Exploring the nature of corporate governance On St. Vincent and the Grenadines Within The private limited Liability Company limited by shares: 1845 - 2013

This original thesis explored the nature of corporate governance in St. Vincent and the Grenadines within the private limited liability companies limited by shares. These were unlisted companies. The period under review was from 1845 up to and including 2013. The hypothesis questioned whether there was an indication about a small category of these companies that contributed to a new variant of poverty referred to as genteel poverty. The lack, absence or disregard of corporate governance best practices within these companies seemed to have impacted the nation’s gross domestic product through a major liquidity crisis from 2009 onwards. These companies were part of a cross border business network and became embroiled in an unprecedented financial crisis originating in and from a conglomerate headquartered in the neighbouring islands of Trinidad and Tobago. There were existing networks of business relationships between member states within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) of which St. Vincent was a part. Historical and legislative legacies were not limited to British company laws and the UK Companies Acts but recently to aspects of German corporate law. A combination of at least seven research methods was used to analyse the hypothesis and to provide a further understanding of the hybrid corporate governance system, which currently exists on the island. The main thesis posited that the admixture of British corporate law, with adaptations from German corporate law, constituted the substantive nature of corporate governance jurisprudence and consequently impacted the financial sector on the island. British Company law recognised two major organs namely, the board of directors and the company itself (shareholder assembly) in meetings. The research discussed these matters further in keeping with national aims and objectives articulated by the Vincentian dichotomous regulators: the Financial Services Authority and the Commercial and Intellectual Property Office. The major recommendation was a Code on corporate governance for all these unlisted companies.