Rockett, Katharine E (1990) Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1). p. 161. DOI https://doi.org/10.2307/2555501
Rockett, Katharine E (1990) Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1). p. 161. DOI https://doi.org/10.2307/2555501
Rockett, Katharine E (1990) Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing. The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1). p. 161. DOI https://doi.org/10.2307/2555501
Abstract
This article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee-monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires. The queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative "strengths" as competitors (for example, by size or level of marginal cost). By structuring the industry to be composed of "weak" competitors, the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires. Examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that "choosing the competition" was an important motivation of the licensor's behavior.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2012 22:49 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 17:09 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2836 |