Kant's a priori history of metaphysics: Systematicity, progress, and the ends of reason

This paper explores Kant's conception of the relation between philosophy and its history. The idea that philosophy must account for its historical development is often associated with German Idealism. On the traditional view, the German Idealists departed from the ahistorical Kantian framework by conceiving of reason in a developmental manner, thus initiating a “historical turn” within philosophy. However, I argue that Kant's sketch of the history of metaphysics in the final chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason and in the so‐called Progress Essay anticipates this turn. Specifically, I argue that in this essay Kant articulates a developmental conception of reason as a basis for understanding the history of metaphysics. My aim is to change the prevailing view of Kant as an ahistorical thinker and to challenge the canonical account of the genesis of the historical turn in philosophy.