

Making Peace or Preventing It? UN Peacekeeping, Terrorism, and Civil War Negotiations

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Abstract

Previous studies have highlighted that United Nations peacekeeping operations are effective at reducing violence during civil wars. But can these operations also change the incentives of the warring parties and lead them to pursue non-violent alternatives? This article provides the first direct test of UN peacekeeping troops' effectiveness at inducing non-violent engagements, specifically negotiations during civil wars. Our analysis of disaggregated monthly data on peace operations, negotiations, and violence in African conflicts (1989-2009) reveals that sizable deployments of UN military troops, by themselves, are insufficient to foster negotiations, even when they reduce battlefield violence. Instead, the probability of negotiation instances is conditional on rebel tactics. We posit, when rebels engage in terrorism, peacekeeping troops can inadvertently alter the "power to hurt" of the belligerents in favor of rebel groups and create conditions conducive to negotiations. Our results have important implications for research on the effectiveness of both peacekeeping and terrorism and for policy-making.

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1 Introduction

The character of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has changed considerably in recent years. Today, there are 14 UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) active in four continents, with a growing number of military and police troops that has tripled since 2000. As the number and size of PKOs has increased, they have also grown in complexity (Moose 2015). In particular, UN forces are increasingly being “asked to go beyond keeping the peace among parties that have pledged to make peace, to imposing and enforcing peace on would-be spoilers” (Moose 2015, 1). Currently, two thirds of peacekeeping missions – including those in South Sudan, the Eastern Congo, and Mali – are deployed to ongoing conflicts. These are especially difficult settings, where no political agreement exists, where efforts to establish, or re-establish one have faltered, where hostilities are ongoing, and parties are often reluctant to negotiate or otherwise prone to undermine future negotiations. In many cases, the deployment of PKOs to ongoing conflicts means that peacekeepers must enforce peace where peace may not even exist.

Previous studies have highlighted that UN PKOs are effective at reducing violence in ongoing civil wars. In particular, scholars have argued that the deployment of a large number of UN military troops to a conflict can effectively separate combatants while alleviating commitment problems and providing guarantees for future conflict resolution efforts (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2017). Although reducing the intensity of fighting may appear as a positive outcome, it remains unclear whether such an outcome is also helpful, or even desirable, from the perspective of fostering peace. Put differently, are UN PKOs also effective at changing the incentives of the warring parties and leading them to engage in non-violent alternatives such as negotiations? To date, the answer remains elusive and we lack direct evidence that peacekeeping has an actual effect on combatants’ motives for violence, unless they have already committed to peace.

This article seeks to provide the first direct test of UN peacekeeping troops’ effectiveness at inducing non-violent engagements, specifically negotiations, during civil wars. We argue that sizable deployments of UN military troops, by themselves, are insufficient to foster

negotiations even when they reduce battlefield violence. Instead, peacekeeping effectiveness at incentivizing non-violent alternatives is conditional on rebel group behavior. When rebel groups engage in terrorism, peacekeeping troops can inadvertently alter the balance of power between the belligerents and strengthen the bargaining position of the rebels relative to the government. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of negotiations between the government and the rebels.

Large deployments of peacekeeping troops have a direct effect of reducing battlefield violence by physically separating combatants. Terrorism, however, is more difficult to forestall due to the clandestine nature of this tactic and the fact that PKOs do not have counterterrorism mandates (Karlsruud 2017). Moreover, the presence of large UN contingents increases international monitoring and, consequently, the costs for the government to engage in repression as a substitute for inefficient battlefield engagements. In contrast, increased international attention can benefit rebels who resort to terrorism by providing a broader audience for their cause. Some rebel groups are even incentivized to escalate terrorist attacks as a means to impose costs on the government when the latter is constrained in its ability to respond due to the presence of PKOs. Thus, when rebel groups engage in terrorism PKOs can have asymmetric effects on government and rebels' incentives. By constraining government responses without significantly reducing rebels' ability to impose costs on the government, PKOs inadvertently increase rebel groups' power to hurt. This increases the likelihood that the government invites rebel groups to the negotiating table.

To test our argument, we use monthly data on negotiations, peacekeeping troops, and rebel terrorist attacks in Africa from 1989-2009, including new data linking groups in the UCDP GED and in the Global Terrorism Database to disaggregate type of terrorist attacks by target — from those that have government personnel and/or government infrastructure as targets to those that have civilians and civilian infrastructure as targets. Across multiple model specifications, we find that sizable deployments of peacekeeping troops, by themselves, are insufficient to induce negotiations. Instead, rebel tactics, particularly terrorist attacks, in combination with PK deployments help rebel groups gain a seat at the negotiating table. This suggests that the effect of peacekeeping on fostering negotiations

is conditional on rebel tactics rather than being a direct effect of UN missions per se. In other words, even though inducing negotiations is often one of the objectives of peacekeeping, peacekeeping missions do not regularly accomplish this. Groups use terrorism to gain leverage against the government, and peacekeeping can inadvertently help them. As a result, negotiations arise from the unintended effects of peacekeeping troop deployments.

This study has important implications for scholarly research on peacekeeping and terrorism as well as for policy-making. More broadly, little research exists on why and under what conditions civil war actors are more likely to negotiate. In many cases, agreements are seen as a single-shot bargaining event where the negotiations that lead up to those agreements are largely ignored (Walter 1997). However, the process leading up to peace and the behavior of warring parties prior to that peace are as important as their behavior during and after peace agreements (Greig 2015; Leventoglu and Metternich 2018; Wood and Kathman 2014).

We also contribute to the peacekeeping literature by showing that the mechanisms that produce negotiations, when they do occur, are not those postulated in the existing literature. Reducing battlefield engagements, by itself, is not only insufficient but may even become counterproductive by increasing uncertainty about actors' capabilities and resolve. This, in turn, can actually decrease the likelihood of negotiations. Our evidence further suggests that peacekeeping may have different effects on government and rebel incentives, and that these asymmetric and often unintended effects can ultimately favor negotiations. Moreover, the finding that peacekeeping allows rebels who engage in terrorism to gain a seat at the negotiating table can be of interest to terrorism scholars, as it sheds new light on the effectiveness of terrorist tactics and how this is conditioned by external interventions.

Finally, from a policy perspective, our evidence can inform the current debate within the United Nations about whether PK mandates should be extended to cover counterterrorism activities (Karlsrud 2017). Our research suggests that it may not be advisable to expand the mandate if counterterrorism is likely to occur alongside the government and directly against the rebels. A major unintended consequence of such an expansion may be the strengthening

of government actors, which would decrease the chances of negotiations and/or impact the perception of peacekeepers' impartiality. However, peacekeeping alongside community actors may be a more effective route for maintaining missions' impartiality while continuing to pursue violence reduction and peace.

2 Previous research on peacekeeping effectiveness

Previous studies have debated the effectiveness of UN PKOs at maintaining peace or reducing conflict violence (Sandler 2017). Maintaining peace has been predominantly assessed by determining the number of years a post-conflict country remains "peaceful" (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004; Gilligan, Sergenti et al. 2008), while studies focused on the reduction of violence have placed particular emphasis on whether UN peacekeeping is effective at reducing belligerent violence during civil wars (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014). Both measures of effectiveness inherently focus on violence: its prevention in the post-conflict period or its reduction during conflicts.

In the maintenance of peace camp, the findings for peacekeeping effectiveness are generally positive. Doyle and Sambanis (2000), for example, focus on the aftermath of negotiated peace and find that, if a peace treaty is in place, UN PKOs effectively maintain short-term peace. The authors also find that large UN PKOs are generally more effective at maintaining peace than smaller ones. Observing that PKOs do not occur at random, Fortna (2004) finds that even though peacekeepers are generally sent to hard cases, cases without a decisive victory, they are effective at maintaining peace, particularly after the Cold War. Finally, Gilligan, Sergenti et al. (2008) take a different approach to examine effectiveness both during and after conflicts. They find that PKOs are only effective at maintaining post-conflict peace and have no effect on shortening ongoing wars. While these studies find that the presence of peacekeepers in post-conflict settings generally increases the durability of peace, they do not explicitly examine whether PKOs make actors more likely to commit to peace in the first place. The post-conflict phase is characterized by the fact that former belligerents (or a critical mass of them) have already agreed not only to stop fighting but also on how to resolve some of the differences that were the source

of their conflict in the past. Do peacekeepers simply strengthen parties' commitment to peace and make this more credible? Or can PKOs fundamentally shift the trajectory of a conflict toward its non-violent resolution?

PKOs have also been increasingly deployed during civil wars when violence is still ongoing. Recent studies have shown that UN peacekeeping can be quite effective at reducing battlefield violence as well as violence against civilians, especially when operations are comprised of a large number of troop and police forces (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013, 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2017). While these findings are insightful and encouraging, it still remains unclear whether PKOs actually change the incentives of the warring parties and lead them to engage in non-violent alternatives. In other words, does this decrease in violence also result in a greater likelihood of non-violent behavior such as negotiations? Providing an answer to this question is particularly important since peacekeeping deployments during conflict are frequently regarded as pivotal for transitioning out of conflict (e.g. Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014). Moreover, the ultimate goal of PKOs is usually to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Aside from one-sided victories, negotiations are generally thought to be the pathway to conflict termination and, as such, they are frequently encouraged by the international community (Walter 1997; Toft 2010; Kaplow 2016). Without negotiations, belligerents are left without a forum to communicate their grievances and/or discuss concessions.

As a consequence, a simple focus on violence is insufficient for evaluating peacekeeping effectiveness during conflicts. Such an analysis requires a different metric of effectiveness, namely, whether peacekeeping leads to negotiations among belligerents *during* conflict. To date, only one study, by Greig and Diehl (2005), has examined the effects of peacekeeping on negotiated settlements and found mixed results. However, this study focused mainly on interventions during the Cold War, when the UN's involvement was much more limited, and missions were often comprised of unarmed personnel and deployed after ceasefires, rather than during active conflicts. Moreover, the use of a binary indicator for peacekeeping presence does not allow us to capture variation in the size and composition of peacekeeping missions, which are critical for their effectiveness (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014;

Bove and Ruggeri 2016). Therefore, we still do not know whether those missions that are most effective at curbing civil war violence can also shift the trajectory of a conflict toward non-violence.¹

The answer to this question is far from obvious, especially if we consider that combatants' incentives to negotiate depend on the expected utility, and outcome, of different violent and non-violent options. Raising the costs of *some* violent tactics may be insufficient if actors can rely on alternative tactics and/or the expected payoffs of violence exceed those of negotiations (Greig 2015; Kaplow 2016; Leventoglu and Metternich 2018). When actors disagree on the relative likelihood of various conflict outcomes they will have incentives to continue fighting in order to avoid settling prematurely on worse terms (Slantchev 2003). Hence, there is still much to learn about whether, and under what conditions, PKOs can be effective at inducing negotiations and fostering the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In the following sections we address this gap.

3 Linking peacekeeping and civil war negotiations

When do combatants negotiate?

According to Slantchev (2003, 123), “war is a process in which players can condition their strategies depending on past play.” This means that negotiations – which constitute one of the strategies at actors' disposal – are endogenous outcomes. Put differently, armed actors have strategic incentives for selecting into negotiations or not, and such incentives can be altered by past play.² More specifically, incentives to negotiate are motivated by past battlefield performance, or, as Schelling (1966) argues, the warring actors' “power to

¹A study by Kathman and Benson (2019) examines the effect of peacekeeping troops on civil war duration until negotiated settlements. However, this approach disregards the actual process leading to those settlements, which are not a single-shot bargaining event, and how variation in actors' responses to peacekeeping troops can significantly influence the likelihood of negotiated solutions.

²Greig (2015) makes a similar point in the context of mediation.

hurt". The power to hurt entails two costs: the ability to impose costs on one's opponent and the ability to bear costs in return.

Warring parties weigh these two costs when deciding whether or not to negotiate (Slantchev 2003; Schelling 1966). When one of the warring parties suffers a decline in its power to hurt the opponent, then its bargaining position is weakened and this influences the party's preference for negotiations as a means to avoid further losses.³

Though both parties must agree for negotiations to occur, state actors generally hold the key to civil war negotiations. In the context of intrastate conflict, rebel groups are the challengers who make demands of the government. Negotiations are less likely to occur when government actors believe that seeking peace is premature and will lead to an unfavorable settlement. In fact, government actors have incentives "(1) to minimize the costs put on them by ongoing disputes, and (2) to concede as little as possible because they are generally reluctant to lose power" (Cunningham 2011, 276). Such calculations are based on the government's power to hurt relative to the rebels and will condition the government's strategy to negotiate or not with a rebel group (Cunningham 2011). If rebels

³Some have argued that negotiations are more likely to occur when none of the parties appears to have a clear military advantage (e.g. power parity, Hultquist 2013). This argument, however, disregards the fact that negotiations are strategic decisions. When there is widespread uncertainty about each actor's ability to win the conflict, an actor's decision to invite the opponent to the negotiation table can reveal important private information about that actor's real capabilities, resolve and (low) expectations of military success. This can be exploited by the opponent as a signal that she may have an edge over the adversary. Knowing this, when there is uncertainty neither actor will have incentives to make the first move toward negotiations. Similarly, the notion of a "mutually hurting stalemate" (Zartman 2001) tends to assume negotiations as a single-shot bargaining event that happens precisely when actors are at a stalemate. Yet, civil war negotiations are, in fact, repeated interactions that take place multiple times throughout the conflict. Fluctuations in power to hurt rather than a static notion of stalemate can better explain these dynamics.

are able to impose costs on the government that the latter cannot reciprocate, then the power to hurt lies with the rebel group and the state will negotiate to avoid further loss of its power, even if quitting early can give some advantage to the enemy. If the state, however, can deny the rebel group's power to hurt by affecting the rebels' ability to impose and/or bear costs, then such denial undermines the rebel group's bargaining position, thereby reducing the likelihood that the government will negotiate with them.

Therefore, negotiations in civil war are more likely to occur following *asymmetric* changes in actors' power to hurt, which strengthen the bargaining position of the rebels relative to the government. This does not necessarily require that rebel groups become equal to, or stronger than, the government in military terms. It simply means that the rebels' ability to hurt the government increases. For example, as Slantchev (2003, 128) shows in the context of the Vietnam war, the Vietnamese insurgency was militarily inferior to the United States; yet, its power to hurt lied in "their ability to kill one American soldier *even if* it took 10 Vietnamese to do so" (emphasis added). For governments, a diminished capacity to hurt the enemy is a major reason to strategically seek a negotiated settlement and prevent greater losses in the future.

When and how peacekeeping influences negotiations: the role of rebel tactics

So far we have discussed, in very general terms, the conditions under which negotiations between a government and a rebel group are more likely to occur. Today, however, civil wars hardly involve the rebel group and the government only. Especially in the post-Cold War period, peacekeepers have increasingly been deployed during civil wars (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017). Additionally, while some scholars have argued that peacekeeping is not particularly effective at terminating conflicts via negotiated settlements (Greig and Diehl 2005), others have suggested that, by separating combatants and mitigating credible commitment problems, peacekeeping *may* increase the likelihood of a peaceful resolution (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014). Yet, it is unclear whether these mechanisms, by themselves, would suffice to induce the parties to negotiate. First,

when violence is ongoing warring actors have obviously not made a formal commitment to peace that requires credible guarantees. Second, reducing the intensity of fighting by itself is insufficient to foster negotiations, especially when this effect is symmetric on both rebels and governments. If actors' motivation to fight remains intact they will adjust to the presence of peacekeepers and the conflict may simply reach a new equilibrium, albeit at a lower level of battlefield violence. In this regard, fighting provides important information about the opponent's capabilities and resolve. This information is critical because it shapes expectations about future outcomes. Indeed, incomplete information about capabilities and resolve is a major reason not only for the outbreak of hostilities but also for their duration (Mattes and Savun 2010). By effectively limiting the role of the battlefield in providing such information to both parties, peacekeeping may hinder negotiations and even peace agreements (see also Greig and Diehl (2005)). Third, rebels and governments are usually characterized by different incentives and constraints in their use of violence (Stanton 2016). These, in turn, influence how they may respond to the presence of peacekeepers. For example, a government's consent is usually required for a PKO to be deployed whereas rebel groups are generally not involved in this process. This leaves rebel motivation for violence less likely to change after the deployment. In fact, some rebel groups have resorted to direct attacks on peacekeepers in order provoke the withdrawal of missions (Fjelde, Hultman and Lindberg Bromley 2016).

For peacekeeping to foster negotiations it needs to influence actors' power to hurt asymmetrically, in ways that favor the rebels over the government. Strictly speaking, this is not something that PKOs are designed to do. UN missions are meant to be impartial and unbiased. However, we argue that this effect can occur as an unintended consequence of PKOs, when rebel groups engage in particular tactics, especially terrorism.

To understand why this may happen, let us first consider governments' responses to terrorism *in the absence* of PKOs. Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond the immediate victims (Enders and Sandler 2011). Terrorism differs from other forms of violence against non-combatants in that, for terrorism, the ultimate

target of influence and coercion is the government, not the immediate physical victims of attacks (Fortna 2015; Stanton 2013). Existing studies have found that rebel groups are more likely to resort to terrorism when they are weak relative to the government (Polo and Gleditsch 2016). Given that the use of terrorist tactics can signal rebel weakness, governments may have little incentive to negotiate with such opponents (Hultquist 2013). At the same time, terrorism does impose costs on the government (Lake 2002). However, these costs vary in their impact and while some governments may negotiate others categorically refuse to do so (Bapat 2006; Bapat and Zeigler 2016; Fortna 2015; Thomas 2014). Moreover, terrorist attacks – especially those against soft civilian targets – often enrage the population who, in turn, pressures the government for harsh responses, repression, and even retribution against terrorists’ constituency (e.g. Abrahms 2013). Therefore, when confronting rebels that resort to terrorist tactics governments face competing incentives. While terrorism provides rebels with the ability to inflict some pain on the state, the state, in turn, has the ability to mitigate this pain by inflicting (sometimes greater) costs on the rebel group and its support base. These competing incentives – for conciliation vs. retaliation – are further reflected in the inconclusive empirical findings on the effectiveness of terrorism in civil wars (e.g. Abrahms 2006; Thomas 2014; Fortna 2015). However, the deployment of a large number of peacekeeping troops can inadvertently influence those incentives and tip the balance in favor of negotiations.

Large deployments of peacekeeping troops have a direct effect of reducing battlefield violence by physically separating combatants (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2014). Thus, when PKOs are deployed, the costs of conventional fighting for both government and rebel actors generally increase.

Terrorism, however, is more difficult to forestall. In fact, PKOs do not have counterterrorism mandates that can equip them with the necessary skills and resources (Karlsruud 2017). Moreover, terrorist attacks usually require very few individuals and these can more easily overcome the barrier represented by peacekeeping forces in order to conduct attacks in government-controlled areas. To illustrate, consider that the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was unable to stop the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF)

terrorist attacks despite the presence of 17,000 military personnel. The RUF even resorted to direct attacks on peacekeepers and in May 2000 it took 300 UN troops hostage.⁴ As the RUF case suggests, PKOs can raise the costs of fighting for actors that mainly engage in conventional tactics (including the government), but not necessarily for those that resort to terrorism.

PKOs also have indirect effects. Large peacekeeping missions signal a strong commitment from the international community and draw increased international attention to the local government. The increase in attention comes with increased monitoring. For the government, this entails an increase in the costs of repression as a substitute for inefficient battlefield engagements with rebel forces. In fact, government consent is usually necessary for PKOs' deployments and a government would face major reputational consequences if it escalated repression in the presence of peacekeepers. Even governments that ostensibly have little concern for human rights would suffer major domestic and international costs by repressing the population when their country is subject to increased media attention and international scrutiny due to the presence of peacekeepers. Indeed, studies have found that the presence of peacekeepers significantly reduces the likelihood of state-sponsored mass-killings (Melander 2009). States' constraints in the presence of peacekeepers are also illustrated by some governments' refusal to allow peacekeeping forces when human rights abuses are taking place within the country. For example, since 2015 the Burundian government has allegedly engaged in human rights violations including arbitrary killings, torture, and the closure of some civil society organizations and the media (Human Rights Watch). During the same period, the government continued to adamantly reject a return of UN Peacekeepers and a peacekeeping force from the African Union (AU).⁵

Moreover, unlike non-state actors, governments are embedded in an international community of states that can impose significant political and economic costs in response to human rights violations. This implies that it is easier to hold the government accountable for human rights violations that take place in the presence of PKOs. As a consequence, the

⁴The Guardian, May 5 2000.

⁵Al-Jazeera, 21 December 2015.

government's tactical options following PKO deployments are limited to military tactics -made less efficient by the presence of PKOs - and negotiations (i.e. non-violent options).⁶

In contrast, the indirect effects of PKOs shape rebel groups' incentives in an opposite way. Specifically, an increase in international media attention can actually benefit groups who already employ terrorist tactics by providing a broader audience for their cause. Some rebel groups may even increase their reliance on terrorism as a means to impose costs on the government, especially when the latter is constrained in its ability to respond. The case of Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) is one example of this. In December 2003, when the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie/Force de Défense de Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burundian government, the FNL categorically refused to do so. When the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was deployed in 2004 to monitor the ceasefire, FNL persisted in its strategy of violence and terrorism, despite the presence of peacekeeping troops. FNL also claimed responsibility for the attack at the Gatumba refugee camp, one of the largest civilian massacres in the recent history of Burundi.⁷ In contrast, the Burundian Transitional Government was limited in its ability to respond to such violence because a violation of the ceasefire would have been easily detected and sanctioned. Moreover, any response could risk the failure of the agreement with the CNDD-FDD. In this context, negotiations between the FNL and the Transitional Government began under the aegis of the UN. Two years later, in 2006, the FNL agreed to sign a ceasefire agreement.

When rebel groups engage in terrorism PKOs can have asymmetric effects on govern-

⁶Governments accept PK deployments despite the constraints they impose for several reasons. First, governments may be willing to countenance some constraints in exchange for the benefits of PK deployments (e.g. separation of combatants, provision of information and monitoring of rebel behavior, civilian protection). Second, there may be significant international pressures for governments to accept PK missions (e.g. UNAMID). Third, governments may anticipate some constraints but not the unintended effect of PK on rebels' ability to impose costs through terrorism.

⁷See the UN Secretary General Special Report on ONUB, March and August 2004.

ments and rebels' incentives. By constraining government responses without significantly reducing rebels' ability to impose costs on the government PKOs inadvertently increase rebel groups' power to hurt relative to the government.⁸ This increases the likelihood that the government invites rebel groups to the negotiating table. Moreover, since rebel groups who employ terrorism are often militarily weaker than the government, they are more likely to participate in such negotiations because negotiations can give better prospects than deciding the conflict outcome only on the battlefield.

Some obstacles to negotiations may, however, persist. Warring actors' decision to negotiate are not immune from the shadow of credible commitment problems. These issues are well-known to influence the success of peace agreements. Even though negotiations do not imply commitments or final agreements they are nonetheless a critical precondition for these outcomes (Walter 1997). Therefore, strategic actors will take into account the perceived trustworthiness of their opponent and the existence or not of credible third-party guarantees. A government, for instance, may be concerned about the trustworthiness of groups that rely on extreme tactics such as terrorism (Stedman 1997; Findley and Young 2015). Rebel groups, on the other hand, may fear betrayal by the government (Fearon 2004). Given incentives to negotiate arising from the power to hurt logic, peacekeeping can further alleviate credible commitment problems on both sides by monitoring belligerents' behavior during and after the negotiations. Therefore, through the *unintended* effect of strengthening some rebel groups and the *intended* provision of a credible third-party guarantee, PKOs can bring about negotiations between civil war actors. In doing so, PKOs can also contribute to minimizing the problem of terrorist spoilers, which can be a major obstacle to peace agreements (Findley and Young 2015; Fortna 2015; Kydd and Walter 2002).

Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses:

⁸Importantly, we are not suggesting that rebels' use of terrorism is triggered by PKOs. Rather, when rebels already engage in terrorism large deployments of PK troops can inadvertently increase rebels' power to hurt by incentivizing the escalation of attacks and amplifying their impact while constraining government responses.

Hypothesis 1 *An increase in the number of peacekeeping troops is insufficient, on its own, to induce negotiations during civil wars.*

Hypothesis 2 *An increase in the number of peacekeeping troops increases the likelihood of negotiations when rebel groups rely on terrorism as a war tactic.*

4 Research design

To test the effect of PKOs and rebel tactics in inducing negotiations, we examine conflicts in Africa from 1989 to 2009⁹. The African continent is a suitable test for our theoretical expectations for a number of reasons. First, Somalia and Nigeria in recent years have featured in the top 10 countries in the world most frequently experiencing terrorism. Secondly, PKOs are historically deployed to countries in Africa- and continue to be so currently. Finally, the monthly data on negotiations by Thomas (2014) are coded for African conflicts. The unit of analysis is rebel vs. government conflict-dyad-months. More specifically, all *active* conflict dyads with more than 25 battle deaths a year from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008) are included in our analysis. Altogether the data cover 106 unique conflict dyads over 240 months.¹⁰

4.1 Negotiations

The dependent variable is a binary operationalization of negotiation instances between the rebels and the government in each dyad-month of active conflict. These data are from Thomas (2014) and coded from a combination of historical accounts of conflicts, news sources and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. The variable captures only open and formal talks (excluding secret and so called backchannel communications) between the belligerents; thus it is a good indicator of the commitment to war-ending processes by both

⁹This timeframe is chosen due to data availability on monthly negotiations in Africa from Thomas (2014).

¹⁰Due to missing values on some independent variables the total number of dyads in the analyses is 96.

parties.¹¹ We focus on instances of negotiations rather than onset for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, this allows us to treat negotiations as a process rather than an single-shot bargaining event – which is fairly unrealistic – and to link temporally disaggregated negotiation events with equally disaggregated data on peacekeeping troop deployments and rebel tactics. From a practical standpoint, since negotiation instances are not necessarily consecutive (i.e. there are gaps), focusing on onset would require making arbitrary decisions regarding what constitutes a new onset versus a continuation of previous talks.

Altogether our data record 341 negotiation instances.

4.2 Peacekeeping deployments

The first empirical expectation deriving from our theoretical argument is that sizable UN troop deployments on their own are not sufficient to induce negotiations. In order to examine this relationship, we introduce a variable that captures the number of armed military troops in the thousands deployed by the UN. These data are from Kathman (2013), who has coded the deployment composition from monthly summary reports of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Missions. Like Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014), we use a one period lag of this variable in order to capture whether the UN troop presence in the previous month influences the occurrence of negotiations in the current month. Of course armed military troops are only one type of personnel that the UN deploys to an armed conflict, in addition to civilian observers and the UN police. However, as previous research has shown, military troops are the only type of deployment that can alter the power to hurt by the belligerents as well as provide assurances for credible commitment.

¹¹Note that these instances of negotiations are coded only if the main parties in the conflict are present, thus any cases where third parties act as intermediaries between the belligerents are excluded unless there is direct communication between the warring parties (Thomas 2014).

4.3 Terrorist tactics

We argue that through the combination of unintended and intended consequences, PKOs incentivize non-violent outcomes (negotiations) conditional on rebel tactics. To explore this conditional effect, our second set of independent variables of interest capture rebel tactics, specifically the use of terrorism. First, we use newly coded data by Polo and Gleditsch (2016) and Polo and Gonzalez (2020) matching rebel groups from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander 2013) with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)¹². These data allow us to disaggregate the attacks by target types and thus exclude all attacks against military targets, i.e. types of attacks that could be deemed guerrilla warfare tactics rather than exclusively terrorism (excluded from all of our operationalizations of rebel terrorism). More importantly, the data help us to examine whether the effect of rebel terrorism on negotiations is different for different targets. Groups who attack harder targets are often perceived to be stronger and the government might be more likely to negotiate when attacks against such targets are more frequent. On the flip side of the coin, as we have previously argued, the government has less incentive to negotiate with groups who target soft targets (especially civilians) since the pressure to act in the aftermath of such attacks tends to lead to the use of more repressive responses by the government. In line with such differences, the first independent variable capturing rebel terrorism is an inclusive operationalization of attacks against all other targets, but the government and police (i.e. excluding official targets). The second less inclusive version captures attacks against exclusively soft targets. The final measure of terrorist tactics by rebels is constructed by calculating a ratio of attacks on soft targets over all terrorist attacks and battle events (overall violence) by the rebels. This outcome represents a harder test for our second hypothesis because the more the rebel groups rely on attacks against soft civilian targets relative to attacks on harder targets (including conventional ones) the fewer the government incentives to negotiate with the rebels. The summary statistics table in the appendix provides additional information about these variables.

¹²Global Terrorism Database. Available at: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

4.4 Control variables

Since the occurrence of negotiations during conflicts is not only driven by UN troops and rebel tactics, we include a number of control variables to take into account alternative explanations. The first set relates to characteristics of the rebel group. Previous literature in war-winning bargaining assumes that stronger rebels are more likely to push governments to negotiate, therefore we include a measure for relative rebel strength. We also control for rebel groups receiving external backing as such groups should in principle be more capable of inflicting damage to the incumbent forces. Both of these variables are from the Non-State Actor (NSA) dataset (Cunningham, Skrede Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). We also adopt a measure for *Main group* coded by Thomas (2014). This measure is based on data from UCDP and captures whether the rebel group in the dyad is the main group inflicting the most casualties against the incumbent forces.

The second set of covariates controls for country-specific conditions. We introduce a measure of regime type from the Polity IV dataset (Gurr, Marshall and Jagers 2010) and one for level of economic development (captured by log transformed GDP per capita from the World Bank 2013 development indicators).

The last category of control variables relates to conflict specific conditions, such as whether conflicts are over territory¹³ or ethnic (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). Negotiations may be more likely to occur in protracted conflicts when the costs of fighting become increasingly difficult to bear and thus similarly to Thomas (2014), we include variables for the number of conflict episodes and the duration of the episode for the dyad. We also account for the number of rebel groups in the dyad since governments who are stretched to fight multiple groups simultaneously may be more likely to initiate talks. All of these variables are constructed from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008). The number of battle deaths is an important indicator of how costly the conflict has been to both parties, and more specifically, how willing they may be to

¹³UCDP Database Categorical Variables. Available at: <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/olddw.html>.

negotiate a war-ending settlement (Mason and Fett 1996). Thus, we include a variable capturing the best estimate of battle deaths (log transformed) in the conflict dyad¹⁴. We also control for rebel one-sided violence against civilians¹⁵ since this may influence PK deployments and rebel's ability to impose costs on the government. Finally, we control for the presence of a third party mediator in the conflict¹⁶, which may affect the likelihood of negotiations, and for time since the last negotiation attempt to account for temporal dependence in negotiation events.

4.5 Estimation

To estimate the effect of PKOs and terrorism on negotiations we employ a two-pronged approach which addresses issues of selection effects in PK deployments and possible endogeneity of PKOs to negotiations.

First, PK missions are not deployed at random (e.g. Fortna 2004). Failing to account for selection effects in PK deployments is likely to bias the results. Therefore, our first estimation strategy accounts for possible differences between treated and untreated cases using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). CEM creates a quasi-experimental sample in which potentially confounding (observed) factors –factors that influence both PK deployments and negotiations– are equally distributed across treated and untreated cases. We use CEM since this is arguably better than alternative matching methods (King et al. 2010). The matching process relies on reducing covariates' imbalance between the treated and untreated cases to improve estimation of the treatment effect (Iacus, King and Porro 2008). For our data, we use the UN troop deployment as the treatment variable. We match on pre-treatment values of battle-related deaths, battle events, terrorism, rebel strength, and

¹⁴UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset 2011 (Version 5.0). Available at: <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>.

¹⁵UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 19.1. Available at: <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/>.

¹⁶UCDP Database Categorical Variables. Available at: <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/olddw.html>.

on the characteristics of the conflict (i.e territorial war and ethnic war). Post-matching, the multivariate imbalance measure L1 indicates a substantial reduction of the imbalance between treated and untreated cases (from 0.63 to 0.09). The last step of the matching process allows us to run our main model on the matched data including all of the control variables to address any residual imbalance.¹⁷

Second, statistical analyses based on observational data may underestimate or overestimate the effect of PK on negotiations if there are unobserved factors which determine both the propensity of civil war actors to negotiate (or not) as well as the decision of the UN to send peacekeeping troops to that conflict. For example, the anticipation of future negotiations could drive the occurrence of negotiations as well as the UN's decision to send peacekeeping troops. In order to address this issue, we model these two processes simultaneously using a recursive bivariate probit model. The bivariate probit relies on two equations where the errors of the first equation are allowed to correlate with the errors of the second equation (Greene 2012). The first equation, which predicts peacekeeping deployments, includes an additional variable, an instrument, in our case a binary operationalization of whether the conflict has child soldiers or not (Haer and Böhmelt 2016).

In order for the child soldier variable to serve as a valid instrument, it must meet two key criteria: it should have sufficient strength in explaining peacekeeping deployments after controlling for other relevant covariates; and “it must meet the exclusion restriction by precluding any correlation between the instrument and the error term” (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman 2016, 893-894).¹⁸ Regarding the former, previous studies have found that the presence of child soldiers in a conflict increases the likelihood of UN peacekeeping deployments to that conflict (Bakaki and Hinkkainen 2016). Our baseline model (see Table 3) confirms that this is the case even when controlling for several other factors

¹⁷Given that our data has more time periods than cases, the matching procedure can be problematic for not producing a lot of treated observations. This is one of the reasons why we chose a two-pronged approach inclusive of a bivariate probit, as well as reporting our findings for the non-matched samples too.

¹⁸See also Greene (2012, 267-268) and Wooldridge (2010, 89-90).

which may influence UN troop deployments. Regarding the latter, the exclusion restriction will be violated if the negotiation propensity of both the government and the rebels influences rebel groups' decision to recruit child soldiers. This seems highly unlikely given the existing literature on child soldiers, which focuses on rebel groups' resources, norms, ideology, and mobilization capacity (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2006; Beber and Blattman 2013). The exclusion restriction is violated also if the instrument has an effect on negotiations through an omitted variable (i.e. other than peacekeeping) which is *not* included in the model. Thus, the exclusion restriction imposes no restriction on potential correlation (or causation) between the instrument and any observed variables which may also affect the outcome, provided they are included in the model (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman 2016). For this reason, in our main and supplemental analyses (see appendix) we control for several factors which are influenced by child soldiers and which could also impact the likelihood of PK deployments as well as negotiations (e.g. various forms of rebel violence, conflict duration, natural resources etc.). Moreover, while there is evidence that the presence of child soldiers influences PK deployments, there are no particular theoretical reasons to believe that the presence of child soldiers per se should make the parties more or less likely to negotiate. Even empirically, child soldier presence is *not* a statistically significant predictor of negotiations, which makes us confident that child soldiers is an appropriate instrument to use in the first equation.¹⁹ The dependent variable in the first equation is a binary variable for UN troop deployment. The second equation (i.e. the outcome) in our bivariate probit excludes the child soldiers instrument, which is replaced by actual UN deployments, and uses negotiations as the dependent variable.

5 Results

Before turning to the empirical models, we first present some descriptive evidence on the relationship between our key variables—UN peacekeeping and terrorism—and the likelihood of negotiations. UN PKOs were deployed in approximately 14 percent of all the conflict

¹⁹In the appendix we provide a more detailed discussion on the validity of our instrument and present additional tests which further support our conclusion.

dyads in Africa between 1989 and 2009. These conflicts include prominent cases such as Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Figure 1 and Table 1 show these dyads disaggregated by level of terrorism and occurrence of negotiations.²⁰ Conditional on PKOs, rebels' use of terrorism appears to be a key determinant of whether or not negotiations occur. When both PK and terrorism are present, negotiations occur 100 percent of the time (9 out of 9). When only PK troops are present (without terrorism) the proportion drops to 66 percent (4 out of 6). Moreover, 70 percent of the dyads in which negotiations occur experience both PK and terrorism whereas only 30 percent of the dyads with a PKO experience negotiations in the absence of terrorism (4 out of 13). Together, Figure 1 and Table 1 provide initial support of the hypothesized interaction between peacekeeping and terrorism in influencing civil war negotiations. To examine the empirical patterns more systematically we turn to the statistical analyses.

[Insert figure 1 here]

Table 1: Terrorism and negotiations conditional on presence of PKO troops

Terrorism PKO = 1	<i>Negotiations</i>		Total dyads
	No	Yes	
No	2	4	6
Yes	0	9	9
Total dyads	2	13	15

Table 2 illustrates the results of the statistical analyses on the full sample (Models 1-2) and on the matched sample (Models 3-6).²¹ These models test our hypotheses about the independent and conjoint effect of PKOs and rebel terrorism on negotiations. Specifically, in Models 1 and 3 we test the unconditional effect of PK troops on negotiations (H1) whereas Models 2 and 4 focus on the interaction with rebel terrorist attacks against non-official targets (H2). Across models and samples we find support for both of our hypotheses. An increase in the number of UN troops, on its own, is insufficient and actually decreases the likelihood of negotiations. However, when combined with rebel terrorist attacks as a

²⁰Table 30 in the appendix provides additional details about the dyads with PKOs included in our analysis.

²¹The variable for territorial conflict is omitted in the matched models due to collinearity.

war tactic, the probability of negotiations increases.²²

Model 5 further disaggregates terrorist attacks and focuses specifically on terrorist attacks against soft civilian targets (while simultaneously controlling for attacks against hard targets). Here we find that the combined effect of UN troops and rebel terrorism against soft targets also increases the likelihood of negotiations. In fact, focusing on attacks against soft targets is a conservative test of our theorized relationships, since attacks against soft targets should be more likely to increase government repression rather than induce non-violent alternatives such as negotiations.²³ Indeed, the independent effect of exclusively soft targets on negotiations is not statistically significant, unlike the attacks against non-official targets in earlier models. The final model (Model 6) evaluates the hypothesis using the ratio of attacks against soft targets relative to the overall violence perpetrated by the rebels. As in the previous models, we find that the probability of negotiations is higher in the presence of PK troops when rebel groups engage in a higher share of terrorist attacks on soft targets. However, in the absence of PK, a higher share of such attacks does not have a significant effect on negotiations (and the coefficient sign is negative). These results suggest that PK troops can indeed change the government's incentives, by inducing the government to negotiate with groups it would not otherwise invite to the negotiating table.²⁴

The control variables perform largely as expected, based on previous findings. Stronger rebels and longer conflicts by groups expressing ethnic aims are consistently more likely to experience negotiations. Conversely, dyads who have been in conflict with one another more times than not are less likely to negotiate. More democratic regimes with higher levels of economic development on the other hand increase the likelihood of negotiation

²²In the appendix we replicate these results using Thomas (2014) original terrorism variable.

²³Due to space constraints the results for the unconditional models are reported in the appendix.

²⁴In the appendix we re-estimate all models on the full, unmatched sample. All conclusions remain unchanged.

Table 2: Regression models for the probability of negotiations

	All terror baseline (Full sample)	All terror interaction (Full sample)	All terror baseline (Matched sample)	All terror interaction (Matched sample)	Soft target interaction (Matched sample)	Soft target ratio interaction (Matched sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.185*** (3.93)	0.174*** (3.77)	0.167*** (2.76)	0.127*** (5.23)		
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.191* (-1.93)	-0.336*** (-3.32)	-0.278** (-2.44)	-0.455*** (-3.87)	-0.462*** (-4.01)	-0.437*** (-3.75)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)		0.146*** (4.43)		0.183*** (4.94)		
Soft Targets (t-1)					-0.000200 (-0.00)	
Soft Targets (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)					0.196*** (5.26)	
Hard Targets (t-1)					0.338** (2.33)	
Soft Target Ratio (t-1)						-0.172 (-0.42)
Soft Target Ratio (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)						0.725*** (4.86)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.546*** (2.97)	0.568*** (3.22)	0.469* (1.92)	0.527** (2.41)	0.535** (2.40)	0.452** (2.20)
Third Party Mediation	1.635*** (4.15)	1.645*** (4.18)	1.616*** (2.62)	1.616*** (2.70)	1.630*** (2.89)	1.657*** (2.93)
Main Group	0.412 (1.34)	0.402 (1.32)	-0.174 (-0.43)	-0.208 (-0.53)	-0.204 (-0.53)	-0.175 (-0.44)
Explicit Support	0.560** (2.44)	0.542** (2.46)	0.261 (1.20)	0.264 (1.24)	0.261 (1.23)	0.313 (1.54)
Regime Type	0.142*** (3.45)	0.151*** (3.93)	0.127* (1.88)	0.155*** (2.59)	0.157** (2.57)	0.139** (2.42)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0784 (-0.69)	-0.0785 (-0.70)	-0.0409 (-0.35)	-0.0551 (-0.48)	-0.0580 (-0.52)	-0.0474 (-0.41)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.0159 (0.28)	0.0123 (0.22)	0.0604 (0.58)	0.0501 (0.50)	0.0510 (0.51)	0.0490 (0.49)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.334 (-1.07)	-0.350 (-1.12)	-1.476*** (-4.43)	-1.470*** (-4.80)	-1.360*** (-3.89)	-1.281*** (-3.72)
Episode Duration	0.00640*** (3.19)	0.00640*** (3.13)	0.00910*** (2.62)	0.00935** (2.41)	0.00957** (2.43)	0.00824** (2.17)
Ethnic War	0.811 (1.63)	0.849* (1.79)	1.130* (1.69)	1.261** (2.14)	1.269** (2.12)	1.235** (2.16)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.183 (1.31)	0.175 (1.21)	-0.264 (-1.05)	-0.276 (-1.05)	-0.275 (-1.04)	-0.307 (-1.25)
ln(GDP)	0.521*** (4.16)	0.537*** (4.60)	0.447** (2.35)	0.487*** (2.70)	0.485*** (2.67)	0.479*** (2.71)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0711*** (-4.78)	-0.0709*** (-4.76)	-0.0643*** (-4.03)	-0.0623*** (-3.70)	-0.0612*** (-3.72)	-0.0636*** (-3.56)
Territorial War	-0.439 (-1.10)	-0.484 (-1.28)				
_cons	-15.88*** (-4.94)	-16.21*** (-5.35)	-12.19*** (-2.74)	-13.05*** (-3.13)	-13.16*** (-3.12)	-12.89*** (-3.17)
<i>N</i>	2220	2220	1164	1164	1164	1164

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

occurrences.

To assess the substantive impact of the interaction between rebel terrorism and UN troop deployments on negotiations, we plot the marginal effects. Figure 2 plots the predicted probability of negotiations and associated confidence intervals across meaningful values of PK troops for different levels of rebel terrorism (0 and 4 attacks respectively) based on estimates from Model 4.²⁵ An increase in the number of UN troops deployed to the conflict increases the likelihood of negotiations at higher levels of rebel terrorism. In the absence of the latter, however, UN troops actually decrease the likelihood of negotiations. Specifically, as UN troops increase from 0 to 6000, an increase in rebel terrorism from 0 to 4 attacks increases the probability of negotiations by 200 percent. Figure 3 shows similar results but focuses on terrorist attacks against soft targets (estimates from Model 5). Again, the probability of negotiations increases at higher levels of UN troops but only when rebel groups also carry out terrorist attacks on soft targets. These results bolster the support for the hypothesized interaction between UN troops and rebel terrorism.

To examine these results in more detail, we generate predicted probabilities and counterfactuals for individual cases. For example, given actual levels of PK troops and rebel terrorism, the predicted probability of negotiations between the Burundian government and Palipehutu-FNL is 64 percent; however, in the absence of UN troops such probability would have decreased to 38 percent and further dropped to 5 percent in the absence of terrorism. Likewise, in Sierra Leone the probability of negotiations at observed levels of UN troops and terrorism is 40 percent; however, in the absence of PK such probability would have been much lower (20 percent) and less than 1 percent in the absence of terrorism.

[Insert figure 2 here]

[Insert figure 3 here]

Our main models systematically support the hypothesis that peacekeeping troops and rebel terrorism interact in creating conditions conducive to negotiations. It may be the case, however, that there are unobserved factors which determine both the propensity of

²⁵All other variables are held at their observed values.

civil war actors to negotiate (or not) as well as the decision of the UN to send peacekeeping troops to that conflict.

To ensure that our results are not driven by such unobserved factors, we model the UN decision to deploy PK troops and the likelihood of negotiations simultaneously, using a recursive bivariate probit model. In this set-up, as previously discussed, we use the presence of child soldiers as an instrument for PK deployments and estimate the correlation between the errors of the two equations. Table 3 shows that even when we model the two processes simultaneously and allow the errors of the two equations to be correlated (statistically significant ρ), the results in our outcome equation are in line with our primary models, and therefore we can be confident that our estimates are robust and not spurious or driven by specific model selection.

5.1 Probing the mechanism

In addition to investigating any issues with our statistical inference, we conduct further analyses to probe the mechanism linking UN troop deployments and rebel terrorism with the occurrence of negotiations. Skeptics may wonder whether our results could reflect a general success of peacekeeping in bringing the parties back to the negotiating table after violent attacks broke a previous deal. In this case, the effect of terrorism could simply capture a more general escalation of hostilities. To address this possibility we test whether the effect of UN troops on negotiations is symmetric to all forms of rebel violence.

Specifically, in Table 6 in the appendix, we substitute the rebel terrorism variables with dyadic battle events and battle deaths. In both models, the coefficient for the interaction effect with UN troops is negative and not statistically significant. This suggests that the effect of peacekeeping on negotiations is indeed conditional on rebel terrorism and does not apply to conventional or guerrilla warfare tactics. Belligerents use information from battles in order to evaluate their chances of winning the conflict (Slantchev 2003; Smith and Stam 2004; Walter 2009). In this sense, battles are important in solving the bargaining problem between the warring parties. However, when UN troops are deployed to a conflict, as prior studies have shown, they reduce battlefield engagements (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon

Table 3: Bivariate probit regression

	Negotiations (Full sample)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.0835*** (3.35)
UN Troops (t-1)	-0.263*** (-4.86)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1) X UN Troops (t-1)	0.0974*** (5.18)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.346*** (3.49)
Third Party Mediation	0.864*** (5.09)
Main Group	0.263* (1.65)
Explicit Support	0.310** (2.56)
Regime Type	0.0869*** (3.96)
ln(Deaths)	-0.0447 (-0.70)
ln(Rebel One Sided Violence)	0.00277 (0.09)
Number of Conflict Episodes	-0.182 (-1.44)
Episode Duration	0.00438*** (3.37)
Ethnic War	0.468* (1.82)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0932 (1.06)
ln(GDP)	0.292*** (4.31)
Time Since Last Negotiation	-0.0297*** (-5.35)
Territorial War	-0.261 (-1.23)
_cons	-9.008*** (-5.19)
PKO Deployment	
Child Soldiers	5.342*** (9.86)
Terrorist Attacks (t-1)	0.0170 (0.64)
Rebel Relative Strength	0.926*** (3.31)
Main Group	-0.344 (-0.88)
Explicit Support	-0.707** (-2.29)
Regime Type	0.189*** (4.83)
ln(Deaths)	0.276*** (3.26)
Number of Conflict Episodes	1.169** (2.02)
Episode Duration	0.0139** (2.56)
Ethnic War	-1.174*** (-2.82)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.480** (-2.50)
ln(GDP)	-0.0392 (-0.34)
Territorial War	-5.439*** (-2.79)
_cons	-8.935*** (-3.23)
athrho	
_cons	0.230*** (4.68)
N	2220

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis 2017) and thus, inadvertently, the information both parties have about each other. Once this information disappears, uncertainty about the opponents' capabilities and resolve increases and negotiations become less likely. This is evidenced by the absence of a positive and significant interaction effect between UN troops and battle events or battle deaths. Essentially, UN troops are not failing (or succeeding) across the board; they have a different effect depending on the specific tactics adopted by the warring parties.

Besides terrorism and conventional or guerrilla warfare tactics, rebel groups also engage in civilian victimization for the purpose of extracting resources or controlling a population. As we discussed previously, these forms of one-sided violence are different from terrorism in both the aims and the targets. However, some may argue that negotiations could be driven by a general escalation of rebel violence against civilians. Model 3 in Table 6 in the appendix shows that one-sided killings of civilians in the presence of UN troops actually *decrease* the likelihood of negotiations. In contrast, when examining the effect of UN troops conditional on terrorism victims (i.e. number of people killed in rebel terrorist attacks) we find the opposite effect, with a significant increase in the likelihood of negotiations (Model 5), which mirrors our main findings on terrorist attacks. These results confirm that the effect of rebel terrorism, in combination with UN troops, on negotiations is indeed terrorism-specific and differs from the effect of other rebel tactics (i.e. conventional or guerrilla warfare and one-sided violence). We also investigate the effect of government one-sided violence, in combination with UN PK troops (Model 4), on the likelihood of negotiations. In line with our argument, we do not find any statistically significant effect.

Finally, we examine the effect of UN troop deployments on rebels' use of terrorism. Our argument posits that groups who already engage in terrorist tactics can exploit the deployment of PK troops, and its asymmetric effects, to impose greater costs on the government. However, our results could be driven by peacekeeping inducing rebel groups to switch to terrorism. In our sample, out of the 15 rebel groups that experienced a UN troop deployment, only 2 groups adopted terrorism following the UN deployment. Among the remaining groups, 10 already engaged in terrorism prior to the deployment of UN troops,

and 3 never resorted to terrorism. In addition to this descriptive analyses, we conduct more rigorous statistical analyses. Table 7 in the appendix illustrates that UN troops do not have a statistically significant effect on the adoption of terrorism by rebel groups (Model 1). However, when looking at whether UN troops create an environment conducive to the escalation of terrorist attacks by rebels, we find that this is indeed the case and that UN troops increase the number of terrorist attacks (Model 2). These findings lend additional support to our theoretical mechanism about rebel groups continuing or escalating their use of terrorism rather than switching to it from more conventional tactics.

5.2 Robustness checks

We also conduct several robustness checks, which we discuss in greater detail in the supplementary appendix. First, while our main models already control for different types of rebel violence, in supplementary analyses we control for government one-sided violence (Table 8) and show that the results are robust. Second, we introduce additional controls for temporal dependence in negotiation attempts, including a dummy for any prior negotiations, the cumulative number of prior negotiations and a cubic polynomial of time since last negotiation (Table 9). All substantive conclusions remain unchanged. Third, we consider the effect of ceasefires, partial peace agreements (Harbom, Högladh and Wallenstein 2006) and re-estimate the models dropping months with partial peace agreements (Tables 11 & 12).²⁶ The main results remain robust. Fourth, we control for the duration of the PKO (Table 13), since the observed effects may be influenced by how long peacekeepers are present in the country. The main findings hold even when considering the mission duration. Fifth, we examine alternative temporal dynamics and replace terrorism in the previous month with the cumulative number of terrorist attacks in the previous 12 months (Table 14); substantive conclusions remain unchanged. Sixth, we consider an alternative measure of dependency between rebel organizations that may influence resort to

²⁶Since our study only includes active conflicts, full peace agreements are automatically excluded and the dyads drop out of our sample when conflicts terminate. Instead we code a binary variable of partial peace agreements on the dyad-month level.

terrorism: specifically, we introduce a spatial lag of terrorist attacks by other rebel groups involved in the same conflict (Table 15). The main findings are robust to the inclusion of this additional variable. Seventh, the observed effects may be specific to strong rebels since governments may not be willing to negotiate with weak rebels, even if they engage in terrorism. Therefore, we re-estimate our models on the sub-sample of weak groups and find very similar results (Table 16).

Finally, some may wonder to what extent our findings can apply to post-2009 conflicts, such as Mali – where since 2013 we have observed high levels of terrorist attacks and PK troop deployments. Mali is not part of our sample due to the lack of data on monthly negotiations in conflicts after 2009. However, to examine the effect of UN troops and terrorism on negotiations in Mali we have relied on monthly data on rebel terrorism as well as data on when the UN mission MINUSMA was deployed and on the signing of the Bamako peace agreement. These data, which are visualized in Figure 4 in the appendix, show that the signing of the Bamako peace agreement between the Tuareg rebels and the Malian government occurred not only during MINUSMA, which deployed up to 13,000 PK troops, but also in the month following the highest spike in Tuareg terrorist attacks. This is fully consistent with our theory.

6 Conclusion

This article provides a direct test of UN peacekeeping troops effectiveness at inducing non-violent engagement, specifically negotiations. Though previous studies have highlighted that UN PKOs are effective at reducing violence in civil wars, there is no clear evidence that peace operations influence the incentives of warring parties to engage in non-violent alternatives. We argue that peacekeeping effectiveness at incentivizing non-violent alternatives is conditional on rebel group behavior. When rebel groups engage in a higher share of non-conventional terrorist tactics during civil wars, peacekeepers can constrain the government's responses without significantly reducing the rebel's ability to impose costs on the government. Therefore, PKOs may inadvertently increase rebel groups' power to hurt relative to the government. This increases the likelihood that the government invites rebel

groups to the negotiating table. All analyses provide strong support for our theoretical argument, even when taking into account possible selection effects, reverse causation, and unobserved factors that may jointly affect peacekeeping deployments, terrorism, and the occurrence of negotiations.

Our findings have important implications for scholarly research on conflict processes, peacekeeping, and terrorism. Little research exists on why and under what conditions civil war belligerents are more likely to negotiate and how peacekeeping deployments influence this process. In many cases, peace agreements are seen as a single-shot bargaining event where the negotiations that lead up to those agreements are largely ignored. But the process leading up to peace, and the behavior of the warring parties prior to that peace are important factors with critical implications for whether or not we see peace in the first place. Additionally, while decreasing the level of civil war violence is important, this may be insufficient to foster peace and potentially even counterproductive, by increasing uncertainty about relative capabilities and resolve. There are also conflicting views on the effectiveness of terrorism, and the risk that terrorist attacks derail negotiation attempts. We show that while terrorism may be a weapon of the weak, its ability to impose costs on the government can be sufficient to induce negotiations conditional on PK deployments and the latter's effect on government responses. Moreover, sizable deployments of peacekeeping troops can be quite effective in overcoming the risk of terrorist spoiling.

Moving forward, additional research should be conducted to examine the outcomes of these negotiations to better understand peacekeepers' ability to induce nonviolent behavior and, ultimately, peace. While peacekeeping has been shown to improve some conflict attributes (e.g., civilian violence, sexual violence, decrease the time to negotiated settlements), it may also change the conflict nexus which affects the path to negotiation. Moreover, while this research has shown that the likelihood of negotiations increases when the rebels resort to terrorism in the presence of large PK troop deployments, it will be important to examine whether the rebels actually get what they want by using terrorism in the context of a PKO (e.g. quality of outcome, number of concessions). If the use of terrorism leads to an increase in concessions, or better concessions, then there may be a

possibility that terrorism could rise because of the expectation that a peace agreement (or forced negotiation) is imminent and therefore, rebels seek to gain a slightly better position at the bargaining table.

Our study also has important policy implications. There is an ongoing debate about whether or not the UN should expand PK mandates to include counterterrorism. Scholars and policymakers argue that, because conflict environments have evolved, peacekeeping must evolve as well. The case of Mali and the UN's PKO MINUSMA has brought this to the forefront (Karlsrud 2017). However, expanding peacekeeping mandates to include counterterrorism activities may facilitate government use of repression and, as a result, inadvertently decrease a government's incentive to negotiate. This may have the perverse effect of not only prolonging the conflict but also increasing the use of terrorism or, at the very least, recruits for terror groups. This can also impact the legitimacy of peacekeepers, retaliation against peacekeepers, and civilian incentives to work with peacekeeping forces. For example, after an April 2018 raid, the UN PKO MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (CAR) was perceived as being biased against Muslims. Locals retaliated by dumping corpses at the base of the UN compound, followed by the proliferation of social unrest along ethnic and political fault lines. Because counterterrorism is likely to occur alongside the government, citizens' perception of peacekeepers as impartial actors may be diminished (Karlsrud 2017). And if MINUSCA were to engage hardened combatants with counterterrorism tactics, such unintended consequences may be more likely to appear.

This does not imply that peacekeepers should remain silent in the face of terrorism or do nothing to prevent terrorism. Instead, we caution that the perceived impartiality of peacekeepers, which has been under debate in the past, may be questioned by civilians who observe peacekeepers engaging in activities that require government troop/police presence alongside them. As Muggah (2018) notes, however, the UN has begun to show some success by engaging communities with local peace agreements and violence reduction projects among other locally focused activities. It may be worthwhile for policymakers to reconsider expanding PK mandates to include counterterrorism and instead opt for expanding locally-based policies and their community-based partners. Our empirical results consistently

show that high levels of troops in the presence of terrorism increase the likelihood of negotiation instances, without counterterrorism mandates. While it is not possible to test for the effect of counterterrorism mandates on negotiations, we believe our study provides sufficient evidence to warrant a reexamination of expanding peacekeeping mandates.

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