Jung as symptomatologist

The critical (in the literary sense) and the clinical (in the medical sense) may be destined to enter into a new relationship of mutual learning. (Deleuze, 1991, 14)

Reading Deleuze, one hears Jung. The internal resonance between Jung's psychological theory and Deleuze's philosophy is uncanny. Zizek (2004) in characteristically pithy fashion states: “No wonder, then, that an admiration of Jung is Deleuze’s corpse in the closet; the fact that Deleuze borrowed a key term (rhizome) from Jung is not a mere insignificant accident – rather, it points toward a deeper link.” (662) This deeper link has been more sympathetically explored by Kerslake, (2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009) Semetsky (2004, 2006, 2009, 2012) and McMillan. (2012, 2018) They provide us with the only systematic studies of Deleuze and Jung available thus far. This chapter is part of an interest in using concepts from the work of Deleuze to amplify elements of Jung's theory. In this case, it employs the concepts of symptomatology, percept and minor literature, from Deleuze's discussion of the critical and the clinical. As such, it belongs to Jungian studies rather than constituting an intervention in Deleuzian philosophy. It is preliminary spadework, experimental exploration of the rhizome, rather than definitive interpretation.

Deleuze introduced the theme of the critical and the clinical in his 1967 essay, ‘Coldness and Cruelty,’ an analysis of the concept of sado-masochism. He suggested that, "Because the judgement of the clinician is prejudiced we must take an entirely different approach, the literary approach, since it is from literature that stem the original definitions of sadism and masochism." (Deleuze, 1991, 14) The diagnostic power of literature continued to be a preoccupation for Deleuze up to his final book, Essays Critical and Clinical, published in 1993.
His interest however is avowedly philosophical, not literary or clinical. Deleuze (2014) insists that, "A philosophical concept can never be confused with a scientific function or an artistic construction, but finds itself in affinity with these in this or that domain of science or style of art." (xiii) Philosophy exploits these affinities for its own purposes. It "always enters into relations of mutual resonance and exchange with these other domains for reasons that are always internal to philosophy itself.” (Smith, 1997, xii)

Does Deleuze's project of the critical and the clinical resonate in the rhizome of psychoanalysis? Freud said that psychoanalysis is located between philosophy and medicine. Jung's (1989) description of his decision to specialize in psychiatry points to similarly liminal territory:

Here alone the two currents of my interest could flow together and in a united stream dig their own bed. Here was the empirical field common to biological and spiritual facts, which I had everywhere sought and nowhere found. Here at last was the place where the collision of nature and spirit became a reality. (109)

Psychoanalysis wrestles with the angel of inbetweenness. It is not entirely one thing or other. Is it science or is it hermeneutics? Is it knowledge or is it narrative?

Among these uncertainties, there is the constant tension in psychoanalytic theory and practice between what is internal to the session or the analysis, and influences or pressures coming from outside of the clinical frame. Like Deleuze's philosophy, psychoanalysis wants to engage in these relations of mutual resonance and exchange with neighbouring discourses for reasons that are internal to itself. It is ultimately concerned with resolving its own clinical and theoretical dilemmas, and not necessarily with shedding new light on other areas of
knowledge. There is an ethical debate within the profession between those who prioritise clinical experience and those who give greater relative weight to concepts and demands coming from outside of the clinical domain. For example, there are those who argue that it is essential for psychoanalysts to be knowledgeable about neuroscience and those who feel that neuroscience has nothing of significance to contribute to our understanding of the analytic process. Infant observation is another example. Some trainings require students to undertake a two-year infant observation in order to understand the developmental process in depth. Others take the approach that there is not necessarily a correspondence between the historical baby and the child archetype, or between the observed infant and the clinical infant as Stern (1985) has described them. Similarly, Hillman (1964) argues that the meaning of suicide within psychoanalysis is radically different from the significance it carries in other disciplines such as sociology, medicine, law or religion. This controversy extends to the reverse direction as well, to the long-standing discussion about the status of applied psychoanalysis, where it is debated to what extent concepts generated in clinical experience are applicable to the world outside the clinic.

In all of these cases it can be argued that ultimately the usefulness or purpose of exploring the affinities, resonances and exchanges with extra-analytic domains arise from reasons internal to analysis itself. We can hear an echo here of Jung's insistence that he was approaching issues and questions as a psychologist – not as a philosopher or theologian. He was alert to an astonishing range of adjacent discourses and he was adept at enlisting concepts from these disparate fields for his own purposes.

**Symptomatology**
Deleuze identified three key features of medicine: symptomatology, etiology and therapy. Symptomatology is the study of signs. Etiology is the search for causes. Therapy is the development and application of a treatment. According to Smith (1997), "While etiology and therapeutics are integral parts of medicine, symptomatology appeals to a kind of limit-point, premedical or submedical, that belongs as much to art as to medicine. "(xvi) Deleuze’s (1983) concept of symptomatology echoes Nietzsche’s active science, as opposed to a passive, reactive or negative science. “A symptomatology… interprets phenomena, treating them as symptoms whose sense must be sought in the forces that produce them.” (70) This critique is productive. As Kaiser (2017) observes, “Symptoms are perspectival and subjective… Symptomatology is used as a critical tool, an activity to distil the relations of forces underlying the currently congealed order of things” (185-6) “The point of critique is not justification but a different way of feeling: another sensitivity.” (Deleuze, 1983, 88)

Illnesses are often identified with the names of the scientists who isolated a constellation of symptoms or the names of patients who suffered from the syndrome – for example, Lou Gehrig’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Roger’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, or Cruetzfeldt-Jakob disease. Deleuze (1990) argued that literary figures, among them Lewis Carol, Zola, Fitzgerald, Artaud, Kafka, Proust and Beckett, are symtomatologists, readers of signs. He was interested in these writers, not as patients, but as “clinicians of civilization”:

Authors, if they are great, are more like doctors than patients. We mean that they are themselves astonishing diagnosticians or symptomatologists. There is always a great deal of art involved in the grouping of symptoms, in the organization of a table (tableau) where a particular symptom is dissociated from another, juxtaposed to a third, and forms the new figure of a disorder or illness. Clinicians who are able to
renew a symptomatological picture produce a work of art; conversely, artists are clinicians, not with respect to their own case, nor even with respect to a case in general; rather, they are clinicians of civilization. (237)

For Jung (1966) art performs critical, interpretive and regulative functions. "Therein lies the social significance of art: it is constantly at work educating the spirit of the age, conjuring up the forms in which the age is most lacking… so art represents a process of self-regulation in the life of nations and epochs." (CW15 130-1)

A good deal of psychoanalytic literary criticism produces what are in essence case studies that use clinical concepts to analyse the psychopathology of authors, their plots and characters. Jung (1993a) was critical of this approach:

It is sometimes possible to explain a work of art in the same way a one can explain a nervous illness in terms of Freud's theory or Adler's. But when it comes to great poetry the pathological explanation, the attempt to apply Freudian or Adlerian theory, is in effect a ridiculous belittlement of the work of art. The explanation not only contributes nothing to an understanding of the poetry, but, on the contrary deflects our gaze from that deeper vision which the poet offers… great art is man's creation of something superhuman in defiance of all the ordinary, miserable conditions of his birth and childhood. To apply to this the psychology of neurosis is little short of grotesque. (CW18 1723-4)

However, Deleuze (1990) argues that Freud also functioned as a symptomatologist. "From the perspective of Freud’s genius, it is not the complex which provides us with information
about Oedipus and Hamlet, but rather Oedipus and Hamlet who provide us with information about the complex." (237) It is Oedipus and Hamlet who illuminate the suffering of the patient, not a putatively neutral or objective, clinical concept. Freud “discovered” the Oedipus complex by exploiting literature to organise certain clinical phenomena.

It is symptomatology that opens the door for Deleuze (2004) into psychoanalysis and psychiatry:

I would never have permitted myself to write on psychoanalysis and psychiatry were I not dealing with the problem of symptomatology. Symptomatology is situated almost outside of medicine, at a neutral point, a zero point, where artists and philosophers and doctors and patients can encounter eachother. (134)

It seems natural that we would find Jung in that encounter of artists, philosophers, doctors and patients. What can we learn about Jung if we think of him as a symptomatologist? How can Deleuze amplify our understanding of Jung? Is Jung like a novelist, “who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to light as the becoming of his characters?” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 174)

Symptomatology functions in terms of the proper name and the "multiplicity" or "assemblage" which is referred to. Jung's name is often associated with certain clinical phenomena, we could say assemblages, such as Jungian complexes, Jungian archetypes, the Jungian collective unconscious, Jungian analysis, Jungian analyst, Jungian dreams, Jungian self. In each of these cases Jung has drawn together certain psychic phenomena and organised particular constellations of experience. New relations between psychic elements are brought
to light and can be discussed. To label these as Jungian is both meaningful and meaningless. The label simultaneously illuminates and obscures. The very name of Jung informs us and blinds us. While he has brought to light striking new psychological facts, the aura of 'Jung' in the minds of some of his followers can eclipse the very phenomena with which he was experimenting.

Deleuze argues that literary artists, through the act of writing, reveal life, a life, non-organic life. "In reality writing does not have its end in itself, precisely because life is not something personal. Or rather, the aim of writing is to carry life to the state of a non-personal power." (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987, 50) Gesturing toward a similar theme in Jung's writing Rowland (2005) observes:

Jung offers the notion of the 'symbol' in which the work or image is an emblem of the unknown or unknowable. Such art principally speaks a language foreign to the ego of its author; its significance surpasses traces of the formation of the ego. Such art is autonomous of the author because it is rooted in the collective unconscious, not reliant upon the author's personal life, but rather his impersonal one. For symbolic art, the author is not a guide to the work. (8)

Rowland highlights the compensatory function of art in Jung's theory. "Such art represents the healing self-regulation of the psyche amplified into the cultural dimension… symbolic art structurally transforms collective culture in ways that amount to an internal self-regulating mechanism." (11)
For Deleuze, the question that a literary work poses is not "What does it mean?" but rather "How does it function?" The work does not propose interpretations. It evokes experimentation. The literary machine is made up of fragments, singularities. The work of art is to "establish a system of communication among these parts or elements that are in themselves noncommunicating." (Smith, xxiii) It produces a unity of parts, but it does not unify the parts:

The whole produced by the work is rather a "peripheral" totality that is added alongside its parts as a new singularity fabricated separately... The work thus constitutes a whole, but this whole is itself a part that merely exists alongside the other parts, which it neither unifies nor totalizes. Yet it nonetheless has an effect on these parts, since it is able to create non-preexistent relations between elements that in themselves remain disconnected, and are left intact... the Whole is never a principle but rather an effect... The Whole, in other words, is the Open, because it is its nature to constantly produce or create the new. (Smith, xxiii)

The suggestion that in this particular notion of the whole the elements "in themselves remain disconnected, and are left intact" resonates with Cusa's (1997) statement that the coincidence of opposites is a “unity to which neither otherness nor plurality nor multiplicity is opposed.” (121) The coincidence of opposites is one of Jung's key images of the whole. (Henderson, 2012) To the extent that Jung follows Cusa, this is a whole that does not extinguish difference or singularity. The assertion that the nature of Deleuze's 'whole' is "to constantly produce or create the new," echoes Jung (1959c), who argues that, "one should not overlook the fact that in reality man's procreative power is only a special instance of the 'procreative nature of the Whole.'" (CW9ii 313)
There are some immediate applications of these thoughts to Jung's view of individuation. They give us a way of thinking about the experiment of individuation as something that produces a sense of wholeness that exists alongside the many elements of the personality and the unconscious. It promotes communication between the elements without subordinating them to a greater identity. We could say that therapy is about discovering possibilities, differences, rather than producing a monolithic personality structure. As Searles says, individuation increases the capacity to live with multiplicity, it does not iron things out.

Jung's (1959a) wry observation that, "Were it not for the leaping and twinkling of the soul, man would rot away in his greatest passion, idleness" (CW9i 56), resonates with the idea that it is the function of literature to stir us to experimentation and to enable communication between fragments and singularities. Like Jung’s “leaping and twinkling of the soul,” Deleuze (1983) characterises Nietzsche’s will to power as “essentially creative and giving: it does not aspire, it does not seek, it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It gives: power is something inexpressible in the will (something mobile, variable, plastic); power is in the will as ‘the bestowing virtue’, through power the will itself bestows sense and value.” (80)

Deleuze's primary concern in his thinking about literature is Life, nonorganic life. In an interview he stated: "You have seen what is essential for me, this 'vitalism' or a conception of life as a non-organic power." (Smith, xiii) Writing is the vehicle that is able "to carry life to the state of a non-personal power." (Deleuze and Parnet, 50) Deleuze refers to a scene in Charles Dicken's *Our Mutual Friend* about a man, despised by everyone, who is on his deathbed:
No one has the least regard for the man. With them all, he has been an object of avoidance, suspicion, and aversion; but the spark of life within him is curiously separate from himself now, and they have a deep interest in it, probably because it is life, and they are living and must die. (Dickens, 1952, 443)

Deleuze observes something similar in babies:

Small infants all resemble each other and have hardly any individuality; but they have singularities – a smile, a gesture, a grimace – which are not subjective characteristics. Infants are transversed by an immanent life that is pure power, and even a beatitude through their sufferings and weakness. (Deleuze, 2001, 30)

It is fair to say that analysts are – or should be – acutely attuned to these sparks, singularities and spontaneous gestures. You might call these experiences, encounters with the archetypal aspect of existence. They are pre-personal, transpersonal and post-personal. You could see them as experiences of the Jungian self. Dicken's character and Deleuze's infant resonate with Jung's (1993b) description of the "collective level" of experience.

Because the basic structure of the mind is the same in everybody, we cannot make distinctions when we experience on that level. There we do not know if something has happened to you or to me. In the underlying collective level there is a wholeness which cannot be dissected. If you begin to think about participation as a fact which means that fundamentally we are identical with everybody and everything, you are led to very peculiar theoretical conclusions. You should not go further than those conclusions because these things get dangerous. But some of the conclusions you
should explore, because they can explain a lot of peculiar things that happen to man.

(CW18 87)

These experiences have peculiar and possibly dangerous effects on our minds. They are present in the dying man and the newborn infant:

In this idea the all-embracing nature of psychic wholeness is expressed. Wholeness is never comprised within the compass of the conscious mind – it includes the indefinite and indefinable extent of the unconscious as well. Wholeness, empirically speaking, is therefore of immeasurable extent, older and younger than consciousness and enfolding it in time and space. (Jung, 1959b, CW9i 299)

One thing that the dying man and the newborn infant have in common is a lack of cognitive capacity and self-consciousness. Nonorganic life is witnessed by the people assembled at the deathbed and by the baby's parents. As Jung (1959c) says, the conscious mind can only have a tenuous awareness of wholeness. "Empirically speaking, consciousness can never comprehend the whole, but it is probable that the whole is unconsciously present in the ego."

(CW9ii 171)

Jung maintained that Christ is an archetypal image of the self in a western context. Is witnessing nonorganic life akin to seeing god in one's neighbour? "The spontaneous symbols of the self, or of wholeness, cannot in practice be distinguished from a God-image… there is an ever-present archetype of wholeness which may easily disappear from the purview of consciousness or may never be perceived at all." (Jung, 1959c, CW9ii 73) It could be argued
that Mother Teresa had a vocation to witness signs of this nonorganic life in the dying people
she nursed on the streets of Kolkata.

According to Jung (1956), "When an idea is so old and so generally believed, it must be true
in some way, by which I mean that it is *psychologically true.*" (CW5 4) Is it *psychologically
true* that nonorganic life *is* wholeness? Did Jung acting as a symptomatologist diagnose the
vicissitudes of nonorganic life in the domain of human experience? He wrote about the perils
of lack of contact with this life and of over-identification with it. He was concerned with how
to establish a viable relationship with wholeness.

A viable relationship with nonorganic life or wholeness involves a combination of openness
and resilience:

> Literature then appears as an enterprise of health: not that the writer would necessarily
be in good health… but he possesses an irresistible and delicate health that stems
from what he has seen and heard of things too big for him, too strong for him,
suffocating things whose passage exhausts him, while nonetheless giving him the
becomings that his dominant and substantial health would render impossible.
(Deleuze, 1997, 228)

Often the popular notion of the wounded healer implies that there is trauma in the therapist's
past that they have dealt with or confronted in their own therapy, and that this informs the
therapist's engagement with clients or patients in the present. Deleuze's construction raised
the question as to whether the practice of psychotherapy is in itself damaging, wounding,
shaming and debilitating for the therapist. The resilient therapist is not an invulnerable
therapist. As Freud observed, "Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too many pains, disappointments, and impossible tasks." (Freud, 1930, 75)

Percept

The percept is a type of vision or hearing. Are there particular features in the way that Jung saw and heard that contributed to his position as a symptomatologist? "A critical-clinical perception. Critical because we discern a force in it, a particular type of force, and clinical because we evaluate the declination of this force, its inclination, its ability to fold or unfold itself." (Zourabichvili, 1996, 192) The percept is one of five themes in Deleuze's work that are important to the critical and clinical project as described by Smith (1997): 1) the destruction of the world (Singularities and Events); 2) the dissolution of the subject (Affects and Percepts); 3) the dis-integration of the body (Intensities and Becomings); 4) the "minorization" of politics (Speech Acts and Fabulations); 5) the "stuttering" of language (Syntax and Style).

The theme of the dissolution of the subject has affinities with Jung's confrontation with the unconscious, in which he encountered spontaneous and autonomous images and affects. He discovered the landscape of the collective unconscious. In grappling with these experiences, he formulated his theories out of unknown and unrecognized forces. As Deleuze observes: "A great novelist is above all an artist who invents unknown or unrecognized affects and brings them to light as the becoming of his characters." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 174) Jung's "characters" are the archetypes, archetypal images and a distinctive approach to clinical practice. The disturbing impact of the percept is a basic component in the formation of concepts:
It is independent of the creator through the self-positing of the created, which is preserved in itself. What is preserved – the thing or the work of art – is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects. Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 164)

Beginning with his confrontation with the unconscious Jung refined his vision and hearing by working with his patients and on the Red Book. He was interested in the autonomous unconscious, whose contents "are independent of a state of those who experience them."

According to Zourabichvili (1996), "Deleuze is less concerned to fix an essence of the appearing of things, than with bringing out and differentiating the non-organic life that they involve." (191)

This points to a tension in analytical psychology between a wish to interpret archetypes and archetypal images and a wish to experiment with them; a tendency to fix the essence of an image and a tendency to be sensitive to the non-organic life, the wholeness in the image. This can appear as a choice between viewing the archetypal image as a representation of the archetype or viewing the archetypal image as the site of archetypal pressure. To ask of Jung "What were you thinking of?" could be rephrased as "What did you see?" or better "How did you see?"

How does sight regain its power when it becomes vision, or percept? When one sees the invisible, the imperceptible, or when what cannot be seen is perceived: the invisible
enveloped in what one sees, not as a hidden world beyond appearance, but animating sight itself from within appearance, or what one sees… it is necessary that the invisible seen is the invisible of the visible itself, the 'being of the sensible.' (Zourabichvili, 190)

Was Jung interested in the invisible of the visible or was he interested in a hidden world? Without a doubt many of his disciples take up his work as a description and exploration of a hidden world. Much of his work lends itself to that sort of interpretation, but it can be argued that in his writings on the practice of psychotherapy he is attending to the invisible of the visible. This resonates with Winnicott's plea that the mother must see the baby that is really there, not the baby that she might wish for, or fear, or feel is expected of her. Can the therapist see the non-organic life, the wholeness, in the patient?

What sort of experience did Jung have that enabled him to formulate his picture of a new landscape – the collective unconscious? As Zourabichvili (1996) observes, "To live a landscape: one is no longer in front of it, but in it, one passes into the landscape." (196) When Jung’s inner landscape came alive and he entered the drama, his relationship with the unconscious changed. He was no longer observing memories and representations. He became an actor and he was acted upon. He was no longer observing the soul, but living with soul. The expanse and force of this newly discovered landscape placed a demand on him as a writer. Jung discusses this in terms of excess libido:

This excess libido constitutes the essential precondition to developing a culture. As such the symbol is also the mother of science “initiating” a sustained playful interest in the object that allows man to make all sorts of discoveries which would otherwise have escaped him. (Gieser, 2014, 153)
In his confrontation with the unconscious Jung experienced visions and intuitions that threw him into turmoil. As Zourabichvili observes, “Can we speak of a profound landscape, as we say of an idea? An idea is not profound because it is well-founded, in close contact with its foundations, but rather because it makes thought ‘founder’ [effondant] and liberates the infinite resonances in chaotic communication within it.” (200) Similarly Jung’s concepts presuppose a collapse in the face the unknown.

The writer, far from reporting lived experience, makes a vital discovery. He sees at the limit of the livable, he lives what cannot be lived through… Deleuze appears to give two reasons, two arguments for the idea that the percept exceeds all lived experience and exists in the absence of man: (1) it overflows subjectivity, and (2) it conserves itself independently of that which experiences it and composes it. So, he specifies, it is a matter of a conservation in itself (and not only in some material). (Zourabichvili, 201)

Jung’s (1964) percept, the collective unconscious, is autonomous and it "was psyche long before there was any ego conscious, and will remain psyche no matter how far our ego consciousness extends." (CW10 304)

The Red Book represents, among other things, Jung’s attempt to grapple with the expanse and force of this newly discovered landscape. He is wrestling with personal and collective turbulence. The Red Book contains a number of features, which can be taken as evidence for the view that Jung can be read as a symptomologist. According to Beebe (2014) the book is:
… a living memorial to the psychological experience of surviving the disorientation occasioned by the emergence of… a ‘psychic epidemic,’ the affects associated with the arrival of World War I… [It] dramatizes with skill not only the abreaction of the fragmented psychic state of one individual traumatized by historical upheaval, but also the therapeutic strategies for self-healing that can emerge out of such and experience. The Red Book thus provides in literary form a model of how the integrity of psyche can be restored in the face of cultural processes that threaten to undermine it. (108-9)

Beebe identifies the Red Book as a “trickster work of art” fuelled by rage with Freud and the psychoanalytic movement. (109) Although Beebe doesn’t explicitly say so, the inference can be drawn that this personal rage resonates with the rage unleashed by World War I. Beebe argues that the book tells a “post-heroic story.” (113) The demand to discover a post-heroic approach is raised by Jung’s own mid-life dilemmas, as well as by the need to recognise the limitations of rationality in culture and politics. “The times were demanding, as if from within themselves, that the heroic quest for a brilliant adaptation be sacrificed… This time, its direction is not up toward mastery, but down into a profound acceptance of incapacity.” (114)

In the face of hubris and the striving toward rational perfection, on a personal or a collective level, Jung, as symptomotologist, prescribes the experience of limitation and learning “how to hold one’s capacity in tension with one’s incapacity.” (116)

As a symptomatologist Jung diagnoses the failures of psychology and psychotherapy. “The Red Book can be metaphorically understood as a dream, not the dream of an individual person, but the dream of the discipline and practice of psychology.” (Drob, 2012, 260) In the face of the tendency to understand “the psychotherapeutic process in simple cognitive, pragmatic, and manualized terms, [he] reminds us that psychological exploration has the potential to open
worlds as well as treat symptoms.” (263) The Red Book is an expression of Jung’s experiment with wholeness. According to Hogenson (2014), “The Red Book is Jung’s umwelt, and, as such, it represents Jung’s recovery of the holistic image in the age of the sciences.” (104)

**Minor literature**

The minorization of politics, and minor literature, are further elements of Deleuze’s thought about the critical and the clinical that can be used to amplify Jung’s own writings and the work of analytical psychologists as minor literature. In their discussion of Kafka and minor literature Deleuze and Guattari (1986) observe:

A minor literature doesn't come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language. But the first characteristic of minor literature in any case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization… In short, Prague German is a deterritorialized language, appropriate for strange and minor uses. (16-17)

Jung was adept at appropriating the language of science, psychology, religion and philosophy for his own "strange" uses. He is "a foreigner within his own language." (Bogue, 2003, 100) This may account for some of the bewilderment and hostility expressed toward Jung's work. Like Kafka, he has taken familiar words and images and infused them with destabilising intent:

Kafka's Yiddish… is not so much a language as a way of inhabiting language, a minority's means of appropriating the majority's tongue and undermining its fixed structure. Yiddish speakers, like Prague Jews, make a *minor* use of language, a
destabilising deformation of the standard elements of German that set it in motion and opens it to forces of metamorphosis. (Bogue, 97)

The sometime kaleidoscopic and florid impression that Jung's writing gives can be seen as an aspect of the experimental nature of his thought. People can feel at sea in the Collected Works. As Bogue (2003) observes, this resonates with the view of Deleuze and Guattari that:

… to invent something new is necessarily to invent something whose shape cannot be foreseen. The new emerges through a process of metamorphosis whose outcome is unpredictable. If writers find existing configurations of social relations unacceptable, their only option is to induce a metamorphosis of the established forms of the social field, with no guarantee that the result will be a more acceptable community. It is for this reason that in a minor literature expression precedes content: "it is expression that outdistances or advances, it is expression that precedes contents." (110)

Jung was led by his dreams, visions, active imagination, intuition, sculpture and play toward the formation of his own language. A major literature starts from given content, whereas minor literature starts with expression:

A major, or established, literature follows a vector that goes from content to expression. Since content is presented in a given form of the content, one must find, discover, or see the form of expression that goes with it… But minor, or revolutionary, literature begins by expressing itself and doesn't conceptualise until afterward… Expression must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, 28)
The notion of a minor literature has a political dimension. It is not the creation of an individual and is not dominated by a towering figure. A hagiographic attitude toward Jung can obscure the collective nature of his work. As Bogue (2003) states:

In the absence of a people, writers who are marginalized and solitary may be in the best position "to express another potential community," but if they do so, it will not be as individual subjects, for "the most individual literary enunciation is a particular case of collective enunciation." (111)

As a solitary explorer of the psyche Jung had rhizomatic links with others contributing to a common endeavour:

It is here that we confront Deleuze’s conception of the political destiny of literature. Just as writers do not write with their egos, neither do they write “on behalf of” an already existing people or “address” themselves to a class or nation… what they find rather is that “the people are missing.” (Smith, xli)

The writer is part of the creation of a people. Literature has the capacity to create a nation. This idea has uncanny resonances with Zeller’s (1975) description of his discussion with Jung about a dream:

**Dream:** A temple of vast dimensions was in the process of being built. As far as I could see—ahead, behind, right and left—there were incredible numbers of people building on gigantic pillars. I, too, was building on a pillar. The whole building process was in its very first beginnings, but the foundation was already there, the rest of the building was starting to go up, and I and many others were working on it.
Jung said, “Ja, you know, that is the temple we all build on. We don’t know the people because, believe me, they build in India and China and in Russia and all over the world. That is the new religion. You know how long it will take until it is built?”

I said, “How should I know? Do you know?”

He said, “I know.”

I asked how long it will take.

He said, “About six hundred years.”

“Where do you know this from?” I asked.

He said, “From dreams. From other people’s dreams and from my own. This new religion will come together as far as we can see.” (2)

Whether this story demonstrates Jung’s supreme confidence in his own interpretations of the unconscious or his experiments in the rhizome of dreams I am not sure, but it resonates with Deleuze’s approach in that both the writer and the dreamer are contributing to the creation of new political and cultural formations.

As a consequence of Jung’s prescription of holism as the remedy for the personal, cultural, ethical and religious ills that assail modern Western civilization, it could be argued that he initiated a minor literature and a minority politics. In the world of psychoanalytic writing, analytical psychology is a minor literature and within the professional world of psychoanalysis Jungian associations practice minority politics.

Minor literature is characterised by a concern not with concepts developed by individual subjects at the centre of literary action, but rather what is given to perception; the forces encountered by the body, experienced as intensities, percepts and affects from which concepts are constructed. This has important implications for psychology, as minor literature articulates modes of becoming that do not emphasise the individual
subject. These intensities, percepts and affects are fleeting and non-representable, where every form that takes shape at infinite speeds vanishes as soon as it appears. (Pannell, 2018, 196)

Jung's writings on psychotherapy are saturated with references to the "fleeting and non-representable," the limits of the analyst's understanding, the plasticity of the psyche and the fluidity of the analytic process. (Henderson, 2014) It might be argued that the liminality of the practice, theory and institutions of analytical psychology are central to the potency of its creative contribution to psychoanalysis. One is reminded of the centrality of the inferior function in Jung's thought. While there is pressure to bring analytical psychology to a more established position, it may be worth considering the words of Deleuze and Guattari (1983): "Only the minor is great and revolutionary." (26)

**Conclusion**

This chapter began with the assertion that, "Reading Deleuze, one hears Jung." It has explored possible resonances between Jung's psychology and Deleuze's philosophy as a way of amplifying our appreciation of analytical psychology. It has made use of Deleuze's concepts of symptomatology, percept and minor literature, from his writings on the critical and the clinical. As a symptomatologist Jung can be seen as a "clinician of civilization," who discovered the collective unconscious and prescribed a renewed relationship with wholeness as a remedy for the personal, cultural and collective dis-eases of modern life. The percept is a type of *vision* and *hearing*. Jung's encounter with elements of the autonomous unconscious, engendered turbulence, which stimulated the production the *Red Book* and the articulation of new theories and clinical methodologies. Jung's writing can be read as a minor literature which destabilises the language of psychoanalysis and psychology for "strange and minor uses" and the
institutions of analytical psychology can be understood as practicing minority politics in the world of psychoanalysis. There is ample scope for further experimentation with the thought of Deleuze to illuminate the texture of the rhizome of analytical psychology.

References


Bogue, Ronald (2003), Deleuze on Literature, London: Routledge


Deleuze, Gilles (1983), Nietzsche and Philosophy, London: Bloomsbury

Deleuze, Gilles (1990), Logic of Sense, New York: Columbia University Press

Deleuze, Gilles (1991), Masochism, New York: Zone Books

Deleuze, Gilles, (1997), 'Literature and Life,' Critical Inquiry, 23(2), 225-230

Deleuze, Gilles (1997), Essays Critical and Clinical, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Deleuze, Gilles (2001), Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, New York: Zone

Deleuze, Gilles (2004), Desert Islands and Other Texts, Sylvere Lotinger (ed.), Michael Taormina (trans.), New York: Semiotext(e)

Deleuze, Gilles (2014), Difference and Repetition, London: Bloomsbury

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari (1983), 'What is a Minor Literature?' Mississippi Review, 11(3), 13-33

Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari (1986), Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

23

Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet (1987), *Dialogues*, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (trans.), New York: Columbia


Kerslake, Christian (2002), ‘The Vertigo of Philosophy: Deleuze and the Problem of Immanence,’ *Radical Philosophy*, No. 113


Kerslake, Christian (2009), ‘Deleuze and the Meanings of Immanence,’ www.after68.org


McMillan, Christian (2018), 'Jung and Deleuze: Enchanted Openings to the Other: A Philosophical Contribution,' *International Journal of Jungian Studies*, 10 (3)

Pannell, Be (2018), 'Deleuze's Critical and Clinical Uses of Literature,' *Annual Review of Critical Psychology*, 14


Semetsky, Inna (2009), ‘Practical Mysticism and Deleuze’s Ontology of the Virtual,’ (with T. Lovat), *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy*, 5 (2)

Semetsky, Inna (2012), ‘Jung’s Psychology and Deleuze’s Philosophy: The unconscious in learning,’ (with J.D. Delpech-Ramey), *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 44(1)


Zizek, Slavoj (2004), ‘Notes on a Debate “From Within the People,”’ *Criticism*, 46(4)