Castillo, Marco and Dianat, Ahrash (2021) Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 24 (4). pp. 1365-1389. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09702-1
Castillo, Marco and Dianat, Ahrash (2021) Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 24 (4). pp. 1365-1389. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09702-1
Castillo, Marco and Dianat, Ahrash (2021) Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence. Experimental Economics, 24 (4). pp. 1365-1389. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09702-1
Abstract
We present experimental evidence on the interplay between strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms. In particular, we apply a version of risk-dominance to compare the riskiness of “truncation” against other strategies that secure against remaining unmatched. By keeping subjects’ ordinal preferences fixed while changing their cardinal representation, our experimental treatments vary the risk-dominant prediction. We find that both truth-telling and truncation are played more often when they are risk-dominant. In both treatments, however, truncation strategies are played more often in later rounds of the experiment. Our results also shed light on several open questions in market design.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | stable matching; equilibrium selection; risk-dominance |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jan 2021 13:22 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 17:35 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/29626 |
Available files
Filename: manuscript.pdf