Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev (2010) The Law of the Few. American Economic Review, 100 (4). pp. 1468-1492. DOI https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1468
Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev (2010) The Law of the Few. American Economic Review, 100 (4). pp. 1468-1492. DOI https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1468
Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev (2010) The Law of the Few. American Economic Review, 100 (4). pp. 1468-1492. DOI https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1468
Abstract
<jats:p> Empirical work shows that a large majority of individuals get most of their information from a very small subset of the group, viz., the influencers; moreover, there exist only minor differences between the observable characteristics of the influencers and the others. We refer to these empirical findings as the Law of the Few. This paper develops a model where players personally acquire information and form connections with others to access their information. Every (robust) equilibrium of this model exhibits the law of the few. (JEL D83, D85, Z13) </jats:p>
Item Type: | Article |
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Additional Information: | DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1468 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | D83; D85; Z13 |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2012 14:33 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 19:42 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2972 |