Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev (2002) Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev (2002) Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev (2002) Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Abstract
This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a society with many groups, where it is cheaper to connect within groups as compared to across groups, strategic play by individuals leads to a network architecture in which there is a core group which is entirely internally connected while all the other groups are entirely externally linked and hence completely fragmented. Since internal/within group links are cheaper to form, this implies that individual incentives may generate a significant waste of valuable social resources.
Item Type: | ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined] |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | C72; C79; Noncooperative games; Network formation; Heterogeneity |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2012 14:32 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:40 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2998 |