Multidimensional Strategies of Boundary-drawing towards Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Informal Market Economy

Selin Siviş

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Summary

This thesis, with its specific focus on the labour-intensive economic sectors, analyses how boundaries are drawn in multiple forms towards Syrians refugees in Turkey's informal market economy. Employing the case of Turkey as a new immigration country, the thesis provides a multidimensional analysis of boundary-drawing in relation to refugees. This study reveals how distinct framing strategies are employed towards Syrian workers in workplaces; how multiple forms of boundaries are drawn in everyday working life; and how the notions of 'insider' and 'outsider' are produced, mobilized, negotiated, and contested through the lens of Turkish employers and employees. This single case study adheres to a qualitative methodology, based on ethnographic observations, structured expert interviews, and semi-structured interviews with Turkish employers and employees. It aims at identifying the multiple ways of creating boundaries toward 'outsiders' (i.e. Syrian refugees) by paying particular attention to how intersubjective meaning-making elements are (re)produced by members of a single community, the city of Adana, which is an economic hub close to the conflict region in Turkey. The research investigates different dimensions of boundary-drawing, namely moral, socioeconomic, institutional, and national identity, within the scope of symbolic and social boundaries. The results suggest that Turkish employers and employees view Syrians in three distinct ways: as *workers*, *peers*, and *foreign nationals*. These distinct ways of perceiving Syrians highly depend on intersubjective evaluative distinctions. These are generated by the host society members through narratives, repertoires, and background factors, such as historical, socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and institutional elements. Overall, the analysis reveals multiple ways of manifesting boundaries towards outsiders. Furthermore, these can be made and remade over time by the same social actors across different workplaces within the same city and/or country depending on the context in which varying forms of justifications are (re)produced.

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Abbreviations

AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AKP	Justice and Development Party
Bag-Kur	Pension Fund for the Self Employed
CHP	Republican People's Party
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
ES	Retirement Fund for Civil Servants
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHIS	General Health Insurance Scheme
LFIP	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SGK	Social Security Institution
SSK	Social Insurance Institution
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TPR	Temporary Protection Regulation
TRY	Turkish Lira
TUIK	Turkish Statistical Institute
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USD	US Dollar
WWI	First World War

Chapter 1: Introduction

Where exactly are the boundaries between 'us' and 'others' constructed? Why do these boundaries matter? How do they shape social interaction within society? Why and how are some boundaries salient across various contexts and types of groups whereas others are not? This thesis looks at multi-dimensional boundary-drawing strategies towards Syrian refugees in Turkey's informal market economy. More specifically, it investigates the host society members' views regarding Syrian *workers*, *peers*, and *foreign guests*. Boundary-drawing is neither static, and nor primarily manifested in a single form. On the contrary, it highly depends on intersubjective evaluative distinctions. In the context of boundary-drawing (Lamont and Molnar, 2002), intersubjectivity can be defined as a shared perception and/or definition of reality between individuals which are generated by dominant group members through narratives, repertoires, and background factors, such as historical, socioeconomic, and institutional elements (Lamont et al., 2014, 2016). As Alba notes, "boundaries do not have the same character everywhere; and though invariably they do allow for some assimilation to occur, the terms under which this happens vary from one societal context to another" (2005: 41). The salience of boundaries therefore depends on the interplay between structural and contextual factors that in turn mobilize individuals to engage in multiple strategies of boundary-drawing. In this regard, identifying the sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociocultural contexts within which boundaries originate is as fundamental as understanding how boundaries are drawn and mobilized. By incorporating the former into the latter, I explain how Turkish employers and employees produce and reproduce different boundary-drawing strategies towards Syrian refugees. Four examples illustrate the distinct ways of the presence of Syrian refugees is approached in Turkey by mobilizing moral, socioeconomic, and institutional contexts.

The first case concerns an employee who was working informally as a cashier at a wholesale market at the time of the interview. He used to work in the textile sector but felt obliged to quit

his job as Syrians' involvement in the job market has depressed wages in the textile sector. When asked his opinion about Syrians in Turkey, he says:

> "I mean we (Turkish citizens), as a human being, feel uncomfortable about their (Syrians') situation, we have this situation on our conscience. They have fled the war. We feel sorry for their unjust treatment. But in the end, we are a human being as well. We also have a house where we have to bring home the bacon. We have a family. Conscience is to some extent…" (male, 24, Kurd, cashier in a wholesale market)

In the second case, a textile mill owner, who has been an employer in the textile sector for thirty-two years, acknowledges that Turkey's textile sector is grappling with an acute labour shortage; therefore, many employers, including himself, see Syrians as 'life savers' as they are willing to take jobs that are disdained by Turkish citizens. He offers the following view on Syrians:

> "They (Syrians) greatly benefit from legislation and laws. They are better than Turkish citizens. They are prioritized in healthcare. They have foreign immunity. For instance, if there was a fight, a person who beats a Syrian up would seem more guilty. They are sort of 'guests' in our country. When a guest comes to our home, we want the guest to be satisfied first. We have to help! If we go to their country now, wouldn't we be glad if they treated us like this? It would make me sad if they returned to their country once the war is over. I might not be a Syrian, but I am an Ottoman grandson!" (male, 54, Turk, medium size textile mill owner)

In the third example, a young coil-winding technician talks frankly about his discomfort about Syrians' presence in the Turkish job market. Although he is convinced that they should be sent back to Syria because they harm Turkish society, he also invokes moral and cultural norms as in the second case, but in a different way:

> "Personally, if I were a Syrian, I wouldn't return (to Syria). Why should I return to a country that recently had a war? I have started a business here; I have an untaxed shop; I live perfectly here. This (Turkey) is a more developed place. I wouldn't leave this place. If I were a Syrian, I wouldn't return. But the state should send them back. They must be sent back because these troubles will grow even more if they are not sent back. To be frank, we hoped that... Syrians' resettlement from here to Afrin would bring global prestige to our state in the eyes of other countries...I mean how nice Turkey did not treat refugees badly. We see Europeans, they trip refugees up...We don't do that; after all, our cultural values do not let us do so. But there are other big problems within our country." (male, 25, Turk, coil winding technician)

The final case is a well-known construction company owner who has run his business for fifteen years and employs around a hundred construction workers, including Syrians. Despite clearly stating that he is happy with his Syrian workers' performance, his tone changes when asked about his general thoughts:

> "Before creating job opportunities and setting up a suitable infrastructure, you take and put all those guys in tents (temporary shelters); each of them has at least two or three wives, produces three children every year; they eat, drink, live in these camps...Those who don't like working sit in the camps. Those who like working live outside. Those who keen on the joy of life live outside. You know that, right? Those who don't like working live in the camps, eat three or four meals per day, and receive 350 Turkish lira cash assistance per family. Those who are keen on the joy of life work, eat, and drink outside. Those who are keen on freedom also work outside." (male, 50, Arab Alawite, a construction company owner)

These four quotes show related but distinct ways of looking at the same issue, which is the result of how they differently perceive and understand it. I have presented them together to draw attention to the importance of the context that such views originate from. In the first case, a cashier initially addresses the humanitarian aspect of the issue. However, he retreats from this humanitarian approach when considering the issue from his disadvantaged position: an employee's perspective. In the second case, a textile mill owner also mentions the humanitarian dimension. In contrast with the first case, he is also satisfied with the Syrians' presence in Turkey because they solve his labour shortage problem. In the third case, a technician points out both the sociopolitical (a Turkish military operation into Afrin in northwest Syria) and institutional context (an implicit reference to rights granted to Syrians in Turkey). He strongly believes that Syrians should be sent back to Syria as they create problems in Turkey, but the state should enforce it. Otherwise, Syrians themselves would not voluntarily return since living conditions in Turkey are much better than in Syria. In the final case, a construction company owner makes a clear distinction between Syrians who stay in the camps and those who do not because they are willing to work. Through this distinction, he associates Syrians who stay in the camps and receive unconditional cash assistance (institutional element) with a dependency culture. He implicitly labels them as morally and culturally deficient since these Syrian men, who have comfortable living conditions in the temporary refugee camps, have several wives, many children, and three free meals a day.

In the light of these examples, I analyse how everyday narratives regarding Syrian refugees in Turkey vary between workplace actors in terms of specific contextual dynamics. In a broader discussion, I illuminate how similarities and differences are constructed between the host society (Turkish employers and employees) and refugees (Syrian workers) in the workplace and how the notions of 'insider' and 'outsider' are produced, mobilized, negotiated, and contested by host society members in specific situational contexts.

1.1 Conceptualization of boundary-drawing

The concept of boundaries has been receiving increasing attention in recent years by various disciplines of social sciences such as anthropology, history, political science, social psychology, and sociology. Extant theoretical and empirical literatures have been generated by various disciplines within the social sciences to understand the very nature of boundaries and to unveil how boundaries are drawn and how boundary-making process takes place across different contexts and types of groups, and at different social-psychological, cultural and structural levels (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). The general aim of those studies is to extend the frame of the concept on 'boundaries' within social sciences.

Traditionally, the boundary-making approach is centred on more constructivist perspective where ethnicity is conceived as an essential boundary marker (Barth, 1969; Bourdieu, 1984; Weber, 1978). Within such constructivist perspective, ethnicity is regarded as 'the product of a social process rather than a cultural given, made, and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth (Wimmer, 2008a: 971). Jenkins (2014) asserts that ethnic identity is not created by a set of common cultural traits, but rather social identity plays role in forming ethnic groups via social interaction. This is why ethnic identity is not a static object, on the contrary, it can be produced and reproduced over time. Cultural characteristics, thus, serve as a boundary-making instrument which greatly contributes to the segmentation between 'us' ad 'them' (Brubaker, Lovemean and Stamatov, 2004; Duemmler, 2015). Jenkins (2014) recognizes the relational aspect of ethnic boundary work by referring to the binding relationship between group identification and external categorization which highly influences the appearance of 'outsider' and 'insider' notions. Whereas group identification deals with the ways individuals distinguish themselves from others through a sense of belonging and similarity within the in-group, external categorization is profoundly related to power relations and the capacity of the extent to which one group

imposes its chosen categories upon another group (Jenkins, 2014; Lamont and Molnar, 2002). This differentiation process basically stems from the struggle between establishing superiority over an out-group and generating control mechanisms for how to maintain it (Tajfel and Turner, 1985).

In the last two decades, sociologists, namely Lamont, Tilly, and Wimmer, have developed related but distinct approaches to the boundary work. Their studies' primary concern is to understand not only how boundaries are drawn, shifted, activated/deactivated and blurred by social actors; but also how boundaries are created among different types of groups and across various contexts, and what kinds of mechanisms and/or processes pave the way for the (re)emergence of boundaries (Lamont and Molnár, 2000; Tilly, 2004; and Wimmer, 2013). After closely looking at contributions of these scholars to academic literature on the concept of boundaries, I will try to explain where I intervene in the boundary-making phenomenon for this research project.

It is beyond doubt that Lamont (1992, 2000; Lamont and Molnar, 2002, Lamont et al., 2014, 2016), from cultural sociology perspective, substantially contributes to academic discussion and advances theoretical development on boundary work by drawing attention to mechanisms and processes within the framework of boundary research. In *Money, Morals and Manners* (1992) and *The Dignity of Working Men* (2000), Michèle Lamont inductively analyses how boundary work is performed by professionals, managers, and workers in the United States and France. More specifically, she focuses on how individuals coming from different occupational categories construct differences and similarities between themselves and others and what criteria are used to draw boundaries. In their seminal work, Lamont and Molnár (2002) draws a clear distinction between symbolic and social boundaries. Symbolic boundaries are defined as "conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come

to agree upon definitions of reality. Examining them allows us to capture the dynamic dimensions of social relations, as groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of classifications. Symbolic boundaries also separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership" (Lamont and Molnár, 2002: 168). With reference to this definition, it is highlighted that symbolic boundaries may evolve into social boundaries over time that are "objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to an unequal distribution of resources (material and non-material) and social opportunities" (Lamont and Molnár, 2002: 168). However, it is intently underlined only when the majority agrees upon symbolic boundaries, can they take on a constraining character and become social boundaries (Lamont and Molnár, 2002).

Tilly also brings to light the concept of 'social boundary mechanisms' by introducing two sets of mechanisms: (1) those that precipitate boundary change and (2) those that constitute boundary change (Tilly, 2004). Regarding the formation of social boundaries, Tilly agrees with the fact that a symbolic boundary is a necessary component of a social boundary as claimed by Lamont and Molnár (2002). However, Tilly proposes a preliminary inventory of robust mechanisms for social boundaries which are causing boundary change, consisting of boundary change, and producing consequences of boundary change (Tilly, 2004). He essentially provides an overarching framework for how causing mechanisms (encounter, imposition, borrowing, conversation, and incentive shift) are operated; how these causing mechanisms trigger constituting mechanisms (inscription and erasure, activation and deactivation, site transfer and relocation); and eventually, what kind of causal connections and consequences may be produced by interactions between the different causing mechanisms (Tilly, 2004).

Wimmer's multilevel process theory (2008a, 2013), no doubt, is a substantial contribution to constructive understanding of how ethnicity is produced and transformed over time. He describes ethnic boundaries as "the outcome of the classificatory struggles and negotiations

between actors situated in a social field" and 'the institutional order, distribution of power and political networks' forms three characteristics of a field (Wimmer, 2008a: 970). Wimmer (2008a, 2008b, 2013) thus criticizes primordialist and constructivist scholars as they are preoccupied with the very nature of ethnicity rather than its transformative character; as a result, Wimmer claims that they fail to explain why ethnic boundaries vary from one context to another. By introducing a systematic description of variety of ethnic constellations and outlining an illuminating theory for why the process of ethnic group formation generates such different outcomes, he examines systematically and empirically the varying character and consequences of ethnic boundaries (Jenkins, 2014).

Given the conceptual divergence and convergence among scholars and their notional approaches to boundary work, I follow Lamont's theoretical path for the contextualization of the use of boundary work for a number of reasons. First, boundary-drawing theory, in cultural sociology, does not establish strict rules regarding how to define and construct the notions of 'insiders' and 'outsiders.' On the contrary, it argues that the ways in which 'us' and 'them' are constructed is more complicated than initially presumed because of the presence of different contextual factors in our everyday lives, therefore, boundaries are not uniform which can be made and remade and constructed and deconstructed over time by social actors in a given situational context. Second, Lamont et al. (2014) argue that boundary work also matters for broader trends in inequality. Accordingly, 'cultural processes', defined as "ongoing actions/practices that feed into structures (organizations, institutions) to produce various types of outcomes" (Lamont, 2014: 817), is proposed as an analytical tool in order to analyse the relationship between inequality and boundary work. Therefore, we firstly look at how cultural processes feed into the production and reproduction of material and/or non-material-based inequality (Lamont et al., 2014). For this purpose, cultural processes are classified into two broad categories: identification (subdivided into: racialization and stigmatization) and

rationalization (subdivided into: standardization and evaluation). “Identification is defined as the process through which individuals and groups identify themselves, and are identified by others, as members of a larger collective whereas rationalization refers to the displacement of tradition and values as motivations for action by a means-end orientation” (Lamont et al., 2014: 15). Such analytical approach sheds two sides of the same coin because the former allows to trace the boundary-making process by analysing how individuals and groups intersubjectively construct their identities and how their identities are constructed by other individuals and groups via practices whereas the latter brings to light how values, attaining a certain type of worth to different groups of people and objects, are assigned by individuals which determines the group entity and ensures the recognition of one’s place in society (Lamont et al., 2014). Third, the linkage between boundaries and justifying/rationalizing one’s actions also advances our understanding with regards to through which contextual factors othering frames are generated and how degrees of othering frames influence the nature of boundaries through monopolization of economic, political, or symbolic resources by powerful social actors over the subordinated groups (Lamont, 2012). The context in which the notion of ‘othering’ is produced and reproduced may drive people to successfully monopolize categories of status ascription or values of specific class culture as a dominant standard. As for the degree of othering, power differentials can lead to the emergence of a boundary and status hierarchy, and direct individuals to question where boundaries lie and whom should be within the boundaries of dominant group, whom not. Last but not least, “Individuals do not aim to consciously deploy one system of symbolic boundaries over another, as they are rarely conscious that they inhabit categorization systems. Instead, they tend to use schemas that are largely taken for granted and made available by the national cultural repertoires that surround them” (Lamont, 2014: 816). Therefore, it is crucial to take into account the role of cultural repertoires and ongoing routine relationships in enabling and constraining behaviours towards dominant groups members as

well as subordinates. Where boundaries, across various contexts, are being established and routinized, how these boundaries are justified by both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, and at which point the ‘insiders’ need to distinguish themselves from the ‘outsiders’ and vice versa should be tackled very delicately.

1.2 Contextualization of boundary-drawing

Boundary-drawing in the context of migration and refugee studies

Because of the ways that “boundaries are drawn across contexts and types of groups, and at the social psychological, cultural, and structural levels”, they are not homogenous (Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 168). On the contrary, diverse strategies of constituting ‘self’ and ‘others’ create complexity and broad variety of boundary-drawing. Recognizing multidimensionality of how boundaries are produced, coexist, and interrelate, Lamont and Molnar, from a relational perspective, illuminate similarities and differences in boundary-drawing “across a wide range of social phenomena, institutions and locations” (2002: 169). Their specific focus is social and collective identity, class, ethnic/racial and gender/sexual inequality, the professions, science and knowledge, and community, national identities, and spatial boundaries (Lamont, 2014).

Without exception, migration scholars are naturally interested in boundary work (Bail, 2008). This may be because it is a flexible analytical tool that addresses varying levels and contexts of the construction of notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ to understand the multidimensional character of social identities. From institutional perspective, scholars examine the linkage between citizenship and integration regimes within the framework of national membership and the emergence of ‘insider vs. outsider' notion. To illustrate, Brubaker (1992) looks at how citizenship, as an institution, plays role in constituting ‘other’ by bringing together two distinct cases: France and Germany. He argues that the concept of citizenship in reference to two countries’ immigration policies is formalized and institutionalized in distinct ways as a consequence of different understanding of national identity. Focusing on France and Great

Britain's approaches to immigrant integration, Favell (1998), in his 'philosophies of integration', similarly discusses that differences in countries' responses to immigrant integration should not be considered independently from their national trajectories. Bauböck (1998) goes one step further in analysing the role of international migration in the crossing and blurring of political boundaries that are categorized as territorial borders of states, political boundaries of citizenship, and cultural (symbolic) boundaries of national communities. By analysing the role of religion (Islam) in Europe and language (Spanish) in the United States, Zolberg and Long (1999) sheds light on how such cultural elements of national identity serve as a boundary marker between immigrants and natives. With its specific focus on Muslim North African in France, Turks in Germany and Mexicans in the United States, Alba (2005) brings to light how citizenship, religion, language, and race extensively contributes to the institutionalisation of boundaries that are mainly derived from cultural, legal, and institutional materials.

Moving from institutional point of view to inter-subjective perspective, recent scholarship on boundary-drawing has taken into account everyday narratives about immigration and integration to explain how individuals engage in conceptual distinctions and mobilize notions of 'us and 'them' in various domains, such as *class, race,* and *ethnicity* (see DiTomaso 2007, 2013; Lamont, 1992, 2000), *religion* (see Trittler 2017, 2019), *generation* (see Çelik, 2017; Simonsen, 2018; Witte; 2017); and various social settings, such as *schools* (see Duemmler, 2015; Duemmler et al., 2010 for the Swiss majority and Albanian minority in Swiss schools), *multi-ethnic cities* (see Albeda et al., 2018 for a comparative case study of Rotterdam and Antwerp), and *workplaces* (see Waters, 1999 for West Indian immigrants' work experiences in the American food sector). For example, Waters (1999) looks at West Indian immigrants' work experiences in the American food sector and examines how conceptual distinctions such as moral discourses, cultural values are intersubjectively mobilised between West Indian

immigrants and American blacks in the United States. The concept of social class, no doubt, has been central to the study of boundaries which attempt to understand how racial boundaries are drawn between white and black workers (Lamont, 1992, 2000) and how racial boundary-drawing ignites inequalities in the labour market (DiTomaso 2007, 2013).

European scholars divert their attention to various social settings such as schools (see Duemmler et al., 2010) and multi-ethnic cities (see Albeda et al., 2018 for a comparative case of study Rotterdam and Antwerp) in order to analyse the role of context in boundary-drawing. For instance, Duemmler (2015) and Duemmler et al. (2010) has brought 'schools' to the agenda of boundary-drawing, as a crucial research site to study peer relations (the case of the Swiss majority and Albanian minority in Swiss schools). In a conceptually similar, but contextually distinct manner, Trittler (2017, 2019) focuses the role of religion as a symbolic boundary marker of the nation among majority and minority populations in Europe and explains direct consequences of such boundaries for the integration of migrants. The specific focus on 'generation' has also given a fresh impetus to the study of boundary work. In this regard, Witte (2017) dissects how first, 1.5 and second generation of Turkish immigrants in Germany engage with situational and discursive destigmatization strategies and how different types of responses to stigmatization affects the nature of boundaries. Despite differences in their analytical and contextual approaches, both Çelik (2017) and Simonsen (2018) specifically concentrate on second-generation immigrants and their boundary-making strategies towards the receiving society members. The former explores the ways in which second-generation of Turkish youth in Bremen engage with boundary-drawing whereas the latter attempts to understand how second-generation immigrants in Denmark simultaneously feels attachment to and distance for the nation. Despite ever-increasing scholarship on everyday narratives about immigration and integration in relation to boundary-drawing, very little has been done to incorporate refugee studies into boundary-drawing literature, except Vandevoordt and Verschraegen' recent work

(2019a), analysing boundary-drawing strategies of Syrian refugees among themselves, established immigrants, and natives in the context of Belgium.

Boundary-drawing in the context of work and employment

As indicated above, migration scholars increasingly turn their attention to explore how boundary-drawing takes places in various domains and social settings across different group of people in distinct country contexts. Yet, rigorous evidence of how boundary work is constructed in everyday work life in the informal sectors is still scant. In a similar vein, there is still an empirical room to explore refugees' involvement in host countries' workforce. As a result of the growing number of refugees around the world, there is a growing attention in migration and refugee studies to explore forced migrants' impacts on host countries' economies and their participation and integration into countries of first receptions.

One side of academic debates with regards to forced migration and employment focuses how refugees can contribute to economies of countries of first receptions. Betts and Collier (2017) underlines the fact that majority of refugees are hosted by the neighbouring countries, and therefore, they suggest the idea of striving for a refugee-driven economy which should empower and boost refugees' economic self-sufficiency in line with their needs in their host countries. By bringing the examples of Jordan and Uganda to the table, they argue that labour market-related investments should be encouraged in host countries through the support of countries in the Global North, instead of continuing to rely on conditional and/or non-conditional cash assistance programs. Similarly, Ruhs et al. (2019) questions the extent to which financial assistance should be provided to countries of first receptions and whether this assistance should be conditional or not by referring to the EU-Turkey Statement in 2016 which sets forth providing 6 billion Euros to Turkey with the aim of affording assistance to the country concerning the protection and integration of refugees. However, such (un)conditional financial assistance does guarantees neither refugees' self-sustainability nor their long-term integration

into host countries. Therefore, Betts and Collier (2017) propose that opening up a path for formal employment for refugees in neighbouring countries, especially through supporting export-driven manufacturing, is necessary. This does not only improve and enhance refugees' economic well-being which may strengthen their motivation to stay in their current host country instead of heading towards Europe, but also boost local economies in host countries (Betts and Collier, 2017).

Another side of the academic literature focuses on forced migrants' effects on host countries' economies. Despite an extensive literature on the impacts of immigrants on economies of host countries (Borjas, 1987; Card, 2001; Ruhs, 2013; Smith, 2012), there is still little literature available regarding how refugees influence host countries' economies (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013; Taylor et al., 2016). While some of the existing research argues that refugees do not significantly affect host countries' economies (see Landau, 2004 for the case of the central African refugees in Western Tanzania; Fakih and İbrahim, 2016 for the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan), other studies find out that refugees can have both positive and negative impacts on economies of host societies such as improving local's welfare (Alloush et al., 2016 Maystadt and Werwimp, 2009) or causing competition for wages, food, jobs, housing prices, and some services (Alix-Garcia and Saah, 2009; Chambers, 1986; Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014; Whitaker, 1999). For instance, Alix-Garcia et al. (2018) suggests that the presence of refugees in Kakuma, Kenya contributes to the local economy as there is a correlation regarding increase in between refugee numbers and higher consumption rates. On the other hand, Whitaker's work (1999) in the context of Western Tanzania shows that a large influx of refugees increases the competition between local and refugees for jobs in the casual labour sectors which results in depressing wages.

In a similar vein, the literature on forced migration and informality is still not abundant although there is an extant literature in the context of migration and informality (Chen, 2009; LaLonde

and Topel, 1996; Marcelo et al., 2013; Schneider and Enste, 2000). Whilst some studies suggest the positive correlation between forced migration and informality (see Oka, 2011), the majority of the existing scholarly work on forced migration and informality argues the opposite. For instance, Calderon and Ibañez (2009) examine the effects of forced migration on both formal and informal labour markets in Colombia by taking into account the role of gender. Their study demonstrates that an unexpected labour supply shock affects informal sector more than formal sector which actually result in depressing wages between locals and forced migrants in informal labour markets (Calderon and Ibañez, 2009). Some recent studies, with their specific focus on the Syrian refugee influx, also explore the link between forced migration and informality. To illustrate, Stave and Hilledsund (2015) find out that the unexpected labour shock created by Syrian refugees in Jordan has triggered the competition in low-skilled jobs in the informal sector between locals and refugees and led to an increase in unemployment rates after the arrival of Syrian refugees. Correspondingly, it is revealed that Syrian refugee inflow into Turkey has created a new source of labour which has a significant impact on the informal sector rather than the formal sector. These impacts can be summarized as decrease in wages, decrease in job finding rates, increase in unemployment, and substituting local labour force (Akgündüz et al., 2015; Balkan and Tumen, 2016; Ceritoglu et al., 2015; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Esen and Binatlı, 2017).

It is clear that the literature on forced migration and informal employment has significantly expanded in recent years, however, the existing literature still needs to assess different aspects of the nexus between forced migration and informal employment. In contrast to the previous scholarship, I do not focus on Syrian refugees' involvement in or their impacts on Turkey's formal and informal economy. Instead, I go one step further in this research by bringing everyday workplace interactions between Turkish employers, employees and Syrian refugees in Turkey's informal labour market to the agenda of not only boundary work literature, but also

the literature on forced migration and (in)formal employment. This is because scholars have paid less attention to the ways in which 'insiders' act with 'outsiders', how they justify their actions towards 'outsiders', and in what manner they react to how 'outsiders' are acting in workplaces in everyday informal economy in the context of forced migration. I further specify this point in the next section.

1.3 Researching multi-dimensional strategies of boundary-drawing

Drawing on these diverse theoretical approaches to boundary-drawing in various social settings, this thesis' central aim is to shed light on the multidimensional strategies of boundary-drawing towards Syrian refugees in Turkey's informal market economy. This study was initially motivated to investigate empirically unexplored dimensions of the boundary-drawing literature by bringing *the perspectives of the dominant group* towards *the refugee population* with its specific focus on *the informal market economy* in *a new immigration country.* In fact, very little has been done to incorporate refugee studies into the boundary-drawing literature (see Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019a) despite growing attention to studies on boundary-drawing in the last three decades. Similarly, studies on boundary-drawing beyond North America and Western European are rare (see Lamont et al., 2016 for an exception: Brazilian and Israeli cases). This geographical bias may result in a narrow understanding of configurations of groupness across societies. Furthermore, most qualitative studies on boundary work in migration studies are restricted to immigrant groups' perspectives (see Çelik, 2017; Simonsen, 2018; Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019a, 2019b). Given that boundary work is a bilateral process, it is also important to capture boundary perceptions of the dominant groups towards immigrant groups. Studying the perspectives of dominant groups is even more crucial for understanding the role of cultural repertoires in boundary-drawing and how they are mobilized to enable and constrain narratives towards 'others' (Lamont et al., 2016). I also look at how boundary work is implied, and boundaries are drawn in workplaces, particularly in the

informal market economy, which is still a neglected aspect of boundary work scholarship although it has been widely studied in other domains, such as multi-ethnic cities, schools, or other social settings (see Albeda et al., 2018; Duemmler, Dahinden, and Moret 2010; Lamont et al., 2016; Simonsen, 2018).

Thus, this thesis fills an empirical gap in existing work by exploring how Turkish employers and employees draw boundaries towards Syrian refugees in Turkey's informal market economy and by identifying the mechanisms they use in everyday work life interactions to differentiate between 'us' and 'them'. Turkey is a new immigration country that is home to the world's largest refugee population while suffering from widespread informal employment. This context provides unexplored venues to investigate how boundaries are drawn, negotiated, and contested in the agenda of employers and employees in Turkey's informal market economy.

Following Lamont's theoretical path, my primary concern in this study is to explain not only how individuals and/or groups intersubjectively construct their identities via practices but also how they assign values and attain a certain type of worth to different groups of people, which in turn determines the group entity and ensures the recognition of one's place in society (Lamont et al., 2014). To explain how Turkish employers and employees engage in multidimensional strategies of boundary-drawing, we should firstly look at the ways Syrians are perceived because this is directly linked with which type of boundary-drawing strategy is introduced. The ways Syrians are seen from the perspectives of host society members can be summarized in three clusters: as *workers*, *peers*, and *foreign nationals*. Of course, these three distinct ways of perceiving Syrians are not mutually exclusive from socioeconomic, sociocultural, sociopolitical and institutional background factors. First, both employers and employees see Syrian refugees as (potential) *workers,* who desperately need jobs. However, their perceptions are distinct. Employers view Syrians as potential workers who not only remedy labour shortages but also demand less than Turkish employees whereas Turkish

employees regard Syrians as a desperately needy group with no alternative other than accepting whatever is offered to them. Second, Syrians' willingness to work for low wages without asking for registration with the Turkish Social Security System also drives Turkish employees to see Syrians as *workplace peers* who are competing for the same jobs but under different conditions. Yet, competing for the same jobs is not a sufficient condition for Turkish employees to regard Syrians as equal peers because of differences in both their regarded and assigned roles, and workplace employment conditions. Third, both employers and employees view Syrians as *foreign nationals* regarding access to and the exercise of social rights, and everyday nationhood and citizenship.

Depending on the perspective from which participants approach the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey, they introduce different boundary-drawing logics. Such logics are sometimes employed to emphasize similarities and differences between host society members and refugees, and sometimes to stigmatize the 'other'. Equally important, the salient boundary-drawing strategies are not homogenous but vary between background factors and social actors. Regarding Syrians' employment, employers mobilize a *moral dimension* of boundary-drawing during both the hiring process and employment itself. Employers use morality as a tool to justify *why* they hire Syrians and *how* they define and distinguish between worthy and less worthy employees. Considering workplace peer relations, employees prioritize the *socioeconomic dimension* of boundary-drawing over race, ethnicity, religious, and moral characteristics because they primarily regard these newcomers (Syrians) as threatening the socio-economic well-being of Turkish employees in both their city and the country. Regarding the *institutional dimension*, both employers and employees forcefully mobilize the perception of allocation of social rights to Syrian refugees in Turkey in the context of differential healthcare policies. This alleged access to healthcare drives host society members to differentiate the institutionalized worthiness of Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees which results in multi-layered welfare

deservingness judgements. In the context of nationhood and citizenship, both employers and employees deploy *the national identity* dimension of boundary work by mobilizing historically rooted national identity constructions (militaristic, unitary) and symbols (language, flag) to demarcate who belongs and deserves citizenship and who does not.

1.4 Situating pivotal terms and concepts in this study

Throughout the thesis, I use the term 'Syrians in Turkey' interchangeably with 'Syrians under temporary protection', 'Syrian refugees', and 'Syrian asylum seekers' for three reasons. First, Turkey does not officially recognize Syrians as refugees. Instead, it grants temporary protection to all Syrians who are registered with the Turkish authorities. Thus, I sometimes use 'Syrians under temporary protection' when I refer to them in the context of Turkish legislation and regulations. Second, although Turkey does not grant refugee status to Syrians in Turkey, I sometimes use the term of 'refugee' to draw attention to the universal aspect of seeking international protection and rights. Third, beyond these legal definitions, Syrians are occasionally referred to as 'refugees' or 'asylum seekers' by the participants to underline their legal status in Turkey. This point is important because I treat the Syrian refugee influx as both the case in this study and a crucial contextual factor in order to uncover boundary-drawing regarding how individuals make sense of their identity, and the reality they experience. Unexpected situations and instances, as in the case of the Syrian refugee influx, can breach unspoken workplace, institutional, and national norms that express people's everyday understandings of how they identify and categorize 'others'. Breaching occurs within contexts, and when norms lying "just beneath the surface" are breached, they become explicit and readily deployable through "the mundane contexts, practices and rhythms of everyday life" (Fox, 2017: 28). In this thesis, I thus consider the Syrian refugee influx as a breaching context that may either enable or constrain individuals' everyday understandings of workplace, institutional, and

national norms while playing a key role in the (re)production of boundaries and making claims about ‘outsiders’.

Beyond these terms, I refer to Syrians in Turkey as ‘Syrians’, ‘Syrian workers/employees’, and/or ‘Syrian peers’ for contextual reasons to capture and highlight how Syrian refugees are seen through the lens of the host society in a given context. The ways Syrians are viewed vary according to one’s social position in workplaces (employer versus employee) and background factors (moral norms, labour market dynamics, unequal access to and distribution of both material and nonmaterial resources, and historically rooted national identity constructions and symbols). Therefore, the ways participants refer to Syrian refugees is not static throughout the chapters. This also means that I variously refer to the participants as ‘Turkish employers’, ‘Turkish employees’ (especially in Chapters 3 and 4), and ‘the host society’, ‘ordinary citizens’ and/or ‘Turkish citizens/native-born’ (especially in Chapters 5 and 6). While ‘Turkish employers and employees’ denotes their social position in the workplace compared to Syrians, both ‘the host society’ and ‘Turkish citizens’ are used as generic terms to refer to the members of a country’s population who are native-born and hold Turkish citizenship. Here, I should explicitly underline that ‘Turkish’ refers to legal citizenship not ethnicity in this thesis. It is defined *in terms of citizenship* in Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, irrespective of religion and race. More specifically, people who have at least one Turkish parent, which accords them Turkish citizenship rights by birth, are called ‘Turkish’. I use this term here as an analytical category to explain the context in which the notions of ‘insiders versus outsiders’ are denoted. That is, ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are attributed and shaped by invoking Turkish citizenship rather than ethnicity or race. This is in line with Elias and Scotson’s ([1965] 1994) empirical study, which claims that conflicts may also stem from power and social dynamics between dominant and subordinate groups (in this case, being Turkish citizen or not) rather than class, race, ethnicity, or other social structures. In this regard, citizenship status allows ‘native-born’

Turkish citizens to set themselves apart as the established insiders whereas the ‘foreign-born’ status greatly disadvantages Syrian refugees, who are categorized as outsiders. Consequently, I consider all the participants in this study as insiders on the basis of citizenship, despite their different ethnic origins (e.g. Kurds, Zaza, Arab Alawites, and ethnic Turks).

Given Adana’s highly diverse ethnic composition, which was selected as a fieldwork site for this study, one might ask whether ethnic differences and ongoing ethnic conflicts (between Turks and minority ethnic groups, and among minority ethnic groups) play a role in the labour market and social relationships and in the attributions of ‘who belongs’ and ‘who does not belong’. Overall, my study finds that the citizenship status takes the precedence over class, race, ethnicity, and religious characteristics in the agenda of the host society while identifying themselves and categorizing Syrians. This might be due to two reasons. First, Adana province has been a historically attractive economic hub which frequently receives seasonal workers, mainly from neighbouring provinces in the South-east region of Turkey. As well as locals with ethnic minority background, such as Arab Alawites, there is a significant Kurdish population owing to internal migration into the province for seasonal work. This heterogenous demographic profile has historically grounded a more harmonious existence between different ethnic groups in Adana compared to other cities and regions in Turkey. Second, and relatedly, regarding employing and working with Syrian refugees, other background factors, such as economic interests, rather than ethnicity, primarily and heavily dominate both employers’ and employees’ agenda. Although both groups introduce different justification logics towards Syrian refugees, neither Syrians’ nor the respondents’ ethnic background seems a crucial determinant in shaping the notions of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ status. Thus, generating feelings of similarity and group membership, based on citizenship, is followed by and reinforced through other kinds of inclusionary and exclusionary attributions as well as one’s social position

at work (insider/employer, insider/employee, outsider/worker/peer). In the chapters to follow, I elaborate these points further.

1.5 Researching boundary-drawing in a new immigration country: Turkey

This study is concerned about understanding and explaining how the host society of a new immigration country views and interacts with refugees in everyday work life in the informal market economy and how this shapes the 'insider-outsider' relationship. As previously mentioned, there is little in the boundary-drawing literature regarding refugees, or countries where immigration is recent (Bail, 2008). Therefore, Turkey is an excellent case to study how boundaries are drawn and mobilized regarding refugees in the informal market economy for several reasons.

First, Turkey historically has been known as more of an immigrant-sending country than an immigrant-receiving one (Şanlıer Yüksel, İçduygu and Millet, 2019). Although immigration is not a new phenomenon in the agenda of Turkey, characteristics of immigration to Turkey was more homogenous between the period of early 1920s and late 1990s. This is because the country opened its doors primarily and mostly to ethnic Turkish Muslims who had to flee to Turkey from Balkan countries, former Communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Kirişçi, 2003), owing to the country's national identity-building policies (İçduygu and Biehl, 2012; Kirişçi, 2003). However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey's migration patterns changed drastically. As a result, the country has become home to highly skilled individuals, economic migrants, students, and lifestyle migrants as well as refugees and asylum seekers (Şanlıer Yüksel and İçduygu, 2014), regardless of one's ethnic and/or religious identity. Acknowledging institutional and contextual changes in the configuration of Turkey's migration patterns in the last two decades, I categorize Turkey as a new immigration country in this research project (see also Düvell, 2020). With the outbreak of the Syria's civil war in March 2011, a majority of Syrian citizens had to escape to near destinations. As of July 2020, more

than 6.6 million people are internally displaced in Syria and over 5 million Syrian refugees live in neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2020). Turkey's open-door policy towards Syrians fleeing their country has made it one of the major countries in the region, along with Lebanon and Jordan receiving Syrian refugees. Consequently, Turkey is today home to more than 3.6 million refugees from the ongoing war in Syria (DGMM, 2020) and 2.1 million of which are of working age in Turkey (Kirişçi and Uysal Kolasın, 2019). However, the actual number of Syrians in Turkey is probably much higher many refugees are either unregistered or awaiting registration (İçduygu, 2015). Initially, Syrians registered with the Turkish authorities were hosted in 25 temporary shelter centres in ten provinces of Turkey (AFAD, 2018). However, Turkey has been systematically closing down those centres since late 2018. Only 61,798 of Syrian refugees are currently hosted in temporary shelter centres while the rest are dispersed among communities across the country (DGMM, 2020; Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016). The majority of non-camp Syrian refugees are highly concentrated in the south and south-eastern provinces of Turkey, such as Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay, Adana, Mersin, Kilis, and Mardin (see Figure 1). As well as these border cities, many Syrian refugees are scattered throughout İstanbul, İzmir, and Bursa (DGMM, 2020). By employing the case of Turkey as a new immigration country and home to the world's largest refugee population, this study assesses how the recent mass influx of Syrian refugees has breached the moral, socio-economic, institutional and national norms of the host society in a given situational context. The aim is to uncover how notions of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' are constructed and reveal how such breaching can enable the deployment of boundaries towards refugees.

Figure 1: Distribution of Syrians under Temporary Protection by Top 10 Provinces



Source: Republic of Turkey, Directorate General of Migration Management, 2020 (accessed 17 August 2020).

The second reason for choosing Turkey is that the legal framework governing how Syrians can enter, stay and depart from Turkey is quite complex. Although Turkey signed the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Additional Protocol, it still maintains the geographic limitation. This means that only asylum-seekers from Europe are entitled to stay in Turkey and to be recognized as refugees (Çorabatır, 2016). Instead, Turkey introduced *the 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP).* This is regarded as a landmark reform because it institutionalized and regularized for the first time the conditions under which foreigners can stay in Turkey and their rights concerning migration and asylum flows (LFIP, 2014). In accordance with the new law, *the Temporary Protection Scheme* was introduced in 2014, which ensures the temporary stay of a mass influx of displaced people to Turkey, as in the case of Syrians. *The 2014 Regulation* of *Temporary Protection* adopts the principle of non-refoulement guaranteeing that Syrians can stay temporarily while their claims for refugee status and resettlement is evaluated by the UNHCR and Directorate General of Migration Management of Turkey (DGMM, 2020). According to this regulation, all Syrian

nationals are eligible to enjoy *'temporary protection'* status in Turkey. Although Turkey currently does not provide any public housing to Syrians (except for those staying in temporary shelter centres), any Syrian national protected under the temporary protection regime has the right to access healthcare[1], education,[2] and some social services irrespective of residing in or outside of the camps.

However, because of the duration of their temporary status in Turkey is not clearly defined (İçduygu, 2015), there is uncertainty for the Syrian refugees themselves and host society members. Therefore, the Turkish State's open-door policy approach has evolved in a legal limbo that has provoked displeasure within Turkey. It is also important to note that the Turkish authorities until recently officially labelled these Syrians as 'guests' rather than 'refugees' while the refugee camps are called a 'temporary residence' for the country's Syrian guests. This ambiguity of the legal status of camp and non-camp Syrian refugees in Turkey has left the host society members more puzzled considering how to address and interpret the temporary versus permanent settlement of Syrians in Turkey. In this regard, opaque legal policies and the ambiguous legal status of Syrians offers a specific context to study how this affects the construction of 'who belongs' and 'who does not belong', and shapes group categorization and identification in relation to notions of 'insiders' versus 'outsiders'.

[1] Syrian refugees' right to healthcare in Turkey is explained in detail in Chapter 5.

[2] Considering that the right to education is granted to everyone under Turkish national legislation, Syrian refugees can freely access to education in Turkey. According to Turkish law, twelve years of education is compulsory for everyone, including foreign nationals. Syrian children have two alternatives to pursue their education in Turkey. The first option is Temporary Education Centres, where education is provided only to Syrian children by Syrian teachers (Çelik and İçduygu, 2018). In these centres, teaching is in Arabic and using a slightly adjusted Syrian curriculum (Save the Children, 2015). The second option is to be enrolled in public schools, where education is given in Turkish by Turkish teachers using the Turkish curriculum (MoNE, 2014). All Syrians also have the right to higher education in Turkey. There are two different admission categories for Turkish higher education institutions: first admission and a 'transfer student' procedure that caters to Syrian students whose university education has been interrupted due to the civil war (Yıldız, 2019). To ease the admission procedures for those without documents, Turkey introduced a new law in 2017: "Recognition and Equivalence Application Processes for Those from Countries with War, Invasion and Annexation" (Turkish Council of Higher Education, 2017; Yıldız; 2019).

Figure 2: Number of Syrian Refugees in Turkey under Temporary Protection by Year



Source: Republic of Turkey, Directorate General of Migration Management, 2020. (accessed 17 August 2020)

Third, Turkey has geographically been a cultural mosaic for centuries which is characterized by a heterogeneous demography across its regions. It is thus very difficult to gauge Turkey's ethnic composition numerically because no government has collected comprehensive data on ethnicity and religious sects since 1960 (Cagaptay, 2014, 2016). The profile of Syrians in Turkey is also heterogeneous in terms of religion (e.g. Sunnis, Alawites, and Christians), ethnicity (e.g. Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen, Yazidis, Dom, Armenians, etc.), and social class (İçduygu, 2015; Şimşek, 2018). And, such diverse Syrian refugee population is dispersed across Turkey. Given that national identification and attachment to one's ethnic and/or religious identity are strongly associated with boundary-drawing (Wimmer, 2013), Turkey, characterized by this ethnic and/or religious heterogeneity while being as a highly unitary state, offers an empirically rich case to examine the roles of ethno-cultural and ethno-religious similarities and differences in boundary-drawing.

Finally, although the socio-economic consequences of rapid urbanization, falling unemployment, and rising life expectancy have improved Turkish society's socio-economic

status within a decade (Grutjen, 2008), a significant number of Turkish citizens, particularly those in blue-collar jobs, still work informally despite the Turkish state's efforts to reduce informality. Undoubtedly, the level of informal employment has been exacerbated by the high influx of refugees. In contrast to the right to healthcare and education, the right to work was not included in the original Temporary Protection Scheme. In order to structure a work permit and regularize employment, the new *Regulation on Work Permit for Foreigners under Temporary Protection* was passed on January 15, 2016. This regulation allows Syrians registered with the DGMM to work legally in the province where they first registered, although the right to work is not automatically granted. Syrians who are under the temporary protection regime are restricted by eligibility criteria and administrative procedures for work permit applications. First, those under temporary protection are only eligible to apply for a work permit after legally residing 6 months in Turkey. Second, any application must be made to the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services from the province where the applicant is first registered by an employer unless they are self-employed. Next, the number of working Syrians under temporary protection must not exceed 10 percent of the Turkish citizens employed at the workplace where the work permit is requested, except for the agriculture and livestock sectors. Last, Turkish employers who intend to hire Syrians under the temporary protection regime must offer a contract that guarantees at least the minimum wage and register them with Turkish Social Security System. Nevertheless, the engagement of Syrian refugees in the formal labour market has remained restricted given that only 31,185 Syrian refugees were granted a work permit between 2016 and 2019 (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services) while there are 2.1 million Syrian refugees of working age in Turkey (Kirişçi and Uysal Kolasın, 2019). In contrast, the number of Syrian refugees informally employed in Turkey is estimated at between 750,000 and 1,000,000 (International Crisis Group, 2018, Kadkoy, 2017).

It is evident that the arrival of Syrian refugees has socially and economically unbalanced society in Turkey's cities (Amnesty International Turkey, 2016). According to Turkish Labour Force statistics, Turkey's overall unemployment was 13.08 per cent as of January 2020, which is the highest level since March 2010. While the national unemployment rate has slightly changed, local unemployment rates have perceptibly increased, particularly in the regions with large populations of Syrian refugees (İçduygu, 2016). According to recent studies, Syrian refugee inflow into Turkey created an unexpected labour supply shock (Akgündüz et al., 2015; Balkan and Tumen, 2016; Ceritoglu et al., 2015; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). These studies underline the role of the informal market in Turkey's economy which accounts for one third of paid employment (International Crisis Group, 2018) and it tended to be higher even before the arrival of Syrians. As of 2019, 34,52 percent of Turkish citizens had undeclared employment (SGK, 2020). Balkan and Tumen (2016), for example, reported 4 percent decrease in wages in the informal sector after Syrians arrived in Turkey whereas there was no significant impact on the formal sector. Similarly, Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) found that the entrance of Syrians into Turkey's informal sector created a new source of labour that replaced native workers regardless of gender, age, and education. That is, labour force participation, informal employment, and job finding rates have fallen among Turkish natives despite the increase in unemployment across particular regions (Ceritoglu, et al., 2015). Building Markets' study in 2017 estimated that there were more than 10,000 unregistered Syrian-owned businesses in Turkey compared to about 8,000 registered enterprises (Building Markets, 2017). Although it is hard to assess the effect of Syrian refugee inflows on Turkey's labour market because Syrians have only restricted access, one can conclude that Syrian refugee inflows have affected the labour outcomes of natives in the regions, particularly in the informal sector, where native workers seem to be replaced by Syrian refugees (İçduygu, 2016; Sivis, 2020; Sivis and Yıldız, 2019). Given the structural dynamics of its labour market, Turkey, where informality persists

among both Turkish citizens and foreigners in the labour-intensive economic sectors, is an interesting case to explore how boundaries are drawn towards refugees in workplaces.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is structured in seven chapters. Following this *Introduction* chapter, *Chapter 2* focuses on research design, where I explain my methodological approach and the tools that I used in this study. *Chapter 2* begins with the scientific logic of a single case study research design and case selection. This is followed by a detailed description of the fieldwork sites, data collection techniques and process, fieldwork strategies, reflections on my positionality during the fieldwork, and ethical considerations. I then present the data analysis and coding process before discussing methodological limitations of this study.

As shown above, boundaries are often looked at across ethnic and/or national groups and different social classes. Unlike the previous scholarship on boundary-drawing, this study brings in workplace relations and the institutional context of rights and citizenship. To be able to explain how and why Syrians are viewed in three distinct ways - as *workers, peers,* and *foreign nationals* - from the perspectives of 'insiders', it is vital to look at the perspective from which participants approach to the presence of Syrians in Turkey. As the notions of 'insider' and 'outsider' are generated on the basis of one's social position at work in particular, and one's citizenship in general, the ordering of empirical chapters in this thesis is, therefore, established according to through which 'insider' title Turkish citizens mobilize to draw boundaries towards Syrians in workplaces. That is to say, moving across chapters, the notions of 'insider' and 'outsider' gets wider (e.g. insider/employer – insider/employee vs. outsider/worker/peer). Beginning with the perspectives of *employers,* continuing with the perspectives of *employees,* and ending with the perspectives of *host society members* gives a complete picture of multidimensional strategies of boundary-drawing.

Accordingly, *Chapter 3* explores the moral dimension of boundary-drawing towards Syrian workers in workplaces from the perspective of Turkish employers. More specifically, it looks at how employers use distinct framing strategies to negotiate and contest moral boundaries at different stages of employment in Turkey's labour-intensive economic sectors. This chapter draws our attention to the role of attachment to the morality of boundary-drawing at different stages of employment: during the hiring process and employment itself as hiring strategies and motivations deployed by employers 'before hiring' greatly differs from 'after hiring' depending on different work experiences.

Chapter 4 concentrates on the role of socioeconomic justification strategies in boundary-drawing from the perspectives of employees. This chapter looks at how employees use socioeconomic justifications to ensure their more dignified status over their Syrian peers in the workplace. More specifically, it explores how boundaries are drawn between Turkish and Syrian employees in the same workplace across various economic sectors through analysing (1) what makes Syrians 'peers' in the eyes of employees and (2) how employees tend to position themselves as worthy over their Syrians peers.

Chapter 5 focuses on the social and symbolic boundaries regarding institutionally driven social differences between social groups from the perspective of the host society members. This chapter, with its specific focus on differential healthcare policies, examines the role of perceptions of allocated social rights in drawing social boundaries and reinforcing symbolic boundaries towards outsiders. Drawing on welfare deservingness and boundary-drawing, this chapter examines (1) how institutional elements (differential healthcare policies) can constrain insiders' narratives about outsiders, (2) how extending the right to healthcare to Syrian refugees provides grounds for social and symbolic boundaries, and (3) how boundary work interacts with insiders' perceptions of welfare deservingness.

Chapter 6 scrutinizes the role of cultural repertoires of everyday nationhood and citizenship in national identity boundary-drawing through the lens of ordinary citizens. By addressing the role of salient contextual factors in this process, this chapter looks at how ordinary citizens deploy historically rooted national identity constructions (militaristic, unitary) and symbols (language, flag) and how boundaries are drawn to demarcate who deserves citizenship and who belongs by mobilizing cultural repertoires.

Chapter 7 presents the concluding remarks of this thesis. After summarizing the research findings, it discusses the study's contributions to the boundary-making literature and beyond (particularly refugee studies, sociology of evaluation, welfare deservingness, and everyday national citizenship). The final part first considers the limitations of this research before suggesting a new agenda for further research on boundary-drawing.

Chapter 2: Methodology and Research Design

The research design of this thesis can be summarized in three key components: it adopts an inductive approach in nature, it exclusively adheres to a qualitative methodology, and it is concerned with subjective meanings, referring to "individuals' own accounts of their attitudes, motivations and behaviour" (Aspers and Corte, 2019: 147). Single-case research design is the primary instrument used in this study in order to find out multiple forms of creating boundaries toward 'outsiders' (e.g. Syrian refugees) by paying particular attention to how intersubjective meaning-making elements are (re)produced by members of a single community: Adana, an economic hub close to conflict region in Turkey. In this study, members of a single community refer to locals of Adana in a narrow sense, and native-born Turkish citizens in a broad sense. As Yin describes, "a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2009: 18). In this research, I focused on Turkish citizens, namely Turkish employers and employees (having at least one Turkish parent, which accords them Turkish citizenship rights by birth). Single-case research design allows me not only to gain a deeper understanding of the narratives of Turkish citizens towards Syrian refugees in Adana, but also to explore how different dimensions of boundaries, within the bounds of a single nation, operate with regards to one's employment status in the workplace (employers versus employees) and exercising citizenship rights (citizens versus foreigners). Acknowledging the advantages and limitations of single case study analysis, this chapter looks at the case selection, the rationale behind the research design and methodology, ethical consideration (access to informal market economy), fieldwork strategies and challenges, how the data is collected, and data analysis. The chapter closes with methodological limitations of this conducted study.

2.1. Case Selection

Adana, 221 km away from the border with Syria, is located in the Eastern Mediterranean part of Turkey (see Map 1). Like many provinces in Turkey, Adana, with 2.237.940 population, is characterized by a heterogenous demography and sheltering individuals with diverse ethno-cultural and ethno-religious background (DGMM, 2020). Despite lack of data on ethnicity and religious sects in Turkey (Cagaptay, 2014, 2016), Adana is known as cultural mosaic harbour hosting a significant number of internal migrants - mostly Kurds coming for seasonal work from Turkey's South-east region- as well as local people such as Turks, Arabs, and Roma people (TUIK, 2020). Migration is therefore not new in the city's agenda; however, migration patterns in Adana have changed in recent years as a result of Syrian refugee inflow. Adana is the fifth province in Turkey in terms of the highest number of Syrian refugees and currently home to 248.789 registered Syrians which accounts for 11.12 percent of the local population (DGMM, 2020). Beyond its geographical proximity to Syria, numerous job opportunities, no doubt, are one of driving reasons why Syrians are attracted to the city. One shall note that the unemployment rate in Adana slightly ranges below the national average (14 percent) which was recorded as 12 percent in 2019 (TUIK, 2020). Perhaps more importantly, the rate for informal economy has always remained considerably higher among Turkish citizens in Adana. Given Adana's overall sectoral dynamics, agriculture, construction and manufacturing appear as main economic sectors not only offering job opportunities to Syrian refugees, but also grappling with high rates of informal market economy. Statistically speaking, 40 percent of Turkish citizens in Adana region were unregistered with the Turkish Social Security System in 2019[3] albeit the national average stood at 34,52 percent (SGK, 2020). Given high rates of informal market among Turkish citizens, it is not surprising that the city also has become a crucial economic hub for Syrians on the grounds that they can readily take part in the local informal market

[33] See Annex, Table 1 for more information on the rate of unregistered employment in regions among Turkish citizens in Turkey.

economy. Despite difficulty in measuring impacts of Syrian refugee inflow on labour market at both national and local level, Syrian refugees seem to substitute for native workers especially in the informal sector (İçduygu, 2016). Adana is thus selected as a case study because not only is the research focusing on the Syrian refugees in Adana nearly none in the literature, but also Adana's vibrant economy and proximity to Syria emerge as main factors of motivation for this study.

Figure 3: Location of Adana Province on Turkey map

Source: Created by the author. Map depicting Adana.

2.2 Ethical Issues, Confidentiality and Data Storage

As required by the University of Essex, ethical approval of research involving human participants was obtained prior to commencing the fieldwork in order to ensure the protection of all human subjects who directly or indirectly took part in this research project. Recognizing that 'informality' is a sensitive issue, I had to be more cautious considering the protection of the anonymity of interviewees prior to, during, and following my data collection. The informed oral consent of each interviewee was taken with guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality before the interview began. Regarding that the interviews were conducted with different target groups (stakeholders, Turkish employers and employees), I had to develop different strategies in regard to obtaining consent for recording. As for expert interviews, none of them were

recorded. Instead, I took extensive notes during the interviews. The main reason behind was to give participants enough flexibility through which they could critically reflect on the issue of *Work Permit for Foreigners under Temporary Protection,* the Turkish state's evolving migration policies towards Syrian refugees and share their opinions on evaluation of the presence or absence of cross-institutional collaboration among local actors in Adana. Only institutional affiliation of the interviewees was referred as (1) experts interviewed talked to me on behalf of their institutions and/or organizations; and (2) any sensitive information that shared with me may generate a conflict of interest for other actors in the field.

Considering the content of the interviews and naturally occurring focus groups with Turkish citizens, this research did not contain any personal details (e.g. participants' contact details) that might lead to the identification of participants. Rather, interviews asked about participants' socio-demographic background (age, sex, marital status, type of residence (urban/rural); socio-economic background (level of education and labour force status); socio-cultural background (ethnicity and religious sects); and both interviews and focus groups asked about participants' overall wellbeing and their experiences with, and the state policies towards Syrians. After participants were informed about the structure and content of interviews, the interviews began. Considering the possibility that recent political atmosphere in Turkey and the research's specific focus on the informal market might have discouraged participants to have an interview with me, I thus did not take a written consent of interviewees. Instead, an oral consent of each interviewee was taken with guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality. Besides, participants were ensured that they had the right to withdraw or to skip any questions with which they might not feel comfortable during the interview if any of them so wished. Regarding recording, the participants were frankly asked beforehand whether they were willing to be recorded or not. As for naturally occurring focus groups, I had to follow a different strategy for obtaining informed consent. While I was conducting an interview with interested respondents, their next-

door neighbours (owner of other sorts of shops or workplaces), customers and colleagues spontaneously showed up. Every time a new person came in, I had to explain the aim of the research and interview and the presence of recording device (except for Focus Group 1 because notes were taken), and to seek their consent to be recorded (while this was already happening).

It is worth mentioning that informal employment is extremely common in my field site, and workplace regulations rarely enforced. Adana is already characterized by the high level of informal economy among Turkish citizens particularly in the labour-intensive sectors, leading to the normalization of such informality in the local work life, which has been like this even before the arrival of Syrians. As a result, participants felt comfortable with expressing their views on their work experiences with Syrians even though informality is generally seen as a sensitive issue. Regarding doing research in the informal economy with vulnerable populations (both Turkish and Syrian employees), using local gatekeepers, which I will explain in the next section, appeared as an important fieldwork strategy in the sense of (1) enabling me to access to the local informal market as a non-local person; and (2) reducing potential risks to employers and employees' well-being. Also, I should note while the employees I observed are economically vulnerable, they were all adults. Thus, observations of employees with undocumented status were not deemed as high risk.

The interview material was carefully stored so that no outsiders except the doctoral project researcher has had access to it. In the process of data analysis, each interview was enumerated as respondent 1, 2, 3 etc. (including research site and demographic codes that was meaningful for my analysis) to ensure all collected information was treated in confidence. In other words, all collected data was anonymized. All data such as interviews/interview notes/transcripts was stored electronically in my personal file space (OneDrive account) on the Essex University server. All files were password protected. When I needed to store data on my laptop other than

the server in the case of a lack of internet connection, I made sure that my laptop had been not only password protected, but also encrypted.

2.3 My Position in the Field

Traditional understanding of migration research draws the concept of positionality upon a clear-cut distinction: an outsider or an insider researcher. The former refers to being a member of the migrant group which is studied whilst the latter encompasses a researcher profile that is a majority group member in the country of settlement (Carling et al., 2014). However, such understanding has been challenged by the fact that the insider-outsider divide is neither static nor fixed, on the contrary, the positionality of a researcher is an ongoing process of negotiation which highly depends on the situational context (Carling et al., 2014; Kusow 2003; Nowicka and Cieslik, 2014; Pustulka et al., 2019; Skrutkowaski, 2014). In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention the contribution of Carling, Bivand Erdal and Ezzatti's work (2014) to the insider-outsider divide debate in migration studies. The authors proposed *third positions* as an additional category which "can give researchers greater freedom from undesired associations and contribute to a focus on individuals rather than categories in the encounter between researchers and informants" (Carling et al., 2014: 52). Accordingly, third positions are accompanied by some markers such as name, occupation, gender, age group, physical appearance, dressing style, language skills, cultural competence, migration experiences and so on. When necessary, such markers can be brought forward as personal attributes by researchers which, in turn, affects researchers' positionality. In guidance of these markers, five distinct categories are introduced: (1) an explicit third part (i.e. acquaintance with neither the migrant nor the majority group), (2) an honorary insider (i.e. surpassing ethno-national boundaries via cultural competence, language skills or sustained commitment to a migrant group), (3) an insider by proxy (i.e. being a migrant researcher who is profile is not the same as the one under study), (4) a hybrid insider-outsider (i.e. sharing same and/or similar peculiarities with both the

migrant and majority group as a researcher), and (5) an apparent insider (i.e. being a member of the researched migrant group without sharing similar life experiences) (Carling et al., 2014). Yet, this existing typology still needs to be expanded by incorporating "the situation wherein the researcher is considered as an 'insider of the host community' by interviewees when conducting research about a migrant community" (Irgil, 2020: 2). This is mostly because "insider status is not simply granted or achieved. It is created through an ongoing process of evaluation that is dependent on the performance of the group membership by researchers and participants at multiple levels" (De Andrade, 2000: 283).

Although it is not a new phenomenon to conduct research in an environment which the researcher is familiar with (see Al-Makhamreh and Lewando-Hundt, 2008; Irgil, 2020; Labaree, 2002), insider status should not be taken for granted because the researcher's positionality is rather fluid which depends on not only the relationship between the researcher and informants, but also kinds of markers are assigned to the researcher during the research progress (Carling et al., 2014). Acknowledging that researchers' positions have a direct impact on reaching to and shaping interaction with informants, taking the previous distinction of locals of Adana and native-born Turkish citizens, my positionality, in a narrow sense, was partially outsider as a non-local person but insider as a native speaker in a broad sense. The fact that I have the same nationality with participants very much facilitated to have more meaningful, fluid and deeper interviews. Besides, I found out that my other titles relating to my personal and professional background (especially for the interviews with employers and employees) helped me spark interviewees' interest in my research topic and find a common ground between me and them during the fieldwork. My position in the field was spontaneously designated depending on course of interviews: as a researcher coming from the university, as a non-local Turkish citizen in Adana, and as a young lady coming from small business owner family.

My position as a researcher from the university was always my main departure point while introducing myself to interviewees. From November 2017 to June 2018, I arranged a Visiting Research Fellow position at Çukurova University which is very well-known for its developed reputation for teaching and research in the region. As it makes more sense and sounds more concrete for participants to refer to my position at Çukurova University in the beginning of conversation, I preferred to mention my title at the University of Essex after a while as conversation progressed. Although I visited most of interviewees during working hours, I was very welcomed all the time. One of the reasons behind this attitude is that being respectful to any person coming from university becomes a part of local culture in Adana. My position as a researcher from the university facilitated not only easily establishing trust with respondents, but also interviews were taken seriously as they were conducted by a university person. In so doing, I was able to develop a more intimate dialogue with participants, and to minimize the possibility of being seen as 'outsider researcher' in the eyes of respondents.

I had both disadvantages and advantages of doing the fieldwork as a non-local Turkish citizen in Adana. Regarding that it was my first time in the city, I was discovering sociodemographic, sociocultural and socioeconomic dynamics of the city through my daily-life and fieldwork experiences. As I was also trying to integrate myself to local culture, I felt like that I was lacking broad knowledge on some aspects of Adana from time to time. For instance, I had to ask for repetition whenever interviewees specifically addressed to names of places, streets or neighbourhoods. Hence, some respondents gave some examples on criminal incidents that occurred between locals and Syrians and appeared on local media. As some of them got very excited about what they were talking, they tended to forget for a moment where I came from and suddenly asked me: "Haven't you heard or witnessed what happened in X neighbourhood with Syrians two years ago?" In such cases, either I kept my silence to prevent any kind of interruption or had to restate that I was not living in Adana during that time mentioned by

respondents. However, I shall underline here that being a non-local person also appeared another way of establishing a bond with interviewees in the sense that a person who is not local and lives abroad just came here with the purpose of doing a research in Adana sounded too exotic to them. I described this situation as ‘exotic’ because I assume what I was doing in the field seemed excitingly and strikingly unusual to them.

It is an undeniable fact that my position as a young lady coming from small business owner family easily let me show empathy towards interviewees. Presuming main challenges and difficulties which have been faced by both employers and employees in the existing economic circumstances in Turkey, I prepared interview questions accordingly and conducted the fieldwork with this mindset. During the fieldwork, it also allowed me to deepen interviews as I was already familiar with all recent regulations and implementations on employment which were referred by respondents. In doing so, interviewees trusted me more and my researcher position was also legitimised in their eyes as they thought the person, whom they were talking and complaining to, did not listened to them from a look-down perspective, on the contrary, she was one of them.

Another interesting issue to point out is that nobody from local governmental institutions had listened to employers and employees about their opinions on current local economy dynamics and Syrians at the time of interviews. Therefore, my intention to listen to their - as citizens of Turkey- thoughts, impressions, and experiences about Syrians was appreciated by respondents which enabled me to receive more sincere responses and gave me the ability to develop more meaningful conversations.

2.4 Strategies in the Fieldwork

2.4.1. Expert Interviews with Stakeholders, Civil Society Members and Policymakers

I met the key informants such as representatives of local NGOs, foundations, municipalities or other public institutions to gain deeper insights into demographic, sociocultural and socioeconomic dynamics of the province and socio-demographic composition of Syrians across Adana. In total, I conducted sixteen expert interviews in Adana from November 2017 to March 2018.[4]

The main aim of those interviews was to reveal their institutional approaches and practices of local institutions and organizations concerning the integration of Syrians to the local labour market, and their insights into what shall be done for the well-being and better engagement of not only Syrians, but also for locals in the local labour market. Thus, a structured interview technique, known as a standardized interview meaning that "all questions being written down in advance and duly asked at the interview appointment" (Fedyuk and Zentai, 2018: 173), is used in order to ensure that the same context of questioning is given to each interviewee and to increase the possibility of aggregation of interviewees' replies (Bryman, 2016). The primary condition for the selection of organizations and institutions for expert interviews was not only their expertise in immigration and asylum, but also their institutional responsibility for economic activities at the province and region level, given that there is a significant number of Syrian-owned businesses in Adana. In-depth interviews with experts from two municipalities, three NGOs, seven local and/or regional public institutions and four other institutions helped me gain deeper insights into the socioeconomic dynamics of the city, its Syrian refugees' socio-demographic composition as well as into institutional approaches to engaging of the Syrian refugees in the labour market. Equally important, these structured interviews along with ethnographic observations helped me identify Syrians' economic sectoral distribution across

[4] See Annex, Table 2 for more information on expert interviews.

the province and construct my purposeful sampling accordingly. Indeed, it was my initial step for the sample composition design because all key informants have been involved in different aspects of migration management process since the arrival of Syrians in Adana. This enabled me to better understand both locals and Syrians' conditions, needs and experiences. Hence, I had the chance to obtain some relevant documents and reports from a few institutions which also helped to deepen my knowledge on initiatives and actions about Syrians having taken at the province and district level. Interview findings are triangulated with secondary data from national and municipal documents, press releases, institutional reports and institutional newsletters covering successful project collaborations.

My insider position, no doubt, greatly helped me arrange expert interviews. After listing all relevant local institutions, and organizations, I first approached to all potential interviewees via e-mail in Turkish; and I had to make a phone call for those who did not respond to my e-mail. I fairly benefited from my professional connections for expert interviews while, for some, my institutional link with Çukurova University was adequate. Yet, I could not manage to conduct all expert interviews in my list. Despite countless attempts including emails and phone calls, Adana Provincial Employment Directorate and Adana Chamber of Agriculture Engineers were not responsive to the arrangement of an interview. Similarly, Adana Farmers Union reached me by phone after receiving my email but refrained from having an interview with me on the grounds that the focus of my research is not their area of interest.

2.4.2. Ethnographic Mapping

Before going through interviews, I made ethnographic observations in the first month of arrival in Adana to gain deeper understanding of the research phenomena. Through ethnographic observations in the first month of arrival and exchanges with key informants, fieldwork sites were mapped out on the account of *degree of informality*, *ethnic composition*, *local poverty*, and *the existence of large number Syrian owned businesses*. I arranged fieldwork visits to

specific neighbourhoods around Seyhan and Yüreğir districts, sometimes with my gatekeepers or sometimes alone. In a qualitative manner, these fieldwork visits helped me to understand current livelihood conditions and main local economic activities, run by both Turkish and Syrian communities around Seyhan and Yüreğir. Another invaluable aspect of field visits was that I sometimes had the chance to engage in small talks with local small business owners about their views on, and experiences with Syrian refugees. These short conversations allowed me to gain comparative insights into transformation of respective districts in the last six years after Syrians refugees arrived, and to have a better understanding of factors behind socio-demographic and socio-economic shifts. In total, twenty-three interviews and one focus group were conducted in eleven different neighbourhoods across Seyhan (see Map 3) whereas sixteen interviews and two focus groups were conducted around Yüreğir (see Map 4).

With few exceptions, all research sites have in common: (1) historically populated by socio-economically disadvantaged group of people, (2) experienced with internal migration, (3) inured for the higher rate of informal employment, and (4) harbouring for many Syrian-owned businesses. To reduce information loss, I supported fieldwork visits by field notes and pictures. The first visit was made toward the end of November 2017, and then both observing and gathering data progressed concurrently in time. I shall underline that field visits and observations immensely contributed to sampling process of target profile and holistically complemented the semi-structured interviews.

The Fieldwork Sites

Although Adana is composed of fifteen districts, ethnographic field visits and interviews were limited to only the city centre as I already found and captured major variations across economic sectors and individuals in relation to the phenomenon of the research question. Observation therefore took place at only two districts: Seyhan and Yüreğir (see Map 2). Despite lack of

reliable data on the exact number of Syrians across districts, Seyhan and Yüreğir are most populated and affected districts by the flow from Syria.

Figure 4: Location of Districts on Adana Province Map



Source: Created by the author. Adana Province map depicting its districts.

There are ninety-six neighbourhoods across ***Seyhan*** and 796.286 people currently reside in the district which makes it the largest district of Adana in terms of population (TUIK, 2020). Seyhan district has a heterogeneous demography sheltering many groups of people with different ethno-cultural and ethno-religious backgrounds. The main reason why Adana, and in particular Seyhan, is characterized by such diversity is a range of industrial initiatives since 1950's and development projects which led the city to receive internal migration flows from different parts of Turkey. Hence, Adana has always been very agro-industry-oriented city. As a result, it continued to receive internal migrants over the years and Seyhan became the most affected district among the others (Seyhan Municipality, 2020). Regarding political context, Seyhan Municipality, at the time of the fieldwork, was running by Republican People's Party (CHP) which is the main opposition political party in Turkey.

Figure 5: Fieldwork sites in Seyhan District



Source: Michelin, Map of Adana.

Yüreğir with 414.574 population (TUIK, 2020) is one of socioeconomically poorest districts of Adana. There are currently 106 neighbourhoods across Yüreğir district. Historically-speaking, internal migration, particularly from Eastern, South-eastern, and Central Anatolian provinces of Turkey, has always been on the agenda of the district . Thus, the profile of population is characterized by diversity such as Arab Alawites, Urfa Arabs, Mardin Arabs and Kurds. These migration waves have led to uncontrolled urban development where not only shantytowns, but also newly built houses and flats coexist side by side. (Yüreğir Municipality, 2020). Economically, the large part of Yüreğir is still an agricultural land, therefore agriculture and animal husbandry are one of common economic activities. The district also hosts the oldest industrial area of Adana, called "Eski Sanayi," which still serves as economic hub for small and medium sized industries. Besides, medium and small-scale trade and businesses are another important economic activity which allows Yüreğir to vividly maintains less competitive, but more intimate friendship-oriented work relations across its community. In contrast to Seyhan,

Yüreğir Municipality, at the time of the fieldwork, was running by the current ruling party: Justice and Development Party (AKP). I should also note that Adana Branch of Directorate General of Migration Management (Adana DGMM) is located in Yüreğir.

Figure 6: Fieldwork Sites around Yüreğir District

Source: Michelin, Map of Adana.

Degree of informality

Degree of informality is identified on the basis of occupational categories as informal employment is extremely common across various neighbourhoods in Adana. Bearing in mind that Syrians are dispersed across various economic sectors in Adana, mapping out occupational sectors is not an easy task, but also is very important to understand and analyse how engagement of Syrians in the informal market are characterized by variety across localities. To illustrate, employing Syrians is very common in manual labour driven economic sectors such as agriculture, construction, manufacturing, porterage, and house painting. While Syrians are mainly employed as farm labourer, portage or mechanic in industrial site around *Yüreğir*, they are heavily concentrated in shoe-making sector around *Büyük Saat* (city center), textile around

Şehit Duran, and wholesale fruit and vegetables, metal industry and shipping/transport around *Şakirpaşa* in Seyhan.

Figure 7: Şakirpaşa neighbourhood

Source: Author's photos from the field, April 2018.

Ethnic composition

Adana shows a very heterogenous demographic profile regarding Turkish citizens' ethno-religious and ethno-cultural background. However, such diversity becomes more visible in particular neighbourhoods. For instance, *Denizli/Narlıca* and *Şehitduran,* where Turkish citizens with Kurdish, Arab or Turk ethnic origin live together, are known for its diverse profile. In contrast to such heterogeneity, some neighbourhoods show a more homogenous character regarding the profile of its residents even though these neighbourhoods are also populated by minority groups. To illustrate, *Küçükdikili*, located in Seyhan district, but half an hour away from the city centre, is mostly populated by Turkish citizens with Kurdish origin whose families migrated from Eastern and South-eastern provinces of Turkey many years ago and settled in Adana. Similarly, *Yüreğir* harbours mostly Arab Alawites despite the existence of other minority groups such as Urfa Arabs, Mardin Arabs etc.

Local Poverty

Another common aspect of the neighbourhoods where I did my fieldwork is the level of poverty. These neighbourhoods have vulnerable and poor living conditions and suffer from an unbalanced urban development compared to other neighbourhoods across Adana. Moreover, some of them such as *Denizli/Narlıca, Şehitduran/Hürriyet* and *Şakirpaşa* are well-known for the high rate of criminal activities. Unsurprisingly, these neighbourhoods attract many Syrian refugees living in Adana due to affordable rent prices. For example, many Syrians live in substandard conditions in ruinous and overcrowded houses in *Denizli/Narlıca.* Similarly, Syrians living in *Yüreğir* can afford to low quality settlements. Usually, more than one family lives in the same house or flat. In some wasteland parts of *Yüreğir*, Syrians who could not afford to paying a monthly rent pitched tents that lacked toilets, showers and clean water. However, the tents were being removed by the municipality after many complaints by the local people.

Figure 8: Flat share advertisement in Denizli/Narlıca



Source: Author's photos from the fieldwork, January 2018.

The existence of large number Syrian owned businesses

As well as being employed, running your own business has been one of the vital living instruments for Syrian refugees in Adana, especially in O*balar Street*, *Mirzaçelebi Street,*

Şakirpaşa, Denizli-Narlıca and Tatlıses Street. These streets and/or neighbourhoods are currently home to numerous small-size Syrian-owned businesses, in addition to shops run by Turkish citizens such as bakery, hairdresser, grocery, footwear, cosmetic, boutique, electronic device shops and restaurants. A sharp increase in the number of Syrian-owned businesses has also affected the socio-demographic, socio-cultural, and socio-economic nature of such streets and neighbourhoods. For instance, locals recently have started to call *Mirzaçelebi Street* as *'Little Syria'* or *'Little Aleppo'* due to a growing number of Syrian workplaces. Regarding signboards, the majority was written only in Arabic and some of them also had explanation in broken Turkish. Although there is no data showing the exact number of Syrian-owned businesses in Adana, workplaces with nylon-made signboards and with missing tax board and business operating license signalled that most of Syrian shops have been informally operated which means these workplaces are not registered with Turkish authorities.[5] The logic behind why I targeted Turkish employers whose workplaces are located in the same street with Syrians' was to understand in which ways working side by side affect the boundary-making process.

[5] This is also confirmed by Turkish small business owners during the field visits and interviews with local public officials and stakeholders.

Figure 9: Mirzaçelebi Street / 'Little Aleppo of Adana'

Source: Author's photos from the field, December 2017

2.4.3. Reaching to interviewees

After identifying main occupational categories according to ongoing informal employment activities in observed districts, I began to contact with potential Turkish employers and employees who might be interested in having an interview with me. I contacted them through gatekeepers, snowballing and introducing myself to potential respondents through ethnographic field visits. Once you contacted with employers through intermediary actors, it was easier to establish trust relationship. Within the case of employees, it was less complicated to have an interview with them because they do not regard themselves as responsible for employment of Syrians in the informal economy; however, I faced with other shortcomings for the arrangement of employee interviews that I will discuss further details below. For each research site, I was accompanied by a different gatekeeper who was usually a local resident or a local authority of respective neighbourhood. I was introduced to my gatekeepers by my field supervisor at Çukurova University, by local stakeholders and participants that I already interviewed. Collaborating with local gatekeepers definitely facilitated my task, enabled me to reach to a

diverse profile of participants, and minimized my ‘non-local outsider’ position in the field. In this regard, local gatekeepers benefited the fieldwork in four ways:

- engaging with informal chats with regards to city dynamics, pertaining to specific a group of people and neighbourhoods
- smooth arrangement of interviews with participants who provided in-depth and detailed information about the research phenomenon
- respondents with different ethno-religious and ethno-cultural background were comfortable to open up themselves to someone (the researcher) who is not from their community (e.g. interviews with Arab Alawites)
- certain small industrial areas (e.g. Eski Sanayi and Büyüksaat Ayakabıcılar Çarşısı) home to male-dominated industries and certain neighbourhoods (e.g. Denizli Mahallesi) are known as unsafe places that might have been challenging especially for a non-local person and young woman.

2.5 Sampling for Interviews with Employers and Employees

It is very important to understand how different principles of boundary-drawing operate in everyday life as well as work life from the perspectives of employers, employees and the host society members. Thus, stratified purposeful sampling was used to capture major variations by selecting information rich cases with regards to the phenomenon of the research question. This technique facilitated comparisons through identification of similarities and differences in the phenomenon of my research interest across individuals and economic sectors (Patton, 2002). As purposeful sampling requires a profound and comprehensive planning (Patton, 2002), I tried to capture a wide range of perspectives relating to Syrian refugees. The logic behind was to reveal by what mechanisms and dynamics boundaries are drawn from the viewpoint of Turkish citizens concerning identifying and rationalizing insider-outsider junction across individuals in the labour-intensive economic sectors.

Given this frame, I targeted Turkish employers and employees coming from physically demanding economic sectors where the rate of informal labour market is usually high across various neighbourhoods. For this reason, I introduced the set of individual level categorical variables in order to identify my target population in research site. My aim was to reach to Turkish employers and employees in Adana whose profile as follows:

- *Socio-economic categorical variables*

  labour force status (employer versus employee)

  type of economic sector

  work experience in respective occupational category

- *Socio-cultural categorical variables*

  ethnicity and religious sects of participants (e.g. Sunni Turks, Alawite Turks, Arab Alawite and Kurds)

- *Access to welfare provision*

  Turkish citizens registered with the Turkish Social Security System versus

  Unregistered ones

- *Environmental categorical variables*

  manual labour sectors in specific economic sectors

  neighbourhoods concentrated by Syrian-owned businesses

To find out multiple forms of creating boundaries and exclusion toward outsiders, it was vital to pay attention to how intersubjective meaning making elements are produced by members of local community and, how shared meaning structures are shaped by social, economic, cultural and/or environmental dynamics across individuals and economic sectors. In this context, interviews sought to reveal how different factors influence the characterization of groupness being (re)constructed by participants during interviews. Interview questions were designed to

reveal *'how Syrians are identified as different'* and *'how Turkish citizens justify their position as worthy*' on the basis of different dimensions of boundary-drawing.

The first set of questions related to interviewees' ***sociodemographic profile***: gender, age, sex, marital status, level of education, ethno-religious and ethno-cultural background, internal migration background, and economic activity in Adana as well as in which neighbourhood they were living and where their workplaces were located.

Second, I gathered Information about the city in general and in particular ***characteristics of the neighbourhood*** where interviewees' workplaces were located and on how participants made sense of their living and working spaces and local life. More specifically, I asked about any changes in the way things were both in their neighbourhood and the city in the recent 5-6 years, the biggest problems that local people in Adana were facing at the time of the interview, and the kinds of shifts they observed after the arrival of Syrians in their neighbourhood and in the city (if any).

This was followed by more details of interviewees' ***profession and economic activity*** in Adana with a specific focus on finding out about the work experiences of employers and employees and the current economic dynamics in a respective occupational category. Further questions were asked about employers' and employees' experiences with Syrians to elicit information on reasons or motivations to employ Syrians as well as the hiring processes (within the case of employers), peer relations (within the case of employees), the role of cultural differences/similarities in the way of working, interactions in workplaces, and the effects of (dis)employing of Syrians on different economic sectors.

The fourth set of questions focused on characterization of groupness with regards to ***sociocultural dimensions*** such as interviewees' socio-cultural background and practices, the way how they have seen and interpreted Turkey's culture, their approach to different cultures,

their interaction with Syrian culture, in which ways they have associated or differentiated Turkey's culture with/from Syrian culture, and their approach to their approach to potentially becoming neighbours or even relatives with Syrians.

The fifth set of questions dealt with getting to know more about the ***social rights*** granted to any Syrian national who is under the Temporary Protection Regime of the Turkish state. Put differently, these questions probed interviewees' knowledge and thoughts about rights granted to Syrian refugees such as the access to healthcare services and their feelings about sharing public spaces such as hospitals and schools with Syrians.

The final set of questions aimed to get insights into participants' understanding ***citizenship and nationhood.*** All interviews took place right after the Erdoğan's (the President of Turkey) speech on the possibility of granting Turkish citizenship to Syrians (BBC Türkçe, 2016) and the first military operation of Turkey to Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield); and during the Turkey's second military operation (Operation Olive Branch). I thus asked explicit questions about the interviewees' opinions on 'granting Turkish citizenship to Syrians' and 'ongoing operation Olive Branch'. By doing so, interviews also sought to understand the ways in which Turkish citizenship is deployed as boundary-drawing instrument to define terrains of nationhood and national identity.

2.6 Semi-structured Interviews with Turkish employers and employees

In total forty-seven semi-structured interviews (thirty interviews with employers and seventeen interviews with employees) were conducted with the Turkish employers and employees in Adana. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as this technique that allowed collecting elaborated discourses and making a balance between freedom for the interviewee to develop complex and meaningful responses and the guidance of the researcher toward research interests.

All interviews were held Yüreğir and Seyhan districts in Adana, and main economic sectors and neighbourhoods being concentred by Syrians were consciously targeted. The fieldwork started in the end of November 2017 and ended in the beginning of June 2018. All participants were interviewed face-to-face, lasted from thirty minutes to two hours. All interviews were conducted in Turkish. Thirty-seven interviews were recorded on tape whereas the researcher took notes for ten interviews due to unwillingness of some interviewees to be recorded. The majority of interviewees were visited at their workplaces with the purpose of observing their work environment and conditions in natural settings. In doing so, it was quite easy to arrange interviews as I visited them at the most suitable time at their working places. Otherwise, it would have been very tough to arrange interviews outside of their workplaces considering that most of employers and employees in manual labour economic sectors work consistently for long hours. Hence, this strategy allowed me to observe how respondents make sense of their work environment and where the line is drawn at the workspaces when the issue comes to Syrians. Those who were not visited at their workplaces were interviewed elsewhere such as their houses or nearby cafes due to their workplace environments being unsuitable for interviews.

2.6.1. Semi-structured Interviews with Employers

All interviews with employers were conducted to reveal the narratives and practices used by employers toward Syrian employees in workplaces and in which ways they tend to legitimise and (re)generate the 'insider-outsider' relationship. In terms of interviewees' profile, all of them were living in or around Adana city centre at the time of the interviews. All of the interviewees came from lower-income and/or middle-income occupations across various economic sectors. The sample is not gender-balanced (twenty-seven male and three female) because the research particularly targeted manual labour sectors such as construction, agriculture and manufacturing in which are mainly dominated by male employers and employees. All participants aged

between 25 and 60 (at the time of the interview), except for only one participant who was 71 years old. All interviewees were Turkish citizens coming from different ethnic and religious backgrounds such as Turks, Kurds and Arab Alawites. In terms of education profiles, nine held high school degrees whereas the remaining nineteen completed primary and/or secondary education. And, only two respondents graduated from university. Among all interviewees, only seven of them were not originally from Adana.[6] As their family migrated to Adana during their childhood and they have spent their most of life in Adana, they frankly expressed that *'Adanalıyım'* or *'Adanalı olduk artık'* (I'm from Adana / I became a local of this city).

Among all interviewees, twenty-three out of thirty Turkish employers had employed Syrians in their workplaces. None of the Syrian employees were registered with the Turkish Social Security System which means that they have been engaged in the local labour market without any authorisation to work in Turkey. Besides, all respondents a had long-term work experience which enabled them to deeply narrate positive and/or negative challenges having faced in the recent years compared to previous years.

Twenty-three interviews took place at interviewees' workplaces whereas seven of them was held in different locations due to some reasons. To illustrate, the interview with stallholder (R14) and driller (R12) took place at their houses due to impossibility to conduct an in-depth interview in their work environment. In a similar way, I had to interview coffee house owner (R2) in one my gatekeeper's house in their neighbourhood because coffee houses in Turkey (kıraathane in Turkish) are known as male-populated social gathering places where it seems culturally inappropriate for females. Overall, the proximity of gatekeeper's house to participants' workplaces and deep-rooted neighbourhood relationship with the gatekeeper very much facilitated to conduct long and rich interviews. Two interviews (R7 and R24)

[6] See Annex, Table 8 for more information on employer interviews.

unintentionally and naturally took place during field visits when I happened to initiate small talks with locals. Also, the length of interviews taking place at participants' workplaces showed a change from one to another due to a constant customer circulation and some of them were interrupted from time to time.[7]

2.6.2. Semi-structured Interviews with Employees

Like employers, all employees that I interviewed were living in or around Adana city centre during the time of interview. Occupational categories of employees were determined depending on (1) in which economic sectors Syrians refugees are mostly employed in the informal market economy; and (2) Turkish employees' work experience with Syrians. Twelve participants were male while five of them female. All participants aged between 25 and 60 (at the time of the interviews). [8]

In terms of ethnic and religious background, seven of them were ethnically Turk, three were Kurd and the remaining was Arab Alawite. The profile of participants was diverse considering their level of education. Three of them held a university degree and three respondents graduated from high school while the rest completed either primary or secondary education. Except three informants, the remaining was originally from Adana.[9] In contrast to employers, being employed in the informal market was not one of my primary criteria to identify participants. On the contrary, I chose to interview employees irrespective of whether they were employed in the formal or informal labour market. The reason behind is to explore (1) how Turkish employees interprets Syrians' engagement in the Turkish informal market; (2) what makes Syrian as 'peers' in their eyes; and (3) the ways in which employees tend to position themselves as worthier to their Syrian peers in workplaces. Thirteen interviewees had work experiences

[7] See Annex, Table 3 and 4 for the length and location of all interviews with employers.
[8] See Annex, Table 5 for gender and age distribution by employees.
[9] See Annex, Table 9 for more information about interviews with employees.

with Syrian workers in their workplaces and only two of them had indirect work experiences (i.e. separately working from employed Syrians in different units or sections of a respective company and institution) while two of them did not have any work experience yet at the time of the interviews.

Eight out of seventeen interviews took place in different locations such as café, restaurant or house due to unavailability of having an interview at their workplaces or inconvenient working hours. Other five interviews with employees spontaneously occurred during my field visits to employers' workplaces and/or houses. For instance, while I was conducting an interview with an owner of a Kebab house (R23), his friend (R4) from the same neighbourhood was there and willing to take part in the interview as well. Another similar instance happened while I was interviewing an iron master (R5). As I visited him at his workplace during working hours, his employee (R7) was also there and simultaneously engaged with the conversation.[10] All interviews with employees were recorded and lasted from twenty minutes to seventy minutes. Some interviews had to be finished earlier because of the work. Compared to employer interviews, the ones with employees who were visited at their workplaces were to be conducted in limited time in order to avoid any potential conflict with their employers and not to put their work at risk.

2.6.3. Naturally Occurring Focus Groups

"In any qualitative research, and perhaps especially in ethnography, there is sometimes a possibility that others will want to 'join in' on the conversation, especially when interviews are being conducted at schools, places of work, and sometimes even in people's homes" (Peek and Fothergill, 2009: 37). This is how three focus groups were conducted in this research which took place randomly and spontaneously during fieldwork visits to interviewees' workplaces.

[10] See Annex, Table 6 for the length and location of all interviews with employees.

Despite long discussions about whether participants should be familiar or unfamiliar with each other while forming focus groups, using focus groups in naturally occurring setting, termed by Sally Brown, has recently gained attention by social scientists which is "defined as places where people would gather whether or not a focus group was taking place" (2015: 86-87). Some scholars argue potential handicaps of carrying out focus groups with participants who are known to each other such as the possibility of not providing all details of their stories as this is something what they already know, of wisely selecting whatever they want to share when friends are present in the same focus group, or of refraining themselves from sharing their own honest views for the sake of not contrasting in the way as they previously act in the group (Hollander, 2004; Wilkinson, 1999). As well as disadvantages, there are also advantages of using focus groups in naturally settings. For instance, when focus groups do not consist of strangers, participants are more likely to "feel themselves comfortable and secure, enables complex social data to emerge, in terms of how the participants speak between themselves, and how that illustrates relational dynamics" (Brown, 2015: 94) especially given that knowing each other increases the likelihood of having a deeper conversation in more revealing ways regarding participants' everyday talk (Kitzinger, 1994; Wilkinson, 1998) and the visibility of group dynamics (Bloor et al., 2001). Viewed in this manner, focus groups in naturally occurring settings in this research also help revealing the complex nature of everyday relations at work considering that focus groups, in migration studies, can serve as a forum for "public thinking" which enable participants to discuss controversial issues such as everyday understanding of migration, mobility, citizenship, diversity, race, ethnicity and so on (Frisina, 2018).

The first focus group took place at interviewee's farm in Yüreğir with participation of other three farmers and one veterinary. In fact, the interview with a farmer (R1) was arranged in advance. However, one veterinary and other three farmers arrived towards the end of the interview. After explaining the purpose of the research, they suddenly started to engage in a

discussion among themselves as well as with me. The other occurred at a health cabinet in Obalar Street with the participation of an owner of health cabinet, a nurse, an upholsterer and a dentist who was running his dental office informally. It was again a planned interview with a health cabinet owner (R10). Once I arrived at the respondent's workplace, a nurse working there expressed her willingness to join the interview. After completing the interview, an upholsterer (R15) whose shop was just across the place of interview entered and I conducted interview with him as well. In the meanwhile, a dentist came inside to chat with them. As they gathered for social purposes, they naturally began to talk about Syrians and share their daily experiences with them. The last one was held at 'Yamaçlı' minibus stop with the participation of five minibus drivers. As for the third focus group, nothing was planned. I went to minibus stop with the intention of seeking any potential interviewee who would speak about experiences and share observations about Syrians. As there was a constant circulation among drivers at the stop, my intention to have an interview turned into having a focus group, naturally occurring setting.

The common aspect among all mentioned three neighbourhoods where focus groups were held is that they are highly concentrated by Syrians. Another common aspect is that focus groups occurred naturally in the working environments of all participants where they were known to each other. These three focus groups were unplanned and occurred in natural settings since all participants would have been gathered in these settings in any case, not because of my presence at that time, but because of their business neighbour relations and connections having been established long time ago (Brown, 2015). Furthermore, individuals spontaneously themselves offered to take part in the ongoing discussion about Syrian refugees in Adana as they also wanted to be heard. This aspect of focus groups is in line with Peek and Fothergill's argument on "spontaneous recruitment" when focus groups occur without any planning in advance as a consequence of "several individuals offering to be interviewed at once" (2009: 37).

Two focus groups were recorded and fully transcribed whereas I had to take note for the first focus group.[11] Despite the lack of exhaustive information regarding sociodemographic profile of all participants in focus groups -as I did not want to interrupt their conversation among themselves-, I adopted a less structured group setting format (Morgan, 1997) with the aim of enabling them to speak freely and learn new things from them. As focus groups were held amongst acquaintances, participants felt comfortable and secure (Brown, 2015) which enabled them to spark a lively discussion among themselves without needing too much guidance. These three focus groups provided comparative insights into understanding how people express their opinions in a naturally occurring group setting and nurturing different perceptions of people from various occupational categories relating to group norms, meanings and processes, and their views on Syrians. Besides, using focus groups in naturally occurring settings allowed me to observe in which aspects of Syrians participants reached to a consensus, and how disagreed points were being negotiated among themselves if there was any.

2.7 Data Analysis and Coding

All interviews were fully transcribed and systematically coded. For the unrecorded interviews, I transferred all notes to a Word document on the same day when the interviews were held to eliminate any information loss and to be able to relay interview information as detailed as possible. I used NVivo 12 software for the data analysis. I adopted an inductive analytical approach to find out multiple forms of creating boundaries towards 'outsiders' by paying particular attention to how intersubjective meaning-making elements are (re)produced by members of local communities. During coding, I highly benefited from memos where I noted my impressions about interviews and contrasting expressions within same interview; and this was supported by my views on interview settings (i.e. brief description of interview place –

[11] See Annex, Table 7 for more information duration of focus groups and settings.

mostly the workplace- and whether Syrian employees were present or not in the workplace at the time of interview).

I conducted a three round-coding process to leave room for the emergence of multiple meanings in the text (Thomas, 2006). The first phase was concerned with understanding and capturing the content by using participants' own words and theme nodes were created accordingly and named in English. As a second step, I identified text segments and created appropriate labels (sub-codes) in line with my research questions. Labels are concerned with participants' boundary-drawing strategies, i.e. how employers and employees identified Syrians as 'different' and how they justified themselves 'worthier' than Syrian refugees. As outlined in Table 10, sub-codes were categorized around which theme they were centred. Recognizing the interplay between identification and justification with regards to boundary-drawing, the following four core elements were identified:

(i) statement by whom (employer versus employee or both)
(ii) on which topic and/or theme (cheap labour force, showing mercy, opaque policies, granting citizenship etc.)
(iii) in which ways Syrians are identified as 'different' and Turkish citizens justify themselves as 'worthier' (moral norms, socioeconomic rationale, granted rights, national citizenship and belonging)
(iv) in which context the sub-codes are used (positively, negatively or both).

In the third phase, overarching boundary categories (e.g. moral, economic, institutional, and the national identity boundary-drawing in reference to symbolic and social boundaries) were conceptualized on the basis of the emerged in Nvivo codes relating to how Syrians are perceived

by Turkish employers and employees in three different, but intertwined ways: as workers, as peers, and as foreign nationals.[12]

2.8 Methodological Limitations

This empirical research has several methodological limitations. The first limitation is the shortage of data on informal economy and the issued work permits at the province level. This made the sampling difficult concerning identification of main economic sectors where Syrians are informally employed. The current data on informal market economy is at the regional level, including Adana and Mersin provinces. Besides, the regional data does not provide a detailed picture of the informal market economy in the region such as sectoral distributions. In a similar manner, our knowledge is limited to total number of the issued work permits to Syrians at the country level. Data on provincial level is unavailable. Identifying economic sectors, characterized by higher rate of informality in Adana province, was crucial for sampling. This lacuna was overcome by ethnographic observations including regular field visits, engaging in small talks with locals and conducting interviews with stakeholders who directly or indirectly took part in the labour market integration of Syrian refugees in Adana. The second methodological constrain is that some key stakeholders were not reached possibly due to unwillingness of these institutions to share the necessary information. The third limitation is the unequal distribution of employer-employee interviews. Arranging an interview with employees was more challenging because of two reasons. First, employees have to work during day hours. Sparing some time for an interview during their working hours was usually impossible. When I showed my intention to visit them at their home or meet them somewhere nearby, not all of them were willing to do so. Second, some of employees whom I contacted were quite hesitant to have an interview with me owing to job loss fear in case their employers

[12] See Annex, Table 10 for details concerning the content of codes.

find out about their views on Syrian refugees and their work conditions in the given workplace. The fourth limitation is related to the previous one. Whereas I visited almost all employers at their workplaces, only half of employees were visited at their workplaces due to the aforementioned reasons. Relatedly, visiting both employers and employees at their workplaces has disadvantages as well as advantages. One disadvantage might be respondents' openness with me. This is because Syrian workers (within the case of employers) and Turkish employers (within the case of employees) were sometimes present at the time of an interview. The last limitation appears in relation to the sufficiency of work environment observations. I had to limit my ethnographic observations to interviews and field visits due to the impossibility of participant observation in this research. This may limit my findings in terms of capturing interactions between Turkish employers/employees and Syrian workers on the grounds that I did not have an opportunity to triangulate what interviewees told me with longer workplace-specific observations.

Chapter 3: Negotiating Moral Boundaries in Workplaces through the Lens of Employers[13]

3.1 Introduction

What is the role of representations of morality in shaping the relationship between employers and employees in workplaces? To what extent can moral considerations determine employers' perceptions of employees as legitimate members of the work force? And, under what conditions are employees perceived more or less favourably in the eyes of employers? More specifically, to what extent are moral boundaries negotiable at different stages of employment and what are factors that drive employers to interpret and reinterpret their approach to employees?

Even though morality is always accommodated both in employers' and employees' work environments, how moral boundaries are drawn, shifted and blurred by social actors in the workplace has received little attention in the boundary-making literature (Dioun, 2018; Lan, 2003; Lamont, 1992, 2000). The primary concern of this chapter is to shed light on the ways the understanding and interpretation of morality at work pertain to boundary-drawing and how the mobilization of shared categories and classification systems affect the nature of moral boundaries in workplaces. In order to demonstrate how the mobilization of shared categories and classification systems affect the nature of moral boundaries in the workplace, I firstly look at how the moral construction takes place at different stages of the employment process and how work experiences contribute to (re)making of the boundaries over time. Morality is a useful theoretical tool to understand how work-related moral norms are assigned by employers and the extent to which moral values and concerns are influential in terms of ensuring the recognition of one's place in the workplace (Lamont, 2012).

[13] A version of this chapter is published in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1736013.

The present chapter explores how distinct framing strategies are employed in relation to morality and how moral boundaries are negotiated and contested at different stages of employment by employers in manual labour economic sectors. It is a very crucial, but subtle task to understand how Syrians are regarded as 'potential employees' in the eyes of employers in the informal market economy and, depending on which criteria employers use, how they define and distinguish between worthy and less worthy employees. In this chapter, I demonstrate how attachment to the morality is (re)constructed by employers at different stages of employment: during the hiring process and employment itself. Drawing a distinction between two stages is very important because hiring strategies and motivations deployed by employers 'before hiring' greatly differ from 'after hiring.' These two phases structure the degree of moral boundary drawing in the workplace. Firstly, I discuss the link between economic motivations and moral boundary-drawing by articulating how employers rationalize hiring decisions based on moral reasoning and how it contributes to further inequalities with regards to Syrians' employment. In doing so, employers tend to create a moral context in which they regard themselves as the 'virtuous' one who fulfils a moral duty by providing employment for Syrians. This moral construction of the 'self' accordingly softens hiring processes in the informal market economy. Secondly, I analyse how moral values and concerns in the workplace ascend the employers' agenda after employment based upon different work experiences even though such norms are not their primary concern during hiring processes. I argue that experiences with Syrian workers push employers to turn their attention to the moral construction of the 'employee' after employment, in direct opposition to framing during the hiring process.

In the first section, I discuss the moral dimension of boundary work to provide a theoretical framework for the case study of this chapter. I will then scrutinize how employers soften moral boundaries during hiring processes when Syrians are regarded as 'potential employees.' Next, I will discuss the extent to which different work experiences drive employers to re-evaluate

their approach to Syrian employees, resulting in hardened moral boundaries after employment. To conclude, theoretical arguments on moral boundary work will be discussed in relation to the case study and the main contribution of this chapter to the current literature will be summarized.

3.2 Morality and Boundaries

There is a growing body of research that seeks to understand the nature of symbolic and social boundaries, to unveil how boundaries are drawn and how the boundary-making process takes place across different contexts and types of groups, and at different social-psychological, cultural and structural levels (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). Tracing back to Barth (1969), Bourdieu (1984) and Weber (1978), the approach has been mainly located within a constructivist perspective on ethnicity which is seen as "the product of a social process rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth" (Wimmer, 2008a: 971). Cultural characteristics, therefore, should be understood as a boundary-making instrument that highly influences the segmentation between 'us' and 'them' (Brubaker, Lovemean and Stamatov, 2004; Duemmler, 2015).

Over the last ten years, sociologists have been intimately studying how boundaries are drawn, shifted, activated/deactivated and blurred by social actors. These studies point out the importance of how boundaries are created among different types of groups and across various contexts, and the processes paving the way for the production of boundaries (Lamont and Molnár, 2000; Tilly, 2004; Wimmer, 2008a, 2008b, 2013). One important type of 'boundaries' is those, which Lamont defines as being "drawn on the basis of moral character; they are centred around such qualities as honesty, work ethic, personal integrity, and consideration for others" (1992: 4). This definition has sparked new research examining how morality pertains to the boundary making process (Sanghera, 2016; Sayer, 2005).

Although different aspects of morality have been widely debated in social psychology (see Blasi, 1983, 1999; Hardy and Carlo, 2005; Schwartz and Howard, 1982; Stets and Carter, 2011), the moral dimension of social life has received less attention than it deserves in both theoretical and empirical sociological research (Sayer, 2004). However, "how, why and in what different ways people supply reasons for the things they do, that others do" (Tilly, 2006: 9) and how they justify their actions and positions based on 'moral worth' (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 2006) still needs to be explored across various contexts and different types of groups in empirical sociological research. Besides, little has been done about employers' moral justification strategies (Chin, 2005; Waters, 1999), despite the extant literature on discrimination in workplaces (see MacKenzie and Forde, 2009; Matthews and Ruhs, 2007; Tannock, 2013; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003).

Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot's concept on 'moral worth' (2006), defined as multiple forms of justice, I aim to elucidate how moral boundary work takes place in the course of employers' everyday work life. Orders of moral worth are characterized by plurality and can be invoked by social actors in any given situation to justify and legitimize their actions and behaviours. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) highlight the plurality of justification strategies which are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary, reinforcing one another. "These different frameworks of moral reasoning, or 'worlds of justification', are systems of logics that define what is worthy and how worth can be identified" (Cohen and Dromi, 2018). Following this line of literature, I discuss that employers engage with different but intertwined logics of justification strategies by imbuing morality: structural conditions driven by economic interests as in the case of employer and employee relationship (the market worth) during hiring processes, and working culture (work ethics) identified with good manners at work such as hardworking, honesty, integrity, discipline, trustworthiness, obedience and dedication (the domestic worth) after employment.

Inspired by cultural sociology (Lamont, 1992, 2000; Lamont et al., 2016) and pragmatic sociology (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 2006), I argue that different moral justification strategies play a prominent role in how moral differences are imposed by certain group members upon others and in which ways such assigned certain moral values affect social actors' everyday interactions. Addressing the plurality of moral justifications (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) in shaping 'insider-outsider' relationship, this research contributes to the moral boundary-making literature in three ways. Firstly, the way how moral justifications are constructed does not only let employers construe their actions as morally worthy despite informal recruitment, but also appears as a form of inequality which feeds into poor working conditions and workplace specific expectations from Syrian workers. Secondly, there is no single way of moral boundary-drawing. Moral boundaries can be made and remade over time by the same social actors depending on in which context moral justifications are (re)produced. I support this argument by showing that there is a distinction in moral discourses and boundaries drawn between hiring and employment phases with regards to employers' moral reasoning. More specifically, I show how employers portray themselves as moral individuals during hiring processes whereas employers' moral justifications are attributed to their Syrian employees' own moral incapacity to work after employment. Thirdly, there is a lack of research on employers' role in boundary-drawing within informal market economies whereas there has been a growing attention on moral boundary work from perspectives of employees (see Purser, 2009; Sherman, 2005). I thus consider the role of moral justifications to understand the moral dimension of work life as well as structural factors. The claimed moral norms can be mobilized differently across social actors depending on local contexts. Social actors in different local contexts may prioritise different things to (de)value and shared moral understanding can be inter-subjectively circulated, consequently, they can come to enable and constrain narratives.

3.3 Different Stages of Employment: Softening Moral Boundaries during the Hiring Process

The first objective of this chapter is to analyse how Syrian refugees are regarded as 'potential employees' by employers; how employers morally justify their motivations to employ Syrians; and how it influences the hiring process in relation boundary-work. More specifically, I discuss how employers tend to create a moral context in which they regard themselves as the 'virtuous' and how such moral construction of the 'self' softens hiring processes in the informal market economy. In doing so, employers mobilize a positive self-perception where they portray and gratify themselves as moral individuals since their Syrian workers are able to meet their families' needs thanks to employers' generosity: providing employment opportunities. Whereas there was wide agreement about the experience of employing Syrians across different sectors, motivations and reasons of employment varied across interviewees due to two main reasons: (1) economic benefits and (2) moral obligation which is regarded as one's sense of responsibility. Thirty employers across a range of sectors, for instance agriculture, manufacturing and construction, were interviewed about their impressions of Syrians as workers. Out of thirty interviewees, twenty-three used to employ or were still employing Syrian(s) employee(s) in their workplace at the time of the interviews. Therefore, the subsequent analysis indicates how economic and moral related factors are linked with the way interviewees position themselves to justify their attempt to engage Syrian labour in their workforce. I found variation in terms of employers' motivations to hire Syrians.

Common to almost all interviewees who have had experience with working with Syrians, economic interests appear as a significant factor across three economic sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary). I did not find meaningful differences across primary, secondary and tertiary economic sectors in this regard. As high informal engagement is quite common in all sectors, it is not surprising that Syrians are prominently regarded as a source of 'cheap labour

force'. 'Labour shortage' was forcefully addressed by the interviewees particularly from primary and secondary sectors (manufacturing, agriculture, livestock, and drilling) while the interviewees from tertiary sectors slightly tended toward moral obligation as a justification mechanism of their motivation to employ Syrians.

The following part sheds lights on how economic benefits play a crucial role in understanding how employers justify their motivations to employ Syrians. After, I discuss how feeling morally responsible –helping poor and needy people as part of human duty - is also brought forward by the interviewees as a factor that motivated them to employ Syrians. Putting these two pieces together, I aim to explain in which way(s) distinct framing strategies are employed in relation to morality and economic conditions and, how it contributes to soften boundaries during hiring processes and perpetuate existing inequalities in the labour market.

3.3.1. The Moral Justification of Economic Interests

Addressing employers' motivations with regards to the current local market dynamics during hiring processes is essential because it signals the way they morally rationalize their economic interest in employing Syrians. Adana has been an economic hub for Syrians since the outbreak of the civil war. Despite the introduction of work permits to Syrian refugees in 2016, the number of work permits granted to Syrians in Adana (and elsewhere) has remained very limited. The main economic activities, therefore, concentrate on the informal sector which is characterized by labour-intensive, low-wage and precarious working conditions. Among all interviewees, none of them registered their Syrian employees with the Turkish Social Security System which means they have been engaged in the local labour market without any authorisation to work in Turkey. High informal engagement seems quite common in manufacturing (in particular textile and shoe-making), agriculture, livestock, construction, small and medium scale industrial and business-oriented sectors in Adana. Concerning the role of employers' economic interests during hiring processes, structural factors such as 'cheap labour' and 'labour shortage' seem

attractive to employers. One cannot deny the role of a functional relationship between Turkish employers (finding employees who not only remedy labour shortage, but also demand less compared to Turkish employees) and Syrian workers (lower wage demand opening the employment door for Syrians). The interview with Respondent 2 (male, 25 a coffee house and blacksmith shop owner) summarizes such a relationship:

> "I've had a blacksmith shop for six months. I have been running a coffee house for 5 years. I opened the blacksmith shop because I was in economic trouble...There is a Syrian worker in my blacksmith shop. As you know, I just established a new business. Although I do not prefer it (employing a Syrian), I had to...Not to overspend economically at first... Subcontracting companies have been established to work with Turkish workers and you have to make an agreement. Well... Because of such hurdles, I employed a Syrian."

'Asking not too much' is appreciated in the eyes of employers

It is not a new phenomenon that employers tend to hire refugees because of their economic interests (see Chambers, 1986; Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014; Whitaker, 1999). However, how employers morally justify paying refugees less and how this streamline hiring processes have received much less attention. This is crucial in terms of understanding not only how such justifications pave the way for boundary-drawing, but also how they feed into the production and reproduction of inequality in routine ways (Lamont et al., 2014). It can be said that paying less to Syrians is taken-for-granted which has become routine in labour-intensive economic sectors in Adana. The functional link between demanding less and paying less unconsciously but routinely contributes to the (re)production of inequalities in two ways: (1) shared characteristics (i.e. paying less, working for longer hours, not being insured) of Syrians' employment across different economic sectors has become a local labour market repertoire and (2) intersubjective mobilization of such repertoire can close opportunities for Syrian employees regarding access to material (lack of bargaining power) and non-material sources (moral traits

in the workplace), and constrain behaviours toward them (Lamont et al., 2014). Thus, explaining the way employers rationalize their actions is important to understand not only how it affects boundary-drawing, but also how it matters for the (re)production of inequalities. My empirical data shows that employers morally justify their economic interests in two ways. The first way is *'asking not too much'*. More explicitly, employers argue that Syrian employees demand less from employers compared to Turkish employees during hiring processes. Respondent 9, a carpenter workshop owner (male, 53), who has been working in carpentry sector for 43 years reported:

> "If I employed a Turkish citizen, s/he would ask for at least 500-600 Turkish lira (weekly) and social security taxes as well. I mean they ask for 500-600 Turkish lira. They also want me to pay their social security tax. They (Turkish) understandably have their own reasons. We cannot say anything. What we do is to employ Syrians for 300 Turkish Lira."

According to Respondent 9, the weekly amount of salary that Turkish people ask for is more than he could actually afford. And Turkish citizens also ask employers to pay their employment insurance in addition to a wage. The respondent views such demands as beyond his economic capacity. Considering that he cannot meet the expectations of Turkish employees, he regards Syrian employees as the only option because they ask a 'reasonable' wage that the employer can afford.

Syrians' tendency to work for lower wages compared to their Turkish peers also received moral appreciation by some of employers. Respondent 27, a dairy farmer (male, 40), used to employ one of his relatives in his workplace; but he was not happy with his employee because his relative was asking for more money (wage) even though he did not excel at the work. Then, he decided to hire a female Syrian labourer who was employed by another Turkish employer in the same neighbourhood, and he described his Syrian employee as less materialistic compared to Turkish citizens (see Waters, 1999 for a similar argument in the case of West Indians):

> "They (Syrians) have sense of ownership of what they do rather than destituteness. They respect bread. The money they earn is not important for them. They embrace the job which enables them to buy bread. They're not sleeping when they're at work. You can trust them."

What is interesting here is that Respondent 27 regards Syrians as less demanding compared to Turkish citizens which makes Syrians humbler in his eyes as they put their shoulder to the wheel without making a big deal out of how much they earn. He even went a further step:

> "Turkish citizen's average daily fee is between 60-70 Turkish liras. To be fair, this Syrian employee did not bargain even for 1 Turkish lira with me. We also provide her weekly food supply. Because it is her right. As for monthly salary, we pay a minimum wage."

All in all, attribution to economic benefits is a very dominant factor which motivates employers to hire Syrian refugees even though they tend to rationalize it differently. In so doing, employers –from their perspective- can find workers who not only do ask for lower-wages, but also willing to undertake less-skilled manual work that natives are reluctant to do. The fact that Syrians do not bargain for wages are also valued by employers. This creates a positive image of Syrians and more welcoming attitude in the eyes of employers during hiring process.

Turkish citizens disdain, but Syrians not

Interviews explicitly referred to labour shortage factor in Turkey. As it is becoming more difficult day by day to find Turkish workers who are willing to work in manual labour driven sectors, employers face difficulties in finding local labour; therefore, Syrian refugees are regarded as lifesavers that bridge labour shortages. Respondents frequently referred to Turkish labour market problems, and twenty-five respondents (six from primary, ten from secondary and nine from tertiary economic sector) considered that there are not adequate qualified employees to fill Turkish labour market demands, especially in secondary economic sectors.

Regarding sectorial differences, particularly primary and secondary economic sectors are very physically demanding which means employees are required to work for long hours and for low wages in difficult and precarious working conditions. These two sectors are also characterized by a high level of informality which is not subjected to taxation and supervision, and is operated by difficult, dangerous and dirty job types and working conditions (İçduygu, 2016). For example, the overall national rate for informal market economy stood at 34,52 percent in 2019 whereas it was 87 percent in agriculture sector. Similarly, the informal economy rate in secondary economic sectors was quite high. To illustrate, it was 38 percent in construction in 2019 whereas it stood at 20 in manufacturing industry (SGK, 2018).

When Respondent 12 was asked why it is becoming more difficult to find an employee nowadays, she complained that Turkish citizens are demanding, and they still disdain jobs in physically demanding sectors even though they do nothing, but loafing around:

> Respondent 12 (female, 44, a driller company owner):
>
> "Turkish people, they don't like, they don't like jobs...This is not only for drilling sector, for any kinds of job. There are available jobs. There is also unemployment in this country. Despite this, they don't like jobs which are offered to them."

Respondent 19 (male, 54, a medium size textile-mill owner) also touched upon 'Turkish people loaf around' from a different perspective. He blamed the duration of compulsory education, which is prolonged from 8 years to 12 years in 2012. The respondent thinks that it has prevented employers in manual labour sectors from training apprentices in early ages, and from developing master-apprentice relationship. Besides, he linked the importance of Syrians in filling labour demand with a highly moralised topic: religion.

> "Compulsory education lasts twelve years in our country. Many types of businesses were affected. Now, people of our country are loafing around. Who solved labour shortage problem of small and medium scale business sectors? Syrians! If Syrians had not been here today, I would have shut this workplace. I am very thankful to all Syrians

> in Turkey. I hug them warmly. I also very much appreciate them due to their faith. They eagerly perform the salaat than us. It does not matter in which religion you believe, but faith is a very significant thing. Well done, them (Syrians)! They were forced to flee their country, but they still somehow continue to work here. I do not think that they are taking Turkish people's jobs. On the contrary, they meet the need of Turkish people. I am proud of having them in Turkey."

In a similar vein, he puts forward a strong connection between master-apprentice relationship and the duration of education. Having a master-apprentice relationship is -according to R19- very important in terms of handing over vocational skills to the next generations. However, he strongly believes that prolongation of national compulsory education harms the traditional nature of apprenticeship-based jobs in Turkey as school-age children are required to participate in full-time education.

> "…There are no negative social or economic impacts of Syrians on Turkey. They contribute to our work. They undertake all labour demand in manual economic sectors. Due to tendency to continue to higher education of new Turkish youth, we lack employees in the labour market. As master-apprentice relationship is about to disappear, we could not find employees anymore. At that time, Syrians came as life saver."

Respondent 8 (male, 30, barber) runs his barber shop for two years in a neighbourhood mostly concentrated by Syrians. In the interview, he explained his reason why he employed a Syrian because he was in need of a barber's apprentice. Also, he found a Syrian young boy quite cute and decided to recruit him. He referred to how the new legislation affects his motivations to hire an apprentice in terms of master-apprentice relationship in his sector:

> "You can find a worker somehow. I do not prefer to employ a Turkish citizen as I am obsessed. Otherwise, I would find both an apprentice and a foreman if I wanted. New graduates go to vocational high schools. In these areas, children are sent to both schools and work (internship). Somehow, they gain some vocational skills. But this number will

> drop in time. When we compare today to ten years ago, it is not the same. There has been a decrease in terms of the number of employees."

The existence of Syrian refugees in Adana, as it seems, has filled the market demands for employment to a certain degree. The interviews also show that employers appreciate Syrians not only for remedying for labour shortages, but also for their willingness to take jobs that Turkish people disdain that appears as a second way of moral justification of economic interests. In the eyes of employers, Syrians value manual jobs which are despised by Turkish citizens. Therefore, employers interpret Syrians' readiness to be employed in any kind of physically demanding job which Turkish citizens do not value as an important moral virtue during hiring processes.

Economic benefits are a dominant factor which motivates employers to hire Syrian refugees even though they tend to rationalize it differently. In so doing, employers - from their perspective - can find workers who not only ask for lower-wages, but also are willing to undertake manual work that natives are reluctant to do. This 'functional' image of Syrians among employers does not only soften hiring processes, but also ossifies inequalities by normalizing Syrians' poor employment and working conditions.

3.3.2. Is 'showing mercy' streamlining hiring processes?

In contrast to economic interests, some employers prioritized moral notions over other factors when asked about their motivation to hire Syrians as employees. 'Mercy' is used as a moral justification for hiring in contrast to the interviewees discussed above. Some participants first brought forward moral consideration rather than economic interests. Their reasoning for hiring is attributed to their understanding of the sense of 'responsibility'; therefore, 'showing mercy' is utilized as a moral tool which motivated employers to hire Syrians.

When asked their motivation to employ Syrians, ten interviewees out of thirty explicitly referred to moral considerations of Syrians' situation in Turkey as guiding hiring processes. It is important to highlight that the interviews referred to related, but slightly different layers of moral obligation and responsibility. In other words, moral notions are a point of departure for some employers to justify their actions during hiring processes, but their understanding of moral obligation shows a heterogeneous character. As a carpenter shop owner (male, 30) explains:

> Interviewer: "Did you employ a Syrian before?"
> Respondent 13 (male, 30, carpenter shop owner):
> "I did in my previous workplaces when they came at first."
> Interviewer: "Around 2012-2013?"
> R13: "Yes, this period. I employed many during that time."
> Interviewer: "What was your motivation to employ them?"
> R13: "I mean I helped them from humanistic perspective. I furnished their all houses. They had come only with a suitcase. I furnished their houses. I even can take you to one of their houses. Their houses, household goods...We supplied many household items to them as well."

As clearly stated by Respondent above, he justified his moral driven action within the case of Syrians by integrating his understanding of humanism into his motivation to employ them in his workplace. Put it differently, attaining 'universal humanism' to the case of Syrians' employment by the interviewer can be understood as a distinct framing strategy which tentatively softens boundaries during hiring processes.

A kebab house owner, Respondent 23 (male, 54), made a point about his understanding of moral obligation in parallel to humane sentiment and the sense of 'responsibility':

> "I employed him because I felt sorry for him. He said, 'I am disabled, I cannot walk' and I decided to give him a job here."

The sensitivity to socioeconomically deprived living conditions of Syrians in their surroundings appears another layer of moral obligation and responsibility driving some of employers to hire Syrians. Although Respondent 27 (male, 40, a dairy farmer) economically benefited from his Syrian employee as outlined in previous part, he genuinely described his moral motivation to help those who are poor and needy as a further justification:

> "The reason is because that this person was in need of job. She needed help, so I wanted to help."

In addition to poor living conditions, being a Syrian parent who seeks a job emerges as core to employers' understanding of moral responsibility as they prioritized those with children. A metal products shop owner/pawnbroker, Respondent 22 (male, 47), summarizes his motivation to hire a Syrian employee:

> Interviewer: "Have you ever employed a Syrian in your workplace?"
> Respondent 22: "There is one who is still working. There is even a (Syrian) family that I meet their bare needs."
> Interviewer: "What was your motivation to hire a Syrian employee?"
> Respondent 22: "I don't expect any benefits. Bring me no benefits. However, (s)he is in a difficult situation. We employ them to sustain their children life. I also help my own people in my neighbourhood as much as I can."

In the similar vein, Respondent 10 (male, 50, a health cabinet owner) emphasizes the role of his Syrian employee having children played during the hiring process:

> "I have personally witnessed. For instance, there was a lady (Syrian) here working as cleaner. I employed her to work here. She has two kids. I hired her to earn a living for her family, especially for her children. Imagine, while I pay 40-50 Turkish liras to a nurse per day, I was paying her (Syrian employee) 35-40 Turkish liras to enable her to bring home the bacon."

Accordingly, 'helping those who are needy' is regarded as a core moral principle. In this respect, letting Syrians invulnerably sustain their life in Turkey such as by providing

employment opportunities for them was interpreted as moral requirement. The sense of responsibility is mobilized among some interviewees as a moral justification for hiring Syrians in their workplace.

The key point for understanding employers' motivations in relation to the boundary-work is twofold. First, structural factors are very relevant to moral boundaries. Even though employers' economic interests are one of the primary reasons why they hire Syrians, they veil their economic interests by deploying moral justifications. Equally important, the moral justification strategy of their economic interests stems from structural conditions in the economy: unease of paying a minimum wage and a lack of adequately qualified employees to fill labour market's demands. However, employers narrate Syrians' tendency to work for lower wages and readiness to take disdained jobs as an important moral value during hiring processes. Secondly, beyond solely economic benefits, there are other criteria which are utilized as main source of motivation to make Syrians potential employees in the eyes of employers during hiring processes. Moral sentiments play a prominent role in streamlining hiring processes because some employers' hiring decisions are justified by what they universally and locally value (Sayer, 2005), such as helping 'needy people' or developing a sense of empathy. Hence, the respondents' use of morality appears multi-layered and subject to a change from situation to situation. Different interpretations of moral obligation reasonably circulate among the respondents and different narratives of 'showing mercy' not only let employers engage with softening boundary strategies during hiring processes, but also show that they can be operated distinctively across individuals based upon intersubjective shared meaning structures.

3.4 Different Stages of Employment: Hardened Moral Boundaries after Employment

In this part, I shift my focus from hiring processes to employment itself. Interviewees describe negative work experiences with Syrian employees, generating a negative image of Syrians as not satisfying employers' expectations and as not contributing to the work as

expected. Mobilization of such shifted intersubjective moral constructions takes shape through different phases of employment. This distinction between two employment phases is important in the sense that employers' moral boundary-drawing, specifically in relation to the way they see Syrians as 'employees', goes hand in hand with their moral expectations. Existing studies argue that employers are likely to develop negative racial attitudes and beliefs towards minority groups before hiring (see Pager and Karafin, 2009). Similarly, Waters (1999) scrutinizes West Indian immigrants' work experiences in the American food sector in relation to how moral discourses are intersubjectively mobilized between West Indian immigrants and American blacks from perspectives of employers. She finds that employers are likely to hire West Indian immigrants because they are seen as more hard-working than American blacks. Strikingly, I here show a reverse pattern by focusing on how moral values and concerns regarding work performance increase in salience after employment even though they were not a matter of concern during hiring processes. My study indicates that work experiences can also have an adverse effect on employers' moral justifications which can perpetuate moral boundary-drawing.

Attachment to moral norms exists in both stages of employment, however; it is treated and interpreted differently by interviewees before and after employment. Notably, moral boundary-drawing does not operate independently from the functional relationship between Turkish employers and Syrian employees. That is to say, such relationships can trigger elevated expectations of obedience and gratitude even though employees' moral traits may play no role during hiring processes. Perhaps, such expectations are always there, but are masked during hiring processes which lets employers depict themselves as moral individuals since employing Syrians is interpreted as a favour done by employers for the Syrians' economic well-being (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). Once employers, however, experience that their Syrian workers failed to meet their work-related moral expectations, their

attention is shifted to employees' own morality. Among thirty interviewees, fifteen were employing Syrians in their workplaces, five had fired Syrians, seven of them never had employed them, and three had ceased to employ Syrians for other reasons at the time of the interview. I now discuss how and why moral motivations to hire Syrians are challenged and even replaced by hostility after employment within the framework of work-related moral norms. Although Syrians 'stronger work ethic does not emerge as a key factor during hiring processes, the same value becomes part of the boundary-making process following hiring.

3.4.1. Moral Values Revisited by Work Experiences

To what extent are we well-informed about the role of work experiences with migrant groups in (re)producing conceptual distinctions that are centred on moral values and concerns in everyday work life interactions? More specifically, how do work experiences shape moral construction of 'refugees' as employees and what is the role of work experience in constructing notions of 'us' and 'them' in the eyes of employers? In this part, I aim to integrate *'moral norms'* into *'boundary-making*' and to show in which work experiences with Syrians affect the boundary-making process and why it becomes more salient across different workplaces whereas others not. In this regard, moral values, virtues and concerns are crucial because they do not only contribute to developing the sense of who we are, but also understanding of how we regard others (Hardy and Carlo, 2005). To achieve this, I closely look at how moral values and concerns in the workplace are brought up to employers' agenda after employment through different work experiences even though such values are not their concern during hiring processes. In doing so, I aim at understanding (1) how work experiences play a crucial role in determining the tone of moral boundary-drawing between employers and employees, and (2) the extent to which labour market conditions drive employers to prioritize economic interests over morality and ethics despite their unsatisfaction with their Syrian workers' work performance.

According to some interviews, employers were more likely to concretely engage in boundary-making strategies, especially when their work-related expectations are not met by their Syrian employees. Work experiences can be very determinant to understanding that boundaries are not uniform, can be made and remade during the whole employment process depending on given circumstances. The fact that the boundary-making is a very dynamic process (Wimmer, 2008a, 2008b), I here direct my attention to the role of work-related moral values assigned by employers to understand the relationship between work experience and the boundary-making process which seems to have qualitatively significant implications for employers' approach to their Syrian employees over time.

Work ethic with regards to a well-behaved human character

Qualitative-driven findings in relation to workplace studies indicate that employers' perception of a strong work ethic of migrants is a very significant factor for choosing migrants as employees compared to native/local workers (MacKenzie and Forde, 2009; Matthews and Ruhs, 2007; Tannock, 2013; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). However, I shall clearly underline three crucial factors here: Firstly, those studies focus on the reasons why employers tend to prefer migrants over local workers in relation to work ethic while my research's focal point is forced migrants. Secondly, I am interested in not only employers' motivations about hiring Syrians as employees, but also how they justify their decisions and how they regard Syrians as workers. Thirdly and perhaps most interesting, although Syrians' stronger work ethic does not emerge as a key factor during hiring processes, the same value becomes part of the boundary-making process following hiring. Fifteen interviewees repeatedly pointed to Syrians lacking a strong work ethic when they were asked about their experience with them. Respondents framed a strong work ethic not only as an essential characteristic of a well-behaved worker but also more generally as key component of the human character that shall entail moral traits such as "honesty, work ethic, personal integrity, and consideration for others" (Lamont, 1992: 4).

Different work experiences elicit different understandings and interpretations of work ethic among employers. This comes to light especially when employers were asked how they regarded the work performance and discipline of their Syrian employees in a given economic sector and workplace. According to interviewees, Syrians' work performance was less satisfactory than Turkish workers because they had failed to accommodate a well-behaved worker's characteristics. In other words, Syrians' work performance and discipline do not meet employers' expectations in a given role or task since it does not correspond to Turkey's embedded working culture. For instance, Respondent 12 made that very clear during the interview:

> Respondent 12 (female, 44, a driller company owner)
> "Their work performance differs from one to another. They performed well in drilling but when I employed them for the garden of my house...We provided them coffee, tea as well as their all meals. We also gave them the password of the internet. They were able to listen to music too. If they are supposed to work around four hours from morning to lunch time, they spend two hours on the phone or talking to each other. They are bad at house related assigned tasks, but they are good at drilling. Our Syrians employee in our drilling company was an exception."

After Respondent 12 recruited and experienced in working with Syrian employees in two different jobs: drilling and garden work, she has a perception that Syrians don't have the right attitude and respect towards work because of the fact that Syrians tend to work under more flexible working conditions. Her dissatisfaction with other Syrian employees pushed her to see Syrians not as hard workers. Although she was happy with the work performance of her Syrian employee in drilling, she interpreted her work experience in drilling as an exception. In return, the tone of her moral justification changed.

Similarly, Respondent 9 (male, 53, a carpenter workshop owner) emphasized his view that Syrians are not hard workers by saying:

> "They are very and very laid-back people. I mean they don't come to the work for a day or two days in a week. They are so relaxed. 'We were not used to work that much in Syria', they say."

Respondent 19 (male, 54, a medium size textile-mill owner) even went a step further by stating that:

> "They (Syrians) learnt how to work in Turkey. Those people had not worked enough there (Syria). I was told that there was government assistance such as food products, pulse etc. They used to work first half of week and loaf around the rest. It takes those who started to work in Turkey a year to be accustomed to working conditions in Turkey. But afterwards, they have been able to keep up with working conditions and actively work."

In the similar vein, Respondent 22 (male, 47, a metal products shop owner/pawnborker) complained about his Syrian employees on the grounds of not only their working performance, but also the type of job which was essentially assigned by the employer himself:

> "They don't have professions like Turkish people. They do whatever duty you impose. They run errands."

When he was asked about whether he feels satisfied with his working performance:

> "No, there is no such thing... They don't like working. I really mean they don't like working. I say all these because I have had conversation with them, and I speak and understand their language. They used to work for 3 hours per day in their previous government, and to live like the kings. They now stumble here because of the war."

As the interviews show, employers framed a stronger work ethic as the ability to work long hours without complaining and to keep up with working conditions in Turkey. Furthermore, satisfying employers' expectations in relation to the Turkish working culture (being culturally embedded with master-apprentice relationship, respecting the employer and working hard) was another criterion for having of a stronger work ethic. Employers feel let down by their Syrian workers because their work discipline and performance are not well-mannered enough in the

sense of fulfilling one's duties at work in line with employers' expectation as their Turkish peers do which is –according to their understanding- considered as a core element of work ethic. Put differently, employers' perception of stronger work ethic in relation to being 'a good employee' is connected with the way of how employers impose their work values as dominant upon Syrians.

Work ethic with regards to a well-behaved human character

Although employers criticized their Syrian workers' performance, most continue to employ them. The mismatch between employers' expectations and Syrians' work performance is not widely appreciated among employers, but tolerable to a certain extent. However, some interviewees experienced employee theft and such intolerable actions obliged them to fire their Syrian employees. Such workplace experiences led them to regard work ethic not only as an essential characteristic of a good worker, but also as more central to the human character by which to conceive of honesty, integrity and dependability on the grounds of moral traits.

The first instance emerged from an interview with a barbershop owner, Respondent 8 (male, 30), who has been running the same workplace for two years in a neighbourhood mostly concentrated by Syrians. In the interview, he explained his reason why he employed a Syrian because he was in need of a barber's apprentice. Also, he found a Syrian young boy quite cute and decided to recruit him. After for a while, the employer caught his young worker while stealing some money.

> "Once I saw him for the first time, I counselled him about what he did was wrong. I saw him another time. I did not do anything again. When he did it for the third time, I had to fire him. I was satisfied with his working style. He was a good worker, but we had other issues with him. Theft is not acceptable. We were paying the same amount of money to him as we do with our own workers (Turkish citizens). I mean I didn't pay less him. But he acted in this way. I was forced to dismiss him."

A similar situation is also observed in an interview with Respondent 23 who has been running the same restaurant in the same place for 20 years. There are now a considerable number of Syrian-owned businesses around this neighbourhood. His Syrian employee worked there for 2 years, but he had to fire him because:

> Respondent 23 (male, 54, a Kebab house owner)
> "I employed one Syrian here. He was performing five-time prayer. But he was stealing. He swore on Quran, but I personally saw him while stealing."

This negative experience is exacerbated by the fact that he witnessed the moment when his employee stole money. When I asked about how the hiring process took place and how his relationship with his Syrian employee ended up in this way, he said:

> "I hired him because I felt so sorry for him. He told me I am disabled, cannot walk. How he fooled me for two years, I seriously did not understand. Not even me understood! Some of people told me afterwards that 'Chef, your employee even cycles.' My response was: 'He cannot walk, I see him here every day. He cannot walk. I told him why my employee would lie.' In fact, he was walking back side of the restaurant. Afterwards, I fired him. Since then, he has not even greeted me. I don't even want any greeting sayings. Now, he walks like a horse while passing by my place. While working here, he was hobbling. Even if I had to shut down my business here, I wouldn`t hire any Syrian in my restaurant."

What we can read out of the quote is that Respondent 23 felt deluded by his employee after working together two years, and this unfruitful experience made him reconsider how he sees Syrians. His perspective of Syrians was suddenly reversed, and he showed the tendency to mobilize negative attribution to not only a person or a group of people, but rather the whole community itself. Moreover, those unfruitful work experiences can activate further stigmatizations on certain community members that increase the salience of moral boundary-drawing.

(Dis)loyalty

Some interviewees linked Syrians' work ethic explicitly to the moral value of (dis)loyalty, reinforcing a negative stereotype about Syrian workers and imbuing it with moral tones. The link between negative perceptions and work experience becomes visible especially when employers' expectations of their Syrian employees are not met. A vehicle repair shop owner (male, 55) used to employ three Syrians in his workplace but they quit the job without notifying him in advance. This situation pushed him to reinterpret his approach to Syrians both: as potential employees before hiring and as non-desired work force after recruitment.

> Respondent 11 (male,55, a vehicle car repair shop owner):
> "Syrians are not settled here, one of them is now working with me here. When somebody gives him 10 Turkish liras more than I give, he abandons me. I mean my situation - after he quits - doesn't pose any problem for him. Not bearing responsibilities, I mean taking no risks...Doesn't care the fact that I work here, I keep working here, my boss treats me well, he gives me food and drink...Whoever gives more, he walks off the job. But our Turkish nation is not like that. For example, this employee (pointing his Turkish employee) working here, when he decides to quit, he tells me 'master, I will quit' one week in advance."

Such experiences not only drive employers to reconsider Syrian employees' work discipline, but also push them to make a comparison between local workers and them. In the eyes of the respondent, being loyal to an employer was an indispensable part of the master-apprentice relationship in his sector as auto work is heavily relied on workers' performance which, in return, affects customers' satisfaction. Considering that the employer felt responsible for his customers, he anticipated getting respect from his employees in terms of a strong commitment to customer expectations in a given time. Accordingly, the interview with Respondent 9 (male, 53, a carpenter workshop owner) also draws our attention to the same point:

> "Turkish people are more loyal. But we cannot trust them (Syrians) much. We cannot trust. They can leave you in the lurch. For example, you take on the job and promise to your customer, but you may sometimes break your word if your Syrian employee quits."

Syrians' perceived disloyalty to their employer and their current job leads to a subjective mobilization of strong attributions. Such experiences and ideas are likely to reinforce specific representation about Syrians in the labour market, especially in the sectors where master-apprentice relations are common that make employers re-evaluate their way of seeing them as potential employees. Employers themselves who had disappointing work experiences with Syrians mobilize their understanding of work ethic by distinguishing between locals and Syrian workers. In this regard, making this clear-cut distinction in terms of working style and work ethic reinforces the emergence of outsider sentiment and drives employers to impose their work-related unwritten rules on Syrians.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter explored the role of everyday work experiences in the construction and reconstruction of moral boundaries. Through a case study of Adana, this chapter looks at how distinct framing strategies are employed towards Syrian workers in workplaces, and how Turkish employers negotiate and contest moral boundaries at different stages of employment in labour-intensive jobs in the informal market economy. I posit that attachment to morality in the workplace is distinctively (re)constructed by employers at different stages of employment: during the hiring process and then employment itself.

The chapter shows that there is a strong link between moral justification strategies and the temporary introduction of the softened boundary work between employers and 'potential' Syrian workers during hiring processes. Economic interests are an inevitable factor motivating employers to hire Syrians; however, the way employers rationalize their action is central to the link that they established between moral aspect and hiring such as 'Turkish employees are so demanding whereas Syrians not' or 'Syrians praise such manual

jobs disdained by Turkish people'. Hence, feeling morally responsible for helping poor and needy people as a part of human duty appears as another justification framework when asked about employers' motivation to hire a Syrian. Compared to hiring processes, the employment stage itself is less smooth. It presents challenges to employers which make them evaluate their standpoint once they start working with Syrians. In this regard, the role of different work experiences is intersubjectively employed by the respondents. Concurrently, work-related moral values become more salient than ever before. In contrast to hiring processes, moral codes such as work ethic, work discipline, loyalty and honesty are emphasized for the first time by employers as a result of work experiences. This also leads them to mobilize negative attribution to Syrian workers and to generalize such negatively assigned personal traits over the whole community. However, the tone of moral boundary-drawing does not act independently from employers' economic interests. Employees' undesired behaviour at work can activate an ignorance mechanism where the tone of moral boundary-drawing is negotiable when it comes to the functional relationship.

This chapter makes three key contributions to the literature. First, it shows the plural nature of moral justifications in shaping the boundary-drawing process. I illustrate the link between structural factors and moral boundary-drawing by demonstrating how employers intersubjectively rationalize hiring decisions based on moral reasoning which is used as a veiling strategy during hiring processes. Furthermore, the functionality aspect of hiring Syrians (i.e. demanding less and paying less) fuels employers' elevated expectations of deference, gratefulness, and drudgery which trigger further inequalities in the labour market. The interdependence between such expectations and structural factors creates a local labour market repertoire that feeds into poor working conditions and workplace specific expectations from Syrian workers. Second, moral boundaries are not fixed and uniform; they can be made and remade over time by the same social actors depending on the context in which moral

justifications are (re)produced. By highlighting a distinction between hiring and employment phases, I thereby illustrate how attribution to employers' understanding of morality shows a change in time: the moral construction of the 'self' during hiring processes and, of the 'employee' after employment. Last, I contribute to the growing body of work on moral boundary-drawing by examining employers' perspective in the informal economy while existing studies focus on employees. This paper suggests that moral boundary-drawing is closely connected to the functional aspect of employer-employee relationship and types of work experiences; however, intersubjective mobilization of shared moral norms affects differently the nature of moral boundaries in workplaces.

Chapter 4: Socioeconomic Justifications of Boundary Work through the Lens of Employees

4.1 Introduction

Boundary work is the dual process through which we constitute 'who we are' and, define 'others'. There is a binding relationship between identifying 'the self' and categorizing 'others' in that. Constituting 'the self' derives from similarities whereas defining 'others' is based on differences. Thus, 'insider' and 'outsider' notions tend to appear in the process of boundary-making, as a result of this binding relationship between group identification and external categorization (Jenkins, 2014). Whereas group identification deals with the way individuals distinguish themselves from others through a sense of belonging and similarity within the in-group, external categorization is profoundly related to power relations and extent to which one group imposes its chosen categories upon another group (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). This differentiation process stems from the struggle between establishing worth over outsiders and generating control mechanisms to maintain it (Tajfel and Turner, 1985).

Over the last twenty years, there is a growing body of research that addresses the concept of the boundary-drawing by applying it to different groups and contexts (Lamont and Molnár, 2000; Tilly, 2004; Wimmer, 2013), including the perspectives of employees (see Lamont, 2000; Purser, 2009; Sherman, 2005). However, very little is known about how insider/outsider boundaries are drawn around native- and foreign-born classifications among employees in workplaces, and how this influences broader trends in the (re)production of inequality in everyday work life interactions "through the routine and taken-for-granted actions" (Lamont et al., 2014: 573). From this point of view, I argue that, although both 'Syrian' and 'Turkish' nationals are on the same plane as workers vis-a-vis employers, insider/outsider boundaries are drawn around the native- versus foreign-born classification, which introduces a different

element of inequality. Boundary work is heterogenous as it can be intersubjectively mobilized across different social actors (e.g. employers versus employees) at work. Accordingly, identifying, prioritizing, and addressing work-related expectations, needs, and concerns vary between employers and employees. Thus, where do boundaries lie in the agenda of employees and how do they operate in everyday work life among work peers?

In her seminal work, Lamont discusses "how workers construct similarities and differences between themselves and other groups" by comparing American and French blue-collar and lower white-collar workers (2000: 3). She demonstrates that lower white-collar workers tended to deploy a set of intertwined criteria, including moral, socioeconomic, and cultural judgements, to define 'who they are' and 'who they are not'. In contrast, working-class men are more likely to engage in a moral reasoning that shows not only different national and class patterns (American versus French working men), but also distinct racial patterns (black versus white Americans and French workers versus North African immigrants in France) (Lamont, 2000). However, 'strategies of self' (Sherman, 2005:133) do not always stems from rigid 'mental maps' which individuals engage with a fixed categorisation to define 'us' and 'them' (Lamont, 2000: 3) but also can be produced and reproduced as a result of other structural factors (e.g. labour market dynamics in the informal market economy) that may disadvantage both outsiders and insiders. This is where I make my intervention: I theorize that the boundary work is also linked with how one positions oneself at work. Furthermore, I argue that previous scholarship has ignored that, while positioning oneself, socioeconomic justification can take priority over class, race, ethnicity, religious, and moral characteristics in the agenda of employees. For this reason, my main concerns here are (1) to draw attention to how socioeconomic justifications regarding employees' positionality are produced and can manifest as boundary-drawing strategies and (2) to reveal how the struggle over maintaining the dignified status of insiders

over outsiders at work perpetuates and normalizes inequalities among employees in labour-intensive occupational categories in the informal market economy.

The previous chapter explored the role of structural factors (e.g. cheap labour, avoiding paying social security premiums, labour shortages) in labour-intensive economic sectors in shaping employer-employee relationships, and how morality is used as a justification strategy by employers by mobilizing the 'paying less' and 'demanding less' discourse. It also examines how the understanding and interpretation of morality at work pertain to boundary-making from the employers' perspectives, and how this feeds into the routine production and reproduction of inequality. This chapter looks at how employees engage with socioeconomic justifications to assure and maintain their dignified status over their Syrian peers in the workplace. Although both employees and employers regard Syrians as 'destitute outsiders' without many choices regarding their labour market participation, employees' and employers' justification strategies differ. The latter can use their position of power to employ the boundary to create a moral self when they hire Syrians whereas the former see Syrians as 'peers' they are competing with. Consequently, the emotional valence of the outsider boundary for employees is primarily negative whereas it is positive for employers (e.g. showing mercy). In fact, both employers and employees view Syrians as 'outsiders', but the way(s) Syrians are seen bring out different nuances in the narratives of employers and employees. Specifically, the ways in which employers regard Syrians as 'outsiders' but not 'peers' whereas employees view them as not only 'outsiders but also peers' offer a nuanced account of boundary-drawing.

Given these divergences between employers and employees, this chapter specifically focuses on how boundaries are drawn between Turkish and Syrian employees in the same workplace across various economic sectors by analysing (1) what makes Syrians 'peers' in the eyes of employees and (2) how employees position themselves as more worthy than their Syrians peers in the workplace. I first elaborate on how employees' perception that 'Syrians are cheap' is

produced and attributed to their position as destitute foreign-born outsiders, and grounds for boundary work. I then argue that the ‘cheapness’ discourse provides a socioeconomic justification strategy that enables Turkish employees to consider themselves worthier than their Syrian workplace peers.

It is worth reminding ourselves that, although Syrians under the temporary protection regime have the right to work in Turkey, this right is not automatically granted, but relies on certain eligibility criteria and administrative procedures. In particular, registration with the Turkish Social Security System is vital for work permit applications. Because it is a legal marker of one’s employment status in Turkey that guarantees access to social rights such as pension schemes or, healthcare benefits. It also draws a line between formal and informal employment. All Turkish employers must register their employees with the Turkish Social Security System and pay employees’ monthly social security premiums, regardless of whether an employee is a Turkish citizen, an immigrant, or a Syrian under Turkey’s temporary protection regime. However, being registered with the Turkish Social Security System is less attractive to Syrian refugees than to Turkish citizens because the right to healthcare is automatically granted to those under the temporary protection regime but not the right to a pension. For employers, informal employment of Syrians means avoidance of paying employee social security premiums, which greatly contributes to the ‘cheapness’ discourse of Turkish employees and Syrians’ tendency to work for lower wages.

4.2 Inequality, Justification, and Boundaries

Both theoretical and empirical sociology has a long history of understanding different dimensions of inequality (see Lamont et al. 2014; Massey, 2007; Ridgeway, 2011; Tilly, 1998). However, sociologists remain concerned about how inequality takes place, what kinds of mechanisms cause inequality, and how the production and reproduction of inequality persist across different contexts and types of groups at the macro level (Ridgeway, 2014; Tilly, 1998),

meso level (Lamont et al., 2014), and micro level (Goffman, 1963). Understanding the multidimensional and multifaceted complexity of inequality is an important task. However, it is not easy to address and analyse how social mechanisms and processes produce and reproduce inequality, and at which level(s) inequality operates. Traditional approaches to inequality centre on access to, and control over material resources and power (Marx, 1976; Weber, 1978) whereas in the last four decades, sociological studies on inequality have focused on neglected dimensions and patterns of inequality, i.e. shifting the gaze from material (e.g. power, income, and wealth) to non-material dimensions of inequality (e.g. access to and distribution of cultural and symbolic capital) (see Brubaker, 2015; Lamont et al., 2014, 2016; Lareau, 2015).

Tilly contributes to this literature by arguing that "Large significant inequalities in advantages among human beings correspond mainly to categorical differences such as black/white, male/female, citizen/foreigner, or Muslim/Jew rather than to individual differences" (1998: 7). Furthermore, such categorical differences not only contribute to the production of inequality but also play a significant role in maintaining inequality between dominant groups and subordinates. Brubaker (2015) also contributes to the debate on categorical differences by bringing up the role of birthplace, residential segregation, and gender; however, his main argument - unlike Tilly (1998) - is that recent inequality has occurred within rather than between categories. According to Ridgeway (2014: 1), incorporating "the effects of a relatively neglected form of social inequality - social status - alongside effects based on resources and power" is vital because inequalities based on differences in respect, esteem, and honour originate at the micro level before being transformed into cultural status beliefs at the macro level. These in turn sustain power and resource inequality where group differences derive from individual or group social positions in society, workplaces, schools, etc. Another notable exception to traditional inequality studies is made by Lamont, Beljean, and Clair (2014). They expand the social inequality literature by exploring the role of cultural processes "moved by

inter-subjective meaning-making: they take shape through the mobilization of shared categories and classification systems through which individuals perceive and make sense of their environment" (Lamont, Beljean, and Clair, 2014: 574). In doing so, they characterize cultural processes shaped by taken-for-granted and routine activities of both dominant and subordinate actors; they demonstrate how these processes feed into the production and reproduction of material, non-material, and location-based inequality by analysing the missing link between micro-level cognitive processes and macro-level outcomes, namely meso-level cultural processes (Lamont et al., 2014).

From justification perspective, there is still room to fill gaps in empirical sociological research to explicate how, why and in which ways individuals engage with different reasoning and justification logics to legitimize their actions (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 2006; Tilly, 2006). In this regard, Boltanski and Thévenot's pathbreaking work (2006) on the pragmatics of justification strategies provides an illuminating room for social scientists to analyse how words, ideas and discourses are deployed by social actors and how they are mobilized, when necessary, to justify and legitimize their actions. Such justification logics are characterized by plurality and can be derived from similar underlying mechanisms and conceptions of the common good. However, social actors can engage with their own justification frameworks depending on their positionality (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). So, what does inequality have to do with justification logics? When social actors draw on common narratives and introduce their own justification logics regarding the common good (e.g. employment and/or the labour market), their actions can routinely yet, unconsciously contribute to producing and reproducing both material and non-material inequality by mobilizing justification strategies that insiders widely agree support their own views over outsiders. My argument here seeks to explain how the 'cheapness' discourse, which maintains an individual's social position at work and caters for a status-based local hierarchy in workplaces, has evolved into a socioeconomic justification

strategy that indirectly and implicitly feeds into inequality. In the Turkish context, the production of the ‘cheapness’ discourse is undoubtedly strongly linked to the functional relationship between Turkish employers, who can find workers who both fill labour shortages and demand less than Turkish workers, and Syrian employees, who demand low wages which opens up the employment path for themselves. While the ‘cheapness’ discourse is associated with the moral context (e.g. Syrian workers are humble enough to demand less) in the agenda of employers, it appears as a socioeconomic justification strategy in the agenda of employees which allows them to label the precarious status of Syrians in the labour market as destitute, foreign-born outsiders who are ‘in need of jobs’. Therefore, the ‘cheapness’ discourse emerges as a way of differentiation between Turkish and Syrian workers which also marks symbolic hierarchies at work because labelling Syrian workers as cheap workforce enables Turkish employees to establish their greater worth and maintain their dignified status over their Syrian peers in workplaces, despite being employed in the same workplace and economic sector.

As I showed in the previous chapter, the boundary-making process is not mutually exclusive from the way justification frameworks are generated. Recognizing a plurality of justification logics, I focus in this chapter on the role of socioeconomic justification strategies in the manifestation of boundaries. Such socioeconomic justifications go hand in hand with the positioning of individuals and/or groups in societies, which in turn may affect one’s positive or negative recognition in society. ‘Positionality’, which can be defined as how social actors position not only themselves but also others according to a specific context in which justification logics are (re)produced (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006), is another important part of boundary-making. The linkage between establishing worth and boundaries may drive people to monopolize successful categories of status ascription or the values of specific class culture as a dominant standard. Elias and Scotson’s ([1965] 1994) empirical study is useful here. They investigated a small community, Winston Parva, near Leicester in the UK to reveal the

significance of power dynamics between two different but similar groups living in distinct zones of a housing estate. They described how social mechanisms enabled residents (the established group) to create a power-based relationship over newcomers (the outsider group). Length of local residence allowed the former group to strengthen its social cohesion within the community and mobilized them to access power resources whereas the lack of established social cohesion greatly disadvantaged the newcomers. Basically, the figuration of group charisma (attributed to themselves by the established residents) and group disgrace (attributed to outsiders by the established residents) was articulated through stigmatization of outsiders. Thus, this study shows that conflicts may also stem from power and social dynamics between dominant and subordinate groups rather than class, race, ethnicity, or other social structures. Regarding power structures in relation to the boundary-drawing, Wimmer states that "where power differentials between individuals of different ethnic backgrounds are high, degrees of social closure are also high….Those who have successfully set themselves apart from the rest of the population as 'ethnic others' and managed to monopolize economic, political, or symbolic resources will try to police the ethnic boundary and make assimilation and other strategies of boundary crossing difficult" (2008a: 1002). Wimmer's approach converges with that of Elias and Scotson by emphasising that those who set themselves apart tend to label newly arriving groups as the 'outsider' when their own monopolized power resources insecure.

In the light of this literature, it is important to investigate how context-specific socioeconomic justification logics are produced and contributes to boundary-drawing. The salience of boundaries is not independent from the context in which routine actions emerge and remerge in relation to positional characteristics. Even if the context is constant (e.g. workplaces), there is still room for the emergence of diverse justification logics because positionality in the workplace can be the basis for boundary-drawing. As shown in the previous chapter, "employers tend to create a moral context in which they regard themselves as 'virtuous' and

such moral construction of the 'self' softens hiring processes in the informal market economy" (Sivis, 2020: 7). Such a moral context also raises employers' expectations of deference, gratefulness, and drudgery from their Syrian workers in Turkey's informal sector. This feeds into poor working conditions and specific expectations from Syrian workers, which I call 'the local labour market repertoire'. Employers' positive self-perceptions (i.e. praising themselves as moral individuals who employ people desperately needing a job) is closely connected to the way employees frame Syrians as 'needy' yet unequal peers who are destitute foreign-born outsiders; are therefore ready to take any kind of job offered. This chapter's goal is to understand how this 'destitute outsider' label is a separate element of inequality in the agenda of employees. It investigates how Turkish employees' socioeconomic justification logics legitimize and normalize such inequality intersubjectively, and how they shape the definition of boundaries among peers at work.

Of the seventeen interviewees, fourteen were working with a Syrian in their economic sector at the time of the interviews. Ten respondents were from the tertiary economic sector whereas seven were from the secondary economic sector. Four interviewees were not registered with the Turkish Social Security System, meaning that they were working informally. Almost all interviewees regarded Syrians as peers that they are competing with. This is not surprising given that Syrians are willing to work for lower wages without demanding employee social security premium. What is interesting here, however, is that structural factors, such as informal market conditions, can be powerful enough to evolve into a local labour market repertoire that enables a socioeconomic justification strategy to emerge that draws workplace boundaries between Turkish and Syrian workers.

4.3 Syrians as 'peers' in the eyes of employees: Production of socioeconomic justifications

While 'showing empathy' appears in the narratives of employers, 'empathy' framing is almost non-existent among employees; instead, they highlight the negative impacts of Syrians on the

job market, particularly in suppressing wages. There is an extensive line of research on the importance of economic competition in migration studies. This focuses on both the micro level regarding individuals' self-interest (see Bonacich, 1972; Burns and Gimple, 2000; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) and the macro-level regarding the interests of the non-immigrant majority (see Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008). Unsurprisingly, Syrians are regarded as competitors in Turkey's labour market given the role of economic competition in shaping everyday work life interactions between Turkish and Syrian employees across different workplaces.

The extent to which Turkish employees feel threatened by Syrians is not the primary concern here. Rather, I aim to show how structural factors in the Turkish informal market economy (i.e. the need of employers to hire employees in unprotected labour markets as shown in the previous chapter) are coupled with Turkish employees' economic concerns. The functional relationship (i.e. paying less, demanding less) allows employees to produce the 'cheapness' discourse. More importantly, this discourse has evolved into a socioeconomic justification strategy by employees that also manifests as a boundary marker between Turkish and Syrians employees in the job market. Fourteen respondents (out of seventeen) strongly associated the presence of Syrians in the labour market with deteriorating employment conditions in labour-intensive sectors and reduced wages in certain economic sectors. Six of them regarded Syrians as threatening their own economic well-being in their workplace while nine thought that Syrians create economic insecurity for both present and future generations. Those who worked with Syrians in the same workplace are more likely to see them as threatening their individual economic well-being while the others consider that they endanger the economic interests of the whole society. In the following sections, I explain how all respondents draw on the discourse that 'Syrians work for lower wages' and 'they are cheap' as their underlying socioeconomic justification logic in drawing boundaries.

What grounds for 'cheapness'?

As shown in the previous chapter, structural factors, such as cheap labour and labour shortages in labour-intensive economic sectors, play a key role in shaping employer-employee relationships. Paying less and demanding less, the so-called *functional relationship,* streamlines a local labour market repertoire mobilized by shared characteristics. In other words, it enables Turkish employers to find employees who demand less than Turkish employees and are willing to do jobs that Turkish citizens disdain; in return, it increases the Syrians' employment opportunities. However, such a local market repertoire damages Turkish employees' employment opportunities. Their perception of Syrians' 'cheapness' hardens boundaries between Turkish and Syrian employees while softening Syrians' hiring processes.

That Syrians are cheap labour force. Consequently, interviewees vehemently referred to *asking for lower wages* as one of major causes of intense competition in manual economic sectors. To illustrate, Respondent 11 (male, 24, cashier at wholesale market, unregistered with SSI) has been working since dropping out of high school when he was 14 years old. Over ten years, he has worked in various economic sectors in Adana, such as in textile manufacturing, school canteens, and kiosks. When I met him, he was working as cashier in a wholesale market. When asked about his work experience in the garment sector, he replied as follows:

> "I worked in the garment sector as a textile machine technician. Before, I worked as a pressman, then I became responsible for textile machines. After Syrians came to our country, I quit my job there because they destroyed the textile market."

Textile is undeniably one of the top informal economic sectors where Syrians are mostly concentrated. I asked him to elaborate on what he meant saying about the devastating effects of Syrians in textiles:

> "There were more job opportunities 5 to 6 years ago. In every sector. For example, employers needed employees. However, such a situation is out of the question now."

Interviewer: “Why?”

> “This is the current situation after those (Syrians) came to our country. We used to work for 5 Turkish liras whereas they worked for 2.5. Now, I am empathizing with the employer. I would probably do the same thing if I was an employer. I criticize this since I am not an employer. If I had someone who would work for such low wages and do twice as much, I would also employ a Syrian. Makes sense.”

Thus, this interviewee explains how wages have declined because Syrians work for lower wages than Turkish peers. He also emphasizes how Syrian’s high demand for jobs has limited job opportunities for Turkish citizens. Believing that he was being paid less than he deserved, he left his job in textiles and found another economic sector that pays better. What is interesting here is that Respondent 11 is only concerned about wage decline in his own economic sector, not with understanding why Syrians work for lower wages than market values. His empathy towards employers is clearly a way of standardizing the cheap labour force through which he unintentionally contributes to the production of labour market inequality. In addition, Respondent 11 mobilizes another crucial part of boundary work, namely identifying himself with the Turkish employer rather than his Syrian fellow worker. Similarly, Respondent 2 (male, 35, welder, registered with SSI) reported that:

> “Employers were giving them (Syrians) less money. They used to work for 30 to 40 Turkish liras per day when they first came here. Now, they (Syrians) dislike this amount of money. When they work for higher wages, Turkish employees are able to find a job too. Nevertheless, they (Syrians) were obliged to work. They are not happy with 30 to 40 Turkish liras now. They work for 60 to 70 Turkish liras. When you compare to a Turkish employee, they still work for lower wages. Masters always take Syrians with them for renovation work. For example, there is tiling work. Who are the workers? Syrians! For electric wiring jobs... They are all Syrians. Why? Because it is cheap.”

Respondent 2 has been working as a welder more than 25 years. He stated that a welder’s daily wage should not be less than 100-120 Turkish liras. However, Syrians work for less, just as in

other economic sectors, which creates conflict between Turkish and Syrian workers. Respondent 2 also pointed out the same situation in construction sector:

> "For example, there used to be Kurds in the construction sector. I heard a lot from them (Kurdish construction workers); I mean their complaints about Syrians. After they (Syrians) arrived, they (Kurds) were no longer able to find jobs. Let me put it this way...Supposing that that a man (a Syrian) was working for 30 to 40 Turkish liras while their (Kurds') daily wage was 100 Turkish liras. That is to say, he (a Kurdish construction worker) could not find the job on the basis of how much he asks for. I have spoken to many Kurds about this issue..."
>
> Interviewer: "Are there any reasons why employers prefer Syrians other than a cheap labour force?"
>
> Respondent 2: "In my opinion, there are no other reasons!"

The fact that Syrians are willing to work for lower wages makes harder for Turkish workers to get hired. Consequently, Turkish workers do not portray Syrians in terms of differences in job skills, race, or moral grounds as employers do. Instead, they label them as 'cheaper', which invisibly plays a crucial invisible role in perpetuating broader trends in inequality. This is because when employees say that 'Syrians are a source of cheap labour', they attribute this to their position as 'destitute outsiders'. Strikingly, almost no respondents showed any empathy or questioned for why Syrians work for lower wages; rather, they emphasised the socioeconomic challenges they face in the job market due to cheap Syrian labour. When this routinized local labour market repertoire disadvantages Turkish employees, their concern is not about 'who is better at work', but 'who is cheaper'. This perception not only reinforces income inequality, which threatens the socioeconomic well-being of Turkish employees, but also legitimizes Syrians' cheap labour status in the Turkish informal job market, which has become another mechanism of inequality.

Another aspect of the interviewees' 'cheapness' discourse concerns paying social security premiums. Turkish Labour Law No. 5510 requires employers to register employees with the appropriate social security authorities, and to pay monthly minimum social security premium, equal to 15.5 percent of the social security premium per person per month in 2018 (Social Security Institution, 2018). Considering that this monthly costs the employer around 600-700 Turkish liras per employee, hiring Syrians in the informal market economy becomes even more attractive to avoid paying social security taxes. Akgündüz et al. (2015) argue that "this might lead us to expect stronger negative effects since refugees may be more attractive than natives in low-skilled sectors where informal employment is possible". Although it is difficult to measure the impact of Syrians on the informal market economy, my fieldwork suggests that Syrians are quite widely employed in the city's informal market economy for almost all manual sectors. According to the Turkish Social Security Institute, 40 percent of Turkish citizens in Adana-Mersin region were working in the informal market compared to 34,52 percent for Turkey overall (SGK, 2019). The region already had a large informal economy even before the arrival of Syrian refugees. Thus, it is unsurprising that Syrian refugees have quickly become part of these longstanding informal economic activities.

Being registered with the Social Security System in Turkey not only allows employees to be formally employed but also brings various welfare benefits, such as access to healthcare, unemployment, temporary incapacity (sickness, disability), maternity, and pension benefits. However, while Turkish workers demand to be registered, Syrians do not because they do not gain pension rights and they already automatically gain the right to healthcare if they are under temporary protection in Turkey. Thus, *not asking for social security insurance* creates resentment among Turkish employees towards Syrians, and also justifies the accusation of 'cheapness' because employers are more likely to hire Syrians as they do not ask employers for

social security taxes. Respondent 6 (male, 27, janitor, registered with SSI) clearly displays his displeasure:

> "For instance, X person works for 50 to 60 Turkish liras per day while a Syrian does the same job for 20 to 30 Turkish liras. Employers are required to pay the social security taxes of Turkish employees. However, there is no such obligation when they hire a Syrian. If I am not wrong, they also receive incentive pay since they employ Syrians... Am I opposed to Syrians? I mean there are certain points that I am against. In the end, those people escaped from the war and took shelter in our country. However, it does not mean that they can take the bread out of our mouths!"

As Respondent 6' comment shows, this situation creates resentment and limits his capacity to empathize with Syrians since his job is threatened by their presence in the labour market. Even when the respondent feels empathy, the socioeconomic justification still takes precedence over empathy. Not asking for social security taxes also routinely consolidates the belief that 'Syrians are cheap'. Employers tend to hire Syrians in manual labour sectors to avoid paying social security premiums for Turkish employees. The employers' interest-based approach drives Turkish employees to see Syrians in two ways: first, as people 'in need'; second, as peers that they are competing with. This competition arises from Syrians' willingness to work for lower wages without demanding social security registration. This also enables Turkish employees to position themselves by attributing 'cheapness' to the Syrians' current position in the labour market.

Although nine interviewees either had no work experience with Syrians or did not feel that Syrians endangered their employment status, they still regard Syrians as threatening society's economic well-being, as can be seen from the interview with Respondent 12 (male, 23, air conditioner technician, registered with SSI):

> Interviewer: "What is your opinion about Syrians in Adana?"

> Respondent 12: “What am I supposed to think? I don’t see any positive aspects of them. They (Syrians) have hampered many people’s jobs here. They made many people (natives) lose their work. Always distress... I mean they have caused distress in Adana.”

At the time of the interview, Respondent 12 had been working for four years in the same workplace. More importantly, he did not have any work experience with Syrians. Nevertheless, he also thinks that Syrians take Turkish people’s jobs, which has caused distress in Adana. Similarly, Respondent 5 (female, 40, cleaner, registered with SSI), who works as a cleaner in one of Adana’s district municipalities, expresses her discontent regarding Syrians’ tendency to work for lower wages:

> “It did not happen to me. But I know other people...The people around us or my sister’s friends...At first, people (Syrians) who went to the workplace and worked for 5 to 10 kurus (exaggerating) became the owners of that shop. Incredible! Our people are making a mistake too! Instead of employing our people for 20 Turkish liras, they hire Syrians for 10 Turkish liras. It doesn’t matter where! Farms, fields, shops...”

Although Respondent 5 is formally employed and her job is guaranteed by the municipality, she still worries about the economic situation of others in Adana as she has witnessed in her own backyard that some native workers were replaced by Syrians. Despite a strong emphasis on how the labour market in Adana has been changed after the arrival of Syrians, Respondent 10 (female, 51, pastry seller, unregistered with SSI) went even further:

> “Let me touch on the unemployment issue a little bit. They (Syrians) work without employment insurance and accept what you give (wages). For example, our young generation is not like them. Should our educated youth work for lower wages? Unacceptable! I may not speak in a properly cultured way; you can write my sentences better. For instance, there is a huge difference between a Syrian and my son. My son won’t work for 50 Turkish liras per day, but a young Syrian man works for 20 Turkish liras. This increases unemployment. So, the employer prefers to choose a person who works for a lower wage.”

Respondent 10 used to be a housewife but has worked in the pastry shop for four years as she needed to work after her children grew up to meet their necessities. Her life is basically centred on her family, especially her children, which even made her start working after her 40s. However, she has become worried for her children's future since Syrians arrived in Adana. She regards them as a main reason for increased unemployment, which has harmed general employment conditions for Turkish youth. She also deploys education to differentiate between Syrian and Turkish youth.

Thus, despite having no work experience with Syrians or no experience in losing jobs because of Syrians, these respondents still regard them as competitors for the jobs and label Syrians as threatening Turkish citizens' well-being in both their city and the country through the 'Syrians are cheap' argument. Consequently, they "contribute to the production and reproduction of inequality in routine ways, often as a side effect of other ongoing activities, and as such do not necessarily involve the intentional action of dominant actors" (Lamont et al., 2014: 574).

These interviews reveal two dominant factors from employees' perspective that make Syrians attractive for employers: working for lower wages without asking for social security insurance. Because Syrians are mainly hired in low-skilled sectors with high levels of informal employment. Natives working in such sectors are more likely to be affected. This causes conflict between Turkish and Syrian employees seeking work in the same economic sectors. These employees also do not reflect on Syrian workers' vulnerability. Instead, they are framed as simply workers like us or anyone else who are willing to accept low wages, rather than as workers like us or anyone else who face a poor structural position that makes them exploited. In doing so, employees draw on an ignorance mechanism, whether intentionally or not, that allows them to gloss over the structural reasons why employers tend to prioritize Syrians over Turkish employees. Instead, they attach more importance to how this situation has affected them individually.

This draws our attention to how differences in employee demands may sustain a two-sided inequality in the informal labour market. That is, the tendency of Syrians to work for lower wages and longer hours without insurance is normalized and routinized in the eyes of Turkish employees, which invisibly contributes to the persistence of inequality in the labour market. From the point of view of Turkish employees, the intersubjective mobilization of such a local labour market repertoire (i.e. Syrians' tendency to work for lower wages without asking for social security insurance) closes bargaining power opportunities for both Syrians and Turkish employees while creating a new mechanism where Turkish employees use the 'cheapness' discourse as a socioeconomic justification strategy to label Syrians as 'the destitute other'. In short, the way that employers worsen workers' economic vulnerability through the hiring process not mentioned by employees because they prioritize socioeconomic justifications over an attachment to morality.

4.4 Peers but not 'equals': Socioeconomic justifications of 'othering'

In this section, I consider the socio-economic mechanisms Turkish employees use to legitimize their worth over Syrian peers. Specifically, they base their status on differences in the division of labour, work tasks, and employment conditions between Turkish and Syrian workplace colleagues. The way Turkish employees position themselves in the job market and/or the workplace is important for understanding how 'insider' and 'outsider' notions emerge among employees. I will closely look at the role of socioeconomic justifications in boundary-drawing (i.e. the 'cheapness' discourse as a boundary marker) and how boundaries are activated between Turkish and Syrian workers (i.e. different ways of establishing worth). Although the respondents' arguments are mainly centred around the idea that 'Syrians are cheap', which invokes different aspects of boundary-drawing, I found variations in how Turkish employees mobilize this discourse to assure and maintain their dignified status at work.

Syrians are paid less, but...

> Interviewer: "The work discipline of Syrians?"
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> Respondent 13 (male, 23, employee at a metal factory, registered with SSI)
>
> "Their situation is not cushy in textiles...You can say that they are more oppressed. For example, both a female worker and another worker were given 1500 Turkish liras as the monthly salary. At that time, the minimum wage was 1300 Turkish liras. Under normal circumstances, both were supposed to earn more than 2500 Turkish liras. However, only 1500 Turkish liras were given to both of them. So, this kind of stuff is happening. It can be said that they (Syrians) are exposed to more pressure."
>
> Interviewer: "Why do they (Syrians) bow to more pressure?"
>
> Respondent 13: "They have no choice...Or, some of them walk off the job. Don't want to work for such a wage and walk off...In the end, they work for lower wages because they have to..."

When I met Respondent 13, he was working as an employee in the welding and assembling section of a metal factory. Previously, he had worked in the garment sector in various positions, including working with Syrians. According to him, unemployment is Adana's main problem recently. He emphasized that Syrians work for lower wages, which in return creates tensions between them and the natives. Although he does not have strongly negative views on Syrians, he draws attention to an important point: the unequal treatment between Syrian and Turkish employees. Specifically, Syrians are paid less than their Turkish peers in textiles despite doing the same work. He consciously or unconsciously interprets this as a way of differentiating Turkish workers' status from Syrians' because the 'cheapness' discourse caters for the interplay of 'symbolic hierarchies' (Sherman, 2005). That is, Syrians work for lower wages because they have no other choice, which also implies their outsider position in Turkey from the perspective of Turkish employees.

This discourse also invokes other intertwined forms of boundary work. For example, Respondent 14 (male, 30, unemployed, unregistered with SSI) had been unemployed for two

weeks when I met him after having worked in a rubber factory. He had also worked with Syrians in metal and bolt factories. As for his work experience with Syrians, he said:

> "I mean they are working more devotedly. Also, they do have feelings of making themselves accepted or try to win the boss's favour since they come from outside (of Turkey). Normally, workers try to win boss's favour but workers in Turkey get fed up at some point, but those who recently came (Syrians) have something more special. Some of them also snitch. For example, one of the Syrians got me fired from my job. Here, at a bolt factory...I was trying to unionize him...While speaking in Arabic, the boss called me and fired me. He (a Syrian colleague) did it because he wanted to ingratiate himself. Afterwards, I thought about whether I should beat him up or not, but I felt sorry for him. I tried to understand him too."

Here, Respondent 14 introduces a moral discourse. The way he explained why Syrians are more hardworking is closely interlinked with why Syrians work for lower wages. That is, Syrians are portrayed as a needy group with no alternative other than accepting whatever is offered to them. References to Syrians' 'needy' and 'cheap' outlook in the labour market arise from their outsider position in the eyes of Turkish employees. Respondent 14 bases his socioeconomic justification logic on Syrians' fragile position in the labour market, accompanied by linking cheapness and neediness on the grounds of their outsider status. This 'cheapness' discourse not only does the boundary work but is also a way of differentiation.

Similarly, Respondent 2 (male, 35, welder, registered with SSI) used neediness to explain why Syrian workers are more hardworking in relation to 'cheap work':

> "As I said, they (Syrians) are more disciplined and spend more hours (working) because they are much more in need."
>
> Interviewer: "How about their work discipline in comparison to Turkish employees?"
>
> "There are many differences. They are so clumsy, for example. In fact, it is the same thing when you work with someone who does not know how to do it even if it is a Turkish person. I don't know how to say... But they (Syrians) do have the different

> foolhardiness, I do not know whether this stems from ignorance... They are foolhardier. I do not know if it is because of education... They are foolhardier. They have more work accidents."
>
> Interviewer: "What do you mean by the different foolhardiness?"
>
> "I mean they (Syrians) know even if they do not know... They say I'll do any kind of work. This is why we call them foolhardy. Employers hire them because they are cheap."

Respondent 2 clearly believes that Syrians are more hardworking because they need work more than Turkish employees. The logic behind this is closely linked with the current local market repertoire, which disadvantages Syrians over Turkish citizens because intersubjective mobilization of the taken-for-granted 'Syrians are cheap' discourse removes bargaining power from Syrian workers. This in turn closes opportunities for them (Sivis, 2020). The situation further symbolically stigmatizes towards Syrian employees, such as Respondent 2' view that they have an 'undesired type of foolhardiness'. His use of 'foolhardiness' strikingly summarizes the situation of Syrian workers in the job market, which is how the 'needy' discourse is produced. It then activates further stigmatizations, such as ignorance or lack of education, leading to attaching the label 'incompetent' to Syrian employees. This shows us how two different boundary-drawing dimensions - moral (foolhardiness) and socioeconomic (lack of competence) - intertwine to constrain Turkish employees' views towards their Syrian peers. At the same time, labelling Syrian workers as 'needy' and 'incompetent' allows Turkish employees to position themselves differently from their Syrian peers, which contributes to routine inequalities in the informal market. These comments show that the moral aspect of the boundary work is still there but has a negative valence in the case of employees since they are not in a position to enact themselves as moral persons in contrast to employers mobilizing a positive self-perception where they portray themselves as generous moral individuals who provide employment opportunities for needy Syrians.

Respondent 10 (female, 51, pastry seller, unregistered with SSI) looks at Syrians' work discipline from a different angle:

> "We (Turkish people) are more loyal to our employer. When an employer asks us for a sacrifice, - I can talk for myself - I would not mind irrespective of financial means. For example, if my employer asks me to work a few more hours, I work without expecting anything in return. But they (Syrians) are not like that... They not only work for lower wages, but also...For example, they say 'I won't work'. But I work. I mean if my boss asks me to, I will work. I would not say no."

As the quote indicates, Respondent 10 acknowledges that Syrians work for lower wages. However, this reality is coupled with a moral evaluation as well. She sees Syrian employees as different from Turkish workers in two ways. First, they demand less money from employers, which both creates hurdles for Turkish employees in the job market and also devalues the job itself. Second, Syrian employees mostly fail to fulfil their work-related duties according to her moral understanding as Syrians understanding of the employer-employee relationship and work ethics differs from that of Turkish employees. Moral judgements do not operate independently from employees' socio-economic justification of 'cheapness', featuring of the local market repertoire, and catalyses the introduction of intertwined judgements on their 'needy' but also 'failing' peers.

Turkish employees are insured whereas Syrians are not

Like lower wages, registering with the Turkish Social Security System is deployed by Turkish employees to establish a hierarchy over Syrian peers. This does not come as surprise because registration means formal employment, which is a legal and social marker of one's employment status in Turkey. Being formally employed is used to draw a line between Turkish and Syrian workers because it is regarded as status hierarchy, Respondent 9 (male, 25, coil winding technician, registered with SSI) exemplifies:

> "In my workplace, all Turkish workers' social security taxes are paid by the employer. For Syrians, no."
>
> Interviewer: "What are the reasons for employing Syrians without registering with social security?"
>
> "If any Syrian came now and asked for social security insurance - they even lack proper documentation (ID) -, the employer would fire this one and hire another Syrian. There is a competition among themselves. They (Syrians) are hired because they don't cost employers. Otherwise, it causes extra expenses for employers."

By saying that "there is a competition among Syrians themselves", Respondent 9 clearly shows where the boundaries lie between Turkish and Syrian workers. Regarding formal employment, he does not see them as threat because he thinks that employers would never pay the social security premiums of Syrians. Therefore, formal employment is greatly valued as an indicator for one's socioeconomic workplace status, which creates a boundary stemming from the 'insider-outsider' struggle. This became more evident when I asked about what he thought about Syrians' work discipline:

> "In fact, they are better. To be honest, they are more hardworking. Because a Syrian labour force is cheap here. You know, these men are already uninsured. These men have to prove themselves; otherwise, they are fired and replaced by another Syrian."

Like the other interviewees, he associates 'hardworking' with both moral traits and 'cheapness' on the assumption that Syrians have no alternative except for accepting what is offered to them. Respondent 15 (male, 25, driver at a private car rental company at the airport, registered with SSI) approaches this issue from a different angle. Because he works at the airport, he has worked with Syrians in the same economic sector, albeit in different positions, according to him, eight out of ten Syrians are employed as car washers in the car rental sector whereas Turkish people are either managers or bus drivers. Besides this occupational difference, he also refers to Syrians' engagement in the informal economy as a form of distinction:

> Interviewer: “Are you registered with social security?”
>
> Respondent 15: “Of course.”
>
> Interviewer: “How about Syrians?”
>
> Respondent 15: “They work separately from us, but they are not registered with social security.”
>
> Interviewer: “Why?”
>
> Respondent 15: “Wages, definitely wages! They already work for lower wages.”
>
> Interviewer: “Dou you know about the work permit scheme?”
>
> Respondent 15: “I do not really respect the work permit scheme...While there are many unemployed people in Turkey, those coming from abroad and work for lower wages...In fact, we disrespect not only them, but also our nation.”

Thus, he believes that, because Syrians come from outside Turkey, they should work for lower wages without social security registration. His approach to the work permit scheme signals that there is a line in terms of employment conditions between those who deserve to be privileged and those who do not.

Since finishing high school, Respondent 9 (male, 25, coil winding technician, registered with SSI) has worked in a coil winding factory for five years. He has witnessed the dismissal of his experienced colleagues since Syrians entered this sector. According to him, the main reason for employing Syrians instead of natives is that employers want to avoid paying social security taxes:

> “There has been a dramatic change especially in the last 1 or 2 years. I mean in terms of economic life. Let me give you an example for the factory in which I am working; there have been dismissals after those (Syrians) came. They (Turkish workers) were replaced by Syrians. Those who were fired were registered with the social security system by the employer whereas Syrians not.”
>
> Interviewer: “So, why weren’t you dismissed from employment like your friends?”

> "They did not fire me because I am responsible for coiling up in the factory. Coiling up is very exhausting work. Besides, I have invested five years there. I don't think they could find an employee who can replace me because not every person can do this job."

Formal versus informal employment is an important part of the categorisation schemes used by respondents. Employers are legally required to pay social security premiums for employees. However, because Turkish employees demand this whereas Syrians do not, the insider-outsider status boundary between the two in the eyes of employees. In fact, both less paid and not insured are treated as two sides of the same coin by the respondents. That is, because they are cheap, Syrians are regarded as both a threat in the job market and of lower status than Turkish employees in the same workplace. Both ideas drive respondents to label Syrians as 'other'. Beyond formal employment, Turkish employees can disassociate themselves from Syrians, on the basis of whether the job requires special skills, as in the case of Respondent 9.

Syrians do all drudgery and dirty work

The third way that Turkish employees disassociate themselves from their Syrian peers is by claiming that all dirty and boring work is assigned to Syrians. By avoiding such tasks, the respondents reveal the extent that status-based differentials can shape informal relations between Syrian and Turkish employees. The type of tasks workers are allocated signals their position, which is used by Turkish employees to establish their higher worth over their Syrians peers. This is not mutually exclusive from the 'cheapness' discourse. On the contrary, by differentiating between allocated tasks, Turkish employees reinforce and legitimize unequal treatment between themselves and Syrian workers, based on access to and distribution of both material resources (e.g. wages and informal versus formal employment) and immaterial resources (e.g. division of workplace labour, informal workplace relations among peers). As illustrated by Respondent 2 (male, 35, welder, registered with SSI):

> "They (Syrians) will not return (to Syria). For instance, they are the ones who do dirty work. Our Turkish people do not. That's why employers prefer Syrians. Drudgery, dirty work, physically demanding work."

Respondent 2 clearly notes how differences between Turkish and Syrian employees in terms of allocated tasks consolidates the boundary-making process from the perspective of Turkish employees. Respondent 11 (male, 24, cashier at wholesale market, not registered with SSI) shares the same views:

> Interviewer: "Are there any advantages or disadvantages of working with a Syrian?"
>
> Respondent 11: "Not many advantages. In general, these (Syrians) stay in the background. They do all the drudgery. They work overtime because employers are already aware that they need a job. So, employers take advantage of them. Actually, they (Syrians) let employers take advantage of them."

Both Respondent 2 and 11 describe differences in assigned tasks at work between Turkish and Syrian workers, and how these become a socioeconomic marker as their Syrian peers are seen as 'destitute outsiders', ready to take any job and do any task as they desperately need a job. While Respondent 6's description (male, 27, janitor, registered with SSI) is similar to the previous two, he also seems willing to take advantage of his position:

> Interviewer: "Working hours of Syrians?"
>
> Respondent 6: "Their working hours were the same as ours. All the boring jobs were done by Syrians. Let me give you an example: X is working with me and I am a master. X is my helper. I tell X that my arm is aching. I directly found a Syrian and said, 'You, do it!'. He does not have any choice. He (Syrian) has to!"

Respondent 6 admits that he does not see his Syrian peers as equal in terms of assigned responsibilities at work. Making Syrians deal with dirty work is taken for granted, which plays a role in (re)shaping his perspective towards his Syrian peers. In short, Turkish employees generally use the allocation of tasks between themselves and Syrian employees as a socioeconomic justification for 'othering' and clearly demonstrates the boundary work.

Having a Syrian employer? It's just disgraceful

So far, I have identified how Turkish employees distinguish themselves from their Syrian peers in terms of work conditions, types of tasks, and experiences. I have shown different patterns of attachment to status-based workplace differences (or the status hierarchy) and how they are mobilized by Turkish employees towards Syrians. Although the respondents are categorized as 'employees' just like Syrians, they imply their higher status by circulating socioeconomically shared categories. That is, Turkish employees identify themselves as 'insiders' who deserve of higher, more decent wages and social security whereas Syrians are categorized as 'foreign-born destitute outsiders', who are exploited and/or let themselves by exploited. I therefore also asked interviewees a more challenging question to understand how they position themselves in relation to potential shifts in workplace status by asking whether they would work for a Syrian employer. Except for three interviewees, they explicitly rejected this, using various reasoning. For instance, Respondent 6 (male, 27, janitor, registered with SSI) clearly expresses why he is against this:

> Interviewer: "Would you imagine yourself as employed by a Syrian employer?"
>
> Respondent 6: "No way!"
>
> Interviewer: "Why?"
>
> Respondent 6: "I feel it beneath one to be employed by a Syrian. What is up with that? In my own country, will I work under a Syrian? We are not dead yet!"

Thus, for Respondent 6 working for a Syrian is unacceptable because it means a Syrian had got the better of him and would be telling him what to do. Accordingly, he would find it very degrading that his economic well-being depended on a Syrian (destitute outsider) in his own country.

In a similar vein, Respondent 11 (male, 24, cashier at wholesale market, unregistered with SSI) would feel inferior:

> Interviewer: “Would you imagine yourself as employed by a Syrian employer?”
>
> Respondent 11: “No, I would not work under a Syrian. I cannot be an asylum seeker in my own country.”

For Respondent 11, being an asylum seeker evokes a lower socioeconomic status, so being employed by a Syrian would mean degrading his socioeconomic status ascription. His outspoken rejection also underlines another important aspect of ‘insider-outsider’ boundary-drawing: being employed by a Syrian also means ‘being an outsider in his own country.’ In contrast to Respondents 6 and 11, Respondent 12 (male, 23, air conditioner technician, registered with SSI) touches on cultural differences between Turkey and Syria:

> Interviewer: “Why are you against being employed by a Syrian?”
>
> Respondent 12: “Because s/he doesn’t know my traditions and customs and what kind of personality I have. Life is cheap in their country and s/he treats me in the same way.”

By saying ‘life is cheap’, Respondent 12 implies that both living and working conditions are poorer in Syria than Turkey. Therefore, a Syrian employer would treat him as in Syria, meaning worse working conditions than he is accustomed to. His understanding of employment conditions in Syria is simply different from Turkey. Thus, Respondent 12 stresses the importance of working in an environment where you share similar living and work culture. In doing so, he applies his understanding of work-related values as the dominant standard. Respondent 16 (male, 57, vehicle mechanic, retired but still working) explained why he would not work under a Syrian by circulating a similar strategy to Respondent 12 of praising Turkish hospitality culture while implicitly denigrating Syrian culture when imagining if he had to flee to Syria one day :

> “I would not prefer to work under a Syrian. Let me say in this way: we (Turkish people) always see Syrians here as do-gooders, we always regard them in good faith. I mean we always try to help them. They have fallen! God forbid! If we (Turkish nation) were

> fallen and had to go to Syria, we would suffer a lot. They (Syrians) would cause us great stress! But we do not treat Syrian here in this way. We always try to help."

Overall, the idea of having a Syrian employer also drives employees to maintain their worth by attaching great importance to their work position and work culture, which they read as signals of status ascription. Therefore, being employed by a Syrian means degrading both their status in their country of origin and, their employment conditions. In other words, Syrians' precarious working conditions are normalized by Turkish employees, which means they also unintentionally contribute to perpetuating existing inequality. Equally important, they contribute to normalizing inequality towards Syrians workers by establishing a status-based local hierarchy characterized by the distribution of both material resources (wage differentials and social security insurance) and immaterial resources (types of allocated tasks) at work between themselves and their Syrian peers. First, this shows us how inequality persists between labour market actors (Turkish employers, Turkish employees, and 'other' Syrian employees) whose levels of power and positionality differ significantly in the informal market economy. Second, it reveals how people perform boundary work based on this unequal treatment as a result of a local labour market repertoire.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that structural factors play an important role in shaping informal relations at work between Turkish and Syrian workers. Economic concerns about job opportunities and employment conditions were very salient in almost all interviews. The interviewees referred to various aspects of boundary work in relation to the role of socioeconomic position and status hierarchy in peer relations. Socioeconomic justifications of boundary work were important for Turkish employees, although there are multiple ways of establishing worth over outsiders depending on context in which "individuals perceive and make sense of their environment" (Lamont et al., 2014: 574). On the one hand, Turkish

employees treat Syrians as both destitute outsiders who desperately need jobs and workplace peers competing for the same jobs but under different conditions. On the other hand, Syrians are not seen as 'equal peers' due to differences in both regarded and assigned roles, and workplace employment conditions.

Socioeconomic interests and well-being at the micro level, and perhaps more importantly, inter-subjective mobilization of the local labour market repertoire at the meso level unquestionably play crucial roles in constructing the 'other'. While individuals vary in how they identify and address their economic expectations, needs, and concerns, they tend to display a monadic approach towards 'others' when their economic interests are threatened. As the first part of this chapter shows, the respondents strongly highlighted labour market competition because Syrians' willingness to work for lower wages without asking for social security premiums attracts employers. Correspondingly, Turkish employees see Syrians as competing peers. This competition is strong enough to affect everyday work life interactions, so contention becomes inevitable between Turkish and Syrian workers seeking employment in the same economic sectors while making different demands. Interestingly, these realities of Adana's local labour market are routinized by respondents and used as a socioeconomic justification strategy that grounds for the boundary work.

Mobilizing the 'cheapness' discourse also enables Turkish employees to establish their greater worth over their Syrian peers. Socioeconomic reasoning can enable individuals to maintain their dignified status over the 'other' in the workplace. In other words, the struggle to establish worth is salient in informal workplaces relations between Turkish and Syrian employees regarding 'insider-outsider' notions. Respondents mostly used the 'cheapness' discourse to legitimatizing Turkish employees' worth over Syrians. Employees intersubjectively mobilize their positionality at work in the course of everyday work life in many ways. By referring to the wage gap, informal employment of Syrians, division of labour and having a Syrian employer, Turkish

employees introduce socioeconomic mechanisms to distinguish themselves from their Syrian peers. In shaping informal relations at work, employees are also very likely to position themselves distinctively from their Syrian peers by bringing up the role of perceptions of local status hierarchies, such as informal versus formal employment.

The analysis presented here suggests that Turkish employees widely resort to 'othering', with many socioeconomic justifications for drawing boundaries. Despite their similar employment background to Syrians, namely working in manual sectors in the same city, Turkish respondents mobilize their justification framework in relation to boundary work. This shows us that boundary work is not solely dependent on employees' economic concerns; rather, it is closely linked with how they legitimize their social position in the workplace. This is because boundary work is intersubjective and can vary between social actors. Therefore, 'othering' can be understood in the context of employees' social position at work, as indicated by monopolizing material resources (access to and keeping a job) and immaterial resources (status-based symbolic hierarchical relations). This chapter also makes a key contribution to the inequality literature. First, it illustrates how Turkish workers normalize and routinize the idea that 'Syrians are a cheap labour force' through their everyday actions. Second, it shows how Turkish employees legitimize inequality on the grounds of how they differently position themselves towards their Syrian peers at work such as assigning all drudgery and dirty work to Syrian workers. Both contribute to producing and reproducing inequality in implicit ways because such micro level actions of insiders mobilize a local market repertoire whereby shared characteristics (i.e. Syrian workers' lower pay, lack of social insurance, and lower workplace status) are routinized by both employers and employees.

Chapter 5: Who Is Undeserving? Differential Healthcare Policies and Social Boundaries

5.1 Introduction

> Respondent: "How many are you in your family?"
>
> Interviewer: "Four of us."
>
> Respondent: "Okay, you are four people. How would you feel if you were treated as a stepchild in your own house?"
>
> Interviewer: "I would feel excluded."
>
> Respondent: "We (Turkish nationals) feel the same because, in our country, we have become just like people who are excluded in their homes. You (the president of Turkey) say 'I will grant Syrians citizenship'. However, they (Syrians) are already more privileged than us without granting citizenship. We're already behind them (in terms of social rights). Isn't it true? Is there any other explanation beyond this?" (male, 57, taxi driver)

To what degree should the state extend social services to migrants? Does easy access to welfare programs soften or strengthen social and symbolic boundaries between insiders and outsiders? How does the relationship between immigration and the welfare state regime influence attitudes towards migrant groups in the host societies? Such questions have occupied migration and welfare scholars for a long time. These debates partly focus on the extent to which the type and dimension of state social services should extend to migrant groups. Whilst some scholars (Facchini and Mayda, 2007) justifying migrants' access to the welfare state by highlighting their economic contributions, particularly those of skilled workers, others (Brücker et al., 2001) argue that easy access imposes a financial burden on the state and leads to competition between natives and migrants (Escandell and Ceobanu, 2009). In recent years, the 'welfare deservingness' debate has given a fresh impetus to reconsideration of the principles that affect people's perceptions of welfare deservingness. Therefore, the question "who should get what

and why", posed by van Oorschot (2000: 34), plays a prominent role in understanding, what the citizens of a given country think about allocating social rights to migrant groups. Equally important, such questions also encourage us to revisit the literature on boundary work to understand how perceptions of deservingness regarding migrant groups' social welfare entitlements contribute to the construction of insider-outsider relationships (Bloemraad et al., 2019).

This chapter examines the role of perceptions of allocated social rights in reinforcing the interdependence between social and symbolic boundaries towards outsiders. In contrast to the previous two chapters, I make no distinctions between the target groups, i.e. employers and employees, as both tended to categorize Syrians as 'foreigners' regarding access to and exercise of social rights. In other words, the tendency to regard Syrians in workplaces as either 'potential employees' or 'peers' becomes less meaningful in the context of allocation of social rights, when they are treated as generic outsiders. Therefore, I shift my gaze from everyday encounters in workplaces at the intersubjective level to institutionally driven social differences between social groups. Drawing on welfare deservingness and boundary work, I aim to indicate (1) in which way(s) the perception of institutional elements (differential healthcare policies) can constrain insiders' narratives on outsiders; (2) how extending the right to healthcare to Syrian refugees provides grounds for social and symbolic boundaries; and (3) how boundary work interacts with insiders' perceptions of welfare deservingness.

The chapter is structured as follows. I firstly bind the two different but intertwined sociological concepts - welfare deservingness and boundary work – closely to demonstrate how differential healthcare policies can inhibit insiders' narratives towards outsiders. Secondly, I provide an overview of the Turkish welfare regime. Then, I move on to explain healthcare policies designed for Syrians who are under temporary protection. Next, I present empirical data to discuss the relationship between boundaries and constructions of welfare deservingness through

the eyes of insiders (i.e. Turkish nationals). To conclude, I discuss theoretical arguments on welfare deservingness and boundary work in relation to the case study and summarize the main contribution of this chapter to the current literature.

5.2 Bridging Two Theoretical Strands: Welfare Deservingness and Boundary Work

In order to trace the link between the role of the perception of allocation of social rights and boundary-drawing, one must look at the role of social citizenship. The concept of social citizenship is coined by T.H. Marshall and defined as "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society" (1992: 8). According to Marshall, social rights of citizenship which is described as the last phase of rights preceded by civic and political rights, plays a fundamental role in allowing individuals to participate in society. More importantly, it is an essential condition for individuals' full membership to a community. In this regard, the role of the state becomes more vital since the state is responsible for the allocation of social rights (the welfare rights) which is central to citizenship status. Such tie between citizens and states makes "the modern state is not simply a territorial organization but a membership organization, an association of citizens" (Brubaker, 1992: 21). The institution of citizenship is thus not only a legally binding social contract between the state and citizens, but also an instrument of closure which creates an inclusive environment for members of the state whilst it excludes those who are not qualified as insiders such as migrants (Brubaker, 1992; Wimmer, 1997; Morris, 2012).

Such exclusions of citizenship also signal the limits of traditional conceptions of national citizenship. Soysal (1994) argues that a postnational membership, based upon principles of 'universal personhood,' gradually substitutes national citizenship. Put differently, universal personal rights have gained more prominence than territorial considerations while claiming rights. The classical understanding of citizenship no doubt has expanded its boundaries which

paves the way for legal recognition of non-citizens' rights, i.e. migrants, on the basis of universal personhood. In so doing, nation-states also become responsible for allocating certain rights and protection to non-citizens as a binding requirement of universal human rights. However, the picture, as pointed out by Morris (2012), becomes much more complex within the case of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers on the grounds that the allocation of rights is subject to one's legal status which is appertaining to a hierarchical system of rights. The dichotomy between expansion of national membership and a hierarchical system of legal statuses has sparked further debate, centred on social citizenship, about how welfare states should accommodate immigration and the extent to which welfare distribution should be extended to migrant groups.

While the link between immigration and public attitudes toward the welfare state is not a recent phenomenon, it still maintains its sociological complexity because of divergent of perception of deservingness on welfare distribution. From an institutional perspective, various studies have investigated the role of constructions of deservingness in policymaking (especially in the United States). Studies of the linkage between policymaking and constructions of deservingness have revealed how beneficiaries are portrayed, which has directly impacted policy decision-making (Ingram and Schneider, 2005; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). Newton notes that "politicians can depict immigrants as beneficial for the nation or detrimental to it because this group has, over time, been endowed with a host of positive and negative attributes that persist as social constructions" (2005: 141). While portraying immigrant welfare beneficiaries as worthy or needy may make public support more likely (Cook and Barrett, 1992), mobilizing negative conceptions of immigrants, as threats, burdens, non-contributors, and morally deficient, may prevent them gaining public assistance (Yoo, 2008). Such negative conceptions can then be used to justify excluding a certain group of people from welfare policies (Fujiwara, 2005; Horton, 2004).

The way(s) immigrants are framed explicitly (at the policymaking level) or implicitly (at the intersubjective level) influences constructions of deservingness. At the intersubjective level, there is a growing literature on the perceived deservingness of beneficiaries of welfare support (van Oorschot, 2000; Petersen, et al. 2010; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013), in which identifying the constitutive elements of the deservingness criteria is as important as understanding public perceptions of deservingness since the conditions for deservingness are not uniform. Rather, they involve subjective evaluations of "who should get what and why" (van Oorschot, 2000: 34). People may attach importance to different principles of social benefits and services while deciding on the type of welfare provision to offer (Laenen et al., 2019). More specifically, the welfare deservingness literature enables us "not only to analyse what principles and norms people deem important when thinking about a just distribution of life chances in society, but also how strictly and strongly they tend to apply such principles and norms when it comes to helping those in need" (van Oorschot, 2000: 35). According to the welfare deservingness theory, citizens deploy five criteria, known as the CARIN criteria: control over neediness (i.e. perception of having little or no personal control over the situation of needy people), people's attitudes (i.e. the tendency to support welfare for those who are regarded as compliant, docile or grateful), degree of reciprocity (i.e. perception of individuals' higher contributions to society in the past, present and future), identity (i.e. the sense of belonging to the in-group), and the level of need (i.e. greatly being in need of support) (Laenen et al., 2019; van Oorschot et al., 2017; 2000).

Beyond identifying the criteria for accepting welfare redistribution, the welfare deservingness literature also explains why some societal groups are regarded as more deserving of welfare support than others. For example, van Oorschot (2006) shows that, across European societies, immigrants are seen as the least deserving group whereas elderly people are regarded as most deserving, followed by sick and disabled people, and the unemployed people. From the

perspective of welfare studies, it is unsurprising that individuals are less likely to support welfare distribution to migrant groups (see Kootstra, 2016; van der Waal et al., 2013; van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007). What is interesting here, however, is that host societies do not completely favour denying immigrants access to social rights. Instead, they support recognition of their rights to welfare benefits in host societies as long as they meet certain conditions, such as citizenship or reciprocity, before actually benefitting. This tendency for conditional welfare distribution is common in states with both less comprehensive welfare systems (e.g. Czechia and Hungary) and more comprehensive ones (e.g. Denmark and Finland) (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2012). Given the welfare deservingness literature's current deductive approach, our knowledge is limited to quantitative studies that cannot fully explain "which deservingness criteria people actually apply when deciding who should get what from the welfare state, how these criteria are applied, and what they really mean to people" (Laenen et al., 2019: 193). Recent welfare deservingness scholarship has therefore emphasized the need for qualitative research (see Kremer 2016; Laenen et al. 2019; Osipovič, 2015) to address in which way(s) individuals apply the (un)deservingness criteria (i.e. in which context welfare deservingness judgments are made).

From a boundary-making perspective, the relationship between welfare undeservingness and exclusionary social citizenship is unsurprising. But, how do welfare undeservingness and exclusionary social citizenship interact with boundary-drawing? To answer this question, one must look at recent theoretical developments on symbolic and social boundaries. It is evident that there is neither a single way of boundary-drawing, nor one type of boundary. Rather, different types of groups create boundaries in many ways across diverse contexts while various mechanisms and/or processes lead to the (re)production of boundaries (Lamont and Molnár, 2002; Tilly, 2004; and Wimmer, 2013). Lamont and Molnár draw attention to the role of symbolic sources "in creating, maintaining, contesting, or even dissolving institutionalized

social differences" (2002: 168). To understand the link between symbolic sources and social differences and their interaction, it is crucial to clearly distinguish between symbolic and social boundaries. "Symbolic boundaries refer to the evaluative distinctions made between groups of people (class, ethnoracial, religious, and gender groups, including the poor, immigrants, and others) or through practices (such as cultural consumption, expressions of masculinity, or national sentiments). Social boundaries refer to patterns of associations as manifested in degrees of separation and proximity between groups (through intermarriage, homophily in friendship, spatial segregation, and so on)" (Bloemraad et al., 2019: 90). Such a distinction is necessary to explain the tensions between more inclusive national membership and exclusionary social citizenship (Bloemraad et al., 2019) as symbolic boundaries are circulated intersubjectively while social boundaries manifest between groups as a form of separation (Lamont and Molnár, 2002). Therefore, particular attention should be paid to the role of institutions in constructing positive or negative definitions of groups. Organizational and institutional actors like the state undoubtedly actively participate in providing institutional scripts through laws and other legislation, policies, and social programmes. Put differently, the state can significantly contribute to legitimizing systems of categorization by extending social rights to different segments of society, which creates a legal framework defining who is more or less worthy. For instance, Ruhs (2013) argues that there is a trade-off between easing the conditions for admitting migrant workers and the rights granted to them by receiving states after admission. However, countries' openness to the admission of migrant workers and granting rights to them depend on migrants' perceived skill level. In other words, highly skilled workers are often considered as net contributors to the receiving country, and for this reason, they are less likely to be subjected to restrictive policies and more likely to be granted more rights by the receiving states. In contrast, low-skilled migrants are mostly regarded as a beneficiary of the social welfare system more than as a contributor on the grounds of their ostensibly low potential to be

able to invest in the receiving country; as a result, they are granted fewer rights and subjected to tighter controls and more restrictions (Ruhs, 2013). Such actions initiated by the state can systematically disadvantage some groups, depending on the distribution of material and non-material resources and the recognition of social groups through laws and policies (Bloemraad et al., 2019; Lamont et al., 2014).

Given the state's influential role in defining groups both positively and negatively, state policies can be powerful enough to strengthen and weaken groupness, shape everyday interactions, and trigger social inequalities. Boundary work can also be mediated by certain categories created by state policies, which "both opens and closes opportunities and enables and constrains individuals' life trajectories" (Lamont et al., 2014: 14). For instance, Ingram and Schneider argue that "laws are not just bundles of advantages or disadvantages but are also messages about who matters and who does not" (2005: 106). The institutional and legal context therefore appears to be a significant background factor that influences insider-outsider relationships and constructions of deservingness regarding distribution of social rights. By combining the two theoretical strands of welfare deservingness and boundary-drawing, this chapter extends our knowledge of how state policies influence social boundaries, how this influence then reinforces symbolic boundaries, and how both affect variations in the constructions of frames of deservingness. Focusing specifically on differential healthcare policies between Turkish citizens and Syrians, I demonstrate in this chapter (1) how unequal access to, and unequal distribution of social rights creates a category of institutionalized worthiness between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees in terms of access to healthcare; (2) how such a categorization reinforces boundary work; and (3) how it influences variations in host society members' perceptions of welfare deservingness.

5.3 Characteristics of Turkey's Welfare Regime

Turkey has mixed levels of welfare state development. Given high informal employment rates, a large informal sector, and the central role of the family without formal definitions of rights and duties, social provision has an unequal structure that covers only some groups working in the formal market while leaving others unprotected (Grutjen, 2008). Turkey is considered as a conservative typology category due to its corporatist and familiastic character (Soto Iguaran, 2011). The main driver of welfare provision is employment status. That is, only formally employed people can access pension and healthcare benefits. The system itself is deeply embedded in a labour market structure where employment, self-employment, unpaid family work, and informal employment have important places in the social security system (Buğra and Keyder 2006; Elveren and Agartan 2017). Given that employment status is the central guarantor of access to social rights, levels of social protection vary, resulting in fragmentation and unfair distribution of benefits. Because the family is a significant component of Turkey's welfare regime, the state provides a rather limited social assistance scheme. That is, "the state recognizes and delegates individuals' protection to the family" (Soto Iguaran, 2011: 92).

Historically, the main three pillars of pension and health insurance in Turkey are the Social Insurance Institution for wage earners (implemented in 1945), the Retirement Fund for Civil Servants (1949), and the Pension Fund for the Self Employed (1971). Only those citizens covered by one of these three schemes received both healthcare and pension benefits. While two other institutions were established in 1980s to cover employees and the self-employed in Turkey's agricultural sectors (Buğra and Keyder, 2006), the 1980 military coup was undoubtedly a turning point for the welfare regime. Since then, welfare provision has followed a market-oriented economic orthodoxy and undergone major transformations, especially in the 2000s, after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power (Elveren and Agartan, 2017). State contributions to social security funds have increased somewhat, such that 10

percent of Turkey's GDP is reserved for social spending, particularly for pensions and healthcare. As Figure 1 shows, Turkey's welfare spending, nevertheless, still trails most other OECD countries, apart from Chile, Mexico, and Korea (OECD, 2018).

Figure 10: Social spending among OECD countries - Percentage of GDP



Source: OECD.Stat (stats.oecd.org, accessed 16.09.2019). Data refers to 2018.

While health and pensions are the two main elements of Turkey's welfare regime that have been most significantly reformed, I focus on here the healthcare system since healthcare policies apply to Syrian refugees whereas pensions do not. Until recently, the healthcare system was described as Bismarckian due to its hierarchical and occupation-based insurance scheme (Bilir and Açıkgöz, 2017). Turkey's healthcare system is financed by both employer and employee contributions towards. Three different types of compulsory social health insurance scheme: The Social Insurance Institution (SSK) for wage earners; the Retirement Fund for Civil Servants (ES); and the Pension Fund for the Self Employed (Bag- Kur) (Erus et al., 2015: 99). Given the high level of informality in the Turkish labour market, a significant number[14] of Turkish

[14] The percentage of undeclared employment over the years: 52,14 per cent in 2002; 51,75 in 2003; 50,14 in 2005; 48,17 in 2005; in 47 2006; 45,44 in 2007; 43,5 in 2008; 43,84 in 2009; 43,25 in 2010; 42,05 in 2011; 39,02 in 2012; 36,75 in 2013; 34,97 in 2014; 33,57 in 2015; 33,49 in 2016; 33,97 in 2017; 33,42 in 2018; 34,52 in 2019.

nationals are excluded from access to healthcare because they cannot join any of these social health insurance schemes. In 1992, the government introduced a means-tested public health insurance scheme called the Green Card (Erus et al., 2015). Its main aim is to enable those not covered by the public health insurance system to benefit from healthcare services (Grutjen, 2008).

In April 2008, there was an institutional turning point as Turkey adopted more universal healthcare provision. The logic behind such a drastic change was to establish "a high-quality and effective healthcare system based on equity, where, in principle, all citizens would have access to healthcare services by contributing to the financing of the services to the extent of their financial power" (Erus et al., 2015: 100). Accordingly, SSK, ES, and Bag-Kur were reunited under the Social Security Institution (SSI), which is considered as a single insurance payer and responsible for implementing the General Health Insurance Scheme (GHIS), "a single system combining all existing schemes under one umbrella" (Yıldırım and Yıldırım, 2011: 179). Indeed, GHIS, which took effect in 2012, is characterized by a single-payer system that depends on social insurance contributions and the redistributive effect of general taxation. Whether a citizen or a migrant, the new universal coverage ensures that all individuals who legally reside in Turkey can access healthcare services.

Registration for GHIS is mandatory and dependants are also automatically insured as long as their families are included in this insurance scheme. GHIS is run by contribution premiums under three distinct mechanisms: social insurance contributions (the main one), state contributions, and out-of-pocket payments (Erus et al., 2015; Yıldırım and Yıldırım, 2011). Social contributions are channelled through earmarked payroll taxes (Yıldırım and Yıldırım, 2011) while employers (7.5 percent) and employees (5 percent) are required to contribute 12.5 percent of the employee's gross income. Accordingly, employers must register their employees with the health insurance scheme, i.e. SSI, which automatically deducts the employees'

contribution from their salary. The state contributes 3 percent through taxation revenue, and also pays the premiums for individuals whose monthly income is below one-third of the gross minimum wage (Adaman and Erus, 2017). Consequently, “People unable to afford the premiums can still access healthcare if they pass the administrative means testing, as the state assumes their GHIS contributions in a system that inherited the Green Card mechanism (this scheme has covered 10-15 percent of the total population since 2005)” (Erus et al., 2015: 100). Although those who fail to pay their public health insurance premiums can still access healthcare in public hospitals, they must pay back to SSI. If this debt is not settled before the given deadline, they must pay interest on top of the SSI premiums.

The SSI also sets the level out-of-pocket payments for medical treatment. While the primary care is free of charge to everyone in public hospitals, all citizens with or without a public health insurance are charged a contributory payment, except for vulnerable groups (e.g. pregnant women, disabled people, war veterans, people suffering from diabetics and tuberculosis) (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services). However, applying to GHIS for a refund is a rather bureaucratic process that can be both lengthy and costly than the actual contributory payment (Yıldırım and Yıldırım, 2011). Those who are covered by GHIS are charged 6 TRY (1.06 USD) for a contributory payment in public hospitals and 7 TRY (1.23 USD) in university hospitals. While uninsured individuals can still access to healthcare, they must pay an examination fee of at least 30 TRY (5.28 USD) in 2019 (SGK, 2019). There are also additional charges of 20 percent for the prescribed medicines if covered by the SSI. This is deducted from the monthly salaries of those who are formally employed whereas retired people, widows, and orphans are only charged 10 percent for prescribed medicines.

Figure 11: Total Health spending among OECD Countries: Percentage of GDP, 2018



Source: OECD.Stat (stats.oecd.org, accessed 29.09.2019). Data refers to 2018.

5.4 Differential healthcare policies as a source of (un)deservingness and social boundaries

According to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, enacted in 2013, and the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR), issued in 2014, all Syrians in Turkey, whether residing inside or outside the temporary accommodation centres, can access health services as Turkish citizens do (Article 27, TPR). Under the TPR, the Ministry of Health is mainly responsible for providing healthcare services to refugees (Alawa et al., 2019; Yılmaz, 2019). Under its supervision, Syrians under the temporary protection regime have the right to benefit from primary health services, including family healthcare, vaccinations, mother and child healthcare, contraception, and immunization. Such services are provided through family healthcare centres, counselling centres, tuberculosis dispensaries, and migrant polyclinics (Mardin, 2017). Emergency and primary healthcare services, including treatments and medication, are free of charge (Article 27/b). Syrians can also access secondary and tertiary health services in public hospitals, research and training hospitals, and university hospitals on condition that the Temporary Protection Holder has been referred to a specialist by a primary care provider (Alawa et al., 2019; Mardin, 2017). The three main healthcare services in public

hospitals are polyclinics, emergency, and inpatient care. Patients must book an appointment for polyclinic services and pay an additional contribution fee. The very small contribution fee is determined by the SSI for the beneficiaries of general health insurance. Since 2015, in accordance with protocols agreed by the Ministry of Health, the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) pays the contribution fee for Syrians who are temporary protection holders (Assi et al., 2019; the Ministry of Health, 2018). "These protocols set an annual fixed lump sum price to be paid by the AFAD for the Ministry of Health-provided services, which equates to roughly 120 million Euros in 2018" (Yılmaz, 2019: 732). Following negotiations over migration between Turkey and the EU in late 2016, the Ministry of Health established Migrant Health Centres in areas heavily populated by Syrians. These centres, which are funded by the European Union and coordinated by the Ministry of Health, are responsible for providing primary care services to Syrian refugees with the aim of overcoming language and cultural barriers and reducing pressure on Turkey's public health facilities (The Ministry of Health, 2020). In December 2019, the TPR was amended in relation to healthcare services provided to temporary protection holders. The statement that the "Patient contribution fee shall not be collected for primary and emergency health services and the respective treatment and medication" (TPR, Article 27/b) was replaced by "The contribution fee can be applied for primary and emergency health services and the respective treatment and medication determined by the Ministry" (Resmi Gazete, 2019).

While acknowledging Turkey's efforts to provide Syrian refugees with fundamental services like healthcare, one should not ignore the other side of the picture, which is that Turkey's tax-funded health coverage leads to differential treatment between Turkish citizens and Syrians refugees regarding access to healthcare services. Currently, 34,52 percent of Turkish citizens are not registered with the SSI (SGK, 2019), which means they must pay premiums out of their own pocket. Indeed, five million of them have failed to pay their premiums. If those owing

payments to the SSI cannot pay back their debt or be means tested by December 2020 (BirGün, 2019), they will no longer be able to access to healthcare services in either public or university hospitals (Ekonomist, 2020). This situation creates a difference between registered Syrians, whose contribution fees are fully covered by AFAD, allowing them to benefit freely from secondary and tertiary healthcare services, and Turkish citizens who cannot because they are not registered with SSI. As discussed in the previous section, this differential access to healthcare between Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens creates two issues: (1) Turkish citizens with health insurance are obliged to pay a contribution fee to access to polyclinic services in public hospitals whereas Syrians do not; (2) Turkish citizens without health insurance are charged an examination fee in public hospitals set by the SSI whereas Syrian are exempt.

Differential healthcare policies have triggered discontent among Turkish citizens while this inequality in access to healthcare services is the basis for the social boundaries they draw vis-a-vis Syrians. Nevertheless, despite wide displeasure due to differential healthcare policies, the interviewees varied in how much they saw Syrians as (un)deserving of healthcare support. In the following part, I will show how interviewees, living in the same city and coming from physically demanding economic sectors, engage with different norms of (un)deservingness regarding Syrians' access to healthcare services and how the different degrees of deservingness link to the context in which welfare deservingness judgments are made.

5.5 The Construction of (Un)deservingness

As the most influential institutional actor, the state is powerful enough to affect "the macro patterns of distribution of material and non-material resources, and the recognition of diverse social groups" by establishing institutional frameworks through legislations and social programmes (Lamont et al., 2014: 13). Such institutional frameworks can determine varying degrees of groupness while the institutionalized worthiness influences people's narratives, which accounts for variations of the way deservingness informs people's narratives. While the

views on (un)conditionality of welfare distribution and perceptions of deservingness are interconnected, the way these such views are framed can be distinct and layered. Individuals tend to develop different deservingness frames and apply distinct principles and norms of deservingness depending on which groups within society are referred to, especially regarding immigrants (see Kootstra 2016; van der Waal et al., 2013; van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007). Host society members can even apply different principles and norms to the same social group. What makes Turkish citizens deserve more and Syrians less or vice versa? How do differential healthcare policies inform the evaluative distinctions (boundaries) between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees? Equally important, how do such perceived evaluative distinctions contribute to framing varying levels of welfare deservingness? The findings reveal that unequal access to healthcare drives host society members to define institutionalized worthiness between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees. The mobilization of institutional worthiness with regards to differential healthcare policies, therefore, do not only affect host society members' perspectives towards Syrians, but also the degree of deservingness regarding who contributes more national well-being and who deserves more benefits. Accordingly, the respondents make deservingness judgements in three distinct contexts: belonging, reservations against preferential treatment, and universalism. The 'unbelonging' context was widely discussed in reference to whether being an insider (i.e. being a Turkish citizen) or not, and the extent to which one, as insider, contributes to national well-being. The second context-related criterion, reservations against preferential treatment, was brought to the table in terms of not equal levels of access to healthcare between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees. The last context, universalism, was reflected in a sense of making access to healthcare equal for all as it is a basic human right. The interviewees' opinions of the Turkish government's healthcare policies towards Syrians revealed that the dominant discourse concerned 'reservations against preferential treatment'. However, although differential healthcare policies made interviewees feel that 'Syrians are

more privileged than Turkish citizens', perceptions of 'deservingness' varied widely from fully deserving to completely undeserving. Such divergent perceptions of differential healthcare policies among respondents are driven by the fact that those, who view Syrians as outsiders or less worthy so on, are also the ones who are more disturbed and distressed about Syrians' preferential access to healthcare. That is to say, the differential healthcare policy towards Syrian refugees designed by the Turkish state creates a social boundary, what I call institutional worthiness, which goes hand in hand with further stigmatizations of Syrians in the context of healthcare. Thus, the intersubjective circulation of both social and symbolic boundaries as espoused by interviewees affects their perceived degree of deservingness and results in divergent welfare perceptions.

5.5.1. Undeservingness in the context of 'embodied unbelonging'

In this part, I pay a particular attention to how attributions to unbelonging create an undeserving context from the perspective of Turkish citizens. Thus, sixteen interviewees claimed that 'Turkish citizens shall be prioritized' regarding access to and distribution of welfare benefits since they regard themselves as "legitimate owners of the state and territory who should have the right to a privileged seat in the theatre of society" (Wimmer, 1997: 30). They justified this view by referring to their attachment to insider position and their contributions to Turkish society. For some respondents, the question "Are you one of us?" (van Oorschot, 2000: 38) is the main deservingness criterion. From both a welfare deservingness and boundary work perspective, this question is important for two reasons. First, it signals the role of identity; and second, reciprocity. While the former signals "people perceived as belonging to one's in-group being deemed more deserving", the latter signals "those perceived to have made higher contributions to society in the past, or who will do so in the present or future, are deemed to be more deserving of social welfare" (Laenen et al., 2019: 192). My data indicates that the two deservingness criteria, identity and reciprocity, are closely intertwined, given how much

Turkish citizens feel they have contributed to the country through their hard work and regular tax payments. This is deployed by some respondents as a fundamental condition of belonging to Turkish society. It is also where boundary work intervenes: their understanding of worthiness for welfare services is associated with hard work and regular tax payments as a duty of citizenship, which simultaneously signals who is an insider or not, and who deserves public assistance. Therefore, some respondents took a very reserved approach to Syrians' access to healthcare since they are seen as unbelonging to Turkish society, hence undeserving of welfare benefits. Respondent 1, a farmer who is in debt to the SSI, exemplifies this attitude:

> Interviewer: "What does it mean for you that Syrians are entitled to the same rights as Turkish citizens?"
> Respondent 1 (male, 52) "It means my rights fall by half."
> Interviewer: "Do you know what kinds of rights Syrians can benefit from in Turkey?"
> Respondent 1: "I do not really know but they are prioritized in healthcare."
> Interviewer: "How would you feel when you share common spaces such as hospitals?"
> Respondent 1: "To me, it means an upstart has come in and tries to oust the old-timers. Turkish citizens should be prioritized."

According to Respondent 1, Syrians are 'foreigners' who have recently arrived and are trying to take Turkish citizens' place. What is interesting here is that one of the employees on his farm at the time was a Syrian. He appreciated their presence in the job market to overcome labour shortages in his economic sector, although he was not fully satisfied with his work performance. Nevertheless, he saw Syrians as outsiders who do not belong to the national majority regarding access to certain welfare services in Turkey. He explicitly showed his reluctance to Syrians' accessing healthcare services and sharing hospitals with them. He engaged in boundary work by associating himself with the established group, defined by citizenship intertwined with national identity in his understanding. By not seeing Syrians as a part of the established group, his construction of deservingness automatically excluded them from healthcare services.

Similarly, Respondent 11 (male, 55, retired), who is retired but still runs a vehicle repair shop, argued that the government's policies towards Syrians should be more selective, meaning a certain level of exclusion is necessary as they have not contributed enough to Turkish society, either in the past or now. This became evident when I asked him what he thought about government policies towards Syrians:

> "My pension was supposed to be 2,500 Turkish liras, but my salary is cut and is given to Syrians. I have worked so hard for this state; I paid my social security taxes and other taxes. However, Syrians are more privileged than me. When I go to hospital, they do not look at my face, they prioritize Syrians. I mean Syrians are more advantageous than us. They live better than us. We (Turkish citizens) are all aware of that. Syrians economically perform better than us. They are given a salary; all rights are allocated to them. We have suffered pain for this country and made a great effort for this country. We do not have as many rights as they do, so we are complaining about such policies. As a Turkish citizen, I feel very sorry. I have worked so much for this country and I feel offended when I see Syrians are more privileged than Turkish citizens in many places" (referring to policies).

Of course, his claim about being cut of his pension and being channelized it to Syrians does not reflect the reality. By engaging with such exaggeration, Respondent 11 implicitly establishes the correlation between having earned support and the degree of reciprocation. This respondent considers that working hard to pay taxes his main contribution to the country regarding citizens' duties to the state. Therefore, what makes Syrians undeserving in his eyes is that they have not yet invested enough in Turkey to be able to freely access the healthcare service. This resonates with how he feels about differential policies between Turkish citizens and Syrians, and explains why he defines Syrians unbelonging to Turkish society:

> "They benefit from healthcare services. They receive monthly benefits from the government. What more I can tell you... Syrians have all rights, more rights than Turkish citizens. I mean, Syrians have greater rights than people who are born, raised and live

> in this country. Syrians have more compared to us except for not being retired, not doing military service and not serving our motherland."

Respondent 22 (male, 47, a metal products shop owner/ pawnbroker, registered with SSI) also explicitly emphasizes that he feels like a second-class citizen in his own country as a result of differential healthcare policies favouring Syrian refugees. This also gives rise to the imposition of symbolic ideas regarding Syrians (e.g. free healthcare means more Syrian-born babies):

> "Yes, yes. Here are some of the examples I just said. (S)he goes to hospital and does not pay the fee as if they are first-class citizens. But when we go, you pay for the examination fee. You wait your turn. You pay for medicine. Like a slave! And if you do not have insurance, you are charged more! Especially if you are not insured...But they (Syrians) are special, they go to hospitals, they receive treatment. As they suffer torment, they will make a baby every year...So, you have escaped the war and you have come here. When you go out, if one hundred women pass by, eighty of them are pregnant. I mean speaking of Syrians. Do you think they can have children if they do not find all this comfort? The state says, 'Have children, I raise enemies.' One day, all will be a pain in the ass! That is what the government says. I mean, the state does not say it explicitly, but it does it."

Here, Respondent 22 not only emphasizes that differential healthcare policies create inequality between Syrians and Turkish citizens but also that such policies enable Syrians to live a comfortable life. This allows them to keep having children in Turkey despite escaping the war in Syria. His disagreement with the government's healthcare policies towards Syrians is accompanied by concerns about the increasing number of Syrian babies in Turkey, which he believes may threat the social fabric in the future. He used boundary-making to mobilize undeservingness in two ways: (1) having children should not be the primary concern of those who have fled from a war because it is a privilege, not a right in this context; and (2) Syrians' free access to healthcare services create the perception that they would not have children so readily if they had to pay for healthcare services.

Similarly, Respondent 40 (female, 51, pastry seller, unregistered with SSI) strongly believes that Syrian refugees are more privileged in access to healthcare by referring to her experience with queue cutters:

> "No, a Syrian right now has more rights than I do! I mean that. For example, I cannot take somebody's place in the queue and go to see a doctor when I go to a health centre. I cannot go and enter to hospital just because I am a Syrian. I cannot get in just because I am Arab (putting herself in Syrians' place). They will tell me to wait your turn. But Syrians do not go through it. They say the state gave me this right."

By exemplifying Syrians' tendency to jump the queue in hospitals, Respondent 40 highlights two different aspects of boundary-drawing. First, she claims that current healthcare policies towards Syrian refugees create a system of categorization in which Syrians are conceived as a privileged group in hospitals. This acts as a social boundary marker. Second, such unfair treatment coupled with an evaluative distinction. That is, Syrians' attitudes in a common social setting. This made the respondent see Syrians as queue cutters which she finds it threatening to queue culture in hospitals in Turkey. Engaging with this narrative enables her to mobilize boundary work, while restricting her definition of welfare deservingness.

Another interviewee, who works as janitor, cynically approached differential healthcare policies by sharing his personal queueing experience in the hospital:

> Respondent 36 (male, 27, registered with SSI):
>
> "The state gives them money, does not tax them (Syrians), pays their social insurance taxes...I even myself want to be a Syrian in this country (cynical laugh). Priority is given to Syrians in hospitals. My wife was pregnant. I took her to the hospital. She forgot her identity card. Even though she knew her ID number, they did not accept her. I was looking around and saw three Syrians. They took them directly. You do not treat me in this way although I am your citizen, I am the one who pays you taxes but you prioritize Syrians!"

Like other interviewees, Respondent 36 primarily argued that citizenship obliges him to fulfil citizen responsibilities like paying his taxes regularly. From the interviewee's perspective, paying taxes is not only his civic duty to the state, but also his investment in his country. However, he did not think his contributions have been reciprocated enough given the rights granted to Syrians:

> Interviewer: "What does it mean for you that Syrians are entitled to the same rights as Turkish citizens are?"
>
> Respondent 36: "They can have some rights; I would not mind. My concern is that they are granted more rights than we have. For example, my people (Turkish citizens) who are poor and sleep on the streets cannot receive a salary from the state; they (Syrians) receive it. They receive money from the state and then they beg as well. They are not charged for medicines and hospital expenses. Now I will give you an example: X person is very poor. He does not work, and he has a disability. This person goes to the hospital and gives money. When this person goes to a pharmacy, he pays for medicine. No income, nothing... He is unable to work and homeless. I mean Syrians are really more advantaged than us in terms of rights!"

By giving the example of an unemployed, homeless, disabled Turkish citizen, Respondent 36 deploys both identity and neediness discourses to justify why Syrians should be less eligible for welfare benefits because they are not insiders. This makes them less worthy than an average Turkish citizen in terms of accessing welfare provision. Respondent 25 (male, 35, registered with SSI), who owns an irrigation products store, makes a similar argument:

> "I said at first I am not happy with this at all. I mean such rights were supposed to be given to my people (Turkish citizens). Before the Syrians, he (the president) should have fed his hungry people in the first place."

The last two interviewees' views on prioritizing needy people who belong to Turkish society also supports van Oorschot's claim that individuals tend to support welfare distribution to needy people if they belong to 'us' (2000). As the comments show, Syrians are viewed as

underserving despite being in need. The interviewees' main narrative, regarding access to healthcare services is that not as much is demanded from Syrians as from Turkish citizens. From Turkish citizens' perspective, this situation disadvantages them. Therefore, they not only question who matters and who does not in the eyes of the state but also introduce justification logic for why Turkish citizens should matter more than Syrian refugees. The wide acceptance and circulation of such narratives also paves the way for boundary-drawing on the basis of how who is deserving and who is undeserving is rationalized.

5.5.2. Reservations against 'preferential treatment'

Unequal access to healthcare services leads to different degrees of deservingness in the eyes of Turkish citizens. Thus, views on Syrians' access to healthcare services vary across interviewees in how they engage with the deservingness frame and how they develop reservations against 'preferential treatment', which was the most frequently used narrative. In contrast to the interviews discussed above, the deservingness consideration is not determined by the extent to which Syrians have contributed to Turkish society since they arrived. Instead, it is centred on the claim by nineteen interviewees that Turkish citizens are not treated equally in terms of access to healthcare than Syrian refugees. The interviewees feel excluded due to two issues: payments for healthcare and prioritization in healthcare centres.

Regarding the first issue, AFAD pays the Syrians' contribution fee and a percentage of prescribed medicines for secondary and tertiary health services but does not for citizens:

> "Why doesn't the state charge them? Also, why don't they pay for medicines whereas I have to? Aren't I a citizen of this country? I am required to pay taxes but they (Syrians) no! Medicine is free for them. On the contrary, I am charged for the examination fee to be able to buy medicine. The value of medicine is 5 Turkish liras, but it becomes 50 Turkish liras together with the examination fee, for instance." (Focus group with minibus drivers)

Participants view Syrians' free access to healthcare services as part of their wider dependence on the Turkish state. Like the respondent above, Respondent 34 (male, 59, retired) strongly believes that Syrians have become an economic burden on the SSI because it covers their contribution fees:

> "I am retired, and I worked for 31 years. I am the one who went to buy medicine and paid the difference of 18 Turkish liras, but (s)he (a Syrian) buys a bag of medicine. (S)he does not pay a penny. How will this happen? Their money (cash allowance funds) comes from Turkey. Nothing comes from outside! Today, the Social Security Institute has 28 quadrillion budget deficit. All deficits are because of this (Syrians)! Even though I am retired, I am still charged the fee in hospitals. At least, either make them (Syrians) to pay for medicines or let them work. If you let them work, they will be able to come and pay for medicines. You take them to work for 2-3 hours. Recently, my brother had to get some wall plastering work done. The guy (Syrian) stops working after 2 hours of work. So, they are very accustomed to lie in bed from morning till noon, and then get up at noon, work for 3 hours so that the job is over. We wish they would go back. Hopefully, they will! If they leave, it would be a very good thing for Turkey."

Beyond emphasizing their preferential treatment regarding hospital and medicine charges, he perceived Syrians threatening the economic viability of the SSI. He was convinced it would not have had a budget deficit if it had not had to cover contribution fees and medicine expenses for Syrians. By giving himself as an example of someone is still required to pay contribution fees and prescription charges despite being retired, he implied that providing unconditional healthcare services makes Syrians even more dependent on the state. Strikingly, he associated this dependency culture with the work culture back in Syria, i.e. working fewer than the long hours typical in Turkey. This mobilized symbolic boundaries by referring to how unconditional healthcare services can trigger welfare dependency among Syrians who come from a country where flexible working hours are common, especially considering that he associated flexible working with laziness.

Like the preceding interviewees, Respondent 20, a taxi driver (male, 57, registered with SSI), pointed out how Turkish citizens are treated less favourable than Syrians in access to healthcare services so that Syrians are better off than Turkish citizens despite earning less than Turkish peers. This is just because Syrians are not charged for the contribution and examination fee in hospitals, which leaving them one step ahead of Turkish citizens, who are required to register with the SSI for free access to healthcare services and must pay a symbolic contribution fee in public hospitals. However, symbolic boundaries deployed by Respondent 20 was distinct from the others. Syrians' free access to healthcare made him think that they were earning without paying any taxes as well as accessing free healthcare. Thus, Syrians were smoothly maintaining their lives in Turkey without being concerned about their country of origin. Instead of benefiting from policies that give them more advantages than Turkish citizens, they should defend their own country:

> "They (Syrians) say: 'We are in your country. We receive 30 Turkish liras for wages in your country.' During that time, I mean when they first arrived, they used to earn 30 Turkish liras per day, and it makes 900 Turkish liras per month. I asked her/him: 'do you pay when you go to hospital?' 'No', (s)he said. I said my salary is 800 Turkish liras. When I go to hospital, I pay the examination fee; I pay for medicine. I pay social security insurance premiums every month. I asked: 'Do you pay all those?' (S)he said: 'No, I do not pay.' But your treatment in hospital, your medicine is free of charge, right? You earn 900 liras per month whereas I earn 800. When I said, 'You are more advantaged than me', (s)he says 'No'. I said 'Yes, you left paradise behind. Syria is heaven. Why are you running away? Defend your country! What are you trying to do here?"

Thus, these interviewees are concerned with the Syrians' preferential conditions of accessing healthcare compared to Turkish citizens rather than the mere fact of access. Interviewees reflect the sense that the Turkish state's current healthcare policies make Turkish citizens feel ignored. Such feelings also constrain their narratives about Syrians to focus on being a burden on Turkish institutions, and threatening social order, the social fabric, and national belonging. In other

words, differential healthcare policies operated at the state level not only influence how people perform boundary work but also affect its importance for broader conceptual distinctions.

The second issue about perceptions of preferential treatment is the prioritization of Syrians' treatment in hospitals, as noted in the previous section. Although there is actually no such policy (Ministry of Health, 2020)[15], some reported experiencing such differential treatment, which encourages more reserved attitudes towards Syrians. To address the different degrees of deservingness, I use the term 'conditional deservingness' to refer exclusively to being subjected to the same conditions of access to healthcare as reciprocity or citizenship. Respondent 35 (female, 40, cleaner, registered with SSI) offers a particularly representative comment:

> "Of course, when you go to hospital, priority is given to them (Syrians). I witnessed something, where was it? Ah, I went to hospital with my sister-in-law to see a gynaecologist. For example, they did not queue with us there. There was a separate unit upstairs, only for Syrians. They even had such privileges. All people there were talking about how important Syrians are. What I want to say is why that much discrimination? It's about us. But, as I said, such policies come from Tayyip Erdogan (the president of Turkey). It is not about us."

The respondent's general concern is thus not whether Syrians should be entitled to healthcare services. On the contrary, she is very much concerned about a differential healthcare policy that has created unequal access to and distribution of healthcare services between citizens and Syrian refugees:

> "If there was no discrimination, we would not mind. There should be equality. I mean, I get sick, (s)he (a Syrian) may get sick as well, but s(he) has to wait for his/ her turn, just as I wait even though I suffer from pain because. there are some occasions when people may die because of severe heavy pain. But nobody wants to give her/his place

[15] Syrians who are under Temporary Protection Regulation are prioritized in hospitals only when they fall into the exceptional category just like in the case of Turkish citizens (e.g. patients who older than 65 or younger than 7, disability, pregnancy, emergency cases etc.)

> to anybody. But when Syrians come, they can let them in. It's everywhere. For instance, when I went to the dental hospital, they treated Syrians in the same way."

By giving the queueing example, she also touched on her understanding of social order in public hospitals. From her perspective, there is an unwritten culturally accepted procedure that everyone has to follow in a public hospital, such as waiting your turn until you are called. However, what she witnessed in some public hospitals challenged her understanding of what she was accustomed to so far, which she interpreted as a threat to the existing social order.

Respondent 6 (male, 44, a shoemaker company owner, registered with SSI) reported a similar experience of prioritizing Syrians in a hospital queue. He felt clearly discriminated against, not because of the right itself, but because of how it happened:

> "Syrians are privileged in health. Let me tell you a story of mine: I went to the emergency unit of Adana Numune Hospital. After me, Syrians came in and they were prioritized. Why? Because the regulation is like that. I mean, that's what I was told. I do not approve this kind of stuff. Both sides should be treated equally."

Not surprisingly, these experiences are coupled with the notion that Syrians gain healthcare opportunities that are not provided to Turkish citizens, which influences the construction of deservingness frames. In particular, the host society believes that Syrians are advantaged because they face fewer requirements than Turkish citizens to access healthcare:

> Respondent 39 (male, 25, coil winding technician, registered with SSI):
>
> "Well, I do not know how Syrians are treated in terms of the legislative framework. As I said at the beginning, since our nation loves guests, they (Turkish nationals) show great respect to guests. Because of this they (Syrians) can be prioritized in hospitals. Health is very important. No matter what and whoever you are, you should be able to benefit from healthcare services immediately, but you should not push your own local people into the background. Otherwise, you would feel terrible. My father had to stay in the emergency unit for two days because there were no available rooms. I mean if a

> Syrian had come and they had prioritized this person, it would have been a big problem from my side."

This comment clearly demonstrates that the respondent views access to healthcare as a fundamental human right; however, the differential healthcare policy towards Syrians creates institutionalized social differences in conditions for using healthcare services. The current healthcare policy appears to favour Syrians while inconveniencing Turkish citizens:

> Respondent 43 (male, 23, metal factory worker, registered with SSI):
> "If something happened here, I would go to a different country, so the same rights will be granted to me as well. The problem is here that Syrians are put first. However, you should not behave unjustly toward this country's citizens. The state does not really care about it. Since Syrians are war immigrants, there is such a right. I do not know if it is because of international law or the United Nations... If it is an international right and if such rights are granted in other countries as well, then such rights should be allocated. However, this country's citizens should not be treated unjustly, either in hospitals or somewhere else."

As the two groups do not have the same healthcare access conditions, Turkish citizens perceive that the current healthcare policy gives Syrians preferential treatment. This also deepens the strength of groupness in their daily lives. How the respondents apply the deservingness frame is also closely related to such differential healthcare policies because the policy's structure and content seem their main concern rather than the right to healthcare itself. Because AFAD pays Syrians' hospital contribution fees, the Turkish state has created a more inclusive environment for Syrians, under temporary protection, in line with universal human rights, whereas Turkish citizens feel excluded because their citizenship cannot guarantee access to healthcare services. This not only creates a feeling of 'otherness' among Turkish citizens but this feeling also is coupled with subjective evaluations of Syrian refugees. This leads to Turkish citizens misinterpreting everyday encounters in hospitals (e.g. newly established migration health centres are funded by the EU not by the Turkish state; or Syrians may be prioritized in hospitals

but based on medical priority ordered by the Ministry of Health rather than nationality). Such narratives play a crucial role in rationalizing constructions of deservingness.

5.5.3. 'Universalism' as grounds for unconditional deservingness

When asked about policies concerning Syrians' access to healthcare services in Turkey, six respondents mentioned the universal aspect of access since healthcare is considered a fundamental human need. For them, the right of access healthcare services is not shaped by the host society members' preferences, but is rather a crystal-clear principle because Syrians are human beings and healthcare is a basic human right that everyone should be able to exercise regardless of their nationality, race, and/or ethnicity. Here, the deservingness framework has a different context whereby providing healthcare services to Syrians is regarded as a moral issue. Respondent 8 (male, 30, a barber shop owner, unregistered with SSI) stated his position clearly regarding the fundamental human right to healthcare:

> Interviewer: "Do you know what kinds of rights Syrians benefit from in Turkey?"
>
> Respondent 8: "For example?"
>
> Interviewer: "Healthcare?"
>
> Respondent 8: "You have to provide them with healthcare services. Likewise, education...These are good things. I do not have any issues with such policies."

Respondent 8 considers both healthcare and education services for Syrians is regarded as necessary policies to cater for their basic needs in Turkey. Such welfare policies should therefore at treating citizens and non-citizens equally because education and healthcare are fundamental rights of every human being. In a similar manner, Respondent 16 (male, 50, registered with SSI), who owns a construction company that employs both Turkish and Syrian nationals, strongly took a moral approach when asked about Syrians' access to healthcare in Turkey:

> "He (a Syrian) is sick. You cannot say anything about this. This is a humanitarian situation. So, I am not against this. As I say, you have to look at the situation from the point of view that they are first of all human beings, then you can take care of loose cannon people among them, but firstly they are human."

While discussing the universal aspect of the right to healthcare, Respondent 16 also distinguishes between good and bad Syrians. However, this does not mean that treatment should depend on personality qualities. Rather, he primarily intends to emphasize the fact that Syrians should be treated equally in terms of healthcare regardless of character or personal traits since health is a basic human need. According to Respondent 16, one can only debate whether a Syrian's personality should be a determining factor regarding their stay in Turkey after their basic needs have been met. Another interviewee from the horticulture sector also referred to equal access to healthcare while suggesting a caveat:

> Respondent 26 (female, 44, registered with SSI):
> "Newspapers say that they (Syrians) freely benefit from hospitals. I think they should. Otherwise, what are we supposed to do? Should we let them die? They do not speak the language (Turkish) anyway. God knows how (s)he manages to get to hospital... Of course, I am saying this for a normal citizen (Syrian). I do not mean militants who have come here with a Syrian disguise, but I do not know how to distinguish this."

Her attitude towards Syrians' access to healthcare is guided by universalism coupled with moral considerations. Given that Syrians currently live in Turkey, they should be entitled to healthcare regardless of who they are. However, she also reveals her dilemma about being more selective because she regards those belonging to certain militias in Syria as less deserving. She also acknowledges the difficulty of identifying such people.

Some respondents, who view healthcare as a basic human right, discuss providing healthcare services to Syrians in terms of the universal aspect of healthcare. For them, moral considerations and universal values go hand in hand to guide their evaluation of the Turkish state's healthcare policies towards Syrians. Instead of having reservations against preferential treatment, they

interpret the healthcare policies implemented for Syrians under temporary protection as a guarantee of access to healthcare services in Turkey. The mere condition of being human is sufficient justification to narrate these Syrians as a group 'worthy' of access to healthcare. The respondents also show us that the deservingness frame can be deployed around unconditionality, especially when individuals are driven by the idea that welfare services like healthcare are indispensable and should be provided equally to everyone regardless of citizenship status.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has revealed that the importance of institutional frameworks in the emergence of social boundaries and the role of social boundaries in triggering symbolic boundaries. Even if a social boundary derives from the same reason (i.e. differential healthcare policy), it can make social actors deploy different evaluative distinctions. This is because the unequal distribution of material and/or non-material sources (social boundaries) encourage distinct individual evaluations and justifications at the intersubjective level. Consequently, differential healthcare policies, interpreted in the context of preferential treatment and unbelonging, are coupled with evaluative distinctions, such as threats to economic well-being, the social order, and the social fabric. Such well-accepted narratives then play a significant role in supporting and rationalizing constructions of deservingness: specifically, who is contributing more to national well-being and who deserves more benefits.

The analysis indicates that these respondents make deservingness judgements in three different contexts: belonging, reservations against preferential treatment, and universalism. First, labelling Syrians as a group who do not belong to Turkish society creates an undeserving context from the perspective of Turkish citizens. The attribution to 'unbelonging' highlights the role of both attachment to insider positionality and contributions to national well-being. References to identity and reciprocity are intertwined with a sense of insider positionality and

past contributions of insiders to the society. This not only tells us what and how welfare deservingness criteria are applied but also how they are utilized to justify excluding Syrian refugees from healthcare as outsiders. Therefore, those who apply the criteria and regard Syrians as unbelonging also object to their entitlement to welfare provision. Secondly, Turkish citizens and Syrians do not have the same access conditions to healthcare services. This creates the conditional deservingness context, in which respondents criticize the preferential treatment of Syrians, both because of their insufficient contribution to Turkish society, and because Turkish citizens face stricter conditions in accessing to healthcare. From a boundary perspective, differential healthcare policies cause unequal treatment, which sharpens groupness. Turkish citizens thus tend to develop more reserved attitudes towards Syrians because of differential access to healthcare. Lastly, unconditional deservingness refers to the belief that healthcare is as a basic human right that everyone should be able to access regardless of nationality. In this context, healthcare policy towards Syrians is interpreted as a regulation that rightly ensures their access to healthcare services in Turkey.

These varying conceptions of deservingness do not originate solely in the state's differential healthcare policies towards Syrian refugees, although it is clear that such differential policy sharpens degrees of groupness. However, it is also further linked with how worthiness is assigned to Syrian refugees by Turkish citizens. In the unbelonging context, respondents utilize the power of their insider positionality to justify their welfare preference for Turkish citizens over less-deserving Syrian refugees by foregrounding their citizenship-related duties. In the preferential treatment context, instead of using their insider position to privilege themselves over Syrian refugees, they bring up unequal access to and unequal distribution of welfare provision because the state's preferential treatment makes Turkish citizens feel excluded. Finally, in the universalism context, the right to healthcare is constructed on the basis of being

human rather than any insider position. As Syrians are seen both as refugees in need and human beings with dignity, respondents interpret their preferential access to healthcare as a necessity.

Differential policies create social differences between Turkish citizens and Syrian nationals as a result of unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources, i.e. access to healthcare services. This not only affects the host society members' perspectives towards Syrians but also the perceived degree of deservingness. The design of the policy itself leads to a form of separation between Syrians and Turkish citizens, which deepens when individuals are directly exposed to the policy as practiced in daily life (queueing, paying contribution fees, etc.). This separation rigidifies social boundaries and becomes coupled with further narratives regarding Syrian refugees, such as cutting the queue for healthcare, being an economic burden, not contributing to the society, and threatening the social fabric. This results in the varied perceptions of welfare deservingness seen in the interviews.

Chapter 6: The Use of Cultural Repertoires of Everyday Nationhood and Citizenship in National Identity Boundary-drawing through the Lens of Ordinary Citizens

6.1 Introduction

> Interviewer: "What is your opinion about the President's statement that Turkey will grant citizenship to Syrians?"
>
> "I am completely against it. My grandparents always fought for this country, for this land; they have always been in the resistance. I think it is very wrong that Syrians come here and demand rights in this land that we had to pay price for it. There is a saying that it is necessary to spill blood on your motherland, it has to be watered with blood, and otherwise, it is not a motherland. But all the blood that was spilled is ours! Is it the blood of Syrians? They (Syrians) sold you (Turkish people) out to the Germans and British during the First World War. Now, they (Syrians) have come here and are trying to be party of this country! There is already a Kurdish issue in this country. Arabs will claim rights someday or other! When Alawites see Arabs, they will claim rights too! Armenians do the same when they see Alawites, for example. That's bullshit! I mean you create an additional problem before solving the other issue."
>
> Respondent 36 (male, 27, Kurd, janitor)

This young Kurdish worker exhibits a conception of citizenship and national belonging built on a cultural imaginary acquired and shaped in relation to national history. However, national imaginaries are not invariant. On the contrary, they are a quite flexible analytical category that invites us to explore the multi-layered understandings of attachment to national identity and citizenship at the intersubjective level. Considering that "nationhood is only one source of identity; whose salience depends on a variety of contextual factors" (Bonikowski, 2016: 428), it is particularly important to understand the role of attachment to the nation in constructing the boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. This is because "individuals do not develop narratives in isolation" (Lamont et al., 2016: 21); instead, historically constituted national repertoires play a

crucial role in relation to how individuals make sense of their identity (Lamont, 1992). In turn, both conceptions nationhood and citizenship and how they are mobilized by individuals may vary; accordingly, so do national identity boundary-drawing patterns.

With the aim of revealing the multidimensional strategies of boundary-drawing in response to the Syrian refugee influx in Turkey, I have so far concentrated on moral, socioeconomic, and institutional aspects of boundary-drawing within the scope of social and symbolic boundaries. In this chapter, I focus on cultural repertoires and conceptions of citizenship and nationhood as another lens to view boundary-drawing by Turkish citizens against Syrian refugees. This introduces a new form of boundary-drawing: 'national identity boundaries'. More importantly, this chapter discusses explicitly how Turkish citizens conceive of who is or is not eligible for 'insider' status, which has been implicit throughout the preceding chapters. The chapter makes two novel contributions. First, it considers how the conception of citizenship and national belonging is deployed as a form of boundary in the course of everyday lives, which remains underexplored in empirical sociological research. Bail (2008) argues that the literature on boundaries is scarce, especially in countries and/or regions with recent immigration. By focusing on Syrian refugees in Turkey, a country characterized by strong patriotic and nationalistic attitudes (see World Value Survey 2010-2014) and transformed into both a transit and destination country over the last three decades (Şanlıer Yüksel, İçduygu and Millet, 2019), this chapter analyses how boundaries are drawn to demarcate who deserves citizenship and who belongs. Second, in contrast to much scholarship concentrated on Western Europe and the USA, where militaristic ideas of nationhood are less common (see DiTomaso, 2013; Lamont, 1992, 2000; Simonsen, 2016; Trittler 2017, 2019; Waters, 1999), this chapter reveals a different boundary-drawing mechanism involving widespread adherence to a militarized sense of nationhood, related more to other ideas of belonging than ethnicity. Accordingly, this chapter looks at how ordinary citizens deploy historically rooted national identity constructions

(militaristic, unitary) and symbols (language, flag). It further indicates that ordinary citizens, in their narratives, link such constructions and symbols with historical and current political contexts (e.g. the conflict between Turks and Arabs during WW1, or; current military operations against Syria).

The chapter starts by presenting recent debates on everyday nationhood and citizenship and multidimensional configurations of boundary-drawing. It continues with contextual background that addresses historically shaped repertoires of the nation (Lamont, 1992; Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Lamont et al., 2016) while locating major events during the fieldwork such as, 'Operation Olive Branch' (20 January - 24 March 2018). This is followed by the empirical results, specifically what kinds of narratives and meanings are attributed to Turkish national identity in everyday understandings of nationhood and citizenship, and how Turkish citizens deploy them to define boundaries concerning Syrian refugees. Finally, the conclusion highlights the contributions this chapter makes to the literature.

6.2. The Role of Cultural Repertoires of Everyday Nationhood and Citizenship in Boundary-drawing

There is a long social scientific tradition of research into the nation, nationhood, and national identity (see Anderson, 1991; Brubaker, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1990). On the one hand, this is largely centred on how the nation state and its elites have played a crucial role in constructing the nation, and how national identities are formed and maintained through institutions and national narratives (see Billig, 1995; Cerulo, 1995; Smith, 1986). On the other hand, scholars have started to emphasize how the nation becomes salient as an everyday life practice based on contextual factors among ordinary citizens (Akıncı, 2019; Bonikowski, 2016; Brubaker et al., 2006; Condor, 2000; Fox, 2006, 2017; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b; Goffman, 1999; Miller-Idriss, 2009; Silova, 2019; Skey, 2011, 2015).

The scholarship on everyday nationhood investigates how nationhood and national identity are produced and reproduced 'from below' in everyday life (Brubaker, 2006; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a; Fox, 2017; Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg, 2012). Fox and Miller-Idriss argue that "nations are not just the product of structural forces; they are simultaneously the practical accomplishment of ordinary people engaging in mundane activities in their everyday lives" (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a: 554). In other words, the nation as a cultural repertoire never fades away; instead, it waits for the right moment to (re)emerge, especially when individuals feel like the monopoly of their nationhood and national identity are endangered. In this regard, how national identity is narrated, how its meanings are attributed, and under which circumstances national frames are deployed in daily practice by ordinary people become crucial (Bonikowski, 2016). Understanding the taken-for-granted aspect of everyday nationhood (Condor, 2000; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b; Skey, 2011) is an important task. Thus, social scientists still focus on determining "when and where it becomes practically important" in the eyes of ordinary people (Bonikowski, 2016: 433) because everyday nationhood is mostly "unseen, unheard, unnoticed". That is, "this kind of nationalism operates off the radar. It's everywhere, yet discernible nowhere; it becomes camouflaged against the backdrop of the ordinary" (Fox, 2017: 27). Everyday nationhood becomes detectable only if the taken-for-granted foundations of nationhood are breached by unexpected instances and situations (Fox, 2017). Following on from this, Fox (2017) presents an analytical picture of the breaching context in what he terms: "the edges of the nation". Everyday nationhood is divided into three edges: 'spatial edges', such as borders and border-crossing practices; 'temporal edges', "the historical and developmental moments when nationalism vacillates between its hot and banal variants"; and 'political edges', which become visible when certain political discourse and symbols galvanize nationhood, such as immigration (Fox, 2017: 27). Such breaching can

operate not only to restore the *status quo ante* (Fox, 2017), but also open up new configurations of everyday nationhood (Antonsich, 2018).

According to Bonikowski, "The nation as a symbolic, discursive, and cognitive category is not content-free: What matters is not just when and why people think and talk with the nation, but also what the nation signifies to them and their communities" (2016: 435). Such signifiers not only make us develop a sense of 'who belongs', but also 'who does not belong' (Simonsen, 2016). Explicit references to citizenship and national identity as everyday practice are not manifested independently from boundary-drawing. The way meanings are attached to the nation and citizenship drive us to consider how we define ourselves as a citizen of a given country and (re)produce the segmentation between 'us' and 'them' (Barth, 1969; Armstrong, 1982; Triandafyllidou, 2001, 2002). Attachment to national benchmarks of values, cultural practices, and historical context can mobilize boundary-drawing. Viewed in this manner, boundary-drawing appears as a useful analytical tool to unveil how the configurations of everyday citizenship and nationhood are mediated through cultural repertoires, "a set of tools available to individuals to make sense of the reality they experience" (Lamont et al., 2016: 21). In this chapter, to emphasize the national aspect of boundary-drawing, I use 'national identity boundary-drawing', to borrow a term from Kristina Bakkær Simonsen (2016), rather than symbolic boundaries.

As outlined above, the literature on everyday nationhood has made significant contributions in recent years (see Bauder, 2008; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008a, 2008b; Miller-Idriss, 2006). By following such a lead, I aim to understand how ordinary citizens evoke various notions of nationhood in everyday life in drawing boundaries against 'outsiders' (i.e. refugees). In order to shed light on the complexities of everyday understandings of citizenship and nationhood with regards to the emergence of 'insider versus outsiders' notions, I bring together two theoretical strands: everyday nationhood and boundary-drawing. Elaborating on salient contextual factors,

such as historical conditions, national history, militarized masculinity, and language, I show how repertoires of everyday nationhood are deployed in relation to boundary-drawing in the context of the recent refugee influx in Turkey. Building on Fox (2017), I adopt a breaching strategy to capture the context in which unselfconscious nationalism becomes explicit as everyday practice when unspoken national norms are breached.

6.3. Historical and Socio-cultural Context of Turkish Citizenship and National Belonging

With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, 'Turkishness' became a forcefully driving factor describing the country's national identity (İçduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004; Kadıoğlu, 2007). Despite the country's multi-ethnic and multi-cultural social heritage, "the founders of the Turkish republic had embarked upon a modernist project that aimed to homogenize a society within the geographical area determined by the National Pact" (Kirişci, 2006: 1). Unsurprisingly therefore, that the country's ethnic and cultural diversity was intentionally neglected enables a Turkish national identity to be constructed - with the one exception of the religious minorities whose rights were recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Accordingly, in Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, "the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race were, *in terms of citizenship*, to be called Turkish" (Al, 2015: 91). However, this legal definition of 'Turkishness', which its exclusively civic and territorially based understanding of Turkish citizenship and nationalism (Secor, 2004) does not align with the state's approach and responses to past and current challenges. Although national identity and citizenship are interdependent but distinct concepts, modern Turkish national citizenship is formulated on the basis of a particular national security concept, "which frames the domestic community in response to a particular perception of threat... The security of a national community of citizens is defined in terms of the sustainability of traditional hegemonic patterns of (national) culture, language, religion, specific cultural codes, as well as a particular system of values. National security is tightly knit to the security of these particular elements of national

identity. National security policy and foreign policy practices can thus be viewed as a performative political discourse through which a distinct national citizenship identity is formed and continuously reproduced" (İçduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004: 35). This has become more evident regarding the formulation of the state's migration and refugee policies, such as opening up a pathway to Turkish citizenship for individuals with Turkish ancestors from the Caucasus and the Balkans while being less generous towards Kurds and Arabs from Iraq (Kirişçi, 2006).

Given how the traditionally multi-cultural and multi-ethnic fabric of society was transformed into a unitary Turkish national identity (İçduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004), Turkey offers an ideal case to examine how national citizenship emerges as a powerful force informing everyday practices of boundary-drawing. In this regard, I will consider four crucial dimensions for understanding the designation of Syrian nationals in reference to Turkish cultural membership: the country's historical context, the military past and present, the role of Turkish language within identity politics, and other national symbolic markers, such as flag.

Cultural repertoires, such as national myths, identity politics or empowering ideologies "...may be widely available to group members as cultural resources as they are looking for scripts to make sense of experiences of exclusion and group stereotypes" (Lamont et al., 2016: 22). Two such readily available cultural resources for Turkish nationals are the scope of World War I (28 July 1914 - 11 November 1918) and the Turkish War of Independence (19 May 1919 - 24 July 1923). This is because the nation's history is portrayed as 'glorious', enabling its own members to conceive of themselves as full participants of modern Turkish society. When the historical background of establishment of states is transformed into cultural myths of national belonging especially in highly militarized societies like Turkey, such narratives, mobilized by collective memory, can be important indicators of cultural membership in the context of a national society. This also plays a crucial role in identifying 'us' and categorizing 'others' on the basis of a shared past and present. Attachment to historical context also reveals the justification frames of

current events that are strongly connected to other dimensions of cultural membership, such as doing military service or defending one's motherland when necessary. To show the importance of a shared past and present in the mobilization of cultural myths, I touch on three remarkable cross-border military operations in the last three years, which I call the *'immediate fieldwork environment'*. I categorized these historical events in relation to my study as: 'before the fieldwork', 'during the fieldwork', and 'after the fieldwork'. The main reason of mentioning the 'immediate fieldwork environment' is to demonstrate the importance of contextual factors (e.g. linking the country's military present with its military past) for thoroughly understanding the relationship between everyday nationhood and national identity boundary-drawing. That is, these military operations involving Syria represent particular historical junctures that affected the salience of everyday nationhood and citizenship. Accordingly, they shape the activation and mobilization of boundaries towards Syrians.

Before the fieldwork *(Operation Euphrates Shield):* The first military operation, named *'Operation Euphrates Shield'*, took place from August 24, 2016 to March 29, 2017. According to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), it had two essential objectives: to maintain border security between Turkey and northern Syria and to push Islamic State (IS) away from its border, particularly northwest of the Euphrates River. TAF also allied with some Syrian opposition groups, such as the Free Syrian Army. The seven-month operation resulted in the removal of IS militants from Jarabulus and al-Rai, which was only 60 km from Turkish border while al-Bab, a strategic town, was also captured in the last phase (Triebert, 2017; Gurcan, 2019).

During the fieldwork *(Operation Olive Branch):* The second military operation, called *'Operation Olive Branch',* took place between January 20 and April 2018. It had three main objectives. The first was to stop the expansion of People's Defence Units (YPG), which had organic links with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in the region of Afrin, located in north-western Syria. The second objective was to create a safe zone in this region to return Syrian

refugees to (Gurcan, 2019). The third was to increase Turkey's role in international negotiations on Syria's future: "with this show of force, Turkey aims to deter the US, its NATO Ally, and to make it desist from backing the PYD" (Kasapoğlu and Ülgen, 2018: 14). It was a shorter operation than Operation Euphrates Shield.

After the fieldwork *(Operation Peace Spring):* The last cross-border military operation, *Operation Peace Spring*, started on October 9, 2019 and ended November 25, 2019. TAF aimed to force Syrian Kurdish fighters of north-eastern Syria to increase security and stability along Turkey's borders. It also aimed a 30-km safe zone between Resulayn and Tel Abyad to relocate Syrian refugees from Turkey (Uras, 2019).

Another powerful component of identity politics for creating a single and homogenous identity by bringing together various cultural and ethnic communities under the same roof was the Turkish language. With the aim of fostering the Turkish national identity and modernizing the country, the new republic standardized language (Aydıngün and Aydıngün, 2010). Accordingly, the new Turkish Republic made Turkish the only official language of the state while prohibiting the use of any other languages in public life. Thus, language was used intentionally as a crucial element in constructing a Turkish national identity. Consequently, being able or unable to speak Turkish and the use of Turkish in everyday life not only fuels national self-identification but also forcefully drives stigmatization of and discrimination against 'outsiders'.

So, how are Syrians designated in reference to Turkish cultural membership? What makes them unqualified members in the eyes of ordinary Turkish citizens? My fieldwork shows that the respondents were more likely to designate Syrians as 'Arabs' in reference to their culture (for a similar argument, see Lamont et al., 2016 on the case of Palestinian citizens of Israel), irrespective of the existence of other minority groups in Turkey, such as Kurds, Druze, Arab

Christians, and Yazidis. This, of course, is very much related to the way locals have been exposed to the Syrian population in their everyday lives as well as the historical context. Although religion seems a common feature of both societies, other cultural elements unbind them and prevent Syrians from being socially accepted within Turkish cultural membership. Therefore, when Turkish citizens designate Syrians as Arabs, they draw on a wider understanding of culture that is characterized by the Arab-speaking population, the positionality of Arabs during historical events, and everyday life habits common to the Arab world, such as shisha smoking. Like other provinces heavily populated by Syrians, Adana also has its own 'Little Syria' or 'Little Aleppo', as called by locals (e.g. Obalar and Mirzaçelebi streets). The main logic behind such renaming reflects both a growing number of Syrian businesses and the everyday use of Arabic in the streets and on signboards (Yeni Adana, 2017), and also draws a particular attention to the fact that Syrians bring their lifestyle to Adana's streets, which locals do not appreciate.

In the following part, I illustrate how such historical and cultural dimensions in the Turkish national context addressed by the interviews are coupled with the current events, reinforce the mobilization of cultural repertoires. In addition, I will show how cultural repertoires of everyday understandings of citizenship and nationhood appear as a form of boundary-drawing (i.e. a nationalistic way of separating) vis-a-vis Syrian refugees.

6.4. Exploring mechanisms of national identity boundary-drawing

Instead of asking direct questions about interviewees' understanding of their nationhood and national identity, I posed two decontextualized questions concerning their opinions about granting Turkish citizenship to Syrians and Operation Olive Branch (which was going on at the time of the fieldwork). I also asked for their opinions and feelings about hearing Arabic and seeing signboards in Arabic in daily life. The data that I present in the following sections result from these interview questions. I was able to reveal how ordinary citizens use cultural

repertoires of nationhood and citizenship in boundary-making. Twenty-nine interviewees out of forty-seven explicitly evoked various notions of everyday nationhood in drawing boundaries against Syrian refugees when they were asked questions about citizenship and Turkey's military operation in Syria. Similarly, drawing on cultural repertoires in relation to nationhood and national identity was the main talking point of the three focus group discussions. Not surprisingly, those who expressed strong attachment to Turkish nationhood and national identity were also against allowing Syrians to have signboards in Arabic for their business. In addition to twenty-nine interviewees, five respondents expressed their discomfort with Arabic signboards, but without forcefully associating Arabic signboards with a political ideology built on national history and historical conditions. My interviews reveal two separate but interrelated mechanisms of national identity boundary-drawing: (1) stigmatization on the basis of a nationhood narrative (e.g. Syrians as untrustworthy, traitorous, cowardly, feckless nation due to their unwillingness to fight for Syria) and (2) reinforcing national identity boundary-drawing through symbolic markers (e.g. language and flag). Although the respondents' conceptions of Turkish citizenship and nationhood were so uniform, my data indicates variation in 'who is excluded and who is included' in this type of citizenship construction. Adherence to these militarized senses of nationhood and belonging were characterised by varying degrees of rigidity, gendered justifications, and political justification.

6.4.1. Narratives of everyday militaristic nationhood as a source of stigmatization

The way boundaries intersubjectively operate between individuals is not homogeneous. On the contrary, it greatly depends on the context where everyday understandings of nationhood and citizenship are breached, such as the current political situation of a country, the nations' histories or militarized masculinities as a form of the country's military culture, and how boundaries are drawn accordingly. Two different but interrelated historical contexts were raised by respondents regarding Syrian refugees in Turkey: World War I and the Turkish War of

Independence. Both historical events are deployed to categorize Syrians as 'others' and are further linked with the current political context, accounting for a militarized sense of nationhood and belonging. Unsurprisingly, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 is regarded as a primary legacy (also see the case of Israel, Lamont et al., 2016) that is readily available to (re)emerge in Turkish people's thinking. Equally important, the mobilization of this historical context is not independent from a country's military past, and perhaps, its present. While nationalism and militarism may be distinct concepts, they are mostly intertwined. Firstly, the nation state and its institutions, which have been historically and commonly monopolized by men are characterized by a hegemonic masculinity "that sets the standards for male demeanour, thinking and action" (Nagel, 1998: 247). Secondly, masculine terms such as honour, patriotism, cowardice, bravery, and national service, are embedded within the culture of nationalism. Therefore, it is not easy to differentiate such terms as they go hand in hand with the ideology of hegemonic nationalism and masculinity (Nagel, 1998). Turkey could be a typical example of understanding "the interplay between masculine microcultures and nationalist ideology" (Nagel, 1998: 242). In highly militarized societies such as Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Turkey, military service is thoroughly linked with manliness because it is regarded as a transition to become a 'real' man and, as a unique ability to protect the motherland if necessary (see Armbrust, 2000; Haugbolle, 2012; Kaplan, 2000). In Turkey, military service has been mandatory for all male Turkish nationals since 1927. Conscientious objection is neither recognized nor allowed. Military service is a masculine institution, is directly linked with the state. Beyond its institutional character, military service has ideological and cultural meanings at the societal level in Turkey. First, doing military service in Turkey is not only an ideological, but also a cultural duty because this is how young males are socially accepted as 'real' men. For instance, having done military service is a socially accepted requirement in hiring across various employment fields in Turkey. Second, military service is associated with manliness in

the sense of always being ready to protect the motherland if threatened by external powers (Sinclair-Webb, 2000).

In the following section, I show how Turkey's historical context is coupled with the country's military past and present, which reinforces further stigmatizations of Syrians as untrustworthy, traitorous, and/or feckless. The idea that all minorities fought for Turkey is linked with the country's military past, enabling the respondents to label Syrians as 'untrustworthy'. Regarding the country's military present, Turkey's cross-border military operations in Syria reinforce the narrative that Turkey is fighting for their country, yet Syrians are here which renders them as 'traitors'.

Narratives of untrustworthiness: Syrians didn't, don't, and won't fight

> Respondent 16 (male, 50, Arab Alawite, a construction company owner):
> "Granting citizenship to those (Syrians) means they will have the same status as us, right? Now... These men ran away from their country, came here and they did not defend their country. Well, I cannot know whether they will do the same thing to me one day. I mean I cannot trust those men! Based on our 70 years of history since the War of Independence together with Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Laz, and Circassians, we always lend a hand to each other whatever happens. Well, I cannot lend my hand to those (Syrians), I cannot trust them. That's why, I am against. There was a saying from Devlet Bahceli[16] once upon a time, saying: 'This guy ran away from his country and came here without defending it.' How am I supposed to trust this guy?"

Here, the interviewee labelled Syrians as 'untrustworthy' (in comparison to other ethnic minorities) by drawing on the Turkish War of Independence. Comparing the Turkish state's history with the Syrian civil war represents two sides of the same coin: praising Turkish nationhood and despising Syrian nationhood. On the one hand, the respondent praises Turkish people because they did not avoid fighting, regardless of ethnic and/or religious background; instead, they stayed and defended their country, which is indeed one of the main components

[16] Devlet Bahçeli is a Turkish politician who has been the chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) since 1997.

of the projection of Turkish national citizenship in line with the country's identity politics. On the other hand, Syrians are despised because they followed a different path from Turkish people by avoiding the fighting instead of defending themselves, which makes Syrians untrustworthy in his eyes. Similarly, Respondent 17 (male, 35, Kurd, a hardware shop owner) pointed out the trust issue by putting Syrians in Turkish people's position:

> "Granting citizenship... A similar thing could have happened to us too. But if this happened to us and we went to their country (Syria), they would not welcome us so warmly and friendly because the Arab nation is untrustworthy!"

This comment shows us two similar but different aspects of boundary-drawing. First, Respondent 17 engaged with the implicit justification of Syrians' trustworthiness. In this context, labelling Syrians as untrustworthy traces back to World War I and the Arabs' positionality as part of Ottoman Syria during the war. Thus, 'untrustworthiness' requires particular attention because its attribution to 'Arabs' does not develop in isolation; on the contrary, it is accumulated in and mediated through a cultural repertoire in relation to the Arabs' revolt against the Ottomans during World War I. Second, he designated all Syrians as Arabs irrespective of the presence of other minority groups. In doing so, the designation of Syrians is informed through past experiences of both societies enabling the participant to link a certain nation with a negative label.

Interestingly enough, 'running away' from the motherland due to the war goes hand in hand with being untrustworthy. In the eyes of some interviewees, leaving the homeland undefended in tough times like war is promptly linked with untrustworthiness because it is understood as a matter of loyalty to the 'motherland'. The interviewees establish this link between defending your motherland and trustworthiness historically:

> "Nothing but harm... A person, who has run away from his/her own country today, can easily leave (your country 8Turkey) in the lurch one day. Let me tell you clearly: why do we love more our country and why are people (Turkish citizens) more interlocked

> today? We have all become a united society, including Kurds, Arabs. Aren't there Arabs in Turkey? Kurds? Turcoman? Everybody fought for this land until they got it. Manners and customs have become one. But when you bring other people and mingle them with these (Turkish) people… To be more precise, when you bring those people who ran away from their country of origin, what would they do if something similar happened in your country? They would run away! If something similar happened in this country one day - god forbid!, they would walk off after eating and drinking in your country. They (Syrians) would leave the state of Turkey to its own devices! If they do not fight for me, why should I fight for them? Can you exactly know who they are, what they are? If Turkey fought a battle tomorrow, would you run away? So, why did those (Syrians) leave their country? I would give their offspring red-carpet treatment; their offspring should be located in camps here. They (Turkish Government) would say that a certain amount of money per (Syrian) family should be given by per citizen. This money is already being cut from people who regularly pay their social security premiums. If they said that we will look after those people, then you would respect it. But every able-bodied man should fight for their country! What did Assad do to them, and they (Syrians) declared a civil war? Logically asking, what did Assad do to those people?" (Focus Group 3, with minibus drivers)

Even though untrustworthiness vacillates between implicit and explicit in this quote, the participant engaged with boundary-drawing by giving the same example: the Turkish War of Independence. However, he went a step further by linking what happened in the past (i.e. regardless of ethnic and/or religious background, all people united to fight for their homeland in Turkey), to what is happening now (i.e. Syrians have run away from their homeland without feeling obliged to defend it) and to what might happen in the future (i.e. Syrians would most probably leave Turkey in the lurch if similar conflict occurred in Turkey). Indeed, the way how this participant envisions Syrians' attitudes in case of potential political turmoil in Turkey demonstrates that the origins of boundaries originate between Turkish people and Syrians are closely linked with how we historically formulate definitions of 'us' and 'them' (Simonsen, 2016). Understanding why Syrians have chosen to come to Turkey instead of fighting for their motherland is very puzzling to some participants because leaving motherland undefended is not

even a matter of discussion for them. This is because of both circumstantial context and "the relationship between deeply held beliefs and dominant narratives embedded in national institutions" (Bonikowski, 2016: 433). Equally important, we should pay particular attention to how masculine terms derived from the culture of masculinity and nationalism operate in everyday practice and can show a constraining character and emerge as a boundary marker. However, the extent to which the mobilization of such militaristic nationhood serves as a boundary marker depends on variations in understandings of who is included and who is excluded. For children, for example, militaristic nationhood, can be inclusionary as they are not expected to fight whereas it becomes very exclusionary for young men as the attribution of being able-bodied exclusively refers to always being ready to fight for one's motherland.

The interviewees also explicitly referred to Syrians as 'traitors', given Turkey's military past and present, they had supposedly failed to do their duty of defending the motherland:

> Respondent 1 (male, 52, Arab Alawite, farmer)
> "Syrians are traitors! Even if all hell broke loose in the world, I would not leave my country! I would fight for my country. These men (Syrians) did not fight for their own country!"

Thus, for this respondent, there are certain situations in which men must be ready to do their 'manly duty', such as fighting in a war, even if it may cost them their life. In this context, fighting for one's motherland when its existence and independence are threatened is perceived as a matter of national duty, which is an undeniable responsibility for male citizens (Nagel, 1998).

Respondent 7 (male, 52, Zaza, a wrapping paper company owner) drew a clear line between honour and shame built on hegemonic masculine and national identities by comparing the Turkish and Syrian nations. From this interviewee's perspective, the Turkish nation is ascribed

by honour based on their 'glorious' past whereas the Syrian nation is associated with 'disgrace' as they have betrayed their motherland:

> "Of course, I see those (Syrians) as traitors! If such a thing happened in my homeland... Homeland is a separate thing; the government-state is a separate thing. There must be different things when you say homeland. What the hell is the guy who is able-bodied doing here? I do not expect that people would run away if such thing happened in our country. Maybe, only 2 to 3 percent at most would escape."

Respondent 11 (male, 55, Arab Alawite, a vehicle repair shop owner) went a step further by accusing Syrians as he strongly believed that their presence in Turkey was the main reason why Turkish soldiers had conducted a military operation in Northern Syria:

> "A Syrian should not be superior to a Turkish citizen because the one who protects this country is a Turkish citizen! As I just told you, who is on the border now? Syrians eat here while our sons are fighting there. Why? To save Syria. It is none of our business! We should save our own country! Syria is not our business! Expel them to their own homeland or take them to the front line! You are taking my kid away, it is incredible! These are very difficult issues; these are things that make me feel offended, nothing else. Okay, let them (Syrians) work here but you should not let them have the edge over me. Both my grandfather and father served this country, so did I! Our grandfathers' blood is still on the ground. Their blood was shed in this country and for this country. None of the Syrians' blood has been shed here for this country, so we should act by bearing these things in mind."

Some of the interviewees differentiated elderly Syrians, Syrian children, and women from young male Syrians. This is because the way they adhere to a militaristic nationhood enables them to engage with inclusionary narratives of these other 'vulnerable' people. However, such a distinction also shows how a militarized sense of nationhood and belonging can be exclusionary for young men as defending the motherland is regarded as the primary national duty for Turkish men who are able-bodied and young enough to go to war:

> Respondent 28 (male, 43, Turk, food wholesaler)
> "I do not understand Syrians anyway. There is war in your country, why do you escape? Fight! I exclude ladies, but why do men escape the battle? Look, how old I am... If they conscripted me now, I would go to defend my homeland!"

It is obvious that adherence to militarized nationhood greatly matters because it accounts for the diverging ways that understandings of national identity and citizenship are spelled out in everyday lives and such militarized narratives are utilized to justify who is included and who is excluded in this type of citizenship construction. Thus, the construction of Turkish national citizenship appears as a unitary identity enabling all Turkish nationals, regardless of their ethnic and religious identity, to develop a sense of belonging based on a common past and present, which also defines the boundaries of cultural membership. As neither Syrian refugees nor their ancestors took part in establishing the new state, in the eyes of ordinary Turkish nationals, they are automatically excluded from Turkish cultural membership mediated through citizenship. Furthermore, the respondents impose their understandings of nationhood and citizenship (e.g. defining the terrain of motherland and the profile of fellow citizens, and framing of national and cultural duties as an automatic outcome of their understanding of national citizenship) as the dominant standard. This drives them to devalue Syrians' understanding of 'motherland' and categorize them as 'ineligible' for Turkish citizenship as they have failed to do their cultural and national duty as 'fellow citizens' of Syria.

Narratives of fecklessness: Syrians fail to do their 'primary' duty for their motherland

Not defending one's motherland brings further stigmatization in relation to Syrians' cultural traits. Beyond labelling them as traitors or an untrustworthy nation (in reference to their Arabic ethnicity), some respondents associated their presence in Turkey instead of staying to fight for their homeland with undesired aspects of their culture. For instance, Respondent 41 (male, 24, Kurd, cashier at wholesale market) claimed that:

> "Of course, we (Turkish people) feel conscientiously uncomfortable about their (Syrians') situation. They escaped from a war. We feel sorry for their unjust treatment. But we are human being in the end. We have to bring home the bacon. We have a family. Conscience to some extent! If this man sits crossed legged and smokes shisha till the morning, wears a kilo of hair gel, and goes for chatting up girls, he could have stayed there and fought for his own land. I am not saying anything about the fathers who have come here for their children. I am not saying anything about the elderly or children either. But I feel uncomfortable with the young people here. Instead of staying and fighting for your own country, for your flag, what is the point of coming here?"

He continues his argument by referring to history of the Turks:

> "Simply, they fled from the battle. Such a thing does not exist in the Turkish lexicon! When you look at 3,000 years since the origin of the Turks, you cannot find anything like that, I mean fleeing the battle and going to another country. Their behaviour is not in line with our manners and customs. They are so feckless; they are fond of pleasure but their way of having fun is so ridiculous. They like showing off. They are so chatty. I mean they have nothing to do with us, it is not even a matter of discussion! They (Syrians) have nothing to do with Arabs in Turkey."

The taken-for-granted foundations of everyday national citizenship in Turkey lead this respondent to label Syrians as people who have run away from their homeland without fighting for it. References to the history of the Turks, particularly a militaristic nationhood, enable this ethnic Arab respondent to justify not only excluding Syrian refugees from Turkish nationhood, but also including ethnic others, including himself. Once again, Syrian refugees who are regarded as 'vulnerable' are not blamed for fleeing whereas young men are not included in this vulnerable category despite their refugee status. Moreover, this can activate and mobilize further stigmatization, such being carefree, feckless, or a pleasure-seeker as exemplified by Respondent 41 above.

A similar justification became visible during the interview with Respondent 3 (male, 53, Kurd, a bakery house owner):

> "They (Syrians) should go and fight! Okay, elderly, young people (referring to children) should stay here (Turkey), but the others shouldn't run away! You have to fight to get somewhere. They left their country, ran away, and came here!"

As the interview continued, it also became clear that he further stigmatized Syrians by referring to Turkey's ongoing military operation. From his perspective, it is incomprehensible why Syrians, particularly able-bodied young men, do not sacrifice themselves for their nation; instead, they chose to travel instead of fighting:

> "I think Syrians will not return unless they are compelled. Our soldiers are dying and being sacrificed in their country, but they are here! Last year, I went to Lake Abant for sightseeing, where I noticed that Syrian families were on holiday. They went for a ride! Why don't they fight, but travel?"

Thus, because these respondents consider defending the motherland as a matter of life and death, the Syrians' daily activities and leisure are illegitimate in the eyes of Turkish people as they are seen undeserving:

> Respondent 18 (male, more than 50, Turk, a small size grocery store owner)
> "Of course, they're fighting with their own nation. Look around, can you see a Turk? Our sons are fighting there, those (Syrians) walk around here! They get their shisha and smoke it in front of their own shop, they are very feckless! You, I... couldn't have done this!"

With reference to Operation Olive Branch, Respondent 18 also touched on the notion of undeserving. While Turkish soldiers are defending their country, which in fact should have been done by Syrians themselves, Syrians' daily activities, such as smoking shisha or running their own businesses disturb Turkish people and trigger discontent with Syrians in Turkey.

Respondent 21 (male, 35, Arab Alawite, house painter) went beyond labelling Syrians as feckless; he mobilized the link between a militarized masculine identity and nationhood by devaluing their dignity:

> "For example, the biggest mistake that they (Syrians) have made is to come to my country, walk around my sea, and sit on my sidewalk while there is an ongoing war in their own country! I do not know... You cannot even have a good conversation in this situation, I mean they shouldn't! Who gave this right to them? 'Go away cowardly chicken!' You sold your country out; you ran away from your country. You have come here, and, in my country, you act as an agha (landowner), you cross your legs in front of me; you chat... Chat but not be rebellious! You rebelled there (Syria), then you ran away... You will run away from here eventually; you will run away from here!"

He took his argument much further by insulting Syrians as a nation just because Syrians have not chosen to resist their enemies by staying and fighting for their motherland. According to Respondent 21, this is very dishonourable:

> "Ok, I have a humanistic approach to the situation, but I cannot stand those kinds of...Shut up, you bastard! Fuck off to your own country and fight there then! Defend your homeland, bastard! Instead of coming and whining here, go there and fight! Let's see how much of a real man are you, aren't you?"

Associating cowardice with fleeing the battle is unsurprising. However, what is striking is that the everyday use of such masculine cultural terms does not emerge from nowhere. Instead, historically and socially constructed national repertoires (Lamont, 1992) serve as the taken-for-granted mechanism for everyday nationhood (Fox, 2017) and as a boundary marker when combined with a given situational context (Bonikowski, 2016).

6.4.2 Reinforcing national identity boundary-drawing through symbolic markers

> "Neither in Arabic, nor in Kurdish! I want everything to be in Turkish. It should be like this in every part of Turkey. Only one language and only one flag!"
>
> Respondent 4 (male, 52, Arab Alawite, farmer)

What does this comment tell us about understandings of everyday nationhood and citizenship? How do language and flag appear as symbolic markers of national identity boundary-drawing in a given context? They are clearly crucial symbolic elements of creating the notion of national

membership since it is directly linked with how we identify ourselves and others. Besides, both play a prominent role in developing the sense of 'belonging' and 'unbelonging' to a national community. Feeling attached to one's national identity through language and flag can become a boundary marker when they are deployed as the taken-for-granted expression of national belonging in everyday practice. As Respondent 4 shows, opinions and feelings about everyday exposure to Arabic and seeing signboards in Arabic (mostly shop signboards) form two interwoven national elements that resonate with national unity. Both language and flag are understood as indispensable elements of Turkish national unity. The latter is associated with territorial integrity whereas the former is addressed in the context of everyday identity politics. For instance, Respondent 23 (male, 54, Arab Alawite, a Kebab house owner) referred to the Turkish flag as a symbolic marker of territorial integrity by stressing the vital importance of self-sacrifice for nation and flag:

> "I do not want it. Some of them were granted (citizenship). I am against and if you ask me why: because they should go back to their own homeland! I mean what are they doing here? What is a traitor doing here among us? Those who have come to here are all traitors! We can die for our flag. What are they sacrificing? Nothing!"

In the case of Respondent 22 (male, 47, Arab Alawite, a metal products shop owner/pawnbroker), the national language was portrayed as one of core elements of national unity and accompanied by loyalty to the Turkish flag:

> Interviewer: "How do feel when you see signboards in Arabic?"
> Respondent: "We do not like it; we do not want them. Write properly! You are in Turkey."
> Interviewer: "You do not want Arabic signboards because you do not understand?"
> Respondent: "No, this is the Republic of Turkey, this is not the Republic of Syria! Look, I am Syrian. But here is not the Republic of Syria; here is Republic of Turkey. Did you (Syrians) come here? Do you eat your bread here? Either you serve this flag (Turkish

> flag); you speak the language of this country, and you will get accustomed to the manners and customs of this country or you will go! It is that simple."

This interviewee disapproves of signboards that are not in Turkish because of a strong belief that you should embrace in every possible the essential components of the national identity of a country that enables you to earn a living despite not being a citizen. Such a narration has two reasons. First, running Syrian businesses with shop signs in Turkish is mostly identified with serving the Turkish flag, meaning respecting the national unity of the country that hosts you. Second, although this respondent (like many others in this study) was originally from Syria and ethnically Arab, his strong attachment to a Turkish identity undermines other sources of identity, such as ethnicity. Respondent 25 (male, 35, Arab Alawite, an irrigation products shop owner) made a very similar argument:

> Respondent 25: "We have been transformed into a little Iraq."
> Interviewer: "Does this situation bother you?"
> Respondent 25: "Sure. We are Turkish indeed together with Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Alawites; we are under a single flag."

Hearing Arabic in streets and seeing Arabic signboards made the interviewee think that the city's national façade was changing, which could potentially threaten the essential constituents of Turkey's national unity. Through the example of 'Little Iraq', he clearly expressed his displeasure with the presence of Arabic signboards. Moreover, he acknowledged Turkey's ethnic and religious heterogeneity by referring to his own ethnic background. However, the respondent explicitly underlined the uniquely unifying power of the national language that unifies all people under the Turkish flag, regardless of ethnicity and/or religious sect. This is not unexpected given the historical background of the formulation of Turkish national citizenship. Many respondents deployed the Arabic signboards as a source of everyday nationhood and national identity boundary-drawing because it signals the sense of both who

belongs and who does not belong. This became evident in an interview with Respondent 11 (male, 55, Arab Alawite, a vehicle repair shop owner):

> "I mean, this is something which seems very odd to me. I mean this state... A Syrian state is established within our state and they write their own script. You cannot own this country! It is wrong that you write your signboard in Arabic and hang it up! I see an ugly image; I do not see a beautiful image. It is not a nice image, at least for me."

This comment once again shows how some respondents associate Arabic signboards with territorial integrity. Among others, Respondent 11 equated opening workplaces with signboards in Arabic to territorializing parts of Turkey by Syrians. Respondent 36 (male, 27, Kurd, janitor) shared this discontent more cynically by calling neighbourhoods mostly populated by Syrians as 'autonomous regions':

> "I feel like I was in another country. To be honest, those guys (Syrians) start their business in places that we (Turkish people) cannot afford. There is an 'Aleppo Castle' next to the subway, they sell döner kebab and so on. We already gave that place to them as an autonomous region."

The existence of Syrians in daily business life in specific areas of Adana causes resentment among the host community members, which then triggers further concerns regarding national unity. Yet, vacillation of the language of everyday life between Turkish and Arabic is spelled out differently regarding such concerns. Respondent 11 resisted the use of Arabic in everyday life because he strongly believed that Syrians aspired to dominate certain neighbourhoods via signboards. In contrast, Respondent 36 tacitly acknowledged the presence of Arabic in daily life. Respondent 41 (male, 24, Kurd, cashier at wholesale market), however, went a step further by saying that the wide use of Arabic in daily life might jeopardize the future existence of the Turkish nation:

> Interviewer: "Do you often hear Arabic in your daily life?"

> Respondent 11: “Generally yes.”
>
> Interviewer: “How do you feel about it?”
>
> Respondent: “To be fair, it pisses me off. One of our clients came recently. He insisted on speaking in Arabic. (S)he also speaks Turkish. Why should we speak Arabic while there is Turkish? (S)he looks down at me just because I do not know Arabic.”
>
> Interviewer: “Signboards in Arabic?”
>
> Respondent: “Exactly. That makes no sense...You (Turkey) should not let them do so! If they make a signboard today, they will do something else tomorrow. In fact, they are capturing you slowly.”

Incomprehension of Arabic is one of reasons why interviewees were against having signboards in Arabic. Nevertheless, the level of incomprehension goes hand in hand with how the common sense of ‘we’ is constructed, whether consciously or unconsciously:

> Respondent 6 (male, 44, Arab Alawite, a shoe-making company owner):
> “Arabic signboards are not nice. I do not understand what those signboards say. I am against having signboards in a language that I do not understand. I am a Turkish citizen and I live in Turkish territory; that’s why I would like to read in Turkish.”

This shows us how the national language is employed as the taken-for-granted foundation of everyday nationhood, mobilized as a core part of national citizenship, and how the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is deepened. Being able to understand the language used for signboards is very important, but still insufficient to accept Syrians in daily life as part of the Turkish community as they do not comply with the national characteristics that the respondents attribute to the Turkish nation and national identity:

> Respondent 16 (male, 50, Arab Alawite, a construction company owner)
> “If 90 percent of this country’s population is Turkish, if we are Turkish, why is it so? I should first understand what is written above, then write whatever you write in Arabic, refer to whomever you want. I mean... For example, how will I know that it is not written that here is our liaison office? It might not be saying kebab house but meeting point;

> how will I know? Write first in Turkish, then Arabic! As you know, it is the same in England. It is true in every form of life but as I say, you write in Arabic in the country where 99 percent of the population is Turkish."

Strikingly enough, the wide use of Arabic signboards is also linked with ingratitude. From the perspective of Respondent 9 (male, 25, Turk, coil-winding technician), Syrians are not thankful to Turkey even though the Turkish state has granted them many rights. The logic behind such an argument is that persisting with extensive use of Arabic signboards reflects disrespect to Turkish nationhood and national identity:

> "This situation makes me very uncomfortable, for example. Sometimes, we happen to pass there. We pass through there, as you said, there are no signboards in Turkish. We hear that they (Syrians) do not shelter Turkish people there. You have come here, my state has given you good opportunities, it does not tax you... You have come here, forgive me for his saying but it is like... Don't shit where you eat!"

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the criteria that ordinary citizens tend to use to construct their everyday understanding of citizenship and national belonging. It investigates how these criteria are intersubjectively mobilized to appear as a form of separation driving Turkish citizens to engage in national identity boundary-drawing. This chapter was mostly concerned with the use of cultural repertoires of everyday nationhood and citizenship in boundary-drawing from perspective of ordinary citizens. Acknowledging the role of cultural repertoires in boundary-drawing, this chapter analysed how these citizens deploy historically rooted national identity constructions (militaristic, unitary) and symbols (language, flag), and how such constructions let national identity boundary-drawing emerge in relation to who deserves citizenship and who belongs.

By adopting a 'breaching' strategy, I demonstrated that historical factors play a crucial role in understanding the link between narratives of everyday nationhood and citizenship and national

identity boundary-drawing in Turkey. Ordinary members of Turkey regard citizenship as not only an institution but also a significant indicator of their political unity, from which their understanding of fellow citizen originates. Accordingly, respondents engaged with two separate but interrelated boundary-drawing mechanisms: (1) stigmatizing via an everyday militaristic nationhood narrative (i.e. Syrians as untrustworthy, traitorous, cowardly, and feckless); and (2) reinforcing national boundaries through symbolic markers (language and flag). By referring to the country's historical context, military past and present, the daily use of Turkish language, and strong attachment to the Turkish flag, the interviewees revealed how national identity and citizenship emerge as interwoven concepts based on how they unconsciously mobilized their everyday understandings of nationhood and citizenship. The mobilization of such cultural repertoires informs us about how 'national citizenship' emerges as a boundary marker between Turkish nationals and Syrians refugees. This is the case especially as citizenship is regarded as the continuum of national existence, coupled with further stigmatizations of Syrians as *'traitorous'*, *'untrustworthy'*, and *'feckless*'. Syrians' positionality in relation to the ongoing civil war in their country of origin does not correspond to the understandings of ordinary Turkish people's national citizenship. Therefore, the interviewees, in their narratives, link such constructions and symbols of citizenship with historical and current political contexts. On the one hand, my data shows how respondents conceive of nationhood and citizenship is characterized by uniformity unlike the existing studies (see Strømsø, 2018). On the other hand, I found that the narratives of Syrian refugees in relation to everyday constructions of nationhood and citizenship vary, which ends up creating boundaries. In other words, constructions of militaristic nationhood constrain the respondents' narratives regarding Syrian young men while remaining inclusionary for Syrian women, children, and the elderly on the grounds that they are not expected to fight. A similar argument holds for language. Those who are willing to speak Turkish are included whereas those who insist on Arabic are not. Such a militaristic vision

of nationality also highlights complete agreement on the contributions of Turkey's ethnic minorities. The interviewees repeatedly emphasized that Turkey exists today because of its glorious past, achieved through the contributions of everyone living in the country, regardless of ethnicity, race, or religion. Although I should note that my sample overrepresented by Turkey's minority groups, it is striking that their conceptions of Turkish citizenship and nationhood were so uniform. Overall, this chapter has contributed to scholarship on boundary-drawing by analysing how citizenship and national identity are made explicit in everyday practices and mediated through cultural repertoires (specifically, the concept of national citizenship, Turkey's identity politics, and the country's military past and present).

7. Conclusions

The civil war in Syria has created the biggest and worst humanitarian crisis of our time. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, the majority of Syrian citizens faced a decision to move to near destinations. Since Turkey has been one of hot spot countries, along with Jordan and Lebanon, the number of Syrian refugees there has dramatically increased over the years. Given a large proportion of working age Syrians in Turkey, the majority actively participates in Turkey's labour market, particularly the informal market economy. Despite a growing attention to the Syrian refugees' working conditions across various economic sectors in Turkey (see Kirişçi, 2014; Korkmaz, 2017; Pinedo Caro, 2020; Şenses, 2016), many unexamined questions remain regarding how workplace interactions take place in everyday work life, in which ways they contribute to the constructions of similarities and differences between workplace actors, and how such constructions enable and constrain narratives of members of the host society towards the refugee population. This is the discussion in which I want to partake. By employing the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey, this study has explored how boundaries are drawn, mobilized, negotiated, and contested in multiple forms by Turkish employers and employees towards Syrian refugees in the labour-intensive economic sectors in Turkey's informal market economy.

Taking 'boundary work' as an analytical and conceptual tool, this research has examined employers' and employees' views on the meaning of work, work ethic, responsibility, loyalty, division of labour, workplace employment conditions, the perception of allocation of social rights, citizenship, and nationhood in the context of the Syrian refugee influx in the everyday work life. Inspired by cultural sociology (Lamont 1992, 2000; Lamont et al. 2016) and pragmatic sociology (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 2006), I have looked at various standards of evaluation (e.g. morality, socioeconomic standing, institutional frames, and national

repertoires) to examine different dimensions of boundary-drawing. Acknowledging the relationship between the context of justification and boundary work, this research has engaged with four different boundary-drawing logics: *moral, socioeconomic, institutional,* and *national identity* dimensions of boundary work. This research's empirical contribution to boundary work literature relies on four components: analysing *perspectives of the host society* towards *the refugee population,* with its specific focus on *the informal market economy,* in *a new immigration country*. Incorporating these four components into researching multidimensional strategies of boundary-drawing, I create a novel research puzzle, focusing on the perspectives of employers and employees towards Syrian refugees in everyday work life, to show the construction of 'insider' and 'outsider' status is multidimensional, multi-layered, and depends on the sociopolitical, socioeconomic, sociocultural, and institutional context in which varying forms of justifications are (re)produced. Therefore, this study offers an original analysis of symbolic and social boundaries in everyday informal work life at the micro level while taking into account the meso-level elements (historical and institutional elements) within a national context.

7.1. Researching Multidimensional Strategies of Boundary-drawing towards Refugees in the Context of Informal Market Economy

This study acknowledges that the ways in which boundaries are drawn, mobilized, negotiated, and contested by social actors are not mutually exclusive from the context (e.g. structural conditions, institutional frames, and cultural repertoires) at which boundaries originate. Relatedly, this study also reveals that socioeconomic, sociocultural, sociopolitical and institutional background factors enable and constrain the host society's narratives of Syrian refugees which activates the introduction of different logics and patterns of boundary-drawing. Recognizing the role of historical, institutional, and structural meso-level elements in shaping micro-narratives, class, race, or ethnicity remain insufficient to explain diverse patterns of

boundary-drawing in this study. Indeed, my analytical framework accounts for four different boundary-drawing patterns which are highly dependent on how members of the host society position themselves towards Syrian refugees in a given situational context.

The moral dimension of boundary-drawing

The Turkish employers I interviewed viewed Syrians as '(potential) workers' who not only desperately need jobs, but also remedy labour shortages and demand less remuneration than Turkish employees. The participants primarily used morality as a justification strategy to distinguish between 'worthy' and 'less worthy' employees. However, employers distinctively (re)constructed their attachment to morality in the workplace at different stages of employment: during the hiring process and then during employment itself. During hiring processes, employers drew boundaries around a moral 'self' which allowed them to use morality as a veiling strategy to justify *what* motivates them to employ Syrians. The first way how employers rationalized their actions was to link local labour market dynamics with moral aspect of hiring (e.g. Syrian workers are less demanding than Turkish workers, Turkish people disdain but Syrians praise labour-intensive jobs). Undeniably, structural conditions in the local informal labour market economy (e.g. Syrians' willingness to work for lower wages without asking for social security premiums) play a key role in motivating employers to hire Syrians; however, their main justification for employing Syrians drew upon moral reasoning rather than an explicit reference to the functional relationship. The second way of rationalization centred on moral obligations as a part of human duty which accounted for feeling morally responsible for helping poor and needy people. In contrast to hiring, employers drew boundaries around 'moral employees' after having different kinds of work experiences. They emphasized moral codes such as work ethic, work discipline, loyalty and honesty only as a result of work experiences although such norms were not their primary concern during hiring processes. Yet, Syrian workers' undesired behaviour at work did not necessarily discourage employers from

hiring/firing Syrians due to their economic interests. This means that the tone of moral boundary-drawing is negotiable when the issue comes the functional relationship. As I have shown in Chapter 3, morality is used as a functional argument by employers, that's why, attribution to employers' understanding of morality is different in the hiring process from employment itself.

The socioeconomic dimension of boundary-drawing

In contrast to employers, the Turkish employees I interviewed primarily mobilized socio-economic dimension of boundary-drawing. As shown in Chapter 4, this is the case because structural conditions (i.e. economic concerns about job opportunities and employment conditions) dominated employees' agendas while morality, race, ethnicity, and other social structures were less salient. Therefore, Syrians were regarded not only as a desperately needy group, but also a newly arrived group of people who threaten the socioeconomic well-being of Turkish employees in both their city and the country. The perception of Syrians' willingness to work for lower wages without asking for social security premiums also drove the Turkish employees to view Syrians as 'workplace peers' competing for the same jobs but under different conditions given that both groups seek employment in the same economic sectors while making different demands. The fact that Syrian workers demand less than their Turkish peers appeared as a way of establishing Turkish workers' worth over their Syrian peers. The Turkish workers employed socioeconomic mechanisms to distinguish themselves from their Syrians peers by portraying differences in both groups' demands from employers and employment conditions, such as the wage gap, the informal employment of Syrians, the division of labour at work and so forth. In doing so, Turkish employees distinctively positioned themselves from their Syrian peers. By mobilizing a socioeconomic reasoning, attribution to 'a worthy employee' was used in the context of employees' social position at work in order to maintain Turkish employees' dignified status over Syrian refugees. By explicitly referring to differences in both regarded and

assigned roles, and workplace employment conditions between both groups, Turkish employees established local status hierarchy over Syrian peers in workplaces as a way of differentiation. This differentiation was activated by labelling Syrians as 'unequal peers'.

The institutional dimension of boundary-drawing

Institutional frameworks greatly account for the emergence of social boundaries as they manifest in unequal access to and unequal distribution of sources, as my analysis in Chapter 5 elaborated. As differential healthcare policies manifested as a form of social difference between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees, the unequal access to healthcare constrained the host society members' narratives on Syrian refugees. Since the unequal access to healthcare drove the host society members to define institutionalized worthiness between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees, thus automatically changing the way Syrian are viewed. Accordingly, Syrians were categorized as 'foreigners' who are more privileged than Turkish citizens regarding the access to healthcare in Turkey. Differential healthcare policies, instituted by the state, is powerful enough to reinforce boundary-drawing which drove social actors to engage with multiple sides of the same coin by deploying different individual evaluations and justifications (e.g. cutting the queue for healthcare, being an economic burden, not contributing to the society, and threatening the social fabric) at the intersubjective level even though reasoning is based upon the same institutional framework. Beyond shaping the host society's perspective towards Syrians, these well-accepted narratives contributed to how Turkish citizens perceived Syrian refugees' welfare deservingness on the basis of who is contributing more to national well-being and who deserves more benefits.

The national identity dimension of boundary-drawing

In Chapter 6, I added new dimensions of complexity to the argument by introducing a new form of division: national identity boundary-drawing. By asking the participants' views on granting

Turkish citizenship to Syrians, Operation Olive Branch, and seeing Arabic signboards in daily life, the national identity dimension of boundary-drawing was captured and explained with a specific focus on ordinary citizens' use of the cultural repertoires of everyday nationhood and citizenship. Interviews revealed that ordinary citizens of Turkey viewed citizenship as not only an institution but also a significant indicator of their political unity, from which their understanding of the fellow citizen originates. Accordingly, the national identity dimension of boundary work was deployed by mobilizing historically rooted national identity constructions (militaristic, unitary) and symbols (language, flag) to demarcate who belongs and deserves citizenship and who does not. Explicit references to the country's historical context, military past and present, the daily use of the Turkish language, and a strong attachment to the Turkish flag made clear *why* Syrian refugees are not eligible for Turkish national citizenship. Since citizenship was understood as the continuum of national existence, the way Turkish citizens constructed their everyday understandings of citizenship and national belonging were built upon national differences between Syria and Turkey and these constructions were mediated through cultural repertoires.

In summary, by focusing on the moral, socio-economic, institutional, and national identity dimensions of boundary work, this study has shown that Syrian refugees in Turkey's informal market economy are categorized as 'outsiders' in three different ways: *workers, peers,* and *foreign nationals.* Despite many having a minority background in Turkey, both employers and employees primarily adhered to their Turkish citizenship status in order to legitimize their 'insider' position over Syrians. This citizenship status is coupled with workplace-related identifiers which consolidate not only the interviewees' insider positionality but also Syrian refugees' outsider position (i.e. in addition to Turkish national, insider/employer, insider/employee - outsider/worker/peer as well as foreign national). By examining Turkish employers' and employees' perspectives towards Syrian refugees in the informal market

economy in the context of a new immigration country, I contribute to cultural and pragmatic sociology in the context of refugee studies by (1) documenting constructions of 'insider' and 'outsider' status towards refugees in the informal market economy through the lens of dominant group members; (2) analysing inductively which justification strategies Turkish citizens employ and mobilize to establish their worth over Syrian refugees in everyday work life; (3) providing evidence on the role of historical, institutional, and structural meso-level elements in shaping micro-narratives; and (4) demonstrating multiple forms of manifesting boundaries which can be made and remade over time towards outsiders by the social actors in a given situational context.

7.2. Contributions to the Literature

In light of these findings, I elaborate on the theoretical and empirical contributions of this research in general, and of each empirical chapter in particular. The primary empirical contribution of this study is its geographical focus. By bringing the case of Turkey to the table, it substantially widens the geographical scope of the boundary work literature beyond its previous focus on North America and Western Europe (see Lamont et al., 2016 for an exception analysing Brazilian and Israeli cases). A specific focus on Turkey, as a new immigration country (Şanlıer Yüksel, İçduygu and Millet, 2019), further brings a new empirical perspective to studies on boundaries given the scarcity of research in countries and/or regions with recent immigration (Bail, 2008). The current scholarship on boundary work has so far mostly focused on traditional immigration countries that are economically developed and also, less likely to strongly attach to militaristic ideas of nationhood. These studies attempt to explain how boundaries are drawn, blurred, and crossed by analysing the role of the social class, ethnicity, race, religion, language, gender, nation, culture, and so on. By focusing on Turkey, I shed light on three empirically understudied geographical components of boundary-drawing literature: (1) a specific focus on an economically less developed country where economic inequality sharply

rises among its own citizens ; (2) a particular attention to a country context in which attachment to militaristic nationhood and national identity are very strong; and (3) a greater emphasis on a new immigrant destination country that has recently exposed to an unprecedented influx of refugees. By decentring the geographical focus of the research in boundary-drawing, this study contributes to the existing literature by showing the importance of historical (everyday nationhood, national identity), institutional (differential healthcare policies), and structural (the informal labour market, widespread informal employment, growing economic inequality etc.) meso-level elements in shaping micro-narratives which allows individuals not only mobilize the existing repertoires such as the Turkish War of Independence, but also create and circulate their own repertoires such as the local labour market repertoire as illustrated in Chapter 3 and 4. This, in contrast to the previous scholarship, shows us that workplace relationships/interactions and the institutional context of rights and citizenship can be more powerful than ethnicity, race, social class, religion to dominate perspectives of host society members in boundary-making process. Relatedly, this study also contributes to another neglected aspect of the boundary literature as the case of Turkey allows an explicit focus on refugees (see Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019a). Given that Turkey hosts the largest refugee population across the world, this study presents a different empirical approach to the study of Syrian refugees by introducing the concept of boundaries because Turkey linguistically, ethnically, and to some extent culturally differs from other neighbouring countries in the region that host most Syrian refugee population such as Lebanon and Jordan. However, this study documents that 'insider' and outsider' status towards forced migrants are not constructed on the basis of differences in language, culture, ethnicity even though they are readily available cultural sources for the participants of this study. On the contrary, a more complex and multiple way of boundary-drawing is deployed by individuals that drive them to engage in a morally-, institutionally-, socio-economically- and socio-politically-relevant

context in which varying forms of justifications are produced and reproduced, instead of relying on a fixed categorisation to define ‘us’ and ‘them’. Furthermore, this research showcases on the narratives of a dominant group (the host society) whereas most studies on boundary work in migration studies have examined the narratives of immigrant groups (see Çelik, 2017; Simonsen, 2018; Vandevoordt and Verschraegen, 2019a, 2019b). This research’s focus on the narratives and perspectives of Turkish citizens also informs us on the ways in which cultural repertoires affect and shape boundaries. The last general contribution of this study comes from its specific focus on the informal market economy. In doing so, this study illuminates how boundaries are drawn in the labour-intensive economic sectors of the informal market economy which is underexplored in the field of not only cultural sociology, but also refugee studies. Despite growing attention in recent years, the existing literature on the nexus between forced migration and employment, especially in the context of informality, is still in its early ages (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013). Hence, these studies’ analytical scope is quite limited as they primarily investigate and explain either the impacts of forced migration on host countries’ economies or the ways in which forced migrants can contribute to the economic well-being of countries of first receptions. Thus, investigating workplace interactions in the informal market economy between host society members and refugees offers a novel and strategic research site for not only cultural sociology and refugee studies, but also sociology of work by giving close and explicit attention to the role of meaning-making elements and its dynamics in boundary-drawing in everyday informal work life. By doing so, this research illuminates that when host society members need to construct their identities, justify their actions and practices towards refugees in everyday work life, they consciously or unconsciously rely on everyday work life-related cultural resources (e.g., work ethic, discipline, trustworthiness, integrity, cheapness discourse etc.) which goes hand in hand structural factors in the labour market (e.g., cheap labour force, work experiences, competition for jobs in labour-intensive sectors etc.) This kind

of meaning-making process in simultaneous multiple contexts brings a fresh impetus to analyse the nexus between forced migration and (in)formal employment.

In addition to presenting these general novel aspects of this thesis to the literature, I will reflect on each empirical chapter's specific theoretical and conceptual contributions in the following part.

Chapter 3 identifies gaps in the morality and boundary-drawing literature in three ways. First, the context of moral boundary work moves beyond the common focus on employees' perspectives (see Purser 2009; Sherman 2005) by taking into account employers' perspectives. Second, this chapter brings together two theoretical strands, the sociology of evaluation (justification strategies) (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 2006; Tilly, 2006) and moral boundary-drawing (Lamont 1992, 2000; Sanghera, 2016; Sayer, 2005), by analysing how the same social actors intersubjectively use moral tools at different stages of employment: during the hiring process and then during employment itself. In doing so, this chapter suggests that the ways moral boundaries are drawn exclusively depends on the context in which moral justifications are (re)produced. Third, this chapter provides new insights into the link between employers' elevated moral expectations (e.g. deference and gratefulness) and structural factors which creates a local labour market repertoire that routinely feeds into poor working conditions and workplace specific expectations from Syrian workers in the everyday informal market economy.

To continue, ***Chapter 4*** extends the existing scope of the boundary-drawing literature with its specific focus on the role of socioeconomic justification strategies by bringing employees' perspectives to the table. This chapter's key contribution to the 'inequality' and 'boundary-drawing' literatures is to draw attention to the importance of structural factors in the emergence of socioeconomic justifications that can manifest as a boundary-drawing strategy. This way I

show that ‘strategies of self’ (Sherman, 2005) do not always stem from rigid ’mental maps' (Lamont, 2000), but can also be produced and reproduced as a result of other structural factors which may put not only outsiders but also insiders at a disadvantage. Concurrently, this disadvantage can feed into the normalization and routinization of inequality in terms of peer relations at work as a result of the struggle over maintaining insider actors’ dignified status over outsider actors.

Chapter 5 addresses another insufficiently explored dimension of boundary work, its ‘institutional frameworks’. It explores the role of perceptions of allocated social rights (i.e. differential healthcare policies) in the emergence of social boundaries and, consequently, the role of social boundaries in reinforcing symbolic boundaries. This chapter’s theoretical and methodological contribution can be summarized in two ways. First, this chapter contributes to the literature on social and symbolic boundaries by indicating that unequal access to, and the unequal distribution of social rights creates a category of institutionalized worthiness between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees in terms of the access to healthcare which reinforces boundary work. Second, there is a lack of research on ‘how and in which context welfare deservingness judgements are made’ (Kremer 2016; Laenen et al. 2019; Osipovič, 2015) whereas there has been growing attention to the perceived deservingness of beneficiaries of welfare support (van Oorschot, 2000; Petersen, et al. 2010; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013). In this regard, this chapter extends our knowledge of how differential healthcare policies influence variations in host society members’ perceptions of welfare deservingness.

Chapter 6 focuses on cultural repertoires and conceptions of citizenship as well as on citizenship another lens to view boundary-drawing by Turkish citizens against Syrian refugees. By employing the concept of national identity boundary-drawing, the theoretical contribution

of this chapter is two-fold. First, it contributes to the boundary work literature by analysing the ways in which the conception of citizenship and national belonging appear as a form of boundary in the course of everyday lives in a new immigration country which is characterized by strong patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. This brings me the second contribution of this chapter. In contrast to most studies which focus on Western Europe and North America (see DiTomaso, 2013; Lamont, 1992, 2000; Simonsen, 2016; Trittler 2017, 2019; Waters, 1999), this chapter introduces a different boundary-drawing mechanism based upon citizens' widespread adherence to a militarized sense of nationhood that is related more to other ideas of belonging than to ethnicity. Therefore, this chapter also accounts for the role of historically rooted national identity constructions (militaristic, unitary) and symbols (language, flag) in 'national identity boundary-drawing' (Simonsen, 2016) against 'outsiders' which evokes various notions of nationhood in everyday life.

7.3. Venues for Further Research

Acknowledging that research on boundary work has often been limited by contextual and geographical borders, more research on the multidimensional strategies of boundary-drawing beyond North America and Western Europe is needed to amplify the findings of my research. Thus, a certain number of issues remain to be addressed theoretically, conceptually, and empirically in the boundary-drawing literature.

Perspectives of Syrian workers: My findings capture only one side of boundary-drawing, which emphasizes the narratives of the host society (i.e. Turkish employers and employees). Given that boundary work is a bilateral process (i.e. it is not only about how we identify 'ourselves', but also 'others'), it is crucial to examine on the basis of what Syrian employees construct and activate boundaries towards their Turkish employers and colleagues in labour-intensive economic sectors. The ways in which Syrian refugees are viewed as *'(un)worthy'*

worker, *peer,* and *foreign national* are captured only through the lens of the host society; however, how Syrian refugees view and experience their Turkish employers and peers has remained unanswered.

Variations within and among the host society: This research particularly targeted manual labour sectors such as construction, agriculture and manufacturing which are mainly dominated by male employers and employees. This limited my ability to fully explore the role of gender differences. In line with the gender aspect, another complementary venue for further research would be class analysis. Given growing economic inequality in the Turkish context, a comparative class analysis would provide deeper insights into the role of class in boundary-drawing. For instance, it is possible that Turkish employers' and employees' work experiences with their Syrian workers and/or peers in white-collar jobs might be different from those in blue-collar jobs.

A comparative approach within Turkey: My empirical findings are currently drawn upon a single case study. Analysing how boundary work is performed in workplaces in the informal market economy can go beyond the context of Adana given that labour informality in Turkey is quite common in other provinces as well, such as Gaziantep, Hatay, Mardin, Mersin, and Şanlıurfa. Other common features of these provinces are their highly diverse ethnic composition and hosting a significant number of Syrian refugees. Acknowledging sociodemographic, sociocultural, and socioeconomic diversity across provinces in Turkey, cross-sectoral and cross-regional experiences of Turkish employers and employees with Syrian workers might show a similar or different pattern in terms of boundary work in workplaces. Further research might take into consideration ethnic differences as well by applying such a comparative approach within Turkey.

A comparative approach beyond Turkey: The geographical scope of the boundary work literature is largely limited to the context of North America and Western Europe. Such a narrow geographical focus may result in an accordingly narrow understanding of configurations of groupness across societies. A natural complement to my study would be to look at other similar country contexts such as Lebanon and Jordan; two other major host countries of Syrian refugees within the region. A comparative country analysis would provide an analytical space to examine the role of cultural repertoires in shaping and contesting boundaries more closely.

Informal peer relations: In this research, I looked at informal peer relations in the context of workplaces. Recognizing that the existing literature on boundary-drawing in the context of refugee studies is scarce, one of the possible ways to incorporate boundary work into refugee studies is to extend the current analytical context to other various social settings such as studying informal peer relations between Turkish students and Syrian students in schools and universities. This study demonstrates that boundary work concepts provide a valuable tool to analyse hierarchical and peer relations between the host society members and refugees in the workplace. Future studies should extend this progress to other social settings beyond the workplace.

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Annex

Table 1: The Rate of Unregistered Employment in Regions (among Turkish citizens)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Turkey	% 42,05	% 39,02	% 36,75	% 34,97	% 33,57	% 33,49	% 33,97	% 33,42	% 34,52
Adana (including Mersin)	% 53,42	% 47,52	% 43,97	% 45,71	% 43,31	%41,74	% 39,96	% 38,99	% 39,71

Source: The Republic of Turkey Social Security Institution. http://www.sgk.gov.tr/wps/portal/sgk/tr/calisan/kayitdisi_istihdam/kayitdisi_istihdam_oranlari/kayitdisi_istihdam_orani . Accessed on July 3, 2020.

Table 2: Interviews with Policymakers, Stakeholders and Civil Society Members in Adana

Name	Place of Interview	Date of Interview	Mandate
Support to Life	Adana	11.12.2017	An independent humanitarian organization Primary areas of work: • emergency assistance • refugee support • child protection in seasonal agriculture • capacity building, including vocational training • informing Turkish employers about the work permit regulation and procedure
			The largest nationwide NGO

Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM)	Adana	27.12.2017	UNHCR Turkey implementing partner Primary areas of work: • Providing trainings and services to refugees and asylum seekers to fulfil their primary needs • help them access for fundamental rights and services including psycho-social support and vocational trainings • inform employers about the work permit regulation and procedure for Syrian employees
Small and Medium Industry Development Organization	Adana	29.01.2018	A public institution at the local level Primary areas of work: • responsible for increase the share of Small and Medium Industries and entrepreneurs in economic and social development • no initiative in response to the Syrian refugee influx (at the time of the interview)
	Adana	12.12.2017	A public institution at the local level Initiatives with regards to the Syrian refugee influx: • no separate immigration unit but employment, youth, disabled and

Seyhan District Municipality			social equality units dealing with Syrian refugees' queries as well • taking part in projects for socio-economic well-being of Syrian refugees in collaboration with German Development Agency (GIZ), ASAM and Support to life
Çukurova Development Agency	Adana	26.12.2017	A public institution at the regional level One of primary areas of work: • supporting the effective management of migration (mostly internal migration) and improving human resources capacity
Adana Chamber of Commerce	Adana	11.01.2018	A public institution at the local level Primary areas of work: • supporting the development of local companies and businesses as a local organization of businesses and companies in Adana • -with regards to response to the Syrian refugee influx- Having organized few meetings with Syrian entrepreneurs in Adana
			A public institution at the local level Primary areas of work:

Adana Chamber of Merchants and Craftsman	Adana	21.12.2017	• Providing support to small traders and craftsmen in Adana • No initiative in response to the Syrian refugee influx (at the time of the interview)
Adana Chamber of Industry	Adana	21.12.2017	A public institution at the local level Primary areas of work: • foreign trade promotion • vocational training • regional economic development • general services • -with regards to response to the Syrian refugee influx- Collaborating with International Labour Organization (ILO) and MEKSA (Vocational Training and Small Industry Support Association) for socio-economic integration of refugees
Adana Branch of Directorate General of Migration Management	Adana	15.01.2018	A public institution at the local level Primary areas of work: • implementing national migration policies as the main public authority for migration management in the city • carrying out the operations and processes regarding foreigners'

			entry into, stay in, and exit from Turkey • facilitating the coordination between local actors and respective organisations and institutions as well as between central and local authorities
Shoe-makers' Solidarity Association	Adana	16.01.2018	A local professional association Primary areas of work: • fighting against unfair competition over wages in footwear market • striving for equal pay to Syrian workers in Adana
Mediterranean Exporters' Association	Adana	08.01.2018	An association at the regional level Primary areas of work: • Supporting the increase of exports, organize the professional relations and activities of exporters • No initiative in response to the Syrian refugee influx (at the time of the interview)
Vocational Training and Small Industry Support Association (MEKSA)	Adana	22.12.2017	A public benefit foundation Primary areas of work: • developing and supporting vocational training in Turkey

			• enhancing and strengthening Syrian refugees' employment skills
Adana Chamber of Fashion, Textile and Garment makers	Adana	25.01.2018	A public institution at the local level Primary areas of work: • Supporting development of local businesses and companies in textile sector • No initiative in response to the Syrian refugee influx (at the time of the interview)
Development Workshop Association	Adana	09.01.2018	A non-profit organization Primary areas of work: • promoting the cooperative movement, agriculture, seasonal labour migration and child labour • local development programs and project development • research • capacity building • -with regards to response to the Syrian refugee influx- identifying main problems of Syrian refugees in agriculture sector in Adana and compiling a needs assessment report to the relevant central authorities

Refleks Newspaper	Adana	07.03.2018	the first and only regional economy newspaper • with regards to response to the Syrian refugee influx- making news about Syrian refugees in Adana
Adana Metropolitan Municipality	Adana	02.03.2018	A public institution at the local level Initiatives with regards to the Syrian refugee influx: • establishing a separate migration unit within the municipality • pioneering the Refugee Council Protocol, signed in 2018 between Adana City Council and Adana Metropolitan Municipality • taking part in several projects funded by the UN and the EU

Table 3: Gender and Age Distribution by Employers

Age	Female	Male	Total
>20	0	0	0
21-30	0	2	2
31-40	0	6	6
41-50	3	6	9
51-60	0	11	12
<60	0	2	2

Table 4: Duration of Interviews and Interview Settings with Employers

EMPLOYERS				
Interviewee Code	**Date**	**Duration**	**Place**	**Neighbourhood**
R1	December 8, 2017	Notes taken ~60'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R2	December 8, 2017	Notes taken ~90'	In gatekeeper's house	Yüreğir
R3	December 8, 2017	Notes taken ~65'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R4	December 8, 2017	Notes taken ~35'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R5	January 12, 2018	30'	Workplace	Narlıca
R6	January 27, 2018	Notes taken ~ 55'	Workplace	Büyük Saat
R7	January 5, 2018	28'	On the street	Mirzaçelebi
R8	January 5, 2018	17'	Workplace	Obalar Caddesi
R9	January 5, 2018	18'	Workplace	Obalar Caddesi
R10	January 5, 2018	76'	Workplace	Obalar Caddesi
R11	January 26, 2018	53'	Workplace	Eski Sanayi
R12	January 26, 2018	30'	In gatekeeper's house	Yüreğir
R13	January 12, 2018	47'	Workplace	Narlıca
R14	January 12, 2018	40'	In his own house	Narlıca
R15	January 5, 2018	75'	Workplace	Obalar Caddesi
R16	January 27, 2018	77'	Workplace	Çukurova University Campus
R17	January 27, 2018	20'	Workplace	Küçükdikili
R18	January 5, 2018	30'	Workplace	Mirzaçelebi

R19	February 12, 2018	Notes taken ~ 135'	Workplace	Hürriyet Mahallesi
R20	April 20, 2018	33'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R21	April 20, 2018	44'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R22	April 20, 2018	30'	At cabstand of Yüreğir	Yüreğir
R23	April 20, 2018	41'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R24	April 20, 2018	25'	At minibus Stop of Yamaçlı	Yüreğir
R25	April 20, 2018	22'	Workplace	Eski Sanayi / Yüreğir
R26	May 15, 2018	78'	In her own house	Toros Caddesi
R27	May 17, 2018	Notes taken ~ 40'	Workplace	Meydan
R28	May 17, 2018	Notes taken ~ 40'	In a workplace of one of his customers	Meydan
R29	May 18, 2018	Notes taken ~ 60'	Workplace	Emek
R30	May 18, 2017	Notes taken ~ 40'	Workplace	Reşatbey

Table 5: Gender and Age Distribution by Employees

Age	Female	Male	Total
>20	0	0	0
21-30	1	2	3
31-40	1	8	9
41-50	0	0	0
51-60	2	2	4
<60	1	0	1

Table 6: Duration of Interviews and Interview Settings with Employees

EMPLOYEES				
Interviewee	**Date**	**Duration**	**Place**	**Neighbourhood**
R1	January 5, 2018	60'	Workplace	Obalar Caddesi
R2	January 26, 2018	65'	In his own house (together with his mother)	Yüreğir
R3	January 12, 2018	50'	Workplace	Narlıca
R4	April 20, 2018	41'	In a restaurant (together with R23 employer)	Yüreğir
R5	April 20, 2018	43'	In her own house	Yüreğir
R6	March 3, 2018	50'	Cafe	Gazipaşa Bulvarı
R7	January 12, 2018	30'	Workplace	Narlıca
R8	May 17, 2018	50'	Workplace	Meydan
R9	May 30, 2018	35'	In his own house	Tepebağ
R10	May 30, 2018	30'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R11	May 31, 2018	17'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R12	May 31, 2018	23'	Workplace	Yüreğir
R13	May 31, 2018	25'	Inönü Park	Yeni Metal Sanayi/ Seyhan
R14	May 31, 2018	33'	İnönü Park	Seyhan
R15	May 31, 2018	16'	In his own house	Şakirpaşa
R16	June 1, 2018	42'	Cafe	Eski Sanayi
R17	January 26, 2018	65'	In her house (together with her son)	Yüreğir

Table 7: Duration of Focus Groups and Settings

Focus Groups	Date	Duration	Place	Neighbourhood	Participants
FG1	December 8, 2017	Notes taken ~ 30'	Farm	Yüreğir	3 farmers and a veterinary
FG2	January 5, 2018	40'	Health Cabinet	Obalar Caddesi	an owner of health cabinet, a nurse, an upholsterer and a dentist
FG3	April 20, 2018	32'	Minibus Stop of Yamaçlı	Yüreğir	5-6 minibus drivers and a farmer

Table 8: Interviews with Employers

Interview Code	Gender	Age	Marital Status	Level of Education	Ethno-cultural / Ethno-religious background	Origin City	Occupational Category	Experience in the sector	Number of Syrians employed by employer
R1	Male	52	Married	High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Farmer	Employer for 30 years	2 Syrians are currently working
R2	Male	25	Engaged	High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Coffee House Owner	Employer for 5 years	None
R3	Male	53	Married	Primary School	Kurd	Ağrı	Owner of a Bakery	Employer for 43 years	Around 4-5 Syrians are working
R4	Male	52	Married	Secondary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Farmer	Employer for 30 years	All employees are Syrians
R5	Male	71	Married	Secondary School	Turk	Adana	Iron master	Employer for more than 30 years	Used to employ a Syrian employee, but fired
R6	Male	44	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Shoemaker	Employer for 30 years	At least around 20 Syrians are working
R7	Male	52	Married	High School	Zaza	Elazığ	Owner of Wrapping paper company	He closed down his workplace a year ago	None

								due to economic reasons.	
R8	Male	30	Single	High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Barber	Employer for 2-3 years	Used to employ a Syrian employee, but fired
R9	Male	53	Married	Primary School	Turk	Adana	Owner of a furniture workshop	In the sector for 43 years	One Syrian is currently working
R10	Male	50	Single (divorced)	Secondary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of a health cabinet		Used to employ a Syrian employee, but fired
R11	Male	55	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of vehicle repair shop	In the sector for 53 years and employer for 28 years	Used to employ 3 Syrians, but they quitted the job
R12	Female	44	Married	Vocational High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of a driller company	In the sector for 20 years with her husband	All workers were Syrians, but she shut down her business.
R13	Male	34	Single	Secondary School	Turk	Adana	Owner of a furniture workshop	Employer for 10 years	Used to employ Syrians, but not anymore
R14	Male	51	Married	Drop out of secondary school	Arab Alawite	Hatay	Stallholder	Employer for 31 years	Almost all workers are Syrians

R15	Male	50	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of an upholstery shop		One Syrian is currently working
R16	Male	50	Married	High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of a construction company	In the sector for 30 years and employer for 15 years	At least 10 Syrians are currently working
R17	Male	35	Married	Primary School	Kurd	Muş	Hardware shop owner	Employer for 20 years	One Syrian is currently working
R18	Male	More than 50	Married	Primary School	Turk	Adana	Small size grocery store owner		None
R19	Male	54	Married	Primary School	Turk	Malatya	Owner of a medium sized textile mill	Employer for 32 years	At least 15 Syrians are currently working
R20	Male	57	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Taxi-driver	Worked as public bus driver for 15 years and as taxi driver for the last 6 years	None
R21	Male	35	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	House painter	Employers for 20 years	Used to employ Syrians
R22	Male	47	Married	High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of metal products shop / pawnbroker	Employer for 20 years	2 Syrians are currently working

R23	Male	54	Married		Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of döner restaurant	Employer for 20 years	Used to employ a Syrian but fired
R24	Male	over 60	Married	-		Adana	Farmer	-	None
R25	Male	35	Married	High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Owner of irrigation products store	Employer for 6 years	2 Syrians are currently working
R26	Female	44	Single (divorced)	University (Agricultural Engineering)	Turk	Adana	Owner of a farm (horticulture)	For long years (family profession)	1 Syrian family is currently working.
R27	Male	40	Married	Primary School	Turk	Adana	Dairy Farmer	Employer for 10 years	1 Syrian family is currently working.
R28	Male	43	Married	High School	Turk	Adana	Food wholesaler	Employer for 2.5 years	None
R29	Male	34	Married	Secondary School	Arab	Mardin	Owner of a medium-sized paper cutting company	Employer for 10 years, but his father in the sector for 49 years (family profession)	1 Syrian family is currently working.
R30	Female	Btw. 30-40	Married	University	Turk	Adana	Human Resources Director at a large-sized construction company	-	None

Table 9: Interviews with Employees

Interview Code	Gender	Age	Marital Status	Level of Education	Ethno-cultural / ethno-religious Background	Origin City	Occupational Category	Working experience with Syrians
R1	Female	58	Married	University	Turk	Adana	Nurse	Yes
R2	Male	35	Married	High School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Welder	Yes
R3	Male	Between 35-45	Married	-	Turk	Adana	Cabinet Worker	Yes
R4	Male	59	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Retired	No
R5	Female	40	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Cleaner at Yüreğir Municipality	Yes but indirectly
R6	Male	27	Married		Kurd		Janitor	Yes
R7	Male	Between 30-40		-	Turk	Adana	Forger	Yes
R8	Female	25	Single	University	Turk	Adana	Dentist	Yes
R9	Male	25	Single	High School	Turk	Adana	Coil winding technician in a generator factory	Yes
R10	Female	51	Married	Primary School	Arab Alawite	Adana	Pastry seller	In the past yes, but now not

R11	Male	24	Single	Drop out from High School	Kurd	Adıyaman	Cashier at wholesale market	In the past yes, but now not
R12	Male	23	Single	High School	Kurd – Urfa Arab?	Şanlıurfa	Air-conditioner technician	Yes
R13	Male	23	Single	Upper Secondary Education	Turk	Manisa	Employee at Metal Factory	Yes, while working in the textile sector
R14	Male	29-30	Single	Drop out from University	Arab Alawite	Hatay	Unemployed for 2 weeks	Yes
R15	Male	25-26	Single	Open Education Faculty	Arab Alawite	Adana	Driver at a private rent a car company at the airport	Yes, but indirectly
R16	Male	57	Married	Primary School	Turk	Adıyaman	Oto	In the past, yes
R17	Female	Over 60	Married	-	Arab Alawite	Adana	Retired	none

Table 10: The Content of Codes

Main Code	Sub Code	Number of Sources	Number of References
Dimensions of Boundary-drawing			
Moral Dimensions	lack of work discipline	14	18
	disloyalty	7	10
	hardworking vs laid back	9	9
	more lax living and working conditions back in Syria	9	11
	Syrians' way of living Islam (negative)	11	25
	feeling sorry for Syrians	24	44
	showing mercy	18	24
	Syrians' way of living Islam (positive)	9	12
	social aids make Turkish people lazy	5	6

Socio-economic Dimensions	cheap labour force	25	47
	competition	23	47
	Syrians do dirty jobs	4	4
	labour shortage	19	23
	in need of employee	3	4
	Syrians asked for a job	3	3
	job fit (handiwork)	3	5
	(dis)satisfaction with Syrian employees' work	10	18
	double standard policies	20	38
	unbelonging (are you one of us?)	14	16
	resentments about preferential treatment	26	38
	Turkish citizens should be prioritized	17	25

access to and distribution of resources/rights	Syrian and Turkish citizens should be treated equally	16	21
	Syrians are more privileged than Turkish citizens	21	41
	Syrians should be subjected to taxation	2	2
	granting Turkish citizenship to Syrians		
	in favour	24	24
	against	5	5
	conditional	2	2
National Identity / Citizenship	attachment to Turkish nation and identity	20	29
	seeing Syrians as ‘traitors’	17	26
	fighting for one’s motherland	16	20
	Unwillingness to hear Arabic and see Arabic letters	22	37