Instefjord, Norvald and Nakata, Hiroyuki (2023) Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring. Journal of Financial Services Research, 63 (3). pp. 339-362. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-021-00376-7 (In Press)
Instefjord, Norvald and Nakata, Hiroyuki (2023) Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring. Journal of Financial Services Research, 63 (3). pp. 339-362. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-021-00376-7 (In Press)
Instefjord, Norvald and Nakata, Hiroyuki (2023) Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring. Journal of Financial Services Research, 63 (3). pp. 339-362. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-021-00376-7 (In Press)
Abstract
We evaluate the value of loan monitoring systems for a bank controlled by a micro-prudential regulator. We investigate dynamic systems (an information channel that generates information flow about quality) and static systems (where the lender receives a single signal about loan quality). We find that dynamic systems carry a regulatory charge that dominates the benefit of the systems and are therefore unprofitable, whereas static systems have positive value. Specifically, lenders can profitably dismantle their dynamic systems and instead turn to static monitoring systems. The model reveals, therefore, a potential weakness of micro-prudential regulation.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Credit scoring; Dynamic monitoring; Loan risk; Loan sales; Optimal stopping; Static monitoring |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Essex Business School |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 11 Feb 2022 16:37 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 21:03 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/31912 |
Available files
Filename: s10693-021-00376-7.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0