Racial Hybridity

Jungian and Post-Jungian Perspectives

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Abstract

This paper explores some possible contributions analytical psychology may make to theorising racial hybridity. Already a ‘hybrid psychology’, Lu suggests that analytical psychology is particularly well-positioned to speak to the specific experiences and challenges posed by multiraciality. In particular, Lu critically reflects on his hopes, fears, and fantasies that have arisen with the birth of his multiracial children, which may in turn act as a springboard to greater depth psychological reflections on the unique and equally ‘typical’ experience of raising mixed-raced children. Such concerns have been articulated by others such as Bruce Lee, who faced the challenge of raising multiracial children amidst a backdrop of racism in the Unites States. This paper critically assesses possible ways in which racial hybridity may be theorised from a Jungian perspective and argues that a Post-Jungian approach must reflect the flexibility and fluidity of hybridity itself.

Keywords: racial hybridity; Jungian and Post-Jungian Studies; racism; autoethnography; miscegenation; liminality; Bruce Lee
1 Introduction

My son was born in 2016 and my daughter in 2018. Alongside the joy they have brought to my life, their arrival has elicited reflection on their mixed-race heritage. An intention to imagine and construct a ‘unique’ upbringing—negotiated between three cultures (British [my wife’s], Chinese and Canadian [mine])—has been complicated by the overt racism my wife and I have experienced. This has made me sensitive to the challenges they face because of the difference they personify—a position that may invite intense shadow projection and scapegoating. In this paper, I explore contributions analytical psychology may make to theorising racial hybridity. Analytical psychology is, I suggest, already a ‘hybrid psychology’, as it draws from several disciplines including psychiatry, psychoanalysis, philosophy, spiritualism, religion and history, to name but a few. Accordingly, it is particularly well-positioned to speak to the specific challenges posed by multiraciality.\(^1\) I critically reflect on the hopes, fears, and fantasies with which I grapple, which may in turn act as a springboard to greater depth psychological reflections on the unique and equally ‘typical’ experience of raising mixed-raced children. Such concerns have been articulated by others facing the challenges of constructing Chinese identities in a western context.

One example is Bruce Lee who, through interviews and letters, expressed the personal and cultural significance his son, Brandon, symbolised, amidst a backdrop of racism in the United States. Lee’s reflections on his son are an additional keyhole through which I explore Jungian and Post-Jungian contributions to theorising racial hybridity. The physicality of being mixed race may be read as a symbolic representation of psychological liminality in a culturally diverse world. Equally, I wish to resist the temptation of placing such individuals on pedestals. I want to be realistic about the added value of Jungian perspectives and emphasise that a Post-Jungian lens must approach situations charged with racial tension with the plurality of positions and responses each deserves. The uniqueness of the individual combined with the singularity of any given moment should define the flexibility of a Post-Jungian ethos. The paper itself constitutes the hybridity it seeks to explore. It is at times an autoethnography, a contemplation on racism and a consideration of how Asians have been represented in, and contributed to, popular culture. Most importantly, mine is an attempt to create a space for greater reflection on racial hybridity, fashioned from a father’s attempt to honour his wounds, so that these do not haunt the directions his children’s respective paths will take.

What I have appreciated with the arrival of my children is the shifting nature of familial expectations and obligations as one moves down a family line. I can only imagine what my grandparents wanted for my parents and how their decision to flee Vietnam drastically altered the demands that would be placed upon my sister and me. In turn, our respective decisions to marry westerners, and my choice to undertake an additional migration experience, means that the pressures and complexes of the next generation will shift as much as they remain the same.

A decision to marry outside of one’s ‘race’—to the degree that the concept exists (Vannoy Adams, 1996, p. 9)—is multifaceted and ultimately over-determined. However we may, intellectually, circumvent the perpetuation of harmful notions of ‘essential’ differences, one thing remains clear: a lived experience of racial difference in the context of an intimate union that seeks to collapse such differences cannot avoid the painful impact of prejudice arising as a response to the ‘dilution’ of perceived racial ‘purity’.\(^2\) Prejudice against skin colour—which confuses cultural differences for biological ones (ibid, pp. 9–11)—effectively shames victims...
for their very existence. One’s sense of belonging is brought into question during racist encounters and feelings of displacement and disorientation emerge. In such a deeply hurtful context, reflecting on one’s ‘differences’ and identity are essential.

It is important to note here arguments made by Slavoj Žižek (2016), Chris Hedges (2018, July 08) and Angela Nagle (2018, November 20) that an uncritical, liberal left acceptance of diversity—which includes anti-racist rhetoric supporting an open-door policy to the refugee crisis—serves to sustain global capitalism. The views adopted by the left buttress the economic goals of the far right. By allowing and encouraging, for example, more refugees to flood into Europe, we are providing a cheap labour pool of which multinational corporations can take advantage. This in turn depletes local economies and suppresses wages which then gives rise to racist and anti-immigrant feelings at the ‘ground level’ manifested in the rhetoric of populists movements. The solution, according to Žižek (2016), would be to champion a common goal against which everyone may fight—the global capitalist structure that has birthed these very logical inconsistencies.

While such arguments possess a degree of explanatory force, it fails to register and attend to a lived experience of racism. Ask, for instance, an individual encountering racism on a daily basis whether framing his/her oppression in terms of the ill-effects of global capitalism does much to alleviate the psychic scars left by these altercations. It seems, moreover, that a perspective focusing so heavily on economic disparity is not free from bias—one that may reflect privileged positions and a privileging of certain discourses, which may in turn maintain the racist beliefs and practices that permeate all facets of our social structure (DiAngelo, 2018). With this in mind, I now recount three instances that, together, served as a catalyst to writing this paper.

2 3 Moments

I walked out of the library. It was St. George’s day and bunting with St. George’s Cross decorated the town centre. I passed a white man who looked at me and then said loudly, with a sense of disgust, “look at all these people walking around here”.

While walking home on another occasion, I was stopped by two white youths. A heated exchange and some pushing ensued. Finally, they told me to “fuck off back [pause] to wherever [you] came from”. I walked away but felt rather vindicated amidst my anger. The pause in the expletive-filled tirade meant they did not know where to place me. I had caused them discomfort and a semblance of the disorientation I was made to feel. Here was a ‘Chinaman’ in the UK speaking with a North American accent. They could not simply tell me to go back to China.

This next experience was particularly hurtful, as it included my wife and son. I had entered a bakery to buy some pastries. My wife stayed outside with Eric and began reading a presentation board on display outside the shop. When I emerged, I found my wife visibly upset. She told me to “wait here”, as she passed the buggy to me. She approached a woman and they exchanged some harsh words. I then intervened as the situation escalated. The woman, who had asked my wife to move away from the board as she was apparently blocking it (a request that remains rather baffling as, presumably, the board was on display to attract onlookers) began yelling at me, “you bastard, you are nobody”. She turned to my wife and said, “you’ve married below yourself, a useless Chinese man, low class bastard”. The
diatribe left us both shaken. What enraged us most was that Eric witnessed this. Upon reflection, I asked myself: was this woman’s vitriol directed towards my wife or towards me? Was it directed at both of us or the fact that we are two individuals in an inter-racial relationship? Or, was the anger indirectly aimed at the product of our union?

Given the nature of the first two examples, one might assume that the aggressor outside the bakery was white, when in fact she was a Mandarin Chinese-speaking woman. Psychologically, one may read this as an instance of projective identification, where the individual identifies with the oppressor/aggressor, and the venomous remarks reflect the injustices to which she may have been subjected. But this is speculation. What we know is that the abuse came from a Chinese woman and was directed against a white, British woman, a Chinese man and, possibly, a multiracial child.

Discussions of race and racism from psychoanalytic perspectives are plentiful (Davids, 2011; Fanon, 1952/1988; Gordon, 2001; 1961/2001; Kovel, 1970/1988; Keval, 2001 and 2016; Lowe [ed], 2014), and the available Jungian and Post-Jungian literature is steadily growing (Brewster, 2013 and 2017; Morgan, 2002; Vannoy Adams, 1996; Welsh, 2018). For good reason, most Jungian and Post-Jungian interventions focus on the abuse of blacks by whites (Morgan, 2002; Brewster, 2017) and a recently published article by Ruth Calland (2019) is one of the first Jungian, clinical accounts of working with a ‘biracial’ patient. While Vannoy Adams (1996) acknowledges the many forms ‘racism’ takes, the scope of research in this area, from a Jungian perspective, raises an important point of caution. For instance, Vaughan (2018) writes:

Psychologically, at the depths of global history, racism has to do with the negative attitudes, projections, and behaviour of Europeans, people claiming European ancestry, and white identities in America, toward people from the African continent and, in general, People of Color. Racism has been institutionalized in the agency of colonialism and systems of apartheid that have rationalized torture, murder, theft, greed, and confiscation of land by church, state, and private enterprise. Through this agency of a violence-enforced white privilege and psychological dissociation, humanity has been truly compromised by these same destructive impulses of which Jung spoke, forces that will likely destroy the planet […]. Psychological defences against truth, honesty, shame, and guilt among people of privilege leads to inhumanity that continues to exist as the psychopathology of racism. It eats away at the soul of humanity and continues as pathos for all. The healing of racism requires a soul searching, reflection in the self, truth telling, reconciliation, and reparation.

I would add that achieving any degree of reconciliation and reparation is best served by resisting the temptation to generalise about the nature of racism. I am, for the most part, in agreement with Vaughan’s views, but would emphasise that racism is not an exclusive tool of white privilege to oppress those of colour (Dikötter, 1992/2015). Those of colour may also mobilise racial discrimination in defiance of the oppressor, in psychological compensation that reverses power positions. As I hope my example shows, we must resist the urge to split the racist (bad) from the racially oppressed (an idealised good object). We cannot ignore the shadow of racism—it can go both ways.
3 Autoethnography

It is timely to say a few words about one of my chosen methodologies, autoethnography. I was introduced to this field by Ken Plummer in 2012. Since then, I have encouraged students to explore the points of convergence between autoethnography and analytical psychology; in particular, the potential contribution of the latter to aid our growing awareness of the unconscious when we consciously choose to narrate a personal process of becoming. Plummer defines autoethnography as a form of “life story work” that refers both “to the ethnography of one’s own group or to […] autobiographical writing that has an ethnographic interest” (2001, pp. 34–35). The aim of such “narratives of the self” is greater acknowledgement of one’s own subjectivity, but the hybrid nature of these studies straddles the “difficult line between the emotionality of its author, its personal writing style and its link to social science” (ibid, p. 35). For example, Ellis’s seminal Final Negotiations (1995) has been accused of being “unacceptable to the more formal scientific academic community because it highlights both speaking of personal experience alongside narrative prose as a way of knowing” (ibid). Yet the growing interest in this type of research (Charon, 2008; Ellis, 2004; Frank, 2002, 2004 and 2013; Kleinman, 1988; Plummer, 2012) denotes a shift in practice.

Amongst psychoanalytic and therapeutic reflections on the utility of applying depth psychological insights to autoethnography (McMillan and Ramirez, 2016), Granger’s (2001) psychoanalytic approach to theorising silence in education, Esping’s (2001) critical analysis of the similarities and differences between autoethnography and Viktor Frankl’s logotherapy, and Garrat’s (2015) psychoanalytic reflections on competitive natural bodybuilding are useful starting points. In spite of these publications, the area of psychoanalytic autoethnography remains an undeveloped area. This is, perhaps, a consequence of its uncomfortable proximity to private therapy writing (Esping, 2011) and auto-analysis (Ticho, 1967). A more detailed consideration of these issues is certainly necessary, although it is beyond the scope of this paper. Regardless of the reasons why psychoanalytic autoethnography has not been more vigorously pursued, the rich possibilities for a Jungian and Post-Jungian intervention should be clear, given Jung’s emphasis on personal myth as a prescient way of thinking systematically about subjective experience. In addition to the various methods currently used to record subjectivity through time—diaries, poetry, art—a serious consideration of dreams would shift emphasis on consciously created products to the unconscious factors that shape individual identity. Although my contention is that Jung’s Red Book might be studied as a graphic novel (Lu, 2018)—that only text and image together can convey the depth of Jung’s psychological insights—it may also be viewed as a quintessential autoethnographic account.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore my dream life during this period, yet noteworthy that several dreams from 2016 to 2018 contained images of my son. These ranged from anxiety-related dreams to, more interestingly, an imaging of diametrically opposed reactions to racial hybridity vis à vis my son. I will return to this theme below.

4 Amplifying Miscegenation

According to the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, miscegenation is defined as “the interbreeding of people of different races” (OED, 2011, p. 913). The word has its origin in the mid-19th century, formed of the Latin word “to mix” (miscere) and “race” (genus). While the definition appears neutral, the term is laden with negative connotations. The term mulatto—
denoting a child born of one white and one black parent—originates in the Latin term for mule (mūlus), the hybrid product of a horse and a donkey, an animal known for its aggressive behaviour and inability to reproduce. Negative associations to interraciality are also perpetuated in the interpretation and mobilisation of some biblical passages, especially in the hands of segregationalists in the United States (for example, Exodus 34:12–16 and Genesis 9:24–26). The Bible has been used, and not unproblematically, to denounce racial interbreeding and, by extension, interracial marriages. Such warnings against miscegenation must be read in the context in which they have been used but equally, it is possible that fear of a mixing of races is archetypal. Yet Jung’s theory of the bipolarity of archetypes explains why miscegenation also summons intense feelings of fascination.

As we amplify this notion, images of the most illustrious heroes arise. In the Greek Pantheon alone, we encounter Achilles (son of Peleus and the sea goddess, Thetis), Hercules (son of Zeus and Alcmena), Perseus (son of Zeus and Danae), and Orpheus (son of Apollo and Calliope) to name but a few (Zimmerman, 1964). Many heroes are conceived as hybrids, straddling the realms of humanity and the gods. This also holds true in a slightly different register for Jesus Christ, who is conceived as both Man and God. Such figures are situated ‘betwixt and between’, holding a middle position between extremes. Psychologically, they serve a ‘hybrid’ function; they are symbolic representations of liminality, a theme to which analytical psychology has devoted considerable attention.

## 5 Defining Hybridity

Hybridity has become one of the most utilised and contested theories in post-colonial studies. It refers to “the creation of new transcultural forms within the contact zone produced by colonisation” (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 2013, p. 135). Hybridity can take many forms, including linguistic, cultural, political and racial. While use of the term is highly contested (Werbner and Modood [eds], 1997), it holds the possibility of reversing “the structures of domination in the colonial situation” (Smith quoted in Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 2013, p. 138) by emphasising the hybrid nature of culture itself. If used uncritically, the term assumes the existence of pure cultural ‘forms’ from which the hybrid third springs. It potentially embodies the very discrimination against which hybridity has been mobilised.

Ideally, hybridity constitutes a site of resistance to combat essentialist, intellectual tendencies. It disrupts the fantasy of homogeneity (that there can be a ‘pure’ source of culture). “[T]he cross-fertilisation of cultures has been,” Ahmad notes, “endemic to all movements of people[,] all such movements in history have involved the travel, contact, transmutation, hybridisation of ideas, values and behavioural norms” (Ahmad quoted in Werbner, 1997, p. 5). Hybridity thus challenges the delusion of racial purity.

Homi Bhabha (1994) argues that culture is constructed in the third space of enunciation, an ambivalent and contradictory locale from which cultural identity arises and in which its conditions are negotiated. Understanding culture as a product of this alien territory “may open the way to conceptualising an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity” (p. 38).

The effects of seeing the hybrid nature of culture itself cannot be underestimated, as Pnina Werbner (1997) articulates:
In such theories, it makes sense to talk of the transgressive power of symbolic hybrids to subvert categorical oppositions and hence to create the conditions for cultural reflexivity and change; it makes sense that hybrids are perceived to be endowed with unique powers, good or evil, and that hybrid moments, spaces or objects are hedged in with elaborate rituals, and carefully guarded and separated from mundane reality. Hybridity here is a theoretical meta-construction of social order.

Anthropologists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Victor Turner and Mary Douglas have expanded on the hybrid’s capacity to challenge cultural order, thereby recovering “a critical cultural self-reflexivity” (ibid, p. 2), which further explains the taboos surrounding ‘dangerous’ hybrids. Racial hybrids, in particular, evoke intense feelings because they aesthetically challenge a social order; their differences are perceived immediately by the senses. There is, however, a shift in scholarly thinking that endeavours to move beyond modernist notions of liminality, “the place and time of betwixt-and-between, of carnivals, rituals of rebellion and rites of cosmic renewal, or of boundary-crossing pangolins, ritual clowns, witches and abominable swine” (ibid, p. 4). Such notions seek to normalise hybridity. However, contemporary debates grapple with hybridity’s transgressive nature as well as its normality, without losing sight of its continuing power to evoke intense fear and fascination; in other words, hybridity’s enduring status as a symbol of transformation.

This brief summary fails to do justice to the complex debates surrounding hybridity, but serves to orient the potential contribution analytical psychology may make to these discussions. Before ascertaining the utility of Jung’s psychology to what seems to be an archetypal fascination with hybridity, a review of Jung’s thoughts on hybridity is required. This allows us to locate our initial vector, so that we are conscious of both the deficiencies needing attention and the strengths from which interventions may be built. Yet we discover in Jung’s writing problematic statements about a mixing of races that repeat colonial discourses defending white privilege (Papastergiadis, 1997).

6 Jung on a Mixing of Races

In Jung’s *Zarathustra* seminars delivered between 1934 and 1939 (1988), we find the following:

There is also that danger in the mixture of races, against which our instincts always set up a resistance. Sometimes one thinks it is snobbish prejudice, but it is an instinctive prejudice, and the fact is that if distant races are mixed, the fertility is very low, as one sees with the white and the negro; a negro woman very rarely conceives from a white man. If she does, a mulatto is the result and he is apt to be a bad character. The Malays are a very distinct race, very remote from the white man, and the mixture of Malay and white is as a rule bad. It is the same with animals: mules have peculiar, vicious qualities and are not fertile. They may have intercourse, but often it is mere friendship between the male and the female; and even if they conceive they have abortions. They cannot carry the young, gestation is interrupted. It is the same with butterflies; some very interesting experiments have been made with the species from the northern shore of the Mediterranean and the same species from the southern shore. The southern variety is much bigger than the northern, and together they bring forth beautiful specimens, yet
they die out in the third or fourth generation because they can’t propagate, they don’t really mix. So with a great effort you can bring oil and water together for a while: you make a sort of foam, an emulsion, but then it separates again. That is the cause of many cases of insanity. A great difference of race nearly always causes a certain fragile, sensitive disposition because the units are not well glued together—that is at least a way of expressing these very difficult problems of psychopathology.

pp. 643–644

Jung’s statement may shock the modern reader. Perhaps, not all Jung’s readers at the time would have received his words in an equable spirit. For is Jung not making a link between mental illness and miscegenation? There is a temptation in the field of Jungian Studies to forgive Jung as a man of his time who was simply repeating commonly held beliefs. The footnote included by the editor, James Jarrett, aims to appease any emotions sparked by Jung’s assertion. “[His] genetic theories”, Jarrett writes, “presumably acquired during his medical-school days, would now be thought archaic, particularly his analogy between interracial genetic crosses (Malay/White) and interspecific genetic crosses (horse/donkey)” (ibid, p. 644). The spurious belief that multiracial children are somehow tainted and weaker has been disproved. Geneticists now hold that, generally speaking, hybrids are more “vigorous [and] fertile […] than their parents” (ibid). It is to be hoped that such distancing from Jung’s colonial attitudes has become the consensus in the field. However, the jury is out on that particular dimension of critical engagement.

My proposal is that Jung’s statements on miscegenation and hybridity occupy a point of delicate tension. One looks for open and positive statements of hybridity’s symbolic significance alongside less appealing ones: where we uncover Jung’s atrocious account of mixed race relationships, we find a more nuanced understanding of hybridity’s psychological import. “But a hybrid is not divided. The point is that it is a [sic] oneness but consisting of two things; a hybrid plant is a mixture, but it is a oneness, as a hybrid word consisting of Latin and Greek words is drawn together into one” (ibid, p. 61). The feeling of relief is only temporary, as Jung goes on to declare that “a hybrid is a united discord, so it is an objectionable sort of union of opposites” (ibid, p. 62). Jung is admittedly providing a psychological interpretation of Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, but this does not excuse the fact that these remarks apply to all representations of hybridity produced by the psyche (real or imagined), if we are indeed persuaded by the implications of Jung’s formulation of the collective unconscious.

In The Tavistock Lectures, Jung reaffirms his problematic position:

We often discover with Americans that they are tremendously unconscious of themselves. Sometimes they suddenly grow aware of themselves, and then you get these interesting stories of decent young girls eloping with Chinamen or with Negroes, because in the American primitive layer, which with us is a bit difficult, with them is decidedly disagreeable, as it is much lower down. It is the same phenomenon as ‘going black’ or ‘going native’ in Africa.

1935, para. 341

This constitutes a hierarchical presentation of racial prejudice that extends to multiracial individuals, the potential product of a union between “decent young girls” and “Chinamen”.
Jung’s racism has been notably discussed by Dalal (1988) and is coming to the forefront once more (Samuels, 2018), especially in light of the open letter published by Jungians addressing Jung’s statements on and about Africans (2018), without forgetting his equally complicated writings on Indigenous peoples and other non-western groupings, not to mention Jews. As we have Chinese culture specifically in mind, Jung does not fail to further display his prejudices against non-Europeans. In a letter to Emma Jung (31 August 1909) on his voyage to America with Freud and Ferenczi, Jung writes of a visit to New York’s Chinatown with their host, psychoanalyst A.A. Brill:

[...] [W]e drove to Chinatown, the most dangerous part of New York, accompanied by three sturdy rascals. The Chinese all wear dark blue clothing and have their hair in long braids. We went into a Chinese temple, located in a frightful den called a joss house. Around every corner a murder might be taking place. Then we went into a Chinese teahouse, where we had really excellent tea, and along with it they served us rice and an incredible dish with chopped meat, apparently smothered in earth worms and onions. It looked ghastly. But the worms turned out to be Chinese potato, whereupon I tasted some, and it was not at all bad.

JUNG quoted in CLAY, 2016, p. 173

One might forgive Jung’s hyperbole, as Chinatown specifically and the Five Points more generally were not the safest of destinations during the early twentieth century (Lui, 2005/2007). Jung’s visit to a joss house, where tourists could learn more about Chinese religious practices, is not surprising, given the group’s interest in religion. Jung’s observation that a murder might be taking place around every corner, however, gives one pause for thought. It is likely that Jung was referring to the murder of Elsie Sigel, which occurred earlier that summer in midtown Manhattan. The murderer was thought to be Leon Ling, Sigel’s Chinese lover and former Sunday school student. The unsolved case sent shockwaves throughout the city and nation. It is likely that Jung heard the story from Brill, who had moved back to the United States from Vienna in 1908. Perhaps Jung’s fantasy of the murderous Chinese paralleled the strong reactions against miscegenation that the murder of Elsie Sigel raised to public consciousness. Yet was Jung’s letter simply an exaggerated attempt to convey to Emma how different life in New York was compared to Zurich? Or, does it smack of something more sinister? When Jung blames the diarrhoea he, Freud and Ferenczi experienced a few days later on those Chinese ‘worms’ they consumed (Clay, 2016, p. 174), we get a taste of the racist and colonialist mind-set within which early psychoanalysis was situated. The ‘worms’ Jung consumed are not potatoes, but noodles, made of wheat flour and eggs. This is not vastly different from German eierspätzle. I wonder if Jung ever suffered any gastrointestinal difficulties due to overindulgence in the German variety?

7 Defining Racism

Racism “either subordinates by positing universal human differences, or differentiates by perceiving the commingling of two cultures as a ‘natural’ threat” (Werbner, 1997, p. 10). It may be defined “as a violating, exclusionary process of essentialism that ultimately seeks to negate ambivalence” (ibid, p. 16). Vannoy Adams describes racism as “any categor[is]ation of people on the basis of physical characteristics (such as skin colour) that are indicative of putatively significant psychical differences, whether these ostensible differences are positive or negative, honorific or defamatory” (1996, p. 10, emphasis in original). Notions of race
(and thus, difference), however, equally give rise to resistance against racism, as much as it may facilitate colonial and imperial domination (Law, 2010). The extent to which Jung’s thinking and sentiments meet these criteria is subject to debate. Yet given his keen sensitivity to psychological liminality and its archetypal images (embedded in his work, for instance, on Mercurius and the trickster archetype), the above statements, clearly demonstrating a racist attitude, seem misplaced when applied to Jung.

Based on the evidence I have presented, a fear of racial hybridity lies at the heart of Jung’s psychology. His supposed recognition of the ‘Other’ (both psychological and physical) (Papadopoulos, 1984/1991; Clarke, 1994) seems disingenuous in light of his views on hybridity. Our understanding of Jung’s indebtedness to the ‘Other’ may in part be an illusion, and perhaps tells us more about the Jung we desire to see rather than the Jung that conforms more concretely to historical reality. Jung’s respect for, and humility towards, the psychological ‘Other’ is, partially, a persona hiding a largely unexamined and unconscious colonialist mind-set. His writings imply and consequently repeat an imperialist discourse; without constant and persistent cultivation, hybrids would fall back into ‘primitivity’ and mental illness, both of which are assumed to be their birth right (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 2013, p. 137). Yet Werbner reminds us that cultural hybrids, for all their normality, still manage to shock, change, challenge, revitalise and disrupt (1997, p. 5, p. 21). They are sites of change and transformation, giving way to heightened reflexivity. Multiraciality, perceived by Jung and others as a weakness is, in fact, a strength.

The conviction with which I write undoubtedly puts into question any objectivity my academic persona might claim. Yet I am not alone in my outrage. Perhaps Frantz Fanon, while not entirely opposed to Jung’s ideas (Vannoy Adams, 1996) has proclaimed his discontent most succinctly and eloquently. In the margins of his French copy of Modern Man in Search of a Soul (Jung, 1940), Fanon responds to this written by Jung:

At the start of my stay in Africa, I was astonished by the brutality with which the indigenous were treated, whipping being a common practice; first, it seemed superfluous to me, but I had to come to the conclusion that it was necessary; since that moment I constantly bore my rhinoceros-hide whip at my side. I learned to simulate affects that I did not feel, to give out full throated cries and to stamp my feet with anger. It is necessary to make up in this way for the deficient will of the indigenous.

ibid, p. 92

Fanon’s reply was brief and to the point. “Bastard” (Khalfa and Young [eds], 2015/2018, pp. 739–740). The term, used as a noun, traditionally referred to an illegitimate child. When used as an adjective, it can indicate something “no longer in its pure or original form” (OED, 2011, p. 113). One possible synonym for this is ‘hybrid’. It seems, then, that even as an activist, Fanon accepted the fact that in French, hybridity is used as an insult.

8 How to Be a Father of a Multiracial Child

How do we begin to confront—let alone repair (Klein, 1975)—the damage done by such biases against racial hybridity? One way is to focus on what Jungians and Post-Jungians are now doing in relation to these ideas. This is a prospective approach, one that derives from Jung’s own teleological method. We are asking about the future of Post-Jungian thought and
action in connection with what I have been calling in this paper ‘hybridity’. While separating
the man from his ideas is perhaps impossible, we must resist the urge to ‘throw the baby out
with the bathwater’, as such dismissals foreclose opportunities for the emergence of new
ideas and the chance of reparation, even though they may be ‘healing fictions’ (Hillman,
1983/1995). Yet being such, their curative potential should not be taken lightly. Jung’s
psychology is well-placed to discuss notions of hybridity because hybridity is central to its
constitution. As mentioned above, analytical psychology combines insights and practices
from several disciplines and synthesises them into a unique whole. Jung’s original distinction
between analytical psychology and complex psychology further speaks to the multiple and
hybrid ways in which he intended his psychology to be used.

Naturally, Jung himself does not hold the key in my quest to become a good-enough father to
multiracial children, although some of his ideas are a springboard to developing useful,
theoretical frameworks supporting the specific challenges of this role. At this point, my
discourse could use a concrete example.

The martial artist and internationally celebrated film star, Bruce Lee (1940–1973), captured
the western imagination and, arguably, did more for the dialogue between East and West than
any other of his generation. His marriage to Linda Lee Caldwell (née Emery) produced two
multiracial children: Brandon (1965–1993) and Shannon (b. 1969). Lee himself was not
‘pure’ Chinese although, ironically, he would become the epitome of Chinese masculinity
(Chan, 2001). Bruce Thomas (1996/2008) suggests that Lee’s mother was half-German, but
Eric Peter Ho argues that Lee’s mother was half-English (2010). Regardless, when Lee’s
fellow students under the tutelage of Ip Man discovered his lineage, several refused to train
with him, as they believed that the art of Wing Chun should not be taught to foreigners.
Eventually, the ostracised Lee left the school of his own accord (Thomas, 1996/2008, p. 25).

Lee married Linda in 1964, at a time when anti-miscegenation laws were still enforced in the
United States. Lee discussed his interracial marriage openly in interviews and often
mentioned Brandon, described as “a golden blond with magnificent licorice [sic] button eyes
[…] a handsome meeting of two cultures” (Balling, 1966/2017, p. 40). This description was
followed by a rather hyperbolic statement that Brandon may be the only blond Chinese baby
in the world, a sentiment repeated several times throughout later articles and interviews
(Rand, 1966/2017; Clopton Jr., 1967/2017; Duncan, 1967/2017; Moore, 1971/2017; Pang,
1972/2017; Moore, 1972/2017). While these authors play their part in constructing an exotic
other, Bruce is equally responsible for weaving this fantasy. In another article also penned by
Balling—and based on an interview with Lee—Brandon is described as “one of destiny’s
children” (Balling, 1966/2017a, p. 41), his mixed race heritage discussed in terms of
stereotypical representations of East and West. He is the “superb” result of a convergence of
“diverse blood lines” (ibid). Noteworthy is the enantiodromic oscillation between repulsion
and fascination evoked by the racial hybrid, which finds expression in Lee’s life. What is it
about the hybrid that eludes a more conscious and integrated understanding of its symbolism,
one that avoids the propensity either to glorify or demonise the racial hybrid; a perspective
that is more mindful of its polarising potential and one that emphasises both its luminous and
darker qualities?

Reflections on Brandon’s racial hybridity are indirectly expressed through Lee’s thoughts on
an ideal education for his son. Lee claims that Brandon will be taught the virtues of both
cultures, which stand in a mutually dependent relationship (ibid, p. 42). While Lee’s
admission—that Brandon’s understanding of the Orient will be founded upon Gung Fu and
Yin and Yang—seems rather caricatured, he maintains a refined appreciation of culture’s hybrid status. “[T]here is no such thing as pure Yin or pure Yang […] Once Brandon has learned”, he continues, “to understand Yin and Yang, he will know that nothing can be secured by extremes” (ibid). The piece ends, however, with an alarming sentiment, namely, that Brandon’s ability to epitomise responsible citizenry will bring forth more racial hybrids as a gift to American society and culture (ibid, p. 46). Although Lee occasionally evidences a more realistic understanding of racial hybridity, the plan he charts for educating a golden child—as clearly Brandon was in his father’s eyes—is a projection of one of his own idealised personas. What he wished to cultivate in Brandon parallels what he desired others to see in himself—a Chinese American male of mixed race heritage who successfully straddles two or more ‘boundaries’ and aspects of himself. As an aspiring actor, he strove to become a transgressor of boundaries—to help Americans re-imagine their perception of the Chinese male in Hollywood and beyond. In a letter to William Dozier, the producer of the Green Hornet, Lee requests that Kato be made an active partner with Britt Reid. “True”, he writes, “that Kato is a house boy of Britt, but as the crime fighter, Kato is an ‘active partner’ of the Green Hornet and not a ‘mute follower’ ” (Lee, 1998/2016, pp. 77–78).

Lee’s ambition to be a bona fide leading man brought him first to Hong Kong, where he starred in three successful films before receiving a call from Warner Brothers. He once described the experience as schizophrenic: “I have to remember which side of the ocean I’m on, and whether I’m the superstar or the exotic Oriental support player” (Lee quoted in Moore, 1972/2017, p. 136). The image of a man poised on an uncertain boundary is unquestionably portrayed in other articles (Kwan, 1973/2017)—a man, we are reminded, who is mostly Chinese and American by birth (Rand, 1966/2017). Chan (2001) argues:

Lee’s birth in America is significant because it legitimizes his Chinese American identity in the form of citizenship. Technically speaking, Lee is a second-generation Chinese American, caught in a conflictual cultural predicament where he is an American citizen, entitled to the social and legal benefits of a capitalist democratic system, yet simultaneously a minority who faces racism, stereotypes, and cultural exclusion from the dominant/mainstream culture, particularly in the television and film industries. Lee’s experiences are common among many Asians in America who are Americans by birth and yet are treated as perpetual foreigners.

Lee would go on to reshape the West’s conception of the eastern male with his final film, Enter the Dragon (1973). Chan rightly contends that Lee’s popularity “crosses cultural boundaries in terms of race, class, gender, sexuality and nationality” (2001, p. 74). Yet in 1966, that eventual achievement was a desire projected onto his son who was, more than himself, a physical and aesthetic representation of the ‘breaker of boundaries’ to which Lee aspired. A central theme that arises from the numerous interviews Lee gave is that Brandon’s birth constitutes a challenge to ingrained beliefs on mixed-race marriages. For Lee, Brandon represents a cultural shift in thinking. Whereas others—in Lee’s estimation—may have seen Brandon’s existence as an insulting sin, Bruce only saw strength in his son’s racial hybridity.

Reading Lee’s letters and interviews from a psychological perspective, the multiracial child may be seen as a container—not just for projections of parents, but as the alchemical vas that contains and gives rise to transformation. Brandon evoked strong feelings within Bruce which, I argue, may be traced to emotions aroused by his own racial hybridity. As I suggest
below, racial hybridity is one physical manifestation of psychological liminality. Reactions to racial hybridity, therefore, evoke reactions to liminality, the psychological sense of inhabiting an indeterminate state. It is ironic—perhaps synchronistic—that Brandon’s final role was in The Crow (1994), an animal thought to guide restless souls back to the land of the living to exact revenge on those responsible for their intermediate, half-life existence. The crow acts as a bridge between the living and the dead. This is a film steeped in themes of liminality.

What I take away from Lee’s reflections on fatherhood and racial hybridity is to be wary of projecting divinity onto a child, no matter how satisfying such fantasy-laden responses may be, where the father’s concerns over unequal power relationships may be indirectly transformed. Yet fantasy, in the psychoanalytic sense, is by no means indicative of an infantile process of imagination that should be rejected as development progresses. On the contrary, fantasy is a doorway to increased understanding of our own inner life and the construction of our identity. “The psyche,” Jung explains, “creates reality every day […] The only expression I can use for this activity is fantasy” (1923, para. 78, italics in original). “Fantasy is not,” Chow rightly contends, “a flight from reality, but helps us to better understand that very reality” (Chow quoted in Bowman, 2010, p. 120). Here Jung’s ideas prove most useful. He reminds us of the importance of maintaining a middle position, holding the tension of opposites—in this case, between fantasy and reality—that may give birth to new ways of imagining the symbolic significance of racial hybridity.

9 Jungian and Post-Jungian Reflections

In this section, I pursue more ‘classical’ interpretations of psychological hybridity, assessing its strengths and weaknesses, before moving to a Post-Jungian reflection on the topic.

9.1 Psychological Liminality

Jungians have embraced Victor Turner’s understanding of liminality to describe a disruption of order and boundaries—usually experienced during rituals—that ultimately facilitates transformation and psychological rebirth. In rites of passage, this transformation is experienced in three stages: separation, liminality, and reintegration (Stein, 1983/2014, p. 27). Murray Stein utilises liminality as a frame for negotiating midlife transition (ibid), which he describes as the “Hermes-effects of the unconscious” (ibid, p. 36). He identifies our repeated encounter with, and experiences of, liminality throughout the human lifespan. He encourages us to understand liminality synchronically, “as a permanent dimension or depth of the psyche, a ‘layer’ that threads through all time and occupies a space in every period of life” (ibid, p. 47). Liminality thus defines our very existence. We are constantly in modes of transition—from one position to the next—and such experiences can be psychologically taxing and challenging. Liminal figures, Stein continues, “are always around and present somewhere in the psyche—although a person may not be conscious of their presence […]” (ibid, pp. 47–48). I suggest that encounters with others—especially those of hybrid skin pigmentation—may evoke a psychology of disruption similar to moments in which liminal states are constellated. When experienced, liminality destabilises established notions of identity (ibid, p. 85).

When one encounters racial hybridity, one is faced with ‘separation’ and ‘liminality’ (the first two stages in rites of passage) almost simultaneously. The moment of impact is the moment of seeing and experiencing, a destruction of notions of ‘pure’ racial categories challenging
self-identity. The aggressor metaphorically stands at a threshold and a reversion to fixed, comfortable categories re-establishes equilibrium. A renewed attachment to an established position may embolden the aggressor to attack the ‘cause’ of disruption, i.e., the bad object. A counterfeit sense of self is preserved at the cost of denying the humanity of the racial other. The unique contribution of depth psychology lies in its acknowledgment that these processes are unconscious, that is, the aggressor may neither be aware of nor wish to know that such psychological movements are occurring.

To summarise, multiracial children represent an unequivocal disruption of homogeneity; they are ‘contaminations’ of ‘purity’ eliciting feelings of displacement. Yet as containers, they are also bridges to unknown possibilities, hence the polar reactions often experienced when racial hybridity is confronted. A vessel that contains purported ‘opposites’ constitutes a powerful image. This idea, together with Jung’s understanding of the child archetype, provides an image of unparalleled possibility that is simultaneously rejuvenating and terrifying. It is not to say that multiracial children are powerful; far from it, their power may be taken from them through repeated racial confrontations. Racial attacks may deprive the victim of his/her innate power as an individual in what is, ultimately, an aggressor’s misguided attempt to connect with both an internal and external other. It is perhaps more precise to say that multiracial children symbolise the possibility of power, both within oneself and the ‘other’.

As noted above, racial hybrids conjure strong reactions because they signify changing cultural attitudes and expectations. While over-idealisations are to be resisted, racial hybrids embody the possibility of psychic integration by imaging a commingling of cultural differences (or opposites), thus making them ideal figures for our projections. The challenge is to withdraw these projections and to see the individual for who he/she truly is, to the degree that this is possible. Admittedly, my anger stemming from the experiences outlined above inevitably shape my interpretations. Yet theorising about such encounters should not be dismissed as projection and fantasy in the pejorative sense. It is anything but; these ideas are informed by real life experiences and to honour their emotional imprint is to bring authenticity to explanatory frameworks.

9.2 Scapegoating, Shadow Projection, and the Transcendent Function

A fear of racial hybridity is a form of racism based on an assumption of racial hierarchies. It is a fear of those who, because of their skin and ‘exotic’-yet-familiar features, elicit shadow projections, awaken deep agitation and a sense of displacement—the possibility of a dislocation of one’s place in the world and a fragmentation of one’s identity. Racism hinges on a psychological encounter with alterity as personified by the shadow. It is given its existence when an image of the other provides a suitable hook onto which projections may be hung. Multiracial individuals are, in several respects, ‘ideal’ scapegoats (Bremmer, 2000; Brinton Perera, 1986); they are both foreign and familiar, oneself and other. While such viewpoints may prove useful, they leave us in danger of reducing racism to a psychic content, as Vannoy Adams rightly highlights (1996). They may also prevent us from celebrating the racial hybrid’s individuality as that individual becomes established as a significant Jungian symbol.

We may also speak of reactions to racial hybridity in terms of the transcendent function. The multiracial individual signifies an identity beyond opposites, a symbol providing insight into how the gap between extremes may be either closed or transcended. Andrew Samuels (2010) has, however, cautioned against such optimistic leaps in the ‘higher reaches’ of Jungian
theory, especially when there are ‘real world’ issues in train. I must reiterate—while my experience of my children is the catalyst for deeper reflection on larger themes, they—and other multiracial children—cannot be wished into becoming transcendent thirds or children whose role it is to mediate culture. While racial hybridity inevitably activates motifs of transformation, we must be vigilant against essentialising narratives, no matter how well-intentioned they may be. To say that any multiracial child is a groovy transcendent third is to assume that he/she arises from two fixed positions or, in this case, parents, whose identities are stable. The risk of deploying any theory—Jungian or otherwise—is that theory may negate the rich complexity of social and personal change that racial hybridity encourages. Moreover, what was once perhaps a cultural rarity—as in Bruce Lee’s time—is becoming, more and more, a cultural norm. Any Post-Jungian intervention needs to reflect these realities to maximise its relevance and impact.

9.3 Psychological Bisexuality

Multiracial individuals, and the reactions they evoke, may be further understood by mobilising Jung’s concept of the Self. Attitudes towards racial hybridity seem to mirror the ego’s response to the Self’s duality and bipolarity. Multiraciality—as Vannoy Adams (1996) suggests—may have a similar significance as the theme of psychological bisexuality, encapsulated by the image of the hermaphrodite. This image, Cirlot (1971/2001) comments, “is a consequence of applying the symbolism of the number two to the human being, creating a personality which is integrated despite its duality” (p. 145). The image represents wholeness and an integration of opposites; the racial hybrid may come to mirror, for some, psychological hermaphroditism. Seen in this light, distinctions based on skin pigmentation are overcome; we move beyond notions of yellow and white, white and black, etc., beyond male and female. Such an interpretation is potentially liberating and has the capacity to become a focal point of theorising cultural hybridity in its many forms. Equally, we need to adopt such approaches cautiously, as we are prone to idealising racial hybridity and, by extension, psychological hermaphroditism. We run the risk of burdening racial hybrids with our own projections and drowning them in our expectations.

10 A Post-Jungian Reflection and Way Forward

While classical Jungian interpretations are useful, they may support intellectual positions that are no longer tenable. As mentioned above, culture itself is a hybrid; the notion of pure cultural positions from which a hybrid emanates is a fallacy. A Post-Jungian approach appreciates the hybrid nature of our very existence, which means caution must be exercised to ensure generalising narratives—no matter how well-intentioned—are critically assessed. Equally, we must grapple with the reality of conflict and violence, and whether a world without it is indeed achievable and desirable. While violence should be avoided at all costs, measured aggression should not (Bly, 1990; Samuels, 1993). Aggression is crucial to empowering voices to speak out against injustice where and when it is met. A Post-Jungian approach endeavours to provide realistic solutions that speak to the psyche’s complex reality. We may dare to dream that violence may one day be abolished but from our current position, such idealisations are unproductive. More compelling is the development of psychologically-aware positions that attend to the realities of the world while preserving individual integrity and, ultimately, a belief in humanity’s capacity for compassion. I am advocating a hybrid, shifting position that integrates (and not necessarily in equal measure on every occasion) Freud’s reality principle with a Jungian sense of soul that remains the heart of our discipline.
What would this look like in practice? What advice does a father have for his children when they experience racial prejudice? How can this be theorised from a psychological perspective? While I have noted the problematic aspects of Lee’s position, I return to his words for a starting point in the next part of our conversation:

The oak tree is mighty, yet it will be destroyed by a mighty wind because it resists the elements; the bamboo bends with the wind, and by bending, survives.

Bruce Lee quoted in Balling, 1966/2017a, p. 42

Be like water; it is the softest element on earth, yet it penetrates the hardest rock. It has no shape on its own, yet it can take any shape in which it is placed. In a cup, it becomes the shape of the cup. In a vase, it takes the shape of the vase and curls about the stems of flowers. Water may seem to move in contradiction, even uphill, but it chooses any way open to it so that it may reach the sea. It may flow swiftly, or it may flow slowly, but its purpose is inexorable, its destiny sure.

Ibid, p. 43

Every encounter with racism must be considered in its own context. Each experience is different and will inspire diverse answers and physiological reactions. We may rejoice in some responses; we may regret others. But the key is to reflect in the hope of cultivating more conscious and genuine expressions of self that honour one’s singularity and integrity while appreciating the extent to which culture and history continue to shape the essence of who we are; in other words, a truly psychosocial response. If culture is in constant flux and indeed hybrid in nature, we must remain equally pliable and embrace a plurality of positions in the face of confrontation.

My response takes inspiration from historic critiques on the ways in which tradition is, in fact, invented. We see this especially in cultural-sociological approaches to the construction of national mythologies. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) show that what is deemed a ‘tradition’ may in fact be an invention and, as such, the political motivations and intentions informing its construction can be ascertained. Similarly, Gellner (1983) explores the mobilisation of folk tradition in the service of nationalist elites, and Anderson (1983) argues that the nation is an imagined community. Admittedly, racism is not a tradition and should not be confused with nationalism. I am in no way suggesting a conflation of terms or collapsing difference and complexity. Yet these authors identify ways in which the social sciences may inform Jungian assessments of race and racism specifically and Jungian academic discourses more generally. In many ways, the research of Hobsbawm and Ranger, Gellner and Anderson mirror what has already been established in academic discourses on race and racism: these ideas have their own history and vary by geographical region (Law, 2010) and deserve to be understood for their complexity and difference.

We may argue that racism is not archetypal in the universalist sense, but it may be that patterns of thinking are actively promoted through cultures via education and the media, amongst other outlets. If racism is not some hard-wired, primordial image that is inherited, then its construction can be challenged so that different accounts may be told and different patterns may arise. While I do not wish to evoke the problems associated with a classical definition of archetypes, such as the tendency towards gross over-generalisation, it would be unfair to say that Jung did not leave some room for revision in his thinking. Every archetype
is bipolar in nature and archetypal images can express the multitude of variations associated
with a particular cultural pattern. If, for example, racism is framed as an expression of the
scapegoat archetype, we can bring greater attention to the transformative aspects of the
scapegoat while still acknowledging the psychological process by which unwanted, negative
traits are projected onto others. Taken one step further, what would be of interest is not the
constellation of the scapegoat archetype per se, but rather a proclivity to impose a scapegoat
narrative to frame our understanding of either a situation or interaction. What analytical
psychology provides is a framework that celebrates similarities and differences, the archetype
and the archetypal image. Equally, we have to assess our own uses of and desires for
imagined communities, and how experiences of racism, if left unresolved, may lead to the
formation of complexes that inevitably shape our individual and collective identities. We can
all too easily fall in love with being the victim as much as we hate being victimised.

Crucially, I have always understood Jung’s psychology—despite its limitations—as a
psychology of hope, and that the various complexes and archetypal patterns that tyrannically
shape our behaviour can be dispelled through greater consciousness and understanding. A
critical engagement with our ‘preferred’ Jungian tools is a part of this process. Rather than
seeing critical analysis as a degradation of the ‘psyche and soul’ of our discipline, I see it as
central to the Jungian project that is completely aligned with the radical hope that defines
analytical psychology. We see patterns and witness how damaging they can be (personally,
sociologically and theoretically). We are also empowered with a voice to say ‘no’ to these
patterns, stopping its deleterious perpetuation.

My wish to disrupt the status quo and to explore the ways in which Post-Jungian thinking can
challenge racism finds further expression in my role as a teacher. We need to radically
overhaul and reflect upon the ways in which racism is proffered, whether consciously or
unconsciously, through what we teach and the way we teach. De-colonising the curriculum is
not limited to exposing students to ‘minority’ writers and intellectuals, although this is a
crucial step in the right direction. Rather, curricula need to include a serious consideration of
white fragility and white privilege in the context of studying racism, as DiAngelo suggests
(2011). In this regard, I have in mind the practices of anti-oppression pedagogy, which
critically locates and addresses systems of oppression, while cultivating greater self-
awareness of how we inadvertently uphold existing structures and fail to facilitate both an
intellectual and embodied social justice. The key question to ask is whether Jungian and Post-
Jungian Studies can play a part in this, given the colonial mind-set embedded within
analytical psychology itself (Clarke, 1994). Yet such a possibility is worth further exploration
in light of Kevin Kumashiro’s (2000) assessment of the role psychoanalysis may play in anti-
oppressive education.

11 Conclusion

We do not have a definitive Post-Jungian position on racial hybridity. My aim has been to
start a necessary conversation that leaves the door open to a fluid approach to a topic that in
itself is constantly shifting. Our thinking must reflect this flexibility and it must be aware of
the shadow aspects of benign, psychological explanations that focus only on ‘dialogue’ and
rapprochement.

Having multiracial children of my own, and having encountered racism in its many forms, led
me to explore the ways in which Lee negotiated his own position as father to multiracial
children. Lee’s projection of his own psychology onto his mixed-race son provides a
framework for understanding the symbolic significance of racial hybridity, and the strong emotions it evokes. And, much like Lee, I find myself trying to deconstruct stereotypes in a field where Asians are the minority and visibility is limited. In such a context, what might individuation look like for those identifying as multiracial (as seen from the standpoint of a father struggling to make sense of racial hatred)?

According to Vannoy Adams (1996), individuation includes encountering the other, an exploration of what other cultures evoke in us and how this facilitates personal growth and insight. We must also reconsider whether individuation is the sole possession and ‘right’ of victims. As victims endure abuse, we may assume they are in a prime position to transform injustices, seeing them as opportunities for individual, psychological growth. Can both victim and aggressor be transformed in and by the racially-motivated encounter? Generalising narratives assume the fragility of the victim and the intransigence of the aggressor. Again, reality is much more complex. Victims are not always the fragile creatures we fantasise them to be. Equally, aggressors have the right to be understood, and the complexity of their motivations to be appreciated. If it were not so, victims would also be susceptible to dehumanising the other, both within and without. If we do not extend this courtesy to Jung, that of attempting to understand the individual in light of his problematic personal and intellectual positions, then all possibilities of a Jungian contribution to theorising racial and cultural hybridity should be abandoned.

In this paper, I have suggested a contextualised, psychological reaction and intellectual stance acknowledging that no two racially-motivated encounters are ever the same. There may be archetypal resonances and structural similarities motivating hatred, but how we comprehend each encounter can and must be different. What should be avoided is ‘one size fits all’ interpretations that collapse the complex ways with which racism may be dealt and in which it may be understood. From a Jungian perspective, we may frame cultural hybridity in terms of psychological liminality, so long as we acknowledge that culture itself is constantly in flux. We must recognise that the fixed positions from which such theorising inevitably stems is a stage on a path to developing a more nuanced psychology of hybridity that acknowledges the unconscious in all acts of racial hatred and, equally, our responses to it. In spite of Jung’s problematic statements about racial hybridity, I argue that his psychology draws its explanatory power by virtue of its place as a hybrid psychology, which maintains a balance between multiple theoretical positions, the archetype and the archetypal image.

There can be no definitive recommendation on how the difficult task of recognising the other—both inner and outer—should be undertaken. I have found, however, Vannoy Adams’ (1996) observations on resilience and elasticity a strong starting point from which a constructive perspective may be formulated:

The self is more resilient and more elastic than we may sometimes imagine (so, too, is the other). Identity formation and transformation entail not a mere zero-sum gain and loss but multiplication of cultural possibilities in the construction of a resilient, elastic, multicultural self that expands to include the other. An encounter with the other can have a multiplier effect on the self. We may eventually contain multitudes. In contact with the other, even as we gain identity, we may still retain or maintain identity. (In the process, we may lose something, too, but it need not be ourselves; it may be only the bias that we project, consciously or unconsciously, onto the other).
Moving towards the ideal of a multicultural Self will not be easy, given the highly charged and divisive nature of the topic under consideration. I take strength, however, from Beth Lofreda and Claudia Rankine’s (2016) description of holding in tension the many ways in which race and racism can and will be discussed:

For some it is nothing short of an assault, an assault no less painful because it is routine, an ordinary effect of negotiating a life in a world of people largely comfortable watching the assault go on, or at least willing to ignore its existence. It’s messy, and it’s going to stay messy. Which is the condition from which we start.

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1. I use this term rather than ‘biraciality’ because it better captures the complexities of the situation, both mine and that of others.

2. Equally, we need to acknowledge and explore the ways in which racism can and does exist within intimate relationships and families.

3. Calland uses the term ‘biracial’. Throughout this paper, I outline the reasons why the term ‘multiracial’ might better capture the complexity of racial hybridity, mainly, to resist the fallacy of fixed racial categories.

4. The on-going research of Emmy Louise Vye (2017) will fill this gap in scholarship.

5. I have raised similar concerns regarding the theory of cultural complexes, where a theoretical violence is inflicted on a more holistic and complex understanding of culture. In order for the concept to have explanatory power, it assumes that the same complex will be constellated in the same way for an entire group (Lu, 2013).

6. Anti-miscegenation laws were ruled unconstitutional in the USA in 1967.
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