

The Real Winner's Curse*

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Abstract: Traditional theories of democracy suggest that political representation of excluded groups can reduce their incentives to engage in conflict and lead to lower violence. However, this argument ignores the response of established elites when: i) their interests are threatened by the policy stance of new political actors, and ii) elites have a comparative advantage in the exercise of violence. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the narrow election of previously excluded left-wing parties to local executive office in Colombia results in a one-standard-deviation increase in violent events by right-wing paramilitaries. We interpret this surge in violence as a reaction of traditional elites to offset the increase in outsiders' access to formal political power. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that violence by left-wing guerrillas and other actors is unaffected, and that violence is not influenced by the victory of right-wing or other new parties in close elections.

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1 Introduction

In many countries, despite the presence of nominally democratic institutions, some political groups remain largely excluded from formal political power. Barriers include clientelism (Anderson, Francois and Kotwal, 2015), uneven access to economic resources (Baland and Robinson, 2008), violence (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2013), and other constraints on political participation (Naidu, 2012). Examples include blacks in the U.S. South prior to the Civil Rights Act, Islamic and Kurdish parties in Turkey between 1950-2002 and the left in Colombia and the Philippines prior to 1988. As a consequence, excluded groups often resort to violence to express their political views and as an attempt to influence the policymaking process and trigger political change.

However, these barriers may not be insurmountable and are often partly removed, enabling traditionally excluded groups to win elections and enter the political system. What happens when these outsiders gain formal political power? Does it lead to an increase or to a decrease in the overall level of violent conflict? One possibility is that giving excluded groups a voice and a stake in the political process strengthens democracy and promotes political stability. Prominent democracy scholars such as Przeworski (1991) argue that democratic elections, and more specifically the alternation in office of different parties, reduces the frequency of violent conflicts. Winning and losing elections is seen as a substitute for rebellion. Conflict may decrease as preferences of the opposition receive attention, which reduces their incentives for violent challenge (Regan and Henderson, 2002). Allowing formal channels of dissent may also discourage social unrest (Davenport, 2007). Similarly, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) granting political power to previously disenfranchised groups constitutes a credible commitment to future redistribution that prevents violent revolutions. Even politicians such as Bill Clinton have argued that elections provide an “antidote to international war and civil strife” (cited in Snyder (2000)).

These theories emphasize how access to power changes the incentives of those previously excluded to engage in violence. However, another likely implication is that, faced with electoral defeat by outsiders, powerful political elites who have previously enjoyed a monopoly of power will feel that their interests are threatened and respond with violence to avoid policy changes and prevent these groups from gaining additional formal power. The violent response of political elites to electoral victories by outsiders is a common phenomenon; some examples are the military coups in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in response to the electoral victories of the left.

However, it is hard to assess if these historical episodes are isolated cases or whether the increase in violence following electoral victories by outsiders is a more systematic phenomenon. Cross-country analyses also suffer from omitted variable bias and thus a within-country analysis may be better suited to study these questions.

This paper examines elite responses to previously excluded parties gaining local representation in Colombia, where we assess whether the victory of left-leaning parties in mayoral elections reduces or instead generates (or exacerbates existing) violence. We use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on close elections and compare municipalities in which the left narrowly won versus narrowly lost the mayoral race. Our results show that a narrow left-wing victory leads to up to 7.3 additional yearly violent events per 100,000 inhabitants by right-wing paramilitary groups during the subsequent government term, a sizable effect equivalent to almost one standard deviation and over three times the sample mean. Importantly, we do not find a significant surge in violence when other (non-left-wing) parties win by a small margin and find no comparable increase in paramilitary (or any type of) violence in the year *before* narrow victories by left-wing candidates. Moreover, consistent with the idea that traditional elites incite violence to prevent left-wing groups from increasing their representation in local government, we show that the increase in violence is concentrated around the time of the subsequent local election.

Our study makes important empirical and theoretical contributions. Most of the existing empirical work focuses on how democracy (and more concretely, elections) may impact political violence. However, there are several challenges to estimating the causal effect of democracy on conflict. The introduction of elections may be endogenous to conflict dynamics. Moreover, elections are often introduced simultaneously across the territory and thus identifying the proper control group can be challenging. We do not estimate the causal effect of introducing elections, but rather focus on how the identity and preferences of election winners are critical for understanding when elections may exacerbate violence. This allows us to use close elections as a source of variation to estimate the causal effect of electoral victories by political outsiders on violence.

We also make an important theoretical contribution by proposing two conditions that are key to understanding when electoral victories by outsiders trigger more political violence from elites. First, elites must feel threatened by the policy platform of the new incumbents. Second, elites must have a comparative advantage in the use of violence thanks to their control over informal armies and their ability to operate with the complicity of key state institutions such as

the military or the judicial system. Existing theories tend to focus on the incentives of excluded groups to engage in violence. Our study shows that in order to understand the dynamics of political violence in democratic societies, it is important to consider as well the strategic response of elites, and how the institutional environment may condition their ability to engage in violence against newly elected groups.

2 The Election of Excluded Groups and Political Violence

The findings from the existing literature present a mixed picture regarding the relationship between the election of formerly excluded groups and political violence. Some studies find that elites invest in violence and other informal means to counteract formal political gains by outsiders. For instance, Bruce and Rocha (2015) show that after democratization in Brazil in the 1980s, turnout patterns were consistent with illiterate voter manipulation by elites aligned with the former dictatorship. Other studies show how elites can use their control over economic resources such as land to create patron-client relations and manipulate voter behavior. Examples include Baland and Robinson (2008) for Chile and Anderson, Francois and Kotwal (2015) for India. The Post-Bellum U.S. South provides a good example of a violent reaction (outside of a fully-fledged internal conflict setting), as Southern elites responded with lynchings to the enfranchisement of freed slaves. Naidu (2012) finds that lynchings and other methods of disenfranchisement such as literacy tests operated as complements rather than substitutes during this period.

Other papers find instead that political representation of formerly excluded groups decreases violence. For the Indian case, Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer (2012) find that an increase in the share of Muslim politicians in state assemblies results in a decline in the incidence of Hindu-Muslim riots. Similarly, Chandra and Garcia-Ponce (2019) find that the success of ethnic subaltern-led parties in India deters armed violence. Finally, Nellis and Siddiqui (2018) show that the election of secular incumbents reduces religious violence in Pakistan.

Other studies examine the introduction of elections more generally, again with conflicting results. Some suggest that they lead to a decrease in violence (Davenport, 2007; Fergusson and Vargas, 2013). But several others suggest that elections and “democratic transitions” nurture violence (Horowitz, 1993; Snyder, 2000). Most closely related to our context, Steele and Schubiger (2018) argue that democratic reforms and decentralization in Colombia may

have exacerbated existing violence. Consistent with our argument that elections may generate violence depending on the overall strength of the institutional environment, Collier and Rohner (2008) find that the introduction of democracy leads to an increase in political violence in poor (but not in rich) countries.

We propose a theory to rationalize some of the mixed findings in the literature and understand when does the election of outsiders trigger more or less violence. We build on the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) according to which, when operating in weak institutional settings, elites may react to a loss in *de jure* political power by investing in *de facto* methods such as violence or electoral manipulation to avoid substantial changes in equilibrium institutions and policies. We argue that opening the door for electoral victories of excluded groups is more likely to lead to increased violence by incumbent elites when two conditions are satisfied. First, the policy stance of the incomers is threatening to the interests of the elite. Second, elites must have a comparative advantage in the use of violence. This stems from their control over informal armies and because they anticipate not to face effective checks from (or even to enjoy collusion with) formal institutions or state actors such as the military or the judicial system. In other words, established elites often enjoy privileged connections with key state actors that enable them to engage in violence with limited consequences.

The first condition in our theory gives content to one of the key comparative static results in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008): elites are more likely to invest in violence when they have more to gain from repression. The second condition is more novel, since it recognizes that in weakly institutionalized environments gaining some form of formal political power (in our case, winning elections at the local level) does not guarantee a level playing field for the formerly excluded groups. Instead, established elites may (and often do) maintain a comparative advantage in the use of violence or other informal methods of influence to tilt political outcomes in their favor.

The Colombian context we study provides variation in these key conditions of our theory. As described in Section 3, the 1990s witnessed the creation and election of several new parties with heterogenous platforms and political leanings. An observable implication of our theory is that we should only observe an increase in elite-led violence following the election of left-wing parties that posed a threat to the interests of established elites, but not following the victory of new, non-left parties or of right-wing parties. Similarly, following the demobilization of many paramilitary groups in 2006, local elites partly lost their comparative advantage in the use of violence. Our theory suggests that the violent response to left-wing victories should become

weaker after 2006.

The prevalence or absence of these conditions can also help explain some of the divergent results found in the empirical literature discussed above. In the cases of Brazil and Chile, for example, outsiders were sufficiently threatening, and the overall institutional environment sufficiently weak and favorable to the elites, that they both wanted and could use violence or other informal means to preserve their relative political power. These examples are also significant in that they reveal that the elites' reaction is not simply through political violence. While violence may be the most natural informal method used, especially in conflict settings, others (such as voter manipulation) are also possible and may respond to a similar logic.

Finally, our theory is also relevant for understanding some recent episodes of political violence following the election of political outsiders. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's ascent to power and adoption of very different policies – including redrafting the constitution – triggered increased violence and a coup. Similarly, when Haiti transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide, a priest representing a new group in politics, won the election. Aristide proposed several reforms, such as a military under civilian control, higher redistribution and enforcement of tax collection. These policies generated violent reactions from the old elite, which culminated in a military coup in 1991 (Collins Jr and Cole, 1996). Naidu, Robinson and Young (2017) find that elite families were more directly likely to promote the 1991 coup, and also that the goods they sold enjoyed higher prices after the coup, confirming that Aristide's policies threatened their interests.

Another relevant example is Venezuela since 2007, featuring a strong leftist Chavista hegemony manifested in the PSUV (*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela*) and the persistence of Maduro in power after Chavez' death (Hetland, 2017). According to recent reports, the left-wing elite has reacted to losing local mayoral elections to the opposition by sentencing mayors to jail.¹ 'Colectivos' have also been accused by opposition and human rights groups of acting

¹BBC News, "Fifth Venezuela opposition mayor sentenced over protests". Available at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-40886198>. Last accessed: July 14, 2019.

Reuter News, "Factbox: Venezuela's jailed, exiled or barred opposition politicians". Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-factbox/factbox-venezuelas-jailed-exiled-or-barred-opposition-politicians-idUSKCN1G31WU>. Last accessed: July 14, 2019.

as government-sponsored paramilitary groups and engaging in violence against communities.² These actions illustrate the complicit relationship between Chavista elites and key state institutions that we alluded to before and gives them a comparative advantage in exercising violence with institutional acquiescence.

These examples also show that the exact identity of formerly excluded groups and elites is not important. Instead, the crucial issue is whether entrants are threatening to existing elites and whether the latter can engage in violence effectively. Thus, while in Haiti and Colombia the entrants were leftists challenging the old elite, in Venezuela we observe a leftist elite reacting to new entrants. In Egypt, instead, a key source of preference divergence concerns religion, and in other cases violence after political inclusion operates along regional and ethnic lines (an example is Ivory Coast's introduction of elections in 2010, won by the outsider group from the North but leading to ethnic tensions and violence after the incumbent from the South, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to concede power).

3 Context: Local Elections in Colombia's Political Landscape

Colombian politics were dominated by the Liberal and Conservative parties from independence until the late 20th century (Bushnell, 1993). Intermittent inter-party violence ended only with the *Frente Nacional* (National Front), a strict power-sharing deal which blurred the ideological line dividing the parties, ultimately seen as agents of different factions of economic elites. Indeed, the National Front openly excluded other political movements, among which peasants, workers and others ideologically aligned with the left stood out. Bipartisan dominance persisted after the National Front formally ended in 1974, and only collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the adoption of the 1986 electoral reforms and the enactment of the 1991 constitution.

The absence of political opportunities for outsiders and weak state presence in the Colombian periphery led to the formation of left-leaning guerrilla movements in the early 1960s (Bushnell, 1993). The most powerful were the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* – FARC), which signed a peace agreement with the government in 2016. In the late 1970s, to finance their activities the FARC and other guerrilla movements

²See for example, BBC News, “Venezuela crisis: The ‘colectivo’ groups supporting Maduro”. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47118139>. Last accessed: July 14, 2019.

began kidnapping and extorting wealthy individuals, particularly landowners. This precipitated the creation of paramilitary self-defense militias by local elites, which in many cases operated with at least the implicit complacency of the national army and local politicians (Dudley, 2004; Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2013).

By the early 1980s, increasing violence in rural areas and repression of left-leaning supporters motivated the government to negotiate with insurgents. As part of the peace talks, and to signal a credible opening of the country's democratic system, the electoral system was reformed to allow the direct election of local mayors by simple plurality rule starting in 1988. This reform sought precisely to give voice to excluded groups, especially the traditionally excluded left. The 1991 constitution further consolidated the opening of the political system and increased resources and devolved responsibilities to local governments.³

The reforms allowed left-leaning groups that had been historically excluded – such as groups of peasants, union workers, and others – to participate in local elections. These were not the only newcomers, however. Splinter factions of the traditional parties also emerged (party fragmentation is a well-documented fact of Colombian politics since 1991) as well as new political forces, ranging from indigenous movements to grassroots movements to new religious parties. Of these newcomers, however, the policy positions of left-wing parties were particularly threatening to the interests of local landowning elites.

The Colombian context we study is therefore characterized by three main features: (1) the declining importance of traditional parties, which had been largely stripped of their ideological differences and legitimacy and that had excluded other political actors with the signing of the National Front agreement (2) new political movements gaining access to the local political arena for the first time, following political reforms implemented by the national government (not local elites), and (3) the presence of both left- and right-wing armed actors in various parts of the country.

The distinction between these two types of violence is important and helps us interpret the findings of our investigation. Left-wing guerrillas are clearly anti-establishment, question the legitimacy of Colombia's democracy, and have not mingled systematically with political parties

³The 1991 constitution allowed citizens to collect signatures to either run independently without the support of any party, or to create a new party. In addition, public financing (proportional to the number of votes) and access to television was granted to all political parties. These reforms facilitated the creation of third parties and made politics more competitive.

or state actors. Given Colombia's history of political exclusion, the entry of the excluded left, with its radically different policy preferences, makes it hard to bargain a policy compromise. This creates incentives for a reaction by local elites, in particular in response to reforms imposed on them by higher levels of government. Right-wing paramilitaries, in addition, colluded with the establishment, especially the army and local land-owning elites. Their origin is local and thus they played no role in the democratizing reforms put in place by the national government in the late 1980s. However, in 1997 they joined forces under an umbrella organization called *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC) with clear political goals and explicit connections to local elites. Its leaders signed a secret pact in 2001 in which politicians (including state governors and members of Congress) called for an explicit role for the AUC in electoral politics (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2013). Their objectives were to strengthen the agrarian model of large landholdings and to use violence and intimidation to protect regional elites from social and political opposition (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, pg. 170).⁴

Crucially, in 2005 and 2006 the AUC came to an end following peace talks that started in 2003 under President Alvaro Uribe. Two key issues are important for our theoretical predictions. First, as noted in Villarraga-Sarmiento (2015, p. 230), the accords between the AUC and the government dismantled paramilitary regional structures and produced large demobilizations (both in terms of men and weapons) which reduced their capacity to exert violence. Several politicians were investigated and convicted for their links to paramilitary groups. Second, while some remnant paramilitary groups persisted and reproduced the former patterns of alliances with local political elites, at least part of the emphasis shifted to extracting rents from illegal industries (see Villarraga-Sarmiento (2015, p. 234)). In short, local elites had historically a comparative advantage in exercising violence with institutional acquiescence, which they could resort to (and our results suggest they did) following left-wing electoral victories. However, at least part of this comparative advantage was lost after 2006.

⁴Ch et al. (2018) show that paramilitary violence shaped local tax institutions and tax policies to favor the concentration of land by formalizing illegally dispossessed properties.

4 Empirical Strategy and Data

4.1 Data

4.1.1 Violence

Our violence dataset was originally compiled by Restrepo, Vargas and Spagat (2003), and was updated through 2014 by Universidad del Rosario. These data have been widely used by scholars studying the Colombian conflict (e.g. Dube and Vargas, 2013) and are thoroughly described in Appendix Section A (p.1).

Violent events are coded for the period 1988 to 2014 as either an uncontested one-sided attack (e.g., shootings against the population, assaults on police stations, or an ambush on a military patrol) or a clash (in which two or more groups exchange fire). However, because the distinction between unilateral attacks and clashes can be noisy (for example, some clashes may have originally started as a unilateral attack), our main variable of interest is the number of violent events (attacks or clashes) involving paramilitary groups during the mayor's term following a narrow victory or defeat by the left. In order to take into account the size of municipalities, in our baseline specification we measure the number of events per 100,000 inhabitants.⁵ However, we also report the robustness of our findings to using unilateral paramilitary attacks as well as non-normalized measures of violence and to using casualties (rather than events) to measure conflict intensity. We also compute similar measures of violence involving the guerrillas and government to help rule out some alternative interpretations of our results.

4.1.2 Electoral results and party classification

We use the electoral data compiled by Pachón and Sánchez (2014), which is gathered from the Colombian national electoral authority, the *Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil*. Figure 1 describes the timing of local elections since their introduction and the availability of electoral data for our analysis. Local elections take place in October, and the term starts in January of the following year. For all elections between 1988 and 1994, there is no detailed information on the vote count of losers; only the total number of votes cast for the election winners are available. Thus, since our empirical strategy relies critically on knowing the identity of the

⁵Larger municipalities may have more rallies, political organizations or activists that could trigger a higher number of violent events. Mueller (2016) argues in favor of population normalized measures of civil war.

runner-up and the margin of victory, our analysis covers elections between 1997-2011.

[Figure 1 About Here]

Mayors who were elected in 1997 and 2000 (and who began their terms in 1998 and 2001, respectively) had three-year terms. However, starting in 2003, the terms were extended to four years, so the remaining election years of our sample are 2003, 2007, and 2011, with associated terms starting, respectively, in 2004, 2008, and 2012. Violence data, while starting early enough, are available only until 2014. Given the difference in term lengths across the sample, as well as the lack of violence data for 2015, for our main results we focus on the effect of left-wing victories on violence during the years available for the government term.⁶

A central part of our empirical exercise involves coding left-leaning parties (we also need to identify and code right-wing parties for key robustness exercises reported in Section 6). This is a challenging task, since there are 9,216 candidates who were either winners or runners-up in the 4,608 mayoral races during our period (we drop unopposed races from the analysis). We classified the ideology of 178 different parties, and of 212 independent candidates who did not run on behalf of any party. The coding of parties as left-wing, right-wing, or neither followed a three-step sequential procedure that is explained in detail in Appendix Section A.2 (p.1). Not all parties analyzed are included in our estimation sample, as some of them compete in races with wide winning margins or compete in races without a left-wing or right-wing party as a winner or runner-up. In particular, our baseline estimation sample of 254 races involving a left-wing candidate includes 51 parties of which 14 are left-wing, 3 are right-wing, and 34 are neither. Once we focus on the sample of races with a left-wing candidate and with a win margin within the optimal bandwidth of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), we end up with a sample of 152 races and 43 parties (13 left-wing, 2 right-wing and 28 neither).

4.1.3 Additional variables

For some of our robustness and mechanism tests we use additional data sources. We use data collected by Martinez (2017) on local government performance and the extent to which mayors and other local officials were involved in corruption. These will allow us to test the extent to

⁶The results using average violence during the first three years produce virtually identical results.

which municipalities under left-wing parties were targeted because of their poorer (or better) governance and corruption. We also collected data on a broad range of predetermined municipal characteristics to assess the validity of our identification strategy.⁷

Finally, throughout our analysis we drop cities with a population greater than 300,000. Institutions and state presence are much stronger in large cities and thus violent events from the guerrilla and paramilitaries are more rare.⁸ In Appendix Table A1 (p.4) we present descriptive statistics for our main variables of interest.

4.2 RD Design

The electoral victory of a left-wing candidate is plausibly correlated with a wide range of municipal-level socio-economic characteristics. Thus, a naive comparison of violent events across municipalities with and without newly elected left-wing mayors may confound the effect of other local characteristics. In order to address this problem, we use an RD approach based on close elections.

We exploit the fact that a mayor’s partisan affiliation changes discontinuously at the threshold between a left-wing party’s victory or loss. Our empirical analysis is based on regressions of the form:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 L_{it} + \beta_2 f(X_{it}) + \beta_3 L_{it} \times f(X_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} is the outcome variable and L_{it} is a dummy for whether a left-wing party won the race. $f(X_{it})$ is a polynomial in our forcing variable, the left wing party margin of victory, and ε_{it} is an idiosyncratic error term.⁹ Throughout our empirical analysis we focus on the sample

⁷A detailed description of all the variables and their sources is available in Appendix Section A.3 (p.3) and Appendix Table A2 (p.5), including those used for robustness, falsification tests, and testing the underlying mechanisms.

⁸Of the 12 Colombian cities of this size, only four held elections in which a left-wing party won or came second during our sample period. Only in Bogotá (in 2003 and 2011) and Bucaramanga (in 2003) was the winning margin within our optimal bandwidth. Our main results remain largely unchanged when we include these two cities (which had a total of three races that fit the criteria).

⁹ X_{it} is the vote share of the left-leaning candidate minus the vote share of the non-left candidate. The vote share is computed as a fraction of the total number of votes obtained by

of races in which the left-wing candidate either wins or comes second.

Estimation of our coefficient of interest, β_1 , can be done both parametrically and non-parametrically in a narrow bandwidth. Bandwidth choice implies a trade-off between efficiency and bias. Too narrow bandwidths affect statistical power while too large bandwidths may introduce bias as units on either side of the threshold become less comparable. To address this issue, we use the data-driven bandwidth selection procedure by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), and their biased corrected estimate with robust standard errors to different bandwidth sizes.¹⁰ We also verify the robustness of our result to different bandwidth sizes (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) and the order of the local polynomial employed. Following Gelman and Imbens (2018), we do so only for local linear and local quadratic polynomials.¹¹

Our empirical approach relies on several assumptions.¹² A first critical assumption is that other covariates, besides our treatment variable, vary smoothly at the threshold and thus, any discontinuous change in violence is only attributable to the partisan affiliation of the electoral mayor. To test this, we follow de la Cuesta and Imai (2016) and report in Appendix Table B1 (p.8) estimates of β_1 based on regression (1) for different municipal characteristics measured at baseline (i.e. prior to the close race) as outcomes. Reassuringly, we find no statistically significant differences at the threshold between treatment and control municipalities for all of these variables.

Our second identification assumption is no systematic manipulation of the electoral results around the threshold. Testing for sorting around the threshold is a useful way of examining potential manipulation. We thus follow McCrary (2008) and check the distribution of our forcing variable around the winning threshold. A discontinuous jump in either direction would indicate the top two candidates in the race. Thus, our treatment variable $L_{it} = 1$ if $X_{it} > 0$ and $L_{it} = 0$ if $X_{it} < 0$.

¹⁰This approach improves over Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidth selector that minimizes the approximate mean square error and produces too large bandwidths (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014).

¹¹In all regressions we use triangular kernel weights which give more weight to observations closer to the cut-off (de la Cuesta and Imai, 2016).

¹²Eggers et al. (2015) present a thorough discussion of the assumptions behind regression discontinuity designs based on close elections. Moreover they validate some of the key assumptions for over 40,000 close elections across the world, finding for example, little systematic evidence of manipulation.

that the left is systematically more or less likely to win close races. Figure 2 shows the results of this test, and reports the statistic of the null hypothesis of no jump in the distribution. We find no jump in the density at the threshold.¹³

[Figure 2 About Here]

5 Main Results

5.1 Baseline results

In Table 1 we report our main result: electing a left-wing mayor leads to a substantial and statistically significant increase in subsequent right-wing paramilitary violence. Panel A reports the non-parametric estimates following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) and Panel B the parametric estimates of the treatment effect.¹⁴ Columns 1 and 5 include no controls; Columns 2 and 6 control for time-invariant geographic characteristics of the municipalities (altitude, average historical rainfall, distance to Bogotá, and region-specific dummies); Columns 3 and 7 include pre-determined socio-economic and political controls (vote share of left- and right-wing presidential candidates in 1994, rurality, literacy rates, and presence of coca crops); and Columns 4 and 8 include all the controls simultaneously. While in principle the inclusion of these covariates should not have a major impact on the coefficients, doing so may help improve the precision of the estimates (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).

[Table 1 About Here]

The non-parametric estimates are positive and statistically significant across all specifications. The parametric estimates are of similar magnitude though not always statistically significant under a linear polynomial specification, but are statistically significant (and of similar magnitude) to the non-parametric estimates under the quadratic polynomial. However,

¹³The estimate is 0.09 with a standard error of 0.24.

¹⁴In Panel A, we implement Calonico et. al 2014's bias correction and robust standard errors, as well as their optimal bandwidths for local polynomials of orders one (Columns 1 to 4) and two (Columns 5 to 8). Optimal bandwidths range from 4.8% to 14.4% depending on the controls included. Estimates in Panel B fit linear and quadratic polynomials (in Columns 1–4 and 5–8, respectively) and restrict the sample to that defined by the optimal bandwidth computed for the non-parametric case fitting a local linear polynomial and including no controls (0.09).

the parametric estimates should be interpreted cautiously since they do not include the bias correction and the robust standard errors suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).

The non-parametric estimates suggest that the election of a left-wing mayor leads to an additional 5 to 7.3 violent events per 100,000 inhabitants per year during his or her term. This increase is substantively large. It is equivalent to 2.2 to 3.2 times the sample mean and 64–92% of a standard deviation. Despite our very small sample by the standards of typical RD analyses, the coefficients are statistically significant at standard confidence levels. Moreover, our results do not depend on our choice of bandwidth, and are robust to considering less-competitive elections. Panel A of Figure 3 shows the estimated coefficient and the 95% confidence interval using a wide range of bandwidths. The effect of a left-wing electoral victory on paramilitary events remains positive and statistically significant for bandwidths as small as 0.05 and as large as 0.15.¹⁵ In all remaining analyses in the paper we restrict all samples to the optimal bandwidth for the linear, non-parametric and no-controls case (0.09). This guarantees that none of the robustness or mechanisms tests are driven by changes in the sample of races considered.

[Figure 3 About Here]

Figure 4 illustrates these findings based on the parametric estimates for polynomials of orders one and two (displayed in the left- and right-hand side panels, respectively). Each point represents the average of our paramilitary events variable within bins of equal size. Linear and quadratic fits (based on the raw, unbinned data with no controls) are depicted together with the bin averages. A statistically significant jump in the number of violent events across the threshold is evident in both figures.

[Figure 4 About Here]

5.2 Robustness to violence measures

Our findings are robust to alternative measures of violence. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 we show that the election of a left-wing mayor causes an increase in 14–18.8 casualties per 100,000 inhabitants from violent events involving paramilitaries. The point estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. This variable captures the intensity (and not only the occurrence) of

¹⁵In order to compare the size of the effects across multiple outcomes, Figure 3 reports the effects on standardized outcomes.

violent events. We also show that our results are robust to using as dependent variable a dummy for whether at least one event involving paramilitaries took place (columns 3-4). Estimates suggest a left-wing victory is associated with an increase in 27 to 30 percentage points in the likelihood of paramilitary violence. Finally, in columns 5-6 we use a negative binomial model to show that our findings are similar if we use as dependent variable the unnormalized number (count) of violent events.¹⁶

[Table 2 About Here]

5.3 Robustness to party coding

Even after following a very strict three-step procedure to code the ideology of political parties, some parties were left coded as neither left- nor right-wing in our baseline analysis. In Appendix Section B.2 (p.6) and Appendix Table B3 (p.10) we show that our estimates remain similar if we drop these unclassified parties (Panel A), or if we code the ideology for some of them as the same as their parent party (Panels B and C).

5.4 Ruling Out Pre-Existing Trends

An important robustness check is to show that a left-wing victory is not correlated with pre-election trends in paramilitary (or other forms of) violence. We study this in Panels D to F of Figure 3, where we plot RD estimates (for several bandwidths) of the effect of a left-wing electoral victory on violence in the year before the election. All the point estimates for paramilitary and guerrilla violence are statistically insignificant for both small and relatively larger bandwidths. Estimates for events involving the government are also statistically insignificant for our preferred bandwidth of 0.09 and smaller bandwidths (estimates for larger bandwidths should be interpreted cautiously as municipalities far away from the threshold are less comparable to each other).

6 Alternative Interpretations

So far we have focused on events involving the paramilitary, arguing that such events best exemplify the type of violent response that traditional elites might exert when facing increased

¹⁶In Appendix Table B2 (p.9) we show that our estimates are robust to using unilateral attacks (rather than total events) as a measure of paramilitary violence.

access to formal political power by left-wing outsiders with sufficiently different (and threatening) political preferences. However, there are other potential interpretations of our results.

We start by examining the impact of a narrow left-wing electoral victory on other types of violence. It is important to rule out, for instance, the possibility that paramilitary violence might have risen in response to either increasing or decreasing guerrilla violence. If the armed and democratic left are strategic complements (substitutes), then we would expect a spike (decrease) in guerrilla violence following a left wing victory. In turn, because of their counterinsurgent nature, paramilitaries are likely to react to these dynamics with violence, either by contesting an empowered armed left or by filling the power vacuum left by a guerrilla retreat (Prem et al., 2018). Likewise, the surge in paramilitary violence may be partly driven by a change in government operations following a left-wing victory. Finally, another alternative is that left-wing mayors are simply unable to curb (any type of) violence, perhaps because they do not prioritize security and law and order (see Appendix Section A.2, p.1).

We reject these hypotheses. In panels B and C of Figure 3 we show that neither guerrilla nor government events change differentially in municipalities in which a left-wing candidate narrowly wins versus comes second. The results for guerrilla events, who share the ideological leanings of winners, also contradicts theories that emphasize *reduced* violence of outsider groups following their political inclusion. The absence of an effect on government events is worth discussing further. While paramilitaries often acted with complacency and sometimes collusion of the armed forces, institutional checks on government forces behavior are not altogether absent. Official government forces cannot openly target the left without consequences and where abuses have been confirmed there have been legal consequences. Thus, local elites had to rely on paramilitaries (rather than on government forces) to exert violence against the left.

[Table 3 About Here]

Another hypothesis is that left-wing parties and politicians are targeted not because they advocate policies that are contrary to the interests of traditional elites, but because their governments are corrupt or perceived as inept. The contrary is also a plausible: the left may be more honest and competent than previous local administrations, and hence may be targeted for changing the way in which municipalities are traditionally run. While measuring corruption is challenging, in Panel A of Table 3 we use reports from the *Procuraduría General de la Nación*, the government Watchdog Agency, to test whether in places where the left won, the mayor

(Columns 1 to 3) or other top municipal officials at the rank of secretary (Columns 4 to 6) are more likely to be investigated for misconduct (Columns 1 and 4), found guilty (Columns 2 and 5), or removed from their post (Columns 3 and 6). We find no evidence that left-wing mayors or their secretaries are more corrupt than municipal executive officials from other parties. The point estimates are statistically insignificant. Furthermore, in Panel B, Columns 1 to 3, we look at the three indices of government performance described in Appendix Section A.3 (p.3), as well as municipal capital and current fiscal expenditure, to check whether left-wing mayors spend more than non-left-wing incumbents (Columns 4 and 5). We find no evidence that left-wing mayors perform worse than those from other parties.¹⁷ In short, the evidence does not corroborate the hypothesis that the violent reaction we observe is driven by higher (or lower) corruption levels or the poorer (better) governance of left-wing mayors.

7 When Does Violence Increase Following the Election of Formerly Excluded Groups?

In this section we explore some of the empirical implications of the theory outlined in Section 2. We argue that violence spikes when the policy stance of the incomers is threatening to the interests of the elite. However, another possibility is that due to the weak legitimacy of the democratic system in Colombia, a violent reaction would have taken place after a narrow victory of other parties as well. For example, increased violence may follow the election of a candidate from any party on the extremes of the ideological spectrum. The most natural comparison is assessing the impact of narrow electoral victories of right-wing parties on levels of violence. Table 4 reports the estimated impact on different types of violence of narrow victories by right-wing versus non-right-wing parties in mayoral elections in Colombia during our sample period. There is no evidence of an effect on either total events (aggregated across all groups), or on events involving the paramilitary or guerrilla groups. The estimates are small, statistically insignificant and robust to varying the estimation bandwidth across a large range of values (Appendix Figure B1, p.12).¹⁸ In sum, and in line with our expectations given the nature of Colombia's political history, the right is not a political outsider, and thus its victories are less

¹⁷These estimates, especially those reported in Columns 2 and 3, are based on a smaller subset of years due to data availability.

¹⁸Moreover, Appendix Figure B2 (p.12) shows that there is no significant evidence of manipulation of the running variable around the threshold in close elections in which right-wing

threatening to existing interest groups with the capacity to react violently.

[Table 4 About Here]

Another possibility is that our estimates simply reflect the effect of the electoral victories of *new* parties. As discussed in Section 3, the 1991 Constitution facilitated the creation of new political movements across the entire ideological spectrum, many of which (leftist or not) have been electorally successful in some municipalities. Thus, the violent response of paramilitaries may reflect a more general reaction to the threat of new political actors to traditional elites' grip on power, and not necessarily a reaction to left-wing ideology, more contrary to their interests. To address this possibility we first follow Galindo-Silva (2015) and code as a *new party* any party in a given municipality that (1) is not one of the two traditional parties (Conservative and Liberal) and (2) has never won an election in that municipality. We then estimate the effect of a narrow electoral victory of a new party on paramilitary violent events. Importantly, we drop from our estimation sample all left-wing parties and thus isolate the effect of new parties that were not associated with a left-wing ideology. The effect of narrowly electing a mayor from a non-left new party on paramilitary events is reported in Appendix Table B5 (p.13). The estimates are very small and statistically insignificant. This implies that our results are related to the ideological stance of left-wing parties, and are not explained by the fact that left-wing parties were simply new to the local political arena. In the Colombian context, only left-wing parties seem to have been particularly threatening to the interests of local elites.

Next, we explore what happens to the effect of left-wing victories on paramilitary violence after 2006, when the largest paramilitary groups (which by then had joined forces under the AUC umbrella organization) demobilized after signing a peace agreement with the government, substantially decreasing the ability of local elites to engage in violence. Table 5 interacts the dummy of a left-wing victory with a time indicator that captures all local elections that took place after 2006 (i.e., in 2007 and 2011). The estimated interaction coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of a left-wing victory in elections after 2006 is equal to zero, which suggests that the increase in violence following the narrow election of left-wing candidates has noticeably decreased after the demobilization of the AUC.¹⁹ This is consistent with our idea that a violent reaction only emerges when there is a comparative advantage in violence emerging from the existence of parties are either the winners or the runners-up.

¹⁹We must nonetheless interpret this result cautiously, since a simple time dummy may also

informal armies and leniency or complicity from state institutions: once the AUC demobilized, the remaining splinter paramilitary groups did not enjoy the same collusion with local political and economic actors, or with the armed forces.

[Table 5 About Here]

One alternative interpretation is that the paramilitaries' violent response to left-wing victories was to protect their illegal rents from activities such as drugs and mining, rather than to protect the economic and political interests of local elites. The distinction between elite and paramilitary interests is not so clear-cut in practice and has changed over time. Most paramilitary groups emerged as self-defense armies put together by local elites to protect their control over land (economic interests) and over political power (political interests). This was particularly the case during the period 1997-2006 when they came together under the umbrella organization AUC with explicit political objectives. Once created, many of these groups became involved in illegal industries, particularly mining, smuggling and cocaine production. Following official demobilization in 2006, some splinter paramilitary groups remained active but these were more focused on illegal industries. The findings in Table 5 are relevant for addressing this issue. If the main goal of paramilitary violence was to protect illegal economic rents, the violent response to left-wing victories should have been similar after 2006. In Appendix Section B.4 (p.14) we provide additional evidence that suggests that paramilitary violence in response to left-wing victories was not larger in places with illegal rents (coca and mining), but was particularly important in places where local elites benefited from controlling political office, in particular in places where they had controlled office in the past and where they could engage in corrupt practices to extract rents from government revenues.

The timing of the observed increase in paramilitary events following left-wing victories also has implications for our interpretation. We argue that in order to avoid the consolidation of political power in the hands of left-wing parties, paramilitaries are likely to concentrate their violent reaction as the subsequent elections approach, thus preventing the left from winning capture other changes that took place after 2006 in Colombia in addition to the demobilization of paramilitaries. For example, it may indicate an overall improvement in institutions and state capacity in the last decade, changes in the electoral law that may have shifted the incentives of political parties, or that left-wing platforms may have become less threatening to the interests of the elite.

again. Known paramilitary tactics include “terrorizing voters to vote in particular ways, ... to stay away from the polls so they could stuff ballots, voting instead of citizens by confiscating their identify cards, terrorizing politicians so that they would not run against their preferred candidates, and manipulating subsequent vote totals electronically” (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2013). Additional case-study and anecdotal evidence on paramilitary violence against left-wing activists or politicians can be found in Appendix Section B.6 (p.20). Table 6 presents estimates of the effect of electing a left-wing candidate as mayor on paramilitary violence during each year of his or her term in office.²⁰ The point estimates suggest a pattern in which violence tends to spike right after the left-wing candidate is elected and, more significantly, approaching the year of the subsequent election. The coefficient for the first year is positive (4.4), while the coefficient for the second year is small in magnitude. However, the coefficients for the third year (13.6) and the year of the subsequent election (21.3) are substantially larger than the baseline estimates.

[Table 6 About Here]

These politically motivated increases in paramilitary violence following left-wing victories may have had downstream effects on future elections. While the role of violence on future electoral outcomes is not the main focus of this paper, in Appendix Section B.5 (p.18) we show that paramilitary violence appears to have been effective and made the next election less competitive and generated a stronger incumbency *disadvantage* for left wing parties in Colombia.

8 Discussion

In the late 1980s and early 1990s Colombia undertook a number of democratizing reforms, most notably the introduction of mayoral elections. The opening up of the political system marked the entry of traditionally excluded groups, particularly left-leaning parties. But these reforms, and the overall shift towards a more inclusive set of institutions, threatened the traditional balance of power in authoritarian enclaves where economic and political elites held a significant amount of both institutionalized and illegal (violent) power, a feature that is typical of countries with an uneven distribution of functioning institutions. This feature has been the focus of

²⁰Recall from Section 4.1 that mayoral terms are either 3 or 4 years.

the “subnational authoritarianism” strand of political science literature, which emphasizes the coexistence of national-level democratization and local authoritarianism (see Gibson (2014)).

We show that left-wing party victories in mayoral elections in Colombia triggered a surge in violence by right-wing paramilitaries. Our findings, however, raise some important questions. For example, why do political elites agree to open up the political system in the first place? If they are powerful enough to respond to the electoral success of outsiders with violence, shouldn't they be able to prevent reforms that threaten their local monopoly of power? We posit that this is due to two main reasons. First, democratization is often conceded by national elites, not by the local elites, following pressure from national interest groups and the international community. Hence, these reforms are often imposed exogenously on local elites, and thus their only alternative is to respond with strategies of boundary control that, given the low state capacity in weakly institutionalized societies are able to coexist with democratizing national reforms. The resulting coexistence of local elites' control with democratizing national reforms in a context of low state capacity is described in Robinson (2016). The second reason has to do with uncertainty about the outcome of future elections. Traditional political groups may overestimate their electoral success (or underestimate the appeal of outsiders), thus gambling their chances of losing power when the reform is adopted and therefore engaging in violence only after and not before the elections, once they have lost.

We also emphasize that while elites were able to react with violence, elections were not fully ineffective. On the one hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that the reforms opening the political arena did generate significant gains in Colombia for these groups.²¹ Also, after 2006 we do not observe a violent reaction anymore, suggesting that sustaining violence against opponents may not be possible for too long.²²

²¹For example, in major cities like Bogota the left was able to hold local office without facing violent retaliation. Left-wing parties have also led legislative initiatives in Congress and have played an important role both in the opposition and as part of larger government coalitions.

²²Albertus and Menaldo (2018) suggests that, in some cases, outgoing authoritarian elites may rig the system sufficiently that the new democratic regimes represent few material changes for them. In theory, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) note, an “invariance” result with no effects on the political and economic equilibrium because the investments in *de facto* power of the elite fully counteract the increase in *de jure* power of the non-elite group is possible, yet this is a polar case and *de facto* investments may fail to fully compensate for *de jure* gains.

One implication of our findings is that several dimensions of institutions must effectively function together in order for democracy to prosper. Open elections that are not accompanied by a state monopoly over violence, or by checks and balances against the disproportional accumulation of political power in the hands of a few individuals, may have unintended negative consequences. The absence of strong and functioning institutions across all dimensions is likely to lead to *see-saw* effects in elites' use of different forms of power. When democratizing reforms strengthen political institutions, elites may simply switch their investments away from the formal exercise of political power, and towards other more violent means to preserve their influence and power. Our findings are thus relevant for other countries in which the political system is opened up in a context of weak institutions and informal means of local authoritarian control over the territory.

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
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Figure 1: Election years and available data



Source: Authors' own.

Figure 2: McCrary test: Sorting around the winning threshold for the left






Figure 3: Effect of electing a left-leaning mayor on measures of violence without controls and optimal bandwidth for each group

Violent events during term in office by group




Violent events in year before elections by group



Notes: The solid line marks the Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth. Non-parametric estimates with bias correction, robust standard errors, triangular kernels, and linear local polynomials (Calonico et al., 2014). The point estimate and confidence interval in red corresponds to the CCT estimate.

Figure 4: Effect of electing a left-leaning mayor on the average yearly violent events involving paramilitaries



Notes: Observations displayed within Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)'s optimal bandwidth for the linear, non-parametric and no-controls case (0.09). Left: linear fit. Right: quadratic fit.

Table 1: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary violence

Dependent variable: <i>Average yearly violent events involving paramilitaries (per 100,000 inhabitants) during term in office</i>								
	Linear polynomials				Quadratic polynomials			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: <i>Non-parametric estimates and robust standard errors of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)</i>								
Left-wing mayor elected	4.963** (2.344)	5.455** (2.307)	6.719*** (2.445)	7.273*** (2.621)	5.665** (2.469)	5.644** (2.400)	6.623*** (2.522)	6.769** (2.689)
Observations	152	129	108	99	205	135	156	140
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0700	0.0540	0.0480	0.144	0.0760	0.0930	0.0780
Panel B: <i>Parametric estimates</i>								
Left-wing mayor elected	4.225** (2.113)	4.136 (2.231)	4.128 (2.175)	4.198 (2.269)	5.469** (2.515)	5.475** (2.533)	6.148** (2.657)	6.215** (2.845)
Observations	152	152	151	151	152	152	151	151
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900
Controls	No	Geographic	Socio-Economic	All	No	Geographic	Socio-Economic	All

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** is significant at 5%, and *** 1% level.

**Table 2: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary violence
Robustness to alternative measures of the dependent variable**

Dependent variable:	Conflict casualties		Dummy any paramilitary violence		Count of violent events	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left-wing mayor elected	13.97*** (5.093)	18.79** (7.299)	0.274** (0.118)	0.299 (0.165)	0.526*** (0.156)	0.750*** (0.212)
Observations	151	151	151	151	151	151
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900
Polynomial order	1	2	1	2	1	2
Controls	All	All	All	All	All	All
Estimation Method	OLS	OLS	Probit	Probit	Neg. Bin.	Neg. Bin.

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** is significant at 5%, and *** 1% level. Non-parametric estimates and robust standard errors of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) in columns 1-2.

Table 3: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on corruption and government performance measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. <i>Dependent variable: Dummy for whether</i>						
	Mayor is			Top official is		
	investigated	guilty	impeached	investigated	guilty	impeached
Left-wing mayor elected	0.276 (0.272)	0.201 (0.156)	0.0906 (0.128)	0.153 (0.150)	-0.00149 (0.0562)	-0.0198 (0.0291)
Observations	100	100	100	100	100	100
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900
Polynomial order	1	1	1	1	1	1
Controls	All	All	All	All	All	All
Panel B. <i>Dependent variable: local government performance</i>						
	Index of			Capital	Current	
	fiscal performance	legal rules compliance	admin. capacity	expenditure	expenditure	
Left-wing mayor elected	-7.736 (4.831)	10.28 (8.686)	-11.16 (8.369)	0.303 (0.525)	0.0112 (0.406)	
Observations	98	61	61	148	147	
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	
Polynomial order	1	1	1	1	1	
Controls	All	All	All	All	All	
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** is significant at 5%, and *** 1% level. Non-parametric estimates and robust standard errors of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) in all regressions.						

Table 4: Effect of electing a right-wing mayor on violence

Dependent variable: <i>Average yearly events per 100,000 inhabitants during term in office involving:</i>				
	All groups (1)	Paramilitary (2)	Guerrilla (3)	Government (4)
Right-wing mayor elected	1.220 (1.250)	0.485 (0.629)	0.154 (0.404)	-0.0715 (0.549)
Observations	480	480	480	480
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900
Polynomial order	1	1	1	1
Controls	All	All	All	All

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** is significant at 5%, and *** 1% level. Non-parametric estimates and robust standard errors of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) in all regressions.

Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects by Timing of AUC Demobilization

Dependent variable: <i>average yearly events involving paramilitary</i> <i>(per 100,000 inhabitants) during term in office</i>		
	(1)	(2)
A Left-wing mayor elected	5.824** (2.582)	8.061** (3.122)
Post AUC demobilization	1.845 (1.572)	1.870 (1.607)
B Post AUC demobilization \times Left-wing mayor elected	-4.314** (1.794)	-4.456** (1.834)
Observations	151	151
R-squared	0.251	0.262
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0900
A + B	1.51	3.605
<i>H₀: A + B = 0</i>		
F-statistic	.53	1.96
P-value	.47	.16
(Local) polynomial order	1	2
Controls	All	All

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** is significant at 5%, and *** 1% level. Parametric estimates.

Table 6: Effect of electing a left-wing mayor on paramilitary events
Heterogeneous effects by year of violence after the election

Dependent variable: <i>Average yearly violent events involving the paramilitary</i> <i>(per 100,000 inhabitants) in year... of term in office</i>				
	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Next election
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left-wing mayor elected	4.373 (2.904)	0.477 (1.482)	13.59** (6.409)	21.29 (11.01)
Observations	151	151	151	117
Bandwidth	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900	0.0900
Polynomial order	1	1	1	1
Controls	All	All	All	All

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** is significant at 5%, and *** 1% level.
 Non-parametric estimates and robust standard errors of Calonico, Cattaneo and
 Titiunik (2014) in all regressions.