Hale, Christopher and Siroky, David (2023) Irredentism and Institutions. British Journal of Political Science, 53 (2). pp. 498-515. DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123422000151
Hale, Christopher and Siroky, David (2023) Irredentism and Institutions. British Journal of Political Science, 53 (2). pp. 498-515. DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123422000151
Hale, Christopher and Siroky, David (2023) Irredentism and Institutions. British Journal of Political Science, 53 (2). pp. 498-515. DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123422000151
Abstract
Why do states engage in irredentism? Expanding on previous scholarship, this article advances a new theory with rationalist microfoundations that accounts for the incentives of both elites and citizens to support irredentism in democracies and dictatorships. Our model suggests irredentism is more likely when it enables political elites to provide a specific mix of private goods, public goods, and welfare transfers to citizens who desire them at the lowest tax rate. This leads to the prediction that irredentism is most likely in majoritarian democratic electoral systems and military dictatorships, and least likely in proportional electoral systems and single-party dictatorships. We test and find supportive evidence for these expectations using a comprehensive dataset covering all observed and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | irredentism; public goods; institutions; computational model; conflict |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 14 Jun 2023 14:01 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 21:23 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/33887 |
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Filename: irredentism-and-institutions.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0