Negative partisanship in changing political contexts in Western Europe

Agnes Magyar

A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Government

University of Essex

Submitted: 27 Sept 2021

ABSTRACT

Negative partisanship (NPID), capturing strong antipathies developed towards one or more parties, is shown to be a fundamental motivation for political and interpersonal judgments and actions. Despite mounting interest in negative political attitudes lately, there is little discussion on how they changed throughout and can be understood in the context of the drastic transformations of the Western European ideological and partisan landscape in the past decades. This dissertation examines the extent and nature of NPID and what we can learn about its consequences in these changing political contexts.

The first chapter maps changes in the prevalence and nature of NPID over time. It shows a declining trend after decades of stability in the 2010s. I argue that this decline is indicative of disillusionment and disengagement with, instead of openness to, what the party system offers. I show that those most affected by this decline are also people that are the least invested in politics and who exhibit the highest indifference and alienation from parties. I argue that these tendencies have implications for the legitimacy of democratic actors and processes.

The second chapter re-examines the linkage between ideological polarization and negative partisanship in societies. NPID is fostered by polarisation along salient ideological conflicts within electorates, but the precise mechanism shifts with the changing relevance of different ideological cleavages over time and across political contexts. The growing dominance of populist ideas promotes new value-based and moralised conflicts that take precedent over the traditionally important left-right ideological extremity in motivating negative partisanship.

The third chapter examines the power of negative partisanship in making interpersonal judgments. Using an experiment to disentangle the effects of ideology and partisan labelling in the United Kingdom, the study demonstrates that hostility is largely driven by perceived ideological (in)compatibility. Nevertheless, when faced with out-partisans whose political views resemble those of oneself, people ignore similarities and make judgments based solely on the partisan ‘otherness’.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could not have been written without many, many people's help and encouragement in various ways: supervisors, colleagues, discussants, friends and family. I keep thinking back to this academic journey and I wish to thank everyone (in chronological order) who at any of the most important academic steps motivated, inspired and guided me.

I first wish to thank Dave Cutts, the supervisor of my undergraduate thesis, which in many respects was my very first academic brain child, for encouraging me to pursue a PhD, which I hardly even knew existed before our conversations. I am more than indebted to Jennifer Hudson, a truly inspirational supervisor, for hiring me as her RA before I even knew what one was; for all that support, wisdom, care and encouragement in an amazing year that truly laid the foundations to my academic pursuits. I am grateful to Dominik Duell for supervision of my MSc thesis, which in many ways was the motivation for this dissertation, and for all the discussion about experiments, academia and Political Psychology. I am mostly indebted to Rob Johns, my supervisor in the past 3 years for all the comments and incredibly generous criticisms that fundamentally shaped and improved my work. Most of all, thank you for all the time and effort, above and beyond what anyone would have expected, devoted to guiding me through the exciting and sometimes terrifying past three academic years. I am also extremely fortunate to have had Lawrence Ezrow, Dominik Duell and Roi Zur as the three members on my supervisory board. Without their suggestions, guidance and sometimes even harsh feedback, I would have never been able to complete this work. I am grateful to Elias Dinas for hosting my visit at the EUI and I thank all the fantastic EUI community for discussions and feedback on some of my work. I am also very thankful to loyal and uplifting academic friends: Sebastian Ronderos, Lydia Karga, David Liao, and the amazing Essex community; Paulina Lenik, Lotte Hargrave and all other wonderful UCL friends; Dominik

Brenner, Alfredo Sanchez and the rest of the CEU community. These past years have been turbulent and unpredictable and being able to rely on these wonderful friends wherever life took me was a source of unimaginable support. Most personally, I could have not gotten here without my family and my partner, Tamas. Thank you for thinking more of me than I could ever deserve, thank you for supporting me, putting up with me and caring for me. It means the world.

My PhD studies were generously funded by the University of Essex, and I gratefully acknowledge their support. I acknowledge that the fourth chapter of this dissertation is based on my master's thesis written in 2018. The whole chapter is my sole work and is not published. Datasets and codes for replication of the empirical parts of this thesis are available electronically upon request.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Negative political attitudes have been very relevant in the past few decades in discussing political behaviour and its consequences. Negative partisanship (NPID), the simple notion capturing that voters develop deep and lasting antipathies towards one or more political parties, is also increasingly in the spotlight both in academic discussions and in popular discourse.

The majority of research on negative partisanship is set in the United States where the notion is a particularly straightforward consequence of a hyperpolarised two-party standoff: in such sharpened political bipolarity identifying as a supporter of one party and identifying as an anti-supporter of the opposite one usually walk hand in hand. The discussion in Western Europe is only in its infancy. Yet, more and more researchers discuss the relevance and empirical characteristics of negative partisanship in European multi-party democracies. This is in part due to a climate where negativity is perceived to be notably strong and alarmingly present in everyday politics both at the elites' (Fridkin and Kenney, 2004; Fridkin and Kenney, 2008; Geer, 2006; West, 2018; Nai and Walter, 2005) and mass level (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020).

The peculiarity of the concept in Western Europe lies in the much more fragmented nature of party systems compared to the US. With more complex links between parties and the electorate and less straightforward bipolarity in political choice, explicit hostility could be a slightly different theoretical concept and empirical phenomenon. And indeed, authors have

recognised this and have made attempts to tailor the notion both in theory and in practice to be more fitting to Western Europe and more allowing to the specificities of its multi-party systems (Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Wagner, 2021).

Despite the wave of interest in researching negative partisanship in recent times, there are many open questions about its history, drivers and political and societal consequences. One such question is whether there have been any important changes in the prevalence and political relevance of being a negative partisan in the past decades in European societies. The significance of this question is that the European political landscape has undergone tremendous changes in the past decades.

Following the weakening of the structural and ideological linkages between traditionally dominant parties and their supporters that had begun in the second half of the 20th century, new challenges were posed to existing political structures by the processes of globalisation in the 1990s and early 2000s. These challenges resulted in unprecedented changes in the supply of politics. On the one hand, they resulted in changes to what the electorally most salient conflicts were, manifesting in the emergence of more moralised, value-based debates (Kriesi, 2010). On the other, changes in the supply of politics also became apparent in terms of actors, given the growing presence and electoral success of populist parties and forces. These parties capitalised on an agenda that challenged the legitimacy of traditional political parties and ways of representation (Rooduijn et al., 2014; Mudde, 2004; Mair, 2002; Galston, 2018).

There is much discussion in recent years of the crisis of democracy (e.g., Kriesi, 2020; Norris, 2020). The crisis of democracy is the alarming consequence of the overarching dominance of populist discourses and the crisis of established parties in representation. Through the crumbling of the public's trust in politics and political parties and growing

disengagement with democratic institutions (Pharr and Putnam, 2006; Torcal and Montero, 2006), these processes ultimately undermine the very idea of participatory democracy.

Rejection of certain parties is the very meaning of negative partisanship and as such, the notion is at the core of the crisis of democracy. At the same time, NPID is a complex phenomenon. From a civic culture approach, negative partisanship – through cognitive engagement and (negative) participation – could play a part in legitimising political competition and democratic institutions. From a normative standpoint, however, there are drawbacks of excessive mobilisation against a disliked party, namely less dialogue, or even hostility between voters of competing parties (Gerber et al., 2012; Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020). When it comes to the healthy working of liberal, participatory democracies, we certainly must understand *if*, *how* and *in what balance* these two aspects of negative partisanship foster or remedy political turbulence and how they poison or mediate social relations.

However, the literature on negative partisanship in Western Europe consistently fails to assess how the concept is placed in changing political contexts. Against unprecedented ideological and structural transformations that have laid the foundation to a whole new type of supply in politics, treating negative partisanship as unchanging is rather a limitation in understanding the true nature of the attitude at any given time point. But more than that, it is also a missed opportunity to paint a complete picture of global *trends* in attitudes towards parties and electoral institutions.

This dissertation explores the dynamics of negative partisanship in the very context of the ideological and political structural transformations in Western Europe's past 30 years. It looks at 1) how this context is relevant for how negative partisanship evolves, 2) how the way

in which NPID is fostered has changed throughout time and 3) what the current political climate means for the societal consequences of negative partisanship in societies.

This introductory chapter serves three main purposes. First, it lays out the theoretical and empirical foundations of a discussion of negative partisanship in Western Europe and elaborates on the areas that need more discussion. I will first introduce the history of the concept and the current theoretical consensus on the meaning and characteristics of NPID. This is followed by a summary of what can be learnt about the attitude and its correlates empirically, while mapping out limited scholarship. As I will discuss, one question that consistently motivates debates is that of ideal measurement. I argue that it is important to establish how proposed measures are related in order to provide a basis for the comparison of existing and future scholarship. Therefore, a second main purpose of this chapter is to address this question empirically. I will then introduce why the political context of the past three decades must be considered when discussing negative partisanship in Western Europe. This will include an elaboration on the ways that negative partisanship might be affected by or be part of widespread political and ideological transformations. Finally, I will introduce the structure of the thesis and summarise the areas that the three main chapters cover.

1.1 NEGATIVITY IN POLITICS

Negativity in politics has been a very relevant topic in the past few decades in discussing the current state of political communication and behaviour. Most scholars agree on the overwhelming dominance of negativity in contemporary elections and political communication – referring most commonly to forms of exchange between actors, ways of communication, the framing of political messages and types of campaign strategies (Fridkin and Kenney, 2004; Fridkin and Kenney, 2008; Geer, 2006; West, 2018; Nai and Walter,

2005) –, even if its increase in recent times is more contested (e.g., Buell and Sigelman, 2009; Lau and Pomper, 2004; Van Heerde-Hudson, 2011; Walter, 2014). The concerns attached to the phenomenon are largely fuelled by the fact that negativity, besides being a powerful tool to convey messages and mobilise unconvinced voters, also has damaging consequences on the public's attitudes towards parties and institutions. Negativity in communication increases distance between voters and the elites; de-mobilises the public and depresses their sense of efficacy; fosters suspicion and mistrust towards parties; and increases political polarization (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Thorson et al., 2000; Yoon et al., 2005; Capella and Jamieson, 1997).

Scholars widely agree that negativity is also present on the demand side (i.e., receiving end) of politics, referring to the public's mood and how they relate to political parties and their supporters (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020). The two sides (supply and demand) should not be confused, even though they are undeniably interconnected, as they should be in representative democracies with active, receptive citizenry. Citizens' demand in the content and tone of political agendas and messages should form in reaction to what and in what way things are presented to them by parties. In turn, parties' agendas and way of communication should equally respond to the communication styles and programmes the public is receptive to.

Much of the literature blames the power and prevalence of negativity in political communication (both in style and content) for heightening partisan animus and affective polarisation (i.e., negativity on the demand side). The role of negativity in the media is often highlighted in generating affective polarization (e.g., Levendusky 2013; Kelly Garrett et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2017). Through an almost unlimited choice of often specialised media outlets and the increasing partisan sorting of news sources (e.g., Sunstein 2017), consumers

are constantly reminded and kept alert of the weight of disagreements between the main parties or competing camps on multiple issues (Putz, 2002; Bougher, 2017). Partisan news normalises antagonism towards the opposition and reinforces hostility with the use of derogatory language (Berry and Sobieraj, 2014) and a steady focus on the opposition's perceived flaws, scandals (Budak et al., 2016).

Matters are only made worse by elite communication – particularly in intense campaigns – in channelling elite-level hostility onto the electorate's level. Campaigns amplify the salience of partisan identities (Michelitch and Utych, 2018) and, in the age of negative campaigning, portray the opposition as an existential threat (Bhat et al., 2016; Fowler et al., 2016). It is little wonder that electorates are much more polarised and hostile at the end of campaign periods. This is especially true for segments who are exposed to more intense negative campaigns (Sood and Iyengar, 2016; Iyengar et al., 2012).

At the same time, studies increasingly acknowledge the ways that negative campaigning and communication are *motivated by* demand contexts: societal conditions and conflicts. As Iyengar and Krupenkin (2018) argue, elites are heavily influenced by the rising importance of partisan affect on the side of the electorate. With the rise of affective polarisation elites are motivated to avoid cooperation with the opposition. They are also inherently motivated to uphold any existing perceived threats and prejudices attached to the opponents. As the authors argue, the very dominance of negative communication style and proliferation of negative message and degrading tactics (Geer, 2008; Grimmer and King, 2011) "provide stark testimony to the affective responsiveness of leaders to their electoral base" (Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018:215).

Scholarly works on agenda setting and conflict expansion show that societal contexts very much shape political dynamics (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Schattschneider, 1960).

By this logic, the existence, type, and strength of conflicts in society – partisan animus included – should indeed influence campaign strategies: "positive and optimistic campaigns in times of great conflict and upheaval might seem excessively tame, inappropriate", thus encouraging negative campaigns (Maier and Nai, 2022:2). Instead of blaming campaign negativity alone for negativity in partisan attitudes, we should increasingly be talking about a spiral of mass-elite negativity (Ornstein and Mann, 2000).

The subject of this thesis concerns negativity on the demand side of politics: hostilities felt towards parties and partisans. On the one hand, the previous discussion is a good reminder of the strength of negative partisan attitudes and their capacity to motivate negativity in campaigns and elite communication as well. On the other, it is also a good reminder to discuss NPID with clarity and the appropriate specificity in what type of negativity it refers to.

1.2 Deriving negative partisanship: history and theoretical consensus

Partisanship is one of the most frequently studied political attitudes that very few studies fail to consider when discussing political behaviour and matters of the vote. The main importance of the concept lies in its prevalence, stability, and importance in providing various shortcuts and cues to evaluate political parties, actors and events and in motivating political decisions and behaviour (Johnston, 2006). Early studies noted that negative partisan evaluations existed and were important to account for to understand the full spectrum of partisan predispositions. Nevertheless, for most of the early years in partisanship research the concept was almost exclusively coined as a positive attachment.

To derive and distinguish negative partisanship, it is important to first consider positive attachment to political parties. Partisanship refers to a broad range of motivationally distinct

understandings of feeling closer to a party in academic works. Over the years two main schools of thought emerged in conceiving of the foundations and nature of party attachment: an automatic, affective understanding and one that relates to more rational, conscious cognitive mechanisms.

The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) conceives of partisanship as a deeply rooted, affective predisposition. It develops early in voters' lives through the context of political socialisation and is stable through the strength of the linkages of socio-demographic and ethnic groups to political parties that traditionally represent them. Partisanship is connected to selective information processing and motivated political thinking, which have strong impact on perceptions and evaluations of actors, ideologies, and performance. It also has an influence on the likelihood of political participation and direction of political choice(s) (Zaller, 1992; Johnston, 2006). It even impacts how early or late voters make their electoral choices (Bassili, 1995; McGregor, 2012). These affective linkages are more enduring and consequential than more passing influences, such as political issues and characteristics of political candidates, in determining the vote and they persist against subsequent learning throughout one's political life (Johnston, 2006).

Later works, motivated by social identity theories (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel and Turner, 1985), reassessed the psychological basis of party attachment. They conceived of partisanship as an attitude formed specifically with reference to membership in groups (Greene, 2002; Huddy et al., 2015; Huddy et al., 2018). The peculiarity of this understanding is that it almost prescribes the existence of negative linkages towards parties, as (partisan) identities are defined and fostered in reference or opposition to other identities. In fact, without the existence of the out-group some layers of partisanship as a social identity are simply impossible to describe. At the same time, the shift in the conceptualisation reinforced the understanding of partisanship as motivated by affective, as opposed to cognitive, processes.

The social identity basis highlighted the stability of partisanship throughout one's lifetime and enhanced its significance in impacting political perceptions and behaviour (Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Johnston, 2006; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008).

These exclusively affective accounts of partisan identification were criticised by scholars who suggested that partisanship was primarily motivated by more cognitive processes. According to this understanding, partisanship does not develop automatically through political socialisation and traditional structural linkages. Instead, it is formed through cognitive assessment of how well or badly parties' previous programmes and performance resonated with people's preferences and lives. This account stresses the ability (and willingness) of voters to assess and re-assess short-term changes associated with political issues, candidates, parties' strategies, and performance (Fiorina, 1981; Holmberg, 2009). A fundamental distinction between the affective and rational understandings of partisanship is that the rational understanding offers a theory of change in party loyalties, as opposed to the rigidity of the attitude in the affective framework.

Potentially offering some consensus between the affective and the cognitive perspectives, scholars proposed that the very fundamentals of partisanship may also be people's well-founded ideological orientations (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006; Dalton, 2008). This idea emerged after considerable transformations of the structure of political allegiances (and the seemingly declining electoral impact of socio-demographic cleavages) in the US. The ideological account also appeared relatively suitable for partisan patterns in Europe (Bélanger et al., 2006; Holmberg, 2009; Klingemann, 1995). However, this is not true reconciliation. On the one hand, ideology arguably holds a more instrumental, cognitive dimension that is independent from senses of group belonging (emotion) or non-rational (socio-demographic) orientations (Holmberg, 2009). On the other, recent works in psychology increasingly maintain that ideology is more deeply engrained in voters' minds than previously envisioned

(van der Eijk et al., 2005). Studies suggest that "left-right ideological stances reflect, among other things, the influences of heredity, childhood, temperament or personality, and situational and dispositional variability in social, cognitive, and motivational needs to reduce uncertainty and threat" (Jost et al., 2009:317-318). Ideology, as Medeiros and Noël (2014) note, presents a particularly sharp bipolar political world that, by inducing conscious in- (favoured) and out- (disliked) positions (Jost et al., 2009), fosters a mindset based on oppositions rather than consensus more so than socio-demographics. And as such, ideology provides fertile ground to the concept of negative partisan and ideological identities (see Malka and Lelkes (2010) on Conservative and Liberal identities).

Despite their differences, both the social identity and the rational choice notions of partisanship are prevalent in research (Johnston, 2006). Though one relies on partisanship as a primarily affective orientation, while the other casts it as cognitive, in both approaches party identification is predominantly understood as a positive attachment. This is despite early, seminal studies of electoral behaviour explicitly talking about the possibility that partisanship can entail negative assessments, evaluations and feelings too (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960). However, these early studies not only discussed negative partisanship with reference to simultaneously holding a positive party ID (Greene, 1999; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977), but often took negativity as a complementary dimension of partisanship necessary to account for to better translate existing social cleavages into voting patterns (Richardson, 1991; Rose and Mishler, 1998; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Wattenberg, 1982; Garry, 2007).

Regardless of how one conceives of the underlying motivation(s) behind partisanship, the concept of a *negative* partisanship can be derived. If partisanship is taken as a "predisposing stimulus which, over and above the contemporaneous effects of ideological or issue proximity, encourages voters to support a particular party" (Sanders et al., 2011:289;

Campbell et al., 1960), then, as Wattenberg note, "it should involve some sense of rejection of the other major party to insulate partisans from shifts to the opposition" (1982:31). While a mostly positive running tally for a specific party might influence a voter to form a positive attachment, it is also possible that a running tally of mostly negative evaluations of a party might lead the voter to develop – independently of positive identification – a feeling of rejection, hostility towards that group.

The two most important characteristics of NPID, just as in the case of positive partisanship, are the strength and stability of the predisposition. Accordingly, negative partisanship can be conceived of in a very similar manner than positive partisanship: "Holding a negative partisanship toward a party is an affective repulsion from that party, one that is more stable than a current dislike and more strongly held than a passing opinion, resilient in part because it entails selective information gathering and processing that is capable of overriding rational updating" (Caruna et al., 2015:772). This theoretical definition permits NPID to be motivated by reasoning based on political issues and ideological considerations or by structural or affective associations attached to various political groups (Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021).

At the same time, rather than being the exact reverse predisposition, studies note that negative partisanship has different psychological foundations than positive partisanship. Psychological studies widely indicate that negative evaluations are not simply the polar opposite of positive ones but may have distinct origins and consequences. Negative perceptions and evaluations in many contexts appear more powerful than positive or neutral ones, as people tend to pay more attention to, better remember and give more weight to bad, rather than good experiences and information (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994; Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo et al., 1997; Ito et al., 1998; Baumeister et al., 2001; Grabe et al., 2000; Newhagen and Reeves, 1992; Taylor, 1991). The negativity bias is profoundly ingrained into human nature and is

evident in perceptions about potential losses and risks, in reactions to positive and negative information: (most) people are primarily risk averse and perceive threats (physical, financial, sentimental, emotional) more intensely than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al., 1990). In the world of political behaviour, the bias has considerable effects on how people perceive, process and evaluate political information, possibilities and realities and whether they decide to engage with news, actors and events to begin with (Soroka and McAdams 2015; Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; Martin, 2008).

Second, while positive identification is related to positive impressions and appraisal of a most preferred in-party, negative partisanship lacks the psychological sense of *belonging* and is based on strong negative connotations (and senses of threat) about the out-parties or what they represent (Bankert, 2020; Brewer, 1999; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Caruna et al., 2015). Because of this motivational difference researchers tend to lean towards understanding negative partisanship in more affective, rather than instrumental, terms.

The difference in the way that negative and positive identities are formed has crucial implications for the conceptualisation of negative partisanship. First, negative identities need to be understood differently than just the mirror opposites of their positive counterparts. The correlates and explanations of who and what type of people negative partisans are may not be identical to those of positive attachments (Zhong et al., 2008). It is important to conceive of negative partisanship as an attitude that can develop without equally strong in-party attachments (Bankert, 2020). Positive and negative partisanships may be held in any combination: either, both, or neither of them (Rose and Mishler, 1998; McGregor et al., 2015). At the same time, it is crucial to account for the possibility – particularly in multi-party settings – that people would not hold the negative party ID of a single party but would be negative partisans of multiple parties (Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Wagner, 2021).

1.3 WHAT IS NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP *NOT*?

After deriving negative partisanship, it is worth taking the time to also discuss how it relates to similar, yet distinct political attitudes, most notably to affective polarisation. Much of the scariest discussions on political hostilities centre around growing affective polarisation, a relevant political phenomenon. People are increasingly polarised in how they evaluate and relate to liked and disliked parties, as well as the messages and people associated with them. High affective polarisation likely hinders cooperation and dialogue both between competing elites (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016) and voters (Gerber et al., 2012) and is often connected to interpersonal discrimination and partisan animosity between competing segments of the public (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020). This is true even if at the core of these hostilities there may not be extreme ideological disagreements.

Affective polarisation and negative partisanship share many properties and correlates and the two notions are intimately related (Wagner, 2021). There is no systematic comparison of their empirical similarity so far. Table 1.1 below summarises their similarities in how they relate to democratic values and participation, as well as highlights some of their key theoretical differences.

High affective polarisation and negative partisanship both motivate turnout and political participation beyond voting. They are also both positively associated with cognitive engagement in and attention to politics. People who express high levels of affective polarisation and negative partisans tend to be less satisfied with democracy than average voters, given their aversion to a disliked party's anticipated or real success. Both groups are

also likely to express a high sense of efficacy, also presumably due to their sensitivity to election outcomes.

Table 1.1: Theoretical and empirical differences between affective polarisation and negative partisanship

	Affective polarization (AP)	**Negative partisanship (NPID)**
Dimensionality		
	Two dimensional: defined as the contrast between positive and negative evaluations of parties	Single dimension: defined as holding deep antipathy towards one or multiple parties
	Biased towards positive partisanship: large AP necessarily presupposes positive feelings towards a party.	The existence of NPID does not presuppose positive feelings for one or more other parties
Correlates		
Turnout	Leads to higher turnout (Abramowitz and Stone, 2006; Wards and Tavits 2019; Wagner, 2021)	Leads to higher turnout (Mayer, 2017; Caruna et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2015; Bankert, 2020)
Participation in politics (besides voting)	Increases non-traditional political participation (Wagner, 2021)	Increases non-traditional political participation (Caruna et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2015).
Engagement with politics	In-group and out-group identity-based aspects of AP increase attention to and engagement with politics (Huddy et al., 2015)	Out-group identity increases attention to and engagement with politics (Huddy et al., 2015); NPID motivates following elections (Section 1.4 in this thesis)
Political efficacy	Associated with believing that it makes a difference who people vote for and who is in power (Wagner, 2021)	Associated with believing that it makes a difference who people vote for (Section 1.4 in this thesis)
Satisfaction with democracy	Leads to a decrease in satisfaction with democracy (Wagner, 2021)	Leads to a decrease if satisfaction with democracy, especially when the disliked party wins election (Spoon an Kanthak, 2019; Ridge, 2021)

These similarities are no coincidence. Affective polarisation and NPID both imply some sense of rejection of certain parties, often paired with strong liking or attachment to the competing opposites. However, affective polarisation is a concept coined by researchers to reflect the *contrast* between positive and negative affect towards parties. It reflects how polar one's opinion is and not the actual evaluation of each party. In its original understanding it is exclusively defined for positive partisans, though in later works that extend the concept to more fragmented party systems the exclusive reliance on positive party identification is omitted (Reiljan, 2020; Wagner, 2021). Yet, the nature of contrasting evaluations remains.

It follows from the measurement that low affective polarisation may mean that one likes all available parties, dislikes all of them or is simply indifferent towards all of them (although measurement may be complicated by weighting to adjust for differences between party types and sizes). Likewise, when researchers talk about increasing affective polarisation, the sources of such increase can be manifold: they can be strengthening in-party attachment, strengthening out-party rejection or both. Negative partisanship, on the other hand, is strictly a single dimension focusing on negativity only and treating attitudes towards parties separate, without prior assumptions about the existence of favoured and disliked, in- or out-parties.

This is a crucial theoretical distinction. Affective polarisation ignores those who have negative feelings for one (or more) party, but only moderately positive or neutral opinion of others. At the same time, it is biased towards positive partisans. Especially in a contemporary European reality with steadily declining partisanship rates, the measurement and discussion of negative partisan evaluations should not be based on in-party evaluations and attachments. Nor should they be overlooked or washed out because of a lack of strong in-party feelings.

The distinction between affective polarisation and negative partisanship is particularly important in multi-party systems, where the polarising and straightforward nature of the traditional bipolarity that inspired the concept is less clear-cut. And indeed, though the two concepts are shown to be empirically related, they are far from identical in these settings (Wagner, 2021). Yet, even in the US with two overwhelmingly dominant parties (where negative partisanship and affective polarisation are arguably so closely related that the two notions are at times used interchangeably) it has been shown that out-partisan negativity increasingly surpasses in-partisan positivity, thus becoming the dominant driver of strengthening affective polarisation in recent times (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018).

More pragmatically, much of the literature that addresses affective polarisation worries more about the types of behaviour fuelled by out-group hatred (mobilisation *against* a party and all that is associated with it), rather than behaviour and biases fuelled purely by in-group love (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Reiljan, 2020). Given the normatively concerning nature of disliking parties, their messages, and their supporters, negative partisanship is more fundamental than – and to some extent is the core of – affective polarisation.

On the other hand, negative partisanship is hardly a new phenomenon and has been with us for a long time (Campbell et al., 1960; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Crewe, 1976). Whether it has gotten more affective is a different and valid question. This in no way makes NPID less relevant over time as an attitude. It warrants the time and context dependent precise understanding of its changing nature and warrants the attribution of the effects of negativity towards a party or parties appropriately.

This is not to discard affective polarisation as a meaningful source of information to theorise about the properties and correlates of NPID. Indeed, one can learn a great deal of either of these concepts based on empirical studies about the other. In fact, it is a great opportunity to carefully define the theoretical and empirical boundaries of concepts and simultaneously rely on related research to *inform* theory building where potential relations are untested.

1.4 Empirical accounts of negative partisanship

There is little systematic collection of the drivers or correlates of NPID at either the individual- or the system-level (apart from positive partisan identification of various strengths). The few studies that do map some correlates of NPID almost exclusively approach the question with an individual-level perspective.

In a recent study using a Flemish sample Boonen (2019) establishes the influence of parental negative partisan identities on people's attitudes. The hereditary nature of negative party IDs is particularly pronounced in the case of ideologically rather extreme parties but holds to a more limited extent in the case of mainstream party attachments / rejections as well. Younger generations are significantly less likely to exhibit partisan attachments (of either direction), a finding that is congruent with much of the literature on generational differences in political engagement.

McGregor et al. (2015) show in a study set in Canada that negative partisanship is fostered by ideological extremity and by the perceived sharpness of the competition between political opponents. They also demonstrate that out of these two factors ideological extremity contributes more to holding an NPID. This underlines the importance of long-term, stable evaluations in making up animosity towards parties. Medeiros and Noël (2014) in studies across 4 Western democracies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) demonstrate that NPID is more connected to ideology than to long-standing structural and socio-demographic cleavages. Other studies specify the role of ideology by showing that ideologically extreme voters develop NPIDs towards parties on the opposite side of the left-right spectrum (e.g., Mayer, 2017; Boonen, 2019; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021).

The literature is richer in studies that discuss the drivers of affective polarisation. These almost unanimously agree that positive partisanship is positively linked to affective polarisation (Huddy et al., 2018; Campbell et al., 1960; Greene, 1999; Taber and Lodge, 2006). Individual ideological extremity (extremity of one's political beliefs) is also positively associated with affective polarization (Westwood et al., 2018; Lelkes, 2019). So is the perceived level of ideological polarization between parties: the more ideological difference one perceives between parties, the more polarised opinions they are likely to have of them (Wagner, 2021; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Reiljan, 2020; Ward and Tavits, 2019).

There are issues that are particularly divisive and polarising, such as those related to culture (Gidron et al., 2019; Gidron, 2020). Perceived disagreement on these issues between parties is likely to facilitate higher affective polarisation as well.

As mentioned in section 1.3, though closely related, the concepts of negative partisanship and affective polarisation are shown not to be equivalents either theoretically or empirically. These studies all *inform* theorising about the roots of negative partisanship, since "there is a clear link between the concepts of negative partisanship and affective polarization", even if "the association is not overwhelming" (Wagner, 2021:7).

Empirical accounts consider at length the various ways that negative partisanship influences behaviour. In particular, very few studies fail to consider how NPID's consequences differ from those of positive partisanship. The broad consensus in recent studies across Canada, Europe and the US is that negative partisanship has a clear and independent mobilising effect on turnout: negative partisans are more likely to participate in elections. This holds even when positive partisanship is controlled for (Mayer, 2014; Caruna et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2015; Bankert, 2020). Mayer (2017) in a study of 17 European countries also shows that the mobilising effect of negative partisanship is in fact the strongest for weak positive partisans and the weakest for strong positive partisans. This implies that negative partisanship is not necessarily induced by a strong sense of attachment to the opposite (liked) party, further underlining the need to discuss the two concepts (negative and positive partisanship) separately in theoretical and empirical works.

Negative partisanship not only motivates, but also moves the vote – again, even when controlling for positive party attachment (Rose and Mischler, 1998; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; McGregor et al., 2015; Caruna et al., 2014; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016). Negative partisanship increases loyal voting for partisans (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Maggiotto

and Piereson, 1977; Mayer, 2017). McGregor et al. (2015) show that even among non-partisans negative partisans are less likely to vote for a disliked party, thus constraining the pool of alternatives for the vote. Mayer (2017) and Caruna et al. (2015) demonstrate that NPID also actively motivates voting for other parties even in the case of non-partisans (the exact effects depend on parties' and respondents' ideology).

Besides participation in elections, negative partisanship appears to mobilise voters to take part in other, non-party related political activities, such as attending protests, rallies, signing petitions, or being politically active online (Caruna et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2015). As negative partisanship is associated with political mobilisation and cognitive engagement with partisan politics, negative identifiers are also more critical than those without a negative party ID. In particular, Spoon and Kanthak (2019) demonstrate in 25 European democracies that satisfaction with democracy declines in those segments of the electorates whose out-party (the party towards which one develops negativity) is in power. Ridge (2021) confirms that negative partisanship is associated with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy more generally, particularly for negative partisans of main parties. Satisfaction with democracy on the side of negative partisans is also more sensitive to election outcomes: the electoral defeat of the out-party is disproportionately associated with higher satisfaction with democracy, whereas the electoral victory of the out-party disproportionately depreciates it.

Negative partisans are more engaged with the political world than the average voter. Nevertheless, there are important distinctions between the profiles of negative partisans based on party types. Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, focusing exclusively on radical right-wing populist parties (RRPs), note that both negative and positive identifiers of RRPs are more mobilised than non-partisans. However, there is considerable difference in the democratic profile of these two segments. Negative partisans of RRPs are characterised by the "defence of both immigration and European integration, as well as the promotion of the electoral,

liberal and social-democratic dimensions of democracy". Positive partisans of RRPs are "distinguished by authoritarian and illiberal tendencies" (2021:14).

To some extent the presence of negative partisanship can be praised for being associated with political involvement, with a healthy criticism when observing political actors, and with consciousness about one's self-defined place within the electoral system. Yet, there are other, normatively undesirable effects of partisan negativity – though their discussion to date is mostly limited to the partisanship and the affective polarisation frameworks mostly in the US context –, namely discrimination towards supporters of the rejected parties. It is important to distinguish between negative partisanship and negative affect *towards partisans* for two main reasons. First, though the link might sound straightforward, Druckman and Levandusky (2019) demonstrate that negative affect towards parties and partisans (though correlate at ~0.69) are empirically different. In fact, when people talk about a disliked party, they talk mostly about the elites. Harteveld (2021) confirms this empirical distinction in a study on a Dutch sample, even though he also finds that disliking parties and disliking their partisans correlate at ~0.66. These two notions are also psychologically different. There is evidence that the direct association between general (*party*-oriented) and specific (*partisan*-oriented) attitudes and behaviour is weak (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010).

Yet, several studies of party identification point out that attachment to a party influences not only political, but also social attitudes and behaviour. The influence appears: in the tendency to avoid talking about politics in the workplace (Mutz and Mondak, 2006) or elsewhere (Gerber et al., 2012); in the homogeneity of one's networks (McPherson, et al., 2001) and immediate neighbourhood (Bishop, 2009; Gimpel and Hui, 2015; Gimpel and Hui, 2017; Hui, 2013); in hiring decisions (Gift and Gift, 2015); in preferences for partisan similarity in relationships (Shafranek, 2021; Joiner, 1994; Huber and Malhotra, 2017); or in people's level

of discomfort with the idea of proximity to a supporter of the other party (Iyengar et al., 2012).

Westwood et al. (2017) show, using trust games in four studies set in the UK, Belgium, Spain and the US, that in all four countries partisans exhibit discrimination along out-partisan lines that transcends discrimination along traditional social cleavages (religion, language, ethnicity, region). In fact, they do so even when traditional social cleavages are strong, salient and serve as consistent, deep roots for positive partisan attachments themselves. Similar results were found in studies in 8 Western countries by Carlin and Love (2018). Iyengar and Westwood assert that partisans in the US view and think of each other through powerful stereotypes to such an extent that partisan antagonisms are "ingrained or automatic in voters' minds" (2015:690). Even more worryingly, Cassese (2021) identifies dehumanising language and metaphors in partisan-political discourses, which potentially pave the way for hostile, aggressive, or even violent behaviour.

These studies speak of negativity almost exclusively in a positive partisan framework. Negativity is conceptualised as arising from strong positive attachments to the opposite group. But what these mechanisms and findings really testify to is the strength of negativity towards out-partisan groups that far transcends the political world and that is normatively relevant in discussions of negative partisanship.

1.5 Measurement of negative partisanship: limitations and possibilities

One of the most disputed aspects of negative partisanship in empirical works is appropriate measurement. The discussion of measurement is almost exclusively theoretical, mostly due to limitation of data on the various supposedly important components of the concept. There is little comparison available on the stability, validity, and the distinctiveness of previously

employed empirical constructs. It is crucial to establish how various measures relate to each other to move forward with a discussion of negative partisanship. This is a particularly important matter if one wishes to compare previous scholarship and their empirical findings.

To capture negative partisanship past studies have used various survey items or constructs tapping different dimensions of negativity. The first dimension is a sense of disliking particular parties, measured with thermometer ratings across the electoral spectrum. This follows from theoretical observations that societies exhibit stronger negativity over time towards political actors independent of (and even without) changes in evaluations of voters' most preferred parties (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Richardson, 1991).

The theoretical concern about this dimension is that negative thermometer ratings may not be exclusively linked to those parties one identifies as a negative partisan of. In fact, one may equally dislike all available parties, without necessarily developing strong animosity towards all of them. Purely gauging the sense of liking or disliking parties confuses sentiments toward specific parties and more general anti-political and anti-politician sentiments (Caruna et al., 2014). Anti-political sentiments may entail a general sense of distance from and dislike of political actors, institutions, and processes. They are important to distinguish from attitudes towards specific parties – regardless of whether these attitudes are motivated by ideology, performance, or as another line of research shows, a divided society or previous one-party dominance (Garry, 2007; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Rose and Mishler, 1998).

From a methodological point of view, the main issue with this measure is differential item functioning often associated with sympathy scores (Bankert, 2020). Respondents appear to unconsciously use the positive and negative parts of the scale differently. People tend to show

more refined positive ratings than negative ones (Winter and Berinsky, 1999). This confuses the interpretation of relevant responses.

The second approach to measure negative partisanship is the use of behavioural intention items that capture absolute certainty never to consider voting for a given party (Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Rose and Mishler, 1998; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Boonen, 2019). This is a very strong statement that fits with theoretical accounts of the effect of negative partisan identities on political behaviour. It is a more stringent measure; it leaves more room for neutrality than thermometer ratings: the construct distinguishes between passing or weak negativity and stronger and more lasting adversity (by explicitly measuring NPID as never considering voting for a given party at all).

The first theoretical concern about this measure is that it confounds a *behaviour* (negative vote) with an *attitude* (negative partisanship). An attitude is generally taken as a causal antecedent of a behaviour. However, psychological theories consider these two to be more profoundly entangled than discussions generally assume. In this understanding: "individuals come to "know" their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior and/ or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs" (Bem 1972:1). Indeed, a number of political studies have shown this complex reciprocal causality in the relationship for example between civic attitudes and attitudes towards politics and political participation (Gastil and Xenos, 2010; Quintelier and van Deth, 2014; Bromme and Rothmund, 2021), between attitudes towards climate change and so called 'green behaviours' (Lacasse, 2014), and between online political expressions and pre-existing political preferences (Cho et al., 2018). These findings imply that types of negative political behaviour may inform, reinforce and be in close harmony with pre-existing negative political attitudes.

Another theoretical concern is that it is possible that this behavioural measure assumes a more instrumental understanding of NPID than researchers are trying to measure. There are various possible reasons for respondents never to want to vote for a given party. For example, one may exclude a party from consideration merely because said party has a history of not being a serious contender. This attitude does not automatically imply the type of affective foundation that NPID is commonly associated with (Caruna et al., 2014, Bankert, 2020).

The third approach to measure NPID is to combine the affective and behavioural dimensions. The resulting measure captures two important layers of NPID (McGregor et al., 2015; Caruna et al., 2014; Mayer, 2017). First, negative partisanship goes beyond strategic reasons for (intended) political behaviour without any necessary underlying affective connotations. Second, negative partisanship differs from mere dislike for a party, a sentiment that may be linked to one's preferred party, or even to all parties. A crucial drawback of this operationalisation is the limited availability of data on both dimensions simultaneously, particularly in a longitudinal setting across countries.

Reflecting specifically on the social identity account of negative partisanship, Bankert (2020) produced a unique negative partisan identity scale. The derivation of the scale follows the theoretical (Green, 2004; Greene, 1999; Greene, 2002; Greene, 2004; Huddy et al., 2015; Mason, 2015) and empirical (Huddy et al., 2015; Bankert et al., 2017) work on expressive, social identity-based positive ties to parties. The multi-item negative partisan identity scale identifies affective negative ties to parties by tapping the subjective sense and affective importance of otherness in reference to a given party (and its partisans), as well as the sensitivity to the party's reputation. The expressive approach acknowledges the interrelation of instrumental and expressive underpinnings of partisanship, even if the two accounts present the psychological development of partisanship differently.

Currently the concept of negative partisan identity as social identity is only applied on (positive) partisans in the United States, though the positive counterpart of the scale is applicable and relevant among partisans of some Western European countries. Expressive negative partisanship scales are likely to be introduced in European multi-party settings soon as well. One of the drawbacks of this account is the lack of consideration of the negative identities of non-partisans. This is a crucial theoretical point emphasised in much of the NPID literature in multi-party contexts.

The discussion of the measurement of NPID is almost exclusively theoretical and admittedly there are notable theoretical distinctions between the operationalisations listed above. However, even though Medeiros and Noël, who themselves rely on two separate types of measures due to data limitations,[1] argue that "different questions capture a similar reality" (2014:1035), there is no empirical discussion of how similar or dissimilar these realities are.

In the next section I briefly compare these dimensions empirically both at the individual- and the aggregate- level to capture the strength of the link between them. For the individual-level comparison I present data from module 3 (2006-2011) of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, the only openly available data source that contains both the affective and the behavioural components in a cross-country setting in Europe. The inclusion of thermometer ratings in the survey is straightforward with an 11-point likert scale for a list of relevant parties complied by country experts. The inclusion of the behavioural component is less straightforward with two main differences in the question wording and scope of response collection. First, the question varies in whether it is posed in an open-ended format (Portugal, Greece, Ireland), whether respondents are asked to rate a list of parties compiled by country experts (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Finland), or whether respondents

[1] certainty not to vote (behavioural dimension) for Australia, New Zealand, and Canada; and feeling thermometers (affective measure) for the United States

are asked to choose from a list of parties (Austria). More importantly, in some cases (Austria, Ireland, Portugal) a limited number of answers are recorded, thus constraining the possible scope of negativity expressed towards parties. For the current purpose (examining the extent of negative partisan identities) this is adequate, though it is up to further methodological investigation whether open-ended and party list formats prompt psychologically equivalent responses in this setting or not. However, it should be noted that further usage of this data is restricted. We cannot count the number of party IDs to measure the frequency of the attitude (a crucial feature of NPID in multi-party settings) or sub-set them along ideological lines or party types.



Figure 1.1: Negative vote ('behaviour'), negative partisan affect: ('affect'), combined NPID measure ('combined') and closeness to a party ('partisanship') in Western Europe. Dots are weighted country averages. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: CSES module 3.

Figure 1.1 shows the weighted proportion of people who are classified as negative partisans using the three different measures in 10 Western European countries. These are compared to the weighted share of those who feel close to a party (a more liberal measure than partisanship, as it does not require an explicit sense of support for a party or identification as a supporter of the party). The affective measure uses thermometer ratings (0-4 on a 0-10 scale), the behavioural measure captures certainty not to vote and the combined measure looks at whether there are parties for which both the affective and the behavioural components are present (negative vote and 0-4 thermometer rating) for respondents.

The first thing that stands out in the plot is that there is considerable difference between the extent of negative partisanship in societies that the three measures indicate. Negative partisan affect is the most commonly held attitude out of the three measures (by around or above 90% of populations), followed by the behavioural component (showing more variability between 55% and almost 100%). Scores on the combined measure range between less than 25% and just above 75% of societies between 2006 and 2010. Though there is a stronger correlation between the affective and the combined measures than between the behavioural and the combined measures,[2] the level of the negative vote (behavioural measure) resembles that of the combined measure more closely. Closeness to a party in most countries is less commonly reported than all forms of negative partisanship.

Figure 1.2 compares some of the individual-level correlates of the three measures. The plot presents coefficients from logistic regressions of the three measures on age, sex, ideology, political efficacy ('who people vote for makes a difference'), satisfaction with democracy, campaign involvement, partisan leaning, perceived distinctions between parties, and country fixed effects. The purpose here is not to formulate a fully specified account of either conceptualisation of negative partisanship. Instead, the purpose of this display is to compare some of the demographic and political correlates of negativity and to discuss the dependency of the mechanisms on empirical construction. Output tables from the regressions are placed in Appendix A. The signs of the coefficients show remarkable similarity in all cases. This indicates that similar political mechanisms foster and depress the two (behavioural and affective) components and the combined understanding of NPID. In particular, political interest (paying close attention to election campaign), partisan motivation (feeling close to a party), aspects of political efficacy of the vote (seeing differences between parties; perceived

[2] The correlation between the combined measure and the affective component is 0.75 (p=0.012), 0.60 (p=0.068) between the combined measure and the behavioural component and 0.61 (p=0.06) between the two individual components.

impact of voting) and *dissatisfaction* with democracy all positively correlate with the three measures of NPID. The coefficients from modelling the behavioural measure resemble those from the regression of the combined variable better in magnitude than coefficients from the affective model, which at least in part stems from differences in the prevalence (and variation) of each measurement of NPID in societies.

The patterns suggest two things. First, negative partisanship is a politically conscious (in large contrast with apathy) and politically responsive attitude (contrary to anti-political sentiments). Second, all three measures follow this pattern, so in terms of where they are placed within the context of other political attitudes the constructs do not differ tremendously.



Figure 1.2: Coefficients from regression of a) negative vote ('behaviour'), b) negative partisan affect ('affect'), c) combined NPID measure ('combined') on relevant political measures. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: CSES module 3.

Next, Figure 1.3 looks at the aggregate extent of NPID measured as affect and as behavioural intent separately over time. Data on thermometer ratings is taken from the integrated dataset of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (modules 1-4) and data on vote certainty items is from 7 waves (1989-2019) of the European Election Studies – in absence of a source that would contain both aspects together in a longitudinal setting in Western Europe. The plot

here distinguishes between dislike in general (thermometer rating of 0-4) and strong dislike (thermometer rating of 0) to gauge the strength of affective negativity over time.

Two main contrasts stand out between the longitudinal dynamics. First, the 2010s see a general declining trend in the prevalence of the negative vote, unaccompanied by a corresponding change in affective negativity, though it is worth noting that the timelines slightly differ in the two panels, which particularly affects comparison of the last decade. At the same time, throughout the 2000s and the 2010s steadily growing segments of European electorates can point at parties that they *very strongly* dislike. From a strict measurement consideration this is unrelated to the prevalence of negative partisanship in societies, but strengthening affective negativity is nevertheless crucial to understanding the changing context of partisan attitudes in Europe.



Figure 1.3: Negative vote ('behavioural measure'); negative affect and strong negative affect ('affective measure') over time in Western Europe. Dots are weighted country averages and coloured lines are loess curves with their respective 90% confidence intervals. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019; CSES integrated dataset (modules 1-4).

Figure 1.4 compares some aggregate-level correlates of the affective (negative partisan affect) and behavioural (negative vote) measures of NPID. Ideological polarisation is consistently cited as a driver of negative partisan evaluations in the literature (Wagner 2021, Huddy et al., 2018, Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Lelkes, 2019; Reiljan 2019; Ward and Tavits, 2019, Webster and Abramowitz 2017). The influence of economic performance on

electoral volatility and on parties' evaluations – beyond governing ones – is also well documented (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999, Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Nadeau et al., 2013, Duch and Stevenson's 2008, van der Brug et al., 2007). This section examines whether there is a difference in *how* the levels of NPID in societies measured with the affective and behavioural measurements are associated with societies' ideological polarisation[3] and countries' economic performance.



Figure 1.4: Negative vote ('behavioural measure'); negative affect and strong negative affect ('affective measure') and their correlates in Western Europe. Dots are weighted country averages and coloured lines are fitted bivariate OLS regression lines with their respective 95% confidence intervals. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019; CSES integrated dataset (modules 1-4).

[3] Data to measure the ideological polarisation of party systems (i.e., the *relative dominance* of radical, polar ideologies) is taken from the ParlGov elections dataset. The measure is a construct that compares the dominance and extremity of ideologically polar parties by calculating the ideological stretch of the party spectrum, weighted by parties' vote share at each election.

The top panels in Figure 1.4 show that countries where a larger proportion of votes are acquired by polar parties tend to be associated with slightly higher levels of NPID, although the association amounts to weak correlations only.[4] The direction of this association does not change with the different measurements and only slightly varies in its strength. These indicate that NPID captured with both the affective and the behavioural measures are (similarly) sensitive to the strength and number of ideologically polar parties in Western Europe.

According to the bottom panels, both measures correlate [5] negatively with economic performance (GDP per capita growth[6]). This indicates that in countries and at times with worse economic performance societies are generally more critical of parties. Again, there is no difference in the direction of the association between affective and behavioural measures. The magnitudes of the associations are also *relatively* similar – except for strong dislike, which shows the greatest variability. In both comparisons it is important to note that these associations do not account for any other temporal, spatial or contextual factors that are otherwise important explanations of NPID in societies. We should therefore be cautious about elaborating on the importance or robustness of these patterns.

The individual- and aggregate-level similarities in how theoretically meaningful correlates of NPID relate to negative partisan affect, the negative vote and their combination are encouraging. If these differences were drastic, they would severely undermine the confidence that one can have in the robustness and validity of findings from past and future studies that rely on the observed measures. Instead, the main message about measurement from this brief

[4] Correlation: 0.12 (p=0.44, n=45) for strong dislike, 0.28 (p=0.66, n=45) for dislike, 0.14 (p=0.15, n=102) for negative vote

[5] Correlation: -0.35 (p=0.017, n=45) for strong dislike, -0.27 (p=0.077, n=45) for dislike, -0.16 (p=0.1) n=102

[6] GDP per capita growth is taken from the World Development Indicators dataset in an attempt to proxy the current economic mood – which is understood as a continuum, so even if the survey takes place in July, people are assumed to have a reasonably good impression of what the country's economic performance is like in that particular year

section is the empirical adequacy of carefully applied previous constructs. The precise level of negativity, however, will vary by construct. But they do appear to capture similar realities (Medeiros and Noël 2014:1035).

1.6 General vs. relative NPID

There are two additional qualities that must be mentioned and theoretically placed when discussing negative partisanship in multi-party systems: direction (i.e., where NPID is targeted) and diffusion (i.e., number of NPIDs). One of the key complexities in translating negative partisanship into multi-party systems results from the absence of a simple bipolarity. Both the target and the multiplication of negative partisan IDs become important qualities of the attitude in different contexts.

The object of the attitude becomes crucial, as NPIDs are no longer held either towards dominant party A, dominant party B (or neither) in a two-party system. With the existence of 5 – 10 – 15 parties in a single electoral context, negative party choices become more complex exercises. The ideology of the negative partisan ID matters. But so does the electoral relevance or politicising capacity of the disliked party. The multiplication of the attitude is also important to account for. Holding a single NPID may indicate stronger hostility than holding many in combination. Viewing NPID as a general attitude seems to be masking too many important features.

NPID refers to being negative partisans of one or more political parties. This is the simplest form of thinking about negative partisanship and the existence (or otherwise) of strong antipathies towards parties. This simple form of NPID is more reductionist than an understanding based on a network of parties. Yet, there is power in simplicity – particularly in longitudinal and/or cross-national comparisons. The general NPID is informative about the

state of *negative partyism* in societies. But is this measure informative if 75%+ of people are negative partisans? What does the fact that an attitude is almost universally held say about its importance? Though this is a legitimate question, the measure becomes more meaningful once variation is considered. While the proportion of negative partisans within each society is high, a visible (~25%) cross-country variation at each time point (see earlier: Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3) indicates the existence and empirical significance of locally relevant systemic characteristics (electoral systems, political and economic circumstances, etc.) in driving the aggregate intensity of negative partisanship (see earlier: Figure 1.4).

The fact that the level of NPID is responsive to contextual changes for example in the state of the economy or in party systems' extremities is a good reason to investigate it as a general attitude. The longitudinal variation in this attitude (a downward tendency, as shown in Figure 1.3) and increasing discriminant power over time are important to investigate. One of the main purposes of the second chapter will precisely be to uncover these tendencies.

Most previous studies used the general measure of NPID. At the same time, accounting for the distinctions between the ideologies of NPIDs' objects has also played a key part in specifying the dynamics of negative partisan attitudes. Past studies almost exclusively approached the question from an individual-level perspective. An aggregate-level enquiry could equally benefit from comparing NPID towards different ideologies or party categories. Reiljan's (2020) study of affective polarisation highlights that even in countries where negative affect towards parties is low overall, there are certain parties that are intensely disliked by the public. The relevance of the question is increased by our interest in the longitudinal dynamics of the concept: the comparative acceptance and/or rejection of ideologies will likely shift over time. The second and third chapters will incorporate this consideration into their analyses and discussion.

One might argue that it is not enough to look at overall or (ideologically) categorised rates of NPID in multi-party electorates. A dyadic view linking voters to the object of their NPID(s) would provide a much more meaningful approach to negative partisanship. This would be better suited to the discussion of the negative links between types of voters and parties. In a cross-country setting this is a complex exercise and is impractical, given the subtleties of each electoral competition and the difficulty of meaningfully comparing any select voter-party dyad in country A and country B.

A more useful approach would be to conceive of *voter type-party type* dyads. While this would permit better cross-country comparisons, it would still beg the question of whether all parties weight the same or not in the evaluation of NPIDs. Is holding an NPID towards a minor party equal in negativity to holding one towards the most successful political actor in a given election? Whether or not it is, the question invites the further refining of parties' weight in the comparative assessment of negative attitudes based on factors such as electoral relevance. The idea of introducing a hierarchy of NPIDs is useful and yields informative conclusions about the variable differences in parties' evaluations in the eyes of voters. Nevertheless, it conflicts with the theoretical aim of formulating the concept of NPID as one that includes *all* negative partisan attitudes (without assumptions or restrictions based on other factors).

A next concern with the concept of a general NPID is that it cannot distinguish between people holding NPIDs in isolation and those holding NPIDs in combination. There should be measures that qualify the exclusiveness (or, as some might argue, *the strength*) of an NPID. But should the measure of NPID directly capture how many parties are disliked by an individual? The answer to the question is far from straightforward. Is holding a single NPID necessarily a stronger attitude than holding 3 NPIDs?

Counting the number of NPIDs leaves the disliked parties' characteristics unaccounted for, raising the same concerns as discussed above. Moreover, the main difficulty of discussing this matter in a comparative setting comes from the imbalance of the supply of parties in elections: there are substantially more parties available in one polity than in another. This makes it difficult to meaningfully compare or contrast the number of NPIDs across systems. Yet, the diffusion of negative partisanship – and particularly the change in the diffusion/focus of NPID – is undoubtedly important to compare. The second chapter will therefore include a discussion on how insights from such a consideration can qualify and add to the general patterns of NPID in Western Europe.

1.7 NPID IN CHANGING WESTERN EUROPEAN POLITICAL CONTEXTS

Despite disagreements on the most appropriate way to measure negative partisan identities, all studies agree that it is important to discuss the nature and consequences of the notion in Western Europe and beyond. Negative partisanship is a prevalent and mobilising predisposition that motivates political engagement and participation and dictates the direction of political choices (Rose and Mischler, 1998; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; McGregor et al., 2015; Caruna et al., 2014; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Mayer, 2017).

Though there is mounting interest in discussing negative partisanship in recent times, there are many unanswered questions about the nature, motivation and consequences of the attitude. One thing we know little about is how NPID changes over time and depending on different political context conditions (Wagner, 2021; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). Discussions of NPID in Western Europe do not address how the political context of the past few decades has influenced the way negative political attachments emerged, as well

as what their roles have been in shaping politics, social life and the very institution of democracy.

The European political landscape has undergone tremendous changes in recent times. The second part of the past century witnessed the gradual erosion of the structural and ideological linkages between social groups and the parties who traditionally represented their interests in advanced industrial democracies (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992; Kriesi, 2010; van der Brug et al., 2007; van der Brug, 2010). At the same time, both economic and political globalization brought unprecedented challenges: the growing gap between the winners and losers of globalisation both economically and politically; global crises with major domestic implications; the increasingly contested boundary between the national and the sub-national, as well as rising tensions about global responsibilities; the fragility of and perceived new threats to geo-political, cultural and ideological identities, etc (Green-Pedersen 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Katz and Mair 2018; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008; de Vries and van de Wardt 2011).

These challenges resulted in unprecedented changes in the supply of politics both in terms of the emergence of heavily moralised, value- and emotion-based discourses (Kriesi, 2010), and the identity of political actors. The appearance and mobilising capacity of new challengers to traditionally established parties strengthened a new cultural line of conflict, transforming the traditional dimensions and arenas of conflict in Western European party systems (Inglehart, 1977; Flanagan, 1987; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hooghe et al., 2002; van der Brug et al., 2007; Bornschier, 2010; Dolezal, 2010; Stubager, 2009; Kriesi, 2010). The unprecedented mobilisation by (right-wing) populist parties within political systems since the 1990s capitalised precisely on the discourse that challenged the capacity of established parties to represent the public and provide adequate

governance. They fundamentally eroded the legitimacy and popularity of traditional institutions and spaces of representation (Mair, 2002; Mair, 2011; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi, 2014).

There is much discussion in recent years of the crisis of democracy (Kriesi, 2020; Norris, 2020). The crisis of democracy is a consequence of a number of related developments. One such development is precisely the rise of populism (Rooduijn et al., 2014; Mudde, 2004; Mair, 2002; Galston, 2018). The growing dominance of populism produced a rise in measures traditionally viewed as illiberal (Levitsky and Lucan, 2010). It has also resulted in the growing rejection of traditional governing parties and a sharpened conflict between newly emerging and traditional forces (Urbinati, 2014; Pappas, 2019; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Mair, 2002; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi, 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Mair, 2011; Ardag et al., 2020; Katz and Mair, 2018). These developments have also been accompanied by steadily declining partisanship rates (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Dalton, 2002), as well as declining trust in and disengagement with political institutions and processes (Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2016).

These tendencies paint an alarming picture of the contemporary political world where the public is increasingly detached from and mistrusting of political parties, elites, ways of politics (Henn et al., 2005; Mierina, 2014), and even democracy (Dahl et al., 2018). Newly salient conflicts play much heavier of people's emotions and conviction. Elite and media communication heightens, rather than mediates, their impact (Levendusky 2013; Kelly Garrett et al. 2014; Lau et al., 2017; Sood and Iyengar 2016; Iyengar et al., 2012). These new ways of politics provide fertile ground for negative partisan attitudes and hostilities.

The rejection of certain parties (i.e., the very meaning of negative partisanship) is central to the crisis of democracy. But NPID, like many other attitudes that capture negativity, is a controversial phenomenon. From a civic culture approach, holding one or more negative

partisan IDs implies at least some minimal cognitive engagement with political actors and processes, as opposed to neutrality, apathy. Cognitive engagement and (negative) political participation are cornerstones of democratic processes. In an ideal world, therefore, negative partisanship would play a part in legitimising political competition between parties as institutions, and indirectly in maintaining the quality of representation and political dialogue.

But there are normative drawbacks of excessive mobilisation against a disliked party. Growing negativity towards parties results in less dialogue both between voters (Gerber et al., 2012) and elites (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015, Abramowitz and Webster 2016). It increases hostility towards ideas and subjects associated with and supporters of the disliked party beyond the political sphere – potentially to an alarming degree (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020). NPID is thus a double-edged sword. It helps to uphold democracy and it is also a destructive feature of political life that poisons social relations. We must investigate what roles these two faces of NPID have in tendencies that either foster or mediate the global crisis of democratic institutions.

The developments in the past few decades altered the way that people relate to and evaluate political actors, ideologies and institutions. Yet, it is noteworthy that the literature on NPID consistently fails to assess how changing contexts modify the concept. We simultaneously observe a decline in negative partisanship among Western European electorates and increasing negative partisan affect (see earlier: Figure 1.3). If we ignore the changing sources, properties and prevalence of NPID we assume that transformations in the supply of and demand for politics have not taken place; that the parties and discourses of the 1990s elicited the same kind reaction of people as those of the 2010s; and that the ways of and meaning of political participation were the same as before populism has become a heavy force in political communication and elections.

Are the widespread changes in the ideological make-up of electoral competitions and the growing presence of moralised conflicts and polarising actors indicative of changes in what it means to be a negative partisan? Do the new conflicts elicit stronger negative partisan dislike in people than before? Have the mechanisms that foster a more mistrusting, hostile mood towards parties been transformed by the shifting salience of ideologies and discourses? How socially destructive an attitude has NPID become?

This dissertation addresses these very questions in hopes to help us gain a deeper understanding of how negative partisanship's roots, characteristics and broader implications changed throughout the transformations of the political landscape of Western Europe in the past 30 years. I will examine:

1. NPID and global trends: How a longitudinal investigation of the characteristics of NPID informs us about the political developments of the past decades;
2. Drivers of NPID*:* What the changes of the ideological landscape mean for the most important mechanisms that are documented to foster NPID;
3. Consequences of NPID: What we can learn about NPID's mostly cited social consequences in an era of heightened partisan tensions.

The following chapters strive to paint an elaborate picture of how partisan attitudes and the democratic profiles of societies have transformed in the past 30 years in Western Europe. The discussions also provide foundation to interpret existing cross-sectional works on negative partisanship in Western Europe.

1.8 AREAS OF INQUIRY, STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION

In this thesis I address three questions related to the origins, nature and consequences of negative partisanship in changing Western European ideological and political contexts. The second chapter focuses on the changing prevalence and properties of negative partisanship against the background of the political changes and ideological transformations of the past 30 years in Western Europe. One crucial consequence of the past decades' transformations is a heightened contrast between mainstream parties and their populist challengers. Another important phenomenon is growing dissatisfaction with and rejection of democratic institutions on the side of the public. It is vital to investigate how the public's attitudes towards parties have changed with the above tendencies. Partisanship rates in Western Europe have for long been declining, which makes an examination of the shifts in *negative* evaluations even more important. We must understand whether there have been changes in who negative partisans are, what parties they hold negative partisan IDs towards, and how such an identification relates to other political attitudes.

The second chapter tries to understand 1) why negative partisanship – stable throughout decades of political developments and turbulence – declined drastically and consistently across Western European countries in the past decade and 2) what this decline means for the nature of negative partisanship, the characteristics of those identifying as negative partisans and for the legitimacy of democratic processes and institutions.

The third chapter examines the changing relation between ideological polarisation and negativity. Ideological polarisation and extremity are the most frequently cited drivers of negative partisanship, besides positive partisanship. However, these relationships are always assumed constant throughout drastically changing political and ideological contexts. Context is particularly important in the investigation of the ideology-negativity relationship,

considering how much attention has been devoted to the transformation of the ideological cleavage structure and the political space in Europe in the past couple of decades.

If negativity depends on ideological polarisation, we must account for the changes in the politicising capacity of traditional and newly emerging ideological dimensions through time. Likewise, we must account for a shift in the type of dominant actors – particularly given the rise of populist forces – and the kind of issues they emphasise. The third chapter addresses these shifting dynamics by comparing different sources of ideological polarisation in societies over time and by discussing what these changes mean for the nature and meaning of the concept of NPID.

Many studies – particularly set in the US – suggest that partisan stereotypes induce hostilities that go well beyond one's political life: the effect of strong antipathies towards certain parties transcends attitudes about political actors, realities and possibilities. The current European climate is often said to be riddled with strong partisan negativities (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020), even though the public is often argued to be increasingly detached from parties and to reject everything associated with them (Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2016). Studies also suggest that party competitions are more about emotionally polarising, moralised debates and communication (Kriesi, 2010). These tendencies provide fertile ground for affective stereotyping and social hostility along (negative) partisan lines.

The fourth chapter examines the scope and limitation of one of NPID's normatively most concerning consequences in the context of the late 2010s: social hostility towards voters of other, disliked parties and the extent to which NPID destroys social relations and democratic dialogue. The chapter singles out the power of (affective) partisan stereotyping in making social judgments, as well as distinguishes between hostility towards a person and that towards

(imagined or real) ideology. This chapter balances the first part of the thesis. It adds a new, societally more tangible, layer to the discussion on the crisis of democratic institutions, civic culture, and social dialogue.

CHAPTER 2

A study of temporal changes in the levels and nature of negative partisanship in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019

ABSTRACT

Negative partisanship (NPID) captures strong and lasting antipathies developed towards one or more parties. Initially coined in the United States, by today it is widely considered relevant in Western European countries too. The importance of the concept lies in its heavy influence on political engagement, the vote and even interpersonal judgments and social behaviour, particularly in an era when partisanship rates are steadily declining across most Western democracies. Despite growing interest in studying negative partisanship in Europe recently, there is no systematic enquiry into the nature and stability of NPID in changing political contexts. The importance of such endeavour lies in tremendous structural and ideological transformations throughout the past decades, which affect how (negative) partisan attitudes develop. In this chapter I show that, though stable and very common throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the prevalence of NPID started to drastically decline in the 2010s. I also show the emerging contrast between distance towards parties with centrist ideologies and growing acceptance and support for polar and populist parties. I argue that the decline in NPID rates is a symptom of growing detachment from parties and the party system. I show that the plunge of NPID disproportionately affects the politically least motivated and invested segments of societies who are also those most susceptible to growing indifference and alienation. The reduction in NPID brings to the fore a stark contrast between those who continue to engage with old and newly emerging political actors and processes and those who withdraw from engagement altogether. This is a fundamental change in the nature of holding NPIDs that needs to be accounted for when approaching existing and future studies on the phenomenon in Europe.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Negative partisanship (NPID), capturing deep and lasting antipathies developed towards one or more parties, is a key political attitude with profound implications for political perceptions and behaviour. Strong rejection of particular parties mobilises citizens to pay closer attention to and participate in politics. NPID motivates the direction of political choice on (negative) partisan lines (Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Caruna et al., 2015; McGregor et al., 2015; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Richardson, 1991; Vlachová, 2001; Mayer, 2017). NPID also influences social judgments and actions to the extent that it is often associated with interpersonal hostility towards disliked parties' partisans (Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020).

Discussions on the role of NPID in shaping decisions and attitudes are growing ever more relevant, as negativity towards parties is a persistent phenomenon (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020), while positive party identification is waning in Western democracies (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Dalton, 2002). Most studies of NPID are set in the United States or in other two-party systems. But scholars are increasingly addressing the phenomenon in European, fragmented party systems, which are characterised by more complex links between parties and the electorate and a lack of straightforward, exclusive bipolarity (e.g., Mayer, 2017; Medeiros and Noël, 2014).

Although there is mounting interest in negative political attitudes, studies still note the lack of an understanding of how negativity rises, falls or fluctuates in the long-term depending on political context conditions (Wagner, 2021; Melendez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). It is vital that we understand how the level and nature of negative partisanship changes within societies in response to relevant political contexts, especially as the European political landscape has

seen tremendous structural and ideological changes throughout the past decades with profound societal and political implications.

The scholarly literature has identified a gradual de-alignment of the traditional structural and ideological linkages between social groups and political actors representing their interests in advanced industrial democracies in the second part of the past century (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992; Kriesi, 2010; van der Brug et al., 2007; van der Brug, 2010). The broad consensus is that this de-alignment is followed by the emergence of new cultural conflicts that fundamentally transform the traditional dimensions and arenas of political competition. These changes facilitate the appearance of actors that capitalise on the very discourse that challenges traditional ways of representation and salient dialogues (Inglehart, 1977; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hooghe at al., 2002; Bornschier, 2010; Dolenzal, 2010; Stubager, 2009). These transformations promote a sense of alienation and detachment from political institutions and actors (Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2016).

By altering the way that people relate to and evaluate political actors, ideologies, and institutions, these processes are central to the nature of negative partisanship. Therefore, we must examine how the meaning and consequences of NPID might have transformed over the past decades. We also must place existing cross-sectional works in the context of these political changes to make valid comparisons of their results and meaningful interpretations of their implications.

In this chapter I provide a descriptive account that explores changes in the extent and nature of NPID in Western European electorates. I rely on data from the European Election Study series to present trends that track the aggregate-level stability of negative partisanship throughout the 1990s and 2000s, followed by a systematic decline in NPID for most countries

in the last decade. I argue that the decline in the prevalence of NPID is only one symptom of broader changes in how the public approaches and engages with types of ideologies and parties. I also argue that this is partly driven by drastic transformations of the ideological cleavage structure and the growing dominance of actors and ideas that challenge traditional institutions, arenas, and discourses of political competition over the past decades.

These changes are mirrored in how attitudes towards particular ideologies have shifted over time. Mainstream parties are increasingly viewed as distant or remote, while polar and populist parties are increasingly approached with growing acceptance and support. I argue that lower levels of negative partisanship in recent times do not imply tendencies of growing optimism and openness towards parties. Instead, they signal growing detachment from and disengagement from the party system as a whole. It also reflects an increasing contrast between those who continue to engage with the changed political landscape and those who turn away from political spaces completely. I show that the plunge in negativity disproportionately affects the politically least motivated and least invested segments of societies. These are also the groups that are the most susceptible to political indifference and alienation.

2.2 NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP

Partisanship refers to a broad range of motivationally, or even directionally distinct understandings of feeling closer to (or distant from) a party in academic works. While most studies talk about positive party support, as Richardson (1991) asserts, partisanship is better thought of as a complex set of positive and negative feelings and evaluations. This approach allows for support out of aversion or opposition to parties (Crewe, 1976; Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Mayer, 2017). Caruna and his colleagues (2015) in one of the few studies that

explicitly discuss negative partisanship (NPID) summarise how the concept can be derived from and compared to positive attachment: “Holding a negative partisanship toward a party is an affective repulsion from that party, one that is more stable than a current dislike and more strongly held than a passing opinion, resilient in part because it entails selective information gathering and processing that is capable of overriding rational updating” (Caruna et al., 2015:772).

Just as its positive counterpart, NPID can be motivated by instrumental reasoning (i.e., based on political issues and ideological considerations) or by expressive type of associations (i.e., based on emotions attached to distinct groups) (Huddy et al., 2015). Yet, while positive identification is related to positive impressions of an in-party, negative partisanship necessarily lacks the psychological sense of belonging and is based on strong negative connotations attached to an out-party (Bankert, 2020; Brewer, 1999; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Caruna, McGregor, and Stephenson, 2015). This makes it an equally and independently relevant political attitude.

The term NPID was initially coined in the United States to describe the sharp bipolarity and the interconnected nature of negative and positive attitudes emerging in such a political environment. European fragmented systems are and have been characterised by a higher prevalence of coalitions and collaboration. Party choice here is a less straightforward exercise. There is huge potential in studying partisan hostility in this setting. The complex link between parties and the lack of straightforward political out-groups in multi-party settings offer a different understanding of negative partisanship (i.e., less predetermined reciprocity between in- and out-group selections).

The question how best to capture the way that people define political in- and out-groups in fragmented systems is one that has been the subject of recent studies. Wagner (2021) argues

that the conceptualisation and measurement of attitudes towards parties and partisans in multi-party settings need to recognise that citizens do not necessarily hold positive attitudes towards one specific party and negative attitudes towards the rest of the party palette (and indeed, that NPIDs are not necessarily directed towards one group only). Instead, one may feel warmth towards more groups, may have none they dislike, or it may be all that they dislike.

Measurement difficulties prevent the calculation of unambiguous, specific rates of NPID within electorates (different measures quantify different amounts of negativity). Nevertheless, existing studies that report descriptive information on the extent of NPID in Western Europe strongly suggest that this is a widely held political attitude. For example, using a combined measure, Mayer (2017) reports 32% of the European population (Western and Central Eastern Europe together) holding at least one NPID between 2006 and 2011 (CSES module 3). Boonen (2019) in a Flemish sample estimates NPID to be ranging between 18.5% and 36.1% (depending on out-party ideology) for the youngest age cohort and between 20.9% and 65% for people one generation older in 2012-2013. Similarly, Melandez and Rovira Kaltwasser (2021), with a more conservative measure, show that NPID varies between 26.78% and 52.59% in 2019 across Western Europe. Although studies in Western Europe are scarce, it is clear that NPID should not be ignored.

But the importance of the attitude does not only come from its prevalence. Studies consider the various ways that negative partisanship influences political perceptions, choices, behaviour. NPID mobilises political participation. This empirical effect holds even when the analysis controls for positive partisanship (Mayer, 2017; Caruna et al., 2015). NPID increases loyal voting among partisans (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Mayer, 2017). NPID motivates voting for a less disliked alternative among partisans and non-partisans alike (Mayer, 2017; Caruna et al., 2015). NPID is also associated with

several alternative political behaviours, such as signing petitions, protesting or online political expressions and activities (Caruna et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2015). All signal cognitive engagement with and investment in politics.

Studies in the US show that the effect of negative partisanship goes beyond the political sphere and influences social attitudes and actions: it induces a sense of distance from, or even hostility towards voters of a disliked party (Westwood et al., 2018; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Abramowitz and Webster, 2018). It is a reasonable assumption that negative partisanship would elicit similar reactions in European environments too.

2.3 POLITICAL CONTEXT: 1989-2019

Despite growing interest in negative political attitudes (Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021), studies still note the lack of an understanding of how negativity rises or falls in the long term and how it depends on political context conditions (Wagner, 2021; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). Time and context matter crucially for the dynamics of negative partisanship. In many European countries surveys consistently documented a gradual decline in partisan attachments over the second half of the 20th century (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Dalton, 2002). In a setting where the public is less motivated by a perceived sense of attachment to political parties, negative partisanship can be even more influential and meaningful a political concept. The political landscape in the past few decades has gone through tremendous changes globally. The changes had profound societal implications and altered the way that people related to political actors, institutions, and system. They are therefore central to the motivation and nature of any attitude related to political parties.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism as defining and ruling ideology on the continent changed the way that people viewed political parties, especially radical left

forces. March and Mudde (2005) note the decline and mutation of the radical left parties after 1989 across Europe and, due to internal conflicts and public scepticism about old and new left-wing forces, their failure (with a few exceptions, e.g., Greece) to develop into salient political actors in the early 1990s. The early 1990s also saw previously unprecedented political and economic globalisation. But it became apparent towards the end of the decade that the opening up of the national borders benefitted and affected segments of societies disproportionately (Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi, 2010).

Scholars have widely documented the de-alignment of traditional structural and ideological linkages between social groups and political representatives throughout the second half of the 20th Century (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992; Kriesi, 2010; van der Brug et al., 2007; van der Brug, 2010). This facilitated the emergence of new cultural conflicts, linked to globalization, which fundamentally transformed the traditional dimensions of politics in Western European party systems (Inglehart, 1977; Flanagan, 1987; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hooghe et al., 2002; Bornschier, 2010; Dolezal, 2010; Stubager, 2009; Kriesi, 2010). Capitalising on these developments offered new populist right forces an opportunity to mobilise. Populist movements confront existing partisan and ideological patterns and tend to mobilise along a discourse that emphasises the moral distinction between the pure common people and the corrupt governing elites, under the flag of popular sovereignty (Mudde, 2004; Zulianello and Larsen, 2020). They pose striking challenge not only to traditional actors, but also to arenas and institutions of (party) politics.

The growing and persistent support for populist parties in the 2000s is linked to the erosion of the representative function of the traditionally governing parties (through their perceived convergence on visible and salient ideological questions or their seeming disconnection from the pure, ordinary people) or their perceived failure to provide public goods or good

governance (Mair, 2002; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi, 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Mair, 2011; Ardag et al., 2020, Katz and Mair, 2018). Indeed, the 2010s notably witnessed tendencies following the 2008- economic crisis indicative of voters turning away from mainstream political parties and the strengthening and normalisation of discourses that challenged the traditional consensus on the questions of austerity, immigration, the European integration and the like (Kriesi, 2014; Hino, 2012; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016; Zulianello and Larsen, 2020).

This point is echoed by Dassonneville and Hooghe (2016) who describe the process of partisan dealignment and its consequences for attitudes towards the party system. Dealignment implies that people hold a more open attitude towards parties, meaning that voters are increasingly less attached to one particular political party and are gradually more indifferent about parties as options for political choice. At the same time, dealignment also brings about a sense of alienation from parties and the party system (Marthaler, 2008; Albright, 2009; Dassonneville et al, 2012, Zelle, 1995; Söderlund, 2008). This can endanger the legitimacy of electoral and party politics in Western Europe and may profoundly alter the stability and the underlying nature of partisan attitudes.

2.4 QUESTIONS AND DATA

Against this political background, I set out the following broad questions to closer examine the longitudinal dynamics of negative partisanship. (1) Has NPID been rising, falling or holding stable in the past decades? (2) What can we learn about the characteristics (ideological direction, clustering, broadness, exclusivity) of those holding NPIDs through time? (3) Are changes universal across people of all kinds of political predispositions? (4)

Can we have a better understanding of the nature of NPID and its connection to other important political attitudes through studying over-time comparisons across relevant groups?

The key data sources for the study are the voter study components of 7 waves (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019) of the European Elections Studies (EES) series, a collection of nationally representative post- European Parliament (EP) election surveys of all EU member states. While the primary focus of the surveys is perceptions of and preferences about the EU as a political regime, the data collection includes questions about national elections and parties. Survey waves are tied to European Parliament election dates. Relevant election-level information for any given survey year is taken from the most recent national elections for all countries. Accordingly, data from all survey years relate to a period of a couple of years, rather than an exact point in the history of public opinion about parties. I use original demographic weights to approximate nationally representative samples at the time of questioning as best as possible.

The propensity to vote (PTV) items included in the EES from 1989 onwards offer the most comprehensive time-series on negative partisanship in Western Europe so far. Negative partisanship is measured as an explicit claim of never considering voting for a given party. This idea is not new. Certainty not to vote for a party is one of the main ways that negative party identities have been operationalised in previous studies, along with a claim of disliking a party, or a combination of the two. The ideal is to combine these two items for a more nuanced, complex measure (McGregor et al., 2015). Unfortunately, there is currently no longitudinal data source that includes both aspects.

I take an explicit rejection of one or multiple parties and their categorical exclusion from consideration for political choice as a sufficiently strong indication of a deeply rooted negative identity of the given party. This provides a more instrumental understanding of

NPID than it would be combined with a sympathy component. This measure also likely overestimates the extent of negativity to some extent. However, since the behavioural and the affective components are strongly correlated (Wagner, 2021) and share many individual- and aggregate-level correlates (introductory chapter), and since the negative partisanship and the negative partisan affect literature draw similar conclusions about the nature and the consequences of the two types of attitudes (Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Caruna et al., 2015; McGregor et al., 2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Mayer, 2017; Bankert, 2020, Garzia and da Silva, 2021), the PTV measure should be informative enough to discuss the temporal stability and changes in the nature of negative partisan identification.

The main variable of interest is holding one or more negative partisan IDs vs. not holding any. The most relevant parties are grouped into ideological families (Socialist/Communist, Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democrat, Right-wing), as well as into party types (parties with populist rhetoric vs. not). The ideological family corresponding to each party mentioned in the EES is imported from the ParlGov party database and information on populist tendencies is taken from a dataset by Zulianello and Larsen (2020).

The peculiarity of the Zulienallo and Larsen dataset is that it focuses specifically on populist parties entering *EP elections.* Previous classifications (for example the widely referenced Rooduijn et al. (2019) collection) deal with *national* parliamentary elections. The specific differences between the Zulienallo and Larsen and the Rooduijn el al. classifications are summarised as follows: “First, we exclude the parties that, according to the latter, have a ‘borderline status’, with some noticeable exceptions that, in our view, warrant inclusion such [...] as the Dutch Socialist Party [...] until the 1999 EP election (Lucardie and Voerman, 2019). Second, we included the parties that were classified as populist radical right parties by Mudde (2007), with the exception of one party that is better understood as belonging to

the extreme right (and hence non-populist), namely the Tricolour Flame in Italy (Tarchi, 2015). Third, we include parties that can be classified as ideationally populist but are absent on the list of parties provided from Rooduijn et al. (2019), for instance Belgium Arise, [...] the Brexit Party in the UK, and Course of Freedom in Greece. Fourth, we classify Alternative for Germany as being non-populist in 2014 but as a populist party in the 2019 election (see Arzheimer 2015). Fifth, we consider the case of the Greek PASOK as populist only during Andreas Papandreou's leadership (Mudde, 2007: 48; see also Lyrintzis 2005), who was its leader from its foundation until 1996. This means that the PASOK is classified as populist until the 1994 EU elections and as non-populist from the 1999 EU elections onwards" (Zulianello and Larsen, 2021:3). These distinctions are summarised in a table in Appendix B/4. Furthermore, while the main analysis relies on the Zulienallo and Larson dataset, all relevant analyses and figures are replicated using the Rooduijn et al. classification (and presented in the Appendix). The results from analysis using the Rooduijn et al. classification show *no difference* from those of the main analyses.

The geographical focus of the study is Western European EU member states. The reason for excluding Eastern European countries is that they lack a sufficiently long history in the EU to establish meaningful time trends. Most Western European countries have been members since before 1989 (with three more countries' accessions in 1995 and the last two member states joining in 2004). It is also important to note that previous studies have discovered differences in the structure of partisan negativity between Western and Eastern Europe (Reiljan, 2020). It is not possible to reliably elaborate on these different structures, particularly given the short time span of data availability for Eastern Europe. The dataset therefore consists of 102 country-year (EP election) samples[7] clustered into 17 countries and

[7] Responses from Belgium, Sweden and Luxembourg in 2004 are not available due to missingness on the key survey items, given the questionnaire design in that particular survey year. I exclude the sample from Cyprus in

seven survey waves (See the Appendix B/1 for a list of available country observations each year).

The questions are approached from country- and group-level perspectives. The enquiry is primarily data-driven and in most part relies on non-parametric, descriptive methods. These methods respect the limitations of the data but permit a very close examination of the patterns without strict prior empirical assumptions. This enables the chapter to highlight crucial trends and properties of negative partisanship that we know little about. The descriptive findings from this paper can provide the groundwork for future analysis to deepen our understanding of the foundations and contextual correlates of negative partisanship in a changing political environment.

2.5 TIME TRENDS: NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP IN WESTERN EUROPE IN 1989-2019

In the first section I describe the proportion of negative partisans in Western European countries over time in parallel with patterns of vote certainty (measured by certainty to vote for a particular party). I take the latter as a crude proxy for positive attachment to parties and as the opposite of NPID. The left panel of Figure 2.1 shows the aggregate levels of negativity and vote certainty, measured as the weighted shares of respondents in each country who answered 'never vote' / 'certain to vote' for at least one party in the period of 1989-2019.

2004, because the calculated share of NPID is an outlier both in that survey year and in the whole sample of country-year observations ($p = 0.0015$). Given the small total number of observations, this could affect the patterns in question. The other outlier (Portugal 1999), which is detected at the $p < 0.1$ level, is kept in the sample.



Figure 2.1: Left: Negative partisanship and vote certainty in Western Europe. Coloured lines are loess curves fitted on weighted country averages and the shaded areas are their respective 90% confidence intervals. **Right:** Cross-country variation in NPID between 1989 and 2019 in Western Europe. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019.

One can immediately notice the relative stability of negative partisanship on average throughout the 1990s and 2000s, ranging mostly between 75% and 90-95% in societies. Negative party identification is widespread in Western European countries, most people can point to a party or multiple parties that they would never consider voting for. This average stability is followed by a noteworthy downturn of the level of NPID after 2009 in the majority of countries.[8] In the last decade the level of negative partisanship ranges mostly between 55% and 85%, with an average decline of 12% from earlier year highs. This may sound like a modest change. Nevertheless, this 12% means a tremendous number of people across Western Europe who suddenly no longer exhibited NPIDs towards *any* political party. A sudden movement of such magnitude is incredibly rare and meaningful when it comes to partisanship and political choice.

[8] In Appendix B/3 I illustrate the statistical significance of the decline on the aggregate with country-level OLS models of negative partisanship with time fixed effects.

It should also be noted that despite the stability of the aggregate pattern, there is considerable cross-country variation in NPID (right panel in Figure 2.1). And while some countries exhibit little variation in the level of NPID over time (e.g., Greece, Spain, and Belgium), there is also extensive fluctuation in others (e.g., Portugal, Luxembourg). This suggests that beyond the aggregate time-specific tendencies, there are important locally relevant contexts that systematically foster or depress negativity towards parties.

Vote certainty also steadily declines, though it is a less pronounced change over the observed 30-year period. The average rate of vote certainty is always lower than negative party identification. It ranges between 25% and 75% and is comparable on average to the level of partisanship from the corresponding years in Western Europe (see Appendix B/2).[9]

In general, having a negative party ID does not necessarily imply that one holds a positive party ID as well. Naturally, the two attitudes correlate. This correlation is far from perfect, however: 0.35 ($p<0.001$, $n=102$) at the aggregate- and 0.28 ($p<0.001$, $n=90269$) at the individual-level. In fact, the rejection of particular parties is a lot more universal among the public than identifying with certainty of voting. This makes intuitive and theoretical sense, particularly in multiparty systems, with numerous and diverse political actors. This is not merely relevant as a descriptive pattern but further highlights the importance of discussing negative partisanship independently of its positive counterpart.

[9]The EES series uses different questions to measure partisanship throughout the 7 relevant survey years, which cannot be used to illustrate descriptive patterns or to make comparisons. Data on partisanship is taken from the European Social Survey for years 2002-2018 and Eurobarometer surveys for years 1989-1994 and are weighted with demographic weights for aggregate comparison. The Eurobarometer questionnaires use the following question 'Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? < if yes > Do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close or merely a sympathizer?' to measure partisanship, where I coded all positive responses as an indication of partisan identification. The ESS questionnaires use the following question 'Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?'. In both cases I excluded NA and DK responses.

2.6 CHARACTERISTICS OF NPID

Theoretical accounts of NPID in multiparty settings frequently stress the need to account for the possibility that people are negative partisans of multiple parties (Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Wagner, 2021). It is useful to explore the prevalence of multiple negative memberships and compare the number of NPIDs people report over time. This may also serve to qualify our understanding of the longitudinal trends.

I focus on the changes between the years characterised by the relative stability of NPID (1989-2009) and the years where negative partisanship shows a gradual decline (2014-2019). Figure 2.1 illustrates this plunge. This decline could imply changes in the nature of NPID. A smaller proportion of the public could, for instance, hold more negative party IDs either spread out across the ideological spectrum (indicating growing negativity towards virtually all, or most parties) or clustered around particular party families. Alternatively, fewer people could gradually be holding the NPIDs of fewer parties (which one could define as a stronger, more exclusive sense of aversion). These are crucial aspects of negativity towards parties that have important implications for how negative partisanship is placed in broader political tendencies.

Figure 2.2 compares the number of NPIDs over time, measured only among negative partisans in each year. The graphs suggest no substantial or significant change in the number and ideological spread of NPIDs between the first two decades and the last. In Appendix B/3 I present OLS models of the number of NPIDs and their ideologies on the 7 time points that confirm that the changes in the mean number of NPIDs and their ideologies are not statistically significant at the country-level. The single exception that stands out is between the relatively higher numbers of NPIDs people report in 1989 and the lower numbers in the

following years. This is particularly puzzling because the prevalence of NPID in 1989 across countries is not high in comparison to later years.



Figure 2.2: Average number of negative party IDs and the average number of ideologies (ideological families) negative party IDs fall into in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019. The considered ideological families are: Green/Ecological, Socialist/Communist, Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democrat, Right-wing. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. Coloured lines are loess curves fitted on country-level data points. *Source*: EES 1989-2019; Holger and Manow 2020 (ParlGov)

One explanation for this contrast lies in the history of the dominant ideologies in the second half of the 20th Century in Europe and the shift in the presence, salience and frequency of parties connected to them in the early 1990s. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the defeat of Socialism as a defining political ideology in Europe changed the popularity, salience, and strategies of political parties, most directly the (radical) left, who largely failed to transform into new, salient political actors (March and Mudde, 2005). Appendix B/4 shows that survey questionnaires in 1989 listed almost twice as many relevant Communist, Socialist and Social Democrat parties as in 1994. It also demonstrates that their presence in countries is associated with markedly more NPIDs but not with significantly higher proportions of negative partisans.[10]

[10] Moreover, Appendix B/4 also illustrates that the presence of the other, right-wing type of relative ideological extremity has no similar links with the number of negative partisan IDs.

After 1989, the average number of negative party IDs people report and the number of ideological families these parties belong to show striking stability, averaging mostly between 2 and 4 in each country. This underlines that negative partisanship is not an exclusive attitude. Only 15-20% of negative partisans hold a single NPID. Another 30-40% list 2-3 out-parties. There is no indication of a systematic, general change over time in the nature of holding NPIDs. Although a substantially lower proportion of people hold any negative partisan IDs after 2009, they do not appear to do so in a broader, ideologically more clustered, or more exclusive way.



Figure 2.3: Negative partisanship and vote certainty of parties belonging to main ideological families and populist parties in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019. Coloured lines are loess curves fitted on weighted country averages with their 90% confidence intervals. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019, Holger and Manow 2020 (ParlGov), Zulianello and Larsen 2020

Previous cross-sectional research show differences between parties in how much negativity they attract in Europe (Mayer, 2017; Boonen, 2019; Melandez and Katwasser, 2021). Figure 2.3 looks at systematic differences in NPID across party families and types over time. Parties are clustered into six ideological families based on information from the ParlGov party dataset: Socialist/Communist parties, Social Democrat parties, Liberal parties, Conservative parties, Christian Democrat parties and Right-wing parties. Populist parties are also examined

separately, regardless of their traditional left-right ideological leaning and are identified using data from Zulienallo and Larsen (2020).

All spatial party groups experience a general decline in the average level of their negative partisans between 1989 and 2019. Ideological extremity makes a substantial difference, particularly in early years, in how much adversity or support parties attract. Ideological extremity tends to be associated with markedly higher rates of NPID and lower levels of vote certainty. For most of the observed 30-year period radical left and right-wing parties have more negative partisans than parties with centrist ideologies. These shares decline significantly over the 1990s and in the last decade. At the same time, whereas mainstream parties lose a sizeable share of their most certain supporters – except for the fluctuating pattern observed for Conservative parties – their radical counterparts manage to gradually attract somewhat larger segments of the public. By 2019 ideology almost ceases to make a difference. NPID associated with all ideological party types is at around 30-40% – except for right-wing parties, who are still characterised by a higher rate of rejection (by 15-20%).

NPID associated with populist parties was notably higher than NPID associated with centrist ideologies and increased throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. This makes intuitive sense, as at that time populist discourses had not yet been widely normalised within the European political scene (Zulianello and Larsen, 2020). Then, just like in the case of right-wing parties, the share of populist NPIDs declined from 70% to an average of 50% by 2019. The parallel in findings makes sense. By the late 2000s the majority of populist parties were of right leaning (Zulianello and Larsen, 2020). At the same time, the vote for populist parties increased sharply from below 5% in the 2000s to almost 15% in 2019. This might seem modest in magnitude but is without precedent for any ideology or type of party throughout the observed 30 years.

These differences allow us to identify two distinct phases. The 1990s and early 2000s are characterised by a marginal decline in the number of mainstream negative partisans, a more pronounced downturn in negative partisanship associated with radical parties, but an increase in antipathy towards populists. The late 2000s and 2010s are characterised by drastic decline in the share of both radical and populist NPIDs, as well as an upsurge in unwavering support for them, while mainstream parties steadily lose their own unwavering supporters.

These trends indicate a growing contrast between attitudes and their changes towards centrist ideological groups and radical or populist parties. The increasing unwavering support for populist parties adds an important point to the patterns. In recent decades general feelings towards all mainstream or centrist parties shift to more indifference and disengagement. Societies exhibit somewhat lower levels of negativity and slightly lower levels of unwavering support towards them. A majority of people would therefore consider voting for them, but they are also less certain in choosing them. However, when it comes to radical and populist parties the corresponding shift is both towards more neutrality and more unwavering support. People exhibit much lower rates of rejection and a slight increase in certain radical vote. Electorates are both more open to voting for them and are more determined to choose them. This is a noteworthy contrast, particularly if this trend continues beyond 2019.

These key long-term tendencies reflect theoretical discussions about the growing disappointment about the perceived failure of mainstream parties to act as institutions of popular representation in the past decades (Mair, 2002; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi, 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Mair, 2011; Ardag et al., 2020) and their rejection by the public, along with the growing presence, salience and acceptance of populist parties and rhetoric (Kriesi, 2014; Hino, 2012; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016; Roberts, 2017; Zulianello and Larsen, 2020). The contrast described above is striking evidence of disengagement with mainstream political forces and their steady replacement by their more radical challengers.

More broadly, it raises a possible connection between the reduction in negative party identification across the continent and growing disillusionment and alienation felt towards traditional actors. Appendix B/6 presents visual descriptions of relevant political trends indicative of these very tendencies. Both indifference,[11] a measure of "how much the respondent prefers his or her favourite party over the least favourite one" (Johnston et al., 2007:737; Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2016), and alienation,[12] a measure of "how far the respondent is from his or her closest party" (Johnston et al.; 2007:737; Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2016), steadily increased over the 1990s and, after stability through the 2000s, even more drastically increased between 2009 and 2014. This indicates that over the 30-year period people grew progressively more distant from parties, even their most preferred ones. At the same time, political interest is not falling among the electorates, which suggests that the apparent disillusionment is not a sign of growing less concerned about the matters of politics altogether but is a more qualified distancing from what parties and the party system can offer.

According to this understanding, lower levels of NPID do not imply tendencies of rising optimism, openness, or warmth towards parties, but rather, increasing detachment from the party system and less willingness to engage with parties as political institutions cognitively and beyond. At the same time, reflection on earlier descriptive evidence of the stability of some fundamental characteristics of holding NPIDs (frequency, ideological sorting, and exclusivity) suggests a deepening divide between segments of societies who continue to engage with political parties of shifting political salience with an unchanged intensity and those who do not. Rather than speaking of the weakening relevance of the concept of negative partisanship, this implies a turn towards a more qualified political attitude.

[11] Indifference = $\frac{10-(\max(PTV_i)-\min(PTV_{j\neq i}))}{10}$, where PTV_i is the rating of the *i*th party on a 1-10 scale

[12] Alienation = $\frac{10-\max(PTV_i)}{10}$, where PTV_i is the rating of the *i*th party on a 1-10 scale

2.7 NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP ACROSS GROUPS OF PEOPLE

The next section examines whether NPID disproportionately fell among some segments of the public in the last decade – with particular focus on segments that are less invested in politics. It is important to first identify such groups of people.

Ideological extremity has consistently been linked to partisan and nonpartisan negative party identification in cross-sectional studies. In particular, it has been linked to holding NPID(s) towards parties of the opposite side of the left-right spectrum (e.g., Mayer, 2017; Boonen, 2019; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). One of the prime political motivations for negative partisan affect, a concept closely related to NPID, is also ideological opposition (Wagner, 2021; Huddy et al., 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Lelkes, 2019; Reiljan, 2020; Ward and Tavits, 2019; Webster and Abramowitz 2017).

The empirical literature also suggests that there are differences between older and younger generations in partisan patterns and political participation. The consensus is that there is a considerably lower rate of participation and engagement on the part of younger generations (Henn et al., 2005; Kimberlee, 2002; Dahl et al., 2018), particularly in recent decades. Boonen (2019) shows generational differences in the level of NPID in Belgium. Older generations are notably more likely to develop deep antipathies felt towards political parties. Studies also document that young European citizens disproportionately show alienation and distrust towards traditional political institutions and actors (Henn et al., 2005; Mierina, 2014) and even democracy (Dahl et al., 2018).

This section therefore examines whether ideologically less extreme groups and younger generations are disproportionately likely *not* to hold negative partisan identities after 2009. Age cohorts are defined to reflect generational differences in political socialisation and motivations for vote choice (van der Brug, 2010). The first cohort, born before 1950, is most

heavily influenced by structural party choice; the second cohort, born between 1950 and 1970, is more influenced by ideological voting; and the third cohort, born after 1970 and socialised largely after the fall of the Berlin Wall, shows the weakest association with traditional structural and ideological links to parties.

To discuss the prevalence of and changes in negative party identification across the left-right ideological spectrum of societies people with identical ideological positions (left-right self-placement) are aggregated by country and year. Appendix B/7 shows the (weighted) ideological dispersion of Western European societies throughout the years.[13] The visual descriptions do not suggest that there have been significant changes in the ideological polarisation and spread of societies over time that would add certain qualifications to any ideology-related pattern.

Figure 2.4 shows loess curves fitted across the levels of NPID that these groups exhibit (i.e., those within each group with at least one negative party ID) between 1989 and 2019. Throughout most of the 1990s and the 2000s there is hardly any ideology-based disparity. But the years after 2009 show the development of considerable difference between ideologically polar and centrist segments of societies. Both left- and right-wing extremities tend to have more negative partisans than groups in the centre. By 2019 this gap is around 25%. The final year also shows a somewhat leftward shift in the pattern, whereby the left is generally associated with a higher rate of negative partisanship than the ideological right.

[13] Note, that the apparent leftward shift after 2004 is due to a change in measurement (from a 10 point to an 11 point scale).



Figure 2.4: Negative partisanship and vote certainty towards parties in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by ideological leaning and extremity. The coloured lines are loess curves fitted on weighted ideological group averages per country and the shaded areas their 90% confidence intervals. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. Data: EES 1989-2019

It is vital to note that this is not a gradual process, but that ideological distinctions are virtually non-existent before 2009, except for the year 1994. This instantaneous nature of the change stands in contrast with vote wavering patterns, which also show increasing sorting by ideological extremity. However, vote wavering is considerably more ideologically sorted throughout the whole 30-year period than negative partisanship. The strengthening of ideological sorting is in fact a more or less gradual process (from a 25% gap between the polar and centrist segments of society to an approximately 40% gap on average).

Turning to generational differences, Figure 2.5 also reveals growing contrasts. Although the levels of negative partisanship in all three age cohorts follow a similar trajectory between 1989 and 2019, the youngest age cohort is generally associated with lower levels of negative party identification throughout the whole 30-year period. At the same time, the gap in the share of NPID between the generations gradually increases in the last 10-15 years from approximately 5% to around 15%. This suggests that the young – already less politically

engaged – cohort is disproportionately sensitive to the changing political context in the 2010s.



Figure 2.5: Negative partisanship and vote certainty towards parties in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by age cohort. The coloured lines are loess curves fitted on weighted ideological group averages per country and the shaded areas their 90% confidence intervals. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. Data: EES 1989-2019

Appendix B/8 presents output from logistic regressions that confirm these descriptive patterns at the individual-level. Together they show evidence that there are segments of the public disproportionately affected by the plunge in the level of negative partisanship in the last decade. Ideologically centrally aligned people and the youngest generation (born after 1970) are less likely to be negative partisans after 2009 relative to their ideologically extreme and older counterparts respectively. Appendix B/9 follows the ideological composition of the three observed age cohorts through time. Given that – with the exception of the 2000s, when the oldest generation appears considerably more ideologically extreme than the younger ones – the ideological moderates and the youngest generation are *not* equivalent segments, it is meaningful to note and stress both of these tendencies.

Neither the emergence of ideological distinctions, nor the sudden strengthening of generational contrasts is a gradual process. Both become pronounced after 2009. This makes the decade turn a crucial political moment and suggests an important change in the meaning of negative partisanship. Strong antipathies towards parties are no longer universal across citizens of diverse political backgrounds and predispositions. Instead, NPID is increasingly an attitude that is qualified and motivated by investment in politics. Appendix B/10 demonstrates that the youngest age cohort and ideological moderates are also more detached from parties in general (and have been for the whole 30-year period) and are less politically interested than the rest of the public. This is a confirmation that it is precisely the segments most susceptible to political disengagement that are the most closely associated with lower rates of negativity after 2009.

These distinctions help us place the changes in NPID within electorates in the context of wider political and social trends. They strongly suggest that the decline in negative partisanship is not a sign of people suddenly warming up towards political parties. Instead, the declining incidence of negative partisanship leaves room for disappointment and growing distance from traditional political institutions and processes. This is a crucial – and perhaps even worrying – finding for the legitimacy of democratic institutions and political processes. Another implication is that negative partisanship, connecting more closely to political engagement, is more informative of efficacy and broader political participation than in previous decades.

There are similarities between the processes starting in the 2010s and those observed in 1994. Increasing alienation and indifference in 1994 compared to 1989 and more pronounced distinctions in negativity between ideologically extreme and central segments of the electorates mark 1994 a time point with similar important changes in how people relate to parties to those in the 2010s. Yet, there are some differences between 1994 and the 2010s.

First, the drop in the level of negativity and the increasing ideological sorting of negative partisanship in 1994 is temporary. Second, these temporary changes are not accompanied by changing generational contrasts: the youngest generation is *not* disproportionately less politically engaged in 1994 than older generations. These patterns suggest that the ideological sorting of negative partisanship in 1994 was indication of a comparatively more optimistic political mood than that in the late 2000s, 2010s.

2.8 CONCLUSIONS, FURTHER QUESTIONS

In this chapter I discussed the longitudinal dynamics of negative partisanship (NPID) in Western Europe in the period of 1989-2019. Negative partisanship captures deep and conscious antipathies towards one or more political parties that have profound implications for political perceptions and behaviour. Particularly in a political context where positive partisanship is less and less prevalent, negative identification can be an increasingly more relevant political phenomenon. I argue that it is vital that we understand how negative partisanship rises, falls, or stays stable across relevant political contexts and what its changes mean for the nature and characteristics of partisan negativity in societies. This is especially so, given that the European political landscape has seen tremendous changes throughout the past decades that change the way that people relate to and evaluate political actors, ideologies, and institutions.

Using longitudinal data from the European Election Study series I show aggregate-level stability in the level of negative partisanship throughout the 1990s and 2000s at a high rate in societies. The years of stability are followed by a systematic decline in negativity for most countries in the last decade. However, although fewer people hold NPIDs in the 2010s, they

do not do so in an ideologically more (or less) constrained way or in a more (or less) exclusive sense.

Political transformations throughout the three decades are accompanied by changes in how the public approaches and engages with types of ideologies and parties. Parties with mainstream ideologies are increasingly approached with suspicion and extreme or populist parties with growing acceptance and support. These tendencies reflect disappointment about the perceived failure of mainstream parties to act as institutions of popular representation and the gradual turning away from them by the public, along with the growing presence, salience and acceptance of populist parties and rhetoric.

I argue that lower levels of negative partisanship in the last decade do not imply rising optimism and openness towards parties. Rather, they signal growing detachment from and relative disengagement with the party system as a whole, along with an increasing contrast between those who continue to engage with the changed political landscape and those who turn away from political spaces. I show that the decline in NPID rates disproportionately affects the politically least motivated and least invested segments of societies. These are also the groups that are the most susceptible to growing alienation from political institutions and widespread indifference in preferences across available parties.

These trends have profound implications for the relevance of NPID as an attitude, especially if these tendencies continue beyond 2019. The shift in the motivation of negative partisanship from a more or less universally held attitude to a more qualified one suggests that the concept is more indicative of political engagement and may be more responsive to political context conditions. This represents an important contribution to the discussion of negative partisanship in Western European multiparty systems.

Nevertheless, there are a few important qualifications to the findings of this study. First, the current measurement of NPID, though it captures strong antipathies towards parties, does not reflect the complexity of more nuanced measures in earlier studies. It is important to validate the patterns in this study using a measure that combines behaviour with affect. Naturally, this is not feasible for the time period observed here but empirical studies on negative partisanship and negative partisan affect would both benefit from future endeavours to better understand their relation to each other and their correlates. The study would profit from further updates. The continuation of the longitudinal trends would validate and emphasise the initial observations about and the transformations in the last decade.

Finally, these explanations are mostly data- and theory-driven interpretations of the patterns. They do not account for the full network of factors that foster and depress NPID in the long term. Nor do they identify causal relationships, whose identification would require more extensive individual-level information in a panel setting. Nevertheless, these descriptive findings provide groundwork for further research investigating the political and contextual motivations of negativity and what they mean for political behaviour in Europe’s changing partisan landscape.

CHAPTER 3

The changing link between ideological polarisation and negative partisanship in Western Europe

ABSTRACT

Negative partisanship, capturing strong and lasting antipathies developed towards one or more parties, is a powerful influence on political and social behaviour. This term was initially coined in the US, but today is widely considered relevant and heavily present in Western Europe too. Most studies agree that ideological polarisation and extremity in party systems are key drivers of negative attitudes towards parties. This relationship is usually assumed constant, despite the drastic transformations of the European political landscape in the past decades. I argue that the ever grater dominance of populist rhetoric in political discourses and competitions and the growing salience of a value-based political cleavage fundamentally alter the role and relevance of traditional ideological conflicts. This must be accounted for when studying the link between ideological polarisation and NPID. In this chapter I compare the influence of polarisation along *ideological extremities* and the partisan *core of an electorate* in driving NPID over time. I show that their balance is conditional and gradually changing. Without populist parties in electoral competitions NPID is/was primarily driven by ideological extremities. However, with the growing presence and success of populist parties in European elections this is replaced by polarisation along the electorally most relevant, core political conflicts. This trend is a symptom of a fundamental change in what the most salient and mobilising political discourses are – through the normalisation of ideas previously considered extreme and the incorporation of new moralised conflicts into mainstream parties' agendas. Coupled with decreasing trust in and engagement with parties through traditional means, this also signals an emerging sharp contrast between engagement with changing political landscapes and growing detachment from the party system and democratic processes altogether.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Positive party identification is one of the most frequently studied concepts in political behaviour. The concept of a negative party identification – feeling a strong sense of aversion towards a given party – is no less important in explaining political attitudes and behaviour, and it has gained much attention, particularly in recent years. Despite the importance of the subject in the United States, the discussion of negative partisanship in Europe – and particularly in European multiparty systems – has only just recently begun, partly due to limited empirical evidence on the phenomenon. It is important to extend the discussion, however, given the limited extent to which the findings from two-party settings can be applied in multi-party contexts.

The majority of the works that explicitly discuss negative partisanship (NPID) in Western Europe focus on voting behaviour and establish that it has considerable directional mobilising effect (Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Caruana et al., 2015; McGregor et al., 2015; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Richardson, 1991; Vlachová, 2001; Mayer, 2017). The origins and drivers of NPID, however, have barely been discussed. There is considerable cross-country and over-time variability in whether party systems and political contexts produce negative partisans. This variability implies that there are locally relevant factors that either foster or depress NPID in societies. It also suggests that negativity is partly a function of supply, i.e., dependent on the availability and politicising nature of certain parties and dependent on the public's receptivity to parties' messages and cues. It is important to investigate what characteristics of political competitions and party systems make societies more negative towards certain or all parties.

Previous research on partisan affect and affective polarisation discusses the various conditions for and drivers of negativity. These can all be applied to the NPID framework.

Among the most prominent drivers are various forms of ideological polarisation and intensity, which studies consistently establish to be positively linked to negativity (Wagner, 2021; Huddy et al., 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Lelkes, 2019; Reiljan, 2020; Ward and Tavits, 2019; Webster and Abramowitz 2017). However, one of the limitations identified by researchers is the lack of an understanding of how negativity rises, falls or fluctuates in the long-term depending on political context (Wagner, 2021; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021).

Context conditions are particularly important in the investigation of the ideology-NPID relationship. Much attention has been devoted to the transformation of the ideological cleavage structure and the political space in Europe in the past couple of decades. Scholars have documented the de-alignment of traditional structural and ideological linkages between parties and their core supporters along with the increasing importance of a new value-based ideological cleavage (Inglehart, 1977; Flanagan, 1987; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hooghe et al., 2002; van der Brug et al., 2007; Stubager, 2009; Bornschier, 2010; Dolezal, 2010; Kriesi, 2010). They have also documented the growing importance of populist parties and discourses in European political competitions (Zulianello and Larsen, 2020). If negative attitudes towards parties depend on salient ideological cleavages, then the study of negative partisanship needs to explain how shifts in the salience of ideologies and transformation of the political space affect how they relate to the public's attitudes to parties.

In this chapter I examine how electorates' relevant ideological cleavages foster or depress negative partisanship. I set out two sources of ideological polarisation within electorates and use longitudinal data on 17 Western European countries between 1989 and 2019 to assess how the emergence of new conflicts shape or amend the way ideology is related to negativity

towards parties. I show that although ideological conflict within a society in general creates more negativity towards both centrist (mainstream) and polar parties, this relationship is conditional. NPID in absence or weak presence of populist forces in political competitions is fuelled primarily by *the electorate's ideological extremity* (i.e., by the contrast between the leftmost and rightmost parties' supporters). This relationship, however, is replaced by the polarisation of the *partisan core of the electorate* (i.e., the ideological contrast between supporters of the most dominant parties in elections) when there is presence of populist discourses.

I argue that this is a symptom of a fundamental change in what the most salient and mobilising political discourses are (shifting from ideologically extreme issues towards more central but more affectively polarising issues). It is also a symptom of the normalisation of populist discourses in politics that challenge traditionally salient problems and traditional ways of representation. This transforms the ways that parties are evaluated and promotes alienation from political institutions. The changing ideology - NPID dynamics illustrate how the nature and motivation of NPID (and negative political engagement in general) have changed through the past decades' political turbulences. These are important to account for, particularly if these trends continue.

3.2 NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP

Positive partisanship is one of the most fundamental and most heavily researched attitudes in the study of political behaviour. Ever since the very beginning of research on political preferences and identities, identification with a particular political party has been considered a long-standing and stable psychological association (Campbell et al., 1960). Negative

partisanship (NPID), the notion that people develop strong, deeply ingrained antipathies towards parties, has been the 'forgotten side of partisanship' (Medeiros and Noël, 2013).

Partisanship has been regarded as "an identification, *positive or negative*, of some degree of intensity" (Campbell et al., 1960: 122) and NPID has only been considered a component of it (Richardson, 1991; Rose and Mishler, 1998; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Wattenberg, 1982; Garry, 2007). Today scholars are increasingly talking about it as a standalone attitude with psychological foundations and motivations distinct from its positive counterpart. The distinction comes from the idea that NPID lacks the psychological sense of belonging that positive partisanship is associated with and is based on strong negative connotations and senses of threat about the out-parties or what they represent (Medeiros and Noël, 2013; Caruna et al., 2015; Bankert, 2020; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). Negativity, as psychological studies consistently demonstrate, is a heavier influence on human perceptions, decisions and actions than positivity (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994; Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo et al., 1997; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al., 1990).

NPID is widely seen as significant due to its prevalence in Western democracies and heavy influence on political and interpersonal attitudes and behaviour. Most studies report that between a third and two thirds (depending on measurement and context) of electorates can identify a party or more that they feel very much repulsed by (Mayer 2017; Boonen, 2019; Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021). This is incredibly important to acknowledge, especially when positive identification with parties is increasingly waning in Western democracies (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Dalton, 2002).

It is important to emphasise that NPID is an active attitude that has considerable effects on political participation and profound implications for aggregate political behaviour in countries. Mayer (2017) in her study of Western European countries and Caruna et al. (2015) in their study in Canada demonstrate the mobilising effect of NPID on turnout, even when

positive partisanship is controlled for. Mayer (2017) also shows that this effect is strongest for weak partisans (and weakens with the strengthening of party attachment). This underlines the need to discuss the two concepts separately in theoretical and empirical works. Negative partisanship increases loyal voting among partisans (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Mayer, 2017). NPID also motivates voting for other parties even among non-partisans. The exact effects depend on party and respondent ideology (Mayer,0 2017; Caruna et al., 2015).

3.3 DRIVERS OF NEGATIVITY TOWARDS PARTIES

There is little systematic collection of the drivers or correlates of NPID at either the individual- or the system-level, apart from positive partisan identification of various strengths. The academic literature is rich in theories and empirical studies that touch upon certain aspects of negative partisanship that all lend themselves to think about what fosters or depresses NPID. Some works on negative orientations towards parties in multiparty systems focus on so-called consideration set models (see Oscarsson and Rosema, 2019). These argue that vote choice is a two-stage process. Voters first exclude certain choice options and then choose from the remaining alternatives (Oscarsson and Oskarson, 2018; Rekker and Rosema, 2018). These studies relate closely to negative partisanship, but they focus on party *choice* rather than party *exclusion from* consideration sets. People appear to have ideologically relatively homogenous considerations sets and then choose the party they vote for based on more short-term factors. This implies potential heterogeneity in the pool of parties excluded from political choice options and suggests that ideology may play a role in making selections, even if in this context rejection and neutrality are blurred empirically.

Another line of inquiry intimately related to scholarship on negative partisanship is on affective polarisation. Affective polarisation, a concept coined by researchers to reflect on the contrast between positive and negative affect towards parties, has been heavily studied lately. Most studies focus on the US, though a number of authors have discussed the relevance of affective polarisation in European countries too (see Richardson, 1991; Hansen and Kosiara-Pedersen, 2017; Westwood et al., 2018). The distinction between the two concepts is that affective polarisation is constructed to reflect the *contrast* between attitudes towards various parties, whereas negative partisanship is a single dimension focusing on negativity (without consideration of the evaluation of other parties). Though closely related (high affective polarisation implying NPID), the two notions differ empirically (Wagner, 2021).

One can learn a lot from the partisan affect literature about the (mainly individual-level) motivation of NPID. Among the most commonly identified drivers of negative affect developed towards particular parties are: positive partisanship (Huddy et al., 2018; Campbell et al., 1960; Greene, 1999; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Medeiros and Noël, 2014), the extremity and intensity of one's ideological positions (Westwood et al., 2018; Lelkes, 2019), the perceived ideological polarisation between political parties (Wagner, 2021; Huddy, Bankert and Davies, 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Reiljan, 2020; Ward and Tavits, 2019; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017), and disagreement with certain parties' positions on divisive political issues, such as those relating to culture (Gidron et al., 2019; Gidron, 2020).

3.4 IDEOLOGICAL POLARISATION AND NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP

Ideology – polarisation, extremity, differences – has been identified as one of the key factors that drive negative partisan attitudes. Most existing findings about negative partisan affect pertain to the individual and not the country-level. A notable exception is the recent cross-

country study by Reiljan (2020) that documents a pattern of polarisation in 22 European democracies and the United States between 2005 and 2016. He finds that affective and ideological polarisations are significantly correlated, but that this relationship differs between Western and Central Eastern European countries. In Western Europe strong ideological divides do not necessarily lead to outstanding affective polarisation. By contrast, even rather centrist party structures can stimulate markedly high levels of affective polarisation in Central Eastern Europe. This suggests that societies in the two regions exhibit somewhat different affective structures. Despite high electoral fluctuations and in cases short history of the current political parties, in Central Eastern Europe the degree of affective polarisation comes in part from partisans being very warm towards their favoured party but exhibiting large variation on how they relate to all other groups. This contrast makes it hazardous to study attitudes towards parties across regions of Europe.

Alternatively, some research has addressed how degrees of ideological polarisation at the system-level affect positive partisanship and the partisan vote. These relationships may also be applicable for NPID in a society. Schmitt (2009) conceptualises ideological conflict as the extent of the electorate's ideological polarisation along party lines. He measures it as the mean ideological distance between relevant parties' supporters. It is not just a reflection of how stretched out individuals see the party system ideologically or how polar parties' positions really are. Rather, this reflects how relevant political conflicts get internalised within societies. This is an important theoretical difference. There can be many reasons why people would be more or less extreme ideologically than the parties they identify with: such as information (un)availability, unclear/blurred positioning, issue emphasis and ownership, hostile or cooperative campaigns, etc. Nevertheless, Reiljan (2020) points out that people tend to follow their parties' divisions consistently and accurately, as their self-reported ideological placements are well aligned with their parties' positions.

Schmitt (2009) demonstrates that the more polarised the electorate is, the greater the ideological conflict between supporters of the most relevant parties is (i.e., the ideological divide is more politicised and central to political attitudes and choice). And the more politicised political cleavages are, the more partisanship there is in a given society. Schmitt discusses two ways to define how pronounced cleavages are: polarisation of the electorate along the *most dominant* parties and polarisation along *the most polar* parties. Both definitions are positively related to the amount of partisanship societies exhibit. We could expect that they would be positively related to the amount of negative partisanship as well.

The first set of testable hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: The greater the ideological polarisation of the electorate as indicated by the most polar parties, the more likely that individuals in that society exhibit NPID(s).

Hypothesis 1b: The greater the polarisation of the electorate as indicated by the most dominant parties, the more likely that individuals in that society exhibit NPID(s).

3.5 Drivers of (negative) partisanship in changing political contexts

Past research has noted the lack of systematic inquiry into differences in negativity towards parties in changing political contexts (Wagner, 2021). This is despite the attention that has been devoted to the transformation of the cleavage structure and political space in Europe in the past couple of decades. The traditionally dominant ideological cleavage in European party systems is based on social and economic values and attitudes, mainly originating from class divides (Berglund et al., 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Lo et al., 2014). This fundamentally shapes electoral competitions as it is institutionalised with the main ideological party families: the Conservative/Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Socialist/Social Democrats (Kriesi et al., 2006). The main parties in most European countries tend to also come from

these ideological families – particularly from Conservative/Christian Democrats and Socialist/Social Democrats. Coalitions that enter competitions are also typically homogeneous in terms of broad ideology. Liberal parties are more often allied with Conservatives or Christian Democrats than with leftist parties (Mayer 2017).

The continuing importance of the traditional left-right spectrum is reinforced in recent studies of ideological divides. Parties tend to predominantly be divided along the left-right spectrum (Stoll, 2010; Reiljan, 2020; Kriesi, 2010). While approaches and terminologies differ, scholars have documented the erosion of traditional links between social groups and political actors representing their interests (Dalton et al. 1984, Franklin et al., 1992; Kriesi, 2010; van der Brug et al., 2007). They have also agreed about the emergence of a new cultural line of conflict that fundamentally transforms the traditional dimension of conflict in West European party systems (Inglehart, 1977; Flanagan, 1987; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Kitschelt, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hooghe et al., 2002; Bornschier, 2010; Dolezal, 2010; Stubager, 2009).

One aspect of this transformation is the rise of populist parties that challenge the existing partisan and ideological patterns. Populist parties tend to mobilise along a discourse that emphasises the moral distinction between the people and the governing elites, along with the establishment (Mudde, 2004). They might also be characterised by an additional set of positions that fit onto the traditional left-right dimension. A recent study by Zulianello and Larsen (2020) documents the growing and persistent support for populist parties, especially right-wing populist parties, in European Parliament (EP) elections. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the growth in the number of populist parties winning seats and the growth in their vote share in EP elections between 1989 and 2019.



Figure 3.1: The highest vote share among (left panel) and the number of (right panel) populist parties competing in European Parliament elections in each EU member state. Data source: Zulianello et al. 2020

The peculiarity of the trends documented by Zulianello and Larsen is that in terms of ideology there is considerable variance across space (e.g., left-wing populism is relatively concentrated in areas such as Greece, Ireland and Spain, but right-wing populist parties are present in the majority of EU countries). But overall, these parties, and especially right-wing populists, have secured remarkable electoral performance in the past years. In fact, many now talk about the consolidation and normalisation of populism in the political landscape.

The rise of populist parties is linked to various factors such as the erosion of the representative function of the traditionally governing parties or their failure to provide public goods or governance (Mair, 2002; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi, 2014). The first development relates to the perceived increase in the formation of informal coalitions and collusion between the mainstream parties. This renders parties' positions very similar in the eyes of voters (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Kriesi, 2014; Mair, 2011; Ardag et al., 2020). The second development relates to the idea that we might witness a growing gap between those parties that tend to be in government but are not seen as representing *the people* and those who claim to represent but do not govern (Mair, 2011; Kriesi, 2014).

These two trends – the growing salience of a second, value-based ideological dimension alongside the left-right dimension and the emergence and growing success of populist parties – are intimately related (Kriesi, 2014). Indeed, populist parties both capitalise on and foster the transformation of the salient political discourse by challenging the mainstream issue structure and the way of governing and delivering. I derive two hypotheses about how these transformations relate to the connection between societies' internalised ideological cleavages and negative partisanship.

Hypothesis 2a: The rise in the number and success of populist parties in European party competitions increases the extent to which the ideological polarisation of the electorate along the *most dominant* parties drives negative partisanship.

Hypothesis 2b: The rise in the number and success of populist parties in European party competitions decreases the extent to which the polarisation of the electorate along the *most polar* parties drives negative partisanship.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b reflect the idea that the emergence and growing salience of a second, value-based cleavage in political discourses and competitions – and the erosion of the cleavage based primarily on social and economic values and attitudes – would shift where the politically post polarising and mobilising conflicts lie. These are increasingly less tied to left-right ideological extremities.

These hypotheses do not amount to a comprehensive model that accounts for negative party identification. My aim is to establish the context dependent dynamics of the mechanisms previously linked to negativity towards political parties and to show how through the transformations of the traditional ideological cleavages existing patterns of attitudes towards parties have changed.

3.6 MEASUREMENT AND DATA

The primary data source for the analysis is the European Elections Studies (EES) series. The EES is a collection of nationally representative post- European Parliament election surveys of all EU member states from 1979 onwards that focuses on the European Parliament elections. This analysis relies on the voter studies. The data includes questions about national parties and elections too – though the questioning is not necessarily tied to national election dates.

The outcome variable for the study, negative partisanship, is measured by an explicit claim that the respondent never intends to vote for a particular party. This is one of the ways that NPID has been operationalised in previous studies, along with disliking a party (thermometer ratings), or a combination of these two aspects. In multiparty systems the ideal measure would combine behavioural (negative vote) and affective (disliking party) components (McGregor et al., 2015). Yet, there are reasons to accept the alternative, not least because there is close correlation between the different measures (see introductory chapter). To identify one or multiple parties as parties one would never consider voting for is a strong statement. Admittedly, this is a more instrumental understanding of NPID than the sympathy component, even if the two are strongly correlated (Wagner, 2021). But the negative partisanship and the negative partisan affect literature come to similar conclusions about the nature and the consequences of the two types of attitudes. This study is not primarily aimed at discovering the motivational foundation of negative partisanship. Instead, it is interested in the temporal, cross-country dynamics of one of its drivers. For that inquiry the 7 waves of EES data represent the most extensive longitudinal resource available.

The analysis focuses on Western European countries for two related reasons. The first is a theoretical concern about the conditionality of the affective-ideological polarisation relationship in Europe (Reiljan, 2020). Second, the number of observations for Eastern

Europe is too low to establish trends, given the timing of EU accession. The data that the analysis relies on consists of 79,190 observations clustered in 17 countries from 7 survey waves spanning between 1989 and 2019.[14] The list of countries participating in the survey is in Appendix C/1.

Figure 3.2 displays descriptive data on negative partisanship (i.e., the proportion of people within Western European societies that report at least one party they would never consider voting for) across countries between 1989 and 2019. This descriptive evidence highlights the overarching presence of NPID in Western Europe over the years with more than 50%, if not 80% of people holding one or more NPIDs at each time point, though there is much cross-country variability. It also shows an apparent stability of (and very slight increase in) the proportion of negative partisans throughout the 1990's and the 2000's and an apparent decrease from 2009 onwards.[15]



Figure 3.2: Cross-country variation in the share of negative partisans in Western European electorates between 1989 and 2019. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. Source: EES 1989-2019.

[14] Responses from Belgium, Sweden and Luxembourg in 2004 are missing due to missingness on key survey items, given the questionnaire design in that particular survey year.

[15] Note that these dates follow EP election years. National parliamentary elections were more spread out.

Three alternative measures covering further aspects of negative partisanship are constructed to test the robustness of the patterns uncovered by the analysis. I separate holding NPID towards parties that belong to the party ideological families around the traditionally dominant ideological cleavage (Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democrat party families) from those holding NPID towards more polar parties and whose place in the traditional left-right spectrum is less straightforward. For each party mentioned in the EES the corresponding ideological family is imported from the ParlGov party database. NPIDs associated with populist parties are also examined separately. Figure 3.3 describes the relation between the level of negativity towards the mainstream, centrist ideological families (Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democrat) and towards the rest of party families over time. These two measures are informative about whether the hypothesised changes in the mechanisms about what motivates negativity differ across party types.



Figure 3.3: Aggregate-level trends between 1989 and 2019: negative partisans of Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democrat parties against negative partisans of more polar parties as shares of electorates at each time point. *Source*: EES 1989-2019.

To capture the polarisation of an electorate along the ideological cleavage structure at each election, I follow Schmitt's (2009) interpretation of the concept. I construct two measures that capture the polarisation along the central, *dominant ideological cleavage* (central

cleavage = the difference between the mean left-right self-placement of adherents of the two largest parties in the most recent national (legislative) election) and the *most polar parties* (ideological spread = the distance between the mean left-right self-placement of partisans of the leftmost and rightmost parties in the most recent national (legislative) election at every survey year). The most dominant parties are identified using the ParlGov election database. The most recent legislative election is selected for each country at each time point. The only exception is importing election level data on the 1990 German legislative election. This is because the first post-WW2 all-German federal election was conducted one year later than the timing of the 1989 EES study wave.

I computed an alternative polarisation measure that reflects the electorates' overall ideological dispersion. This more closely resembles the way that ideological polarisation is measured in the affective polarisation literature. Unlike Schmitt's operationalisation, which takes a difference in mean placements, this measure takes the standard deviation of the mean left-right self-placement of supporters of all relevant parties. This is strongly correlated with the construct that follows Schmitt's operationalisation (0.85, $p<0.001$) and both measures correlate positively with polarisation along the central cleavage (difference: 0.39, $p<0.001$; SD: 0.40, $p<0.001$). Given their similarity, the analysis will be limited to the measure constructed using the difference in mean placements.

Figure 3.4 shows the electorates' ideological polarisation between 1989 and 2019. The ideological spread increases in the 1990s and early 2000s, with a decrease following 2009 in Western and European electorates. The electorates' central cleavage follows this pattern, though less visibly. Further descriptive statistics for the relevant variables are placed in Appendix C/1.



Figure 3.4: Aggregate-level trends between 1989 and 2019: the polarisation of electorates along the two most dominant parties (central cleavage) and along the two most polar parties (ideological spread). Data source: EES 1989-2019.

3.7 Analysis

Since the data is nested, the analysis relies on multilevel binomial models to account for the group-specific interdependence of the residuals. Multilevel modelling can separate within-cluster effects (how individuals' social characteristics and political predispositions affect their attitudes towards parties) and between-cluster effects (how countries' (elections') characteristics are associated with certain attitudes towards parties in societies). The models are fitted with random intercepts and random slopes for relevant individual-level attitudinal variables (partisanship, folded ideological intensity scale). Continuous measures (central cleavage, ideological spread, folded ideological intensity scale) are re-scaled to 0-1. Random intercepts allow for the intercept to vary between clusters. The relevant parameters for models with random intercepts are the fixed intercept (β_{00}) and the random group-level intercept variance (u_{0j}). Random slopes allow the effect of relevant lower-level variables to vary between clusters, thus similarly estimating sets of two relevant parameters: fixed slopes

(average effects of lower-level variables in the overall sample, (β_{10})) and the random slope variances around them (u_{10}).[16]

$$y_{ij} \sim \beta_{00} + \beta_{01} X_j + \beta_{10} x_{ij} + u_{1j} x_{ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

There is controversy around the suitability of multilevel modelling for country clustered data. A number of simulation studies demonstrate that if the number of level 2 units is too small – particularly in the case of or GLS models or complex model specifications – estimates of group-level variances will be biased downwards (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016). To test the robustness of the results of this analysis Appendix C/3 presents results from models using logistic models with country-fixed effect to absorb all unspecified country-level effects.

Table 3.1 presents output from the models that describe the relationship between cleavage politics and negative partisanship.[17] Appendix C/2 and Figures 3.5-3.7 present the relevant predicted probabilities for interpretation. Model 1 is the base model with the main effects of the two polarisation measures. It tests Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. In model 2 I introduce interactions between the polarisation measures and time to assess how the relevance of the two sources of ideological polarisation changed throughout the past 30 years. In particular, the model tests the continuity and gradual nature of any context-based change. Models 3 and 4 test Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b, assessing whether the presence (model 3) and success (model 4) of populist parties in European elections change the extent to which sources of ideological polarisation in societies foster NPID.

[16] $\beta_{00} + u_{0j}$ is the fixed intercept and the random variance around it; $\beta_{01}$is the coefficient that corresponds to country level variable X_j; $(\beta_{10} + u_{1j})x_{ij} = \beta_{10} x_{ij} + u_{1j} x_{ij}$ is the individual-level variable's fixed coefficient and random variance around it. u_{1j}, u_{0j} and e_{ij} are normally distributed.

[17] The models control for the age and sex of respondents, as well as for time effects using a cubic polynomial.

Table 3.1: Multi-level logistic regression models of negative partisanship and ideological polarisation on the rise of populist parties and over time

	Dependent variable:			
	NPID			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Folded LR scale	1.925***	1.956***	1.969***	1.969***
	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.149)
Age	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex (male)	0.017	0.011	0.017	0.014
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.227***	0.226***	0.236***	0.220***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Central cleavage (0-1)	0.804***	-1.253***	-1.543***	-0.328**
	(0.095)	(0.197)	(0.166)	(0.143)
Ideological spread (0-1)	0.182**	1.398***	0.834***	0.487***
	(0.088)	(0.184)	(0.144)	(0.124)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.436***		
		(0.037)		
Ideological spread (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		-0.263***		
		(0.034)		
N of populist parties			-0.429***	
			(0.054)	
Central cleavage (0-1) * N of populist parties			1.267***	
			(0.078)	
Ideological spread (0-1) * N of populist parties			-0.233***	
			(0.071)	
Vote share of populist parties				-0.023***
				(0.005)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				0.085***
				(0.008)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				-0.023***
				(0.006)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	-0.747***	-0.926***	-1.054***	-0.822***
	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	0.230***	0.260***	0.329***	0.257***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	-0.022***	-0.024***	-0.030***	-0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.971***	1.344***	1.908***	1.344***
	(0.175)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.174)
Level 1 N (observations)	79,190	79,190	79,190	79,190
Level 2 N (country)	103	103	103	103
Groups (country)	17	17	17	17
Log Likelihood	-31,602.650	-31,526.230	-31,430.960	-31,542.360
Akaike Inf. Crit.	63,237.290	63,088.450	62,899.910	63,122.720
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	63,385.770	63,255.490	63,076.220	63,299.040
Intercept random variance	0.25427	0.23308	0.18794	0.20743
Folded LR scale random variance	0.27147	0.26680	0.26591	0.27408
Partisanship random variance	0.01138	0.01136	0.01325	0.01112

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 3.5: Predictive margins of holding negative partisan IDs by the polarisation of electorates along the two most dominant parties (central cleavage, left panel) and along the two most polar parties (ideological spread, right panel).

Figure 3.5 plots the average expected probabilities of holding one or more NPIDs at changing levels of the electorate's ideological polarisation along the most dominant parties (central cleavage) and along the most polar parties (ideological spread) from model 1 in Table 3.1. The positive coefficients in model 1 and the evidence in Figure 3.5 support H1a and H1b. In both panels the relationship between polarisation and the likelihood to hold NPID(s) is on average positive, though very modest in size.

The most important general pattern that Models 2-4 describe is that the link between ideology and aggregate negativity towards parties within societies is not constant across political contexts. Model 2 demonstrates that there is a more or less gradual change in the salience of the two types of polarisation in driving negativity over the 30 year period. In particular, the positive coefficient of the interaction between the central cleavage size and time indicates an increase in the extent to which polarisation along the most dominant parties motivates holding NPID(s) in societies over time. At the same time, the results suggest the opposite for the effect of the ideological spread of an electorate (see appendix C/2 for tables and plots for the illustration of the marginal effects from model 2). Models 3 and 4 confirm that a large

part of the shift in the salience of these two sources of ideological polarisation is explained by the growing presence and success of populist parties.



Figure 3.6: Predictive margins of holding negative partisan IDs at varying presence of populist parties in EP elections by the polarisation of electorates along the two most dominant parties (central cleavage, left panel) and along the two most polar parties (ideological spread, right panel).

Looking at the number of populist parties, the predicted probabilities from the interaction term reveal that the effect of the central cleavage size strengthens with the increase in the number of populist parties. A 4-unit (0-4) increase in the electorate's central ideological cleavage is associated with a ~5% decrease in the likelihood of holding one or more NPID when there are no populist parties competing (in EP elections), a ~5% increase when there are 2 populist parties, a ~30% increase when there are 4 and a staggering ~50% increase when as many as 6 populist parties compete.[18] The results also describe a slight, but not substantial, decrease in the effect of the ideological spread of an electorate as more populist parties enter EP elections. A 5-unit (0-5) difference in the ideological spread is associated with a ~5% increase in the likelihood of holding one or more NPIDs when there are no

[18] This concerns a single country, Greece in 2019, whereas 4 populist parties exist in multiple countries at multiple EP election years. For a list of the number of populist parties per country, see Appendix C/1 and for a list of these populist parties, see Appendix B/4.

populist parties competing in EP elections, but a ~4% decrease when there are 6 populist parties in the competition.



Figure 3.7: Predictive margins of holding negative partisan IDs at varying success of populist parties in EP elections by the polarisation of electorates along the two most dominant parties (central cleavage, left panel) and along the two most polar parties (ideological spread, right panel).

Looking at the vote share of populist parties, the predicted probabilities from the interaction term reveal that the effect of the size of the electorate's central cleavage on NPID strengthens with the increase of the vote share of populist parties. If the central cleavage size increases by 4 units (0-4), the likelihood of holding one or more NPIDs decreases by ~2% when there is no support for populist parties competing (in EP elections) but increases by ~14% when the support is 30%. Mirroring previous patterns, the results also suggest a slight, but not substantial, decrease in the effect of the ideological spread of an electorate as more populist parties enter (EP) elections. If the ideological spread increases by 5 units (0-5), the likelihood of holding one or more NPIDs increases by ~3% when there is no support for populist parties competing (in EP elections) but decreases by ~1% when the support is 30%.

Overall, the results presented reveal that although ideological polarisation fosters a higher level of negative partisanship, the presence of populist parties in elections alters the dynamics of NPID. The success of populist parties reduces the impact of polarisation between the (left-

right) ideologically extreme segments of society and increases the impact of ideological conflict between the supporters of the most dominant parties.

3.8 Robustness of patterns

The chapter argues that societal conflicts driving ideological polarisation create conditions for greater partisan animosity. It argues that there have been changes in what the most engaging, affectively polarising and politically relevant conflicts are in societies. This affects how such conflicts are manifested in the ideological structure (and polarisation) of systems. Such changes are also manifested in political evaluations and behaviour, as new salient conflicts increasingly become the foundation for the public mood about political actors and processes.

In discussing these findings, we must give consideration to the cleavages that drive such changes. Societal cleavages – social, economic, religious and cultural – represent value conflicts rooted in persistent and objectively identifiable social divisions. These divisions are powerful sources of political information for identities, evaluations, and behaviour. Cleavages are institutionalised (i.e., they are translated into actionable divisions) by parties who give consistency, structure, and representation to otherwise fragmented conflicts (Knutsen and Scarborough, 1998:494).

As advanced societies increasingly give way to post-industrial, post-materialist structures within societies, many authors claim to have witnessed a turn to new post-materialist value conflicts that outweigh traditional cleavages (e.g., Inglehart, 1977; 1984; 1990; Dalton et al., 1984; Dalton, 1988). These new conflicts are less rooted in social structure (i.e., one's objectively definable place within society) than in distinctions by skill, values and other more fluid characteristics.

Such new influences on political identities, vote choice and political deliberation also put pressure on parties to change and adjust to changing social structures by broadening their appeal and incorporating certain values or losing part of their heritage. But importantly, despite the importance of value orientations in structuring political life – and in part through parties' adjustment – the structural basis of party choice has remained persistent and stable (Knutsen and Scaraborough, 1998:519).

Cleavages continue to be directly associated with voting patterns and as such, they are central to our understanding of NPID. Since they are associated with voting patterns, one could argue that societal cleavages affect the polarisation of the system itself (and are endogenous to sources of ideological polarisation) by affecting party support. With this in mind, it is crucial to account for the strength of such cleavages to better model country-level variation in the mechanisms driving NPID to produce a more conservative estimate of changes in the link between different sources of ideological polarisation and NPID over time.

To this end I ran models controlling for the strength of social, economic and religious cleavages using the kappa index. The index was introduced by Hout et al. to assess class voting (Hout et al., 1995; Brooks and Manza, 1997a, 1997b). It is defined as "the standard deviation of class differences in vote choice in a given election" (Hout et al., 1995: 813). It measures how distinct voting patterns are between social groups that constitute a given cleavage. For example, the strength of the religious cleavage is a measure of how differently the religious groups cast their vote compared to non-believers. The value of the (absolute) kappa index can range between 0 and 0.5. Higher values correspond to larger differences between social groups. Unfortunately, the data does not permit mapping the extent of all relevant social cleavages. There is no consistent information on income and on occupation in the surveys over time. But the EES waves do contain data on religion, subjective social class and education.

One of the main advantages of the kappa indices is their flexibility: they can be computed with many social groups and many party choice options and are easy to compare across elections and party systems. They have been criticised for their sensitivity to potentially irrelevant differences between social groups (Elff, 2002a). Another critique is that *small* social groups (and *in*frequency of vote choice of a given direction in a social group) increase the uncertainty around the estimated values and bias the kappa index (Nieuwbeerta, 1995: 109). However, the first issue is to do with the definition of social groups and the second issue is to do with party family categorization. The EES data is limited to educational (educational attainment, particularly obtaining higher education vs. not), class (working class vs. middle and upper class) and religious cleavages. These are easily definable divisions within society; therefore, the estimation of the kappa indices is relatively unproblematic.

As Table C.6 in Appendix C/3 show, controlling for the strength of social cleavages in the core models does not change the results. In fact, if anything, we see stronger effects and over-time changes between sources of ideological polarisation. At the same time, cleavages themselves are strong and significant predictors of partisan animosity, as prescribed by existing scholarship.

The chapter suggests that there is a change in the dynamics of NPID. Once again, we must ask whether treating NPID as a general attitude without considering the characteristics of its object(s) is meaningful. The general changes in the dynamics of NPID may not be universal across parties of all types. In addition to system-level determinants, temporal changes in the importance of certain party-level information (such as the target parties' ideological position, populist nature, association with certain polarising issues, electoral size, and the like) in driving NPID might also be crucial to account for. The longitudinal dynamics of what issues and what type of parties cognitively mobilise the public might be a crucial element of the mechanisms discussed. A convenient approach to account for such party-level information

would be to run the models on voter-party dyads, with the dataset stacked at the party level. This would also allow for the testing of heterogeneous party effects (based on alignment of and contrasts between voters' and parties' characteristics).

These are important questions. Nevertheless, such an extension of the analysis goes beyond the scope of the enquiries of this chapter. Parties' functions and perceived legitimacy have changed tremendously over time. This chapter discusses overall trends to capture the *public mood towards parties* in a broad sense. The argument unfolded in the analysis is that the *extent* of negative partisanship in societies is less and less rooted in left-right extremity alone with a steady rise of populist actors (and their ideas) and increasingly connected to new electorally salient and central conflicts. This argument explains an important change in how parties *in general* have come to be evaluated.

This is not to say that the characteristics of parties do not qualify the general dynamics of negative partisan attitudes. However, the data does not permit an examination of voter-party dyads. Information on party ideology is static and scattered (not all parties, let alone electoral coalitions, present in the studied EP elections are included in expert studies on party ideology), so a comprehensive and longitudinally meaningful analysis would not be feasible. Nor do we have information on the exact electoral size of coalitions in EP elections, which would also lead to selective modelling. Restricting the analysis to a select few important parties would contradict the very idea of accounting for relevant characteristics across all parties. Matters are only made more hopeless by the fact that individual-level data on party support or political ideology is missing or at best inferable.

One solution to investigate the changes in NPID towards types or subcategories of parties is to look at parties with centrist ideologies, ideologically polar parties, as well as populist parties separately. This is examined by restricting the dependent variable of the models to

NPIDs held towards the relevant subcategories of parties. Analyses like this are described in Appendix C/3. The distinction between centrist (i.e., parties that belong to the party families around the traditionally dominant ideological cleavage: Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Christian Democrat party families) and polar parties illustrates the heterogeneity in how parties of differing ideological extremity change over time.

The patterns in these models are almost identical to those when NPID is applied to the whole spectrum of parties. The exception is that for polar parties the ideological spread of an electorate does not cease to drive negativity (in fact, the effect somewhat increases) with the growing success of populist forces and with the passing of time. It makes intuitive sense that the presence of ideological extremities in societies (i.e., ideological spread) remains closely related to the development of NPID towards polar parties under changing conditions. But even in the case of polar parties we see a rise in the importance of the electorate's central cleavage is driving NPID as the number (and success) of populist parties increases.

Next, populist parties are considered separately. We must be cautious when thinking about this subcategory. At the beginning of the period there were relatively few populist parties, but they tripled in number in the 30 years covered. The tables in Appendix C/3 reveal that the general patterns discussed above do not hold for NPIDs held towards populist parties. Instead, what we see is quite the opposite: the central cleavage is a more important driver of NPID towards populist parties when populist parties are scarcely present in EP elections and becomes less dominant when their number rises. The ideological spread, on the other hand, is increasingly more important in driving targeted NPID as more populists compete in elections.

This should not be a surprising contrast. As we see in the second chapter, populist parties are viewed differently than mainstream actors over time. We should also note that their association with issues beyond the traditional ideological axis is central to the type of party

that they are, making this longitudinal relationship endogenous. With populist parties' growing integration into the political world, their other, ideologically more structured, features become important in distinguishing them.

Next, I look at whether the identified trend over time is associated with how many relevant parties the electoral systems produce (i.e., controlling for the effective number of parliamentary parties in countries) or whether they are driven by the number of parties listed in the survey questionnaire. Since the dependent variable is based on a survey item that presents respondents with a list of relevant parties and asks them to consider how likely it is that they would vote for each one of them, it is reasonable to think that the responses would be endogenous to the composition of this list of parties. These lists are, of course, not arbitrary, but carefully selected by country experts.

The results are robust both to the effective number of parliamentary parties and the number of parties in each party list, though some of the relevant effects weaken somewhat with the inclusion of the party number controls. This is a reasonable addition to the findings as with a longer list of political parties one would expect to see people to be more likely to select parties they dislike. And it is an important detail to keep in mind: if the number of parties in a given competition affects negative partisanship, that in and of itself is an important point to acknowledge.

3.9 Discussion

The results presented in this section reveal that although ideological conflict within a society in general fosters a higher degree of NPID, this relationship is conditional on political context conditions. In political systems where populist parties are scarce and not overly dominant negative partisanship is fostered primarily by left-right *ideological extremity*: the presence of

parties representing extreme left and extreme right ideas and the extent to which voters are ideologically polarised along them. In electoral contexts with successful populist parties this changes. The overarching relevance of pure left-right extremity in fostering the rate of NPID diminishes and is replaced by the polarisation that the *core of the electorate* exhibits along conflicts between the most dominant parties. These conflicts are those that are most central to the political competition and those that represent some of the most salient ideological dilemmas of everyday politics at the time.

Intuitively, when the main political conflicts are primarily contrasts of traditional left and traditional right ideas, the presence of extremities and their ability to mobilise create a more hostile environment towards political parties in general. However, the steady increase in the number and electoral success of populist parties in the European party landscape is associated with a shift in the relative salience of the traditional and newly emerging issues. This changes what conflicts serve as the most relevant sources of negativity – by the normalisation of ideas previously considered extreme or niche and by the incorporation of new, politicising, moralised conflicts into mainstream parties' agendas and discourses.

This shift cannot merely be blamed on the normalisation of extreme ideologies and radical ideas over time. Instead, a shift away in importance from left-right extremities fits well with theories and empirics that recognise the growing importance of a second, value-based ideological cleavage in the political world. Although the left-right dimension remains relevant, issues outside of this axis increasingly become central to political competitions. One important tendency about value-based issues is that they tend to be more moralised and affectively polarising in the eyes of the public than those connected to the economic left-right dimension (Gidron, 2020). This has important consequences for the (changing) underlying nature of NPIDs.

Populist parties not only capitalise on and foster the salience of moralised issues, but also echo a profound criticism of established parties and partisan representation. Their growing presence in elections signifies a more fundamental shaking of the traditional ideological foundations of representation and political dialogue. Such change inevitably affects what the electorally most dominant and successful discourses are. It also increasingly shifts the basis for the public mood about parties and representation in general. This extends the findings of the second chapter. NPID steadily declines in societies. At the same time, we are also seeing important qualifications to what negative partisanship is connected to both in terms of individual-level affiliation (more and more connected to investment in politics) and system-level motivation (shifting to be more closely related to newly salient moralised conflicts).

The patterns from this chapter also show that this is a gradual process. The emergence of populist forces and the steady stabilisation of their influence on political debates and competition develop over time. The patterns are more clearly associated with the number of populist parties present in the Western European party landscape, rather than their electoral success. This suggests that it is not necessarily the electoral dominance but merely the presence of populist ideas in political competitions that is linked to a change in how political conflicts mobilise negativity.

An important addition to these patterns is the universality of the shift from ideological extremities towards ideologically more central conflicts in facilitating NPID across broad party types, although the study does not account for single party ideological families. This is not to say that all parties are liked or loathed to the same extent but that the *change* that the shifting salience of various ideological cleavages can account for is similar across polar and centrist party ideologies.

More broadly, and in line with the findings from the second chapter, the results suggest that the shift in the importance of the ideological components may not be limited to negative partisanship but is relevant for people's more general attitudes towards parties as well. Indeed, we witness a decline not only in negative partisan rates (after 2009) but also in the rate of unwavering voters and in turnout at elections (Figure 3.9).

The fact that many people are either uncertain about their vote choice or are alienated from political participation suggests that parties are of declining relevance as tools for representation. This point is echoed in Dassonneville and Hooghe's (2016) work who describe the process of partisan dealignment and its consequences for attitudes towards the party system as a democratic institution. Dealignment in part implies that people hold a more 'open' attitude towards parties, meaning that voters are increasingly less attached to one particular political party. It also indicates a sense of alienation from parties and the party system. This can endanger the legitimacy of electoral and party politics in Western Europe.



Figure 3.9: Aggregate-level trends: share of electorates that report that there is a party they would always vote for (left panel) and turnout level (right panel). *Source*: EES 1989-2019, ParlGov elections database.

Populist parties' emergence also follows notable individual-level attitudinal changes, namely disillusionment in governing parties, the rejection of traditional institutions and arenas of politics, turning away from the party system (Mair, 2011; Kriesi, 2014), non-voting,

indifference and alienation (Ardag et al., 2020). This sheds a new light on how people relate to parties and better explains the universality of the patterns across NPID towards different party types. The decline in NPID suggests that parties appear to have lost their relevance as democratic instruments and institutions to many. Those who continue to engage with the traditional political entities and arenas are increasingly motivated in their judgements by new conflicts and ideological dimensions.

3.10 Conclusion

Studies increasingly discuss the extent, as well as the political and social consequences of negative partisan attitudes. Nevertheless, one of the limitations of previous scholarship is the lack of an understanding of how and why negativity rises or falls depending on political contexts and long-term processes. Negative partisan attitudes are consistently linked to ideological differences, extremity or polarisation. This link is assumed constant in previous studies. Context is particularly important to account for, given considerable changes in the structure of party competitions and the shifting salience of ideological cleavages in the past decades.

Using longitudinal data between 1989 and 2019 on 17 Western European countries I assessed the link between the electorates' polarisation along relevant lines of ideological conflict and negative partisanship. Although ideological conflict within a society in general fosters a higher degree of negativity towards both centrist and polar parties, this is conditional. I show that in absence or scarce presence of populist parties negativity towards parties within electorates is/was primarily a product of the electorate's polarisation along *ideological (left-right) extremities* in societies. However, in higher presence of populist ideologies in European party competitions NPID is associated with the polarisation of the *core of the*

electorates along the most dominant parties' ideological conflicts. With a steady increase in the number and electoral success of populist parties in the European party competition landscape throughout the past 30 years this represents a more or less gradual transformation over time.

This pattern resonates with accounts that document the growing salience of a second, value-based cleavage in political discourses and competition. The findings imply the decreasing dominance of left-right extremity both through the normalisation of ideas previously considered extreme and through the incorporation of new, moralised conflicts into mainstream parties' agendas and discourses. This signals a profound change in what the most important and most mobilising political discourses are. It also adds important qualifications to the ideology-NPID relationship, highlighting that it is not constant over time and across political contexts. The appearance of populist discourses in the past decades posed challenges to the legitimacy of mainstream political issues and ways of representation and promoted a sense of alienation from traditional political institutions. The change in the dynamics of NPID must be viewed as an organic part of these developments.

It is important to emphasise that there are a number of important limits to the findings presented in this analysis. This chapter is limited in discussing the motivational origins of negative partisanship, as NPID is understood more in instrumental terms. More extensive individual-level data would be needed to confirm these patterns with the measure for negative partisanship that combines behaviour with affect. Such an extension would also add to the understanding of the salience of particular political issues in driving NPID. For now, the analysis is restricted to discussing single dimensional issue conflicts. While this is an unfortunate limitation, there is currently no alternative data source that contains information on other issue dimensions for the observed parties at the observed time points. A possible

extension would be to add country case studies or further international cross-sectional evidence to support the analysis. A further limitation is that we cannot, in absence of panel data, properly identify causal mechanisms. Nevertheless, the findings of this chapter should provide encouragement to study negative partisanship in and beyond the Western European context.

CHAPTER 4

Experimental analysis of partisan and ideological hostility in Britain

ABSTRACT

A large body of literature shows that the effect of party cues on people's thinking transcends political judgments. Social discrimination along negative partisan lines (i.e., hostility towards the supporters of disliked parties) is an alarming phenomenon in the US and in Western Europe. In the US severe elite and public polarisation and unprecedented ideological sorting along partisan lines established the overarching primacy of partyism. This has grown to be the strongest influence on political and social attitudes, behaviour. Can the same be said about the way that negative partisan labels affect judgment and actions in Europe? This chapter explores whether negative partisan prejudice (*partisan cue*) more strongly motivates (in)tolerance for others than evaluations of ideological (dis)similarity (*ideological cue*) in the UK. It uses experimental design that induces a trade-off between judgements based on perceived ideological closeness and attitudes towards the supporters of parties. The UK provides a valuable opportunity to research the sources of partisan intolerance, given the traditionally strong bipolarity between the Conservative and Labour parties, the visible divide between their supporters and the powerful stereotypes attached to both parties in the eyes of the public. The analysis finds that political hostility towards supporters of a disliked party is largely motivated by perceived ideological incompatibility. However, when faced with out-partisans whose views closely resemble their own, people dislike them regardless. That is, they ignore the similarity of their preferences and focus on the conflict in party affiliation instead. The study also finds that hostility towards a supporter of a disliked party is the direct consequence of strong opposition to the set of political ideas associated with them. This illustrates the power of loyalty to one's ideological convictions and the partially blinding power of political stereotypes.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to identify the sources of political hostility. Are attitudes towards political groups and their members motivated primarily by ideological or affective considerations? Do people relate to rhetoric or substance? Who do people consider their *'political others'* and how do they construct images of such groups? Are people able to realistically assess what sets of ideas they oppose and what the people they say they stand against politically are like?

Discrimination along partisan lines (i.e., hostility towards the supporters of disliked parties) is common in the US and in Western Europe (Westwood et al., 2018; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Huddy et al., 2015; Huddy et al., 2018; Hobolt, Leeper and Tilly, 2020). The earliest research into the roots and limits of such hostilities took it as merely the influence of partisanship. Only recently did studies start conceiving of deep and lasting intolerance or hatred for a party as explicit *negative* partisan identities (Abramowitz and Webster, 2017; Bankert, 2020). Though these two phenomena (in-group love and out-group hate) are closely related – especially in bi-polar two party dominated systems –, more and more research suggest that hostility towards supporters of other parties is driven by *out-party hatred*.

Most people would agree that strong political hostility towards other people is normatively undesirable. Nevertheless, some degree of remoteness between peoples of drastically different political orientations and values can be understandable, given psychological evidence of people's preference for, the prevalence of and psychological strength of group uniformity (Marquez and Paez, 2011; Cartwright, 1968; Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Brown, 1984; Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Brewer, 1979; Joiner, 1994). An important question is to what degree discrimination towards political others is ideologically founded. Discrimination may mask conscious evaluations of the perceived incompatibility of someone else's political views and values with one's own. But it may also mask strong affective projection of an

imagined set of ideas about the supporters of another party (party labelling) that may or may not be detached from reality. And indeed, evidence from studies suggests that people's thoughts about and links to parties are rather affective (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; Iyengar et al., 2012:427). This question is important to establish the role of parties and political communication in fostering or mediating hostility between people who otherwise might not be all that different in their views and ideals.

This study is based on a survey experiment. It assesses whether party labels are a stronger influence on openness to and acceptance of the political other than perceived compatibility of political preferences. The experiment is designed to induce a trade-off between judgements based on ideological closeness and based on attitudes towards supporters of parties. The study is set in the United Kingdom. The traditional dominance of the Conservative and Labour parties and powerful stereotypes associated with both parties (Shephard and Johns, 2008) provide a valuable opportunity to extend existing (mainly US-based) literature on social divisions.

This chapter lays out the theoretical and empirical framework for studying political and social hostility based on ideology and based on party stereotypes. It then presents evidence from a survey experiment on the effect of partisan labelling. The results demonstrate that social acceptance (or hostility) towards another person is largely motivated by perceived ideological proximity. However, the results also demonstrate that when people are faced with out-partisans whose ideological positions resemble their own, they readily ignore this similarity and update their evaluations of the other with expectations based on negative partisan stereotypes: when in doubt, people focus on anticipated differences based on partisan cues more so than on apparent ideological similarities.

4.2 (Negative) Partisanship and Political Decisions

Partisanship refers to a broad range of motivationally distinct understandings of feeling closer to a party (Garzia, 2013). Early accounts understood it as a psychological link to a party rooted in early age socialisation and social status (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960; Johnston, 2006). This was later challenged by more instrumental and cognitive understandings of party support (Fiorina, 1981; Green et al., 2002; Johnston 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Thomassen and Rosema, 2009). It was also challenged by the idea that affective ties to a party arise from a shared social identity (Greene, 2002; Huddy et al., 2015; Huddy et al., 2018; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). The importance of partisanship largely comes from its stability and its significance in providing cognitive and affective cues to evaluate and relate to political parties, actors, events, and realities. Partisanship has long been recognised as one of the most crucial factors that motivate political attitudes and behaviour (Johnston, 2006).

It is widely recognised that people often rely on easily accessible cognitive and affective priors that match their existing predispositions and bias their reasoning (Sweeney and Gruber, 1984; Ditto and Lopez, 1992; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Zaller, 1992; Zaller and Feldman, 1992; Schultz-Hardt et al., 2000; Bartels, 2002; Redlawsk, 2002; Ditto et al., 2003; Taber and Lodge 2006). Studies in the US and Europe demonstrate how feeling closer to a party distorts the way that people seek out, perceive and react to factual information (for example by under- or overestimating economic performance indicators, or making overly optimistic or pessimistic political forecasts in support of their parties' reputation or to undermine a disliked opposite (Bolsen et al., 2014; Lebo and Cassino, 2007)). It is also recognised that partisans are very much willing to adopt their preferred party's or candidate's issue stance, even if these go against their previous preferences (Broockman et al., 2015;

Brader et al., 2013). Biased reasoning in defence of one's preferred party or its coalition partners (and in attack of disliked opposites) characterises strong party identifiers more than ideologues (Huddy et al., 2015; Huddy et al., 2018; Schaffner and Luks, 2018; Rotschild et al., 2019).

Most studies on partisanship talk only about positive party support. But partisanship is better thought of as a complex set of positive and negative feelings and evaluations (Richardson, 1991). This conception suggests that people may support a party out of aversion or opposition to another party, parties (Crewe, 1976; Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Mayer, 2017). Early accounts suggested that negativity (towards the polar opposite party in mostly two-party systems) was a complementary dimension of partisanship. They stressed that it was important to take it into account in order to understand the consequences of partisan attachments (Richardson, 1991; Rose and Mishler, 1998; Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; Wattenberg, 1982; Garry, 2007). As attention turned to more fragmented multi-party systems, it was realised that negative partisanship was an independent and psychologically distinct attitude that might develop without an equally strong sense of positive attachment towards any party (Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Caruana et al., 2015; McGregor et al., 2015; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Richardson, 1991; Vlachová, 2001; Mayer 2017).

Negative partisan orientations – whether negativity follows from positive attachment to a/the rival party (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Huddy et al., 2015; Huddy et al., 2018) or is a standalone psychological motive (Mayer, 2014; Caruna et al., 2014; McGregor et al., 2015; Bankert, 2020) – provide shortcuts that inform political decisions and behaviour. Psychological studies suggest that in many contexts human thinking is biased towards negative information. Negative information provides stronger, more lasting influences on cognition and behaviour. People tend to pay more attention to, better remember and give more weight to bad, rather than good experiences and news (Kahneman and Tversky

1979; Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo et al., 1997; Ito, Larsen, Smith, and Cacioppo, 1998). This makes (out-)partisan negativity psychologically distinct and independent in relevance from its (in-)partisan positive counterpart.

4.3 (Negative) Partisanship and Social Decisions

Several recent studies have pointed out that attachment to a party influences not only political, but also social attitudes and behaviour. A set of – mostly US-based – studies establish that partisan animosity is manifested: in the tendency to avoid talking about politics in the workplace (Mutz and Mondak, 2006) or elsewhere (Gerber et al., 2012); in the homogeneity of one's networks (McPherson, et al., 2001) and immediate neighbourhood (Bishop, 2008; Gimpel and Hui, 2015; Gimpel and Hui, 2017; Hui, 2013); in hiring decisions (Gift and Gift, 2015); in preferences for (Shafranek, 2021) and self-verification from (Joiner, 1994) partisan similarity in relationships; in people's high level of discomfort with the idea of proximity to a supporter of the other party (Iyengar et al., 2012); or in the disproportionately low level of reciprocal communication on dating sites between people of different party affiliations (Huber and Malhotra, 2017).

Westwood et al. (2017) show, using trust games in four studies set in the UK, Belgium, Spain, and the US, that in all four countries people exhibit discrimination along party lines. This is conditioned by ideological proximity: people show stronger discrimination towards supporters of those parties that are further from them in the ideological space. Similar results were found in studies in 8 Western countries by Carlin and Love (2018). Iyengar and Westwood conclude that partisans in the US perceive and think of each other through powerful stereotypes to such an extent that "hostile feelings for the opposing party are

ingrained or automatic in voters' minds" (2015:690). Cassese (2021) even identifies dehumanising language and metaphors in partisan-political discourses.

Political parties have strong foundations in British society. Although partisanship has been declining, the stability of the vote has held to a large extent (Schmitt, 2009; Webb, 2000). Accordingly, there is consistent and considerable affective divide between Labour and Conservative voters (Iyengar et al., 2012). While in the 1960s 12% of Conservatives and 3% of Labour voters felt uncomfortable with the idea of their children marrying the political other, by 2010 these statistics changed to 22% and 25% respectively. Alternatively, a second measure (evaluating in- and out-party members on intelligence and on selfishness) captures perceptions about supporters of one's own party and about the political others.[19] As the study shows, the magnitude of in-group favouritism increased from 0.17 to 0.29 and the level of out-group hate remained at 0.22. Even bearing in mind the limitations of the measures to map the public's attitudes, the trend is rather concerning.

To date the discussion of partisan hostility and discrimination is exclusively tied to positive party attachment. Yet, antipathies towards parties may develop without equally strong senses of positive identification (McGregor et al., 2015; Caruna et al., 2014; Mayer, 2017; Bankert, 2020). This proposition is further reinforced by the heavily documented negativity bias ingrained into human thinking.

4.4 Ideology and Party

This chapter draws heavily on the contrast between partisan and ideological thinking, decision-making and behaviour. Ideological thinking refers to the idea that the main driver of political and social attitudes and behaviour are spatial considerations. Feelings towards

[19] Average ratings for the positive and negative traits measured on a 0-1 scale.

parties (or their supporters) are based on proximity between one's own issue preferences and between parties' (or fellow citizens') perceived spatial positions. Spatial attitude formation presents a more cognitive type of thinking than judgement-making that is influenced overwhelmingly and more restrictively by party identification (positive and negative alike) or other affective party cues.

Several theories in public opinion point out that people do not think in ideological ways and that political attitudes and behaviour are largely motivated by simpler and clearer political cues, such as those provided by partisanship (Iyengar et al., 2012; Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Leonie Huddy and her colleagues (2015; 2018), building on social identity theories (e.g., Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), coined the notion of expressive partisanship. This captures an affective sense of identification with a party rather than closeness based on more instrumental considerations, such as party performance (Fiorina, 1981; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006) or ideological beliefs. Expressive partisans "take action precisely because they wish to defend or elevate the party's political position. Their internalized sense of partisan identity means that the group's failures and victories become personal" (Huddy et al., 2015:3). Bankert (2020) extended the notion of a social identity-based expressive type of attachment to negative partisans as well. Affective negative ties to parties are manifested in the subjective sense of 'otherness' in reference to a given party (and its partisans), as well as the sensitivity to the party's reputation.

There is a core theoretical difference between affective and ideological linkages. Affective partisan linkages are inherently defensive towards the positive reputation of *the party* one has a subjective sense of belonging to (or: negative reputation of the disliked party, parties). Ideological party linkages, on the other hand, arise in support for a particular *set of issue stances*. This link is more deliberative because one is motivated to defend an issue agenda, rather than a party (Huddy et al., 2015).

But Huddy et al. (2015) point out that ideological thinking and affective thinking are not mutually exclusive and may very well coincide. Expressive attachment to a party might be accompanied by strong and conscious attachment to core beliefs the party is associated with. Recent works in psychology suggest that ideology itself may not be completely instrumental, cognitive, but instead is deeply engrained in voters' minds (van der Eijk et al., 2005). Studies suggest that "left-right ideological stances reflect, among other things, the influences of heredity, childhood, temperament or personality, and situational and dispositional variability in social, cognitive, and motivational needs to reduce uncertainty and threat" (Jost et al., 2009:317-318). This provides fertile ground for affective ideological responses to political stimuli (e.g., Malka and Lelkes (2010) on Conservative and Liberal identities).

Partisan affect in political behaviour have particularly been in the spotlight in the US. Yet, this is a very salient and noteworthy phenomenon outside of the US as well (Huddy et al., 2018). In a comparative study, Adams et al. (2012) compared polarisation and depolarisation trends in the second half of the twentieth century (between 1987 and 2001) in the United States and the United Kingdom. While the US showed patterns of elite and public polarisation and of increasing partisan sorting both among Republicans and Democrats, the mirror opposite trends were observed in Britain. People increasingly consider themselves weak partisans or independents; and among those feeling closer to a party, people's preferences are less consistently linked to parties' agendas. This suggests that party support as a *spatial* consideration is losing its salience in the UK. Hostility towards the political other, if assumed to be based on ideological similarity, would also be on the decline.

The study is motivated by the following broad question that gets to the root of this dilemma: Do people (in Britain) give more weight to partisan political labels than ideological proximity when making social and ideological judgments about the political other?

4.5 APPROACH

The existing data is insufficient to answer the above questions in the British context. One of the very few available sources on partisan hostility in Britain is Wave 7[20] of the combined internet panel study of the British Election Study.[21] The study includes an item traditionally used to measure social hostility towards voters of main parties: "How would you feel if you had a son or a daughter who married someone who votes for… [party]?", with answers ranging from very unhappy, through happy, neither happy nor unhappy, happy, to very happy. Hobolt et al. (2019) utilised this item, along with another question (happiness to talk about politics with the other side) to measure social distance. In two surveys they find that Labour supporters appear more hostile to the other side: 24-25% of Conservatives are happy for their child to get married to and 43-53% of them are happy to talk about politics with a Labour supporter, while the reverse statistics are only 16-19% and 41-46% respectively.

These two items cannot suggest much about the motivations behind closeness or distance. Items such as these provide insufficient incentive for people to think about the question from an ideological point of view. Even if they do, responses cannot be said to be motivated by ideological or (negative) partisan considerations.

Figure 4.1, based on data from the British Election Study, suggests an association between people's perception of the left-right distance between themselves and the opposite party and their attitudes towards the political other. Those who are unhappy with the idea of marriage to a supporter of the opposite party (blue line) perceive significantly larger distance on average between themselves and supporters of the other party (no matter how closely their political

[20] Wave 15 also included the question; however, that wave was fielded after this current study was conducted.

[21] Wave 7 was a 30,895 respondent survey conducted by YouGov between 14th April 2016 and 4th May 2016. The social distance items were answered by 7,682 individuals.

preferences actually resemble the average supporter of the out-party) than those who would be happy to see their son or daughter marrying their political other (red line).



Figure 4.1: Comparison of actual and perceived ideological distance by acceptance or resentment of partisans of the Conservative and Labour parties. Measure of acceptance (resentment) is happiness (distress) with the idea of one's child marrying someone who votes for a given party. The red line denotes perceptions of those who are happy with the idea; the blue line represents perceptions of those who are unhappy. Shaded areas are the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Actual ideological distance is absolute deviation of left-right self-placement from the positions of the two parties taken from the BES expert survey; perceived ideological distance is absolute distance between left-right self-placement and left-right placement of the other. *Source:* BES Internet Panel Wave 7 (2016); BES Expert Survey (2015)

These data suggest (1) a partisan labelling effect (in-partisan favouritism and out-partisan prejudice) and (2) an association between perceived ideological compatibility and social prejudice. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess these mechanisms. The BES survey respondents were not provided with any benchmark. They were asked about their attitudes towards a hypothetical, stereotypical voter of the other party. Motivated misperceptions necessarily confound the effect of conflict in partisan affect with the effect of ideological considerations.

The core of the analysis is based on data from a survey experiment[22] (N=327) fielded in July 2018 and administered through Prolific's online platform.[23] Respondents were pre-screened by country of residence. Only residents of England were invited to participate to avoid the complications arising from multiparty systems with Nationalist parties. The design was specifically developed to measure opinions about and attitudes towards typical and atypical Conservative and Labour supporters as potential political others. Two related dependent variables were operationalised: personal acceptance/resentment (representing the extent of personal openness or closeness to the political other) and ideological acceptance/resentment (representing the degree to which one accepts the views and motivations of the other). To date no such measures have been used in parallel. While very closely related, they represent separate theoretical considerations. One may exhibit personal hostility towards someone whose views they do not have particularly negative feelings about, or to be friendly towards a person whose ideology they fundamentally disagree with. The aim is to determine how these two concepts are linked to perceived ideological (in)compatibility between the self and the other.

Both dimensions are measured with additive scales from 4-4 items and rescaled between 0-1. The items of the personal acceptance/resentment scale asked about accepting the other as a

[22] Ethical approval was granted on 26 June 2018.

[23] Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012:352) thoroughly assess the challenges and limitation (to internal and external validity) and advantages of subject recruitment using online labour markets (Amazon MTurk in their case) for political science experiments with very promising overall results. Despite the limitations, they conclude that "demographic characteristics of domestic MTurk users are more representative and diverse than the corresponding student and convenience samples typically used in experimental political science studies". Threats usually associated with online subject recruitment ("in particular, concerns about heterogeneous treatment effects, subject attentiveness, and the prevalence of habitual survey takers"), are not large issues. Furthermore, they successfully replicate findings from experiments using convenience and national probability samples, suggesting that taking into the many benefits of online recruitment (in particular: speed, ease, availability, cost), the trade-off is marginal.

spouse to their child, as a good friend, as a dinner guest and as a neighbour. The items of the ideological acceptance/resentment scale asked about accepting the political other's views, sharing them, wanting to learn more about their opinions, and trusting their motivations. All are measured on 4-point likert scales.

4.6 Experimental Design

The survey starts with demographic and political background questions (see full questionnaire in Appendix D/9). Partisanship (closeness to party and strength of closeness) is asked as a means to test the robustness of the findings and as a way to better identify potential political out-groups for supporters of the two main parties (Labour and Conservatives). No Conservative partisan is asked about a hypothetical Conservative supporter and no Labour partisan is asked about a hypothetical Labour supporter. The study examines prejudice against supporters of parties people do *not* feel close to – without comparison of sentiments towards supporters of the in- and out-parties.[24]

Respondents are then presented with a list of salient economic and social issues.[25] They are asked to place themselves on a 1 to 7 scale between an extremely liberal and an extremely conservative position. The items are used to create a summative issue scale, which is then normalised between 0 and 1.[26] Each respondent is then presented with a vignette that shows the political preferences (using the same items) of a hypothetical person. Respondents are then asked to answer questions about how agreeable they find such views and how agreeable

[24] It should be acknowledged that theoretically one could hold similar views (warm and cold alike) towards all partisans. This could be subject to future follow up enquiries.

[25] The sources of the items are the Ideological Consistency Scale developed by the Pew Research Center and the items that make up the liberal-conservative ideology scale in the British Election Study's internet panel questionnaire.

[26] Cronbach's Alpha score of the ideology scale is 0.82.

they find someone with such views using the personal and ideological acceptance/resentment scale items.

The two randomised elements of the experiment are (1) whether respondents are explicitly told about the partisan identity (party label) of the profile they see on the vignette; (2) whether the profile they see on the vignette is of moderate or extreme (liberal-conservative) issue preferences. The reason for the second randomisation is to induce variation in perceived ideological distance and examine what happens when the vignettes clash with stereotypical party profiles. The four experimental conditions are the following:

Control condition 1: Presented with a profile with *moderate* left-right issue preferences (*without* indicating partisan affiliation)

Control condition 2: Presented with a profile with *extreme* left-right issue preferences (*without* indicating partisan affiliation)

Treatment condition 1: Presented with a profile with *moderate* left-right issue preferences (*with* clear indication of partisan affiliation)

Treatment condition 2: Presented with a profile with *extreme* left-right issue preferences (*with* clear indication of partisan affiliation)

4.7 HYPOTHESES

Respondents' own answers to the economic and social issue items provide the basis for a comparable left-right ideological scale (issue scale). This allows for the calculation of the ideological proximity between the self and the political other. Respondents are also asked to place themselves and the hypothetical other on a left-right scale. This then yields a measure of *perceived* ideological proximity or distance. Both measures are expected to closely relate

to the ideological and personal resentment that respondents exhibited. The focus of this analysis is on perceptions primarily. This leads to the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 1:** Larger perceived ideological distance between the self and the political other is associated with more hostility towards (lower level of acceptance of) both the hypothetical person and their ideas.

The experiment is designed to force respondents to prioritise either political identity or ideological preferences. This enables us to distinguish the effects of partisan conflicts and of ideological proximity. Those cases where respondents are not presented with party cues provide a baseline to be compared with those respondents who are exclusively told about the hypothetical other's partisan identity.

The experimental manipulations are designed to yield instances when respondents hold very similar issue preferences to the profile they are presented with, yet have different political identities. In these cases, the way respondents answer the ideological and social resentment items reveal how they (consciously or unconsciously) prioritise ideology and political identity.

> **Hypothesis 2:** Those who are primed to think about the partisan conflict between themselves and the political other will find the political other's profile and arguments less agreeable than those who are only exposed to the political other's issue preferences.

> **Hypothesis 3:** When the perceived ideological distance between one and the political other is small, party labels will exert stronger influence on judgments; ideological (dis)similarity will not have an effect on judgments.

Hypothesis 3 implies that as perceived ideological distance grows and the effect of ideological distance strengthens, the treatment effect will be relatively less pronounced. The attitudes of the treatment and control groups will converge (Figure 4.2).



Figure 4.2: Expected effect of perceived ideological distance on personal and ideological acceptance (H1); expected treatment effect (H2); and their expected dynamics as a function of ideological distance perceptions (H3). The solid line corresponds to expectations about the control group and the dashed line corresponds to expectations about the treatment group.

There are several reasons why attitudes are expected to converge. Party cues are expected to be more salient and more accessible considerations in the treatment group than in the control condition (Zaller, 1992). Nevertheless, even respondents in the control group can make inferences about the other's party affiliation. This is particularly likely when the dissimilarity between their own and the presented ideological position increases. As the distance between the two persons' ideological positions grows, the imagined extremity of the other's (and/or own) positions necessarily increases. An extreme profile is likely to be less representative of the median supporter of the other party. Attention shifts to the extremity of the position that may be a stronger cue than one's hostility towards the stereotypical supporter of the other party. Both explanations suggest convergence between the otherwise diverging attitudes of treated and non-treated respondents.

4.8 Quality of Data

The issue scale was developed to reflect respondents' left-right self-perceptions. The correlation between respondents' left-right self-placements and their scores on the issue-scale is 0.632 (p = 0.000). This confirms that the understanding of the *left* and the *right* were reasonably similar among respondents and the researcher (Figure 4.3). The issue scale also helps to identify respondents who had a different conception of the political left and right or paid too little attention to the questions to be reliable sources of data.



Figure 4.3: Left: Mean issue scale scores (measured on a 0-1 scale) against self-reported left-right ideology (measured on a 1-11 scale) **Right:** Attention check based on perceived ideological distance against actual deviation. People excluded from the sample are those who perceive no or little (below 2 units) ideological difference between the self and the extreme vignette; and those who perceive large distance (8 units or more) when presented with a moderate profile.

Respondents also placed the hypothetical profile on the left-right scale. The comparison between these placements and the vignettes' designed ideological positions[27] (mean of individual item scores for each profile) can be combined with respondents' self-placement on the left-right scale to serve as an attention check. The exclusion criteria are defined as 1) perceiving no or very little (below 2 units) ideological difference between the self and an *extreme* vignette; or 2) perceiving extremely large distance (8 units or more) when presented

[27] The correlation between the hypothetical profiles' placements on the left-right scale by respondents and the vignettes' designed ideological positions is 0.499 (p=0.000).

with a *moderate* profile. These appeared to be mistakes either due to own misplacement (if one's issue scale score and left-right self-placement do not align, see Figure 4.3) or misplacement of the other.[28] 52 respondents were excluded from the sample. The remaining sample does not differ significantly from the initial set of respondents in terms of the relevant political attitude measures and scales (see Appendix D/1).

4.9 RESULTS

Figure 4.2 illustrates the hypotheses. Figures in Appendix D/3, using locally weighted regression curves, depict what data from the experiment looks like. Locally weighted regression is a non-parametric technique. It does not make assumptions about the form of the relationship between variables and allows it to be discovered using the data itself. It is a useful method to make preliminary observations about whether our empirical hypotheses are suitable for the data from the experiment. The patterns shown in Appendix D/3 are similar to those prescribed by the hypotheses (Figure 4.2).

The hypotheses are concerned with the heterogeneity in the effect of ideological distance on political hostility as perceived left-right distance varies. This is best captured by a curve-linear model:

$$A_P \sim \widehat{D_{LR}} \times \widehat{D_{LR}} \times T + E$$

$$A_I \sim \widehat{D_{LR}} \times \widehat{D_{LR}} \times T + E$$

A_P is personal acceptance and A_I is ideological acceptance; $\widehat{D_{LR}}$ is perceived ideological distance; T is a dummy for treatment and E is a dummy indicating whether respondents were presented with an extreme or moderate profile.

[28] Metadata on completion times suggest no significant difference (p = 0.216) between those who passed and those who failed the attention checks. The new correlation between the issue scale and left-right self-placement is 0.641 (p = 0.000).

Table 4.1 reports output from OLS models of personal acceptance and ideological acceptance. As expected, the effects of both perceived left-right distance and treatment are negative both in relation to personal and ideological acceptance. The negative coefficients for the interaction and three-way interaction terms suggest that the treatment effect is negative but decreases as ideological (L-R) distance grows. The (negative) effect of left-right ideological distance becomes progressively more pronounced as distance grows and the responses of control and treatment group subjects converge. The patterns shown in Table 4.1 are displayed in Figure 4.4.

Table 4.1: OLS regression of Personal Resentment and Ideological Resentment

	Dependent variable:	
	(1) Personal Acceptance	(2) Ideological Acceptance
Extreme Vignette	0.017	-0.009
	(0.039)	(0.032)
LR Distance	-0.063***	-0.073***
	(0.024)	(0.020)
LR Distance^2	-0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Treated	-0.197***	-0.225***
	(0.069)	(0.057)
Treated x LR Distance	0.097***	0.103***
	(0.035)	(0.030)
Treated x LR Distance^2	-0.009**	-0.009***
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Constant	0.727***	0.714***
	(0.048)	(0.040)
Observations	277	277
R^2	0.287	0.302
Adjusted R^2	0.271	0.286
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Respondents were randomly shown extreme or moderate vignettes to induce variation in left-right distance. Exposure to one or the other has no significant effect on personal and ideological acceptance/resentment in any model. This is reassuring in terms of survey

desingn. The effect of perceived ideological distance (and how it is moderated by treatment) should be independent from whether the displayed vignette was moderate or extreme.



Figure 4.4: Predicted levels of personal and ideological acceptance for the control (C) and treatment (T) groups at growing levels of perceived left-right distance between the self and the political profile shown on the vignette.

Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 summarise the patterns that are shown in Figure 4.4 numerically. Table 4.2 illustrates the dynamics of the treatment effect. It shows the predicted levels of personal and ideological acceptance ('Prediction' columns in the table) in both the control and the treatment groups at different levels of perceived left-right distance. A score of 0 on personal or ideological acceptance means complete rejection of the political other and their views, whereas 1 denotes complete acceptance.

The control group exhibits more or less linearly decreasing predicted personal and ideological acceptance from a score of 0.73 and 0.71 respectively at 0 units of ideological distance to 0.2 and 0.12 respectively at 10 units of left-right difference. This linearity is also illustrated by the red lines in Figure 4.4. In contrast, acceptance is stable (around a score of 0.5) in the treatment group when the perceived left-right distance is low. It only significantly declines when the distance between the self and the other exceeds 4 units. Beyond this point the levels of personal and ideological acceptance gradually decline to a predicted score of -0.08 and 0.03 respectively at 10 units of left-right difference.

Table 4.2: Predicted level of personal and ideological acceptance for the treated (T) and non-treated (C) groups

	Personal Acceptance		Ideological Acceptance	
	Prediction	[90% Conf. Int.]	Prediction	[90% Conf. Int.]
LR=0 (C)	0.73	[0.65, 0.82]	0.71	[0.64, 0.78]
LR=2 (C)	0.61	[0.56, 0.66]	0.57	[0.53, 0.61]
LR=4 (C)	0.47	[0.42, 0.52]	0.44	[0.40, 0.48]
LR=6 (C)	0.33	[0.28, 0.38]	0.32	[0.28, 0.36]
LR=8 (C)	0.18	[0.10, 0.25]	0.22	[0.15, 0.28]
LR=10 (C)	0.02	[-0.13, 0.18]	0.12	[0.00, 0.25]
LR=0 (T)	0.54	[0.45, 0.62]	0.49	[0.41, 0.56]
LR=2 (T)	0.57	[0.52, 0.62]	0.51	[0.47, 0.55]
LR=4 (T)	0.52	[0.47, 0.57]	0.48	[0.44, 0.53]
LR=6 (T)	0.4	[0.34, 0.45]	0.39	[0.35, 0.44]
LR=8 (T)	0.2	[0.12, 0.28]	0.24	[0.17, 0.31]
LR=10 (T)	-0.08	[-0.24, 0.09]	0.03	[-0.11, 0.17]

Table 4.3 details the results for the three-way interaction and shows the average marginal effects of percieved ideological difference for the treatment (T) and control (C) groups at specific levels of perceived ideological distance. It also shows the average marginal effects of the treatment at the same levels of perceived left-right distance. The marginal effects of percieved ideological distance ('AME(LR)' columns in the table) show *by how much* and *in what direction* personal and ideological acceptance change in the control and treatment groups as the percieved ideological distance increases by 1 unit. These tendencies are also illustrated by the (changing) slope of the red and blue lines in Figure 4.4. The marginal effects of the treatment ('AME(Treatment)' columns in the table) show *by how much* and *in what direction* acceptance differs between the control and treatment groups at given levels of percieved ideological distance. These contrasts are also illustrated by the distance between the red and blue lines in Figure 4.4.

Table 4.3: Average marginal effects (AME) at specific perceived values of LR distance for the treated (T) and control (C) groups

	Personal Acceptance		Ideological Acceptance	
	AME (Treatment)	AME (LR)	AME (Treatment)	AME (LR)
LR=0 (C)		-0.06		-0.07
LR=2 (C)		-0.07		-0.07
LR=4 (C)		-0.07		-0.06
LR=6 (C)		-0.07		-0.06
LR=8 (C)		-0.08		-0.05
LR=10 (C)		-0.08		-0.04
LR=0 (T)	-0.20	0.03	-0.22	0.03
LR=2 (T)	-0.04	0.00	-0.06	0.00
LR=4 (T)	0.05	-0.04	0.04	-0.03
LR=6 (T)	0.07	-0.08	0.07	-0.06
LR=8 (T)	0.02	-0.12	0.02	-0.09
LR=10 (T)	-0.10	-0.16	-0.09	-0.12

The marginal effects of ideological distance on personal and ideological acceptance in the control group are relatively stable (around -0.07 and -0.06 respectively) no matter how large the perceived L-R distance is. This indicates a linear decline in acceptance (see red line in Figure 4.4). Among treated respondents the table indicates different dynamics. The marginal effects of treatment on personal and ideological acceptance are -0.20 and -0.22 respectively at 0 units of ideological distance and -0.04 and -0.06 at 2 units of ideological distance. Beyond this point, however, the treatment ceases to have a negative effect on acceptance. It is also illustrated by the convergence of the red and blue lines in Figure 4.4. At the same time, among treated respondents the negative impact of ideological distance on evaluations of the political other and their views only emerges – and gradually increases in magnitude to a marginal effect of -0.16 and -0.12 respectively – at 4 units of ideological distance (see blue line in Figure 4.4). At 4 units of ideological distance therefore the negative effect of the treatment is replaced by the negative effect of (growing) ideological difference.

Models 1-4 in Table 4.4 report separate regression outputs for the lower and higher levels of perceived ideological distance. They confirm that the treatment effect is limited to evaluations of spatially proximate political others. Estimates from the model on the subset with small left-right distance (models 2 and 4) resemble those from the full model, with somewhat larger coefficients. Treatment and all its interactions are, however, insignificant in the sub-sample with larger left-right distance (models 1 and 3). As models 5 and 6 confirm, in this sub-sample there is a linear relationship between acceptance of the political other and their views and the extent of the perceived ideological (in)compatibility.

Table 4.4: Test for the limit of treatment effect, OLS models on personal and ideological acceptance

	Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Personal A. (LR>4)	Personal A. (LR<5)	Ideological A. (LR>4)	Ideological A. (LR<5)	Personal A. (LR>4)	Ideological A. (LR>4)
Extreme Vignette	0.005	0.009	-0.007	-0.030	0.014	-0.002
	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.041)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.041)
LR Distance	-0.216	-0.070	-0.093	-0.074	-0.074***	-0.059***
	(0.187)	(0.074)	(0.155)	(0.064)	(0.021)	(0.018)
LR Distance^2	0.010	0.003	0.002	0.001		
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.015)		
Treated	1.389	-0.268***	0.997	-0.282***	0.200	0.143
	(0.993)	(0.078)	(0.822)	(0.067)	(0.200)	(0.163)
Treated x LR Distance	-0.386	0.298***	-0.275	0.248***	-0.024	-0.016
	(0.294)	(0.103)	(0.243)	(0.089)	(0.030)	(0.025)
Treated x LR Distance^2	0.026	-0.062**	0.019	-0.045**		
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.022)		
Constant	1.242*	0.723***	0.801	0.718***	0.759***	0.686***
	(0.639)	(0.055)	(0.529)	(0.047)	(0.134)	(0.110)
Observations	129	148	129	148	129	129
R^2	0.238	0.134	0.211	0.187	0.203	0.195
Adjusted R^2	0.200	0.097	0.172	0.152	0.177	0.169
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Overall, these patterns suggest that partisan acceptance or hostility is largely driven by the ideological (in)compatibility that people perceive between their own preferences and those of

the political other. People are more open to associate with people (and their views) whose political preferences resemble their own. Yet, there is a crucial difference between how people think of and relate to the supporters of the other party *with* explicit knowledge of their party affiliation and how people make judgments *without* such cue.

Given no or very little perceived ideological dissimilarity between the self and the other, a visible and explicit partisan label focuses respondents' attention on party affiliations and reduces the importance of ideological considerations (i.e., people ignore their ideological similarity with the out-partisan). When the political other's thinking is sufficiently different from respondents' own views the negative impact of ideological dissimilarity on attitudes towards the out-partisan is identical regardless of whether they receive party cues or not.

This pattern may have more to do with survey design than attitudes. Respondents may make inferences about other people's party affiliations, particularly when the contrast between the ideological positions of their own party and that of the political other is sizeable. However, if the control group respondents were also to base their judgements on party stereotypes, this would mean that treatment (party cue) indirectly affected people beyond the targeted sub-sample. Data from this survey experiment cannot prove or discredit this idea. However, that the effect of perceived left-right distance is very much linear in the control setting makes it improbable. It should also be noted that the experiment is not realistic in the sense that the issues on which both the respondents' and the vignettes' positions are based are the same and are easily quantifiable given their closed-ended nature. This is not the case in real life conversations where the choice of topic is more varied and where responses are more difficult to quantify. This likely exaggerates the clarity that people exhibit in the placement of the vignettes.

A second explanation is that one's associations with party labels and with policy positions clash. It might be that the profile that respondents are presented with shows a more extreme set of positions than their stereotype of the other party's voter would be. In this case their aversion towards this ideological extremity (large distance between the self and the other) dominates. Or it might be that the profile is more moderate than their image of the typical out-party supporter is. In this case the partisan label itself induces a different (more hostile) reaction than the perceived ideological closeness would otherwise warrant.

The latter explanation – that when the party label and the political views presented to respondents clash people disregard ideological compatibility and focus solely on the *otherness* of the political other – fits the data better. This makes intuitive sense: in navigating our ways through social life without much conflict the point of partisan hostility is precisely to avoid conflict with someone we think is different from us. It also fits in with theories of group stereotyping. People try to maintain the applicability of stereotypes even to deviant out-group members by focusing on their other, more stereotypically fitting attributes (Kunda and Oleson, 1995). They also generally judge in-group members significantly more positively than out-group members of very similar attributes (Marquez and Paez, 2011). This does not mean that people fail to assess the position of the hypothetical profile (as the reasonably correct ideological placement of the other shows), but that on average less weight is given to issue positional closeness or differences.

4.10 Explaining Personal Acceptance / Resentment

As the analysis has demonstrated, both personal and ideological resentment are closely linked to perceived ideological distance: one recognises that there is substantial difference between one's own issue preferences and those of the other and expresses dislike for the other person

and their arguments. The final part of the analysis focuses on whether and how ideological and personal resentment are related. In particular, it focuses on whether ideological resentment *mediates* the effect of perceived left-right distance on personal resentment. This idea is rooted in the intuition that personal hostility towards an unknown person should not be unfounded. This experiment only provides respondents with political cues about the other. Accordingly, while ideological resentment may develop without personal resentment towards the other, this should not hold the other way round: personal resentment should not develop without negativity towards the other's views.

Table 4.5: Mediation Analysis, OLS models of personal and ideological acceptance

	Dependent variable:	
	(1) Personal Acceptance	(2) Ideological Acceptance
Ideological Acceptance	0.991***	
	(0.040)	
Extreme vignette	0.026	-0.021
	(0.022)	(0.018)
LR Distance	0.010	-0.030***
	(0.014)	(0.011)
LR Distance^2	-0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Treated	0.025	-0.088***
	(0.039)	(0.033)
Treated x LR Distance	-0.005	0.035**
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Treated x LR Distance^2	0.0002	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Personal Acceptance		0.696***
		(0.028)
Constant	0.020	0.208***
	(0.039)	(0.031)
Observations	277	277
R^2	0.779	0.783
Adjusted R^2	0.773	0.778
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In testing this association, the study benefits from the randomisation of moderate and extreme profiles for the displayed vignettes. This induced random variation in ideological hostility (provided that ideological resentment is driven by perceived ideological distance). Table 4.5 confirms that personal acceptance is explained by ideological acceptance only. The initial predictors (ideological distance, treatment) have no effect anymore. Ideological acceptance, however, is still driven by the initial set of covariates even after the inclusion of personal resentment in the model.

This is a crucial and reassuring finding. Personal hostility not only coincides with but is by and large preceded by rejection of certain opinions. It is driven by a perception of ideological or party stereotype-based incompatibility between the self and the other. Rejection of a certain set of views implies some level of cognitive involvement in the process of evaluating those who hold them. It confirms that antipathy towards an unknown political other emerges from imagined, stereotypical or real ideological contrasts.

Overall, the messages of this study are reasonably promising. There are three hopeful findings. First, that the majority of respondents appeared tolerant or indifferent towards the political other, hostility is not the norm.

Second, though party stereotypes are influential, they are only partially blinding. Even if people exaggerate the *otherness* of the other (disregard ideological similarity) under some conditions, this does not mean that they ignore ideological positions completely. This is demonstrated by the reasonably high correlation between people's placement of the political other on the left-right scale and the vignettes' designed left-right positions. It is also demonstrated by the absence of any impact of party labelling beyond a certain level of perceived ideological distance.

In order to appreciate the relevance of the party labelling effect, it is important to understand whether perceptions of a political other as spatially close to the self (4 or less units of spatial difference) are realistic or not. Since most respondents placed themselves in or close to the centre of the left-right scale (see Appendix D/2), they are not unrealistic at all. The inclusion of moderate vignettes in the experiment served precisely the purpose to induce scenarios when people are spatially relatively close to the profile they are judging.

A third pattern worth appreciating is that ideological resentment is higher than and mediates personal resentment. Respondents recognise and react to ideological and partisan differences, but personal hostility, it appears, is not necessarily engrained in their minds to the extent that popular discourse would suggest.

4.11 Robustness of Findings

One relevant concern is that the designed treatment – instead of affecting the way perceptions of ideological closeness drive social judgements – might affect the left-right ideological placement of the hypothetical profile itself, which should largely be a function of *real* differences between the views of respondents and those presented to them only. Table 4.6 presents output from a linear regression of perceived left-right distance on treatment, actual ideological distance, and their interaction, confirming that it is real distance, unaffected by the presence of partisan cues, that drives the perceptions of the political other's ideology.

Table 4.6: Modelling Perceived Left-Right Distance, OLS

	Dependent variable:
	Perceived LR Dist.
Treated	-0.079
	(0.426)
LR dist (real)	0.761***
	(0.057)
Treated x LR dist (real)	-0.028
	(0.082)
Constant	0.709**
	(0.296)
Observations	277
R^2	0.549
Adjusted R^2	0.544
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The dependent variables are bounded between 0 and 1. Output from tobit models is presented in Appendix D/4 with almost identical substantive findings as those reported above. Likewise, models were tested against additional demographic and political predictors. Adding these controls did not change the established patterns. Even when the strength and direction of (positive) partisan attachments are controlled for the effect of perceived ideological dissimilarities prevails. So does the effect of the visibility of party cues when the other is seen ideologically similar to the self.

The sample is not large enough to statistically compare patterns between smaller subgroups. Nevertheless, Appendix D/5 indicates that partisan stereotypes are also relevant and powerful for non-partisans in evaluating Conservative and Labour supporters. Loess curves mapping the structure of the data from the experiment show that party cues reduce both personal and ideological acceptance of the hypothetical person on the side of those who do not feel close to a party (37 people, 13.7% of respondents) and also in the subgroup of those who do not feel close to a party or feel just weakly connected to a party (97 people 35% of respondents). This

confirms that the observed treatment effect is not primarily driven by the standoff between strong Conservative and Labour supporters. Partisan negativity is a general pattern and not simply a strong partisan pattern. This finding validates our insistence that negativity towards parties is independent from positive attachments to rival groups.

An additional consideration when testing the trade-off between ideology (rational cues) and stereotyping (affective cues) is that it might be more meaningful to qualify the perceived ideological contrast between voters and parties by issue importance. The literature is rich in theories and empirical accounts that testify to the power of issue importance in making political evaluations, decisions: although many voters have little interest in and general knowledge about politics (e.g., Carpini and Keeter, 1996), they attach importance to specific issues (Converse, 1964; Krosnick, 1990). This motivates voters to pay more attention to matters related to these very issues (Bolsen and Leeper, 2013; Henderson, 2014; Holbrook et al., 2005; Hutchings, 2001; Iyengar et al., 2008; Krosnick, 1998; Visser et al., 2003).

Different issues also polarise the public's opinions and attitudes differently. Some issues, such as those connecting to culture, tend to do so more affectively (Gidron, 2020). Such issues can be expected to prompt more affective *personal* judgments too when encountering people with conflicting views. Reactions to the issue of Brexit are clear examples of this. The question of leaving the European Union – a new cross-cutting issue with no overwhelming sorting in partisan representation at the time – was consistently reported to be the most important problem in public opinion surveys and became the foundation of strong opinion-based identity groups (Hobolt et a., 2021), leading to a new axis of affective polarisation in Britain.

The comprehensive profiles built for the current experiment's vignettes were designed to reflect previous traditions in ideological profile building and existing scales measuring

ideological consistency. The broadness of a partisan profile represents virtue because it provides a complete picture of the out-partisan and an overall image of ideological hostility. Yet, focusing on the issues that are the most important for each respondent (MIPs) would highlight the essence of the contrast between the voter and a partisan of the disliked party.

It must be noted that measurement of the most important problems is not uncontested. It has been argued that it potentially conflates the importance of an issue with the *problematic nature* of the same issue (Wlezien, 2005) or conflates the personal importance of an issue with its perceived importance in the national political agenda (Johns, 2010). Yet, it offers a degree of differentiation that would allow us to separate out the very part of the ideological conflict between a respondent and the out-partisan that is most critical for personal judgments. A vignette focusing on MIPs can capture targeted hostility towards people based on specific ideological considerations. A comparison between reactions to broad/ comprehensive and more restrictive issue profiles could yield even more interesting findings. If there are particular issues that stir up disproportionately high levels of affective antagonism in judging out-partisans, then such issues are worthy of a separate discussion.

Finally, it is important to scrutinise the two scales developed to capture how people relate to out-party supporters and their respective political views. The 4-4 items of the personal and ideological resentment scales were selected to reflect the distinction between acceptance of a given set of political opinions and acceptance of a person holding such views. Undoubtedly the two aspects are closely related both theoretically and empirically (see section 4.10). Appendix A/8 presents results from a factor analysis on the personal and ideological resentment survey items. A factor analysis discovers the latent dimensions (factors) of responses to a set of survey items. Each item is given a score between 0 and 1 for each factor. The larger a score is, the more strongly the item is associated with the given factor. The analysis presented in Appendix A/8 yields two factors. The ideological resentment scale

items are more strongly related to Factor 1 and the personal resentment scale items are more closely related to Factor 2. This confirms that these are not only distinct theoretical concepts but are also separate empirical dimensions.

The results in Appendix A/8 show considerable cross-loading: some items have large scores on both latent dimensions (factors), meaning that they are associated with both personal and ideological resentment to some extent. The results also show that 1 item among the personal resentment scale items is more strongly related to the factor representing ideological resentment and 1 item among the ideological resentment scale items is more strongly related to the factor representing personal resentment. Appendix A/8 replicates the core of the analysis using newly constructed scales that leave out these two problematic items. It also replicates the core of the analysis using 1-1 item from the personal and ideological resentment scale items that show the strongest discrimination between the two factors (meaning that they are very strongly connected to the factor they theoretically belong to and are only weakly associated with the factor they do not theoretically belong to). The results do not change significantly or substantively.

4.12 Conclusions

This experiment was designed to disentangle the effects of ideology and negative partisan stereotyping on acceptance of and openness to the supporters of disliked parties and their views. It has demonstrated that social hostility is largely driven by the ideological (in)compatibility people perceive between their own preferences and those of the political other. Naturally, people hold more open and welcoming attitudes towards those whose ideological standing is similar to their own.

However, there is an important difference in the weight people give to ideological considerations when they *explicitly know* which party the other person supports and when they do not. When the other person's views are reasonably similar to one's own, an explicit out-partisan label focuses the respondents' attention on the partisan 'otherness'. People ignore the apparent ideological similarity with the out-partisan and dislike them nevertheless. This shows that sharing a general ideological orientation and senses of group belonging are separate considerations.

The study also finds that personal hostility towards the other person emerges through ideological hostility – i.e., the adverse feelings induced by the set of views the political other holds –, rather than personal and ideological judgments being parallel, independent thoughts. This suggests that animosity towards a supporter of a rival party is ideologically not entirely unfounded. Altogether the findings speak equally of the power of ideological convictions and the power of negative partisan stereotypes, highlighting both the strength and the limits of partisan othering. People do deliberate ideology and consider the acceptability of the political values of the other before judging them politically or personally.

It is important to acknowledge that the analysis would benefit from a larger pool of observations. A larger sample could lend further robustness to the findings and would enable testing the homogeneity of the treatment effect across relevant subgroups. It would also permit additional comparisons – such as those between partisans of various strength and non-partisans to strengthen the argument that (out-)partisan negativity can develop without an equally or stronger sense of positive party attachment.

Admittedly, the experiment is not realistic in the sense that it presents issues and opinions in an artificially quantifiable manner. It is also unrealistic in the sense that in real life discussions topics of conversation are more varied. The results should be interpreted with

these features in mind. The study would benefit from future endeavours to elaborate on how people perceive ideological differences in settings that better resemble real world conversations and how such perceived differences induce personal or ideological hostility.

The chapter also opens up a number of further questions to follow up. The analysis focused on judgments about the two dominant British parties, which are characterised by identifiable perceptions and stereotypes by the public. It would be an informative addition to see how the patterns change in case of smaller and less visible parties that potentially have shorter history or are less easy to place ideologically. We could equally extend the enquiry to party systems with more than two dominant actors to describe party-based social discrimination in absence of straightforward, largely internalised bipolarity. Future studies could pin down what precise factors determine whether a party becomes polarising enough either ideologically or affectively that hostility becomes internalised in the minds of people beyond the political world.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

The past decades showed drastic transformations in the ideological and partisan landscape in Western Europe. Popular discourse and the academic literature speak increasingly worryingly about the crisis of established parties in representation and mobilisation (Mair, 2002; Mair, 2011; Kriesi, 2014; Fortunado and Stevenson, 2013), the growing presence and large scale normalisation of populist discourses across Western democracies (Zulianello and Larsen, 2020; Kriesi, 2014; Mair, 2002), the way political competitions have changed to be around new, politicising, moralised agendas (Kriesi, 2014); and about the prevalence and relevance of partisan negativity in politics (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Reiljan, 2020; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Wagner, 2021; Gidron et al., 2019).

Negative partisanship (NPID), the notion capturing that voters develop deep and lasting antipathies towards one or more political parties, is also increasingly in the spotlight both in academic discussions and in popular discourse. Research on negative partisanship in Western Europe is only in its infancy. To be sure, there are a few notable exceptions that highlight the applicability and relevance of the concept in the region and tailor it to fit multi-party systems.

An important point consistently overlooked in past works so far is precisely how changes in the prevalence or the nature of NPID contribute to or are affected by the structural and ideological transformations of the past decades. The political developments of the past few decades altered the way that people relate to and evaluate political actors, ideologies, and institutions. An enormous change in the supply of political ideals and conflicts – strengthened salience of value-based, moralised issues in political competitions and debates – paved the way for considerable changes in the reactions today's salient discourses and relevant actors

produce among the public compared to those of the 1990s. A new set of actors – most notably populist parties – who capitalise on a political agenda that challenges the legitimacy of the traditional institutions has created a huge divide between traditional elites and the people. Amidst these new dynamics ever larger segments of societies feel detached from parties and alienated from established political institutions.

Negative partisanship captures the rejection of certain parties, which is at the core of political behaviour and to attitudes towards representation. NPID is especially relevant for the discussion of the crisis of mainstream political actors and democratic institutions that has emerged over the past decade(s). The widespread failure to discuss the changes in the nature, strength, and prevalence of NPID means that the literature offers a simplified, limited image of how we can conceive of the concept. We need a more comprehensive picture of the past decades' global trends in attitudes towards parties and electoral institutions.

This thesis addresses the need to place NPID *in political context.* I discuss the following broad questions: 1) How have the characteristics of negative partisanship changed in the past 30 years? 2) What role does NPID have in contemporary processes that either foster or undermine democratic resilience, civic culture, societal harmony and even the legitimacy of democratic institutions?

5.1 Stability and change in NPID

Almost all research on negative partisanship and its consequences in Western Europe has been motivated by US trends, where partisan negativity is extremely prevalent, strong, blinding and rising (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). And, without exception, all studies that track the relevance of negative partisan attitudes in Europe

establish that it is present in this region as well (Reiljan, 2020; Wagner, 2021; Gidron et al., 2020; Hobolt et al., 2020). Though the scholarly interest in negative partisanship has been growing recently, there are many unanswered questions.

The second chapter addresses the most fundamental question posed by this thesis, namely how stable, how unchanging, how constant NPID really is. And if it is not, what key lessons there are regarding NPID's role in global democratic tendencies and its meaning as a political attitude. The importance of these questions lies in the changes that have occurred over the past decades: weakening of partisanship; growing dissatisfaction with the traditional institutions of representation and democracy; growing influence of populist forces and radical challengers who undermine the legitimacy of democratic processes; and growing affective negative reactions to parties. Rejecting certain parties is central to these tendencies. However, *changes* in how and to what extent the public rejects certain parties are important too. We must investigate whether the processes ultimately leading to the crisis of democracy include changes in *who* negative partisans are, *what* parties they hold negative partisan IDs towards and *how* such an identification relates to other political attitudes.

The second chapter provides a descriptive account of how the meaning and extent of negative political identification has changed over the past three decades in the context of changes in salient political discourses, actors and rhetoric. I show that negative attitudes towards all types of parties decreased in the past 30 years, though by far the most pronounced decline relates to ideologically extreme and populist parties. Nevertheless, all types of parties have been losing vote shares throughout this time, with the notable exception of populist parties.

The main message of the chapter is that the way that the public approaches certain types of parties reflects the shifting salience of issues and the supply of ideologies in electoral competitions. Accordingly, with the growing dominance of populist discourses in political

competitions the patterns illustrate the growing *acceptance* of populist ideas. These are now increasingly central to the public's cognitive mobilisation and investment. The same cannot be said about mainstream parties, which are increasingly approached with suspicion.

A trend of a consistent decline in NPID rates in the 2010s might be surprising against popular discourse that has pointed to the growing impact of political negativity on the side of the public across Western societies (Gidron et al., 2019). Against this background – and along with tendencies of falling partisanship rates, declining turnout, and growing alienation from political parties – the most important argument I make is that the lower levels of negative partisanship in the last decade do not imply warmth and openness towards parties.

The decline of NPID in the past decade is indicative of drastically changing attitudes both towards parties and more broadly towards democratic processes. These changes are a result of external factors (globalisation; cultural and economic turbulences) and internal factors (the emergence and growing success of new actors and the normalisation of the radically different and often moralised discourse they capitalise on) that challenge existing political structures, ideas and actors. I link lower levels of negative partisanship to gradual alienation from and mistrust in traditional institutions of political representation and arenas of participation over the 2000s. I show that the decline in negative partisanship in Western Europe disproportionately affects the politically least motivated and least invested segments of societies. These happen to be the groups that show the highest levels of alienation from politics.

One unsettling message from the second chapter is that the aggregate trends in the dynamics of NPID are a prime symptom of the crisis of democracy. They attest to growing acceptance of and warming to extreme and populist ideas. They also show that lower rates of negative partisanship across the continent ultimately signify less motivation and/or willingness on the

side of the public to engage with political parties cognitively and behaviourally. Throughout the thesis I emphasise the primacy of negativity – the idea that negative instincts are stronger, that negative news stay with us for longer and concern us more, etc. A decrease in negative predispositions, such as that currently seen with the decline of NPID in Western Europe, is a painful and alarming wound to the legitimacy of parties and institutions.

5.2 Changing ideologies and NPID

The unprecedented transformations of the European ideological landscape in the past decades drastically changed the saliency of certain conflicts. This culminated in the emergence and increased salience of a second, value-based ideological line of competition and the emergence of movements, discourses, and political actors that challenge and reject established actors and ways of governing. These developments had important implications for the make-up and approval of parties and party systems. Against this background the third chapter examined the changing relation between ideological polarisation and negative partisanship. Ideological polarisation and/or extremity are frequently cited and accepted as the main drivers of negative partisanship. However, their relationship is never discussed in light of global changes to ideological structures and cleavages. It is always assumed constant throughout drastically changing political and ideological contexts.

The third chapter focuses on the relative importance of various sources of ideological conflict or consensus in shaping societies' overall attitudes towards parties over time. I show that although degrees of ideological conflict within a society in general foster a higher level of negativity towards both mainstream and radical parties, this relationship is conditional. Negative partisanship in absence or scarce presence of populist political forces within electoral competitions is primarily a product of *left-right ideological extremity*. But the

growing presence and success of populist parties in European elections has modified this. NPID is now fostered by how much the *core of the electorate* polarises along the most salient and electorally most dominant conflicts.

The results here show a shift in what drives negative partisanship with populism gaining electoral ground: a shift *away* in salience from traditionally extreme left-right conflicts and a shift *towards* conflicts more central to political competition and wider political mobilisation. When the main political conflicts are primarily contrasts of traditional left and traditional right ideas, the presence of extremities and their ability to mobilise create a more hostile environment towards political parties in general. The steady increase in the number and electoral success of populist parties in the European party systems (whose placement in the ideological spectrum is less straightforward and whose agenda challenges the traditional ideological divisions) is associated with a shift in the relative salience of the traditional and newly emerging issues. This changes what conflicts stimulate NPID the most – as ideas previously considered extreme or niche are normalised and as new, politicising, moralised conflicts are incorporated into mainstream parties' agendas and discourses.

One of the intriguing messages of the third chapter is that the way that party systems are ideologically and structurally made up affects NPID at the aggregate-level. A society's cognitive mobilisation is endogenous to features of party competitions and the supply of politics both locally and globally. This is an important message because it highlights a mechanism that is independent of citizens' individual predispositions. It is the supply of parties and the politicisation of conflicts within societies that has the capacity to shift the political mood. Ideological conflicts shape the composition of the party system, drive cognitive mobilisation and fuel the development of negative attitudes towards parties in societies.

5.3 GLOBAL TRENDS AND NPID

The messages from the second and third chapters are consistent. First, they all imply that the nature of NPID has been transformed in the past 30 years. These changes in people's attitudes towards political actors and institutions are a result of the changing contexts and the supply of politics. These dynamics mean that the public's attitudes inevitably adjust to shifts in the salience of issue dimensions, to how parties are aligned along relevant conflicts and to the supply of ideas, discourses and types of representation.

There is no straightforward linearity between these two processes (see section 1.1 in the introductory chapter). The supply of politics (both in content and tone) is also shaped by the public's perceived demand for politics. Demand for responses to newly emerging issues and demand for certain type of representation walk had in hand with the emergence of those actors who capitalise on these demands, foster them, or even plant them in the public discourse.

Second, besides suggesting mere change in prevalence or direction, the chapters speak of a change in the quality of negative partisanship as an attitude. The patterns suggest that NPID has become more affective (though there is no longitudinal data to confirm this). The second chapter indicates that NPID is becoming more exclusive with lower proportions of the public identifying as negative partisans. Those with NPID are more invested and more politically motivated than those with no NPIDs. At the same time, the third chapter suggests than traditional economic or social issues are increasingly replaced in societies by value-based, more moralised issues in fuelling NPID. These issues tend to be more affectively polarising (Gidron, 2020).

We do not see rising negativity towards parties in contemporary societies. We see a shift in the nature of NPID towards a type of negativity that is motivated by more affectively

polarising ideologies and that is more closely connected to political engagement, efficacy, ideological or affective investment. We also see an increasing contrast between those who continue to engage with the political system and those who withdraw from engagement with what the party system offers. This has important implications for the legitimacy of parties and democratic processes.

Many scholars point pessimistically to the past decades' developments: declining political participation; growing cynicism with how democracy functions and what it can offer; the lack of a strong sense of political efficacy (Foa and Munk, 2016); the crisis of representation and a perceived lack of responsiveness by parties to new demands and popular challenges; and particularly the challenges posed by the integration of populist discourses into political norms (Mair, 2002; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi, 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Mair, 2011; Ardag et al., 2020). The symptoms described in the second and third chapters do not ease these worries. Declining engagement with institutions is a sign of a troubling transformation.

There are a few more optimistic responses to the dilemma, which are important to mention. Kriesi (2020) argues that support for democracy and democratic processes is very much alive, even if younger age cohorts tend to consistently score lower on democratic resilience. There are debates over whether populism can serve as a democratic corrective (among others: Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016) or not (among others: Ardag et al., 2020). In their discussion of negative partisanship towards radical right-wing populist parties Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser (2021) demonstrate that negative partisans of radical right-wing populist parties (and importantly, these people take up 52.59% of the Western European electorate) exhibit remarkable pro-democratic attitudes. This is worth keeping in mind among the gloomy messages.

In the introductory chapter I briefly discussed how NPID is generally connected to political interest, efficacy and investment in politics. If NPID is a sign of political engagement, then its disappearance is concerning from a civic culture and democratic mobilisation perspective. Cognitive mobilisation and motivation to participate in various conventional and non-conventional ways are very much necessary for the healthy functioning of a democracy on the surface.

Negative partisanship is an indicator of political engagement. It can simultaneously signal democratic resilience and be a symptom of processes that legitimise the populist turn and agendas (and de-legitimise traditional ways of representation). There is no straightforward answer to the question of whether it is better for voters to distance themselves from the primary institutions of democracy when they are perceived to be flawed or whether it is better to legitimise them through engagement. Either way, both the presence and the absence of NPID is important to consider.

5.4 NPID: THE GOOD OR THE EVIL?

The fourth chapter deals with a related question. Based on the apocalyptic accounts of and the contemporary outlook for affective polarisation, one might reasonably think that growing affective negativity and a high proportion of negative partisans are undesirable in societies. There is hardly a discussion of negative partisanship that fails to mention the destructive consequences of negative partisanship on political and societal harmony. But does negative partisanship have to be harmful? Political conflict, competition and oppositions are central to the life and functioning of democracy (Schattschneider, 1960). A healthy democracy is not democracy without conflict and competition. The threat to a healthy functioning democracy

is when disagreements become so entrenched that they become excessively influential in political and social thinking and actions (Lipset, 1959).

Today it is evident that (negative) partisan attitudes spill over to evaluations of and behaviour towards supporters of the disliked party (Hobolt et al., 2020; Westwood et al., 2018; Huber and Malhotra, 2017; Carlin and Love, 2018). There is a very fine line between constructive and destructive negativity and that line is a moral boundary that is difficult to objectively capture. People should not hurt each other. Should they also not dislike each other at all? That is a more difficult question. Indeed, if social distance from those with different values, ideologies or party affiliation helps us to steer our lives through social interactions with the least possible unnecessary conflict, then avoiding these people serves just this purpose, even if it is not a socially constructive attitude.

Unfortunately, NPID – according to studies in the US, where partyism is the most powerful influence on social judgments compared to other group identities and instrumental evaluations (Westwood et al., 2018; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) – can elicit hostile beliefs and reactions. The fourth chapter contributes to our understanding of how concerning a phenomenon negative partisanship is when it comes to social hostility in Europe.

In the chapter I establish that party labels are powerful sources of negativity when it comes to judging partisans, but that they do not necessarily trump ideological convictions. In fact, adversities originate in intolerance for the set of real or imagined political views associated with supporters of parties. The main, discouraging implication for the power of negative partisanship is that negative partisanship induces heavy stereotyping. Even when these stereotypes are not confirmed, people persist with them against other relevant cues and attributes of people they meet.

However, the experiment in the fourth chapter (and several supplementary sources) suggests that hostility is not the norm in these settings. In the fourth chapter the average social acceptance is at around 50%. A 2016 YouGov survey indicated that 73% of Conservative supporters and 60% of Labour supporters would *not* be upset if their child was to marry the supporter of the other party. The equivalent statistics in 2019 were 78% of Conservatives and 56% of Labour supporters. This does not mean people would actually be happy to see cross-party marriages or that they have a favourable opinion of the other. Yet, this evidence is more cheerful than popular discourse suggests.

Negative partisanship is an influential driver of political behaviour. Nevertheless, it is not as poisonous an attitude for social dialogue and harmony as the US-based literature suggests. This is not to discount the destructive potential that lies in excessive negative partisan stereotyping. But partisan distance is in part based on rational considerations. There is conceptual clarity in people's minds about parties' standing. The findings also indicate that though there is anger at elites and institutions, there is a limit to which this anger spills over to those who support and uphold these institutions.

Given the geo-contextual limits of the fourth chapter, some questions remain unanswered. How dangerous a problem is negative partisan affect in social judgments in the rest of Europe? What is the role of ideological convictions in furthering or mediating partisan discrimination? Future studies should capitalise on these findings and replicate similar contexts widely across Europe to see how partisan discrimination changes in absence of straightforward, largely internalised, traditional bipolarity.

As I argued in the fourth chapter, a further crucial next step in the discussion is to extend the enquiry to smaller and less visible parties. Ultimately, the ideal research outcome would be a comprehensive picture of the features and contexts that determine whether a given party

becomes polarising enough either ideologically or affectively that antipathies become internalised among the public. These discussions should examine the role and incentives of parties, political communication, and media environments in politicising issues or fostering existing affective oppositions between citizens.

5.5 NEGATIVITY TOWARDS PARTIES

A lot of attention is paid to negative political attitudes these days. Most of the scariest discussions on political hostilities centre around growing affective polarisation, a phenomenon that suggests that people are increasingly polarised in how they evaluate and relate to liked and disliked parties, as well as the messages and people associated with them. This is understandable. Affective polarisation hinders cooperation and dialogue both between competing elites (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016) and voters (Gerber et al., 2012). It is often connected to interpersonal discrimination and partisan animosity between competing segments of the public (Abramowitz and Webster, 2018; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; Hobolt et al., 2020), even if there may not be extreme ideological disagreements between them.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, affective polarisation and negative partisanship are related. Both imply negative evaluations of or attachment to certain parties, often paired with strong liking of the competing opposites. In discussing the contributions and relevance of this dissertation it is important to reiterate the importance of NPID.

The fundamental difference between affective polarisation and NPID lies in the fact that affective polarisation reflects the *contrast* between positive and negative evaluations. It is a measure of polarisation and not a measure of how parties are evaluated separately. Low

affective polarisation may be indicative of liking, disliking or indifference towards all available parties. Likewise, when researchers talk about increasing affective polarisation, it is not obvious whether the source of such increase is strengthening in-party attachment, strengthening out-party rejection or both. Negative partisanship is a single dimension focusing on negativity only and treating attitudes towards parties separate, without prior assumptions about the existence of favoured and disliked, in- or out-parties.

Negative partisanship is not a new phenomenon, as implied even by the earliest accounts of partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Crewe, 1976). The question whether it has become more affective in its motivation and connotations is relevant in the current political climate. This requires an assessment of NPID's changing nature throughout the past decades even further, rather than subsuming the concept beneath other notions, such as affective polarisation. As I also discussed in the introductory chapter, the concerns expressed in the literature and public discourse about the destructive consequences of affective polarisation on political and social harmony are about the consequences of mobilisation *against* a party/ certain parties, rather than behaviour and biases fuelled purely by in-group love (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Reiljan, 2020). In this light, negative partisanship is more fundamental than affective polarisation.

Another critique of negative partisanship is the argument that NPID is primarily a theoretical side-line and necessary empirical biproduct of a strong positive partisan identity. In fact, most early research considered NPID a component of positive partisanship (Richardson, 1991; Rose and Mishler, 1998; Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977; Wattenberg, 1982; Garry, 2007). This focus later changed. Yet, this confusion is captured in studies' careful ways of framing

the discussion of negative partisan identification.[29] As Bankert summarises "the term 'negative partisanship' captures the idea that strong out-party hostility can develop "without equally" strong in-party attachments" (2020:2). But if equally strong in-party attachments also emerge, can we establish which attitude emerged first?

Virtually every study of negative partisanship frames the discussion of NPID's effects on political behaviour very carefully: they never fail to add that the effects hold *'even when controlling for positive partisanship'*. On the one hand, such statements are fair, particularly in light of the two concepts' heavily intertwined and interlinked nature. On the other, noting that there are substantial individual effects on the side of negative partisanship even when those of positive partisanship are partitioned out strengthens the argument for its separate consideration. But the idea that researchers constantly must defend this line of theoretical conceptualisation in their research still to some extent weakens the legitimacy of speaking of NPID independently.

The idea is not new that one would support a party purely out of aversion for another. This line of reasoning inspired the first wave of research on NPID in post-communist parties. Post-communist societies were heavily characterised by the rejection of the Communist power system (and aversion towards parties that carried the Communist era's legacy) after their democratic transformation. Party systems here were still highly volatile, party support in large part evolved in reaction to these strong negative foundations (Vlachova 2001, Rose and Mischler 1998). This is one of the most straightforward, unambiguous examples of how negativity emerges independently and ends up developing warmth towards a competitor. Where is then the line between NPID that emerges as a cognitive bias, a reaction to in-party

[29] Think for example of the title of Medeiros and Noel's (2014) work, 'The Forgotten Side of Partisanship: Negative Party Identification in Four Anglo-American Democracies', which, ironically, is among the pioneering studies of negativity understood as more that simply the bipolar opposite of its positive counterpart.

attachment and the one that emerges independently from positive partisanship? But more importantly, do we even need to talk about them separately if the end result is the same: people cling on to some parties and loath others?

There are two ways to approach this question. Empirically, it is important to acknowledge that not every partisan will develop negative partisan identities and vice versa. The second and third chapters demonstrate that negative partisanship is a much more widely held attitude among Western European electorates than positive party attachment. And indeed, various studies show the mobilising effect of negative partisanship among non- and weak partisans in political decisions too (Mayer, 2017; Caruna et al., 2015). The fourth chapter demonstrates that partisan othering and biased thinking about supporters of competing parties also equally appear among these groups, indicating that negative partisan attitudes are not fully captured by positive partisanship. In a world where there is growing disillusionment from the established parties and structures (Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2016), where partisanship is declining in advanced Western democracies (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Dalton, 2002), and where there is a growing presence of hostile and polarising forces in politics (Wagner, 2021; Zulianello and Larsen, 2020), there is increasing need to investigate to what extent and with what limits partisan negativity mobilises people.

The second way of approaching the question focuses on its power, its connection to biased reasoning, its ability to motivate and mobilise people and the tendency for NPID to induce distance, or even hostility towards parties, agendas, and groups of people in society. When we worry about the way that partisans discriminate against ‘the other’, what we are really concerned about is out-group hatred. In a hyper-polarised US context this tends to coincide with strong partisanship, as prescribed by social identity theories.

Throughout much of this dissertation I emphasised the psychological weight of negativity. Many studies stress the primacy of negativity in human thinking: the biases towards more likely perception of, stronger reaction to and the more intense internalising of risks, threats, bad news and information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et al., 1990; Cacioppo and Berntson, 1994; Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo et al., 1997; Ito, Larsen, Smith, and Cacioppo, 1998; Baumeister et al., 2001; Grabe et al., 2000; Newhagen and Reeves, 1992; Taylor, 1991). Advocating for more exclusive focus on the concept might seem like a small theoretical adjustment. But it is nothing less than the appropriate attribution of the effects (constructive and destructive alike) of negative predispositions. This thesis adds to a growing literature that reassesses the nature, place, and role of negative attitudes towards parties in a political world of complex and increasingly weakening partisan ties.

5.6 Avenues forward: researching NPID in Western Europe

Research on negative partisanship in Western Europe is still in its infancy. There are many important theoretical and empirical avenues forward to extend this line of enquiry. Negative partisanship as an independent political motivation is deserving of more in depth and more focused assessments. Many related attitudes and phenomena offer insights into what the characteristics and consequences of NPID might be both individually and collectively in societies. It is important that we attribute the consequences of out-party animosity appropriately, instead of blurring or merging distinct, but related concepts.

A related point is the need for unified measurement. NPID is (and have been) measured in at least five different ways. All are closely related, though there are slight differences in what they tap precisely. We have certainly learnt a great deal of how attitudes towards parties emerge and what their role in political and social actions is. In an ideal world there would be

more clarity in and more understanding of how various constructs are related. It is important to compare patterns between measurements – particularly as in many cases the valid interpretation of findings from past studies, which will not be replicable in current or future contexts, hinges upon it.

An important way forward in researching Western European negative partisanship is to look more closely at the motivations behind NPID at the individual- and at the party-level. There is a wide consensus that NPIDs may have instrumental or affective origins, even if the latter tends to heavily dominate the discussions. With the currently available data it is virtually impossible to distinguish between them. Yet, it is important to understand whether and how these motivations differ and what consequences they have for political and social behaviour. Second, how do negative partisans of various types of parties differ from one another in their political profiles? Although Melendez and Rovira Kaltwasser (2021) started this discussion, there is much more one can learn about the motivations of people with drastic differences in the type of parties or ideologies they rally up against with potentially crucial distinctions in the political and even democratic profiles of distinct groups of negative partisans.

We know little about the locally relevant factors that foster or depress negative partisanship, such as the characteristics of electoral systems; the rules and types of elections; political culture; political history of countries and the like. The message of the third chapter is that certain aggregate features influence the aggregate political mood and how accepting or resenting people are towards political actors, institutions and even to each other. If conflict is inherent in certain electoral structures and political patterns we are socialised into, then these structures are crucial to account for in discussing and explaining cross-country patterns. To what extent negative partisan attitudes are entrenched into system-level structures and realities is also a question that bears certain normative importance.

Going forward, it is important to reiterate the importance of the cornerstones of this thesis, which I hope will serve as motivation for the specific and appropriate discussion of negative partisanship. One foundation of this thesis is that we need to talk about negative partisanship, the idea that people develop strong aversion to certain parties. Though often masked as a side-effect of its positive counterpart, negative partisanship is a fundamental part of political life: it motivates political behaviour. More specifically, it motivates opposition to a political force and partisan negativity is associated with strong negative stereotyping of or even hostile attitudes and actions towards supporters of a disliked party. One needs to recognise the importance of these features and attributing them to negative identities should continue to be a part of research on attitudes towards parties and partisans.

Another cornerstone of this thesis is the idea that we need to understand the interrelatedness of political processes and phenomena. When we speak of negative political attitudes, we need to view it as one part of a much larger context and that context changes throughout political transformations and turbulence: the emergence of new, polarising parties; the erosion of previously influential structural linkages; the shifting salience of particular ideologies and issues; outside challenges (e.g., economic turbulences) all shape how people relate to parties. A comprehensive understanding of the nature and relevance of negative partisanship will recognise the interrelatedness of the relevant political processes and transformations of the past 30+ years.

Although I have pointed out limitations to the current approach to the research of NPID in Western Europe, I hope that this dissertation managed to convincingly demonstrate that NPID is a relevant, prevalent, and dynamic political attitude among Western Europeans. It has profound consequences on political and social behaviour and important implications for broader political attitudes and party systems.

APPENDIX A – CHAPTER 1

Table A.1: Individual-level logistic regressions to compare the correlates of behavioural, affective and combined measures of NPID

	Dependent variable:		
	Behaviour	Affect	Combined
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Income	0.008**	0.005*	0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Age	-0.0001	0.0003	0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)
Left-right self-placement	-0.020***	-0.009*	-0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Left-right self-placement ^ 2	0.001	0.001	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.001)
Political efficacy	0.022***	0.007**	0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Perceiving difference in vote options	0.036***	0.027***	0.062***
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Partisanship	0.046***	0.008	0.053***
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.0003	-0.021**	-0.023
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Following election campaign	0.105***	0.025**	0.056***
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.022)
Sex: female	-0.002	-0.005	-0.022*
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Country FE	Y	Y	Y
Constant	0.659***	0.925***	0.555***
	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.050)
Observations	5,020	5,341	4,997
Log Likelihood	-1,486.156	-54.979	-3,046.996
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,010.313	147.959	6,131.992
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX B – CHAPTER 2

B/1 DATA AVAILABILITY

Table B.1: Availability of data: country-year matrix

	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Austria			x	x	x	x	x
Belgium	x	x	x		x	x	x
Cyprus					x	x	x
Denmark	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Finland			x	x	x	x	x
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ireland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x	x	x
Malta					x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Spain	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden			x		x	x	x
The Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

B/2 Cross-country and over-time variation in NPID and partisanship



Figure B.1: Partisanship in Western Europe in 1989-1994 and 2002-2018, Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: Eurobarometer 1989-1994; European Social Survey Cumulative Datafile 2002-2018

B/3 NPID TIME TRENDS

Table B.2: OLS regression of NPID, the number of NPIDs and the number of negative ideological IDs on time

	Dependent variable:		
	NPID (% of pop.)	N of NPIDs	N of ideologies
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1994	-0.071*	-1.240***	-0.623**
	(0.039)	(0.420)	(0.259)
1999	-0.010	-0.820**	-0.179
	(0.036)	(0.398)	(0.246)
2004	0.001	-0.967**	-0.385*
	(0.039)	(0.420)	(0.259)
2009	0.009	-0.812**	-0.346**
	(0.036)	(0.388)	(0.239)
2014	-0.086**	-1.273***	-0.579*
	(0.036)	(0.388)	(0.239)
2019	-0.110***	-1.393***	-0.586
	(0.036)	(0.388)	(0.239)
Constant	0.861***	3.816***	2.754***
	(0.027)	(0.297)	(0.183)
Observations	102	102	102
R^2	0.207	0.148	0.104
Adjusted R^2	0.157	0.095	0.047
Residual Std. Error (df = 95)	0.095	1.029	0.634
F Statistic (df = 6; 95)	4.135***	2.761*	1.836
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table B.3: Marginal effects from OLS regression of NPID on time

Year	NPID (%)	95% CI
1989	0.86	[0.81, 0.92]
1994	0.79	[0.74, 0.85]
1999	0.85	[0.80, 0.90]
2004	0.86	[0.81, 0.92]
2009	0.87	[0.83, 0.92]
2014	0.78	[0.73, 0.82]
2019	0.75	[0.71, 0.80]



Figure B.2: Predicted levels of NPID with 95% CI from OLS regression of NPID on time

Table B.4: Marginal effects from OLS regression of the number of NPIDs on time

Year	N of NPIDs	95% CI
1989	3.82	[3.23, 4.40]
1994	2.58	[1.99, 3.16]
1999	3.00	[2.48, 3.52]
2004	2.85	[2.27, 3.43]
2009	3.00	[2.52, 3.49]
2014	2.54	[2.05, 3.03]
2019	2.42	[1.93, 2.91]



Figure B.3: Predicted numbers of NPIDs with 95% CI from OLS regression of the number of NPIDs on time

Table B.5: Marginal effects from OLS regression of the number of negative ideological IDs on time

Year	N of ideologies	95% CI
1989	2.75	[2.40, 3.11]
1994	2.13	[1.77, 2.49]
1999	2.58	[2.25, 2.90]
2004	2.37	[2.01, 2.73]
2009	2.41	[2.11, 2.71]
2014	2.18	[1.87, 2.48]
2019	2.17	[1.87, 2.47]



Figure B.4: Predicted numbers of negative ideological IDs with 95% CI from OLS regression of the number of negative ideological IDs on time

B/4 CLASSIFICATION OF POPULIST PARTIES: ZULIENALLO ET AL. VS. ROODUIJN ET AL. (POPULIST)

Table B.6: Classification of populist parties

Country name	Party name	Abbrev.	Variety	Elections	Not included in Rooduijn et al.	Only included in Rooduijn et al.
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZÖ	Right	2009–2014		
	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ	Right	1999–2019		
	Hans-Peter Martin's List	Martin	Valence	2004–2009		
Belgium	National Front	FN	Right	1994–2009		
	Belgium Arise	**DLB**	**Right**	**2014**	**X**	
	List Dedecker - Libertarian, Direct, Democratic	LDD	Right	2009		
	People's Party	PP	Right	2014-2019		
	Flemish Block / Flemish Interest	VB	Right	1984–2019		
Cyprus	Citizen's Alliance	SYM	Left	2014, 2019*		
Denmark	Danish People's Party	DF	Right	1999-2019		
	Progress Party	FrP	Right	1979-1999		
Finland	True Finns / Finns Party	PS	Right	1999-2019		
France	Republic Arise / France Arise	DLR/DLF	Right	2009-2019		
	National Front / National Rally	FN/RN	Right	1984-2019		
	Unbowed France	LFI	Left	2019		
	National Republican Movement	**MNR**	**Right**	**1999-2004**	**X**	
Germany	**Alternative for Germany**	**AfD**	**Right**	**2019**		**2014**
	German People's Union – List D	**DVU**	**Right**	**1989, 2009**	**X**	
	The Republicans	REP	Right	1989-2014		
	Party of Democratic Socialism / The Left	PDS/LINKE	Left	1994-2019		
United Kingdom	**Brexit Party**	**BP**	**Right**	**2019**	**X**	
	British National Party	**BNP**	**Right**	**1999-2014**	**X**	
	Respect – The Unity Coalition	RES	Left	2004		
	United Kingdom Independence Party	UKIP	Right	1994 – 2019		
Greece	Independent Greeks	ANEL	Right	2014-2019		
	Democratic Social Movement	DIKKI	Left	1999		
	Greek Solution	EL	Right	2019		
	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	Right	2004-2014, 2019*		
	Political Spring	**POLAN**				**1994-1999**
	European Realistic Disobedience Front	MeRA25	Left	2019		
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	**PASOK**	**Left**	**1984-1994**	**X**	
	Course of Freedom	**PE**	**Left**	**2019**	**X**	
	Coalition of the Radical Left / SYRIZA	SYN/SYRIZA	Left	2009-2019		
Ireland	Sinn Fein	SF	Left	1984–2019		
Italy	Forza Italia – The People of Freedom	FI / PdL	Right	1994–2019		

	Brothers of Italy	FdI	Right	2014–2019	
	Lombard League – Northern League – Lega Salvini Premier	LL/LN/Lega	Right	1989–2019	
	Five Star Movement	M5S	Valence	2014–2019	
Luxembourg	Action Committee for Democracy and Pensions Justice' / Alternative Democratic Reform Party	ADR	Right	1994–2019	
	National Movement	NB	Right	1989–1994	
The Netherlands	Centre Democrats	CD	Right	1989–1999	
	Centre Party	CP	Right	1984	
	Forum for Democracy	FvD	Right	2019	
	List Pim Fortuyn	LPF	Right	2004	
	Party for Freedom	PVV	Right	2009-2019	
	Socialist Party	**SP**	**Left**	**1989-1999**	**2004-2019**
Portugal	Coalition Basta – Enough	B-C	Right	2019*	
Spain	Podemos	Podemos	Left	2014, 2019*	
	Vox	Vox	Right	2014-2019	
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD	Right	1999 – 2019	

Note: * indicates coalitions between different parties.



Figure B.5: Time trend of negative partisanship towards parties of given party ideological families. Populist parties' classification is adopted from Rooduijn et al. (2019), *Source*: EES 1989-2019, Rooduijn et al., 2019 (PopuList)

B/5 NPID IDEOLOGICAL FAMILY TIME TRENDS



Figure B.6: Number of parties that belong to each ideological group listed in the EES survey questionnaires in each country in each survey year, *Source*: EES 1989-2019, Holger, Manow 2020 (ParlGov)



Figure B.7: Top left: Number of Communist/Socialist and Social Democratic parties and the number of NPIDs in countries; Top right: Number of Right-wing parties and the number of NPIDs in countries; Bottom left: of Communist/Socialist and Social Democratic parties and the level of NPID in countries; Bottom right: of Right-wing parties and the level of NPID in countries. Data for country-level observations are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019, Holger, Manow 2020 (ParlGov)

B/6 Alienation, Indifference, Political Interest



Figure B.8: Alienation in Western European countries. Dots are weighted country averages and the coloured line is a loess curve with its 90% confidence interval. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019



Figure B.9: Indifference in Western European countries. Dots are weighted country averages and the coloured line is a loess curve with its 90% confidence interval. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019



Figure B.10: Political interest in Western European countries. On the political interest scale 1 denotes no interest at all and 4 denotes very much interest in politics. Dots are weighted country averages and the coloured line is a loess curve with its 90% confidence interval. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019

B/7 IDEOLOGICAL DISPERSION



Figure B.11: Weighted dispersion (relative frequencies) of the left-right self-placement of EES respondents by survey year. Weights are original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019



Figure B.12: Weighted dispersion (relative frequencies) of the left-right self-placement of EES respondents by year survey year. Weights are original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019

B/8 NPID OVER TIME BY GROUPS OF PEOPLE

Table B.7: Logistic regression of NPID on respondents' left-right self-placement across time with country fixed effects.

	Dependent variable:
	NPID
Left-right position	-4.356***
	(0.549)
Left-right position ^2	3.778***
	(0.512)
Left-right position:Year1994	-0.706
	(0.718)
Left-right position:Year1999	0.850
	(0.678)
Left-right position:Year2004	0.197
	(0.665)
Left-right position:Year2009	-0.106
	(0.658)
Left-right position:Year2014	-0.946
	(0.664)
Left-right position:Year2019	-1.865***
	(0.652)
Year1994:Left-right position^2	1.306*
	(0.679)
Year1999:Left-right position^2	-0.046
	(0.645)
Year2004:Left-right position^2	0.301
	(0.624)
Year2009:Left-right position^2	0.291
	(0.609)
Year2014:Left-right position^2	1.407**
	(0.627)
Year2019:Left-right position^2	1.302**
	(0.601)
Year1994	-0.466***
	(0.180)
Year1999	-0.532***
	(0.170)
Year2004	-0.372**
	(0.167)
Year2009	-0.058
	(0.171)
Year2014	-0.556***
	(0.168)
Year2019	-0.328*
	(0.168)
Country FE	X
Constant	3.062***
	(0.146)
Observations	82,367
Log Likelihood	-35,074.280
Akaike Inf. Crit.	70,222.560
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.8: Logistic regression of NPID on respondents' age cohorts across time with country fixed effects.

	Dependent variable:
	NPID
Age category 2	-0.129**
	(0.062)
Age category 2:Year1994	0.091
	(0.083)
Age category 2:Year1999	0.221***
	(0.086)
Age category2:Year2004	-0.126
	(0.088)
Age category2:Year2009	-0.134
	(0.093)
Age category2:Year2014	-0.098
	(0.089)
Age category2:Year2019	-0.025
	(0.100)
Age category 3	-0.501***
	(0.097)
Age category 3:Year1994	0.151
	(0.116)
Age category3:Year1999	0.277**
	(0.117)
Age category3:Year2004	-0.119
	(0.116)
Age category3:Year2009	-0.280**
	(0.118)
Age category3:Year2014	-0.062
	(0.114)
Age category3:Year2019	-0.294**
	(0.122)
Year1994	-0.489***
	(0.056)
Year1999	-0.229***
	(0.059)
Year2004	0.063
	(0.064)
Year2009	0.351***
	(0.070)
Year2014	-0.332***
	(0.067)
Year2019	-0.411***
	(0.082)
Country FE	X
Constant	2.026***
	(0.061)
Observations	90,194
Log Likelihood	-39,811.600
Akaike Inf. Crit.	79,697.210
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure B.13: Predicted probabilities of holding NPID(s) with 95% CI from logistic regression of NPID on respondents' left-right self-placement across time with country fixed effects.



Figure B.14: Predicted probabilities of holding NPID(s) with 95% CI from logistic regression of NPID on respondents' age cohorts across time with country fixed effects.

B/9 IDEOLOGICAL DISPERSION BY GROUPS OF PEOPLE



Figure B.15: Weighted dispersion (relative frequencies) of the left-right self-placement of EES respondents by age cohort and survey year. Weights are original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019

B/10 INDIFFERENCE, ALIENATION & POLITICAL INTEREST BY IDEOLOGICAL DISPERSION



Figure B.16: Top left: Indifference in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by ideological leaning and extremity; Top right: Indifference in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by age cohort; Middle left: Alienation in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by ideological leaning and extremity; Middle right: Alienation in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by age cohort; Bottom left: Political interest in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by ideological leaning and extremity; Bottom right: Political interest in Western Europe between 1989 and 2019 by age cohort; The coloured lines are loess curves fitted on weighted ideological group averages per country and the shaded areas their 90% confidence intervals. Data are weighted with original demographic weights. *Source*: EES 1989-2019

APPENDIX C – CHAPTER 3

C/1 AVAILABILITY OF DATA

Table C.1: Availability of data: country-year matrix

	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Austria			x	x	x	x	x
Belgium	x	x	x		x	x	x
Cyprus				x	x	x	x
Denmark	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Finland			x	x	x	x	x
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ireland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x	x	x
Malta					x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Spain	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden			x		x	x	x
The Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table C.2: Descriptive statistics of variables of interest

	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
Ideological spread (not scaled)	2.49	4.70	5.36	5.51	6.45	10.00
Central cleavage (not scaled)	0.00	1.97	2.68	2.75	3.82	7.71
Effective number of parliamentary parties	2.03	3.21	3.98	4.58	5.42	11.00
Left-Right intensity scale (scaled to 0-1)	0.00	0.33	0.44	0.49	0.67	1.00
Left-Right intensity scale (folded, scaled to 0-1)	0.00	0.05	0.17	0.19	028	0.50
NPID	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.82	1.00	1.00
NPID (centrist parties)	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.82	1.00	1.00
NPID (polar parties)	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.83	1.00	1.00
Number of NPIDs	0.00	1.00	3.00	2.91	4.00	14.00
Number of NPIDs (grouped by party family)	0.00	1.00	2.00	2.35	4.00	8.00
Partisanship		Yes: 53725			No: 25991	

Table C. 3A/B: Number and vote share of populist parties in EP elections

(A) Number of populist parties

	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Austria			1	2	3	2	1
Belgium	1	2	2		3	3	2
Cyprus				0	0	1	0
Denmark	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
Finland			1	1	1	1	1
France	1	1	2	2	2	2	3
Germany	2	2	2	2	3	2	2
Greece	1	1	1	1	2	3	6
Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Italy	1	2	2	2	2	4	4
Luxembourg	1	2	1		1	1	1
Malta					0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Spain	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Sweden			1		1	1	1
The Netherlands	2	2	2	1	1	1	2
United Kingdom	0	1	2	3	2	2	2

(B) Vote share of most successful populist party in EP elections per country

	1989	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Austria			23.4%	14%	17.7%	19.7%	17.2%
Belgium	4.1%	7.8%	9.4%		9.9%	4.3%	12.1%
Cyprus				0	0	6.8%	0%
Denmark	5.3%	2.9%	5.8%	6.8%	15.3%	26.6%	10.8%
Finland			0.8%	0.5%	9.8%	12.9%	13.8%
France	11.7%	10.5%	5.7%	9.8%	6.3%	24.9%	23.3%
Germany	7.1%	4.7%	5.8%	6.1%	7.5%	7.4%	11%
Greece	36%	37.6%	6.9%	4.1%	7.2%	26.6%	23.8%
Ireland	2.2%	3%	6.3%	11.1%	11.2%	19.5%	11.7%
Italy	1.8%	30.6%	25.2%	20.9%	35.3%	21.2%	34.3%
Luxembourg	2.9%	6.9%	9%		7.4%	7.5%	10%
Malta					0%	0%	0%
Portugal	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1.5%
Spain	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	10.1%
Sweden			0.3%		3.3%	9.7%	15.3%
The Netherlands	0.8%	1.3%	5%	2.6%	17%	13.3%	11%
United Kingdom	0%	1%	7%	16.2%	16.5%	27.5%	31.6%

C/2 Predicted Probabilities from Main Models

Figure C.1: Predicted probabilities from Model 2 in Table 3.1 (multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship with interactions between the sources of ideological polarisation and time)



Table C.4: Predicted probabilities from Models 2-4 in Table 3.1 (multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship)

(A) interactions between the sources of ideological polarisation and time

Year	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
1989	0.00	0.90	[0.77, 0.96]
	0.19	0.88	[0.75, 0.95]
	0.30	0.87	[0.73, 0.95]
	0.37	0.87	[0.72, 0.94]
	1.00	0.80	[0.60, 0.91]

Year	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
1999	0.00	0.83	[0.65, 0.92]
	0.19	0.83	[0.65, 0.93]
	0.30	0.83	[0.65, 0.93]
	0.37	0.83	[0.66, 0.93]
	1.00	0.83	[0.66, 0.93]

Year	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
2009	0.00	0.79	[0.60, 0.91]
	0.19	0.82	[0.64, 0.92]
	0.30	0.83	[0.66, 0.93]
	0.37	0.84	[0.68, 0.93]
	1.00	0.91	[0.79, 0.96]

Year	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
2019	0.00	0.58	[0.35, 0.78]
	0.19	0.67	[0.44, 0.84]
	0.30	0.71	[0.49, 0.86]
	0.37	0.73	[0.52, 0.88]
	1.00	0.89	[0.77, 0.96]

Year	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
1989	0.02	0.80	[0.61, 0.89]
	0.28	0.85	[0.68, 0.92]
	0.38	0.86	[0.71, 0.93]
	0.49	0.87	[0.73, 0.94]
	1.00	0.93	[0.83, 0.97]

Year	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
1999	0.02	0.79	[0.59, 0.91]
	0.28	0.82	[0.63, 0.92]
	0.38	0.82	[0.65, 0.92]
	0.49	0.83	[0.66, 0.93]
	1.00	0.87	[0.73, 0.95]

Year	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
2009	0.02	0.84	[0.66, 0.93]
	0.28	0.84	[0.67, 0.93]
	0.38	0.84	[0.67, 0.93]
	0.49	0.84	[0.67, 0.93]
	1.00	0.85	[0.68, 0.93]

Year	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
2019	0.02	0.76	[0.56, 0.89]
	0.28	0.74	[0.53, 0.88]
	0.38	0.73	[0.52, 0.88]
	0.49	0.73	[0.51, 0.87]
	1.00	0.68	[0.45, 0.85]

(B) interactions between the sources of ideological polarisation and the number of populist parties in EP elections

N of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
0	0.00	0.92	[0.83, 0.96]
	0.19	0.89	[0.78, 0.95]
	0.30	0.88	[0.75, 0.94]
	0.37	0.87	[0.73, 0.94]
	1.00	0.71	[0.50, 0.86]

N of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
2	0.00	0.80	[0.62, 0.90]
	0.19	0.83	[0.67, 0.92]
	0.30	0.84	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.37	0.85	[0.71, 0.93]
	1.00	0.91	[0.82, 0.96]

N of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
4	0.00	0.51	[0.36, 0.77]
	0.19	0.68	[0.53, 0.87]
	0.30	0.76	[0.62, 0.90]
	0.37	0.81	[0.68, 0.92]
	1.00	0.98	[0.95, 0.99]

N of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
6	0.00	0.32	[0.16, 0.54]
	0.19	0.60	[0.39, 0.79]
	0.30	0.74	[0.55, 0.87]
	0.37	0.82	[0.65, 0.91]
	1.00	1.00	[0.99, 1.00]

N of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
0	0.02	0.82	[0.66, 0.92]
	0.28	0.85	[0.71, 0.93]
	0.38	0.86	[0.73, 0.94]
	0.49	0.87	[0.74, 0.94]
	1.00	0.91	[0.81, 0.96]

N of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
2	0.02	0.83	[0.67, 0.92]
	0.28	0.84	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.38	0.85	[0.70, 0.93]
	0.49	0.85	[0.71, 0.93]
	1.00	0.87	[0.74, 0.94]

N of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
4	0.02	0.84	[0.68, 0.92]
	0.28	0.83	[0.68, 0.92]
	0.38	0.83	[0.67, 0.92]
	0.49	0.83	[0.67, 0.92]
	1.00	0.82	[0.66, 0.92]

N of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
6	0.02	0.84	[0.68, 0.93]
	0.28	0.82	[0.66, 0.92]
	0.38	0.81	[0.64, 0.91]
	0.49	0.80	[0.63, 0.91]
	1.00	0.75	[0.55, 0.89]

(C) interactions between the sources of ideological polarisation and the vote share of populist parties in EP elections

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
0%	0.00	0.87	[0.72, 0.94]
	0.19	0.86	[0.71, 0.94]
	0.30	0.86	[0.71, 0.94]
	0.37	0.85	[0.70, 0.93]
	1.00	0.82	[0.65, 0.92]

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
10%	0.00	0.82	[0.65, 0.92]
	0.19	0.84	[0.68, 0.93]
	0.30	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.37	0.85	[0.70, 0.93]
	1.00	0.89	[0.76, 0.95]

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
20%	0.00	0.77	[0.58, 0.89]
	0.19	0.81	[0.64, 0.91]
	0.30	0.83	[0.67, 0.93]
	0.37	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	1.00	0.93	[0.84, 0.97]

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's central cleavage	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
30%	0.00	0.71	[0.49, 0.86]
	0.19	0.79	[0.60, 0.90]
	0.30	0.82	[0.65, 0.92]
	0.37	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	1.00	0.96	[0.90, 0.98]

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
0%	0.02	0.82	[0.67, 0.93]
	0.28	0.84	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.38	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.49	0.85	[0.70, 0.93]
	1.00	0.87	[0.73, 0.94]

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
10%	0.02	0.83	[0.67, 0.93]
	0.28	0.84	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.38	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.49	0.85	[0.70, 0.93]
	1.00	0.87	[0.73, 0.94]

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
20%	0.02	0.84	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.28	0.84	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.38	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.49	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	1.00	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]

Vote share of populist parties	Electorate's ideological spread	Predicted probability of holding NPID	95% CI
30%	0.02	0.85	[0.70, 0.93]
	0.28	0.85	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.38	0.84	[0.69, 0.93]
	0.49	0.84	[0.68, 0.93]
	1.00	0.83	[0.66, 0.92]

C/3 ALTERNATIVE MODELS, ROBUSTNESS CHECK

Table C.5: Multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship: Rooduijn et al. (2019) populist classification

	Dependent variable:	
	NPID	
	(1)	(2)
Folded LR scale	1.975***	1.972***
	(0.148)	(0.148)
Age	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex (male)	0.012	0.014
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.230***	0.230***
	(0.036)	(0.036)
Central cleavage (0-1)	-1.351***	-0.346**
	(0.160)	(0.143)
Ideological spread (0-1)	0.648***	0.505***
	(0.142)	(0.123)
N of populist parties	-0.459***	
	(0.052)	
Central cleavage (0-1) * N of populist parties	1.145***	
	(0.072)	
Ideological spread (0-1) * N of populist parties	-0.143**	
	(0.071)	
Vote share of populist parties		-0.022***
		(0.005)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties		0.086***
		(0.008)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties		-0.025***
		(0.006)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	-1.066***	-0.821***
	(0.095)	(0.093)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	0.336***	0.255***
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	-0.031***	-0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.937***	1.327***
	(0.183)	(0.173)
Observations	79,190	79,190
Log Likelihood	-31,443.780	-31,540.510
Akaike Inf. Crit.	62,925.570	63,119.030
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	63,101.880	63,295.340
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table C.6: Multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship controlling for the strength of societal cleavages

	Dependent variable:			
	NPID			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Folded LR scale	1.955***	1.984***	1.969***	1.981***
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Age	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex (male)	0.017	0.014	0.014	0.016
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.229***	0.230***	0.227***	0.231***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Cultural cleavage (education)	0.653***	0.766***	0.199	0.128
	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.233)
Religious cleavage	1.722***	1.766***	1.314***	1.765***
	(0.321)	(0.313)	(0.319)	(0.324)
Class cleavage	0.468***	0.717***	0.713***	0.849***
	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.114)
Central cleavage (0-1)	0.791***	-1.475***	-1.293***	-0.518***
	(0.095)	(0.197)	(0.162)	(0.148)
Ideological spread (0-1)	0.184**	1.705***	0.764***	0.588***
	(0.091)	(0.188)	(0.144)	(0.124)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.478***		
		(0.037)		
Ideological spread (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		-0.339***		
		(0.036)		
N of populist parties			-0.398***	
			(0.053)	
Central cleavage (0-1) * N of populist parties			1.069***	
			(0.073)	
Ideological spread (0-1) * N of populist parties			-0.255***	
			(0.073)	
Vote share of populist parties				-0.021***
				(0.005)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				0.095***
				(0.009)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				-0.036***
				(0.007)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	-0.657***	-0.843***	-1.031***	-0.784***
	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	0.203***	0.241***	0.327***	0.244***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	-0.020***	-0.022***	-0.030***	-0.023***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.669***	0.968***	1.652***	1.118***
	(0.179)	(0.184)	(0.194)	(0.181)
Observations	79,213	79,213	79,213	79,213
Log Likelihood	-31,581.900	-31,486.660	-31,427.430	-31,505.480
Akaike Inf. Crit.	63,201.800	63,015.330	62,898.860	63,054.950
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	63,378.110	63,210.210	63,103.010	63,259.110

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.7 Multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship, DV confined to central parties

	Dependent variable:			
	NPID central parties			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Folded LR scale	1.916***	1.928***	1.930***	1.930***
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.128)
Age	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Sex (male)	-0.030*	-0.031*	-0.029*	-0.030*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.214***	0.213***	0.218***	0.212***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.053)
Central cleavage (0-1)	-0.212***	-1.011***	-1.825***	-0.519***
	(0.076)	(0.145)	(0.136)	(0.115)
Ideological spread (0-1)	0.499***	2.429***	0.820***	0.946***
	(0.057)	(0.145)	(0.094)	(0.088)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.173***		
		(0.028)		
Ideological spread (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		-0.395***		
		(0.027)		
N of populist parties			-0.457***	
			(0.042)	
Central cleavage (0-1) * N of populist parties			0.892***	
			(0.063)	
Ideological spread (0-1) * N of populist parties			-0.101*	
			(0.056)	
Vote share of populist parties				0.014***
				(0.004)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				0.019***
				(0.007)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				-0.034***
				(0.005)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	-0.798***	-0.806***	-0.880***	-0.854***
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	0.226***	0.255***	0.263***	0.237***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	-0.020***	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.316**	-0.071	1.015***	0.288*
	(0.155)	(0.166)	(0.174)	(0.158)
Level 1 N (observations)	79,014	79,014	79,014	79,014
Level 2 N (elections)	103	103	103	103
Groups (country)	17	17	17	17
Log Likelihood	-47,423.400	-47,315.940	-47,263.000	-47,387.280
Akaike Inf. Crit.	94,878.790	94,667.880	94,564.010	94,812.560
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	95,027.230	94,834.870	94,740.280	94,988.830
Intercept random variance	0.26457	0.27651	0.30267	0.25476
Folded LR scale random variance	0.21871	0.21942	0.21756	0.22390
Partisanship random variance	0.0.4253	0.04218	0.05124	0.04187
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.8 Multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship, DV confined to polar parties

	Dependent variable:			
	NPID polar parties			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Folded LR scale	1.169***	1.187***	1.199***	1.191***
	(0.180)	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.184)
Age	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex (male)	-0.008	-0.008	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.158***	0.152***	0.170***	0.162***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.045)
Central cleavage (0-1)	0.435***	-1.460***	-2.469***	-0.928***
	(0.085)	(0.168)	(0.151)	(0.126)
Ideological spread (0-1)	-0.025	-0.781***	0.459***	-0.131
	(0.059)	(0.150)	(0.096)	(0.092)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.422***		
		(0.031)		
Ideological spread (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.156***		
		(0.028)		
N of populist parties			-0.622***	
			(0.045)	
Central cleavage (0-1) * N of populist parties			1.616***	
			(0.069)	
Ideological spread (0-1) * N of populist parties			-0.180***	
			(0.059)	
Vote share of populist parties				-0.065***
				(0.004)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				0.117***
				(0.008)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				0.016***
				(0.005)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	-0.191**	-0.437***	-0.455***	-0.273***
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	0.065***	0.066***	0.153***	0.106***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.016***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.237	1.237***	1.500***	0.880***
	(0.167)	(0.181)	(0.187)	(0.178)
Level 1 N (observations)	78,349	78,349	78,349	78,349
Level 2 N (elections)	103	103	103	103
Groups (country)	17	17	17	17
Log Likelihood	-42,071.320	-41,907.000	-41,761.870	-41,925.730
Akaike Inf. Crit.	84,174.650	83,850.010	83,561.730	83,889.460
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	84,322.950	84,016.850	83,737.840	84,065.570
Intercept random variance	0.30021	0.32660	0.34995	0.33506
Folded LR scale random variance	0.49062	0.51982	0.51147	0.51294
Partisanship random variance	0.02947	0.02828	0.03205	0.02677
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.9: Multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship, DV confined to populist parties

	Dependent variable:			
	NPID populist parties			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Folded LR scale	0.649***	0.661***	0.664***	0.645***
	(0.221)	(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.218)
Age	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex (male)	-0.198***	-0.200***	-0.198***	-0.197***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.155***	0.150***	0.156***	0.171***
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.047)
Central cleavage (0-1)	1.099***	-1.462***	1.581***	1.383***
	(0.080)	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.145)
Ideological spread (0-1)	-0.626***	-0.974***	-0.815***	-0.336***
	(0.063)	(0.186)	(0.124)	(0.119)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.581***		
		(0.039)		
Ideological spread (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.085**		
		(0.035)		
N of populist parties			0.261***	
			(0.060)	
Central cleavage (0-1) * N of populist parties			-0.229***	
			(0.087)	
Ideological spread (0-1) * N of populist parties			0.060	
			(0.077)	
Vote share of populist parties				-0.015***
				(0.005)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				-0.018**
				(0.008)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				-0.009
				(0.006)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	1.325***	0.917***	1.265***	1.071***
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.088)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	-0.329***	-0.292***	-0.319***	-0.271***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	0.022***	0.020***	0.021***	0.019***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-1.259***	-0.149	-1.547***	-0.998***
	(0.152)	(0.170)	(0.190)	(0.163)
Observations	60,373	60,373	60,373	60,373
Log Likelihood	-37,869.780	-37,662.650	-37,761.280	-37,756.120
Akaike Inf. Crit.	75,771.550	75,361.300	75,560.570	75,550.250
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	75,915.690	75,523.450	75,731.730	75,721.400
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.10: Multi-level logistic regression of negative partisanship, controlling for the effective number of parliamentary parties and the number of parties in survey questionnaires

	Dependent variable:	
	NPID	
	(1)	(2)
Folded LR scale	1.749***	1.755***
	(0.169)	(0.166)
Age	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex (male)	0.010	0.006
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.219***	0.222***
	(0.032)	(0.034)
Effective number of parliamentary parties	-0.075***	
	(0.014)	
Number of parties (in survey)		0.132***
		(0.008)
Central cleavage (0-1)	-1.467***	-0.765***
	(0.189)	(0.194)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)	1.340***	0.825***
	(0.180)	(0.184)
Ideological spread (0-1)	0.382***	0.262***
	(0.036)	(0.036)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)	-0.247***	-0.137***
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	-0.690***	-0.164*
	(0.092)	(0.099)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	0.199***	0.064**
	(0.026)	(0.027)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	-0.019***	-0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	1.589***	-0.318
	(0.193)	(0.207)
Level 1 N (observations)	79,190	79,190
Level 2 N (elections)	103	103
Groups (country)	17	17
Log Likelihood	-32,782.690	-32,661.630
Akaike Inf. Crit.	65,603.370	65,361.260
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	65,779.690	65,537.570
Intercept random variance	0.28942	0.24578
Folded LR scale random variance	0.398719	0.38253
Partisanship random variance	0.009115	0.01072
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table C.11 Logistic regression of negative partisanship with country fixed effects

	Dependent variable:			
	NPID			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Folded LR scale	1.948***	1.962***	1.962***	1.966***
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Age	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex (male)	0.012	0.009	0.012	0.011
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Partisanship(y/n)	0.210***	0.211***	0.212***	0.210***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Central cleavage (0-1)	0.768***	-1.332***	-1.340***	-0.281**
	(0.093)	(0.192)	(0.157)	(0.141)
Ideological spread (0-1)	0.094	1.421***	0.387***	0.341***
	(0.081)	(0.181)	(0.129)	(0.116)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		0.444***		
		(0.036)		
Ideological spread (0-1) * Electoral cycle (1-7)		-0.274***		
		(0.033)		
N of populist parties			-0.485***	
			(0.050)	
Central cleavage (0-1) * N of populist parties			1.108***	
			(0.070)	
Ideological spread (0-1) * N of populist parties			-0.062	
			(0.067)	
Vote share of populist parties				-0.020***
				(0.005)
Central cleavage (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				0.078***
				(0.008)
Ideological spread (0-1) * Vote share of populist parties				-0.018***
				(0.006)
Electoral cycle (1-7)	-0.729***	-0.899***	-1.037***	-0.802***
	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.092)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 2	0.228***	0.256***	0.331***	0.252***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Electoral cycle (1-7) ^ 3	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.031***	-0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	1.330***	1.617***	2.334***	1.691***
	(0.126)	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.139)
Observations	79,190	79,190	79,190	79,190
Log Likelihood	-33,655.080	-33,580.650	-33,491.610	-33,599.930
Akaike Inf. Crit.	67,362.150	67,217.300	67,041.220	67,257.850
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX D – CHAPTER 4

D/1 DEMOGRAPHICS

Table D.1: Party attachment.

	BES w7	Social Acceptance Survey
Conservative	30.09%	19.86%
Labour Party	33.02%	52.35%
Liberal Democrats	10.05%	7.22%
UKIP	6.86%	1.81%
Green Party	2.67%	5.05%
Other	0.79%	0%
None	8.96%	13.72%

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel wave 7; Social Acceptance Survey (current study)

Table D.2: Strength of Partisanship.

	BES	Social Acceptance Survey
Weak/None	29.32%	35.02%
Moderate	48.33%	51.62%
Strong	20.18%	13.36%

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel wave 7; Social Acceptance Survey (current study)

Table D.3: Gender.

	BES	Social Acceptance Survey
Female	51.48%	62.45%
Male	48.52%	37.55%

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel wave 7; Social Acceptance Survey (current study)

Table D.4: Education

	BES	Social Acceptance Survey
No qualifications	7.28%	0.36%
Below GCSE	4.87%	0.36%
GCSE	21.90%	12.64%
A-level	23.55%	27.80%
Undergraduate degree	34.76%	40.43%
Postgraduate degree	7.65%	18.41%

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel wave 7; Social Acceptance Survey (current study)

Table D.5: Age

	BES	Social Acceptance Survey
Below 18	2.87%	0.72%
18-25	13.22%	15.52%
26-35	17.78%	41.16%
36-45	14.18%	23.10%
46-55	18.75%	11.91%
56-65	19.30%	5.78%
66+	13.89%	1.81%

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel wave 7; Social Acceptance Survey (current study)

D/2 Political Measures

Table D.1: Political Attitude Measures

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Personal Acceptance	0.456	0.306	0	1
Ideological Acceptance	0.439	0.259	0	1
Perceived Left-Right Distance	3.986	2.707	0	10
Issue Scale	0.404	0.246	0	1

Table D.2: Political Attitude Measures in the treated and control groups

	Treated			Control			T-test
	Mean	Variance	Skewness	Mean	Variance	Skewness	p-value
Personal A.	0.457	0.088	0.009	0.456	0.100	0.143	0.985
Ideological A.	0.432	0.060	0.006	0.445	0.075	0.160	0.683
L-R Dist.	3.847	7.453	0.220	4.110	7.229	0.030	0.442
Issue scale	0.401	0.060	0.274	0.407	0.061	0.147	0.856

Table D.3: Political Attitude Measures in the full sample and the restricted sample (excluding those who failed the attention check)

	Full sample	Reduced sample	T-test
	Mean	Mean.	p-value
Personal Acceptance	0.476	0.456	0.440
Ideological Acceptance	0.457	0.439	0.406
Left-Right Self-placement	4.863	4.845	0.917
Issue Scale	0.335	0.336	0.917



Figure D.1: Histogram showing the distribution of respondents' self-reported placement on the left-right scale. Sample restricted to those respondents who passed manipulation checks.

D/3 DATA PATTERNS



Figure D.2: Locally weighted regression curves modelling the relationship between perceived ideological distance and both personal and ideological resentment. Sample restricted to those respondents who passed manipulation checks.

D/4 ADDITIONAL MODELS

Table D.4: OLS regression of Personal Resentment and Ideological Resentment - Separate Models for Control and Treatment Groups

	Dependent variable:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Personal R. (T)	Personal R. (C)	Ideological R. (T)	Ideological R. (C)
Extreme Vignette	0.087	-0.055	0.074	-0.094**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.045)
LR Distance	0.025	-0.057**	0.018	-0.066***
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)
LR Distance^2	-0.009***	-0.001	-0.007***	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.527***	0.726***	0.486***	0.712***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.039)
Observations	131	146	131	146
R^2	0.240	0.340	0.213	0.395
Adjusted R^2	0.222	0.326	0.194	0.382
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.5: Tobit models of Personal Resentment and Ideological Resentment

	(1)	(2)
	Personal Acceptance	Ideological Acceptance
Extreme Vignette	0.013	-0.0160
	(0.785)	(0.649)
LR Distance	-0.062*	-0.0754***
	(-0.038)	(0.000)
LR Distance^2	-0.003	0.000958
	(-0.406)	(0.704)
Treated	-0.243**	-0.247***
	(0.003)	(0.000)
Treated x LR Distance	0.115**	0.110***
	(0.008)	(0.001)
Treated x LR Distance^2	-0.011*	-0.00957*
	(0.040)	(0.011)
Constant	0.764***	0.735***
	(0.000)	(16.58)
Observations	277	277
Log-likelihood	-108.038	
Note:		$p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table D.6: OLS models of Personal Resentment and Ideological Resentment with Additional Control Variables

	Dependent variable:	
	Persona Acceptance	Ideological Acceptance
	(1)	(2)
18-25	0.125	0.046
	(0.184)	(0.153)
26-35	0.152	0.083
	(0.182)	(0.151)
36-45	0.153	0.074
	(0.182)	(0.151)
46-55	0.259	0.151
	(0.182)	(0.152)
56-65	0.161	0.121
	(0.189)	(0.157)
66+	0.192	-0.002
	(0.208)	(0.173)
Below GCSE	0.208	0.469
	(0.346)	(0.288)
GCSE	0.485*	0.464**
	(0.249)	(0.207)
A-level	0.446*	0.461**
	(0.248)	(0.206)
Undergraduate Degree	0.415*	0.435**
	(0.247)	(0.206)
Postgraduate Degree	0.490**	0.498**
	(0.249)	(0.207)
Labour	-0.224***	-0.182***
	(0.041)	(0.034)
Lib Dem	-0.005	-0.001
	(0.065)	(0.054)
UKIP	-0.148	-0.091
	(0.117)	(0.097)
Green	-0.326***	-0.300***
	(0.074)	(0.061)
None	-0.141**	-0.081*
	(0.057)	(0.048)
Moderately close to party	-0.082**	-0.087***
	(0.037)	(0.031)
Very close to party	-0.028	-0.038*
	(0.028)	(0.023)
Extreme Vignette	-0.021	-0.034
	(0.037)	(0.031)
LR Distance	-0.141**	-0.171***
	(0.065)	(0.054)
LR Distance^2	-0.054**	-0.070***

	(0.023)	(0.019)
Treated	0.001	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Treated x LR Distance	0.073**	0.080***
	(0.034)	(0.028)
Treated x LR Distance^2	-0.006*	-0.007**
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Constant	0.200	0.227
	(0.307)	(0.255)
Observations	277	277
R^2	0.436	0.456
Adjusted R^2	0.382	0.405
Residual Std. Error (df = 252)	0.241	0.200
F Statistic (df = 24; 252)	8.108***	8.818***
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D/5 NON-PARTISAN PATTERNS



Figure D.3: Locally weighted regression curves modelling the relationship between perceived ideological distance and both personal and ideological resentment. *Sample restricted to those not feeling close to any particular party.*



Figure D.4: Locally weighted regression curves modelling the relationship between perceived ideological distance and both personal and ideological resentment. *Sample restricted to those not feeling close to a party or not very close to a party.*

D/6 Personal and Ideological Acceptance Scales

Table D.7: Personal and Ideological Acceptance Scale Items

Personal Acceptance	Ideological Acceptance
I would (not) be happy for my child to be married to someone like this person.	This person's views (do not) make sense.
I could (not) be good friends with this person.	I (do not) trust the motivations of this person.
I would (not) be happy to invite this person over for dinner.	I (do not share any) share many of these views.
I would (not) be happy to line next door to this person.	I (do not) want to learn more about these views.

D/7 VIGNETTES

Table D.8: Moderate and **extreme** liberal vignettes

Immigrants culturally enrich the country.	1	2	**3**	4	5	6	7	Immigrants are a cultural threat to the country.
The government provides too much benefit to people who do nothing in return.	1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	The government should do much more to help the needy.
Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples.	1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples
Homosexual couples should be welcomed by society.	1	2	**3**	4	5	6	7	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society.
Those who are less well of are mostly responsible for their conditions.	1	2	3	**4**	5	6	7	.Inequality is society's responsibility.
Protecting the environment should be prioritised, even if it impedes economic growth.	1	2	**3**	4	5	6	7	Economic growth should be prioritised at all cost, even if it impedes protection of the environment.
Immigration is economically beneficial to the country.	1	2	3	**4**	5	6	7	Immigration is an economic burden to the country.
The government should do much more to reduce inequality.	1	2	**3**	4	5	6	7	Redistribution of income has gone too far.

Immigrants culturally enrich the country.	**1**	2	3	4	5	6	7	Immigrants are a cultural threat to the country.
The government provides too much benefit to people who do nothing in return.	1	2	3	4	5	6	**7**	The government should do much more to help the needy.
Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples.	1	2	3	4	5	6	**7**	Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples
Homosexual couples should be welcomed by society.	**1**	2	3	4	5	6	7	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society.
Those who are less well of are mostly responsible for their conditions.	1	2	3	4	5	**6**	7	.Inequality is society's responsibility.
Protecting the environment should be prioritised, even if it impedes economic growth.	1	2	**3**	4	5	6	7	Economic growth should be prioritised at all cost, even if it impedes protection of the environment.
Immigration is economically beneficial to the country.	1	**2**	3	4	5	6	7	Immigration is an economic burden to the country.
The government should do much more to reduce inequality.	**1**	2	3	4	5	6	7	Redistribution of income has gone too far.

Table D.9: Moderate and **extreme** conservative vignettes

Immigrants culturally enrich the country.	1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	Immigrants are a cultural threat to the country.
The government provides too much benefit to people who do nothing in return.	1	2	**3**	4	5	6	7	The government should do much more to help the needy.
Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples.	1	2	**3**	4	5	6	7	Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples
Homosexual couples should be welcomed by society.	1	2	3	**4**	5	6	7	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society.
Those who are less well of are mostly responsible for their conditions.	1	2	3	**4**	5	6	7	.Inequality is society's responsibility.
Protecting the environment should be prioritised, even if it impedes economic growth.	1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	Economic growth should be prioritised at all cost, even if it impedes protection of the environment.
Immigration is economically beneficial to the country.	1	2	3	**4**	5	6	7	Immigration is an economic burden to the country.
The government should do much more to reduce inequality.	1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	Redistribution of income has gone too far.

Immigrants culturally enrich the country.	1	2	3	4	5	6	**7**	Immigrants are a cultural threat to the country.
The government provides too much benefit to people who do nothing in return.	**1**	2	3	4	5	6	7	The government should do much more to help the needy.
Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples.	**1**	2	3	4	5	6	7	Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples
Homosexual couples should be welcomed by society.	1	2	3	4	5	**6**	7	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society.
Those who are less well of are mostly responsible for their conditions.	**1**	2	3	4	5	6	7	.Inequality is society's responsibility.
Protecting the environment should be prioritised, even if it impedes economic growth.	1	2	3	4	**5**	6	7	Economic growth should be prioritised at all cost, even if it impedes protection of the environment.
Immigration is economically beneficial to the country.	1	2	3	4	5	**6**	7	Immigration is an economic burden to the country.
The government should do much more to reduce inequality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	**7**	Redistribution of income has gone too far.

D/8 Personal and Ideological Acceptance Scales: Reliability and Altenative Scale Developments

Table D.10 / Figure D.4: Reliability of Personal and Ideological Resentment Scales [based on the full list of scale items]

		Factor 1	Factor 2
Loadings	Makes sense	0.556	0.389
	Motivations	0.760	0.484
	Share views	0.680	0.421
	Learn more	0.293	0.509
	Marriage	0.759	0.494
	Friendship	0.586	0.714
	Dinner	0.546	0.740
	Neighbour	0.577	0.600
SS loadings		2.983	2.484
Proportional var		0.373	0.310
Cumulative var		0.373	0.683
Alpha	IR	0.81	
	PR		0.93



Table D.11 / Figure D.5: Reliability of Personal and Ideological Resentment Scales [based on the reduced list of scale items]

		Factor 1	Factor 2
Loadings	Makes sense	0.576	0.388
	Motivations	0.687	0.553
	Share views	0.682	0.430
	Friendship	0.579	0.715
	Dinner	0.475	0.805
	Neighbour	0.593	0.587
SS loadings		2.983	2.484
Proportional var		0.373	0.310
Cumulative var		0.373	0.683
Alpha	IR	0.83	
	PR		0.92



Table D.12: Replication of main models using reduced scales

	Dependent variable:	
	(1)	(2)
	Personal Acceptance 2	Ideological Acceptance 2
Extreme Vignette	0.022	0.004
	(0.040)	(0.034)
LR Distance	-0.050***	-0.078***
	(0.025)	(0.021)
LR Distance^2	-0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Treated	-0.180***	-0.232***
	(0.071)	(0.061)
Treated x LR Distance	0.089***	0.098***
	(0.037)	(0.031)
Treated x LR Distance^2	-0.008**	-0.008***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	0.730***	0.724***
	(0.050)	(0.043)
Observations	277	277
R^2	0.263	0.335
Adjusted R^2	0.246	0.320
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.13: Replication of mediation analysis using reduced scales

	Dependent variable:	
	(1) Personal Acceptance 2	(2) Ideological Acceptance 2
Ideological Acceptance 2	0.913***	
	(0.044)	
Extreme vignette	0.018	-0.011
	(0.025)	(0.022)
LR Distance	0.020	-0.044***
	(0.016)	(0.013)
LR Distance^2	-0.003	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Treated	0.031	-0.111***
	(0.046)	(0.038)
Treated x LR Distance	-0.0004	0.038*
	(0.023)	(0.020)
Treated x LR Distance^2	-0.0002	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Personal Acceptance 2		0.670***
		(0.033)
Constant	0.069	0.234***
	(0.045)	(0.036)
Observations	277	277
R^2	0.714	0.742
Adjusted R^2	0.707	0.735
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table D.14: Replication of main models using single items (normalised)

	Dependent variable:	
	(1) Dinner	(2) Share views
Extreme Vignette	0.029	0.013
	(0.044)	(0.039)
LR Distance	-0.049*	-0.103***
	(0.027)	(0.024)
LR Distance^2	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Treated	-0.184***	-0.205***
	(0.078)	(0.070)
Treated x LR Distance	0.091**	0.114***
	(0.040)	(0.036)
Treated x LR Distance^2	-0.008**	-0.010****
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Constant	0.714***	0.697***
	(0.055)	(0.049)
Observations	277	277
R^2	0.238	0.314
Adjusted R^2	0.221	0.299
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table D.15: Replication of mediation analysis using single items (normalised)

	Dependent variable:	
	(1) Dinner	(2) Share views
Ideological Acceptance	0.622***	
	(0.057)	
Extreme vignette	0.021	-0.001
	(0.037)	(0.033)
LR Distance	0.015	-0.078***
	(0.024)	(0.020)
LR Distance^2	-0.004*	0.004*
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Treated	-0.029	-0.085
	(0.057)	(0.051)
Treated x LR Distance	0.020	0.069**
	(0.034)	(0.030)
Treated x LR Distance^2	-0.002	-0.006*
	(0.004)	(0.003)
Personal Acceptance		0.498***
		(0.045)
Constant	0.281***	0.341***
	(0.060)	(0.052)
Observations	277	277
R^2	0.474	0.527
Adjusted R^2	0.460	0.514
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

D/9 Survey Questionnaire

Q1 Are you male, female or what?

Male

Female

Other:

Q2 What is your age?

Under 18

18-25

26-35

36-45

46-55

56-65

66+

Q3 Are you a citizen of any of the following?

United Kingdom (Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Any member of the European Union

Any commonwealth country

Any other country

Q4 What is your highest educational qualification?

No qualifications

Below GCSE

GCSE

A-level

Undergraduate degree

Postgraduate degree

Q5 Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others? If yes, which party?

Conservative

Labour

Liberal Democrat

United Kingdom Independence Party

Green Party

Other:

None

Q6 [if positive for Q5] Would you say you feel very close, fairly close or not close to that party?

Very close

Fairly close

Not close

Q7 In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

Left ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Right

Q8 Where would you place yourself on the following scales?

Immigrants culturally enrich the country.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Immigrants are a cultural threat to the country.
The government provides too much benefit to people who do nothing in return.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	The government should do much more to help the needy.
Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Homosexual couples should not enjoy the same legal rights in everything as heterosexual couples
Homosexual couples should be welcomed by society.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society.
Those who are less well of are mostly responsible for their conditions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	.Inequality is society's responsibility.
Protecting the environment should be prioritised, even if it impedes economic growth.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Economic growth should be prioritised at all cost, even if it impedes protection of the environment.

Immigration is economically beneficial to the country.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Immigration is an economic burden to the country.
The government should do much more to reduce inequality.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Redistribution of income has gone too far.

Q9 Please consider the following response profile [Vignette shown here]

Imagine a [person / supporter of the **Labour Party** / supporter of the **Conservative Party**] with such a set of responses. Please consider the following pairs of statements. In each row please indicate which statement you agree more with. (Items displayed in randomised order)

I would (not) be happy for my child to be married to someone like this person.	1	2	3	4	I would be happy for my child to be married to someone like this person.
I would (not) be happy to line next door to this person.	1	2	3	4	I would be happy to line next door to this person.
I (do not) want to learn more about these views.	1	2	3	4	I want to learn more about these views.
I (do not share any) share many of these views.	1	2	3	4	I share many of these views.
I (do not) trust the motivations of this person.	1	2	3	4	I trust the motivations of this person.
I could (not) be good friends with this person.	1	2	3	4	I could be good friends with this person.
I (do not) trust the motivations of this person.	1	2	3	4	I trust the motivations of this person.
I would (not) be happy to invite this person over for dinner.	1	2	3	4	I would be happy to invite this person over for dinner.

Q10 In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place this person on the following scale?

Left ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Right

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramowitz, A. I., and Saunders, K. L. (2006). Exploring the bases of partisanship in the American electorate: Social identity vs. ideology. *Political Research Quarterly , 59*, 175-187.

Abramowitz, A. I., and Stone, W. J. (2006). The Bush effect: polarization, turnout, and activism in the 2004 presidential election. *Presidential Studies Quarterly , 36* (2), 141-154.

Abramowitz, A. I., and Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century. *Electoral Studies , 41*, 12-22.

Abramowitz, A. I., and Webster, S. W. (2018). Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans. *Advances in Political Psychology , 39* (S1), 119-135.

Adams, J., Green, J., and Milazzo, C. (2012). Has the British Public Depolarized Along With Political Elites? An American Perspective on British Public Opinion. *Comparative Political Studies , 45* (4), 507-530.

Albright, J. J. (2009). Does political knowledge erode party attachments?: A review of the cognitive. *Electoral Studies , 28* (2), 248-260.

Ansolabehere, S., and Iyengar, S. (1995). *Going negative: How attack ads shrink and polarize the electorate.* New York: Free Press.

Ardag, M. M., Castanho Silva, B., Thomeczek, J. T., Bandlow-Raffalski, S. F., and Littvay, L. (2020). Populist Attitudes and Political Engagement: Ugly, Bad, and Sometimes Good? *Journal of Representative Democracy , 56* (3), 307-330.

Arzheimer, K. (2015). The AfD: finally a successful right-wing populist eurosceptic party for Germany? *West European Politics , 38* (3), 535-556.

Bankert, A. (2020). Negative and Positive Partisanship in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections. *Political Behavior* , DOI: doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09599-1.

Bankert, A., Huddy, L., and Rosema, M. (2017). Measuring Partisanship as a Social Identity in Multi-Party Systems. *Political Behavior , 39*, 103–132.

Bartels, L. M. (2002). Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions. *Political Behavior , 24*, 117–150.

Bassili, J. N. (1995). On the Psychological Reality of Party Identification: Evidence from the Accessibility of Voting Intentions and of Partisan Feelings. *Political Behavior , 17*, 339–58.

Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., and Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. *Review of General Psychology , 5*, 323-370.

Baumgartner, F. R., and Jones, B. D. (1993). *Agendas and Instability in American Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bélanger, E., Lewis-Beck, M. S., Chiche, J., and Tiberj, V. (2006). Party, ideology, and vote intentions: Dynamics from the 2002 French electoral panel. *Political Research Quarterly , 59*, 503-515.

Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-Perception Theory. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , 6*, 1-62.

Berglund, S., Ekman, J., and Aarebrot, F. H. (2004). *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., and Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis , 20*, 351-368.

Berry, J., and Sobieraj, S. (2014). *The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Bhat, P., Farzad-Phillips, A., Hess, M., Hunter, L., Murphy, N., Serrano Rico, C., et al. (2016). *Campaign Advertising 2016. Center for Political Communication.* College Park: University of Maryland.

Bishop, B. (2009). *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart.* Boston: Mariner Books.

Bolsen, T., and Leeper, T. J. (2013). Self-Interest and attention to news among issue publics. *Political Communication , 30* (3), 329–384.

Bolsen, T., Druckman, J. N., and Cook, F. L. (2014). The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion. *Political Behavior , 36* (2), 235–62.

Boonen, J. (2019). Learning who not to vote for: The role of parental socialization in the development of negative partisanship. *Electoral Studies , 59*, 109-119.

Bornschier, S. (2010). The New Cultural Divide and the Two-Dimensional Political Space in Western Europe. *West European Politics , 33* (3), 419-44.

Bougher, L. D. (2017). The Correlates of Discord: Identity, Issue Alignment, and Political Hostility in Polarized America. *Political Behavior , 39*, 731–762.

Brader, T., Tucker, J. A., and Duell, D. (2013). Which Parties Can Lead Opinion? Experimental Evidence on Partisan Cue Taking in Multiparty Democracie. *Comparative Political Studies , 46* (11), 485-1517.

Brewer, M. B. (1979). Ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup situation: a cognitive-motivational analysis. *Psychological Bulletin , 86*, 307-324.

Brewer, M. B., and Kramer, R. M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology , 36*, 219–243.

Brewer, M. (1999). The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate? *Journal of Social Issues , 55* (3), 429–444.

Bromme, L., and Rothmund, T. (2021). Trust and Involvement as Higher-Order Factors of General Attitudes Towards Politics. Testing a Structural Model Across 26 Democracies. *Politial Psychology* .

Broockman, D., and Butler, B. (2015). The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication. *American Journal of Political Science , 61* (1), 208-221.

Brooks, C., and Manza, J. (1997). Class Politics and Political Change in the United States, 1952–1992. *Social Forces , 76* (2), 379–408.

Brown, R. (1984). The role of similarity in intergroup relations. In H. Tajfel, *The Social Dimension,*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bryan, M. L., and Jenkins, S. P. (2016). Multilevel modelling of country effects: A cautionary tale. *European Sociological Review , 32* (1), 3-22.

Budak, C., Goel, S., and Rao, J. M. (2016). Fair and Balanced? Quantifying Media Bias Through Crowdsourced Content Analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly , 80*, 250–71.

Buell, E. H., and Sigelman, L. (2009). *Attack politics. Negativity in presidential campaigns since 1960 (2nd ed).* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,.

Cacioppo, J. T., and Berntson, G. G. (1994). Relationship between attitudes and evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the separability of positive and negative substrates. *Psychological Bulletin , 115*, 401-423.

Cacioppo, J. T., and Gardner, W. L. (1999). Emotion. *Annual Review of Psychology , 50*, 191–214.

Cacioppo, J. T., Gardner, W. L., and Berntson, G. G. (1997). Beyond bipolar conceptualizations and measures: The case of attitudes and evaluative space. *Personality and Social Psychology Review , 1*, 13-25.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., and Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American Voter.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Capella, J. N., and Jamieson, K. H. (1997). *Spiral of cynicism. The press and the public good.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carlin, R., and Love, G. (2018). Political Competition, Partisanship and Interpersonal Trust in Electoral Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science , 48* (1), 115-139.

Carpini, M. X., and Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cartwright, D. (1968). The nature of group cohesiveness. In D. Cartwright, and A. Zander, *Group Dynamics.* London: Tavistock.

Caruna, N. J., McGregor, R. M., and Stephenson, L. B. (2015). The power of the dark side: Negative partisanship and political behavior in Canada. *Canadian Journal of Political Science , 48* (4), 771–789.

Cassese, E. C. (2021). Partisan Dehumanization in American Politics. *Political Behavior , 43* (1), 29-50.

Cho, J., Ahmed, S., Keum, H., Choi, Y. J., and Lee, J. H. (2018). Influencing Myself: Self-Reinforcement Through Online Political Expression. *Communication Research , 45* (1), 83-111.

Converse, P. E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In D. E. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent.* New York: Free Press.

Crewe, I. (1976). Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain. In I. Budge, I. Crewe, and D. Farlie, *Party Identification and Beyond.* Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.

Dahl, V., Amna, E., Banaji, S., Landberg, M., Serek, J., Ribeiro, N., et al. (2018). Apathy or alienation? Political passivity among youths across eight European Union countries. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology , 15* (3), 284-301.

Dalton, R. J. (1988). *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France.* Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

Dalton, R. J. (2008). *Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Dalton, R. J. (2002). The Decline of Party Identifications. In R. J. Dalton, and M. P. Wattenberg, *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R., Flanagan, S. C., and Beck, P. A. (1984). *Electoral Changes in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dassonneville, R., and Hooghe, M. (2016). Indifference and alienation: Diverging dimensions of electoral dealignment in Europe. *Acta Politica , 53*, 1-23.

Dassonneville, R., Hooghe, M., and Vanhoutte, B. (2012). Age, period and cohort effects in the decline of party identification in Germany: An analysis of a two decade panel study in Germany (1992–2009). *German Politics , 21* (2), 209–227.

de Vries, C., and van de Wardt, M. (2011). EU issue salience and domestic party competition. In K. Oppermann, and H. Viehrig, *Issue Salience in International Politics* (pp. 173–187). London: Routledge.

Ditto, P. H., and Lopez, D. F. (1992). Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 63* (4), 568–84.

Ditto, P. H., Munro, G. D., Apanovitch, A. M., Scepansky, J. A., and Lockhart, J. K. (2003). Spontaneous Skepticism: The Interplay of Motivation and Expectation in Responses to

Favorable and Unfavorable Medical Diagnoses. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 29*, 1120–1132.

Dolenzal, M. (2010). Exploring the Stabilization of a Political Force: The Social and Attitudinal Basis of Green Parties in the Age of Globalization. *West European Politics, , 33* (3), 534-52.

Druckman, J. N., and Levendusky, M. S. (2019). What do we measure when we measure affective polarization? *Public Opinion QUarterly , 83* (1), 114–122.

Eagly, A., and Chaiken, S. (1993). *The psychology of attitudes.* Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Elff, M. (2002). An Orthodoxy Disrupted: Cleavage Voting in Western Europe. *Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association ,* Boston, Aug 29-Sept 1.

European Social Survey Cumulative File, 1.-9. (2020). Data file edition 1.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS-CUMULATIVE.

Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Mellon, J., et al. (2015). *British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 7.*

Fiorina, M. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American Elections.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Fishbein, M., and Ajzen, I. (2010). *Predicting and Changing Behavior: A Reasoned Action Approach.* New York: Psychology Press, Taylor and Francis Group.

Flanagan, S. C. (1987). Value Change in Industrial Societies. *American Political Science Review , 81* (4), 1303–19.

Flanagan, S. C., and Lee, A. R. (2003). The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian–Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies , 36* (3), 235-70.

Foa, R. S., and Mounk, Y. (2016). The dangers of deconsolidation. *Journal of Democracy , 27*, 5-17.

Fortunado, D., and Stephenson, R. T. (2013). Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies: The Effect of Coalition Participation. *American Journal of Political Science , 57* (2), 459-477.

Fowler, E. F., Ridout, T. N., and Franz, M. M. (2016). Political Advertising in 2016: The Presidential Election as Outlier? *The Forum , 14*, 445–69.

Franklin, M. N., Mackie, T. T., and Valen, H. (1992). *Electoral Change. Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fridkin, K. L., and Kenney, P. J. (2004). Do negative messages work? The impact of negativity on citizens' evaluations of candidates. *American Politics Research , 32* (5), 570-605.

Fridkin, K. L., and Kenney, P. J. (2008). The dimensions of negative messages. *American Politics Research , 36* (5), 694-723.

Galston, W. (2018). The populist challenge to liberal democracy. *Journal of Democracy , 29* (2), 5–19.

Garrett, K. R., Gvirsman, S. D., Johnson, B. K., Tsfati, Y., Neo, R., and Dal, A. (2014). Nations of Pro- and Counterattitudinal Information Exposure for Affective Polarization. *Human Communication Research , 40*, 309–32.

Garry, J. (2007). Making "party identification" more versatile: Operationalising the concept for the multiparty setting. *Electoral Studies , 26*, 346-358.

Garzia, D. (2013). Changing Parties, Changing Partisans: The Personalization of Partisan Attachments in Western Europe. *Poitical Psychology , 34* (1), 67-89.

Garzia, D., and da Silva, F. F. (2021). Negative personalization and voting behavior in 14 parliamentary democracies, 1961–2018. *Electoral Studies , 71*, 102300.

Gastil, J., and Xenos, M. (2010). Of Attitudes and Engagement: Clarifying the Reciprocal Relationship Between Civic Attitudes and Political Participation. *Journal of Communication , 60* (2), 318–343.

Geer, J. G. (2006). *In defense of negativity. Attack ads in presidential campaigns.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., and Dowling, C. M. (2012). Disagreement and the avoidance of political discussion: Aggregate relationships and differences across personality traits. *American Journal of Political Science , 56* (4), 849–874.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., and Horne, W. (2020). *American Affective Polarisation in Comparative Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gidron, N., Adams, J., and Horne, W. (2019). Toward a comparative research agenda on affective polarization in mass publics. *APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter , 29*, 30-36.

Gift, K., and Gift, T. (2015). Does politics influence hiring? Evidence from a randomized experiment. *Political Behavior , 37* (3), 653–675.

Gimpel, J. G., and Hui, I. (2017). Inadvertent and intentional partisan residential sorting. *The Annals of Regional Science , 58* (3), 441–468.

Gimpel, J. G., and Hui, I. (2015). Seeking politically compatible neighbors? The role of neighborhood partisan composition in residential sorting. *Political Geography , 48*, 130–142.

Grabe, M. E., Lang, A., Zhou, S., and Bolls, P. D. (2000). Cognitive Access to Negatively Arousing News: An Experimental Investigation of the Knowledge Gap. *Communication Research , 1*, 3–26.

Green, D., Palmquist, B., and Schickler, E. (2002). *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and Social Identities of Voters.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Greene, S. (2004). Social identity theory and party identification. *Social Science Quarterly , 85* (1), 136–153.

Greene, S. (2002). The social–psychological measurement of partisanship. *Political Behavior , 24* (3), 171–197.

Greene, S. (1999). Understanding Party Identification: A Social Identity Approach. *Political Psychology , 20*, 393–403.

Green-Pedersen, C. (2012). A giant fast asleep? Party incentives and the politicization of European integration. *Political Studies , 60* (1), 115–130.

Grimmer, J., and King, G. (2011). General purpose computer-assisted clustering and conceptualization. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 108* (7), 2643– 2650.

Hansen, K. M., and Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2017). How campaigns polarize the electorate: Political polarization as an effect of the minimal effect theory within a multi-party system. *Party Politics , 23* (3), 181-192.

Harteveld, E. (2021). Fragmented foes: Affective polarization in the multiparty context of the Netherlands. *Electoral Studies , 71*.

Henderson, M. (2014). Issue publics, campaigns, and political knowledge. *Political Behavior , 36* (3), 631–657.

Henn, M., Weinstein, M., and Forrest, S. (2005). Uninterested youth? Young people's attitudes towards party politics in Britain. *Political Studies , 53* (3), 556–578.

Hetherington, M. J., and Rudolph, T. J. (2015). *Why Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the Governing Crisis.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hino, A. (2012). *New Challenger Parties in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.* Abingdon: Routledge.

Hobolt, S., and Tilley, J. (2016). Fleeing the centre: the rise of challenger parties in the aftermath of the Euro crisis. *West European Politics , 39* (5), 971-991.

Hobolt, S., Leeper, T., and Tilley, J. (2020). Divided by the Vote: Affective Polarization in the Wake of Brexit. *British Journal of Political Science* , 1-18.

Hogg, M. A., and Abrams, D. (1988). *Social Identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations.* New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall.

Holbrook, A. L., Berent, M. K., Krosnick, J. A., Visser, P. S., and Boninger, D. S. (2005). Attitude importance and the accumulation of attitude-relevant knowledge in memory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 58* (5), 749–769.

Holger, D., and Manow, P. (2020). *Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version.*

Holmberg, S. (2009). Partisanship reconsidered. In R. J. Dalton, and H. D. Klingemann, *The Oxford handbook of political behavior* (pp. 557-571). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2018). Cleavage theory meets Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage. *Journal of European Public Policy , 25* (1), 109–135.

Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2001). *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration* (Vol. 39). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G., and Wilson, C. (2002). Does Left/Right Structure. Party Positions on European Integration? *Comparative Political Studies , 35* (8), 965–89.

Hout, M., Brooks, C., and Manza, J. (1995). The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States, 1948–1992. *American Sociological Review , 60* (6), 805–828.

Huber, G., and Malhotra, N. (2017). Political Homophily in Social Relationships: Evidence from Online Dating Behavior. *The Journal of Politics , 79* (1), 269-283.

Huddy, L., Bankert, A., and Davies, C. (2018). Expressive versus instrumental partisanship in multiparty european systems. *Political Psychology , 39*, 173–199.

Huddy, L., Mason, L., and Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive partisanship: campaign involvement, political emotion, and partisan identity. *American Political Science Review , 109* (1), 1–17.

Hui, I. (2013). Who is your preferred neighbor? Partisan residential preferences and neighborhood satisfaction. *American Politics Research , 41* (6), 997–1021.

Hutchings, V. L. (2011). Political context, issue salience, and selective attentiveness: Constituent knowledge of the Clarence Thomas confirmation vote. *The Journal of Politics , 63* (3), 846–868.

Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1984). The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society. In R. J. Dalton, S. C. Flanagan, and P. A. Beck, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ito, T. A., Larsen, J. T., Smith, N. K., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1998). Negative information weighs more heavily on the brain: The negativity bias in evaluative categorizations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 75*, 887-900.

Iyengar, S., and Krupenkin, M. (2018). The Strengthening of Partisan Affect. *Advances in Political Psychology , 39* (S1), 201-218.

Iyengar, S., and Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization. *American Journal of Political Science , 59* (3), 690-707.

Iyengar, S., Hahn, K. S., Krosnick, J. A., and Walker, J. (2008). Selective exposure to campaign communication: The role of anticipated agreement and issue public membership. *The Journal of Politics , 70* (1), 186–200.

Iyengar, S., Sood, G., and Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarisation. *Public Opinion Quarterly , 76* (3), 405-431.

Johns, R. (2010). Measuring issue salience in british elections: Competing interpretations of 'most important issue'. *Political Research Quarterly , 63* (1), 143–158.

Johnston, R. (2006). Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences? *Annual Review of Political Science , 9*, 329–51.

Johnston, R., Matthews, J. S., and Bitterner, A. (2007). Turnout and the party system in Canada, 1988–2004. *Electoral Studies , 26* (4), 735-745.

Joiner, T. E. (1994). The interplay of similarity and self-verification in relationship formation. *Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal , 22* (2), 195–200.

Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., and Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology , 60*, 307-337.

Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , 47*, 263–91.

Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. H. (1990). Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. *Journal of Political Economy , 98* (6), 1325-1348.

Katz, R. S., and Mair, P. (2018). *Democracy and the cartelization of political parties.* Oxford: University Press.

Kimberlee, R. H. (2002). Why don't British young people vote at general elections? *Journal of Youth Studies , 5* (1), 85–98.

Kitschelt, H. (1994). *The Transformation of European Social Democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, H., and McGann, A. J. (1995). *The Radical Right in Western Europe.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., and Ryan, J. B. (2018). Affective Polarization or Partisan Disdain? Untangling Dislike for the Opposing Party from a Dislike of Partisanship. *Public Opinion Quarterly , 82*, 379-390.

Klingemann, H. D. (1995). Party positions and voter orientations. In H. D. Klingemann, and D. Fuchs, *Citizens and the state (* (pp. 183-206). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Kriesi, H. (2010). Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values. *West European Politics , 33* (3), 673-685.

Kriesi, H. (2014). The Populist Challenge. *West European Politics , 37* (2), 361-378.

Kriesi, H. (2020). Is there a Crisis of Democracy in Europe? *Politische Vierteljahresschrift , 61*, 273-260.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., and Lachat, R. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research , 45* (6), 921–956.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., and Frey, T. (2008). *West European politics in the age of globalization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krosnick, J. A. (1990). Government policy and citizen passion: A study of issue publics in contemporary America. *Political Behavior , 12* (1), 59–92.

Krosnick, J. A. (1988). The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: A study of policy preferences, presidential candidate evaluations, and voting behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 55* (2), 196–210.

Kunda, Z., and Oleson, K. C. (1995). Maintaining stereotypes in the face of disconfirmation: Constructing grounds for subtyping deviants. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 68* (4), 565–579.

Lacasse, K. (2015). The Importance of Being Green: The Influence of Green Behaviors on Americans' Political Attitudes Toward Climate Change. *Environment and Behavior , 47* (7), 754-781.

Lau, R. R., and Pomper, G. M. (2002). Effectiveness of negative campaigning in U.S. Senate elections. *American Journal of Political Science , 46* (1), 47-66.

Lau, R. R., Andersen, D. J., and Ditonto, T. M. (2017). Effect of Media Environment Diversity and Advertising Tone on Information Search, Selective Exposure, and Affective Polarization. *Political Behavior , 39*, 231–255.

Lebo, M. J., and Cassino, D. (2007). The aggregated consequences of motivated reasoning and the dynamics of partisan presidential approval. *Political Psychology , 28* (6), 719-746.

Lelkes, Y. (2019). Policy over party: comparing the effects of candidate ideology and party on affective polarization. *Political Science Research and Methods* , 1-8.

Lelkes, Y., and Westwood, S. J. (2017). The Limits of Partisan Prejudice. *The Journal of Politics , 79* (2), 485-501.

Levendusky, M. (2013). Partisan Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward the Opposition. *Political Communication , 30*, 565–81.

Levitsky, S., and Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive authoritarianism. Hybrid regimes after the cold war.* Cambridge: University Press.

Lewis-Beck, M. S., and Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science , 3*, 183-219.

Lewis-Beck, M. S., Jacoby, W. G., Norpoth, H., and Weisberg, H. F. (2008). *The American voter revisited.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.* MD: John Hopkins University Press.

Lo, J., Proksch, S., and Gschwend, T. (2014). A common left–right scale for voters and parties in Europe. *Political Analysis , 22* (2), 205-223.

Lucardie, P., and Voerman, G. (2019). The Dutch Socialist Party: from Maoist sect to Social Democratic mass party with a populist style. In G. Katsambekis, and A. Kioupkiolis , *The Populist Radical Left in Europe* (pp. 113-128). Milton : Routledge.

Lyrintzis, C. (2005). The changing party system: stable democracy, contested ‘modernisation’. *West European Politics , 28* (2), 242-259.

Maggiotto, M. A., and Piereson, J. E. (1977). Partisan identification and electoral choice: The hostility hypothesis. *American Journal of Political Science , 21* (4), 745–767.

Magyar, A. (2018). *Experimental Analysis of Social and Ideological Hostility along Party Lines in Britain.* Unpublished MSc Thesis; University of Essex.

Maier, J., and Nai, A. (2021). When conflict fuels negativity. A large-scale comparative investigation of the contextual drivers of negative campaigning in elections worldwide. *The Leadership Quarterly , 33* (2).

Mainwaring, S., and Zoco, E. (2007). Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies. *Party Politics , 13* (2), 155-178.

Mair, P. (2011). Bini Smaghi vs. The Parties: Representative Government and Institutional Constraints. *EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2011/22* .

Mair, P. (2002). Populist democracy vs Party Democracy. In Y. Meny, and Y. Surel, *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (pp. 81-98). Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Malka, A., and Lelkes, Y. (2010). More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Receptivity to Political Cues. *Social Justice Research , 23*, 156–188.

March, L., and Mudde, C. (2005). What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation. *Comparative European Politics , 3*, 23–49.

Marques, J. M., and Paez, D. (1994). The 'black sheep effect': Social categorization, rejection of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. *European Review of Social Psychology , 5* (1), 37–68.

Marthaler, S. (2008). The paradox of the politically-sophisticated partisan: The French case. *West European Politics , 31* (5), 937–959.

Martin, P. S. (2008). The Mass Media as Sentinel: Why Bad News about Issues is Good News for Participation. *Political Communication , 25*, 180–93.

Mason, L. (2015). "I disrespectfully agree": The differential effects of partisan sorting on social and issue. *American Journal of Political Science , 59* (1), 128–145.

Mayer, S. (2017). How negative partisanship affects voting behavior in Europe: Evidence from an analysis of 17 European multi-party systems with proportional voting. *Research and Politics , 4* (1), 1-7.

McGarty, C., Bliuc, A. M., Thomas, E. F., and Bongiorno, R. (2009). Collective action as the material expression of opinion-based group membership. *Journal of Social Issues , 65* (4), 839-857.

McGregor, R. M. (2012). Voter Sincerity and the Time-of-Voting-Decision. *Electoral Studies , 31*, 715–25.

McGregor, R. M., Caruana, N. J., and Stephenson, L. B. (2015). Negative partisanship in a multi-party system: The case of Canada. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties , 25* (3), 300–316.

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., and Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. *Annual Review of Sociology , 27*, 415–444.

Medeiros, M., and Noël, A. (2014). The forgotten side of partisanship: Negative party identification in four Anglo-American democracies. *Comparative Political Studies , 47* (7), 1022–1046.

Melendez, C., and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2021). Negative partisanship towards the populist radical right and democratic resilience in Western Europe. *Western Europe, Democratization* , DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2021.1883002.

Michelitch, K., and Utych, S. (2018). Electoral Cycle Fluctuations in Partisanship: Global Evidence from Eighty-Six Countries. *Journal of Politics , 80*, 412–7.

Mierina, I. (2014). Political alienation and government-society relations in post-communist countries. *Polish Sociological Review, ,* 3-24.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition , 39* (4), 542–563.

Mutz, D. C., and Mondak, J. (2006). The Workplace as a Context for Cross-Cutting Political Discourse. *Journal of Politics , 68* (1), 140–55.

Nadeau, R., and Bélanger, E. (2012). Quebec versus the rest of Canada, 1965-2006. In M. Kanji, A. Bilodeau, and T. Scotto, *The Canadian election studies* (pp. 136-153). Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press.

Nai, A., and Walter, A. (2015). The war of the words. The art of negative campaigning. In A. Nai, and A. Walter, *New perspectives on negative campaigning. Why attack politics matters* (pp. 1-31). Colchester: ECPR Press.

Newhagen, J. E., and Reeves, B. (1992). The Evening's Bad News: Effects of Compelling Negative Television News Images on Memory. *Journal of Communication , 42*, 25–41.

Nieuwbeerta, P. (1995). *The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries.* Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers Amsterdam.

Norris, P. (2017). Is Western democracy backsliding? Diagnosing the risks. *Journal of Democracy Web Exchange. ,* https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exchange-democratic-deconsolidation/.

Ornstein, N. J., and Mann, T. E. (2000). *The permanent campaign and its future.* Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Oscarsson, H., and Oskarson, M. (2018). Sequential vote choice: Applying a consideration set model of heterogeneous decision processes. *Electoral Studies , 57*, 275-283.

Oscarsson, H., and Rosema, M. (2019). Consideration Set Models of Electoral Choice: Theory, Method, and Application. *Electoral Studies , 57*, 256-262.

Pappas, T. S. (2019). *Populism and liberal democracy. A comparative and theoretical analysis.* Oxord: University Press.

Pew Research Center (2017). Trust, Facts and Democracy: The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider. Methodology. *available: http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/methodology-86/, accessed: 16/09/2021* .

Pharr, S. J., and Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Disaffected democracies. What's troubling the trilateral countries?* . Princeton: University Press.

Putz, D. W. (2002). Partisan conversion in the 1990s: Ideological realignment meets measurement theory. *Journal of Politics , 64* (4), 1199–1209.

Quintelier, E., and van Deth, J. W. (2014). Supporting Democracy: Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Exploring Causality Using Panel Data. *Political Studies , 62* (1), 153-171.

Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making. *Journal of Politics , 64*, 1021–1044.

Reiljan, A. (2020). 'Fear and loathing across party lines' (also) in Europe: Affective polarisation. *European Journal of Political Research , 59* (2), 376-396.

Rekker, R., and Rosema, M. (2018). How (often) do Voters Change Their Consideration Sets? *Electoral Studies , 57*, 284-293.

Richardson, B. (1991). European party loyalties revisited. *American Political Science Review , 85*, 751-75.

Ridge, H. M. (2020). Enemy Mine: Negative Partisanship and Satisfaction with Democracy. *Political Behavior .*

Roberts, K. M., and Wibbels, E. (1999). Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations. *The American Political Science Review , 93* (3), 575-590.

Rogowski, J. C., and Sutherland, J. L. (2016). How ideology fuels affective polarization. *Political Behavior , 38* (2), 485–508.

Rooduijn, M., de Lange, S. L., and van der Brug, W. (2014). A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe. *Party Politics , 20* (4), 563–575.

Rooduijn, M., van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., De Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., et al. (2019). The PopuList: an Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe. www.popu-list.org.

Rose, R., and Mishler, W. (1998). Negative and positive party identification in post-Communist countrie. *Electoral Studies , 17*, 217-234.

Rothschild, J. E., Howat, A. J., Shafranek, R. M., and Busby, E. C. (2019). Pigeonholing partisans: Stereotypes of party supporters and partisan polarization. *Political Behavior , 41* (2), 423–443.

Sanders, D., Clarke, H. D., Stewart, M. C., and Whiteley, P. (2011). Downs, stokes and the dynamics of electoral choice. *British Journal of Political Science* , 287-314.

Schaffner, B., and Luks, S. (2018). Misinformation or Expressive Responding? What an Inauguration Crowd Can Tell Us about the source of Political Misinformation in Surveys. *Public Opinion Quarterly , 1,* 135–147.

Schattschneider, E. (1960). *The Semi-Sovereign People.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schmitt, H. (2009). Partisanship in Nine Western Democracies: Causes and Consequences. In J. Bartle, and B. Bellucci, *Political Parties and Partisanship: Social Identity and Individual Attitudes.* London: Routledge.

Schmitt, H., and Holmberg, S. (1995). Political Parties in Decline? In H. D. Klingemann, and D. Fuchs, *Citizens and the State.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmitt, H., and Scholz, E. (2005). The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-2002. doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04357.v1.

Schmitt, H., Bartolini, S., van der Brug, W., van der Eijk, C., Franklin, M., Fuchs, D., et al. (2009). *European Election Study 2004 (2nd edition).* GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4566 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.10086.

Schmitt, H., Evans, G., Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Mellon, J., Prosser, C., et al. (2015). British Election Study 2015 Expert Survey.

Schmitt, H., Hobolt, S. B., Popa, S. A., Teperoglou, E., and European Parliament, D.-G. f. (2016). *European Parliament Election Study 2014, Voter Study, First Post-Election Survey.* GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5160 Data file Version 4.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12628.

Schmitt, H., Hobolt, S. B., van der Brug, W., and Popa, S. A. (2020). *European Parliament Election Study 2019, Voter Study.* GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7581 Data file Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13473.

Schmitt, H., van der Eijk, C., Scholz, E., and Klein, M. (1997). *European Election Study 1994 (EES 1994).* European Commission [Principal investigator]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2865 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.2865.

Schultz-Hardt, S., Luthgens, C., and Moscovici, S. (2000). Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 28*, 655–669.

Shafranek, R. M. (2021). Political Considerations in Nonpolitical Decisions: A Conjoint Analysis of Roommate Choice. *Political Behaviour , 43*, 271–300.

Shephard, M., and Johns, R. (2008). Candidate Image and Electoral Preference in Britain. *British Politics , 3*, 324–349.

Söderlund, P. (2008). Retrospective voting and electoral volatility: A nordic perspective. *Scandinavian Political Studies , 31* (2), 217–240.

Sood, G., and Iyengar, S. (2016). Coming to Dislike Your Opponents: The Polarizing Impact of Political Campaigns. *SSRN Electronic Journal* , doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840225.

Soroka, S., and McAdams, S. (2015). News, Politics, and Negativity. *Political Communication , 32* (1), 1-22.

Spoon, J. J., and Kanthak, K. (2019). "He's not my prime minister!": negative party identification and satisfaction with democracy. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties , 29* (4), 511–532.

Stoll, H. (2010). Elite-Level Conflict Salience and Dimensionality in Western Europe: Concepts and Empirical Findings. *West European Politics , 33* (3), 445–73.

Stubager, R. (2009). Education-based Group Identity and Consciousness in the Authoritarian–Libertarian Value Conflict. *European Journal of Political Research , 48*, 204–33.

Sunstein, C. R. (2017). *#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Sweeney, P. D., and Gruber, K. L. (1984). Selective Exposure: Voter Information Preferences and the Watergate Affair. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 46*, 1208–1221.

Taber, C. S., and Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science , 50* (3), 755-769.

Taggart, P., and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2016). Dealing with populists in government: some comparative conclusions. *Democratization , 23* (2), 345–365.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. C. (1979). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In W. G. Austin, and S. Worchel, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.* Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Tarchi, M. (2015). Populismo, destra radicale, estrema destra. Affinità e false equivalenze. *Società Degli Individui , 52*, 34-46.

Taylor, S. E. (1991). Asymmetrical Effects of Positive and Negative Events: The Mobilization-Minimization Hypothesis. *Psychological Bulletin , 110*, 67–85.

Thomassen, J. A., and Rosema, M. (2009). Party identification revisited. In J. Bartle, and P. Bellucci, *Political Parties and Partisanship. Social identity and individual attitudes.* Routledge.

Thorson, E., Ognianova, E., Coyle, J., and Denton, F. (2000). Negative political ads and negative citizen orientations toward politics. *Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising , 22* (1), 13-40.

Torcal, M., and Montero, J. M. (2006). *Political disaffection in contemporary democracies.* London: Routledge.

Urbinati, N. (2014). *Democracy disfigured. Opinion, truth, and the people.* Harvard: University Press.

van der Brug, W. (2010). Structural and Ideological Voting in Age Cohorts. *West European Politics , 33* (3), 586–607.

van der Brug, W., van der Eijk, C., and Franklin, M. (2007). *The Economy and the Vote: Economic Conditions and Elections in Fifteen Countries.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

van der Eijk, C., Franklin, M., Schoenbach, K., Schmitt, H., Semetko, H., van der Brug, W., et al. *European Election Study – 1999* . DANS.http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-z9j-vy6m.

van der Eijk, C., Oppenhuis, E., and Schmitt, H. (1993). *European Election Study 1989 (EES 1989).* European Commission [Principal investigator]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2320 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.2320.

van der Eijk, C., Schmitt, H., and Binder, T. (167-191). Left-right orientations and party choice. In J. Thomassen, *The European voter* (p. 2005). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

van Egmond, M., van der Brug, W., Hobolt, S., Franklin, M., and Sapir, E. V. (2013). *European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study.* GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5055 Data file Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.11760.

Van Heerde-Hudson, J. (2011). The Americanization of British party advertising? Negativity in partly election broadcast, 1964–2005. *British Politics , 6* (1), 52-77.

Visser, P. S., Krosnick, J. A., and Simmons, J. P. (2003). Distinguishing the cognitive and behavioral consequences of attitude importance and certainty: A new approach to testing the common-factor hypothesis. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 39*, 118–141.

Vlachová, K. (2001). Party identification in the Czech Republic: Inter-party hostility and party preference. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies , 34* (4), 479–499.

Wagner, M. (2021). Affective polarization in multiparty systems. *Electoral Studies , 69*, 102199.

Walter, A. (2014). Choosing the enemy. Attack behaviour in a multiparty system. *Party Politics , 20* (3), 311-323.

Walter, A. (2014). Negative campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or different? *Political Studies , 62* (S1), 42-60.

Ward, D. G., and Tavits, M. (2019). How partisan affect shapes citizens' perception of the political world. *Electoral Studies , 60*, 102045.

Wattenberg, M. P. (1982). Party Identification and Party Images: A Comparison of Britain, Canada, Australia, and the United States. *Comparative Politics , 15*, 23–40.

Webb, P. (2000). *The Modern British Party System.* London: Sage.

Webster, S. W., and Abramowitz, A. I. (2017). The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate. *American Politics Research , 45* (4), 621-647.

West, D. M. (2018). *Air wars. Television advertising and social media in election campaigns 1952–2016 (7th ed).* Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Westwood, S. J., Iyengar, S., Walgrave, S., Leonisio, R., Miller, L., and Oliver, S. (2018). The tie that divides: cross-national evidence of the primacy of partyism. *European Journal of Political Research , 57* (2), 333–354.

Winter, N., and Berinsky, A. J. (n.d.). What's your temperature? Thermometer ratings and political analysis. *Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA* .

Wlezien, C. (2005). On the salience of political issues: The problem with "most important problem. *Electoral Studies , 24*, 555-79.

Yoon, K., Pinkleton, B. E., and Ko, W. (2005). Effects of negative political advertising on voting intention: An exploration of the roles of involvement and source credibility in the development of voter cynicism. *Journal of Marketing Communications , 11* (2), 95-112.

YouGov. (2019). YouGov Survey Results. https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/6oh60e84pb/190822_PartisanRelat.pdf; accessed:23/09/2021.

Zaller, J. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zaller, J., and Feldman, S. (1992). A Simple Theory of the Survey Response. *American Journal of Political Science , 36*, 579–616.

Zelle, C. (1995). Social dealignment versus political frustration: Contrasting explanations of the floating vote in Germany. *European Journal of Political Research , 27* (3), 319–345.

Zhong, C. B., Phillips, K. W., Leonardelli, G. J., and Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Negational categorization and intergroup behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 34*, 793-806.

Zulianello, M., and Larsen, E. G. (2020). Populist parties in European Parliament elections: A new dataset on left, right and valence populism from 1979 to 2019. *Electoral Studies , 71* (5), 102312.