Sirota, Miroslav and Juanchich, Marie and Holford, Dawn L (2023) Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152 (7). pp. 2052-2073. DOI https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001375
Sirota, Miroslav and Juanchich, Marie and Holford, Dawn L (2023) Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152 (7). pp. 2052-2073. DOI https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001375
Sirota, Miroslav and Juanchich, Marie and Holford, Dawn L (2023) Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152 (7). pp. 2052-2073. DOI https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001375
Abstract
Why is it that sometimes people do not correct their reasoning errors? The dominating dual-process theories of reasoning detail how people (fail to) detect their reasoning errors but underspecify how people decide to correct these errors once they are detected. We have unpacked the motivational aspects of the correction process here, leveraging the research on cognitive control. Specifically, we argue that when people detect an error, they decide whether or not to correct it based on the overall expected value associated with the correction—combining perceived efficacy and the reward associated with the correction while considering the cost of effort. Using a modified two-response paradigm, participants solved cognitive reflection problems twice while we manipulated the factors defining the expected value associated with correction at the second stage. In five experiments (N = 5,908), we found that answer feedback and reward increased the probability of correction while cost decreased it, relative to the control groups. These cognitive control critical factors affected the decisions to correct reasoning errors (Experiments 2 and 3) and the corrective reasoning itself (Experiments 1, 4 and 5) across a range of problems, feedbacks, types of errors (reflective or intuitive), and cost and reward manipulations pre-tested and checked in five separate studies (N = 951). Thus, some people did not correct their epistemically irrational reasoning errors because they followed the instrumentally rational principle of the expected value maximisation: they were rationally irrational.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | cognitive reflection test, dual-process theory, error correction, cognitive control, expected value of control model |
Divisions: | Faculty of Science and Health Faculty of Science and Health > Psychology, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 29 Mar 2023 15:13 |
Last Modified: | 07 Aug 2024 20:18 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/34555 |
Available files
Filename: 2023-58265-001.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0
Filename: xge0001375.zip