

NGOs and Strategic Resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War (1972-1980)

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Abstract

Strategic resettlement was employed as part of white Rhodesian counterinsurgency during the Zimbabwean Liberation War. It was modelled by Britain in Malaya, the French in Algeria, the South Vietnamese and United States in Vietnam and Portugal in Lusophone Southern Africa. Up to three quarters of a million black Zimbabweans were forcibly relocated between 1972 and 1980 to concentrated settlements designed deny the guerrillas the resources they procured from the rural African population. Those relocated faced material hardship and cultural violation through their dispossession and relocation from their traditional homelands. It was to this situation which NGOs responded. Using various NGO and state records from the UK and Zimbabwe this thesis reveals a spectrum of NGO relations with the Rhodesian state, the UK government, and insurgents. It shows that some organizations were clearly functional to and even supportive of the white-minority regime including the Anglican Church, the Salvation Army and the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign (RFFHC) whilst others including Christian Care, Oxfam, and the Red Cross emerged as intercessors mediating between various conflicting interests (including the guerrillas). The Methodists broadly were much moderate even if the Wesleyans signalled their concerns for race relations and the United Methodists had clear links to African nationalism under Muzorewa. On the other hand, the Catholics who were much more oppositional to the Smith regime and inclined much more towards the liberation cause. However, despite the varying extent of their responses and stances to the white-settler regime all organizations in question had to relate to and play an important role ameliorating the dire humanitarian impact of Strategic resettlement and thus saved many lives in the war.

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Finally, I should acknowledge that the starting point for chapter 6 was a small portion of the dissertation of my taught course master's thesis. Approximately, 4,000 words of that chapter then are based on the earlier analysis. However, this has been substantially transformed and new material added based on further research.

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Map of Zimbabwe



<http://www.southern-africa.arroukatchee.fr/zimbabwe/maps/zimbabwe-map.jpg>
 [accessed 9/10/22].

Introduction

Strategic resettlement – the forcible removal of rural communities and their control in restricted areas – was employed as part of the counterinsurgency strategy against nationalist guerrillas utilized by the white minority regime in Rhodesia during the Zimbabwean Liberation War. This enforced villagization was based upon the model used by Britain in Malaya, with the New Villages imposed to defeat guerrillas in that country in the 1950s. (A number of future commanders of the Rhodesian Army had served in Malaya). Similar policies had been followed in wars against nationalists by the French in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam (with the Strategic Hamlets programme) and by Portugal in the aldeamentos used in lusophone Southern Africa. Strategic resettlement was therefore an extremely important part of counterinsurgency during the second half of the twentieth century.

Existing comparative literature on the involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in enforced villagization or strategic resettlement frequently highlights NGO collusion in such programmes, sometimes through a focus on development. This is certainly true with respect to the counterinsurgencies implemented in Malaya and Kenya in the 1950s.¹ It is true, too, of the significant role played by the International Voluntary Service in the Vietnam War in supporting the implementation of the Strategic Hamlet programme, although the IVS would later become critical of this policy.² Interestingly, and whilst outside the realms of counterinsurgency strategy, it has been shown that Oxfam aided the implementation of the

¹ Lee Ham King, 'A Neglected Story: Christian missionaries, Chinese New Villages, and Communist in the Battle for the 'hearts and minds' in Malaya, 1948-1960', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol 47, No.7 (2013). Emily. Baughan, 'Rehabilitating an Empire: Humanitarian Collusion with the Colonial State during the Kenyan Emergency, Ca. 1954–1960', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol, 59, no. 1 (2020), pp.57–79. Beth Rebisz 'Violent Reform: Gendered Experiences of Colonial Develop Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1954-1960' (PhD Thesis, University of Reading, 2021).

² Jessica Elkind, *Aid Under Fire Nation Building and the Vietnam War*, (Lexington, 2016).

forced villagization programme which formed a central pillar of Julius Nyerere's Ujamaa policy in Tanzania during the 1970s.³

In Rhodesia, hundreds of thousands of peasants were forcibly relocated between 1972 and 1980 to what were called protected or consolidated villages. Strategic resettlement was first implemented in the north-eastern corner of Rhodesia but from 1976, as the war spread to other areas, so did the policy of strategic resettlement. Protected villages (PVs) were established by force, surrounded by barbed wire, and garrisoned, with the villagers who were forced into them subject to strict controls, including curfews. Consolidated villages (CVs) were, at least in theory, neither fenced nor garrisoned and the villagers not subject to movement controls; however, they still had been removed from their original lands. The aim of the policy was to deny the guerrillas the resources they procured from the rural African population. Those relocated faced material hardship and cultural violation, through their dispossession and forcible relocation from traditional homelands. In the zones into which they were forced, they were strictly controlled and remained caught in the crossfire between the Rhodesian security forces and the nationalist guerrillas in the so-called 'free fire zones' created by the Rhodesian Security Forces in the vicinity of each village; moreover, the PVs and CVs, seen as institutions of the counterinsurgency, came under attack from the guerrillas.

How has strategic resettlement been approached in the historiography of the Zimbabwean Liberation War? Broadly speaking, one can discern a number of distinct schools. One approach focuses very largely on the counterinsurgency dimensions of strategic resettlement. Emblematic of this would be Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin's study of the war, originally published in 1982.⁴ They argued very much from the perspective of military

³ Michael Jennings; 'Almost an Oxfam in itself': Oxfam, Ujamaa and development in Tanzania, *African Affairs*, Volume 101, Issue 405, 1 October 2002, pp.512-514, Michael Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: Non-Governmental Organisations, Development and Ujamaa in Tanzania*, (Bloomfield, 2008).

⁴ Paul L Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, (Barnsley, 2008).

historians concerned to see how the guerrillas could have been defeated and consequently they saw the system of PVs as the potential lynchpin of a successful counter-insurgency strategy if only they had been provided with adequate manpower.⁵ A variant of this view was shared by

J. K. Cilliers' later work on *Counterinsurgency In Rhodesia*.⁶ The policy of strategic resettlement could have been successful, he argued, if only better conditions were provided within the PVs compared with those in the areas from which the peasants had been moved; this had to be coupled with socio-economic upliftment for the villagers so as to circumvent resistance from the local population to the scheme. There had to be provision of electricity, running water, schools and clinics as well as the private ownership of land: "simply herding people behind barbed wire and uprooting their traditional lifestyle with no material compensation provides extremely fertile area for insurgent recruitment".⁷ Maia Chenaux-Repond's recent study provides particularly valuable discussion of the actual development efforts undertaken by the state in the PVs.⁸ Offering a personal account of her role as a provincial community development officer as well as documentation from Internal Affairs, the ministry that oversaw the protected villages, she offers something of an insider's view of the development efforts associated with strategic resettlement. (It might be noted here that Chenaux-Repond's personal archive, which she recently donated to the National Archives of Zimbabwe, has been especially useful for this study since it provides much material relating to the role of NGOs in the protected villages.)

There is another major strand of the scholarship that looks at strategic resettlement. It is marked by a humanitarian approach and began with the critically important engaged

⁵ Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, p.66

⁶ J.K. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London ,1985).

⁷ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, pp.80,83.

⁸ Maia Chenaux Repond, *Leading From Behind: Women in Community Development in Rhodesia, 1973-1979*, (Harare, 2017).

sociology of A.K. H. Weinrich who explored the impact of this policy in the Chiweshe and Madziwa areas, where it was first implemented.⁹

Drawing on a mixture of oral and written sources she outlined how dispossession, disruption and dislocation of the peasantry became synonymous with the policy. Due to government restrictions, Weinrich was unable to undertake research in PVs or CVs themselves and she was forced to leave Rhodesia in 1975, which meant that her work could only capture the impact of the initial phase of the protected village scheme in the Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands. Nevertheless, her work was a landmark one. We might consider the much later work of Munyaradzi Mushonga as falling in with the humanitarian scholarship of strategic resettlement pioneered by Weinrich. Mushonga's work focuses on the importance of curfews imposed in the east of the country by the Rhodesian Security Forces during the Zimbabwean Liberation War.¹⁰ Curfews were part and parcel of the realities of the lives of inmates of the protected villages, with a 6pm to 6am curfew applied in and around the PVs with potentially fatal consequences for those breaking the curfew. Crucially Mushonga highlights the important concept of 'Man in the Middle' – this dissertation prefers 'people in the middle' – which refers to the situation where the rural African population found themselves caught in the crossfire – quite often, literally – between the Security Forces and guerrillas; those living in the PVs were subject to coercion and violence from both sides.

In the classic literature of the Zimbabwean Liberation War, there is a strong focus on the relationship between peasants, the guerrillas, and the state. Three writers – sometimes in

⁹ A.K.H Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.3, No.2 (April 1977), pp.207-229.

¹⁰ Munyaradzi Mushonga, 'Curfews and the 'Man in the Middle' in Zimbabwe' War of Liberation with Special Reference to the Eastern Areas of Zimbabwe, 1977-1980 in Cheryl Hendricks and Lwazi Lushaba (eds.) *From National Liberation to Democratic Renaissance in Southern Africa*, (Dakar 2005), pp.171-190.

debate – stand out in this tradition: Terence Ranger, David Lan and Norma Kriger.¹¹ Ranger and Lan focus mainly on the interactions between the peasantry and the guerrillas, with particular focus given to peasant consciousness/culture and its relationship to nationalism and those waging armed struggle against white rule. Ranger posits a pre-existing nationalist consciousness that existed amongst the Zimbabwean peasantry, a consciousness particularly forged in the context of the radically unequal land apportionment in favour of the white settler. Lan points to the “assimilation of guerrillas into peasant categories” which required the liberation fighters to “win the approval of the ancestors, to be (therefore) seen as their tools, almost one might say, as the passive mediums of their will”.¹² Ranger would support this, pointing out that spirit mediums in rural African society became particularly relevant with respect to “peasant resentment over land alienation and the enforcement of agricultural rules”.¹³ Both Ranger and Lan tend towards a view of the guerrillas sitting rather comfortably with peasant culture and society and representing peasant opposition to the discriminatory order of Rhodesia, particularly as this related to the land. Norma Kriger took issue with some aspects of their perspective by exploring the pattern of guerrilla coercion against the peasantry in the Mtoko and Mrewa districts. In mobilizing the peasantry, she found coercion was as important as appeals to nationalism or the redressing of the discriminatory order.¹⁴

Heike Schmidt’s work builds upon the earlier studies of peasant-guerrilla-state relations with her micro-history of the war in the Honde Valley (Manicaland) in the far east of the country.¹⁵ Unlike some of the other writers discussed, strategic resettlement forms a key part of her analysis. She highlights not only the tremendous violence accompanying the process–

¹¹ Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study*, (London 1985), David Lan, *Guns & Rain- Guerrillas & Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, (London, 1985), Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, (New York, 1992).

¹² Lan, *Guns & Rain*, pp.225-6.

¹³ Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*, p.190.

¹⁴ Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, (New York, 1992).

¹⁵ Heike Schmidt, *Colonialism and Violence: A History of Suffering*, (Harare, 2013).

how peasants were caught in the crossfire - but equally how people of the Honde Valley were able to adapt to the conditions. She also – intriguingly – outlines the concept of “keep-ethnicity”, the idea that the experience of enforced villagisation generated a sense of identity and belonging and that many decided to remain indefinitely in the protected villages after the war.

There are other studies that focus directly on the world of the protected villages and that take a gender or generational approach to strategic resettlement. Mike Kesby’s study alerts us to the importance of spatial dynamics in understanding strategic resettlement and he reminds us how space related to gender dynamics. More specifically, he argues that protected villages created a space where the patriarchal authority of African males over their kin could be regulated or even silenced.¹⁶ Eleanor O’Gorman provides the first extensive focus on women and their importance in the history of strategic resettlement in her study of the women in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land who were subjected to the policy. She explores how living conditions and state surveillance within the PVs provided the context for an intensification of relations amongst women, between women and their families and neighbours and, finally, between women and the district assistants, the lowest level of state administration and control in the protected villages. She also highlights the enormous effect of guerrilla surveillance of community life in the PVs through their identification and punishment of those accused of being sell-outs. This fostered an atmosphere of fear and suspicion within communities who turned in and on themselves. O’ Gorman stresses the key role of women in supporting households through securing food and their strategies to earn money. Finally, she acknowledges

¹⁶ Mike Kesby, ‘Areas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerrilla Struggle and Counter-Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec. 1996).

the dilemmas of those women who were involved in sexual relationships with district assistants.¹⁷

Ishmael Mamzambani's recent study extends our knowledge of the protected villages by focusing on the impact of strategic resettlement on children, a previously neglected group. His study reveals the material privation suffered and also shows the psychological impact of the war on the children in the protected villages. Both the Rhodesian Security Forces and the guerrilla fighters committed massacres, and engaged in executions, beatings, and torture in order to eradicate support for their opponents. This left the severest mental scars on the child inmates of the protected villages. In particular many children were subjected to war zone trauma as they witnessed various forms of violence. Mamzambani's study shows how male children were recruited by the guerrillas as mujibhas (guerrilla messengers) in order to obtain information and intelligence. At the same time, teenage boys in the protected villages were subjected to harassment and torture by the Rhodesian Security Forces when they were suspected of being mujibhas. Mamzambani's study also considers the pattern of dehumanisation and humiliation of adolescent females in the protected villages. Not only could they be victims of sexual abuse by the forces of both sides, but they were also denied access to basic medical provisions such as sanitary pads.¹⁸

Some of the more recent scholarship investigating strategic resettlement emphasises the politics and propaganda of the white settler regime. Ishmael Mazambani and Terence Mashingaidze argue that the history of the PVs "was largely influenced by the political motives and agenda of the colonial regime". They emphasise the importance of the Rhodesian propaganda that was designed to give the international community the illusion that PVs were

¹⁷ Eleanor O'Gorman, *The Front Line Runs Through Every Women: Women & Local Resistance in the Zimbabwean Liberation War*, (Harare 2011), p.92.

¹⁸ Ishmael Mazambani, 'Did Children Matter? Unprotected children in "Protected Villages" created by the Rhodesian Regime During the Liberation Struggle for Zimbabwe (1970-1979)', (PhD Thesis, 2016), Midland State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe, p.301.

humanitarian centres' designed to protect the rural African population. Hence, claims about protecting rural Africans from diseases such as cholera were used to justify and legitimise the state sponsored forced removals. These were coupled with false claims of social upliftment in the protected villages which, it was alleged, provided better facilities and amenities to peasants compared with those to which they had access before. According to this propaganda, it was the Rhodesian government's duty to protect rural Africans against the insurgents.¹⁹

Finally, one might note the very recent scholarship that explores the history of the enforced villagization programme in terms of its legacy. Godhi Bvocho and Farau Nydidizu Chabata, explore the PVs through a kind of heritage typology in Zimbabwe.²⁰ Shelley Lieu, meanwhile, correlates pre-war and current-day administrative divisions in Zimbabwe to determine the ways in which the strategic resettlement program has continued to affect the lives of rural communities.²¹

All of the approaches – even that focused on counterinsurgency – have been helpful in their differing ways for this study. Thus, Moorcraft and McLaughlin's military history highlighted for me the important developments from 1976 as guerrillas seized the strategic initiative in eastern, south-eastern, and western areas of the country, leading to the massive expansion of the protected village system to encompass three new operational areas.²² They alert us, too, to the importance of the period after 1978 with the formation of Bishop Abel Muzorewa's interim government as part of the so-called Internal Settlement. This initiated the process by which PVs were dismantled in some areas to gain rural support.²³ Cilliers' work

¹⁹ I Mazambani and T. M, Mashingaidze, 'The Creation of Protected Villages in Southern Rhodesia: Colonial Mythologies and the Official Mind' (1972-1980), *The Dyke*, Vol 8:3 (2014), pp.72,90. Quotations from p,72.

²⁰ Godhi Bvocho and Farau Nydidizu Chabata, An Assessment of the Potential of "Protected Villages" as a Significant Heritage Typology, in Munyaradzi Mawere and Tapuwa R. Mubaya, *Colonial Heritage, Memory and Sustainability in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Prospect*, (Bamenda, 2016).

²¹ <https://www.shelleyxliu.com/projects/zim-protected-villages> [accessed 26/09/2021].

²² Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, p.62.

²³ Moorcraft and McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War*, p.132.

alerts us to the lack of resources and funds devoted to the non-security dimensions of strategic resettlement, something which severely hamstrung the efforts to promote protected villages as ‘growth points’.²⁴ Maia Chenux Repond’s account of her work as a provincial community development officer in the context of strategic resettlement contributes significantly to our understanding not only of the regime and settler perspectives on the villagization programme, but also to our knowledge of the role of both white and African women in the state-sanctioned development efforts in the protected villages.

Weinrich’s humanitarian sociological approach provide significant insights which cast light on the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the PVs and the alienation of inmates. Mushonga’s work – identified here as falling into the humanitarian approach – has helped to enhance my sense of the oppressions suffered by the inmates of the PVs as also the fact that they were people caught in a crossfire of armies.

The scholars within the peasant-guerrilla-state relationship approach also signposted important considerations for this study. Lan and Ranger remind us of the need to view strategic resettlement as part of the broader phenomenon of dispossession and control of the peasantry that marked the history of white-ruled Rhodesia, and how this alienated the rural population and informed peasant consciousness with the onset of the liberation struggle. They also imply the necessity to be conscious of the specific cultural norms and practices of the Zimbabwean peasantry and how these could be violated by state policy. Kriger alerts us to the phenomenon of guerrilla coercion of the peasantry, which was as important as their appeals for support based on peasant alienation from the regime and its land policies. Finally, Schmidt – with her detailed study of the Honde valley provides us much about how the very layout of the PVs inevitably placed the inmates between the opposing forces and about how the protected villages in this

²⁴ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.96

zone served the dual purpose of serving local (white) agricultural interests as well as its obvious role in counter insurgency strategy. Schmidt's approach also reminds us of the importance of the transfer of colonial knowledge in shaping strategic resettlement, with the experiences of forced resettlement in Kenya and Malaya serving as a 'blueprint' for the rapid implementation of the policy in the Honde Valley.

Any study of the history of NGO activity in Rhodesia's protected villages during the Zimbabwean Liberation War must be aware of the gender and generational dynamics, which makes the work of those historians who focus on women or children – O'Gorman, Kesby and Mazambani – of great value to this study. Their close focus on the world of the protected villages provides, variously, powerful insights into women's experience of strategic resettlement, as also into the relations between villagers (especially female villagers) and state personnel (that is, the district assistants) and the guerrillas. Importantly, this approach highlights key themes of survival for female inmates which provide a highly useful optic in which to view the harsh reality of the protected village. Such work has helped us to appreciate, for example, the experience of adolescent females in the protected villages who often found themselves subjected to the brutality and sexual abuse by the Rhodesian Security Forces (notably the district assistants) and the guerrilla fighters. Some of the work of these historians reveals, too, how the very young were often the principal victims of the humanitarian crisis in the protected villages as they faced hunger, starvation and diseases associated with malnutrition. Finally, some of the most recent work referred to in this survey – that by Mazambani and Mashingaidze on the ideological dimensions of the protected village scheme, a project infused with the belief in the "White man's burden"²⁵ — highlights the propaganda

²⁵ Mazambani and Mashingaidze, 'The Creation of Protected Villages in Southern Rhodesia', p.72.

elements of the policy. As we shall see, there was something of a conflict of discourses around the PVs in which the NGOs were involved.

If all of these works and approaches have been extremely helpful to my study in the ways suggested, it must be noted that they have little or nothing to say about the role of non-governmental organisations in responding to the results of strategic resettlement, although – as this thesis will show – it was crucial. This is true of the counterinsurgency historians Moorcraft, McLaughlin and Cilliers. Chenaux Repond's work – written by somebody actually involved in work in the PVs - does provide some important insights into the role played by various non-state actors such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army but her commentary in this regard focuses on merely one aspect of the NGOs' role: how they related to the state's community development efforts.²⁶

A relative neglect of the role of NGOs in analyses of strategic resettlement also marks the studies here identified as the humanitarian strand. The classic studies of the peasant-state-guerrilla school only make passing references to strategic resettlement and never deal with how NGOs related to this and its peasant victims. Thus, Kriger notes guerrilla attacks on the PVs but ignores the role of NGOs in responding to the civilian victims of them. Even Schmidt, whose rich work deals centrally with strategic resettlement, makes no mention of the role played by NGOs in responding to its results in the Honde Valley. There is also no registering of the NGO role in the 'gender and generational' school, despite the fact that women and children were such a notable focus of their aid and welfare work. It is also striking that those who have recently explored the political and propaganda dimensions of the policy of strategic resettlement offer no commentary on how NGOs sought to challenge the claims about PVs

²⁶ Maia Chenaux Repond, *Leading From Behind: Women in Community Development in Rhodesia, 1973-1979*, (Harare, 2017).

which were propagated by the white-settler state and also how they sought to make known its dreadful results.

My research project has several objectives. It will seek to provide the first detailed account of the relief operations of the NGOs in Rhodesia's protected villages, outlining the practical and geographic dimensions of their various relief programmes. Coupled with this, my study aims to explore the ideology and attitudes of various NGOs with respect to the victims of forced villagisation. The thesis recovers also the unknown history of NGO relationships with the Rhodesian state and guerrillas with particular reference to the policy of strategic resettlement. It also aims to identify the spectrum of differing NGO relations with the white-settler regime and offers a systematic comparison of how these NGOs related to the Rhodesian state. My study will also consider the relationship of NGOs (particularly Oxfam) with the UK government with respect to strategic resettlement and in the context of the UK's broader political interest in the Rhodesian question and the illegality of the country's regime. A particular area of exploration is the dilemma faced by NGOs which, even when critical of the regime, could stray into contributing to a Rhodesian security force policy by assisting the victims of the strategic resettlement and thereby making the PVs workable.

Overall, my research seeks to provide a systematic enquiry into NGO activity in Rhodesia's protected villages, one which can be melded into the broader social, political, and military history of the Zimbabwean Liberation War.

* * *

The data on which this dissertation rests has been drawn from multiple sources. Newspapers – notably those of Rhodesia but also the international press – were explored. In the UK, the following collections in the British National Archives were mined: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) records which

concern themselves with strategic resettlement and the role of NGOs. I have also consulted the records of certain NGOs, including the British Red Cross Archive (London), the Oxfam Archives (Bodleian Library, Oxford) and the Salvation Army Archive at William Booth College (London). This has been supplemented by research into records available at various university libraries in the UK. These include the Catholic Commission of Justice and Peace papers held at both the Borthwick Institute of Archives, University of York and at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at Senate House in London. Various Catholic and Rhodesia publications were available from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

Much of this dissertation, however, draws upon archival material from research conducted in Zimbabwe during 2019. These archival materials, supplemented by other sources referred to, enabled me to provide a systematic rendering of NGOs and strategic resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War. Particularly useful in the National Archives of Zimbabwe were the collections donated by Christian Care, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and the International Defence and Aid Fund, as well the private collection of the former provincial community development officer, Maia Chenux Repond (an employee of Internal Affairs who had worked in the protected villages). Sundry materials and periodicals, including issues and cuttings from *The Rhodesia Herald* and *The Sunday Mail*, were also available in this archive. I also carried out research in the Matabeleland branch of the National Archives of Zimbabwe in Bulawayo. Other helpful sources in Zimbabwe were the archival holdings of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) held in the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Library in Harare and the press cuttings related to enforced villagization in the holdings of *The Herald* archive in Harare.

It would be well now to reflect on the methodological choices and constraints that have shaped my research. Firstly, I made the conscious decision to undertake largely archival

research in Zimbabwe. The clearance regime was a major factor in this decision. To undertake field research, including research in the National Archives of Zimbabwe, clearance is required via the Research Council of Zimbabwe (RCZ) at a cost of US\$500. The process of obtaining research clearance can take several months and requires institutional affiliation with a local university. Before the clearance was granted an interview with the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) was required. During the interview I had to provide a detailed itinerary of my research.²⁷ To maximize my chances of clearance I made it explicitly clear that I would be mainly using the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) where my activity could be easily confirmed by state employees. The parameters of my research were also set by the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. My archival work was carried out in the period following Mugabe's downfall in November 2017 and the waves of violence surrounding the Zimbabwean elections in August 2018. Due to this volatile situation, a safety plan was agreed with my home institution, which made it explicitly clear that research would have predominantly to take place in Harare. Moreover, severe fuel shortages anyway made it difficult to travel to rural areas to carry out interviews around many of the protected village (PV) sites which would have made collecting oral testimony from the victims of the policy of strategic resettlement very difficult. Moreover, given the repressiveness of the regime, I did not wish cause difficulties or endanger respondents, particularly if they were linked to NGOs, which are viewed suspiciously by government authorities in Zimbabwe.

With regard to the Rhodesian state papers in the National Archive of Zimbabwe, it is important to note that, upon the transition to independence in the spring of 1980, many state records from the Rhodesian state either went 'missing', were destroyed or were kept in private

²⁷ See my research note Ryan Clarke, 'Navigating NGO records in Zimbabwe' in Sue Onslow, 'Research Notes Special Collection: The Cold War in Southern Africa', *Cold War History*, Vol 22, No. 3, (2022), pp.254-258.

hands.²⁸ For my research, I had hoped to make extensive use of records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – the body responsible for implementing the villagization programme during the Rhodesian conflict. However, due to the extensive removal or destruction of much documentary evidence, I was unable to make any meaningful use of these records. The only records I was able to access were those from the Community Development section of the Department of Internal Affairs which had been donated to the NAZ after independence by a former Provincial Community Development Officer, Mala Cheneaux Repond. I was also unable to consult the Rhodesian Army Archive, now located in the UK, to which access is highly restricted and which is not housed in a public institution since the closure in 2011 of the Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol which had acted as the repository for this rich collection.²⁹ On the other side, many documents pertaining to the liberation fighters' role in the war were largely absent from the NAZ aside from official publications and propaganda literature that has been widely disseminated. The official record of ZANLA (the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army), including military reports, have been retained by ZANU-PF and are housed in their own archive in Harare. Whilst having the necessary clearance to enter this archive, I decided against it due to a concern not to draw the ruling party's attention to my work as a critical researcher in what is a repressive environment. For this reason, made almost exclusive use of the ZANU materials donated to the National Archives.

NGO records central to my study are constituted in part by manuscripts donated to the National Archives of Zimbabwe by Christian Care, the Catholic Church, the Red Cross and the

²⁸ See Julie Frederikse, *None But Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe*, (Harare, 1983), p.4, Bessant, 'Descent From Privilege', p.403, Schmidt, *Colonialism and Violence*, p.17.

²⁹ Luise White is one of the most recent scholars to have consulted the Rhodesian Army Archive. See Luise White, *Fighting and Writing: The Rhodesian Army at War and Postwar*, (London, 2021). It is important to note that the archive was taken back by the 'Rhodesians' following the closure of the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in 2011. I had also been informed that there were concerns regarding ownership of the records. Indeed, the Zimbabwean state considers these records its property. The National Archives of Zimbabwe is currently seeking the repatriation of the Rhodesian Army Archive: see Forget Chatera Zambuko, 'Ngaadzoke Please, 'A Dare/ Inkundla for the Rhodesian Army Records' in James Lowry (ed.), *Disputed Archival Heritage*, (London, 2022), pp.120-134.

International Defence and Aid Fund. Many of these records were fragmentary and required corroboration by archival sources available in non-state archives in the United Kingdom and, in the case of the Catholics, in Harare. Some records, including Christian Care's papers in the NAZ, though comprehensive were damaged due to improper storage. Nonetheless, these records were invaluable to this study and offered detailed insight into these organizations' articulation with strategic resettlement.

It would be easy to suggest that humanitarian organizations assumed a somewhat neutral or even innocent and honourable role in the Zimbabwean Liberation War. Yet, it is imperative to read their sources "against the grain".³⁰ Hence I am concerned in this thesis to register an organization's position regarding the politics of the war and my study will reveal that a typology of NGO relations with the Rhodesian state and the nationalist guerrillas emerged. As we shall see, most organizations were led by whites who wrote most of their documentation, and I make clear where racist attitudes towards the victims of the war are present: this was especially marked in the views of some regarding the causes of malnutrition in the PVs and the alleged benefits of the villagization programme.

I was, of course, in Zimbabwe as a 'white' and 'foreign' researcher. Residing in the relatively affluent suburb of Borrowdale in northern Harare while I engaged in my research, I was offered a snapshot of the privileged existence that had been (and in places continues to be) enjoyed by the white-settler community. Despite shortages and hyperinflation, I benefited from access to foreign currency and links with more affluent members of the white community which provided a certain security and contacts which enabled me to carry out much of my research in relative safety. However, I was determined to relate to black Zimbabweans whose rural

³⁰ David M. Gordon, 'Reading the Archives as Sources', Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History. 20 Nov. 2018, p.9.

communities were the principal victims of the enforced villagization programme during the war. While trying to learn the Shona language and to learn about the dynamics of Shona rural society, I was blessed to develop many important friendships that provided important insights which helped me understand better the culture and society deeply violated by strategic resettlement.

Finally, it would be important to reflect upon my position as a Christian researcher. During my doctorate, I came to profess the Christian faith and became an active member of an Anglican congregation. During my time in Zimbabwe, I was a congregant in Northside Community Church and regularly engaged in prayer and spiritual reflection with other Zimbabwean Christians, even amongst the staff at the NAZ. Despite my Protestant disposition, I also developed a very close relationship with a Catholic archivist, Sister Assumpta Mapungwana, at the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference Library. A growing theological understanding shaped how I read certain sources, especially allowing me to understand the spiritual dimensions of Christian humanitarianism and missionary activity, the emphasis given to the practical aspects of Gospel ministry, as well as divisions between different Churches. All this has shaped chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this study.

* * *

The dissertation is structured in this way. Chapter one offers a survey of the scale and impact of strategic resettlement, providing a contextual frame which underpins the broader analysis of the role of the NGOs in the subsequent chapters. The next two chapters consider the role of the churches in responding to the crisis caused by strategic resettlement. The first these deals with the Catholic Church, explaining its opposition to racial discrimination and the white regime generally and its central role in making known the facts about strategic

resettlement. The geography of the Church's rural missions is sketched, and this is used, in part, to explain its energetic criticism – in great part through the work of its Justice and Peace Commission – of enforced villagisation and Security Force atrocities. Chapter three highlights the role played by the Protestants (Anglicans, Methodists, and the Salvation Army) in meeting the humanitarian needs of inmates in the protected villages. It explores their varying orientations to the regime, noting how – unlike the Catholics – they did not play a radical role in exposing the oppressions and violence of the Security Forces (including with respect to the victims of enforced villagisation) and instead prioritized the humanitarian relief programme to the protected villages. Chapter four outlines the important role played by Christian Care as an internal intercessor between the various organisations relating to the victims of strategic resettlement, and between those organisations, the British government, and the Rhodesian state. As shall be seen, this was crucial since various internal organizations, including the various Christian denominations, were themselves divided in their respective stances to the regime, while international NGOs – importantly, Oxfam, in this context – were unable to operate directly in Rhodesia due to the sanctions attendant upon the regime's international illegitimacy. An intercessor was, therefore, needed and Christian Care fulfilled this role.

The dissertation, having provided something of this with respect to Oxfam in chapter 4 moves then to consider exclusively the role of non-Church NGOs. Chapter five focuses on the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the British Red Cross and the Rhodesia Red Cross. It explores the important intermediary role of the ICRC, especially in its efforts to ensure that both the Rhodesian forces and the guerrillas adhered to the principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention in their prosecution of the war. The scale of the humanitarian crisis amongst those forcibly resettled required a coming together of the ICRC and the Rhodesia Red Cross despite their markedly different stances to the Smith regime, so that medical outreach and relief programmes could be brought to the PVs. The final chapter then

outlines the role played by the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign and investigates if its work in countering malnutrition in the protected villages – and more particularly its ideology and connections to the regime – necessitate calling it something of a sham NGO.

This study, then, focuses on all the key NGOs – whether Churches or non-Church organisations – that related to strategic resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War. It excludes from consideration certain organizations that sometimes worked in conjunction with the NGOs here identified but that were not centrally involved in their work. Examples of such organisations would be the International Defence and Aid Fund, an organisation that disseminated information (referred to throughout this work) about strategic resettlement or the American organization, World Vision, which supported the Salvation Army's feeding schemes and nutritional education programmes in the PVs. A range of other international NGOs made financial contributions to the relief efforts in the PVs but did so through the organisations that lie at the heart of this study.

Sadly, this study of the role of non-governmental organizations in the Zimbabwean Liberation War and their responses to forced civilian resettlement seems once again topical as such organizations have once again come to the fore responding, for example, to the waves of internal and external displacement resulting from the unfolding Russian-Ukrainian War, the Syrian Civil War, the persecutions of the Rohingya in Myanmar and the catastrophic conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria. My study has resonances with all this, though it focuses on a different kind of forced displacement – that linked to wars of counterinsurgency – and, in this regard, it offers the first systematic study of the role played by NGOs in the Zimbabwean Liberation War.

Chapter 1: The Zimbabwean Liberation War and Strategic Resettlement

The origins of the Zimbabwean Liberation War were in the broader political developments associated with decolonization and the attempt by the Smith regime to forestall this process. Settler colonialism in Rhodesia was characterized by deep racial inequalities with political power monopolized by the whites and its African majority largely disenfranchised through lacking basic property and voting rights. There were deep socio-economic inequalities as shown by the disproportionate levels of wealth, income, and property ownership between its European and African populations, something that was particularly evident in the rural world where the war was overwhelmingly to be fought. Starting in the 1930s, the enterprise of African cattle farmers and maize growers was taxed and manipulated to subsidise the earnings of white ranchers and farmers.¹ Discriminatory pricing policies were compounded by segregation of the land, a policy which white farmers had long called for.² The outcome of this was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. This Act divided Rhodesia's 96 million acres as follows: 49 million acres for white settlers, and 29 million acres for Africans, the remainder controlled by the state and unassigned to any racial group or designated as game reserves or forestry areas.³ Importantly, 70 % of arable land suitable for commercial farming was earmarked for European use.⁴ The legislation also set aside 7.5 million acres as 'native purchase areas' for African

¹ Ian Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle*, (London, 1988), pp.184 -185.

² Robin Palmer, 'The Agricultural History of Rhodesia' in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons (eds.) *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, (London, 1977), pp.221, 235.

³ Victor E.M. Mashingaidze, 'Agrarian Change From Above: The Southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act and African Response', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1991), pp. 557-588

⁴ Montague Yudelman, *Africans on the Land: Economic Problems of African Agricultural Development in Southern, Central and East Africa, with Special Reference to S. Rhodesia*, (Cambridge,1964), p.78.

buyers, the quid pro quo being that they could no longer buy land in the better situated areas designated for Europeans.⁵ Later, these socio-economic and racial inequalities were deepened with the passing of the Land Husbandry Act (1951). Ostensibly the Act sought to tackle food shortages and stabilize the rural population in the poverty-stricken native purchase areas by encouraging better farming methods to increase yields via the allocation of individual privately-owned holdings. However, instead it led to the further dispossession of land and cattle and, as a result, many were forced to turn to migrant labour.⁶

It was in the context of such discriminatory legislation and, of course, the refusal of political rights, that African nationalism grew exponentially during the 1950s. In 1955 the Youth League was formed demanding universal suffrage.⁷ In 1957, it merged with the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC), which had been formed under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo in response to the Land Husbandry Act. The SRANC was a merger between the Southern Rhodesia African League and the City Youth League.⁸ This organization was an important precursor to the much more well-known Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). The SRANC was banned in February 1959 and re-emerged as the National Democratic Party (NDP) in January 1960. Whilst the latter was banned in December 1961, it reappeared as ZAPU that same month.⁹ However, divisions emerged amongst African nationalists. Leading such dissent was Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe who formed the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) in 1964.¹⁰ The challenge of African nationalism during the 1960s led to Mugabe, Nkomo and Sithole remaining in detention until 1974.¹¹ Another important

⁵ Palmer and Parsons, *The Roots of Rural Poverty*, p.236.

⁶ Mashingaidze, 'Agrarian Change From Above', pp. 557-588

⁷ Eliakim M. Ibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union, 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*, (Trenton, 2004), p.34.

⁸ Mashingaidze, 'Agrarian Change From Above', pp. 557-588

⁹ J.K. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London, 1985), pp.4-5.

¹⁰ Peter L Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History*, (Barnsley, 2008), p.27.

¹¹ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, pp.4-5

development in African nationalism took place in the early 1970s when Abel Muzorewa and Canaan Banana – supported by the nationalists in prison – formed the United African National Council (UANC) to oppose a settlement struck between the Smith regime and the British government which allowed an impossibly-long transition to majority rule and an end of sanctions.¹² However, unlike ZANU and ZAPU which, as we will see, turned to guerrilla warfare Muzorewa's party formally rejected violence and due its relatively moderate stance remained the only legal African nationalist party until the end of the war.

UDI, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith regime in 1965, attempted to maintain white rule in perpetuity and was central to the origins of the war, though the extension of racial segregation after it, in the late 1960s, is held to be a key factor in the nationalists' turn to armed resistance.¹³ The Land Tenure Act (1969) further deepened racial segregation in Rhodesia. It allocated grossly disproportionate amounts of land to the European and African populations (45,000 000 acres each), despite the black population being twenty times the size of the white.¹⁴ Like previous land legislation, this was accompanied by widespread evictions of the black peasantry.¹⁵ This served as a direct precursor to the waves of forced resettlement which would take place during the war as part of strategic resettlement. In fact, between 1969 and 1976 such resettlement was to see the population in the Tribal Trust Lands and Purchase Areas increase by 50% which compounded the issues of soil erosion and land scarcity.¹⁶ Prior to the war, there were some elements of resistance to the land policies, as shown by the widely publicized case of the Tangwena. Situated in the hills around Inyanga

¹² Wazha G. Morapedi and Bongani G. Gumbo, 'Schisms in Zimbabwean Anti-Colonial Movements in Botswana, 1959-1979', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2016), pp. 361-379

¹³ Josiah Tungmirai 'Recruitment to ZANLA: Building up a War Machine' in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, (London, 1996), p.37.

¹⁴ Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *A Guide to the Land Tenure Act*, (Salisbury, 1970).

¹⁵ *The Guardian*, 8th September 1974 in British National Archives (Hereafter referred to as the BNA), FCO 36/1371, 'Dispute between Tangwena tribe and regime in Rhodesia' (1973).

¹⁶ Bhebe and Ranger, *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, p.37.

(Nyanga) in Manicaland, the Tangwena were for a time able to evade forcible resettlement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.¹⁷ This was one of the first significant instances of peasant resistance to the land policies of the Smith regime. Ultimately it was the Tangwena leader, Chief Rekayi, who enabled Robert Mugabe to escape from Rhodesia following his release from prison in 1975.¹⁸

As noted earlier, the growth of nationalism within Rhodesia was centrally linked to the broader process of decolonisation which swept Africa in the 1950s and 60s. Amongst its neighbours that were British colonies, Southern Rhodesia was the exception to this rule. Since 1923, the colony had been governed by its sizeable white minority population under the principle of 'responsible government' and it controlled domestic matters, the police and the civil service. Despite the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, Southern Rhodesia remained the dominant economic, political, and military entity. In 1963, the Federation was dissolved, and Malawian and Zambian independence attained the following year. However regional decolonization and calls for majority rule led to the rise and subsequent election of the far-right Rhodesia Front (RF) party under the leadership of Winston Field in 1962. The RF was strenuously white supremacist and capitalized on white fears of the violent transition to majority rule that had been witnessed in the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). It was Field's successor Ian Smith (who became Prime Minister in 1964) who turned to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11th November 1965 to preserve white-settler rule in Rhodesia.

UDI garnered an international response in the form economic and political sanctions which were enacted against the rebellious regime by the United Kingdom and the United

¹⁷ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Rhodesia: Land Apportionment Act' in BNA FC0 36/1371 'Dispute Between Tangwena Tribe and Regime in Rhodesia (1973)'.

¹⁸ Pius S. Nyambara, 'Review of Suffering for Territory: Race, Place, and power in Zimbabwe, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol.40, No.3 (2007), pp.513-515.

Nations. Initially, however UDI provoked a limited response from the African nationalists. At this stage the nationalists believed that Britain would stage a military intervention against the Smith regime.¹⁹ However, such a course of action was ruled out by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.²⁰ In fact, given the racial order and political repression in Southern Rhodesia, the recruitment and training of insurgents had already begun in 1963. And there had been limited guerrilla activity as shown with the actions of ZANU's 'Crocodile Gang' who killed a white farmer at a roadblock near Melsetter on 4th July 1964.²¹

The Zimbabwean Liberation War

Until 1972, such guerrilla activity as there was, was negligible and largely concentrated around the Zambezi and easily contained by the Rhodesian Security Forces and their South African allies.²² The Battle of Sinoia on April 28th, 1966, is often cited as the start of the war. In this small engagement, a group of 21 ZANU insurgents infiltrated from Zambia with the aim to cut powerlines and attack white commercial farms around Sinoia (Chinhoyi). However, this attack was limited in nature and easily contained by the British South Africa Police and the Rhodesian Security Forces.²³ In December 1972, the liberation struggle began in earnest with the attack on Altena Farm in the Centenary District (Mashonaland Central). By this stage increased opportunities for ZANLA incursions had emerged following FRELIMO's liberation of Mozambique's Tete province which was adjacent to Mashonaland.²⁴ Until 1976 the war was largely concentrated in the north-east in the operational zone codenamed 'Hurricane' in

¹⁹ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.29.

²⁰ Philip Murphy, 'An Intricate and Distasteful Subject': British Planning for the Use of Force against the European Settlers of Central Africa, 1952-65', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 121, No. 492 (Jun. 2006), pp.746-777.

²¹ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.4.

²² Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, pp.29-33.

²³ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.29.

²⁴ Ronald Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe*, (Oxford, 1990), p.83, *The Rhodesia Herald*, 22nd December 1972 in National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter to referred to as NAZ) 'Newspapers'.

Mashonaland. At this stage the guerrillas principally operated from Mozambique and Zambia close to the Rhodesian frontiers. By January 1976, the war spread to Rhodesia's eastern zone as a whole following Mozambique's independence, with the two new operational areas 'Thrasher' and 'Repulse' opening in February and May respectively (Fig.1). In August 1976, another operational area 'Tangent' emerged in Matabeleland. Here the guerrillas operated from Botswana and Zambia. Additional operational areas 'Grapple' (in the Midlands) emerged in August 1977 and 'Splinter' (near Lake Kariba) in June 1978 (Fig.1) as the war spread throughout Rhodesia.

To give a sense of the escalation of the war between 1972 and 1976, according to official figures, 215 Security Force personnel and 1,917 insurgents were killed, but in 1977 alone 197 Rhodesian soldiers and 1,774 guerrillas were killed in combat. In early 1976, it was believed that there were 700 guerrillas operating in Rhodesia. By 1979, there were 10,000.²⁵ In addition, by 1979, Nkomo's conventional forces positioned in Zambia had increased to approximately 20,000 men allegedly equipped with MiG fighters and armoured vehicles. However, unlike in the Portuguese colonial war, liberated zones like those in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau were limited in number, and the Rhodesian Security Forces remained undefeated in a strictly military sense despite the apparent stalemate which had emerged by 1979, when the war had become uncontrollable.²⁶

Ultimately, the war was ended by a negotiated settlement. This had been preceded by the abortive Internal Settlement signed on March 3rd, 1978, by Ian Smith and moderate nationalists led by Muzorewa. Whilst this indicated a shift towards majority rule, the agreement excluded both ZANU and ZAPU, failed to gain support from the international community and

²⁵ Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*, p.84.

²⁶ I Major Charles M. Lohman and Major Robert I. MacPherson, 'Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat', USMC Seminar paper delivered 7 June 1983, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, p.52.

the war continued to escalate. However, the British Government ultimately sponsored an agreed transition through the Lancaster House Agreement signed on 21st December 1979 by the nationalist organisations and by the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government led by Muzorewa. However, Zimbabwean independence was preceded by the temporary imposition of direct British rule under the governorship of Lord Soames between December 1979 and April 1980.²⁷ A ceasefire was monitored through a deployment of British and Commonwealth troops who were also to monitor the forthcoming elections.²⁸ The elections in February 1980 swept Mugabe to power the following April thus heralding the transition to black majority rule in a newly independent Zimbabwe. By this time the war is estimated to have cost 30,000 dead and 275,000 wounded, which included soldiers, guerrillas, and black and white civilians; in



addition, it had created 1.5 million refugees.²⁹

Fig.1 Operational Zones of the Rhodesian Security Forces

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rhodesian_Security_Forces_operational_areas.png

²⁷ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.167.

²⁸ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.171.

²⁹ Michael Evans, 'The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965–80', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 175–195, June 2007, p.176.

The guerrillas who fought the war that ended white rule were divided into two main forces. The larger was the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed wing of ZANU. Initially led by Herbert Chitepo (until 1972) and then by Josiah Tongogara (1973-1979), it was largely comprised of people from the Shona-speaking ethnic groups and followed Maoist principles of guerrilla warfare. ZANLA operated principally in the north and east of the country, in the Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland West, Manicaland and Victoria provinces (Fig.2). The other guerrilla force was the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) which was the armed wing of Nkomo's ZAPU. Led by Dumisa Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, it was rooted predominantly in Ndebele-speaking ethnic groups and operated in the south and western areas of the country, in the provinces of Matabeleland and Mashonaland West (Fig 3). Despite clear ethnic divisions between both forces, they formed a military coalition known as the Patriotic Front in October 1976.³⁰ The guerrilla armies received material aid and training from the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, China, and North Korea,³¹ though ZAPU/ZIPRA principally obtained such support from the Soviet Union and its allies,³² while ZANU/ZANLA gained material support principally from China.³³ The guerrillas combat strategy utilized hit and run raids in rural areas with the insurgents operating in small groups (around 10 to 30) targeting white farms, roads, railways, military or administrative targets, for example.³⁴ These guerrilla units were supported by mujibas, (male youths, usually adolescents) who were used in sorties involving sabotage of communication lines and transport links, reconnaissance and even enforced punitive actions including beatings

³⁰ Timothy Scarnecchia, 'Front Line Diplomats: African Diplomatic Representations of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, 1976-1978', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Volume 43, No. 1 (2017), pp. 107-124

³¹ Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*, p.103.

³² Dumiso Dabengwa, 'Relations between ZAPU and the USSR, 1960s-1970s: A Personal View', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Volume 43, No.1 (2017), pp.215-223.

³³ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, pp.33-4, 73-4.

³⁴ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, pp.98-99.

and killings of those deemed collaborators with the Rhodesian Security Forces.³⁵ Female youths were often deployed as *chimbwidos* and mainly carried out menial domestic tasks assigned by the guerrilla fighters.³⁶ The guerrillas also engaged in acts which targeted the civilians or civilian infrastructure. There were a number of incidents within Salisbury proper during the war, including the bombing of a Woolworths department store in 1977, the destruction of the capital's main fuel depot in December 1978 and an attack on Salisbury International Airport in 1979.³⁷ Elsewhere a surface to air missile launched by ZIPRA guerrillas shot down a civilian airliner in September 1978 near Karoi (Mashonaland West), with 38 people killed during the crash and 10 survivors killed by the guerrillas at the crash site. Later, a similar attack in February 1979 near Kariba led to 59 fatalities.³⁸ There were also some guerrilla killings of missionaries and, on a greater scale, of black civilians who were held to be collaborators with the enemy.

Fig.2. ZANLA Guerrilla Operational Zones



https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ZANLA_provinces_and_sectors.png

³⁵ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.99.

³⁶ Ishmael Mazambani, 'Did Children Matter? Unprotected children in "Protected Villages" created by the Rhodesian Regime During the Liberation Struggle for Zimbabwe (1970-1979)' (PhD Thesis, Midland State University, 2016), p.3.

³⁷ *The New York Times*, August 7th, 1977, and February 21st, 1979; *The Herald*, 2nd April 2015.

³⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 5th September 1978; *The New York Times*, 13th, 1979.

Fig.3 ZIPRA Operational Zones



https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ZIPRA_sectors.png

The Rhodesian Security Forces comprised a wide range of units, many of them depending on conscripts and reservists: there were a set of Rhodesia Regiments, the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), the white-officered but black rank-and-file Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), the Rhodesian Special Air Services (Rhodesian SAS) and the Selous Scouts, a notorious group that often masqueraded as guerrillas. The British South African Police – especially its Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (PATU) – also played an important role in Security Force operations in the war. Auxiliary forces – all composed of African recruits except for the whites commanding them – included the Guard Force and the District Security Assistants (DSAs), as well as the Special Forces (the latter set up under the Muzorewa regime towards the end of the war). The Guard Force and the DSAs played an important role in that element of the Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy that focused on the enforced villagization programme.

Aside from strategic resettlement of the peasant population and the policy of curfews and ‘free fire zones’ described below, the military strategy of the Rhodesian Security Forces centred around a ‘Fireforce’ strategy: a tactic utilizing helicopter borne commandos to trap and attack the insurgents on the ground. This was facilitated by the almost total air supremacy of the Rhodesian forces. This strategy used units from the RLI, RAR, the Air Force and the Rhodesian SAS and accounted for almost three quarters of the 9,000 insurgents killed in the war.³⁹

There is evidence that the Rhodesian Security Forces utilized biological and chemical warfare to target the guerrillas and their supporters by, for example, poisoning water supplies and uniforms.⁴⁰ Alongside this, the infamous Selous Scouts engaged in clandestine reconnaissance missions and raids on guerrilla bases, the turning of captured insurgents and operations in which they masqueraded as the insurgents, facilitating their attacks on guerrillas and refugee camps in Mozambique.⁴¹ Externally, the Rhodesian forces engaged against guerrilla cum refugee camps during the war. The Selous Scouts played a leading role in the ground operations and were involved in the infamous Nyadzonya (Nyadzonia) raid in Mozambique on 9th August 1976.⁴² Approximately 1,200 people (including civilians and ZANLA cadres) were killed in this raid.⁴³ Later in response to the guerrilla attacks on civilian airliners, several airstrikes were launched against guerrilla encampments. Many killed though were refugees who were camped close to the guerrilla positions in Mozambique and Zambia.⁴⁴

³⁹ *The New York Times*, 4th July 1979.

⁴⁰ Glenn Cross, *Dirty War: Rhodesia and chemical biological warfare: 1975-1980*, (Solihul, 2017). Ian Martinez, ‘The history of the use of bacteriological and chemical agents during Zimbabwe’s liberation war of 1965–80 by Rhodesian forces’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 23, No 6 (2002), pp 1159–1179.

⁴¹ The Anti-Apartheid Movement, *Guardians of White Power: the Rhodesian Security Forces*, (London, 1978), pp.6-7

⁴² Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, pp.43-4, 106; *The Herald*, 8th August 2016.

⁴³ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.36.

⁴⁴ *The Washington Post*, 18th February 1979; Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.155.

Internally, as will be shown below, civilians were also caught up in Security Force attacks on guerrillas and during the curfew hours in the free-fire zones.

In various ways, and as will be shown in chapters two and three, rural missionaries – a group important in this study – were targeted by both sides. However, it was the actions of the guerrillas that were widely publicized as highlighted by the coverage of the infamous Vumba massacre at Elim Mission (Manicaland) on 23rd June 1978 where ZANLA guerrillas killed 8 missionaries and their children.⁴⁵ Between 1972 and 1978 nearly 40 missionaries were killed by the guerrillas with many others subject to harsh repercussions from the government due to their failure to report the presence of the guerrillas.⁴⁶

Control of the rural population was a central part of both sides' military strategy in the war. The guerrillas followed a Maoist strategy of operating amongst the rural population, mobilizing it, and harnessing it to their needs. The insurgents certainly procured significant material support from the African rural population, either by consent or by means of coercion. Night-time pungwes were held by political commissars to generate support for the insurgents in the 'Chimurenga' tradition which highlighted the land alienation, rural poverty, racial discrimination, and brutality of the Smith regime. At the same, alleged collaborators or 'sell-outs' were targeted by the guerrillas with executions and homes and sometimes entire kraals (settlements) destroyed.⁴⁷ African labourers on white-owned farms were also targeted. On December 21st, 1976, 27 black workers were murdered by the guerrillas on the Aberfoyle tea estate (in the Eastern Highlands, Manicaland).⁴⁸ After this, protected villages in the nearby Holdenby Tribal Trust were linked to the need to provide labour to the nearby tea estates.⁴⁹ In

⁴⁵ *The Washington Post*, 25th June 1978.

⁴⁶ *Time*, July 10th, 1978.

⁴⁷ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.101.

⁴⁸ *The New York Times*, December 22nd, 1976.

⁴⁹ Heike Schmidt *Colonialism and Violence in Zimbabwe: A History of Suffering*, (Harare, 2013), p.184.

1978, a deliberate policy was adopted by the guerrillas to kill labourers who refused to cease working on white commercial farms.⁵⁰

In response to the guerrilla mobilization strategy, the Smith regime enacted a series of counterinsurgency measures. This was construed as a broad policy of “convincing the minds and winning the hearts of the people”; in fact, it oppressively targeted the black rural population.⁵¹ One of the first counterinsurgency measures enacted was imposing collective fines on communities that did not report the presence of guerrillas: this included fixed penalties and the confiscation of cattle, a crucial material and cultural resource of the peasants. In January 1973, administrative officials were empowered to impose these fines on the inhabitants of any area, if in the view of the officials the inhabitants had actively supported the insurgents or failed to report the presence of guerrillas or knowledge of where their weapons were stored.⁵² In addition, curfews and so-called ‘free-fire zones were gradually established throughout the operational areas to curtail the movement of the insurgents and their supporters. Alongside these methods, the Security Forces created a cordon sanitaire along the frontier with Mozambique consisting of fences and minefields and periodic patrols in hinder the movement of the insurgents and their civilian supporters. The aim was to create a broad operational zone along Rhodesia’s north-eastern frontier in which the Security Forces could move unhindered.⁵³ Between December 1972 and the end of July 1978, the official figures spoke of 322 curfew breakers killed by the Security Forces, an additional 263 people killed due to being “caught in the crossfire” and a further 645 persons labelled as “collaborators” of the guerrillas met their deaths. Security Force personnel were effectively given carte blanche through the legal immunity conferred on them through the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975. Now

⁵⁰ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.101.

⁵¹ Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.101.

⁵² Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, *Civil War in Rhodesia – A Report from the Rhodesian Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace*, (London, 1976), p.16.

⁵³ *The Washington Post*, September 11th, 1978.

beyond the law, police and military personnel routinely used torture in their interrogations.⁵⁴ The culmination of this regime of impunity was the imposition of martial law throughout the operational areas from September 1978.⁵⁵

Food control measures, codenamed ‘Operation Turkey’, were also instituted in 1978. Moreover, utilizing martial law legislation, the Security Forces were empowered to destroy crops, livestock, huts, and personal property of any civilian they suspected of supporting the insurgents.⁵⁶ It was strategic resettlement, however, that would become the cornerstone of the Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy against the civilian population.

The Origins, Extent and Geography of Strategic Resettlement.

Whilst there is not an exact figure regarding the numbers, anywhere between 260,000 to 580,000 people were forcibly relocated either to the Protected Villages (PVs) or Consolidated Villages (CVs) in the war.⁵⁷ To give a sense of the costs involved, an average village cost the government between \$30,000 and R\$45,000 to construct,⁵⁸ and the villagization programme in Chiweshe cost more than R\$3 million.⁵⁹ Unsurprisingly, the expenditure of the Department of Internal Affairs – the state department administering strategic resettlement– rose by nearly 320% between 1971/2 to 1975/6.⁶⁰ District Commissioners and armed District Security Assistants (DSAs) played important roles in enforcing and maintaining the PV system. From 1975, the responsibility of guarding the PVs in many areas was handed to Guard Force,

⁵⁴ Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*, pp.94 -95.

⁵⁵ *The Washington Post*, September 11th 1978.

⁵⁶ Kevin Danaher, “The Political Economy of Hunger in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe.”, *A Journal of Opinion*, Vol. 11, No. 3/4 (1981), pp. 33–35.

⁵⁷ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*, (London, 1977), *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 7th 1977 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’. A report from 1980 had this figure at around 350,000, see *The Herald*, 18th July 1980 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

⁵⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 30th May 1977 in NAZ MS 308. *The Sunday Mail*, 19th June, 1977, in NAZ ‘Newspapers’

⁵⁹ <https://rhodesianforces.org/Intafprotectedvillageprogramme.htm> [accessed 4/10/2021 16:53].

⁶⁰ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency*, p.30.

an auxiliary branch of the Security Forces comprising African personnel.⁶¹ This was the Rhodesian version of similar units which were deployed in the resettlement villages in Malaya and Vietnam.⁶² However, despite the raising of Guard Force, Internal Affairs was still responsible for guarding around 50% of the PVs through its DSAs by 1978.⁶³ Towards the end of the war, Muzorewa's private auxiliaries also played an increasing role also in manning the PVs as well as the implementation of the programme.⁶⁴

Strategic resettlement was not invented by the counterinsurgency strategy in Rhodesia. The policy was used by the Spanish in the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) and by the British during the South African War (1898). Both General Weyler in the former case and Lord Kitchener in the latter made extensive use of concentration camps to separate the insurgents from their civilian support base. However, strategic resettlement assumed particular importance during the second half of the 20th century in the context of decolonization and the Cold War. Villagization was a central part of the British counterinsurgency operations in both the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960) in both of which the Rhodesian military were directly involved. Later, the French utilized civilian resettlement and 'concentration' in their own counterinsurgency in the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). Strategic resettlement was also a crucial part of the South Vietnamese and American counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War (1955-1975). The Portuguese also utilized such a strategy in their own anti-guerrilla operations in Angola, and Mozambique

⁶¹ IDAF, *Guardians of White Power*, p.12.

⁶² Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War*, p.58.

⁶³ *The Sunday Mail*, 26th February 1978, NAZ MS 308. Despite the increased role played by Guard Force, Internal Affairs maintained responsibility for 145 PVs by 1977. Generally, where Guard Force personnel were deployed, they would often deputize for the District Security Assistants. In certain areas such as Sinoia/Umvukwe (Mashonaland Central) there were no Guard Force personnel. See Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol. 96.No.7, 30th June 1977, in NAZ MS 311/27/1, Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol.97 No.9, 5th October 1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/3, Hansard: The Senate, Vol. 9, No.7, 30th June 1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/5.

⁶⁴ Joshua Chakawa 'Abel Muzorewa's Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) During and After The War of Liberation in Hurungwe District, Zimbabwe', (PhD Thesis, Midland state University, 2015), pp.110, 197, 198.

during the Portuguese Colonial War (1961-1975) which was closely interconnected with the war in Rhodesia.

The villagization programme in Rhodesia began in the north-east of the country, being first implemented in the Centenary and Mount Darwin areas in 1973.⁶⁵ The first official PV opened in Mukumbura in October 1973.⁶⁶ As the insurgency spread deeper into this zone of Rhodesia, the policy was implemented in the following year in Chiweshe and Madziwa. In Chiweshe, as part of “Operation Overload”, around 46, 690 people were placed into protected villages.⁶⁷ There came to be 21 protected villages in the Chiweshe area, with the population of each of these villages averaging around 3,500, with the largest in Bare holding 4000 residents and the smallest in Chaona holding 800 residents.⁶⁸ In September 1974, around 13,500 were moved into eight villages in Madziwa.⁶⁹ Two PVs had already been ‘voluntarily’ created by the local population here, it was alleged. Later a Salvation Army educational centre at the Bradley Institute became the eleventh PV in Madziwa.⁷⁰ (It might be noted that prior to the creation of the Madziwa PVs, over 200 residents from the area had been forcibly moved to Beit Bridge and closely monitored by the Security Forces due to their failure to report the presence of the guerrillas in April 1974).⁷¹ The process continued apace in the north-east. In 1975 around 100 people in Mudzi district who had lived near the Tete Road (near the Mozambiquan frontier) were forced into Makaha PV and by August 1976, eight PVs had been established in the area.⁷² During 1975, a variation of the policy emerged in Mrewa with the construction of the

⁶⁵ Hansard: The Senate, Vol. 9, No.7, 30th June 1977, NAZ MS 311/27/5.

⁶⁶ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol. 3. No.3 in NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: Focus on Rhodesia March 1976.

⁶⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 15th August 1974 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

⁶⁸ C.E Mckone, ‘Tour Report- C.E McKone Visit to Rhodesia on Monday/Tuesday 2nd to 3rd September, BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) ‘Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to ‘Protected Villages’ in Chiweshe’ (1974).

⁶⁹ *The Sunday Mail*, 8th September 1974 in NAZ, ‘Newspapers’.

⁷⁰ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.86.

⁷¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 12th April 1974 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

⁷² A.K.H Weinrich, ‘Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.3, No.2 (Apr, 1977), p.215

consolidated villages (CVs). CVs were, at least, in theory neither fenced nor garrisoned and the villagers not subject to movement controls; however, they still had been removed from their original lands. In June 1975, 7,500 people in the Mrewa area were initially resettled into CVs as an experiment.⁷³ By the end of 1975 about 60,000 people in this district had been moved into 39 consolidated villages. In a single month – July – in the same year around 86,000 people in Uzumba were also moved into CVs.⁷⁴

So far, the policy had affected the north-east of the country but during 1976 as the war spread to Manicaland province in the east of the country, so did the policy of strategic resettlement. In June 1976, around 6,000 people from Chikore mission farm (near Chipinge) were resettled in three CVs.⁷⁵ In the Honde Valley (Manicaland) the villagization programme was implemented as part of Operation Rivet which lasted from March 1977 to the beginning of 1978. In this period, 16 PVs with an average population of 1,500 to 3,000 in each were created.⁷⁶ The policy had become an extremely widespread phenomenon across the country. In fact, by August 1977 it was reported that there were around 209 protected villages, of which 165 were in Mashonaland, 31 in Manicaland and 13 in Victoria Province, with a total number of about 600,000 inhabitants.⁷⁷ In response to the growing ZIPRA insurgency, the policy was also implemented in parts of Matabeleland, albeit in a much more limited form. Still by April 1978, the policy was being implemented in Matabeleland South with 7 villages being constructed around Beit Bridge.⁷⁸ There was much less implementation of the policy in Matabeleland North province, but still some examples of it as at Binga where 38 families were

⁷³ Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', p.215. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.4.

⁷⁴ Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', p.216.


⁷⁵ Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', p.217.

⁷⁶ Schmidt, *Colonialism and Violence in Zimbabwe*, p.182

⁷⁷ 'Minutes of Christian Care National Executive Meeting Held on Saturday 27th August 1977' in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1.

⁷⁸ <https://www.freewebs.com/dudleywall/keepsandpvs.htm> [accessed 16:04 15/05/20]

located in a PV (Negonde Keep) by May 1977,⁷⁹ and in the Wankie (Hwange) area where approximately 500 people had been moved into PVs by April 1978, with more people due to be so moved imminently.⁸⁰



Adapted from:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rhodesia_protected_villages_1978.png

Given the importance of strategic resettlement to the Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy, it is not surprising that the PVs and CVs became important targets for the guerrillas. ZANU and ZAPU were clear in their opposition to the policy. Their propaganda consistently

⁷⁹ Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee- Bulawayo Office Co-Ordinator's Progress Report for the Period May to August 1977, NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1

⁸⁰ 'Minutes of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee Meeting held in the Co ordinators Office at 16:00 hrs on Monday 5th June 1978' in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

denounced its punitive nature and referred to the PVs as either ‘detention’ or ‘concentration camps’.⁸¹ (Notwithstanding the validity of the critique they offered regarding the punitive nature of the policy and inmate alienation, any mention of guerrilla coercion of the peasantry in the PVs and CVs was absent in these publications.) Writing to the Catholic Institute of International Relations in October 1978, Mugabe himself had explicitly outlined the nature of ZANLA strategy regarding the protected and consolidated villages: guerrillas would attack and destroy them regarding them as mere “civil and military instruments for the oppression and suppression of the Zimbabwean people. It was on this basis, he declared, that ‘we have, over the past twelve months been carrying out a concerted campaign of destroying all “keeps”, [and] the enemy then decided to abandon the rest of all those “keeps” that he could not defend’.⁸² One can find countless examples of reports documenting the attack on the PVs in the *Zimbabwe News*.⁸³ If this source was likely to exaggerate ZANLA actions in this regard, it is clear that guerrilla attacks put the system under significant pressure. However, in early 1977 there had been 70 attacks as admitted by Provincial Commissioner for Internal Affairs where 114 officials had been killed, 25 missing or abducted and 243 wounded because of these attacks.⁸⁴ In fact, around 10% of protected and consolidated villages were destroyed by them in the single year between September 1976 and October 1977.⁸⁵ This phenomenon was particularly evident around Mrewa and Mtoko (and to a lesser extent Mount Darwin). Elsewhere, the insurgents actively sought to prevent the local population from being relocated to the PVs. This was

⁸¹ Zimbabwe African People’s Union, *The Zimbabwe Review*, December 29th, 1973; January 1st; February 23rd; 1974, March/April 1976, October 1977. Zimbabwe African National Union, *The Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 7, No. 10, (Oct,1973) Vol. 8, No. 8, (Aug, 1974); Vol 10, No. 3, May 1978, Vol. 10 No.4 July- August 1978.

⁸² Letter from Robert Mugabe (ZANU President) to Tim Sheehy (Catholic Institute of International Relations) 5th October 1978, ICS 151 CIIR A/2/2/6.

⁸³ *The Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 9, No. 5/6, (Jul, 1977), Vol. 10, No. 1, (Jan, 1978), *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10, No.5, (Sep,1978), *The Zimbabwe Review* December 1977, Vol.10. 2 March-April 1978 *Zimbabwe News*, Vol 2, No.3 September- October 1979. ZANLA were preeminent in the attacks on the Protected and Consolidated Villages which were located their operational areas in the north and east during the war.

⁸⁴ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*, see section titled ‘Protected Villages on the Increase’. Also see *The Rhodesia Herald*, 30th May 1977 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’ and *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 6, No. 12, 12-01-1977.

⁸⁵ Norma Kriger *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, (New York, 1992), pp.108-109.

particularly evident in Sengwe Tribal Trust Land (Victoria province) where six of the designated PVs had only had 60 percent occupancy due to the intimidation of the local population by the guerrillas.⁸⁶ Indeed, the guerrilla attacks on the PVs was one of the significant factors causing a new wave of displacement, with its own humanitarian concerns, in the closing stages of the war between 1978 and 1980, myriads fled to either Salisbury or more importantly across the border to Zambia and Mozambique.

To a limited extent, the policy came to be tempered from within, as it were. For after the Internal Settlement of 1978 some PVs were dismantled in the Muzorewa government's attempt to gain support. Muzorewa and the UANC had actually criticized the implementation of the villagization programme citing the lack of adequate sanitary facilities and the cultural violation attendant upon the policy.⁸⁷ In fact Muzorewa had called for the end of the programme as an important precondition for his involvement in any constitutional negotiations.⁸⁸ In September 1978, the Muzorewa government released the communities in 59 protected villages in the Mudzi, Mtoko and Mrewa Tribal Trust Lands.⁸⁹ However, while Muzorewa undeniably played an important role in beginning the process of dismantling the PV system in some areas, somewhat paradoxically during his tenure as interim leader after 1978 he also played an important role in maintaining and implementing the villagization programme elsewhere via his own auxiliary force.⁹⁰ In the last months of the war, the authorities remained adamant that the PV system would not be dismantled due to the worsening security situation: they actually cited the results of releasing the former inmates in Mtoko in justifying their policy.⁹¹ Even as late as March 1980 – that is to say, the month before the first democratic elections in Zimbabwe's

⁸⁶ Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.89.

⁸⁷ *Moto*, August 10th, 1974.

⁸⁸ *Financial Times*, December 9th, 1977.

⁸⁹ Salisbury Domestic Service, "Government Officially Opens 11 Protected Villages", 11th September 1978.

⁹⁰ Chakawa, *Abel Muzorewa's Security Forces*, pp.110, 197, 198.

⁹¹ *The National Observer*, 4th October 1979 in NAZ MS 308.

history and shortly before the achievement of independence - the Minister of Home Affairs, Geoffrey Henson still insisted that the PVs would not be dismantled, justifying this by saying that many of the inmates' homes had been destroyed and they were unable to construct new ones.⁹² Nevertheless, there was now a British -supervised cease fire and that very month around 150 PVs were opened up affecting around 300,000 people.⁹³ By December 1980, virtually all the former PVs had been vacated and dismantled throughout the rural areas and former inmates in Chiweshe, Mount Darwin, Bindura, Shamwa and Mtoko had reportedly rebuilt their original homes.⁹⁴ There were some places, however, where villagers themselves decided to remain in what had been PVs following the cessation of hostilities. This phenomenon was particularly marked in the Honde Valley in the east of the country.⁹⁵ In fact, the history of strategic resettlement in the country goes beyond the timeframe of the Zimbabwean Liberation War: during the 1980s, Mugabe's government revived the policy in eastern Zimbabwe in response to incursions from Mozambique of the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO), the armed opponents of the post-independence government of that country.⁹⁶

The Rhodesian Narrative of Strategic resettlement

The official narrative of strategic resettlement was extensive and widely disseminated via pro-government media and was overwhelmingly favourable and paternalistic, emphasizing the supposed humanitarian and developmentalist benefits of the policy. Early on there had been some limited critique in *The Rhodesia Herald*, regarding the manner in which the policy had been implemented. Indeed, an editorial from 16th August 1974 suggested that the effect of the villagization programme was in the nature of imposing a 'collective fine' which "bears hardest

⁹² *The Rand Daily Mail*, 14th March 1980 in NAZ MS 308.

⁹³ *The Herald*, 14th March 1980 in NAZ MS 308.

⁹⁴ British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Report from Salisbury 29th December 1980' in NAZ MS 308.

⁹⁵ See Schmidt, *Colonialism and Violence in Zimbabwe*.

⁹⁶ Bhebe and Ranger, *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, p.20.

on those who made the greatest effort to better themselves” and that the “government must think again; justice is involved and decency”.⁹⁷ However, any extensive coverage of the policy’s dire humanitarian consequences – to be made clear in the next section – or the alienation of the inmates was largely absent in such reports. It was well-nigh propagandistic even mythologized accounts of strategic resettlement that dominated reports in the pro-government media. In fact, as the policy was first implemented, Jim Latham, a high-profile district commissioner (for Mount Darwin) claimed that PVs had been part of the way of life of people living in the north-east border area for hundreds of years, protecting them against Arab slavers and the Portuguese; it was alleged to be standard in the Monomatapa kingdom.⁹⁸ There was no reference to its novelty during the war, nor any mention of the waves of forced resettlement attendant upon the regime’s land policies that preceded strategic resettlement and that were kindred with it to some degree.

The official narrative of strategic resettlement failed utterly to grasp what will become clear in the next section of this chapter: its catastrophic socio-economic impact and the cultural violation attendant upon the policy. In fact, it was claimed that the villagization programme did not lead to a notable breakdown of the traditional norms of African rural life in Rhodesia.⁹⁹ Whilst acknowledging that the protected village layout was much more crowded, it was claimed that the traditional kraal layout was retained within each PV.¹⁰⁰ In fact, DC Jim Latham made the claim that the PVs had enhanced traditional social structures and had improved the contact between the people and the civil administration.¹⁰¹ (As we shall see, the actual

⁹⁷ CCJP, ‘Report on Chiweshe TTL 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4. Early in the war *The Rhodesia Herald* did publish reports that were much more critical (compared to later reports) regarding the harsh way strategic resettlement had been implemented. See *The Rhodesia Herald*, 16th August 1974.

⁹⁸ *The African Times*, February 6th, 1974, NAZ N/S AF714.

⁹⁹ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol. 3. No.3, NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: *Focus on Rhodesia* March 1976.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *The Sunday Mail*, November 20th, 1977.

experience revealed greater impoverishment, cultural violation and the growth of inmate hostility to the authorities.) Government reports placed particular emphasis on the alleged paternalistic function of the PVs. One such report claimed that the people moved had realized that “their progress and happiness [depended] on the government and not on those outside it [the nationalists]”.¹⁰² Indeed, the emphasis in many reports was on the role played by the PVs in supposedly sheltering the peasantry from the guerrillas in concentrated settlements in the operational zones.¹⁰³ Reports particularly emphasised guerrilla coercion of the peasantry including rape, mutilation, and intimidation.¹⁰⁴ Some reports went so far as to suggest that the peasantry – which had actually been forcibly relocated – had requested to be moved into PVs.¹⁰⁵ An article in the government publication, *Focus on Rhodesia*, even suggested that there was a high demand for places in the PVs from the African rural population.¹⁰⁶ It was actually claimed, as enforced villagization was implemented in Mount Darwin, that many had returned from the cities requesting places in the PVs.¹⁰⁷

In fact, the official discourse on strategic resettlement overlooked the inadequacy of the settlements to afford protection to the civilian population: the design of the PVs ensured that residents were caught in the crossfire between the insurgents on the perimeter and state forces garrisoned in the centre. Whilst the pro-government media did at least register incidences of guerrilla attack – for example, the destruction of Kandeya Consolidated Village in Mrewa (Mashonaland East) where guerrillas had burned over half of the 380 huts in the settlement,¹⁰⁸ – the emphasis remained on the ‘protective’ role of the nucleated settlements. This was

¹⁰² *The African Times*, January 9th, 1974, NAZ N/S AF714

¹⁰³ *The African Times*, May 1st, 1974; July 31st, 1974; February 11th, 1976, NAZ N/S AF714.

¹⁰⁴ *The Sunday Mail*, June 19th, 1977, in NAZ ‘Newspapers’. Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol. 3. No.3 in NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: *Focus on Rhodesia* March 1976.

¹⁰⁵ *The African Times*, Feb 7th, 1973, NAZ N/S AF714.

¹⁰⁶ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol. 3. No.3 in NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: *Focus on Rhodesia* March 1976.

¹⁰⁷ *The Sunday Mail*, June 19th, 1977, in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

¹⁰⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 6th January, 1977 in NAZ MS 308.

particularly evident when reporting on the conversion of CVs into the more controlled PVs following these attacks.¹⁰⁹ The Rhodesian discourse regarding strategic resettlement moved beyond security concerns, however, and emphasised charity and, above all, development. With regard to the charitable, there was – for example – publicity given to the work of the National Federation of Women’s Institutes of Rhodesia which started what was known as ‘Operation Comfort’. The campaign sought to obtain scrapbooks and second-hand toys or picture books for the children in the PVs which would be of ‘educational interest’. They also sought assistance from older schoolchildren who could “make up similar scrapbooks and puzzles in their spare time for use by African children in the protected villages”.¹¹⁰ Following on from a talk given by a state official on “Children in the Protected Villages” at Alfred Beit Primary School in Salisbury in April 1977, arts and crafts lessons in that school focused on the making of toys and educational apparatus suitable for pre-school groups in the PVs/CVs in Mashonaland East. These articles were handed over for use by such children in Nyamara PVs in the Pfungwe Tribal Trust Land on January 31st, 1978.¹¹¹ However, the often-catastrophic impact of strategic resettlement on children made clear in the next section emphasizes starkly the inadequacy of such charity. Much more significant than charity was the stated developmentalist ideology of strategic resettlement.

From the early stages of the villagization programme, the PVs were presented as sophisticated urban environments and potential “growth points”.¹¹² Indeed, it was claimed that they could facilitate development in a concentrated space which was hitherto impossible amongst previously scattered communities.¹¹³ It was also held that the policy would benefit

¹⁰⁹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, November 16th, 1977, in NAZ MS 308.

¹¹⁰ *The Sunday Mail*, February 6th, 1977 in NAZ MS 308. *The African Times*, January 26th 1977 in NAZ S / AF 714.

¹¹¹ Ministry of Internal Affairs, ‘Monthly Report Senior Community Development Office (women) Mashonaland West’, February 1978 in NAZ MS 1287/1.

¹¹² *The Rhodesia Herald*, October 4th 1974 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

¹¹³ *The Rhodesia Herald*, October 10th, 1977, NAZ MS 308.

African commerce by providing business opportunities for store owners and villagers.¹¹⁴ The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs claimed that the PVs would provide their African residents with increased opportunities for the sale of cattle and cash crops alongside agricultural shows, thereby linking them up with Rhodesia's cash economy.¹¹⁵ The development of infrastructure was alleged to be another benefit of the PVs, one that supposedly improved not only access to water but also latrines thus improving sanitation and hygiene. (The next section will reveal the opposite.) Equally it was pointed out that schools and medical clinics were established inside the PVs or nearby.¹¹⁶ Indeed, according to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Rollo Hayman, these new nucleated settlements provided convenient access to agricultural and shopping facilities as well as social amenities including schools and shops.¹¹⁷ Sometimes, the Rhodesian military logic of the settlements was wholly diminished as in the claim that the purpose of "the regrouping of traditional village units" was undertaken "in order to bring the benefits of the twentieth century, such as health and educational facilities, to remote rural based blacks".¹¹⁸ Similar benefits were alleged for the less strictly controlled CVs which were also referred to as growth points highly advantageous for the development of the amenities held to be found in the PVs.¹¹⁹

Interestingly, this developmentalist rendition of strategic resettlement made references to the supposed developmental benefits of the concurrent Ujaama policy in Tanzania – that is, the experiment of 'African socialism' which also entailed forcing rural communities into larger settlements. Yet, there was a clear glossing of the oppressions of Ujaama, which even with its

¹¹⁴ *The African Times*, April 6th, 1977, NAZ N/S AF714.

¹¹⁵ *The African Times*, January 26th, 1977, NAZ N/S AF714

¹¹⁶ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol. 3. No.3, NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: Focus on Rhodesia, March 1976.

¹¹⁷ *Rhodesia Financial Gazette*, 14th October 1977, NAZ MS 308.

¹¹⁸ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol. 3. No.3, NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: Focus on Rhodesia March 1976.

¹¹⁹ *The Sunday Mail* 31st August 1975 in Herald House Library (Harare), 73LA: Resettlement 1973-1978.

genuinely developmentalist goals was characterised by deep oppressions of the Tanzanian peasantry.¹²⁰ The trajectory of the aldeamento policy in neighbouring Mozambique was also cited in support of strategic resettlement when it was alleged that, despite previous opposition from FRELIMO towards the policy, that liberation movement had recognized its developmental potential as a means of rendering key services for, and maintaining control over, the rural population.¹²¹ (We should not lose sight of the fact that FRELIMO's policy regarding the aldeamentos it had once opposed would have taken place in the context of an escalating RENAMO insurgency during the Mozambiquan Civil War (1975-1992) during which fighting RENAMO, an organisation supported by the Rhodesians and later South Africa, took precedence over development.) In fact, in Rhodesia by Smith's own admission so much of the resources of the country had been diverted to what he called the 'protection' of black civilians (via enforced villagization) that less money was available for developmental efforts in African areas (and therefore in the PVs).¹²²

To a degree, however, there was something of a developmentalist agenda followed in some of the PV sites. For example, in Mudzi District (Mashonaland East), the PVs were sited at points where adequate water supplies existed or where such supplies could be developed: in Marembe PV in this district a reservoir was created nearby to irrigate the vegetable gardens and crops. Factors including the locations of pre-existing schools and business centres were also factored into the siting of the PVs.¹²³ Commercial activity, it was held, could be enhanced by the increased footfall from the high-density population in the PVs. (However, in Mudzi,

¹²⁰ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol. 3. No.3, NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: Focus on Rhodesia March 1976. For the policy of Ujamaa and its oppressions, see Michael Jennings; 'Almost an Oxfam in itself: Oxfam, Ujamaa and development in Tanzania', *African Affairs*, Volume 101, Issue 405, (October 2002), pp.509-530.

¹²¹ *The African Times*, January 8th, 1975, NAZ N/S AF714. Later another article referred to the developmentalist potential of the PVs through referencing a former Aldeamento in Nampula province, Mozambique which had been converted into a 'communal village' by the Frelimo authorities, *The African Times*, December 15th, 1976.

¹²² *The Rhodesia Herald*, 15th October 1977, NAZ 308.

¹²³ Ministry of Internal Affairs, 'Provincial Policy Seminar: Highlands Park Hotel' 12th-14th November 1974 in NAZ, MS 1287/3; and *The African Times*, August 17th, 1977, NAZ N/S AF714.

military concerns remained central: the previous order in this area, which saw communities scattered across the entire district had rendered security control measures impossible.)¹²⁴ In general, it can be said that there was a stronger developmental ethos in districts like Mudzi, Chiweshe and Madziwa where protected villages had been created earlier in the war when more capital and resources were available and the military situation less dire for the authorities. For the villages hastily constructed during the later stages of the war, resources and finances were much more limited.¹²⁵ But in a place such as Chiweshe, the state could arrange agricultural shows in the PVs – as, for example, the one that took place in January 1977 at Nyakyyda School in Keep 11 where over 600 exhibits of vegetables, cotton, maize, tobacco, sunflowers and such like were displayed by 140 producers from four different PVs;¹²⁶ or the Annual Women's District Show held at Nzimbo keep in September 1977 where over 300 women from 34 clubs in Chiweshe exhibited sewing knitting, crocheting, tradecraft, agricultural products and cookery.¹²⁷

The key arm of government engaged in the state community development efforts in the PVs was the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its female employees were central to this: programmes were overseen by a white female provincial community development worker who supervised the work carried about by African development workers and women Advisors in the PVs who ran programmes revolving around needlecraft, nutritional education, cooking, hygiene and first aid as well as recreational activities including netball.¹²⁸ The women advisors were allocated an important role to identify family needs and they were tasked to promote skills defined as problem solving, leadership, mutual assistance and self-help.¹²⁹ Women's clubs and

¹²⁴ *The African Times*, April 20th, 1977; May 4th, 1977; June 15th, 1977; August 17th, 1977 in NAZ N/S AF714.

¹²⁵ *National Observer*, July 5th, 1979, in NAZ MS 308.

¹²⁶ *The African Times*, January 12th, 1977 in NAZ S / AF 714.

¹²⁷ *The African Times*, September 1st, 1975, in NAZ S / AF 714.

¹²⁸ Ministry of Internal Affairs, 'Province of Mashonaland: The Role of Women's Advisers in Protected and Consolidated Villages: A Handbook', November 1976, NAZ MS 1287/2.

¹²⁹ Ministry of Internal Affairs, 'Province of Mashonaland: The Role of Women's Advisers in Protected and Consolidated Villages: A Handbook', November 1976, NAZ MS 1287/2.

village committees were also set up by development workers and allocated a role in the state's community development efforts.¹³⁰ The advisors and development worker worked closely with these women's clubs and their main focus was teaching homecraft, including sewing, as well as cooking and nutrition.¹³¹

It is obvious that a racially prejudiced and paternalistic ideology animated the Ministry of Internal Affairs' notion of community development. For the cabinet minister at its head, Jack Musset, the clubs set up in the PVs afforded "previously uneducated and backward women...the opportunity to learn about things such as cooking, sewing, childcare, hygiene and so on".¹³² This view epitomized the values of white settler culture regarding the domestic skills of Zimbabwean women who had long undertaken such tasks without any interventions from the white authorities. Development workers also emphasized nutritional essentials and the improvement of agricultural methods.¹³³ This was ironic given the chronic disruption of agriculture by strategic resettlement (to be discussed shortly) as also the peasantry's historic development of appropriate farming techniques.

Unsurprisingly, due to their association with the state and its Ministry of Internal Affairs' prejudiced approach to those resettled, development workers and the women advisors were met with considerable hostility from inmates in the PVs. Such was their alienation that many residents simply refused to cooperate with the development workers and the various agricultural programs (including the digging – sometimes as punishment imposed by the keep

¹³⁰ M. Chenux Respond, Provincial Community Development Office (Women), Province of Mashonaland East, *The Role of a Development Worker- A Handbook* (March 1977) in NAZ MS 1287/2 and *The Sunday Mail*, January 12th 1975 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹³¹ *The Sunday Mail*, May 9th, 1976, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹³² Hansard: The Senate, Vol. 9, No.7, 30th June 1977, in NAZ MS 311/27/5.

¹³³ Ibid. Also see Penny Ross, 'Development Workers' in NAZ 1287/24, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Community Development Section (Women) Rhodesia: 'Protected Villages- A New Challenge' April 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/2.

authorities – of soil fertility trenches) which the development workers were responsible for.¹³⁴ Some development workers were even accused of being employed by Rhodesian intelligence.¹³⁵ This must call into question, the view of the government-supported African Times that, despite initial suspicion from residents, the development workers had come to be accepted and were seen as helping to improve the situation in the PVs.¹³⁶ The fact remains that development workers and women advisors were inadequately resourced – they were not provided with adequate housing, or sufficient access to stores and medical facilities – and they faced hostility and social isolation, with many of them posted far from where they originally came from. Many had little contact with their provincial development community officers and received little to no support from the Keep commanders (perhaps due to their race). Like other women in the PVs, they could be victims of the sexual harassment of the district security assistants. They lived in fear, not only of Security Force personnel but equally of the guerrillas and muijibas.¹³⁷

However, even the areas of strategic resettlement– like Chiweshe – where the state pursued its ‘development’ early on still saw an unfolding humanitarian crisis. In the very year in which the shows above took place, the American Christian organization World Vision published *People Behind Wire* which focused on one of the protected villages mentioned above - Keep 13 (Nzimbo); it referred to an alarming increase of malnutrition, people dying of starvation and to children dying of enteritis in large numbers.¹³⁸ Running against the state’s sanitised version of strategic resettlement, the report’s findings were denied by the pro regime newspaper, The Sunday Mail. It also provoked a strong reaction from the Provincial

¹³⁴ Provincial Community Development Office (Women) Mashonaland East, Monthly Report January 1975, (Hartley and Gatooma Districts), NAZ MS 1287/14. This report refers to Nyakasoro Protected Village in Pfungwe T.T.L near Mrewa.

¹³⁵ Maia Chenux Repond, ‘Problems Faced by Development Workers’ in NAZ, MS 1287/24.

¹³⁶ *The African Times*, March 24th, 1976, in NAZ S/AF 714.

¹³⁷ Maia Chenux Repond, ‘Problems Faced by Development Workers’ in NAZ, MS 1287/24.

¹³⁸ World Vision, *In Rhodesia: People Behind Wire*, February 1977.

Commissioner for Mashonaland Central, Trevor Hermans, who condemned it as “blatantly biased’ and written be somebody, “obviously looking for trouble”.¹³⁹

Conditions in the Protected Villages

Strategic resettlement was undeniably a policy of dispossession and control. Aside from its impact on the peasants’ access to land (dealt with later), it led to much dispossession of their culturally and economically important livestock. Those being forcibly relocated had to make their own arrangements for moving livestock to the PVs.¹⁴⁰ In fact, many of the inmates were either forced to abandon their livestock or it was confiscated by the government as part of the collective fines regulations. In other cases, cattle were sold on the orders of the District Commissioner (DC) to provide food for the inmates when they first arrived in the PVs. The government claimed that the sales of cattle were to cover the inmates’ living expenses in the PVs.¹⁴¹ Thus, in Makaha PV (Mashonaland East), the authorities justified on this basis the retention of the monies it procured from the cattle sales it held. Only those who had sold their cattle privately received any money.¹⁴² The losses of cattle were compounded by theft and the lack of veterinary services which led to the decimation of the people’s cattle herds.¹⁴³ What is more it was also accepted policy of the government to dispose of unattended cattle.¹⁴⁴ All of this had a devastating socio-economic impact on the inmates in the PVs. It was in cattle which

¹³⁹ *The Sunday Mail*, 27th February 1977 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

¹⁴⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’ in Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Senate House, University of London (hereafter ICS) 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 (The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8), ‘Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages’ Appendix 10/12/13.

¹⁴¹ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.10. No.4. 28th September 1977, in NAZ MS 311/27/5.

¹⁴² Commission on Social Service and Development. ‘R.C.B.C: Makaha Protected Village June 1975’, NAZ MS 591/2/2 ‘Protected Villages’. Weinrich, ‘Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia’, p.215.

¹⁴³ *The Catholic Herald* 9th September 1977 in NAZ MS 480/2. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Meetings with Patriotic Front Leaders, 13th to 21st August 1978’ in NAZ, MS 1082/5/18.

¹⁴⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (eds.) *Man in the Middle: Torture, Resettlement and Eviction*, (Salisbury, 1975), p.9

most of the peasant households had invested much of their savings.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, it was via the sale of livestock that funds for school fees were obtained.¹⁴⁶

Dispossession was not limited to livestock; it massively affected homes. As strategic resettlement was implemented, communities were either forced to dismantle or abandon their houses when they moved to the PVs and they received no compensation for this.¹⁴⁷ Despite the loss of homesteads, businesses, clinics, and school buildings, it remained government policy not to compensate the victims despite continued criticism from African MPs voicing the concern of their constituents in parliament.¹⁴⁸ In the protected villages, the shelter was totally inadequate for the inhabitants. Early on there was a lack of building materials and people were advised to repurpose the material from their old homes to rebuild shelters on their stands in the PVs.¹⁴⁹ (There was a great constraint on this since, as note earlier, there was much abandonment or destruction of the original homes.). Many people in the PVs continued to live in the temporary grass shelters they constructed when they were first forced into the settlements.¹⁵⁰ These types of huts were, flimsy and supported only by a basic wooden frame, with walls made with mud and grass and a grass roof which were vulnerable to infestation by termites which would eventually compromise the structural integrity of the huts.¹⁵¹ However, there could be a vast difference in the quality of housing within PVs: some had better, more permanent, dwellings (especially in more established PVs). Other dwellings were totally

¹⁴⁵ Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', p.215.

¹⁴⁶ Roy Henson 'Report on the Protected Villages 22nd March 1976', NAZ MS 591 2/2.

¹⁴⁷ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974' and CCJP, *Man in the Middle*, p.9.

¹⁴⁸ Hansard, House of Assembly, Vol.88, No.5, 30th August 1974 (NAZ MS 311/19), Hansard, House of Assembly Vol. 94. No.11. 19th August 1977 (NAZ MS 311/26), Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol 96 No.10, 15th July 1977 (NAZ MS 311/27/1), Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol.97, No.4, 27th December 1977 (NAZ MS 311/27/2), Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol 27. No.22. 27th October 1977 (NAZ MS 311/27/4). *The Rhodesia Herald*, 22nd September 1977 in NAZ MS 308.

¹⁴⁹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁵⁰ Roy Henson 'A Report on the Protected Villages? 31st December 1975', NAZ 589/7/2.

¹⁵¹ Oxfam, 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Afflicted Areas in Rhodesia, 8th October 1974' in BNA FCO 36/1645 (CP 4/2), Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'protected villages' at Chiweshe (1974).

inadequate sheltering elderly and sick persons who lacked both the resources and ability to construct adequate shelter for themselves.¹⁵² Elsewhere, it was reported that people were simply living in the open.¹⁵³ There was a reluctance amongst many to construct proper homes since they viewed enforced villagisation as a temporary measure and were therefore reluctant to construct permanent shelters or even put roofing on their huts when materials were available. This may have been linked to guerrilla intimidations. For a while, some believed that the guerrillas would release them from the keeps,¹⁵⁴ others would not construct permanent dwellings out of fear of reprisals from the guerrillas.¹⁵⁵

The sanitary conditions in the PVs were particularly disquieting. Many of them lacked access to basic sanitary facilities and many villagers were drinking contaminated water. One report showed how water supplies were merely being pumped from nearby rivers or streams or even from polluted wells in some cases.¹⁵⁶ Another report showed that whilst some villages had boreholes either within the PVs or nearby, others whose water was pumped in from nearby rivers had drinking water contaminated with that used for washing and bathing.¹⁵⁷ Toilet facilities were also of significant concern. Whilst the government had constructed latrines many inevitably had to use surrounding fields and ditches (especially when working in the fields) which posed a continuous health hazard especially during the rainy season with its increased run off into the water supply.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, there were many shallow toilet pits in close

¹⁵² Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace in Rhodesia Dieter Scholtz, 'Report on Visit to Chiweshe TTL', 20th December 1974 in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages', Appendix 10/12/13.

¹⁵³ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 31st July 1974 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ 'CCJP: Report on Chiweshe TTL 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁵⁶ Oxfam, 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Afflicted Areas, October 8th, 1974, BNA FCO 36/1645.

¹⁵⁷ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 'Reports received from Chiweshe Resident's Association 24th May 1975' in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages', Appendix 10/12/13.

¹⁵⁸ Oxfam, 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Afflicted Areas, October 8th, 1974, BNA FCO 36/1645.

proximity to many dwellings which caused infestations of green flies which contaminated foodstuffs and drink containers. The toilet pits and standing water (especially during the rainy season) in the PVs became a major epidemiological concern and led to increased cases of typhoid, diarrhoea, and malaria since the conditions facilitated the breeding of mosquitoes.¹⁵⁹ Given these appalling conditions, there is something bizarre in the fact that, in April 1977, a scheme involving the suburban white community in Borrowdale, Salisbury, aimed at making the PVs in the north-east more aesthetically pleasing by donating various plants and flower seedlings.¹⁶⁰ Equally bizarre under the circumstances was the flower gardening in the Kaunya Protected Village near Mtoko, the work of its keep commander.¹⁶¹

Overcrowding in the PVs also became an important social concern. Each family was only allocated a small plot of 15 metres square.¹⁶² However, these small stands did not afford the necessary social distance between the members (and notably adolescent members) of families that was customary in Shona culture.¹⁶³ Moreover, the allocated stands were insufficient for maintaining the traditional separation between sleeping quarters, kitchens, granaries, fowl runs, toilets and bath houses.¹⁶⁴ There was a general lack of privacy in the PVs which made it difficult to maintain “the appropriate social distance with respect to specific categories of relatives such as in laws and strangers in particular”.¹⁶⁵ Traditional moral values were thus violated by the overcrowded household format in the PVs, with its violation of the usual sleeping quarter patterns of adolescents in Shona rural culture (where males and female slept in separate huts). Confinement increased the pre-marital sexual activity of younger

¹⁵⁹ Report from Chiweshe Resident’s Association 24th May 1975’ in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 ‘The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: ‘Justice and Peace Reports on Protected Villages’.

¹⁶⁰ *The Sunday Mail*, April 24th, 1977, in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

¹⁶¹ *The Sunday Mail*, February 19th, 1978, in Herald House, 7L3A: Resettlement 1973-1978.

¹⁶² C.E Mckone, Tour Report, 2nd to 3rd September 1974, BNA FCO 36/1645.

¹⁶³ Weinrich, ‘Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia’, p.226.

¹⁶⁴ CCJP, *Man in the Middle*, p.11.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

inmates which was strictly forbidden in traditional rural Shona culture.¹⁶⁶ What is more, such spatial controls that existed within the PVs were exercised by alien authorities, and this worked to undermine and even silence the patriarchal authority of African headmen over their kin.¹⁶⁷

Spatial control was a salient feature of life in the PVs. Inmates were under constant surveillance from the watchtower located in the middle of the settlements and some PVs were even equipped with floodlights to expose any suspect activity around the perimeter of the villages at night.¹⁶⁸ Located in the centre of each PV was a garrison which housed around 20 armed African District Security Assistants(DSAs) and/or members of the Guard Force with one or two white commanders (often on national service) who would be responsible for administering the PV.¹⁶⁹ It was the role of personnel such as the DSAs to enforce stringent movement controls in the PVs and they held discretionary powers to detain, arrest, punish, and deny entry and exit.¹⁷⁰ Hence, movements in and out of the protected village were strictly controlled with villagers made to carry situpas (passes).. Alongside this – and affecting greatly villagers’ work in their distant fields – a curfew was implemented generally from 6pm to 6 am. PVs had two gates (for entrance and exit) at which the DSAs would strictly search individuals for weapons and food supplies and at which they would register and examine visitors.¹⁷¹ Those breaking curfew could be caught up in the ‘free-fire’ zones around the villages and shot, and the victims included the elderly, women, and children.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁶ CCJP, *Man in the Middle*, p.10.

¹⁶⁷ Mike Kesby, ‘Areas for Control, Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerrilla Struggle and Counter- Insurgency Warfare in Zimbabwe 1972-1980’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.22, No.4 (Dec,1996), pp. 561-584.

¹⁶⁸ *The Sunday Mail*, December 7th, 1975, in NAZ ‘Newspapers’. The article refers to a PV in Madziwa.

¹⁶⁹ IDAF, *Guardians of White Power*, p.12.

¹⁷⁰ Ishmael Mazambani, ‘Did Children Matter? Unprotected children in “Protected Villages”’, p.2.

¹⁷¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Madziwa Keeps’, August 1975 in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, ‘Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages’, Appendix 10/12/13.

¹⁷² Roy Henson, Emergency Relief Committee: Report on the Protected Villages, April 1976, NAZ MS 591 2/2.

However, there was regional variation regarding the degree to which movement controls were enforced in the PVs. In some areas, curfew regulations were enforced for up to 22 hours per day.¹⁷³ In others, areas were kept under total lockdown.¹⁷⁵ The degree to which movement controls were enforced hinged on the levels of military activity in an area: strict lockdowns were often enforced following guerrilla contacts or landmine blasts. However, if the military situation improved for the authorities, movement controls were relaxed and villagers were freer to visit relatives in other keeps, work in their fields and gardens, go to medical facilities or even leave the local area for months at a time.¹⁷⁴ In the unfenced consolidated villages (CVs) villagers were afforded more freedom than those housed in the PVs with much greater ability to visit medical and business centres. Nevertheless, residents in CVs still had to pass through an entrance gate where their situpas were inspected by the DSAs and a curfew was still enforced from 5:30 pm to 7:00 am.¹⁷⁵

Movement controls were one of the principal causes of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the PVs. Firstly, they significantly disrupted farming activities with the night-time curfew making it difficult for people to monitor and protect their distant fields.¹⁷⁶ Many would return to their fields in daylight and find that overnight their crops had been destroyed by stray cattle and wild animals as the night-time curfew had prevented them from taking appropriate measures against this.¹⁷⁷ Secondly, a government ruling prohibited those held in the PVs from taking food with them to eat whilst they worked to cut the insurgents off from supplies of food from the rural population.¹⁷⁸ This particularly imposed great hardships on female inmates who

¹⁷³ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Meetings with Patriotic Front Leader- 13th – 21st August 1978' in NAZ, MS 1082/5/18.

¹⁷⁴ CCJP, 'Report on Madziwa Keeps', August 1975 in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁷⁵ 'Confinement in Mrewa' in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages' Appendix 10/12/13.

¹⁷⁶ Oxfam, 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Afflicted Areas, October 8th, 1974, BNA FCO 36/1645.

¹⁷⁷ Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', p.228.

¹⁷⁸ Oxfam, 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Afflicted Areas, October 8th, 1974, BNA FCO 36/1645.

predominantly undertook agricultural labour and who had to travel significant distances to their fields.¹⁷⁹ The disruption of agriculture and the general conditions in the PVs were such that children and vulnerable persons were badly affected. Many women would leave the villages early in the morning to farm and would not return until the evening and their dependants were left alone all day with either scraps of food or whatever grandmothers could provide. Many vulnerable persons would not receive a meal until the end of the day.¹⁸⁰ The result was a significant increase in cases of the malnutrition. For example, 20 to 40 percent of children the PVs in Chiweshe were malnourished.¹⁸¹ (The food shortages were also heightened by drought in the Rhodesian countryside.¹⁸⁴) Movement controls rendered many of the rural medical centres inaccessible. Many were located far from the PVs and people often lacked the means of transportation (which was essential due to the curfews) to go to and from clinics in time. Even when transport was available, the driver was still constrained by the curfews.¹⁸² In this situation people were unable to access emergency treatment even when absolutely needed such as in cases of maternity and critical injuries.¹⁸³ As we will see later in this dissertation, responding to malnutrition in the PVs and providing medical outreach became crucial aspects of various NGOs' humanitarian response to strategic resettlement.

The people exercising movement and other controls in the protected villages – the DSAs and others – were linked to the grave human rights violations which often took place in the PVs. Indeed, the brutality of the district security assistants became a central feature of life

¹⁷⁹ Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', p.228, There was however regional variation in Chiweshe this practice had been discontinued whereas in Madziwa such measures remained in place. See The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia 'Report on Madiwa TTL' 26th December 1974 p.1. in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 'The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: 'Justice and Peace Reports on Protected Villages'

¹⁸⁰ RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes] in BNA, OD 66/51 'Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages' (1978). Hereafter this will be referred to as 'RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes]'.
¹⁸¹ Captain (Dr) James Watt 'A Village with Vision', All the World, January to March 1977, Vol.22 No.5 in Salvation Army International Heritage Centre, London.

¹⁸² Report from Chiweshe Resident's Association 24th May 1975 in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 'The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: 'Justice and Peace Reports on Protected Villages'

¹⁸³ Ibid.

in PVs.¹⁸⁴ Supported by the Security Forces, these European officers and their African subordinates subjected inmates in the PVs to numerous acts of brutality, intimidation and lust.¹⁸⁵ Throughout the war, there were frequent complaints about the lack of discipline and training of the DSAs and their treatment of Africans in the PVs.¹⁸⁶ Even the pro-government *Rhodesia Herald* reported on the atrocities committed by the DSAs.¹⁸⁷ By the end of the war, the sexual offences committed by the district security assistants or their white superiors featured frequently in the same newspaper.¹⁸⁸ It is clear, then, that girls and women living in the protected villages were often subject to harassment, sexual advances, and even raped and impregnated by the DSAs.¹⁸⁹ District security assistants had been known to confiscate passes (situpas) of the women in order to elicit sexual favours for their return.¹⁹⁰ As a result, many teenage inmates were impregnated or infected with sexually transmitted diseases.¹⁹¹ There was thus a noticeable rise in cases of venereal disease in the PVs due to the actions of the DSAs.¹⁹² It was reported in the Mount Darwin area that an entire village was infected with sexually-transmitted disease for this reason.¹⁹³ Strategic resettlement had resulted in a particular gendered power dynamic in the protected villages that gave considerable power to DSAs over women and girls in these controlled zones. Given the district assistants' role in this and other

¹⁸⁴ Eleanor O’Gorman, *The Front Line Runs Through Every Women*, (Harare, 2011), pp.90-91 and Weinrich, ‘Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia’, pp.224.

¹⁸⁵ Roy Henson, ‘The Day of the Wire’, 3rd January 1976, NAZ MS 589/7/2.

¹⁸⁶ Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol 94, No.1, 3rd August 1976 in NAZ MS 311/26.

¹⁸⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 29th July 1977; 29th July 1977 in NAZ MS 308.

¹⁸⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 14th August 1979; 15th August 1979; 8th August 1979; 9th August 1979; 11th August 1979; 16th August 1979; 29th September 1979; 27th September 1979; 20th October; 21st October 1979 in NAZ MS 308.

¹⁸⁹ Henson, ‘The Day of the Wire’, NAZ MS 589 7/2.

¹⁹⁰ *The Catholic Herald*, 9th September 1977 in NAZ MS 480/2. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia ‘Report on Madiwa TTL’ 26th December 1974 in in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 ‘Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages’ Appendix 10/12/13.

¹⁹¹ Mazambani, Did Children Matter? Unprotected children in “Protected Villages”, p.150.

¹⁹² This challenges government reports which placed the blame for the rise of STD cases in the PVs exclusively on the guerrillas. M.M Chitauro, Chiweshe Residents Association, ‘Present and Future of Protected Villages’ July 1977 in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 ‘The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: ‘Justice and Peace Reports on Protected Villages’

¹⁹³ Interdenominational Committee for Reception and Distribution of Aid. Regarding Needs in the Protected Villages, 9th October 1975 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

oppressive behaviour, it is not surprising that in some instances DSAs were threatened or even attacked by the inmates.¹⁹⁴

Conclusion

The Zimbabwean Liberation War emerged out of the broader political developments associated with the Smith regime's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and its pursuit of policies that were designed to entrench white rule in Southern Rhodesia in the face of the widespread decolonization that was sweeping the African continent. With respect, to the policy of strategic resettlement during the war, it is clear that its pattern bore a relation to the long history of forced resettlement linked to the formation of the tribal trust lands, the so-called native purchase areas, and the establishment of zones exclusively for European commercial agriculture.

Strategic resettlement was central to the Rhodesian counterinsurgency and the forcible relocation of hundreds of thousands of people into the protected villages (PVs) was an integral part of a broader a range of measures — including curfews, free fire zones and collective fines — that were designed to separate the insurgents from the financial, material, and logistical support they received – whether coerced or not – from the Zimbabwean peasantry. This policy was not unique to Rhodesia and was inspired by other counterinsurgency experiences, most immediately in Kenya and Malaya (in which the Rhodesians, such as their forces' commander General Walls, were directly involved) and the closely interconnected conflict in Lusophone southern Africa. In the Rhodesian case, as shown, the policy initially was localized to the Mashonaland Central province in the north-eastern part of the country (in the Zambezi Valley) and later to the Chiweshe and Madziwa areas. By 1978, it had spread much more widely in the Mashonaland, as well as the Manicaland and Victoria provinces. As shown, the policy spread

¹⁹⁴ *The Sunday Mail*, January 12th, 1975, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

to a limited extent to Matabeleland North and South as well. The considerable controls over people that existed in the PVs have been explored but, as noted, there were some important regional variations in the policy, including in the design of the villages themselves: there were unfenced consolidated villages (CVs) built in Mrewa and Uzumba which were in theory less strictly controlled though these were still garrisoned and inmates subject to movement controls.

The PVs and CVs, unsurprisingly, became prime targets for the insurgents, something that could lead to the further victimisation of those forcibly resettled, due to their centrality in Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy. Whilst the guerrillas did have a significant role in disrupting the policy, the moves to dismantle some of the PVs also came from within the government under Muzorewa's transitional regime. Nevertheless, for many, the enforced villagization programme remained a feature of rural life after Zimbabwean independence and in places such as the Honde Valley (Manicaland), it remained in place indefinitely after the war owing to the incursions of the opponents of the post-independence government in Mozambique.

Above all, this chapter has revealed how myriads of peasants were forcibly relocated, losing their homes, and often dispossessed of their livestock. In the PVs they were resettled in overcrowded conditions with inadequate shelter and sanitation, rendering the villagers much more vulnerable to disease. Distance from fields and a night-time curfew inevitably disrupted agricultural production. Indeed, many of the PVs were located far away from the inmates' original lands and the disruption of production was such that it led to widespread food shortages and increased malnutrition. Enforced villagization also represented a deep cultural violation for the inmates who were relocated from their ancestral homelands. This was exacerbated by spatial organization in the PVs where inmates were now unable to observe traditional mores. The PVs also became sites of grave human rights abuses. Many were caught up in the free-fire and curfew zones surrounding the PVs, while female inmates became victims of sexual

harassment, abuse and violence at the hands of the district security assistants (DSAs). All of this inevitably caused the widespread alienation of the peasantry leading to growing hostility to the Smith regime.

It was to these dire oppressions and conditions that a range of non-governmental organisations responded. Those responses will be detailed and explored during the course of this dissertation. It begins with a study of the role the Catholics, the group who were preeminent in making the facts known about the harsh conditions in the PVs and the human rights abuses that were connected with enforced villagization.

Chapter 2: The Catholic Church, the War and Strategic Resettlement

The nature of Catholic NGO involvement in the history of Strategic resettlement needs to be understood in terms of the Church's pre-war history in Rhodesia. That history stretches back to the missionary activities of Portuguese Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries century which focused on the area of present-day Zimbabwe that abuts the Tete province of Mozambique and the area south of the Zambezi where the Dominican Fathers established themselves after 1775, however, all catholic missionary work in this part of the world ceased until 1879 when Catholic priests once again entered pre-colonial Zimbabwe, this time coming from the South. The original Zambesi Mission of the Catholic Church was entrusted to the Jesuit Fathers by Rome on 7th February 1879 which included area which would later become the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi) and most of Botswana.¹ The Jesuit Fathers and the Dominican Sisters later returned with the white settlers of the 'Pioneer Column' in 1890. Chishwasha Mission near Salisbury was established in 1891 and the Dominican Sisters began their Convent School in Salisbury in 1892.²

Early Catholic involvement in Rhodesia was characterised by active collaboration with the colonial regime. Jesuit priest, Father Peter Prestage had "openly and unashamedly" supported the British South Africa Company in the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893.³ Whilst missionaries had made some converts in Mashonaland and Matabeleland from 1890 to 1896, these early successes were scuppered by the Ndebele and Shona risings of 1896-1897.

¹ R.H. Randolph, *Church and State in Rhodesia 1969-1971: A Catholic View*, (Gwelo, 1971), p.9.

² Ibid.

³ C.J.M Zvogbo, *A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939*, (Gweru, 1996), p.57.

Traditional religion remained important at that stage many Christian missionaries felt it had “militated against Ndebele and Shona acceptance of Christianity”.⁴ According to accounts by Catholic priests the execution of rebel leaders had created “new vistas” of Christianity. Catholic priests, Father Andrew Hartmann, Father Mark Barthelemy and Father Edward Bachler played a crucial role in the efforts to suppress the two risings.⁵ As we will see later this active collaboration with the colonial regime was in marked contrast to the oppositional stance to the white-settler regime later taken by Catholic Church during the Zimbabwean Liberation War.

Until the Second World War the Catholic Church in Rhodesia was largely dominated by English speaking Jesuits. Linden notes that during this period, Jesuits located in Salisbury were able to exert considerable influence both individually and through St George’s Mission; a Jesuit mission school located on the outskirts of the capital. German Marianhill Missionaries had worked in the eastern province of Manicaland from 1908 to 1930. They were later confined an area around Bulawayo in 1930. However, their importance was limited due to the relative lack of success for evangelization amongst the Ndebele-speaking people in the Matabeleland province. Incoming Catholic missionaries including the Marianhill missionaries tended to be seen as ‘assistants’ to the English Jesuits and to assumed ‘suitably subordinate’ roles. At the same time this was reinforced by the fact that incoming Catholic missionaries focused on established missions in rural areas.⁶

Following the Second World War Jesuit Father, Bishop Chichester (and later Archbishop of Salisbury) had sought to expand the number of Catholic missionary personnel working in Rhodesia. In 1946 the area surrounding Fort Victoria (Masvingo) in Victoria Province and Gwelo (Gweru) in Midlands’s province was committed to the Swiss Bethlehem

⁴ Zvogbo, *A History of Christian Missions in Zimbabwe 1890-1939*, p.57.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ian Linden, *The Catholic Church and the struggle for Zimbabwe*, (London, 1980), p.32.

Fathers. In 1953 in the Umtali (Mutate) in Manicaland province was confided to the Irish Carmelite Fathers and the Wankie (Hwange) area to the Fathers of the Spanish Mission Institute. The increased regional scope of Catholic missionary activity in Rhodesia culminated in the formation of the Ecclesiastical Province of Southern Rhodesia on the 1st January 1955 which comprised the Archdiocese of Salisbury with Dioceses of Bulawayo, Gwelo (Gweru), Umtali (Mutare) and Wankie (Hwange). In 1973 the Prefecture Apostolic of Sinoia (present day Prefecture Apostolic of Chinoyi) was separated from the Salisbury Archdiocese. As the accompanying maps (Figs 1, 2 and 3) shows, the missions had spread widely throughout Rhodesia but were particularly concentrated in north and eastern areas in Rhodesia. As we shall see, these became key zones of the guerrilla war.




Fig. 1 'Ecclesiastical Geography of Catholic Church' R.H Randolph, *Church and State in Rhodesia 1969- 1971: A Catholic View*, (Gwelo,

Fig. 2 'Map of Guerrilla Operational Areas' Janice McLaughlin, *On The Frontline: Catholic Missions in the Zimbabwean Liberation War*, (Harare, 1996)








Fig. 3 Maps of Catholic Dioceses in A. J. Dachs, W. F. Rea, *The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe 1879-1979*, (Gweru, 1979).

Fig. 4 Map of Protected Villages in Rhodesia, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Rhodesia: The Propaganda War, (London, 1977)



The arrival of the Irish Carmelite Fathers particularly marked an important moment in the history of the church in Rhodesia. Donal Lamont who figures importantly in this analysis was the leader of the first group of Irish Carmelites which had volunteered to go to Rhodesia in 1946. He became a parish priest in Umtali [modern-day Mutare] in 1950 and later the first Catholic Bishop of the town in 1957. The Carmelite profile of these missionaries led by Lamont was a significant factor in the oppositional stance that the Catholic Church in Rhodesia would later adopt towards the white-settler regime during the 1960s. The Irish Carmelites including Lamont had actually lived through the Irish War of Independence (1919-1922) and had negative experiences of British rule in their homeland. Indeed, just as the white settler regime in Rhodesia would, the British had launched a violent counter-insurgency war in Ireland during the independence struggle. The establishment of the Free State in 1922 represented an

important turning point for those including Lamont who had supported the nationalist cause. As McLaughlin notes it was “a blend of Carmelite spirituality and Irish nationalism [that] was to shape their response to African nationalism in later years”.⁷

During the 1960s, the Catholic Church had adopted an oppositional stance towards the discriminatory legislation of the settler regime as indicated by a series of pastoral letters issued by the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops’ Conference (RBC). The early letters included *Purchased People* (1959), *Peace Through Justice* (1963), *A Plea for Peace* (1965) and Bishop Lamont played a crucial role in their production.⁸ Later *A Message and Appeal from Church Leaders to the Christian People of Rhodesia* was published in June 1969.⁹ It was produced in response to the drawing up of the 1969 constitution which entrenched the system of racial discrimination in Rhodesia. At the same time Catholic bishops challenged the segregationist Land Tenure Act (1969) where they became the principal critics of this legislation and viewed the dispossession of the local people of their land as unjust. Donal Lamont who later became President of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace played a crucial role in articulating a critical analysis of the land issue in Rhodesia.¹⁰ This was an important factor shaping the nature involvement of the Catholic Church to strategic resettlement during the war.

Evictions of the Zimbabwean peasantry from their ancestral homelands had been an ongoing process since the European occupation of the country in 1890. Forced resettlement from their homelands, loss of property including cattle and repression from the authorities

⁷ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.108.

⁸ See Lamont *Speech From the Dock*, pp 8-11 and Walter Nyatsanza, *The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops on the Land Issue 1959-2002*, (Harare, 2002) and *A Plea For Peace Pastoral Instruction of the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia*, (Gwelo, 1965) in Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Pastoral Letters: Bishops Statements 1961- 1979, Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop’s Conference Library.

⁹ ‘A Message and Appeal from Church Leaders to Church Leaders to the Christian People of Rhodesia June 1969’ in Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Pastoral Letters: Bishops Statements 1961-1979, Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop’s Conference Library.

¹⁰ Nyatsanza, *The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops on the Land Issue*, p.14.

characterised the pre-war experience of the Zimbabwean peasantry.¹¹ The Land Apportionment Act 1930 had set aside 7 ½ million acres of ‘native purchase areas’ which Africans alone could purchase, however there was the quid pro quo that they could now no longer buy the land in the better situated European areas.¹² Later the Land Tenure Act of 1969 allocated an equal amount of land to Africans and whites. At the time white community comprised only 5% of the colony’s population. Hence approximately 5 million Africans shared 44.9 million acres at the ratio of 67.9 persons per square mile, while less than a quarter of a million whites shared 44.95 million acres at 3.2 persons per acre. The land allocated to the Africans was often in drought ridden areas with less fertile soils which greatly contributed to the underdevelopment and economical marginalisation of the rural African population.¹³

Forced resettlement for non-military reasons had been a major aspect of the enforcement of the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the later the Land Tenure Act (1969) through which myriads of rural Africans were evicted from and forcibly relocated away from their ancestral homes. Evictions attendant upon the Land Tenure Act were an important antecedent to the forced villagization of the Zimbabwean peasantry into the Protected and Consolidated Villages during the war. The Catholic bishops’ criticism of the Land Tenure Act therefore established an important precedent for the Justice and Peace Commission’s extensive criticism of the injustices attendant upon strategic resettlement. In fact, the Catholic Church in Rhodesia had been directly impacted by the implementation of the Land Tenure Act by the white-settler regime. The Land Tenure Act had serious ramifications for the Church’s work at various levels, notably for the operations of their educational and medical facilities, since the

¹¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, *Civil War in Rhodesia: Abduction, Torture and Death in the Counter-Insurgency Campaign*, (London, 1976), p.61.

¹² Robin Palmer, *The Agricultural History of Rhodesia*, (London, 1977), p.236.

¹³ A.S. Mlambo ‘Racism in Colonial Zimbabwe’ in S. Ratuva (eds.) *The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity*, (Singapore, 2019), pp.1-7.

law prohibited African teachers from working areas in areas designated for Europeans and white missionaries working in African designated areas.¹⁴

Equally important to note is that the Catholic Church in Rhodesia had a distinctly 'African' profile. By 1976, it was the largest Christian denomination amongst Rhodesia's African population and totalled around 575,000 adherents.¹⁵ *Moto* magazine was a clear reflection of the close proximity between the Catholic Church and Rhodesia's African population. *Moto* was distributed by Catholic publisher Mambo Press in Gwelo (Gweru) and published weekly from 3rd September 1971. Inter alia one of the magazine's principal policies was to "give voice to African opinion" and to serve "as a forum for the exchange of views on matters which vitally [affected] Africans". Material was written in both English and Shona and occasionally Ndebele.¹⁶ Established by Bishop Haene in 1958, *Moto* rapidly became one of the most significant "voices of lay African perspective in Rhodesia, often providing scathing criticism of the settler government and support for African nationalist parties".¹⁷ Equally Creary points out that *Moto* itself also reflected the process the inculturation within the Rhodesian Catholic Church. This was the process whereby its teachings were adapted to a non-Christian cultural background including its liturgy. At the same time both African clergymen were ordained, and African literature was promoted within the church. *Moto*, therefore had made a significant contribution to African nationalism in Rhodesia.¹⁸

At the same time *Moto* reflected the critical voice of the church in Rhodesia. Indeed, the tone of *Moto* reflected that of the aforementioned pastoral messages with its condemnation

¹⁴Nyatsanza, *The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops on the Land Issue*, p.12.

¹⁵ Randolph, *Report to Rome*, p.10.

¹⁶ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Memorandum on the Prohibition and Publication of the Newspaper "Moto" prepared by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 9th October 1974', NAZ MS 589/7/8 'Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, August 28th, 1974 to July 1979'. Hereafter this will be referred to as CCJP 'Memorandum on the Prohibition and Publication of the Newspaper "Moto"'.
¹⁷ Nicholas M. Creary, 'African Inculturation of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe, 1958-1977' *The Historian*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (1999), pp.765-781.

¹⁸ Ibid.

of the system of racial segregation of white-settler rule.¹⁹ For example, the leading coverage of two editions had been dedicated to the aforementioned impact of the 1972 revisions to the Land Tenure Act which had restricted Catholic missionary personnel working in the Tribal Trust Lands.²⁰ *Moto* was, therefore, a further indication of the growing antagonism between the Catholic Church and the white-minority regime.²¹ Eventually in September 1974 *Moto* was banned by the Rhodesian authorities.²² This publication, however also set an important precedent for the dissemination efforts of the CCJP during the liberation insofar through critique of the injustices of white-settler rule. The formation of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) represented then something of a culmination of growing (Catholic) church-state antagonism on one hand and Catholic affinity with Rhodesia's African population on the other.

It is important to acknowledge here the multiple dimensions of Catholic attitudes towards the Rhodesian state and the guerrillas. Firstly, as we will see later there was a clear distinction between the German Jesuits in Mashonaland who came out as anti-guerrilla. The Carmelites in Manicaland who were much more inclined to support the liberation struggle. Additionally, as we will see in the next section concerns were also raised about the position of the Catholics downplaying guerrilla violence against white missionaries in rural areas and the allegations of poor treatment of Catholic Security Force personnel.²³ Yet, as we will see in its

¹⁹ *Moto*, Vol.15 No.17, 28th April 1973.

²⁰ *Moto*, Vol 15 No.25,23rd June 1973, *Moto* Vol.15 No.26, 30th June 1973.

²¹ Elaine Windrich, *The Mass Media in the Struggle For Zimbabwe*, (Gwelo, 1981), p.78.

²² CCJP "Memorandum on the Prohibition and Publication of the Newspaper "Moto", NAZ MS 589/7/8

²³ *Hansard*: House of Assembly, Vol.97., No.19, 21st October 1977 in NAZ, MS 311/27/4 'The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8' Appendix No.27 'Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977, Vol.4. Hereafter this will be referred to as 'Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol.97. No.19, 21st October 1977'.

NGO capacity, the Catholics through its Justice and Peace Commission remained overwhelmingly focused on human rights concerns and the victims of the war.

In the beginning, the principal objective of the CCJP was to ensure that justice and peace issues were a focal point of Church activity which hinged on the role of local churches; an effective dialogue was to be encouraged between laity and the Church and both were to be educated in matters regarding justice and peace between the people of Rhodesia was viewed as a principal responsibility of Christians in a multi-racial society.²⁴ The commission saw itself as having an important role in informing the conscience of the citizenry with respect to rights and duties and also to press for the reform of discriminatory legislation that was unjustly discriminatory.²⁵ It aimed to make positive suggestions regarding civil law and its impartial administration and called for lay people to fully utilise their “specialised knowledge”.²⁶ An important objective of the CCJP therefore was “to investigate the allegations of injustices which it considered merited attention and publicize those found to be true and take any corrective action in its power”.²⁷ In practice, this entailed promoting human rights in the face of systematic racial discrimination enacted by the Rhodesian Front government. The Commission’s work, however, was soon to have to deal with the oppressions and brutalities of the counter-insurgency strategy of the Rhodesian Security Forces and, notably, their policy of strategic resettlement. The church’s focus, then, shifted from a general one on race relations and reform to the issues emanating from the armed conflict following the outbreak of the liberation struggle in December 1972.²⁸

²⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace ‘20 Questions and Answers For Justice and Peace’ in Borthwick Institute Archive in Borthwick Institute for Archives, University of York, GB 193 CAT ‘Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: pamphlets and publications’ (1975-1976). Hereafter this will be referred to as ‘20 Questions and Answers For Justice and Peace’.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, pp.188-189.

²⁸ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.21.

Catholic Missions and the Zimbabwean Liberation War

Catholic missions in Rhodesia were located in the principal conflict zones and eventually the liberation struggle and its expansion came to engulf the missions in each diocese (Fig.1, 2 &3) By the end of the war, the Catholic Church had suffered a number of war casualties at the hands of both the Rhodesian Security Forces and the guerrilla fighters. One bishop, 23 expatriate missionaries and one local priest were killed during the war. Moreover, by March 1979, 65 schools and hospitals run by Catholic missionaries had been closed as a result of the war.²⁹ As will be demonstrated the missionary entanglement in the Rhodesian conflict provided an important backdrop to the Catholic NGO response to strategic resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War.

The first Catholic mission to be visited by the guerrillas during the war was St Albert's Mission, located in Sinoia Prefecture and run by German Jesuits (Fig 3.). The mission was in Centenary district in the north-east corner of Rhodesia and close to Altena Farm where the opening guerrilla action of the war had taken place on December 21st, 1972. In January 1973, following this incident, the Rhodesian authorities and local white farmers accused the missionaries at St Alberts of harbouring and even training guerrilla fighters. On 19th February 1973, both primary and secondary schools at St Alberts were forcibly closed by the authorities. St Alberts was subsequently – if temporarily – used as a holding and interrogation centre for suspects amongst the local population by the Rhodesian Security Forces and was surrounded with barbed wire and powerful search lights.³⁰ However, the German Jesuits at St Alberts were also subject to coercive measures from the guerrilla fighters. On 5th July 1973, guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) openly visited St Alberts Mission

²⁹ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.4.

³⁰ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, pp.23, 84-85

where they kidnapped 292 students.³¹ According to one historian, the abductions at St Albert's were related to an internal power struggle within ZANLA, with the abductions engineered by the dissident guerrilla commander Thomas Nhari in a bid to outdo or match the recruitment success of the key ZANLA leader, Rex Nhongo who in less than a year had gained 750 recruits.³² At any rate, due to the harassment of the Zimbabwean peasantry by the contending forces, many residents were to flee (or be forced) across the border and were incorporated into ZANLA forces.³³

Nevertheless, the abduction at St Albert's marked a shift in attitude of the Rhodesian authorities towards the missionaries at St Albert's. Hitherto, the regime had viewed St Albert's and its staff with suspicion, but it now praised the German Jesuit priests citing their "courage in standing up to the guerrilla forces".³⁴ The mission received a financial redress of R\$680.10 from the Rhodesian government via the 'Terrorist Victim Relief Fund'.³⁵ At the same time, the abductions at St Albert's had a significant bearing on the attitudes of the German Jesuits to the guerrillas. Whilst few were supportive of minority rule, some were sympathetic to the anti-communist rhetoric of the Rhodesian Front and others believed in political neutrality, even if the missionaries had been quietly critical of the punitive measures carried out by the Security Forces at St Albert's in January. The victimhood of children – it was mainly school pupils who had been abducted was – cited as an important factor in these Jesuit missionaries taking sides against the guerrilla fighters. The German origin of the missionaries at St Albert's also had a significant bearing on their attitudes in this regard; they viewed the abductions of staff and students by guerrilla at St Albert's as another form of oppression similar to that their

³¹ J.K Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia*, (London, 1985), p.17.

³² Nhari's original name was Raphael Chinyangya.

³³ Ngwabi Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe*, (Gweru, 1999), pp.43-44.

³⁴ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, pp.95-6.

³⁵ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.96.

compatriots had experienced at the hands of the Nazis and Communists in Germany.³⁶ For this reason the abductions at St Albert's therefore marked a hardening of attitudes by the German Jesuits towards the guerrilla fighters.

From 1976 Catholic missionaries increasingly came into contact with both the Security Forces and the guerrilla fighters as the war spread throughout Rhodesia. An entire new front had been opened along Rhodesia's vast eastern frontier following Mozambican independence in 1975 (Fig.2). This new conflict zone encompassed Umtali Diocese in the east (Fig.2 and Fig.3), and Catholic missions in this frontier region were now situated close to one of the principal transit routes used by the guerrillas. As a result, the Catholic missionaries here were regularly coming into contact with insurgents. Avila Mission located in north of Manicaland province was one of the first missions that had to relate to the guerrillas during 1976. Unlike, the Jesuits at St Alberts, there seemed to be support for the guerrillas. It was possible, however that the missionaries may have been compelled to supply the guerrilla fighters. The mission not only provided food and clothing for them but also treated wounded guerrillas. Priests from other missions had brought wounded guerrillas to the mission and its proximity to the border enabled the guerrillas to be taken into Mozambique by stretcher when they had recovered sufficiently.³⁷ It was not long before these contacts³⁷ with the guerrillas brought the Catholic Church into open confrontation with the Rhodesian government.³⁸ In April 1976, guerrillas visited Avila mission to procure medical supplies. Security Force personnel arrived almost immediately after this and interrogated and beat people at random and shot people from helicopters which were hovering over the mission.³⁹ These actions were one of the chief reasons why the Umtali Diocese adopted the policy to render assistance to the guerrillas and to

³⁶ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, pp.96-98.

³⁷ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.132.

³⁸ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.27.

³⁹ Bhebe and Ranger, *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, p.93.

not report their presence to the Rhodesian authorities.⁴⁰ Indeed, following the Avila incident, Bishop Lamont called a meeting to develop a common position on the matter and it was agreed to provide material assistance when the guerrillas requested (or demanded) this and to not report their presence in the area. Those did not agree with this position were advised to leave Rhodesia.⁴¹ Bishop Lamont was subsequently tried for failing to report guerrilla activity,⁴² found guilty and sentenced to 10 years in prison, later reduced to four on appeal. However, he was subsequently deported by the Rhodesia authorities in March 1977.⁴³ During his trial Lamont had outlined the ‘missionary dilemma’ of whether to report guerrillas’ activity or not to do so and face repercussions from the government.⁴⁴ It was principal and dangerous dilemma of Catholic missionaries in the escalating guerrilla war. Elsewhere, Swiss Bethlehem priest, Father Paul Egli of Berejena Mission in Gwelo (Gweru) Diocese (Fig. 3) faced similar charges in January 1977.⁴⁵

By the end of 1976 most Catholic missions in Umtali (Mutare)Diocese – that were dominated by Irish missionaries – were visited by the guerrillas. According to McLaughlin, “diocesan policy together with the Irish predilection for the underdog led to cordial relations between the guerrillas and the Irish missionaries often bordering on partnership”.⁴⁶ Terence Ranger indicates that this type of relationship existed between missionaries and guerrillas at Triashill, St Barbara’s and St Kallian’s missions in Umtali Diocese.⁴⁷ Thus, despite anti-

⁴⁰ Bhebe and Ranger, *Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, p.93.

⁴¹ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.31, Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds.), *Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, (Harare, 1996), p.93.

⁴² Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *For the Record No.41 ‘Bishop Lamont V. The State’*, March 1977.

⁴³ Bhebe and Ranger, *Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, p.93.

⁴⁴ Lamont, *Speech from the Dock*, pp.16-17.

⁴⁵ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 11th January 1977, *The Bulawayo Chronicle*, 13th January 1977 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’. Despite the close proximity of these newspapers to the Rhodesian government and the values of white settler culture, they capture important details regarding the war, including Rhodesian-counter insurgency, guerrilla activity and missionary entanglement in the liberation struggle.

⁴⁶ Bhebe and Ranger, *Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War*, p.94.

⁴⁷ Terence Ranger, ‘Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe, 1970-1989’, *Studies in Church History*, Vol.20 (1983), pp.443-61.

Christian rhetoric, the guerrillas came to view the Catholic missionaries as playing an indispensable role in the liberation struggle. This was not in small part due the outspokenness of Bishop Lamont and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace who denounced the injustices attendant upon Rhodesian counterinsurgency. There was also an undoubted willingness of some Catholic missionaries to collaborate in the liberation struggle as signalled by the diocesan policy in Umtali (Mutare), and Catholic missions came to play an important role as logistical centres for the liberation struggle in eastern Rhodesia.⁴⁸ Inevitably, Catholic missions in Manicaland were caught in the crossfire between the Security Forces and the guerrillas as the war engulfed the province. At Regina Coeli mission (Fig.3) in the Eastern Highlands near Inyanga (Nyanga), a shootout occurred at the mission in August 1977, resulting in the death of one guerrilla and the wounding of two others.⁴⁹ In May 1978, three workers of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were killed by ZANLA guerrillas, close to Regina Coeli mission.⁵⁰ Following this incident. the mission's priest, Father Muzungu, arranged a meeting between Red Cross officials and the ZANLA guerrillas where an apology for the abovementioned killings was offered. However, Muzungu was arrested on 8th November 1978, after Rhodesian soldiers searched the mission and found a number of letters from the liberation fighters. He was subsequently imprisoned in Inyanga. Whilst he was later released, the Rhodesian authorities strictly barred him from working in rural areas.⁵¹

As illustrated by the incidents at St Albert's and that near Regina Coeli, Catholic missionaries could be subject to coercive and violent tactics of the guerrillas. A report in The Sunday Mail claimed that by April 1977, twenty-four Catholic nuns and nine priests had fled Rhodesia because of the escalating guerrilla war. Sometimes, a priest could fall foul of the

⁴⁸ Bhebe and Ranger, *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, pp.93-98.

⁴⁹ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.135.

⁵⁰ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 27th May 1978, 12th March 1979 in NAZ 'Newspapers'. Also see *The Rand Daily Mail* 23rd January 1979, *The Guardian* 14th November 1978, *The Daily Telegraph* 7th September 1978.

⁵¹ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, pp.135-136.

guerrillas: In one instance Carmelite Father Bernard Clinch had been driven from Mountain Malleray Mission, north of Inyanga, after the guerrillas had allegedly stated he was no longer welcome.⁵² However, most Carmelite missionaries had resolved to remain in war zones unless lives were imminently in danger, a policy which was formalised in 1978.⁵³

Nevertheless, it is certain that in late 1976 and early 1977 there were a series of murders of Catholic missionaries at the hands of the guerrilla fighters. This may have been part of the policy that made whites in far-flung rural areas frequent targets of the guerrillas. On November 25th 1976, ZANLA forces killed Fr George Jeorger, a Bethlehem Father from Bondolfi Mission in Gwelo Diocese (Fig.3) who disappeared when travelling to mass.⁵⁴ On December 5th 1976, Adolph Gregor Schmidt, a representative of the Bishop of Bulawayo, along with Father Possenti Weggarten and Sister Maria Francis Van Den Berg from Regina Mundi School, were ambushed and killed by the guerrillas in the Lupane district in north-west Rhodesia whilst travelling from Regina Mundi Mission to St Luke's Mission.⁵⁵ Sister Ermenfried Knauer, who was wounded, was the only survivor of this incident.⁵⁶ Not surprisingly, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace formally complained to the nationalist delegates at the Geneva Conference, expressing its "grave concern" about guerrilla atrocities in the war.⁵⁷ Bishop Lamont now condemned the actions of the guerrillas which had brought "unspeakable shame" to the liberation cause and felt that "all African politicians present at Geneva must at

⁵² *The Sunday Mail*, April 3rd, 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'

⁵³ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.31.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 9th December 1976.

⁵⁶ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 6th December 1976.

⁵⁷ *The Daily Telegraph*, 7th December 1976, *The Times*, 8th December 1976. The Geneva Conference held between October and December 1976 mediated by the British government had been the abortive attempt to broker a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia between Ian's Smith's unrecognised government and black nationalist parties including the African National Council (ANC) led by Abel Muzorewa, Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) headed by James Chikemera, and the Patriotic Front made by Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

once denounce this outrage and all other murders and atrocities and take positive action to put an end to them if they are to continue to presume to speak for their own people”.⁵⁸ Patriotic Front leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, however, chose to blame the Selous Scouts, a notorious unit of the Rhodesian Security Forces, for the murder of Bishop Schmitt, Weggarten and Van Den Berg.⁵⁹ It was later reported however, that Albert Sumbo Ncube, a guerrilla, admitted to seven murders including that of Bishop Adolph Schmidt when he appeared at Bulawayo Magistrates on charges of ‘terrorism’.⁶⁰

On February 6th, 1977, seven European missionaries were killed at St Paul’s Mission near Musami only 45km from Salisbury.⁶¹ The massacre at St Paul’s was widely publicised and was one of the most high-profile cases of guerrilla violence against Catholic missionaries in Rhodesia. The events at St Paul’s received widespread coverage in the international press,⁶² and –once more – there was significant controversy surrounding this particular incident, Rhodesian accounts insisting that the massacre was the handiwork of ZANLA guerrillas,⁶³ while the Patriotic Front, the joint organisation that supposedly unified the nationalist armies, continued to deny guerrilla responsibility for the murders. ZANU leader Robert Mugabe claimed that a full enquiry had been conducted which pointed to “the possibility that these assassinations have been committed by the Selous Scouts”.⁶⁴ There were undoubtedly guerrilla atrocities against missionaries, but it becomes difficult to state definitively which side was responsible for the massacre at St Paul’s, it being argued that there were instances of Selous

⁵⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 7th December 1976.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 1st January 1977.

⁶¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 8th, 1977.

⁶² *The New York Times*, February 8th, 1977, *The Guardian*, February 8th, 1977, *The Daily Telegraph*, 8th February 1978.

⁶³ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *The Murder of Missionaries in Rhodesia*, (Salisbury, 1978)

⁶⁴ *Zimbabwe News*, Vol. 10 No.4 July- August 1978 in NAZ, MS 536/11/1

Scouts masquerading as guerrilla fighters in order to commit atrocities for propaganda purposes during the war.⁶⁵

Despite the horrific events at St Paul's one of the serving priests there, Father Myerscough, had signalled his intention to remain at the mission despite having concerns for his own safety.⁶⁶ At the same time, Father Patrick McNamara, Father Superior of the Jesuit Fathers in Salisbury, indicated that it was unlikely there would be any increasing security measures at St Paul's "beyond the dictates of common sense" including not travelling at night during the curfew hours and avoiding dirt roads which had been mined.⁶⁷ In the Rhodesian parliament, however, it was claimed that the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace were denying the fact that the guerrillas were committing atrocities against missionaries in the Rhodesian countryside: Mr John Deary, Chairman of the CCJP, had – it was alleged – denied the culpability of the guerrillas for this atrocity despite evidence from Father Myerscough.⁶⁸

The situation was undoubtedly extreme: a report from *The Sunday Mail* on April 3rd, 1977, one that did not refer at all to the fears created by the counter-insurgency campaign, claimed that threats from the guerrillas had caused twenty-four Roman Catholic nuns and nine priests to leave the Mountain Malleray Mission (Fig.3) in Manicaland north of Inyanga (Nyanga).⁶⁹ As we have already seen, Manicaland became a particular hotspot for missionary entanglement in the war. On June 23rd, 1978, eight British missionaries and four of their children were killed by the guerrilla fighters at Elim Pentecostal Mission located near

⁶⁵ <https://www.jesuit.org.uk/rememering-musami-martyrs-40-years> [accessed 18/1/20 19:30]

⁶⁶ *The New York Times*, February 9th, 1977.

⁶⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, February 9th, 1977.

⁶⁸ *Hansard*: House of Assembly, Vol.97., No.19, 21st October 1977 in NAZ, MS 311/27/4 'The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8' Appendix No.27 'Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977, Vol.4. Hereafter this will be referred to as '*Hansard*: House of Assembly, Vol.97. No.19, 21st October 1977'.

⁶⁹ *The Sunday Mail*, April 3rd, 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

Inyanga.⁷⁰ The mission was located close to the Catholic missions at Avila and Regina Coeli (Fig.3). By 1978, the Church was faced with the dilemma of whether or not to withdraw all of its missionaries from the sensitive areas as the war further intensified.⁷¹ At the same time government propaganda including the government publication *Murder of Missionaries*, had publicised various atrocities committed by the guerrillas against missionaries.⁷² It was in this context that, in August 1978, members of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace met with the Patriotic Front leaders. It is highly significant that, during this meeting Nkomo, the leader of ZIPRA, did not dispute that the missionaries had been victimised by nationalist guerrillas, he merely denied the responsibility of the Patriotic Front leadership for the murder or harassment of missionaries; rather, he cited the system of racial discrimination, the frustration and ill-discipline of the guerrilla fighters and what he held to be the previous collaboration of the Church with the regime as reasons behind these violent acts.⁷³ In September 1978, meanwhile, Josiah Tongogara, ZANU's defence minister, alleged that guerrilla atrocities against missionaries had in fact been committed by Smith's forces and Selous Scouts disguised as guerrilla fighters in order to discredit the liberation force.⁷⁴ ZANU's military court, he insisted, had been "guarding against this all along"; his forces would never be responsible for such a 'notorious act'.⁷⁵ After all, he insisted, the missionaries were an asset to the guerrillas through their provision of medicine and clothes and therefore could not possibly be their targets.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ *The Washington Post*, 25th June 1978, *The New York Times* 25th June 1978

⁷¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 'Report on Meeting with Patriotic Front Leaders 13th – 21st August 1978' in NAZ, MS 1082/5/18.

⁷² Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Murder of Missionaries* (Salisbury, 1978)

⁷³ 'Report on Meeting with Patriotic Front Leaders 13th – 21st August 1978', NAZ, MS 1082/5/18.

⁷⁴ Interview with Josiah Maganda Tongogara, Defence Secretary of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Maputo, Mozambique, 11 September 1978' in ICS 151 CIIR A/2/2/6, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Senate House Library, University of London. Hereafter this will referred to as 'Interview with Josiah Tongogara, Defence Secretary of ZANU, 11th September 1978'.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

In fact, guerrillas did not in any way constitute a homogenous bloc, divided as they were both between the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces representing ZANU and ZAPU and by the varying policies followed by different units within each guerrilla army. As reported to Rome by the CCJP: “some guerrilla groups had shown sympathy towards the work of the Church and had given the assurance that they want the Church, including its European missionaries, to continue in the work in the Christian service of the people, especially in the fields of health and technical education of the people. At the same time other guerrilla groups were anti-Christian and others even anti-religion which openly persecuted the church as an instrument of the colonial regime.⁷⁶ Regional differences are also important to consider. It was noted that in western areas where ZIPRA operated, guerrillas “appeared to be far more anti-white” which meant that even missionaries were unable to move about. What is more it was noted that there was an anti-Catholic sentiment in the west of the country.⁷⁷

Another more serious ZANLA attack occurred at St Alberts in October 1979 which led to the closure of the mission. Mortar rockets had been fired at the mission and some nurses and teachers at the mission had been beaten up by the guerrillas. As already noted, mutual hostility had developed between the missionaries and the guerrillas here following the abductions July 1973; at the same time the guerrillas viewed the missionaries as collaborators with the Security Forces who had established a base at St Albert’s Mission.⁷⁸ Before its closure towards the end of the war, St Alberts had become a focal point of conflict between the Security Forces and the guerrilla fighters who frequently arrived at the mission in order to procure food supplies.⁷⁹ Despite the ceasefire in December 1979, the killing of Catholic missionaries continued. During the general election in February 1980, two Catholic missionaries were murdered: Father

⁷⁶ Randolph, *Report to Rome*, p.84.

⁷⁷ ‘Riddell, The War and the Work of Relief Agencies inside Rhodesia’ in BNA, FCO 36/2289 ‘Interest of Religious Bodies in the Rhodesian Situation’ (1978).

⁷⁸ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.98.

⁷⁹ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, pp.102-3.

Machikicho and a catechist from Gokomere Mission were murdered travelling to Mass at an outstation. Mujibas (youths who assisted the guerrillas) were later discovered to have carried out the killings and on 20th February 1980, Father Killian Hueseer was shot dead at Berejena Mission. Allegedly the Selous Scouts were responsible for this, because of Hueseer's known links with the guerrilla fighters.⁸⁰

The Catholic Church, Human Rights and Strategic Resettlement

Catholic missions played a crucial role in the investigative efforts of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace with regard to the plight of the rural population during the war. Indeed, the ecclesiastical geography of the Catholic Church missions, where they were located, is key to understanding the efficacy of the investigative efforts of the CCJP into the human rights abuses attendant upon strategic resettlement. Aforementioned many Catholic missions were located in principle conflict zones. Indeed, there was clear correspondence between the geography of Strategic resettlement and the Catholic Church (Fig. 1, 3 and 4). According to human rights lawyer Niall MacDermott the Churches generally in Rhodesia had a significant advantage in investigating human rights violations across the country as they had through missionaries and mission schools, representatives throughout the African areas who "were closely associated with the people and knew what was happening to them and what they were thinking".⁸¹ (Fig.3) The Catholic Church took the lead investigating human rights abuses during the Zimbabwean Liberation War. MacDermott claimed that such activity was also ecumenical with close co-operation between the Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists and other Churches.⁸² However, Bhebe points out the new challenges from the liberation movement from

⁸⁰ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.47.

⁸¹ Niall Macdermot (Secretary General of the International Committee of Jurists, Geneva) 'The Churches and Human Rights' Address to the Annual General Meeting of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, 18th June 1976 in Church, State & Politics Box P.322.1 in Zimbabwean Catholic Bishop's Conference Library (Harare).

⁸² Ibid.

1960 onwards put national church structures to the test “as their adherents were often violent divided along racial lines in political matters”.⁸³ The Catholic Church was able to overcome this due to the outspoken nature of Bishop Lamont and the work of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace who openly condemned human rights violations attendant upon Rhodesian counterinsurgency. However, the issue was more contentious in the Methodist Church. The issue of national and racial liberation divided the Wesleyan Methodist synod which led to the temporary resignation of Rev. Canaan Banana.⁸⁴

On other end of the spectrum some in the Anglican Church had identified closely with the white-settler regime.⁸⁵ Bishop Paul Burroughs has suspended to the membership of the Diocese of Mashonaland to the World Council of Churches due its decision to support the liberation movements.⁸⁶ What is more the Bishop had been supportive of Rhodesian counter-insurgency measures and had even requested that new protected village be constructed near the Anglican mission at St Albans.⁸⁷ Yet again the Anglican Church had already been divided over the matter of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Rev. Sam Wood of the Anglican Cathedral saw Rhodesia’s Declaration of Independence as “prompted not by Christian ideals but by Rhodesian Front policies”.⁸⁸ In his charge to the synod in June 1968 Rev. Wood (now Vicar-General of the Diocese of Mashonaland) had expressed his opposition to UDI: a view he claimed was shared by many amongst the clergy and laity. However, he acknowledged that there many within the denomination who did not share this view and thus

⁸³ Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZAPU Guerrilla Warfare*, p.124.

⁸⁴ Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZAPU Guerrilla Warfare*, p.124.

⁸⁵ *Zimbabwe News* Vol. 10 No.4 July- August 1978 in NAZ, MS 536/11/1 ‘Julie Frederikse Manuscripts’.

⁸⁶ Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare*, p.124.

⁸⁷ *Hansard*: House of Assembly, Vol 97, No.13. 12th October 1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/4 “The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8’. Appendix No.27 ‘Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977 Vol. 4.

⁸⁸ Chengetai J. Zvobgo, Church and State in Rhodesia: From The Unilateral Declaration to the Pearce Commission, 1965-72, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 31, No.2 (Jun,2005), pp.381-402.

the Church was unable to “speak with one voice”.⁸⁹ However, in any case, Christian Churches predominantly focused the relief efforts to war victims under the aegis of Christian Care as opposed to investigating human rights violations. The humanitarian response strategic resettlement was clearly an asset to the Rhodesian regime absolving it from the full responsibility of maintaining acceptable living standards in the Protected Villages. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace was therefore a clear frontrunner amongst Christian NGOs investigating human rights violations in the Rhodesian conflict.

Probably nothing affected the growing antagonism between the Catholic Church and the settler regime as its willingness to investigate the human rights abuses attendant upon Rhodesian counterinsurgency. Human rights advocacy was, in fact, a central pillar of Catholic involvement during the liberation struggle through the work of its Justice and Peace Commission. Christian Churches played a central role in investigating human rights abuses attendant upon Rhodesia’s counter insurgency strategy, but it was the Catholics who were pre-eminent in this.

As early as April 1974, the war not yet eighteen months old, the Catholic Commission called publicly for an enquiry into allegations of brutality by members of the police and Security Forces.⁹⁰ However, the Commission was immediately subjected to a serious backlash from the regime, with the Minister of Law and Order claiming that the Catholic bishops were “attempting to undermine lawful authority and the forces of law and order” and “trying to provoke a confrontation between church and state in Rhodesia”.⁹¹ Later the minister referred in the Rhodesian parliament to the Commission as a ‘fifth column’ which “on the face of it [appeared]... to stand for justice and peace and so forth, but which in reality [had] more sinister

⁸⁹ Zvobgo, ‘Church and State in Rhodesia’, pp.381-402.

⁹⁰ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 2nd April 1974 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

⁹¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 5th April 1974 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

objectives”.⁹² He rejected calls by the Commission for an inquiry into Security Force atrocities and regarded such as the “usual ploy for those who are indoctrinated by the Communist code”.⁹³

Such arguments were being made by the minister while the Rhodesian government passed the Indemnity and Compensation Act (1975) which, in effect, gave Security Force personnel protection from any legal repercussions for committing atrocities against the rural African population.⁹⁴ This enabled the Security Forces often to wage unrestricted warfare in the Rhodesian countryside to the detriment of the basic human rights of the rural African population. The Rhodesian parliament remained silent on human rights abuses of the Rhodesian Security Forces. It was therefore “left to the Christian Churches to collect and publish, with [support from the Catholic Institute for International Relations] ... information about the torture and ill-treatment of suspects and the demoralizing effects of the way in which Africans ...[were] placed into the so-called protected villages”.⁹⁵ As stated in the official history of the CCJP, the organisation viewed the enforced villagization programme in the tribal trust lands in north-eastern Rhodesia as another example of the application of the draconian Emergency Power (Maintenance Law and Order) Regulations.⁹⁶

The notion of ‘propaganda war’ provides an important conceptual framework for understanding CCJP dissemination efforts during the Zimbabwean Liberation War. This refers to the regime’s concerted efforts to disseminate biased reports regarding the conduct of the counter insurgency campaign, including the villagization programme. Mazambani and Mashingaize argue that Strategic resettlement was an important reflection of colonial ideology through the settler regime’s emphasis on the supposedly humanitarian and developmental role

⁹² *The Rhodesia Herald* 28th August 1975 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’

⁹³ Macdermot, ‘Churches and Human Rights.’

⁹⁴ Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1975-1976*, (London, 1976), pp.70-72.

⁹⁵ Macdermot, ‘The Churches and Human Rights’ to the Annual General Meeting of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, 18th June 1976.

⁹⁶ Diana Auret, *Reaching For Justice: The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1972-1992*, (Harare, 1992), p.65.

of the Protected and Consolidated Villages.⁹⁷ The CCJP, however sought to provide a counter-narrative and publicise the harsh conditions in the keeps, thus offering a different discourse regarding Strategic resettlement from that provided by the Rhodesian government. *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War* was the chief example of the Commission's efforts to challenge the biased reports of conditions in the Protected Villages in pro-government media and Rhodesian propaganda.⁹⁸

Not surprisingly the CCJP was subjected to a harsh backlash from the authorities and supporters of the regime due its dissemination efforts regarding villagization. In 1974 the Reverend. Johnstone, a Catholic priest, was "prosecuted for drawing a cartoon depicting the living conditions in a Protected Village".⁹⁹ However the charge was withdrawn after evidence given by a District Commissioner and a Provincial Commissioner did not support the state's criticism of the cartoon. However, despite being acquitted Rev. Johnstone and his family were then deported.¹⁰⁰ This was just one example of the attempt at censoring the Catholics' coverage of strategic resettlement and other military policies of the regime. The Rhodesian regime's power to suppress journalistic and other criticism of the conduct of their counter-insurgency campaign was considerable. The country had been placed under a state of emergency since UDI in 1965 and regulations restricted the free flow of information. The Official Secrets Act 1965 was particularly important in this regard. Under it, as noted in the CCJP's *Rhodesia The Propaganda War*: "anyone writing, publishing or distributing anything likely to cause alarm or despondency or lead to action which might be detrimental to national defence, public safety, public order or the termination of the state of public emergency is punishable by a fine of \$600

⁹⁷ I Mazambani and T. M, Mashingaidze, 'The Creation of Protected Villages in Southern Rhodesia: Colonial Mythologies and the Official Mind', *The Dyke*, Vol. 8.3 (2014), p.72.

⁹⁸ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*, (London, 1977), see section titled 'Protected Villages on the Increase'

⁹⁹ This was reported to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (eds.) *Man in the Middle: Torture, Resettlement and Eviction*, (Salisbury, 1975), p.21.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

or six months in jail”.¹⁰¹ In fact, during the liberation struggle, the Rhodesian authorities allowed only a “select number of accredited journalists in operational areas who had to abide by the Official Secrets Act”.¹⁰² Indeed those who wished to become defence correspondents had to sign a document which set down rigid conditions they had to accept in order to obtain press accreditation. This involved submitting material when called for, receiving approval from civil and military authorities, reporting visits to all operational areas to the Joint Operational Centre and obeying the laws of Rhodesia including the Official Secrets Act.¹⁰³ However it is important to note that it was not until 1978 that the regime imposed direct censorship on reporting; prior to this, it adopted indirect intimidatory tactics to ensure that these journalists exercised self-censorship.¹⁰⁴ For example BBC reporter Brian Barron was refused an extension of work permit because he reported on the massacre of 23 black Zimbabweans in the north east.¹⁰⁵

The CCJP pointed out that villagization had “gone largely uncriticised in the media”.¹⁰⁶ At the same time it noted how “Rhodesian propaganda presents these villages as havens of safety and welcomed by the local people”.¹⁰⁷ A pro-regime newspaper, *The Sunday Mail* illustrates this point in an article from August 1975, which expresses the developmental and humanitarian gloss referred to earlier. It alleged that these villages not only provided protection but also offered great socio-economic potential for their inhabitants.

¹⁰¹ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*, See section titled ‘A Crime to cause alarm or despondency in Rhodesia’

¹⁰² Geoffrey Feltoe, ‘Law, Ideology and Coercion in Southern Rhodesia’, MPhil thesis (1978), University of Kent, p.42

¹⁰³ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propoganda War*, See section titled ‘A Crime to cause alarm or despondency in Rhodesia’

¹⁰⁴ Feltoe, *Law, Ideology and Coercion*, p.41.

¹⁰⁵ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propoganda War*, see Preface.

¹⁰⁶ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace *Rhodesia: The Propoganda War*, see Preface.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

The report suggested that the minor inconveniences of a mass move pale into insignificance besides the atrocities that been committed under ‘the banner of freedom’. The paper’s reporter claimed he “had not anticipated finding the people cheerful when I visited a forward area which was involved in translocation” instead he had expected “to find the people complaining about the hardship of the work required, the cold night and the general situation”. The journalist claimed that “walking through the village... [it was found] that soldiers were popular, heart-warmingly so... small children (always the barometer of opinion) ran after the soldiers instead of away from them”. Moreover, it was said that concentrating the population into one large centre with ‘amenities’ close at hand was better than attempting “to spread those amenities through half a dozen villages”. Finally, the report outlined how District Commissioner Dave Mirams (of Mrewa) viewed the less-strictly controlled Consolidated Villages as growth points which, he believed, could support the development of schools and clinics, not to mention the creation of business centres and even small industries which would suit the people’s requirements.¹⁰⁸

The CCJP were very critical of these optimistic reports. It highlighted an example of three large and well-built villages which were located in the Zambezi valley. These featured good water supplies and health clinics and were functional as “show-piece” villages that were regularly shown to journalists by the authorities.¹⁰⁹ These show-piece villages remained important even during the latter phase of war. Writing in 1978, Terence Ranger pointed out that a television reporter who had been “allowed into a new ‘concentrated’ village in Rhodesia for half a day [had] solemnly assured on camera that he had found no evidence to substantiate allegations of brutality”.¹¹⁰ A television programme produced by Thames Television in 1979

¹⁰⁸ *The Sunday Mail*, 31st August 1975 in Herald House Library (Harare), 73LA: Resettlement 1973-1978.

¹⁰⁹ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace (eds.) *Man in the Middle*, p.8.

¹¹⁰ Terence Ranger, ‘Conflict in Rhodesia- A Question of Evidence’, *African Affairs*, Volume 77, Issue 306, 1 January 1978, pp.3-5.

entitled. Goodbye Rhodesia saw reporter Peter Taylor given a tour of a Protected Village located near Umtali (Mutare). Like those in the Zambezi Valley, it had been used for propaganda purposes by the authorities. Indeed, Taylor pointed out that “visitors are no strangers here”. He described the toilet facilities “spotless” but had no doubt that he was on a “guided tour”.¹¹¹ In order to capture glimpses of the harsh conditions of the keeps, he had to speak to the residents in secret, such were the strict controls placed on the journalists who sought to report on the problems of strategic resettlement.¹¹²

This illustrates a problem faced by the CCJP when it sought to publicise the harsh conditions in the Protected Villages. All too often its reports could not be supported by evidence from journalists’ reports, let alone the official record. As early as 1975 the CCJP had stated that it was “particularly concerned because official reports of these conditions are much at variance with the first hand evidence available”.¹¹³ It had pressed the Rhodesian regime “to invite reputable welfare agencies and other impartial observers freely to visit all Protected Villages so as to make an independent report and as far as possible to alleviate the misery of the unfortunate people compelled to live in them”.¹¹⁴

Not surprisingly the CCJP found itself attacked by the pro-government media. With *The Sunday Mail* quick to deny the allegations made by the CCJP regarding conditions in the Protected Villages:

The facilities in Protected Villages are severely criticised; the government is accused of breaking down traditional life and custom. But which is better a safety zone, with initially the minimal of facilities and amenities, or a terrorist bullet in the back or a bayonet in the stomach...The Church has a duty to say what in its opinion is right and what is wrong. It has no right to present biased dangerous documents in the name of justice.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹Thames Television, ‘Goodbye Rhodesia’ (1979) see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3u5CxS3j5M> [accessed 14:06 04/05/20]

¹¹² Thames Television, ‘Goodbye Rhodesia’ (1979).

¹¹³ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Man in the Middle*, p.21.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ *The Sunday Mail* 18th June 1975, in ‘NAZ Newspapers’.

Despite the hostility (and, we shall see, the dangers), the CCJP pressed forward with a series of reports which highlighted the harsh conditions in the Protected Villages. Published in May 1975, *Man in the Middle* brought attention to the conditions in the protected villages, the experiences of the celebrated Tangwena community who were resisting eviction in the eastern highlands around Inyanga and the conduct of the Security Forces. This publication was a clear indicator of the project of the CCJP, with “the voice of the rural African...being broadcast far and wide through the bonds forged by the listening church”. However when seeking to publish the dossier through the CIIR in April 1975, Father Dieter Scholz discovered when arriving at Heathrow airport in London “that the manuscript had been removed from his suitcase”. Another copy of the manuscript was, however, sent on and, in the end, the Rhodesian authorities were only able to delay publication by a week.¹¹⁶ Subsequently *Man in the Middle* received wide publicity and was translated into French, Spanish, German, with extracts made in Dutch.¹¹⁷ Strategic resettlement thus became an important focus through which the CCJP conveyed to a worldwide audience the plight of the Zimbabwean peasantry caught in the midst of an escalating guerrilla war. Moreover, this set an important precedent for subsequent CCJP publications.

The publication of both *Man in the Middle* and *Civil War* in Rhodesia were a significant factor for understanding the growing antagonism between the CCJP and the white-settler regime. Later *Civil War in Rhodesia* (1976) uncovered state violence against the rural population.¹¹⁸ By 1976 the Government “no longer content with trying to discredit the Commission, moved against the members themselves.”¹¹⁹ As aforementioned, Bishop Donal Lamont was arrested and charged with failing to the guerrillas and was subsequently deported.

¹¹⁶ Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. Quotations from pp.208,209.

¹¹⁷ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, p.82.

¹¹⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, *Civil War in Rhodesia*. pp.7-15, 55-60.

¹¹⁹ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, pp.96-97.

The Commission still sought a dialogue with the Rhodesian government regarding legislation and the actions of the state. Thus, in August 1976, the Deputy Minister in the Department of the Prime Minister, Edward Sutton-Pryce, was invited to discuss, inter alia, the Protected Villages with members of the CCJP. Sutton-Pryce however, refused to discuss the Protected Villages.¹²⁰ Deep hostility developed towards the CCJP from the Rhodesian regime following the publication of *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War* in 1977. *Already Man in the Middle* had been banned by the Rhodesian authorities in 1977. *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War (1977)* is the chief example of the Commission's efforts to challenge the biased reports of conditions in the Protected Villages in pro-government media and Rhodesian propaganda.¹²¹ As shown earlier Mazambani and Mashingaidze's work has stressed the importance of kind of colonial ideology and Strategic Resettlement.¹²² The CCJP sought to provide a counter-narrative and publicise the harsh conditions in the keeps, thus offering a different discourse regarding Strategic resettlement from that provided by the Rhodesian government.

Sister Janice McLaughlin played a crucial role collating material for *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*. David Owen, who had recently become Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs had sent a request from London to the CCJP Communication Office for material that dealt with various aspects of the war including the villagization programme.¹²³ The subsequent "Fact Papers" were approved by Monsignor Helmut Reckter SJ, the President of CCJP, and 200 copies duplicated and distributed to the Bishops, Diocesan Committees, and other Church organizations for information purposes. However, the Commission had no intention of publishing these "Fact Papers" themselves due to the sensitive nature of the

¹²⁰ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, pp.96-97.

¹²¹ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*; see section titled 'Protected Villages on the Increase'.

¹²² I Mazambani and T. M, Mashingaidze, 'The Creation of Protected Villages in Southern Rhodesia: Colonial Mythologies and the Official Mind', *The Dyke*, Vol. 8.3 (2014), p.72

¹²³ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, p.84

material. They would, however, go on to form a crucial part of *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*, for McLaughlin had, unbeknownst to the Commission, sent copies of the 'Fact Papers' to the Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR) in London in September 1977 and the Institute independently published *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*. This was a further attempt to highlight the truth of the war situation in Rhodesia.¹²⁴ It brought within its covers four additional papers which had been taken to the CIIR in London.¹²⁵ *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War* thus contained details of systematic torture, civilian casualties, protected villages, security legislation and government techniques of propaganda used on the rural population.¹²⁶ It is important to note, however, that the, CCJP were against the publication of *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War* on the basis that it contained the highly sensitive material from the Fact Papers and this might endanger members of the Church.¹²⁷ Other detailed CCJP reports on Rhodesia's Protected Villages were highly confidential and required written permission from the Commission for reproduction or transmission. From the perspective of the Justice and Peace Commission such activity carried significant risk as evidenced by the Lamont case. It was noted that that Rhodesian CID had already been "monitoring the Commission's correspondence [and] doubtless knew of the impending publication and attempted to forestall it by confiscation of Commission documents".¹²⁸ It was not long before the Rhodesian CID moved against Commission personnel notably McLaughlin. On 5th August 1977 the CID searched the Commission's premises in Salisbury and removed papers, confiscated files and destroyed all copies of the banned publications in the JPC strong room. The following day Father Scholz was declared a prohibited immigrant.¹²⁹ On 31st August warrants were issued for

¹²⁴ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, p.84.

¹²⁵ Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, pp.255-256.

¹²⁶ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia The Propoganda War*.

¹²⁷ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, p.84.

¹²⁸ Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p.255.

¹²⁹ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, p.97.

McLaughlin's 'Fact Papers'.¹³⁰ The residences of Brother Arthur, Sr Janice McLaughlin, Fr Dieter Scholz and Mr John Deary were searched. This exercise resulted specifically in the arrest, imprisonment and ultimately the deportation of Sr Janice McLaughlin. During the search, the CID held that it found a high frequency radio and device which, it was alleged, enabled her to listen to army radio signals. Even more significantly "a private diary was discovered which contained references of a favourable kind to the liberation movement and to the guerrillas".¹³¹ She was immediately arrested and removed to Chikurubi prison.¹³² Subsequently, McLaughlin was put on trial on September 13th, 1977, charged under the Law-and-Order Maintenance Act and subsequently deported by the Rhodesia authorities.¹³³ But the plight of the victims of strategic resettlement was brought to light by the McLaughlin case and took this to an international audience as indicated by reports in *The New York Times*. Referring to the dire humanitarian situation and guerrilla attacks on the Protected Villages, these reports indicated how McLaughlin's work, which found its way into *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*, served as an important corrective to hitherto biased accounts regarding Strategic resettlement.¹³⁴

The subsequent history of Sister McLaughlin was to reveal her strong support for the guerrillas. Her appearance on 13th September 1977 in the regional magistrates Court following her arrest "afforded the first public demonstration of unequivocal Catholic support for the liberation movement" and she was unwilling to moderate her public stance.¹³⁵ It was reported in the overseas press that she had actually told the court of her support for the freedom fighters.¹³⁶ A Rhodesian MP used McLaughlin's stance as evidence in parliament of extensive

¹³⁰ Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p.253.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ *The Sunday Mail*, September 25th 1977 in NAZ Newspapers, Sunday Mail July to December 1977

¹³⁴ *The New York Times*, 6th September 1977, September 23rd, 1977,

¹³⁵ Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p.253.

¹³⁶ *The Guardian*, 14th September 1977.

‘communist infiltration’ in the country and it was argued that such ‘infiltration’ had been “been most successful in the so-called Catholic Justice and Peace Commission”.¹³⁷

She proved herself willing to engage in a dialogue with the ZANU leadership and interviewed Josiah Tongogara in September 1978 when he was the Defence Secretary of ZANU and therefore a central figure directing guerrilla strategy in the liberation war. Writing in *Zimbabwe News*, the official ZANU publication, she outlined the nature of the propaganda war waged by the Rhodesian regime through which the whites had been “closed from the truth” and she noted how the efforts of the Catholic Church to make the facts known had been heavily curtailed by the government.¹³⁸ It was evident that McLaughlin viewed the efforts of the Justice and Peace Commission in investigating state violence through the work of rural missionaries as vital to the cause of liberation. Significantly, she referring to Protected Villages as “concentration camps” echoing the attitude towards them by the Patriotic Front guerrillas.¹³⁹ McLaughlin felt the villagization programme would “simply increase the oppression against the people” and would therefore “be counter-productive for the Smith regime because it will simply intensify people’s desire to be free”.¹⁴⁰ We should not let the prominence of Sister Janice Mclaughlin lead to us lose sight of the fact that many other Catholics contributed to consistent and lengthy investigative efforts regarding the impact of strategic resettlement.

¹³⁷ *Hansard*: House of Assembly, Vol.97. No.19, 21st October 1977.

¹³⁸ *Zimbabwe News* Vol. 10 No.4 July- August 1978, NAZ, MS 536/11/1 ‘Julie Frederikse Manuscripts’. Hereafter this will be referred to as ‘*Zimbabwe News* Vol. 10 No.4 July- August 1978’.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁴⁰ *Zimbabwe News* Vol. 10 No.4 July- August 1978, NAZ, MS 536/11/1.

Themes of Investigation and exposure: The Catholic Church and the ‘Protected Villages’

In fact, the principal role of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in the history of Strategic resettlement came to be the investigation of the situation in the Protected and Consolidated Villages in north and eastern areas of Rhodesia and the dissemination of its findings. Throughout the war the CCJP collated classified data on villagization.¹⁴¹ Early on (in 1974) Father Dieter Scholz and Brother Mukonori played a crucial role in these efforts.¹⁴² These initial investigative efforts marked the first important engagement on the part of the Justice and Peace Commission in the ‘propaganda war’ as it sought to challenge biased accounts of the enforced villagization from pro-government media. The CCJP pointed out that in government propaganda the principle aim of the villagization programme was to protect the rural population from guerrilla coercion.¹⁴³ Indeed, the regime had asserted that “in many cases it is local people who have asked to be moved into protected villages so they can be safe from the guerrillas”.¹⁴⁴ This rendering of the villagization programme was consistently disseminated through various editions of *The Rhodesia Herald* and *The Sunday Mail*.¹⁴⁵ This was also evident in publications from the Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism published during the war.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’ in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 ‘Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages’ Appendix 10/12/13. Hereafter this will be referred to as Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’.

¹⁴² Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁴³ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Press Statement by Mr G Feltoe on Rhodesia: *The Propaganda War*’ in Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning The Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No. 29 in Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop’s Conference Library.

¹⁴⁴ ‘Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Press Statements by Mr G Feltoe on Rhodesia: *The Propaganda War*’.

¹⁴⁵ *The Rhodesia Herald* 16th April 1974, 15th October 1977, 16th November 1977 and *The Sunday Mail*, May 9th, 1976, April 17th, 1977 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

¹⁴⁶ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Focus on Rhodesia*, Vol.2.4, Vol.2 No.11 Vol. 3. No.3 in NAZ S 3562 S/F0 23: Focus on Rhodesia March 1976-.

The Minister of Internal Affairs (B.H Musset) had claimed that the rural African population had frequently requested to be moved into Protected Villages which afforded them a stronger degree of ‘protection’ from the ‘terrorists.’¹⁴⁷ The Commission was quick to challenge such claims regarding the enforced villagization programme. Thus, early on in the process of strategic resettlement, the CCJP contested the Rhodesian authorities’ claim that “the people living in the northern two-thirds of the [Chiweshe] area ...[had] moved quite happily...while [only] the people in the lower third -- while they didn’t refuse- were not as happy”.¹⁴⁸ On the contrary, reported the CCJP, an informant claimed that “the people of her village had never been consulted about the move, but were ordered, with guns pointed to them, to get things ready and board the lorries”.¹⁴⁹ Later, it was publicly pointed out that “anyone with any army experience will be able to tell you that the decision to institute protected villages is often made solely because of military considerations and not because of any concern for the safety of the people”.¹⁵⁰ What is more the CCJP, pointed out that “there is little evidence to back up the government’s thesis, that although the people may initially resent being moved into protected villages after a while, they start to appreciate the benefits of such villages”.¹⁵¹

There were two strands to the CCJP’s critique of the villagization programme. Firstly, it challenged the supposedly developmentalist and humanitarian objectives of the policy. Secondly and linked to the above, the Commission highlighted the plight of the victims of Strategic Resettlement. If, the CCJP sought to challenge the government narrative of the policy,

¹⁴⁷ *Hansard*, House of Assembly, Vol.88, No.5, 30th August 1974 in NAZ MS 311/19, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No.17 ‘Parliamentary Debate on an Appeal to Conscience by Christian Leaders and On Related Matters’. Hereafter this will be referred to as ‘*Hansard*, House of Assembly, Vol.88, No.5, 30th August 1974’.

¹⁴⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁵⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace ‘Press Statements by Mr G Feltoe on Rhodesia: The Propaganda War’.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*.

sketched earlier in this thesis, which highlighted the potential of the Protected Villages to act as important nodes of socio-economic development, it is important to note nevertheless, that many implementing the policy genuinely believed this and that the Justice and Peace Commission recognised it. A CCJP report from 1975 indicated this:

Many more villages are being planned at the moment in sensitive areas. However, Internal Affairs would prefer not to force the people to go into these villages, but rather entice them to do so voluntarily through offering them good services there. There is a serious belief that these villages will become growth points of development.¹⁵²

There was anyway a clear tension between any developmentalist efforts, whether state-sanctioned or not, and the widespread alienation of the victims of Strategic resettlement due to the simple fact that they had been forcibly relocated from their ancestral lands to the harsh environment of the Protected and Consolidated Villages in the first place. A report from Fr. Scholz who had been invited on an officially conducted tour in September 1974, implied this:

Generally, we found a sharp contrast between the priorities of the Government policy on the development of the Protected Villages which include items such as security lighting, public address systems and mobile film units -- and the basic wants of the people for food, water, housing and their cattle.¹⁵³

In other words, 'development' was arguably skewed towards the clear military function of the villagization programme. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, moreover, sought to illustrate the clear tension between the stated developmentalist/humanitarian goals of strategic resettlement with its punitive nature and, as pointed out in Scholz's CCJP report, punitive was exactly how people subjected to it viewed the villagization programme. In other words, it was argued that strategic resettlement, in effect, penalised rural Africans' attempts at

¹⁵² Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 'Note to the Executive: Protected Villages 12th February 1975' in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages' Appendix 10/12/13 in Senate House Library, University of London.

¹⁵³ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

development or self-help. The report also drew attention to the collective fines which could precede the villagization programme and have a significant impact on kraal-based communities' resources for survival (let alone development) through the widespread confiscation of their cattle due to their failure to report guerrilla activity. Moreover, as Schulz's report pointed out, there was a lack of communication between the villagers and the District Officers which fostered a climate of misunderstanding and mutual distrust precluding "normal and constructive relations".¹⁵⁴ Any moves towards a form of development that could have been mutually beneficial required an effective dialogue between the villagers and the "District Officers" who served as the principal representatives of the Department of Internal Affairs in the PVs. However, Schulz noted that in some villages the main link across the double-barbed wire security fence separating the District Office and his staff from the people was the police informer.¹⁵⁵ As indicated by O'Gorman's study the presence of informants turned communities in and on themselves in the PVs.¹⁵⁶

However, in fact, there is some evidence that the Catholic Commission For Social Services and Development (CSSD) viewed the role of PVs as potential developmentalist nodes. During 1977 and 1978, for example, the CSSD embarked on an agricultural scheme "assisting people in the protected villages with the growing of cotton crops in the Mount Darwin area".¹⁵⁷ In another instance, a local Catholic priest had signalled the developmentalist potential of the

¹⁵⁴ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, 'Report on Visit to Chiweshe TTL 20th December 1974' in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages' Appendix 10/12/13 in Senate House Library, University of London. Hereafter this will be referred to as Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, 'Report on Visit to Chiweshe TTL 20th December 1974'

¹⁵⁵ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, 'Report on Visit to Chiweshe TTL', 20th December 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁵⁶ Eleanor O'Gorman, *The Front Line Runs Through Every Woman: Women & Local Resistance in the Zimbabwean Liberation War* (Harare, 2011), p.92.

¹⁵⁷ 'Notes of an Ad Hoc Committee Meeting Called at the Request of the Women's Group Liason Adversary Committee to Discuss Feeding Schemes in the Protected Villages Held on Tuesday, 3rd May. 1977 at 16 Jameson Ave, Salisbury' in NAZ, MS 1287/43 'Maia Chenuaux Repond Manuscripts' and The National Observer 22nd April 1978, NAZ, MS 308/62/1 'International Defence and Aid Fund Papers'

Protected Villages in Chiswiti and Kandeya TTLs to the CSSD. However, he argued that a “prison mentality” hindered the ability of the villagers “to appreciate the good will and great efforts, taken by the government”.¹⁵⁸ Interestingly, he argued that any development initiatives – these have been sketched in the survey chapter – in the protected villages should not be the monopoly of the government and that the church should be allowed to “co-operate in development schemes”.¹⁵⁹ The CCJP alleged that if aid from the government was accepted there was a fear that it would therefore claim that the “people in the PVs were receiving aid through state sponsorship”.¹⁶⁰ This is a clear indicator of how state-sanctioned humanitarian involvement in the PVs was viewed as unacceptable by the inmates and that aid had strictly to be a non-governmental enterprise.

In fact, as the CCJP made clear any government initiatives, even humanitarian aid, in the protected villages could be rejected by the resident inmates. One informant claimed that “people are wary of help. They willingly accept help from churches, but will not accept help offered by the government, because they resent the government”.¹⁶¹ This viewpoint is unsurprising given the long history of racial segregation and then the punitive measures imposed by the white settler regime as evidenced by the collective fines regulations and now dispossession and resettlement. It was noted that people rejected any assistance from aid organisations that were in any way associated with the government.¹⁶² The International Red Cross had already faced this situation when its aid had been rejected by the people as it had

¹⁵⁸ Father N. Gille S.J Catholic Commission on Social Services and Development: Report on the General Situation in the Protected. Villages of the Chiswiti and Kandeya TTLs, 27th November 1975 in NAZ MS 591/2/2 ‘Christian Care Papers’

¹⁵⁹ Father N. Gille S.J Catholic Commission on Social Services and Development: Report on the General Situation in the Protected. Villages of the Chiswiti and Kandeya TTLs, 27th November 1975, NAZ MS 591/2/2

¹⁶⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

been channelled through the district administration.¹⁶³ As we will see later guerrilla intimidation may have also been an important factor as to why the victims of strategic resettlement may have rejected humanitarian assistance.

The reality, however, was that all non-governmental organisations had to utilise the Rhodesian Security Forces for protection in the face of the rapidly escalating guerrilla war and to access the PVs which were in restricted zones. What is more important to note is that any degree of humanitarian involvement in strategic resettlement irrespective of an organisation's relationship with the state served as an important asset for the Rhodesian government, absolving it of the full responsibility to maintain acceptable living standards in the protected villages. This is the context in which the CCJP claimed that the help the inmates of the PVs most desired was to make their plight known as they felt that any material help was inadequate "to address the enormity of their suffering".¹⁶⁴ This is crucial for understanding the subsequent publication of *Man in Middle* and later *Civil War in Rhodesia and Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*.

The CCJP developed its understanding of the plight of those forcibly resettled through investigating inmate opinion in Chiweshe district. (It is important to note that this preceded by some months the report by Robert Mugabe to the Justice and Peace Executive in December 1974 which pointed out that during recent 'settlement' talks with the Rhodesian government, ZANU had demanded that protected villages, which they called "concentration camps", be dissolved".)¹⁶⁵ Brother Fidelis Mukonori played a crucial role here. In August 1974, he was

¹⁶³ C.E Mckone 'Tour Report- Colin McKone Visit to Rhodesia on Monday/Tuesday 2nd to 3rd September, TNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974).

¹⁶⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁶⁵ The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: 'Report by Robert Mugabe to the Justice and Peace Executive, Tuesday December 17th, 1974' in NAZ MS 589/7/8 'International Defence and Aid Fund Papers'.

tasked with this investigation and his work was of undeniable significance. An African member of the Commission, he was born in Chiweshe and had relatives in the PVs. Between August and November 1974, he made four trips into the district, and in discussions with the people in the Protected Villages, was able to gather the story of their appalling “resettlement”.¹⁶⁶ This resulted in a detailed set of data containing the opinions of certain individuals who had been forcibly relocated to one of Chiweshe’s protected villages.¹⁶⁷ It is important to note that respondents’ names were anonymised, and the report was placed in a classified file, protecting them from any potential repercussions: this was of paramount importance to the CCJP.¹⁶⁸

Whilst protecting their anonymity, this data nevertheless provides detailed insights into the inmates’ attitudes regarding their experience of strategic resettlement and conditions in the PVs and was subsequently disseminated in *Man in the Middle*.¹⁶⁹ The CCJP was quite explicit that its analysis was based on the testimony of 18 people in one district in the north-east of Rhodesia.¹⁷⁰ It conceded that it was not providing a “scientific sample but a collection of opinions”.¹⁷¹ The data, moreover, was presented very much from a Catholic perspective. Each of the informants were profiled by their religious background: the Apostolic Faith Movement, the Catholic Church, and Salvation Army, those who followed the traditional religion based on the ancestor spirits, which the CCJP referred to as the “ancestor cult”.¹⁷² This suggested a hint of Catholic bias regarding non-Christian indigenous religion. However, these early investigative efforts set the stage for a wider investigation by the CCJP.

¹⁶⁶ Auret, *Reaching For Justice*, p.65

¹⁶⁷ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Man in the Middle*, p.8.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁷² Ibid.

Firstly, various testimonies alluded to the dire conditions the Chiweshe's residents faced after they were forcibly resettled. Sanitary conditions were signalled as a major concern for the residents. One respondent "Mr C" saw "the shortage of drinking water as one of the greatest problems. At present the people at that protected village use the same river water for washing and drinking... [and he asserted that] boreholes would be a great help in protecting the health of the people".¹⁷³ Another informant expressed concerns about the sanitary facilities in Chiweshe's protected villages: latrines were unhygienic and with the hot season coming a serious epidemiological situation was likely to arise; people were also drinking dirty river in this particular PV. In one instance it was noted that water tapped and pumped into a village from a nearby river was dirty and polluted. A visitor from Salisbury who had drunk it had vomited profusely. In this situation it was noted that many people continued to obtain their drinking water from afar near to their old villages.¹⁷⁴ The people had been told that government would provide adequate toilets and water, but it was noted that no such facilities had been provided. No cement pipes had been provided, while people tried to cover the pit latrines with poles, leaving a very narrow opening, but it was noted that "the stench was already very strong".¹⁷⁵ It was reported that many people actually left the camp to defecate in the countryside. The CCJP were informed that many feared "that an epidemic will break out".¹⁷⁶ A local Salvation Army Doctor, Captain (Dr) James Watt was cited by the CCJP as having pointed out that disease was increasing in Chiweshe's protected villages due to a lack of clean drinking water.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

The Catholic Commission drew notably on information it received from the Chiweshe Residents' Association which drew a link between the overcrowding, poor sanitation and disease in the PVs:

The crowdedness of the people in the Keeps, does not allow them to make the area tidy every time. The whole family is to live on a 15-metre square piece of land with all the property that the family might have, a toilet pit also as a well as fowl-run etc. The very shallow toilet pits, uncovered on top, make the villages face great danger on public health. Out of these toilets, the big green flies come and get on to the food stuffs and some even in water pots as well as milk pots and so on.¹⁷⁸

Moreover, it was pointed out that “due to the wet ground, mosquitos are found in big numbers in most keeps, they breed easily and very quickly in these toilets and in some pools of standing water found anywhere in the keeps”; as a result, there had been an increase in a number of diseases including typhoid, diahorrea and malaria.¹⁷⁹ The Chiweshe Residents Association pointed out to the Commission that water supply posed a major problem to public health in the protected villages. Whilst most PVs in Chiweshe had water taps, in others water was drawn from boreholes drilled inside or just outside the settlements. This was the case in Keeps 16, 20 and 21.¹⁸⁰ In other PVs in the area water was pumped in from the nearby streams of small rivers. But this was highly problematic. For example, water was pumped in from the Monera river to Keep 1. However, before being pumped the water of this river was used for all washing and bathing by people in Keeps 1 and 6. People in Keeps 15, 14, 11 and 8 were also getting water from a source which had been first used by the people for all their washing and bathing.¹⁸¹ In their research into conditions in the protected villages, the Catholic Church also

¹⁷⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident’s Association 24th May 1975’ in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No. 10/12/13 ‘Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages’.

¹⁷⁹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident’s Association 24th May 1975’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, ‘Report on Visit to Chiweshe TTL 20th December 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

focused on the inadequacy of shelter. Shelter was regarded as the most important immediate need when people were first uprooted and moved to the PVs.¹⁸² CCJP reports captured the degree of variation of the shelter within the PVs. Dieter Scholz pointed out that the “vast difference between the quality of housing was one of the striking features in all the villages we visited: some houses are well built and convey the impression of a permanent dwelling”; others he noted were of inadequate standard housing mostly elderly and sick people.¹⁸³ Clearly, the most vulnerable people in the PVs had neither the physical capacity nor sufficient resources to construct suitable shelter for themselves. Reportedly, when the people were told to move, they were ordered to pull down their houses and take their doors and windows with them. Whilst some did follow this order, according to the CCJP, “the majority did not dismantle their homes”.¹⁸⁴ In fact, they were “utterly disgusted with the way in which they had been dumped inside the fence. To make the move the more difficult the day they were transferred when it was raining, and there was no shelter of any kind available.”¹⁸⁵ The new shelter had been built from poles and dagga (dry leaves). During the first two days of the move lorries provided by the Security Forces had helped the people hauling poles and grass. However, it was noted that “only a few resettled families could profit from this help”.¹⁸⁶

The CCJP’s research and, later its dissemination of conditions in the PVs, focused on the loss of existing shelter entailed through African rural communities being uprooted. There was a focus on the resentment of people who were forced to abandon their previous homes when

¹⁸² Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Madziwa Keeps, August 1st, 1975’ in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No. 10/12/13 ‘Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages’. ¹⁸⁸ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, ‘Report on Visit to Chiweshe TTL 20th December 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁸³ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, ‘Report on Visit to Chiweshe TTL 20th December 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁸⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

they were forcibly relocated to the protected villages. One of the CCJP's informants was particularly eloquent about this:

In early 1974, when the crops were turning green, people saw the first fences go up, but no one informed them of their purposes. Then in July, the people were moved into those fences and told to settle down in them as their new homes. They were exceedingly unhappy about the move and resented the government calling the fenced-in places their homes. Many of them had built good permanent bricks homes and they had to abandon [them] without receiving any compensation.¹⁸⁷

The villagers had actually been given a mere ten days to move.¹⁸⁸ One of Mukonori's respondents, a "Mrs K", pointed out that she and her husband had "owned a house worth \$8000 which had to be abandoned during the move".¹⁸⁹ Many others were in the same position as they were uprooted and confined in the -protected villages. In September 1974, Father Scholz noticed (when travelling from Chiweshe to Salisbury) "a number of deserted bungalow-type homes which must have been built at considerable expense" at Shopo village located in Mashonaland Central. These dwellings "were of a higher standard than a typical Salisbury township home and would compare favourably with the houses in Kambunzuma [a show-piece protected village in the Zambesi valley]". As he noted, it was "unlikely compensation would be paid...even if there was no chance of the owners returning".¹⁹⁰ In fact, the Minister of Internal Affairs (B.H Musset) had stated to parliament that there were no plans to compensate Chiweshe's residents for loss of property when they were relocated to the protected villages.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on the Conducted Tour of the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land 5th September 1974 (Arranged by the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Information), 10th October 1974'. in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 Appendix No. 10/12/13 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages'

¹⁹¹ *Hansard*, House of Assembly, Vol.88, No.5, 30th August 1974.

This remained the government's policy for the duration of the war,¹⁹² and it was an issue taken up on behalf of the victims of strategic resettlement in Catholic publications including the *Catholic Herald*.¹⁹³ The Ministry of Internal Affairs countered the Catholics' concerns with the allegation that the residents were encouraged to move with "all their property with them when being relocated to the Protected Villages including thatched roofs, doors and windows".¹⁹⁴

Starvation was another major phenomenon featured in CCJP reports on strategic resettlement. Disruption to agricultural production attendant upon forced removal and the tactics of the Rhodesian Security Forces were the chief causes of malnutrition (and worse) in the PVs, as indicated in a series of reports collected by or made available to the CCJP. In Madziwa, "there was considerable concern about the damage done to unprotected crops at the old village sites by wild pig and straying cattle" as people were relocated to the PVs.¹⁹⁵ There was also a destruction of the crops at Musiywe-Kete and Gurure villages in February 1974 after the inhabitants had been forcibly relocated to Beitbridge in the south of Rhodesia: the grain supplies in the two villages were burned while the crops were destroyed.¹⁹⁶ Such actions and losses caused lasting resentment and anger amongst the people, including those in Madziwa.¹⁹⁷ A report from the Chiweshe Residents Association from 1975 outlined the likely starvation the people were due to face as result of the disruption to agricultural production. It was pointed out how "the people did not work their lands the usual way..[due to the]..the great distances from

¹⁹² *Hansard*: House of Assembly, Vol 96, No.10, 15th July 1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/1, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No.27 'Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977, Vol.1

¹⁹³ *The Catholic Herald*, 9th September 1977 in NAZ, MS 480/2.

¹⁹⁴ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 22nd September 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁹⁵ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974' in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4 The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages' Appendix 10/12/13. Hereafter this will be referred to as Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia 'Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974'

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

the keep to the land the people had to work”.¹⁹⁸ It was also pointed out that where fields had been planted the crops were destroyed by cattle, no doubt because distance from fields and curfews prevented the usual mode of controlling livestock. In this situation it was reported that “only in a few places did crops remain intact”.¹⁹⁹

The Catholics also made clear the harsh realities of the curfew which affected myriads in Rhodesia’s protected villages. It is the CCJP reports which provide extensive insights into the nature of the curfew and its link to the wider disruption of agricultural production which was one of the chief causes of the calamitous humanitarian situation in the PVs. Father Dieter Scholz played a crucial role investigating the impact of movement controls in December 1974 in Madziwa. He revealed how the District Assistants, African officials supervising residents in the PVs, could search each person leaving the settlements to see if they carried food and they were prohibited from taking food out of the villages (presumably in case this might be given to the guerrillas) even though they might need such for their day’s labour in the fields. He noted that even dishes, pots and plates to be taken to the river for washing were inspected at the checkpoint.²⁰⁰

As a result of the enforced villagization programme, the inmates had to travel far to access their fields which were often located in their original lands. Scholz had noted how the informants who hosted him had originated from a village located three to four miles away from the PV they were relocated to and that “the fields apart from a small patch allocated to each family in the vicinity of the Protected village [were] still at the old site”.²⁰¹ These harsh measures had imposed considerable hardship particularly on women who had to leave to work

¹⁹⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident’s Association 24th May 1975’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia ‘Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

in the fields at 6 a.m. due to the night-time curfew, and also on travellers. Young children who had go with their mothers to the fields had to stay without food for most of the day, which Scholz identified as a significant cause of resentment amongst parents.²⁰² Moreover, according to Scholz, on “a number of occasions people who returned late, after the gates had been locked, were refused entry and had to spend the night outside sleeping by the fence”.²⁰³ As Scholz’s investigation revealed, there were only two gates in each of Madziwa’s PVs, one for entrance and one for exit. At these nodes, “armed District Assistants strictly search for weapons and food and register and examine visitors. The gates are open from 7.00 am to 6.00pm every day. However, it was noted that “if there was an incident like a landmine blast around the keeps the people may be locked in the whole day”.²⁰⁴ The survey in chapter one reveals, the times when freer movement was allowed, but the experience of the inmates in Madziwa’s PVs was fundamentally shaped by the fact that they had been uprooted from their ancestral homes and subjected to draconian controls.

A report from the Chiweshe Residents Association in 1975 outlined to the CCJP the impact of the curfews on people’s ability to access vital medical services in the area, something which the Church was to stress in its published analysis. It was pointed out that it was “very hard to get people to medical centres...because some keeps are too distant from the hospital or clinic”.²⁰⁵ There was simply “no transport to get these sick people to the place they can get medical assistance”.²⁰⁶ Even if one had money to hire a car to take a patient to hospital before the curfew time, if it appeared there would not be enough time to get back before curfew, the owner of the car would seek to defer the journey till the next day as not run the risk posed to

²⁰² Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia ‘Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Madziwa Keeps, August 1st, 1975’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁰⁵ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident’s Association 24th May 1975’, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia ‘Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

life by travelling after the 6.00 pm curfew time.²⁰⁷ (The Security Forces were highly suspicious of people moving about after curfew and frequently shot them.) In such circumstances, newborn babies and their mothers were often deprived of medical attention since there was a lack of qualified medical personnel in the PVs.²⁰⁸

Another focus of the Catholic Church's critique of the conditions in the PVs centred not merely on the "the strict regimentation of their [the inmates'] lives...[but on] the gross disruption of their cultural and tribal patterns of life".²⁰⁹ This was made particularly clear in *Man in the Middle* (1975) and in the later published research of Catholic nun Sister Aquina Weinrich who undertook pioneering work on strategic resettlement in Chiweshe— the findings are sketched earlier in this thesis.²¹⁰ Respondents "spoke of the deep unhappiness of the people and the lack of human dignity felt by those in the Protected Villages where people are in disgusting conditions and are deprived".²¹¹ It was reported that when "people first arrived, they were sleeping in the open, fathers and grown up daughters sleeping around the same open fires. This was considered most mortifying to the people who have [a] very delicate sense of appropriate behaviour between sexes. Now that shelters have been erected, this communal sleeping is avoided".²¹² But as reported in Moto "the removal scheme was cutting across African custom in that in-laws were being forced sleep in the same accommodation with their sons and daughters-in-laws".²¹³

²⁰⁷ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Reports received from Chiweshe Resident's Association 24th May 1975', Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia 'Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁰⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Reports received from Chiweshe Resident's Association 24th May 1975', Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia 'Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁰⁹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 'Press Statements by Mr G Feltoe on *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*'.

²¹⁰ A.K.H Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.3, No.2 (Apr, 1977).

²¹¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ *Moto*, Vol 16 No.32, 10th August 1974.

Privacy was (and remains) an important part of Shona culture.²¹⁴ Yet in the protected villages of the Chiweshe area, a household was only allocated a stand that was 15 square metres in area. This was insufficient for maintaining the traditionally segregated sleeping quarters, kitchens, granaries, fowl runs, toilet and bath house or enclosure.²¹⁵ Traditionally, the Shona were used to a system of strict segregation in village life with each man, wife, boy and girl having their own hut.²¹⁶ The CCJP recognized and emphasised how the enforced villagization had violated the traditional familial order in rural Shona communities, where boundaries were clearly defined so that the individuals were “unshakably aware of his rights and obligations in the village”.²¹⁷ Many of these rights and obligations centred on gender and age and, as the CCJP stressed, in *Man in the Middle* (1975) forced villagization led to a breakdown of patriarchal authority and gender divisions. There was, it was held, also a violation of traditional sexual moral values. One informant pointed that due to the crowdedness in the Protected Villages young boys and girls had taken advantage of this proximity to engage in sexual activity that clearly disturbed their elders.²¹⁸ The power of the District Assistants was also resented, with complaints about women being impregnated by them and undergoing risky sometimes fatal procedures in order to terminate pregnancies. Abortion – so often a focus of Catholic moralists – was signalled as a major problem in the protected villages. One informant spoke of medicine being used to end pregnancy “before the husband knew it”.²¹⁹ There were reports of dead babies put in plastic bags and thrown into rivers and toilets in Keeps 10, 8, 17 in Chiweshe.²²⁰

²¹⁴ Weinrich, *Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia*, p.226.

²¹⁵ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, *Man in the Middle*, p.11.

²¹⁶ Weinrich, *Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia*, p.226.

²¹⁷ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Man in the Middle*, p.7.

²¹⁸ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Man in the Middle*, p.10.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident’s Association 24th May 1975’.

The CCJP was exercised also by reports of the spread of venereal diseases in the Protected Villages which again held the DSAs responsible, at least in part. The government, by contrast, blamed spread of venereal disease on the guerrillas. However, the CCJP's perspective was based on information received from the Chiweshe Resident's Association: this situation was getting worse all the time and clinics were particularly worried about this trend.²²¹

In the Catholic's critique of the impact of strategic resettlement, alcoholism – again, a familiar focus of their religion's moral crusading – was also reported to be a major problem in the protected villages. Beer halls had been opened by the authorities in the settlements and, according to Weinrich, they were bitterly resented by those deemed more responsible because they robbed “the poor of their last pennies and enrich the Rhodesian breweries, besides lowering the moral standards in the keeps”. They also prevented local women from earning some money from home brews. The government-provided narcotic was seen as a means to keep the people subdued.²²² At any rate, one must note the finding that men were drinking on an unprecedented scale because of desperation, and this represented a “change in drinking habits [that] was especially noteworthy as most in Chiweshe belonged to the Salvation Army: a denomination which forbids the consumption of alcohol”.²²³

The disruption of education was another facet of the Catholics' conception of the protected villages. They were alerted to this by the Chiweshe Residents' Association, which pointed out that in July 1974 schools had been shut by the authorities, anticipating the move to the protected villages. Children in the area were therefore out of school until September 1974. During this period both teachers and children were “terrified by the situation”.²²⁴ Some

²²¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident's Association 24th May 1975’.

²²² Weinrich, *Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia*, p.220

²²³ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²²⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident's Association 24th May 1975’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

teachers, in fact “ran away from the area to their areas of birth and some went to seek work in towns or elsewhere”.²²⁵ Schools eventually reopened in September 1974 and children went back to classes. However, the headteachers had much to rearrange and cope with given the inevitable transfer of pupils from closed schools to “schools near or in the keep where the kraal was moved into”.²²⁶ There was a “tremendous drop in educational standards” and examination results after the move to the protected villages. The grade seven results were compared with those areas without protected villages with the results obtained in Chiweshe revealing a startling difference, with the standard dropping by around 47 percent.²²⁷

Another major feature of the Catholics’ portrayal of the protected villages was that they were like prisons. Certainly, evidence provided to the CCJP would have pushed them in this direction: many of the resettled undoubtedly viewed themselves as prisoners in the protected villages. Alluding to the dire provision of shelter and sanitary facilities respondent “Mr A” felt that “that convicted prisoners... [were] better cared for than his people, since prisoners have at least a roof over their heads, clean drinking water and toilets” and he pointed out that “none of these facilities have been provided”.²²⁸ In one of the Madziwa PVs, Schulz had a discussion – later conveyed to the CCJP - with a group of elder men and two teachers, regarding recent newspaper reports which had commented favourably on the progress made in the development of the Protected Villages. It had been claimed that the people had begun to accept the permanency of these nucleated settlements. Schulz noted the response to these reports: “the men said nothing; they just laughed bitterly. Then one old man commented: “Our villages are where they were; but they have no people; they have only fields, some straying cattle and wild

²²⁵ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Reports received from Chiweshe Resident’s Association 24th May 1975’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

pig; the people are in gaol. We are in gaol.... This place is like a cattle byre”.²²⁹ And this resentment against being in what was viewed as a harsh prison probably found a resonance in some residents’ attitudes towards humanitarian aid.

Out of 18 responses in Father Mukonori’s survey “six did not want help at all; 3 would accept help and the remaining 9 wanted help only for the aged and invalids....it is noteworthy that women are more outspoken in their rejection of help and in their opposition to government than the men”.²³⁰ One respondent, Mr A, believed that help would have the effect of making people forget the cruelty of the government”.²³¹ Another respondent “Mrs C” remarked:

Help would only dull the people’s suffering and make them forget their plight. She wants the people to remain united and oppose the government’s policy. When she heard that missionaries were thinking of giving material help, she wondered whether they were trying to divest the government of its responsibility towards the people. She pleaded [to] missionaries not to give any help so that the people’s resentment towards the government was kept alive.²³²

This was reinforced by informant “Mrs E” who felt aid would minimise the suffering of the inmates and “give the government the impression that the plight of the people was not really very extreme... [and that] relief of the suffering would prevent government from realising the full extent of its policy”.²³³ Most of the respondents felt that relief should be limited to the most vulnerable including the elderly and disabled in the PVs but that in most cases it should be rejected.²³⁴

²²⁹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on visit Madziwa TTL 26th December 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²³⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

The CCJP thus concluded that “it is from... [a] new political awareness that the people’s suspicion of aid [comes].... where people consider association [of those providing humanitarian aid] with the government as polluting and they rather suffer hardship than accept help from this source”.²³⁵ According to Mukonri’s report, many of those spoken to, distrusted the Security Forces and saw the guerrillas as their liberators. This would explain the almost paradoxical situation where despite their dire needs they rejected material assistance, food and medical supplies and instead wanted their plight to be made known as “widely as possible and so lead to action to reverse the government policy of settling them in fenced-in villages”.²³⁶

However, when understanding why some of Chiweshe’s residents rejected humanitarian aid in the PVs, it is important to factor in the degree to which they faced intimidation from the guerrillas, a factor that was perhaps not particularly stressed by the Catholics. In fact, when some inmates refused to co-operate in the construction of shelters, it was rumoured that guerrillas had threatened retaliation to those who...told erected roofs as doing so would signify a degree of co-operation with the government.²³⁷ Later, the CCJP did give a clear indication of the degree of guerrilla intimidation in two separate reports regarding the villagization programme. They reported that many people in Madziwa actually did feel safer in the Protected Villages than in their former homes where many had been killed by either Security Force personnel or the guerrillas.²³⁸ It was noted that someone could report a person they disliked to either to the guerrillas for being a ‘sell-out’ or conversely to the Security Forces for harbouring guerrilla fighters.²³⁹ The result was “either death or torture or both”.²⁴⁴ Father Schulz had

²³⁵ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Madziwa Keeps, August 1st, 1975’, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²³⁹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Madziwa Keeps, August 1st, 1975’, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ‘Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974’, ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

spoken with four women whose husbands had been killed by the guerrillas after having been accused of being sell-outs".²⁴⁰

In Mrewa it was reported that people were reluctant to relocate not merely to due to the disruption of their normal pattern of life but equally because of the "terrorist threat".²⁴¹ The CCJP reported that in this area "the terrorists...told people to refuse being moved into such areas or at least to refuse to build huts in the confinement, since this would mean building prisons for themselves".²⁴² In Maramba and Pfungwes districts in 1975 residents had been warned by the guerrillas against this type of 'co-operation' and therefore "had for some time to sleep in the open".²⁴³

A final feature of the Catholics' conception of strategic resettlement should be noted: the CCJP portrayed the protected and consolidated villages as sites of crossfire. They would have given credence to that informant who had questioned whether or not "these fence-in areas can be called protected villages, since any guerrilla can shoot through the fence to attack the people".²⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, Rhodesia: The Propaganda War publicised guerrilla attacks on PVs. Since the beginning of 1977, there had been 70 such attacks as admitted by a Provincial Commissioner of Internal Affairs. They wrought havoc on the village administration, with 114 officials killed, 25 missing or abducted and 243 wounded as a result of these attacks.²⁴⁵ The PVs themselves had become sites of 'crossfire' which affected both civilians and

²⁴⁰ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Madziwa Keeps, August 1st, 1975', Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁴¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Confinement in Mrewa', Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Weinrich, 'Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia', p.216.

²⁴⁴ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on Chiweshe T.T.L 26th August 1974', ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4.

²⁴⁵ Catholic Commission For Justice and Peace, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War*, see section titled 'Protected Villages on the Increase'.

administrative personnel alike. But it was the civilians, caught between the contending forces, that were the prime focus of the Catholic Church.

The term ‘Man in the Middle’ – coined in the publication of that name – was an important concept in the Commission’s rendering of the position of inmates in the Protected and Consolidated Villages.²⁴⁶ In broad terms, it referred to the situation where the peasantry was caught in the crossfire between the Security Forces and the guerrillas. *Civil War in Rhodesia* follows a more conventional understanding of this concept presenting the ‘Man in the Middle’ as innocent civilian victims of contending military forces, with their experience particularly shaped by the excessive use of force by the Rhodesian regime.²⁴⁷ However, *Man in the Middle* casts this idea in a different light, highlighting the importance of resettlement and evictions in understanding the plight of the Zimbabwean peasantry during the war, which saw them dispossessed and their everyday pattern of life greatly disrupted.²⁴⁸ The CCJP were, of course, considering their concept in terms of ‘people in the middle’ since women and children also have a central part to play in understanding the history of Strategic resettlement and how the CCJP challenged the idealistic picture of it painted by the pro-government media, especially regarding the claims that the move to the protected and consolidated villages was voluntary. The Catholics focus on people caught in the crossfire requires some exploration of its position on the violence of the contending forces, and the contradictions and complexities.

Officially, the Catholic Church absolutely rejected the use of violence as a form of redress against the system of racial discrimination in Rhodesia. This was the view adopted by Catholic leaders within Rhodesia and the wider Catholic Church.²⁴⁹ During his trial Bishop Lamont responding to accusations that he had been party to the violent actions of the guerrilla forces

²⁴⁶ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, *Man in the Middle*, pp.8-11.

²⁴⁷ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, *Civil War in Rhodesia*.

²⁴⁸ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, *Man in the Middle*, pp.8-11.

²⁴⁹ ‘Evaluation of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe’ in CCJP on Social Concerns 340.11 CAT, Zimbabwe Catholic Bishop’s Conference Library.

stated that he viewed non-violent means of protest as the only justifiable means of response to the “intransigent oppression of the State”.²⁵⁰ This viewpoint was shared by the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia as a whole who had stated in September 1977 that: “we condemn unreservedly... all unjust use of force by whosoever applied and in whatever manner.... We recognise too, that violence breeds violence.”²⁵¹ Indeed it was noted that the Catholic Church had always “always been an uneasy ally of the militant African nationalist cause, refusing to go as far as to condone guerrilla violence but strongly affirming the rightness of the goals which were being fought for”.²⁵² As pointed out by the Justice and Peace Commission’s then legal adviser Geoffrey Feltoe, in its publications the CCJP “maintained the attitude that, although it supports the objectives of the guerrilla strategy and fully understands the reasons why the African nationalists have resorted to violent means to liberate Zimbabwe, it cannot morally condone the means of struggle because it disapproves of all acts of violence”.²⁵³ However, it was only in Rhodesia: After the Internal Settlement – which was published late in the war – that the CCJP (via the CIIR) first criticised guerrilla violence: there it pointed to the fact that guerrillas had committed “atrocities by which we mean actions not only cruel and repugnant but also unjustifiable even by the crude standards of war”.²⁵⁴ This position however, was challenged by African members of the Commission who felt that “it was not possible to separate support for the ends of the struggle from support for the use of violence to topple the regime”. They felt that the CCJP “should recognise that in Rhodesia today true liberation can only be attained by violent means”.²⁵⁵ Even so, in a comment that ignored guerrilla atrocities against black civilians and the reasons for this, Feltoe pointed out the “difficulty of applying a

²⁵⁰ Lamont, *Speech from the Dock*, p.87.

²⁵¹ Randolph, *Report to Rome*, p.82.

²⁵² Catholic Institute of International Relations, ‘Meeting of CIIR Executive Committee on Thursday, 12th January 1978 at 6.p.m in NAZ, MS 1082/1/23 ‘Garfield Todd Papers’.

²⁵³ CIIR, ‘Meeting of CIIR Executive Committee on Thursday, 12th January 1978’, NAZ, MS 1082/1/23.

²⁵⁴ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Catholic Institute for International Relations, *Rhodesia: After the Internal Settlement*, (London, 1978), p.16.

²⁵⁵ CIIR, ‘Meeting of CIIR Executive Committee on Thursday, 12th January 1978’, NAZ, MS 1082/1/23.

just war concept to the fighting' given what he held to be 'the style of war which of necessity was adopted by the African nationalists. Their guerrilla tactics involved the killing, for propaganda purposes, of white civilians, including women and children'.²⁵⁶ The Commission had seemingly been willing to downplay the significance of guerrilla atrocities in the liberation struggle. It is striking that in Rhodesia: *After the Internal Settlement*, guerrilla atrocities, far from pointing to the complex reality identified by scholars such as Kriger, were attributed merely to a "isolated bands of bitter, frightened, poorly trained" guerrillas who had simply taken matters into their own hands.²⁵⁷

In fact, the CCJP engaged in a dialogue with the guerrillas regarding the conduct of the war. In August 1978, it sent a request to Catholic Institute of International Relations (London) to set up a meeting between ZANU and representatives of the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops' Conference whose delegation would include the Archbishop of Salisbury, Patrick Chakaipa, one other bishop and representatives of the CCJP. The CCJP hoped to speak with the president and other members of the central committee of ZANU in order express their concerns about the escalation of human suffering resulting from the war and offer any help to end to the conflict.²⁵⁸ These two points were consistent with the Catholic position regarding the armed struggle against the white-settler regime and the emphasis on peaceful transition to majority rule. The CCJP had also requested a similar meeting be set up with the other major nationalist party, ZAPU.²⁵⁹ However, by this time with the formation of Muzorewa's interim government it was clear that the effective transition to African majority rule was within sight, and the CCJP

²⁵⁶ CIIR, 'Meeting of CIIR Executive Committee on Thursday, 12th January 1978', NAZ, MS 1082/1/23.

²⁵⁷ CCJP and CIIR, *Rhodesia: After the Internal Settlement*, p.16.

²⁵⁸ 'Message to Simon Muzenda from Tim Sheehy (CIIR), 19/7/78' in ICS 151 CIIR A/2/2/6, Senate House Library, University Library.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

were also looking to the future and sought to discuss the Catholic role in the post-war reconstruction.²⁶⁰

Perhaps, they were influenced to some degree by the fact that ZANU's leader Robert Mugabe was supposedly a devout Roman Catholic: certainly, the British foreign secretary was to be informed that some within the Church including the CIIR saw Mugabe as the "best bet for a multi-racial future Zimbabwe".²⁶¹ Just as the Rhodesian Security Forces denied the atrocities and oppressions for which they were responsible, so too did the guerrillas. This was illustrated when that former high-profile member of the CCJP, Sister Janice McLaughlin, engaged in something of a public dialogue with the ZANU leadership on the topic of guerrilla violence. In the latter part of 1978, she interviewed Josiah Tongogara, the Defence Secretary of ZANU who was central in directing guerrilla strategy in the liberation war. In the interview Tongogara had rebuked the claim of the Western media that the ZANLA forces were undisciplined, and he spoke of his forces in a well-nigh propagandistic way:

The ZANLA discipline code guides us in all our operations. You're a party watchdog in the field. You must mix with the masses, be polite with them and not ill-treat them. You mustn't take anything by force. You must pay for what you get. You must not take liberties with women. These are only some of our rules. If you don't observe them, you are liable to punishment. We're very strict. We're a force fight to liberate the people, with the interests of the people at heart. If we mistreat them, we can't succeed. We can't determine when the war will end and sustain the support of the people we must [have these] regulations.²⁶²

Ultimately as an organisation the Catholic Church in general, and its Justice and Peace Commission in particular, had a basic allegiance to the Zimbabwean rural population, were conscious of the level of popular support for the guerrillas such as it existed, and were acutely conscious of the widespread alienation of those who had been subjected to a series of punitive,

²⁶⁰ 'Message to Simon Muzenda from Tim Sheehy (CIIR), 19/7/78' in ICS 151 CIIR A/2/2/6.

²⁶¹ David Stephen (Political Adviser) to Mr Rowlands (Private Secretary David Owen), 9th November 1978, titled "My visit to Maputo and Lusaka: Comments and Conclusions ZANU' in BNA, FCO 73/318 'David Owen, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: personal papers on Rhodesia; part 3 (1978)'.

²⁶² 'Interview with Josiah Maganda Tongogara, Defence Secretary of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Maputo, Mozambique, 11 September 1978'.

often brutal measures at the hands of the Security Forces, culminating in strategic resettlement and the policies related to it,, including collective fines., the creation of ‘free fire’ zones , curfews and “the establishment of “no-go” areas in the north-east, south-central and south-west of the country : such measures were considered to be determined by widespread support for the guerrillas amongst the rural population.²⁶³ The CCJP may have noted the coercive tactics used by the guerrillas but held that the “impartial observer will notice that even where the guerrillas are feared or resented by some, the Security Forces are detested by all. They are seen as the ultimate enemy”.²⁶⁴

Conclusion

The nature of Catholic NGO response to Strategic resettlement was shaped first by its pre-war history, and particularly the Church’s relationship with (the predominantly rural) black population of Rhodesia and the discrimination it suffered. Before the war began, the pastoral letters of the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops were already setting the tone for the subsequent publications of the Justice and Peace Commission during the liberation struggle by offering a critique of the injustices attendant upon white-minority rule. Thus, the stance of the CCJP to the white-minority regime and its military campaign can in part be understood as an extension of the pre-existing antagonism of the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops’ Conference to the system of racial discrimination in Rhodesia. The Catholics’ denominational profile and their key publication *Moto* – its press was to be attacked by the Rhodesian security forces – reveal the Church’s orientation to the African population at large., something which inevitably dictated a strong and sympathetic response to the victims of Strategic Resettlement. In this, the ecclesiastical geography of the Catholic Church was highly significant. Indeed, the

²⁶³ CCJP and CIIR, *Rhodesia: After the Internal Settlement*, p.12.

²⁶⁴ CCJP and CIIR, *Rhodesia: After the Internal Settlement*, p.12.

villagization programme had been implemented in each Catholic diocese in north and eastern Rhodesia and as shown, rural mission stations themselves became, as it were, caught in the crossfire as indicated by the events at Avila and St Alberts. Not surprisingly, missionaries came to play a crucial role in exposing human rights abuses attendant upon the Rhodesian counter-insurgency strategy, and – as shown through the work of the CCJP – such exposure became an important pillar of the Catholic response to the war.

This human rights focus was probably the main source of church-state antagonism during the war as the Catholics' investigation and exposure of the results of the Rhodesian counter-insurgency, notably the enforced villagization programme, brought it into opposition to the regime's 'propaganda war' CCJP publications challenged the biased government reports regarding the villagization programme in the face of stringent censorship laws, a backlash from pro-government media and the arrest and deportation of leading members of the Commission for Justice and Peace. The Commission's investigation and dissemination of conditions inside the Protected and Consolidated Villages profoundly questioned the stated developmentalist/humanitarian goals of the villagization programme and countered them with evidence of appalling conditions and alienation.

The Catholic NGO relationship with the nationalist guerrillas was, as has been illustrated, a complex one. As was there was something of a tension and contradiction in the Catholic position which rejected guerrilla violence, of which its members were sometimes the victims, and yet supported the liberation cause. This chapter, however, has focused overwhelmingly on the investigative and political campaign of the Catholics regarding strategic resettlement. It was this that had greatest impact. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that running alongside it was a practical humanitarian intervention in fact, the Justice and Peace Commission's sister organisation, the Catholic Commission for Social Services and Development (CSSD), played a crucial role responding to strategic resettlement during the

Zimbabwean Liberation War, saving countless lives through humanitarian assistance, while the Commission was “drawing world attention to the plight of growing numbers in the protected villages as the war went on”.²⁶⁵ There was an important connection, then, between the dissemination efforts of the Justice and Peace Commission and the humanitarian efforts of the Social Services and Development Commission and, as will be seen, the humanitarian involvement of other organisations. By October 1977, the Catholic Commission on Social Services and Development, spent more than \$R24, 379 on emergency relief programmes in Protected Villages and other war affected areas. This relief work focused on providing food, clothing and blankets, payment of school fees and the provision of mobile clinics, and medicines to mission hospitals.²⁶⁶ To give a sense of the value of this contribution 10 kilos of mealie meal (maize), cost 85c in early 1977.²⁶⁷

The CSSD however, faced a number of problems regarding its relief effort to the Protected Villages. Firstly, there was the impact of the war on its ability to provide medical services in rural areas. By 1978, many of its clinics in the war- affected areas were finding it very difficult to recruit medical staff due to the outflow of doctors from Rhodesia. Secondly, due to the war situation the majority of secondary roads throughout the country were often not safe to travel on and traversing they had been curtailed on most”.²⁶⁸ These factors had led to a drastic reduction in both the curative and preventative health services provided and to health education in rural areas. The CSSD had become increasingly reliant on the dissemination of medical and nursing information in places where doctors were not available for consultation and where it was difficult to transfer patients to nearby medical facilities. The handouts included information on home nursing for mothers where medical centres were either non-

²⁶⁵ Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p.207.

²⁶⁶ *National Observer*, 22nd April 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

²⁶⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 10th February, 1977 in NAZ ‘Newspapers’.

²⁶⁸ *National Observer*, 22nd April, 1978, NAZ MS 308/62/1.

existent or situated a great distance away from the protected villages.”²⁶⁹ Information on the care of war injured patients and nursing procedures for ‘at risk’ maternity patients who could be transferred to hospital during the night because of curfew regulations, was also disseminated by the CSSD.²⁷⁰ Even so, the role of the CSSD in the protected villages must be considered in terms of the ecumenical relief efforts of Christian Care, the umbrella of humanitarian efforts in the PVs, which will be explored in chapter 4.

It is important to note – and as will be demonstrated in the next chapter – that many of the above-mentioned projects of the CSSD were carried out in conjunction with other Christian denominations (including the Anglicans, the Methodists and the Salvation Army) in the Protected Villages, but it was the Catholics who had made the victims of strategic settlement an urgent focus for such groups.

²⁶⁹ *National Observer*, 22nd April, 1978, NAZ MS 308/62/1.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

Chapter 3: The Protestant Churches and Strategic Resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War

Protestant Churches alongside their Catholic counterpart played a crucial role responding to the results of strategic resettlement, though – as we shall see – they were far less oppositional than the Catholics. The principal denominations concerned were the Anglican Church, the Salvation Army and the Wesleyan and United Methodists. (Certain Protestant denominations – for example, the Evangelical Lutherans (Church of Sweden Mission), Elim Pentecostal Mission and the Southern Baptists – are excluded from this analysis since, despite being deeply affected by the war, these missions had no engagement whatsoever with strategic resettlement as their missions were outside the zones in which the policy was implemented. A comparative analysis of the denominations considered here will be offered to illustrate the typology of Protestant church relations with the Rhodesian regime regarding strategic resettlement, as also the significance of the various responses of the churches to the victims of the process.

The analysis considers each denomination's experience separately, focusing first on each denomination's pre-war trajectory in terms of the complex interplay between its relationship with the white-settler regime and the racial profile of both the church's membership and leadership. Secondly, the geography of these churches will be highlighted to illustrate their comparative engagement with strategic resettlement as their rural missions were engulfed by the war, thereby becoming – in a sense, by force – the principal humanitarian responders to the results of strategic resettlement in certain war zones. As we shall see, of the Protestant denominations, the Anglicans were preeminent in their support for the enforced

villagization strategy. The Salvation Army, meanwhile, whilst maintaining a degree of criticism of strategic resettlement, launched a humanitarian intervention in the Protected Villages (PVs) which was undeniably an asset to the Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy. Finally, the Methodists whilst more oppositional to the villagization programme than their fellow Protestant churches, in part because of their following and orientation to African nationalism, were limited in their responses to it both by the geographical scope of their ministry and the moderate stances of their leaders when compared to the Catholics.

To understand the nature of the Protestant churches' engagement with strategic resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War we should first turn briefly to their pre-war history. There was historically a symbiosis between these churches' establishment and the rise of the settler state. Indeed, Protestant missions played a central role in the development and consolidation of colonial Southern Rhodesia.¹ Protestant churches provided the chaplains for the white columns that suppressed the risings in the First and Second Matabele Wars in 1893-4 and 1896.² The churches, moreover, became dependent upon the colonial regime for financial and material support. Prominent examples from the early colonial period would be the money provided by the British South Africa Company during the Second Matabele War to Anglican missionaries to cover the expenses of their rural outposts in Mashonaland,³ or the 4,000-acre farm granted to the Methodist Episcopal Church (the United Methodists) to establish the Nyadiri Mission in 1922.⁴ As will be shown later this mission became an important node for rendering assistance to the victims of strategic resettlement in Mrewa and

¹ Erica Bornstein, *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe* (New York, 2005), p.11.

² Terence Ranger, 'Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe, 1970-1980', *Studies in Church History*, Vol.20 1983, p.443.

³ Ngwabi Bhebe, *Christianity and Traditional Religion in western Zimbabwe 1859-1923*, (London, 1979) p.88.

⁴ Nathan Goto 'A Central Mission, The Legacy of the United Methodist Church in Zimbabwe', *Methodist History* 33:1 (October,1994), pp.18-21.

Mtoko.) For the Salvation Army, meanwhile, state financial support during the colonial period was its cornerstone, with the Rhodesian government providing funds for its churches, schools, and hospitals.⁵ By accepting by such support, these Christian missions were inevitably subsumed by the colonial regime.

For most of the colonial period, the leadership of each of the denominations in question was dominated by whites and generally identified with the values of white-settler culture. In 1959, 29 percent of the Salvation Army's active officers in Rhodesia were white expatriate missionaries whilst 98% of members were Shona and Ndebele. Significant numbers of African members graduated from the educational institutions at Howard, Mazoe, Usher and Bradley, but the segregationist attitude of the leadership meant that they were never allowed to rise to the upper echelons of the Salvation Army's officer ranks in the Rhodesia Territory.⁶ Unlike the Catholic Church as shown in the previous chapter, or the two branches of the Methodist Church as shall be revealed in this one, there was no decisive step taken by the Rhodesian Salvation Army to include Africans in leadership positions. The Anglicans, too, were largely conservative in their stance on this matter as they were entrenched within the white community. Indeed, aside from the Dutch Reformed Church, the Anglican Church had the largest proportion of white members of any Church in Rhodesia: their 79,000 white congregants accounted for almost a third of the total white population in Rhodesia.⁷ It was only in 1974 that the first African Anglican bishop, Patrick Murindagomo was elected. Even then he only served

⁵ For example, evidence of such state funding in 1939-40 (amounting to £2,824) and then decades later in 1970 (totalling, R\$48,000), can be found respectively. In Norman H. Murdoch, *Christian Warfare in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe: The Salvation Army and African Liberation, 1891-1991*, (Harold Hill, 2015), p.102 and *The Rhodesia Herald*, 20th July 1970 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁶ Murdoch, *Christian Warfare in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe*, p.105.

⁷ Michael Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option: Anglican Church and State from 1964 until the Independence of Zimbabwe*, (Gweru, 1986), p.73, R.H. Randolph, *Church and State in Rhodesia 1969-1971: A Catholic View*, (Gwelo, 1971), p.10.

as a suffragan (subordinate) to the (white) Bishop of Mashonaland. Only in 1980, once white rule had ended, was an African, Peter Hatendi, appointed as a diocesan bishop.⁸

The United Methodist Church linked to American Methodists and to be distinguished from the (British) Wesleyan Methodist Church, largely mirrored the power dynamics of white-settler society until the 1960s. Whilst the number of ordained Africans increased from 24 to 46, and local preachers from 428 to 2,017, between the early 1940s and the early 1960s, white missionaries continued to dominate the decision making in the denomination which in turn impeded the development of African leadership. Indeed, the government-sanctioned curriculum (especially the religious elements of this) trained African students to be obedient and promoted dependency, rather than providing a rounded education.⁹ Until the 1950s, American Methodist missions offered the type of education geared towards keeping the African parishioners in agricultural production.¹⁰ This meshed with the white settler's well-known project to keep Africans rural and 'tribal' as much as possible. The arrival of Bishop Ralph Dodge from the USA in, 1956 however, marked a significant turning point in the history of the United Methodists in Rhodesia since he immediately advocated the transfer of power within the Church from white missionaries to indigenous leadership.¹¹ Later, under Abel Muzorewa who succeeded Ralph Dodge in 1968 as the first African Bishop in Rhodesia,¹² the United Methodists mounted a serious challenge to the Land Tenure Act (1969). This segregationist legislation had far reaching implications for many of the Church's parishioners (especially in rural areas), the denomination being almost entirely African in membership, though there were a notable number of white missionary workers.¹³ Muzorewa' was also actively involved

⁸ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, p.9.

⁹ Goto, 'A Central Mission The Legacy of the United Methodist Church in Zimbabwe', p.21.

¹⁰ Todd H. Leedy, 'The World the Students Made: Agriculture and Education at American Missions in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1930-1960', *History of Education Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Nov. 2007).

¹¹ Goto, 'A Central Mission The Legacy of the United Methodist Church in Zimbabwe', pp.22-23.

¹² Goto, 'A Central Mission The Legacy of the United Methodist Church in Zimbabwe', p.24.

¹³ R.H Randolph, *Church and State in Rhodesia*, p.10, Marion O'Callaghan, *Southern Rhodesia: The Effects of a Conquest Society on Education, Culture and Information*, (Paris, 1977), p.168.

African nationalist politics, serving as leader of the African National Council (ANC) which was unequivocally opposed to the segregationist Land Tenure Act. Indeed, Muzorewa was ultimately to be issued with an order banning him from entering Tribal Trust Lands where three-quarters of his congregation lived.¹⁴

By contrast, the leadership of the Wesleyan Methodist Church – both historically and into the last decades of white rule - supported land segregation.¹⁵ Until the 1960s African and European members of the Wesleyan Methodist Church remained largely segregated in worship and much more stringent conditions of membership were placed upon Africans.¹⁶ Until 1959 the Methodist Synod was dominated by European missionaries who held attitudes typical of the paternalistic European settler (if one of a more liberal hue) that colonization was legitimate and had benefited African society.¹⁷ In 1964, the Wesleyans' Methodist Missionary Society (MMS), appointed its first African chairman Rev. A Ndhela to its Synod in Rhodesia.¹⁸ However, this was at the behest of the Wesleyans in the UK, and significant divisions within the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Rhodesia would continue to manifest between white and African members, particularly with the onset of the war.

In the white-dominated Protestant churches, there were however, some notable dissidents. In the Anglican Church, as early as 1903, Arthur Cripps, was already advocating for the African's cause.¹⁹ Later Anglican layman, Guy Clutton-Brock played an important role in the emergence of Rhodesia's first African National Council.²⁰ Bishop Kenneth Skelton

¹⁴ *The Times*, September 5th, 1970.

¹⁵ Zvobgo, 'The Wesleyan Methodist Missions in Southern Rhodesia', pp.320, 347,348.

¹⁶ Albert Mosley, 'The British Methodist Church and African Nationalism in Southern Africa 1950-1960', p.2 in <http://www.methodistheritage.org.uk/missionary-history-mosley-african-nationalism-nov-2007.pdf#:~:text=The%20British%20Methodist%20Church%20and%20African%20Nationalism%20in,Ian%20Smith%20made%20a%20unilateral%20declaration%20of%20independence.> [accessed 17:08 25/08/2020].

¹⁷ W.R Pearden, 'Aspects of The Church and Its Political Involvement in Southern Rhodesia', 15- 172, *Zambezia* Vol 7, No.2, (1971), p.194.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Norman E. Thomas, 'Church and State in Zimbabwe' *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (1985), p.118.

²⁰ *The Independent*, 16th February, 1995, Thomas, 'Church and State in Zimbabwe', p.121.

(1972-1970) came the fore on behalf of the Protestant churches in his critique of the white settlers' Unilateral Declaration of Independence.²¹ Amongst the white ministers of the Wesleyans, Reverend. Whitfield Foy was an outlier who distinguished himself by his acute awareness of the racial injustices and nationalist aspirations in Rhodesia and had successfully pushed for de-segregated worship.²² However, these dissenting elements amongst the leadership and rural missionaries regarding racial injustices in the country were marginalized and white-led Protestant churches by and large remained clear supporters of the white supremacist regime.

Whatever their orientation to white supremacy and African nationalism, and whatever their dissident voices, the fact is that all the Protestant churches had historically sponsored the spread of missions with notable educational and health roles. And these widespread networks of missions were inevitably to bring them into contact with those who bore the brunt of the war and, often, of strategic resettlement. Both the Anglicans,²³ and Wesleyan Methodists,²⁴ established rural missions in what turned out to be principal zones of the liberation struggle in the north and east of Rhodesia. The United Methodists had mission stations at Mrewa, Mtoko and Nyadiri.²⁵ The missions at Mrewa and Mtoko were located in what would be the principal

²¹ Thomas, 'Church and State in Zimbabwe', pp.121-22

²² Pearden, 'Aspects of The Church and Its Political Involvement in Southern Rhodesia', p.195.

²³ The period following the Second Matabele War saw a massive growth of the Anglican Church in Rhodesia. By 1925, it had established various missions stations across Rhodesia including St. Augustine's (1891), St Faith (1891), Epiphany Mission (1891), St Bernard's Mission (1891), St Columba's Mission (1897), All Saint's Missions Wreningham, (1899), St Alban's Mission (1902), St Mary' Mission (1905), St David's Mission (1907), St Patrick's Mission (1925) and Cyrene Mission (1939) amongst others.
<http://www.rhodesianstudycircle.org.uk/church-of-england/> [accessed, 15:57, 31/07/2020].

²⁴ The Wesleyan Methodists extended their operations to the rest of Matabeleland after 1896. Missions at Tengwani and Gambo opened in 1897, and those at Majila and Mpini in 1898. Bembesi Mission (25 miles north of Bulawayo) was opened in 1901, while other missions opened near the Gwaai river in 1902.,at Tashankawa (1905) and Zizoomba (1906). In Mashonaland, mission stations were established at Samuriwo (1899), Altona (1899), Marondera (1904), Maponda (1904), Chimanza (1908), Gatooma (Kadoma) 1910, Sandringham (1913), Marshall Hartley (1914) and Waddilove (1915). See Zvobgo, 'The Wesleyan Methodist Missions in Southern Rhodesia, 1891-1945', pp. 52, 58, 69, 116-121, 127-130, 185.

²⁵ Goto 'A Central Mission The Legacy of the United Methodist Church in Zimbabwe', p.18.

zone of strategic resettlement during the war, while Nyadiri Hospital at the mission station of that name would be at the forefront of the United Methodist humanitarian response to the results of strategic resettlement. The Salvation Army, crucially, established an important connection with Chiweshe in Mazoe District, Mashonaland Central. Through Howard Secondary School (established in 1923) and Howard Hospital (founded in 1928), it was the principal provider of education and medical services here.²⁶ It is, therefore, unsurprising that later the Salvation Army would lead the humanitarian response to the results of strategic resettlement in this area.

Protestant Churches and the War

With the onset of the war several of the Protestant denominations in question were riven by the matter of the Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) fund of the World Council of Churches (WCC), an international umbrella organisation to which they were affiliated. The Programme to Combat Racism) was started in August 1969 initially as a five-year programme which rendered support to organizations of racially oppressed groups and to the victims of racial injustice. The criteria for receiving financial support from the PCR included the recommendation to support those organizations which combatted racism as opposed to welfare organizations (NGOs) which the WCC felt merely alleviated its effects. Most of the funds went to Southern African liberation movements, including the Zimbabwean ones, engaged in armed struggle against their respective countries' white minority regimes. The grants were allocated for humanitarian purposes.²⁷ Not surprisingly, the grants became highly controversial for those

²⁶ <http://www.salvationarmy.org/ihq/news/inr011214> accessed 16:50 30/4/2018.

²⁷ Antti Laine, Juha Meriläinen and Matti Peiponen, 'Ecumenical Reconstruction, Advocacy and Action: The World Council of Churches in Times of Change, from the 1940s to the early 1970s', *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Ökumenische Zusammenarbeit und Weltpolitik / Ecumenical cooperation and world politics (2017), pp.337-8, Darril Hudson, 'The World Council of Churches and Racism in Southern Africa', *International Journal*, Vol. 34, No. 3, (Summer, 1979), pp. 475-500.

Rhodesian Protestant denominations dominated by whites due to the alleged support given to the military strategy of the nationalist guerrillas.

i: The Anglicans

The Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland, Paul Burroughs, felt grants from the Fund raised the “spectre of religious schism”. However, when Burrough proposed that his Diocese should leave the Christian Council of Rhodesia (due to its support for the WCC), Percy Mkudu, a key Anglican layman, made it clear that even if Burroughs withdrew from CCR, the African members of the church would not.²⁸ In fact, the Bishop of Matabeleland noted that many African Anglicans enthusiastically supported the WCC grant but that it had incensed and perturbed many white Anglicans. At the Matabeleland Synod held on 5 May 1971, racial discrimination had been acknowledged, and speakers (unlike those at the Mashonaland Synod) utilised the neutral term ‘guerrilla’ as opposed the pejorative term ‘terrorist’ to refer to the armed nationalists. Nevertheless, the Synod still criticized the WCC grant to the liberation movements.²⁹ Later in 1978 Bishop Paul Burrough attacked the WWC grant totalling £83,333 for anti-apartheid groups including guerrilla organizations in Africa (including ZANU and ZAPU). The Bishop then formally dissociated the Anglican dioceses of Rhodesia from the WCC due to what it saw as its support for organisations pledged to use force against Rhodesia. It is certainly true that many white Anglican laymen were disturbed by the extent to which the Church of England appeared to be giving tacit support to militant political causes in Africa via the World Council of Churches to which it made an annual grant of over £9 000 in the early-1970s.³⁰

²⁸ Thomas, ‘Church and State in Zimbabwe’, p.129-130.

²⁹ Lapsey, *Neutrality or Co-Option* p.37.

³⁰ *The Times*, 7th May 1971.

In fact, the Anglican leadership in Rhodesia became one of the principal critics of guerrilla conduct in the war. In January 1973, they condemned the attack at Altena Farm by guerrillas who, they alleged, were funded by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and they made a series of high-profile attacks against this organization during the war.³¹ Elsewhere, Father Arthur Lewis, Rector of Rusape (Manicaland province), who was outspoken in his support for the regime, published various works including *Christian Terror in Southern Africa* (1977) and later *Liberation in Africa* (1979). Both cited atrocities committed against missionaries during the war and in them Lewis was scathing in his condemnation of the WCC Programme to Combat Racism Fund which, he argued, promoted guerrilla violence.³² In 1974, Burroughs and his fellow-bishop, Mark Wood (the Anglican Bishop of Mataberland) pointed to 87 war casualties, principally African civilians, who had been killed, abducted, raped, beaten or disfigured by the ‘terrorists’. The bishops were dismayed on learning of the \$15,000 grant which been allocated to ZANU and ZAPU by the World Council of Churches.³³ Later Bishop Paul Burrough would suspend the membership of his Diocese of Mashonaland to the World Council of Churches due its decision to support the liberation movements.³⁴ It is true that the Anglican Dean of Salisbury, John Da Costa, initially preached neutrality, using a national day of prayer held on 18th February 1977 to read a poem which expressed the view that it was human beings who were killing each other in the war; it was not a matter of humans versus the “ters” as Rhodesian government propaganda insisted. De Costa’s position, however, would radically change following the Viscount Disaster in September 1978, when a civilian airliner was shot down by guerrillas, as detailed in the survey chapter.³⁵ Following that incident, he

³¹ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, p.44.

³² Father. Arthur Lewis, *Christian Terror in Southern Africa*, (Salisbury, 1978) and Father Arthur Lewis, *Liberation in Africa*, (Sunnyside, 1979).

³³ *The Times*, May 22nd, 1974.

³⁴ Bhebe, *The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, p.124.

³⁵ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, pp.51-52,59-61.

gave a widely publicised sermon which condemned the apparent silence from international leaders regarding ‘terrorist atrocities’ in the war. In this politically charged sermon, he also implicated the World Council of Churches and the United Nations in these atrocities, presumably because of the solidarity of these organisations with the cause of the nationalist movements and made a scathing attack against Marxism and Communism.³⁶

The stance of the Anglican leaders is unsurprising however, given the racial profile of the leadership of the Rhodesian Anglican Church which was entrenched within the white-settler community. Aside from the Dutch Reformed Church, the Anglican Church had the largest number of white members (79 000) of any Church and actually accounted for almost a third of the total white population in Rhodesia.³⁷ Still, the Anglican Church had 150,000 African members and after the Catholic Church it had the second largest African membership. Yet it was only after independence in 1980 that an African Diocesan Bishop, Rev. Peter Hatendi, was elected. Before him Patrick Murindagomo had become the first African Anglican to become a bishop in Rhodesia, but significantly he had served as suffragan (subordinate) to the Bishop of Mashonaland from 1974, and – as if to emphasise segregation – he had ministered to African parishioners in Mashonaland Diocese.³⁸ Moreover, the Anglican Church was by and large dependent upon its European members for financial contributions. Any priest who championed the cause of the unenfranchised African majority (such as Bishop Skelton, discussed earlier) was likely to antagonize this group who held the “purse strings of the Church”.³⁹ As already suggested, and as evidence raised later in this chapter shows, the Church’s leadership was increasingly vocal in its support of the Smith regime during the war,

³⁶ For a transcription of Da Costa’s sermon see <http://rhodesia.nl/silence.htm> [accessed 17:26 14/08/2020]

³⁷ Lapsey, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, p.73, R.H. Randolph, *Church and State in Rhodesia 1969-1971: A Catholic View*, (Gwelo, 1971), p.10.

³⁸ Musodza, *An investigation of the Process of Indigenisation in the Anglican Diocese of Mashonaland*, p.31.

³⁹ *The Times*, June 17th 1968.

even as pockets of localised support for the liberation cause merged in a small number of rural missions.

These pockets of localized support for the liberation cause came principally from African members of the Church. In fact, St Faith's Mission, in Makoni (Manicaland) had collaborated with the guerrillas during the war: alongside the Catholic missions at Triashill and St Barbara's in this area, St Faiths became a guerrilla stronghold.⁴⁰ Stephen Matewa was a leading figure in this localized collaboration. He served as headmaster of Torino school and became an auxiliary Anglican priest during the war. He had been a member of ZANU since 1963 and involved in the co-operative farming ventures at St Faith's and Nyafaru. During the war, the mountain close to Torino school became a key guerrilla base.⁴¹ In this context, Matewa emerged "as the indispensable mediator between the local population and the guerrillas".⁴² The Anglican authorities in Salisbury (who were opposed to the guerrillas) reluctantly agreed for Matewa to work with the guerrilla fighters and provide them with food and clothing in order to influence them. Indeed, there was an important caveat as Matewa was more concerned with establishing "local ground rules which would mitigate the sufferings of the war" which, according to Ranger, he was able to achieve. Indeed, he was able for a time to have the area around Torino declared an open zone, immune from military action (from both sides) which was achieved "by means of the influence of the Anglican hierarchy".⁴³ Both the Anglican and government authorities had hoped by this means that "the guerrillas would be persuaded to surrender".⁴⁴ However, instead the open zone of Torino arguably aided the guerrilla strategy. The liberation fighters utilised the zone for convalescence and obtaining supplies. Matewa's

⁴⁰ Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study*, (London, 1985), p.198.

⁴¹ Terence Ranger, 'Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe, 1970–1980', *Studies in Church History*, Vol.20 (1983), p.457.

⁴² Ranger, 'Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe', p.457.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ranger 'Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe', p.458.

wife, a trained nurse, provided medical treatment to wounded guerrillas.⁴⁵ Matewa continued to appeal for support in this ministry as the number of guerrillas seeking help continued to increase and food supplies were dwindling. However, as a mediator, Matewa also refused to agree to the punishment of those accused by the guerrillas of being ‘sell-outs’, in one instance a woman whose husband was a supporter of Abel Muzorewa.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Matewa also petitioned on behalf of the local peasantry who were caught in the crossfire in the war. He noted how the people around the Ruwombe mountain, located close to St Faith’s, were suffering particularly as their crops left untended were destroyed by animals during the fighting while granaries was burnt by the Security Forces to stop food supplies reaching the liberation fighters. Matewa himself came to be a victim of Security Force brutality when he was arrested and beaten whilst out searching for missing girls.⁴⁷ In turn, Matewa reported instances of Security Force violence against the people to Christian Care and appealed for relief from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).⁴⁸

Other African Anglican priests and evangelists at St Faith’s obtained supplies for the guerillas and legal aid for those arrested and tortured by the authorities.⁴⁹ However, the St Faith’s Anglicans were somewhat (if not entirely) unique in doing this. If Catholic rural missions were indispensable in the investigative campaign of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) into the human rights abuses committed by the Security Forces, there was no general role of Anglican missions in this regard, and some could be attacked by the guerrillas, depending on their history and leadership. St Peter’s Mission in Manicaland Province had been served by Father Arthur Lewis during the 1960s and, as shown earlier, he was outspoken in his support for the Rhodesia regime. Once the villagization programme in

⁴⁵ Ranger ‘Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe’, p.458.

⁴⁶ Ranger ‘Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe’, p.458.

⁴⁷ Norma Kriger ‘Struggles Within Struggles’, p. 321.

⁴⁸ Ranger, *Holy Men and Rural Communities in Zimbabwe*, p.458.

⁴⁹ Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*, p.198.

the Honde Valley in was implemented in May 1977, the Anglican mission station was actually abandoned and subsequently looted and burnt down by the guerrillas. By contrast, Roman Catholic missionaries in the area including Carmelite sisters, catechist John Sunwa and Father Michael Hender could still travel to visit their brethren, albeit by bicycle to avoid landmines. As revealed in the previous chapter missionaries in Umtali (Mutare) diocese generally had cordial relations with guerrillas due to the deep sympathies of the local missionaries for the liberation cause.⁵⁰

However, there was one notable Anglican exception in this area of during the war. Father Kebble Prosser, a white minister and principal of St Augustine's school also played a crucial role rendering assistance to the liberation fighters. It was one of the few secondary schools which remained open for the duration of the war.⁵¹ St Augustine's served as a base camp where supplies of food, clothing, medicine and other needs were provided to the guerrillas.⁵² Cordial relations clearly emerged between Prosser and the ZANLA guerrillas, and this is cited as one of the principal reasons why St Augustine's avoided closure through guerrilla attack or, indeed, why it avoided any major casualties in the war. Prosser also rendered financial assistance to the guerrillas, a fact that was kept hidden from the Anglican leadership in Salisbury.⁵³ Despite the risks he ran from the Rhodesian Security Forces, Father Prosser supported the struggle to the bitter end, with his school offering a base of support for the guerrillas operating around Umtali (Mutare), Inyanga (Nyanga) and Makoni. What is more many St Augustine's alumni crossed the border to join the liberation struggle (either voluntarily or by force).⁵⁴ Not surprisingly, there was a clear tension between Prosser and his local white

⁵⁰ Heike Schmidt, *Colonialism and Violence in Zimbabwe: A History of Suffering*, (Harare 2013), p.165.

⁵¹ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, p.67.

⁵² *The Manica Post*, 11th January, 2019.

⁵³ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, pp.67-68.

⁵⁴ *The Manica Post*, 11th January 2019.

parishioners who refused to attend services taken by him.⁵⁵ Due to his suspected collaboration with the ZANLA guerrillas he was regularly threatened with arrest by Rhodesian Special Branch.⁵⁶ But, like Matewa, Prosser represented a small minority of those Anglican priests (especially within the white community) who were actively willing to support the guerrillas. As with so many other missionaries, this placed him in a potential crossfire situation. As revealed through this thesis, coercion was an important part of the guerrilla strategy to procure resources from the missionaries and the peasantry alike; and it was fundamental to the Security Force attempt to deny guerrillas those resources.

ii. The Salvation Army

Turning now to the Salvation Army, it should be noted that tension had already emerged between the Salvation Army and the World Council of Churches (WCC) before the war. In 1971, it had disengaged with the Christian Council of Rhodesia (CCR) due to its support for African land rights, liberation and majority rule and, in particular, because of CCR support for the WCC humanitarian aid to the guerrillas. However, it was only following the guerrilla killings at its Usher station in June 1978, that the Salvation Army opted to suspend its membership of the World Council of Churches, arguing that the grants given to ZANLA and ZIPRA were promoting ‘terrorist’ acts.⁵⁷ What emerged in 1978 was the unequivocal opposition to the nationalist guerrillas amongst the international leadership of the Salvation Army.⁵⁸ Conservative North American leaders had pressured International Headquarters in London to withdraw from the WCC.⁵⁹ At the same time, Richard Atwell, the regional joint territorial commander’s response to the Usher killings revealed his deep sympathy with the

⁵⁵ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, p.68.

⁵⁶ *The Herald*, 17th February 2016.

⁵⁷ Murdoch, *Christian Warfare in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe*, pp.129, 163-164.

⁵⁸ Major (Dr) Jim Watt ‘World Council Decision and its Effect on Zimbabwean Salvationists’ in The Salvation Army International Heritage Centre, ZIM 1/2 ‘Papers from Zimbabwe Territory 1981-2001’

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

white-settler regime. He referred to the guerrillas as “terrorists” and concluded that Nkomo’s ZIPRA had carried out the killings. However, his conclusion was based on government censored police reports as opposed to interviews with African eyewitnesses although the evidence does suggest guerrilla responsibility. However, Atwell’s rendering reflected the well-nigh propagandistic view of the war which emphasised guerrilla violence against rural missionaries and linked this not only to the nationalist movements but to those overseas who supported them. Thus, like most white Rhodesians, he blamed the Usher killings also on the Programme to Combat Racism grant of the WCC.⁶⁰ Nevertheless there was a clear split between the Salvation Army leaders and many of the (predominantly African) members of the Church on the ground who protested this decision.⁶¹ This tension would become increasingly manifest as rural missions (including those of the Salvation Army) were engulfed by the war.

The conflict imposed the most severe strains on the Salvation Army. Many black members joined the Rhodesian Security Forces, no doubt to gain employment. White Salvationists were conscripted, though some objected conscientiously.⁶² In fact, according to medical missionary Major (Dr) James Watt there were members of the Salvation Army who fought on both sides.⁶³ It was in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land in Mazoe District (Mashonaland Central), where the Salvation Army became principally entangled in the war. In 1973, the guerrillas arrived in the area and the Church was subject to the regime’s strict counter-insurgency measures. Salvation Army schools were closed and a threat of closure was extended to the organisation’s regional base at Howard Institute.⁶⁴ However, a vigorous campaign – conducted by District Commissioner Frederick Adllam, Territorial Commander Major John

⁶⁰ Murdoch, *Christian Warfare in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe*, pp.158-161.

⁶¹ Major (Dr) Jim Watt ‘World Council Decision and its Effect on Zimbabwean Salvationists’, ZIM 1/2.

⁶² Murdoch, *Christian Warfare in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe*, p.162.

⁶³ Major (Dr) Jim Watt ‘World Council Decision and its Effect on Zimbabwean Salvationists’, ZIM 1/2.

⁶⁴ Major John G. Merritt, *Historical Dictionary of The Salvation Army*, (Oxford ,2006), p.668.

Swinfen, the Institute's principal and its medical director, with support from the heads of Rhodesia's churches as also the state's Director of African Education – was successful in pressuring Prime Minister Ian Smith to reopen the schools and stores and allow the return of students to the Howard Institute.⁶⁵ The fact that the Salvation Army were able to get an intervention from Smith suggests they were in a position to exploit access to the highest echelons of the white-settler regime. Indeed, historically the Salvation Army had close ties with the regime. However, they were unable to prevent closures elsewhere: in 1976 the secondary school at the Bradley Institute in Madziwa was closed by the Rhodesian authorities. Although, the Bradley Institute actually served the eleventh Protected Villages set up in Madziwa at the end of 1974, it was claimed that the 'terrorists' were entering the school in the evenings for recruitment purposes and the authorities opted to close the school.⁶⁶ During the early stages of the war, and for the purposes of using it as some kind of base and interrogation centre, the Rhodesian Security Forces surrounded Howard Institute with "a chain link fence surmounted with four strands of barbed wire, angled outwards".⁶⁷ Such a design was uniform with the fence construction of the Protected Villages (PVs) that would be constructed in Chiweshe.⁶⁸ The guerrillas also caused problems for the local Salvation Army. As shown in the survey chapter, guerrillas adopted the tactic of mining roads in rural areas.⁶⁹ By September 1974, this mining – there had already been three separate incidents by then – had rendered Howard Hospital virtually isolated.⁷⁰ As we will see later, this would have a direct impact on the Salvation Army's mobile medical provision to the victims of strategic resettlement in Chiweshe. Concerns

⁶⁵ Merritt, *Historical Dictionary of The Salvation Army* p.668.

⁶⁶ Knightley O.F, *Zimbabwe Calling*, pp.44-46.

⁶⁷ C.E Mckone Tour Report 2nd to 3rd September 1974 in BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ For further evidence of mines see 'Letter from British High Commission in Blantyre to Rhodesian Department, 22nd October 1974' in BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974).

⁷⁰ C.E Mckone and J.J Swinson 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Affected Areas in Rhodesia- 16th- 22nd September 1974' and Letter from British High Commission in Blantyre to Rhodesian Department, 22nd October 1974' in BNA, FCO 36/1645.

were raised that if this situation remained, no relief programme of any nature could be implemented due to the danger posed by landmines.⁷¹

Significantly, the medical director of Howard Hospital could remark on how, when travelling around Nzwimbo (Mashonaland Central) his vehicle had passed over a landmine unharmed, but the following vehicle exploded.⁷²

From the perspective of Howard's medical director, Major (Dr) James Watt, there had been for a time a degree of cordiality between the local Salvationists and the guerrillas. He noted how local guerrillas would assist in the safe transit of the Salvation Army's mobile medical units throughout Chiweshe:

We would notify African officers [the guerrillas] of our travel, and no land mines would be planted in our way (or a little boy [Mujiba] would be placed to wave us down). We were given instructions on how to make our ambulance recognised from a distance so we would pass through ambushes unharmed... another time we were warned of a land mine planted by the troops [Security Forces] to blow up our ambulance and so implicate the guerrillas. In the worst areas, certain Salvation Army officers [clearly those whom the guerrillas trusted] would accompany us, dropping off to let new combatants know we were there.⁷³

Yet, it is important not to exaggerate this phenomenon. Elsewhere, there "were groups of guerrillas that were strongly anti-Christian" such as ones Watt had met in Mount Darwin and still others who were viewed as "out of control", including those who committed atrocities against alleged 'sell-outs'.⁷⁴ Towards the end of the war, the Salvation Army became increasingly vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. On 7th June 1978 at the Usher Institute, a Salvation Army run school in the village of Figtree, a village 57 km southwest of Bulawayo (Matabeleland South province), two Salvation Army women, Dianne Thomson and Sharon Swindells, were

⁷¹ 'C.E McKone and J.J Swinson Tour Report 16th to 22nd September 1974', BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2).

⁷² Major (Dr) Jim Watt 'World Council Decision and its Effect on Zimbabwean Salvationists', ZIM 1/2.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

killed and two male members, Gunvor Berit Polsson, and Mr. David Cotton, injured.⁷⁵ As with the Catholic missions mentioned in the previous chapter, the vulnerability of Usher Institute can be attributed to its close proximity to the frontier with Botswana: it was located on one the principal transit zones of ZIPRA guerrillas. It has also been suggested that the Usher Institute was left in a vulnerable position due its isolation from the African population around Figtree and its close proximity to white commercial farms that were often notable targets for the guerrillas. The Rhodesian authorities concluded it was Nkomo's ZIPRA guerrillas who were the perpetrators,⁷⁶ though Nkomo placed the blame on the infamous, Selous Scouts. Atrocities like this were subject to the spread of misinformation during the propaganda war waged by both sides during the conflict. The Usher Institute would not reopen until March 1980, with 240 pupils. When it closed in June 1978 because of the war it had housed 267 secondary school boarding students and 260 primary school pupils.⁷⁷

Towards the end of the war, the Salvation Army personnel at Howard were subjected to increasing pressure from guerrilla attacks. This became more so as the international leadership of the Church signalled its unequivocal opposition to the liberation movements following the Usher killings. Due to increasing hostility from the guerrillas, the Salvation Army had to move its nursing school and expatriate officers into Salisbury (Harare) for safety. What is more, Chiweshe's Howard Secondary School was actually abandoned until the end of the war, following a Security Force 'contact' with the guerrillas.⁷⁸ The Salvation Army temporarily relocated the school to Salisbury, but the Salvation Army had to close at least 40 primary and 2 secondary schools across its Rhodesian territory as the war intensified.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ *The Times*, 9th June 1978.

⁷⁶ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Murder of Missionaries* (Salisbury, 1978).

⁷⁷ Murdoch, *Christian Warfare in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe*, p.157.

⁷⁸ Rhodesian Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, *Murder of Missionaries*.

⁷⁹ The Salvation Army – Zimbabwe Rhodesia and Malawi Territory 'Refugees in Zimbabwe Rhodesia' (1979) in ZIM 1/2, 'Papers', Salvation Army Heritage Centre.

iii. The United Methodist Church

Moving now to the United Methodists, this denomination had a complex relationship with the WCC due to Bishop Muzorewa's rising prominence in Rhodesian politics during the war attendant upon his leadership of the United African National Council (UANC). In 1970 the United Methodists in contrast to the Anglicans had very few European members and supported the WCC anti-racism grants almost unanimously.⁸⁰ During the early stages of the war there appeared to be a close relationship between Bishop Muzorewa and the World Council of Churches. In April 1975, its Executive Committee had decided to allocate a grant totalling \$83,500 for the support of the African National Council for humanitarian purposes.⁸² During 1976 and 1977 the WCC corresponded with Muzorewa regarding the fund it allocated to the humanitarian programmes of the Zimbabwe liberation movement.⁸¹ But in 1978, the relationship between Muzorewa and the WCC would change markedly following the formation of the interim bi-racial government following the Internal Settlement engineered by the white regime. The WCC's financial assistance totalling \$85,000 to the Patriotic Front, a loose alliance between ZANU and ZAPU during the guerrilla war was criticised and not just because it could be used to finance the military activities as opposed to the humanitarian programmes of the guerrillas, but because the World Council of Churches had cut off financial assistance to Bishop Muzorewa and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole after they had joined Ian Smith in a transitional government which opposed the Patriotic Front.⁸² This move was also criticised by the United Methodist Church leaders in the USA.⁸³

⁸⁰ Pearden, 'Aspects of The Church and Its Political Involvement in Southern Rhodesia', p.209.

⁸¹ Letter from B. Sjollem (World Council of Churches, Geneva) to A. T. Muzorewa (African National Council of Zimbabwe), February 18, 1977] in JSTOR Primary Sources <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/al.sff.document.ydlwcc1712>. (accessed 15:13 4/11/2020]

⁸² *The Spartanburg Herald*, October 30th 1978.

⁸³ *The Washington Post*, August 18, 1978

United Methodist ministers inevitably became entangled in the war. Indeed, the principals at Old Umtali Mission and those in the Mtoko-Mrewa were located in key zones of the conflict in northern and eastern areas. In December 1976, Bishop Abel Muzorewa announced that Rev. Elisha Kawana and his wife were killed at their home 40 miles west of Umtali by the Security Forces following a contact with the guerrillas. Throughout the war, the Rhodesian authorities accused Methodist missionaries of playing a “prominent role in the recruitment of guerrillas”.⁸⁴ In July 1977, United Methodist pastor Rev. Thomas Mveve was shot and killed by a member of the Security Forces in a protected village. Allegedly an arrest had been made and a police investigation undertaken; however, it is unlikely there was any follow up given the Indemnity and Compensation Act detailed in the survey chapter. Muzorewa protested in a letter sent to the Prime Minister Ian Smith and to the Supreme Commander General Peter Walls regarding the incident.⁸⁵ However, after the ‘internal settlement’, Muzorewa’s place in the ‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’ government, as also the emerging role of his Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs), as detailed in the survey chapter, inevitably altered his position regarding Security Force violence. Muzorewa’s predecessor, Bishop Ralph Dodge, a critic of the SFAs, urged the United Methodist Church to oblige Muzorewa to resign as bishop due to his participation in politics and, in turn, his responsibility for the atrocities committed by the SFAs.⁸⁶

In fact, ultimately there came to be significant guerrilla coercion of members of the United Methodist Church, especially in areas such as Mtoko (Mutoko), where the United Methodists were strong and where Muzorewa allegedly had considerable support.⁸⁷ Gadanzara in Makoni District, Manicaland province, was another United Methodist stronghold and

⁸⁴ *The Washington Post*, 18th August, 1978.

⁸⁵ *The Daily Mail*, July 21st, 1977.

⁸⁶ Joshua Chakawa, ‘Abel Muzorewa's Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) During and After The War of Liberation in Hurungwe District, Zimbabwe’, (PhD Thesis), Midland state University (2015), p.216.

⁸⁷ Chakawa, ‘Abel Muzorewa's Security Force Auxiliaries’, pp.24, 216.

continued to support the UANC even after others felt that Muzoroewa had betrayed the liberation cause. Gadanzara also provided some of the recruits for the SFAs. Indeed, two Security Force Auxiliary camps were located there, and the unit had been deployed to defend the local population and Methodist church there. During one operation, ZANLA guerrillas captured and interrogated many of the leading United Methodists in the area. According to Ranger, who does not give sufficient weight to guerrilla coercion, many of those captured were found to be willing to co-operate. The guerrillas claimed that those killed were not killed due to their membership of United Methodist Church. However, not only were most of the Security Force Auxiliaries killed by the guerrillas, the buildings around the Methodist Church at Gadanzara were destroyed.⁸⁸

iv. The Wesleyan Methodist Church

Significant divisions were to emerge amongst the other Methodist denomination, the Wesleyan Methodist Church over the World Council of Churches' grants to the nationalist movements. When, in November 1970 four European pastors expressed their "unequivocal opposition to the use of violence", they were justifying their condemnation of the grants.⁸⁹ Rev. Ndhela, the African Methodist Superintendent also argued that Church funds should be used only for church projects.⁹⁰ White congregations had contemplated leaving the Synod if it endorsed the WCC grants. Later, they would give grants for welfare purposes to the Rhodesian Security Forces in order to express their condemnation of the WCC grants which they felt were funding 'terrorist' organizations.⁹¹ This is unsurprising given the large number of Europeans in

⁸⁸ Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*, pp.239-241.

⁸⁹ *The Times*, November 16th, 1970.

⁹⁰ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 5th December 1970 in 'NAZ Newspapers'.

⁹¹ Pearden, 'Aspects of The Church and Its Political Involvement in Southern Rhodesia', p.209.

the Church. By 1976, Europeans made up just over a third (21,000) of the total membership of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Rhodesia.⁹²

The war also had a significant impact on the Wesleyan Methodist Church. In many areas in which the Church operated, the Rhodesian Security Forces prohibited any gathering and, consequently, the Wesleyan Methodist congregations were unable to meet for worship. Several African ministers had to leave the rural missions and move into the towns for safety. Whilst some remained in touch with their congregations, others did not and were not accepted back after the war. Some local priests, however, remained with their parishioners throughout the war, and some clinics and schools continued to operate throughout. In the Zambesi valley at Siabuwa, members of the Church continued to meet throughout the war. This was despite the fact it was located on one of ZAPUs principal transit routes into Rhodesia from Zambia. There is some evidence of guerrillas instructing members of the Church to revert to the traditional religion, and one ZANU meetings were intentionally held at the same time as Church services to prevent people from attending. But in other areas, political meetings were arranged around Church services. In one case a grandmother had persuaded local ZANU cadres to rearrange their youth meeting so that it did not clash with a meeting of the Girls Christian Union.⁹³

There could be some Wesleyan support – coerced or not – for the guerrillas in particular localities. It was reported that one clinic was able to remain open due to the medical assistance it provided to the guerrillas.⁹⁴ In another instance, a local minister in an area occupied by ZANU guerrillas played a crucial role running errands for the guerrillas (providing shoes) and later the

⁹² Randolph, *Church and State in Rhodesia*, p.10.

⁹³ Mosely, 'Rhodesia Becomes Zimbabwe and Programme to Combat Racism', p.5.

⁹⁴ Albert Mosely, 'Rhodesia Becomes Zimbabwe and Programme to Combat Racism', p.4.

<http://www.methodistheritage.org.uk/missionary-history-mosley-rhodesia-becomes-zimbabwe-nov-2007.pdf> [accessed 18:32 29/08/2020].

chairman of the Church's District here had provided funds to the guerrillas.⁹⁵ One Wesleyan Methodist, Rev. J. Chirisa, raised funds and procured resources for the ZANU guerrillas based in Mozambique when he was based in Manchester during 1975. Rev. Matemavi had provided "food, clothes and moral support to the guerrillas".⁹⁶ Rev. Kadenge assisted those injured during the war, both civilians and guerrilla, transporting them to hospital in a mission vehicle. Rev. Z. Magoronga also played a crucial role rendering material assistance to the guerrillas.⁹⁷ Three, African Wesleyan Methodist ministers, Rev. G. Chombo, Rev. A. Kanodereka and Rev. E. Jaja were assassinated by elements of the Security Forces due to their political activities and support of the guerrillas during the war.⁹⁸ As is well known, young women and girls were often required to aid the guerrillas: this laid them open to extreme danger in 'contacts' with the Security Forces: in one such battle, the soldiers killed twelve girls who were members of the local Wesleyan Methodist Church.⁹⁹ While Kanodereka worked with the ZANU guerrillas he served as the national secretary of Muzorewa's UANC in the period before it fell out with the exiled nationalist movements.¹⁰⁰

The guerrillas, too, subjected Wesleyans to coercion. In July 1975, ZIPRA guerrillas abducted 18 students who attended Tegwani Secondary School near Plumtree, close to the Botswanan frontier.¹⁰¹ Later, they abducted 430 students and 12 staff members from the same school and took them across the border to become part of Nkomo's forces. After protests by the Church leaders and the Red Cross, the Botswana Government screened the children in Francistown and transported those who opted to return to the Rhodesian border.¹⁰² Later,

⁹⁵ Albert Mosely, 'Rhodesia Becomes Zimbabwe and Programme to Combat Racism', p.4.

⁹⁶ Simon Madhiba 'Methodism and Public Life in Zimbabwe: An analysis of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Zimbabwe's impact on politics from 1891-1980 (PhD Thesis), University of Pretoria (2010), p.214.

⁹⁷ Madhiba 'Methodism and Public Life in Zimbabwe', p.214.

⁹⁸ Madhiba 'Methodism and Public Life in Zimbabwe', pp.215-16.

⁹⁹ Mosely, 'Rhodesia Becomes Zimbabwe and Programme to Combat Racism', pp.4-5.

¹⁰⁰ Madhiba 'Methodism and Public Life in Zimbabwe', pp.215-16.

¹⁰¹ *The Daily Telegraph*, 23rd July 1975.

¹⁰² *The Daily Telegraph*, 31st March 1978.

following an attack by ZIPRA forces Tegwani was closed and the whole school was later relocated to Bulawayo.¹⁰³ Elsewhere, the Wesleyan's Pakame Mission was only spared by the guerrillas supposedly due to the fact that Josiah Tongogara, head of ZANLA, had been educated at the school. However, this raised the suspicions of the Security Forces who accused the African minister there of collaborating with the guerrillas and beat him very severely. Other church members were also arrested.¹⁰⁴

The preceding analysis suggests the following. Overall, the Protestant Churches in Rhodesia, had a complex relationship with the World Council of Churches to which they ostensibly belonged. White congregants and leaders of the Anglican Church, Wesleyan Methodist Church and the Salvation Army were broadly oppositional to the grants made by WCC to nationalist organisations which they felt were aiding guerrilla movements in the war. The Anglicans were most outspoken in their condemnation of the WCC. But African Anglicans, Wesleyans and Salvationists were supportive of such grants insofar as they were for humanitarian purposes and, more broadly, they also supported their churches' membership of the WCC. The United Methodists initially supported the WCC grants which favoured Abel Muzorewa's UANC in the early stages of the war. However, the Church became more critical of the organization as grants were redirected to support the humanitarian programme of the guerrillas' Patriotic Front in the closing stages of the liberation struggle.

Anglicans and the Wesleyans along with the Salvation Army did sometimes join with the Catholics in condemning atrocities and human rights abuses by the Security Forces,¹⁰⁵ and they could oppose legislation (the Indemnity and Compensation Act) that gave those forces

¹⁰³ Mosely, 'Rhodesia Becomes Zimbabwe and Programme to Combat Racism', p.5.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ *The Daily Mail*, 23rd August 1974.

immunity from prosecution.¹⁰⁶ However, their leaderships remained generally in support of the regime and its forces. At the grassroots level, however, there were in some rural areas close relations between the guerrillas and Anglican Salvation Army and Wesleyan personnel of all groupings discussed, African Wesleyan Methodists were probably the most supportive of the liberation struggle, rendering financial and material aid to the guerrillas. The position of the United Methodists stands out. Initially supportive of the guerrillas, their position shifted and became especially thorny following their leader's participation in the 'Internal Settlement' and the deployment of Muzorewa's auxiliaries towards the end of the war, many of whom were stationed in the Protected Villages. However, whatever their stances Protestant Missions (like their Catholic counterparts) were engulfed by the war and their personnel in rural areas became part of the growing list of casualties in the war. Indeed, in some rural areas close relations between the guerrillas and Anglican, Salvation Army and Wesleyan personnel. Although in many areas they were subject to coercion by the guerrillas. Nevertheless, the precarious position of these Protestant churches during the war in the rural areas was further complicated as the scope of their ministry increased as myriads of their adherents were forcibly relocated to the protected villages.

¹⁰⁶ *The Times*, 10th September 1975.

Protestant Churches and Strategic Resettlement

The enforced villagisation programme was to become one of the principal concerns of Protestant churches during the war. In August 1974, Bishop P. Burrough (Anglican Church), Rev. F.S Rea and Rev. Ndhela (both of the Wesleyan Methodist Church), Col. Richard Atwell (Rhodesian Salvation Army) and Father Dieter Scholz (Catholic Church) were all taken on an official tour of the protected villages to survey the results of the early strategic resettlement exercise in Chiweshe in Mazoe District. They were joined by a group of journalists including representatives of the government-supporting Rhodesia Herald, the Ministry of Information and RTV/RBC (the state television and radio broadcasters).¹⁰⁷ Such tours, as revealed earlier in this dissertation, were designed to promote the propagandistic view of the villagisation programme; in this case, however, the tour may also have been motivated by a desire to tap church resources to ameliorate the results of strategic resettlement. If the Catholics were vocal in their critique of the policy and contested the biased rendering of it presented officially, Protestant churches had a set of markedly different renderings of the villagisation programme and its results. This reflected the spectrum of opinion amongst them regarding the Rhodesian government and the guerrillas respectively, and it reflected also the impact of conduct of the war and strategic resettlement on the denominations in question. As we shall see, their response to strategic resettlement reveals the complexities of their humanitarian response to the policy and illuminates important nuances in their attitude towards Rhodesian counterinsurgency. Of course, the various Protestant denominations were differently affected by strategic resettlement, depending on the degree to which their missions were engulfed by the process. The Salvation Army were the most affected, followed by the Anglicans and then the United

¹⁰⁷ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 'Report on the Conducted Tour of the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land 5th September 1974 (Arranged by the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Information), 10th October 1974' in ICS 151 CIIR/A/2/3/4, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8 Appendix No. 10/12/13 'Justice and Peace Reports in Protected Villages'

Methodists. The Wesleyan Methodists, however, were the least affected by the process, although in Mount Darwin, their Rev. M. Masvanhise and his family were actually living in one of the PVs.¹⁰⁸

i. The Methodists and Strategic Resettlement.

Given that few of its congregants were swept up in the process, the Wesleyan Methodist Church had a limited articulation with strategic resettlement. Its stance on the policy reflected the changed racial profile of its leadership (now largely black) during the war. At a Synod meeting held on 12th January 1975 it was resolved that race relations in the country were at breaking point in part due to the alienation of the peasantry who had been forcibly resettled in the protected villages. It was pointed out that the PVs had not been accepted by the peasantry and that they saw them as an unjustified communal punishment. Noting that the African population faced widespread racial discrimination,¹⁰⁹ the Synod recognized the clear contradiction between the official discourse which emphasised the ‘communist threat’ and the coercive and violent methods used by the Smith regime which were akin to those used by such regimes.¹¹⁰ Later, like the Catholics, the Wesleyan Methodists signalled their particular concern that the peasantry was subjected to extensive curfews and the system of PVs. However, the Synod chairman also condemned the killing of innocent people, whether by the Security Forces or the guerrillas, and it found unacceptable “these acts of violence and intimidation as a means of achieving their objective, whatever their policy”.¹¹¹

The Wesleyan Methodist Church played some humanitarian role in responding to the strategic resettlement of the (marginalised minority) Tonga people in the Binga district in

¹⁰⁸ Madhiba ‘Methodism and Public Life in Zimbabwe’, p.176.

¹⁰⁹ Madhiba ‘Methodism and Public Life in Zimbabwe’, p.172.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Madhiba ‘Methodism and Public Life in Zimbabwe’, p.176.

Mashonaland North, close to the Zambesi escarpment near the Zambian frontier. In 1977, Rev. S.W. Tshabangu of the Wesleyans' Methodist Missionary Society delivered to 38 families in Negode Protected Village 1977 mealie-meal, beans and salt to the tune of R\$242, 76, and 163 blankets valued at R\$611, 25. Relief supplies were also provided to rebuild six huts in Negonde village at a cost of R\$220.¹¹² It is important to note that the Binga district was (and still is) principally inhabited by the Tonga people.¹¹³ The Wesleyans activism regarding the Tonga is unsurprising as the first African members of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Rhodesia had been Tonga.¹¹⁴ A particular historic connection dictated this response, then, and such connections often shaped denominational aid to the victims of strategic resettlement during the war. But this was the only notable focus of the Wesleyans themselves in aiding the victims of strategic resettlement, although some of their clergymen – for example Reverend Ndhela - would also participate in the relief efforts of Christian Care in the PVs (detailed in the next chapter), in part through membership of the Emergency Relief Committee (E.R.C), also to be discussed in the next chapter.¹¹⁵

The United Methodist Church broadly opposed strategic resettlement throughout the war, even after Bishop Muzorewa briefly became Prime Minister following the 'Internal Settlement' in March 1978. As early as 1974, Muzorewa's ANC had criticized the implementation of the villagisation programme in Chiweshe, citing the lack of adequate sanitary facilities and the cultural violation entailed by a situation where "in law laws were forced to sleep in the same accommodation with their sons and daughters-in-law."¹¹⁶ In 1977, Bishop Muzorewa advocated the "end to the system of the Protected Villages" as a precondition

¹¹² Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee- Bulawayo Office Co-Ordinator's Progress Report for the Period May to August 1977 in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹¹³ J.K Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia* (London, 1985), p.6.

¹¹⁴ Zvobgo, 'The Wesleyan Methodist Missions in Southern Rhodesia', p.64.

¹¹⁵ Roy Henson "The Protected Villages" (Undated), Roy Henson 'A Report on the Protected Villages? 31st December 1975. in NAZ MS 589/7/2 and C.F Hallencrutz, 'A Council in the Crossfire: ZCC 1964-1980' in Carl Hallencrutz and Ambrose Moyo (eds.), *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, (Gweru, 1988), p.91.

¹¹⁶ *Moto*, August 10th 1974.

of his party's participation in settlement negotiations with Ian Smith.¹¹⁷ Following the Internal Settlement, dismantling of the PVs became one of Muzorewa's principal objectives, and as shown in the survey chapter, Muzorewa began dismantling some of the PVs in the north-east in 1978 at a time when the PVs and curfews remained a basic feature of rural life due to the ongoing counterinsurgency.¹¹⁸ However, in spite of any military repercussions, Muzorewa shut down many of the PVs in areas where the government had lost effective control, including Mtoko, Mrewa and Mudzi, all areas with high numbers of United Methodist adherents. By the end of that year, all the PVs in this zone had been opened.¹¹⁹ Undeniably there was a clear political motive for this: in the UANC, voices were growing louder to end the villagisation programme which was so unpopular with the Zimbabwean peasantry. In a sense, one cannot in considering these actions against strategic resettlement, separate the UANC from the United Methodists – both of them led by Bishop Muzorewa: the impact of life in the PVs was not merely a political, but a pastoral, concern since so many United Methodist congregants came from Mtoko, Mrewa and Mudzi, a principal zone of the United Methodists' missionary involvement in Rhodesia. Muzorewa's decision to dismantle the PVs, then, can in part be explained by the complexities borne of his concurrent roles in ministry and political office following the Internal Settlement, as also the geographical pattern of the Church's membership.

If the United Methodists (and the ANC and later the UANC with whom they were strongly linked, not least through the figure of Bishop Muzorewa) opposed strategic resettlement and, indeed, helped to dismantle many PVs from 1978, they also played a crucial role in (literally) treating its victims. United Methodists, including Reverends Kurewa and Nyanungo, played an active role on Christian Care's Emergency Relief Committee that directed

¹¹⁷ *Financial Times*, December 9th 1977.

¹¹⁸ *The Daily Telegraph*, May 15th 1978, *The Times* June 12th 1978.

¹¹⁹ Paul Moorcraft, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History* (Barnsley, 2008), p. 102, Cilliers, *Counter- Insurgency in Rhodesia*, p.93.

help to the victims of strategic resettlement.¹²⁰ Above all, the hospital at the United Methodists' Nyadiri (Nyadire) Mission was at the forefront of the denomination's practical relief efforts in the protected villages, and served particularly those forcibly resettled in Mtoko and Mudzi (Mashonaland East). As the local population were placed in confinement this hospital would come to the fore in rendering medical assistance as crops were destroyed and malnutrition, malaria and dysentery became widespread. The hospital's mobile clinic was viewed as of particular importance.¹²¹ Interestingly, it became a way for Oxfam – forbidden, as we shall see, from operating directly in the PVs or, indeed, in the country at all – to aid the victims of strategic resettlement. In 1976, the organisation approved £10,000 for the purchase and maintenance of a vehicle.¹²² In fact, even before this Oxfam had provided some money for fuel and such like.¹²³ Nyadiri thus took delivery of a Land Rover ambulance from Oxfam – it was delivered via Christian Care – and it could do something to provide mobile medical services in a context in which strategic resettlement and military operations had reduced access to local clinics.¹²⁴ The Nyadiri ambulance and mobile clinic, then, became a lynchpin of the United Methodists' humanitarian response in the PVs around Mtoko, Mrewa and Mudzi. There was a paradox in this, since it helped, in a sense, to service strategic resettlement. A local Keep Commander, Simon Pitt, who headed Marembe Protected Village (PV) in Mudzi district pointed out that the existing Dendera Clinic, run by the United Methodist Church, was about four kilometers away, and had a minimum charge of 35c per patient. For Pitt, both these factors made it impractical for the majority of minor ailments to be treated there. Ideally, the Keep Commander had sought a fully equipped clinic inside the Marembe PV to be constructed but

¹²⁰ Roy Henson 'A Report on the Protected Villages? 31st December 1975, NAZ MS 589/7/2.

¹²¹ Some information regarding Nyadiri's mobile medical units can be provided in 'Roy Henson Emergency Relief Committee: Report on the Protected Villages, April 1976', NAZ MS 591/2/2.

¹²² 'Oxfam: Africa Development Schedule July 1976' in M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/4 Folder 2: October 1975- October 1976.

¹²³ 'United Methodist Church 5th May 1976' in NAZ MS 1184/7.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

had conceded that a shortage of trained nursing staff and the high cost of the necessary equipment meant this idea was not feasible. Clearly, Nyadiri's mobile medical units which serviced Mtoko, Mrewa and Mudzi addressed, in however limited a way, the health crisis caused by strategic resettlement. The United Methodist medical provision, therefore, might, from one perspective, be considered to have been functional in aiding the local counter-insurgency strategy by providing much needed medical cover in the PVs in the area.¹²⁵ This helps to explain why, when Nyadiri's Landrover was badly damaged by a land mine planted by the guerrillas in 1977.¹²⁶ A new one was purchased using money from the government via the Terrorist Victims' Relief Fund.¹²⁷

ii. The Anglican Church and Strategic Resettlement.

The Anglican Church, officially, stood in marked contrast to the Methodists. From the outset, it offered its support for the enforced villagisation programme. An education newsletter issued by the Church emphasised the need to "establish fortified villages to protect the inhabitants from the appalling atrocities carried out by the terrorists".¹²⁸ Bishop Burrough was notable in his support for strategic resettlement in Chiweshe. In fact, in 1977 he requested (along with state-sanctioned kraal heads) that a new protected village should be constructed near the Anglican mission at St Albans.¹²⁹ It is true that elsewhere Burrough pointed to the dilemma created by the serious military situation, the need for the security of the African people and the significant disruption to their lives in Chiweshe and Madziwa as people were forced to

¹²⁵ 'Letter from Simon Pitt (Keep Commander Marambe Protected Village, Mtoko) to Maia Chenux Repond, 20th December 1976' in NAZ, MS 1287/37.

¹²⁶ 'Rhodesia Policy Discussion Paper' (1977) in Oxford Bodleian Library in Oxford, Bodleian Library, M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/5 Folder 1: January to October 1977.

¹²⁷ 'Minutes of the Local Committee Meeting Held on Tuesday 20th September 1977 at the Christian Care Emergency Relief Office' in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹²⁸ O'Callaghan, Southern Rhodesia: *The Effects of a Conquest Society on Education, Culture and Information*, pp.165-66.

¹²⁹ Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol 97, No.13. 12th October, 1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/4, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No.27 'Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977, Vol.1.'

leave their homes at short notice and required to construct new shelters in neighbouring fields.¹³⁰ But despite acknowledging the disruptive impact of villagisation, Burroughs praised the Ministry of Internal Affairs (INTAF) for their efforts in implementing the policy.”¹³¹ His basic sympathy was undoubtedly with the counter-insurgency strategy of the white settler regime, and he actually cited the success of the villagisation programmes in Malaya and Kenya without acknowledging their punitive aspects. Burrough was more concerned with the manner in which the policy was implemented as opposed to the principle of the strategy, which he accepted as a military and political necessity.¹³²

This view was shared by another outspoken Anglican supporter of the regime, Reverend Arthur Lewis, who was a member of the Rhodesian Senate. Like Burrough, he stressed the strategic necessity of the PVs. and praised the Ministry of Internal Affairs for carrying out its “unenviable task”.¹³³ Like the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he presented the well-nigh propagandistic view of the Protected Villages as potential ‘growth points’, just as rural mission stations had supposedly been before them.¹³⁴ Elsewhere, the Church cited the alleged role of the aldeamentos in Mozambique in this capacity. It was stated that FRELIMO who previously viewed these villages as ‘concentration camps’ were utilizing them to provide villages schools, clinics, power, water supplies and assisted agricultural schemes.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, like Burrough, Lewis did recognize something of the plight of those relocated to the PVs. Thus, he argued that, whilst in some places the villagization had been welcomed by the local population, in others it had not and one had to acknowledge the disruptive impact of the process by which

¹³⁰ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, p.49.

¹³¹ Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, pp.49-50.

¹³² Lapsley, *Neutrality or Co-Option*, pp.49-50.

¹³³ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.9. No.8. 1st July 1977 in NAZ MS 311/19, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No.27 ‘Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977, Vol.1.’ Hereafter this will be referred to as ‘Hansard: The Senate, Vol.9. No.8. 1st July 1977.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ O’Callaghan, *Southern Rhodesia: The Effects of a Conquest Society on Education, Culture and Information*, pp.165-66.

myriads had been uprooted from their previous homes at short notice and “expected to rebuild [them] with whatever assistance the Ministry was able to offer”.¹³⁶ The difficulties of the relocation were compounded by climatic conditions and the absence of many men (the principle wage earners) who were away engaged in migrant labour. He also acknowledged that food supplies had either been damaged by the rain or restricted so as to not to fall into the hands of the ‘terrorists’. He also noted that amenities such as churches and schools were abandoned and he conceded that, even with substantial assistance from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Churches and the Ministry of Education, it would take a long time for acceptable living standards to be reached in the PVs. However, whilst conceding that some of those in confinement had been alienated from the regime, he attributed this to guerilla intimidation and hostile propaganda, and above all he continued to emphasize the ‘protective’ function of the PVs in light of ‘terrorist’ atrocities; injuries and loss of life inflicted by Security Forces had been inadvertent. He drew attention to the plight of families whose relatives had either been killed or adducted; according to Lewis, the inmates in the PVs did not support the ‘terrorists’ and feared they would become the country’s future rulers. He thus endorsed the view of the Minister of Internal Affairs (B.H Mussett) that whatever the deficiencies of strategic resettlement, the regime was now winning over Rhodesia’s African population.¹³⁷

The Anglican Church’s response to strategic resettlement was evidently a clear reflection of the leadership’s close proximity to the white settler regime. This was somewhat paradoxical given the direct impact of strategic resettlement on the Church. In 1974, an Anglican school of 650 pupils, St Albans, had been closed by order of the Ministry Internal Affairs. Unlike, say, the Salvation Army who opposed the closure of their schools in Chiweshe, the Anglicans remained silent following the closure of St Albans and emphasised the allegedly

¹³⁶ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.9. No.8. 1st July 1977.

¹³⁷ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.9. No.8. 1st July 1977.

‘protective’ function of the PVs, offering limited criticism regarding the manner in which the enforced villagisation programme was implemented.¹³⁸ Indeed, the Anglicans’ official position regarding strategic resettlement, including their humanitarian role in the PVs, reflected the Church’s support of white settler rule and Rhodesian counterinsurgency, including its developmentalist ideology with respect to the protected villages.

There was one area of the country, however, where the Anglican Church was more willing to provide (an albeit faint, implied) critical appraisal of the results of strategic resettlement: the Honde Valley in Manicaland Province. This is unsurprising since the vocal Father Arthur (now Senator) Lewis had served as Rector of Rusape in that province. As noted earlier, St Peter’s Mission where he had ministered was abandoned as strategic resettlement was implemented as part of Operation Rivet in the Honde Valley in May 1977.¹³⁹ The Anglican leadership now raised concerns about the fate of their medical and educational facilities in Holdenby Tribal Trust Land which was located in this area with Lewis requesting the re-establishment of those facilities in the numerous PVs into which people had been concentrated. He pressed the Minister of Internal Affairs to spell out the progress made in replacing abandoned schools and clinics in the newly constructed PVs,¹⁴⁰ with the Minister of Health assuring him that it was government policy for clinics to be established in the protected villages and for village health workers (employed by the state) to be allocated to the PVs from January 1st, 1978.¹⁴¹ Given the Anglican leadership’s (and, specifically, Senator Father Lewis’s) pro-regime credentials, it is hardly surprising that the Minister of Health was receptive to Lewis’ concerns, in stark contrast to the government’s response to the Catholics’ pointing out of the

¹³⁸ O’Callaghan, *Southern Rhodesia: The Effects of a Conquest Society on Education, Culture and Information*, pp.165-66.

¹³⁹ Schmidt, *Colonialism and Violence in Zimbabwe*, p.165.

¹⁴⁰ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.10. No.4. 9th November 1977.

¹⁴¹ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.10, No.15. 14th November 1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/5 ‘The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No.27 ‘Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977, Vol.5.’

health crisis in the PVs. As illustrated elsewhere with the Salvation Army, proximity to the regime was a key factor in deciding whether a particular denomination was able to challenge or shape – to however limited a degree – government policy in the war.

But Father Lewis, partly spurred by the guerrilla massacre of Aberfoyle tea plantation workers referred to in chapter one, praised strategic resettlement in the Honde Valley. Before the war, he noted, the area had been “a place of scattered villages and of peace”. There was now a “new order of crowded protected villages”, but this was a “tremendous achievement however much one must regret its necessity. And it has achieved its object. The forces of order and the civil administration are one more in control. The slaughter has ceased”.¹⁴² For Lewis, then, the villages in the Honde Valley served an important humanitarian function, one made necessary by “the ghastly scene after the brutal massacre of 27 tea estate workers in the Honde Valley. No praise is too high for those who have brought the situation under control and made the repetition of such an incident very unlikely”.¹⁴³

Whatever Father Lewis’s views regarding “a real need for responsible [i.e. pro-regime] Rhodesians to get to know the people in the protected villages and...when practicable, [for] the Ministry [of Internal Affairs] ... to provide facilities for this to take place...without supervision”,¹⁴⁴ he supported the overall jurisdiction of the state’s District Commissioner in the -protected -villages,¹⁴⁵ and praised what he saw as the state’s role in restoring educational facilities. In effect, he accepted that the state would run the 170 schools in the area.¹⁴⁶ As with the earlier closure of the Anglican mission school at St Albans in Mazowe District, he did not

¹⁴² Hansard: The Senate, Vol.10. No.4. 9th November 1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/5 ‘The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia: Documents Concerning the Prosecution of Members of the Executive 1977/8, Appendix No.27 ‘Parliamentary Debate on Alleged Security Force Atrocities and on Related Matters, 1977, Vol.5.’

¹⁴³ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.10. No.4. 9th November 1977.

¹⁴⁴ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.10. No.4. 9th November 1977

¹⁴⁵ Hansard: The Senate, Vol.10. No.4. 9th November 1977

¹⁴⁶ Hansard: The Senate. Vol.10. No.16. 15th November, 1977

challenge the state's paramount role in education in an area which had traditionally been the domain of rural missionaries, including those from the Anglican Church. He thus fell in with the massive state intervention in the Honde Valley during the war. As Heike Schmidt's work has shown, the war transformed the frontier zone from an area which was almost beyond the reach of the state in the 1950s to one in which sufficient control was exerted over the population and territory so as to facilitate the Rhodesian counter-insurgency strategy.¹⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the position of the Anglicans was nevertheless a complex one. With their strong link to the regime, they could – through Senator Father Lewis – publicly press for facilities for the missionaries, priests and ministers of religion working in the PVs so that they could “pick up the threads of religious work which has suffered” as a result of the war. The Minister of Internal Affairs responded sympathetically, saying that “consistent with the security situation prevailing at any time, it has always been the policy to ensure that the persons concerned are offered reasonable facilities to carry on their work in the protected villages”.¹⁴⁸ Provided that work did not call into question the counterinsurgency strategy, such pastoral work could even act as a support to enforced villagisation, ameliorating the harsh conditions. Indeed, Anglican personnel played a role in monitoring or aiding the relief efforts in the PVs, particularly in Manicaland Province. At Mwoyoweshumba PV in Mutasa district, it was a Church official who reported the shortage of food.¹⁴⁹ Notwithstanding the Anglicans' official support of the counterinsurgency, along with all other Churches, they participated in the Christian humanitarian response to strategic resettlement. Indeed, the Anglican leadership, including Senator Father Arthur Lewis himself, continued to minister to, and raise concerns about, those displaced, including those who had been placed in the Protected Villages in the

¹⁴⁷ Schmidt, *Colonialism and Violence*, p.187

¹⁴⁸ ‘Hansard: The Senate. Vol.10. No.16. 15th November, 1977’

¹⁴⁹ ‘The Coordinator's Report - Salisbury Emergency Relief Committee-Period May - June 1978’ in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

Honde Valley: at the height of the war: an Anglican reverend and a bishop had together taken supplies to the local Anglicans in the valley at the time when the forced removals from villages into fortified camps was undertaken.¹⁵⁰ But much of their humanitarian work took place through Christian Care, the umbrella body on whose Emergency Relief Committee Anglicans sat alongside other denominations.¹⁵¹

iv. The Salvation Army

Despite its proximity to the regime, the Salvation Army played the most significant role amongst Protestant denominations offering a critique of the villagization programme and rendering assistance to those in the protected villages. This is hardly surprising as the Salvation Army was not only a Protestant Church but also an international charitable organization which advocated the practical application of the Christian Gospel, with a particular emphasis on provisioning and sheltering the needy.¹⁵² At the same time, it had a long and historic association with Chiweshe, which became one of the first, most extensive and highly publicized instances of strategic resettlement.

It is therefore not surprising that very early on in the process the Salvation Army condemned the way strategic resettlement had been implemented. Richard Atwell, the territorial commander of the Church in Rhodesia pointed out that forcibly removed “men, women and children with their possessions have been deposited in the bare veld [fields], in

¹⁵⁰ http://andrewneaum.com/articles/56-Returning_to_Zimbabwe_1&2&3etc.htm [accessed 16:05 08/11/2020].

¹⁵¹ Roy Henson ‘A Report on the Protected Villages?’ 31st December 1975 in NAZ MS 589/7/2.

¹⁵² The following passage from Matthew 25: 34-50 (New King James Version) features in the main exhibit at the Salvation Army’s International Heritage Centre, Denmark Hill, London which the author visited in April 2018: Matthew 25: 34-50 (New King James Version) “[34]Then the King will say to those on His right hand, ‘Come, you blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: [35] for I was hungry and you gave Me food; I was thirsty and you gave Me drink; I was a stranger and you took Me in; [36] I was naked and you clothed Me; I was sick and you visited Me; I was in prison and you came to Me.’ [37] “Then the righteous will answer Him, saying, ‘Lord, when did we see You hungry and feed *You*, or thirsty and give *You* drink? [38] When did we see You a stranger and take *You* in, or naked and clothe *You*? [39] Or when did we see You sick, or in prison, and come to You?’ [40] And -the King will answer and say to them, ‘Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did *it* to one of the least of these My brethren, you did *it* to Me.’ answer and say to them, ‘Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did *it* to one of the least of these My brethren, you did *it* to Me”.

some areas without shelter, water or adequate sanitation".¹⁵³ Indeed, the Salvation Army played an important role in making the facts known regarding the conditions in the protected villages and, in this regard their local connections were indispensable. In September 1974, Oxfam's Field Director, Colin McKone was able gain access to a Protected Village in Chiweshe (which was otherwise a restricted zone) via the local connections of the Salvation Army's Colonel Ron Cox and the Canadian medical missionary Captain (Dr) James Watt who facilitated a tour of the district. Officially the PVs remained out of bounds, but the party contrived access, being led in by one of the African guards who doubtlessly was familiar with the Salvation Army officers. Indeed, McKone acknowledged that the guard had saluted upon recognizing Cox's and Atwell's uniform.¹⁵⁴ This is an indication of the tacit recognition of the work played by (white) Salvation Army personnel in the PVs by members of the Security Forces. The touring party had to remain out of sight of the command post at the centre as they had not obtained permission to be there from the Keep Commander.¹⁵⁵ McKone's ability able to conduct two tours of the ostensibly restricted PVs in Chiweshe in September 1974 was only possible through using Salvation Army networks. It was these tours which provided Oxfam and the British government with their first factual reports regarding the villagization programme. From then on, there was regular correspondence between the Salvation Army and Oxfam regarding the policy and, as will be shown later, the Rhodesia Territory of the Church received considerable financial and material contributions from Oxfam for their relief programme in the PVs.

¹⁵³ *The Rhodesia Herald* 31st July 1974 in BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'protected villages 'at Chiweshe' (1974).

¹⁵⁴ C.E McKone 'Tour Report- Colin McKone Visit to Rhodesia on Monday/Tuesday 2nd to 3rd September, BNA, FCO 36/1645,

¹⁵⁵ C.E McKone 'Tour Report- Colin McKone Visit to Rhodesia on Monday/Tuesday 2nd to 3rd September, BNA, FCO 36/1645.

Despite the close proximity (shown earlier) of its leadership with the regime, the evidence referred to here and throughout this section reveals that the Salvation Army played an important intermediary role between various parties, including the UK government and a British NGO, Oxfam, in their humanitarian response to strategic resettlement. The Church, however, still maintained a working relationship with the Rhodesian regime. As we will see in the next chapter, this somewhat ambiguous position was also taken by the inter-denominational Christian Care.

During the war Captain (Dr) James Watt sent a series of photographs to Oxfam that visualised the conditions inside PVs. The pictures *inter alia* portrayed malnourished children at Howard Hospital in Chiweshe during the process of rehabilitation in “an area formerly not noted for severe malnutrition”.¹⁵⁶ The children’s enlarged abdomens reflect a major symptom of kwashiorkor, a form of severe protein deficiency. In fact, by 1977 45% of the children in Chiweshe were undernourished and severely underweight with many either on or below the third centile.¹⁵⁷ The photographs illustrate a particular paediatric concern of the Salvation Army’s work in the Protected Villages and they are affected by a wider humanitarian discourse of the 1970s. Thus, the photograph captioned ‘Biafra Rhodesia’ drew parallels between the plight of the malnourished children of the Rhodesian conflict and the starvation in Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). Thus, the Salvation Army drew on the trope of the starving African child which was a key feature of media and NGO representations of the Biafra conflict. Watt’s caption suggests how this trope was used to convey the dire consequences of forced villagisation on African children. A subsequent photograph, taken in August 1977 by the Salvation Army, was captioned ‘children playing while mothers work’ and illustrates the absenteeism of parents of child inmates of the PVs who were left to their own devices during

¹⁵⁶ ‘Biafra Rhodesia’ (Photograph) in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

¹⁵⁷ ‘Photographs, August 1977’ in Oxford Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 2 = Box 975.

the day while their mothers were away working in the fields, now much further away from their homes than was the case prior to resettlement.¹⁵⁸

We should not lose sight of the dangers of taking and disseminating such photographs. Oxfam's Overseas Director M.R Harris stressed to the UK's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the confidentiality of the Salvation Army reports provided in order to safeguard the relief operations in the PVs in which Oxfam was now involved. Concerns were raised regarding the backlash Salvation Army personnel could face if such reports were publicised. Publicity was also not given to the Oxfam grants secretly provided to the Salvation Army for work in the PVs, because the Church's Doctor Watt was shortly coming on leave to the UK and there was a fear that – given the Rhodesians' hostility to Oxfam – such information might result in his being banned from returning to Rhodesia.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, Oxfam's Assistant Field Director, Jeremy Swainson, made it clear that the photographs provided should not be publicised since cameras were officially forbidden in operational areas by the Security Forces.¹⁶⁰ The need for secrecy was paramount: even in the classified correspondence with the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Watt was anonymised.¹⁶¹

Such concerns were not unfounded: as shown in the previous chapter, members of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) had been arrested and deported by the regime for disseminating factual reports regarding strategic resettlement.

However, as we will see below Watt's involvement in the humanitarian efforts, especially the nutritional education programmes, received favourable publicity in the pro-

¹⁵⁸ Children Playing while mothers work', August 1977 (photograph) in Oxford Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 2 = Box 975.

¹⁵⁹ Letter from M.R Harris (Overseas Director) to David Ennals, July 30th, 1975 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974. Hereafter this will be referred to as 'Harris to Ennals, 30 July 1975: Oxfam PRF Rho 40, Vol 1 = Box 40'

¹⁶⁰ 'Letter from Jeremy Swainson to Miss Bernadette Prat 21st July 1975' in Oxford, Bodleian M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974. Hereafter after this will be referred as: 'Swainson to Prat, 21st July 1975: Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974'.

¹⁶¹ C.E McKone and J.J Swinson Tour Report 16th to 22nd September 1974 in BNA, FCO 36/1645.

regime media., a hint of how the Salvation Army's role was viewed as functional to the strategic resettlement programme. Indeed, the state-supporting press could refer to strenuous efforts being taken by the Salvation Army, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to combat the villagers' health and social problems.¹⁶² Watt also contributed to the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign's publication *Food For Your Family* and, as detailed in the survey chapter, this presented something of a racial discourse surrounding malnutrition in the Protected Villages (PVs), one that blamed the child victims' parents for the nutritional deficiencies.¹⁶³ But there is no doubt that Watt played an important role in a survey of Chiweshe conducted by final year social medicine students from the University of Rhodesia who were investigating malnutrition, other childhood diseases and the sociological effects of life in a Protected Village.¹⁶⁴ Thus, whatever the Salvation Army's work with the regime, Watt sought to present a factual account of malnutrition in the PVs and this became an important focus of the Salvation Army's relief efforts. Indeed, it was the Salvation Army (with some assistance from World Vision, the American Christian organisation) who were preeminent amongst Protestant Churches in investigating conditions in Chiweshe's PVs and disseminating reports regarding them. This was the essential precondition for the Church's practical humanitarian intervention in the PVs to which this chapter will now turn.

Some of the Salvation Army's most important work in response to strategic resettlement in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land took place in the Mazoe District. Starting in response to Operation Overload August 1974, the Salvation Army established soup kitchens via Howard Hospital. At same time they sought to purchase plastic sheeting in the hope of providing some form of protective roofing, at least for mothers and children in the temporary shelters.¹⁶⁵ From

¹⁶² *The Sunday Mail*, 27th February 1977 in NAZ MS 308.

¹⁶³ The Nutrition Council of the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign, *Food for Family*, (Salisbury, 1974).

¹⁶⁴ *The Sunday Mail* 6th March 1977, NAZ MS 308.

¹⁶⁵ Letter from Colonel Frank W. Hutchins (Salvation Army) to Miss Bernardette Prat (Oxfam), 9th August 1974 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

the outset Oxfam rendered significant material support via the Salvation Army to those forcibly relocated in Chiweshe with it being reported that “Oxfam was the first and...only overseas donor to respond to the situation[in Chiweshe] ... so far”.¹⁶⁶ The £2,500 the Church received from Oxfam was spent entirely on blankets.¹⁶⁷ In October 1974 Oxfam approved a grant to cover the cost of clearly very rudimentary housing for 20 people in each PV. This amounted to providing for 420 houses across the Chiweshe district at a cost of R\$25.00 per house. It also approved a grant for Howard Hospital which would cover the increased costs of that facility.¹⁶⁸ This was crucial, given that Howard Hospital was the lynchpin of the Salvation Army’s relief programme in Chiweshe TTL. However, with the onset of the war, the hospital’s resources were quickly overwhelmed, and it was soon operating at 200% capacity: a report had identified the need for a “mobile medical service not only to provide assistance to areas without a clinic but to treat people in order to relieve the pressure on Howard Hospital”.¹⁶⁹ Mobile medical provision was therefore desperately needed, and it became the focus of Oxfam’s financial and material support for the Salvation Army’s relief programme to the victims of strategic resettlement in Chiweshe TTL.

It was estimated that the total monthly cost for running the mobile clinic – including transport, staff, medicines, but excluding accommodation – were R\$1085. Other costs including R\$6 500 for the accommodation of a nurse and a medical assistant.¹⁷⁰ As mentioned, the Salvation Army received vital support from Oxfam in order to run the mobile medical

¹⁶⁶ C.E Mckone Tour Report 2nd to 3rd September 1974 in BNA, FCO 36/1645.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Oxfam: Application for Grant Over £5000 (From The Salvation Army via Interdenominational Committee of the Heads of Churches) 13/8/1974 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

¹⁶⁹ C.E Mckone and J.J Swinson ‘Report on Chiweshe and Other Affected Areas in Rhodesia- 16th- 22nd September 1974’ in BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) ‘Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to ‘Protected Villages’ in Chiweshe’ (1974).

¹⁷⁰ Calculated from figures in ‘Proposed Mobile Clinic Visits in Chiweshe and Madziwa, Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

provision. By April 1975 Oxfam had already spent a total of R\$12.996 on the project which included the provision of vehicles and medical supplies.¹⁷¹

The Salvation Army envisaged a systematic medical outreach programme which would minister to the needs of the victims of strategic resettlement in Chiweshe and Madziwa. In Chiweshe, it was planned that a medical unit would travel up the eastern border of the reserve on a Thursday, staying overnight at Keep 1 or 2 and then proceed along the western border on a Friday. Once a month a doctor would visit various clinics held at PVs remote from Howard Hospital. Every two weeks the unit would also hold clinics at the lower end of the reserve. It was envisaged that the unit would pass through most Protected Villages once a week and hold a clinic every 3-4 weeks.¹⁷² The same mobile medical unit would service neighbouring Madziwa, visiting its PVs earlier in the week on Mondays and Tuesdays, staying over at Chihuti (Keep 9) or the Bradley Institute (Keep 5) for this purpose.¹⁷³

It was projected that 50,000 people in Chiweshe and 20,000 in Madziwa, the approximate number of people in the protected villages in the area, would benefit from the mobile medical provision, especially as the majority of people lived more than five miles from any clinic and money for bus fares and medical fees were in short supply since an already impoverished population had just been subjected to the economic dislocation of the forced removals. Mobile clinics would not only provide on-the-spot treatment for the sick but also infant clinics and transport for the elderly to the nearest hospital.¹⁷⁴ It was also intended that Salvation Army staff and students would - gain experience in “grass-roots community

¹⁷¹ Calculated from figures in ‘Proposed Mobile Clinic Visits in Chiweshe and Madziwa, Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ ‘Proposed Mobile Clinic Visits to Chiweshe and Madziwa: Answers to Questionnaire’ in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

medicine”. In each village they were to train people as “Health Scouts” who could give first aid and find those malnourished or ill.¹⁷⁵

It should be noted that if, in Chiweshe, the Salvation Army dominated the provision of medical services with the state supplementing this, the position was reversed in Madziwa. It was intended that government run clinics would provide most of the medical services there. However, Salvation Army medical support was necessitated by the deficiencies of the government run clinics. Yet it was only during 1977 that the Salvation Army were being allowed into Madziwa as the local District Commissioner (DC) insisted that there was no need for additional medical intervention as the people were allegedly ‘healthy’ and were attending the government-run council clinics. But the Salvation Army reported that, during a visit to a council clinic, they had seen many cases of hepatitis, gangrene, heart failure, general fungal infection and that patients had been unable to get sufficient treatment as they were unable to afford the fees.¹⁷⁶ They therefore proposed that their mobile clinic would charge merely a small fee which would be subsidised via an Oxfam grant at a cost of around R\$500, 00 per month. World Vision also provided drugs for the programme.¹⁷⁷ Those unable to pay this fee were treated for free at the discretion of local ministers and teachers. Just over one in ten patients were treated free of charge.¹⁷⁸ The Ministry of Health however, accused the Salvation Army of treating people for free, probably an expression of their discomfort at charging the impoverished patients: in the government-run clinics in two PVs in Madziwa between 20 to 30c per visit.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ ‘Proposed Mobile Clinic Visits to Chiweshe and Madziwa: Answers to Questionnaire’ in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

¹⁷⁶ Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan August 1977 in Oxford, Bodleian Library M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan August 1977 in Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

¹⁷⁹ Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan August 1977 in Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

From a practical point of view there were, however, delays with getting the mobile medical provision underway. (Prior to the establishment of the mobile medical units, Captain (Dr) Watt had already been sending out an ambulance where possible.) There were delays with the arrival of the Landrover needed to start the project, presumably due to the shortages attendant upon the war and economic sanctions. Initially the unit would focus on curative (as opposed to preventative) work, especially typhoid control, and it was hoped that ultimately permanent clinics would be established.¹⁸⁰ Until then, the mobile facility would be crucial, and its work was described with pride in the Salvation Army publication *All the World*:

The hospital does not end at the gate. At least four days a week Sister Chitengu and her staff climb in the mobile clinic with its pre-packed medicines and vaccines and jolt over the dirty roads to bring medical care to the protected villages in two tribal areas Chiweshe (our own) and Madziwa (nearby). The vehicle is protected against landmines and drives somewhat like an old Sherman tank. But it provides a much needed and much appreciated service.¹⁸¹

For the Salvation Army Territorial Commander, Richard Atwell, the “mobile clinic had been a great asset making it possible for Captain (Dr.) Watt and the hospital staff to deliver medical services to those who would otherwise be neglected”.¹⁸² However, early on there were limitations due to the overwhelming patient load at Howard Hospital which limited the staff available for staffing the mobile clinics. During this early stage, priority was given to villages where there known cases of severe malnutrition, typhoid and other serious illnesses. Treatment (where possible) was given on the spot, and those who were extremely ill were taken to Howard Hospital. On these visits high protein milk powder was also distributed during these visits.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Letter from Jeremy Swainson to Miss Bernadette Prat 21st July 1975 in Oxford, Bodleian M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974.

¹⁸¹ Captain (Dr) James Watt ‘Healing and Training in Rhodesia’ in *All the World*: January- March 1978, Vol.23, No.1.

¹⁸² Letter from Richard Atwell (Territorial Commander , Rhodesia Territory) to Oxfam Field Director 25th March 1975 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

¹⁸³ Atwell to Oxfam Field Director, Oxfam PR PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974’.

Later the villages were divided into four groups, with each group visited every fortnight. The ill in a PV not visited in a given week could, if they were able to move, access medical treatment at a nearby PV where a mobile medical unit was calling, sometimes, the mobile unit would be positioned between villages.¹⁸⁴ 3 or 4 clinics were held per day per day. The medical practitioners regularly staffing the clinic included Dr Watt, Professor Rees (from Salisbury) and a staff nurse from Howard Hospital. At a later point, mobile clinics specifically for infants were established and some home visiting was undertaken. It was reported that the local response was good, and this was attributed to the free nature of the service in Chiweshe.. Shortly after the establishment of the mobile unit, it was reported that there was no shortage of medical supplies except for measles vaccine and high protein milk powder, the distribution of which was at this point the responsibility of others.¹⁸⁵

Logistical problems however posed a serious issue to the Salvation Army's mobile medical provision. In September 1975 it was noted that the vehicle on which it depended had a few minor breakdowns and had recently met with an accident in Chiweshe and was in for repair. Moreover, due to the ongoing guerrilla warfare personnel occasionally refused to go to certain areas of the reserve although the clinic largely carried out its work unhindered and was accepted by the local population.¹⁸⁶ By the end of 1976, the mobile medical unit was beset by mechanical issues which limited its coverage of Chiweshe's PVs. Oxfam provided financial assistance for a new vehicle.¹⁸⁷ It allowed the mobile medical unit to visit each protected village in Chiweshe and hold a clinic every 2-3 weeks. Aside from this, they also passed through or near each village for emergencies on a weekly basis. The impact was considerable: it was soon

¹⁸⁴ Atwell to Oxfam Field Director, Oxfam PR PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974'.

¹⁸⁵ Letter from Jeremy Swainson to Miss Bernadette Prat 21st July 1975 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

¹⁸⁶ Letter from Richard Atwell (Salvation Army) to Jeremy Swainson 17th September 1975 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 040 Vol. 1 = Box 974.

¹⁸⁷ Grant/ Loan Application Summary Form 22nd July 1976, in Oxford, Bodleian Library M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

reported that in the Chiweshe district measles had been nearly eliminated and whooping cough had notably reduced in frequency. In two months between May and June 1977, the mobile medical teams had travelled a total of 4510 km, treated 1925 sick patients, saw 410 malnourished children, and gave 888 measles vaccinations for those who had not received it the previous year.¹⁸⁸ Table 1 indicates the number of visits made by the mobile medical units between May and July 1977 and reveal the degree to which the Salvation Army were able to implement a successful mobile medical programme in the protected villages. The programme was only made unworkable once the guerrillas forced the Salvation Army personnel to leave Chiweshe following the aforementioned decision of that organization to leave the World Council of Churches because of its opposition to white rule. There followed the complete breakdown of the mobile medical provision in the area as safe passage through mined roads could no longer be guaranteed.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan August 1977 in Oxford, Bodleian Library M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

¹⁸⁹ Major (Dr) Jim Watt, 'World Council Decision and its Effect on Zimbabwean Salvationists', The Salvation Army International Heritage Centre, ZIM 1/2.

Table 1 Howard Hospital- Mobile Clinic Visits For May, June, July 1977.

Month	No. Treatments Mondays	Keep (Protected Village)	No. Immunisations Tuesday	Keep	No. Treatments Thursdays	Keep	No. Immunizations Friday	Keep
May	2	Nyakudya (Keep 11)	3	Chigwida (Keep 4) Chinohasha(Keep 5)	5	Rwere (Keep 6) Madombwe (Keep 7)	6	Bare (Keep 1)
	9	Mukozongi, (Keep 8)	10	Shutu (Keep 14) Bell Rock (Keep 16)	12	Gungwe (Keep 10)	13	Kanghukahamwe (Keep 18) Gweshe (20)
	16	Muchirikuenda Keep 12	17	Kakora (Keep 15) Kanyemba (Keep 17)	19	Jingamavura (Keep 2) Chaona (keep 3)	20	Gungwe (Keep 10) Nzimbo (Keep 13)
	23	Chigwida (Keep 4) Chinohasha (Keep 5)	24	Mukodzongi (Keep 8) Shopo (Keep 9)	26	Bare (Keep 1)	27	Rwere (Keep 6) Madombwe (Keep 7)
	30	Shutu (Keep 14) Bell Rock (Keep 16)	31	Nyakudya (Keep 11) Muchirikuena (Keep 12)	2	Gungwe (Keep 10) Nzimbo (Keep 13)	3	Jingamavura (Keep 2) Chaona (Keep 3)

June	6	Madziwa	7	Chigwida (Keep 4) Chinohasha(Keep 5)	9	Madziwa	10	Bare (Keep 1)
	13	Mukodzongi (Keep 8) Shopo (Keep 9)	14	Shutu (Keep 14) Bell Rock (Keep 16)	16	Rwere (Keep 6) Madombwe (Keep 7)	17	Gungwe (Keep 10) Nzimbo (Keep 13)
	20	Nyakudya (Keep 11) Muchirikuena (Keep 12)	21	Kakora (Keep 15) Kanyemba (Keep 17)	23	Jingamavura (Keep 2) Chaona (Keep 3)	24	Kanghukahamwe (Keep 18) Gweshe (20)
July	27	Chigwida (Keep 4) Chinohasha (Keep 5)	28	Mukodzongi (Keep 8) Shopo (Keep 9)	30	Bare (Keep 1)	1	Rwere (Keep 6) Madombwe (Keep 7)
	4	Shutu (Keep 14) Bell Rock (Keep 16)	5	Nyakudya (Keep 11) Muchirikuena (Keep 12)	7	Gungwe (Keep 10) Nzimbo (Keep 13)	8	Jingamavura (Keep 2) Chaona (Keep 3)

Alongside its mobile medical provision, the Salvation Army also established a nutritional rehabilitation centre in Chiweshe. Howard Hospital was site of a pilot scheme which became known as the 'Nutritional Village' to combat malnutrition in the protected villages). For the Salvation Army tackling child malnutrition became an important focus of the relief efforts during the Zimbabwean Liberation War. Indeed, as shown earlier, infant malnutrition was a major problem, and it was reported that it affected between 20 to 40 percent of children in Chiweshe.¹⁹⁰ The Church's nutritional programme provided high protein foods suitable for infants and also had a focus on training in nutrition for mothers and child health workers.¹⁹⁴ The foods were distributed both at Howard Hospital and in the 'protected villages'.¹⁹⁵ For this programme, the Salvation Army had received considerable support from World Vision, an American Evangelical organization that provided funds for feeding malnourished children in Howard Hospital.¹⁹¹ The foods were distributed both at Howard Hospital and in the 'protected villages'.¹⁹² For this programme, the Salvation Army had received considerable support from World Vision, an American Evangelical organization that provided funds for feeding malnourished children in Howard Hospital.¹⁹³

The nutritional rehabilitation centre at Howard served an important practical need for the Salvation Army as Howard Hospital itself was simply not in a position to accommodate malnourished children as capacity and staff shortages were compounded by the escalating war and the villagisation strategy: in April 1976 it was reported that, the nutritional village had had 50 mothers and 267 children in for periods of up to 3 weeks. The centre, aside from providing

¹⁹⁰ Captain (Dr) James Watt, 'A Village with Vision', *All the World*, Vol.22 No.5 January to March 1977.

¹⁹¹ Major (Dr) Jim Watt, 'World Council Decision and its Effect on Zimbabwean Salvationists', *ZIM* 1/2.

¹⁹² The Salvation Army – Zimbabwe Rhodesia and Malawi Territory 'Refugees in Zimbabwe Rhodesia' (1979) in *ZIM* 1/2.

¹⁹³ World Vision had pledged R\$79,000 to help malnourished children and treat related diseases see *The Sunday Mail*, 27th February 1977.

food, aimed to teach nutritional education, hygiene, breast-feeding, family spacing, and immunization.¹⁹⁴

This was in keeping with Watt's citing ignorance, diet, and poverty as the some of the main causes of malnutrition amongst the first 250 patients who had been admitted to the nutritional centre, as also his assertion that the biggest challenge in the centre was teaching the people the necessity of adequate calorific intake.¹⁹⁵ Yet in this analysis of malnutrition, he made no attempt to highlight the disruptive impact of strategic resettlement as the main cause of food insecurity in the PVs in which low calorific intake and poor diet were a clear symptom not a cause. It is not surprising that Watt's view of the causes of malnutrition amongst those forcibly resettled featured prominently in the *Sunday Mail*, a pro regime newspaper. As a leading medical authority, his analysis could be used to support to the official discourse sketched earlier in this dissertation which blamed the victims of strategic resettlement for its results.

At the same it must be noted that the Salvation Army was acutely aware of the clear link between material deprivation caused by Rhodesian counter insurgency and malnutrition in Chiweshe as the enforced villagisation policy was implemented there. Their own reports noted that as well as children, the elderly were also suffering from malnutrition and sometimes dying from starvation. The place of the war in the was clear: thus, the Hwenge family which the Salvation Army tried to support lost its male head to malnutrition in Howard Hospital, while his wife was also suffering from this. Their household was clearly unable to manage due to loss of cattle needed for ploughing due to the communal fines.¹⁹⁶ Elsewhere it was noted that crops had been mostly lost to cattle and baboons as people were not allowed out of the PVs until late

¹⁹⁴ *The Sunday Mail*, 27th February 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁹⁵ *The Sunday Mail*, 6th March 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁹⁶ Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan August 1977 in Oxford, Bodleian Library M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

morning due to the overnight curfew.¹⁹⁷ The Salvation Army provided preschool feeding groups in the Protected Villages who were providing supplementary feeding whilst their mothers worked in the fields.¹⁹⁸ Yet, even with this scheme in place, such was the scale of the problem that the Salvation Army was far from tackling malnutrition in the PVs. Indeed, Watt felt that ultimately, the widespread problem could only be dealt with on the cessation of hostilities.¹⁹⁹ Ultimately, in the context of the grave disruption attendant upon the war and strategic resettlement, the nutritional village had limited success: one report suggests that 7-10% of people treated there died after leaving.²⁰⁰

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As implied in much of the preceding analysis, the Salvation Army collaborated with the white minority government in its medical relief programme. The Church's mobile medical provision was carried out under the guidance of the Ministry of Health who supervised the Salvation Army clinics which were to be located within the overall health plan for the area. Due to shortages of government medical workers, the project was beneficial to the authorities and there were cordial relations between the local Salvation Army and the Ministry of Health, with the Salvation Army emphasizing that it would co-operate with government employed health visitors and agricultural advisors.²⁰¹ The Church thus buttressed the authorities' medical provision in Chiweshe and Madziwa. Indirectly, it therefore in a sense supported local counterinsurgency strategy here, by supporting what the state provided to the victims of strategic resettlement. Indeed, the Salvation Army was sufficiently close to the regime to opine that if its mobile medical units were replaced by clinics run by the local authorities, a

¹⁹⁷ Roy Henson Emergency Relief Committee: Report on the Protected Villages, April 1976 in NAZ MS 591/2/2.

¹⁹⁸ Eleanor O'Gorman, *The Front Line Runs Through Every Women: Women & Local Resistance in the Zimbabwean Liberation War*, (Harare,2011), p.115.

¹⁹⁹ *The Sunday Mail*, March 6th 1977, NAZ 'Newspapers'.

²⁰⁰ Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan August 1977 in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

²⁰¹ 'Proposed Mobile Clinic Visits to Chiweshe and Madziwa: Answers to Questionnaire'.

supervisory role played by the Church would in all likelihood lead to it receiving a government grant. In fact, the Salvation Army's mobile medical units received a mileage grant (10c per mile) from the government.²⁰² What is more, the project was viewed by the authorities as part of an integrated health program which was linked to an agricultural development program in the protected villages which included a 'butchery in the backyard scheme' and improvements to garden plots.²⁰³ State and Church thus worked together: hence the Salvation Army and the Ministry of Health together sought to improve sanitary conditions in Chiweshe's PVs and the Ministry assisted with the Salvation Army's vaccination drive.²⁰⁴

At the same time, we must not lose sight of the Salvation Army's relations with the guerrillas. As we have seen earlier, there was sometimes a degree of co-operation between the mobile medical teams and the guerrillas - for example, in the information given regarding the location of land mines. There were also instances where the Salvation Army was coerced into providing medical supplies or treatment. This was a reason for the regime's controls over medicines given to patients.²⁰⁵ In the end, however, the guerrillas made the Salvation Army's work in the PVs dangerous and even impossible, with, many of the Church's personnel been driven out of Chiweshe by the guerrillas in 1978. The African communities in the PVs suffered not merely from strategic resettlement but from the landmines and guerrilla ambushes that disrupted assistance to the victims of malnutrition.²⁰⁶

The nature of the Salvation Army relief programme also changed as the guerrillas launched regular attacks against the PVs towards the end of the war. Many of the inmates fled to the capital Salisbury (Harare), while others went (or were forced) across the border to

²⁰² 'Proposed Mobile Clinic Visits to Chiweshe and Madziwa: Answers to Questionnaire'.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Major (Dr) Jim Watt 'World Council Decision and its Effect on Zimbabwean Salvationists', ZIM 1/2.

²⁰⁵ Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan August 1977 in Oxford, Bodleian Library M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

²⁰⁶ *The Sunday Mail*, 27th February 1977.

Mozambique or Zambia into the refugee camps run by ZANU and ZAPU respectively. In 1979, Salvation Army Officers in the field in the Mount Darwin district reported that five PVs had been burned to the ground by the guerrillas and up to 500 families were exposed to severe cold weather without shelter, food, clothing, bedding and drugs of any kind. The children and elderly were left in a particularly vulnerable position. The Church's Territorial Headquarters spent nearly R\$5,000 of their emergency relief fund on supplies of blankets to combat the severe winter. Nearly 1,000 bundles of clothing were prepared in different sizes and then distributed to refugees in Salisbury and to the burnt-out keeps in the Mount Darwin and Bindura areas. With the assistance of Christian Care, they opened a supply depot in the area. The Salvation Army increasingly focused on rendering assistance to the displaced persons in Salisbury where it distributed food rations to around 10,000 refugees in conjunction with Christian Care and World Vision.²⁰⁷ The Salvation Army would continue to minister to the physical and spiritual needs of those displaced by the guerrilla war following independence.²⁰⁸

Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has shown how the prior history of the Protestant churches – the degree to which they supported or opposed the white settler state, and the degree to which their leadership remained white-dominated – dictated a particular orientation to strategic resettlement. The United Methodists led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa were hostile to the policy and played a key role in dismantling the system. Other denominations that were white led were either supportive or very supportive including the Salvation Army and the Anglican Church respectively, which it has been argued became somewhat functional to the enforced villagisation. From this we can observe a spectrum of denominational relations with the

²⁰⁷ 'Refugees in Zimbabwe Rhodesia', ZIM 1/2.

²⁰⁸ Captain Valma Ray, 'Lost in Zimbabwe- Rhodesia' in *All the World*, Vol.24, No.2, April- June 1980.

Rhodesian state. Secondly, this chapter has shown how the respective geographies of each denomination dictated a particular response to strategic resettlement including the nature and extent of their humanitarian relief programme in the Protected Villages. The Salvation Army had the most significant articulation with strategic resettlement because of the geographical location of their membership in an area (Chiweshe) particularly affected by enforced villagisation. The Anglicans and Methodists (particularly the Wesleyan Methodists) played a much more limited role in these relief efforts, again depending upon the geographical location of their adherents. Nevertheless, all had to relate to the humanitarian issues thrown up by the process, necessitating a coming together under the aegis of Christian Care to offer some support to those victimised. The role of Christian Care, and its Emergency Relief Committee which brought together churches (including the Catholics) with radically different orientations to the regime to meet the dire emergency, is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Christian Care, Oxfam and Strategic Resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War

The previous chapters on the Catholic and Protestant relationship to strategic resettlement have revealed a great variety of responses and attitudes to the settler regime and its counterinsurgency strategy, ranging from strongly oppositional to supportive. Notwithstanding the different stances of the various Churches, however, their Christian ethos and mission presence in the war zones demanded – to varying degrees – a practical response to the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding because of the war, including the crisis resulting from what befell the rural population as it was subjected to strategic resettlement, whatever the view of a given Church to that policy. How, given the divisions between the denominations and their contrasting views of the regime, could they come together to meet the crisis? The answer was to be found in the creation of the inter-denominational Christian Care. This was the organisation that allowed various Churches with their differing stances nevertheless to cooperate with one another in their humanitarian response to strategic resettlement. At the same time, as a ‘neutral’ organisation in a country subjected to international sanctions, it also became a means by which external opponents of strategic resettlement including, as we shall see, Oxfam and the British government could aid its victims and circumvent the sanctions regime. In this sense Christian Care became a space where various organisations with conflicting or even radically different views regarding the policies of the Rhodesian state could operate.

During the war Christian Care and Oxfam, the latter with the agreement of the British Government, came together to launch an extensive relief programme in the Protected Villages (PVs). Christian Care had a necessarily ambiguous relationship with the settler regime. It

deliberately did not engage directly with the political aspects of the war since it would not have been allowed by the regime to operate effectively had it done so; instead, it prioritised the welfare needs of war victims. Indeed, as we will see, in their response to strategic resettlement. Christian Care and Oxfam acted as intermediaries for various parties concerned with the war: Christian Care did this in two ways: for various Churches with respect to the Rhodesian Government; for the British government and international organisations seeking to provide aid to the victims of strategic resettlement. Oxfam, meanwhile, acted as something of an intermediary for the British government. Through both bodies, humanitarian aid could be provided by international actors who were unable to directly render assistance to the victims of strategic resettlement due to the sanctions regime.

If Oxfam acted as a surrogate for the British government, Christian Care acted as something of a surrogate for Oxfam which developed a close relationship with Christian Care as the former sought to establish an appropriate channel for its financial and material assistance to the victims of strategic resettlement. In fact, Christian Care became the means by which international NGOs could render assistance to the victims of strategic resettlement whilst eliminating the risk to their own relief personnel. What made Christian Care so effective was that it collaborated with the rural missions of all Churches that had a direct interface with the inmates of PVs and such missions could then be utilized to distribute the needed supplies within the PVs. Moreover, as we shall see, Christian Care sometimes intervened to ensure that the rural missions were able to continue their own operations in the PVs. Aside from this, Christian Care's relationship with Oxfam and other organizations illuminates a largely unknown history of NGO work amongst those who had been subjected to enforced villagisation during the Zimbabwean Liberation War.

The Origins of Christian Care

Christian Care emerged in 1967 from the inter-denominational Christian Council of Rhodesia (CCR). The CCR itself was formed in 1964 by leaders of various denominations including the Anglican, Catholic and United Methodist Churches in response to increasing racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia.¹ Probably because of this stance regarding discrimination, the regime quickly became suspicious of the welfare activities of the CCR which, it argued, did not fall under its definition of Christian work.² This was the context in which Christian Care was set up by the various churches in 1967, being careful to be politically neutral and officially registering itself as an autonomous welfare organization under the Welfare Act (1966).³ This independence was particularly important to the humanitarian work of Christian Care as the CCR itself came to strongly criticise the Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy during the war, challenging the Indemnity and Compensation Act, political detentions, the execution of guerrilla fighters, and the villagization programme.⁴ This would have made any relief work undertaken by it in the war zones deeply suspect to the regime. In fact, Christian Care's emergence as a separate organization enabled humanitarian programmes to be carried out "without the danger of political attacks on specific churches".⁵ Christian Care therefore kept a distance from the explicitly oppositional stance of the CCR. Indeed, at the height of the war it gave preference to an independent humanitarian programme, in the context of an increasingly tense social and political situation in Rhodesia.⁶ Any close association with the

¹ Norman E. Thomas, 'Church and State in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 1985), pp.121-22.

² Ibid.

³ Report of the Work of Christian Care 1974-1975' in National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter this will be referred to as NAZ), MS 589/6/5.

⁴ Carl F. Hallencreutz 'A Council in the Crossfire: ZCC 1964-1980' in Carl F. Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo (eds.) *Church and State in Zimbabwe* (Gweru, 1988), p.90.

⁵ Erica Bornstein, *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe* (New York, 2005), p.12.

⁶ Hallencreutz and Moyo, *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, pp.96-7.

CCR would have affected the image of Christian Care in the eyes of the regime and would have had a detrimental impact on the ability of Christian Care to carry out its relief work during the war which often required access to restricted zones.

Two features of Christian Care's pre-war work oriented it towards the victims of strategic resettlement: its focus on rural welfare and its work with detainees. Before the war proper began, rural development work was one of the organization's principal concerns, given the condition and poverty of the peasantry in the Tribal Trust Lands.⁷ In Mashonaland, Christian Care focused on training and land utilization schemes including a "butchery in the back yard" project and tractor provisioning, for example. In Matabeleland, projects responded to the persistent droughts in the region, so water conservation and irrigation became the focus of schemes in the province along with youth training workshops.⁸ These rural development schemes would provide a link to the areas that would later be swept by strategic resettlement in the war.

In addition to its pre-war rural development work, Christian Care was preeminent in rendering emergency aid to political detainees, supplying them and their families with relief supplies, educational grants, and legal aid.⁹ Between 1967 and 1971, it was ministering to 400 detainees per year.¹⁰ This work increased with the rise in the number of political detentions with the onset of the war.¹¹ It is important to note that in order to carry out this work, Christian Care had to co-operate to some extent with the regime, even just to access classified information including names of detainees, information which was denied the public.¹² This

⁷ 'Report of the Work of Christian Care 1974-1975' in NAZ, MS 589/6/5.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Thomas, 'Church and State in Zimbabwe', pp.126-7.

¹⁰ 'Christian Care: General Information January 1979' in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹¹ 'Christian Care Report, 9th April 1975' in NAZ MS 308/6/5.

¹² Mr Mansfield to Mr Laver, 9th May 1977', The British National Archives (Hereafter this will be referred to as the BNA) FCO 36/2066: Aid to Rhodesia Africans in Rhodesia: Policy (1977).

work with detainees was not without its problems: the regime considered that there was a fine line between assisting detainees and their dependants and ‘assisting terrorists’, and some Christian Care officials were in fact detained by the regime.¹³ In this precarious situation, a formally neutral stance was therefore of paramount importance to ensure Christian Care could continue with its work, particularly in the face of growing state repression during the war. For this reason, it tended to offer a critique of the oppressions attendant upon the war privately, although the organization clearly viewed political detention and the villagisation programme as one and the same.¹⁴ It referred to those in the protected villages as ‘inmates’ and saw the villages as “concentration camps”.¹⁵ In fact, there was a clear overlap between political detention and villagization during the war. Firstly, many of the detainees’ families were relocated to the PVs.¹⁶ Moreover, upon release many of the ex-political detainees themselves were confined in them.¹⁷ What is more, the rising political tension and resistance attendant upon the implementation of strategic resettlement saw a rise of political detention. In Chiweshe, for example, 313 people were detained for this reason.¹⁸

Christian Care became preminent in the relief efforts in the PVs not merely through its links to the rural population through its development projects and its welfare work with detainees, but also due to the limitations of the initial Christian humanitarian intervention of the Interdenominational Committee (the I.D Committee) in the PVs. The Committee was formed in September 1974 and comprised leaders from the Anglicans, Catholics, Methodists

¹³ Mansfield to Laver, 9th May 1977’, BNA, FCO 36/2066.

¹⁴ “Rev S.K. Maguni (National Relief Office) Christian Care Relief Officers Report AGM” (1978) in NAZ MS 589/7/2.

¹⁵ ‘Report of the Work of Christian Care 1974-1975’, NAZ MS 589/6/5.

¹⁶ Roy Henson, ‘Emergency Relief Committee: Report on the Protected Villages, April 1976’ in NAZ MS 591/2/2 and C.E Rougemont (International Committee of the Red Cross, Salisbury) to Rev. Manguni (Christian Care Relief Office) February 2nd, 1976 in NAZ, MS 1184/23.

¹⁷ International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, *Ian Smith’s Hostages: Political Prisoners in Rhodesia*, (London, 1976), pp.14-27 in Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference Library (hereafter referred to as ZBC Library), Box 340-359 “Law and Public Administration”.

¹⁸ ‘Christian Care Report, 9th April 1975’ in NAZ, MS 1194/1/1.

and the Salvation Army. It was founded specifically to respond to the disquieting conditions in the PVs in Chiweshe, with a focus on water and sanitation provision.¹⁹ However, the Interdenominational Committee was unable to act as a collective to apply pressure on the government over the inadequate facilities in the PVs.²⁰ The various church representatives were too divided. Whilst the Catholics and the Salvation Army, as we have seen, were vocal in their criticism of the dire conditions in the PVs, the Anglicans emerged as clear supporters of the policy of enforced villagization. Consequently, the churches failed to come together as a united pressure group: it is significant that Oxfam's Assistant Field Director, Jeremy Swainson, felt that each denomination was more concerned with the needs of its own mission.²¹ This is borne out by the fact that, the Catholic Commission for Social Services and Development had collected R\$28,735, ostensibly for the I.D Committee. However, it was pointed out that the donor, Misereor – a German Catholic overseas development organization – intended these funds to be spent on a specific Catholic relief project.²²

Indeed, fundraising became one of the major sources of tension within the Interdenominational Committee. Much mutual suspicion and ill-feeling arose amongst the committee members over the financial contribution made by each member. Whilst the Salvation Army and the Catholics played a very active role in the fundraising efforts, neither the Anglicans nor the United Methodists had contributed in any way. The burden of the initial relief efforts at this stage disproportionately fell upon the Salvation Army who were the only

¹⁹ C.E McKone and J.J Swinson, 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Affected Areas in Rhodesia- 16th- 22nd September 1974' in BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974). Hereafter this document will be referred as 'C.E McKone and J.J Swinson Tour Report 16th to 22nd September 1974', BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2).

²⁰ Jeremy Swainson to Bernadette Prat, 8th January 1975 in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

²¹ Jeremy Swainson to Bernadette Prat, 8th January 1975 in Oxford, Bodleian Library, M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974.

²² Letter from C.E Mckone to Miss Bernadette Prat, 16th November 1975, M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library.

group initially able to access the PVs.²³ Moreover, the I.D Committee were only concerned with Chiweshe and were prepared to stand down once the relief programme was completed there.²⁴ It appears, then, that they were not geared for a longer-term commitment to the humanitarian efforts in the PVs. However, the relatively limited scope of the enforced villagization programme was to change markedly as the war continued to escalate. It was in this context that Christian Care superseded the Interdenominational Committee.

Christian Care were much better suited than the I. D. Committee to leading the relief efforts in the protected villages. Although, as will be shown later in this chapter, there were some interdenominational tensions in Christian Care, the organisation was structured in such a way that it was not prey to the same extent to the ecumenical disunity which had hampered the work of its predecessor. At its core was a professional stratum with dedicated relief personnel employed to co-ordinate the relief efforts.²⁵ At the same time, it also had access to extensive financial resources from international NGOs including Christian Aid, the World Council of Churches and Oxfam.²⁶ Christian Care launched an Emergency Relief Committee (E.R.C) in December 1975, specifically to aid the victims of strategic resettlement. Subsequently the Interdenominational Committee was absorbed into this as a sub-committee.²⁷ Roy Henson would play a central role setting up this new department serving as vice chairman.²⁸ A diverse of range of personnel (though overwhelmingly European) were recruited into the E.R.C including Methodists Rev. H.H Kachidza and Mr and Mrs Knottenbelt, and Catholics such as

²³ Roy Henson "The Protected Villages" (undated) in NAZ MS 589/7/2 and Jeremy Swainson to Bernadette Prat, 8th January 1975 in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

²⁴ Roy Henson "The Protected Villages", NAZ MS 589/7/2.

²⁵ Hallencrutz, *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, pp.91.

²⁶ C.E McKone to Bernadette Prat, 16th November 1975', M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

²⁷ 'Rev. S. Manguni (National Relief Officer) Christian Care Relief Officer's Report AGM (1978) in NAZ MS 589/6/5.

²⁸ Rev. S.K. Manguni (National Relief Officer) Christian Care Relief Officer's Report: A.G.M, 29th May 1976 in NAZ, MS 1194/4/1/2.

Father Rogers and Sister D Vanwesenbeeck.²⁹ Fundamental to Christian Care's work was its close relationship with Oxfam. In fact, it was Oxfam's Central African Field Director Colin McKone who had stressed the need for Christian Care to supersede the I.D Committee.³⁰

The Oxfam Connection

As is well known Oxfam, started life as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief which was formed in 1942 by academics and social activists in a church hall in Oxford. It aimed to respond to the famine situation in Greece during the Second World War.³¹ In the post-war period, Oxfam became one of the principal humanitarian responders to a series of conflicts which emerged in the post war period including the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).³² In the late-1960s and 1970s, Oxfam rendered assistance to Bengali refugees in India who had fled from civil war and extreme repression in East Pakistan (Bangladesh).³³ The organisation also played an important role responding to famine in India, the Sahel and Ethiopia.³⁴ Alongside providing this emergency relief, Oxfam played an important role in rural development schemes in parts of Africa including work relating to clinics, flying doctors, schools, and vocational workshops. Such work was undertaken largely in partnership with Christian missions run by expatriates.³⁵ The model of working with churches, then, that was to mark Oxfam's aid to the victims of strategic resettlement in Rhodesia was a standard one. It should be noted that Tanzania, located in the broader Southern African region of which Zimbabwe is part, was the focal point for Oxfam activity on the African continent, so much so that it opened a separate

²⁹ Hallencrutz, *Church and State in Zimbabwe*, p.91, Roy Henson 'A Report on the Protected Villages? 31st December 1975', NAZ MS 589/7/2.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and The Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (Oxford, 1997), p.67.

³² Maggie Black, *A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam the first 50 years* (Oxford, 1992), pp.297-299.

³³ <http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/en/index.php?page=fiche-ong.php&part=historique&chapitre=383&id=77> [accessed 5/1/2019]

³⁴ Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, pp. 238 -239.

³⁵ Black, *A Cause for Our Times*, pp. 238 -239.

field office in Tanzania in 1976.³⁶ Somewhat paradoxically – given its opposition to strategic resettlement in Rhodesia – Oxfam was involved in and supported a process of enforced resettlement in Tanzania. There it became something of a surrogate of the government and played a leading role in the implementation of the villagization programme enacted as part of the Ujaama policy designed to support social and economic development in rural areas.³⁷ However, this process was oppressive, sometimes violent and was part of an authoritarian shift in government in Tanzania under the Nyerere regime. Despite the resulting oppressions, Oxfam still “maintained a close ideological commitment to, and identification with, the government’s objectives and strategy” regarding the Ujamaa policy and its “criticism of some of the policies more negative aspects was muted”.³⁸ Yet, in marked contrast, Oxfam was highly critical of strategic resettlement in Rhodesia with the Assistant Field Director, Jeremy Swainson, going so far as to draw parallels of the policy there with the Holocaust.³⁹ Ironically, at the same time Swainson was regularly visiting Tanzania to monitor Oxfam’s projects, including those linked to the Ujaama policy.⁴⁰

Prior to war breaking out in Rhodesia, Oxfam was involved in drought relief and rural development programmes in the country. In 1965 to 1966 it rendered assistance to the drought relief programme run by the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign.⁴¹ It also sponsored the agricultural programmes and training courses run by Silveira House, Christian Care and the Mashonaland Drought Relief Committee.⁴² Later, Oxfam earmarked just over £27,000 to

³⁶ Michael Jennings, ‘Almost an Oxfam in Itself’: Oxfam Ujamaa and Development in Tanzania’, *African Affairs*, Oct. 2002, Vol. 101, No. 405 (Oct. 2002), p.529.

³⁷ Jennings; ‘Almost an Oxfam in itself: Oxfam, Ujamaa and development in Tanzania’, p.512.

³⁸ Jennings, ‘Almost an Oxfam in Itself’: Oxfam Ujamaa and Development in Tanzania’, pp.513-514.

³⁹ Jeremy Swainson to Bernadette Prat, 21st July 1975’, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol 2 =Box 975.

⁴⁰ Jeremy Swainson to Major Sven Bjorndal, 18th October 1974’, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol 1 =Box 974.

⁴¹ Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe): drought relief, 1965-1966’, Library, MS. Oxfam PRF ZIM-G-003 = Box 1086, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁴² ‘Silveira House, Christian Care, Mashonaland Drought Relief Committee, Rhodesia): funding of agricultural programmes and training courses, 1969-1975’, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 008 A Vol. 1 = Box 1084, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

contribute towards the costs of the travelling clinic run by Freedom from Hunger as part of their 'Well Baby' scheme which was run partly in conjunction with the Rhodesian Red Cross. This mobile clinic operated in remote areas of Mashonaland and Matabeleland and provided refrigerated vaccines and nutritional supplements.⁴³ It was through this work and these connections that Oxfam was well positioned to support the relief projects carried out by Christian Care in the PVs during the war.

However, probably nothing affected Oxfam's involvement in strategic resettlement more than its relationship with the British government. As a British NGO, it inevitably became subject to British policy regarding Rhodesia's constitutional future and the sanctions imposed following UDI. As a result, Oxfam had to seek Treasury approval to disburse funds to the aid projects it supported in Rhodesia whilst keeping in close contact with the Commonwealth Relations Office (later the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – FCO) on the matter.⁴⁴ Unsurprisingly, Oxfam's activity during the Rhodesian conflict was closely monitored by the FCO and Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM).⁴⁵ In southern Africa itself, Oxfam liaised with British representatives such as the High Commissioner in Malawi regarding the villagisation programme in Chiweshe.⁴⁶ (Obviously, the British government's diplomatic representation in Rhodesia had effectively ceased following UDI.)

However, precisely because of its connections and work in Rhodesia, Oxfam served as a vital asset in Whitehall's investigations into the effects of strategic resettlement. Indeed, in

⁴³ Oxfam Information Office, 'Well-Baby Clinics: Freedom From Hunger Campaign' 19th February 1969 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 012 [a] = Box 001, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.

⁴⁴ See J.A Molyneux to Mr. Adams, 7th February 1966' and 'Her Majesty's Treasury Rhodesian Exchange Control Committee: Oxfam – Note by Treasury 15th March 1966' in BNA DO 207/138 'Illegal Declaration of Independence: Question of continued Financial Aid to Projects in Rhodesia- Oxfam (1965-1966)'

⁴⁵ The Ministry of Overseas Development was answerable to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1970-74 and 1976-1977. It operated as a separate government department between 1975 and 1976. These responsibilities until recently belonged to the Department of International Development created in 1997 until was it reintegrated with the FCO in 2020.

⁴⁶ W. Jones (British High Commission, Blantyre) to Rhodesia Department FCO, 22nd October 1974 in BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages'.

September 1974, Oxfam's Field Director for Central and Southern Africa, Colin McKone, and its Assistant Field Director, J.J Swainson, produced two reports regarding their visit to the PVs in Chiweshe; these made the facts about the dire humanitarian situation in Chiweshe's PVs known to the British government.⁴⁷ Due to UDI and censorship by the Smith regime, the British government had little access to impartial information about conditions in the PVs with which to counter Rhodesian propaganda regarding them. Not surprisingly, the Rhodesia Department of the FCO expressed the view that "these particular reports had been a useful corrective to [Rhodesian spokesman] Mr Louis De Bruijn's recent statement that the PVs might become 'growth points' to be lived in with pleasure".⁴⁸

Oxfam and Whitehall continued to communicate on the matter as the PV policy became more established in 1975. As noted in the previous chapter, Oxfam was providing substantial material and financial support for the Salvation Army's relief work in Chiweshe, and Oxfam's Overseas Director M.R Harris visited Chiweshe in June 1975 and confirmed reports regarding the dire humanitarian situation in the PVs.⁴⁹ However, in a letter sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Harris had stressed the confidentiality of these reports. This was to safeguard the relief operations in the PVs. Concerns were raised regarding the serious repercussions from the regime which would be suffered by NGOs such as the Salvation Army if the fact of their divulging damaging information regarding strategic resettlement was

⁴⁷ C.E McKone 'Tour Report- C.E McKone Visit to Rhodesia on Monday/Tuesday 2nd to 3rd September', BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974) [Hereafter, this document will be referred to as 'C.E McKone Tour Report 2nd to 3rd September 1974'; and C.E McKone and J.J Swainson 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Affected Areas in Rhodesia- 16th- 22nd September 1974' in BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974) Hereafter this will be referred to as 'C.E McKone and J.J Swainson Tour Report 16th to 22nd September 1974'.

⁴⁸ R.A.C. Byatt (Rhodesia Department) to Rev R. Elliot Kendall (Conference of Missionary Societies), 6th November 1974 in BNA, FCO 36/1645 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974).

⁴⁹ M.R Harris (Overseas Director) to David Ennals, July 30th, 1975 in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

publicised.⁵⁰ Whitehall therefore ensured the aforementioned tour reports received from Colin McKone were marked as confidential and in turn placed within a classified file by the FCO which would not be made accessible to the public until 2005.⁵¹ But, alongside those later produced by the Catholics, Oxfam's reports enabled Whitehall to monitor the results of strategic resettlement.

Whitehall clearly had significant influence over the shape of Oxfam's relief programme in Rhodesia. Firstly, as noted earlier, the remittance of funds had to be approved by the Treasury, with Oxfam warned that the conveying of money could be blocked by Whitehall.⁵² The British government's official policy for much of the war was not to render any direct assistance to the victims of strategic resettlement as it was felt that that this would absolve the Smith regime from the full responsibility of maintaining acceptable living standards within the protected villages and, moreover, that by aiding the victims of strategic resettlement, Whitehall would effectively be supporting the counter-insurgency strategy of the rebellious white-minority government in Rhodesia.⁵³ Nevertheless, the humanitarian imperative was evidently conceded and the evidence suggests that the Foreign Secretary, David Ennals, provided some tacit support for Oxfam's involvement in the aid effort. This is why Oxfam's Overseas Director had no compunctions about informing the Foreign Secretary that the Chiweshe Association, a body representing the area, "would welcome assistance, particularly in the forms of finance, blankets and clothing" and that he had "agreed to make enquires on their behalf of voluntary bodies in this country [i.e. the UK]".⁵⁴ He also informed Ennals that Oxfam were already

⁵⁰ M.R Harris (Overseas Director) to David Ennals, July 30th, 1975 in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁵¹ 'C.E McKone Tour Report 2nd to 3rd September 1974 and C.E McKone and J.J Swainson 'Report on Chiweshe and Other Affected Areas in Rhodesia- 16th- 22nd September 1974', BNA, FCO 36/1645

⁵² 'Minutes of the Africa Field Committee 9th October 1974' in M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/4, Folder 1: January 1974 to May-1975, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.

⁵³ R. J. Spencer (Rhodesia Department) to Mr Laver (Consular Department) 9th August 1976, BNA, OD 66/51 'Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages' (1978).

⁵⁴ M.R Harris to David Ennals, July 30th, 1975', M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Vol1 = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

“contributing generously to the alleviating of suffering in the Rhodesian Tribal Trust Lands and in Chiweshe in particular”.⁵⁵ Officially the UK government was unable to render direct assistance to the victims of strategic resettlement and it was not until 1978 that Whitehall rendered any financial assistance to any relief programmes in the PVs.⁵⁶ But before this, it was clearly allowing Oxfam to fund such relief. Paradoxically, it was noted that Oxfam would likely reject any direct British governmental assistance lest it affected its ‘political image’.⁵⁷

Like Oxfam, Whitehall felt that Christian Care was the most appropriate channel for rendering aid. Prior to rendering any direct assistance, Whitehall had in fact cited Christian Care as the preferable channel in any hypothetical situation where such aid was provided as it had necessary access to the PVs and the necessary relationship with the Rhodesian state to carry out relief programmes whilst maintaining independence from the Smith regime. It is therefore not surprising that it was Christian Care, as will be detailed shortly, that was to receive direct financial support from the UK government in 1978 for its relief programme in the PVs.⁵⁸ It is also unsurprising that Oxfam had sought to strengthen its ties and assist the relief work of Christian Care even as it worked with that accredited international organisation that had no connection with the Smith regime, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).⁵⁹ Undeniably Christian Care was an asset for both Oxfam and Whitehall insofar that it could be utilized to respond to the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding in the PVs whilst allowing the

⁵⁵ M.R Harris to David Ennals, July 30th, 1975’, M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 40 Voll = Box 974, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁵⁶ R.J Spencer to Mr Laver 9th August 1978 in BNA, OD 66/51 ‘Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages’ (1978). Hereafter this will be referred to as ‘R.J Spencer to Mr Laver 9th August 1978’.

⁵⁷ ‘Letter to Mr Laver from Mr Mansfield 9th May 1977’ in FCO 36/2066.

⁵⁸ Letter to Mr Laver (Consular Department) from Miss R.J Spencer (Rhodesia Department) 9th August 1976, BNA, OD 66/51 ‘Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages’ (1978)

⁵⁹ ‘Oxfam Response to the Zimbabwe Situation’ in M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/6 Folder 1: May to November 1979, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

British government and an NGO following its strictures to circumvent the sanctions regime in the most targeted and justifiable way.

Oxfam's crucial role in rendering financial and material assistance to Christian Care can be evidenced by many examples. In March 1976, it provided £3500 to the Emergency Relief Committee programme of Christian Care which covered the salaries of its relief workers for a year as well as flights to and from the United Kingdom.⁶⁰ In July 1976, Oxfam contributed £1818 specifically to Christian Care's relief programme in the PVs and CVs.⁶¹ In fact, Oxfam grants to programmes in Rhodesia were almost always remitted via Christian Care, as was the more than £12,000 provided in August 1976 for the medical outreach programme discussed in the previous chapter.⁶² It was also Oxfam that was later to provide over £6000 to Christian Care to cover the cost of the new Landrover and trailer required for the Salvation Army's medical outreach programme in Chiweshe and Madziwa.⁶³ Oxfam's centrality to this extended to the mechanics of purchase outside the country. The new vehicle could not be procured within Rhodesia, so arrangements were made to buy it in South Africa, the money being transferred from the UK direct to South Africa.⁶⁴

Other projects run by Christian missions in the PVs supported by Oxfam (through Christian Care) included that of the United Methodists at Nyadiri Mission (near Mtoko), for which Oxfam provided R\$10,000 for the mobile medical provision discussed in the previous chapter.⁶⁵ Oxfam was also fundamental to Christian Care's general distribution of relief

⁶⁰ Oxfam 'Africa Development Schedule March 1976' in, M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/4 Folder 2: October 1975-October 1976, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² 'Grant/Loan Application Form: Medical Services for Protected Villages in Chiweshe and Madziwa July 1976'.

⁶³ Oxfam 'Grant/Loan Application Form 'E.R.C of Christian Care: Medical Services for Protected Villages (for Chiweshe and Madziwa) July 1976' in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford. Hereafter this will be referred to as 'Grant/Loan Application Form: Medical Services for Protected Villages in Chiweshe and Madziwa July 1976'.

⁶⁴ 'Chiweshe & Madziwa-Rho 40 in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁶⁵ Oxfam, 'Grant/ Loan Application Summary Form 11th March' 1977'; 'Africa Development Schedule June 1976 in Library M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/4 Folder 2: October 1975-October 1976, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

supplies to the missions – whether food, blankets, clothing, and medical supplies – which would then be forwarded on to those in the PVs. It was intended that the lorry provided for this purpose would visit 16 PVs per month,⁶⁶ and a grant from Oxfam for this purpose covered around 60 percent of the total cost of over R\$8300.⁶⁷

Christian Care: the general funnel of aid

Aside from its place in acting as the means by which Oxfam and the British government could dispense aid to the victims of strategic resettlement, Christian Care became the principal node through which a range of international NGOs were able to render assistance to the people in the PVs in the context of UDI and the sanctions regime. Hence Christian Aid, a division of the British Council of Churches rendered aid to the victims of strategic resettlement by providing financial assistance to Christian Care's relief programme in the PVs. As a British NGO, the FCO exercised the same degree of control over the activity of Christian Aid as it did Oxfam. Initially, Christian Aid made a grant of just over R\$12, 000,⁶⁸ but very early in 1979, the press reported that the organization had made a grant totalling £50,000 to Christian Care for its relief programmes, including its work in the PVs.⁶⁹ Once more, Christian Care – with its formally neutral stance – proved an ideal conduit for the funds from this British NGO. In fact, the previous year, the Rhodesian Anglican Church had alleged that Christian Aid had given the 'terrorists' financial backing via the British Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches (WCC).⁷⁰ But Christian Aid's director, Dr Kenneth Slack, had dissociated his organization from the grants made through the WCC Programme to Combat Racism Fund and

⁶⁶ Oxfam: 'Grant/ Loan Application Summary Form 11th March' 1977 in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁶⁷ 'Information on Oxfam Financed Projects', M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁶⁸ 'National Accounts: Financial Statement From the 27th September 1977 to 30th September 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁶⁹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 3rd January 1979, in MS 308/62/2

⁷⁰ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 22nd May 1978, and 27th May 1978.,

it could be pointed out in the Rhodesian press that Christian Aid's grants were being made to "quite specifically neutral institutions and not as an expression of solidarity with anyone".⁷¹ Indeed, the evidence suggests both sides in the war supported this grant. It met with no criticism in *The Rhodesia Herald*, a pro-government newspaper, and it was reportedly welcomed by ZANU "as a wonderful gesture to the suffering people of Zimbabwe".⁷²

It was not only Christian Care's formally non-partisan stance that was functional to its role as a funnel for external NGOs, so was its non-denominational profile. In fact, the British Council of Churches (with which Christian Aid was closely aligned) had encouraged this feature of Christian Care, as also the absence of direct Church representation on its committees.⁷³ As we have already seen, the initial humanitarian response led by the Church leadership in Rhodesia had been hampered by ecumenical disunity and differing stances towards the Smith regime. Christian Care largely (though not entirely) avoided such disputes and disunity, and this non-sectarianism allowed a range of different Christian organizations from outside the country to render financial assistance to it which could then be used in the PVs. The United Methodists in the United States provided US\$35,000 annually to the organization between 1975 and 1978.⁷⁴ Over R\$130 000 was passed to Christian Care by Brot für die Welt (Bread for the Word), a development and relief agency of the Protestant churches in West Germany, and around R\$190 000 was provided by the World Council of Churches in 1977-1978. Smaller amounts were received from the Catholic agency Caritas (R\$1,154) and from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Sweden (R\$4000).⁷⁵ Despite clear theological

⁷¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 3rd January 1979 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁷² *The Rhodesia Herald*, 3rd January 1979 in NAZ 'Newspapers', *The Rise*, 14th January 1979, in NAZ MS 308/62/2.

⁷³ Oliver M. Munyaradzi (National Chairman) and Chemai J Mzite (National Treasurer), 'Report on Overseas Trip 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁷⁴ 'Report on Overseas Trip Oliver M. Munyaradzi (National Chairman) and Chemai J Mzite (National Treasurer), 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁷⁵ 'National Accounts: Financial Statement From the 27th September 1977 to 30th September 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

differences between the organizations abovementioned, Christian Care acted as a funnel through which they could all render assistance to the victims of strategic resettlement.

It did this also for secular NGOs as well. It was not only Oxfam that dispensed finances to and through it, so did the Joseph Rowntree Foundation which provided almost R\$5 000,⁷⁶ not to mention the R\$20,000 from the International Red Cross (ICRC) in 1977- 1978.⁷⁷ Christian Care could also function as a preferred route for foreign government aid to the victims of strategic resettlement. In fact, it was the British government which became pre-eminent in this regard when, in 1978, it provided £238,000 to Christian Care for its work in the PVs.⁷⁸ This was a departure from Whitehall's earlier policy of not rendering any direct assistance to the relief programmes in the PVs lest it aid the Rhodesia government in its strategic resettlement policy. However, presumably in response to the extreme suffering in the PVs, a shift in policy was decided upon by the Minister for Overseas Development,⁷⁹ and the proposed grant was included in a supplementary budget presented to the British Parliament in August 1978. Further financial support was also mooted with provision made for the accounts for future needs to be presented to Whitehall.⁸⁰ In addition, the Dutch Ministry of Technical Aid and Development provided R\$675,000 to Christian Care via Cebemo, a Catholic development charity.⁸¹

Overall, then, Christian Care therefore served as a clearing house for a range of international bodies, representing different interests who sought to respond to the humanitarian

⁷⁶ National Accounts: Financial Statement From the 27th September 1977 to 30th September 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Letter to Mr Laver (Consular Department) from Miss R.J Spencer (Rhodesia Department), 9th August 1976, BNA, OD 66/51 'Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages' (1978), *The Rhodesia Herald*, 9th May 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁷⁹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 6th May 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁸⁰ Oliver M. Munyaradzi (National Chairman, Christian Care) and Chemai J Mzite (National Treasurer), 'Report on Overseas Trip 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁸¹ Ibid. Cebemo, is a Roman Catholic developmental organization that was set up in 1961 as a non-governmental channel for Dutch development aid to missionaries in developing countries: see <https://www.cordaid.org/en/who-we-are-our-history/> [accessed 14:54 26/2/2021].

crisis in the PVs whilst circumventing the sanctions regime in a controlled manner to ensure that the Rhodesian government did not dispense their aid. However, its intercessory role was not without its problems.

First and foremost, there were concerns regarding Christian Care's financial accountability with donors not receiving feedback on how their grants had been spent. The organisation's national chairman, O.M Munyaradzi, attributed this to the fact that Christian Care's work was growing so fast, outstripping its personnel resources.⁸² Certainly, as we have seen, there was an upsurge of financial backing from international bodies in 1977 and 1978. Nevertheless, financial reporting responsibilities were clearly neglected, and there was no liaison between members of the executive and local committees regarding financial matters.⁸³ In fact, Christian Care was forced to delay its AGM in 1978 as the accounts for 1977-1978 had not been audited.⁸⁴ Neither had the accounts for 1976-1977. This was, in the words of Christian Care's national chairman, a "serious breach of trust."⁸⁵ Not surprisingly, Christian Care's donors became very concerned about the issue. The Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church, for example, requested information on Christian Care's financial requirements as well as financial statements and project reports citing previous inadequate reports which contained out of date information regarding the organisation's budget.⁸⁶ The United Methodist Church emphasized reputable financial control as an important precondition for receiving further grants and actually proposed the creation of an appropriate office, separate from the relief offices, to regulate financial matters and which would work closely with all

⁸² C.J Mzite, 'Annual Report National Chairman's Report: 1977-1978 Christian Care: National Treasurer's Report For Year Ending September 1978', NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ O.M Munyaradzi, 'Christian Care: National Chairman's Report 1977-78, 25th November 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/5/1.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ United Methodist Committee on Relief: Board of Global Ministries – Dr J.T. Haines in NAZ MS 1191/1/1.

Christian Care offices and related agencies.⁸⁷ The World Council of Churches (WCC) adopted a similar stance, in particular seeking information regarding Christian Care's donors and the amounts received so that there would be no duplication of grants for the same projects.⁸⁸ To that end, the WCC proposed that Christian Care should define their needs according to three distinct areas: emergency funds, short term and intermediate funds, and long-term financial needs, all derived from information on projects, income and expenditure.⁸⁹

It was Oxfam however, that became key in responding to Christian Care's inadequate financial accounting. In December 1977, the organization stressed to Christian Care the importance of presenting accurate accounts to encourage support from potential donors.⁹⁰ A year before this, an Assistant Field Director of Oxfam had already outlined concerns regarding correspondence and accounts which made it difficult to evaluate Christian Care's work and its use of funds. Such correspondence and reports of accounts were crucial given the difficulties Oxfam's personnel had in visiting Rhodesia.⁹¹ In the course of 1977, it became evident that financial claims of Christian Care excluded funds to cover the ongoing running costs for the vehicles operating in Chiweshe, Madziwa and Mtoko which played such a crucial role in the medical outreach programme in the PVs. Clearly, there was a mismatch between operations and accounting and Oxfam decided to withhold its support for Christian Care until their next annual general meeting, although it continued to support directly the above-mentioned mobile

⁸⁷ United Methodist Committee on Relief: Board of Global Ministries – Dr J.T. Haines in NAZ MS 1191/1/1.

⁸⁸ Report on Overseas Trip Oliver M. Munyaradzi (National Chairman) and Chemai J Mzite (National Treasurer), 1978 in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Letter from Martyn T. Young to Oliver Munyaradzi, 13th September 1978 in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁹¹ Martyn Young, Rhodesia Tour Report, December 1976 in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

clinics which, as we have seen, were run by the Salvation Army and the United Methodists respectively.⁹²

Linked to the measures to improve financial accountability, Oxfam also suggested improved communication within the organization through broadening the executive, the holding of regular meetings and, importantly, the appointment of a communications director.⁹³ The latter would be expected to serve an important role writing reports to both local and national committees and to international donors, alongside co-ordinating individual projects.⁹⁴ The director could convey essential information to address the issues relating to financial accountability which were so important to the external donor organizations who rendered significant financial support for Christian Care's work in the PVs. An Oxfam official went so far as to recommend the dismissal of Christian Care's national relief officer, Rev Stephen Manguni, whose salary was, in effect, paid by Oxfam and who was held responsible for the inadequate reporting and accounting of the financial matters.⁹⁵ Whilst, it is not clear whether Manguni was dismissed, Christian Care's correspondence does indicate that C.J Mzite (National Treasurer) and Oliver Munyaradzi increasingly took the lead in the organization's affairs during 1978.⁹⁶ Oxfam also suggested a series of measures to improve Christian Care's financial accounting. Martyn Young, the Assistant Field Director, pointed out that, given Christian Care's large budget (R\$2.5 Million by 1978), it was important to appoint a dedicated office to manage its financial affairs.⁹⁷ A finance director was proposed and this officer would

⁹² Martyn Young, 'Tour Report 28th August to 10th September 1977' in, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

⁹³ Martyn T. Young to Oliver Munyaradzi', 13th September 1978, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Martyn T. Young to Michael Harris' 24th August 1978 and 'Letter from Martyn T. Young to Oliver Munyaradzi, 13th September 1978' in Oxford, Bodleian Library, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

⁹⁶ Christian Care: National Treasurer's Report For Year Ending September 1978 in NAZ MS 1194/5/1, Oliver M. Munyaradzi (National Chairman) and Chemai J Mzite (National Treasurer), 'Report on Overseas Trip 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

⁹⁷ Martyn T. Young to Oliver Munyaradzi', 13th September 1978, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

answer to the executive committee and be responsible for completing monthly reports, biannual reports and, as required, reports on individual projects.⁹⁸ Christian Care obliged and also proposed a national committee which comprised all the treasurers of the local committees which would facilitate communication between all those responsible for Christian Care finances.⁹⁹

Poor accounting was not the only problem affecting Christian Care. There was certainly some inter-denominational tension in the organization, notably in its Bulawayo office, with the Catholics ultimately pulling out of the Bulawayo committee.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, there came to be some feeling amongst the Catholics that they should exclusively handle their own Emergency Relief Programme and withdraw entirely from Christian Care.¹⁰¹ Aside from this, some tensions emerged along regional and ethnic lines. Both the national treasurer and the national chairman who were based in Salisbury were accused of marginalizing the Bulawayo office, with the national chairman accused of neglecting the needs of the Ndebele people.¹⁰² The movement of Christian Care's bank accounts from Bulawayo to Salisbury appears to have been carried out under irregular circumstances, with the Bulawayo-based official who had hitherto been handling them not informed.¹⁰³ However, the move was dictated by practical necessity. Initially funds were channeled via the Bulawayo office for relief programmes across Rhodesia.¹⁰⁴ But this situation was clearly impractical as the relief supplies intended for the PVs (and purchased

⁹⁸ Martyn T. Young to Michael Harris' 24th August 1978, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975

⁹⁹ C.J Mzite, 'Annual Report National Chairman's Report: 1977-1978: Christian Care: National Treasurer's Report For Year Ending September 1978', in NAZ MS 1194/5/1.

¹⁰⁰ Martyn T. Young to Michael Harris 24th August 1978, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹⁰¹ Martyn T. Young to Michael Harris 24th August 1978, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ 'Minutes of the Local Committee 'Held on Tuesday 28th February 1978 at the Christian Care Emergency Relief Office in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.

for that purpose) were mainly distributed by the Salisbury office which had a greater proximity to most of the victims of strategic resettlement.¹⁰⁵

Despite the organizational problems detailed above, we must however not lose sight of the fact that Christian Care still proved able to implement a far-reaching relief programme in the protected villages and to allow external organizations to contribute to it. Christian Care proved crucial to Oxfam, for example. In 1977, that organisation had barred its personnel from travelling in rural areas of Rhodesia, because of the widespread use of land mines by the guerrillas.¹⁰⁶ Usually, to operate in these conditions, NGOs had to enlist support from the Rhodesian Security Forces to ensure safe passage. Oxfam had been unwilling to do this and had been made aware that the guerrillas had discouraged any contact whatsoever with the government.¹⁰⁷ At the same time Oxfam was reluctant to channel any relief through the guerrillas, emphasising that the transition to majority rule should be through peaceful means, even if its correspondence suggests an inclination towards the liberation cause – hence its referring to the guerrillas as “freedom fighters”. (However, perhaps because of the degree of coercion by the insurgents, Oxfam was unsure about how genuinely accepted they were by the people and this also inclined Oxfam against using the guerrillas to channel relief to war victims.)¹⁰⁸ In this situation, Christian Care became the ideal conduit for Oxfam aid. And Christian Care came to play a similar role on behalf of the International Red Cross (ICRC), when Christian Care briefly took over its operations in the PVs, following the ICRC’s decision to suspend its work in rural areas after three of its personnel were killed by the guerrillas in

¹⁰⁵ ‘The Coordinator’s Report, Salisbury Emergency Relief Committee Period May to June 1978’ in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹⁰⁶ ‘Rhodesia Policy Discussion Paper’ (1977) in Bodleian Library, M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/5 Folder 1: January to October 1977, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹⁰⁷ Martyn T. Young ‘Annual Report for Central and Southern Africa December 1978’ in M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/5 Folder 2: January 1978 to January 1979, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

¹⁰⁸ Field Committee: A Review of Oxfam’s Activities in Central and Southern African Covering the Period June 1974 to June 1976 in M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/4: Folder 2 October 1975-1974. Oxfam: ‘Annual Report for Southern Africa: October 1977’ in M.S Oxfam PRG 1/3/5 Folder 1: January to October 1977, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

May 1978.¹⁰⁹ Overall, what is revealed is the indispensable role played by Christian Care as the intermediary for both Oxfam and the ICRC whose aid continued via Christian Care's extensive rural support network despite the escalating guerrilla war.

Christian Care's Relief Programme in the PVs

Christian Care's Emergency Relief Committee (E.R.C) would play a significant role in the overall relief efforts directed at the victims of strategic resettlement. In fact, even by 1976 it had the responsibility of providing aid to PVs that held up to 300,000 inmates.¹¹⁰ By this stage Christian Care, usually through the networks referred to above, were operating in the protected villages in Chiweshe, Madziwa, Mount Darwin, Mtoko, Mrewa, Fort Victoria, Chiredezi, the Honde Valley and Chisumbanje.¹¹¹ And its relief effort in the PVs would become much more extensive from 1977 once strategic resettlement was implemented across Rhodesia's north, eastern and western frontiers in particular spreading to Mashonaland West and Victoria Provinces as well as to Matabeleland.¹¹² By 1978-9 Christian Care's total budget amounted to almost R\$3,000, 000 which covered expenses for food, blankets and clothing, medical aid, school fees and construction costs in the PVs.¹¹³ Christian Care's principal offices were based in Salisbury and Bulawayo, their committees assisted by two full time co-ordinators.¹¹⁴ However, the Salisbury office which was geographically closer to most of the victims of strategic resettlement played a more crucial role. In the rural areas, there were local

¹⁰⁹ Oliver M. Munyaadzi (National Chairman) and Chemai J Mzite (National Treasurer), 'Report on Overseas Trip 1978' in NAZ MS 1194/1/1.

¹¹⁰ Rev. S.K. Maguni (National Relief Officer) Christian Care Relief Officer's Report AGM', NAZ MS 589/6/5. As shown in the survey chapter, the implementation of the villagization programme was still ongoing with thousands more being placed in confinement during 1977 and 1978.

¹¹¹ 'Annual General Meeting of the Heads of Denomination, 28th September 1976' in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 050 = Box 2759, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹¹² 'Co-ordinators Report for the Period- May 1978' in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2 and 'Co-ordinators Report For the Period- May 1978', NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹¹³ 'Christian Care Budget for 1978-9' in NAZ MS 589/6/5.

¹¹⁴ Rev. S.K Maguini, 'Christian Care Report November Quarter 1977' in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

committees, subordinate to Christian Care's E.R.C, and they played an important role in the distribution of relief to the PVs, but these committees were instructed by the Salisbury office or, in the case of the south and west of the country, by the Bulawayo office.¹¹⁵

Aside from these local committees, and as made clear earlier, Christian Care utilized a network of Christian missions, welfare and civic organisations and even commercial stores to render assistance to the residents forced into the PVs. The organisation itself was responsible for financing and transporting the relief supplies to affected areas. But, given the scale of the operation and the need to control costs, the distribution of relief supplies to the PVs themselves would often be outsourced to rural missions, local associations, and the like.¹¹⁶ Use of this network was vital to Christian Care, not least in the context of petrol rationing which sometimes dictated a dependence upon the rural missionaries' transport resources to distribute relief supplies since Christian Care might be unable to obtain a permit for additional fuel for its own vehicles.¹¹⁷

As noted, Christian Care did not restrict itself to church and mission networks to distribute aid to the victims of strategic resettlement. While the missions were probably the crucial nodes to provide aid, other institutions of civil society were utilised – for example, the Chiweshe Residents Association.¹¹⁸ The Chikore Welfare Committee also played a role for Christian Care in administering an under-five supplementary feeding scheme around Chipinga (in Manicaland. Thus, in June 1978, it could be found distributing high protein foodstuffs (including milk and maheu) to 50 clearly seriously malnourished children in four of the PVs in

¹¹⁵ Christian Care Emergency Committee Division Matabeleland area What We Are and What We are asked to Do (Undated) in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹¹⁶ 'Roy Henson: Report on the Protected Villages 22nd March 1976' in NAZ MS 591/2/2.

¹¹⁷ Emergency Relief Committee, Christian Care 'Minutes of Committee Meeting Held' on 10th June 1976 in, MS. Oxfam PRF Rho 050 = Box 2759, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹¹⁸ Emergency Relief Committee, Christian Care, 'Minutes of Committee Meeting Held on 10th June 1976' MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 050 = Box 2759, Bodleian Library, Oxford

the area.¹¹⁹ Where such civic organisations could not be used, Christian Care used local store owners to distribute food in the PVs. This was the case in Victoria (Masvingo) Province where a local store owner who operated in the PVs was paid a handling fee to forward food relief to the inmates.¹²⁰ A voucher system was actually implemented in areas such as the Honde Valley (Manicaland) whereby food could be purchased at a local store.¹²¹ (It is interesting to note that such a system was not used in Victoria province, however, it being felt that a voucher system would be too open to abuse.¹²² Perhaps, there were concerns that it would be used as a means to render supplies to the guerrillas.) Nevertheless, it is clear that Christian Care utilised local traders for the distribution of foodstuffs to the needy residents of the PVs. This was particularly important in more remote areas where the coverage of Christian Care personnel and rural missionaries was limited. However, elsewhere as shown in Mataka District, Mtoko (Mashonaland East), the voucher system was rendered ineffective due to the disruption of supplies to stores as transporters refused to take the risk of traversing roads which had been mined by the guerrillas.¹²³ In the end, it was the missions that served as the organisation's key network for dispensing humanitarian aid.

The centrality of the missions to Christian Care's relief efforts in the PVs is made clear by many examples. Local Catholic catechists, for example, were preeminent in distributing aid from Christian Care in the Mount Darwin area.¹²⁴ In May 1978, Jesuit priest Father Norbert Gillie, operating in Mount Darwin, distributed 120 blankets, 250 kg of nutresco, 50kg of milk

¹¹⁹ 'Minutes of the Local Committee Meeting Held on Tuesday 20th September 1977', 'The Coordinator's Report, Salisbury Emergency Relief Committee Period May to June 1978', NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹²⁰ 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee' Monday 4th July 1977 in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹²¹ Emergency Relief Committee, 'Minutes of the Meeting Held on 1 March 1977', M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

¹²² 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee', Monday 28th March, 1977 in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹²³ Martyn Young, Rhodesia Tour Report, December 1976 in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

¹²⁴ Emergency Relief Committee, Christian Care, 'Minutes of the Executive Meeting Held on 8th May 1976' in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 050 = Box 2759, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

and bags of maize to destitute families in the protected villages.¹²⁵ Catholic missionaries in Umtali Diocese (in the east of the country) played the crucial role there in rendering humanitarian assistance from Christian Care to inmates in the PVs. Following a tour of the sensitive areas in both Manicaland and Victoria (Masvingo) provinces including Chipinga, Mount Selinda, Chikoro, Chiredzi and Gutu in March 1977, it was decided that a request would be made by Christian Care for the Catholics' St Paul's Mission Hospital (near Chipinga) to serve as a distributional node for medical supplies from the organisation to the victims of strategic resettlement.¹²⁶ The Catholic missionaries also played an important role for Christian Care in Matabeleland.¹²⁷ There, the Catholics' Sacred Heart Mission rendered vital medical assistance, in part made possible by Christian Care, to the rural population in Siabuwa, located between Wankie (Hwange) and Victoria Falls.¹²⁸ St Mary's Mission located near Wankie also played a similar role.¹²⁹

Aside from this, over and over, one may find examples of the Catholics distributing aid from Christian Care to those who had been forcibly resettled. Thus, in May 1978, Father Falon of St Patricks Mission (Manicaland) distributed rolls of blankets to a family in a consolidated village whose male head of household had disappeared. Around the same time, at Mwoyoweshumba (Mutasa district, Honde Valley), Father J. Wardle distributed money and blankets provided by Christian Care to 13 destitute families in the PVs.¹³⁰ Around Wankie,

¹²⁵ The Coordinator's Report Salisbury Emergency Relief Committee Period May to June 1978' in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹²⁶ Minutes of the Meeting of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee Held in the Co-Ordinator's Office on Monday 28th March, 1977 at 16:30 hours in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹²⁷ 'Co-ordinators Report for the Period- May 1978' in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹²⁸ Minutes of the Meeting of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee held in the Co-ordinators Office on Monday 4th July 1977 at 16:30 hours in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹²⁹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee Field in the Co-Ordinators office on Monday 25th April 1977 at 16:30 hours in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹³⁰ The Coordinator's Report_ Salisbury Emergency Relief Committee_Period May_ June 9 (1978) in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

Catholic missionaries distributed to seven families, emergency aid from Christian Care in the form of bales of blankets, clothes, and 280kg of mealie meal.¹³¹

As the preceding chapter shows, Christian Care also utilized the rural networks of the Anglicans, Methodists and Salvation Army to dispense aid.¹³² The Evangelical Lutheran Church also played a role, however limited, in the distribution of such relief supplies to the victims of strategic resettlement as when, around Beit Bridge (in Matabeleland South), a local minister of the Church distributed blankets and food on behalf of Christian Care.¹³³

A sense of how crucial Christian Care was as a body that enabled provision of humanitarian relief can be gained from how they empowered church personnel in their work. In some instances, the state authorities in the rural areas recognized the essential humanitarian role played by the missionaries' work – this was the case in Siabuwa district and with respect to the PVs in the Sabi (Save) valley.¹³⁴ Elsewhere, however, ministers were sometimes denied access to the PVs.¹³⁵ Indeed, certain District Commissioners had objected to relief goods and food being transported in their areas, presumably out of fear that it could fall into the hands of the insurgents. On behalf of the rural ministers, Christian Care took up the matter with the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs who, in turn, agreed to support the humanitarian work in the PVs though this was still to be left to the discretion of the local DCs.¹³⁶ Even so, Christian Care had managed to gain a ministerial steer in favour of humanitarian assistance to the PVs. It could also provide invaluable material and logistical support to rural missionaries.¹³⁷ To help

¹³¹ 'Co-ordinators Report For the Period- May 1978. Bulawayo' in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹³² See Chapter 3 'Protestant Churches and Strategic Resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War'.

¹³³ 'Co-ordinators Report For the Period- May 1978. Bulawayo' in NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹³⁴ In fact, Sacred Heart Mission had received a letter from the District Commissioner and local headmen Chief Negonde commending them for their work in Siabuwa. Elsewhere, the work of Father Makonese was praised by the authorities for his work in the Sabi (Save) Valley. Minutes of the Meeting of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee held in the Co-ordinators Office on Monday 4th July 1977, NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/1.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ 'Emergency Relief Committee Christian Care September 1976, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 050 = Box 2759 in Bodleian Library Oxford.

¹³⁷ Father David Gibbs, 'Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan July 1977', Oxford, Bodleian Library, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

make good the deficiencies, Gibbs enlisted the support of Christian Care (and the Red Cross) for additional relief supplies. Logistical difficulties were alleviated before this by an Oxfam grant (provided via Christian Care) to purchase a new vehicle for All Souls.¹³⁸ St Peter's Mission (in Manicaland) benefited from something similar. The mission had been placed in a most serious situation due the withdrawal of its medical missionaries because of the escalating guerrilla war and its loss of government funding. In this situation, the support of Christian Care proved vital to the mission's ability to continue to run a mobile clinic that served 16 protected villages in the vicinity of St Peter's.¹³⁹

There was some regional variation in Christian Care's aid to the PVs, with some differences in what was given to the more established PVs in Mashonaland Central compared with aid given to the PVs that were more recently established in Mashonaland East (Mtoko and Mrewa) and Manicaland. It is notable, for example, that in Mount Darwin (Mashonaland Central) where the PVs were longer-standing institutions that requests for aid could have a more long-term focus on bettering agricultural production to enable the inmates to ensure their own basic needs. There is some evidence of Christian Care providing seed for future food production in a more recently established PV, as it did for residents of Chawanda PV near Karoi (Mashonaland West).¹⁴⁰ However, requests from Mount Selina, Chikore and the whole of the Sabi Valley (all in Manicaland) – where PVs were established later than those in Mashonaland Central – were focused on the immediate need for basic food supplies and the extra protein foods for the under-fives.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Father David Gibbs, 'Progress Report on an Oxfam Grant/Loan July 1977', Oxford, Bodleian Library, M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975.

¹³⁹ Emergency Relief Committee, 'Minutes of the Meeting Held on 1 March, 1977', M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹⁴⁰ 'Minutes of the Local Committee Meeting Held on Tuesday 20th September 1977' in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹⁴¹ 'Minutes of Christian Care National Executive Meeting Held on Saturday 27th August 1977' in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/1, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

However, whatever the slight regional variation, in all areas Christian Care responded to the widespread malnutrition in the PVs via a number of feeding schemes. This became one of the most important pillars of Christian Care's relief programme in the PVs.¹⁴² Based on the advice of health experts, allocations were made up of high protein foods and vitamin drinks that would be supplied to the children (including pronutro for under-fives and nutresco or maheo for schoolchildren) and protein rich foods including beans and nuts for adults.¹⁴³ It would appear that such a programme mirrored existing state sanctioned relief efforts made by the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign (RFFHC) and that of the Salvation Army discussed earlier in this dissertation. However, Christian Care maintained a distance from the state supported Freedom From Hunger Campaign, despite it being encouraged to link up with it. When, in March 1977, the US Christian charity World Vision made an offer of financial support to Christian Care for a feeding programme that would be carried out in cooperation with the RFFHC, Christian Care rejected the offer.¹⁴⁴ Perhaps such a collaboration would have largely duplicated the existing distribution networks which Christian Care had already established via the rural missions. However, the organization probably rejected the offer to maintain a distance from the Smith regime which the RFFHC was closely aligned. Christian Care had to be careful about collaborating with a state sanctioned feeding programme given its determination to affect a non-partisan stance and given its close relationship with Oxfam and Whitehall who later both distanced themselves from the RFFHC owing to its regime links. At any rate, Christian Care's aid philosophy was very different from that of the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign. It did not prioritise 'nutritional education' in its response to malnutrition in the PVs in marked contrast to the ideological approach taken by the RFFHC

¹⁴² Emergency Relief Committee, 'Minutes of the Meeting Held on 1 March 1977', M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Emergency Relief Committee, 'Minutes of the Meeting Held on 1 March 1977', M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol.2 = Box 975, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

whose stance inclined it somewhat to blame the victim for the situation. Christian Care's priorities were dictated overwhelmingly by practical measures regarding the distribution of relief supplies and a concern for the welfare of those who had been strategically resettled.

As the war escalated markedly, Christian Care had to focus on immediate relief of those affected by guerrilla action against the villages set up through strategic resettlement. In 1977, Christian Care played an important role monitoring to the situation in Mrewa after the consolidated villages there had been burned down by the guerrillas, with many of those affected fleeing to Salisbury (Harare).¹⁴⁵ (Photographs depicting burnt out PVs – see Fig. 1 and 2 – were taken by Roy Henson of Christian Care and forwarded on to the International Defence and Aid Fund.) Over and over, in several areas, Christian Care played an important role in rendering emergency assistance for those displaced by the destruction of the PVs. Hence in May 1978, in Mtoko, it provided clothing and blankets to particular families in Kawere PV whose homes had been destroyed.¹⁴⁶ In the same month in Mount Darwin, hundreds of blankets and over a hundred items of clothing from Christian Care were distributed by the Jesuit Father Gerhard Pieper to families from PVs who had been further impoverished through guerrilla attack. Indeed, May 1978, saw dozens of families from various PVs – at Mpunzamombe, Bvunsamombe, Jawara and in Chesa – variously provided with goods from Christian Care (clothes, blankets, food) to tide them over after they had lost property when the PVs they were confined to had been attacked by the guerrillas.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ 'Minutes of the Local Committee Meeting Held on Tuesday 20th September 1977', NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹⁴⁶ 'The Coordinator's Report, Salisbury Emergency Relief Committee Period May to June 1978', NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹⁴⁷ 'The Coordinator's Report, Salisbury Emergency Relief Committee Period May to June 1978', NAZ, MS 1191/3/4/2.



Fig 1 and 2 Protected Villages After Guerrilla Attacks taken by Roy Henson in NAZ M3 625/11.

Conclusion

To conclude, both Christian Care and Oxfam became important intermediaries for a range of Rhodesian and international organizations who had varying degrees of interface with strategic resettlement. Christian Care itself had been first created as an explicitly non-partisan vehicle to provide welfare to the victims of racial discrimination and political repression in Rhodesia. As shown, the work of its parent organization, the Christian Council of Rhodesian (CCR) had been stymied by the Rhodesian government due to the CCR's increasingly oppositional stance to the regime. Christian Care therefore deliberately maintained a strategy of avoiding overt criticism of the regime and instead prioritized practical humanitarian efforts over advocacy and thus operated at a distance from the CCR during the course of the war. In the protected villages, it was the relief programme of Christian Care, an organisation already linked to rural communities through its support for political detainees and its agricultural aid, that superseded the initially separate efforts of the various Churches' Interdenominational Committee. As shown, the work of that Committee had been hindered by the divisions amongst various Christian denominations. Indeed, the early relief efforts under the aegis of the Interdenominational Committee comprising the Anglicans, Catholics, Methodists and Salvation Army were beset by the parochialism of the various denominations (whether Anglicans, Catholics, Methodists or Salvationists) and their radically different stances towards white-settler rule and the nationalist guerrillas. Christian Care served as an important mediator between these often-conflicting denominational interests, and because of its non-partisan stance, it could act as an intercessor for them with the Rhodesian regime. This was the context in which its important connection with Oxfam emerged.

Oxfam played an important role in its own right making the facts of strategic resettlement known to the British government via Field Officers stationed in southern Africa who made frequent visits to Rhodesia to monitor the results of strategic resettlement as well as overseeing the relief efforts in the PVs. However, its response was fundamentally shaped by British foreign policy towards Rhodesia and its close relationship with Whitehall. Due to the obvious restrictions arising from the sanctions policy, Oxfam was unable to play a direct role in the relief efforts to the PVs and thus tended to render financial assistance to projects run by Rhodesian NGOs. It was in this context that Oxfam developed a close relationship with Christian Care: that organisation was an ideal intermediary because of its ability to maintain a distance from the regime and the values of white-settler culture whilst nevertheless avoiding overt criticism of these which allowed the organisation to maintain the necessary contact with the Rhodesian government which allowed it to access to the victims of strategic resettlement. Hence Christian Care was deemed as the most acceptable channel for several international organizations who were unable to operate directly in Rhodesia but who wished to provide significant financial and material support to the those forced into the protected villages. The role was especially important not only for the British government and Oxfam but equally for international Christian NGOs including Brot für die Welt (West Germany), Caritas, Cebemo (The Netherlands), Christian Aid (United Kingdom), the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Sweden), the United Methodists (United States) and most notably the World Council of Churches. Christian Care and its networks were also used by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Ultimately, Christian Care became a means by which these bodies could funnel aid to the victims of strategic resettlement and yet avoid providing resources to the Rhodesian government's counterinsurgency strategy. This chapter therefore casts light on some of the challenges of rendering humanitarian aid in areas controlled by a regime under international sanctions, having relevance for example to later

experiences such as the provision of humanitarian aid to Iraq under Saddam Hussein's regime when it was under sanctions between 1991 and 2003.¹⁴⁸ NGOs were used in a similar way following the imposition of targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe by the European Union and United States following the controversial election in 2002.¹⁴⁹

Oxfam was undoubtedly something of a pioneer in utilizing Christian Care in this way, not only providing it with financial backing but equally using the organisation in its monitoring of the drastic results of strategic resettlement. In fact, as has been shown, Oxfam shaped Christian Care, improving its financial accountability, reporting and communications in a situation where deficiencies were alienating international donors.

Nevertheless, Christian Care played a central role in aiding the victims of strategic resettlement. However, as shown, its relief work was underpinned by its relationship with rural missions (Catholic ones predominantly, but those of other denominations as well), not to mention local residence associations and even storekeepers. The funnel of aid from Christian Care fed these important channels to the residents of the PVs. This was vital, given the geographical scope of strategic resettlement and it was only through the network of missions and other entities that it could provide a comprehensive programme of emergency relief in the PVs. At the same time, Christian Care proved able to intervene on behalf of rural missions when their activity in the PVs was challenged by the Rhodesian authorities. Aside from this, the interventions and aid of Christian Care proved crucial to ensuring that medical outreach programmes to the PVs could continue despite the escalating war. Finally, Christian Care via their missionary partners were preeminent in aiding the victims of the guerrilla campaign

¹⁴⁸ <https://www.enonline.net/fex/4/iraq> [accessed 11:48 01/11/2021]. The International Red Cross became an important funnel of aid in the context of sanctions in Iraq.

<https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/57jqap.htm#a5> [accessed 11:48 01/11/2021],

¹⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Zimbabwe's Non-Governmental Organizations Bill: Out of Synchrony with SADC Standards and Threat to Civil Society Groups*, December 2004.

against strategic resettlement when the homes and property of those who had been forcibly resettled were targeted.

Despite the internal problems resulting from poor organisation (as in financial reporting) or ethnic and regional tensions, Christian Care was able to launch a far-reaching relief programme, partly by serving as a clearing house for international donors in a situation where not only sanctions, but strategies of Rhodesian forces and the guerrillas made it dangerous and even impossible for international NGOs to operate in rural areas. One of these NGOs was the International Committee of the Red Cross, an organisation for which it came to deputise when the ICRC temporarily withdrew their own relief personnel because of the extreme danger they faced. Like Christian Care, the ICRC developed a close relationship with rural missionaries via its relief efforts in the PVs. And like Christian Care and Oxfam, the Red Cross had to navigate and intercede in an increasingly delicate political and security situation in Rhodesia. However, as we will see, unlike Oxfam, the ICRC had a direct interface with the victims of strategic resettlement. The role of the ICRC, alongside that of the British and Rhodesian Red Cross societies, is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Red Cross, the War and Strategic Resettlement

The previous chapter has highlighted the internal intercessory and coordinating role played by Christian Care which served as the crucial means by which different Rhodesian churches and organisations – that were rivalrous or had different political orientations – as well as international NGOs could aid the victims of strategic resettlement in rural areas. Overlapping with Christian Care’s practical humanitarian efforts in this regard were those undertaken by both the Rhodesia Red Cross, which was dominated by the white-settler community though it was still under the aegis of the British Red Cross society, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC played an important overarching role and, as we will see, unlike other international organizations, which tended to operate through local organisations, it responded directly to the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the PVs during the war. Due to that direct involvement, the ICRC had to navigate the escalating guerrilla war in a way that no other international organisation did and, as this chapter will show, it sought to negotiate a code of conduct to ensure that humanitarian principles of conflict were observed by both the Rhodesian Security Forces and the guerrillas. In the end, both sides questioned the neutrality of the ICRC. This may have been inevitable to some degree, especially as the ICRC operated alongside the white-dominated Rhodesian Red Cross and had to work closely with the authorities to implement a comprehensive relief programme in the PVs. As we shall see, the Red Cross’s involvement in aiding the victims of strategic resettlement was complex, not least because of the relationship between its Rhodesian and international branches which had radically different stances to the white-settler regime.

The Red Cross and War

The nature of the Red Cross's involvement was shaped by a long and complex pre-war history. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Swiss organization, was founded by Jean-Henri Dunant, who was concerned with the prosecution of warfare after witnessing the Battle of Solferino in 1859. He advocated for the adoption of the Geneva Convention in 1864 to enable neutral field hospitals, ambulances, and medical staff to reach the battlefields and this formed the basis for the emerging Red Cross movement. By the First World War the ICRC became the largest humanitarian organization responsible for monitoring on the battlefield the application of the Geneva Convention which codified the laws of war and the treatment of prisoners of war.¹ During that conflict, the ICRC played a crucial role visiting and sending parcels to POWs, and tracing soldiers missing in action and co-ordinating the deployment of around 1,200 volunteers. Importantly for the purposes of this analysis, the ICRC also played a crucial role in raising concerns about the treatment of civilians who had been forcibly resettled in internment camps. Indeed, after the First World War, the ICRC provided aid to those displaced by both the conflict and the territorial changes that place across much of central and eastern Europe and the former Ottoman Empire.² Hence, when during the Zimbabwean Liberation War, the ICRC responded to displacement of the civilian population and made this a principal focus of its mission in the Rhodesian conflict, this was in keeping with an earlier history. Hence, when during the Zimbabwean Liberation War, the ICRC responded to displacement of the civilian population and made this a principal focus of its mission in the Rhodesian conflict, this was in keeping with an earlier history.

¹ Costas Douzinas, *Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of cosmopolitanism*, (New York, 2007), p.58.

² Gerald Steinacher, *Humanitarians at War: The Red Cross in the Shadow of the Holocaust*, (Oxford, 2017), pp.17,19.

During the interwar period, a number of important developments took place of relevance to the Red Cross movement. In 1919, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies was created to co-ordinate the various national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. In 1929, a new Geneva Convention was adopted which finally provided a legal basis for the protection of POWs.³ Unsurprisingly, the ICRC became one of the principal humanitarian responders during the Second World War (1939-1945) and one of the main conduits for humanitarian assistance to the prisoners of war.⁴ However, during this period a significant and probably the most controversial chapter in the ICRC's history emerged due to its perceived inaction with respect to the Nazi concentration camps, something which has some relevance for understanding how it later articulated with strategic resettlement in Rhodesia. Whilst the ICRC were undoubtedly aware of the treatment of the Jewish people in the concentration camps, concerns were raised in its ranks that disclosing such information would have compromised its neutral position which it required in order to gain access to the POWs.⁵ In fact, there were instances where the ICRC was manipulated by the Nazi propagandists as shown in the notorious positive reports written after Red Cross inspector Maurice Rossel visited the sanitized model camp in Czechoslovakia at Terezín (Theresienstadt) in June 1944.⁶ Additionally, there was the concurrent role played by the Nazified German Red Cross (DRK) which offered a well-nigh propagandistic rendering of the concentration camps which falsely and bizarrely claimed a high standard of living in them.⁷

Nevertheless, in response to the atrocities committed during the Second World War, the mandate of the ICRC was expanded with the ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

³ Steinacher, *Humanitarians at War: The Red Cross in the Shadow of the Holocaust*, pp.20-21.

⁴ Ronald W. Zweig, 'Feeding the Camps: Allied Blockade Policy and the Relief of Concentration Camps in Germany, 1944-1945', *The Historical Journal*, Volume. 41, no. 3 (1998), pp.825-851.

⁵ *The New York Times*, December 19th, 1996.

⁶ Sebastien Farré 'The ICRC and the Detainees in Nazi Concentration Camps', *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 94 Number 888 Winter 2012, p.1383.

⁷ <https://blog.oup.com/2017/07/132420/> [accessed 17:34 02/06/22].

These provided protections not only for wounded and captured military service personnel but also for civilians and this was enshrined in international law. As we will see later, this shaped the response of the ICRC to the Rhodesian conflict when it acted as an intermediary between the warring parties in seeking to ensure their adherence to the Geneva Conventions with respect to treatment of civilians. In fact, this had become a foremost role of the Red Cross in its general response to unconventional counterinsurgency warfare during the period of decolonization.

Thus, the Red Cross played an important role in responding to the unfolding humanitarian crises during the colonial emergencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Kenya (1952-1960) in which the British Red Cross Society was prominent in responding to the results of the enforced villagization programmes enacted as part of the British counterinsurgency. The British Red Cross Society was thus highly functional to the British colonial administrations in both Malaya and Kenya, in effect supporting the implementation of the respective villagization programmes in those countries.⁸ Both societies were proximate to the colonial regimes. The Kenyan branch of the British Red Cross in particular was patronized almost entirely by European settlers and its ethos illustrated its allegiance to the values of white-settler culture.⁹ White women especially played an important role overseeing the medical outreach and developmental counterinsurgency efforts in the protected villages.¹⁰ However, the ICRC itself played a rather limited role in the Kenyan Emergency. In fact, the British Red Cross and the colonial authorities initially forbade any intervention by the ICRC, and it was only in 1957 that the ICRC were granted access to Mau Mau detainees.¹¹

⁸ Hamzah Sendut, 'The Resettlement Villages in Malaya', *Geography*, 47, no. 1 (1962), pp.41-46. Emily Baughan, 'Rehabilitating an Empire: Humanitarian Collusion with the Colonial State during the Kenyan Emergency, Ca. 1954-1960', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol, 59, no. 1 (2020), pp.57-79.

⁹ Baughan, 'Rehabilitating an Empire: Humanitarian Collusion with the Colonial State during the Kenyan Emergency', pp.57-79.

¹⁰ Beth Rebisz 'Violent Reform: Gendered Experiences of Colonial Developmental Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1954-1960' (PhD Thesis, University of Reading, 2021).

¹¹ Nicolas Lanza, 'Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et le soulèvement des Mau-Mau au Kenya, 1952-1959', *Relations internationales*, 133.1: (2008), pp.91-110.

Interestingly, the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) also revealed significant divisions between various branches of the Red Cross. Unsurprisingly, the French Red Cross supported the authorities and rendered assistance to French military personnel.¹² On the other hand, the ICRC served as critical observers and decried the French prosecution of the war and the enforced regroupment policy that closely resembled the villagization programmes in Malaya and Kenya.¹³ However, from 1957 ICRC representatives in Algeria distributed emergency relief to those internally displaced and to those (mostly women and children) in the regroupment centres in partnership with the French Red Cross.¹⁴ At the same time, the indigenous led Algerian Red Crescent Society formed in 1957 unsurprisingly supported the FLN insurgents explicitly.¹⁵

Overall, the articulation of the various Red Cross branches with these various colonial emergencies reveals a range of (often conflicting) responses to counterinsurgency and the villagization programmes that would also be manifest in Red Cross involvement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War.

The Rhodesia Red Cross

The Rhodesian (now Zimbabwean) Red Cross Society was first established in 1921 and admitted into the IFRC in 1929.¹⁶ A Rhodesia Central Council Branch of the British Red Cross Society was formed a few years later in 1931.¹⁷ Eventually both came together and formed what was then known as the Rhodesia Red Cross. However, despite its relative autonomy, the

¹² Jennifer Johnson, 'The Limits of Humanitarianism: Decolonization, the French Red Cross, and the Algerian War.' In A. Dirk Moses, Marco Duranti and Roland Burke (eds), *Decolonization, Self-Determination, and the Rise of Global Human Rights Politics*, (Cambridge, 2020), pp. 79–108.

¹³ Françoise Perret, and François Bugnion. 'Between Insurgents and Government: The International Committee of the Red Cross's Action in the Algerian War (1954–1962)', *International Review of the Red Cross*, Volume 93, No. 883 (2011), pp. 707–42

¹⁴ Perret, and Bugnion. 'Between Insurgents and Government', p.725.

¹⁵ Johnson, 'The Limits of Humanitarianism: Decolonization', p.80.

¹⁶ <https://redcrosszim.org.zw/about/> [accessed 15:43 03/06/22].

¹⁷ Mr Pigget, 'Rhodesia Red Cross', 24th February 1976 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

Rhodesian Red Cross formally remained a branch of the British Red Cross until 1981 despite the sanctions regime following UDI.¹⁸ From its inception it relied heavily on the voluntary efforts and financial contributions of white members.¹⁹

To understand the nature of the Rhodesia Red Cross intervention in the protected villages set up by the security forces, we must first turn to the work it undertook in rural areas prior to the war. It provided a feeding scheme for children as well as support for an agricultural development programme between 1966 and 1969.²⁰ During this time it also launched a medical outreach programme which included a measles and polio vaccination scheme in rural areas and the provision of home nurses.²¹ Significantly, it drew on international connections in its work: with financial help from the British Red Cross and Oxfam, it was able to import thousands of doses of the measles vaccine.²² It also had a focus on medical training in rural areas and thus the Rhodesia Red Cross established the Westwood Training Centre located in Domboshava (Mashonaland East) in 1967.²³ This followed a decision of the council of the Rhodesia Red Cross to expand training where its divisions had hitherto not existed. In particular, it was aimed at training African women to run home nursing points in remote areas in the Tribal Trust Lands.²⁴ Once more, international connections proved crucial: construction of the centre was

¹⁸ British Red Cross Society, 'Report to the Council by the Director General on his visit to the Rhodesian General Council Branch, March/April 1978' in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

¹⁹ 'Summary of the Report made by Director General to a meeting of the Society Council on the 10th of October 1978' in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

²⁰ 'Rhodesia Red Cross Society, Rhodesia Girl Guides Association, Avila Mission, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe): measles vaccination programme; feeding scheme for children; agricultural development scheme, 1965-1969', MS. Oxfam PRF ZIM-G-009; 010; 011 in Oxford, Bodleian Library.

²¹ 'Rhodesia Red Cross, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe): vaccinations for measles and polio; provision of home nurses, 1966-1969' in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 002 A-C in Oxford, Bodleian Library

²² *The Rhodesia Herald*, 26th June 1967 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

²³ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 26th June 1967 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

²⁴ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 25th October 1968 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

only possible through the financial contributions of the British Red Cross Society,²⁵ while Oxfam made a significant financial contribution to construction and operational costs.²⁶

At Westwood, selected women would undertake a month-long intensive course which aimed at teaching preventative medicine and treatment for minor ailments.²⁷ The Rhodesia Red Cross thus played an important role in providing training and health education for African volunteers with a particular focus on first aid, hygiene, vaccinations, nutrition, and accident prevention. Between 1973 and 1974 nearly 9090 Red Cross certificates were issued to such volunteers.²⁸ The Westwood Training Centre – with its monthly intake of 56 new trainees for its 3 ½ week course – was important in reaching women principally from the Tribal Trust Lands (with the intention of disseminating knowledge to rural communities).²⁹ As we will see later, this facility played a crucial role in the medical outreach programme linked to strategic resettlement and was used to train Red Cross personnel who staffed medical posts created in the PVs.

With the outbreak of the war, the Rhodesia Red Cross continued to receive grants from the British Red Cross Society which provided almost R\$400,000 to set up seven field offices in the main centres throughout Rhodesia.³⁰ This grant made possible the establishment of offices in Bulawayo, Umtali, Marandellas, Inyanga, Fort Victoria, Gwelo and Salisbury, as also the training of seven permanent field officers for work throughout Rhodesia to respond to the escalating conflict.³¹ The role of the British Red Cross, however, extended beyond financial

²⁵ Paul Adams (Director, International Aid- British Red Cross) to Peter Freedman (Ministry of Overseas Development) 9th June 1978, BNA, FCO 37/2298.

²⁶ Rhodesia Red Cross, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe): running costs of Westwood Training Centre and its courses, 1967-1976 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 002 D; F in Oxford, Bodleian Library.

²⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 26th June 1967 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

²⁸ Rhodesia Red Cross, 'Rhodesia Red Cross in Action 1974', M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol 1 =Box 974 in Oxford, Bodleian Library.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ British Broadcasting Corporation, 3rd October 1978 in National Archives of Zimbabwe (Hereafter referred to as NAZ), MS 308/62/1.

³¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 3rd October 1978 in NAZ MS 308/61/1.

aid. It sought to ensure that its Rhodesian branch reflected the country's racial composition and made this a condition for ongoing financial support. As early as 1973, it was calling for increasing African representation in the management structures of the Rhodesia Red Cross.³² This was a matter of principle, but it was not long before it was seen as essential for the long-term future of the Red Cross in the country.

Developments in Angola and Mozambique – both achieved independence during the Zimbabwean Liberation War – marked an important turning point in this regard for it was recognised that their local Red Cross societies – which lacked indigenous leaders and membership – had been unable to adapt to the circumstances created by the large-scale white exodus from 1975.³³ During the war, then, the British Red Cross felt that the management structure of the local Red Cross had to come to proportionally reflect the country's racial composition and this was vital also for it to be recognized by the whole population following independence.³⁴ It was a precondition for the creation of an independent Zimbabwe Red Cross Society after the war.³⁵ Significant financing would be 'available' from Britain and Geneva, but it would not be forthcoming if the recipient Red Cross society was not independent and representative. Both the British Red Cross and the ICRC were firm on this point.³⁶ Equally it was pointed out that professional Africans (perhaps potential donors to the envisaged Zimbabwean Red Cross society) would not openly commit to an organization which remained

³² Anne Soper (B.R.C.S Field Delegate), Report on Visit 15th to 25th July 1973 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

³³ Mr A.B. Hodgson (Executive Director, British Red Cross), 'Report to Council', 15th April 1980 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/141, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 4 (1980).

³⁴ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 27th October 1978 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

³⁵ Paul Adams (Director of International Aid, British Red Cross) to Peter Freedman (Ministry of Overseas Development), 9th June 1978, BNA, FCO 37/2298 'International Committee of the Red Cross: Aid for Rhodesia' (1978).

³⁶ Rhodesia Red Cross, 'Minutes of Special Council Meeting Held on 20.9.78' in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

white dominated.³⁷ Immediately after the war and on the eve of Zimbabwean independence, the British Red Cross was stressing that Africanization of the Rhodesian Red Cross was important to ensure that the local branch was acceptable to the new majority rule government.³⁸ And, in fact, before the war, the British Red Cross had suggested that the ICRC perform a discreet background check that the African recruits to leadership positions were acceptable to the liberation movement.³⁹

The attempt to make the Red Cross in Rhodesia less white dominated was resisted to some degree. Throughout the war African members increased their presence in the operations of the Rhodesian society and by 1979 a total of 8,000 people had passed through the Westwood Red Cross Training Centre.⁴⁰ The incumbent white chairman Mr Brian O'Connell claimed that inclusion of African members had always been the policy of the Rhodesia Red Cross.⁴¹ But the fact remains that, until the late 1970s, the organisation remained a largely white-run organization with limited representation of African members at the managerial level.⁴² This was the context in which the British Red Cross successfully pushed for the promotion of several African members within the Rhodesia Red Cross Society. At the very highest level, John Kapetta was appointed joint director of the Rhodesia Red Cross headquarters, although it is important to note even with his promotion Kapetta still deputized for the incumbent white female director, Ruth Tucker, in 1977.⁴³ Later, in 1978, Pascal Midzi was appointed as deputy

³⁷ British Red Cross Society, 'Report to the Council by the Director General on his visit to the Rhodesian General Council Branch', March/April 1978 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

³⁸ Hodgson, Report to Council, 15th April 1980, British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/141, 19/17A (Z/3/3).

³⁹ British Red Cross, Aide Memory Rhodesian Development Plan, 14th June 1978 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

⁴⁰ R.A.C Byatt to Rosemary Spencer, 29th October 1979 in BNA FCO 36.2597 'International Committee of the Red Cross Involvement in the Rhodesia Problem' (1979).

⁴¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 26th January 1978 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁴² *The Rhodesia Herald*, 2nd February 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁴³ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 2nd February, 1977, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

director and Nahemiah Chapfika was appointed to lead the National Junior Red Cross.⁴⁴ The success of the Africanization policy varied by region. In some smaller centres, there was opposition: Mr R. Hobbs, a Rhodesia Red Cross official from Concession (Mashonaland Central), decried the policy and claimed that the white national president, vice-president, chairman, as well as the divisional chairmen of Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali (Mutare) had been compelled to resign under pressure from the British Red Cross. Interestingly, he highlighted the fact that the (white) treasurer had not been asked to resign, indicating his clearly racist attitude that black members were incapable of handling the branch's finances.⁴⁵ In fact, in the main urban centres of Salisbury and Bulawayo, the policy of Africanization was much more successful.

Probably the most bitter resistance to the new policy came from Umtali (Mutare) where there was considerable opposition from white members.⁴⁶ The stance of the Umtali division is unsurprising as it actively supported the local counterinsurgency operations, providing two ambulances to take wounded Security Force personnel to hospital when the government ambulances were unavailable.⁴⁷ The resistance to Africanisation in Umtali may also have had something to do with the Rhodesia Red Cross's divisional chairman there, Mr Tom Gargan. He was clearly hostile to the British Red Cross, and claimed that it had threatened to withdraw funding and recognition from the Rhodesian society, while terminating his membership after prolonged efforts by the British Red Cross and Rhodesian officials to persuade him to resign had failed.⁴⁸ Gargan apparently had close links with the government and in particular the

⁴⁴ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 26th January 1978 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁴⁵ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 27th October 1978, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁴⁶ R.A.C Byatt to Rosemary Spencer, 29th October 1979 in BNA FCO 36.2597.

⁴⁷ Red Cross, Minutes of the Divisional Representatives Meeting Held in the Jameson Hotel, 8th April 1978 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

⁴⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 14th November 1978, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

Foreign Affairs ministry.⁴⁹ His influence affected the Government's attitude towards the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁵⁰ Indeed, the ICRC was often met with hostility by (white) members of the Rhodesia Red Cross.⁵¹ As we will see, the tension with the ICRC was unsurprising as the latter had earlier embarked on a radically different trajectory from the local Red Cross in terms of the nature of its involvement in Rhodesia where it had earlier prioritized ministering to political detainees.

The International Committee of the Red Cross and the War

From as early as 1959, the ICRC played an important role rendering humanitarian assistance to political detainees in Rhodesia, in this way acting alongside Christian Care. People they aided included those who had been detained in 1961 under the Emergency Regulations.⁵² However, this work became especially important with the onset of the war. During October 1973, several ICRC representatives visited and provided relief supplies to 289 persons detained under the new wave of Emergency Regulations at Marandellas, Salisbury, Que Que, Wha Wha, Shabani, Sengwe, Buffalo Range and Chikurubi. The delegates were able to speak freely to all the inmates without the presence of the authorities. Like Christian Care, in order to be able to continue this work the ICRC had to maintain a working relationship with the regime. Still, the ICRC pushed for improvement for conditions in the detention camps. Following their visit in October 1973, the delegates met the Secretary for Justice and the

⁴⁹ Rhodesia Red Cross, BRCS Delegate Report Week Ending', February 2nd, 1979, in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

⁵⁰ Rhodesia Red Cross, 'Delegate Report Executive Meeting, 23rd February 1979 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

⁵¹ British Red Cross, 'Report from BRCS Delegate Rhodesia' 15th November 1978 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3) British Red Cross Assistance to the Rhodesian Red Cross, Volume 1 (1973-1979).

⁵² Comite International De La Croix-Rogue (International Committee of the Red Cross), 'Report on ICRC Activities in Southern Africa', 14th February 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069 'International Committee of the Red Cross' (1977).

Secretary for Law and Order to discuss potential improvements to the situation of the detainees. They challenged the regime through probing questions regarding visits to 30-day detainees and to charged or convicted prisoners whom the ICRC had not been permitted to visit but whom they wished to extend their support.⁵³ The ICRC also proposed to carry out a 20,000 Swiss Franc programme of material assistance to detainees.⁵⁴

Despite the ever-widening war, the ICRC was able to continue its work with detainees. For example, a regional and medical delegation for Southern Africa was able to visit the Khami and Salisbury prisons in November 1974, allowing the ICRC to function as a critical observer of the political detention programme in Rhodesia. Following the visits to the detention centres, the ICRC presented its findings and suggestions to the director of the Prison Department and reports were sent to the Minister of Justice.⁵⁵ Throughout the war, the ICRC continued its bi-annual visits to the detainees, arranging relief supplies and family visits for them. It continued to report their findings regarding the detainees directly and in confidence to the regime.⁵⁶ This was in keeping with its desire to be considered a neutral observer of the war.

The ICRC tried to ensure that the principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were observed in the context where grave human rights abuses were committed by both sides during the Rhodesian conflict. It had played a similar role in the Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960) and the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62) during which it had attempted to ensure that minimum humanitarian norms were adhered to on the basis of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention.⁵⁷ Similarly, during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) the ICRC had

⁵³ International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC in Action: Information Notes, 5th December 1973 in NAZ MS 589/7/6.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC in Action: Information Notes, 20th December 1974 in NAZ MS 589/7/6.

⁵⁶ P.J Hurr (Rhodesia Department) to V McGee (Ministry of Overseas Development), 13th October 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069 'International Committee of the Red Cross' (1977).

⁵⁷ Fabian Klose, 'The Colonial Testing Ground: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Violent End of Empire', *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism*,

established a code of conduct for combatants, in this case drawing on African customary law as well.⁵⁸ The ICRC pressed for the Rhodesian regime to recognize the prisoner-of-war (POW) status of the guerrilla fighters. The Foreign Minister, P.K Van der Byl claimed that captured guerrillas were being granted POW status but the regime's overall military commander, Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, confirmed that they were not.⁵⁹ In this situation, the ICRC pressed to be granted facilities for visiting and rendering material support to captured guerrillas.⁶⁰ It also made frequent representations to the regime regarding the execution of suspected guerrillas.⁶¹

The work of the International Committee of the Red Cross in all these matters was complicated by the complex political and legal questions surrounding the Rhodesian conflict. The illegal Smith regime could not ratify the principles of international conventions though it could still declare its intention to abide by them.⁶² Equally, ambiguity surrounded the legal status of the guerrilla fighters who did not belong to a state army and were, therefore, on some readings not formally combatants.⁶³ However, guerrillas also had been granted rights of POWs under a new article added to the 1949 Geneva Convention.⁶⁴ But the Rhodesian authorities simply regarded the insurgents as criminals violating common law.⁶⁵ Significantly, the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith himself rejected any moves to grant the guerrillas POW status on the grounds of their "rebellion against the legally constituted and elected government

and Development, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011, pp. 107-126.

⁵⁸ Call on Sir A Duff by ICRC Representative' [Frank Schmidt], 15th March 1978 in BNA, FCO 36/2069 'International Committee of the Red Cross' (1977).

⁵⁹ P.J Hurr to V. McGree 13th October 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

⁶⁰ Message from Alexandre Hay (President of International Committee of the Red Cross) to Julius Nyere, Samora Machel, Kenneth Kaunda, Agostino Neto, Seretse Khama, Ian Smith, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe, Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithole, Ambassador I. Richard (Great Britain Permanent mission Geneva), 17th January 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069 'International Committee of the Red Cross' (1977).

⁶¹ P.J Hurr to V. McGree, 13th October 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

⁶² 'Call on Sir A Duff by ICRC Representative [Frank Schmidt]', 15th March 1978 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

⁶³ Comité International De La Croix-Rouge (International Committee of the Red Cross), 'Report on ICRC Activities in Southern Africa', 14th February 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069 'International Committee of the Red Cross' (1977).

⁶⁴ *The Rhodesia Herald*, April 23rd, 1977, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁶⁵ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 27th February 1978 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

of their country” and on account of their “brutal and inhuman murders of innocent black and white civilians”.⁶⁶

At the Geneva Conference of 1976-7, where the Smith regime and the nationalists met to discuss a solution to the conflict, the ICRC encouraged the parties to adhere to the basic principles of the existing humanitarian law and to follow basic humanitarian principles in their prosecution of the war. Quite specifically, it appealed to all sides to adhere to the principles of the Geneva Convention which broadly stipulated the protection of civilians, those wounded, medical personnel as well as those who had surrendered or were taken as prisoners of war. Any accused of crimes were to be granted fair legal representation and not subjected to torture or any other forms of cruel punishment. Under the Convention, it was also forbidden to use weapons or tactics likely to cause unnecessary suffering and loss of life.⁶⁷ However, even after these principles had been outlined to the combatants, it is clear that none of the parties gave a meaningful undertaking to observe the principles as evidenced by the countless atrocities carried out by both sides and as outlined in the earlier survey chapter.

Still, the ICRC particularly reached out to representatives of the liberation movement with the aim of drawing up a code of conduct for the insurgent forces.⁶⁸ The nationalist factions responded differently to the ICRC’s appeal, with the organization able to secure an agreement in principle from Joshua Nkomo who informed ZIPRA guerrillas that they would be expected to carry a card on their persons stating the basic points of the ICRC code of conduct.⁶⁹ However,

⁶⁶ Hansard: House of Assembly, Vol.97 No.5. 28th September,1977 in NAZ MS 311/27/2.

⁶⁷ Comite International De La Croix-Rogue (International Committee of the Red Cross), ‘Report on ICRC Activities in Southern Africa’, 14th February 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

⁶⁸ Message from Alexandre Hay (President of International Committee of the Red Cross) to Julius Nyere, Samora Machel, Kenneth Kauanda, Agostino Neto, Seretse Khama, Ian Smith, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugade, Bishop Muzorewa, Reverend Sithold, Ambassador I. Richard (Great Britain Permanent mission Geneva), 17th January 1977; Comite International De La Croix-Rogue, ‘Report on ICRC Activities in Southern Africa 14th February 1977, ‘Call on Sir A Duff by ICRC Representative’ [Frank Schmidt], 15th March 1978 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

⁶⁹ P.J Hurr to V. McGree 13th October 1977 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Rhodesia Zimbabwe Conflict: ICRC Appeal’, 28th January 1976 in 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069 ‘International Committee of the Red Cross’ (1977).

in practice these principles were largely ignored by the ZIPRA insurgents. It was not, for example, ZAPU policy to take prisoners in combat. No agreement at all was struck with ZANLA. Indeed, Mugabe was unwilling to ratify the Geneva Convention due to the nature of the guerrilla war.⁷⁰ Indeed, ZANU did not co-operate with the ICRC and did not offer any details about prisoners they had taken or held.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the ICRC appealed to the insurgents to cease all attacks against the civilian population in the war-affected areas including the burning of villages and "protected villages".⁷²

The International Committee of the Red Cross was undoubtedly faced with the difficulty of proving to both sides that they were neutral. On one hand, the government accused the ICRC of actually supporting the insurgents. This is unsurprising as there were instances where the ICRC had provided medical assistance to the guerrillas.⁷³ However, the guerrillas could also view ICRC activities as an extension of government operations.⁷⁴ As we shall see, the local Red Cross's practical relief efforts were of clear utility to the strategy of strategic resettlement of the regime and this could incline nationalists to view the ICRC askance. In fact, the Rhodesian Security Forces had started to use the Red Cross emblem on their ambulances to identify them as medical vehicles.⁷⁵ In theory, this symbol was a mark of neutrality as per the principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention and therefore to be used only for vehicles of non-aligned organizations. The Rhodesia Red Cross had, in fact, made strenuous efforts to distinguish its activities in the war zone from those of the Government specifically by marking its food and medical supplies with the Red Cross emblem.⁷⁶ Later, in 1979, an agreement

⁷⁰ F.A Wilson to Rhodesia Department 31st October 1978 in BNA FCO 36/2298 'International Committee of the Red Cross: Aid for Rhodesia' (1978)

⁷¹ P.J Hurr to V. McGree 13th October 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

⁷² International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, April 1979.

⁷³ F.A Wilson to Rhodesia Department 31st October 1978 in BNA FCO 36/2298.

⁷⁴ R.A.C Byatt to Rosemary Spencer, 29th October 1979 in BNA FCO 36/2597 'Involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the Rhodesia problem'.

⁷⁵ *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 29th, 1977, NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁷⁶ *The Guardian*, 8th March 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

between the ICRC and the Ministry of Health allowed all civilian medical vehicles and staff to operate under the Swiss insignia.⁷⁷ For the ICRC, this was acceptable under the Geneva Convention on the proviso that the vehicles were used to transport wounded or sick persons. At an earlier point of the war, such a move had been opposed by Dame Molly Gibbs (President of the Matabeleland Branch of the Rhodesia Red Cross) who made it clear that the emblem should not be used on any vehicle that did not belong to the Red Cross.⁷⁸ In fact, the use of Red Cross insignia perhaps because government vehicles, as pointed out, had used it would not be a protective shield.. This is clearly highlighted by the events of May 19th, 1978, when three Red Cross personnel were killed by ZANLA guerrillas near Nyamaropa (Manicaland).⁷⁹ Those killed had been travelling in a clearly marked vehicle. However, some guerrillas evidently saw this as having a clear association with the Smith regime.⁸⁰ It was claimed that the guerrillas who murdered the ICRC personnel had asserted that they had no intention of killing the Red Cross personnel but had been targeting European Security Force personnel in the area.⁸¹

A crisis was reached with the ICRC itself suggesting that the guerrillas had a deliberate strategy to cripple the humanitarian mission of the organisation in Rhodesia due to an alleged association with the government.⁸² Consequently, the ICRC temporarily abandoned its operations in the country.⁸³ However, after this ICRC personnel reportedly managed to establish a fair working relationship with guerrillas in certain places. For example, some of its relief workers were warned to avoid certain roads that had been mined.⁸⁴ One ICRC field officer, a Mr Chapfika, was seemingly able to travel freely around the Kariba area without fear

⁷⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 22nd June 1979 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁷⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald*, January 29th, 1977, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

⁷⁹ *The Guardian* 14th November 1978.

⁸⁰ F.A Wilson to Rhodesia Department, 31st October 1978 in BNA FCO 36/2298.

⁸¹ W.E Rous to Miss Spencer (Rhodesia Department), 14th June 1978 in BNA FCO 36 2297, 'International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC): aid for Rhodesia' (1978).

⁸² International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Serious Threat to the Red Cross Mission' [Press Release], 25th May 1978 in FCO 36 2297, 'International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC): aid for Rhodesia' (1978).

⁸³ *The Rand Daily Mail*, 7th September 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁸⁴ F.A Wilson to Rhodesia Department, 31st October 1978 in BNA FCO 36/2298.

of attacks from the guerrillas in an area close to where one of the Viscounts had been shot down by ZIPRA guerrillas in February 1979. He was also not restricted by the Rhodesian Army.⁸⁵

In general, however, Red Cross personnel often faced extreme danger. In Victoria (Masvingo Province), the local Red Cross field worker, a Mr Ndlovu, was given what was called the “no-go” by the ‘boys’ (guerrillas). This might be attributed to the fact the local Rhodesia Red Cross branch was largely white (especially around Chiridezi) and to the fact that the programme in Fort Victoria operated from a Government building.⁸⁶ In Inyanga (Nyanga) (Manicaland province), the field officer had to travel around by bicycle due to the guerrilla strategy of mining roads which made it unsafe to travel by car in the Tribal Trust Lands.⁸⁷ Later, the ICRC district office in Inyanga was forced to close when the local African representative was abducted by the guerrillas.⁸⁸ ICRC personnel rarely stayed in rural area overnight because of the danger of being killed by the guerrillas.⁸⁹ Road journeys were dangerous but travelling by aeroplane offered no guarantee of safety. In March 1979 the ICRC medical teams had to suspend all their journeys to St Theresa’s Mission (located near Rusape, Manicaland) after an incident that saw one of their planes hit by bullets.⁹⁰ In August 1979, it also had to temporarily suspend flights to Silveira Mission (Victoria Province) as trenches had been dug into the airstrips presumably by the guerrillas to hinder Security Force operations in the area.⁹¹ In fact,

⁸⁵ Sue Quinn (British Red Cross), ‘Red Cross Delegates Report Weekend 18th February 1979’ in Rhodesia Red Cross, ‘Delegate Report Executive Meeting, 23rd February 1979 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3).

⁸⁶ Rhodesia Red Cross, ‘BRCs Delegate Report Week Ending’, February 2nd, 1979, in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3).

⁸⁷ Rhodesia Red Cross, ‘Delegate Report Executive Meeting, 23rd February 1979 in British Red Cross Archive, RCC/1/12/4/136, 19/17A (Z/3/3).

⁸⁸ R.A.C Byatt to Rosemary Spencer, 29th October 1979 in BNA FCO 36/2597.

⁸⁹ *Commerce*, December 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁹⁰ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross), 3rd April 1979 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

⁹¹ ICRC Text to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross), 28th August 1979 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

some regions which could only be reached by road became so dangerous that they had to be abandoned by ICRC personnel.⁹²

Nevertheless, despite guerrilla actions against its mission and the context of curfews and no-go areas imposed by the Rhodesian army, the ICRC still played a crucial role in filling the gap in rural medicine towards the end of the war. Government clinics had become targets of the guerrillas who were determined to destroy all official administration.⁹³ In this context, the work of the ICRC was important. As an important precaution, ICRC delegates largely travelled by air.⁹⁴

However, not only did it utilize air transport, but it also operated a distinctive fleet of marked vehicles which included nine mine-protected vehicles supplied to various areas.⁹⁵ By 1979, the ICRC was employing 57 African paramedical personnel who worked in 27 rural dispensaries in the Tribal Trust Lands (the zones in which the PVs were located), and they treated 16,000 patients every month. Moreover, ICRC mobile medical teams made periodical visits to mission dispensaries and hospitals dealing with around 2,600 patients every month.⁹⁶ In the single month of March 1979, the ICRC medical teams treated a total of 2,777 out-patients, undertook 31 major operations and 90 others involving minor surgery.⁹⁷

The Red Cross and Strategic Resettlement

⁹² *The Rand Daily Mail*, 7th September 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁹³ According to government statistics, from 1975 to 1978 100 rural clinics had been attacked and, 71 closed. In the same period 14 country hospitals were closed and 17 more were operating at reduced level. *The Guardian* 8th March 1978 in NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁹⁴ *Commerce*, December 1978, NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁹⁵ *Commerce*, December 1978, NAZ MS 308/62/1.

⁹⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, June 1979.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Despite their markedly different stances towards the regime, the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the PVs required an important collaboration between the ICRC and the Rhodesian Red Cross. This was initially demonstrated by the first aid post scheme. This medical outreach programme was intended to provide medical training for female inmates in the PVs and was proposed in 1974 by ICRC delegate Andre Beaud. To begin with, the programme, was not part the official strategy of the Rhodesia Red Cross but it was tasked to run it and, in fact, many women in the protected villages enrolled on their own initiative for the preventative health education that the programme provided.⁹⁸ The first aid posts were necessitated by the escalating war situation as government run clinics had either ceased operating or the medical staff had resigned. Most importantly most medical services were some distance from the rural population that had been forcibly resettled in the PVs and away from their original lands.⁹⁹

Operating from the recently established Westwood Training Centre, the Rhodesia Red Cross trained African women to administer basic first aid for cuts, burns, abrasions and to treat minor ailments including diarrhoea, eye infections, coughs, and headaches.¹⁰⁰ In doing so they played a role in providing frontline medical treatment in isolated rural areas where doctors had been withdrawn for reasons of safety.¹⁰¹ The scheme sought particularly to ensure that at least some medical care could be provided in the operational areas which were often difficult and dangerous to reach by road.¹⁰² Initially about a score of women from Mashonaland and Manicaland were being given elementary medical training,¹⁰³ though it was envisaged that

⁹⁸ Miss Tucker (Director of Rhodesian Red Cross to Miss M.E Nares Director Overseas Branches Department from 4th May 1977 in NAZ MS 628/7.

⁹⁹ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.372.

¹⁰⁰ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.372.

¹⁰¹ Comite International De La Croix-Rouge (International Committee of the Red Cross', 'Southern Africa Budget 1st January- 30th April 1978 and Situation Report No.3. April to December 1977 in NAZ MS 628/7. ¹⁰² *The Rhodesia Herald* 2nd September 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁰² *The Rhodesia Herald*, 2nd September 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

more than double this number would be trained.¹⁰⁴ Basic initial equipment was provided, including medicines, containers, cleaning materials and uniforms. Monthly remuneration for nurses would also be paid at a total cost \$7564,00. Overall, the ICRC projected costs to be in the region of 40,700 Swiss Frs which it would provide to the Rhodesian Red Cross.¹⁰⁵ The first-aid posts were first trialled (successfully) in Marembi Protected Village in Mudzi district.¹⁰⁶ Westwood Training Centre held courses in August 1977 and November 1977 which saw 24 women provided with the requisite skills.¹⁰⁷ Later 19 more women would be trained which enabled the Red Cross to open an additional 14 first aid posts in the PVs.¹⁰⁸

The intervention required an important collaboration between the Rhodesia Red Cross (RRC) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Intaf) if this medical outreach programme could respond, in however, limited a way to the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the PVs.¹⁰⁹ Undoubtedly, like other programmes outlined throughout this dissertation, the scheme was of clear utility to the regime's counterinsurgency efforts. Indeed, District Commissioners – who oversaw the implementation and running of the villagization programme – were encouraged to take advantage of this scheme in order to expand medical provision in the PVs.¹¹⁰ And they were to do so. For example, Keep Commander Simon Pitt had sought to create a fully equipped clinic for the treatment of minor injuries inside his PV at Marembe. This was because the nearby Dendera Clinic was located 4km away which made it impossible for most of the minor ailments to be treated there, especially given the wartime conditions. Moreover, that clinic was

¹⁰⁴ Miss Tucker to Miss M.E Nares, 4th May 1977 in NAZ MS 628/7.

¹⁰⁵ ICRC, Annex No: 2 ICRC Budget 1st January to 30th April 1978' in NAZ MS 628/7.

¹⁰⁶ A.B Yardley 'Red Cross Posts in Protected Villages', 5th July 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Comite International De La Croix-Rouge (International Committee of the Red Cross), Southern Africa Budget 1st January- 30th April 1978 and Situation Report No.3. April to December 1977 in NAZ MS 628/7.

¹⁰⁹ R.C Wollacott, 'Protected Villages: Co-ordinating of Matters Concerning Health/Hygiene/Nutrition, etc.', 5th April 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/38.

¹¹⁰ A.B Yardley, 'Red Cross Posts in Protected Villages', 5th July 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

affected by a shortage of trained nursing staff and the high cost of the necessary equipment.¹¹¹ He therefore sought the first aid training provided by the Red Cross Westwood Training Centre in Domboshava and this was arranged by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹¹² In fact, the Ministry of Health had identified the important need for clinics in most of the PVs and recognized that much of this work could be outsourced to non-government organizations or mission hospitals. Originally, the Ministry had planned to launch a similar scheme but this was shelved due to resource constraints arising from the rapid expansion of the villagization programme.¹¹³

In effect, the Rhodesia Red Cross, enabled by the funds of the ICRC, was deputizing for the Ministries of Health and Internal Affairs by establishing medical posts in the PVs.¹¹⁴ In fact, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had a certain oversight over the training process, local councils and committees in the PVs would recommend candidates for interview to receive the medical training.¹¹⁵ A Red Cross medical trainee required approval from the established spiritual leader of a given community or 'kraal' as it was often referred to and if the villagers disapproved of her, they would not go to her for treatment or attend any medical lesson she provided.¹¹⁶ However, the final selection process was in the hands of state employed Provincial Community Development Officers (PCDOs).¹¹⁷ For example, PCDO Maia Chenux- Repond was crucial in the selection interviews for the Red Cross posts in the Mudzi district.¹¹⁸ She visited the PVs in Gozi, Chikwizo and Nymande in that district and conducted interviews in

¹¹¹ Simon Pitt (Keep Commander Marambe Protected Village, Mtoko) to Maia Chenux Repond (Provincial Community Development Officer), 20th December 1976 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ A.B Yardley 'Red Cross Posts in Protected Villages', 5th July 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹¹⁴ A.B Yardley 'Red Cross Posts in Protected Villages', 5th July 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹¹⁵ Maia Chenux Repond, *Leading From Behind: Women in Community Development in Rhodesia, 1973-1979*, (Harare, 2017), p. 372.

¹¹⁶ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.374.

¹¹⁷ A.B Yardley 'Red Cross Posts in Protected Villages', 5th July 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹¹⁸ Chenux Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.47.

July 1977.¹¹⁹ It was Repond who then assessed whether the candidates were suitable and acceptable to the village population.¹²⁰

However, despite the important role played by the officers of the Community Development section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the selection process, the Rhodesia Red Cross technically maintained the right to veto any decision made regarding the medical outreach programme in the PVs. Indeed, the Director of the Rhodesia Red Cross had the ultimate power to accept or reject any of the applications to enrol for the training, to withhold certificates from any who did not pass the end of course examination and to replace trainees if they were considered unsuitable for the position.¹²¹ Ruth Tucker, the Director, had made it clear that the medical posts had to be configured to her specification in order to receive medical supplies from the Rhodesia Red Cross.¹²²

Finally, it should be noted that there were several difficulties that affected the selection and interview process for the trainees at the heart of the first aid post scheme, as the evidence from Mudzi suggests. The village committees set up under the authority of a headman (or kraalhead) were not briefed before the arrival of PCDO Chenaux-Repond and transport difficulties also hampered the selection procedure.¹²³ Guerrilla attacks on the PVs meant that the District Commissioner's office was unable to arrange safe movement, and this made it impossible for Chenaux-Repond to keep to her intended interview schedule.¹²⁴ Many candidates were unavailable for interview as they were labouring in the fields which were often located a considerable distance from the PVs. Moreover, those women recommended for

¹¹⁹ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.372.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, pp, 372,376.

¹²² Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.376.

¹²³Ministry of Internal Affairs (Community Development Section) 'Red Cross Centers: Protected and Consolidated Villages Mashonaland East Applicants for August Course (1977) in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹²⁴ Maia Chenaux-Repond (Provincial Community Development Office), 'Red Cross Centres: Protected and Consolidated Villages Mashonaland East Applicants for August Course (1977) in NAZ MS 1287/37.

interview were – like most female inmates in the PVs – pressed by having to carry out domestic chores when returning to their homes.¹²⁵ It also needs to be noted that, so far as the all-male village committees were concerned, only unmarried women were eligible for the medical training. Many married women who had received some education (and who were, therefore, ideal candidates for the scheme) were unable to go for training due to this or owing to the opposition of their husbands. Such factors led to the medical training starting later for some women which could delay the establishment of a first-aid post by a few months.¹²⁶

Despite these difficulties, the Red Cross medical post scheme was implemented from September 1977 when the first trainees took up their positions in PVs the Mudzi district. Mtoko soon followed. Red Cross dispensaries were particularly important for the communities in the protected villages in both of these districts which by this stage were particularly exposed to military action; the scheme thus enabled medical provision to continue there.¹²⁷ Later additional posts were opened to serve people in PVs in the Centenary, Chiweshe and Mount Darwin areas.¹²⁸ Thus, the medical post scheme was confined to the Mashonaland area and was somewhat experimental and restricted to particular districts of Mashonaland. Nevertheless, it reached thousands of inmates who otherwise would not have access to medical provision due to the war situation.

However, the nature of this Red Cross intervention was such that it placed significant onus on the inmates in the PVs to run the scheme. Early on in Marembe PV (Mashonaland East) — where the initiative had been trialed — the scheme was largely run by the villagers themselves.¹²⁹ As the scheme was due to be rolled out in the PVs, inmates were required to

¹²⁵ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.373.

¹²⁶ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, pp.372-3.

¹²⁷ Comité International De La Croix-Rouge 'Southern Africa Budget 1st January- 30th April 1978 and Situation Report No.3. April to December 1977 in NAZ MS 628/7.

¹²⁸ ICRC, *International Review of the Red Cross*, November 1977.

¹²⁹ Simon Pitt to Maia Chenaux Repond, 20th December 1976 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

make the necessary arrangements for suitable premises and to pay (if not the full cost) for medical treatments at the first aid posts. Initially it had been proposed that adults would pay 20 cents and children ten cents for every ten treatments. The Red Cross trainees were required to keep a record of all treatments and charges made. 50% of the takings would be used to fund the necessary furnishings for the medical posts in the PVs, while re-supply of essential inputs would be arranged by the ICRC.¹³⁰ However, given the widespread dispossession and socio-economic hardship inflicted due to strategic resettlement it is more than likely that many were unable to afford even this relatively low fee for medical treatment.

As to the specific role of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this scheme, it was extensive. It designated a two-member team which was to monitor the activities and effectiveness of the first aid posts as soon as they were opened.¹³¹ From the end of October 1977, a pediatrician and nurse specializing in public health joined that ICRC delegation in Rhodesia whose main function was to supervise the first posts set up by the Rhodesian Red Cross.¹³² An ICRC specialist, Dr Russbach, meanwhile carried out a survey of the medical and health problems in the PVs. ICRC medical personnel, then, who were mobile supervised the first-aid workers at Red Cross posts in the PVs.¹³³ They also co-ordinated the supply of ICRC medicaments to the various mission hospitals and dispensaries.¹³⁴

As the scale of its work increased in Rhodesia, so did the number of personnel employed by the ICRC. There were around 30 by the end of 1977,¹³⁵ but this number more than tripled rapidly so that by December 1978, there were 23 employees from overseas (four

¹³⁰ A.B Yardley 'Red Cross Posts in Protected Villages', 5th July 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹³¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 2nd September 1977 in NAZ MS 308.

¹³² *The Rhodesia Herald* 2nd September 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers', Comite International De La Croix-Rouge 'Southern Africa Budget 1st January- 30th April 1978 and Situation Report No.3. April to December 1977 in NAZ MS 628/7.

¹³³ International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, October; November 1977.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ P.J Hurr to V. McGree 13th October 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

from Scandinavia and the rest Swiss), and 80 locally recruited black Rhodesians who are responsible for the bulk of contact on the ground when it came to distributing relief supplies to the local population. The Red Cross teams enabled by the ICRC operated out of four centres located in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali (Mutare) and Fort Victoria (Masvingo).¹³⁶ To give one a sense of the reach of its work in the war zone: by the end of 1977, three new medical clinics were established in the far east of the country in Inyanga; they were equipped and inspected by ICRC medical teams.¹³⁷ This was particularly important given the disruption and eventual breakdown of the Salvation Army's medical outreach programme in the area. Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross played a crucial role in reinforcing medical infrastructure in Chiweshe: in May 1979, it agreed to assist the Rhodesia Red Cross there with ambulances, driver, nurses and medicines.¹³⁸ In November 1979, the war about to end, two further ICRC clinics were completed in Chiweshe in PVs 14 and 17, and here there was close co-operation between the Red Cross and the residents to expedite the work.¹³⁹

This is not to say that the ICRC's work was not disrupted during the final escalation of the guerrilla war and the counterinsurgency. In 1979, the war situation deteriorated so significantly that many relief operations became simply untenable: in August of that year, the ICRC clinic in Mzarabani PV was temporarily closed for this reason.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in this final year of the war, the ICRC continued to provide medical relief to the victims of strategic resettlement. For example, it was central to the opening of a clinic in Madziwa TTL to increase medical coverage in the area: this was the facility opened in Bveke PV (Mount Darwin District), with each village community (or kraal) contributing towards costs and materials

¹³⁶ *Commerce*, December 1978, NAZ MS 308/62/1.

¹³⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, December 1977.

¹³⁸ 'Report from International Committee of the Red Cross (Salisbury Delegation)', 24th May 1979 in BNA FCO 36/2597.

¹³⁹ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross), 23rd November 1979, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

¹⁴⁰ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross), 16th August 1979, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759.

equally.¹⁴¹ The clinic was staffed by ICRC personnel and Red Cross trainees and provided medical care for the 10,000 local inhabitants who had been without any medical facilities after the Karanda Mission Hospital had closed due to the war. The clinic's work was supplemented by the labours of an ICRC mobile medical team who visited the clinic every fortnight.¹⁴² It might be noted that the ICRC were able to concentrate their efforts where they were most needed through a scaling back of its medical outreach work in parts of the Victoria (Masvingo) province in May 1979 as the state's provincial health authorities opened new clinics in the PVs in the Sabi Valley. This enabled the ICRC clinics in the Matuku, Machiona and Veneka PVs to be closed.¹⁴³

The work of the International Committee of the Red Cross was not limited to its medical outreach initiatives; it involved as well a general relief programme. Already, by the mid-point of the war, the ICRC was ministering to around 400,000 people in the PVs.¹⁴⁴ By April 1979, it had spent a total of 3,551,524 Swiss Frs in Rhodesia. Much of this must have been on administration and salaries, but over half a million francs was spent directly on medical aid but almost three times that amount was spent on relief supplies mainly destined for the PVs.¹⁴⁵

Much of this relief was geared to dealing with the acute hunger resulting from strategic resettlement. There was a parallel here with the Red Cross's efforts during the Emergency in colonial Kenya: the distribution of high protein food stuffs had been an important feature of its relief efforts in the equivalent of the PVs during the Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1960).¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Report from International Committee of the Red Cross (Salisbury Delegation), 24th May 1979, in BNA FCO 36/2597 'International Committee of the Red Cross Involvement in the Rhodesia Problem' (1979).

¹⁴² International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, March 1979.

¹⁴³ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross) 16th August 1979, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759.

¹⁴⁴ Comité International De La Croix-Rouge (International Committee of the Red Cross), 'Report on ICRC Activities in Southern Africa', 14th February 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

¹⁴⁵ *New African*, April 1979 in NAZ MS 308/62/2.

¹⁴⁶ Beth Rebisz, 'Nyeri, 1957: "Mamas", Milk and Modernisation: The British Red Cross Society and the Kenyan Emergency, *Online Atlas on the History of Humanitarianism and Human Rights* (2021) <https://hhr-atlas.ieg-mainz.de/articles/rebisz-nyeri> [accessed 05/06/2022].

Milk distribution was a hallmark feature of the ICRC involvement in the villagization programme in Rhodesia. Starting in 1974, the ICRC provided powdered milk to the PVs which was distributed via the authorities and local organizations (including the Rhodesia Red Cross). The first consignment of full cream powdered milk (30 tonnes) at a cost of \$39,900 had been distributed to infants (1-5 years) and to malnourished children above the age of five.¹⁴⁷ Unlike the medical treatment programme of the ICRC the high protein milk powder would be provided free of charge.¹⁴⁸ The purpose of the milk distribution was clearly to mitigate the widespread cases of malnutrition in the PVs. Its focus was principally children and breast-feeding mothers as well as the sick and aged who were particularly vulnerable in a time of conflict.¹⁴⁹ The growth of malnutrition in the PVs was to be an abiding concern of the ICRC. In November 1976, it despatched a relief expert to Rhodesia to make a thorough assessment of food and medical requirements in conjunction with the Rhodesia Red Cross.¹⁵⁰ Within months – in June 1977 – the ICRC provided 20 tonnes of full cream powdered milk for use in the war zones including the PVs and CVs.¹⁵¹ This consignment was forwarded to the district commissioners throughout the country.¹⁵²

As the provision of the powdered milk to the DCs suggests, and like the Red Cross's medical outreach programme, the distribution of milk in the PVs was carried out in collaboration with the government. State channels were proposed as the main means of distribution. Ministry of Health clinics (supplemented by church missions) were earmarked for this purpose.¹⁵³ Development workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs would distribute high

¹⁴⁷ Rhodesia Red Cross, *Rhodesia Red Cross in Action 1974* in M.S Oxfam Rho 40 Vol 1 =Box 974.

¹⁴⁸ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.353.

¹⁴⁹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 25th 1977 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁵⁰ Comité International De La Croix-Rouge (International Committee of the Red Cross), 'Report on ICRC Activities in Southern Africa', 14th February 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

¹⁵¹ *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 10th, 1977, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁵² *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 25th, 1977, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁵³ *The Rhodesia Herald*, March 10th, 1977, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

protein foodstuffs provided by the ICRC on the ground.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the Community Development section of Internal Affairs was regularly given supplies of milk powder by the ICRC.¹⁵⁵ Development workers had the daily task in the PVs to assemble the children aged five years or less, to mix the powder appropriately and to distribute the milk to those attending playgroups and, in particular, to those suffering from kwashiorkor.¹⁵⁶ These tasks might also be executed by state supervised Red Cross trainees who already staffed the first aid posts in the PVs.¹⁵⁷ The involvement of the state and its officials was justified by the ICRC since its agents would act as important gatekeepers of the aid. The Ministry of Health could ensure the correct use of the aid in terms of quantities distributed and beneficiaries targeted.¹⁵⁸ Hence children had to drink the milk under the supervision of a development worker to ensure it did not fall into the hands of the adults.¹⁵⁹

Development workers were often subject to inmate hostility due to their employment by the state.¹⁶⁰ (In fact, during the early stages of the villagization exercise, inmates in Chiweshe had rejected ICRC aid since it had been distributed by the Security Forces).¹⁶¹ The International Committee of the Red Cross, therefore, devoted time to facilitating acceptance of its aid. It stressed to the inmates the origin of the milk powder and that it was free.¹⁶² Indeed, development workers themselves had an important role in explaining the source of the milk powder to the mothers by giving a short lesson on the objectives and mode of operation of the

¹⁵⁴ Letter from M. Chenaux- Repond (Provincial Community Development Officer) to Director Rhodesia Red Cross (Mrs Tucker), 25th February 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37. Also see Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.353.

¹⁵⁵ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.330.

¹⁵⁶ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, pp.289,330.

¹⁵⁷ M. Chenaux- Repond (Provincial Community Development Officer) to Mrs Tucker (Director Rhodesia Red Cross), 25th February 1977 in NAZ MS 1287/37.

¹⁵⁸ A. Beaud (ICRC Relief Delegate) to Miss Tucker (Director of Rhodesia Red Cross) 9th February 1977, NAZ MS 628/7.

¹⁵⁹ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.330.

¹⁶⁰ See 'The Rhodesia Narrative of Strategic Resettlement' in Chapter 1 'Strategic Resettlement and the Zimbabwean Liberation War'.

¹⁶¹ C.E McKone, 'Tour Report- C.E McKone Visit to Rhodesia on Monday/Tuesday 2nd to 3rd September', BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) 'Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to 'Protected Villages' in Chiweshe' (1974).

¹⁶² Rhodesia Red Cross, 'Relief Operations in the Protected Villages 3rd February 1977' in NAZ MS 638/7.

ICRC.¹⁶³ The ICRC also sought to ensure that the supplies were distributed by someone who was deemed trustworthy within the local community.¹⁶⁴ Advice regarding the nutritional value of what was provided was impressed upon mothers collecting the milk powder and this was linked to wider lessons in nutrition and hygiene.¹⁶⁵ It was the Rhodesia Red Cross specifically that emphasised this – in July 1977, it was reported in the *Rhodesia Herald* that the local Red Cross was apparently shifting towards providing a nutritional education programme.¹⁶⁶ Given the ideological and well-nigh propagandistic reporting of the Rhodesia Herald regarding strategic resettlement revealed throughout this dissertation and the tendency of the Rhodesia Red Cross – as opposed to the ICRC – to reflect white settler values, the highlighting of education by both the newspaper and the organisation (as if the humanitarian crisis was caused by ignorance) was hardly surprising.

Nevertheless, whatever the problems it encountered and despite its differences from the local section of the Red Cross, it is clear that, by 1977, the ICRC's relief programme had extensive regional coverage, being implemented throughout all the provinces where the villagization programme had been imposed. The tables below, which relate to the provision of relief on select days in June, July and August 1977, indicate the nature of the relief provided.

As is clear, there was a particular emphasis on high protein foodstuffs and crucial items such as blankets., (The tables – provided below and on the succeeding pages - clearly indicate that both missionary and Internal Affairs personnel played an important role in the distribution of the humanitarian relief, acting as a local funnel for ICRC aid to the PVs. It should be noted that REACH refers to a missionary aid group, while Begle and Perez were ICRC officials.)

¹⁶³ Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.331.

¹⁶⁴ *Commerce*, December 1978, NAZ MS 308/62/1.

¹⁶⁵ Rhodesia Red Cross, 'Relief Operations in the Protected Villages', 3rd February 1977 in NAZ MS 628/7.

¹⁶⁶ *The Rhodesia Herald*, July 25th, 1977, in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

Distribution Report: ICRC Distribution to the Protected Villages June 1977

Source: MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

(Note: some information in original excluded).

Date	Nature of Goods	Weight	Rhodesian Dollars	Distributed By	Number and Nature of Recipients	Areas
23 rd June 1977	2 Blankets 2.5kg Swiss Milk			C. Begle	6 children of M. Mzezury Keep No.5 Madziwa TTL.	Shamwa District
24 th June 1977	Instant Mahewu 160 blankets	500kg	196 542	All Souls Mission	Population Protected Village All Souls Mission	Mtoko District
27 th June 1977	Instant Mahewu Pronutro Natural	1250kg 100kg	489 54	St Alberts Mission	Population of Protected Villages	Centenary District.
29 th June 1977	Skimmed Milk 300 blankets	800kg	896 600	Howard Institute	Protected Villages Chiweshe	Mazoe District

Table for July 1977 follows on the next page.

Distribution Report: ICRC Distribution to the Protected Villages July 1977

Source: MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

(Note: some information in original excluded).

Date	Nature of Goods	Weight	Rhodesian Dollars	Distributed By	Number and Nature of Recipients	Area
19 th July	635 blankets		1841	REACH	Population of Mtoko and Mudzi Protected Villages	Mtoko and Mudzi Districts
21 st July	Mealie Meal	7500kg	3957	REACH	Population of Mtoko and Mudzi Protected Villages	Mtoko and Mudzi Districts
	Instant Mahewu	1300 kg				
	Skimmed Milk	300 kg				
	Pronutro Natural					
	1020 Blankets	750kg				
22 nd July	Medical Supplies		125	REACH	Population of Mtoko and Mudzi	Mtoko and Mudzi Districts
	500 Blankets					

Table for August 1977 follows on the next page.

Distribution Report: ICRC Distribution to the Protected Villages August 1977

Source: MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

(Note: some information in original excluded).

Date	Nature of Goods	Weight	Rhodesian Dollars	Distributed By	Number and Nature of Recipients	Areas
2 nd August	Mealie Meal	1000kg	1094.10 (plus sales taxes).	All Souls Mission	Population of Protected Village near mission	Mtoko District
	Instant					
	Mahewu	1500kg				
	Skimmed Milk	300kg				
	Pronuto Natural	200kg				

4 th August	Skimmed Milk	2000kg	2139	Internal Affairs	12,000 children 21 PVs in Chiweshe TTL	Mazoe District
5 th August	Mealie Meal	7500kg	4281.40	REACH	Population of Mudzi and Mtoko	Mudzi and Mtoko Districts.
	Instant Mahewu					
	Skimmed Milk	1300kg				
	Pronutro natural	300kg				
	1000 blankets	750kg				
		1631kg				
29 th August	Cash		2500	C. Begle	Running Expenditure for clinic St Peter's Mission	Chipinga District
30 th August	Skimmed Milk	100kg	106.95	F. Perez	Playgroups keeps 16 + 27 Chiweshe TTL	Mazoe District

31 st August	Mealie Meal	7500kg	1061.40	REACH	Population Mtoko and Mudzi	Mtoko and Mudzi Districts
	Pronutro Natural	600kg				

The above tables relate merely to disbursements between July and August 1977, but it is evident that the vital ICRC aid – sometimes using missions and clinics – continued to flow to the people in the PVs after this period and throughout the war. This can be seen through a discussion of the process in various provinces.

We begin with the evidence from Mashonaland, where we find the ICRC distributing food and medicine around Mtoko and Mudzi (Mashonaland East) soon after the period referred to in the tables above.¹⁶⁷ In fact, by the end of the war, , the ICRC was implementing a programme of milk distribution in 17 protected villages in Dotito and Chiweshe (Mashonaland Central): here powdered milk was provided to around 4500 children twice a week to counteract malnutrition.¹⁶⁸ And by this time, 11,000 children in the ten PVs of Madziwa, another district of Mashonaland, were benefiting from the distribution of Mahewu.¹⁶⁹ The International Committee of the Red Cross was also clearly providing aid in Matabeleland in the last years of the war. In Matabeleland North around Wankie (Hwange), it provided food relief which was distributed through local Catholic nun Sister Sithole via the malnutrition clinics during 1978. In Matabeleland South, around Beit Bridge, the ICRC had a much more extensive involvement from this time. Its programme here was initially hindered as the Red Cross representative was unable to provide a systematic report of the unfolding humanitarian situation in the PVs due to movement restrictions imposed by the local district commissioner. Initially, relief distribution was undertaken via local groups who provided ICRC-supplied pronutro, blankets and soap which were distributed through the village health assistants.¹⁷⁰ In 1979, however, the ICRC was able to undertake something more systematic in the Tshiturapadzi, Tshawingo and Shabwe

¹⁶⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, October 1977.

¹⁶⁸ *The Rhodesia Herald* 22nd June 1979 in in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

¹⁶⁹ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross) 23rd November 1979 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759.

¹⁷⁰ Minutes of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee, 3rd April 1978 in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

PVs in Matabeleland South where it distributed powdered milk, maize, sugar, beans, and protein cereal to 1,300 inmates.¹⁷¹ When the Tshiturapadzi PV was closed and its inmates transferred to Tschawingo..The ICRC aided the transition by initially providing 6.2 tons of foodstuffs, including 875 kg of powdered milk and 250 kg of soap.¹⁷² It then provided ongoing support in that PV, with two tons of basic foodstuffs provided every month for 85 orphans and 35 elderly or vulnerable persons.¹⁷³ The humanitarian crisis in the PVs of Matabeleland South may have abated since the ICRC suspended relief distributions in some PVs due to an apparent relative improvement of living conditions.¹⁷⁴ By November 1979, only Chaswingo and Shabwe were receiving ICRC assistance.¹⁷⁵

In Victoria (Masvingo) province in the south of the country, the International committee of the Red Cross also played a continuing role in providing emergency relief in the period after that covered by the tables above. At first, and as made clear in a report in April 1978, ICRC efforts in Victoria province were largely concentrated on the Fort Victoria area – in the east of the province – where the organisation had carried out a systematic survey of the relief needs of the 26 PVs in the region.¹⁷⁶ However, the Chiredzi area in the east of the province became an increasing focus. Already, in December 1977 it was reported that, the International Committee of the Red Cross had distributed 500 articles of clothing, 100 kg of foodstuffs, 50 kg of soap and 240 blankets to 340 displaced persons in a transit camp in Chiredzi, who were awaiting relocation to the PVs.¹⁷⁷ By mid-1979, warehouses had been built by the ICRC in three PVs and high protein foodstuffs (milk and mahewu) were provided to children in the PVs south of

¹⁷¹ *National Observer* 6th March 1979 in NAZ MS 308/62/2. For further evidence of ICRC assistance to one of these PVs, see Extract of ICRC Telex, 26 April 1979 in BNA FCO 36/2597.

¹⁷² International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, June 1979.

¹⁷³ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross) 28th August 1979 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

¹⁷⁴ Extract of ICRC Telex, 26th April 1979 in BNA FCO 36/2597

¹⁷⁵ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross) 23rd November 1979 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759.

¹⁷⁶ 'Minutes of the Christian Care Emergency Relief Committee', 3rd April 1978 in NAZ MS 1191/3/4/2.

¹⁷⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, *International Review of the Red Cross*, December 1977.

Chridezhi.¹⁷⁸ In addition, and with the assistance of Chikore Mission, over a ton of powdered milk and 850kg of high protein food was distributed to the PVs in Sengwe TTL, also in Chridezhi district.¹⁷⁹ Later, in August and September 1979, much more aid was provided by the ICRC when 15 tons of relief goods were funnelled to this area and distributed to the Malapati and Mase PVs.¹⁸⁰

A final point: it will be noted that in the discussion that follows, more extensive evidence comes from the ICRC's relief programme in Manicaland than in most of the other provinces. This is because in Mashonaland, ICRC interventions were less pressing since much relief work in the PVs was undertaken by established mission stations and Christian Care.¹⁸¹ There was also a relatively limited scale of strategic resettlement in Matabeleland and Victoria provinces, which therefore saw more limited work by the ICRC in these provinces. It was in Manicaland in the east of the country where the International Committee of the Red Cross played the most extensive role. Here, ICRC clinics distributed high protein foodstuffs to those who had been resettled, as evidenced – for example – by the 300kg of powdered milk provided in late-1977 by the ICRC to the Inyanga Red Cross centre for use in a children's food aid programme.¹⁸² In the south of the province around Chipinga, meanwhile, the ICRC established a relief network which ministered to the 25 PVs in the area. This grew out of a pilot programme initiated in September 1977 which involved the distribution of whole unskimmed milk and sugar to 600 children via the Catholics at St Peter's Mission. A second phase of the programme saw the aid extended to an additional eight villages and reached up to 6,000 children under the

¹⁷⁸ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross), 25th July 1979, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

¹⁷⁹ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross), 22nd May 1979, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

¹⁸⁰ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross) 16th August 1979, MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759.

¹⁸¹ See Chapter 4 'Christian Care, Oxfam and Strategic Resettlement during the Zimbabwean Liberation War'.

¹⁸² *National Observer*, 15th March, 1979 in NAZ MS 308/62/2.

age of ten. In January 1978, the scheme was extended throughout the Chipinga area so that milk was being distributed to 18,000 children at a total cost of 22,200 Swiss Frs.¹⁸³ However, in December 1978, the ICRC was forced to suspend its activities in this area due to guerrilla activity in the area.)¹⁸⁴ In the west of Manicaland province, there was a particular focus in the area around Rimbi PV: here the Chridezzi ICRC office in 1979 was distributing 1000kg of mealie meal, 75kg of mahewu, 75kg of milk and 125kg of sugar beans once a month to the needy population,¹⁸⁵ although constraints in available funds led to something like a 10 percent reduction in the amount of relief provided in the last months of the war.¹⁸⁶

Conclusion

The Red Cross had a complex relationship with settler colonialism in Rhodesia. Until the late 1970s, the Rhodesia Red Cross remained dominated by the white-settler community. However, through the intervention of the British Red Cross (to which the Rhodesian society remained formally linked) it underwent a process of Africanization which led to a growing antagonism between individual white members and the British Red Cross society. Despite these tensions, the Rhodesia Red Cross still received significant financial support from its British parent organisation, and this enabled it to establish the Westwood Training Centre that was to train African volunteers for their work in the frontline medical outreach programmes in the PVs which were established by the Rhodesia Red Cross with the support of the regime.

¹⁸³ ICRC, Annex No.3: Three actions on behalf of victims of the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in ICRC 'Southern Africa Budget 1st January-30th April 1978 in NAZ MS 628/7.

¹⁸⁴ *Commerce*, December 1978, NAZ MS 308/62/1. Also see *The Rand Daily Mail* 23rd January 1979 in NAZ MS 308/62/2.

¹⁸⁵ Extract of ICRC Telex, 26th April 1979 in BNA FCO 36/2597 'International Committee of the Red Cross Involvement in the Rhodesia Problem' (1979).

¹⁸⁶ ICRC Telex to Mr Adams and Miss Clayton (British Red Cross) 16th August 1976 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 056 = Box 2759, Oxford, Bodleian Library.

Unlike the Rhodesia Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross, had from the start a critical stance towards the regime, one rooted in its pre-war history and its work with Rhodesian political detainees, which meant that human rights and the application of humanitarian law became an important focus. There was also an important legal dimension to the ICRC's involvement in the Zimbabwean Liberation War and it sought to address the legal ambiguity surrounding non-state actors (in this case, the nationalist guerrillas) whom it stressed, were also subject to international humanitarian law, namely the 1949 Geneva Convention. The ICRC attempted to broker a code of conduct applicable to all the combatants. Whilst Nkomo (ZAPU/ZIPRA) had agreed in principle to this, there were no such undertaking from Mugabe (ZANU/ZANLA) or the Rhodesian Security Forces. The ICRC were thus unsuccessful in this initiative as evidenced by the sheer number of atrocities committed by all sides in the war, a phenomenon emphasized in the survey chapter.

The Red Cross as a whole were put in an extremely difficult position during the war and their neutrality was called into question. There was, first, the controversy surrounding the use of the Red Cross symbol on medical vehicles of the Rhodesian forces. There were guerrillas who viewed the Red Cross insignia, whatever vehicle it was, as being indicative of having an association with the Smith regime. For this reason, the insurgents targeted the activity of the ICRC in rural areas, and this culminated in the murder of three relief personnel in May 1978 which led to the temporary suspension of its relief programme. Towards the end of the war, the activity of the ICRC was constrained greatly by guerrilla activity, more specifically through their use of landmines and coercive acts including abductions. ZANLA commanders in Mozambique might have claimed they did not object to the health and food programmes in protected villages carried out by the ICRC.¹⁸⁷ But the fact remains that, as shown in the earlier survey chapter, they were also engaging in a concerted campaign to destroy the PV system and

¹⁸⁷ *The Rhodesia Herald*, 22nd June 1979 in NAZ 'Newspapers'.

force people to relocate across to their camps in Mozambique where – somewhat ironically – the ICRC rendered humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwean refugees.¹⁸⁸

Nevertheless, despite guerrilla activity and restrictions imposed by the Rhodesian Security Forces, it is clear that the ICRC – along with the Red Cross posts set up by the Rhodesia Red Cross – were able to fill to some extent the gap in rural medical services as government clinics closed due to the war. In this, they provided crucial resources for rural folk and notably those in the protected villages.

Unsurprisingly, questions regarding Red Cross neutrality were also raised with regard to the medical outreach programme since it was carried out in collaboration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The scheme was, after all, was designed to fill the gap in rural medicine left by the escalating war which forced the withdrawal of government medical provision in rural areas, even as hundreds of thousands of people were compelled to move to the PVs as part of the counter-insurgency strategy. This was the context in which the Rhodesia Red Cross and the Ministry of Internal Affairs came together to train female African volunteers to run the medical posts in the PVs with the former maintaining a veto power over the recruitment process and running of the scheme. However, As we saw, though providing vital resources, the programme was hindered by guerrilla attacks on the PVs, the pressures of women's labour in subsistence agriculture and the household, as well patriarchal concerns regarding the involvement of particular categories of women. Despite its successful introduction in some PVs this programme was largely experimental and localized in nature, being confined to areas of Mashonaland. What success it had was partly the result of the International Committee of the Red Cross rendering financial support. Was the Rhodesia Red Cross and the ICRC to some

¹⁸⁸ International Committee, ICRC, African Report No.1 (Situation, Plan, Budget and Appeal), 19th May 1978 in FC0 36/2297 'International Committee of the Red Cross' (1978).

extent useful to the war effort of white Rhodesia? Paradoxically, yes. The very fact that the Ministry of Internal Affairs worked with the Rhodesia Red Cross amongst those forcibly resettled, and that the ICRC in 1977 were granted blanket access to the PVs by the regime is a clear indication of their functionality to the regime's counter insurgency strategy.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ P.J Hurr to V. McGree 13th October 1977 in BNA, FCO 36/2069.

Chapter 6: The Sham NGO? The Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign and Strategic Resettlement During the Zimbabwean Liberation War

So far, this dissertation has considered a range of different organizations and institutions with varying degrees of relationship with the white-settler regime ranging from oppositional through to ambivalent and vacillating to supportive. However, as we have seen in earlier chapters, even those organizations, including the Anglican Church and the Salvation Army which in many ways strongly inclined towards the values of white settler society, maintained a degree of critical distance from the regime which allowed them to act as more than just struts of state policy. However, the subject of this chapter, the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign (RFFHC) was so proximate to the white-minority government that it was – in effect – deeply intertwined with the apparatus and values of the white-settler state as well as its war effort. As this chapter shows, far from being a neutral humanitarian relief organization, the RFFHC became a notable quasi-state, or pseudo-non-governmental, organization. As will be shown, this is clearly revealed by its articulation with and treatment of the victims of strategic resettlement.

Like all organizations considered throughout this dissertation, the RFFHC and its responses to the villagization programme was shaped, in part, by its pre-war history. The worldwide Freedom From Hunger Campaign was formed in 1960 in response to growing hunger and malnutrition in developing countries that was unfolding in late 1950s. Its founder was Dr. Binay Ranjan Sen, the Director of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, who launched a worldwide Freedom From Hunger Campaign to respond to the issues

raised by the disjuncture between growing population and a limited rise in food production.¹ The Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign was the national branch of this world-wide organisation but its trajectory was very much decided by its enmeshment with the white-settler regime. In fact, Rhodesia's Freedom From Hunger Campaign was an initiative of the government itself which, in January 1964, submitted a successful application to the headquarters of the worldwide organization based in Rome.² The national committee of the Rhodesian branch was actually nominated by the white regime's Minister of Agriculture. It was composed of representatives from various denominations, and from women's, men's, and youth organizations but, significantly, the committee also included officers from several government ministries, including Agriculture, Education, Health, Internal Affairs, Social Welfare and Information Services.³ Whilst the national committee was unpaid, the Rhodesian government paid the executive director and provided free office space for the organisation. Unsurprisingly, the executive committee of the RFFHC was almost entirely white.⁴ Mr. L. T. Tracey, a well-known farmer and writer on agriculture was invited to become the first chairman and the national committee held its first meeting in January 1964 at which it decided to form a number of sub-committees that would examine dozens of different possible projects. By 1968, the organization had created a number of regional committees and operated from 22 main centres which covered almost the entirety of Rhodesia.⁵

The closeness of the RFFHC with the Rhodesian state was demonstrated with its work that was focused on improving African animal husbandry; it did this in conjunction with the

¹ Oxfam Information Office, 'Well Baby Clinics: Freedom From Hunger, 19th February 1969' in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 012 Vol. 2 in Oxford, Bodleian Library.

² J.A Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign'. *The Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 2, no.3 (1968), pp.44-45.

³ Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign' pp.44-45.

⁴ G.D Leeds (Freedom From Hunger Campaign) to Peter Freeman (Ministry of Overseas Development), June 7th 1978 in British National Archive (Hereafter referred to as 'BNA'), OD 66/51 'Rhodesia: aid for protected villages' (1976-1978).

⁵ Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign', pp.45-47.

Ministry of Agriculture.⁶ This programme of the RFFHC ostensibly aimed to make the African rural population self-sufficient in the provision of high protein food, i.e., meat.⁷ (It was paradoxical, but typical of those holding to a white settler ethos, that such a programme was delivered to rural communities for whom the rearing of livestock was economically and culturally central and who had accumulated expertise in this over centuries. Moreover, the programme failed to address the fundamental issue of land shortages and loss of cattle attendant upon the discriminatory land policies detailed in the survey chapter and which rendered livestock production untenable for many.)

Another area in which the closeness of the RFFHC to the Rhodesian state prior to the war can be discerned is in the relief efforts during the 1964/5 and 1968 droughts.⁸ The earlier drought in 1965 was coincident with the development of RFFHC regional committees, especially in the affected regions in the south of the country. The response to these droughts was government led, with the state providing £3,000,000 for the construction of dams and irrigation works to improve water conservation efforts in the more drought prone regions but also to provide paid work for the adult population. However, unsurprisingly due to its interconnection with the regime, the RFFHC deputized for the state in the relief effort. providing food to the children in drought affected areas through local schools and by launching a successful appeal for funds from Rhodesian whites. The relief programme was largely successful with the no reported fatalities from starvation, though between 40 000 and 50,000 head of cattle were lost, apparently due to the reluctance of African peasants to sell their livestock which was economically and culturally fundamental to their societies. In 1968 a more

⁶ Oxfam Information Office, Well-Baby Clinics Freedom From Hunger Campaign, 19th February 1969 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 012 Vol. 2.

⁷ Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign', p.49.

⁸ Oxfam 'Well baby clinics', 19th February 1969 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 012 Vol. 2, Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe): drought relief, 1965-1966', Library, MS. Oxfam PRF ZIM-G-003 = Box 1086, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

serious drought gripped southern Matabeleland and once more the Government oversaw the relief measures, but – as during the earlier drought – the RFFHC ran the child feeding schemes.⁹ The state sanctioned nature of the RFFHC role in drought relief would foreshadow its later humanitarian role in supporting the victims of strategic resettlement during the war.

Like other Rhodesian aid organizations, Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger had to navigate the sanctions regime following UDI in 1965 as both the illegal Rhodesian state and organizations within the country were deprived of the usual sources of funding from abroad as a result of UN embargoes. The RFFHC responded by adopting a policy of self-sufficiency prioritising local fund raising.¹⁰ However, whilst the organisation raised money within Rhodesia, some funds were received during the sanctions period from international relief agencies, including the Save the Children Fund, and Bread for the World Mission.¹¹ Moreover, the organization also received financial support from the British Freedom From Hunger Campaign, which provided funds for the RFFHC's nutritional educational work in Rhodesia, with just under half the costs (£20,000) of the programme met by the British branch. These funds were used to purchase four 36-seater buses, intended to transport members of African Women's Clubs and Young Farmers' Clubs to research stations and experimental farm projects – for example, the Ministry of Agriculture's Henderson Research Station (Mazowe, Mashonaland Central)– where agricultural demonstrators were employed. The RFFHC also made provision for six mobile instruction units which would be manned by Ministry of Agriculture personnel, and which would play an 'educational' role: they were equipped with films and film projectors, slide projectors, flannelgraphs and other media for instruction, and

⁹ Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign', pp.46-7.

¹⁰Rhodesia Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Chairman's Report 13th Annual RFFHC Conference, 30th September 1977 in BNA OD 66/51 'Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages' (1976-78).

¹¹ Ibid.

they idea was that they would undertake extensive work in the Tribal Trust Lands and Native Purchase Areas.¹²

During the sanctions period, the RFFHC received substantial financial support from Oxfam for its rural development programmes. As shown earlier in this dissertation, any grants, or loans by Oxfam to any Rhodesian organisation required approval from the British treasury and this applied to those disbursed to the RFFHC. Controls were also initially imposed upon Oxfam by the Rhodesian authorities.¹³ Yet in May 1966, the Rhodesian government reversed this decision, perhaps because of Oxfam's support for the RFFHC which, as we have seen, worked hand in glove with the white-settler regime.¹⁴

Oxfam was therefore able to make a significant contribution to various projects run by the RFFHC. For example, it provided a £24 000 subsidy for high protein foodstuffs distributed by the RFFHC between 1969 and 1970.¹⁵ It sponsored a traveling clinic of Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger that administered vaccines and distributed pro nutro in Mashonaland. For this scheme, it provided £1,756 for a specially designed vehicle with an additional £600 for running costs for one year.¹⁶

It was, in part, the support which Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger received from international NGOs that enabled it to launch a number of a rural outreach programmes that would lay an important foundation for the work it would later undertake in the PVs. One of its most important projects was its 'Well Baby Clinics' which focused on nutritional rehabilitation and education.¹⁷ Importantly, the scheme overlapped with the homecraft and nutritional

¹² Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign', p.45.

¹³ Mr Hennings to Mr Molyneux 16th February 1966 in BNA, DO 207/138 'Illegal Declaration of Independence: Question of continued Financial Aid to Projects in Rhodesia- Oxfam (1965-1966).

¹⁴ R.E.C (66) 17th Meeting Minutes, Item 1 (c) 18th May 1966 in BNA, DO 207/138 'Illegal Declaration of Independence: Question of continued Financial Aid to Projects in Rhodesia- Oxfam (1965-1966).

¹⁵ Oxfam 'Well baby clinics', 19th February 1969 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 012 Vol. 2.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Oxfam 'Well baby clinics', 19th February 1969 in MS. Oxfam PRF RHO 012 Vol. 2.

education initiative that formed part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' community development efforts.¹⁸ (Those state efforts have been sketched in chapter one and they would later be significant in the PVs during the war.) The well-baby clinics were piloted by the RFFHC's Gwelo (Gweru) regional committee in conjunction with the Ministry of Health. The state would cover the expenses of a state registered nurse who would hold clinics for African mothers who could visit with their infant children. Mothers were encouraged to bring their children shortly after birth for a medical examination. As part of this scheme, the RFFHC provided high protein food powder or powdered milk to children who were underweight or falling to gain weight as they should.¹⁹

A small charge was required to use this service but those unable to pay it were exempt from the fee. Due to the apparent success of the scheme in Gwelo (Gweru), this scheme was taken up by all regional committees across Rhodesia,²⁰ with clinic selling the high protein milk powder cheaply on the same basis as in the original trial scheme. Demonstrations were also held to show the correct preparation of food and to illustrate – if this was needed – “how good feeding improved children's health”.²¹ This instruction failed, however, to address the fact that rural poverty was the root cause of infant malnutrition, and that this poverty resulted, in great part, from state policy. Still, the ‘Well Baby Clinics’ had an important function in infant vaccination programmes, targeting diseases including smallpox, diphtheria, measles, and tuberculosis.²² The clinic also treated ailments of various kinds.²³

Aside from the nutritional initiative of the ‘Well Baby Schemes, the RFFHC established a number of feeding programmes directed at pre-school age children that operated through

¹⁸ Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign, *Food For Your Family*, (Salisbury, 1974), pp.94-5.

¹⁹ Lombard, ‘The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign’, p.48.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ RFFHC, *Food For Your Family*, p 69.

²² RFFHC, *Food For Your Family*, p.61.

²³ RFFHC, *Food For Your Family*, p.63.

medical mission stations. This saw the provision of powdered milk and other protein additive foods on a subsidised basis.²⁴ At the same time, local councils amongst rural Africans were encouraged by the RFFHC to introduce a light meal for children on arrival at school. There was a loan on offer to construct and add a storeroom and kitchen to a given school building. In addition, a grant would be provided on the proviso that the feeding scheme continued for two years.²⁵ Overall, in 1967-8 for both schemes the RFFHC provided 40 tons of high protein foodstuff powder on a subsidised/partial-repayment basis to the well-baby clinics, mission hospitals, clinics and council schools.²⁶

Aiding the Victims of Strategic Resettlement

With the onset of the war, and with the support of the state, the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign turned its focus though belatedly (from 1977) towards those children who had been displaced in the unfolding conflict in the Tribal Trust Lands. The organization had some limited focus on school feeding projects in towns or those areas not swept by the war or strategic resettlement. - for example, the programmes undertaken in Que Que Tribal Trust Land (now Kwe Kwe, Midlands Province)²⁷ and that implemented in Salisbury's Dzivaresekwa township (now in western Harare).²⁸ However, overwhelmingly the main priority was aiding the malnourished children in the protected villages. It did so on more than one level. Despite its closeness to the regime and its implicit support for the counterinsurgency strategy, Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger at least recognized to some degree the disruptive impact of strategic resettlement and movement controls on the ability of mothers to provide for their

²⁴ Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign', p.48.

²⁵ RFFHC, *Food For Your Family*, p.61.

²⁶ Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign', p.49.

²⁷ Chairman's report at RFFHC Conference 1977, BNA, OD 66/51.

²⁸ Ibid.

children. As shown in the survey chapter, many women would leave the villages early in the morning to travel to their fields, often some considerable distance from the PVs and would not get back until late at night and therefore be unable timeously to give food to hungry children.²⁹ In this situation, the RFFHC recognized the necessity for a ‘supplementary feeding’ programme to ensure children were adequately fed during the day.³⁰

Probably the most notable roles played, by the RFFHC during the war was supplying high protein foods for infants and providing training in nutrition for mothers and child health workers responding to the widespread cases of malnutrition in the PVs. To carry out this programme – as we shall see in the next section, it also included non-powdered dairy products provided by the state – it utilized its own network of voluntary distributors.³¹ The RFFHC’s nutritional demonstrators also had an important role in the distribution of milk products.³² However, Rhodesian Freedom from Hunger also worked closely with Christian Care, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and World Vision.³³ Efforts were thus made to co-ordinate, avoid overlap and target appropriately in the provision of high protein foodstuffs to malnourished children in the PVs. This was especially required with regard to the similar schemes launched by the Red Cross and the Salvation Army detailed earlier in this dissertation.

However, Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger took a markedly different approach to the organizations with which it worked. Whilst the Salvation Army and Red Cross provided the high protein foodstuffs free of charge, the RFFHC required communities to make a small financial contribution with parents paying thirty cents per child fed.³⁴ The organisation also

²⁹ RFFHC, Conference, September 1977 [Minutes], BNA, OD 66/51.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes], BNA, OD 66/51.

³³ Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign, 14th Annual RFFHC Conference, 15th Sept. 1978 in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001 in Oxford, Bodleian Library.

³⁴ Maia Chenuaux Repond, *Leading From Behind: Women in Community Development in Rhodesia, 1973-1979*, (Harare, 2017), p.353.

continued with its established practice of selling the (albeit subsidised) high protein foods it provided through well baby clinics run by missions, local councils and by Government health teams.³⁵ In September 1977, the RFFHC held a conference at which it decided its overall aim was to focus on what it defined as long term problems as opposed to short-term or pressing relief needs which, betraying its ideology, it considered as likely to make parents irresponsible:

While relief for immediate needs can be met by the free distribution of milk this may make it more difficult to ensure that parents accept full responsibility for the upbringing of their children. Our policy has always been to ensure that parents accept these responsibilities and to pay for whatever foods may be required.³⁶

Whilst welcoming some short-term humanitarian relief that could be “directed towards the mitigation of present circumstances”, the organisation held this as unlikely to contribute to the long-term purposes of its campaign which aimed to make Rhodesia’s black population more self-reliant and self-supporting and not coming to rely on what it saw as “free hand outs”.³⁷ (Note the failure to mention radical racial and social inequality and land dispossession as being of relevance.) On the basis of this set of beliefs, the type of scheme the RFFHC wanted to implement in the PVs was one which saw food provided at subsidised prices to ensure the sufficient nourishment of infants. But the subsidy would be slowly reduced until full costs were met by purchasers. They believed that in turn there would be a “greater likelihood of feeding schemes being permanently established to the long-term benefit of the children and the country as a whole”.³⁸ The RFFHC tried to justify this, by citing rising sales of its nutritional supplements through the Well Baby Clinics which rose from R\$60,000 to R\$95,000 during 1978.³⁹ Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger claimed this evidence represented increased efforts

³⁵ Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign, ‘14th Annual RFFHC Conference Held, 15th Sept. 1978, M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

³⁶ Chairman’s Report 13th Annual RFFHC Conference, 30th September 1977 in BNA, OD 66/51.

³⁷ RFFHC, Conference, September 1978 [Minutes], MS Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

³⁸ Chairman’s report at RFFHC Conference 1977 in BNA, OD 66/51.

³⁹ RFFHC, Conference, September 1978 [Minutes], MS Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

by the rural African people to support themselves.⁴⁰ Yet this clearly overlooks the fact that it could easily be interpreted as evidence of rising malnutrition as also the fact that many who purchased the milk powder via the Well Baby Clinics were subject to the stringent movement controls in the countryside and were therefore unable to access the free service offered elsewhere by the Red Cross or Salvation Army. And it is undeniable that the RFFHC's approach set much more store on African mothers paying to ensure their malnourished children received a sufficient intake of protein. It also imagined that the malnutrition – structurally and systemically caused – could be countered by education.

It is surely significant that with the onset of the war, and before it began its work in the PVs, nutritional education was somewhat prioritized by the RFFHC and this was in keeping with its pre-war developmental efforts discussed earlier. As if this was not obvious to them, Africans mothers were 'informed' of the value of high protein foods through their contact with Women's Clubs, Well Baby Clinics, mission hospitals and rural clinics, as well as through specific lectures provided by the RFFHC and Government educational organisations.⁴¹ There is a sense in which the nutritional education and feeding schemes of the RFFHC, notwithstanding the aid they undoubtedly provided, were exemplary of the values of white-settler culture in Rhodesia. This is demonstrated most clearly in the RFFHC publication *Food for Your Family* (1974) which was disseminated to the black rural population in the early years of the war and was later published in simplified Shona.⁴²

The publication was produced by the Nutrition Council of the RFFHC in collaboration with the Government Literature Bureau. It is therefore unsurprising that much of its content

⁴⁰ RFFHC, Conference, September 1978 [Minutes], MS Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

⁴¹ Lombard, 'The Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign', pp.46-7.

⁴² Rhodesia Freedom From Hunger Campaign 13th Annual RFFHC, Conference 30th September 1977 [Minutes] in BNA, OD 66/51 'Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages' (1976-78).

would reflect the racially prejudiced discourse surrounding malnutrition. Indeed, the Secretary for Health M.H Webster, wrote in its pages that:

Undernutrition or poor nutrition is the biggest single cause of the remaining health problems among the African population. There is also no doubt that this problem is not due so much to the lack of food, or lack of ability to procure food (although the increasing population may result in shortages in future) but to lack of knowledge about proper feeding, particularly the feeding of infants and children.⁴³

Food for your Family claimed, therefore, that nutritional educational programmes would “help bring to the African parents the knowledge they need to bring up healthy children and to keep themselves fit and healthy and therefore productive and prosperous”.⁴⁴ The focus was on the supposed ignorance of the mother regarding the food requirements of a child. Whilst there some limited recognition that rural poverty – never seen as resulting from a discriminatory order – was a major factor in malnutrition, educating parents of malnourished children in terms of the need for a balanced diet, food preparation and budgeting was viewed as the solution.⁴⁵ The book placed the onus on the parents for malnutrition and remained silent on the fundamental issues of rural poverty caused by the racially-discriminatory policies of the settler regime. In a similar vein, the publication commented on the alleged poor care of African mothers, claiming for example that “many mothers do not seem to think it matters if baby’s eyes are covered with dirty flies, but it does, it is often the start of a very serious eye infection”.⁴⁶ Once the RFFHC began its work in the PVs it continued to view matters from its biased educational perspective which alleged ignorance as fundamental to malnutrition. There were women living in the PVs, the organisation claimed, who came from very remote areas and lacked any basic nutrition and health education.⁴⁷ There was, then, considerable racial prejudice embedded in the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger’s perspective regarding

⁴³ RFFHC, *Food For Your Family*, p.6.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ RFFHC, *Food For Your Family*, pp. 36-7.

⁴⁶ RFFHC, *Food For Your Family*, p.63.

⁴⁷ RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes], BNA, OD 66/51

malnutrition. It held that African parents were incapable of properly feeding their children: a very anomalous view of peasant society which had historically produced its own food and reared its own livestock, accumulating enormous knowledge in the process. Such a viewpoint also clearly overlooked the disruptive impact of the enforced villagization programme on women and children and instead placed the onus for infant malnourishment on the parents as opposed to the upheavals of the war and regime policy. This was so despite the RFFHC having been made aware of conditions inside the PVs during its conference in September 1977.⁴⁸ Linked to this, was Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger's recognition of the need for childcare provision, given that the women were faced with the problem of simultaneously undertaking agricultural labour on distant fields and childcare. For this reason, the RFFHC supported the establishment of crèches run by experienced women, specifying that they should not be elderly, an odd attitude that overlooked the central role of the grandmother (*ambuya*), in the Shona family unit, particularly in child rearing. The organisation proposed playing a central role in organizing the crèches and suggested seeking support from the white community.⁴⁹ It is not known, however, whether or not this childcare scheme was ever implemented.

Finally, like the other organisations discussed in this thesis, the work of the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign was greatly affected by the escalation of the war. Their nutritional demonstrators played an important role monitoring the health of infants and providing advice to women who lived in the keeps, but their efforts to alleviate malnutrition were greatly curtailed by the intensification of the liberation struggle. Thus a report to the Umtali (Mutare) Regional Committee of the RFFHC showed that three out of five demonstrators were unable to continue work as they were unable to gain access to many areas due to the worsening

⁴⁸ RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes], BNA, OD 66/51

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

conflict. In this situation, many Well Baby Clinics were closed down. By 1977, the war set to escalate further, only 150 of these clinics were still operating compared to over 200 that had been set up initially. However, the villagization programme enabled some of this work to continue since nutritional demonstrators were able to provide makeshift clinics in around half of the PVs.⁵⁰

Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger: A Surrogate of the State?

The RFFHC can be viewed as a surrogate of the state.⁵¹ The fact that the RFFHC prioritized nutritional education, which implied that the malnutrition was the result of ignorance, largely emanated from its shared values with, and close proximity, to the regime. As shown in chapter one, courses run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Women Advisers and by the Women's Clubs it sponsored all provided training in nutrition. Similarly, the Ministry of African Education included "matters relating to nutrition and other health problems in their Grade 7 syllabi".⁵² In some ways, the RFFHC's work in this regard had the extend the reach of the government's nutritional education programme especially for women living in the PVs. Notwithstanding the usefulness of information provided, it carried the ideological assumptions of white settler society.

In more practical ways, Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger worked hand in glove with the authorities. This can be seen in its distribution of (non-powdered) milk products to tackle malnourishment in the PVs. Whilst milk powder with its high protein content was deemed the most important foodstuff in this regard, supplementary foods with a lower protein factor were

⁵⁰ RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes], BNA, OD 66/51.

⁵¹ This concept was first coined by Michael Jennings when referring to close ideological proximity and function role played by Oxfam in enacting the villagization programme linked to Nyere's Ujamaa policy in Tanzania during the 1970s. See Michael Jennings; 'Almost an Oxfam in itself': Oxfam, Ujamaa and development in Tanzania, *African Affairs*, Volume 101, Issue 405, 1 October 2002, pp.512-514 and Michael Jennings, *Surrogates of the State: Non-Governmental Organisations, Development and Ujamaa in Tanzania*, (Bloomfield, 2008).

⁵² Chairman's report at RFFHC Conference 1977, BNA, OD 66/51.

also required and this – more specifically, the supply of milk – came directly from the government run Dairy Marketing Board, with the RFFHC receiving financial support for providing these products from the Ministry of Health. The RFFHC efforts to distribute these foodstuffs were not without its problems, however, and perhaps residents of the PVs discerned the organisation as part of the state. There was certainly some suspicion and on occasion even a hostile reaction to what was distributed. A reason given for this was the fact that the labels on the tins containing the milk products had been removed and that parents were concerned to know what would be fed to their children.⁵³ However, the most significant problem lay in the fact that the RFFHC explicitly worked with the government and Internal Affairs staff played an important role in the organisation's distribution of high protein foodstuffs in the PVs.⁵⁴ As has already been demonstrated, Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger had close links with various important government officials and it was even possible for officials specifically involved in the rolling out of strategic resettlement on a local level to be engaged in the deliberations of the Freedom From Hunger Campaign. An example of this was District Commissioner (DC) Dave Mirams of Mrewa who attended the RFFHC annual conference in 1977. Moreover, for a time, Security Force personnel had actually helped the RFFHC distribute milk products in the PVs which, unsurprisingly, disturbed the inmates.⁵⁵ The very people who were distributing RFFHC aid, then, were those associated with the disruptive and often traumatic experience of forced villagisation in which the Security Forces had a central role. It was thus somewhat paradoxical that Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger recommended that, the African District Security Assistants, employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs but nevertheless something of an arm of the Security Forces in the PVs, should undertake the distribution of the milk

⁵³ RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes], BNA,OD 66/51.

⁵⁴ Repond, Repond, *Leading From Behind*, p.353.

⁵⁵ RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes], BNA,OD 66/51.

products: this was because they had relatives in the keeps.⁵⁶ However, as was shown in chapter one, women in the PVs were often brutalized by the DSAs.

The degree to which Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger was an arm of the Rhodesian government and came to be recognised as such can be seen in its relations with other NGOs and, indeed, with the British government. The RFFHC explicitly recognized the importance and usefulness of the NGOs who filled many gaps, providing much expertise, and made available considerable funds which would not otherwise have been available to Government.⁵⁷ Moreover, it was held that the NGOs (like the RFFHC and also civil society organizations) provided an avenue for particularly “the women of the country to apply their ideas and to exercise their skills to a degree which would be impossible within a wholly Government controlled system”.⁵⁸ However, Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger may have viewed itself as akin to the international NGOs, but its close proximity to the white-settler regime and its values led to a significant rift emerging between it and Oxfam and, later, with Whitehall itself.

As shown earlier, the organization had prior to the war received significant support from Oxfam. Indeed, its work was seen to be in the line with Oxfam’s general policy which emphasised long term goals over short term relief.⁵⁹ During the early stages of the war, the RFFHC continued to receive support from Oxfam for its nutritional outreach programme and supplementary feeding schemes. However, Oxfam came to feel that the RFFHC was too closely aligned with the Rhodesian government, and it withdrew its support in 1978.⁶⁰ Field Director Colin Mckone and former Assistant Field Director Swainson were influential in this

⁵⁶ RFFHC Conference September 1977 [Minutes], BNA,OD 66/51.

⁵⁷ RFFHC, Conference, September 1978 [Minutes], MS Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Martyn Young, ‘Rho/Zim Tour Report 9th to 16th January 1978’ in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001 in Oxford, Bodleian Library.

⁶⁰ Young, ‘Rho/Zim Tour Report’, 9th to 16th January 1978 in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001. Memorandum from P.D.M Freeman, 15th May 1978 in TNA, OD 66/51 ‘Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages’ (1976- 1978).

regard and had both expressed the view that Oxfam should not be funding government or quasi-government organisations.⁶¹ The RFFHC was undoubtedly this: markedly over half of its total income came from the Rhodesian Ministry of Health.⁶² RFFHC chairman J. M. Hammond decried the fact that various voluntary agencies (including Oxfam) which had hitherto provided welcome assistance refused to provide any further finance to the RFFHC on the basis of its close association with the Rhodesian government.⁶³ Christian Care and the ICRC were providing vital assistance to those distressed by the war situation, including those living in the PVs, claimed Hammond, but there were many more infants who could only be reached by the RFFHC.⁶⁴ So far as he was concerned, the close links of his organisation with the government was justified given that “access to protected villages can only be obtained through the various agencies of government due to the present security situations”.⁶⁵

In fact, the change of Oxfam’s policy towards the RFFHC reflected its own experience on the ground. During a visit to the PVs in Chiweshe in 1974, Oxfam’s Field Director had become aware of the hostility of inmates in the PVs and noted that “any assistance provided by the authorities tended to be rejected”.⁶⁶ Moreover, its reports suggest that the RFFHC appeared insensitive to the traumatic experience of forced villagisation as indicated by a discussion between Assistant Field Director, Martyn Young and the RFFHC Executive Director, G.D Leeds, who had recently visited the (showpiece) PVs near Mukumbura (Mashonaland Central). Young remarked that Leeds echoed the regime’s well-nigh propagandistic rendition of strategic resettlement and “genuinely felt that the infrastructure for

⁶¹ Young, ‘Rho/Zim Tour Report’, 9th to 16th January 1978 in M.S Oxfam PRF Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

⁶² Miss R.J Spencer (Rhodesia Department) to Mr Laver (Consular Department), 9th August 1976, BNA, OD 66/51 ‘Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages’ (1976--1978)’

⁶³ Chairman’s report at RFFHC Conference 1977, BNA, OD 66/51.

⁶⁴ J.M Hammond (Freedom From Hunger Campaign) to Ministry of Overseas Development, 5th June 1978 in BNA, OD 66/51 ‘Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages’ (1976-78).

⁶⁵ Chairman’s report at RFFHC Conference 1977, BNA, OD 66/51.

⁶⁶ C.E McKone, ‘Tour Report- C.E McKone Visit to Rhodesia on Monday/Tuesday 2nd to 3rd September, BNA, FCO 36/1645, (CP 4/2) ‘Tribal Trust Lands in Rhodesia: discussions over removal of African tribesmen to ‘Protected Villages’ in Chiweshe’ (1974).

these people in the areas has been greatly improved”, by pointing out that “tarred roads have been made much further into the bush; [and] airstrips were nearby the PVs”.⁶⁷ Young interpreted the evidence differently, and saw the white-minority government’s counter-insurgency strategy as the principal benefactor of the infrastructure improvements as opposed to the local residents who had been relocated to the PVs.⁶⁸

Once Oxfam decided to withdraw funding from Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger (under pressure from Whitehall antagonism grew between the RFFHC and the British Government which had originally exempted it somewhat from sanctions. When, during 1978, the RFFHC sought funding from Whitehall to finance its aid programme to the PVs, its request was rejected.⁶⁹ It was felt that the work of the RFFHC largely duplicated the relief operations of Christian Care and the ICRC detailed earlier in this dissertation, and the Ministry of Overseas Development had already provided a grant-in-aid of £500,000 to the ICRC for its relief work in Southern African including Rhodesia. This was in addition to the £238,000 grant which was given to Christian Care in that year. There were also concerns raised regarding discrepancies in RFFHC expenditure figures. Indeed, the sum requested by the RFFHC had not been specified, and the organisation claimed their estimates for total expenditure in the first quarter of the 1977/8 financial year amounted to R\$100,000. This was despite the fact that total expenditure for the year 1976/7 had amounted to only about an eighth of that figure. Concerns were also raised regarding the disbursement of any grant to the RFFHC without the assistance of a British charity or internal agency to act as an intermediary. The protocol required that funds should not go directly to a Rhodesian organisation or any other similar organisations operating in any developing country because it would be difficult to provide “any kind of satisfactory

⁶⁷ ‘Martyr Young Rho/Zim Tour Report 9th to 16th January 1978’ in M.S Oxfam PRF, Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

⁶⁸ ‘Martyr Young Rho/Zim Tour Report 9th to 16th January 1978’ in M.S Oxfam PRF, Rho 12 (a) Vol. III = Box 001.

⁶⁹ Hammond to Callaghan, 24 June 1977 in BNA OD 66/51.

audit of how the money had been spent”.⁷⁰ (As shown earlier this dissertation, Christian Care had acted as an important ‘clearing house’ organization for international financial and material support and presumably it could verify how money was spent, but it had no such relationship with Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger.)

When all this has been said, however, there was also a very important political reason that the Ministry of Overseas Development of a Labour government gave for rejecting the RFFHC grant request. Until 1978, it was Whitehall’s policy to reject grants to any relief scheme in the PVs on the grounds that such assistance could be functional to the Rhodesian government because it would mean providing resources to help ensure the functioning of institutions controlling people forcibly resettled. It was acknowledged that whilst there was a clear humanitarian case for helping the victims of the strategic resettlement, it was felt that such assistance – unless very carefully provided – would make it easier for the regime to carry out its repressive policies by helping to absolve it from dealing with (and paying for) the results of its own actions. A warning was, thus, issued that any change in the British policy could lead to an expansion of strategic resettlement as the British taxpayer could be viewed by Smith’s government as a means by which to meet the basic needs of those living in the keeps.⁷¹ Moreover it was felt that there was “no certainty that the regime would permit imports specifically to the keeps on a scale sufficient to remove hardship”.⁷² Rhodesia, it was emphasised, was an exporter of food and therefore did not meet the usual criteria for food aid; the Rhodesian government, it was held, also possessed the necessary financial resources to meet the requirements of those living in the PVs.⁷³

⁷⁰ Spence to Laver, 9th August 1978, BNA OD 66/51.

⁷¹ Barlow to Turner, 6th July 1976, BNA OD 66/51.

⁷² Memorandum from A.M Turner (Ministry of Overseas Development) 9th June 1976 in BNA, OD 66/51 ‘Rhodesia: aid for Protected Villages’ (1978). Hereafter the document will be referred to as ‘Memorandum from A.M Turner 9th June 1976’.

⁷³ Memorandum from A.M Turner 9th June 1976, BNA OD 66/51.

The response by the RFFHC to this rejection of a request for financial assistance from the British government illustrates Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger's close ideological proximity to the regime and the organisation's support of strategic resettlement as a counter-insurgency strategy. The chairman of the RFFHC had actually made something of a personal appeal to the British prime minister, James Callaghan in requesting funds:

On the strength of having once given you tea at Goromonzi School, I am writing this personal letter to ask if you would consider directing a small proportion of the £670m which Britain is to make available to underdeveloped nations, to the children of Rhodesia.⁷⁴

Hammond, the chairman of Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger, spoke of his position giving him an acute awareness of the danger of malnutrition amongst the children in the PVs in Rhodesia's border areas. Significantly, he placed a particular emphasis on the plight of infants in the keeps but, even in doing this, he gave the regime credit by arguing that actual starvation was more or less prevented since basic maintenance needs were fulfilled by the government.⁷⁵ In fact, Hammond's particular emphasis on the children not only reflected the aims and objectives of his organisation but formed part of his critique of Whitehall's policy towards the RFFHC and, by implication, to the Rhodesian state. Humanitarian concerns, he argued, should take precedence over political views in deciding whether organisations should receive financial assistance from the British government: "children can have no influence on our political situations" and it was "a sterile argument to put the blame for their present plight on the failure to reach a political solution for Rhodesia's future".⁷⁶ He continued: "the lives of tribesmen have been considerably disrupted by the pressures put upon them by the terrorists

⁷⁴ Hammond to Callaghan, 24th June 1978, BNA OD 66/51.

⁷⁵ Hammond to Callaghan, 24th June 1978, BNA OD 66/51.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

(guerrillas to you know doubt) and by the movement which they all now wish to make into protected villages”.⁷⁷

Undoubtedly such a viewpoint reflected the attitudes of the white settler regime as indicated by the use of the term ‘terrorist’, the pejorative term given to armed nationalists by the white-settler regime. Moreover, Hammond here echoed the regime’s claims that the movement to the protected villages was voluntary as opposed to enforced. This was in keeping with his report to the RFFHC conference held in September 1977 where he harshly criticised the British government’s attitude towards the operations of the RFFHC. Funds had been denied to its feeding scheme in the PVs, he argued, because these villages had been established by the ‘illegal’ white-settler regime.⁷⁸ The fact that the term ‘illegal’ was placed in inverted commas was another indicator of Hammond’s support for the rebellious Smith regime. He went so far as to liken Whitehall’s policy to a modern form of ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’, one in which the British government was prepared to use “the possible deprivations of the children in these villages as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Rhodesia Government to accord to Britain’s wishes” regarding Rhodesia’s future.⁷⁹ In keeping with the white settler regime’s view of Britain, the leader of the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger campaign was here construing British foreign policy, which had led to sanctions and diplomatic isolation after UDI, as a threat to the children forced into the PVs by the Rhodesian regime.

Conclusion

Overall, this chapter reveals how the ideology and policies of the white-settler state deeply affected the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger’s work in the protected villages set up under strategic resettlement. There was a focus on infant nutrition but this was supplemented

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Chairman’s report at RFFHC Conference 1977, BNA,OD 66/51.

⁷⁹ Chairman’s report at RFFHC Conference 1977, BNA,OD 66/51.

by a programme of nutritional education of mothers in which because the onus for the malnutrition was placed on the victims of strategic resettlement: the ignorance of African parents, it was held, was the main cause of infant malnutrition in the PVs. Such a view deliberately overlooked the traumatic and disruptive impact of forced villagisation. This perspective was hardly surprising since, as was revealed, there was significant involvement of government agencies in the RFFHC, including the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Health and Internal Affairs, whose local representatives – the district commissioners – clearly worked alongside Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger. The state also provided the organisation with most of its resources. The head of the RFFHC might have justified the close links of his organization with the white-settler regime as enabling access to the PVs which were otherwise heavily restricted zones. However, the fact remains that the relationship between the RFFHC and the Rhodesian regime was mutually beneficial. Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger could carry out its relief programme in the PVs, while the organisation could be counted upon by the Rhodesian regime to alleviate the problems of poverty and malnutrition resulting from the policy of strategic resettlement that was crucial to counter-insurgency... It has been shown that it was the surrogacy of the RFFHC to the Rhodesian state that was a key reason for why Whitehall chose not to provide the organisation with funds that might, in effect, lend support of the policy of strategic resettlement. Clearly, given its inextricable links to both the Smith regime and the values of the white-settler state, as well as its functional role in the government's counter-insurgency strategy, the RFFHC can be categorized as a quasi-state organization rather than as an NGO.

Conclusion

Strategic resettlement was a standard policy of counterinsurgency, often used in wars of decolonisation. It entailed forcibly relocating civilians into controlled, concentrated settlements with the chief aim to separate insurgents from the resources they obtained from the rural populace. As already implied, the policy was not invented by the Rhodesians but part of a wider international phenomenon in the period of decolonization. It was extensively used by the Rhodesian Security Forces in their war against nationalist guerrillas. In Rhodesia, hundreds of thousands of black Zimbabweans were forcibly relocated to so-called protected or consolidated villages. It was rolled out throughout the north, east and, to a lesser extent, the south and west of the country as the war escalated. Despite efforts of the Rhodesian regime to provide a sanitized image of the scheme through propaganda and its community development programme, the policy greatly oppressed the Zimbabwean peasantry, dislocated its economy, and gave rise to a grave humanitarian crisis in the PVs due to the inadequate shelter and sanitary provision as well as the disruption of agriculture. It was to this crisis that the churches and other non-governmental organisations discussed in this thesis responded. That response included making the facts known, rendering material (especially nutritional) and financial assistance to those displaced and providing medical care (often through first aid posts or mobile clinics) to address the growing problem of malnutrition and various epidemiological concerns in the PVs. Sometimes, this aid was delivered with a certain paternalistic ideology, but these interventions were vital and undeniably saved myriads of lives.

The Churches were the first to respond to this humanitarian crisis. The Catholics – their Church shaped by its pre-war history of opposition to racial discrimination in Rhodesia and disagreement with the white state's Unilateral Declaration of Independence – soon set up the

Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP). It came rapidly to play a central role in publicising the injustices of white-minority rule, the human rights abuses committed by the Rhodesian Security Forces in the war and the oppressions attendant upon strategic resettlement. It was quite logical for the Catholic Church to do this since the enforced villagization programme was early on implemented in the Catholic dioceses in north and eastern Rhodesia, where Catholic missions were swept by the war and often caught in the crossfire. Catholic missionaries were thus well positioned to investigate and expose the human rights abuses committed by the Rhodesian Security Forces. It was this role of the Catholics in identifying and disseminating the atrocities and oppressions (including those related to strategic resettlement) which was the principal source of church-state antagonism during the war. A range of the Church's publications openly challenged the regime's biased reports regarding the villagization programme. The CCJP waged this campaign in the face of stringent censorship laws and a backlash from pro-government media and the authorities which led to the arrest and deportation of some of its leading members, including Bishop Donal Lamont. The Catholics were in an undeniably difficult position. They opposed the Rhodesian regime but had a complex relationship with the nationalist guerrillas whereby they rejected guerrilla violence (of which some Catholics had been victims) and yet supported the liberation cause with many of the Church's adherents developing close relationships with the insurgents and their leaders.

The various Protestant churches did not play the kind of uniform oppositional role of the Catholics. There was a whole spectrum of responses to strategic resettlement reflecting their pre-war histories and the racial profiles of their followings. On the one end of the spectrum were the Anglicans. They were deeply entrenched within the settler community and supported strategic resettlement wholeheartedly. The Salvation Army's leadership inclined strongly towards the Smith regime and the values of white-settler culture though, importantly, it criticized the manner in which strategic resettlement had been implemented. This was partly

due to its historical links with the Chiweshe area, one of the first to be swept by the policy. The Wesleyan Methodists tended to take something of a moderate stance with respect to the regime, though it did voice its concerns about the impact of the policy on race relations in Rhodesia. The United Methodists, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa – until the mid-point of the war, considered a nationalist opponent of the Smith regime – were hostile to the policy and played a key role in dismantling the system towards the end of the war once Muzorewa was in power.

Like the Catholics, the respective geography of each Protestant church shaped its responses to strategic resettlement. Due to its historical links with Chiweshe, which we have seen was an early focal point of the enforced villagization programme, the Salvation Army unsurprisingly had the most significant articulation with the victims of strategic resettlement. For the Anglicans and the Methodists (particularly the Wesleyan Methodists) fewer members were affected by the policy and therefore these denominations played a much more limited role in the relief efforts. There was, then, something geographically contingent in the humanitarian response of the churches to strategic resettlement. Those denominations who articulated most with strategic resettlement unsurprisingly were either those situated in the key zones of strategic resettlement – for example, the Catholics and the Salvation Army as opposed to the Anglicans and Methodists (especially the Wesleyan Methodists). Ecclesiastical geography, then, was important.

Given that the various churches had different orientations to the regime, they could not necessarily themselves coordinate relief supplies and work. As was shown in chapter four, it was Christian Care that became the important internal intercessor between various internal aid organizations, including the fragmented Christian denominations. Still, all of those denominations had to respond to the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the PVs and they could do this through Christian Care's Emergency Relief Committee which served as the lynchpin of the Christian humanitarian response to strategic resettlement. At the same time, Christian Care

became the general funnel for international NGOs who were unable to operate directly in Rhodesia due to UDI. It was an ideal organization due to its relatively neutral stance towards the regime – which therefore didn't act against it as it did the Catholic Church – owing to its prioritization of practical relief programmes as opposed to advocacy. As shown, an important connection was formed between Christian Care and Oxfam which channelled significant financial and material resources to the victims of strategic resettlement through the Emergency Relief Committee. Oxfam was the one British NGO that played an important role monitoring the relief programmes and making the facts about strategic resettlement known to the British government. However, like all international NGOs, Oxfam's work was shaped (even dictated) by British foreign policy which restricted the role it could play in the relief efforts to the protected villages, not least because the UK did not wish to support strategic resettlement.

Nevertheless, resources from Oxfam and other international organisations did flow to Christian Care and it was able to launch a far-reaching relief programme. In effect, it acted as a clearing house for internal and external aid and interceded in a situation where not only sanctions, but the war (including guerrilla strategy) made it either impossible or extremely dangerous for international NGOs to operate in rural areas in the war zone. Christian Care was able to use local networks, in particular, rural Catholic missions, to aid those who had been forcibly displaced.

If Christian Care played the internal intercessory role, it was the International Committee of the Red Cross that played the external one. This was the organisation that tried to get both the Rhodesian Security Forces and the guerrillas to adhere to the principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention in their prosecution of the war. It was also the ICRC that rendered financial and material assistance to the refugees in the camps runs by the guerrillas in Mozambique and Zambia. Unlike the emergencies during decolonization struggles in Kenya and Algeria where national Red Cross/Crescent societies had taken a lead in the medical relief

efforts in the humanitarian crises attendant upon civilian displacement and reconcentration, it was the ICRC which took the leading role in the Rhodesian conflict. The Rhodesia Red Cross did play a significant role in its own right, especially in the medical outreach work carried out in the PVs in conjunction with the ICRC and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But, given its entrenchment in the white-settler community and its undeniable links to the state, it had something of a surrogate relationship with the regime. It was for this reason that an increasingly antagonistic relationship emerged between individual white members of that Society and the British Red Cross to which it remained formally linked, particularly as the latter pushed for the promotion of African members to leadership roles within the Rhodesian society. Still, despite this tension, the British Red Cross – within parameters set by the UK government – rendered significant financial support which enabled the Rhodesia Red Cross to carry out its medical outreach programme in the PVs. Even so, towards the end of the war it was the ICRC that came to the fore overseeing and implementing an extensive relief programme in the PVs throughout Rhodesia.

If the Rhodesia Red Cross worked closely with the Smith regime, this cannot compare with what the final chapter discloses about the surrogate role played by the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign. Government agencies, principally the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Internal Affairs (the last mentioned responsible for administering the protected villages) were actually represented in the organisation and the ideology of white settler society had a significant bearing on the RFFHC campaign in the protected villages. Thus, its infant feeding scheme and nutritional education programme reflected the racist attitudes of the ‘white-settler’ state in placing an unwarranted onus on the victims of strategic resettlement – in effect, blaming them for infant malnutrition. Reflecting the organization’s clear support for the villagization programme, it placed much stress on promoting what it considered development and ‘self-help’ programmes amongst the peasantry. This emphasis overlooked the traumatic

and disruptive impact of the policy of strategic resettlement. The work of Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger certainly countered malnutrition, but its ideology and work in the regard were functional to the Rhodesian regime, and it aimed to make the protected villages workable.

When considering the range of responses to strategic resettlement by the organizations presented above, we can observe a spectrum of NGO orientations to the phenomenon. This was decided by each organization's prior history and its relationship and proximity to the Smith regime and 'white-settler culture. (This was also of relevance to their relationship with the guerrillas, the British government and the wider international NGO community.) The Catholics were oppositional in terms of their stance to the Smith regime and willingness to expose the human rights abuses attendant upon Rhodesian counterinsurgency. The Methodists, especially those under Muzorewa, whilst inclining somewhat to the liberation cause adopted a much less radical approach than the Catholics in support of African nationalism and in its critique of the villagization programme. The Wesleyan Methodists, meanwhile, were much more neutral in their stance. Christian Care and the ICRC can be regarded as intercessor organizations representing a range of different and often conflicting interests but being able to act as important funnels for rendering humanitarian assistance, especially for the British government and the wider international community who could not play a direct role in the context of sanctions. Of the churches considered, the Anglicans can be considered proximate to the Rhodesian regime and overwhelmingly supportive of its counterinsurgency strategy. The Salvation Army, despite its leadership tending to support the regime, nevertheless had to relate to – and provide for – its congregants who were victims of strategic resettlement in Chiweshe and it played a role in making the facts known about the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the PVs. At the furthest end of the spectrum was the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign (RFFHC) which clearly acted as a surrogate of the regime.

In identifying this spectrum, one should not however, lose sight of the tensions within organisations and certain contradictory dynamics between their levels. Consider for example the various strands of the Red Cross. Tensions emerged between white members of the Rhodesian Red Cross, which was deeply entrenched in settler society, and the British Red Cross which pushed for and secured increased African representation at the managerial level of the organization. In Christian Care, concerns about its lax accounting procedures and the calibre of its leadership were raised both by local committee members and international donors. This was also compounded by growing ecumenical disunity within the organization, as witnessed by the Catholic threat to withdraw from it.

It would be well to bring out here more clearly the continuities and changes of NGO relations with the state, the guerrillas and, to a lesser extent, the UK government which have emerged somewhat fitfully during the chapters in this dissertation. As noted, the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign (RFFHC) remained throughout the period unequivocally a surrogate organization of the state and continued to espouse the racist values of white-settler culture in its attitudes towards the victims of strategic resettlement even as it aided them. The Anglican Church, the Rhodesian Red Cross and the Salvation Army maintained a fairly close proximity to the white-settler regime and its values but tended to be increasingly critical of the results of the enforced villagization programme. The Salvation Army was preeminent in this regard owing to that fact that many of its members were swept by the policy in Chiweshe and neighbouring Madziwa. Christian Care maintained a neutral and intercessory role throughout the war. This is to be explained by the fact that it grew out of the need to create an impartial organization focused on welfare and development projects to which all organisations and churches could subscribe, and that the government would accept, in the context of growing Church-state tensions resulting from the critical stance of the Catholics and Methodists.

The Catholic Church's relationship with the Rhodesian regime during the period considered was largely unchanged in its strongly oppositional stance to the state and the human rights abuses attendant upon its counter-insurgency strategy. However, though strongly inclining towards the liberation movements, by the end of the war the Catholics became more willing to challenge the atrocities carried out by the guerrillas against missionary and aid personnel. This set an important precedent for the work it would undertake after independence during the 1980s in making the facts known about the atrocities committed by the ZANU-PF regime in Matabeleland. Hence human rights abuses remained a principal focus of this Church.¹

Oxfam, as we have seen, followed the strictures of the UK government, and its approach to the relief efforts remained shaped by British foreign policy and its implementation of sanctions towards Rhodesia. Consequently, Oxfam supported Christian Care (which Whitehall formally supported by 1978) but withdrew financial assistance from the Rhodesian Freedom From Hunger Campaign, despite its work in the PVs, due to its links to the rebellious Smith regime. With regard to the International Red Cross, its attempt to play a neutral role to get both sides to observe the tenets of the Geneva Convention, was affected by the fact that it increasingly found itself at odds with the guerrilla fighters who increasingly targeted its personnel towards the end of the war.

The United Methodists led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa underwent, in many ways, the most significant transformation in their relationship to the state of all the NGOs and Churches. As we have seen until the mid-1970s, Muzorewa was a central figure of moderate but nevertheless oppositional African nationalism in Rhodesia as leader of the UANC, which was early on supported and seen as useful by the radical nationalists whose organisations had been banned. However, the relationship of the UANC and that of the Methodists Muzorewa led was

¹ Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, *Breaking the Silence Building the True Peace, A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands, 1980 to 1988*, (Harare, 1997).

radically transformed as he became a figurehead of the internal settlement which had been engineered by the white-settler regime towards the end of the war. Despite moves by the Muzorewa's government to dismantle some of the protected villages (PVs), it played an active role supporting the Rhodesian counter-insurgency efforts through the auxiliary units that owed allegiance to the UANC.

Finally, it is important to be mindful of the contradictions and heterogeneity of some of the organizations considered in this dissertation. The Catholics were generally oppositional to the regime and inclined strongly towards the liberation cause. However, it is important not to homogenize the denomination and to recognize the particular character of its different missionary sects. This could be linked to these sects' pre-war histories. The German Jesuits who had experienced oppression at the hands of both the Nazis and the Communists came out in opposition to both the Rhodesian Security Forces and the guerrillas following the guerrilla abductions of school students from St Alberts Mission in 1973. In contrast, the Carmelites, including the high-profile Bishop Donal Lamont, who had experience of British oppressions during the Irish nationalist struggle inclined much more strongly to the liberation cause, often providing material assistance to the guerrillas from their missions in Manicaland. As shown, there were also tensions within the Salvation Army between members in Rhodesia who protested against the decision of the international leadership to condemn the guerrillas and withdraw from the World Council of Churches (WCC). This was linked to the concerns for the safety of personnel on the ground who were rendering aid to the victims of strategic resettlement around Chiweshe and Madziwa. Even amongst the Anglicans — a generally white and pro settler denomination — there was some division in attitude between the Salisbury-based leadership who were wholeheartedly supportive of the Smith regime, and individual ministers in Manicaland who, however rarely, actively provided support for the guerrillas.

Whatever the differences and contradictions between and within these organizations, certain continuities and similarities were evident and these were determined by the fact that they were all responding to the humanitarian crisis resulting from strategic resettlement. Finally, and paradoxically, it would be worthwhile in further work to pay due attention to the complexities of white might be considered the coerced creation of settlements by the guerrillas in and around their bases through their policy of abductions and forced resettlement for the purposes of recruitment. This shared some characteristics with strategic resettlement, and it would be interesting to uncover and provide a systematic account of how NGOs related to this.

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