# Hustlers, Traitors, Patriots and Politicians: Legitimising London's Transport Monopoly 1900-1933



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## Contents



## Tables and Figures

## List of Abbreviations

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| GLC | Greater London Council |
| LCC | London County Council |
| LGOC | London General Omnibus Company |
| L&HCTAC | London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee |
| LRT | London Regional Transport |
| LT | London Transport |
| LTB | London Transport Board |
| LTE(BTC) | London Transport Executive (British Transport Commission) |
| LTE(GLC) | London Transport Executive (Greater London Council) |
| LTPB | London Transport Passenger Board |
| MBW | Metropolitan Board of Works |
| TfL | Transport for London |
| TGWU | Transport and General Workers Union |
| UERL | Underground Electric Railway Company of London |

## Chapter One

## Introduction and Historical Overview

*'We had lost our licence to operate, the informal licence that society gives you. That had to be regained at all costs.'* Denis Tunnicliffe, Managing Director of London Underground, speaking about the consequences of the Kings Cross fire in 1987.[1]

*'You introduced, if I may say so, the hustling methods of the States into our slow-going old country'* The House of Commons Select Committee Motor Traffic to Albert Stanley, 1913.[2]


### Abstract

*The History of London's transport is primarily charted through its physical expansion, with unification seen as a logical and inevitable end point. Relatively little has been explored regarding the politics of its creation, the personalities involved, or why events occurred as and when they did. This book sees the development and amalgamation of London's transport system as series of social permissions which had to be legitimised before they could be enacted. The role of statistical accounting is particularly emphasised, as trust in numbers played an important part in ensuring trust in persons and organisations. Using legitimacy as theoretical framework around which to hang the historical detail, this chapter opens the narrative and provides an overview of events 1900-33.*


### Introduction

The story of how London's transport became London Transport is well known. In 1900 the capital's transport was provided by a mixed mass of municipal and private providers. In 1933, after almost half a century of debate, approximately 100 different undertakings were merged into a single organisation.[3] All public road transport provision and all rail transport except mainline railways were unified into a single, unified provider, the London Passenger Transport Board. Thereafter, though it has been known by a variety of names, the vast majority of London's public transport has been provided by a single organisation commonly known as London Transport. The scale and complexity of what happened in 1933 impressed contemporaries, but also left them and commentators since with a nagging sense of bemusement and even irritation about why it had not happened sooner. London Transport, once created as an organisation, seemed such an obvious solution that its previous absence appeared absurd, and its eventual arrival is still treated with a sense of the natural, common sensical and inevitable.[4] A unified system for a single city was surely, incontestably, rational and by extension the previous free-market system was chaotic, wasteful and driven by the profit motive rather than a higher sense of civic service. But situating the creation of a

coordinated system to provide London's transport as the inexorable product of rational, sensible, progressive thinking leaves a number of problems. Nothing is inevitable until it actually happens. What constitutes rational common sense is more of a perspective than a fact. 'Rational' Cost-Benefit analysis solves far less than its proponents hope as a policy instrument because one person's benefits are invariably somebody else's costs. Whilst people are pleased when public services can be objectively proven to be efficient, they also want to know whose interests that efficiency is operating in. They want people in positions of authority to be accountable, and ideally, relatable. The greater the authority, the more pressing those issues of licence and recognition are. The unfinished story of London Transport is not about what happened, but how and why it was allowed to happen at all.

This book attempts to explain the transformation of London's transport provision in terms of political and social history, and to get beyond the traditional, rationalist justifications rooted in a combination of simple economic, administrative and engineering efficiencies alongside high minded ideals of public service. The premise explored here is that it is not enough for an organization to be efficient, it also has to be socially and politically legitimate. The story of how London's transport became London Transport is therefore composed of many strands of which its construction, operation and engineering are just a few.

Thus, the narrative of how London Transport was allowed to take shape and the form it took is inherently social. In it, we see how a cosmopolitan, multinational society gave way to one which gave greater importance to national identity and patriotism. London Transport's story was a managerial elite's struggle to gain the necessary political and social legitimacy to be entrusted with the control of a major public corporation. It is therefore a story mostly about people: their perspectives, their origins, their politics and their worlds in which they lived. In this book I have made it a story composed around four men deeply involved in the creation of London Transport, not because I intend to lend any weight to the discredited idea that history or leadership is a series of 'Great Men', but because they humanise the parallel, but otherwise rather less engaging revolution in data gathering which made centralised control feasible, and because they usefully personify the changing politics and society of the period.

However dry, we must not entirely forget the developments in management and information systems that, at an organisational level, made unification possible and perhaps more importantly provided a useful veneer of rational calculation to decision making. In the latter part of first decade of the 20th century London's transport providers began to collect data with an unprecedented exactitude and range, allowing them to claim that managerial decisions could be made objectively with scientific rigour. This process sponsored the rise of the professional manager and the creation large M-Form organisations, which in turn allowed the economies of scale and scope described elsewhere by Chandler.[5] There is nothing inherently unique about these developments in industry, so what lends London Transport's story its social twist is that during roughly the same time-period, the reputations of the leading personages in London's transport had become badly tarnished as dishonest foreign speculators, and perhaps even traitors to Britain during the First World War (Lentin, 2013).[6] The ability to collect and analyse large volumes of data made unified, centralised control of London's transport more plausible, but was it desirable to put control in the hands of this type of person? Could the most important characters in London's transport world be trusted to run it responsibly in the public interest? I explore how the employment of statistical data combined with skilful media repositioning allowed a new generation of figureheads in the transport business to emerge as honest, professional, and patriotic, making them suitable business leaders and trustees of a transport monopoly in the capital by 1933. This account of events combines the concepts of trust in numbers and trust in character to produce a wide-ranging, cultural and qualitative historical account of the creation of a major public monopoly.

As well as being social, a history of the changing legitimacy of a major organisation is also inevitably political. This is a story about transport, but it is also a story about how liberalism, conservatism and socialism contended for supremacy as ideas about how society should be organised. As liberal elites were super-ceded by conservatives, we can also observe that allowing organised labour within the citadels of power was part of the price that conservatism paid to displace liberalism. Nationally based industries were also socialised industries, and

as London's transport gradually transformed from an international free market to a centrally controlled British monopoly, we can see that the influence of trade union power and Labour politics grew commensurately. The prevalence of these ideas not only shaped policy, but condoned or condemned the behaviours, and perhaps even the identities, that individuals in positions of authority were able to assume in society. As we will see, who was allowed to run London Transport as a unified monopoly was not the same as who had been allowed to run London's multifarious laissez faire transport companies. This brings us back to the individuals. In the book we will look at four men whose careers were intimately involved in London's transport and its eventual merger. Charles Yerkes and Sir Edgar Speyer were sometimes flamboyant representatives of an internationalist, liberal, and free market world order which collapsed in the First World War. Sir Albert Stanley, later Lord Ashfield, managed a transition to more conservative, unified, inward looking and self-consciously 'British' way of doing business. In doing so, he had to make a truce with and acknowledge the representatives of the British working-class and the Labour Party. Their principal spokesmen on matters relating to London's transport were Ernest Bevin, leader of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and Herbert Morrison, Labour Party MP, Chairman of the London County Council and briefly Minister of Transport.

In conclusion, I argue that the need for London Transport to legitimize itself is an essential though intermittent factor, as relevant today as it was in the early part of the 20th century. While there are long periods of calm and consensus in the provision of London's transport, there are also distinct crises of legitimacy. The value of this otherwise rather anodyne statement lies in spotting or even predicting these crises, and usefully explicating how their nature arises out of the context of their times which, in turn, perhaps lends itself towards resolutions of otherwise seemingly intractably complex problems. There were several crises of legitimation in the period covered in this book, another set subsequently in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and I suggest that we are in a fresh iteration of crisis now in the 2020s. The direct instrumental value today of understanding the crises of legitimacy described and assessed in this book a hundred years ago is open to debate, but they do remind us that

London Transport in its current form and function is not a rational inevitability. Legitimacy, especially for a monopoly of provision, has to be periodically bargained for in the social, political and cultural national arena. I now turn to an outline of the initial, and perhaps hardest, of these battles for legitimacy. This was the struggle to obtain permission to create a single body to run London's transport in the first instance. Given the huge ambit of the task it is less surprising than generally perceived that this took many decades.

**Historical Overview**

The failure of proposals to unify London's governance and public utility networks had long precedents stretching back into the 19th century. As early as 1835, The Municipal Corporations Act transformed and rationalised the government of provincial cities, but it did not apply to London. This was a 'calamity' which stymied and delayed efforts at co-ordination and centralization in London's governance thereafter.[7] Twenty years passed before Parliament assented to the Metropolis Management Act of 1855 which coordinated control of drainage, sewerage, lighting and paving through the Metropolitan Board of Works. Gradually, the powers of the Board were expanded by Parliament incrementally to include gas inspection, the fire brigade, parks, tramways etc. By 1876, 80 further statutes had enlarged the Board's powers, and brought its activities into the realm of public transport.[8] By this point, the report of The Select Committee of the House of Lords on Metropolitan Railway Communication in 1863 had already tentatively suggested that a 'competent authority' should take control of coordinating the construction and working of metropolitan (i.e. London) railways, and in the same period, the 1870 Tramways Act substantially augmented the potential power of local government by allowing it to purchase, though, curiously, not directly operate, privately constructed tramway systems after 21 years.[9] However, despite these growing delegations, it is important to note that Parliament always reserved ultimate power in the creation public utility networks to itself, and that a Parliamentary Act rather than the operation of the law or local initiative was fundamental to their establishment.[10]

This factor made itself felt in the design of the next stage in the evolution of London's governance in 1889; the creation of the London County Council (LCC) as a successor to the

Metropolitan Board of Works, and the later arrival of the Metropolitan Boroughs which both surrounded and interpolated its jurisdiction. When it was created in 1889, the LCC's jurisdiction covered the entirety of the urban area of London and the degree of its social and economic responsibilities for public services expanded.[11] Finally, 54 years after the Municipal Corporations Act, London possessed an institution capable of exerting centralized control, and the hour of rationalization and coordination of public services in the capital appeared to be at hand. However, the LCC's full potential as a unified system of governance was stymied from the outset by the survival of the City of London as in independent corporation at its geographical heart, and then later in 1899 by the creation of the Metropolitan Boroughs at both its suburban fringes. These checked the LCC's physical expansion and overlapped within its existing inner-city remit, which detracted from some of its activities and set up rival power structures. This was intentional. Parliament was Conservative dominated in that period and had grown alarmed by how the Progressive Party[12] dominated the LCC had used its control of the institution and its resources to implement their own policy agenda.[13]

As an example of this aggrandizement in the sphere of transport policy, the LCC constructed what became by far the largest tramway network in London, and gradual subsequent reinterpretations of the 1870 Act also allowed it to take direct control of its operations.[14] Thus the Boroughs, some of whom operated their own tramway systems, were designed to dilute and constrain the LCC's role, and ensured that after 1900 London's government now resembled a series of three concentric rings: The Corporation City of London retained its independence as a small island in the centre of the capital. Around that stretched the jurisdiction of the LCC, which it now shared in some limited ways with the inner Borough Councils.[15] On the periphery, the outer, Suburban Councils provided, to Tory minds, a 'cordon sanitaire' which safely constrained the LCC from ever greater horizons.

At first glance, the byzantine intricacies of local government arrangements would seem to have little to do with the provision of London's transport. Yet, even at this stage, a glance at the tramway map from the period reveals some puzzling gaps and anomalies in the network.

Like a small fortress, the City of London kept trams outside the perimeter of the former medieval walls. In the West End, there was a great tramway desert between the Fulham Palace Road and the Kingsway. Viewed more widely, there were few tramways beyond the modern north and south circular roads. This makes a lot more sense when viewed in the context of London's politics and governance. Trams made the working-class mobile and threatening.[16] Even decades later in 1931, The Times published the following letter from an irate middle-class commuter on the underground: 'The *intelligentsia* of Hampstead has the chagrin of witnessing the *canaille* of Highgate lolling at their ease while we have to hang on our straps, usually changing our stance and wishing we were on a different footing. Is it fair?'[17] At the time, the huge violent riots in Trafalgar Square in 1887, and the great dock strike in 1889 offered ample evidence of what might happen if the East End working class met the West End middle and upper classes. A simple way to ensure that the underclass of the East End never got to Chelsea was to ensure that there was no easy way of getting there. The tram network of 1900 was the physical manifestation of the capital's politics, and of the psychopathology of urban space.[18]

I argue that it is these connections, the social, the political and the cultural, that are so absent from the majority of the literature which discusses London's transport. Reading and re-reading them over the years, it appears to me that they are written above all from an engineering perspective. Their focus is on the physicality of the system, the challenge and marvel of construction in the face of danger and obstruction, in the diligence in refining and improving the manufacture of components and vehicles and on the endless mechanical and administrative challenges of daily operation. This supports a narrative rooted in the technical data of performance, the arrival of new equipment, and the dates of new openings.[19] Yet, this approach leaves many questions unanswered regarding why, rather than how, London's transport developed as it did, which the authors either tend to skirt over, or simply condemn.[20] At the back of this evasion, I sense the engineering profession's frustration: 'The purpose of transport is the carriage of quantity for distance. If only the politicians, the travelling public, aldermen, councillors, newspapers and financiers would just mind their own

business and let us design, build and operate a coordinated system run along rational, efficient, scientific principles to everybody's benefit.' Yet transport, in the sense of moving from point A to point B in the most efficient way possible is far too narrow a definition of a phenomenon which might be better construed as 'mobility'.[21] As such, it cannot be disentangled from the social, political and cultural context in which it takes place. Therefore, one of the main purposes of this book is to try and claim London's transport history back from technical experts and situate it in a more realistic place as an expression, not just of engineering prowess, but of social and political forces.

Thus, we arrive at 1900, noting that the considerable complexity and attendant jealousies of London's governance structure during the 19th century make the 'inevitable' march towards a rational, unified, publicly owned transport system beloved of Progressives on the LCC[22] a far less likely outcome than might at first glance seem the case. At this point, while the administrative and electoral contortions of London's wider systems of governance continued, several further complicating factors enter the transport narrative, personified by Charles Tyson Yerkes. Yerkes arrived in London in 1900. As we will see in later chapters, he had already enjoyed a colourful and fraudulent career in American public transit systems and seems to have believed that London was ripe for the taking.[23] Yerkes embodied the British popular press's stereotype of a buccaneering, hustling Yankee businessman intent on taking over traditional British companies and establishing monopolistic 'Trusts'.[24] But the picture was not entirely negative. American businessmen were also considered efficient and dynamic, and newspaper reports of the time also indicate that Yerkes arrival was greeted with the hope that he might inject some vim and vigour into the management and expansion of London's transport system.[25] Yerkes complicated the situation because his enthusiasm and effectiveness at amalgamating the nascent London underground railway network associated the idea of unification with both his somewhat dubious methods of raising finance, and sowed the seeds of the suspicion that the capital city's transportation system was in some shadowy and illicit way controlled by foreigners to the detriment of Londoners.[26]

Yerkes died in December 1905, perhaps fortuitously, as the financial systems he had created to sustain his project to expand and agglomerate the underground railway network were built on wildly unrealistic passenger numbers and a good deal of financial chicanery which collapsed in 1906-07.[27] His legacy in some ways augmented the arguments of the Progressive Party and all those who had long believed that the solution to provision of public services required amalgamation and centralised control. In that respect Yerkes had done more than anyone previously to bring that about for London's transport, through the creation of his holding company The Underground Electric Railways Company of London (UERL). Ironically, this slightly shady private company was the genesis of what later became a great public service organization.[28] This paradox was appropriate for Yerkes who was a visionary, but also a red-blooded capitalist, a foreigner and a dishonest speculator. He fitted no particular party-political interest. His vision pointed the way towards a certain kind of operational and institutional future for London's transport that we have come to regard as normal, but the manner of his activities in sowing the seeds of that outcome made an already stony path to its realization a great deal steeper.

The crisis bought to the fore Yerkes' associate in the City, Sir Edgar Speyer, and also a new generation of professional transport managers headed up by Sir George Gibb as the new managing director. Gibb was a pioneer of detailed statistical reporting as a method of restoring efficiency to railway operations, and he had been impressed by the adoption of these systems by American railroads during his visits there.[29] Joining him was a new general manager for the UERL, Albert Stanley, formerly of the Public Service Corporation of New Jersey. On 20th February 1907 the UERL Board resolved to appoint Stanley from 1st April on a salary of £2000 p/a. A month later he laid before them a new scheme of operational re-organization for the company. In January 1908, the Board was pleased enough with his performance to grant him a salary increase to £3000 p/a.[30]

From this point, we see the great battles for unification and legitimacy enter a new phase. Just as the private sector appeared to resolve that unification, professional management and efficiency were the way forward, events in politics turned in the opposite direction. In the

same year as the Speyer resolved the crisis by declaring the UERL technically bankrupt and then re-issuing its capital debt in fixed interest securities rather than shares,[31] the Progressive Party lost control of the LCC to the conservative Municipal Reform Party. Proposals that London's struggling private transport companies should be unified under municipal auspices were now unlikely to find any favour with a governing Party explicitly elected on a platform of controlling or reducing property taxes,[32] and the prospect of further expansion of municipal transport activity beyond tramways was curtailed.[33]

Moreover, Speyer's appointment as Chairman along with an American general manager and financial backers exacerbated the sense, already apparent in Yerkes' time, that the controlling interests and decision making in London's transport were under foreign control. It did not help that the keenest advocates for yet more agglomeration of transport – naturally under the auspices of the UERL – also emanated from this quarter. As a German Jew, Sir Edgar Speyer was doubly damned in this respect. After 1900, long standing anti-semitism amongst conservative elites combined with a fear of a powerful and hostile Germany to make Speyer initially provocative to some, and then after the outbreak of the First World War, an intolerable personage in public life.[34]

In the meantime, Speyer's financial re-organisation alongside Gibb and Stanley's managerial and organizational reforms began to bear fruit. Branding and advertising were standardized and stepped up and finances stabilized. However, the full results of their policy were only realised after Gibb's departure in 1910 which allowed Stanley to become managing director. Over 1911-1913 he and Speyer negotiated the absorption of the London General Omnibus Company (LGOC) into the UERL and added the Metropolitan Electric Tramways (MET) to the UERL's extant tramway holdings via the London United Tramway company. A number of smaller bus companies now followed suit and joined what was now becoming known as the 'London Traffic Combine', formerly the UERL.[35] On the tube railways, the Central and the City and South London Railways joined the Combine in 1912, while the Great Northern and City was absorbed by the Metropolitan Railway. On the eve of the First World War, Speyer and Stanley were not entirely the masters of all they surveyed,[36] but their only systematic

competition came from the LCC tramway network and to a lesser extent the Metropolitan and other suburban mainline railways. Although large, rival, private organisations akin to the Combine did not meaningfully exist, Stanley correctly foresaw that either 'dis-organised' free-market competition at the micro level or direct municipal or state control still posed a threat to the private monopoly that he was gradually building. Nevertheless, both central and municipal government were, thus far, acquiescent in allowing the London Traffic Combine to emerge. The contradictory attitude of the 1905 Royal Commission on London Traffic explains why a large, private, quasi-monopoly appeared legitimate. In the report under the section dealing with 'fundamental difficulties', it had identified the central problem as being the absence of centralized oversight and control of London's transport. Yet it had also been deeply reluctant to create such a public body, or award it any powers as this would be a 'municipal revolution'.[37] Speyer and Stanley's enterprise in creating the London Traffic Combine effectively solved this problem for them without any central government action or involvement. Extending municipal control over the UERL, which had been briefly toyed with in the 1906-07 crisis, was also unlikely as the Municipal Reform party continued to win majorities on the LCC in 1910 and 1913. The LCC's sizeable tram network made them major players in the capital's transport service, but as we shall see in the 1920's it was an asset that the Municipal Reform Party regarded as a liability and was only too keen to divest itself of when the opportunity subsequently presented itself.

While government appeared satisfied in allowing Speyer and Stanley to advance their plans for amalgamation, some elements in the media and the public were less so. In 1912 The Daily Mail reassured its readers that 'All attempts at [London's Transport] monopoly will be closely watched'.[38] The requirement to overcome, or at least neutralise, the watchful eye of the press and make 'monopoly' less of dirty word leads us to a further factor for consideration when surveying the state of London's transport provision before the upheaval of the First World War. In 1911 the Railway Companies (Accounts and Returns) Act was passed, requiring all companies to keep detailed statistical and financial returns on their activities in the way that Gibb had long believed necessary to achieve operating efficiency.

From this point onwards, coincident with the amalgamation of the LGOC, the MET, the remaining tube railways and an assortment of small bus companies into the Combine, the organization kept detailed, centralized financial and statistical information about all aspects of its activities at a level of detail previously undocumented. Furthermore, all these figures were kept in one book.[39] Whether collecting all this information actually resulted in the kind of operating efficiencies and financial profits that the supporters of statistical accounting sincerely believed that it would remains open to debate.[40] However, the purpose of this book is to examine numbers' role in the pursuit of legitimacy rather than efficiency. Here, as Theodore Porter argues, numbers play a crucial part in managing trust. Numbers create new things and transform the meanings of old ones.[41] We have seen how Speyer, and to a certain extent Stanley, were immigrants to Britain and as a such viewed with suspicion and distrust, a situation aggravated by their control of an organization whose reputation was already tainted by Yerkes. This was a weakness that was about to dramatically escalate after 1914. But I argue that even to be entrusted with creating the Traffic Combine as it stood in 1913, they had to show that their probity was greater than that of Yerkes. Detailed numerical information gathering, and its usage as the basis for managerial decisions as Gibb and others had long demanded,[42] was an excellent way of depicting their actions in an objective, scientific and rational, light. Whether they were truly objective is irrelevant, the issue at hand was re-shaping public and political perception of their project in their own desired image.[43] In this, Stanley was assisted by a media that, while it was concerned about monopoly, was also well-disposed to see Americans as purveyors of 'Yankee Efficiency' in the operation of large organisations.[44] However, despite their success in creating the Traffic Combine I argue that Stanley, and particularly Speyer, were still skating on thin ice as concerned their reputations and their legitimacy as custodians of London's transport. The tabloid press was hostile to Germans and Jews, and fickle as regarded Americans. Enjoining the British public to trust in numbers, rather than in them as persons, was an effective way to dilute and distract hostility during the late Edwardian peace. It did not prove equal to that task in wartime.

The war destroyed Sir Edgar Speyer and made Sir Albert Stanley pre-eminent as London's transport supremo. As we shall see, even Stanley did not escape entirely unscathed by the rampant xenophobia that the war unleashed. By contrast, Speyer fell almost immediately. A German, a Jew and a prominent Liberal closely associated with the Prime Minister Herbert Asquith made him an irresistible target for the conservative popular press and a group of ultra-nationalist Conservative politicians. They accused him of being a spy, a traitor, a German citizen, and a social parasite[45] and demanded that he be removed from his official offices including membership of the privy council.[46] Back in the transport world, on the 18th May 1915 Speyer's resignation from the Chairmanship of the UERL was accepted, and though his fellow directors recorded their appreciation of his 'invaluable service' in the minutes, they did not prevent his departure.[47] On the 26th of May he left Britain, and arrived in New York on 3rd June. Even this physical departure was not enough. The accusatory tirade against him was kept up relentlessly, and eventually the claim that his financial connections through his brother had continued to trade with Germany during the war was enough to recall him to Britain and strip him of his British citizenship in 1922.[48] The claim remains debatable, but the hysterical social and political atmosphere legitimised direct and indirect calumnies and made would-be defenders cautious about speaking out. Speyer was not the only one to suffer this degrading treatment. Stephanie Seketa shows how only the most nimble-footed of businesses associated with German-Jewry escaped persecution and closure.[49]

Speyer's disastrous crisis of personal legitimacy ending up involving Stanley too. He had enjoyed an easier war, leaving the sphere of London's transport temporarily to become President of the Board of Trade and a Conservative MP. The press lionized him, playing up to the notion of him as a super-efficient example of the new men of 'push and go' that Lloyd-George had appointed to cabinet following the removal of Herbert Asquith in December 1916. 'Efficiency. That is the term that springs most naturally to the lips when you survey Sir Albert Stanley. He exudes it with every word and gesture' gushed the Daily Mail in 1917.[50] But a year later, the same critics who had seen off Sir Edgar Speyer now closed in to

eliminate Stanley as well. The issue was that while Sir Albert had been born in Britain, his date of birth was slightly confused and his family had emigrated to America when he was eight, changing the family name from 'Knatriess' to 'Stanley' after arriving.[51] On 26th June 1918 Noel Pemberton-Billing, MP for Hertford, asked Parliament whether the President of Board of Trade (Sir Albert Stanley) was actually: 'A German by the name of Nuttmeyer, whether the name Stanley has not been adopted since, and whether it is not the fact that he holds his position owing to the influence of a German Jew called Edgar Speyer.'[52] Stanley had to make a personal statement to House of Commons explaining that his parents were British, and that their former surname (actually Knattriess, rather than Nuttmeyer as claimed by Billing) was an old English name that his father had given up because people could not spell or pronounce it correctly. Fortunately for him, The Daily Mail recorded that he sat down to the laughter and cheers of friends and wrote up the story as an unreasonable attack by Pemberton-Billing.[53] It was a narrow escape and showed how dangerous even the slightest hint of unorthodoxy had become.

On 30th May 1919, Sir Albert Stanley was invited to return to the London Traffic Combine as chairman. The minutes record that he was granted a period to recuperate from ill-health in the United States, but he was soon back, and on the 14th October his understanding that maintaining good organizational reputations required active management was underlined by his announcement that a new office would be set up by the London Traffic Combine to deal with 'Propaganda for bringing to the Press and Public the present position of the operating companies.'[54] Three months later, his social legitimacy was re-affirmed in the New Year's honours list where he was made Lord Ashfield. He had survived the war and come out with his personal status enhanced. Unlike the mainline railways, the Combine had avoided state control during wartime. Yet in the background the war had also done much to boost and legitimize the argument that centralised co-ordination of transport was synonymous with efficiency, while free-market competition was by contrast chaotic, wasteful and somehow immoral.[55]

Ashfield's challenge was now to ride the wave of opinion that conflated centralized co-ordination with efficiency, but not so enthusiastically that he propelled the Combine and London's transport into full municipalisation or nationalisation. Somehow, he had to legitimize the idea that a private monopoly was the desirable outcome for London's transport and that he, not an elected public body, was its rightful guardian. We have seen how both notions had already advanced a long way since 1900 in the face of intellectual opposition, irrational prejudice and the counter-productive behaviour of some of Ashfield's predecessors. In terms of his personal legitimacy as an honest, patriotic Briton, Ashfield was secure. After the War the press continued to lionize him, declaring Ashfield 'as sound as a rock and as honest as day' in 1920.[56] War hysteria receded. Ashfield, though a resident of America for twenty-five years who had served in the US Navy and who had married an American, had been nevertheless claimed by the British establishment as one of their own. At the moment of Pemberton-Billing's attack, Bonar-Law, the Leader of the Conservative and Unionist Party, had stood by him and clapped him on the back as sat down to the cheers and applause that followed his reply.[57] He had been weighed in the scale of patriotic opinion, and found suitable. The peerage merely offered a public acknowledgement of that fact.

As regards his publicly acknowledged personal reputation for efficiency and dynamism, this had thrived as a result of his wartime responsibilities. But in private, some senior colleagues were less sure. In February 1919, shortly before his departure from the Coalition government and return to the Traffic Combine, the Prime Minister David Lloyd-George confided to a friend that Ashfield's handling of industrial unrest in Glasgow had revealed him as a 'glib funk' who was liable to 'take in innocent persons like me'.[58] This in some ways is one of the most intriguing statements about Ashfield, not least because it is one of very few disrespectful ones, and from a highly talented and experienced observer. However, I argue that it should be read carefully. The paradox is that it is also a back handed compliment from a man who was no stranger to taking in innocent persons himself.[59]

We now arrive in the early post-war period with Ashfield's personal legitimacy essentially secured. The same could not yet be said for the legitimacy of his project to unify London's

transport fully, still less that it should done via a privately run organisation. As we have seen, this faced two critiques, one from the left wing of politics which wanted a unified system but under some form of democratic state or municipal control, and one from the right which celebrated the free market and public choice. Both are visible in Herbert Morrison's 'Socialisation and Transport' which was published in 1933 and drew on Morrison's decades of prior experience as a London focused national politician who was already prominent in the Labour Party.[60] Though Morrison was a politician in a left-wing Party who espoused socialism throughout his career, both he and his biographers are keen to draw attention to his ability to understand and channel the views of the skilled working class and lower middle class, many, perhaps even a majority of whom, were Conservative voters.[61] Therefore, I see Morrison's perspectives on London's transport as well grounded in personal, political and administrative experience, though somewhat inconsistent – in other words, a good amalgam of political and public opinions on the topic at that time.

In his book, Morrison first examines the case for competition. In common with other commentators from the pre-war left wing of politics, he acknowledges that there was 'A measure of public opinion that hankers after competition.'[62] He then set up six tests for transport[63] which he argued that free market competition failed in every respect. He concluded with the rhetorical flourish that: 'The socialist has often been reminded by superior critics that fact is stronger than theory. I do not dispute the observation. The facts are on my side.' The facts about the often slipshod and unreliable service standards provided by the smaller private companies were indeed frequently on Morrison's side.[64] The problem was that at least some of these facts also applied to the larger operators, and the while the larger providers did generally exceed the performance of the smaller companies in terms of Morrison's tests, this was by virtue of their scale rather than whether they were privately or publicly operated.[65] This remained the biggest hole in Morrison's arguments, which, when summarized, essentially listed the virtues of 'bigger is better' but then found it difficult to explain objectively why a large public monopoly was superior to a large private one. To respond, Morrison had to fall back on essentially moral arguments founded on the alleged

selfishness of the profit motive: ‘A private monopoly cannot be trusted as much as a public concern to pursue the public good. For the private monopoly has behind it hungry shareholders who bring pressure to bear on the directors to provide the highest possible dividend’.[66] But opponents could fairly point out that a public organization had equally hungry voters behind it who might bring every bit as much pressure to bear on the politicians running it for benefits such as subsidized travel for the masses. This forced Morrison back on to another argument which cut to the heart of the legitimacy issue which had surrounded the formation of monopoly, whether public or private, from the outset: ‘We must establish a management in which we can place a far greater trust than a private monopoly…Once the public is convinced that efficient management for the public good is the basis for our policy, the sooner the public will be willing to grant greater freedom to the management. A large public concern employing able officers supervised by a Board of public-spirited people is much more likely to resist improper influence and corruption.’[67] Therefore, in the end, it all came down to legitimacy and trust, concepts which Morrison felt were best guarded in the public, civic or state sphere, but that Lord Ashfield had already been privately at work on assiduously cultivating for himself for well over a decade.

It was fortunate for Lord Ashfield that in the early 1920s his task of winning the battle for trust in a private monopoly was made much easier for him by two events, neither of which he controlled, but both of which served to render the alternatives to his preferred vision far harder to support. The first was in the sphere of local and municipal government, whose evolution after the creation of the London Boroughs in 1899 had gone quiet for several decades. However, the war had stirred up enthusiasm for social reform of all types, and so in 1921 there was an attempt to investigate and review the state of local government in London.[68] After several years of hearing a huge variety of witnesses, The Ullswater Commission eventually issued three separate reports. The majority report proposed no change. There had been great concern expressed during the hearings that any alteration might augment the powers of the LCC, which, even 30 years after Lord Salisbury had first suggested it, was still held to be ‘An overtly political body’ and ‘A strong nursery for radical

members of parliament.' This was despite majority control by the Conservative aligned Municipal Reform Party from 1907 onwards, and which would last until 1934.[69] One of the two minority reports proposed that all of London should be turned over to borough councils, with a few superordinate bodies to control water supply and tramways as discrete activities. The final minority report recommended a new Greater London Council encompassing the whole urban area.[70] The whole exercise was, in William Robson's words, an unmitigated fiasco, aided and abetted in Robson's view by members of the LCC themselves who as loyal Conservatives did not want to see their powers widen or strengthened any further at the expense of their Borough or County Council brethren.[71] The collapse of the attempt to reform, rationalize or enhance municipal government's powers was grist to Ashfield's mill. One outcome he had previously had cause to fear, the municipal monopoly of public transport which had worked to such good effect in other regional cities such as Glasgow, was now certainly dead as a possibility in London. Moreover, as Robson points out, the refusal of municipal authorities to reform themselves in the face of changing social, economic and demographic needs inevitably opened the door the provision of those services being provided by ad-hoc private bodies.[72] If he ever read these arguments, Lord Ashfield could be forgiven for concluding that the London Traffic Combine might be one such eminently suitable private ad-hoc body, ready to step in at the public's hour of need.

This left only two alternative systems of running transport to be de-legitimised, the free market and full state ownership. Ashfield's toughest intellectual and political opponents were always likely to be the free-marketeers who enjoyed much Conservative tradition and vested interest on their side,[73] as well as being the 'plucky little men' who symbolized British free enterprise.[74] But another stroke of luck for Ashfield meant that their interests suffered a fatal setback in the court of public opinion which was concurrent with the equally mortal blow dealt to the municipal reformers by the failure of the Ullswater Commission.

Following the First World War there was a large increase in the number of small independent bus companies, especially in London.[75] They were small businesses, and easy to set up by military veterans with a service gratuity who had often learned to drive during their time on

the forces.[76] After a slightly hesitant start, the number of small operators grew vertiginously between 1922 and 1924,[77] but such breakneck growth contained the seeds of its own demise. Congestion and dubious operating practices angered passengers,[78] while downward pressure on wages across all transport workers caused by the fierce competition prompted the Trade Unions to act. In early 1924 a full-scale strike by several Unions across all of London's transport modes was in prospect, effectively compelling the newly elected Labour minority government to rush the London Traffic Act through parliament in March 1924.[79] The Act rapidly shut down any possibility of new entrants to the London bus market by creating 'Restricted streets' closed to new operators, which, despite promises to the contrary, swiftly encompassed the majority of thoroughfares in the centre of London. The Act was bitterly protested in Parliament by defenders of the small businessman and of public choice,[80] but the threat of strikes and chaos on the streets had cost them their credibility and society's informal 'licence' to operate. Lord Ashfield and Ernest Bevin[81] were able to celebrate jointly the demise of free enterprise as a plausible alternative to the 'efficient' and 'rational' London Traffic Combine. As one angry MP pointed out: 'They [The Traffic Combine] have got their Act and they have got their regulations, which will kill out the healthy competitors, and leave entirely at the mercy of the Combine, without its paying one penny for it.' It was a fair verdict, but Lord Ashfield had not orchestrated the events which had so de-legitimised the private operators in the eyes of the public, he had merely stepped through a legislative door which had been opened by the actions of the small companies themselves. Full state ownership, or nationalization, remained a cloud on the horizon, perhaps no larger than a man's hand, but a possibility nonetheless whenever Labour was in government. Here again, Lord Ashfield was fortunate. In the December 1924 election Labour was decisively defeated after barely a year in office. [82] Nationalisation had a long way to go before it was accepted by a sufficient number of politicians and the electorate as a legitimate method of running major utilities.[83] Helpfully for supporters of the Combine, Morrison lost his seat in Hackney in1924 and was, for the time being, kept out of Parliament though he retained his place on the public stage through his membership of the LCC. There now followed an

interlude where Ashfield began discrete negotiations with the ruling Municipal Reform Party at the LCC to absorb their tramway system, which, as I discussed earlier, as good defenders of economy in local government and the ratepayers' interest they were happy to divest themselves of. These meetings were not reported to the public, or indeed to the LCC itself. Morrison eventually found out in December 1926 and made himself extremely obstructive to the proposals both in committee[84] and in carefully orchestrated public campaigns.[85] Nevertheless, legislative progress towards the merger of the LCC tramways into the Traffic Combine ground on. In July 1927 a 'Blue Report' on the co-ordination of passenger transport facilities in London officially proposed the absorption of the LCC tramways into the Combine. Morrison denounced it in a pamphlet entitled 'The London Traffic Fraud' and in a poster campaign 'Hands off our Trams'. However, the report was agreed by not only Ashfield and the LCC, but by officials from the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU). In early 1929 the legislation made its way through Parliament, stopped only at the eleventh hour by the election of a (minority) Labour government in May 1929. Morrison became Minister of Transport, but despite his earlier opposition to the Combine, he and Ashfield got on well together. Morrison recognized Ashfield's philanthropy to his employees, personal financial probity and commitment to public service.[86] Yet again, personal reputation helped tip the scales of negotiation, Ashfield having ensured that he was clearly distinct from the 'ruthless profit grabbers' of the past which Morrison despised. Aided by the good relationship with Ashfield, Morrison recognized the wide coalition from Conservatives to Trade Unionists that now supported the previous government's Bills,[87] and though he insisted that his new bill to create what he called a public corporation to run London's transport was materially changed, his 'new' parliamentary Bill largely contained distinctions without differences.[88] To underline that point, there was one final twist in the tale of London's transport monopoly. Before Morrison's 'new' Bill became law, Labour lost the 1931 election catastrophically. Yet again it appeared that progress towards the coordination of London's transport had been placed in jeopardy, but this was deceptive. In reality, the momentum for this idea had now gained almost universal acceptance, and there was such a wide-ranging coalition in its favour that

the general principle of unification under Ashfield's control was proof against even the electoral swings of 1929 and 1931. The new Conservative dominated coalition government picked up Morrison's Bill, and with very minor adjustments made it law. On the 1st July 1933, the London Passenger Transport Board came into being, with Lord Ashfield as the incontestable candidate for its chairman.

This has been a long story. Far too long from the perspective of the engineers who understandably wanted to get on with building and operating the system. Far too long as well for the progressive politicians whose view of the rational public interest required the biggest and most accessible transport system for the good of the many. The implicit alliance between the two is not difficult to spot, and I argue that it is these views that have dominated the histories of London's transport. My purpose here is not to challenge its assumptions per se, but to point out that legitimacy is at least, if not more, important than efficiency in public service organisations. Unifying London's transport places a lot of power in the hands of a few people. It is right that we should be certain of who they are and how they behave before we do so.

**The London Passenger Transport Board**

Having told the long story of how a monopoly of London's transport gradually came to be seen as the logical and natural outcome to London's traffic management I conclude here by briefly outlining the nature and scope of the organization that was handed over to Lord Ashfield in order to give a sense of substance to the powers and responsibilities to which he had made himself the legitimate heir.

In fact, despite being frequently termed a 'monopoly', the new London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) still fell some way short of that title. In the pooling arrangement with other transport providers in London, it was allocated 62% of the revenues. Broadly speaking, considering revenues, passengers carried, and mileage run, an overall two-thirds to three-quarters share of the transport market within a 30-mile radius of the centre of London would seem about correct.[89] The LPTB never controlled the extensive overground suburban railway network, particularly south of the river Thames, which was operated by the mainline

railway companies. The omission remained contentious for decades afterwards, but along with the independent taxis, it ensured that Ashfield's transport 'monopoly' never amounted to total overlordship. Perhaps the fairest way to express the situation is that Ashfield and his organization were granted a degree of influence that no other operator came close to approaching.

However, within those parameters the substance of the Board's powers, and its discretion, were very extensive indeed. Section 3(1) of the London Passenger Transport Act laid out the overall purpose and duties of the new organization: '[The Board are to] To exercise their powers under this Act to secure the provision of an adequate and properly co-ordinated system of passenger transport… while avoiding the provision of unnecessary and wasteful competitive services, take from time to time such steps as they consider necessary to extending and improving the facilities for passenger transport… as to provide most efficiently and conveniently for the needs [of passengers]. This broad remit was somewhat circumscribed by Section 3(4) where: 'It shall be the duty of the Board to conduct their undertaking in such a manner… as to secure that their revenues shall be sufficient to defray all charges which are required to be met out of the revenues of the Board.' This meant meeting the payments on the fixed interest bonds which had been issued to and exchanged between the miscellaneous investors in London's transport, some dating back to Yerkes' time, the details of which were specified at Section 39. But as the preamble had expounded, the Board was more than just a normal profit seeking private company. It had statutory duties to negotiate with Trade Unions (Sections 67 and 68), and some rather loosely worded commitments to consult with other representative bodies including County Councils and the Ministry of Transport (Section 59). In reality, as I have argued elsewhere, real decision-making powers were vested only with the seven members of the Board.[90] Such was the trust in Ashfield, that he and his fellow Board members were openly described as 'A small group of seven people selected for their knowledge and experience… an aristocracy of business… practically beyond control.'[91] Frank Pick's words were borne out by events of the next fourteen years where Ashfield effortlessly dominated the Board. During that time, he did not

feel the need to consult formally, regularly, at times or even at all, with passenger advisory committees or Ministers. He did listen on specific occasions, such as the 1937 London bus 'coronation' strike, to Trade Unions. By the late 1930's, there were some small squeaks of discontent about this magisterially aloof state of affairs from MPs,[92] and some bondholders who were angry that Ashfield had coolly defaulted on the statutory returns secure in the knowledge that threats to his position were miniscule. Neither protest did him any harm whatsoever as by this point his career, he had moved to the status of a transport national statesman. As his obituaries portrayed him, he was beyond partisanship, calmly arbitrating between the clamant demands of passengers, employees, government and investors in the wider national interest.[93]

Throughout its existence the Board consisted of Ashfield as Chairman, a vice-chairman, a Trade Union representative, two leaders of County Councils, a representative of the Bank of England and a senior official from the Institute of Civil Engineers. Another group of senior worthies acted as trustees and selected new Board members where necessary, but there was little doubt that Ashfield was primes inter pares. His only potential, though extremely unlikely, rival was the vice-chairman Frank Pick, who left the LPTB in 1940 after seven years. Pick described the Board as a new experiment in the administration of a public utility undertaking. Another way of looking at it was as a new experiment in trust. Ashfield and London Transport had come of age in an era of wheeler-dealing transport tycoons. He himself lived in some style on South Street in Mayfair between 1918 and 1940, allegedly entertaining a series of female friends at his private suite at Claridges. But whatever his personal proclivities, Ashfield had consummately won the battle for his public character, and for the concept of London's transport as delivered by a unified, centralized organization under his control. By the time he died in 1948, transport had become a staid affair, presided over by experts and civic minded officials. The extent of the powers awarded him in 1933 and the acceptance of his discretion in the way he used them subsequently bear testimony to the public trust, faith and sense of legitimacy that he had been able to engender.

[1] David Bownes, Oliver Green and Sam Mullins, *Underground – How the Tube Shaped London*, (London: Allen Lane, 2012) p225.
[2] Report of the Select Committee on Motor Traffic 1913, Cmd 278, paragraph 4.
[3] Theodore Barker and Michael Robbins, *A History of London Transport Volume Two*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974), p283.
[4] See Desmond Croome and Alan Jackson, *Rails through the Clay*, (London: Capital Transport, 1993) pp197-199; Stephen Halliday, *Underground to Everywhere*, (Stroud: Sutton, 2001) pp98-99 and Christian Wolmar, *The Subterranean Railway*, (London: Atlantic, 2004) pp194-197.
[5] Alfred Chandler, *Scale and Scope, the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) pp36-38.
[6] Anthony Lentin, *Banker, Traitor, Scapegoat, Spy? The Troublesome Case of Sir Edgar Speyer*, (London: Haus, 2013) pp140-141.
[7] William Robson, *The Government and Misgovernment of London*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939) pp21.
[8] Robson, *The Government of London*, (1939) pp59-60.
[9] From date of opening rather than date of the Act.
[10] Harold Laski, Ivor Jennings and William Robson, (Eds), *A Century of Municipal Progress*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935) pp300-301.
[11] For a full list, see Tony Travers, *The Politics of London*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004) pp26.
[12] The Progressive Party was allied to the Liberal Party.
[13] Owen Hatherley, *Red Metropolis, Socialism and the Government of London,* (London: Repeater, 2020) pp24-30.
[14] Laski et al., *A Century of Municipal Progress*, (1935) pp 321-322.
[15] For example, refuse collection and street lighting were Borough Council responsibilities, whilst education remained with the LCC.
[16] Christian Wolmar, *Are Trams Socialist? Why Britain has no Transport Policy*, (London: London Publishing Partnership, 2016) pp9-10.
[17] Quoted in Croome, *Rails through the Clay*, (1993) p10. Elsewhere, David Ashworth quotes the Railway Times from 1890: 'We have scarcely yet been educated up to that condition of social equality where Lords and Ladies will be content to sit side by side with Billingsgate 'Fish Fags' and Smithfield butchers.' David Ashworth, *London Underground, a Cultural Geography*, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013) p47.
[18] Ashworth, *London Underground, a Cultural Geography*, (2013) p13.
[19] For example, the contents of Croome and Jackson's original classic 'Rails Through the Clay' published in 1963 contained the following appendices: 1. Dates of opening to the public. 2.Accidents. 3. Notes on Tickets and Ticket Issuing Machines. 4. Traffic results and estimates. 5. North End station and Hampstead Garden Suburb – The brief story of a station that never opened. In 1993 the appendices were revised, and now contained: 1. Dates of Opening. 2. Accidents. 3. Lifts and Escalators. 4. The Tube in the Cinema. However, this last section focussed primarily on a series of factual television documentaries, while the cultural impact of films merited just a paragraph. Barker and Robbins state openly in their preface that: 'Some readers, approaching this book as specialists – railway historians, for instance, or transport economists, or experts on some particular branch of London's history – may well find that our history lacks depth.' I find it interesting that their list of named experts omits politics and governance. But that is congruent with my view that both of these excellent histories essentially construe London's transport as a technical achievement, rather than the product of social and political policies.
[20] Barker and Robbins, *A History of London Transport Volume Two*, (1974) p86. Michael Robbins terms London's transport as a 'Shapeless, ill-coordinated and inconvenient' in his notes, Box B262, London Transport Museum Library.
[21] For a wider discussion of mobility see Geoff Vigar, *The Politics of Mobility: Transport Planning, the Environment and Public Policy*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002) and Tim Cresswell, 'Towards a Politics of Mobility, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28 (2010), 17 – 31. For a political/cultural turn in Transport History generally, see the following: Gijs Mom, 'The Crisis of Transport History. A Critique, and a Vista', *Mobility in History* 6 (2015), 7–19 and James Fowler, 'Historical Institutionalism, Hybridity and Institutional Logics and Public Transport History', *The Journal of Transport History,* Published online 2022.
[22] For example, Sidney Webb was a founder member and an official.
[23] Tim Sherwood, *Charles Tyson Yerkes: The Traction King of London*, (Stroud: Tempus, 2008) p26.

[24] Severine Marin, 'Did the United States Scare the Europeans? The Propaganda about the 'American Danger in Europe around 1900' *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 15 (2016), 23–44.
[25] For example, The Daily News thought his arrival was 'Welcome news… to London's teeming millions' (A Man of the Moment, 1900, 7).
[26] Even in 1920, long after Yerkes death, members of the London County Council declared that London's transport was run as an 'International Trust Company with interests in England, America and Holland... not a London Company at all'. Transport for London Archives, LT346/101. Minutes of the Meeting of the LCC, 21st November 1921.
[27] Alan Jackson and Desmond Croome provide a useful summary of those overestimates in detail at Appendix 4a of *'Rails Through the Clay'* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1992).
[28] Stephen Halliday, *Underground to Everywhere: London's Underground Railway in the Life of the Capital*, (London: Capital, 2001)
[29] Robert Irving, *The North-Eastern Railway Company,1879-1914.* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1976) p221.
[30] London Metropolitan Archive, ACC1297/UER/1/1 UERL Directors' Meetings No.2
[31] These were a combination of ordinary shares which received an initial call on profits to give up a 5% dividend and 'Certificates of Interest in the Contingent Profit of the Company' which would then receive priority on the allocation of the profits once the shareholders' interests had been met of up to a 3% dividend. Any subsequent profits would be divided equally between each interest. The certificates of interest were redeemed in 1907 at 40% of their value for fixed interest bonds offering 4.5%. Barker and Robbins, p71-72 and 152.
[32] Charles Masterman devotes an interesting section of his book *The Condition of England* (London: Faber, 1909) to analysing exactly why the Progressives lost the LCC elections in 1907. His verdict is, above all, concern over property taxes to fund ever expanding public services. Masterman was a radical Liberal politician and MP 1906-1914.
[33] It was unfortunate for the Progressives that their scheme to involve the LCC in the provision of public waterbuses on the Thames collapsed at this point with serious losses. Thirty years later it was still being referred to as a reason why public bodies should not over-reach themselves and waste public money. See Ralph Turvey (2003) The London County Council's River Steamboat Service, *The London Journal*, 28(2), p54-73 and TfL Archives: LT674/002 River Thames Passenger Services.
[34] For a general account see Anthony Lentin, *Banker, Traitor, Scapegoat, Spy? The Troublesome Case of Sir Edgar Speyer*, (London: Haus, 2013) pp25-28. See specific articles by Hirschfield and Cesarani on the evolution of anti-semitism in this period: David Cesarani, 'An alien concept? The continuity of anti-alienism in British society before 1940', *Immigrants & Minorities*, (1992) 11(3), p24-52 and Claire Hirshfield, 'Labouchere, Truth and the Uses of Anti-semitism', *Victorian Periodicals Review*, (1993), 26(3) pp134-142. Evidence of anti-German feeling manifested itself both in the press and in a series of popular books such as William LeQueux's *The Invasion of 1910* (London: Nash, 1906) - which was also serialised in The Daily Mail - and Erskine Childer's *The Riddle of the Sands* (London: Smith, Elder and Co, 1903).
[35] Barker and Robbins, pp179-180.
[36] The Traffic Combine accounted for about 60% of all London traffic revenues at this point. James Fowler and Alex Gillett, "Making a hybrid out of a crisis: historical contingency and the institutional logics of London's public transport monopoly", *Journal of Management History*, (2021) 27(4), pp. 492-518.
[37] See the Report of the Royal Commission on London Traffic 1905 Chapter Two, Paragraphs 21 and 22.
[38] "London Traffic Monopoly." *The Daily Mail,* January 20, 1912.
[39] The London Metropolitan Archive. ACC1297/UER/04/065 Underground and London Traffic Statistics No. 1.
[40] The claim that statistical accounting delivered significant efficiencies is challenged by James Fowler, Statistics: Spur to Productivity or Publicity Stunt? *Essays in Business and Economic History,* (2019) 37(1) pp146-179. Michael Bonavia makes a similar point about the time for any efficiencies from amalgamation would require to emerge in his book '*The Four Great Railways'* (Newton Abbott: David and Charles, 1980).
[41] Theodore Porter, '*Trust in Numbers, The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life'* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) p17.
[42] William Acworth and George Paish, British Railways: Their Accounts and Statistics, *The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,* (1912) 75(7) pp. 687-743.
[43] Theodore Porter, pp193-194.

[44] See "Mr Yerkes Successors." *The Pall Mall Gazette*, January 24, 1906 and "American Manager for a British Railway." *The Times,* February 14, 1914.
[45] A flavour of this hyperbolic vitriol and can be seen in these two articles from the time: "Aliens in High Places." *The Globe,* May 14, 1915 and "The Enemy Within." *Justice,* November 12, 1914.
[46] Anthony Lentin, pp59-60.
[47] LMA ACC1297/UER/1/3 Underground Electric Railways Company of London, Directors' Meetings No. 3.
[48] For a more detailed summary of events, see Lentin, pp149-156.
[49] Stephanie Seketa, Defining and Defending Valid Citizenship During War: Jewish Immigrant Businesses in World War I Britain, Enterprise and Society, (2021), 22(1) pp78-116
[50] "Efficiency, Sir Albert Stanley, Businessman." *The Daily Mail,* March 3, 1917.
[51] Albert Stanley was born on 8th August 1874. But the birth was not registered until 15th April 1875 and Stanley chose to celebrate his birthday on 8th November during his lifetime. Barker and Robbins, p142.
[52] Hansard, Volume 107, Columns 1031-1033.
[53] "Mr Billing's Unfounded Imputation." 1918, *The Daily Mail,* June 27, 1918.
[54] LMA, ACC1297/UER/1/4 Underground Electric Railways Company of London, Directors' Meetings No. 4.
[55] Hey, Kevin. "Transport Co-Ordination and Professionalism in Britain Forging a new Orthodoxy in the Early Inter-War Years," *The Journal of Transport History,* (2010) 31 pp. 25-41.
[56] "A Talk with Lord Ashfield." *The Graphic,* March 17, 1920, 22.
[57] *The Daily Mail,* June 27, 1918.
[58] Kenneth Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity, The Lloyd George Coalition Government of 1918–1922*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). p51.
[59] Kenneth Morgan 'Lloyd-George's Premiership: A Study in Prime Ministerial Government' *The Historical Journal,* (1970) 8(1) p146. The full quote from a letter by Lloyd-George sees him compare Ashfield to the Liberal Politician Walter Runciman and suggest that like Runciman, Ashfield's glibness had the ability the pull the wool over his (Lloyd-George's) eyes.
[60] For further details of Herbert Morrison's general view see chapters four and five of *Socialisation and Transport: The Organisation of Socialised Industries with particular reference to the London Transport Bill*, (London: Constable, 1933). Morrison was born in Brixton in 1888. A former member of the Social Democratic Federation, he joined the Labour Party in 1910, became a borough councillor in 1919, Mayor of Hackney in 1920, a member of the LCC in 1922, a Labour MP for Hackney South in 1923, Minister of Transport in 1929-31 and Chairman of the LCC after 1934.
[61] See David Marquand *The Progressive Dilemma*, (London: Butler and Tanner, 1991) p102.
[62] Herbert Morrison, p55.
[63] Herbert Morrison, p58. These tests were: 1. Good wages and conditions. 2. Adequate capital expenditure. 3. Adequate services everywhere. 4. Rock bottom fares. 5.Safer, more pleasant rolling stock. 6. A reliable and speedy service.
[64] See 'Honest Methods Necessary in Bus Operation', *The Commercial Motor*, 1925, April 7th, p1 and 'The Small Bus Owner', *The Commercial Motor*, 1922, August 22nd, p14.
[65] Both the Traffic Combine and the LCC offered much better pay and conditions to their employees in comparison to smaller companies. They were able to do this because of their relative financial security via the ability either to raise major government backed loans or ratepayers' taxation. See Barker and Robbins on the topic of labour relations 1900-47 in chapter 17.
[66] Morrison, pp77-78.
[67] Morrison, pp79-80.
[68] Robson, p294.
[69] Robson, p191.
[70] This was the outcome eventually arrived at in 1965.
[71] Robson, pp295-296.
[72] Harold Laski, Ivor Jennings and William Robson, (Eds) *A Century of Municipal Progress*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935) p458.
[73] See a detailed article in what was effectively the house magazine of free enterprise on the roads: 'Pirates!', *The Commercial Motor*, 1921 22nd November p15.
[74] 'The Small Bus Owner's Chance in London', *The Commercial Motor*, 1923, 6th March p19.
[75] 'London's Traffic Increase', *The Commercial Motor*, 1925 18th August p4.
[76] 'Progress in Passenger Travel', *The Commercial Motor*, 1921 15th February, p17.

[77] By 50% between 1922 and 1924. James Fowler, *London Transport: A Hybrid in History 1905-48*, (Bingley: Emerald, 2019) p67.
[78] 'Absolute Chaos', *The Daily Telegraph*, 1923, July 4th p10.
[79] Hugh Clegg, *Labour Relations in London Transport*, (Blackwell: Oxford, 1950) pp24-27.
[80] See the House of Commons debate in Hansard: London Traffic (Restricted Streets) Regulations 1925, 12th March, Volume 181 columns 1700-1730.
[81] Leader of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) who favoured a situation where a single large Trade Union - preferably the TGWU - negotiated with a single large Traffic Combine. He thought that this scenario better secured employees' working conditions and wage rates.
[82] The Conservatives returned 419 MPs, Labour 151, Liberals 40.
[83] Even within the Labour movement there was considerable divergence of opinions in this issue, see Martin Pugh, *Speak for Britain* (London: Vintage, 2011) pp111-114 and Edmund Dell, *The Chancellors*, (London: Harper Collins, 1996) pp75-76.
[84] In his autobiography he claims that his insistence on long, drawn out meetings late at night compelled the Municipal Reform chairman of the committee to go on a long cruise to recover his health. Herbert Morrison, *Morrison* (London: Odhams, 1960) p141.
[85] Bernard Donoghue and George Jones, *Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician* (London: Phoenix, 2001) p122.
[86] Morrison, p139.
[87] Donoghue and Jones, p123.
[88] For example, Morrison approved of all the all the Board Members subsequently appointed by the trustee and later claimed the successes of the LPTB as his own for having 'set up' the organization in the first place. Donoghue and Jones, pp187-188.
[89] See the statistics from first annual report in 1934. TfL archives, LT1011-001.
[90] Fowler, *London Transport*, p86-88.
[91] Frank Pick, Lecture to the LSE in 1935, London Transport Museum Library Box B6.
[92] Fowler, *London Transport*, p79.
[93] Lord Ashfield, biographical notes. TfL archives, LT042/023.