

THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY IN THE
WRITINGS OF MARK AND ENGELS
AND IN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN
SOCIALIST PARTIES FROM THEIR
INCEPTION TO 1905.

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"Ces messieurs font tous du marxisme, mais de la sorte que vous avez connue en France il y a dix ans et dont Marx disait: 'tout ce que je sais c'est que je ne suis pas marxiste moi!' Et probablement il dirait de ces messieurs ce que Heine disait de ses imitateurs; j'ai semé des dragons et j'ai récolté des puces."

Friedrich Engels to Paul Lafargue
27th August 1890.

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INTRODUCTIONPrecis:

I will argue that in the works of Marx and Engels one can find a notion of strategy based upon the teleological assumptions found in their writings that consummated their break with Hegel and led to the formulation of the notion of praxis. In essence Marx and Engels argue that the strategy of revolution must be based upon the proletariat's own discovery of its exploitation and the role of those attached to the proletarian movement is to find the means to enable (befähigen) and compel (zwingen) them to embark on the process of social liberation. I will trace this theme through their theoretical works: La misère de la philosophie, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Marx's notebooks called the Grundrisse, Kapital, and the Theorien über den Mehrwert; Engels' military writings and the political texts like their critiques of the Gothaer and Erfurterprogramme, their analysis of the Commune, and finally, Marx's Enquête ouvrière. Their argument was that the means used to start the process of revolution must be based upon a thorough understanding of the revolutionary possibilities of each individual situation.

I will then argue that the strategy developed and practised by the socialist parties in France and Germany at the moment of the socialist "take-off", although paying lip-service to Marx and Engels, developed from non-teleological assumptions. Consequently, the parties never raised the problem of consciousness. Instead, they developed a strategy that grew from a disjuncture between theory and practice. On one hand, the chief theorists of the Second International argued that capitalist society would collapse automatically and the role of the proletariat was to wait for that collapse and prepare itself for the assumption of power. On the other hand, they worked for reform on a day-to-day level, with the aim of increasing the level of consumption of the existing stock of social values.

Finally, I will argue that the reason for the disjuncture can be found in the structure of the working class itself, and the party and its strategy were a product of its own social alienation.

My final argument is only a working hypothesis. My original intention was to spend considerably more time developing that argument. In particular, I wished to explain:

- (i) why the strategy of the European socialist movement at the moment of its "take-off" was revolutionary in tone but not in action;
- (ii) how the ideology of the working class played an important role in sublimating the instinct to revolt against exploitation;
- (iii) how the major strategic innovation of the turn-of-the-century socialists, the political party, played a critical role in defusing that instinct and integrating the working class into an acceptance of prevailing and tolerable forms of social contestation.

Neither the data nor other materials needed to make such a thorough examination were available in a form where comparison is possible. Secondly, the need to compare the strategy of Marx and Engels to that developed by the social democrats proved such a lengthy business that my research in that direction had to be curtailed. Instead, I have presented a series of working hypotheses for further investigation based upon the conclusions I reached by analysing statistical material for France and for Germany where it was available.

Socialist strategy and the problem of the political party:

The 1890's bore witness to a new phenomenon: the growth in a spectacular way of socialist parties committed to what they called "scientific" revolution. Their swift and prodigious growth, their "steady, unbroken, resistless progress" as Friedrich Engels glowingly described it,¹ mesmerised both socialist and non-socialist commentators.

For the socialists the party promised fulfilment. For the non-socialist commentators, like Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, it led them to the consideration of the working-class question out of which much of modern sociology has emerged.

In 1891, 1,427,298 votes were cast for the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. These votes represented 19.7% of the German electorate and nearly double the percentage of the previous election. The party published 60 newspapers, with a paid circulation of 254,100. Of these 19 appeared daily. The trade-union movement affiliated to the party, the Freie Gewerkschaften, represented some 301,000 workers, published 201,000 copies of its newspapers and journals

and had a yearly turnover of 425,845 Marks (about £22,000).

By 1905 the numbers had increased enormously. There were then 384,327 fully paid-up members of the party. Every constituency had a local party organisation, even the most rural and "feudalistic" constituencies in East Prussia. In the 1903 elections, 3,010,771 or 31.7% of the electorate had voted for the socialists. The party published 64 newspapers that had a circulation of 1,250,000. There were 1,689,709 trade unionists belonging to the Freie Gewerkschaften and the yearly turnover of the trade-union movement had risen to 25,000,000 Marks (approximately £1,250,000). The trade union employed some 1,500 full-time officials and the party a like number. There were 855 cooperative societies tied to the party. Their membership was over 700,000 and the yearly turnover approached 231,000,000 Marks (approximately £16,000,000). These figures do not include the thousands of workers whose daily livelihood depended upon the good offices of the party and its ancillary organisations. These were the publicists, publicans, printers, journalists. The people who worked in the distributive societies, the socialist clubs, schools and youth clubs.

If we look at the party in France we find a similar phenomenon though the figures are considerably less impressive. The one area in which they approach the German statistics in their magnitude were the relatively highly industrialised regions of the départements of the Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and to a lesser extent, the Ardennes, Somme and Aisne.

Clearly the political party founded by the French and German working classes was something more than the political organisation that comes to mind when we normally use the term today. The figures alone show the extent of its organisation. It is clear why some looked upon the party as a kind of state within the state. It was surrounded by awe and clothed in mystique - no wonder grandiose claims were made for the party. Karl Kautsky, in many ways the architect of the notion of party, shedding his normally pedantic style, spoke of the party as the "spiritual" tie that made the working class "an irresistible whole".² Engels gave way to a kind of "proletarian positivism" when he alluded to the irresistible march forward of the party with "L'Etat ... au bout de son latin, les ouvriers ... au commencement du leur."³ These notions, coupled with the idea of industrial progress and the eventual replacement of machine labour for human labour, echoed both the positivism of industrialists and the nascent social sciences.

Commentators have generally divided the socialist world into two camps. On one side we find the "reformists" or "revisionists" who preached the need to alter the fundamental revolutionary texts of the party and felt that Marx needed renovating. On the other side we find the "revolutionaries" or those who were true to the party programme and the interpretation of Marx accepted within the socialist movement. Yet the mystique of the party knew no such division. Karl Legien, the creator of the unified German trade-union organisation, a considerable power within the SPD, and considered an arch-reformist, nonetheless constantly preached loyalty to the party in much the same eloquent and, indeed, sugary, terms as the most zealous of the party's revolutionaries.⁴

The strategy based upon the efforts of the socialist party and its ancillary organisations was the essence of the working-class's efforts to cope with and control the rapid mechanisation accompanying the development of the mass production phase and the beginnings of the organisational phase of industrialisation. From August Bebel, for some thirty years the leader of the SPD, trumpeting utopia from party tribunals, Jules Guesde preaching the need for organisation and propagandising for the revolution in the "wilderness" for twenty years, the ordinary workingmen of Décazeville and Fourmies who gave their lives, red banners in hand, and the printers of Hamburg and Düsseldorf who risked their livelihood and their families' future by distributing a banned journal and newspaper, the party was a centre of life. For the miners and textile workers it provided a sense of community. Amidst the chaos of the burgeoning urban communities, with their ghettos of workers, the party provided a focal point. It penetrated into the daily lives of the working class with its schools, cooperative and mutual aid societies, insurance funds, crèches, and its feuilletons. Two contemporary commentators show how the party was a dispenser of culture. Its fêtes celebrating its icons, as Winnig points out, were occasions similar to the medieval fête foraine.⁵ The party provided youth organisations, womens' circles, taught workingmen to appreciate the refinements of opera and theatre, the essentials of the national culture, according to Milhaud.⁶ The party was at once a moulder of men, a source of confidence and pride, a beacon and a buoy.

NOTES.

1. Friedrich Engels, Einleitung (zu Karl Marx' "Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848 bis 1850", (1895), Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW), Band 22, p. 522.
2. Karl Kautsky, Die soziale Revolution, Berlin, 1902, p. 2.
3. Friedrich Engels, to Laura Lafargue, 20.6.93, in Friedrich Engels-Paul et Laura Lafargue, Correspondance, t. iii, Paris, 1956, p. 284.
4. Karl Legien, Warum müssen die Gewerkschaftsfunktionäre sich mehr am inneren Parteileben beteiligen, Berlin, 1915, p. 3. Legien is a much neglected figure in socialist history. By his own admission he work was accomplished behind the scenes. He very rarely made public statements or spoke at party congresses. A Catholic of some orthodoxy and a craftsman who had experienced life on the tramp, Legien was keen on respectability, education, order and decorum. A glance at his curriculum vitae reveals his pivotal role in the history of the SPD. At 27 he was elected president of the carpenters' trade union. At 29 he was elected Vorsitzer (president) of the Generalkommission, (executive) of the Freie Gewerkschaften, (the socialist trade-union federation). At 31 he became the principal architect of the party's trade-union policy and editor of the trades'union journal, Correspondenzblatt, as well as deputy for Kiel. With the exception of a short period when he was absent from the Reichstag, he held all of these posts and offices until his death in 1920. As Leipart concluded, (Theodor Leipart, Karl Legien, Ein Gedenkbuch, Berlin, 1929), he was "einer der grossen Realpolitiker der Arbeiterbewegung".
5. August Winnig, Der weite Weg, Hamburg, 1932, pp. 145-46.
6. Edgard, Milhaud, La démocratie socialiste allemande, Genève, 1903, pp. 43-47.

Section I:

The concept of strategy in the
writings of Marx and Engels.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGY IN THE WRITINGS OF MARX AND ENGELS

Some preliminary problems:

My purpose in this first section is to question the frequently expressed opinion and equally widely held assumption that Marx's strategy was of the order that once the objective laws governing the functioning of a society had been discovered, it remained for the socialist movement, organised into a political party to act in the light of those laws to change society. However, if Marx's theory is of a different order from such an objective theory and raises a host of problems that those theories are not equipped to deal with, then a fruitful line of research would be to pursue those elements of Marx's argument that appear to undermine the widely held view of his strategy.

In this section I will point out that it is difficult to find a strategy of the instrumental order in Marx's writings, and that it has been appended to his economic writings by the socialist movement. I will argue that the problem of consciousness raised serious problems for this interpretation because Marx ascribed it an importance that undermines any objective theory and with it brings an instrumental strategy into serious question. I will argue that Carl von Clausewitz raised similar problems in his study of military strategy and that the suggestions made by Clausewitz pertain to our investigation of Marx. Briefly, if a revolution depended upon a class-conscious proletariat, as Marx argued, then a strategy must be based upon activating the proletariat. I will suggest that we should turn our attention in that direction.

In his magnum opus, Clausewitz recounts how the strategy of war and conflict in general had come to be considered a science structured in the tradition of the natural sciences. A strategy, he notes, is assumed to be composed of discrete and independent steps or stages:

- (i) One decides upon the object of one's inquiry.
The enemy is identified;
- (ii) The forces at the enemy's disposition and his powers of manoeuvre are analysed in depth and detail;
Those at one's own disposition are similarly analysed;
From these data a plan to engage and defeat the enemy is composed;

- (iii) Having observed, identified, analysed, planned and to the best of one's ability anticipated the results, one prepares and organises the forces at one's own command for battle.¹

Despite adhering to many different theoretical positions, many followers, students, biographers, and analysts of Marx and Engels, have evoked a Marxism fitting Clausewitz's description of the steps taken in a scientific strategy. We find that such a notion of strategy is assumed by socialist theorists like Kautsky, Mehring, Plekhanov and Bukharin, is at the heart of the official Russian and French communist histories of socialist political movements as it is of the analysis of philosophers in the Marxist tradition like Louis Althusser and historians and interpreters of Marx like Cole, Lichtheim, Carr and Avineri.² They tend to see Marx's strategy as a ladder each rung of which represents a step from theory to practice, and in particular, many regard Kapital as comprising the first and second steps outlined by Clausewitz.³ We find that the social-democratic followers of Marx define Kapital as a scientific text, in the tradition of the natural sciences and, as Kautsky wrote, the necessary prelude to the correct and scientific organisation of the working classes.⁴ Many of the historians and interpreters of Marx have treated post-Marxian socialist movements like the SPD and the POF as applications of Marx's teachings.⁵

Appending the third step mentioned by Clausewitz to their formulation of Marx, has caused historians and followers many conceptual and practical difficulties in their attempts to justify their actions by quoting from Marx or Engels. Search as one may one is hardpressed, indeed, to find a single text that remotely follows the three-step formulation of a strategy in the writings of Marx and Engels.

If we examine the Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (1848), we find that although an enemy is identified, the problem of how to fight him depends upon how well the proletariat is conscious of its exploitation and upon it devising its own plans of battle according to its experience of exploitation.⁶

If we turn our attention to Marx's writings on political economy, his notebooks of 1857-58, (Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie), Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, (1859) or the three subsequent

volumes of Kapital, (1867, 1886, 1894),⁷ we find that Marx does not even obliquely discuss the third step but directs his attention towards examining how the capitalist system functioned.

In later years, Engels wrote that the texts that best illustrated his and Marx's concept of strategy were the Forderungen der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland (1848)⁸, and the Considérants of the Programme du parti ouvrier, (1880).⁹ It is difficult, at first glance, to see how either text can be an example of a socialist strategy because in neither case is a strategic procedure outlined. Both documents can be described as a short list of traditionally democratic proposals, and in some cases even liberal demands that in themselves would hardly seem to constitute a threat to a capitalist society.¹⁰ Neither document, like the Manifest, discusses what kind of political organisation is required and one can well understand why Kautsky, in later years, regarded the Considérants as vague and woolly.¹¹

Our problem then is that it is impossible to find in the copious writings of Marx and Engels a notion of strategy of the instrumental order. We are led to the unexpected conclusion that Marx, who wrote with such consummate skill on any number of themes, leaves us even less than the tantalising aphorisms impregnating his early writings on political economy.

Kautsky and the social democrats concluded from their reading of Marx and the fact that he and later Engels worked with the SPD that the reason for Marx having omitted the vital third step is that he saw no need to engage the enemy because capitalism would collapse as the result of its own economic contradictions.¹² In his Karl Marx' ökonomische Lehren, (1887), he wrote that Marx had discovered the laws governing social evolution and change and the duty of the party was to organise in the light of the impending collapse of capitalist society.¹³ Kautsky's theory has been generally called the Zusammenbruchstheorie.

Ought we to accept Althusser's premise, that Marx was a scientist in the tradition of Newton and Kepler, whose life's work was crowned by his great scientific statement, Kapital, and leave to one side Marx's political writings and activities?¹⁴

Such a conclusion has been accepted or propounded by the vast majority of

analysts of the writings of Marx and Engels as Riazanov and Korsch have demonstrated.¹⁵

Our original definition of strategy came from Clausewitz, who, in his analysis of the theories of war and their relations to society, emphasised that such a theory, despite its claims to be scientific and flawless, was abstract, idealistic and basically poor philosophy.¹⁶ In his view, the theory failed to take into account the widely differentiated perceptions and hence the actions of the actor. He compared it to what he called the elemental reasoning characteristic of a young child. Marx and Engels were both appreciative of Clausewitz's observations and Engels, who laboured to produce a strategy of proletarian revolution, willingly acknowledged his debt to Clausewitz.¹⁷

Clausewitz was a Prussian general who participated in some of the wars between the new French regime and the continental alliance composed, for the most part, of the traditional monarchies. He was deeply impressed by what he called the inventiveness, tenacity, endurance and morale of the early revolutionary armies of France, which allowed them, he remarked, to succeed against what the traditional theorists had calculated to be overwhelmingly unfavourable odds.¹⁸ He also remarked that those same qualities rubbed off on the satellite armies created in the Rhineland provinces in the wake of the social reforms initiated by the French. Clausewitz, who had been an assiduous devotee of Hegel, was driven to write his theoretical tract of war in order to explain two factors that the traditional theorists never seemed to discuss: (i) The superiority of the revolutionary armies seemed to stem from their ability to master time and space and that mastery, in no small measure, seemed to depend upon their ability to exhort their followers to do the impossible and to sow discontent and fear amongst their enemies;¹⁹ (ii) Warfare appeared to be related to immense social upheavals and the strength of the French armies seemed to be related to the social changes that were taking place in France.²⁰ Clausewitz wanted to explain the clash between two vastly different social and political orders but his wish involved him rethinking the essence of strategy.

Clausewitz argued that the principal mistake of the theorists was that they defined war as a means to an end or as a completely independent element with its own rules.²¹ If we look at a weapon, he suggested, we find

that its definition far from depending upon the inherent qualities of that weapon depends upon the use that is made of the weapon.²² The use of a weapon, he continued, is circumscribed by "... the intelligent force that gives life to matter".²³ This force, also called the "moral force", by Clausewitz, or the teleological vision inherent in any posited ends, transforms the weapon from a mere "wooden handle" into the "noble metal, the real bright-polished weapon".²⁴

Moreover, Clausewitz continued, the moral force is responsible for deciding what actions are taken and for deciding what ends are to be chosen. There is no way of adjudicating or judging between the different moral forces that come into conflict, as in the case of the continental wars, or that cohabit the same society. For that reason, these forces must be recognised for what they are, Clausewitz insisted: political forces.²⁵

Hence, in Clausewitz's view war is a means employed to resolve a conflictual situation to one's benefit and as such cannot be separated from ends.²⁶ War is also merely a continuation of the internal and external political wars of a society and its only real difference from other forms of conflict, he noted, is that blood is shed.²⁷

One can never hope to establish principles and rules independent of the "intelligent force", Clausewitz maintained, for as soon as these forces appear the supposed definitive rules governing the practice of warfare are shown to be fatuous and useless, and:

"... we begin to count exceptions which we thereby establish as it were theoretically, that is, make into rules; or if we resort to an appeal to genius, which is above all rules, thus giving out by implication, not only that rules were not only made for fools, but also that they themselves are no better than folly."²⁸

The construction of a strategy, Clausewitz concluded, must involve a thorough understanding of the "intelligent force", how it understands its situation and that of others.

Clausewitz then argued that the recognition of the importance of the teleological side of action is only the beginning of the difficulties

encountered by the aspiring strategist because the data world around us is not constant but in a constant state of flux.²⁹ Not only does one perceive vast changes in the composition of the material world taking place at a breathtaking rate, he argues, but the material world itself is completely dependent upon the "intelligent forces".³⁰ Their definition of the data world is their preface to whatever actions they take and how they evaluate the actions taken by others. If there is no possible agreement between different groups of "intelligent forces", he argued, then the form that a conflict would take cannot be open to prediction because the conflict takes the form of a total social war where one force is pitted against another.³¹ War is never waged against matter, for all its destructive force, but against "intelligent forces" by other "intelligent forces" and as such must be seen as a battle between contending social Weltanschauungen.³²

For all of these reasons, Clausewitz maintained, it is impossible to construct a general theory of warfare.³³ Whatever theory one constructs is really the sum and total of one's own perceptions based upon one's evaluation of one's interests and that of others. The theory that one builds, he wrote, is no more than a preparation for action, or a plan, in the light of past actions.³⁴

Finally, Clausewitz revealed in more detail what he meant in concrete terms by his view that war depends upon "intelligent forces". He argued that the superiority of the revolutionary French armies, came from the power of their political doctrines of social emancipation for the bourgeoisie and more economic self-determination for the peasantry. What all victorious sides in a conflict had in common, Clausewitz argued, was their power to shatter the expectation of their opponents, or in everyday language, the power of "surprise", and the power to do what the opponent could not but regard as impossible.³⁵ Clausewitz believed that in the case of the French revolutionary armies, the source of that new-found power grew from the social modifications they had made and the expectations they had aroused. Hence the essence of war, he wrote, is not only the battle that takes place on the pitched battlefield, but all of the elements that have led to that battlefield being defined as the place of battle.³⁶

Clausewitz's model strategy is based upon a rejection of what one might call the objective theories of strategy. Clausewitz did not regard theory as a value-free perception, as most of his contemporaries did, but saw it as a result of certain perceptions that were governed by teleology. Clausewitz defined theory as no more than "a preparation for battle", and insisted that the key element in any situation of conflict were the relative drives that spurred each of the contending forces to action.³⁷

I will now argue that there is sufficient evidence in the writings of Marx and Engels that they saw society and social conflict in the same sense that Clausewitz did to make it fruitful for us to attempt to find a strategy of the Clausewitzian type, based upon teleological perception or consciousness, in their writings.

In his second introduction to Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, (1959), Marx presented a brief outline of what he called the "overall results", (das allgemeine Resultat) of his inquiry into political economy and the society that nurtured it.³⁸ Defenders of the theory of economic determinism have often quoted this passage to support their argument. I will use it to show how close Marx's argument was to that of Clausewitz.

In one of the most important sections Marx wrote:

"Auf einer gewissen Stufe ihrer Entwicklung geraten die materiellen Produktivkräfte der Gesellschaft in Widerspruch mit den vorhandenen Produktionsverhältnissen oder, was nur ein juristischer Ausdruck dafür ist, mit den Eigentumsverhältnissen, innerhalb deren sie sich bisher bewegt hatten ... Es tritt dann eine Epoche sozialer Revolutionen ein. Mit der ganzen ungeheure Überbau langsamer oder rascher um ..."

"... die ökonomische Struktur der Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau erhebt, und welcher bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewusstseinsformen entsprechen."³⁹

Our first impulse is to regard Marx's analysis of his method as a definite corroboration of his not only building a theory in the tradition of the natural sciences, as Althusser and his school would argue⁴⁰, but also firm proof that the arguments of the economic determinists are correct. The reading that the social revolution would be the direct result of the contradictions occurring in the infrastructure of capitalist society, or as Kautsky was to write of an economic collapse⁴¹ appears to be largely confirmed.

The case for this view, however, is far from conclusive. In the first place our suspicions are aroused by the meaning imputed to some of the terms that Marx used in his precis. For such a reading to be definitive, Marx's notion of relations of production, (Produktionsverhältnissen), must mean no more than what many social scientists would call the economic structure of society. Such a rendering is unlikely in view of Marx's continual attacks on those who attempted to restrict the concept of production to the production of material goods or the workings of the economic system.⁴² Secondly, the term "reale Basis", in his text, must be translated as "real basis" rather than the equally possible and much more damaging for the deterministic view of his argument, "material basis".

The determinist reading must overcome still more serious problems with their reading of the text. Marx states that the totality of the relations of production of a society constitutes the economic structure of that society. Does Marx intend to suggest that the relations of production and the economic structure of the society are one and the same? The verb he uses, "bildet", can just as easily be an active as an inactive verb. Moreover, if the economic determinist reading is correct, why would Marx use such a totally redundant or pleonastic sentence in a text outlining the essentials of a complex system? If by the economic structure of society Marx is referring to, as was his custom in later works, the basis of exchange prevailing in a society, the phrase does have a very precise and important meaning, namely, that the totality of the relations of production in a society give rise to the basis of the system of exchange prevailing in that society.

If we append this version to the second section of the quotation we find the following argument: the totality of the relations of production in a society give rise to the basis of the system of exchange prevailing in that society. Around that basis of exchange, which is the material base of that society, grow the legal and political structure and corresponding forms of social consciousness.

To what extent are the "social forms of consciousness" actually determined? In the next paragraph of his precis, Marx argued that the processes of life are conditioned, bedingen,⁴³ (not determined) by the mode of production and that the social, political and spiritual processes of life are conditioned by the material means of production. Moreover, he writes, social existence determines consciousness, that is one's experience of the system of exchange and not the system of exchange itself is what

determines consciousness. In other words, social existence is not determined by the mode of production prevailing in a society itself but there are a series of filters and possibly feed-backs that make the picture a good deal more complex. Since the mode of production must mean more than the economic basis and must include the way a society organises its social forms of exchange, it follows that the economic deterministic argument fails.

Such a view is supported by a similar argument that Marx made in the concluding sections of his first introduction to Zur Kritik,⁴⁴ which we will discuss later in more detail. Discussing the relationship between different expressions of human consciousness, myth and society, Marx argues that the first level of oppression in a society is found in the ideological means of reinforcing social assonance.⁴⁵ The material base of a society, (materiellen Grundlage), he writes, is no more than a skeletal framework of that society's form of organisation, (Knochenbaus ihrer Organisation).⁴⁶ The mythology that chains people to their daily existences, Marx writes, is an unconscious elaboration of nature and the social forms in the popular imagination.⁴⁷ These relationships, Marx insists, constitute the "real" basis of any society.

From his argument one can conclude that the relationship between the "suprastructure" and "infrastructure" of a society is not a relationship based on deterministic laws but on the laws of dialectics in Marx's view. Secondly, if one wants to change a society, one of the most important points of attack is to demythologise the "Volksphantasie",⁴⁸ by making people aware of the true nature of their unconscious elaborations of their own societies. In the final section of this chapter I will elaborate this theme when I discuss the concluding sections of the final volume of Kapital.

My intention here has only been to demonstrate that a non-deterministic reading of Marx is possible and that it involves a discussion of the role of consciousness in his theory. I have purposefully not quoted from his early works on the grounds that many contemporary Marxologists have claimed that early Marx and "late" Marx were two very different kinds of theorists. For that reason I have drawn my examples from Zur Kritik and specifically from a section of that work that those who regarded Marx as a strategist of the kind Clausewitz described have themselves singled out for praise.⁴⁹

Commenting to Engels on the progress of his labours on Kapital, Marx insisted that he regarded his elaboration of the contradiction between exchange value and use value as one of his most important contributions.⁵⁰

In the text of Zur Kritik itself, Marx drew a distinction between an object used in accordance with the wishes of he who possessed or used the object and an object being used in accordance with imposed rules and an imposed set of desires.⁵¹ The nature of the contradiction was not a material contradiction of the sort recognised by the economic determinists but a contradiction between two levels of experience that were internalised by man in his relationships with objects and other men.⁵² Many years later, Engels told Kautsky, whose theories of value he criticised, the key to the understanding of society lay in understanding the theory of value and its dependence upon the contradiction between exchange and use value.⁵³ If so, we must conclude that the social revolution of which Marx spoke in the excerpts we have quoted from the introduction to Zur Kritik occurs when the experience of the contradiction between one's own evaluation of one's ideas and actions and that imposed upon one reaches the boiling point.

Engels wrote that the boiling point was reached when the chasm between the "Verkauf ihrer Arbeit" and "Lebensunterhalt" was most keenly experienced.⁵⁴

In conclusion, we find that Marx, like Clausewitz, was suspicious of any theory that separated ends from means. Like Clausewitz his most important and dominating variable was consciousness; and, like Clausewitz, the outcome of the battle depended upon the mobilisation of those forces with an inbuilt propensity to act. Whereas the social democrats argued that strategy meant acting in the light of an objective theory, Marx, again like Clausewitz, argued that such a theory avoided the problem of consciousness. Clausewitz argued that the resolution would take place only on the battlefield itself, and Marx wrote that the resolution depended upon the activation of consciousness to enlist the "moral intelligence" of the working class that would effectively combine theoretical perceptions with action and lead to genuine revolutionary praxis. For Clausewitz the outcome of the French revolutionary wars depended upon the activation of his "moral forces", and for Marx the outcome hinged on the activation of "consciousness". Clausewitz argued that the determinant of this activation was not war (the means) as such but the total social battle. In Marx, we find the embers of a suggestion that the outcome hinged upon the unleashing of working-class consciousness rather than upon a single means (like the party). Is this why Marx and Engels commended Clausewitz for what they called his earnest "commonsense"?⁵⁵

The social-democratic interpretation of Marx:

Before commencing a more extensive examination of the elements of teleology and consciousness in the writings of Marx and Engels and the extent to which they constituted the starting point of their concept of strategy, I must make some introductory remarks about the interpretation of Marx developed in social-democratic milieux and the strategy related to that interpretation. My reason for what, at first glance, may appear as putting the cart before the horse is that much of the strategic writings of Marx and Engels were written as responses to what they regarded as serious mistakes made by the social democrats. Marx's critique of the Gotha programme and Engels' remarks concerning the drafts for the Erfurterprogramm are outstanding examples. I will also discuss a number of texts that whilst analysing concrete situations and events were in the first analysis intended to be vigorous critiques of the strategy devised by the social democrats.

My manner of resolution of this problem is far from satisfactory because it is premature to analyse the nature, background and reasons for the development of the strategy practised by the main constituents of the Second International in depth and detail. For that reason, I will compromise by restricting myself to an analysis of those texts and documents that, in the view of the socialists themselves, formed the basis of their strategy and to some remarks about how the instrument embodying their strategy, the party, was organised.

Hence in this section I will analyse the two major party programmes produced by the social democrats, texts that made the transition from analysis to strategy, like Bebel's Die Frau und der Sozialismus, Kautsky's analyses of the party programmes and finally the organisational statutes and procedures of the German and French parties.

In the course of my argument, I have spoken of the tendency common to many of the social-democratic followers of Marx and Engels to interpret their argument as an objective and economic-deterministic one. I have mentioned how Kautsky emphasised the doctrine of imminent or eventual collapse of the capitalist system as the most important prerequisite for a socialist strategy. In his Karl Marx' ökonomische Lehren, (1887),⁵⁶ regarded by Lenin as the foundation text of the Marxist current in the Second International,⁵⁷ Kautsky argued that Marx had discovered the objective and historical laws of social development,⁵⁸ and that the social-

democratic party was the instrument to order the world in the light of Marxist science.⁵⁹

Many writers have suggested that Kautsky's view of Marxism had little in common with the actual theories espoused by Marx. Rosa Luxemburg argued that the strategy practised by social democracy, rather than emphasising the theory of class warfare, that she believed to be the basis of Marxism, tended towards a do-nothing approach.⁶⁰ Expanding her argument into his more refined notion of praxis, Lukacs developed a critique of what he called the orthodox interpretation of Marx, arguing essentially that because social democracy persisted in regarding Marxism as being concerned with economics, in the sense of distribution, and not with political economy, the social democrats could never understand the contradiction between exchange and use value that was at the heart of Marx's theory. For that reason, he concluded, they could never develop a revolutionary strategy.⁶¹ Gramsci stressed the importance of consciousness and cultural hegemony,⁶² whilst Matthias suggests that Kautsky, far from a thorough-going Marxist, can be described more succinctly as a social Darwinian and an evolutionist.⁶³ Finally, Goldmann argues that the social-democratic Weltanschauung displayed tendencies leading towards technocracy rather than towards the kind of socialist society envisaged by Marx.⁶⁴

Within the SPD itself, the party programme was considered as much more than a list of demands or a propagandistic broadsheet. Liebknecht, who played an important role in the preparation of both programmes, saw the programme as a scientific statement.⁶⁵ Kautsky wrote that the programme contained all the scientific findings about modern society and without the programme there could be no viable socialist organisation.⁶⁶ He wrote that the programme established the basis for the deployment (Aufmarsch) of the proletarian army.⁶⁷

The Gothaerprogramm, written in 1875, was the work of a committee chosen from among the members of the two largest socialist organisations, the so-called Eisenach party, led by Bebel and Liebknecht, and the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein, (ADAV or Lassalleans). The first section of the programme presents a long social analysis of the nature of the exploitation of the working class. Its second section is composed of a list of demands that, if fulfilled, would right the social imbalance. Its principal contention is that the worker's exploitation could be defined as his being unjustly rewarded for his labour. Its main proposition was to transform the State into a "popular state" (Volksstaat).⁶⁸ The Gotha

programme was attacked by Marx as a petit bourgeois⁶⁹ programme. Later most of the SPD leaders deserted the programme and claimed that they had either been duped by the clever Lassalleans into accepting a programme that preached social intergration or, at the time, the important issue was to unify the German socialist movement and the programme could wait until later. Subsequent research has confirmed that none of these arguments hold water and that the Eisenach party, despite its self-proclaimed Marxism,⁷⁰ maintained previously an argument very similar to the Gotha programme. Indeed, Bebel was still calling for the Volksstaat in his propagandistic work, Die Frau und der Sozialismus, as late as 1886 when, at the same time, denouncing the scourge of Lassalleanism in the party.⁷¹

Nonetheless, the party set about to adopt a new programme in 1891.⁷² The Erfurt programme was prepared for the new situation prevailing upon the expiration of the anti-socialist laws (Sozialistengesetz) a series of laws rammed through the Reichstag by Bismarck as a means of cementing an alliance between the German Junkers and the aspiring German bourgeoisie. Prior to 1891 the socialist party was hampered in its daily activities by the law and decrees preventing propagandistic work at all times except during electoral periods.⁷³ The notion was that a fresh start required a fresh programme that would be modern, scientific and would shed all the negative qualities of the Gotha programme.⁷⁴

The programme was primarily the work of Kautsky. Kautsky claimed that the problem with the Gotha programme was that it was not precise enough. It did not outline the general development of capitalist society and prove conclusively that it was doomed. It did not understand the laws of economic development.⁷⁵ Even the 1880 Programme du parti ouvrier written by Marx himself suffered from these deficiencies.⁷⁶ What was required was a document that spelled out clearly the basis for the strategy of the workers' movement. The programme was seen as the pinnacle of the SPD's achievement and the basis for the subsequent organisation of the party. It laid down the basis of the socialist strategy.⁷⁷ It was seen by both contemporary and present-day writers as a fully-fledged Marxist programme. It had very much the same form as the Gotha programme. The first section was a much-enlarged discussion of the

economic evolution of society. It was based upon Kautsky's Karl Marx's ökonomische Lehren. It laid down what Kautsky called the "natural laws of history".⁷⁹ It traced the development of capitalist society to its inevitable collapse. The mechanism was the theory of the gradual impoverishment of the working class (Verelendsungtheorie) and the result was the inevitable collapse (Zusammenbruchstheorie). The Zusammenbruchstheorie was never mentioned as such. But the argument is clear in both the programme and Kautsky's commentary, the Grundsätze. Kautsky never denied that he meant the inevitable collapse. All he modified his conclusion to was that the collapse was not imminent but that it was a general tendency.⁸⁰ The second part of the programme, like the Gotha programme, is a list of demands: improvement in working conditions, factory laws, etc. Like the Gotha programme, all of the demands are immediate economic demands, and none of them are political demands. There is no statement that the working class must organise to make a revolution.

Engels attacked Kautsky for overzealous economic determinism when he read his version of the Erfurter Programm. Several years earlier he had attacked Kautsky's idea that value and price were not dissimilar. Yet in Karl Marx's ökonomische Lehren, the bases of the economic argument in the programme, Kautsky persisted in looking at value nominalistically.⁸¹ What exactly did Kautsky change ?

Kautsky's stated aim in producing the new party programme was to eradicate the non-scientific ballast from the Gotha programme. Equipping the SPD with a scientific Marxist "means of study", as he preferred to call the programme, would have been the proper theoretical basis for enjoining revolutionary practice.⁸² Yet, from what we have indicated, capturing the spirit of Marx would have at least partially entailed playing down the notion of economic determinism and emphasising the social contradiction between exchange value and use value. Scrutinise the programme as we may, we find no signs of such an argument. As Engels indicated, the programme spoke only in mechanical absolutes.⁸³ Erich Matthias, in his study on Kautsky, observes that the Erfurter programme is not only deterministic but reeks of classical fatalism.⁸⁴ The assumptions made in the Gotha programme about absolute impoverishment are there in a more elaborate form. The economic argument in the Gotha programme

centred on a notion not dissimilar to Lassalle's iron-law of wages. The Erfurt programme did not dispute the iron-law of wages. It encased it in a model of an economic system. The Gotha programme spoke favourably of the need for state intervention. The Erfurt programme maintained that the State was an integral part of the system of capitalist exploitation. Yet we find that the Gotha proposals about the State are similar to those in the Erfurt programme. Cole, when examining the idea of the State, confessed to finding the two programmes almost indistinguishable.⁸⁵ The Erfurt programme in his view is the "textbook of State socialism".⁸⁶ What does Cole mean? If we examine the Erfurt programme we find that Kautsky dutifully removed all references to the Volksstaat in line with the criticism of Marx and Engels.⁸⁷ He condemned the State as the guarantor of the capitalist system. But if we turn to his ideas about what the future society will look like, we find that his version of the socialist society requires a very intricate system of coordination. Anticipating an argument, Kautsky and the social democrats insist upon two themes: greater productivity and expanded distribution. These cannot be obtained without coordination.⁸⁸ Efficiency must be organised; a fairer distribution must be adjudicated. Who is to do this? The only possible answer is a strong centralised government.

Having demonstrated the similarity between the two SPD programmes, I shall now examine their themes in order to show how their strategy was formed. There are four general themes developed in the programmes:

- (i) The economic theme: the explanation of all social activity.
- (ii) The social theme: that all social problems are solved by a more equal distribution of the existing stock of social values.
- (iii) The transformation theme: that distribution does not require fundamentally altering social institutions.
- (iv) The cataclysm theme (Zusammenbruchstheorie): that socialist society will emerge from the imminent collapse of capitalist society.

- (i) The economic theme: In the Gotha and Erfurt programmes, economics is treated as the science of distribution. The relationship between man and the objects he creates is not regarded as an important issue. The problematic for the working-class movement is an insufficient distribution of goods and an insufficient system of material rewards.

The Gotha programme develops this thesis from its initial observation, that work is the source of all wealth and culture:

"Die Arbeit ist die Quelle allen Reichtums und aller Kultur, und da allgemein nutzbringende Arbeit nur durch die Gesellschaft, möglich ist, so gehört der Gesellschaft, d.h. allen ihren Gliedern, das gesamte Arbeitprodukt bei allgemeiner Arbeitspflicht, nach gleichem Recht, jedem nach seine vernunftgemässen Bedürfnissen."⁸⁹

The argument developed in the ensuing sections of the programme stems from the idea that if work is the source of wealth, each creator of wealth must be given his "just rewards". He must be rewarded in accordance with what he produces.⁹⁰ Showing evidence of the nineteenth century theme of industrial progress, the programme continued with the observation that work is socially necessary. Work creates those goods that can eventually fill human needs. Work must be organised so that the wherewithal to distribute just rewards is created. It must be organised efficiently so that there is no wastage and it must be organised humanely so that efficiency is promoted. The worker therefore has a right not only to an increased share in the social product but also must be treated decently. Social harmony and greater effort need to be fostered. Such fostering requires a neutral agency. The authors of the programme called this the "peoples' State", or, Volksstaat.⁹¹ The "neutral" state would divide up the social product and organise industry so that it might be expanded.

The argument in the Gotha programme rests on the assumption that there is no disagreement about the definition of "wealth". Wealth signifies possession of goods or certain socially required skills. Value is inherent in the object.⁹² Once this assumption is made it is quite possible to go on and argue that the only real problem in society is the problem of the distribution of wealth or what we shall call the existing stock of social values.⁹³

The Erfurt programme and Kautsky's texts on economics that preceded the writing of the programme differ from the Gotha programme in the way they spell out their argument and resemble the Gotha programme in the acceptance of its fundamental definitions of value, wealth and work.

As we have seen, Kautsky's stated wish to change the Gotha programme was because it was imprecise. How did he see this imprecision? According to Kautsky, in his texts of economics and an analysis of the Erfurt programme produced forty years after the inception of the programme, the programme did not explain how capitalist society functioned.⁹⁴ The programme was written for an earlier historical period and capitalist society had changed considerably since that time. Kautsky spelled out the fundamental changes. The capitalist economy had expanded rapidly. It introduced new machines that in turn led to the establishment of larger factories. The working conditions of the worker deteriorated. His work was increasingly an atomised labour, shorn of interest and creativity. His work rhythms no longer depended upon his own pace or intentions but upon the rhythms of the machine.⁹⁵ Whereas the Gotha programme emphasised the falling-wages phenomenon as the hallmark of the movement of the artisans into the factory, Kautsky's analysis, written after the German industrial boom of the 1880's, emphasised the ruthless mechanisation of the work.⁹⁶ Hence Kautsky's first argument rests upon the creation of a new style of worker.

It follows that his economic theme is spelled out in much more lengthy terms than the argument in the Gotha programme. He speaks of the importance of understanding the capitalist system as a whole. In his view, it functions like a machine. It is subject to periodic breakdowns. But each of these breakdowns is growing in intensity and in length.⁹⁷ He explains how mechanisation has a tendency to expand the army of the exploited and increase the rate of exploitation. Finally, he re-appraises the notion of exploitation developed in the Gotha programme. In the Gotha programme, the worker is subject to the iron-law of wages where, as mechanisation spreads, his real earnings will be less and less. Kautsky did not challenge that

argument. He circumvented it by pointing out how the wages of the worker were determined by the system as a whole. He extracted a simple version of the "surplus" value theory from Marx to bolster his argument.⁹⁸

Kautsky, however, develops a second argument about productivity and just rewards that is similar to the distributive theme in the Gotha programme. Kautsky maintains that in the new form of capitalist society the worker has neither the means nor the time to enjoy the fruits of his labour.⁹⁹ As a producer he is denied the right to say how his factory should be run and as a consumer he is denied what is rightfully his. His surplus should be restored to him. Moreover, Kautsky argues, capitalism has created the means for unparalleled abundance that no other society had previously been able to create. Despite its great advance over all other societies, it still could not make use of its potential abundance most efficiently.¹⁰⁰ Hence, like the Gotha authors, Kautsky declares that the socialist aim is to ensure a better distribution of the existing stock of social values and create conditions for its rapid expansion. Capitalist society, he argues, is a hindrance to increased productivity. But if one were to put the "means of work" (Arbeitsmitteln) into the hands of the producers, they would see to the efficient organisation of production.¹⁰¹

Again, Kautsky's argument rests upon the assumption that the basic problem to be solved is the distribution and creation of wealth - the existing stock of social values. The surplus extracted from the worker is a material surplus. It can be measured and it follows that the necessary adjustments can be made.¹⁰² In toto his argument is a technological deterministic argument.

- (ii) The social theme: Implicit in the economic argument about distribution and productivity are assumptions about how society is organised, how men think and act, and how society should be organised. I say that the argument is implicit because, although the distributive and productive themes are clearly enunciated, the argument about the future organisation of society has to be deduced from the way the theme is developed.

The economic argument about greater productivity contains the assumption that satisfaction and fulfilment are conditional upon obtaining material possessions and that leisure or free time is sufficient reward for the monotony, boredom and alienation of work. Exploitation does not depend upon working conditions or one's place in the social hierarchy as much as upon insufficient reward in exchange for one's labour.¹⁰³ If this is the case, we can begin to understand something of the relationship of the first part of both programmes depicting capitalist society and the second part where social reforms are outlined. Given the claim that work is socially necessary and rewards are made according to what one produces, one cannot envisage a total social transformation. For that reason the second part of both programmes calls for reforms to ameliorate the working conditions in factories so that the worker will become a better producer. It could have been a call to revolution, but it is not. Education is given priority because it will allow society to marshal fully its resources by allowing the most intelligent to rise to the top. Better working conditions, housing, health services and other such reforms are seen from the criterion of reducing economic wastage.¹⁰⁴

We have seen that Marx and Engels found that, although exploitation was reflected and immediately experienced in the denial of a good, an object or any particular desire, it was the result of social differentiation and the fact that self-governed purposefulness was absent from the workers' creative and "acting-out" activities. The essence of exploitation, they maintained, is the contradiction between any role imposed upon one (exchange value) and a desire to find fulfilment (use value). The imposed role can include the forms of enjoyment, hopes and desire conditioned by that role as much as an onerous task. What the worker lacked was the power to define his own daily rhythms of life, (Lebensmitteln).¹⁰⁵

Engels made this point quite forcefully to Kautsky in his criticism of Kautsky's draft of the Erfurter Programm.¹⁰⁶ But Kautsky developed a very different argument. He divided man into man the producer and man

the consumer. Man the producer performs socially necessary work. Although the work can be made slightly less onerous, it can never be made one hundred percent acceptable. Man the consumer makes up for the boredom and exploitation experienced by man the producer. Production ensures that he has a larger stock of wealth at his disposal. It means that he has more free time to enjoy himself.¹⁰⁷

The implication of Kautsky's argument is that work is necessary because only through work can one's future pleasure be ensured. But if this is the case, then the socialist society can hardly be called a radical transformation of capitalist society. An institution to coordinate will still be required. Rules and regulations would still be enforced and enforceable. One would be rewarded by how much one produces and not according to one's needs as one defines them. Kautsky contended that such an organisation is the natural order of society.¹⁰⁸ In his commentary on the Erfurt programme, he argues that the aim of socialism is to put the "means of work" (Arbeitsmitteln) into the hands of the working class.¹⁰⁹ He rejected the argument that the "means of life" (Lebensmitteln) should be put into their hands. Why? Because, I think, once one has adopted a model of society based upon productivity one assumes that all social problems are solved by the efficacious organisation of production. The teleological vision of man behind the formula of Lebensmitteln has no relevance.

- (iii) The transformation theme: Such a view is corroborated by the fact that neither programme talks about the transformation of society. For Marx and Engels, intent upon a teleological theory, the transformation was all-important. Indeed, Engels' main criticism of the Gotha programme and of Kautsky's rendition of the Erfurter Programm was the absence of the notion of dictatorship of the proletariat. For Engels it signified the transitional stage between a capitalist and a communist society, where the proletariat had already taken control of the "means of life" (Lebensmitteln).¹¹⁰ Given Kautsky's view that the problem is how to transform a capitalist economy into a socialised economy one should not be surprised at his refusal to include the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the programme. Hence the problem

of transformation is not mentioned because, rather than Kautsky and the other social democrats having been unaware of such a problem, they felt it was relatively unimportant.¹¹¹

Kautsky touched upon the problem when he argued that the aim of the SPD was to "prepare" the way for a transformation of a society but ruled out the party organising a revolution and refused to specify what it could do to attain its ends.¹¹² In an article written to explain the duties of the party, Kautsky argued that it must not engage in activity likely to endanger itself or the social transformation.¹¹³ In other words, if the social problematic was one of increasing the existing stock of social values, one cannot endanger the means of production. Finally, Kautsky argued that the future problem for the socialist movement lay in finding a suitable adjudicator or regulator. Adjudication and management, one should add, are functions of a kind of highly centralised authority that is a State in everything but name.

- (iv) The cataclysm argument: But there is another theme in both programmes that is hard to reconcile with the implications of the transformation theme. Time and time again, Kautsky emphasised the idea of the impending collapse of capitalism. Bebel often wrote along those lines to Engels, frequently inquiring if the collapse was not coming the next Spring or in the Autumn or early the following year.¹¹⁴ In Karl Marx' "ökonomische Lehren", and again, in the Enfurter Programm, Kautsky argues that each succeeding economic crisis of capitalism is becoming more severe. The number of exploited expands daily, he remarked, and the position of the worker is deteriorating.¹¹⁵ The tone and language of the programme is bellicose and bloodcurdling. How can Kautsky maintain the Zusammenbruchstheorie alongside the argument that the socialist party must ensure that the transformation to a socialist society must be a peaceful transformation?

What kind of strategy can be deduced from such a contradictory argument? Kautsky can no more than conclude that the role of the party is to prepare the way for the coming socialist society. But what must the party do? Here his answer is ambiguous. His argument rules out anything but a hedged reply. For the idea that the communist society will emerge from an economic cataclysm and that it will also come about peacefully can lead to no easy answer. But if it were to occur peacefully, as Kautsky argues, why the roar of the lion to justify the propositions of the mouse?

Perhaps we have misjudged. Kautsky was a theorist and not a politician. He very rarely interfered in the daily workings of the party. He had no grassroots contacts. He was aloof and lived what he called the life of a scientist.¹¹⁶ He concerned himself almost exclusively with the economic doctrines of the party. The day-to-day organisational and propagandistic work was left to other hands. Here then we might find an argument less complex and contradictory than Kautsky's .

August Bebel was very much a populariser of socialist ideas and after the 1880's largely in charge of the party machine. Bebel's texts were always to the point and were unencumbered by scientific exegesis.¹¹⁷ His two major texts, Unsere Ziele and Die Frau, analyse society according to the social-democratic interpretation of Marx and then go on to state what the social democrats propose and how they propose to achieve their ends.¹¹⁸ Bebel worked very much in a tandem with Kautsky. One of his best-known and most widely read works is Die Frau, first published in 1886. Bebel had the benefit of Kautsky's advice and Kautsky's theory of economics. His argument merits our attention all the more because neither his analysis nor his proposals were revised significantly for the next twenty-five years.¹¹⁹

Bebel develops the theme of what the future socialist society will look like and how to get there in two chapters entitled "Die soziale Revolution" (The Social Revolution) and the "Grundgesetze der sozialistischen Gesellschaft" (Bases of Socialist Society).¹²⁰

Bebel leads up to the question of the social revolution by repeating the familiar argument about the growing antagonism between the exploiting class and the exploited class. He recounts the inhumanity of the factory system and how the majority of the German population would soon be driven into the factory.¹²¹ The majority, he argues, will soon be deprived of the most elementary means of maintaining human decency.¹²² They cannot look for salvation in the direction of the state because the state is the "Kommis" (the errand-boy) of capitalist society.¹²³ One would now expect that the stage is set for Bebel to expound what form the social revolution would take or, at least, how to organise the working class for the coming struggle. One must wait in vain. Bebel never raises the theme of transformation. Will it occur by the majority's somehow taking power into their hands? Will they rise up? Will they simply find that power will fall into their

laps? Will the capitalists abdicate, as Kautsky was to suggest some twenty years later,¹²⁴ or must a revolution be organised.

Some writers have argued that Bebel's refusal to be more specific in his prognosis of events is that because of the strict censorship laws and the recently imposed state of siege on Berlin and some other major German cities, he could hardly be expected to dot the "i's" in his argument. Even if Bebel could not have recounted his theory by analogy, a device used by Engels on many occasions,¹²⁵ he could certainly have added the crucial paragraphs in later editions. Since Bebel does not do so, we are left with the hypothesis that his conclusion, like Kautsky's in his discussion of the ramifications of the Erfurterprogramm,¹²⁶ is that the essence of socialist strategy is to join the party.

After avoiding the question of transition, Bebel devotes the major portion of his argument to a description of what a future socialist society would look like and what it would do. Far from emphasising Marx's theme, " ...from each according to his abilities to each according to his needs...",¹²⁷ Bebel argues that a socialist society will have all of the elements of a "biblical"¹²⁸ society. The glory of Western civilisation is that Western man discovered the secret of unlimited future wealth, work. Society must be based upon labour and those who do not work should not eat.¹²⁹ Socially necessary work is composed of those tasks that fulfill immediate human needs, Bebel maintained.¹³⁰ Every person requires more leisure and more material possessions and the way to increase pleasure is to work hard and efficiently.¹³¹ Echoing the Erfurterprogramm,¹³² Bebel argues that production must be organised and planned with care so that the maximum amount can be produced in the shortest time.¹³³ Finally, he argues that educational and social reforms must be enacted to achieve maximum efficiency and that talent must be allowed to develop so that the most intelligent can find scope for their genius and society can benefit from their gifts.¹³⁴

Amongst the benefits of higher productivity, Bebel wrote, would be the creation of a state of social harmony. Socialism, he concluded, alone could guarantee both social harmony and higher productivity.¹³⁵

Finally, Bebel suggests that socialism can be achieved through peaceful evolution rather than through revolution. His argument that

electricity had created the objective conditions for socialising the means of production is a variant of an argument made by many of his contemporaries, like Lafargue and Kautsky, that the means of production now required such an immense amount of cooperative effort, that the grounds for socialism had been created by the evolution of industry itself.¹³⁷ There is clearly an implication in Bebel's argument that the best course of action is rather than precipitating events to prepare the working class through the educative efforts of working-class organisations for the advent of a new and socially necessary system of social relations.

Bebel's conclusion that one must devote the energies of the socialist movement to organisation and await events with the certainty that the tide of history was flowing strongly in the favour of the working class was a common argument in the socialist movement. In his Sozialdemokratische Katechismus, (1893), Kautsky, after arguing that there was a tendency towards a greater and greater concentration of wealth in the hands of a shrinking minority and an increasing rate of exploitation, and the likelihood of the final overheating and collapse of the capitalist economy, argued that social democracy must not run undue risks, because the inexorable cunning of historical development was running their way. Kautsky concluded that the principal activities of the party should be propaganda and persuasion conducted by a strong organisation.¹³⁸

Kautsky argued that the source of the power of the movement was rooted in its organisation, (In der Organisation erkennt sie die Quelle seiner Macht);¹³⁹ yet despite the evocation of the necessity of organisation we find that the organisation of the SPD could hardly be described as an organisation preparing for a revolutionary confrontation.¹⁴⁰

Firstly, discussions about organisation were virtually non-existent in the party.¹⁴¹ The 1900 and 1901 congresses of the SPD discussed and adopted some extremely important and consequential organisational statutes.¹⁴² The new rules and regulations increased the power of the regional party organisations, severely curtailing the scope for initiative on the part of local party organisations. Despite these important modifications, the issue aroused little interest and by all accounts the proposals were adopted without dissension.

The founding conference of the united French socialist party, Section française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, (SFIO), whilst the scene of a fierce debate over whether a working-class party should lend critical support to a bourgeois cabinet, accepted the organisational proposals made by its organising committee without discussion.¹⁴³ The model of organisation the committee adopted was taken from the statutes of the SPD. The rapporteur argued that the methods of the SPD had withstood the test of time and proved their efficiency.¹⁴⁴

Judging from the praise of the French, one would expect that the SPD was a highly centralised and efficient organisation, geared to prepare the working class for its historical mission. The organisation of the party was certainly complex if one includes the large number of associated organisations and clubs that catered for every conceivable activity. But contemporary commentators like Friedrich Ebert and present-day historians like Ritter argue that the party was woefully organised and discipline was extremely loose.¹⁴⁵

The idea that it was necessary to discipline membership was an idea that the SPD accepted with great difficulty. Throughout the years the party was forced to operate in a semi-clandestine fashion and depended upon confidence and cooperation between its members, there are no reports of expulsions or disciplinary action.¹⁴⁶ The first regulations dealing with discipline were drawn up at the Halle congress, (1890), stating that anyone who committed a breach against the principals of the party or who acted in a dishonorable manner could be excluded from the party.¹⁴⁷ However, judging from our reading of the party programme and the different readings Kautsky gave to that programme, it would have been difficult to breach those principles. The proof was that when Bernstein, who called for a fundamental revision of party thinking and acted against the letter of the Erfurterprogramm was interpellated at the 1901 congress, Kautsky argued that no one could be expelled for a mere difference of opinion.¹⁴⁸

Although the Mainz congress added a clause to the disciplinary regulations allowing for the setting up of a party tribunal to judge internal disputes,¹⁴⁹ only when the party, at the behest of Ignaz Auer, adopted a more bureaucratic system of organisation in 1906 were sections added to the statutes dealing with discipline.¹⁵⁰

Shorske writes that the reason the new regulations were adopted was not to protect the party against those who broke revolutionary discipline, but in order to control those members who called for actions which the party felt might jeopardise its legal position.¹⁵¹ Indeed, the more organised the party became and the less it paid lip service to revolutionary phraseology, the greater the number of exclusions it decreed. In 1900 no one was excluded from the party, whereas in 1906 there were fourteen exclusions and in 1913 207.¹⁵²

Until the early 1900's the organisation of the SPD can only be described as haphazard.¹⁵³ A national conference elected from local organisations met yearly and was charged with deciding party policy. It elected an executive (Parteiivorstand) and a control committee, (Kontrollkommission) to check the work of the executive. The elected members of parliament could attend party conferences but had no voting rights and in theory were responsible to the executive organs of the party. The grass-roots organisations of the party were adapted to local conditions and for the most part had not been reorganised since before the enactment of the Sozialistengesetz in 1878.¹⁵⁴ In some areas, the party and local trade-union organisations were really the same body, whilst in other areas the trade unions were coordinated by party organisations.¹⁵⁵ In some areas the local management committees were composed exclusively of cooperative and trade-union officials and in other areas, they appear to have been excluded from holding office in the party.¹⁵⁶ Many areas had no real party organisation at all, as Ebert reported when he joined the Parteiivorstand to take charge of organisation in 1906.¹⁵⁷ These areas were organised by Vertrauensmänner messengers or organisers who constituted the party's underground system of organisation during the years when the repressive laws were in force.¹⁵⁸ They had a relatively free hand and in some areas the system was self-perpetuating.

Finally, in many areas delegates to party congresses were not elected but chosen by either trade-union organisations or by the party's central office.¹⁵⁹ Rural areas, as Shorske indicates, and areas of low industrial concentration were grossly over-represented at the party congresses and coordination between local groups was in most cases non-existent.¹⁶⁰

Kautsky's declarations to the contrary, one can hardly call the SPD an efficiently organised machine.

The party was reorganised by Ignaz Auer between 1900 and 1906. By 1900

Auer, who owing to the division of labour in the party, had sole charge of party organisation was under two kinds of pressures. The trade-union organisations, resentful of party interference in what they regarded as trade-union affairs, demanded that he discipline recalcitrant local organisations.¹⁶¹ The regional party organisations that had grown up around the demands for participating in Länder governments, wanted the right to discipline and control local party organisations that refused to toe the line.¹⁶² In particular the Baden party was worried that radicals from areas of high industrial concentration would constantly draw attention to the fact that the Baden organisation was technically acting against party statutes when it lent critical support to the government in the hope of getting them to enact certain reforms in a quid pro quo.¹⁶³ Auer therefore proposed that the regional organisations be given total power over membership and that no one could be a member of the party if his regional organisation denied him membership. He proposed to build a strong party machine to make sure that all local organisations were consistent with the demands placed upon them, obeyed the regional organisations and could be prevented from meddling in trade-union affairs by the different party organisations being able to intervene quite rapidly.¹⁶⁴

Auer immediately doubled the size of the permanent party secretariat and staffed it with young men who had been trained as trade-union officials. These new executives were given full voting rights in the Parteivorstand. He replaced the haphazard system of local organisation by setting up new party organisations responsible to regional secretaries responsible to the Parteivorstand and made all local organisations responsible to the appropriate secretariat.¹⁶⁵ The result of Auer's reforms was that by the year of his death, 1906, the party was organised into a coherent system of organisations where responsibility was clearly laid out. The trade unions were able to influence the party at every level and indeed were by secret agreement given the right to veto any action taken even by the Parteivorstand.¹⁶⁶ The strongly conservative regional organisations could control their memberships and the parliamentary delegation could benefit from the new statutes by acting as it chose.

The upshot of the Auer reforms was to give the SPD its first real dose of organisation. But the party was not organised for revolutionary purposes but in order to satisfy the trade unions that local organisers would not seek to turn strikes into insurrections and to satisfy regional party leaders who

feared that some of the actions and proposals of the urban radicals, for example the Stuttgart city organisation,¹⁶⁷ would jeopardise their efforts to obtain regional reforms through the Land assemblies.¹⁶⁸

The best example we have of how the machinery of the party organisation operated to prevent actions it judged to be adventurist is the period encompassing the strikes of the mining and textile workers in 1905 and the first signs of popular protest movements over the government's threats to alter the system of universal suffrage in order to reduce the number of socialist representatives in the Reichstag and Land assemblies. Shorske and Koch discuss these events in some detail,¹⁶⁹ I will return to analyse their sociological aspects in Chapter VII, whereas for the moment I want only to stress that the party did everything in its power to prevent the spread of the strike movement and to curtail demonstrations. A reading of the local party press for Leipzig and Dresden shows the lengths that party officials were willing to go to in order to stop demonstrations. It also shows how Auer's organisational reforms were effective not only in stopping the spread of the protest movement but in heading off strikes.¹⁷⁰

Bebel, himself, shows the extent to which the party wished to prevent spontaneous movements and movements the party did not directly control. Speaking from the rostrum of the Reichstag he assured the government that the socialist party had prevented the situation from getting out of hand:

"Meine Herren, die Zeiten sind ernst, wird uns von allen Seiten zugerufen. Ja, sie sind sehr ernst! Glauben Sie denn, dass das, was sich dort in Osten abspielt, nicht auch den deutschen Arbeiter bis ins Innerste bewegt und erregt? Ich sage Ihnen, Herr von Kardoff, wenn wir nicht bremsen, würden Sie Böses erleben."¹⁷¹

Our brief outline of the strategy of the socialist movement by looking at what it regarded as its most important policy statements and its form of organisation has indicated that the intended means of revolution was itself far from an organisation geared to make a revolution.

Because of the theory of economic determinism current in the party, the strategy of the social democrats can be described as a theory preaching waiting for the inevitable. Because they rejected the idea that human consciousness was the key to the social problematic and because of their persistence in believing that all problems could be solved, as Kautsky

argued, by increasing the stock of social values and their availability, their organisations were never intended to be offensive organisations. Indeed, we have seen evidence, that we will examine in more detail in the sixth and seventh chapters of this essay, that their organisations were geared to defend the existing status quo within the working-class movement as a whole.

The point of our discussion has been to demonstrate that the strategy devised and practised by the social-democratic movement was a strategy that had little in common with some of the strategic requirements Marx and Engels laid down. We have seen evidence that the essential task of the socialist movement, in their estimation, was to activate working class consciousness. The task of the party could be described as finding the ways and means to construct a strategy based upon the element of "surprise".

Having shown the persistence of what one can call a teleological theme in the writings of Marx and Engels, having demonstrated that the theme did not disappear from their later works and having shown that the strategy of the socialist movement diverged from the requirements for a strategy they established, I can now turn to analyse the elements for a revolutionary strategy proposed by Marx and Engels. I shall in the course of my argument return to some of the points I have made in this section because many of the most important elements of Marx's strategy were formulated as a reaction to the actions of the social-democrats. As the social-democratic strategy was based upon their interpretation of capitalist society, I shall start with Marx's view of political economy.

I have so far argued that the teleological theme we found in Marx's work and his and Engels' comments about strategy seem to suggest that a reading of his works as works of strategy in the direction proposed by Clausewitz is possible. I have so far only referred to what many writers have called Marx's transitional texts, like Zur Kritik.¹⁷² I want to argue that the theme is consistently maintained in Marx's texts on economics before going on in the following chapters to consider their relation to his more political texts. The texts I shall examine here are his intended introduction to the Grundrisse that Marx refused to publish because, as he argued, it anticipated many of his themes,¹⁷³ and La Misère de la philosophie where the relationship between the economic theme and the political theme is clearest and closest before turning to Kapital and the Theorien. The introduction compels us to look more carefully

at our second point, the question of Marx's purpose. For whom was Marx writing, and whom was he actually criticising? I shall suggest that Marx's critique, far from being aimed at the political economists, was clearly aimed at the social democrats and their notion of strategy. I shall suggest that the subsequent texts on economics, Kapital and the Theorien, were designed to show that the social democrats were proposing to wage their battle against bourgeois society on the wrong terrain.

I shall look first at the manner in which the strategic theme entered into Marx's research on political economy. Then I shall look at Marx's critique of the social-democratic notion of production, value and labour. I shall then try to show that, according to Marx, the problem confronting a revolutionary strategy was that the proletariat was imbued with the basic value system of bourgeois society and an attack upon that ideology was the starting point of a socialist strategy.

Background to a Critique:

Writers representing such fundamentally different standpoints as Riazonov, Lefebvre and Althusser have commented that although Marx called stridently for a science of the concrete, the call was still made in abstract discourse before Zur Kritik and Kapital.¹⁷⁴ Reflecting upon the epoch of his and Engels' acrimonious break with the Hegelian left-liberal tradition, Marx himself characterised the texts calling for the science of the concrete as a "settling of their scores with their philosophical conscience" ("in der Tāt mit unserm ehemalige philosophischen Gewissen abzurechnen").¹⁷⁵ He wryly commented that those texts had outlived their usefulness and had best be left to the gnawing criticism of the mice.¹⁷⁶

One should not immediately join Althusser in his precipitous leap in reasoning when he concludes that Marx's condemnation of his early texts means that he rejected them completely. Althusser takes this to mean that Marx was eschewing the teleological element in his writings.¹⁷⁷ Marx's comment could just as easily mean nothing more than his having rejected the abstractness of his earlier texts without for one moment having rejected their teleological elements. It could just as easily

mean that the texts had served their purpose in his and Engels' itinerary towards finding a more viable solution to the human problematic than that proposed by Hegel.¹⁷⁸

Firstly, it can be argued that the pre-1847 works of Marx and Engels added a new dimension to the Hegelian dialectic rather than destroying it as some writers insist.¹⁷⁹ Hegel's contemplative subject, it can be maintained, was transformed into Marx's "active subject".¹⁸⁰ Hegel's idea that the act of contemplation was the essence of true (liberating) activity was changed into Marx's idea of "practical-critical-activity". The means to resolve the human problematic, idealistic transcendence in Hegelian terminology, was transformed into Marx's and Engels' notion of praxis.¹⁸¹ In many ways, Die deutsche Ideologie (1845), one of the texts Marx bequeathed to the rats, is the dénouement of his search for the form of a new strategy.¹⁸² Still working within the Hegelian framework and armed with Hegelian concepts and terminology, Marx and Engels savagely attacked their erstwhile Hegelian comrades-in-arms for what they called their vague and abstract philosophising and their failure to retrieve the concept of man from heavenly abstraction and root it firmly on Earth.¹⁸³ Through their critique, they developed the notion of "concrete human activity". In the companion notes to the body of the manuscript, the so-called Thesen über Feuerbach (1845), unearthed and published by Engels in 1888 at the height of his campaign to teach dialectics and strategy to the German SPD, Marx attempted to show how the essence of Hegelian contradiction, the subject/object dichotomy, could not be characterised as an abstract subject contemplating an empirical object. The subject and object were united through concrete activity, he argued, and the only possible transcendence could be accomplished through man's acting to change the foundations of his existence.¹⁸⁴ In other words, we can just as well argue that the outcome of the critique of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians was not an abandonment of teleology but a sharpening of the notion of praxis.¹⁸⁵ But praxis was still defined abstractly, hence the need to define it more concretely and Marx's impatience with these transitional texts.¹⁸⁶

Secondly, we find that the theme of praxis does not disappear in subsequent texts. It persisted and was developed in various ways in La misère de la philosophie (1847), the Manifest (1848) and the Forderungen (1848).

La misère, which I shall discuss in more detail below, is probably the text that most clearly demonstrates the link between Marx's critique and the subsequently developed notion of praxis. The hitherto abstract presentation of the subject/object dichotomy is now presented as the contradiction between exchange value (an imposed social system) and use value.¹⁸⁷ Significantly, it is the only text from this period that Marx did not denounce.¹⁸⁸ It was a text often cited in his other works and a text Engels was most anxious to make available to the German and French socialists in the 1880's. Putting the Manifest and the Forderungen into their historical context, one can see how they crystallised Marx's and Engels' argument about concrete and transcendental activity and the development of the notions of use and exchange value as the pivot of human existence. The solution to what had hitherto been the philosophical problematic, whose abstractness had been savaged by Marx and Engels, was not presented as resolvable through social action and, in particular, through the initiating action of the proletariat, and the liberation of human activity.¹⁸⁹ That the proletariat was the only agent of change was already a well-established theme in Marx and Engels.¹⁹⁰ But for the first time the hitherto abstract discussion about the process of liberation was presented as the concrete problem of revolutionising and unleashing the contemporary working class.¹⁹¹ Steering the discussion in this direction, however, raised a host of new problems.

In full dialectical flight, Engels was to write that the conclusion they reached at this time, that the proletariat was the initiating force of social liberation, was not a solution but a problem. It opened up a hornet's nest of new problems.¹⁹² Firstly, Marx and Engels stressed the enormous gap between the proletariat's potential understanding and its actual understanding. The various texts they wrote reflecting upon their own activities during the 1848-9 halcyon and those of the contemporary working class, Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte (1852), Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich (1851) and the Reichverfassungskampagne show the

extent of their scepticism.¹⁹³ In later years, Engels was to remark that the artisans and craftsmen who had been the backbone of the June Days and the resistance, in the small industrial towns of the Ruhr, could not initiate the process of liberation.¹⁹⁴ Was this because of an inherent block created by their working conditions? Or was it created by their role in relationship to other classes?¹⁹⁵ Marx wrote to Kugelmann that the proletariat was a revolutionary class but normally only in a latent sense. Its greatest barrier, he wrote, was its own ideology. Only in abnormal situations was its ideology, based on the evidence of 1848 and 1849 shakable. The proletariat proved itself incapable, he continued, of taking charge of a revolution, founding its own independent movement nor of sustaining a revolution when its own resistance was its only possible hope.¹⁹⁶

Nonetheless, Marx and Engels found that 1848 confirmed their radicalisation of the neo-Hegelian precepts. Marx's correspondence reveals how fully he turned towards the problem of turning potential into actual activity. The process of liberation could only be engaged by the proletariat and could only be accomplished through its taking charge, not only of the material means of production but also of the means of social organisation. This process he called for the first time in 1852 the Diktatur des Proletariats.¹⁹⁷ There can be no objective measure of the relationship of subject to object, he wrote, the abnormal situation when the proletariat momentarily perceives the path of the liberation must become a permanent state of affairs: "Der Schlachtruf ... der Partei des Proletariats muss sein: Die Revolution in Permanenz".¹⁹⁸

The first order of the day was to understand the problem in all its complexity. The first requirement was to understand the proletariat more clearly and, in particular, the nature of its Weltanschauung. Fresh from the battles of the abortive Baden Republic, Engels immersed himself in the new science of warfare and conflict from which, as we shall see, he drew some lessons for working-class strategy. Marx went in a different direction. If, he wondered, the proletariat encompassed the means to solve the social problematic, it was necessary to understand how and under what precise conditions the proletariat could initiate the process of liberation.¹⁹⁹ For that reason, Marx concentrated on a study of contemporary society announced in La misère. He wrote that his research was to comprise a study of the general theory of and distribution of social values, the social mechanisms ensuring and maintaining such a distribution, and finally how to foster and/or impede the proletariat's consciousness of its exploitation. His initial step was the preparation of a

critique of the existing ideas on the social distribution of values.

These are the roots of what was to become his critique of political economy.²⁰⁰

The Critique of Received Ideas:

Those dealing with Marx's intensive interest and attraction to political economy had more often than not assumed that Marx wished to found a new science.²⁰¹ As we have seen there are reasons for doubting this argument. But one current and convincing argument is that Marx had scientific aspirations and wanted to constitute a science on the order of the natural science.²⁰² There are many passages in the writings of Marx and Engels that seem to lead towards such a conclusion. One can cite certain letters written by Marx to Kugelmann and Lassalle, Engels' letters to Lafargue, as well as his introduction to the second volume of Kapital to support such an argument.²⁰³ We have already seen tendencies in Marx's writings of a science of a different order, a science whose vocation, one might say, was to establish that orderly universe where the equalised perception of the laboratory would fit society, and this tendency is confirmed in his later writings.²⁰⁴

If we start with Marx's argument itself, we find that he characterised political economy not only as a poor view of society but as a dangerous view of society.²⁰⁵ To argue that political economy is a poor view of society means to criticise it from a philosophical standpoint. Marx's internal critique of political economy is well-known and I need hardly do more at this point than to make a précis of his contentions. According to Marx, it is a poor view because it repeats all the major errors he attributed to Feuerbach's materialistic variation on Hegel. A materialistic philosophy of that kind rested on idealistic premises that were socially determined, Marx argued. To neglect the fact that social laws were humanly created was to accept, and possibly deify, existing social relations.²⁰⁶ In his projected introduction to Zur Kritik and his notebooks on the theory of surplus value, which he had hoped to publish as the fourth volume of Kapital, Marx tried to show how political economy rested on such foundations.

In his view it exhibited all the traits of an abstract syllogism ("hegel-rechten Schluss") that hypostatized existing social relations and viewed all past events and phenomena as leading towards the present.²⁰⁷ It developed a concept of man and human relations suitable to the syllogism ("phantasielosen Einbildung der 18-Jahrhundert-Robinsonarden") with predetermined human needs

(menschlichen Bedürfnissen) that could fortunately be satisfied by the products of capitalist society ("Gegenstände des Genusses").²⁰⁸ Man was defined as an unrepentant and infinitely voracious consumer of those objects that capitalist society produced.²⁰⁹ In other words, he could be satisfied by quantity because quality was a function of quantity. Political economy thus made use value a function of exchange value by reducing the act of appropriation to the simple act of merely acquiring material objects or acceding to the "enjoyment" of certain activities.²¹⁰ The political economists then proceeded to introduce the notion of immutable and natural laws ("unumstößliche Naturgesetze") ending with Mill and the idea that freedom consisted of the adjustment to the immutable market processes of bourgeois society.²¹¹ For the bourgeoisie, Marx maintained, political economy, as contradictory as it may be, constituted an honest appraisal of society. It reflected their positions and aspirations in society and was to them a reasonable view. It was a viewpoint, thus, that could not be changed by persuasion. Only the destruction of existing social relations that made that view appear to hold water could bring about such a change. In other words, driving home the nails on the coffin of the Left-Hegelians' concept of idealistic transcendence, Marx characterised political economy as no more than the distributive ideology of a class whose power must be broken were the Hegelian problematic to be solved.²¹²

But why did Marx characterise political economy as a dangerous view of society? Writers who have treated the concept of ideology have generally interpreted it as a compendium of thoughts and principles. Within social-democracy Kautsky distinguished between a proper scientific understanding of society and an improper understanding. An improper understanding could be corrected only by teaching Marxist dialectics.²¹³ Marx, however, argued that ideology was a view of reality upon which men base their actions and it was impossible to talk about proper and improper consciousness. The improper understanding, too, had its roots in the day-to-day problems and existence of those who adhered to it and fulfilled some need. Although an obviously distorted mirror-image of that reality, one could not deal with the ideology separately from the reality within which it was in apparent contradiction.²¹⁴ As he was to argue subsequently, in the concluding sections of Kapital, it was the raw material with which one

had to work after understanding the existing mechanism for the distribution of values in society. I shall argue that Marx felt that the basic principles of political economy were found in the "ideology" of the proletariat. This constituted the dangerous side of political economy and if Marx's notion of science depended upon the initiation of the process of liberation, then an attack upon political economy was a strategic intervention to hasten the process.

In Marx's view, the events of 1848 in France and Germany and the subsequent political struggles in France, marked the first stirrings of the newly-born European proletariat. The beginnings of rapid industrialisation, the growth and transformation of the artisanal workshops into fledgling factories and the appearance of large urban conurbations, made up primarily of workmen, led - after 1848 - to the formation of many kinds of organisations.²¹⁵ In Marx's view, these organisations were considerably less utopian than earlier workingmen's movements, more practical and more independent. In the wake of Chartism in Britain, artisanal trade-union movement, called the New Model Unions, were being organised. Whilst abhorring their level of politicisation, Marx lauded their independent form of organisation.²¹⁶ In Germany, the textile workers in Saxony, one of the few areas before the 1860's where there was an intense concentration of workers, founded trade-union cum political organisations. Again, Marx and Engels were highly critical of their views but encouraged their organisation.²¹⁷ Lassalle's gigantic crusade through the towns along the Ruhr and Rhine fermented the brief organisation of scores of thousands of weavers, textile workers, metal workers, craftsmen and even miners.²¹⁸ In France artisanal organisations, particularly those seasoned by the combats of 1848 and 1849, like the knot of Parisian craftsmen owing their allegiance to Blanqui, directly posed the question of political power.²¹⁹ In the view of Marx and Engels all of these events were positive.²²⁰ But there was a negative side to these developments as well. Looking at the ideas espoused by and generated in these movements, Marx found a common thread that had, in his view, to be ripped out. Without exception, all these movements, no matter how vehement their language and how actionist they were in policy, accepted the key assertion of the 'political economists, that use value was no more than a function of exchange

value. According to the theories of not only Proudhon and Lassalle but those expressed by ordinary workmen themselves in their meetings, and organisations, the essence of the social problematic was that there was an insufficient distribution of the existing stock of social values.²²¹ Labour was the only measure of value and the worker was insufficiently rewarded. In Marx's view, the programme of action expressed by these writers boiled down to demanding a just share of the social product and ignored the implications behind the theory of use value. These ideas were most cogently developed in the writings of Lassalle and Proudhon.²²² Lassalle, he wrote, was a Realpolitiker: he accepted things in the end as they were. The problematic, though, is a question of determining the means of existence and Lassalle's theories converge towards the opposite direction.²²³ They are part and parcel of the same ideology developed by the bourgeois economists to defend bourgeois society.²²⁴ Hence, in Marx's view, they were dangerous views indeed.

Marx's compendium of these errors was in fact written before 1848. Proudhon's La philosophie de la misère was, in his view, a genuine attempt to concretise the philosophical problematic.²²⁵ Like Feuerbach and the economists, Marx argued, Proudhon espoused a notion of materialism based on a metaphysic.²²⁶ Proudhon argued that the goods produced and made available by the industrial revolution were valuable in themselves. They were valuable because they were useful and they were useful because they were exchangeable and because the industrial age marked a considerable progress over previous epochs in human history.²²⁷ The use that a good had was inherent in that good itself. These uses were determined by immutable laws independent of the subject. They could, moreover, be measured against each other because labour-time constituted the value of a good. Marx argued that Proudhon's reasoning was faulty because he does not tell us how the relations of production themselves are produced.²²⁸ The origin of a system of value, he wrote, is in power relations and social conflict ("véritable guerre civile").²²⁹ A system of values does not spring out of thin air.²³⁰ The essence of proletarian repression is not the denial of a good or the possibility of engaging in certain activities, as Proudhon argues, but being the subject of a system of social relations transmuted into so-called natural laws and being forced

to gauge and govern one's activities according to those laws. These laws were the system of exchange value (or imposed reality) and the denial of the possibility of being able to determine one's activities (use value).²³¹ By compressing use value into exchange value, or quality into quantity, Marx argued, Proudhon - rather than being the fierce opponent of capitalism he fancied himself to be - had outlined a theory that could only lead to social integration.²³²

After outlining the errors attributable to Proudhon, Marx discussed the requirements for a strategy of revolution. Until one was clear about what one meant about repression and suppression, wrote Marx, one could not begin to talk about a revolutionary strategy.²³³ He argued that, according to Proudhon, repression meant denying the worker his just share of the social product. The essence of social emancipation ("affranchissement de la classe opprimée")²³⁴, however, is the destruction of the notion that the political contest is merely a contest about the distribution of the existing stock of social values and of the society in which that ideology flourishes.²³⁵ Marx, in many ways anticipating the final sections of the Manifest, concluded his argument by stating that only with that end in mind could one begin to organise for the battle to come.²³⁶

Hence, far from abandoning the teleological aspects of his argument, Marx, in la misère, spells them out clearly along with their strategic repercussions by contrasting them with the socialist adaptation of the political economists' argument. More firmly than before, he posed the central problem as the concrete and daily oppression of the proletariat and the forcing of the battle. He argued that a clearer understanding of the proletariat's consciousness, the manner in which it experienced the contradiction between exchange value and use value, was required because these constituted the contradiction that must be exacerbated. At the same time, the system of exchange required a more thorough exegesis because this constituted the basis of the proletariat's existence.

Did Marx abandon this theme in his later works? If we look at the final sections of the third volume of Kapital, where Marx begins to discuss the way the system of exchange is experienced by the proletariat, we find him arguing along much the same lines. The social process of production, he writes, is as important as material production, because material production takes place under specific conditions and these conditions are prerequisites as well as results and creations of material production.²³⁷ Until the basis of society is altered one cannot begin to talk about the marriage of necessity and freedom.²³⁸

Is there other evidence in support of the contention that Marx's critique was aimed at a mistaken outlook, hence a mistaken strategy in the socialist movement? We have seen the viciousness of his critique of Proudhon. In his correspondence, he made similar critiques of Lassalle with such ferocity that when his correspondence with Kugelmann was published by Kautsky in the Neue Zeit in 1902 the two letters where Marx spelled out his critique of Lassalle and Proudhon were omitted.²³⁹ The theory of both is an accommodation to existing society, Marx argued; yet, nonetheless, he showered praise on both writers.²⁴⁰ In a short text written in 1865, Über "Misère", Marx spoke of Proudhon the gallant battler and his struggles to make the working class aware of its conditions.²⁴¹ Nor did Marx flinch from defending Lassalle. What he praised in both cases was that the calls to organisation and the organising skills of both Lassalle and Proudhon, no matter what their theoretical shortcomings, were positive moves towards the creation of an independent working-class consciousness.²⁴² They raised the possibility of translating actual consciousness into possible consciousness. In that sense Marx's critique was not a negative critique but a dialectical critique, whose point was that a certain stage had been arrived at in the struggle for emancipation and the theory behind Proudhon and Lassalle had served in that struggle. Now it must be transcended.

To summarise our discussion to this point, Marx had two requirements in mind. The first was the need to formulate a strategy which would engage the working class in such a way that it would start the battle for social liberation. The chief requirement here was the need to free it from its attachments to the ideology of political economy and to prod it by revealing the fundamental

contradictions experienced in its daily life. The second requirement was the need for an independent workingmen's organisation and the need for an organisation that would be an offensive rather than a defensive organisation. The movements in France, Germany and Britain were moving towards the formation of independent organisations but, because they were attached to political economy, they could not be the required offensive organisation.

These are the general and specific reasons for Marx's critique of political economy. What I hope to have demonstrated is that Marx's concern with political economy can just as easily be called a strategic concern - a desire to formulate the basic principles before engaging the battle - as a concern to replace political economy by a more scientific doctrine explaining economic and social processes. I hope that this theme, together with the idea that Marx undertook his research into political economy with a view to liberate the socialist movement from its distributive philosophy, will become clearer as we analyse Marx's texts.

Probably the most important text we have from this period is to be found among the crowded folios of Marx's own notes. They are difficult texts because they are written in aphoristic form and vary in presentation from an exposé or précis of themes developed by the political economists to a lengthy critique of certain schools of thought. They were first published in 1939 but became generally available only as recently as 1953. They are known under the title of Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857-58.

The Grundrisse were Marx's working notebooks from which he developed the arguments he later developed in Zur Kritik, Kapital, and the Theorien über den Mehrwert. Each of the three later texts develop specific arguments. Zur Kritik presents the contradiction between exchange value and use value as it develops within the capitalist system of production. It is mostly concerned with the mechanisms of exchange as they exist.²⁴³ Kapital starts by repeating and clarifying the argument of Zur Kritik. The first volume discusses the process of capitalist production and introduces the theme of surplus value. The second volume discusses the process of circulation

and the final volume the process as a whole. The theme running through Kapital is the importance of the role played by labour, and its non-reducibility to the political economists' syllogism. Only at the end of the third volume does Marx return to raise the theme of freedom and necessity. The Theorien were designed to reinforce Marx's argument by showing how political economy functioned as an ideology.²⁴⁴ This was to be done by demonstrating how its argument developed in response to social needs and finally to make Kapital's argument about the active appropriation of society clearer - contrasting the difference between the revolutionary and the non-revolutionary points of view. That was how Marx envisaged his work.

The importance of the Einleitung is that it was a kind of trial run. It anticipated most of the themes Marx intended to take up. Its theme was production; the notions of labour and commodities were barely discussed. It sought to demonstrate the temporality of capitalism and how production was also the production of social values. It integrated Marx's notion of active transcendence with his economic research. The reader's difficulty lies in its density, compactness, tendency to aphorism and startling jumps from one apparently unrelated topic to another.

In the opening sections of the Einleitung, Marx distinguishes between what he calls production in general, Produktion im allgemeinen, and material production, materielle Produktion.²⁴⁵

According to Marx, the political economists do not deal with production in general. Production in general is the complex process by which social relations and class relations are produced within a society, where man is moulded into a producer and consumer of the values produced by that society and by which the values of that society are generated.²⁴⁶ The process involves not only the exchange of objects and material goods that a society values, but the process of the buying and selling of labour-power (Arbeitskraft) required to produce those material goods and to consume them.²⁴⁷

Marx's basic theme is that, according to the laws of the political economists and those who accept their dicta, production is defined exclusively as material production. In other words, Marx is repeating the criticism he directed against Proudhon in La misère.²⁴⁸ But he presents his argument in more detail. Production in general, he argues, also involves what the political economists have called consumption, distribution and exchange.

They regard each of these categories as independent steps. But in Marx's view one cannot separate one step from another. ("Die Produktion ist also unmittelbar Konsumtion, die Konsumtion ist unmittelbar Produktion. Jede ist unmittelbar ihr Gegenteil.")²⁴⁹

A product only becomes a real (wirkliches) product in consumption. For example, Marx argues, a dress only becomes a dress through its being worn and a house that is not lived in is not a house. The use of an object determines its definition. But the object is used under socially determined conditions. People in different positions with different experiences (class) have different observations and act, or try to act, according to those observations.²⁵⁰

The form of consumption not only moulds the product but it helps to mould the producer.²⁵¹ In Kapital Marx was later to develop this theme in his discussion of commodities and the fetishism of commodities.²⁵²

The material act of production not only produces a good or an object for the consumer, it also moulds the consumer.²⁵³ The producer is partially consumed (Arbeitskraft, Lebenskraft), in the act of production and is reproduced as a consumer of the values of his society.²⁵⁴ The act creates needs (Bedürfnisse). These are both immediate needs and needs to replace the loss²⁵⁵ of the power that went into the act of production, Marx writes.

Likewise, distribution is not an independent realm. Distribution depends upon the social form under which it takes place.²⁵⁶ The form of exchange in a society is also determined by these social norms and rules.²⁵⁷ So that looking at the process as a whole, Marx concludes:

"Das Resultat, wozu wir gelangen, ist nicht, dass Produktion, Distribution, Austausch, Konsumtion identisch sind, sondern dass sie alle Glieder einer Totalität bilden."²⁵⁸

Marx therefore identifies several interacting elements of what he calls the social totality.²⁵⁹ Firstly, we have the constituted system of exchange described, he felt wrongly, by the political economists. This is the notion of material production that they confused with production in general. Secondly, we have the differential series of experiences with the system leading to different perceptions of the system.²⁶⁰ If we recall Marx's remarks about the relationship between the levels of exchange that existed in a society and its relationship to perception, we must conclude that to call one a mirror-image of the other is a tautology. It would be better to see one as the absorption, for precise reasons, of the other level as a kind of compensation.²⁶¹ This is what he means when he says that the role played by the producer moulds him as a consumer, and his role as a consumer prepares him to be a producer.²⁶² Finally, there is the important

level of the generalised acceptable notion of value and how this is experienced and absorbed by different classes.

A crucial element here is labour. The economists along with most socialists, as we have seen, saw labour, labour-time, or the amount of labour expended in the production of a good as the measure of value. Marx sharply disagreed. He insisted that labour is no more an independent category than are production, consumption, distribution and exchange. There is, however, what he called labour power (Arbeitskraft)²⁶³. This is what the worker expends of himself in his tasks. But given that the worker is formed by the totality of social relations, Marx continues, the labour theory of value must be fallacious. What is crucial is the fact that the worker has no control over the sector he called production in general. The worker not only has no control in determining his labour rhythm as a producer but no control in determining the content of what he is producing and what he is consuming. In other words, he has no control in the genesis of and changing role of value.²⁶⁴

Here Marx comes to the vexing question of what is value and how is it determined. Is there an objective measure of value, he asks in detail. If so, under what conditions? Marx determines several hypotheses. He demonstrates that gold, supposedly the basis and regulator of the economic system (system of exchange),²⁶⁵ has no inherent properties that make it more valuable than any other metal, no qualities that led people to decide that gold would be the measure of value.²⁶⁶ What determined its role, Marx writes, was the value it had to the beholder. He shows how gold as the economic regulator owed its role to power relations and conflict, again the famous "guerre civile" for the determination of social values.²⁶⁷ The same holds true of any supposedly valuable object, Marx maintains. In particular, the same holds true of the capitalist system of production and its worship of the machine and its products. In itself the notion of value is tautological, Marx concludes.²⁶⁸ Is value determined then by any one element? Is value determined, as Lassalle and Proudhon argued, by labour or labour time? No, replies Marx: it is determined by the battle between classes in society. Is value determined by judicial agreement, by the institutional relations a society seemingly establishes and maintains

to distribute value? Again no, because these institutions have no permanency. They are mere moments of temporary compromise, mere equilibrium points in class conflict.

But this leads to an important problem. If the system is illogical and riddled with contradictions and dependent upon the creation of an army of labourers (and consumers), why does it not collapse?²⁶⁹ In the Einleitung Marx deals with this argument obliquely and marginally. In Kapital he approaches it in more detail when he discusses the life of the factory worker as a producer and consumer of exchange value.²⁷⁰ Let us first look at the more general argument as it is presented in the Einleitung.

After demonstrating the inter-relatedness of all forms of activity within a society, or, as Hobsbawm maintains, having developed the model of a functioning society, Marx devotes practically all the rest of the introduction to looking at the method of political economy before touching marginally on what a proper study of society would comprise.²⁷¹ Political economy, according to Marx, is an ideology.²⁷² It is not only a remote ideology, the property of philosophers, but - as we have seen - an important buttress of capitalist society.²⁷³ It is important, he argues, because it comprises the perceptual categories of the beholder. His wishes, needs, hopes and aspirations are channeled and formed through the categories of political economy.²⁷⁴

In Kapital Marx develops this theme in more detail. In the first volume of Kapital, Marx first engages in a discussion on commodities, money and the system of exchange prevailing in capitalist society, and also how value is, in an every-day sense, transmuted into commodities in that society. He next discusses the transformation of money into capital. These two segments contain the rudiments of his critique of the political economists' theory of social development, and these are taken up and expanded in the second and third volumes of Kapital where Marx discusses the exchange value system as such in more detail. The labourer is "made poor in individual productive powers", he argues, in order to ensure the prosperity of the capitalist system.²⁷⁵ This reduction in individual productive power is accomplished by his subjugation to the "uniform and unceasing motion of an automaton"²⁷⁶

The machine "confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual activity".²⁷⁷ And, finally, "the instrument of labour confronts the labourer, during the labour-process, in the shape of capital, of dead labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour-power".²⁷⁸ Outside the labour process, the workman is "taught from childhood, in order that he may learn to adapt his own movements" to the productive process and its fetishism of commodities.²⁷⁹ The denial of freedom is not only a denial of control of the material productive process but of production in general or control over "Lebensmitteln".²⁸⁰ And the essential condition of the worker is that he is a consumer of the established distributive ideological pattern of capitalist society.²⁸¹

Marx expands this last theme in more detail in the final sections of the third volume of Kapital, where he returns to contrast exchange value and use value. The section, as Engels points out, is incomplete, aphoristic and "endlessly involved".²⁸² In many ways, it is no more than an outline of a chapter. After summarising once again his material by arguing that the capitalist process of production is an historically determined form of the social process of production in general, Marx states that the essence of oppression lies in the inability of the oppressed to determine either their role as producer or consumer. This lack of control is a concretisation of the human problematic.²⁸³ In capitalist society, because of the relative overtness of the oppression due to its rapid development and because the social relations built around the machine are so much more visibly oppressive, the possibility of breaking the cycle is greater.²⁸⁴ Marx then argues that the realm of freedom actually begins only when labour, which is determined by outside considerations ("mundane considerations"), ceases. The essence of freedom lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Capitalist society, being a society which must produce more and more goods to continue to exist and correspondingly produce a consumer for those goods, develops the realm of immediate (physical) necessity, wants and the forces of production. Freedom consists in:

"... socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of their being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature."²⁸⁵

The importance of Marx's seemingly precipitous return to this theme is that, because value cannot be determined according to inherent criteria or the laws of exchange value, the experience of oppression can only be defined by the working class itself.²⁸⁶ A strategy that does not concentrate on the contradiction between the system of imposed values and aspirations and does not seek to encourage a teleological solution is a poor strategy.²⁸⁷

We have already seen that Marx was critical of Proudhon and Lassalle for their neglecting the essence of oppression. The theme is frequently taken up in his later writings. He returns to it in the Einleitung and hoped to devote the fourth volume of Kapital to enunciating it still further.

In the Einleitung, Marx castigated those whom he calls the adversaries (whether political economists or not) who, whilst attacking political economy for seeing production as an end in itself ("die Produktion ... als Selbstzweck"), were, for their part, proposing that the essential social problem was distribution.²⁸⁸ In Marx's view, this was far from representing a radical departure from political economy and still repeats its confusion over exchange value and use value. The notion that wider distribution is the solution to social problems is a dangerous view, he says elsewhere, because it not only does not tackle the essence of social exploitation and oppression but creates a fantasy (Willkür) at a point when it should be laying reality bare.²⁸⁹ Again, Marx not only means the economists who deduced the labour theory of value - like Hodgskin - but the socialists - like Proudhon and Lassalle - whose theories he found even less acceptable than those of the radical political economists.²⁹⁰

Can Marx's criticism be extended to the social democrats? We have already seen that their notion of value, labour and the role played by distribution was very similar to that of Proudhon and Lassalle.²⁹¹

We have already seen Engels' criticism of Kautsky for misunderstanding what Marx meant by use value and for not understanding the essence of the critique of Lassalle.²⁹² We know that Bernstein and Kautsky on different occasions edited and printed the texts of Marx and Engels, and that Kautsky suppressed Marx's criticism of Lassalle. Was this because they could not accept the theory of praxis Marx produced?

From our analysis of the Erfurterprogramm, it is clear that Kautsky saw Marxism as a science of economics. In his introduction to Marx's critique of the Gotha programme in the Neue Zeit, Kautsky said that its main importance was as an historical document.²⁹³ When he edited what Marx had intended to be the fourth volume of Kapital, he saw the manuscript as an historical sidelight to Kapital, rather than as a manuscript trying to outline clearly the difference between Marx's concept of surplus value and that of the political economists. He wrote that the text was unclear and for the sake of clarity he had to amend it considerably. He cut out all references to "relative surplus value" because, in his view, surplus value could be measured objectively.²⁹⁴ In his introduction to Marxism, he omitted a discussion of use value and ignored the last sections of volume three of Kapital in order to create an objective science.²⁹⁵ Whilst working on the Theorien, Kautsky translated the intended Einleitung to Zur Kritik. We know from Engels that Marx's handwriting was so indecipherable that on occasions Marx could barely read his own notes and that Engels had to have his manuscripts completely copied out before he could edit the second and third volumes of Kapital. For that reason one could excuse Kautsky's having confused Auflösung²⁹⁶ (analysis) with Auffassung (conception) in the text.²⁹⁷ But to transcribe Marx's phrase:

"In der Produktion objektiviert sich die Person, in der Person subjektiviert sich die Sache"

as

"In der Produktion objektiviert sich die Person, in der Konsumtion subjektiviert sich die Sache"²⁹⁸

must be considered minimally as a Freudian slip, if not another judicious doctoring of a difficult passage. Kautsky wrote that production transformed the person into an object and the object was subjectivised through consumption. In this version consumption is freed from any relationship with production of the kind described by Marx. Marx's version states clearly that the object's definition depends upon how it is perceived by the person. Kautsky's version allows no differential perception. If the essence of the Erfurterprogramm was that man became free through consumption, Kautsky seems to have tilted the text in that direction. The consequence of Kautsky's transcription was to sweep the problem of consciousness completely under the rug.²⁹⁹ In that sense, Marx's attack against the "opponents of the political economists" is also an attack against the conclusions that Kautsky and the social democrats drew from his texts. What Marx labelled the essence of his strategy in a letter to Engels was suppressed by the social democrats.³⁰⁰

In the Einleitung, whilst attacking the way the political economists used the concept of material production, Marx insisted that material production was important because it created the daily living conditions of the worker through which he experienced social oppression.³⁰¹ To take present material conditions, capitalist society, out of historical context either by seeing it as a final stage in human development or by regarding its economic description as the only form of description, as the socialists did, was a terrible mistake. As we have seen in both Zur Kritik and in the Einleitung, Marx emphasised that the economic system (the prevailing system of exchange and distribution) was no more than the bare bones of its organisation ("der Knochenbaus ihrer Organisation"). The Knochenbaus sets the limits of the experience of oppression.³⁰² It is the basis upon which complex and often contradictory social procedures of the society are built up. But, he warned, to understand the Knochenbaus does not describe the process of the mechanism of oppression any more than an understanding of the human skeleton would allow us to understand human action.³⁰³

Hence, within the Einleitung, the pages of the Grundrisse, Zur Kritik and Kapital, one of Marx's aims was to describe the essence of material production. As he wrote to Engels and Lassalle, his work in this direction was prefatory to his describing more thoroughly the entire process of oppression. In the Einleitung, Marx argues that any doctrine based upon material production assumes and seeks to eternalise a specific value system and the social processes that gave birth to that system of values. In subsequent texts, in particular the Theorien, he sought to analyse the close relationship between an ahistorical conception claiming to be a social law and its enforcement in a society. Work, he maintained, as Grossman has demonstrated, was not only oppressive as work but as part of an entire system of oppression.³⁰⁴ But in most of his subsequent texts Marx spent most of his time analysing the internal inconsistencies of political economy and the socialists who had developed the theory of insufficient distribution or relative deprivation.

In particular, Marx dealt with the idea of surplus value. As he intended to stress in the Theorien, and as Engels argued in his introduction to the second volume of Kapital, much of what Marx said about surplus value

was not new. The idea was an old one stemming from the consequences of Adam Smith's theory of labour.³⁰⁵ It had been developed by Ricardo and used by opponents of political economy like Hodgskin and Bray.³⁰⁶ Criticising this general theory for the undue emphasis it placed upon labour and material production, Marx first expounded and clarified the formula of what one might call surplus value of exchange value. This is the measure of the amount of labour extracted from the worker within terms of exchange value for which he is not rewarded. This form of extraction was immediately visible to the worker. But Marx was also interested in what one might call the surplus value of use value. Marx indicated that there was ultimately no such thing as labour. There was, however, what he calls Arbeitskraft (labour power).³⁰⁷ Labour power was diminished by the very terms of the exchange system. Not only was there a directly material visible extraction, but there was also that extraction which turned the worker into the subject of the "automaton" and denied him control over his life (Lebensform).³⁰⁸ As Grossmann argues, this second level of surplus value is the crux of Marx's concern.³⁰⁹ In sections of volume one of Kapital, Marx discusses the experience of work and turns to this problem and, as we have seen, he returns to it again in volume three where he discusses and resumes the uses of the syllogistic argument as part of the lived experience of the working class, the contradiction between the realm of necessity (the exchange system) and the realm of freedom (the use system). He then intended to continue, having described how the exchange system functioned, to concentrate more on how it was experienced before discussing the elements of strategy.

Kapital is incomplete at this crucial point. The Grundrisse, for all its complex aphorisms and asides, goes beyond this point. Marx describes how the worker is both the creator of exchange value and the consumer of its system of values.³¹⁰ He consumes a prepared system of social norms and rules. For that reason it has what Marx calls fantasy qualities.³¹¹ Why is this the case? As a producer of exchange value the worker is an incomplete producer. As a consumer of exchange value he is an incomplete consumer. Yet his role as a producer enforces his role as a consumer

and vice versa. The ideology of consumption and distribution, his fantasy structures and ghost-walking qualities, form the unconscious mechanism that allows the persistence of the workers' oppression and underwrites the continued existence of capitalist society.³¹²

In essence, I have tried to demonstrate that there are two important and often neglected, elements in Marx's work which he expressed with great persistence. The first is that when Marx spoke of oppression he did not mean deprivation or relative deprivation. We have seen his critique of Proudhon and the political economists, and his statements in Kapital were concentrated on social exploitation. Marx characterised the writers who saw the solution to social problems through wider distribution as no more than philanthropists, both in La misère and, as we shall see, in his second address written for the International about the Commune of Paris.³¹³ Philanthropists alleviate symptoms, he wrote, but never eradicate the illness itself. Secondly, there is much evidence that Marx sought to demonstrate that so long as the consumptionist and distributive theories were currency within the socialist movement, social liberation would be impossible. Finally, he admitted that these arguments had deep roots amongst the proletariat and that these roots must be attacked.

If this is the case, one would expect Marx to deal exhaustively with the problem of working-class consciousness. We find that he engages a discussion on the problem in the final sections of the Einleitung.³¹⁴ Under the general rubric, "Bewusstseinsformen im Verhältnis zu den Produktions- und Verkehrsverhältnissen", Marx presents a list (Nota bene), the last item of which is an expanded and unevenly polished series of aphorisms about Greek art. Marx discusses Greek art from two different points of view. The most obvious to a German audience, instructed in classicism by Wincklemann and his followers, was how Greek art is related to, and played a role in, contemporary German society. The less obvious and more germane aspect is how Marx uses his discussion to illustrate the relationship between a body of ideas that grows from man's relationship with his social milieu (Natur) and how that social milieu is maintained and held together. Marx argues that any form of social expression or any action is conducted within the guidelines provided by a mythology.

A mythology is a compendium of definitions and categories outlining the permitted activities of man in his society. It is, Marx writes, the fanciful and unconscious elaboration of nature and the social forms by the popular imagination ("die Natur und die gesellschaftlichen Formen selbst schon in einer unbewusst künstlerische Verarbeitung der Natur").³¹⁵

A fanciful and unconscious elaboration is itself part of the productive relations within a society. At the beginning of the Einleitung Marx defined political economy in such a way ("Dies Schein und nur der ästhetische Schein der kleinen und grossen Robinsonarden").³¹⁶ The elaboration provides the basis for the codification of the rules (Rechtsverhältnisse) of that society.³¹⁷ In his argument Marx takes the relationship between Greek mythology and Greek society as a case in point. His aim is to explain how existing social reality, oppressive as it is for the proletariat, is made to be compelling and omnipresent. The "phantasierende locus communis" of political economy, with its theories of distribution, played an important role in that oppression.³¹⁸ That this "commonsense" is the "commonsense" of the proletariat, in Marx's view, seems to be confirmed by the fact that, in the manuscript, whenever Marx criticises political economy as a fantasy or ideology it is accompanied by a reference to writers like Proudhon who exerted a great influence on the proletariat with his theory of value and labour.

Marx claimed that the essence of a socialist strategy was to attack capitalism at its weakest point. From our investigation of the Einleitung, La misère and Kapital, we have seen that working-class consciousness, in Marx's view, could be characterised as one of the weakest links in the capitalist system and that a strategy of liberation could be composed, based upon an attack on the ideological ties of the working class to capitalist society.

If my interpretation of the teleological strand in Marx's thought is correct, it follows that in the light of that strand a revolution cannot occur but it must be made. Marx insisted that exchange value and use value were incommensurable. In Kapital he argues that quality depends upon the transition from necessity to freedom and the precondition of that transition is the control over the rhythms of one's existence. Use value is a function of that control.³¹⁹ For that reason as a heuristic device I have argued that one can distinguish between the surplus value of exchange value and the surplus value of use value.³²⁰ Use value depends upon qualitative satisfaction. Marx does not discuss this theme in detail in Kapital. He argues that he is presenting no more than the mechanism of the existing system of exchange and revealing its ideology. If we return to our argument about determinism this means that Marx is merely presenting the Knochenbaus, the background. Indeed, even in the concluding section of Kapital he again argues that ideology is not only a reflection but a rationalisation of the basic structure. The ideological bonds are important because, if one must activate the exploited, this can only be done through their consciousness - that is, through their experience of the system.³²¹ One must be acquainted with the Knochenbaus, but it is not everything. What people do depends upon their interpretation. Marx argued that the proletariat - due to its position in capitalist society - experienced its conditions of oppression most harshly.³²² In many ways a part of that condition was the adoption, in caricature, of the ideology of exchange.³²³ We saw that Marx's critique of Proudhon was based upon Proudhon's having compressed use value into exchange value. I have also extended the argument to show how the socialist programmes did the same thing. I have also shown how the interpreters of Marx in the Second International, like Kautsky and Lafargue, likewise emphasised the "bare-bones" and even suppressed references to arguments about consciousness.

What I have tried to suggest is that, even in Marx's works criticising political economy, he expresses the strategic element. His problematic can be interpreted as finding the ways and means to activate the proletariat. His theory of value can only mean striking at the weak link binding the proletariat to bourgeois society, its daily experience of a system of need obligations (exchange value) and need aspirations (use value).³²⁴ This leads us to define the essence of his strategy as follows:

- (i) Marx wrote to Lassalle that the "party" must choose its terrain carefully. He identifies two interacting levels: the functioning system itself (exchange value) and proletarian consciousness (use value).³²⁵
- (ii) The need to make the contradiction between exchange value and use value apparent to the proletariat. This could be described as the seizing of the terrain.
- (iii) The need for a constant appraisal of the forces and means one can use to make the contradiction apparent, to raise consciousness to the level of revolutionary consciousness and to engage the process of liberation.

In this section I have looked almost exclusively at Marx's theoretical works and those dealing with the functioning of the economic system of his time as well as his and Engels' correspondence directly connected to those works. I have tried to show how the essence of Clausewitzian strategy is a persistent theme found in all these works. Marx wrote that Kapital was not intended to be more than a description of an economic system (a system of exchange within a specific society).³²⁶ I have pointed out that there are many possible objections to such a reading. In the following sections, I shall deal with Marx's direct political interventions and his and Engels' occasional writings for the socialist movement. In Marx's case, in particular, these were texts written whilst he was labouring on Kapital, and in Engels' case they were texts written, in many instances, to awaken the social democrats to the strategic problems facing them. Marx once wrote, later echoed by Riazanov, that one could not understand any one of his texts without understanding how it related to his other writings and the precise situations for which he was writing. I hope to demonstrate that my reading of Marx's opus is at least a tenable reading.

NOTES

1. Clausewitz, On War, (Penguin ed.) London, 1968, II, 1, pp. 172, 174.
2. The texts to which I will refer are Kautsky, Die historische Leistung von Karl Marx, Berlin, 1908, pp. 30-46, "Der Entwurf des neuen Parteiprogramms", in Die Neue Zeit, Jhrg. 9, Band 2, (1891), pp. 780-92, Grundsätze und Forderungen der Sozialdemokratie: Erläuterungen zum Erfurter Programm, Berlin, o.J.; Mehring, Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Stuttgart, 1919, pp. 291-309; Plekhanov, "Karl Marx" in D. Riazanov, Karl Marx: Man, Thinker and Revolutionary, London, 1927, pp. 79-91; Bukharin, The A.B.C. of Communism, (Penguin ed.), London, 1969, pp. 66-67; N. Popov (ed.), Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, London, n.d., pp. 18-22; V. Vygodsky, A Book for All Time: Centenary of Karl Marx's Capital, Moscow, 1967, p. 150; Stalin, Über die Grundlagen des Leninismus, Berlin, 1946, pp. 16-20; Louis Althusser, Pour Marx, Paris, 1965; Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, vol. II, Marxism and Anarchism 1850-1890, London, 1957, pp. 267-88; George Lichtheim, Marxism, (2nd ed. 1964), London, 1964, p. xiii; E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, vol. I (Penguin ed.), London, 1969, p. 30; Carr, Karl Marx: A Study in Fanaticism, London, 1934, p. 301; Schlomo Avineri, The social and political thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge, 1966; Histoire du Parti communiste français (manuel), Paris, 1964, pp. 24-25.
3. Karl Korsch, Marxisme et philosophie, Paris, 1964, pp. 18-26; G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Frankfurt, 1967, pp. 17-19, 42-44; Henri Lefebvre, La sociologie de Karl Marx, Paris, pp. 36-39; David Riazanov, Marx et Engels, Paris, 1967, pp. 1-23; Rosa Luxemburg, "Stagnation and Progress of Marxism", in D. Riazanov, opcit., p. 109. Texts like these are the major exceptions.
4. Kautsky, Die Entwurf, p. 781, Die historische Leistung, pp. 30-46, Taktische Stürmungen in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Berlin, 1911, p. 7; Plekhanov, opcit., p. 79-80; Bukharin, opcit., p. 66; Popov, opcit., p. 19; Vygodsky, opcit., pp. 3, 69, 150; Stalin, opcit., p. 16;
5. Lichtheim, opcit., pp. xiii-xiv; Althusser in M.A. Macciocchi, Lettere d' all'interno del PCI a Louis Althusser, Milano, 1969, pp. 25-26; Vygodsky, opcit., pp. 3-6; Cole, opcit., pp. 268-69.
6. Manifest der Kommunistische Partei, (1848), MEW, Band 4, pp. 461-93, especially pp. 492-493.
7. Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, (Rohentwurf 1857-58), I say a good edition because the 1939 edition was still full of Kautsky's errors, Berlin, 1953; Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, (1859), MEW, Band 13, pp. 7-160; Kapital: Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, MEW, Bände 23,24,25;
8. Engels to Bracke, 11.10.75, MEW, Band 34, p. 155; Forderungen der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland (1849), MEW, Band 5, pp. 3-5.

9. Programme du parti ouvrier (1880), in Jules Guesde, textes choisis, (ed. Claude Willard), Paris, 1959, pp. 117-19.
10. The practical claims spelled out in the Manifest are limited to an extension of public liberties. The demands in the Forderungen take the same pattern and also cover certain economic reforms such as nationalisation of the railways, a claim, in fact, supported by the liberals and even the military.
11. Kautsky, "Der Entwurf des neuen Parteiprogramms", in Neue Zeit, 1851, Band II, pp. 748-49; 780-81.
12. Kautsky, Taktische Stürmungen, p. 7; Die historische Leistung, pp. 30-46; Jules Guesde to Karl Marx, cited in A. Zévaes, Sur l'écran politique ombres et silhouettes, Paris, 1908, p. 52; Althusser, Lénine et la philosophie, Paris, 1969, p. 57.
13. Karl Marx' Ökonomische Lehren, Stuttgart, 1887, pp. 246-47, and in Grundsätze, pp. 43-49; "Die Entwurf", pp. 780-81.
14. Althusser, Lire le Capital, Paris 1968, pp. 24-28; Pour Marx, pp. 12-13.
15. Karl Korsch, Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, Leipzig, 1929, pp. 117-118; David Riazanov, Marx et Engels, pp. 3-6.
16. Clausewitz, III, 3, 251.
17. Engels to Marx, 7.1.58, MEW, Band 29, p. 252; Marx to Engels, 11.1.58, MEW, Band 29, p. 256.
18. Clausewitz, III, 9, 268-69.
19. III, 9, 269-70.
20. III, 9, 270.
21. I, 1, 109.
22. ibid., II, 2, 184.
23. ibid., II, 2, 185.
24. ibid., III, 1, 243; II, 3, 252.
25. ibid., I, 1, 109; II, 2, 189.
26. ibid., I, 1, 119; I, 2, 125.
27. ibid., II, 3, 202.
28. ibid., II, 3, 251.
29. ibid., II, 1, 179.
30. ibid., II, 2, 180-85

31. Clausewitz, II, 2, 181.
32. ibid., II, 2, 180; IV, 10, 341.
33. ibid., Theory only becomes real in war when it is united with its object. V, 2, pp. 366-67.
34. ibid., II, 1, 173-75.
35. ibid., III, 9, 269-70.
36. ibid., II, 3, 202.
37. ibid., III, 12, 279-80; II, 1, 173-78.
38. Zur Kritik, p. 8.
39. ibid., p. 8-9.
40. Althusser, opcit.,
41. Kautsky, Grundsätze, pp. 24-28.
42. Grundrisse, p. 638-40.
43. Zur Kritik, p. 9; Engels repeats the same argument, Karl Marx, 'Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie', 1859, MEW, Band 13, pp. 468-77.
44. Einleitung (Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie), MEW, Band 13, p. 640; this text is the first chapter of the Grundrisse, we will henceforth cite it as such.
45. ibid., p. 641.
46. ibid., p. 641.
47. ibid., p. 641.
48. Kapital, MEW, Band 23, pp. 38-39, 78; MEW, Band 25, pp. 132, 146.
49. Engels to Marx, 7.1.58, MEW, Band 29, p. 252.
50. Marx to Engels, 31.7.65, MEW, Band 31, p. 132. and in Zur Kritik, p. 15.
51. ibid., pp. 15, 22.
52. ibid., p. 22.
53. Engels to Kautsky, 20.9.84, MEW, Band 36, pp. 209-11.
54. Engels, Grundsätze des Kommunismus, (1847), MEW, Band 4, pp. 361-2, and also in Die Kommunisten und Karl Herzen, MEW, Band 4, pp. 321-22.

55. Marx to Engels, 11.1.58, MEW, Band 29, p. 256.
56. Kautsky, Karl Marx' ökonomische Lehren, Stuttgart, 1887.
57. V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution, Moscow, n.d., p. 78
58. Kautsky, opcit., p. 256.
59. ibid., p. 257.
60. Rosa Luxemburg, "Stagnation and the Progress of Marxism", pp. 101-112.
61. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, "Was ist orthodoxer Marxismus?", pp. 1-32.
62. Gramsci, The Modern Prince and Other Writings, London, 1962, pp. 18-25.
63. Erich Matthias, "Idéologie et pratique: le faux débat Bernstein-Kautsky", in Annales, janv.-févr 1964, pp. 19-30.
64. Goldmann, "Pour une approche marxiste des études sur le marxisme", in Marxisme et sciences humaines, Paris, 1970, pp. 220-226.
65. Protokoll, Erfurt, Berlin, 1891, p. 333.
66. Kautsky, Bernstein, und das Sozialdemokratische Programm, Stuttgart, 1899, p. 3; Der Entwurf, p. 782-83.
67. ibid., p. 780; Grundsätze, p. 1-2.
68. The text of the Gotha programme is taken from Fricke, Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 1869-1890, Leipzig, 1964, p. 109-11; the text of the Erfurt programme is taken as it was spelled out section by section in the Grundsätze; Erich Kundel, Marx und Engels im Kampf um die revolutionäre Arbeiter-einheit. Zur Geschichte des Gothaer Vereinigungs Kongresses von 1875, Berlin, 1962, pp. 150-60, 250-66, 308-09.
69. Randglossen zum Programm der deutschen Arbeiterpartei, MEW, Band 19, pp. 18, 30. An important charge because he said the same of Proudhon for the same reasons:- "Il veut planer en homme de science, au-dessous des bourgeois et des prolétaires; il n'est que le petit bourgeois, balloté constamment entre le Capitole et le Travail, entre l'économie politique et le communisme." La misère de la philosophie (1847), Paris, 1964, p. 434.
70. Matthias, opcit., p. 23; Gustav Mayer, Radikalismus, Sozialismus und bürgerliche Demokratie, Frankfurt, 1969 and his J.B. Schweitzer und die Sozialdemokratie, Jena, 1909, Morgan, opcit., passim; Cole, opcit., vol. II, p. 436; Korsch, opcit., pp. 32-33.
71. Die Frau, p. 372; Bebel ingeniously attacks the idea of the state not because it cannot possibly be the essence of a socialist society but only because the state-power is in the wrong hands: Protokoll, Widen, 1880, p. 28; Bebel's problem is recounted by Vernon L. Lidtke, The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878-1890, Princeton, 1966,

72. Protokoll, Halle 1890, Berlin 1890, p. 181.
73. Ernst Engelberg, Revolutionäre Politik und Rote Feldpost 1878-1890, Berlin 1959; Engelberg tries to paint a picture of the party functioning like a hardline partisan organisation. In the light of Lidtke, opcit., it is difficult to accept that the party was anything but an organisation scrupulously observing the law and hoping it would be legalised because it set a good example.
74. Das Erfurter Programm, pp. 46-47.
75. Der Entwurf, pp. 780-81; he expressed his low opinion of the party's theory during the 1880's in Erinnerungen und Erörterungen, Gravenhang, 1960, pp. 436-39.
76. Das Erfurter Programm, pp. 43-44.
77. Taktische Störung, pp. 6-8; Der Entwurf, p. 782.
78. Cole, opcit., p. 425; though how Cole can maintain that the programme expelled Lassallean theory yet maintained the essence of Lassalle's ideas is a bit of a mystery. p. 436; Fricke, Zur Organisation und Tätigkeit der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (1890-1914), Leipzig, 1962, pp. 16-22, C. E. Shorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917, New-York, 1965, p. 6; Morgan, opcit.,
79. Grundsätze, p. 5.
80. Kautsky argues that a crisis is inevitable and each succeeding crisis will be worse, Ibid., pp. 24-28, yet he maintains that it is only a "tendency", Der Entwurf, p. 787. Why this wooliness and backpeddling? Engels had attacked Kautsky's formulation: "In Abdruck Deines Entwurfs in "Vorwärts" finde ich zu meiner grossen Verwunderung plötzlich die "eine reaktionäre Masse" hineingeschneit ... Falsch, denn sie spricht eine an sich richtige geschichtliche Tendenz als vollendete Tatsachen aus." Engels to Kautsky, MEW, Band 38, 14.10.91, p. 179,
81. Karl Marx' ökonomische Lehren, pp. 3-42; By a nominalist argument I mean that value is an inherent property of an object and there is only one evaluation that can be made of the product. Such an argument cannot allow the development of Marx's contradiction between exchange value and use value.
82. Die Entwurf, p. 781; He was not alone in his belief that the programme had to be made more scientific and revolutionary. See Bebel to Engels, 18.4.84, in Briefwechsel, pp. 175-76.
83. Engels, Zur Kritik, (1891), MEW, Band 22, pp. 227-28.
84. Matthias, opcit., p. 23.
85. Cole, opcit., p. 436.
86. ibid., p. 436.
87. Randglossen zum Programm der deutschen Arbeiterpartei, (1875), MEW, Band 19, pp. 21-22.

88. Kautsky, Grundsätze, pp. 56-58.
89. The opening paragraph of the Gotha programme, Fricke, Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung 1869-1890, p. 109.
90. ibid., p. 109-110. The idea was supposed to have been first expressed by Lassalle.
91. ibid., p. 110.
92. ibid., p. 110.
93. I take this expression from Hodgskin, Theorien, MEW, Band 26, 3, p. 265.
94. Der Entwurf, p. 781; Das Erfurter Programm, p. 47.
95. Grundsätze, pp. 16-17; the second paragraph of the Erfurt programme: "Für das Proletariat und die versinkenden Mittelschichten - Kleinbürger, Bauern - bedeutet sie wachsende Zunahme der Unsicherheit ihrer Existenz, des Elends, des Drucks, der Knechtung, der Erniedrigung, der Ausbeutung." ibid., p. 2.
96. Grundsätze, pp. 28-38; first paragraph of the Erfurt programme, ibid., p. 2.
97. ibid., pp. 24-29; paragraph four of the programme, ibid., p. 2.
98. ibid., pp. 18-24.
99. ibid.,
100. paragraph 5 of the programme, ibid., p. 3.
101. ibid., pp. 42-44.
102. ibid., pp. 44-45.
103. ibid., pp. 42-43.
104. final paragraph of the programme, ibid., p. 3.
105. Engels, Zur Kritik, MEW, Band 22, pp. 227-28; the point was made on many occasions previously, Engels, "Ein gerechter Tagelohn für ein gerechtes Tagewerk" (1881), MEW, Band 15, pp. 247-250.
106. Engels to Kautsky, 14.10.91, MEW, Band 38, pp. 179-80.
107. Grundsätze, p. 55.
108. ibid., p. 58.
109. ibid., pp. 55-57.
110. Engels, Einleitung (1891), p. 197.

111. Grundsätze, p. 55.
112. ibid., p. 58.
113. "Ein Sozialdemokratischer Katechismus" in Neue Zeit, 1893, Band II, pp. 361-69, 402-410.
114. Bebel to Engels, 11.2.81, 24.11.84, 23.4.86, in Briefwechsel, respectively pp. 103, 199, 274-75.
115. paragraph two of the programme, ibid., p. 2; Grundsätze, pp. 40-45. The argument also occurred in "Die Akkumulation des Kapitals", N.Z. Jhrg V, Band 1, 1887, pp. 47-48, and "Die Konzentration des Kapitals und die N.Z., Jhrg III, Band 1, 1885, pp. 257-61.
116. Matthias, opcit., p. 23.
117. ibid., p. 23-24. Matthias also saw him as the Janus reflection of the party, ibid., p. 30; Bernstein saw him as an eminently practical man, Bernstein to Adler, 28.3.99, in V. Adler Briefwechsel, p. 302.
118. Unsere Ziele, Stuttgart, 1884 ; Die Frau, 1886.
119. Matthias, opcit., p. 24.
120. Die Frau, pp. 368-413.
121. ibid., pp. 369-70.
122. ibid., pp. 372-73; paralleling the 2nd and 5th paragraphs of the programme, Grundsätze, pp. 2-3.
123. Die Frau, p. 372.
124. Kautsky, Die soziale Revolution, Berlin, 1902, pp. 6-9.
125. We will see this in Chapter IV.
126. Grundsätze, pp. 6-7.
127. Die Frau, pp. 375-413.
128. Marx, Randglossen, p. 21.
129. ibid., p. 375.
130. ibid., "Der Sozialismus stimmt mit der Bibel darin überein, wenn dieses sagt: Wer nicht arbeitet, soll auch nicht essen."
131. ibid., p. 375: "Aber die Arbeit soll auch nützliche, produktive Tätigkeit sein."
132. ibid., p. 379.
133. ibid., p. 380.
134. ibid., p. 381.

135. Marx, Randglossen, pp. 380-81, 386, and section called "Das Wachstum der Produktivität der Arbeit", pp. 388-89.
136. ibid., pp. 389-398.
137. ibid., pp. 388-89.
138. "Ein Sozialdemokratischer Katechismus", pp. 407-08; Grundsätze, p. 58; He also suggested the same to Engels. Kautsky to Engels, 3.4.89, in Friedrich Engels Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky, (ed.) B. Kautsky, Wien 1955, p. 238.
139. Grundsätze, p. 8.
140. On these issues Legien, the leader of the trade-union organisation, agreed with Kautsky. Protokoll, Halberstadt, 1894, p. 31; Auer and Adler report on there being no need for such discussion. V. Adler: Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky, 3 Bde, Gesammelt und erläutert von Friedrich Alder, Wien, 1954, p. 447.
141. Protokoll, Mainz, 1900, pp. 16, 136-45, 186.
142. Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, pp. 130-88.
143. The principal battle was between the large federations and the small federations over how many seats each would be given on the federal governing body and how representation to the national congress would be calculated. This cut cleanly across ideological lines. Humanité, 29.3.05, 12.4.05; we will see that this was also the case in the POF, in Chapter VII.
144. It was true of its principal opponent, the Parti socialiste francais, 4e congrès du parti socialiste de France tenu à Tours, 2-4 mars 1902, Paris, 1902, pp. 59-71.
145. G. A. Ritter, Die Arbeiterbewegung in Wilhelminischen Reich, Berlin, 1963, pp. 109-112; Friedrich Ebert, Kämpfe und Ziele, Dresden, n.d., p. 389.
146. Engelberg, pp. 136-45.
147. Protokoll, Halle, 1890, pp. 3-6.
148. Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, pp. 137-38.
149. Protokoll, Mainz, 1900, pp. 6-9.
150. Protokoll, Jena, 1905, pp. 123-32.
151. Shorske, pp. 122-36.
152. Protokoll, Jena, 1905, p. 15; Protokoll, Mannheim, 1906, pp. 23-24; Protokoll, Essen, 1907, pp. 19-20; Fricke, pp.
153. Adler conveys just how loose the organisation was. Protokoll, Halle, 1890, pp. 121-6; Ebert, pp. 348-50.

154. Bebel claimed the Parteitag was the highest authority in the party. Bebel to Engels, 8.12.94, Briefwechsel, p. 786; Auer, ibid., Shorske, pp. 136-7.
155. J. Schmüle, Die sozialdemokratischen Gewerkschaften in Deutschland seit dem Erlasse des Sozialistengesetzes, 1 teil, Jena, 1896, p. 74.
156. Wilhelm Schröder, Geschichte der sozialdemokratischen Parteiorganisation in Deutschland, Heft 4 u. 5 der Abhandlungen u. Vorträge zur sozialistischen Bildung, Dresden, 1912, pp. 41-43.
157. Ebert, pp. 123-28.
158. Engelberg, pp. 128-32.
159. Shorske, pp. 136-41.
160. ibid., pp. 141-45.
161. Ritter, pp. 52-58.
162. Shorske, pp. 129-31.
163. ibid., pp. 130-31.
164. Protokoll, Bremen, 1904, pp. 127, 134; R. Michels, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, Band XXIII, 1906, pp. 541-56.
165. Ebert, pp. 340-45.
166. Shorske, pp. 88-90.
167. ibid., p. 133.
168. Wilhelm Keil, Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten, Stuttgart, 1947, pp. 147-8.
169. Shorske, pp. 42-49; Max Koch, Die Bergarbeiterbewegung in Ruhrgebiet zu Zeit Wilhelm II, Düsseldorf, 1954, pp. 137-58.
170. Leipziger Volkszeitung, 17-20.12.05. Vorwärts 5, 7, and 19.12.05.
171. Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstags, Berlin, 7.12.05, p. 162.
172. Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, (1859), MEW, Band 13,
173. ibid., p. 7.
174. Althusser, Pour Marx, Paris, 1965, pp. 233-36; Henri Lefebvre, Le matérialisme dialectique, Paris, 1949, pp. 62-63; Riazanov, Marx et Engels, Paris, 1967, p. 6.
175. Zur Kritik, p. 10.

176. "Wir überliessen das Manuskript der nagenden Kritik der Mäuse um so williger, als wir unsern Hauptzweck erreicht hatten Selbstverständigung". Zur Kritik, p. 10.
177. Introduction, Capital, tome i, Paris, 1968, p. 27.
178. In essence this is the position developed by those close to the Frankfurt school or those whose encounter with Marxism came after a Weberian apprenticeship. R. Rosdolsky, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Marx'chen "Kapital", B. i, Frankfurt/Main, 1968, p. 10; Lukacs, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Neuwied, 1963, p. 166.
179. Althusser and Cornu insist that Marx destroyed rather than sublimated the Hegelian dialectic. Althusser, p. 27; Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, B. ii, Berlin, 1962, p. 204; the opposite position is developed by writers strongly influenced by phenomenology, J. Zeleny, Die Wissenschaftslogik in "Das Kapital", Frankfurt/Main, 1968, pp. 100, 324-25; Jean Hyppolite, Etudes sur Marx et Hegel, Paris, 1955, p. 172.
180. Marx to Engels, 14.1.58, MEW, Band 29, p. 260.
181. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, 2 teil, p. 121; Phänomenologie des Geistes, pp. 5-6. The notions of "practical-critical activity" ("praktisch-kritischen Tätigkeit") and "Sinnliche menschliche Tätigkeit" are developed in the first and second theses of Feuerbach, MEW, Band 3, pp. 5-6. "Das Zusammenfallen menschlichen Tätigkeit oder Selbstveränderung kann nur als revolutionäre Praxis gefasst und rationell verstanden." III, Thesen über Feuerbach, MEW, Band 3, pp. 5-6.
182. "Wir haben gesehen, dass das ganze Problem, vom Denken zur Wirklichkeit und daher von der Sprache zum Leben zu können, nur in der philosophischen Illusion existiert, d.h. nur berechtigt ist für das philosophische Bewusstsein, das über die Beschaffenheit und der Ursprung seiner scheinbaren Trennung vom Leben unmöglich klar sie kann." Die deutsche Ideologie, MEW, Band 3, p. 435.
183. Marx praised Feuerbach for his notions of the social and "practical" aspects of thought though attacking him for his idealistic version of materialism. Thesen über Feuerbach I, IV, V, VII, MEW, Band 3, pp. 5-7; letter in Bibliothek, Universität München, 4^o, Cod. ms. 935b
50,2
184. ibid., Thesis III.
185. This is repeated in the Manifest especially the sections attacking Moses Hess; Lukacs, "Moses Hess und die Probleme der idealistischen Dialektik" in Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, 12, 1926.
186. Thesen über Feuerbach, VIII, IX, XI; H. Marcuse, "Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des historischen Materialismus. Interpretation der neuöfflichen Manuskripte von Marx" in Die Gesellschaft. Internationale Revue für Soziologie und Politik, 9 Jg. 1932.

187. Marx never abandoned the view that the crux of his theory was the contradiction between exchange value and use value. "Das Beste an meinem Buch ... (darauf beruht alles Verständnis der facts) der gleich im Ersten Kapital hervorgehobne Doppelcharakter der Arbeit, je nachdem sie sich Gebrauchtwert oder Tauschwert ausdrückt." The book Marx was referring to was Kapital; Marx to Engels, 24.8.67, MEW, Band 31, p. 326.
188. He praised it in an obituary of Proudhon in 1865. MEW, Band 16, p. 27; Engels republished it with an introduction in 1884.
189. Marx maintained in a letter to the Labour parliament that the aim was the "absolute emancipation of labour" and that "The labour classes have conquered nature; they have now to conquer man." MEW, Band 10, p. 116.
190. The argument was even made in the 1844 manuscripts.
191. Marx to Weydemeyer, 5.3.52, MEW, Band 27, p. 287.
192. "Wo dieses ein Lösung gesehn hatten, sah er nur ein Problem." MEW, Band 24, pp. 15-16; Zur Kritik, pp. 10-11.
193. Die Klassenkämpfen in Frankreich (1851), MEW, Band Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte (1952), MEW, Band Die Reichverfassungskampagne (1852), MEW, Band I will discuss this text in some detail when I discuss Engels' concept of warfare.
194. Die Bauernfrage in Frankreich und Deutschland, (1894), MEW, Band 22, pp. 488, 499, 503, 504; Marx to Engels, 16.4.56, Band 29, p. 47.
195. According to Engels it was probably both. ibid., pp. 488-490, 504-05.
196. Marx to Kugelmann, 12.4.71 and 17.4.71, in MEW, Band 33, respectively, pp. 205-6, 209. I will discuss both these letters in more detail in the section on Marx's analysis of the Commune of 1871.
197. Marx to Weydemeyer, 5.3.52, MEW, Band 27, p. 287 ; Weltgesellschaft der revolutionären Kommunisten, MEW, Band 7, p. 553.
198. Ansprachen des Zentralkomitees an den Bund, MEW, Band 7, p. 254.
199. Rosdolsky, pp. 29, 37.
200. The first plan occurs in the Einleitung to Zur Kritik, Einleitung (Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie), MEW, Band 13, pp. 639-42; Marx wrote to Engels that he would first write a critique of bourgeois economics. This would be followed by a critique of the mechanisms for the distribution of bourgeois values (commodities of bourgeois law and morals). Marx to Engels, 13.2.55, MEW, Band 28, pp. 434-35; He gradually pruned the project back as he became convinced that he would never accomplish the tasks. It was reduced to a projected four volume critique of political economy. MEW, Band 30, p. 703, and MEW, Band 23, p. 844; Rosdolsky maintains that despite the changed plans Marx never abandoned the idea of writing the total social critique, Rosdolsky, pp. 17-18; this seems to be confirmed by his letter to Lassalle where

he pointed out that Kapital was not intended to be anything more than the "presentation of a system and through its elaboration its critique". Marx to Lassalle, 2.2.58, MEW, Band 29, pp. 549-52; there is also a plan in the Grundrisse, p. 175.

201. Kautsky, , Karl Marx, pp. 14-15.
Lafargue, Le matérialisme économique de Karl Marx, Paris, 1883, pp. 12-13.
Althusser, Pour Marx, pp. 19-20, Lire le Capital, pp. 87-94.
202. Althusser, ibid., pp. 24-28.
203. Marx to Kugelmann, 28.12.62, MEW, Band 28 , pp. 121-22; Marx to Lassalle, 12.11.58, MEW, Band 28 , pp. 89-90 ; Einleitung, MEW, Band 24, pp. 21-23.
204. This is Zelený's interpretation: "Die theoretische Kritik, die die über historische, über der Praxis stehende Vernunft zur Voraussetzung hat, kann kein realisierbares Programm der Veränderung der bürgerlichen Welt geben." Zeleny, p. 324.
205. MEW, Band 13, pp. 616; La misère, p. 419.
206. La misère, p. 414: "Les catégories économiques ne sont que les expressions théoriques, les abstractions des rapports sociaux de la production."
" ... bei welcher Gelegenheit dann ganz unter der Hand bürgerliche Verhältnisse als unumstößliche Naturgesetze der Gesellschaft in abstracto untergeschoben werden." Einleitung, p. 618, the same theme is also taken up on p. 618; Rosdolsky, p. 18.
207. "Produktion, Distribution, Austausch, Konsumtion bilden so einer regelrechten Schluss;" Einleitung, p. 621.
208. ibid., p. 615; "Die flach auf der Hand liegende Vorstellung: In der Produktion eignen (bringen hervor, gestalten) die Gesellschaftsglieder die Naturprodukte menschlichen Bedürfnissen an; die Distribution bestimmt das Verhältnis, worin der einzelne teilnimmt an diesen Produkten; der Austausch führt ihm die besondern Produkte zu, in die er das ihm durch die Distribution zugefallene Quotum umsetzen will; endlich in der Konsumtion werden die Produkte Gegenstände des Genusses, der individuellen Aneignung." ibid., p. 630; and in the Grundrisse, p. 82.
209. ibid., p. 615-16.
210. Marx discussed the contradiction between quantity and quality in La misère, pp. 343-44. The theme is also developed most clearly in later texts. Particularly, in the Gotha critique and in specific relation to the political economists in Marx's critical notes on Adolph Wagners' interpretation of Kapital, Randglossen zu Adolph Wagners "Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie" MEW, Band 19, pp. 363-65. Also in his critique of Ricardo in the Theorien, MEW, Band 26, 2, pp. 170-86.
211. Einleitung, p. 618; La misère, p. 434.

213. La misère, pp. 431-32, 490-91.
214. Kautsky, opcit.
215. In Kapital, MEW, Band 25, pp. 826-27.
216. Marx to Kugelmann, 12.4.71; in MEW, Band 33, pp. 205-06; Die Klassenkämpfe, pp. 18-20; Der 18. Brumaire, MEW, Band 8, pp. 117-18; Die Reichsverfassungskampagne, p. 72. ; MEW, Band 11, p. 269.
217. Collins/Abramsky, pp. 59-78.
218. MEW, Band 12, p. 3.
219. Marx to Engels, 5.3.56, MEW, Band 29, p. 29; Morgan, pp. 6, Riazanov, pp. 123-4.
220. Marx even insisting that they were laying the foundations for international cooperation. Marx to Engels, 1.3.69, MEW, Band 32, p. 264.
221. Concerning Germany, Marx to Engels, 20.7.70, MEW, Band 33, p. 5; concerning France, Marx to Engels, 19.6.61, MEW, Band 30, p. 176.
222. Marx to Kugelmann, 9.10.66, MEW, Band 31, p. 529; Marx to Büchner, 1.5.67, MEW, Band 31, p. 544.
223. Marx criticised Lassalle, Marx to Engels, 28.1.63, MEW, Band 30, pp. 322-23; Marx to Engels, 3.6.64, MEW, Band 30, p. 403; Marx to Engels, 23.2.65, MEW, Band 31, p. 451; that the errors committed by Proudhon and Lassalle were one and the same, Marx to Engels, 25.1.65, MEW, Band 31, p. 43; Marx to von Schweitzer, 13.10.68, MEW, Band 32, p. 569;
224. "Sie wollen dem bestehenden Verhältnis Rechnung tragen ... " Marx to Kugelmann, 23.2.65, MEW, Band 31, p. 454; Lukács comments on this in his review of Mayer's collection: "Die neue Ausgabe von Lassalles Briefen, (Rezension) in G. Lukács Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik, Neuwied, 1967, p. 231.
225. Marx to Engels, 1.2.58, MEW, Band 29, p. 275; Marx to Engels, 25.2.59, MEW, Band 29, p. 404; Marx to Engels, 9.12.61, MEW, Band 30, p. 207.
226. La misère, pp. 413.
227. ibid., pp. 420, 409, 44; in later works he called the metaphysic a fantasy, Einleitung, MEW, Band 13, p. 616.
228. La misère, pp. 331, 401, 439-41.
229. "Mais du moment qu'on ne poursuit pas le mouvement historique des rapports de la production, dont les catégories ne sont que l'expression théorique, du moment que l'on ne veut plus voir dans ces catégories que des idées, des pensées spontanées, indépendantes, des rapports réels, on est bien forcé d'assigner comme origine à ces pensées le mouvement de la raison pure. Comment la raison pure, éternelle, impersonnelle fait-elle naître ces pensées? Comment procède-t-elle pour les produire?" ibid., pp. 409-10, 416.

228. ibid., p. 490.
230. ibid., p. 332.
231. ibid., pp. 419-20; but as Engels argues a still hazy concept of labour: Vorwort zu Karl Marx' Das Elend der Philosophie, (1884), MEW, Band 4, p. 569.
232. ibid., p. 432.
233. ibid., p. 491.
234. "Une classe opprimée est la condition vitale de toute société fondée sur l'antagonisme des classes. L'affranchissement de la classe opprimée implique donc nécessairement la création d'une société nouvelle." ibid., p. 491.
235. "La condition d'affranchissement de la classe laborieuse c'est l'abolition de toute classe ... et il n'y aura plus de pouvoir politique proprement dit, puisque le pouvoir politique est précisément le résumé officiel de l'antagonisme dans la société civile." ibid., p. 491.
236. "Jusque-là, à la veille de chaque remaniement général de la société, le dernier mot de la science sociale sera toujours: Le combat ou la mort; la lutte sanguinaire ou le néant. C'est ainsi que la question est invinciblement posée." ibid., p. 420.
237. Kapital, MEW, Band 25, pp. 826-28.
238. ibid., pp. 830-31.
239. Engels to Marx, 7.3.56, MEW, Band 29, p. 31; foreword to Letter to Kugelmann by Karl Marx, London, 1934, p. 10.
240. This is the essence of the longer of the two letters Kautsky omitted from his collection of the Marx-Kugelmann correspondence. Marx to Kugelmann, 23.2.65, MEW, Band 31, pp. 452-53.
241. Über Misere, MEW, Band 19, p. 229.
242. Marx to Kugelmann, 29.11.64, MEW, Band 31, p. 430; Marx to Engels, 7.9.64, MEW, Band 30, p. 432; Marx to Engels, 25.11.64, MEW, Band 31, pp. 31-32; Marx told von Schweitzer who took over the presidency of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV) upon the death of Lassalle that he rendered a great service to the development of the working-class movement in Germany, MEW, Band 32, pp. 568-69.
243. Zur Kritik, pp. 12-18.
244. Marx to Engels, 31.7.65, MEW, Band 31, p. 132.
245. "In Gesellschaft produzierte Individuen - daher gesellschaftlich bestimmte Produktion der Individuen ist natürlich der Ausgangspunkt." Einleitung, p. 615.
246. ibid., p. 631; the theme is developed in an essay by Karel Kosik, "Gesellschaftliches Sein und ökonomische Kategorien" in Folgen einer Theorie. Essays über "Das Kapital" von Karl Marx, Frankfurt/Main, 1967, pp. 94-102.

247. Folgen einer Theorie, pp. 634-36; the role of commodities and what one might call the "commoditisation" of social relationships is almost absent from the Einleitung. This argument is found in Marx's Randglossen zu Adolph Wagners "Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie", MEW, Band 19, p. 355.
248. Einleitung, p. 616.
249. ibid., p. 622.
250. ibid., p. 623.
251. "Ebenso produziert die Konsumtion die Anlage des Produzenten ... " ibid., pp. 624, 625.
252. Kapital, MEW, Band 23, pp. 75-76, 85.
253. Einleitung, p. 622.
254. The theme is already found in La misère, where it is developed with its object more clearly in mind: "Le consommateur n'est pas plus libre que le producteur." La misère, p. 329; The Einleitung presents a more abstract version of the argument. "Die Produktion ... indem sie die erst von ihr also Gegenstand gesetzten Produkte als Bedürfnis im Konsumenten erzeugt.", Einleitung, p. 624.
255. ibid., pp. 624-25; La misère, pp. 329-30.
256. Einleitung, p. 628.
257. "durch gesellschaftliche Gesetze", ibid., pp. 626, 630.
258. ibid., p. 630, but not one of equivalence, an interacting totality, ibid., p. 625.
259. ibid., p. 625.
260. ibid., pp. 625-26.
261. "Die Produktion ... liefert dem Material auch ein Bedürfnis ... Das Bedürfnis, das sie nach ihm fühlt, ist durch die Wahrnehmung desselben geschaffen." ibid., p. 624; La misère, p. 329.
262. "Einmal ist der Gegenstand kein Gegenstand überhaupt, sondern ein bestimmter Gegenstand, der in einer bestimmten ... konsumiert werden muss." Einleitung, p. 624.
263. The argument is found in Zur Kritik where Marx distinguishes between "menschlicher Lebenskraft, vergegenständlichte Arbeit" and "abstrakt allgemeine Arbeit", Zur Kritik, pp. 16-17; in Kapital Marx insists that this was his most original contribution, Kapital, Band 23, p. 48; Kapital, Band 25, p. 823; the argument in the Einleitung is still abstract, Einleitung, p. 634; already in Grundrisse, p. 143.
264. He describes this as a state of society in which the process of production has mastery over man instead of being controlled by him. Kapital, MEW, Band 23, pp. 94-96.

265. Marx told Lassalle that these two terms were interchangeable. Marx to Lassalle, 2.2.58, MEW, Band 28, pp. 232+3.
266. Grundrisse, pp. 136-62.
267. ibid.
268. Randglossen zu Adolph Wagner "Lehrbuch", MEW, Band 19, pp. 375-76.
269. Zur Kritik, pp. 10-11.
270. Kapital, MEW, Band 25, pp. 835-36.
271. Einleitung, pp. 617, 631: Hobsbawm, passim.
" ... die Analyse des Kapitals in seiner Kernstruktur ... die innere Organisation der kapitalischen Produktionsweise, sozusagen in ihrem idealen Durchschnitt, darzustellen ... ", Kapital, MEW, Band 25, pp. 278, 839.
272. Einleitung, p. 636, Wagner, pp. 380-82.
273. Einleitung, pp. 619-20; " ... die modernen Ökonomen, die die Ewigkeit in Harmonie der bestehenden sozialen Verhältnisse bewisen.", ibid., p. 617.
274. ibid., pp. 627, 632-33 where Marx discusses the relationship between perception, desire and appropriation, Kapital, MEW, Band 23, p. 62.
275. ibid., p. 442;
276. ibid., p. 441.
277. ibid., p. 425.
278. He contrasts dead capital to "lebendige Arbeitskraft". We will return to this theme in his first draft of his analysis of the Commune of 1871. ibid., p. 446.
279. ibid., pp. 86, 441.
280. ibid., p. 441.
281. Man is reduced to a robot, he argues. Every atom of freedom is confiscated, ibid., p. 446.
282. Vorwort, Kapital, Band 25, pp. 14-15.
283. Already in the Einleitung, p. 636.
284. ibid., p. 636; La misère, pp. 432-33.
285. Kapital, Band 25, pp. 826-27.
286. " ... während die Methode, vom Abstrakten zum Konkreten aufzusteigen, nur die Art für das Denken ist, sich das Konkrete anzueignen, es als ein geistig Konkretes zu reproduzieren." Einleitung, p. 632.

287. "Mais à mesure que l'histoire marche et qu'avec elle la lutte du proletariat, se dessine plus nettement, ils n'ont plus besoin de chercher la science dans leur esprit, ils n'ont qu'à se rendre compte de ce qui se passe devant leurs yeux ... Tant qu'ils cherchent la science et ne font que des systèmes, tant qu'ils sont aux débuts de la lutte, ils ne voient dans la misère que la misère sans y voir le côté révolutionnaire, subversif, qui renversera la société ancienne," La misère, p. 433.
288. Einleitung, p. 621; again the "sozialistischen Belletristen", p. 625; the attack is taken up in the Theorien, MEW, Band 26, 3, pp. 234-319.
289. "Bei der Distribution dagegen sollen die Menschen in der Tat allerlei Willkür sich erlaubt haben," Einleitung, p. 619; the same theme occurs in Kapital, Band 25, p. 835.
290. This is the point of Engels' reminder in Kapital, MEW, Band 24, p. 13. "Die einer - die klassischen bürgerlichen Ökonomen - untersuchten höchstens das Grössverhältnis, worin das Arbeitsprodukt verteilt wird zwischen dem Arbeiter und dem Besitzer der Produktionsmittel. Die andren - die Sozialisten - fanden diesen Verteilung ungerecht und suchten nach utopistischen Mitteln, die Ungerechtigkeit zu beseitigen. Beide blieben befangen in den ökonomischen Kategorien, wie sie sie vorgefunden hatten."
291. This is also Grossman's argument, Grossman, p. 73.
292. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 13.9.86, Correspondance, t. i, p. 378; Engels to Kautsky, 26.6.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 163.
293. Kautsky, Entwurf, opcit.
294. Kautsky, Einleitung, Theorien über den Mehrwert, Stuttgart, 1905-1910, pp. vii-xiii; Rosdolsky, pp. 11-18.
295. Kautsky, Karl Marx, p. 9.
296. MEW, Band 25, pp. 8-11.
297. Einleitung, p. 621.
298. ibid., p. 621.
299. Kautsky, Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm. Eine Antikritik, Stuttgart, 1899, p. 32.
300. Marx to Engels, 24.8.67, MEW, Band 31, p. 326.
301. Einleitung, p. 616.
302. ibid., p. 616.
303. Zur Kritik, pp. 9-10.
304. Grossmann, p. 16.
305. Kapital, MEW, Band 24, p. 377.
306. Theorien, 26, 3, pp. 136, 263.

307. The theme is developed in La misère, pp. 348-49; Herbert Marcuse "Über die philosophischen Grundlagen des wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Arbeitsbegriff," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, 68 Bd, 1933.
308. Zeleny, p. 324.
309. Grossmann, pp. 20-26; we find a primitive form of it in the Grundrisse, p. 75.
310. Kapital, MEW, Band 23, pp. 43-44.
311. "Wir haben bereits bei den einfachsten Kategorien der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise, und selbst der Warenprodukt, beim der Ware und dem Geld den mystifizierenden Charakter nachgewiesen, der die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, denen die stofflichen Elemente des Reichtums bei der Produkt als Träger dienen, in Eigenschaften dieser Dinge selbst verwandelt (Ware) und noch ausgesprochener der Produktionsverhältnis selbst in ein Ding (Geld) ... Alle Gesellschaftsformen ... nehmen an dieser Verkehrung teil." Kapital, MEW, Band 25, p. 835.
312. ibid., p. 838.
313. La misère, p. 432.
314. Einleitung, pp. 640-42.
315. ibid., p. 641; Bloch develops this theme in "Methode" und "System" bei Hegel, Frankfurt/Main, 1970, pp. 67-68.
316. ibid., p. 615.
317. ibid., p. 616.
318. ibid., p. 616.
319. Kapital, MEW, Band 25, pp. 826-27.
320. Marx makes the distinction in Kapital, MEW, Band 25, p. 827.
321. Kapital, MEW, Band 25, pp. 826-27.
322. Kapital, MEW, Band 23, p. 62.
323. La misère, p. 344.
324. The distinction is taken from Chombart du Lauwe in Sociologie des aspirations, Paris, 1970, pp. 69-70.
325. " ... weil die Zeiten verändert sind und ich es jetzt für wesentlich halte, dass unsere Partei, wo sie kann, Position nimmt, sollte es auch einstweilen nur sein, damit nicht andere sich des Terrains bemächtigen." Marx to Lassalle, 28.3.59, MEW, Band 29, p. 587.
326. Marx to Lassalle, 2.2.58, MEW, Band 29, pp. 549-52; Marx to Danielson, MEW, Band 33, p. 271.

CHAPTER II

THE RANDGLOSSEN ZUM PROGRAMM DER DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI

Our examination of the intended Einleitung to Zur Kritik, La misère, Kapital and the Theorien supplemented by Marx and Engels' correspondence seems to indicate that their problematic was how to encourage the proletariat to begin the process of liberation. Our reading of those texts also indicates that, in Marx's view, a strategy must be based upon revealing the contradiction between an imposed system of values (the system of exchange value) and the freedom to determine values and aspirations (use value). The elaboration of the strategy entailed a thorough understanding of how the system of exchange value operated in a society, how the proletariat reacted to that system and how it was tied to that system. This Marx called understanding the "terrain".

In 1875 a committee composed of representatives from the ADAV and the Eisenacher party drew up a programme that would serve as the statement of aims for the unified German socialist party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands).¹ Marx's critique of the programme, written in the form of extensive notes, (Randglossen), repeats the arguments about the contradiction between exchange value and use value, demonstrates the consequences of the failure of the social democrats to make such a distinction and then goes on to suggest some essential elements for a revolutionary strategy.² The Randglossen were written for a large audience and in a language considerably less abstract than the language of Kapital.³ For that reason its arguments and conclusions are much clearer.

Before discussing the body of the Randglossen, I will first summarise Marx's argument. The first sections of the text are largely repetitions of the theory of labour Marx developed in Kapital. The programme, in his view, bases its proposals upon the need to reward labour sufficiently. He notes that such a theory of labour is similar to that elaborated by Ricardo and the radical political economists as indeed are the final conclusions and proposals.⁴ The Gotha programme identified work as the creator of all values. This glorification of work, Marx maintained, led to proposing a form of society that was not radically different from a capitalist society (a society based upon commodities and the commodity fetish)⁵ The proposed solution to all human problems, he continued, was the wider distribution of

the existing stock of social values. Marx then argued that the compulsion to work subordinates man to things, producing at the same time confusion in the valuation of things and devaluation of the self. The essence of a socialist strategy is not the wider distribution of the existing stock of social values, he wrote, but the ending of the commodity fetish. In that sense Marx largely repeats his argument made in Kapital itself highlighting the need to attack the system of exchange value. He then went on to argue that the essence of a socialist strategy could be found by looking at the Paris Commune.⁶ It was the dictatorship of the proletariat or what one might call the reverse of the process of reification (thingification) man's "dictatorship" over the formation and generation of social values.⁷

I will stress three points in my presentation. Firstly, I will argue that Marx tried to make the implications of what we might call the "distributive theory" clear to the social democrats. In the unpublished text called the sixth chapter of Kapital, Marx argued that any social order based upon commodities and the distribution of commodities could only be or lead to capitalism.⁸ In the Randglossen, Marx tried to demonstrate this point concretely by showing how the initial theories of the social democrats led to a notion of social organisation based on a concept of the State that was not radically different from that practised by the most advanced democracies of his time. Secondly, I will argue that the Randglossen were intended to redirect the social democrats' attention to the Commune and Marx's text describing the Commune which, as he hinted, seemed to have dangerously anarchistic overtones to many of the German socialists. Thirdly, I will argue that Marx's attack was not only directed against the Lassalleans, who seem to bear the brunt of his ire in the Randglossen, but also against those who considered themselves to be his own ardent followers.

(i) The distributive theory and its consequences: We have already seen Marx's attack on the upholders of the distributive theory that he made in the Einleitung. In the Randglossen, he restates his argument:

"Der Vulgärsozialismus (und von ihm wider, ein Teil der Demokratie) hat es von den bürgerlichen Ökonomen übernommen, die Distribution als von der Produktionsweise unabhängig zu betrachten und zu behandeln, daher den Sozialismus hauptsächlich als um die Distribution sich drehend darzustellen."⁹

In Marx's view the political propositions and solutions proposed in the Gothaerprogramm are outgrowths of the initial definitions of value, wealth and labour made at the beginning of the document.¹⁰ The programme argued, as we have seen, that labour was the source of all wealth. Marx countered that the prevailing social and physical resources that were used were just as much determinants of wealth. Labour was the process of altering these resources.¹¹ But how to alter and how to charge were decisions independent, for the most part, of the native properties of material production. The form and content of labour are socially determined by the norms and rules that govern each individual society.¹²

Marx insisted that if the argument about labour and value were taken to their logical conclusions the following picture would emerge. If labour is regarded as the source of all wealth and hence the measure of value, the essence of the social problem is how to distribute the fruits of accumulated labour.¹³ What criteria can be used under those circumstances to decide how much the worker is to be rewarded for his labour?¹⁴ Because, Marx points out, the programme assumes that satisfaction is gained from the consumption of the existing stock of social values, the dimensions of the problem are reduced to finding a means of ensuring that labour is rewarded justly.¹⁵ Once one arrives at this hazy conclusion, Marx argued, the solutions proposed by Proudhon and Lassalle become compelling. The necessity of a neutral institution capable of dividing up society's stock of values becomes the answer to the problem posed in the initial hypotheses.¹⁶

On the other hand, he argued, if satisfaction is defined as the control over one's rhythm of life ("Jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jeden nach seinen Bedürfnissen."), the problem is not to build a neutral institution but to create a new kind of society.¹⁷

In the following sections of the Randglossen, we find Marx's contention that value cannot be equated to commodities and the production of commodities (Waren) as the programme insists.¹⁸ Marx repeats the essence of his arguments against Proudhon and Lassalle. The programme assumes that the goods produced by society are inherently valuable. The social problem is to increase the availability of these goods. Marx argued, that the problem of value is much more complex than arguing over how much of and how a good should be distributed.¹⁹ The good is desired for specific socially-inculcated reasons. In essence, Marx repeats his discussion about the commodity

fetish that he made in Kapital but with the important addition that, in his view, the distributive argument totally ignores the worker's role in society. It never discusses the roots or potential solution to his powerlessness to decide the pace, form and rhythm of his daily life.²⁰ Marx argues that there is no possible common ground between the kinds of evaluation made by the worker of himself, his labour and his potential and that imposed by a society based upon the commodity fetish. The programme never comes to grips with these problems, Marx wrote, and because it ignored these problems it could not envisage what actions were necessary for the proletariat to secure its emancipation.²¹

In the final sections of the Randglossen, Marx analysed the political proposals made by the drafters of the Gothaerprogramm and the means they suggested to ensure that those proposals would be accepted. Given the narrow terms of reference set out in the initial sections of the programme, he wrote, the idea of the state as a neutral body, immune to contentious class conflict,²² is the only way to meet their demands for the dividing up of the cake. The "free State" (freie Volksstaat), Marx maintained, would not change the essence of the worker's existence. He would still be alienated and no more than a "factor" of the system of production and consumption.²³ The "free State" was no more than a slightly more radical rendition of the theories of distribution suggested by "radical" political economists.²⁴

The programme proposed that the socialist party constituted the means to obtain these ends. But Marx insisted if the problematic is the liberation from existing society, how can the process of liberation be aided by an organisation set up with specific ends that have nothing to do with that problematic? The essence of a socialist strategy, he wrote, is the destruction of an exploitive society.²⁵ For that reason he emphasised the need for a radical break with a society based upon the commoditisation of social processes. He emphasised the need for the "dictatorship of the proletariat".²⁶ The propositions and means proposed by the Gothaerprogramm did not raise those problems. Because they defined the revolutionary alternative as no more than greater distribution they were, in Marx's view, both "obsolete" and "criminal".²⁷

In his comments to Bebel concerning the programme, Engels, too, emphasised the importance of a decisive break with the established system of values as the starting point for producing a socialist strategy. The aim of the socialist movement was a new form of community and a new system of values.²⁸

(ii) Practical-critical activity: From his reading of the programme, Marx concluded that the German social democrats never quite grasped the essence of working-class oppression. Because their initial theory and appraisal was mistaken, it followed that the political strategy they recommended was also mistaken. The long list of practical proposals found at the end of the programme, in Marx's view, would contribute little towards encouraging the working class to begin to examine its problems in depth.²⁹ It could hardly lead to the increase in working-class consciousness necessary to the building of a revolutionary movement. Hence, in Marx's view, the practical proposals and the means to achieve those ends were of little strategic value.³⁰

In his letter to Bebel, Engels spelled out Marx's contention in more detail.³¹ A proposition for a particular reform within bourgeois society, he wrote, derives its value and cogency not from the content of the reform itself, but from the experience gained by the working class in fighting for that reform. A strategically-chosen reform would open the possibility of the working class becoming conscious of the nature of its oppression. It could allow the working class to see the fundamental contradictions of bourgeois society. Finally, the battle for the reform could potentially lead to a revolutionary situation.³² But if the reform was regarded as no more than an end in itself and no effort was made to reveal the oppressive nature of bourgeois institutions, then the mystique of continuity that bolstered bourgeois society would never be revealed. Proposing a reform without taking into account its strategic potential, Engels concluded, diverted the working class from the reality of its condition. It hampered revolutionary action because the working class would not be able to see the relationship between its own oppression and how society operated.³³

What should a programme be and how should it be used in the estimation of Marx and Engels? Fricke's view that the Forderungen der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland is an example of what a Marxist programme should be was also shared by Engels himself.³⁴

If we look at the Forderungen we find that it was a short, concise list of very precise political demands.³⁵ It was composed in 1848 by Marx and Engels for the Bund der Kommunisten. The demands themselves were far from socialistic. They called for the extension of bourgeois liberty to all classes and for a certain amount of state intervention in the economy.

According to Engels appearances were deceptive, because the demands satisfied several important criteria. Firstly, they made the kinds of demands and spoke the kind of language that the intended audience, artisans, skilled craftsmen like printers and tailors and journeymen could both understand and wanted to hear.³⁶ Secondly, behind the list was an appraisal of the present state of German society. Engels calculated that these demands would be fought for by the artisan workers and sufficiently large sectors of the bourgeois would support them to cause the creation of a potentially explosive situation. Behind the list of demands was a calculation that fighting for their demands, being forced to create institutions to maintain the struggle and forward their demands would start a process whereby the artisans would become increasingly aware of their oppression and take steps to end it.³⁷

About ten years later in the heat of his campaign to encourage the SPD to wage a similar kind of campaign amongst the peasantry and army, Engels wrote that the demands in themselves are not as important as the context in which they are made and the political repercussions arising from them.³⁸ Make a demand, he encouraged Bebel, that both makes sense to the potentially revolutionary class, and cannot be agreed to by capitalist society. Play upon the contradiction between the ideology of that society and its reality. Such action could activate the inherent and latent opposition of the proletariat and lead to the initiation of the process of liberation.³⁹

A notion of strategy emphasising developing the contradictions of a specific and concrete situation is found elsewhere in the writings of Marx and Engels. To cite another contemporary example, Marx and Engels were charged with the preparation of a circular for the International dealing with the problem of the introduction of new machinery into the workshop. We find that the English version is remarkably different in its emphasis of the problems involved from the French version.⁴⁰

The English version emphasises the potential loss of employment arising from mechanisation. The French version emphasises how the machine depersonalises the worker.⁴¹ According to Marx, in England there was neither a working-class political movement as such nor even a revolutionary political theory. There was a strong trade union movement but one that refused to admit the workers most likely to be displaced by machines. A fight against mechanisation could

be a useful starting point in the formation of a political movement under those circumstances. In the case of France, many workers, Marx wrote, were already convinced that the struggle was essentially a political struggle. But they were imbued with the anti-political doctrines of proudhonisme. Here the problem was to emphasise how progress and the economic system did not go hand in hand and how the economic system had to be changed radically.

Finally there is evidence that Marx and Engels envisaged a programme as a prod or catalyst. Marx stated his preference for what he called an action programme and Engels told Bebel that the programme must serve as a basis for action.⁴² The Gothaerprogramm did not correspond to either of these formulations. Hence within the Randglossen Marx stressed how the programme did not take account of the general condition of the German working class during the 1870's nor of the contemporary political situation in Germany.⁴³ The proletariat, he wrote, was no longer quite an artisanal proletariat and not yet quite a proletariat composed in its majority of unskilled workers. The proletariat was still relatively small and any strategy of revolution must make an appeal to other groups such as the peasantry.⁴⁴ But the programme signally failed to have anything to say that could interest the peasantry. The Commune, with its dictatorship of the proletariat, demonstrated how it was possible to circumvent the problem of a bourgeois revolution as a necessary preface to a proletarian revolution. The example must be adapted to the German situation. Hence a programme should be in essence a call to action rather than a litany preaching better distribution of the very values that oppressed the working class.⁴⁵ Here, Marx concluded, is the starting point.

(iii) The dangers of the theory behind the Gotha programme: Having looked at Marx and Engels' criticism of the underlying assumptions of the Gotha programme, we can now go on to discuss in more detail the political and strategic ramifications of those assumptions.

According to Marx, the principle danger of the Gotha programme was that its arguments never led to a revolutionary appraisal of existing society and its mechanisms of oppression and social adjustment. On the contrary, they led to a view of society, already found in the writings of the progressive critics of political economy, that never challenged the norms or rules of capitalist society.⁴⁶

Marx's principal point of attack was against the immediate ramifications of the theory of exploitation and value developed in the programme. These were

the notions of the iron-law of wages ("eherne ökonomische Gesetz") popularised by Lassalle,⁴⁷ and the idea that the worker was denied the material fruits of his labour. From these ideas, the drafters of the programme, Marx maintained, deduced a solution. The essence of the solution was the freie Volksstaat as the means to secure those reforms necessary to increase working-class consumption.⁴⁸ Marx directed his second attack against this idea of social regulation. In his letter to Bebel, Engels amplified Marx's argument by spelling out clearly the vital difference between the concept of the State as a distributor of the existing stock of social values and the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the means of liberation from the shackles of the existing system of values. He redirected Bebel's attention to the Paris Commune as an example of that process of liberation.⁴⁹

Towards the beginning of his critique, Marx repeated his argument that the socialists persisted in conceptualising production as nothing more than the production of goods, or, as he maintained in the intended Einleitung to Zur Kritik and Kapital, as the production of commodities. In their view, he argued, the means of production are no more than the factories churning out commodities. These, according to the programme, are the producers of value.⁵⁰ It follows that when the socialists talk about the revolutionary seizure of the means of production they meant no more than seizing those factories. In that way they would achieve their aim of securing for the worker his means of work (Arbeitsmittel) so that he could enjoy the integral portion of his labour (unverkürzten Arbeitsertrag).⁵¹ Marx wrote that the sections of the programme calling for the seizure of the means of production were lifted bodily from the Statutes of the International, as indeed was the section dealing with the "Befreiung der Arbeit".⁵² In both cases, as Marx put it, the drafters decided to improve (verbessert) the Statutes.⁵³ Whereas in the Statutes a socialist strategy depended upon seizing the "means of life" (Lebensquellen), that is the mechanism by which all social rules and norms and activities are decided, the socialists, in whose view Lebensquellen and Arbeitsmitteln were synonymous, dropped the notion of Lebensquellen from their rendition of the aims of the socialist movement.⁵⁴

Marx's explanation of the "improvement" of the Statutes was that because the initial theory of the drafters of the programme made it impossible for them to understand the double meaning of value, it restricted their aims to seizing the existing means of production to no other purpose than increasing consumption. The problem of control over the rhythms of life, which, as we

have seen, played a major role in Marx's thinking, was shoved to one side. The result of this action was that once having deradicalised the social problematic the socialists necessarily deradicalised the solution to social problems. Their major concern, Marx argued, was to find a means of ensuring how to divide up the existing stock of social values fairly, according to the amount of labour exerted in production, and to maintain that distribution.⁵⁵

In Marx's view, the basic and fundamental concepts of the socialists that we have just outlined above culminated in the idea of the so-called neutral or free State (freie Volksstaat). The properties of that State echoed, "der
aller Welt bekannten demokratischen Litanei", all of their initial precepts.⁵⁶

They proposed to provide free and equal education for all, to institute a normal working day (Normalarbeitstag), State inspection of factories, build a popular army, institute universal suffrages and provide an equitable (direct) system of taxation.⁵⁷ In each case, these propositions, Marx wrote in the final sections of his critique, echoed the precepts of existing society and would achieve no more than making the worker a more efficient consumer of its values.⁵⁸ The State would coordinate all of these activities. The State, however, was no more than a reflection of the distribution of power in a society and the guarantor of existing social patterns, he wrote. A radical view of society, he wrote, demands a radical break with social norms and patterns.⁵⁹

Engels, in his letter to Bebel, expanded Marx's theme by pointing out that the programme never once discussed the problem of social liberation. Instead, it did no more than propose how to better the condition of the worker without once proposing how to solve his problems.⁶⁰

Marx terminated his discussion of the ramifications of the theory behind the Gotha programme by pointing out how the socialist view, as developed in the programme, would do no more than develop or improve capitalist society. It never raised the basic strategic problem of how to move from a capitalist society into a communistic society.⁶¹

"Womit wir es hier zu tun haben, ist eine kommunistische Gesellschaft, nicht wie es sich auf ihrer eignen Grundlage entwickelt hat, sondern umgekehrt, wie sie eben aus der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft hervorgeht" ⁶²

The second danger of the programme, Marx and Engels maintained, was that it was self-contradictory and hence confusing. The programmes written by Marx and Engels were short and to the point. We have seen this with the Forderungen and we will also see this was the case with Marx's revision of the introductory sections, Considérants, to the programme of the Parti ouvrier français (POF). In their view, the Gotha programme was particularly confusing because, on one hand, it condemned any alliance with other social groups because they were a reactionary mass (nur eine reaktionäre Masse),⁶³ whilst the reforms it proposed could easily be accepted by many sections of the progressive bourgeoisie.⁶⁴

Proletarian unity is needed, Engels wrote to Bebel, but it cannot be obtained by refusing to understand that such unity could only be built through struggles for very concrete aims and in those struggles working and tactical alliances with other social groups were often required.⁶⁵ Marx pointed out that in many cases the peasantry and even intermediary classes (Mittelständen) were also in opposition to the owners and managers of the means of production. He wrote that the Manifest tried to show how that opposition could be galvanised by the proletariat and through those campaigns proletarian unity could be forged.⁶⁶ Engels wrote to Bebel that, on one hand, the programme presented aims that fell short of the mark and to compensate for that conjured up a mystique of the working class fighting alone and unaided against all other social groups for those limited ends. Far from spelling out the way forward, it only fell between two stools.⁶⁷ Finally, the party worked with the reactionary masses! Lassalle proposed to form an alliance with Bismarck and the Eisenacher party worked with bourgeois liberals.⁶⁸ Because the party failed to understand the nature of working-class oppression, and because it could not devise in full confidence of its theory a strategy to work towards social liberation, it could never develop a consistent statement of aims and policies, he maintained. How could such a programme give confidence to the working class, he inquired of Bebel?⁶⁹

Thirdly, if the process of liberation is a teleological process depending upon the extent to which the objectivised subject emerges as an actor in his own right, the programme allows little scope for the proletariat to become conscious of himself and of his social role and relations. What possibilities, in Marx's view, did the programme develop? First of all, the specific

reforms in the programme were, in his view, not likely to lead to such consciousness. Either they were already enacted in progressive capitalist states like Switzerland and the United States or were reforms that even German capitalism could accept.⁷⁰ Secondly, the programme insisted on seeing its propositions as the solution (Lösung) of the "social question" (soziale Frage). Posing the problem in those terms transformed the problem into one of a very different order from Marx's teleological problem.⁷¹ By substituting fixed ends for the consciousness of oppression that could only emerge from the actor's discovery of his own condition, as Marx emphasised in his study of the Paris Commune, the process of liberation became all but impossible.

Engels advised Bebel that specific claims and demands ought to be formulated in such a way that the ensuing battle for those reforms would awaken the working class to the reality of its own oppression. As a consequence, the working class could assume its true role as the initiator of the social revolution. Engels expressed his astonishment that the Eisenacher group should have fallen prey to such clearly retrograde ideas in the light of their supposedly having absorbed La misère, the Manifest and the experiences of the Commune.⁷² Because the party failed to understand the true nature of oppression, Engels concluded, it proposed a series of reforms that could not only be satisfied by the German empire but failed to provide a stimulus towards working-class unity.⁷³

The fourth danger of the programme had to do with the organisational consequences to be drawn from its underlying principles. Because the party envisaged the enactment of its proposed reforms as the solution to all social problems, any future working-class activity and organisation of activity would have to be conceived in the light of the degree they worked towards those reforms. In the view of Marx and Engels this dangerously restricted the form and content of the struggle. In his short letter to Bracke accompanying his critique of the programme, Marx stated that the broadening of the struggle was the crucial problem of the socialist movement.⁷⁴ How does one broaden the struggle? According to Marx it could only be accomplished through the reality of the day-to-day battles of the proletariat.⁷⁵ For that reason an action programme or a plan of organisation that encouraged independent working-class action was what should have been devised:

"Jeder Schritt wirklichen Bewegung ist wichtiger als ein Dutzend Programme so hätten sie sich mit einem Aktionsprogramm oder Organisationsplan zu gemeinschaftlicher Aktion begnügen müssen." ⁷⁶

Engels re-emphasised the same theme to Bebel. ⁷⁷ An organisation that does not take account of the daily struggles (täglichen Kämpfe) of the proletariat plays a potentially dangerous role. ⁷⁸ Not only would it hinder the working class from becoming aware of itself but as the organisation speaking for the working class battled for its specific ends it would become more and more like the authoritarian ADAV. Is this why Marx, at the beginning of his letter to Bracke, said that after a decent interval he and Engels would disassociate themselves from the new party publically? ⁷⁹ Is that why they withdrew their threat when they saw that the working class nonetheless interpreted the programme as the revolutionary document it never was? ⁸⁰ Is that the reason why Marx never publically attacked the programme telling an English journalist ⁸¹ that it appeared to be faulty but this was only due to a shoddy translation?

On every occasion Marx begins to spell out the elements of a strategy of revolution he refers his readers to his analysis of the Commune. When he discusses the difference between a capitalist and a communist society, he refers to the dictatorship of the proletariat in that work. ⁸² When he states that communism entails the destruction of the State, he speaks of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the communist alternative. ⁸³ Engels speaks of the Commune as the essence and best example yet of socialist strategy. ⁸⁴ Hence to discuss Marx's critique of the Gothaerprogramm before having examined his analysis of the Commune is, in some ways, like listening to Galileo's attack on the upholders of the crystal-sphere theory without more than a slight acquaintance with Galileo's own theory. The reason I have chosen this apparently roundabout approach is that the transition from the critique of socialist ideas to the elaboration of strategy is not as clear in the analysis of the Commune as it is in the Gotha critique. The former text, in Engels' words, represents an example of strategy, the latter text is a transitional text retracing Marx's basic argument about use value and exchange value, his critique of the socialists' concept of oppression found in the Einleitung, ⁸⁵ Kapital and La misère and then turning to the question of strategy as such. Because the Gotha critique makes the teleological strand in Marx's thought more accessible, I have chosen to look at it prior to looking at his analysis of the Commune.

What I propose to do is to examine the elements of a counter-theory that can be deduced from Marx's criticism of the social democrats and then, in the following section, to analyse his work on the Commune.

From the outset, Marx makes it clear that, in his view, any strategy must combine two elements. It must enable the worker to enter the struggle (befähigen) and it must also compel him to enter the struggle (zwingen).

"Es war also, hier bestimmt nachzuweisen, wie in der jetztigen kapitalistischen Gesellschaft endlich die materiellen etc., Bedingungen geschaffen sind, welche die Arbeiter befähigen und zwingen, jenen geschichtlichen Fluch zu brechen."⁸⁶

Marx's argument is developed in the following way.

Firstly, the drafts of the Gotha programme should have dealt with how to make those kinds of demands that would have enabled the proletariat to awaken to the nature of his oppression and to realise its revolutionary potential. This theme is an enduring theme in Marx's writing. When he re-drafted the Considerants for the POF he emphasised the necessity of making the demands accessible to the French working class.⁸⁷ It must express wishes that are their immediate wishes, in a language the working class can immediately understand. To devise such an "action programme" would have been a difficult task. It would have required understanding not only the general nature of working-class oppression, but also the lived and experienced forms of social oppression. For that reason Engels referred his readers to La misère for the general nature of oppression and called upon them to examine the specific trends in the development of capitalism in Germany in detail: the role of the peasantry, the role of the middle classes, and cases where specific sectors of the working class were already ready for far-reaching activity and cases where they were not.⁸⁸

Secondly, we have seen that the idea of compulsion was portrayed in the Gotha critique as the working class coming into contact with the fundamental problems of its existence by having to fight for those rights and aims they immediately set for themselves. These aims are not important for what they are in themselves. They are important because of the fact that they will bring the working class into contact with reality. That reality is the permanent guerre civile,⁸⁹ masked by ideology, that is the basis of capitalist society. One can judge the usefulness of any programme or action, Marx told Bracke, by the extent it made the working class aware of its condition and of the need to change not only its condition but the order of society as well.⁹⁰

The process of enabling and compelling would lead to the working class achieving and exerting power over the means of production. This stage, called by Marx a transitional stage between capitalism and communism (Zwischenstudium) was the dictatorship of proletariat.⁹¹ What were its properties?

In the critique itself Marx wrote little more than that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the process by which the eventual unity of man and nature would be achieved. Its characteristics were that the proletariat had seized the means of life (Lebensquellen), it was no longer imprisoned by ideology and the commodity fetish and had established its hegemony over all other classes and was re-creating society in its image.⁹² What was this idea of hegemony and the re-creation of society in the image of the working class? Unfortunately the theme is not gone into in any detail within the critique. The point of the document was not to present a counter-theory in detail but to introduce a counter-theory that had already been presented elsewhere and apparently had not been understood.

In that sense, one can speak of the critique as a return to the sticky problem of how to conceptualise oppression in order to prepare the reader for the counter-strategy. Marx merely stated that the fundamental problem for the socialist movement was the problem of activation.

Marx had hoped that his critique would be widely diffused and discussed.⁹³ It crystallised the political conclusions of Kapital, updated the arguments of La misère and could serve as an introduction to his analysis of the Commune. But much to his and Engels' chagrin, it was never diffused and apparently never discussed by the three or four people who read it.⁹⁴

Earlier, I said that my point in discussing the Randglossen was to stress three themes. The first two themes, the implications of the distributive theory and Marx and Engels' emphasis of the dictatorship of the proletariat have so far commanded our attention. I will now turn to the third theme, that Marx was not only attacking the Lassalleans but the Eisenachers as well.

Many historians, particularly those keen to preserve Bebel as something like a working-class hero, have argued that the Lassalleans had astutely pulled the wool over the eyes of the Eisenachers.⁹⁵ They take their cue from two sources. Firstly, Engels generously provided the Eisenachers with an escape-hatch when he suggested to Bebel that the Eisenachers had been misled by the

Lassalleans on the drafting committee.⁹⁶ In later years Bebel made use of Engels' way out by claiming that the Eisenachers were not prepared to meet the Lassalleans head on at that time.⁹⁷ Anxious to preserve the authority of the Eisenacher leaders, Bebel went on to insist that the programme drawn up by the Eisenacher party in 1869 was an example of what a programme should be.⁹⁸

Bebel's sleight-of-hand is based upon a slight distortion of what Engels and Marx wrote. Engels did state that the Eisenacher programme had been better than the Gothaer programme, but better does not mean sufficient. Marx did not hesitate to indict the Eisenacher programme but writing of the need "über das Eisenacher Programm hinausgehn".⁹⁹ Engels compared it unfavourably to the Statutes of the International.¹⁰⁰ If we look at the programme, we find the idea of the "popular State" occupying a prominent role alongside the call for a just division of the social product based upon labour-time.¹⁰¹ Perhaps the reason Engels felt the Eisenacherprogramm was somewhat better than the Gothaerprogramm was because the former mentioned the importance of an international working-class movement whereas it was hardly mentioned at all in the latter.¹⁰²

For these reasons a prominent historian like Franz Mehring concluded that Marx's attack could have just as easily been directed against the Eisenachers.¹⁰³ Indeed, Marx told Bracke that even if the overt and specific Lassallean terminology was omitted from the programme it would still be a worthless document.¹⁰⁴

The subsequent history of the Randglossen seems to confirm this view. Marx sent the Randglossen to Bracke requesting that he use the document as he saw fit but implying that he hoped that it would be as widely distributed as possible.¹⁰⁵ Either Bracke never sent the Randglossen to Liebknecht and or Bebel or one or both of the latter two suppressed the document.¹⁰⁶ The truth in the matter will probably never be known. Liebknecht and Bebel tried almost hysterically to stop Kautsky from publishing the document in the Neue Zeit in 1891. The parliamentary delegation of the SPD censured Kautsky. One is entitled to wonder if they either held the original text back because of their personal involvement in its suppression or saw the Randglossen as such a vigorous denunciation of their own brand of socialism that they thought the publication of such a document could easily threaten their efforts to relaunch the SPD as a united party upon the expiration of the Sozialistengesetz.¹⁰⁷

If the socialists were interested in a party based upon Marxist principles, as Bebel and Kautsky maintained, then one would have supposed they would have warmly welcomed Marx's critique as a means to such ends. In his memoirs Kautsky recounts how, in his view, the new generation of German socialists who cut their political teeth under the Sozialistengesetz was sickened by the spectacle of the party's opportunism and flimsy theories. They were keen to turn Marx's ideas into a science on the order of the natural sciences, and then, in the tradition of the good natural scientist, apply their findings to society.¹⁰⁸ They found their views were widely shared in the party. The hierarchy was particularly intent to have a programme suited to the new political era that was opening and one that echoed the findings of science.¹⁰⁹

When the time came to write a new programme, Kautsky corresponded with Engels indicating his wish to correct the errors of the Gothaerprogramm. To bolster his argument, Kautsky published the Randglossen.¹¹⁰ Yet his view of what was wrong with the Gothaerprogramm was hardly that voiced by Marx and Engels.

Kautsky did not challenge the notion of value nor the notion of distribution at the core of the programme. His argument centred on the programme being "imprecise" and unscientific. Imprecision meant that the programme did not spell out the nature of economic exploitation with sufficient clarity and that it presented very little evidence to back up its proposed reforms.¹¹¹

Kautsky concluded that an acceptable programme must contain:

- (i) A preliminary analysis of capitalist society leading up to the presentation of its fundamental law, the emmiseration and proletarianisation of most sectors of society (Verelendsung);
- (ii) A water-tight scientific argument based upon economic determinism;
- (iii) A demonstration of the need for an organisation that would apply the findings of that science.¹¹²

Finally, when Kautsky published the Randglossen, he appended a short introduction that can only be described as a disclaimer. Kautsky argued that many of Marx's criticisms were probably too harsh. Lassalle had made many valuable

contributions and, in his view, the notion of economics as a science and the political party as the guardian and dispenser of that science were important and useful.¹¹³

All of these elements found their way into the draft of the SPD's new programme, published in the name of the Parteiivorstand.¹¹⁴

There are three main strands to Engels' criticism of the draft. The first revolves around its restrictive definitions of production as the production of material goods, oppression as the denial of the right to enjoy those goods and the solution as the seizing of the means of work (Arbeitsmitteln).

Engels stated that the essence of oppression lay far deeper than the denial of a manufactured good. It was the denial of control over one's living rhythms.¹¹⁵ Because of their initial definitions the drafters concentrated on the theme of poverty as the denial of material goods and tried to show how the continued development of the capitalist system would lead to the growth of poverty (Wachstum des Elends).¹¹⁶ In Engels' view the theme should have been the Unsicherheit der Existenz involving looking at social manipulation.¹¹⁷

The implications of Engels' initial arguments are that the social democrats justified the need for revolution by the theory of the emmiseration of the proletariat and the solution as the proper distribution of the goods produced by society. Engels saw the problem as the subjugation of man to processes he could not control and his alienation from his own activities as the justification of and force behind revolution. The solution in his view was, as we have seen before, the seizing of the means of life (Lebensmitteln).¹¹⁸

The second strand of Engels' criticism concerns the social democrats' notion of science. Engels faulted their analysis because it did not include an examination of the changes in the structure of capitalist society. In particular, they only discussed the condition of the working class in abstract.¹¹⁹

Engels was concerned with how the new technology would affect the proletariat. Innovation, he noted, brought changes in the work situation and in the way society was experienced.¹²⁰ A theory based upon the notion Wachstum des Elends is a limiting theory because the poverty that accompanied the first industrial upsurge is qualitatively different from the experiences of the working class during the coal-textile-iron industrial transformation. A theory based upon the alternative formulation, Unsicherheit der Existenz, is not only a more exact description, he noted, but one that clearly allows one to develop a strategy where these exploited discover and define the content of their denial

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and suffering and organise to rectify the situation. Whereas the former notion assumes that the actor will be satisfied by possessing certain concrete objects and being able to engage in certain activities, the latter theory does not predict how he will act because it can envisage no solution to the human problematic that is not based upon the actor defining and solving the problem. The solution cannot be separated from the struggle, Engels concluded, and the relationship between that brand of socialist science and the free development of the movement is extremely close.

"Ihr - die Partei - braucht die sozialistische Wissenschaft und diese kann nicht leben ohne Freiheit der Bewegung."¹²²

Engels' final major criticism of the official draft was that it did not present a comprehensive list of demands that would have aroused the interest of the working class and led to the formation of politically active groups to fight for those ends.¹²³ In the remainder of his critique, he outlined how, in the German context, the demand for a republican form of government would have been such a starting point. It could potentially, he suggested, engage the same process of liberation that hallmarked the Commune.¹²⁴ But the drafters backed away from such a solution by in no way relating their economic analysis and demands to the distribution of power in society or how to devise a strategy to challenge that power at its weakest point.

Responding to Engels' criticisms and his own doubts about the official draft, Kautsky hastened to produce his own version.¹²⁵ In substance, Kautsky's draft was accepted by the party conference at Erfurt in October and has since been known as the Erfurterprogramm.

Kautsky's reworking of the official draft seems to have met with the approval of both the party as a whole and Engels. Engels expressed his satisfaction with the new programme in a letter to Bebel.¹²⁶ All of the old Lassallean terminology has been eliminated, he glowed. To Sorge, he noted that at long last Marxist ideas seemed to have taken root in the SPD and the last vestiges of Lassallean ideas had been eradicated.¹²⁷

But how great was Engels' satisfaction? He cautioned Sorge that his opinion was based on no more than a fleeting first reading.¹²⁸ He complained privately to Kautsky that while Kautsky's draft was an improvement on the official draft, nonetheless the political elements that Engels sought to introduce into the programme were still not there and Kautsky tended to abstraction and utopianism.¹²⁹

What changes did Kautsky make? His major alterations were in the first section of the programme where the economic mechanism of capitalism and capitalist oppression was described. He tended to shorten the descriptive sections, substituting terms from the natural sciences for the less rigorous language of the Partei Vorstand (e.g. Naturnotwendigkeit to give authority to the description of impoverishment). His changes covered the technical points raised by Engels' call for a shorter and more precise introduction.¹³⁰

Engels was unhappy with Kautsky's ideas about the composition of capitalism.¹³¹ Under pressure of time, Engels could not draft an alternative version to the official draft but he did make suggestions about how to modify some paragraphs and in one or two cases actually drafted entire paragraphs. One of the suggestions that he made was to speak about joint-stock companies and the new factories.¹³² There is no reference to either of these in Kautsky's draft. Engels' draft of the second paragraph contains the idea of Lebensquellen.¹³³

Kautsky's version reads:

"Die ökonomische Entwicklung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft führt mit Naturnotwendigkeit zum Untergang des Kleinbetriebes, dessen Grundlage das Privateigentum des Arbeiters an, seinen Produktionsmitteln bildet. Sie trennt den Arbeiter von seinen Produktionsmitteln und verwandelt ihn in einen besitzlosen Proletarier, indes die Produktionsmittel das Monopol einer verhältnismässig kleinen Zahl von Kapitalisten und Grossgrundbesitzern werden." ¹³⁴

There is no material here out of which the teleological notion of strategy can be built. The description is neither precise nor concrete.

Engels drafted an entire paragraph dealing with the "uncertainty of existence" (Unsicherheit der Existenz).¹³⁵ Kautsky, however, chose to keep the old formulation adding Engels' concept to the argument about growing poverty in such a way that the uncertainty appears to be a function of the growth of poverty rather than of social conditions ("... bedeutet die wachsende Zunahme der Unsicherheit ihrer Existenz, des Elends, des Drucks der Ausbeutung").¹³⁶

Engels wanted to tone down the emphasis on the purely economic aspects of the analysis and emphasise the political. For that reason he wanted the economic argument to rest on the concept of the Unsicherheit der Existenz. Finally, he wanted to sum up the section with the phrase:

"... setzt und damit die Macht der ökonomischen Ausbeutung und politischen Unterdrückung in einer Hand vereinigt." ¹³⁷

Moreover, Engels proposed that the substance of the political sections should be brought forward towards the beginning of the programme.¹³⁸ He wanted to lead from the description of how capitalism in general and the present stage of capitalist development in particular affected the working class to a section clearly and precisely explaining the relationship of the working class to other classes and sections of classes.¹³⁹ The point here was to emphasise what demands they had in common so that one could begin to understand how the tactics of the strategy should be worked out. Secondly, he wanted to devote a paragraph to explaining how the liberation of the proletariat would also imply the liberation of all other classes, and as Marx emphasised in La misère,¹⁴⁰ the end of class society as such together with all its institutions.

To his horror, Engels found that not only were these ideas not adopted by Kautsky, but that Kautsky regressed on the draft prepared by the Parteivorstand. He wanted to reintroduce the idea that all other classes in society were one single "reactionary mass" (reaktionäre Masse) and were the sworn enemies of the proletariat and proletarian aims.¹⁴¹

As fundamental as they are, these criticisms are only peripheral to Engels' main argument. The crux of the matter was the problem of taking political power. The original version never broached the problem. Kautsky only tinkered with the first sections of the programme and never touched the political sections. Indeed, in later years when he wrote a commentary of the programme he was so uninterested in the list of demands that constituted the second section of the programme that he gave the task to a party expert on the social services.¹⁴²

Engels' three points: that the original draft showed no understanding of capitalist society, that it showed little comprehension of the nature of working-class exploitation and that it could not formulate a meaningful strategy, can just as easily be applied to Kautsky's version.

For these reasons, the conclusion that Engels' criticism of the official and revised drafts of the Erfurterprogramm repeats in substance Marx's criticisms of the Gothaerprogramm becomes extremely attractive. Like Marx, Engels spelled out the difference between a teleological and a non-teleological approach and tried to show the consequences of both. His critique goes further than the Randglossen because he tries to give an example of what an alternative approach would look like.

There is one other striking similarity between Zur Kritik and the Randglossen. Engels' critique disappeared. It was only discovered after the death of Wilhelm Liebknecht amongst his papers.¹⁴³

Our reading of the Gotha and Erfurt affairs raises two important questions. Firstly, why did Kautsky persist in his reading? Indeed, what could have possessed him to use one of the most heavily criticised phrases from the Gothaerprogramm? Was he trying to steer a compromising course between Engels and the Partei Vorstand? It is difficult to see how such an erudite Marxist scholar as Kautsky could have so clearly blundered. There can only be two hypotheses, that Kautsky was lying to Engels from beginning to end or that some raison du parti forced him to act as he did. I cannot possibly hope to begin to answer this question here. I will try to provide enough information in the sections of this essay analysing the theory and practice of the SPD and POF so that the reader can begin to formulate his own hypotheses.

Secondly, why was Engels not more outspoken in his criticism? To state it bluntly, why did Engels continue his association with Kautsky and the SPD? According to Morgan and Bebel, Engels had few allies in the party and only symbolic influence if we believe some historians.¹⁴⁴ Under those circumstances his only possible strategy could be to pressure the party leadership.¹⁴⁵

Engels' literary activities in 1891 seem to make this argument tenable. Engels' critique was written in June 1891. The party committed itself to drawing up a new programme at the Hall conference in 1890. On the 6th of January, Engels published the Randglossen¹⁴⁶ and on the 18th of March Marx's Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich¹⁴⁷ to which he wrote an introduction concluding:

"Der sozialdemokratische Philister ist neuerdings wieder in heilsamen Schrecken geraten bei dem Wort: Diktatur des Proletariats. Nun gut, ihr Herren, wollt ihr wissen, wie diese Diktatur aussieht? Seht euch die Pariser Kommune an. Das war die Diktatur des Proletariats."¹⁴⁸

Engels tried to ensure that the German worker would not only be able to read Marx's critique but would also have Marx's alternative close at hand. Whilst preparing these works for publication, Engels also published a new edition of Marx's Lohnarbeit und Kapital where in an introduction he spelled out the difference between Marx's theory of exploitation and that of Lassalle.¹⁴⁹ He

wrote a series of letters to Kautsky and Schmidt where he said the time had now come to reveal the essence of Lassalle's theory because if Lassallean ideas no longer existed on paper, Lassallean behaviour had not disappeared. 150
Are all of these elements of a campaign on Engels' part to convince the social democrats?

The two introductions of 1891 both emphasise the need to understand the strategic possibilities afforded by the new political situation in Germany. Engels emphasised how the old "distributive" (or Lassallean) theory chained the working class to contemporary society and could only be broken if a strategy were devised.¹⁵¹ Were these clarifications all part of a concerted programme of hints, prods and nudges of the order of his escape-hatch for Bebel?

Engels terminated his critique of the draft of the Parteivorstand with a warning that if the party persisted in its refusal to lay out strategic perspectives that would awaken the working class to its revolutionary vocation, a revolution whose aim was man entering the realm of freedom would be difficult to start:

"Ob es sonst noch möglich ist, in bezug auf die soeben diskutierten Punkte Programmforderungen zu formulieren, kann ich hier nicht so gut beurteilen als Ihr dort. Aber wünschenswert wäre es, dass diese Fragen innerhalb der Partei debattiert würden, ehe es zu spät ist." 152

Marx's Randglossen and Engels' Zur Kritik enlarged and developed the main themes of works like La misère and Kapital. They amplified the political significance of the relationship between exchange value and use value. The Randglossen were an attempt not only to delineate the relationship between the "realm of freedom" and the "realm of necessity" but to suggest how to work towards their unity. Against a different background, Engels attempted to do the same some sixteen years later. We will now look at the Commune, the event that Marx and Engels regarded as the best example of a strategy for the working-class movement and at what they regarded as its most important properties and the lessons to be gained from it.

NOTES

1. Protokoll des Vereinigungs-Congresses der Sozialdemokraten Deutschlands abgehalten zu Gotha von 22. bis 27. Mai 1875, Leipzig, 1875, pp. 5-10.
2. Randglossen zum Programm der deutschen Arbeiterpartei, (1875), MEW, Band 19, pp. 15-32.
3. Marx to Bracke, 5.5.75, MEW, Band 34, pp. 137-38, where Marx asked for the widest possible distribution of his critique.
4. Randglossen, pp. 18, 25, 29, 30.
5. ibid., p. 28.
6. ibid., p. 28; Engels went further in Einleitung (1891), MEW, Band 22, p. 199, Engels to Bebel, 18/28.3.75, MEW, Band 34, p. 126, Engels to Sorge, 12.9.74, MEW, Band 33, p. 642.
7. ibid., pp. 28-29.
8. Erstes Buch: Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals. Sechstes Kapitel. Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses, in Arkhirv Marksa i Engelsa, vol. II (vii), Moskba 1933, pp. 8-9.
9. Randglossen, p. 22.
10. ibid., pp. 15-16.
11. ibid., pp. 15, 17.
12. ibid., p. 16.
13. ibid., pp. 18-19, 21.
14. ibid., pp. 20-21.
15. ibid., p. 22.
16. ibid., pp. 23-24; Engels to Bebel, 18/28.3.75, MEW, Band 34, pp. 127-29.
17. ibid., pp. 20-21, 28.
18. ibid., pp. 24-25.
19. ibid., pp. 22, 25-26.
20. ibid., pp. 21, 25.
21. ibid., pp. 22, 26-27; Engels to Bebel, 18/28.3.75, MEW, Band 34, pp. 128.

22. Randglossen, p. 26..
23. ibid., pp. 29-30, 21-22; TW Adorno, Drei Studium zu Hegel, Frankfurt/Main, 1963, pp. 35-36.
24. ibid., pp. 27-29.
25. ibid., p. 20.
26. ibid., pp. 28-29.
27. ibid., p. 21.
28. Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 128.
29. Randglossen, pp. 30-32.
30. ibid., p. 28, Marx to Bracke, 5.5.75, MEW, Band 34, pp. 137-38.
31. Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 128.
32. ibid., p. 129.
33. ibid., p. 129.
34. Fricke, opcit., pp. 13-14, also claimed by the Marxist-Leninist Institute of Moscow, MEW, Band 34, p. 569; F. Engels, Zur Geschichte des Bundes der Kommunisten, 1885, Band 21, pp. 206-8.
35. Forderungen der Kommunistischen Partei in Deutschland, (1848), MEW, Band 5, pp. 3-5.
36. Engels, Zur Geschichte, pp. 215-16.
37. ibid., pp. 222-24.
38. Engels, Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfs, (1891), MEW, Band 22, pp. 233-34.
39. Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 126.
40. Adresse du conseil général de l'Association internationale des travailleurs aux membres et aux sociétés affiliées et à tous les travailleurs
41. Address of the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association to the Members and Affiliated Societies, (1867) in Documents of the First International, vol. ii, 1866-68, pp. 288-91 and 285-87 respectively.
42. Marx to Bracke, opcit., p. 138. "Hätte man ihnen von vornherein erklärt, man lasse sich auf keinen Prinzipienschacher ein, so hätten sie sich mit einem Aktionsprogramm oder Organisationsplan zu gemeinschaftlicher Aktion begnügen müssen."; Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 130.

43. Randglossen, pp. 29-30.
44. Randglossen, p. 23; Engels to Bebel, 11.12.84, 28.10.85, 20.1.86, in MEW, Band 36, pp. 250-54, 376-79, and 424-28, respectively.
45. Randglossen, p. 29.
46. ibid., p. 20, 22, 29.
47. F. Lassalle, Arbeiterlesebuch, Rede Lassalles' zum Frankfurt am Main am 17. und 19. Mai 1863 nach dem stenographisches Bericht, Frankfurt/Main, 1863, p. 5.
48. Randglossen, pp. 20, 22, 26, 29.
49. Engels to Bebel, ibid., pp. 128-29.
50. Randglossen, pp. 20-22.
51. ibid., pp. 18, 20-21.
52. ibid., p. 17, 22.
53. ibid., p. 17.
54. ibid., pp. 17-18.
55. ibid., p. 22.
56. ibid., pp. 27, 29.
57. ibid., pp. 30-32.
58. ibid., pp. 30, 32.
59. ibid., pp. 28-29, echoing the Manifest: "Die kommunistische Revolution ist das radikalste Brechen mit den überlieferten Eigentumsverhältnissen; kein Wunder, dass in ihren Entwicklungsgänge am radikalsten mit den überlieferten Ideen gebrochen wird." Manifest, MEW, Band 4, p. 479.
60. Engels to Bebel, opcit., pp. 127-28.
61. Randglossen, p. 20-21.
62. ibid., p. 20.
63. ibid., pp. 22-23; Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 126.
64. Randglossen, pp. 26, 29.
65. Engels to Bebel, opcit., pp. 126-27.
66. And also Marx in La misère, Engels to Bebel, opcit., pp. 128-29.

67. Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 128
68. ibid., p. 126.
69. ibid., pp. 129-130, and played into the hands of the anarchists like Bakunin,
70. Randglossen, p. 28.
71. ibid., p. 26; Engels to Bebel, p. 128.
72. ibid., pp. 128-29.
73. ibid., p. 130; also Marx to Bolte, 23.11.71, MEW, Band 34, pp. 332-33.
74. Marx to Bracke, opcit., p. 137-38.
75. What he called the "wirklicher Bewegung", ibid., p. 137.
76. ibid., pp. 137-38.
77. Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 130.
78. ibid., p. 130, Randglossen, p. 30.
79. Marx to Bracke, opcit., p. 137; also Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 129.
80. Engels to Bracke, 11.10.75, MEW, Band 34, p. 156, Engels to Bebel, 12.10.75, MEW, Band 34, p. 159.
81. Interview mit dem Grundleger des modernen Sozialismus. Besondere Korrespondenz der "Tribune", 18.12.78, MEW, Band 34, pp. 509-511.
82. Randglossen, p. 28.
83. ibid., p. 29.
84. Engels to Bebel, p. 129.
85. Einleitung 1891, p. 199.
86. Randglossen, p. 17.
87. Marx to Sorge, 5.11.80, MEW, Band 34, pp. 475-76.
88. Zur Kritik, p. 231, Engels to Bebel, 18/28.3.75, pp. 128-29.
89. La misère, p. 490.
90. Marx to Bracke, opcit., p. 138.
91. Randglossen, p. 28, the term is from the first draft to the Third Address, Erster Entwurf zum "Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich", MEW, Band 17, p. 546.

92. Randglossen, pp. 20-21, 28-29.
93. Marx to Bracke, opcit., p. 137.
94. Engels to Kautsky, 8.2.91, MEW, Band 38, pp. 22-23; Engels to Kautsky, 11.2.91, MEW, Band 38, pp. 34-36; Engels to Bebel, 18/28.3.75, MEW, Band 34, p. 130.
95. Dieter Fricke, Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung, 1869-1890, Berlin, 1965, pp. 13-14; Emile Bottigelli, Avertissement, Critiques des programmes du Gotha et d'Erfurt, Paris, 1949, pp. 4-5. The Eisenach programme called for a "free state" in part I, the restoration of the "integral part of labour" in part II 3 and a democratic state in part II 4. "Die Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei erstrebt die Errichtung der freien Volksstaates". K. H. Leidigkeit in Wilhelm Liebknecht und August Bebel in der Arbeiterbewegung 1862-69, Berlin, 1957, argues that the Eisenach programme was Marxist, p. 79.
96. Engels to Bebel, 12.10.75, MEW, Band 34, pp. 158-60.
97. Bebel to Engels, 21.9.75, in August Bebel's Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Engels, herausgegeben von Werner Blumenberg, S'Gravenhaage, 1965, pp. 35-37; whereas according to Pierre Angel, Eduard Bernstein et l'évolution du socialisme allemand, Paris, 1961, p. 45, only Liebknecht presented a draft programme in the name of the SDAP which was quickly accepted by the ADAV. Morgan confirms this, Morgan, p. 250, as does Lenin, Werke, Band 25, Berlin, 1960, p. 485.
98. Bebel to Engels, 21.1.91, opcit., p. 406; Unsere Ziele. Eine Streitschrift gegen die "Demokratische Korrespondenz", 8 unveränder. Auflage, Leipzig, 1886, pp. 14, 44.
99. Marx to Bracke, opcit., pp. 137-38.
100. Engels to Bebel, 18/28.3.75, MEW, Band 34, pp. 125.
101. Also the viewpoint of Franz Mehring who had access to previously unpublished correspondence. Franz Mehring, Karl Marx, Geschichte seines Lebens, Berlin, 1960, p. 578,
102. Engels, to Bebel, opcit., p. 126.
103. Mehring, pp. 578-579, also in Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Berlin 1960, Band II, pp. 448-50.
104. Marx to Bracke, pp. 137-38.
105. ibid., p. 138
106. Bracke's disagreement with the document was only that it did not mention the importance of trade unions. Wilhelm Bracke, Der Lassalle'sche Vorschlag: Ein Wort an den 4. Congress der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei, Braunschweig, 1873.
107. Morgan, p. 136.

108. Kautsky, "Das Erfurter Programm" in Arbeiter-Jahrbuch, hrsgg. von Parteivorstand der Deutschen Sozialdemokratischen Partei in Tschechoslowakischen Republik, Prag, 1931, p. 43.
109. Liebknecht, Protokoll, St-Gallen, 1887, p. 47; and again Protokoll, Halle, 1890, p. 158; in Neue Zeit 1890, Band I, p. 680.
110. Kautsky, "Der Entwurf des neuen Parteiprogramms", Neue Zeit, 1891, Band 2, pp. 780-81; Die historische Leistung von Karl Marx, Berlin, 1908, p. 30
111. Kautsky, Grundsätze und Forderungen der Sozialdemokratie, Berlin, 1891, p. 26; Die historische Leistung, pp. 31-2.
112. Kautsky, "Der Entwurf", pp. 781, 785, 787.
113. ibid., p. 680.
114. Published in Vorwärts, 4.7.91.
115. Zur Kritik, pp. 228-29.
116. ibid., p. 231.
117. ibid., p. 231. "Die Organisation der Arbeiter, ihr stets wachsender Widerstand wird dem Wachstums des Elends möglicherweise einer gewissen Damm entgegenzusetzen. Was aber sicher wächst, ist die Unsicherheit der Existenz."
118. ibid., (Beilage zu Abschnitt), 1, p. 239.
119. ibid., pp. 233-234.
120. ibid., he discussed the changes in the structure of the factory and the work situation of the worker, pp. 229-32; Engels to Bebel, 24.10.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 189.
121. ibid., pp. 233-34.
122. ibid., p. 237.
123. ibid., pp. 233-34, 237.
124. ibid., pp. 233-35.
125. Kautsky, "Der Entwurf", Neue Zeit, 1891, pp. 749-58, 780-91, 814-27. Unsere Programm, Neue Zeit, 1891, pp. 680-86, and I Kongress zu Erfurt, Neue Zeit, 1892, pp. 161-72.
126. Engels to Bebel, 29.9.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 163; Engels to Bebel, 24.10.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 185.
127. Engels to Sorge, 24.10.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 183.
128. and he underlined the word "erster", ibid., p. 183.

129. Engels to Kautsky, 28.9.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 156.
130. Engels to Kautsky, 29.6.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 125, and in Zur Kritik, p. 227.
131. Grundsätze, p. 1; Kautsky's programme opens with the statement: "Die ökonomische Entwicklung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft führt mit Naturnotwendigkeit zum Untergang des Kleinbetriebes, ... "
132. Zur Kritik, p. 231.
133. ibid., p. 239. "Die hierdurch bedingte ökonomische Unterwerfung des Arbeiters unter die Aneigner der Arbeitsmittel, d.h. der Lebensquellen, ist die Grundlage der Knechtschaft in jeder Gestalt: des gesellschaftlichen Elends, der geistigen Verkümmernng, der politischen Abhängigkeit."
134. Grundsätze, pp. 1-2.
135. Zur Kritik, p. 239.
136. Grundsätze, p. 2, third paragraph of the programme.
137. Zur Kritik, p. 240.
138. Zur Kritik, p. 240.
139. ibid., pp. 228-29, 231, 233, ending with his recommendation of the Considerants drawn up by Marx, p. 238.
140. ibid., p. 240
141. Engels to Kautsky, 14.10.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 179; surprising since emphasised to Bebel and Bernstein, Engels to Bebel, 28.10.82, MEW, Band 35, pp. 381-82, Engels to Bernstein, 2/3.11.82, MEW, Band 35, p. 389.
142. The second half of the programme was analysed by Bruno Schonlank in the Grundsätze.
143. MEW, Band 38, p. 595.
144. Morgan, p. 86; Winnig, p. 39.
145. In the Neue Zeit.
146. A thesis supported by Mayer, Band II, p. 98.
147. As a pamphlet that only had a printing run of 5,000.
148. Einleitung (1891), MEW, Band 22, p. 199.
149. Einleitung (zu Karl Marx' "Lohnarbeit und Kapital" (Ausgabe 1891)), MEW, Band 32, pp. 202-09.
150. Engels to Kautsky, 28.9.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 156; Engels to Kautsky, 23.2.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 40.
151. Einleitung (1891), MEW, Band 22, pp. 197-99.
152. Zur Kritik, p. 237.

CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNE OF 1871.

Marx's analysis of the Commune, popularly known as the Civil War in France, (Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich) was written in English in the name of the International under the title, Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Civil War in France, 1891.¹ It was the third in a series of addresses analysing events in France from the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July 1870 to the crushing of the Commune at the end of May 1871. The first address described the war as a clash between two ruling classes in which the working class could not take sides.² The second address, written when the French Republic was declared in September, warned the French working class against taking hasty and precipitous action against the bourgeois republic.³

Marx started working on the third address in mid-April 1871 when the general tone and character of the Commune had become quite clear. He finished his work towards the end of May, about a week after the massacre of the communards at the Mur des fédérés. His sources were reports sent to London by members of the International in Paris and those newspapers and documents that he could obtain in London.⁴

Marx's main source of guidance, however, came from Engels' work on military strategy. Ever since the collapse of the ephemeral Baden Republic, Engels devoted a considerable amount of his time to the study of war not only in the traditional mould but much more in the Clausewitzian tradition of trying to understand under what conditions a society collapses. From the outbreak of the war in 1870, Engels analysed every development of the war and its effects on French society. He tried to gauge under what conditions the French could overcome their initial reverses. Engels drew two general conclusions. The war after Sedan, he wrote, could only be won by transforming a national war into a peoples' war. But at that point a war of national defence or national liberation must also become a war for liberation from an oppressive social system. The masses will only make the necessary sacrifices when they are fighting to gain or preserve their liberty.⁵ Secondly, Engels was interested in the problem of under what conditions the proletariat could engage the bourgeoisie in combat of its choosing and win. In that light, he considered the feasibility and properties of peoples' war and guerilla warfare.

Marx began where Engels left off. He started with the problem of the transformation of a national war (based on a bourgeois society) into a peoples' war (proletarian revolution).⁷ My point will be that Marx and Engels regarded the Commune as an exemplary action not for what it accomplished but for the fact that, in their view, it once and for all established the feasibility of independent working-class action and showed the path that any social revolution must travel.

The tone and style of the Address are reminiscent of the Manifest. It is a clear, ironic, polemical and hard-hitting work, unencumbered by the scientific terminology characteristic of most of Marx's other works. We find, however, that Marx's first draft is brimming over with references to Proudhon and the political economists. Long sections refer to Hegel's writings and review the need for a concretisation of the Hegelian dialectic.⁸ Because Marx was interested in "addressing" the European working class in terms they could understand and which could potentially make them think about their own situations, Hegelian language and references to the political economists all disappear from the Address itself, whilst the essential argument remains.⁹

The essential message is: here is an example of those who against incredible odds made a Revolution; here are the conditions that precipitated that revolution; here is how they made the Revolution and here is why they failed; you, who live under similar conditions, draw your conclusions.

Earlier, when we were discussing the role of teleology in Marx's theory, we said that his rejection of Hegel cannot be explained as a rejection of Hegel having centred his problematic on man. Marx rejected Hegel's abstractness, not his framework. In a letter written to Kugelmann at a time when he was hard at work on the first draft of the Address, Marx juxtaposed Hegelian terminology and the accomplishments of the Commune.¹⁰ The Commune, he told Kugelmann, was the concrete solution to Hegel's problematic. In that sense, the Commune contained all of the elements of the concrete solution that Marx and Engels had raised in their theoretical works.

According to Hegel, history and the history of human thought, in particular, can be best described as the relentless search for the means to end the subject/object or master/slave dichotomy. Hegel never once doubted that the solution was realisable through philosophy. The solution, Hegel argued, was the attainment of Idea. Those who enacted the Idea were classified by him as "world historical figures".

Marx's letter to Kugelmann contains a passage where the positive properties of the Commune are described in Hegelian terms: "historische Initiative", "Elastizität", and "Aufopferungsfähigkeit".¹² The lauding of the Commune in the enthusiastic Hegelian terms of his and Kugelmann's youth demonstrates the importance Marx placed upon it. It presented the elements of the solution of the social problematic. It overcame the obstacles of the dominant ideology of the working class and material obstacles. It was forced by its momentum to bring into view what Marx, in the Gotha critique, spelled out as the essence of revolution:

"... nicht mehre wie bisher die bürokratisch-militärische Maschinerie aus einer Hand in die andre zu übertragen, sondern sie zu zerbrechen."¹³

The Commune had three major elements, Marx wrote to Kugelmann. Firstly, it demonstrated historical initiative, not only because it raised the issue of transcending the State, but because its hallmark was the building of a new form of society based upon human satisfaction ("... in welchem dieser Klassenkampf seine verschiedenen Phasen auf rationellste und humanste Weise durchlaufen kann").¹⁴ Secondly, it was elastic. It was able to transform a situation that even Marx had judged as hopeless into a situation where for the first time the working class began to build a new society. The Commune was able to combine its destruction of the State with the building of a society moulded according to human needs. Finally, even in defeat it was important because it was the "harbinger of the true social revolution",¹⁵ (die Vorbedingung jeder wirklichen Volksrevolution).

Since Hegel and the theorists of warfare inspired by his writings, the general assumption has been that a text laying out a strategy or commending a strategy to the reader must identify, in addition to the ends of that strategy, the means to obtain those ends.¹⁶ The social democrats inspired by Marx assumed that the agent was to be the political party. But Marx never speaks of the political party in such a context in either the Address itself nor in the two preliminary drafts leading up to the Address. Given Marx's care in the preparation of the Address, in the light of his transposition of Hegelian ideas, one cannot let this omission pass. The term "party" is used in only two contexts. The first is when Marx refers to a manifesto published by the German social-democratic Workmen's Party and the second is when Marx, on various occasions, refers to the "Party of Order".¹⁷ The first reference is a statement of fact and the second uses the term "party" in such a loose

context that it could just as easily refer to an entire class. In a text bristling with the fervour of revolution, and a text whose purpose is to describe the best example of a strategy of revolution in his lifetime, to find that Marx never mentioned the importance of the role of established political organisations or the need to establish such an organisation within the Commune is extremely important. One can well imagine why Eduard Bernstein, loyal to the social-democratic strategy, found the text "anarchistic".¹⁸

I will argue that the term "party" was replaced by a series of terms or expressions describing a situation in which the social and political context was being modified constantly. At each stage of the evolution of the Commune, in Marx's view, there were different protagonists. Each major development brought forward different kinds of organisations. As each stage was passed the organisations of that stage became obsolete.

Stage one of the development of the Commune, Marx wrote, was highlighted by the contrast between an isolated class (Klasse an sich) and a united class (Klasse für sich). Once that transition is accomplished we find in stage two a contrast between community and armed community and in stage three political or deliberating power and liberating power. Finally, the last stage is marked by social revolution, the terminal point.

(i) Isolated class vs. united class (Klasse an sich und Klasse für sich):

In his letter to Kugelmann, Marx characterised the Commune as a continuation of the confrontation dating from the June Revolution of 1848,¹⁹ between the proletariat and the political institutions of the bourgeois state. In Marx's judgment the proletariat of 1848 was politically immature. In the 18. Brumaire and the Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, Marx analysed the reasons for its immaturity. He wrote that it was impossible to consider the events of 1848 as a confrontation between two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.²⁰ He described a series of partial and overlapping confrontations arguing that Paris was not characteristic of the rest of France and her social structure did not even resemble that of other large French cities. The proletariat in Paris was larger and had more political experience but it was divided. Paris was an artisan and administrative centre.²¹ The dependence of a large section of that proletariat upon those exploiting the peasantry meant that it was politically at odds with the peasantry.²² The relative marginality of the Parisian proletariat to the dominant social system in France, based on agriculture, hampered its understanding of the

political situation. The main city of an agrarian country was the centre of administration and the centre of financial power. For that reason conflict in the Capital was more important than conflict in the rest of France and a relatively weak and marginal proletariat found itself called into political conflict prematurely.²³ Marx analysed these problems and contradictions in depth. One would have expected him to continue the same kind of analysis in the Address. However, the term "class" used analytically in the 18 Brumaire and the Klassenkämpfe is used as a synonym for the proletariat in action.

If we look at the way Marx and Engels judged the Commune in their correspondence, we find that they returned to analysing the class structure of contemporary France. Neither expressed particular optimism for the chances of social revolution in France either before or during the Commune.²⁴ In September 1870 Marx warned the Parisian members of the International against provoking a split with the bourgeoisie.²⁵ During the Commune itself, he complained to Frankel about the theoretical backwardness of the Parisian proletariat.²⁶ Engels wrote that the Parisian proletariat were mostly skilled workers closely tied to the bourgeoisie. There was little development of mass industry for the market at that time. The artisans and mastercraftsmen usually worked in small workshops and could still aspire to become their own master. Most manufacturing consisted in the production of luxury goods. There was little scope for mechanisation and much scope for the small independent producer.²⁷ The social views of these workers were anti-trade union and economist. Their heroes were Proudhon, Louis Blanc and the utopian socialists, who preached a fair return for a fair day's labour.

"Die Masse in Paris ist "sozialistisch" in Sinne eines aus Proudhon, Louis Blanc, Pierre Leroux, usw, im Lauf der Jahre herausdestillierten ziemlich neutralen Durchschnittssozialismus."²⁸

Paris may well have a strong revolutionary heritage, he wrote, and it may well have the largest concentration of workers anywhere in France, but the solidarity of exploitation found in areas where mechanisation was possible and where large numbers of work-

men laboured at the same kind of cooperative and/or repetitive tasks was lacking.²⁹ The working class was thoroughly imbued with the positivism of the ruling classes.³⁰ Marx told Nieuwenhuis that for those reasons the Commune itself could never have been successful.

The relative unpreparedness of the Parisian working class for making a social revolution was of such capital importance that Engels in his 1891 introduction to the Address stressed how their demands were vague and undetermined, ("mehr oder weniger unklar und selbst verworren ...").³¹ He wrote that the principal lesson to be drawn from the defeat of the proletariat in 1848-49 was that, given the peculiar development of French capitalism, the proletariat was capable of mounting convincing defensive actions, so long as both political and industrial power were concentrated in one city, but they could not move to the attack.³² They were hindered not only by their material existence but by their ideology.³³ Although, he continued, industry was larger in scale and more mechanised by 1871, the structure of the Parisian proletariat and their relation to other classes had hardly changed since that time.³⁴ Paris was an administrative and artisanal centre. Her industry was largely a handicraft-industry and the artisans were just as firmly tied to bourgeois values as ever. Paris remained the swollen "service" metropolis that one finds in most societies based on an agrarian economy. Under these circumstances it becomes very difficult to see how the Parisian proletariat could ever become the "harbinger of the true social revolution".

Yet in the Address Marx cast caution to the winds and used the term "class" without reference to any of these drawbacks. He spoke of the heroic Parisian working class as though they were a Klasse für sich and the embodiment of a revolutionary class.³⁵

How can we understand these two different appraisals?

In Marx's estimation, the collapse of the Empire, the military débâcle and the disorganisation of the French economy created a power vacuum. The bourgeoisie felt it had been betrayed by its leaders and the working class felt it had been called upon to make sacrifices that threatened its livelihood. It revolted in the name of resistance against the invader and its revolt was

quickly transformed into a revolt against the French bourgeoisie. Its revolt and the disorganisation of the bourgeoisie, in Marx's estimation, created a situation where it was forced to act independently. The repercussion of the 1870-71 War effectively altered the political landscape. For once the working class was forced to act for itself, to organise its defence and to organise society in its image. The general situation led to a process in which the Parisian working class was transformed from a Klasse an sich into a Klasse für sich.

Marx wanted to emphasise this transformation and for that reason his studiously precise examination of the differences within classes that we find in the 18 Brumaire is never once evoked in the Address.

- (ii) Paris and Paris armed: In the Address Marx invoked two contrasting images of community. The first image is that of the bourgeois community. Supposedly it is based upon the division of labour and cooperation. In fact it is based on corruption and exploitation. The second image is the community armed, the community defending itself which, in order to defend itself, has transformed itself into an egalitarian community.

Marx wrote that Paris was the cultural jewel of nineteenth century urbanism. It was the contemporary idea of what a city should be. It was the Riesenstadt, as Benjamin wrote, Paris was the Hauptstadt des XIX Jahrhunderts, (capital of the 19th century). For Marx, Paris was the cauldron of all the contradictions of contemporary European capitalism magnified. It was the "meretricious Paris", the Paris of the "cocottes", the Paris of the "vile multitude".³⁶ It was the cultural centre and metropolis of the "old world", the most consummate expression of the reeking corruption and of the political failure of the French bourgeoisie floundering amidst the contradictions between its impeccable logic and expressions of liberal sentiment and its oppression and exploitation of the proletariat and peasantry.³⁷ Marx portrayed its representatives, Thiers and Favre, as puppet-like caricatures, declaiming Guignols of liberty and bumbling Simon Lagrees strutting across the stage of history with the exaggerated gestures of the actors of the Boulevard du Crime.³⁸

The bourgeois community, the "old world", was transformed into the community armed or the "new world".³⁹ The bourgeois city had been built

reflecting the values and social hierarchy of bourgeois society. Paris was divided into quarters according to the division of labour and rewards. The city reflected and physically reinforced the distributive ideology. Haussmann effectively destroyed what had remained of the semblance of cultural unity that remained from the artisan age, integrated housing. He created the working-class ghettos, the first of the dormitory communities. Enormous unused or underused impressive governmental mausoleums were erected. They were monuments of the new age. The Commune destroyed this Paris. It occupied the buildings and transformed them into meeting places. It used its streets. It integrated labour and shed its distributive ideology because it did not have the time to distribute. It could only take power and try to find some kind of way of organising its defence and managing the community. In that sense, Paris was the symbol of the destruction of the bourgeois hegemony, for Marx, and the dissolution of old social rules and mores. The new Paris was the community armed with a new power ("lebendige Macht").⁴² The Commune, he wrote, was

" ... die Rücknahme der Staatsgewalt durch die Gesellschaft als ihre eigne lebendige Macht".⁴³

Deliberating body and working body:

The transformation of the community into the community armed to defend itself required means to coordinate that defence. The first form of coordination was the organisation of an army to defend the city against the Versailles army. That army, in fact, was a popular militia raised from the Parisian working class. The second form of coordination was the political organisation arising from the problem of how to run the community on a day-to-day basis.

Marx was particularly interested in the forms of political organisation that appeared during the Commune. We saw that he commended them to the German social democrats as an example of the transition (Zwischenstadium) between bourgeois society and communist society.⁴⁴

Marx started by criticising the existing procedures for settling social problems. Those bodies that organised the distribution of the existing stock of social values were, in his view, deliberating bodies.⁴⁵ Their actions did not qualitatively change the form or content of man's activity or change his rhythms of life. They merely enforced the existing social order. A society based upon the production of commodities and the organisation of the market and the pre-

paration of producers and consumers required a coordinating body to defend the established system of exchange. As Engels declared, the State, for Marx, was the machine to maintain the hegemony of one class over another:

"In Wirklichkeit aber ist der Staat nichts als eine Maschine zur Unterdrückung einer Klasse durch eine andre "⁴⁶

Marx's point was that so long as the problematic was cast in terms of greater distribution of commodities such a body would be required. It was essential to Proudhon and Lassalle and by implication to the Parisian workers so thoroughly imbued with Proudhonist ideology. Yet they destroyed such a form of authority.⁴⁷

The Commune, Marx wrote, was a "working body", an expression of active power ("lebendige Macht").⁴⁸ Once it occupied the institutions of bourgeois society, it changed them qualitatively. Marx described that change in the following way. In order to organise its defence and in order to construct what it regarded as a viable society, the working class started by replacing the standing army by a militia, the "armed people", run democratically.⁴⁹ The Church was disestablished and free education was provided. The form and content of education were changed radically.⁵⁰ As the first of its industrial measures, night-work in bakeries was abolished.⁵¹ The Commune then moved towards a reorganisation of the system of production itself.⁵² These changes, far from socialist changes, were important because they were measures taken by a working class body.⁵³

What was the working-class body? In part it was the elected representatives of the arrondissements of Paris subject to recall. More importantly, it was the open or general assemblies of working-men in their places of work, of the denizens of the quartiers and of the women's organisations. The problems they discussed were not remote problems or problems whose import was only partially known to them. Their decisions were about how to run and organise the essence of their daily activity. In Marx's estimation, this was an example of the working class not only destroying the old society but of changing the social order and moulding it in its image.⁵⁴ In that sense, he wrote,⁵⁵ the Commune was the political form of the emancipation of the proletariat.

Political power and "living power":

We find that the majority of socialist commentaries on the Address share the assumption that Marx was writing about transferring the centres of decision-making from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat.⁵⁶ On one hand, Eduard Bern-

stein in the Voraussetzungen speaks out strongly against the violence that such a change could entail. He suggested that if one were interested in such a transfer then parliamentary means could well suffice.⁵⁷ Josef Stalin regarded the Commune as the first and necessary step towards socialism. It put the apparatus of the State into the hands of the most intelligent sections of the working class, he wrote. He shelved the problem of democracy and a change in the form of decision making until the material basis for socialism was created.⁵⁸

Both these arguments assume that political power is concerned with the distribution of resources. They also assume that the aim of the social revolution is the wider distribution of goods until satisfaction is achieved. They therefore assumed that the question of value had little to do with social pressures. For that reason the Hegelian mumbo-jumbo about desires and the dialectic of the master and the slave could be dispensed with.⁵⁹ The key problem was that of productive efficiency. For both writers the problem of transferring the centres of decision from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat was resolved through the creation of a "workers' State".⁶⁰

I have made this detour into the works of Bernstein and Stalin only to show that what have been normally judged as the extremes in the socialist and communist movement both arrived at the same conclusion and both shared the same basic concept of power. We have already seen in the Randglossen that Marx regarded the idea of the freie Volksstaat, or the workers' State as internally inconsistent because the State could not be a neutral body but only the result of an oppressive social system, and could do no more than allocate what that system had chosen to be its basic values. In effect, the Randglossen can be compressed into the aphorism to choose the State is to choose a system of hierarchy and exploitation. One could widen the activities of the State, Marx wrote, at a time when the State was beginning to play an increasingly important role in the management of the economy but that would not alter the essence of social exploitation:

"... the State power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labour."⁶¹

Again, this was Engels' theme in the 1891 Einleitung when he described the State as the consummate machinery to oppress the proletariat.⁶²

Marx's point was that if one restricts one's notion of power to the activities of the State and one's idea of seizing power to capturing the apparatus of the State one has misunderstood the whole apparatus of social power

and its exercise. The problem is to change society. The problematic of man is not a question to be resolved quantitatively but the complex question of banishing all possible forms of exploitation and bringing about "the sensuous side of things".⁶³ Marx wrote in La misère:

"La classe laborieuse substituera, dans le cours de son développement, à l'ancienne société civile une association qui excluera les classes et leur antagonisme, et il n'y aura pas plus de pouvoir politique proprement dit, puisque le pouvoir politique est précisément le résumé officiel de l'antagonisme dans la société civile."⁶⁴

This seems to imply that whereas many of Marx's followers saw increasing productive facilities, increasing consumption and establishing the means to do this as the solution to social problems, Marx's problematic was finding the means to bring about a revolution in social relations.

The Commune, in his judgment, was an example of that possibility. It destroyed the old form of political power and replaced it by a new form of community and a new form of social relationships.⁶⁵ The power over the environment, over oneself, the control over natural and man-made objects, was called "living power". Political power of the old order defined man as an object whilst living power signified man's control over his environment. In La misère Marx wrote that the aim of the social revolution was that form of appropriation. In the Address, he emphasised how the Commune approximated that idea.⁶⁶

In the text, Marx and Engels listed the achievement of the Commune. The Commune, they said, practised universal suffrage and instituted general assemblies, practised recall, communal and local liberties and was drafting a Communal Constitution.⁶⁷ These reforms were the result of the experience of a working class in power. Moreover, they were indicative of a general process of social appropriation that would occur, they wrote, when the working class came into power.⁶⁸ It allowed one to glimpse at the future, Marx wrote. The emancipation of labour and the restoration of creativity to man's actions were what the Commune was beginning to achieve. In that sense the Commune was what Marx called the "beginning of the social revolution", (der Beginn der sozialen Revolution).⁶⁹ It opened the possibility of breaching capitalist society from within and took one to the threshold of what Marx had earlier called "die Revolution im Permanenz".⁷⁰

From our examination so far of Marx's analysis of the Commune we have seen that the teleological themes in his other works still occupy a prominent place in his work. His concretisation of the Hegelian dialectic is confirmed by his analysis of the Commune. The Commune gave a concrete expression to his concepts of appropriation and revolution. He emphasised that its principal achievement was that it opened the way to ".... productive labour ceas(ing) to be a class attribute"⁷¹. Its message, he wrote, was:

"Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class government, the produce of the struggle against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which⁷² to work out the economic emancipation of labour."

Our discussion raises two problems. The first is the need to look at how Marx saw the commune as the solution to the human problematic and the second is to specify how the commune was the essence of a new strategy ("the political form at last discovered").

Earlier I pointed out that Marx's first draft of the Address provides a bridge between his critique of the assumptions behind the strategy proposed by the socialists and the elements he regarded necessary to a strategy of revolution. Whereas many passages were almost lifted bodily from the first draft to the final version of the Address, like those describing the Paris cityscape, it emphasises a series of themes that all but disappear from the final version. In addition to a long section listing the events, almost in the form of a chronology, leading up to the Commune, Marx starts with a description of the class structure.⁷³ It is followed by a long section in which he discusses the character of the Commune. Here Marx refers to the Hegelian problematic and revives certain themes from his earlier writing that many critics have thought all but disappeared from his work after Kapital.⁷⁴ Specifically, Marx talks about the liberation from work and the need to reconstruct society "auf rationellste und humanste Weise".⁷⁵ Finally, he concludes with a long section on the Commune as catalyst, how it was beginning to involve the largest class in French society, the peasantry, its effect on the middle class and its transcendence of the traditional ideology of the working class.⁷⁶ All of these themes are either absent from the final draft or appear in a compressed form.⁷⁷

In the first draft, Marx centred his argument on what he regarded as the most important achievement of the Commune, that it dispensed with the ideology of work accepted by the social democrats.⁷⁸ Its greatest innovation, he wrote, was the liberation of man from the alienation inherent in productive activity he does not control and sublimation through the accumulation of replacement objects.⁷⁹

"Sie vertritt die Befreiung der "Arbeit", das heisst der grundlegenden und natürl-lichen Bedingungen des individuellen sozialen Lebens."⁸⁰

Marx charted the course of this liberation in the following way. If a society is no longer based upon a system of derived and imposed values and its values are determined by the freely-determined actions resulting from inter-personal contacts, interchange of activities and cooperation as in the Commune, it must dispense with the machinery that managed the old order.⁸¹ Hence the Commune was a real revolution in the sense that it dispensed with the machinery that enforced social oppression. Once these forms had been dispensed with, the ideology that bound the proletariat to an acceptance of existing social relations became absurd in its eyes. The so-called "'spontane Wirken der Naturgesetze des Kapitals und das Grundeigentums'"⁸² lost their compelling relevance and the working class realised that the time had come to construct a new kind of communal political organisation.

"Aber die Arbeiterklasse weiss ... dass durch die kommunale Form der politischen Organisation sofort grosse Fortschritte erzielt werden können und dass die Zeit genommen ist, jene Bewegung für sich selbst und die Menschheit zu beginnen."⁸³

Marx then went on to discuss how the process of liberation was on the point of being extended to other classes. The working class, having begun to grasp the essence of its own liberation, was beginning to look for ways to spread that message to the peasantry and the bourgeoisie.⁸⁴ The bourgeoisie was confronted by a new kind of society where all their ages old litany of freedom and liberty, rather than being merely the property of philosophical discourse, Marx wrote, were being enacted before their eyes.⁸⁵ The action of the working class served as the first step in their liberation. In that sense Marx called the Commune the "'rationnelle Zwischenstadium'" between the old society laying in ruins and the new society in the process of construction.⁸⁶

Marx's mechanism can be summarised as follows. The class that most harshly experienced the contradictions of capitalist society was called into action and once called into action began to build a society based upon the liberation of human activity. Effectively it hegemonised the other classes in society. The process was called the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁸⁷

To make his point clearer Marx concluded the first draft with a sharp contrast between his notion of social liberation and that developed and currently held by the "charitable friends of the proletariat" (die g nerhaften Freunden des Proletariats).⁸⁸ A "charitable" action, Marx wrote, can be described as robbing people of their ability to judge and choose their own values and to act for themselves, and giving them what is judged to be good for them by those who put them in the position where they required charity.⁸⁹ A consumption theory, for Marx, was a theory of that order. The general theory that man was denied the fruits of his labour was dependent upon universal agreement that what society produced was per se valuable. Once such agreement existed one could identify precise laws regulating the system. All that was required was specialists to operate the system in order to produce the goods "desired" by those who produced. These socialists, Marx wrote, shared the essence of Comte's hierarchical political theory.⁹⁰ Society in their view would still have to be managed even after the productive facilities were put to "good use" to produce an unlimited abundance of consumer goods.⁹¹ The problematic of man estranged from his activity was never envisaged.

The Commune cut swiftly through these arguments, in Marx's view. It tackled the essential problem of man's relationship to things and to himself. It refused the "oracular tone of scientific infallibility"⁹² of such "didactic patronage".⁹³ Such a philosophy, he wrote, was blown away by the "breath of the Parisian peoples' revolution".⁹⁴

In the Address itself Marx curtails his discussion bridging his analysis of contemporary capitalism to the concept of human liberation developed in his earlier writings.⁹⁵ His presentation of the idea of the liberation of work and his denunciation of the philanthropists is abridged.⁹⁶ Marx stressed what the Commune accomplished and how it went about achieving these accomplishments. Whereas the first draft is an analysis of the Commune, the final version talks positively of the Commune as an example of the strategy of revolution. Marx's audience was composed largely of skilled workers on the verge of political organisation in Germany and having developed a considerable

able amount of trade-union organisation in Britain. He was anxious to demonstrate not only the fallacy of the distributive theory behind their claims and organisation but the example of political change accomplished by the proletariat acting independently. For that reason he was keen to emphasise the spontaneity of the Commune, the importance of working-class leadership, the importance of analysing the situation concretely and the importance of the agent of change.

The Commune, in Marx's view, was a complex process. Its occurrence was not determined by a specific level of productive power but by a specific level of productive relations and how these were acted upon.⁹⁷ The process was encouraged by the development of working-class consciousness that grew beyond any of the organised sects and parties.⁹⁸

The importance of the Commune, Marx wrote, was not the reforms it enacted but the process of enactment itself. Through its general assemblies it was leading to a new kind of decision making and a new relationship between man and his environment, Marx argued.⁹⁹ Its key was "productive labour ceasing to be a class attribute"¹⁰⁰ and the "destruction of the state".¹⁰¹ Such a process could only be initiated by the class that through its experience of oppression could propose a model of society in its place.

Finally Marx laid down specification for what the initiating agent must accomplish. Firstly, it must allow and encourage the development of "spontaneous" working class consciousness. The force behind the Commune had been the day-to-day creativeness of the workmen in their workshops, women in the organisation of social services. These must develop.¹⁰²

Secondly, such an agent must find the ways and means to catalyse the working class into action. It must not dictate set ends. As Engels emphasised:

"Aber wir haben kein Endziel ..., wir haben nicht die Absicht, der Menschheit endgültige Gesetze zu diktieren. Vorgefasste Meinungen in bezug auf die Organisation der zukünftigen Gesellschaft im einzelnen? Davon werden Sie bei uns keine Spur finden. Wir sind schon zufrieden, wenn wir die Produktionsmittel in die Hände der ganzen Gesellschaft gebracht haben, und wir wissen wohl, dass das bei der gegenwärtigen monarchistischen und föderative¹⁰³ Regierung ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit ist."

Thirdly, it must have a strategic understanding of the terrain and how to use and develop that terrain.

Fourthly, it must open the way to the dictatorship of the proletariat without in any way impeding the development of working-class consciousness.¹⁰⁴

Finally,¹⁰⁵ it must learn from the proletariat and it must profit from its errors.

These are very stringent requirements. Some writers, like Paul Lafargue, after reading the Address came to the conclusion that Marx implied that the agent must willingly disappear as soon as its initiating work had been accomplished.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, if we read through the Address we find that Marx spoke about the necessary disbanding of organisations that fought for certain ends once those ends had been achieved.¹⁰⁷ In the Manifest Marx spoke of the State "withering away and dying".¹⁰⁸ Did Marx mean that an organisation like the party must also disappear? Is Marx's reason for not mentioning the political party in his text that he didn't think it could accomplish any of the requirements he set up?

What form the "organisation" would take was never really made clear in the Address. In the Manifest Marx specified that the form of the agent would vary according to local conditions.¹⁰⁹ Is the Commune an example of this? In the Statutes of the International that he re-edited the year after the Commune, Marx emphasised that organisation had to be adapted to the perspective of local needs and conditions.¹¹⁰ In that sense his description of the Commune can be regarded partially as a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions corresponding to his concept of revolution. He wrote to Kugelmann that the Commune initiated a new phase in world history:

"Der Kampf der Arbeiterklasse mit der Kapitalistenklasse und ihrem Staat ist durch den Pariser Kampf in einen neue Phase getreten. Wie die Sache auch unmittelbar verlaufe, ein neuer Ausgangspunkt von welthistorischer¹¹¹ Wichtigkeit ist gewonnen."

And at the conclusion to the Address, he stated,

".... the Commune annexed to France the wor-¹¹²king people all over the world."

Marx, in that sense, used the Commune as a general model of a strategy of revolution. He suggested that it be adapted according to prevailing conditions once the general and specific elements of that situation were understood.¹¹³ Marx therefore did not criticise the Commune in the Address nor in his correspondence with his strategically placed allies like Bebel, Liebknecht and Bracke. Engels continued to stress only the positive aspects of the Commune in his public writings and in his correspondence with the future French and German socialist parties.¹¹⁴

But to his friends Marx wrote that the Commune was not aggressive enough. It had missed its golden opportunity by not attacking Versailles rather than waiting for Thiers to raise an army with the connivance of the Prussians.¹¹⁵ He argued to Nieuwenhuis that it was premature.¹¹⁶ Dominated by the traditional working-class instinct of defence it chose to hold its ground. An attack, he argued, could have precipitated uprising in other cities and had a positive influence on the peasantry.¹¹⁷ The Commune believed that warfare would be waged "fairly" and did not prepare its defence against an attack coming from territory under Prussian occupation. It did not put itself on a war footing quickly enough.¹¹⁸ It was too slow organising its own reforms and too slow organising its militia. Indeed, Marx conceded it was properly under too great pressure internal and external to succeed.¹¹⁹

Marx's critique is that the Commune was not audacious enough. The persistent artisanal pattern of behaviour, the defence of the shop without seeing that offence was its best defence, were still too deeply engrained. Did Marx imply that only a working class with a smaller stake in property could begin to envisage that possibility?¹²⁰ Did he imply that an artisan revolution could never succeed?

The configuration of events as a whole was too much against the Commune, he wrote. "Time was not allowed to the Commune".¹²¹

"Die Weltgeschichte wäre allerdings sehr bequem zu machen, wenn der Kampf nur unter der Bedingung unfehlbar günstiger Chancen aufgenommen würde."¹²²

The social democrats were suspicious of the Address.¹²³ When Engels re-issued the text in 1891 as part of his campaign to change the party programme, he concluded his introduction with the remark that if the "sozialdemokratischer

Philister" wanted to know what the dictatorship of the proletariat was, they should look at the Commune.¹²⁴ Richard Fischer, acting for the SPD, changed the social-democratic philistines into "deutscher Philister".¹²⁵

The sections of Bernstein's Voraussetzungen that deal with Marx's political writings are attacks upon the Address. Bernstein found the Address to be utopian and anarchistic in its propositions and Marx's admiration for the political achievements of the Commune to be similar to Blanqui's theory of the coup d'etat.¹²⁶ Bernstein felt that the party was the necessary means of proletarian emancipation.¹²⁷ To find that Marx penned a text where the party was not mentioned and where he seemed to be praising spontaneous consciousness was incomprehensible.¹²⁸

Kautsky's reply to the Voraussetzungen never discussed the dictatorship of the proletariat, the concept that Marx and Engels stated to both him and Bebel, was the essence of the lesson to be learned from the Commune.¹²⁹ Kautsky preferred to answer Bernstein by arguing that the Address was a history of the civil war in France and not a scientific work on the order of Kapital.¹³⁰ Marx, he wrote, was describing a series of events and not preaching a strategy. Kautsky's theory depended upon the party as the infallible revolutionary guide. There was no room in his theory, as we will see, for spontaneous consciousness. Here the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was superfluous.

Alone among the socialist leaders, Lenin, drawing upon the experience of St. Petersburg in 1905, saw the Commune ushering in a new era. He wrote that the dictatorship of the proletariat was the essence of Marx's political strategy and saw the Address as a textbook for revolutionary strategy.¹³¹

Engels survived Marx by twelve years. During that period the socialist movements were organised into durable political organisations for the first time. A considerable amount of Engels' time was taken up by quarrels within the socialist parties. As we have seen in his campaign over the Gothaer- and Erfurterprogramme, Engels saw his role as explaining the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the socialist movement. I mentioned in the previous section his idea of using demands for republican government as a tactic and in the present section his work on class conflict and warfare. I will now try to explain the theory and the practice of his concept of strategy more clearly.

NOTES

1. The text I have used is called The Civil War in France, edited and published in English by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, n.d.
2. Erste Adresse des Generalrats über den Deutsch-Französischen Krieg, MEW, Band 17, pp. 1-8, also in the above text, The Civil War in France, pp. 22-28.
3. Zweite Adresse des Generalrats über den Deutsch-Französischen Krieg, MEW, Band 17, pp. 271-279; in The Civil War in France, pp. 29-37.
4. Marx quoted from these in the Erster Entwurf zum Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich, MEW, Band 17, p. 564-65, 571, 558, 560, 563. He also received reports from Frankel, Varlin and Lafargue amongst others.
5. Argued by Jehuda Wallach, Die Kriegslehre von Friedrich Engels, Frankfurt, 1968. I will take up this theme in more detail in the next chapter.
6. Über den Krieg 1870/71, (Notes on the War), in AMS II, pp. 272-526. Engels sent at least the first of his articles to Marx for his criticism (Engels to Marx, 22.7.70 and 31.7.70, MEW, Band 33, pp. 8-10 and 15-19. Marx echoes Engels' expressed view that the war had been transformed into a Volkskrieg, Marx to Kugelmann, 13.12.70, MEW, Band 33, p. 164.
7. Marx to Kugelmann, 12.4.71, MEW, Band 33, p. 206; and in the text: "The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable is national war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug, intended to defer the struggle of classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as that class struggle bursts out into civil war. Class rule is no longer able to disguise itself in a national uniform; the national Governments are one as against the proletariat!", The Civil War, pp. 89-90.
8. Erster Entwurf, for Hegel, pp. 545-49; the influence of Proudhon and the positivists, pp. 555, 562-63.
9. The long argument about consciousness, pp. 545-59 in the first draft is compressed into a shortened paragraph on the historical mission of the Commune, p. 68; Abramsky and Collins, p. 44.
10. Marx to Kugelmann, 12.4.71, MEW, Band 33, pp. 205-06.
11. GWF Hegel, The Philosophy of History, New York, 1956, pp. 28-29.
12. Marx to Kugelmann, p. 205.
13. Randglossen, p. 26.
14. Erster Entwurf, pp. 545-46.
15. Marx to Kugelmann, pp. 205-06; also in The Civil War's final paragraph: "Working men's Paris, with its Commune, will be for ever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society.", p. 91.

16. André Glucksmann, Le discours de la guerre, Paris, 1967, pp. 23-43; I will take up this theme in the next section in more detail.
17. The Civil War, pp. 56, 60, 71, 88.
18. Eduard Bernstein, Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie, (1899), Stuttgart, 1920, pp. 134-36.
19. Die 18. Brumaire von Louis Napoleon, (1852), MEW, Band 8, pp. 117-18, where Marx identifies a multiplicity of classes and Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, (1851), MEW, Band 7, p. 18, where Marx comments on the weakness of the different constituents of the working class.
20. Die Klassenkämpfe, pp. 18-20, 42, 69, 89.
21. ibid., p. 45, 60, 70, 79, 87.
22. ibid., pp. 81-85, Die 18. Brumaire, p. 120.
23. ibid., pp. 18-20.
24. Engels, Einleitung (zu Karl Marx' Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich (Ausgabe 1891)), MEW, Band 22, p. 189; Einleitung (zu Karl Marx' Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848 bis 1850 (Ausgabe 1895)), MEW, Band 22, pp. 519-20.
25. Zweiter Adresse, MEW, Band 17, pp. 277-78.
26. Marx to Frankel and Louis-Eugène Varlin, 13.5.71, MEW, Band 33, pp. 226-27.
27. Engels, Einleitung, 1891, pp. 187-90.
28. Engels to Bebel, 28.10.85, MEW, Band 36, p. 378.
29. ibid., pp. 378-79; EA Stepanova, Friedrich Engels, Berlin, 1958, p. 199.
30. Marx called them the "positivistischen Proletarier", Marx to Engels, 19.3.70, MEW, Band 32, p. 463.
31. Einleitung 1891, p. 189.
32. Einleitung 1895, pp. 519-20.
33. Einleitung 1895, pp. 521-22; Charles Seignobos, L'évolution de la III République, Paris, 1921, p. 171.
34. Einleitung 1891, pp. 187-88, 196; The theme is developed in Walter Benjamin, "Paris die Hauptstadt des XIX Jahrhunderts", in Illuminationen, Frankfurt/Main, 1961, pp. 185-200; some interesting observations in François Bederida, "Londres au milieu du XIX siècle", in Annales, mars-avril 1968, pp. 258-295; also Marx, Erster Entwurf, p. 513.
35. The Civil War, p. 59.
36. Erster Entwurf, p. 513: "Paris - das ist das reiche, das kapitalistische, ... Paris (warum nicht das kosmopolitische Bordell?)" ; the final version

itself makes use of heightened dichotomy. As the process of the battle between opposites escalates the adversary of the Commune becomes no more than a caricature and a stage character, hence terms like "men of straw", (p. 52) "drunkard" (p. 41), gnomes (p. 42), and crocodiles (p. 46) and other examples of iconography culminating in "The civilisation and justice of the bourgeois order comes out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise against their masters ... A glorious civilisation, indeed, the great problem of which is how to get rid of the heaps of corpses it made after the battle was over!" (p. 83).

37. Benjamin, opcit.
38. The Civil War, pp. 76-77 ending in a parody of the bourgeois concept of history, the confrontation between the "real Paris" and a "phantom Paris": "The men who fell were really dead; the cries of the wounded were cries in good earnest; and, besides, the whole thing was so intensely historical."
39. Erster Entwurf, pp. 513-14.
40. The Civil War, p. 77.
41. Erster Entwurf, p. 545; The Civil War, p. 64: "The Paris Commune was, of course, to serve as a model to all the great industrial centres of France." ... "Paris, the central seat of the old government power, and, at the same time, the social stronghold of the French working class ...", p. 62.
42. Erster Entwurf, p. 529; Engels' Zur Wohnungsfrage, (1872), MEW, Band 18, takes up this theme, pp. 212-15.
43. ibid., p. 543.
44. Erster Entwurf, p. 546.
45. ibid., p. 545; also Engels to Bernstein, 27.8.83, MEW, Band 36, p. 55; Der Ursprung der Familie des Privateigentums und des Staates, MEW, Band 21, pp. 30-173; The Civil War, p. 60.
46. Einleitung, 1891, p. 199; The Civil War, pp. 66-67.
47. Erster Entwurf, p. 543; Einleitung 1891, p. 198; The Civil War, the working class could never seize the ready-made State without changing it, p. 59; "The Commune was the positive form of the Republic", p. 62; it led to a new form of social organisation, p. 65; and its roots were in the fact that "productive labour cease(d) to be a class attribute", p. 67; Einleitung 1891, p. 197.
48. Erster Entwurf, p. 543.
49. The Civil War, pp. 66-67.
50. ibid., p. 63.
51. ibid., p. 63; Einleitung 1891, p. 193.
52. ibid., p. 193; The Civil War, p. 72.

53. "It was essentially a working-class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour."
The Civil War, pp. 66-67.
54. The Civil War, pp. 71-72.
55. ibid., pp. 66-67; Erster Entwurf, p. 543.
56. Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, p. 172; Bebel, "Rezension über Bernhard Beckers "Geschichte und Theorie der Pariser revolutionären Kommune des Jahres 1871" ", in Sozialdemokrat, 23.11.79.
57. Bernstein, Voraussetzungen, pp. 23-26.
58. Josef Stalin, Über die Grundlagen des Leninismus, Berlin, 1946, pp. 6, 62-70.
59. Bernstein, Voraussetzungen, p. 46, he called it the most perfidious element in Marxist doctrine, an obstacle to logic and a trap; Bernstein Archive IIHS, A17; it led to confused revolutionary cant.
60. Voraussetzungen, pp. 125-27, 164; Stalin, Les problèmes économiques du socialisme en U.R.S.S., Paris, 1952, p. 15.
61. The Civil War, p. 60.
62. Einleitung 1891, pp. 198-99.
63. Thesen über Feuerbach, III; Erster Entwurf, p. 546.
64. La misère, p. 491; Compare to Engels' notion of the destruction of the State, Einleitung 1891, p. 199, and The Civil War, pp. 68-9.
65. Erster Entwurf, pp. 545-46, 49; The Civil War, p. 69.
66. ibid., pp. 62, 72; Erster Entwurf, pp. 542-3.
67. The Civil War, pp. 66-67.
68. ibid., p. 67; Einleitung 1891, p. 197.
69. "Die Kommune war die entschiedene Negation jener Staatmacht und darum der Beginn der sozialen Revolution des 19. Jahrhunderts", Erster Entwurf, p. 542.
70. Ansprachen des Zentralkomitees an der Bund, (1850), MEW, Band 7, p. 254.
71. The Civil War, p. 72.
72. ibid., pp. 66-67.

73. Erster Entwurf, pp. 510-32.
74. ibid., especially section on productive labour and social liberation, pp. 545-49.
75. ibid., p. 546.
76. ibid., on the middle classes, pp. 553-54; on the peasantry, pp. 549-52; on the transcendence of working-class ideology, pp. 556-63.
77. The Civil War, middle classes, p. 69; the peasantry are only briefly discussed, pp. 70-71; Marx does not mention the working-class ideologues at all in the text.
78. Erster Entwurf, pp. 545, 557.
79. ibid., pp. 545-46.
80. ibid., pp. 545-56.
81. ibid., p. 546.
82. ibid., p. 546.
83. ibid., pp. 546-9.
84. ibid., p. 546.
85. ibid., pp. 553-54.
86. ibid., p. 546.
87. Einleitung, 1891, p. 199.
88. Erster Entwurf, p. 557.
89. ibid., p. 557.
90. ibid., pp. 555, 562-63.
91. ibid., p. 562.
92. The Civil War, p. 68
93. ibid., p. 68.
94. ibid., p. 89.
95. ibid., pp. 59-75.
96. ibid., p. 68.
97. ibid., pp. 63, 67, 75-77.
98. ibid., p. 68; Einleitung 1891, pp. 196-97.

99. Erster Entwurf, p. 545.
100. The Civil War, p. 66.
101. Einleitung 1891, p. 198.
102. The Civil War, p. 66.
103. Interview Friedrich Engels mit dem Korrespondenten der Zeitung "Le Figaro" am 8. Mai 1893, MEW, Band 22, p. 542,
104. Erster Entwurf, p. 546.
105. Marx to Frankel, 13.5.71, MEW, Band 33, p. 226; Marx to Beesley, 12.6.71, MEW, Band 33, p. 229; Marx to Kugelmann, 12.4.71, MEW, Band 33, p. 206, Marx to Liebknecht, 6.4.71, MEW, Band 33, p. 200.
106. Cited in Zévaès, Jules Guesde, p. 68.
107. The Civil War, pp. 68, 72.
108. Manifest, p. 491.
109. ibid., pp. 486-90.
110. Allgemeine Statuten, pp. 440-445.
111. Marx to Kugelmann, opcit., p. 209.
112. The Civil War, p. 72.
113. ibid., p. 72.
114. Einleitung 1891, pp. 197-99; and Marx and Engels criticised the social democrats for not having learned the lesson of the Commune. Zirkularbrief an Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracké, u.a., MEW, Band 19, pp. 150-66.
115. Marx to Beesley, opcit., p. 229.
116. Marx to Niewenhuis, 22.2.81, MEW, Band 35, p. 160.
117. Marx to Liebknecht, opcit., p. 200.
118. Marx to Beesley, opcit., p. 229.
119. Marx to Niewenhuis, 22.2.81, MEW, Band 35, p. 160; The Civil War, " ... but time was not allowed to the Commune." p. 75.
120. Marx to Niewenhuis, opcit., p. 160.
121. The Civil War, p. 75.
122. Marx to Kugelmann, opcit., p. 209.

123. They claimed its only message was the need for strong organisation, Sozialdemokrat for 13.3.81, 16.3.82, 15.3.83; Mehring, Karl Marx, p. 463.
124. Einleitung, 1891, p. 199.
125. MEW, Band 22, p. 588.
126. Voraussetzungen, pp. 28-30.
127. ibid., p. 134.
128. ibid., p. 134; Mehring, pp. 462-63.
129. Eduard Bernstein, pp. 22-25; V.I. Lenin, Les enseignements de la Commune, Oeuvres, tome 13, pp. 437-40; Sur la dualité du pouvoir, Oeuvres, tome 24, pp. 28-31.
130. Kautsky, p. 172.
131. Lenin, opcit.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGY IN ENGELS' MILITARY WRITINGS AND PAMPHLETS

I have referred to the importance of military strategy for Marx and Engels and to Engels' deep and abiding interest in warfare and the contemporary forms of military theory and tactics. We have seen that Marx consistently sought Engels' advice on questions of strategy. In the last section, in particular, I demonstrated the continuity between Engels' analysis and prognosis of the Franco-Prussian War and Marx's subsequent analysis of the Commune.

The drive behind their common interest is that one obviously could hardly pretend to a revolutionary strategy without a thorough understanding of the concept of warfare, its existing and potential weapons and the so-called "laws" governing their use.¹

During the twenty or so years that Engels worked for the firm of Engels and Erman in Manchester, much of his free time was absorbed by his research into the scope for armed proletarian action and military theory.² The immediate source of his interest were the urban revolutions of 1848 in Paris and the developing industrial towns along the Rhine and his own participation in the campaign waged by the army, sponsored by the revolutionary government of Baden. The army, to which Engels and his comrades-in-arms, August Willich and Joseph Weydemeyer, were attached, fought what can be described as the only real military campaign (in the usual sense of the term) fought during the Western European revolutions of 1848-49.³

Engels sought to find the cause for the failure of the revolutionary army through studying contemporary military theory. He discovered that the military scientists were as much baffled by the series of events that swept through Europe as Metternich had been. The theorists could neither explain the tactics nor the military strategy of the campaign to his satisfaction.⁴

Engels started by questioning Willich and Weydemeyer, both of whom had been career officers.⁵ He found that their answers only led to more problems. Weydemeyer referred Engels to Willisen, the noted Prussian military theorist. Engels, in full labour on the Betrachtungen über die Folgen eines Krieges der

Heiligen Allianz gegen Frankreich and becoming more and more interested in that area of study called "the intelligent force" by Clausewitz, was shocked by the banality of Willisen's argument and conclusions.⁶ He told Marx that Willisen's methodology was full of unexplained a prioris in much the same way that Marx found the political economists' argument full of equally questionable assumptions.

"... der Kriegkunst in dem einen absoluten Satz aufgehen lässt, das der Stärkere immer den Schwächeren schlagen muss!"⁷

Engels pointed out that there are two ways that one can theorise about war. The first, or Willisen's method, is to assume that there is an independent category called war with its own rules, laws and patterns of action. These rules, laws and patterns of action are internal developments of war and only marginally affected by outside factors. The science of warfare, called Kriegkunst, therefore, is limited to dealing with the art of deploying one's resources. The second requires one to step outside the generally accepted notion of war and to understand the social context in which wars are fought and, in particular, to examine the human element of conflict.⁸

At first, Engels tried to limit himself to an investigation of the content of warfare of the first order.⁹ He was gradually forced to the conclusion that the strategists based their theories upon a series of a prioris that were in fact assumptions about how society operated. These a prioris governed not only the decision when a war would be waged but how it would be waged and what was militarily possible. Engels commented to Marx that these assumptions were similar to the assumptions of the political economists criticised by Marx in his writings. The essence of Willisen's argument that the stronger inevitably triumph over the weaker, he wrote, was the essence of the political economists' concept of change.¹⁰

In reading Engels' military writings, the reader must remember that, as Engels himself noted, his aim was to study the content or practice of contemporary warfare in order to understand how to adapt it to a programme of successful proletarian revolution. He dealt with problems of content like batallion strength, deployment of forces, firepower, etc., in order to gain a firm knowledge of all of the possibilities open to counter-revolutionary armies. At the same time he tried to get behind the content to understand the origin, nature or logic of the rules of warfare so that a successful proletarian revolution could be fostered.¹¹

Considering the second notion of war, the war fought between two radically different concepts of society or two radically different cultures, rather than war as the independent category operating within a certain set of social rules, as the theorists proposed, changed the direction and complexion of Engels' research. In order to understand and operationalise the second concept of war, he had to question and attempt to discover the social origins of traditional warfare.

As Engels' research progressed, the nature of his inquiry turned more and more from estimating battle strengths and fire power to one asking why certain forms of warfare were regarded as "ordinary", acceptable and within the general evolution of things. What criteria determined that a particular war should be regarded as "normal" and another as "abnormal"? Why, for example, Engels queried, should the American Civil War have been hailed by the strategists as a logical outgrowth of existing military strategy while other forms of warfare, the Spanish guerrilla struggle of the Peninsula War, the Hungarian uprising of 1847-49, and the practice Chinese armies of the 1860's have been classified as abnormal or aberrations?¹² Why were they placed beyond the pale? Why was the battlefield defined as it was? What were the assumptions and suppositions lurking behind the tactics devised by the military strategists? When does a proposition or proposal become thinkable and when does it become unthinkable? What do unthinkable propositions have in common?

The parallel between Engels' inquiry and that of Marx should be clear. Marx inquired into the logic and workings of the "economic system" in order to find a way of destroying that system. Engels studied the persuasive force of the last instance that a society could use to compel obedience in order to see how that force could be defeated, turned against itself or utilised in the name of transforming society.

The questions that Engels composed resemble those asked by Clausewitz fifty years before when he reflected upon his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars. We know from Engels' correspondence with Marx, that he did not read Clausewitz before the period between 1849 and 1852 when he first examined war in detail. The nature of the problems he examined forced him to abandon Hegelian suppositions about war for a view close to the Clausewitzian aphorism that war was an "extension of politics". The practice of war, Engels wrote, was inextricably bound up with the rules, norms and social mores of capitalist society.¹³ The theory of warfare, Engels concluded, was a highly developed refinement of the

political economists' syllogism. When all other means failed war played the role of the distributor. It was in that sense part of the system of production in general, he wrote. It also reproduced in its form and content the very values underpinning the bourgeois Weltanschauung.¹⁴

Engels' final conclusion was that the strategy and tactics of proletarian war or the proletarian struggle must differ qualitatively from those of bourgeois war if there was to be any hope of victory. The proletarian struggle was a total war fought against the entire structure of society without obeying its norms, rules and principles. Echoing Marx in La misère, he wrote it was a true civil war. Proletarian war could not be fought according to the bourgeois concept and conduct of war. The battlefield was not marked by the picket and trenchlines that marked the post-Crimean innovations in warfare but by attacking in an unsuspected way where it would hurt most. The essence of strategy, Engels concluded, was to shatter the expectations of the enemy by doing the "unthinkable" by forcing them to fight the kind of battle for which their weapons were useless.¹⁵

I will argue that the idea of mastering the terrain and the unthinkable hypothesis were behind the tactical proposals that Engels made during the late 1880's and early 1890's. His various ideas for extended campaigns built around the themes of universal suffrage, the agrarian problem, and republicanism were reflections of this strategy.

I will now show how Engels arrived at these conclusions and then went on to develop them.

We find the embryo of Engels' future argument first developed in Die deutsche Reichsverfassungskampagne.¹⁶ Written in 1850 at the height of his and Marx's disillusionment with the revolutionary movements of 1848 and 1849, Engels wanted to explain why the revolutionary movements failed despite apparent popular support. It was more than a theoretical question because proponents of the bourgeois cause of liberty earnestly believed that the revolutions of 1848 had been destined to complete the work of the first French Revolution. The German Hegelians, in particular, convinced that they had been in the natural course of history, were totally at sea.¹⁷

Against his former Hegelian associates, Marx argued in the Klassenkämpfe that no revolution could use the past for its model. A revolution reflects the

present and the aspirations of the exploited class. The June days in France confirmed his and Engels' view that the proletariat alone had a revolutionary vocation and that its fulfilling that vocation was, as yet, premature.¹⁸ Engels' discussion of the military campaigns of the republican armies of the short-lived badische Republic came to much the same conclusion.

According to Engels, the republican government in Baden started with all the trump cards in its hands.¹⁹ Because of the relatively slow development of capitalism, a political alliance between a petite bourgeoisie, striving to legalise its economic practice, and the dependent and numerically small urban proletariat was possible.²⁰ Having had a taste of land reforms spread by the armies of the French Revolution, the peasantry warmly supported the republic in its early days.²¹ On the surface the badische revolution, Engels wrote, could be spoken of as a genuinely national or popular revolution, enjoying the support of almost all orders of society. Yet no sooner had the Prussian army crossed the frontier into Baden, than the movement crumbled. In the towns only the proletariat fought, a hopelessly defensive war of barricades, whilst the bourgeoisie, fearful of Prussian revenge, traded its vociferous cries of republican liberties for neutrality and finally horsetraded guarantees of its economic position against the Prussians' restoration of order.²² The urban movement, Engels argued, consumed itself. In the countryside, the army of the Republic waiting for a lead from the national assembly lost all sense of direction. Directives from the towns reflected the increasing hesitancy of the bourgeoisie.²³ The army became increasingly despondent, isolated and disorganised. Finally it had no recourse but to retreat across the border into Switzerland, where it was disbanded.²⁴

The military generals tried to explain the débâcle as a failure of fighting nerve and a lack of martial fibre.²⁵ But to Engels, such an argument was no more realistic than Willisen's. He argued that the purely military aspects of the campaign could hardly be separated from the more general social and political conditions and changes. The army's lack of direction could be traced back to the revolution's failure to reform and from its own internal contradictions.²⁶

Analysing the social and political conditions behind the failure, Engels wrote that the badische urban proletariat, the keenest and most martial of all the social groups behind the Republic, was too small and too recently born to take independent or decisive action.²⁷ Echoing Marx's judgment of the Parisian prole-

tariat of 1848-49, Engels maintained that whilst the badische proletariat was the only social group that attacked audaciously it still had no common ideals to unite it into a Klasse für sich.²⁸ The peasantry, the vast bulk of the population, waited upon events in the town. When favourable legislation failed to materialise, their native revolutionary fervour vanished and they became spectators.²⁹ The moment this occurred, Engels noted, the revolution was a lost cause. The moment the vast expanses between towns and centres of supply became neutral rather than hostile territory to the Prussian armies, the badische revolution was doomed.³⁰ The revolutionary bourgeoisie, he argued, was for the most part a petite bourgeoisie or a client bourgeoisie still partially dependent upon the rural aristocracy. It oscillated between a desire to translate its economic power into social prestige and political influence and a need to protect its economic gains.³¹

Engels wrote that in view of the superior numbers, organisation and weaponry of the Prussian armies, the only way the badische Republic could have won would have been to fight a peoples' war.³² The two key classes in such a struggle would be the peasantry and the urban proletariat.³³ The only way they could be brought into the battle effectively would have been the initiation of a much more radical redistribution of land, availability of credit for the peasants, the establishment of cooperatives and the organisation of a genuinely democratic army.³⁴

To put the country on an adequate war-footing would have required marshalling all possible resources, and a degree of cooperation that could only be obtained by dispensing with social hierarchy, Engels observed. Collective action was repellant to the bourgeoisie fighting to legalise its concept of property relations. A tumultuous situation in which property would no longer be sacred was the outcome the bourgeoisie most feared. An army of militiamen also violated their view that the army must be a disciplined and hierarchically organised body of trained soldiers.³⁵ Engels wrote that the essence of the bourgeois notion of property, regarding man as an object, the respect for hierarchy and ranking were reproduced in their views of the practice of war.³⁶ The armies of revolutionary Baden were caricatures of the bourgeoisie's ideal image of how a society should be organised. When the Baden junta proclaimed that the army could not play a "political" role, they condemned the army to fight a kind of war it could only lose. A revolutionary war, Engels wrote, depends on its political content.³⁷

When its political content is maintenance of the status quo for the vast majority of the population they cannot be expected to fight. Proposals for redistribution of land, altering the management of the economy, and the enfranchisement of the artisans in the towns would have provided the same impetus to fight that the land reforms of 1791 gave to the French peasantry and artisans. The French victory at Valmy, repelling foreign troops from France for a generation, was sealed by the enactment of those reforms.³⁸ The collapse of the Baden revolution was heralded by the failure of the junta to be genuinely revolutionary in the context of a middle of the nineteenth century European society.³⁹

Engels repeated his arguments in an article appraising the attempts of Charles Albert, King of Piedmont-Sardinia, to unify Italy.⁴⁰ Analysing the defeat of the Piedmontese army at the hands of the Austrians in 1849, Engels argued that had Piedmont been a republic rather than a petty feudal kingdom or had its social structure been so transformed that the urban proletariat and the peasantry could have been easily mobilised to defend and spread their social gains to the rest of the Italian peninsula, then the outcome of the war would have been the expulsion of Austria from Italy. Because the régime could not mobilise the people, Engels wrote, it had to fight the kind of war at which the Austrians excelled (einer gewöhnlichen, bürgerlichen, honetten Krieg).⁴¹ This was a kind of war composed of a series of battles where the variables were numbers of troops, mobility and ability to handle weapons.

A peoples' war (Volkskrieg), Engels argued, would have been fought under entirely different conditions and with no respect for the ballet-like movements of traditional war. A people defending freshly gained social reforms and certain that their new conditions were worthwhile would fight ferociously and without quarter to defend their independence.

"Ein Volk das sich seine Unabhängigkeit erobern will, darf, sich nicht auf die gewöhnlichen Kriegsmittel beschränken. Aufstand in Masse, Revolutionskrieg, Guerillas ..."⁴²

Rather than arguing that the defensive war would have allowed the Piedmontese to mobilise a massive army to engage the Austrians in battle, Engels argued that the numbers, in themselves, were not as important as how the war was fought. The most telling weapon in the arsenal of a peoples' war, he wrote,

was their inventiveness and the terror they caused in the enemy.⁴³ Having built a society that fitted the image of their desires, the people became creative and inventive in the defence of their gains. Refusal to fight according to the rules of the enemy would disorganise his recuperative powers and not only deny him the time needed to mount a counter-attack but would lead him into taking increasingly risky and foredoomed actions. Terror, the fear of the unknown, would grow from the enemy's finding that his opponent had attacked and would continue to attack him when, where and using means he least expected.⁴⁴

Hence, as a result of the different aspects of the 1848 and 1849 struggles in Europe, Engels began to turn his attention to the assumptions and problems of the military theorists and what he regarded as their inadequate solutions and propositions. Firstly, he questioned their suppositions about what was the battlefield and what was an army. In the Reichsverfassungskampagne, he noted that the nature of the army and the struggle depended upon social conditions, and in Der Krieg in Italien, that playing what for the enemy was the "irrational" card could upset his calculations, no matter how well they had previously been thought out.⁴⁵ Secondly, he seemed close to concluding that had either war been generated by the proletariat enjoying or fighting for its emancipation, the outcome would have been different. Thirdly, Engels was at the very least toying with notions of peoples' war surprisingly close, as some writers have pointed out, to those more recently espoused by Giap, Mao and Guevara. Finally, his conclusions are similar to those Marx arrived at after his analysis of the Klassenkämpfe where he argued that the proletariat alone was the modern revolutionary class.⁴⁶

The text most incisively summarising many of Engels' ideas on the theory and practice of war during this period, the Betrachtungen, a survey of the military capabilities of the major European powers, was never published.⁴⁷ It was written in 1851 on the assumption that if the French Republic survived internal division, sooner or later the powers of the Holy Alliance would have to undertake an invasion of France if they hoped to curb dissidence at home. The text was never finished because the rapid accession of Louis Napoléon to power effectively ended the need for the European powers to repeat their invasion of 1791.

The text summarises Engels' arguments about the nature of the theory and practice of bourgeois war and restates his argument that it was an extension of distribution and exchange. The theory in full respect of the existing social

order limited the use of war. At the same time the practice and organisation of war were not only reproductions of notions of capitalist efficiency, but respected all its social conventions. Engels examined the foundations of the major premises of modern warfare and their basic contradictions.⁴⁸ The trend in modern warfare, he argued, is towards further refinements of Napoleon's innovations:⁴⁹ the use of mass armies and the development of those kinds of weapons suitable to combat engaging large numbers of troops. Previously, war was limited to a single battlefield, and sieges. With the advent of mass armies the problem of mobility became important.⁵⁰ The territory between battlefields was no longer neutral and the means to maintain large armies became a problem of dimensions as large as fighting the actual battle. The aim of the modern army was to destroy the opponent's lines of communications and his mobility.⁵¹ Guns, cannons, and batteries were developed to fight that kind of war. But, Engels argued, the more refined the contemporary army and weaponry suitable to the mobility of mass armies became, the less able that army was to fight against a force that did not respect its definition of battle and refused to fight according to its rules.⁵² Unfortunately, the text breaks off with Engels' discussion of the origin of the theory of warfare and his catalogue of the strength of armies. He intended to raise a host of problems, stemming from the possibility of revolutions in the countries of the Holy Alliance, such as civil war and risings behind the battlelines, but he never reached that point.⁵³

Engels first examined the logic behind the practice of bourgeois war and the limitations it placed upon tactics.

Modern warfare, Engels wrote, was the creation of the bourgeoisie's struggle for emancipation.

"Die moderne Kriegführung setzt also die
Emanzipation der Bourgeois ... voraus,
sie ist der militärische Ausdruck dieser
Emanzipation."⁵⁴

Napoleon, he continued, was the innovator of the modern practice of war in both its military organisation and the way it was used as a means to further and, later, to protect the bourgeois concept of social order.⁵⁵ Yet Engels remarked to Marx that an observer of the Napoleonic phenomenon and the most radical of bourgeois philosophers, Hegel, drew his concept of praxis from the consequences of the liberation of the Rhineland provinces and the construction of the German

federation.⁵⁶ Hegel, Marx wrote, was the most ardent and consummate philosopher of the practice, possibilities and limitations of conflict and hence of modern warfare.⁵⁷ If Napoleon's march across Europe demonstrated the last revolutionary trust of the bourgeoisie expressed through wars of social liberation, Hegel was both the philosopher who invoked this praxis and set its limits.

What did Engels mean? We have already seen that in the period of their early collaboration Marx and Engels criticised Hegel for his idealism and abstraction.⁵⁸ The dialectic in his hands could not only be a liberating ideology but also set limits beyond which one could not go.⁵⁹ Hegel's logic set limits of rationality.

Hegel was the philosopher of conflict. According to Engels, Hegel's philosophy was permeated with the imagery of social war in the Hobbesian sense of a total and generalised conflict between colliding systems of thought and value.⁶⁰ The form and content of the Hegelian problematic and its exposition was imbued with the imagery of conflict.⁶¹ But Hegel arbitrarily set limits to the flight of the dialectic. This can be characterised as follows.

Hegel was not only a radical philosopher but a conservative philosopher.⁶² He defined conflict as the essence of human existence but sought to limit it to a rational pattern. He sought to lay down conditions and limits of acceptable action. His mechanism was a dialectic that progressed through a dichotomous series. He described its progression as a continual escalation to extremes. But at some point true rationality would be attained.⁶³ Napoleon, for Hegel, was the innovator of the reign of rationality.⁶⁴

The dialectic must not progress into the realm of the incomprehensible. But what were the properties of the incomprehensible? His choice of example indicates how these were formed out of the very real day-to-day concerns that troubled Hegel: the need to legalise the system of rational thought that was bourgeois Weltanschauung, the need for the freeing of the ego and the kinds of social relations that were regarded as normal continuations of that ego.⁶⁵

The comprehensible was the milieu of social relations in which true logic could manifest itself. The comprehensible was the form of property relations that developed in the wake of feudalism and that were unleashed by the advance of the French armies into Germany.⁶⁶ The incomprehensible would be the irrational situation when either the realm of logic was not attained or when the means

used to obtain the ends refused to disband when the ends were obtained. When the means exceeded the ends, they could destroy the ends in what was an almost undialectic way.⁶⁷ An example of this would be a revolution that challenged the basis of Hegel's dialectic and his system of logic. To challenge the milieu of social relations that supported the realm of rationality, or the bourgeois State, was synonymous with entering the realm of the incomprehensible.⁶⁸ For Hegel this was synonymous, as it is for any individual or social group, with courting the risk of annihilation or, as he expressed it in the Phänomenologie, running the risk of death.⁶⁹ Hence the essence of Hegel's philosophy was an escalation to extremes, but only to a certain precise limit, and the resulting necessity of suppressing the battle between extremes when that limit was attained in order to avoid chaos and destruction of the milieu itself.

When Marx and Engels criticised the idealistic notion of the Hegelian dialectic and its restrictiveness, they meant that it was inherently a conservative notion of praxis and one that set limits. Indeed, after having read through the major theorists of modern warfare, Engels told Marx that he was convinced that they were all Hegelians of that mould.⁷⁰ The general schema of bourgeois warfare, he wrote, was based upon an escalation to extremes within certain limits. As for Hegel, the limit was based on the unchallengeability of the immediate milieu, capitalist society. The escalation to extremes was accepted so long as it did not entail anything more radical than a redistribution of existing values, at the lowest possible cost. These suppositions would have been upset by a radical redefinition of the existing stock of social values. It would have involved the "destruction" of the existing stock of values and the extension of the battlefield outside the acceptable limits.⁷¹ For that reason, like economics, bourgeois warfare tried to set certain limits. It was merely intended to be a distribution of the stock of values within the framework of existing society when other means had failed.

From his criticism Engels concluded that the strength of the bourgeois form and practice of warfare was also potentially its greatest weakness. If it were challenged by a force that would not accept its limits and its definition of rationality, it was highly vulnerable. Its realm of the comprehensible and rational would have been transcended.⁷² As the greatest weapon and advantage of the French bourgeois armies sweeping across Europe and the spur to their inventiveness was the new model of society they constructed and the practices of

conflict that evolved from that model, so the greatest weapon of any force attacking or opposing the bourgeois would be to do the incomprehensible. The strength of the bourgeois system of warfare lay in its further development and refinement of the practices of warfare invented by the French bourgeois armies.⁷³ But if that system were subverted, and if the bourgeoisie were challenged to battle outside that schema, its weapons could prove ineffective and it could find itself helpless against the attack. As the revolutionary bourgeoisie had defeated the forces of feudalism, so the proletariat would defeat the bourgeoisie, Engels concluded.⁷⁴

In the Betrachtungen, Engels analysed these problems in some depth. Bourgeois war, he argued, was qualitatively different from earlier kinds of war, just as bourgeois thought or the bourgeois system of allocating values was different from other philosophies (Weltanschauung) and systems of allocation.⁷⁵ The problematic of bourgeois war was how to redistribute property within acceptable limits. This did not mean that it ruled out the destruction of property but only that it tried to limit destruction beyond a certain level.

Engels was also interested in another property of the bourgeois army. During its epoch of armed liberation, the bourgeoisie drew its strength from the social forces that launched and maintained its army, rather than from day-to-day military organisation. Whilst not dwelling too long on the advent of capitalism which developed the industrial means to make such armies and forms of combat possible, Engels turned to the innovating genius, or the consciousness and creativity that had made it possible for the bourgeois army to challenge the old society on a terrain on which it could fight only at a signal disadvantage. He concluded that the bourgeois army drew its strength from its drive for social and political emancipation, its intended transformation of property relations, and that these were translated into military organisation and the new theory and practice of war.⁷⁶ Here was a lesson to be absorbed by those interested in the theory of conflict and how to organise the proletariat. Judging from the French revolution, Engels wrote, the requirements were to unleash the innovating genius of the proletariat so it too would organise a successful revolution:

"Und was brachte in der ersten französischen Revolution die Disziplin in die Armee? Nicht die Generale, die erst nach einigen Siegen in einer Revolution bei improvisierten Armee Einfluss und Autorität bekommen, sondern die Terreur der Politik, der Zivilgewalt ... "

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The power to improvise, the initiative of the peasant-soldiers and the innovations in warfare that Engels traced to the élan provided by a revolution in social relations could not be repeated in the organisation of the armies after the French Revolution. Engels mentioned two reasons: firstly, the tactics and techniques of the revolutionary armies were adapted and refined by all European countries. This had a levelling effect and rendered the surprise and subversion of the terrain that hallmarked the French revolutionary armies impossible.⁷⁸ Secondly, only the partial or total enfranchisement of an exploited class could bring forward the initiative and improvisation that guaranteed the victory of the French armies.⁷⁹

If we look at the tactical and technical changes mentioned by Engels, we find that the French revolution initiated two principal innovations. The first, Engels wrote, was mobility.⁸⁰ Means were developed to transport and feed massive armies so that a débâcle of the scale of the retreat from Moscow need not be repeated. The railway allowed the swift movement of many troops from one battlefield to another so that warfare slowly took on the guise of an elaborate system of battles based upon a front. Weapons answering to the needs of this new kind of warfare were developed to such an extent that they almost led to the stalemate of trench warfare.⁸¹ Secondly, the rising of the people that marked the early successes of the French revolution was transformed into the levée en masse or national conscription. The army became a standing army and its ideology was transformed from one of national liberation into one emphasising loyalty to the nation.⁸²

In Engels' view these all had a levelling effect to the extent that victory could only go to the largest armies ("ce seront alors les gros bataillons qui l'emporteront").⁸³ The proletariat, Engels wrote, must learn how to deal effectively with the modern weaponry and military science devised in the light of the French Revolution.⁸⁴

Having analysed the origins of the principles and practice of bourgeois war, Engels, intending to have discussed the "... case of the successful revolution", left his text unfinished.⁸⁵ He left himself with a series of problems. The proletariat could not engage the bourgeoisie in a war where the standing armies of the bourgeois state could be used. That kind of war it could never hope to win. It had to devise a form of battle in which the bourgeois army could not fight and its strategy was inappropriate. The soldiers of the bourgeois army were proletarians and peasants, Engels wrote.⁸⁶ If a tactic could be devised to disengage them from the army the army would be immobilised. But Engels' major tactic was not developed until several years later when, analysing what were called Asian wars, he returned to consider the idea of Volkskrieg that he first mentioned in his analysis of the Italian and Hungarian wars of 1848 and 1849.

The lacunae of contemporary military theory struck Engels all the more forcefully with the advent of a series of colonial wars and uprisings during the 1850's. These stimulated his returning to and developing the themes of wars of liberation and guerrilla combat that he had noted most military theorists had dismissed as aberrations.

Looking at the Sepoy Mutiny and the British invasions of China, Engels became conscious of a curious anomaly that was to have a great influence in the development of his strategy of proletarian revolution.⁸⁷

Despite their much vaunted military acumen and their lauded advances in military science, the armies of the aspiring European imperialist powers initially experienced some major and puzzling setbacks in their quest for colonies and markets. The "Asiatic hordes"⁸⁸ they encountered hardly squared with the idea of what an army was, and the practices of war to which they were accustomed. The Chinese, the Sepoy mutineers and the mountain folk did not fight according to their tried and tested rules of war, (allgemein anerkannten Regeln der regulären Kriegsführung).⁸⁹

Whereas the European military theorists dismissed the phenomenon of the Asian wars with a strike of a Darwin-inspired pen, Engels was impressed by what he called its inventiveness, tenacity and fanaticism.⁹⁰ At times it rendered the highly efficient fighting machines of the Europeans completely useless. Commenting on the British invasion of China, Engels wrote that if the Chinese

could organise themselves and studiously apply their inventiveness, no invading army could have withstood them:

"Während das zerrüttete, auseinanderfallende China eine Methode des Widerstands gefunden hat, die wenn sie fortgesetzt wird, eine Wiederholung der Triumphmärsche des ersten englisch-chinesischen Kriegs unmöglich machen wird."⁹¹

The secret of the success of the Chinese in Engels' view was that they fought a total war or a war "pro aris et focis".⁹² Against an aroused people, he wrote, no army no matter what its battallion strength and the power behind its batteries could hope to conquer and hold them in abeyance. The properties of the war, Engels wrote, were that the peasants fought hit-and-run battles, attacked the infrastructure behind the army, never regarded a battle as lost, did not accept the consequences of a defeat on the battlefield and continued to attack when they should have retreated.⁹³ The surprise and confusion sown by their tactic disorganised the invading and occupying forces, and, Engels argued, could have led to their rapid annihilation had the Chinese been better organised. Instead, one only caught a glimmer of what they could do because they fought spontaneously and sporadically with little apparent military organisation outside the personal troops of some of the warlords.⁹⁴

What were the necessary and sufficient conditions for sporadic attack and spontaneous combat to be transformed into a continuous and systematic war without quarter?

Engels conceded that China was still a feudal or "barbarian" society and to that extent hardly an example to those devising a strategy of revolution for an industrial society.⁹⁵ The Chinese peasantry, he wrote, were clearly oppressed. Their inventiveness in battle and their tenacity were due to their defending a Weltanschauung and a culture. Their Weltanschauung, as in most agrarian societies, echoed the existing and seemingly impregnable social order. When violated by an outside force they fought. But the tradition of landlord against landlord meant that some would desert to the enemy, now learning the process of dividing the native forces from each other, and the war would be lost. With the gradual introduction of imperialism and the rising interests of the landlords and warlords in raising larger amounts of money, the oppression of the

Chinese peasant was becoming both more pronounced and more uniform.⁹⁶ Whereas the total war fought sporadically by the peasants against the invaders was a hopeless war, as the peasants became conscious of their oppression and as conditions became broadly similar throughout the country the grounds would be set for the transformation of a war of personal defence into a war of liberation.⁹⁷

The lessons Engels drew from his investigation of the Asian wars were that an oppressed class defending its culture, heritage or aspirations against a potential invader or any group denying those aspirations could defeat that force by waging a war pro aris et focis. If one could discover how and under what conditions such a war could be created and how a war of defence could be transformed into a war of liberation one was a long way towards finding a strategy applicable to the proletarian struggle. These ideas were carried over into Engels' subsequent analyses of the process of war and proletarian struggle in Europe.

The Notes on War (Uber den Krieg), Engels' running commentary on the Franco-Prussian War, is the first text in which the theme of the proletarian struggle and its relationship to the idea of a war pro aris et focis is discussed in detail.⁹⁸

Engels began his analysis of the Franco-Prussian War, like his Betrachtungen, with a very orthodox survey of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Prussian and French armies and their allies.⁹⁹ He concluded that in terms of a traditional analysis the Prussian army and its allies had an overwhelming superiority. Their creative adaptation of conscription, from Moltke's studiously conceived innovations in troop mobility and their flexibility made that superiority crushing.¹⁰⁰ Engels restricted his first articles to analysing and explaining troop movements, tactics, innovations and descriptions of battles in a very traditional way. But after the battle of Sedan and the catastrophic retreat of the French army behind the defences of Metz he changed his form of analysis.¹⁰¹

According to the tenets of military science, the French army and with it the French nation was defeated. There was no real army to speak of in the field and no way of stopping the advance of the Prussian troops to Paris and the Loire. On all counts, the war should have ended there and then with the surrender of the French.

But according to Engels the war was produced by those social groups supporting and responsible for the Empire and its policies. The defeat was their defeat. But in their exacerbation of the martial spirit and in the defeat they brought on France, they also brought the lower social orders into the battle. The petite bourgeoisie and the proletariat, Engels wrote, still had the will to fight.¹⁰² They transformed the war into a national war of defence. Subsequently, when the nerve of the petite bourgeoisie failed, the proletariat transformed the war of defence into a war of social liberation.¹⁰³

Engels argued that after the defeats at Sedan and Metz a French army could still have defeated the Germans, but that it would have had to be a very different kind of army than the one fielded by the Empire. It would have had to create conditions that made it impossible for the Prussian armies to make use of their superior weapons and deployment of their troops.¹⁰⁴

The military and tactical requirements, themselves, were for a number of extremely mobile guerrilla units operating across the Prussian lines. These must be recruited and organised locally. They would be supported by large-scale resistance in the cities and towns and more covertly by intelligence and supply networks organised by workers and peasants.¹⁰⁵ Commando units would be drawn from the same groups to sabotage the Prussian lines of supply and communications. The people, Engels wrote, would have to be armed and organised. But once power was even partially in their grasp they would hardly relax it. The technical requirements for a continuation of the war implied a democratic army. But one could hardly create a democratic army without a democratisation of society as well.¹⁰⁶ In other words, he argued, only a socialist or socialising society could be equipped to fight the war pro aris et focis to repel an invading force.

The adaptation of the war pro aris et focis or the defensive war in Engels' analysis of the Franco-Prussian conflict is the key to the problem he set himself in the wake of the Reichsverfassungskampagne. The problems and themes it brought to the surface dominated his thinking, writing and intervention in the affairs of the socialist parties. He argued that, once awakened, the proletariat would fight such a war against bourgeois society. The problem was how to stimulate it to take such action and how to organise. Engels worked from several principles deduced from his examination of the nature of conflict.

I think these can be described as doing the unthinkable or irrational, creating

situations in which the enemy cannot respond, subverting the enemy, transforming a situation qualitatively into one favourable to oneself and catalysing the forces at one's command.

By looking at his subsequent analyses, interventions and suggestions, I will try to show how the concept of war pro aris et focis was used as a guiding principle and how it rejoined Marx's argument about consciousness.

The nature of war and conflict in general in and amongst bourgeois societies, Engels argued, was a regulated combat based upon an agreement between the antagonists to respect certain rules and not to transgress certain limits. The battle against bourgeois society, he continued, was not primarily a battle fought within that system of rules but a battle against those rules. If the problem of the proletariat centred upon his having imbibed and unconsciously accepted those rules, one could naturally not begin to talk of the liberation of the proletariat so long as one respected those rules. Such a battle could only be fought to a successful conclusion by those who were marginal to the institutionalisation of those rules and subject to them to a greater extent than any other group. Their experience of marginality gave them the potential to devise forms of combat exceeding the permissible limits of combat and to turn the rules of society against themselves.

Along these lines, in the days after the Commune Marx specified two general aims: organisation and attention to the day-to-day battles of the proletariat. He noted that some "previous organisation der working class" that issued from the day-to-day economic battles was a necessity, but that working-class consciousness could often be raised from concrete battles and seemingly mundane situations that often seemed only indirectly political.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, these sudden movements could in many cases go far beyond the party or whatever form of organisation the working class had adopted and used at the outset of the battle.

"Und in dieser Weise wächst überall aus den vereinzelt ökonomischen Bewegung der Arbeiter eine politische Bewegung hervor, d.h. eine Bewegung der Klasse, um ihre Interessen durchzusetzen in allgemeiner Form, in einer Form, die allgemeine, gesellschaftlich zwingende Kraft besitzt." 108

Engels noted that the commentators and military experts all estimated that the French were defeated as a nation after Sedan. Who was this France, he asked?

The experts assumed that the army was the incarnation of the nation and if the army were defeated then the nation was also defeated. The proletariat, Engels argued, only began to act decisively after Sedan.¹⁰⁹ Wakened to a war of national defence, the proletariat was the only possible force that could still fight the Prussians. It not only continued the war against the Prussians, the invader from without, but against the social forces that had led it into battle and deserted it on the battlefield.¹¹⁰

The most vulnerable point of any society is not on its accepted battlefield but outside the constituted battlefield. To fight on the constituted battlefield would be like the proverbial Russian story of the elephant inviting the mouse to join him in his boxing ring. The essence of successful combat was to strike where least expected. The popular war drew its fire and strength from its subversion of existing social rules and institutions. It changed the battlefield so it could no longer accommodate the enemy. It shattered his expectations and calculations. The Commune, in Engels' view, was the best example of such a process. It was a national war transformed into a war of liberation.¹¹¹

In the days following the defeat of the Commune, Engels turned his attention towards applying its lessons to the proletarian struggle. He was particularly interested in encouraging the newly-launched Eisenacher party (SDAP). Having identified itself as a force of opposition by its hostility to the war against France and the subsequent annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the party, on the eve of the birth of the German Empire, was in need of creative tactics. During the 1860's the German towns along the Rhine and Ruhr grew rapidly into cities and the developing weaving towns and cities in Sachsen were expanding into large agglomerations.¹¹² Emigration from the countryside was large and the cities far too small and without the will to house the sudden influx. Moreover, many of the newly arrived peasants, many of whom came from the Junker strongholds in the East, were still in the grips of the patronising attitudes common to the German agrarian workers at that time.¹¹³ Ideas of working class solidarity were furthest from their minds. Yet the housing crisis presented one of those unique times when material conditions were such that a protest movement of immense political possibilities was feasible. At this point Engels wrote Die Wohnungsfrage to demonstrate that the housing issue was but one aspect of the problem of control over the quality of existence and to urge upon the SDAP the organisation of the disparate urban proletariat.¹¹⁴ The points that could be raised, he noted, were endless. Who was to build? How and what was to be built?

Who had the right to make decisions? Here was the kind of campaign that refused to accept the constituted terrain, could take account of the current situation of the working class and use a particular issue to demonstrate the problem of lack of control over the Lebensquellen, as he argued in his and Marx's analysis of the Commune and subsequently in their critiques of the Gothaerprogramm.¹¹⁵

In 1875 Engels brought out a new version of Der deutsche Bauernkrieg, first published in 1850, to which he appended an introduction arguing that the farm labourers from the large estates in the North and East of Germany were the industrial workers' "zahlreichsten und natürlichsten Bundesgenossen", (most numerous and most natural allies).¹¹⁶ He argued that in common with the industrial workers, the farm workers could only be rescued from their misery by the transformation of the large holdings into public property cultivated by cooperative associations of agricultural workers.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the farm labourers provided the bulk of the armies recruited by the Prussian government and, tied to their landlords, the votes that sent the numerous feudal lords and Junkers to the Reichstag. To draw that class into the movement, he concluded, was the most immediate and urgent task confronting the German labour movement (das ist die nächste, dringendste Aufgabe der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung).¹¹⁸ To awaken its latent power (verborgene Macht)¹¹⁹ was an action worthy of the gigantic impulse given by the Parisian Commune (den riesenhaften Antoss, den namentlich die Parisier Kommune gegeben).¹²⁰

The general theme calling for a creative use of tactics after having investigated the current situation in detail was repeated in all of Engels' subsequent works. The particular themes that he stressed: the importance of the peasantry, the need to neutralise the army and the need for the party to act with more haste and less deliberation, were the essence of the propositions he made to the SPD during the 1880's and 1890's. Finally, the presentation of the text demonstrates how Engels skilfully tried to convince the party that it ought to consider new tactics by coating his suggestions in lavish praise.¹²¹ The first section of the text analyses the present situation in Germany, the balance between and aspirations of the main classes and the importance of the peasantry.¹²² In the final sections, Engels remarks that the German workers belong to the most theoretical people in Europe, have grasped the essence of Hegel and "have exploited the advantages of their situation with rare understanding", (Man muss den deutschen Arbeitern nachsagen, dass sie die Vorteile

ihrer Lage mit seltnem Verständnis ausgebeutet haben).¹²³ Finally, he concluded that because the French workers were unable to undertake an offensive in the light of their defeat at the hands of the Versailles government, and the English, thanks to their "insular peculiarities" (insularen Eigentümlichkeiten),¹²⁴ were immobilised, the German must redouble their efforts.

"Dazu gehören verdoppelte Anstrengungen
auf jedem Gebiet des Kampfes und der
Agitation."¹²⁵

Yet he told Laura Lafargue that in his view the German social democrats were a group of "gebildete Schafsköpfe", (cultured blockheads).¹²⁶

Throughout the 1880's and the 1890's Engels chided the German social democrats for their unadventurous and hidebound tactics. The party was torn between two tactics. There were those who wanted to support the reforms proposed by the Bismarck government and those who wanted to oppose them en bloc. The result was that the party was stagnant and followed events rather than setting the pace.¹²⁷ Engels told Bernstein and Bebel that the party should be initiating action and using the public forum allowed by the Reichstag creatively.¹²⁸

Bebel wrote back to Engels stoutly defending the position of economic determinism as he saw it. He was convinced that the reign of socialism would arrive with little or no action on the part of the organised party so long as it stood by its principles, because the collapse of capitalist society would come about as a result of its own internal and mechanical contradictions.¹²⁹ As late as 1885 he told Engels that the series of rows shaking the party were not as important as Engels assumed and did not require the drastic package of reforms that Engels proposed. The reason for not getting excited about the deep split in the party, Bebel argued, was that the outcome would have little effect on whether capitalism would collapse or not.¹³⁰ However, he added, the only reason the battle against those threatening to support the government's legislative programme in part had to be won was in order to defend socialist principles, so that when the collapse came they would be there intact for the proletariat to follow.¹³¹

In his arguments about party principles Engels struck a theme that was to remain a commonly expressed criticism. He warned Bebel and Singer that the party was entangled in its own orthodoxy and could not face up to practical and tactical questions. The problem, he wrote, was to devise a series of tactics that would

awaken the working class, unite the party and attack Bismarck on grounds where he would find it difficult to muster a counter-attack. In 1890, when the disagreement over the party programme was at its height, Engels sternly warned Schmidt, saying that if the economic deterministic argument then the rage in the party was true why on earth should the party even consider the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat? What was the point of organisation and propaganda if all one had to do was to sit tight?¹³²

Engels first impressed the importance of making what he called positive proposals (positive Gesetzesvorschläge) upon Bernstein.¹³³ The renewal of the anti-socialist laws made agitation in the towns and countryside impossible, he said. Therefore one must use the parliamentary forum, the only available forum, to one's advantage to make those kinds of proposals that would capture the imagination of the working class and threaten the coalition supporting Bismarck. He argued in favour of proposing bills to limit the working day to ten hours, for factory inspection and employers' liability in case of accidents.¹³⁴ Not only would these have the effect of rallying the untapped support of the working class in the newer industrial areas, he suggested, but it would effectively sweep the carpet from under the feet of the wing of the party proposing to collaborate with the legislative machinery of the Bismarckian regime in return for certain favours.¹³⁵

Engels' intervention puzzled the party, his closest collaborators and future historians as well. Lidkte implies that Engels may have been out of touch with events in Germany.¹³⁶ Bebel argued that one must stand on principle and that Engels' proposals smacked of Lassalle.¹³⁷ Bernstein objected that if the party accepted Engels' ideas, power would pass effectively into the hands of the collaborationists.¹³⁸

When the crisis over whether the party should support the government's subsidising of steamships arose and threatened to destroy the unity of the parliamentary delegation,¹³⁹ Engels made a proposal that he felt would have turned the crisis from one threatening the socialists into one threatening the government, would have forced the party back to a unified stand and would have effectively taken the struggle outside parliament.

He proposed to Liebknecht and Bebel that the socialists offer to support the government's proposal in return for the government leasing lands to agricultural cooperatives in East Prussia rather than continuing to lease them to Junkers and also to help to set up industrial cooperatives that would be closely linked to the agricultural cooperatives.¹⁴⁰

If the cooperatives worked, Engels said, they would establish a socialist presence in the most reactionary part of the Empire and that part of Germany from which the majority of troops were recruited.¹⁴¹ Anything that could introduce the idea of socialism in a practical way to the peasants still living in semi-feudal conditions and would thereby begin to neutralise the army so that it could not be so readily used in strikebreaking activities was a step forward, Engels argued.¹⁴² Even if one got no further than making the proposition publicly, it could begin to detach the agrarian workers and peasantry from their traditionalist positions and draw them into the struggle (gerade die Bevölkerung in die Bewegung zu ziehn)¹⁴³ and to subvert the régime from within (kurz, Preussen von innen, zu der Wurzel kaputt machen).¹⁴⁴

If the government agreed, Engels argued, then the socialists would gain an immense advantage. The reformists in the party would see that they could gain their reforms and also a long-term negotiating advantage. Those who claimed to support the principles of the party would see that the party would expand and that socialism would become a much larger force with which to reckon. If the government did not accept the proposal, the most likely outcome in Engels' view, the socialists would have gained an important advantage and at last developed a message that could be used in the agricultural communities.¹⁴⁵

Bebel argued back bitterly that the question of subsidy could not be horsetraded against Engels' proposals in principle and also because the lands of Prussia were controlled by the Prussian government and not by the Empire.¹⁴⁶ The legal point, in Engels' view, was not what was at stake. The point at issue was how to take advantage of the possibilities of the existing situation and get the party out of its impasse:

"Ich gehe noch weiter: wenn wir sozialistische, zur Sturz der kapitalistischen Produktion führende Massregeln vorschlagen (wie diese), dann nur solche, die sachlich praktisch aber für diese Regierung unmöglich sind."¹⁴⁷

During the 1890's, Engels steered his battle for a sachlich-praktisch strategy away from the inner councils of the SPD and towards the ordinary members and sympathisers of the party. His criticism and proposals were delivered, on the whole, in public documents, his Zur Kritik and his introduction to Marx's Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich.¹⁴⁸

We have already noted the considerable change in the political climate when the Sozialistengesetz were not renewed. Behind the euphoria of the demonstrations of joy that greeted the end of the repressive laws and the consequential fall of Bismarck from power, the party and associated organisations were heatedly discussing what kinds of tactics and what forms of organisation were best suited to the new state of affairs. We have seen that in Zur Kritik Engels criticised the party leadership for not acting boldly by making concrete political proposals that would awaken the proletariat. In his view, the climate was favourable for pushing demands for radical democratisation. The régime itself admitted that new legislation was needed and the Emperor called for measures to ease the misery of the working class.¹⁴⁹ The party should react, Engels wrote, by again making those kinds of proposals that appeared to be logical outgrowths of the propositions of the Emperor and liberal bourgeoisie but proposals they could never accept. Principal amongst those proposals, he noted, was the demand for a republic.¹⁵⁰

Engels did not envisage the campaign for the republic as an end in itself.¹⁵¹ He never hid his view from the social democrats that the campaign was designed to seize the political advantage from the régime rather than leading to a republican form of government.¹⁵² As early as 1884 he suggested to Bernstein that

"Was zu sagen war, ist nach meiner Ansicht dies:
auch das Proletariat braucht zur Besitzergreifung der politischen Formen, nur Mittel." 153

He argued that the idea of a republic-of-work was deeply rooted in the ideology of the working class.¹⁵⁴ Having served as the foot soldiers for the liberal ideal, the working class was thoroughly imbued with a vague but persistent notion of republican liberties. The semi-utopian and populist idea of the Volksstaat was not only a creation of Lassalle, he noted, but played an important role in contemporary working-class mythology.¹⁵⁵ It was a simple idea and one that could be easily understood. In the German context, where the denial of the most elemen-

tary constitutional and democratic rights was keenly felt by the working class in what has come to be known as the Puttkamer era, a campaign for republican liberties could well be the catalyst to stir the proletariat.¹⁵⁶

Coming hard on the heels of Engels' calls for agrarian reform, agricultural and industrial cooperatives, restructuring the army and the suggestion that one could strike a bargain with Bismarck, the raising of the republican issue puzzled and annoyed the social democrats. Bebel was ready to concede that the SPD should assume the responsibility for proposing certain liberal-democratic measures dropped by the liberal bourgeois parties during the Bismarck era, but he drew the line at devoting party time and energy to a campaign for the republic.¹⁵⁷ Bebel argued consecutively and contradictorily that the enemy of the working class was the bourgeoisie and it was inconsequential whether it ruled through an empire or a republic and that to campaign for a republic could well mean the suppression of the party.¹⁵⁸

When Engels replied publically several years later in Zur Kritik urging the German workers that they could never obtain power outside the framework of a democratic republic

"Wenn etwas feststeht, so ist es dies, dass unsre Partei und die Arbeiterklasse nur zur Herrschaft kommen kann unter der Form der demokratischen Republik." 159

Bebel and Kautsky studiously ignored all his political proposals. Bebel accused Engels of espousing a doctrine dangerously close to Lassalle and assured him that the issue was irrelevant and would not affect either the timing or the inevitability of the coming collapse of capitalism.¹⁶⁰

In line with their reactions to Engels' previous proposals, the social democrats took Engels' call for the republic literally. They restricted themselves to debating whether the party campaigning for the republic was a good or bad thing for the party.¹⁶¹ What they failed to observe was that Engels was not arguing about the relative merits of an empire or a republic or what would be good for the party as an organisation but about a strategy to involve the working class in the struggle. As Engels emphasised to the Lafargues, the battle for the republic was a valuable tactic in the contemporary Germany context and a means to stir the party from futile and endless discussions about minor points.¹⁶²

Judging by his comments to the Lafargues, Engels was near the point of total exasperation with the SPD after their failure to use their weight in parliament to their advantage, and their persistent fretting about being attacked rather than moving to the offensive.¹⁶³ The fruit of his impatience was a public document written to celebrate the new edition of Marx's Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich.¹⁶⁴

In 1894 the leaders of the SPD detected signs that the government, after three years of relative toleration, might be preparing to re-impose a new version of the Sozialistengesetz. Fearful of the damage that such an action could cause to their organisation and the havoc it would spread throughout the reorganised trade-union movement, the Partei Vorstand tried to demonstrate that the SPD did not fit the Junkers' stereotyped image of the socialists as a dangerously anarchistic group bent on the total destruction of existing society.¹⁶⁵ Engels was at first sceptical of Bebel's warnings but finally heeded them and agreed to cooperate with the party in warding off any new imposition of the hated laws of repression.¹⁶⁶

Part of the anti-socialist fervour was directed against Marx, depicted by the government as the dark power behind the party. If Engels, widely regarded as Marx' chosen successor, would write a text outlining how conditions had changed since the writing of Marx's fire and brimstone addresses of 1848 and 1851, the socialists felt that they would be able to counter many of the arguments directed against them with ease.

As they appealed to Engels in 1891 in their battle against the Jungen, Bebel, Kautsky and Fischer asked him to write a new introduction to the Klassenkämpfe to demonstrate how the violence preached in the text was a primitive reaction that had long since disappeared now that the socialist movement had matured.¹⁶⁷

The request coincided with Engels' very different wish to demonstrate yet once again to the Germans the need for a comprehensive strategy. Having just engaged in yet another series of attacks against Kautsky's orthodox rendition of economic determinism, Fischer's tendency to compromise and Bebel's tendency to allow policy to be determined by the party machinery without reference to ordinary party members,¹⁶⁸ Engels welcomed the opportunity to set the record straight and to present an outline of an alternative strategy. The introduction was his last pronouncement on how to start the process of social revolution in Germany.

With these two very different ideas about the purpose behind the publication of Engels' text, one should hardly wonder at the amount of bitterness and contention arrangements for its publication raised in the party. Engels was forced to cut several passages from his original draft.¹⁶⁹ Without consultation, the party's representatives, Fischer and Bernstein, cut out other sections which they felt might damage the image of the party.¹⁷⁰ As even Bernstein's admiring biographer admits the result was to distort Engels' text to such an extent that it appeared to be arguing that the present course of social democracy was correct.¹⁷¹ Engels was turned into an apologist for the legal struggle. Before discussing the circumstances behind Engels' modifications and the cuts imposed by the SPD, I will discuss the text itself.

In accordance with his commission from the Parteivorstand, Engels argued at the outset of the introduction that he and Marx had been proved wrong in their over-optimistic prognostications of the 1848 and 1849 urban revolutions.¹⁷² In the same confessional tone, he said that one could say that economic causes were at the root of political events only in the last analysis (die politische Begebenheiten zurückzuführen auf Wirkung von in letzter Instanz ökonomischen Ursachen).¹⁷³ The laws of causality were of a different order from the simple cause-effect formula, he continued. There are other important factors to be taken into account and one must understand both the experiences of the actors as well as the general economic setting more clearly than they were accounted for in Marx's early experimental writings (Probe).¹⁷⁴ One must clearly understand the different forms of political expression (politischen Ausdruck)¹⁷⁵ of classes and strata within classes, the general economic setting and the relationship between the two, Engels concluded, if one wished to devise a proper strategy.¹⁷⁶

Turning from the theoretical to an analysis of the revolutions of 1848 and 1849, in particular, and their importance for the German industrial society of 1895, Engels continued his argument almost in the manner of the apologist. Marx and he had been too full of enthusiasm and expectation for the proletariat's first real independent efforts at fighting against the bourgeoisie in an urban civil war!¹⁷⁷ without analysing in depth the tactical reasons and structural reasons for the failure of the Parisian and Berliner proletariats of that era, Engels went on to argue that the tactics of the proletariat of 1848 were hardly relevant to the present day.¹⁷⁸

He cited two main reasons to support his contention. On one hand, street-to-street fighting, the hallmark of what he called the classical revolutions, could be easily contained thanks to the invention of new weapons and the evolution of strategy to contain mobs and urban uprisings.¹⁷⁹ In the era of large-scale industry, trains could speed troops from one corner of Germany to another in the course of a maximum of 48 hours.¹⁸⁰ The large cities like Berlin were ringed by army barracks housing specialists in containing urban revolutions.¹⁸¹ The revolutions of 1848 had been popular revolutions, fought not only by the proletariat but by large sections of the bourgeoisie.¹⁸² In contemporary Germany, he pointed out, the bourgeoisie had proved that it would never support the proletariat in any like undertaking.¹⁸³ The cityscape had changed. Whereas in 1848 the city was still a relatively homogenous mélange of classes, in most European cities the proletariat was now restricted exclusively to certain districts usually quite far from the centre of the towns so that their uprising could not only be quickly contained but would be most unlikely ever to reach the nerve centres of the cities and paralyse their activities.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, Engels argued the barricades had lost their symbolic value to the proletariat. Used so many times since 1848 and so often overcome with ease by the national army, they were more symbols of defeat than symbols of an heroic and possibly victorious battle. The proletariat had also changed. It was no longer an unsettled and restless mob as it had become when the social institutions of the French and German monarchies crumbled in 1848.¹⁸⁵ The spur to action provided by the threatened collapse of existing social institutions no longer existed in the relatively quiet 1890's. Hence a battle of the sort waged by Blanqui, the exemplary action launched by a class-conscious minority, was no longer viable.¹⁸⁶

Engels' apologia is a curious panorama of self-denigration and praise of the efforts of the German social democrats, in his opinion now occupying the centre stage of the international proletariat's struggle against capitalism. Even when he comes to offer suggestions his tone never varies. When he presents his arguments for universal suffrage he uncharacteristically clothes his argument in social-democratic respectability by saying that the argument had been proved not only by Bebel but espoused by Lassalle (Lassalle hatte diesen Punkt wieder aufgenommen).¹⁸⁷ Why this curious form of argument?

To add to our quandary, we have already seen that Marx in La misère and the published introduction to Zur Kritik rejected the simple form of causal analysis based upon what one might call the laws of economic determinism. Engels' implication that Marx's principal analytical error was not to spell out the complexity of the relationship between the superstructure and the infrastructure does not hold water. In the Klassenkämpfe Marx analysed the relationship between different classes and fractions of classes in detail. Indeed, he explains many of their actions in terms of their role in the struggle rather than ever using a simple causal argument of the form that Engels judged incorrect.¹⁸⁸

Can we explain the pattern of Engels' introduction to the Klassenkämpfe by his relationship to the social democrats? We know that Engels attacked Schmidt prior to his writing the introduction for putting far too much weight on economic factors.¹⁸⁹ He said there was no point in bothering to organise a party if the collapse would come through the internal mechanical contradictions of the capitalist system, and in another instance that Schmidt's view of history was too mechanical.¹⁹⁰ We have seen that Engels scaringly criticised Kautsky's version of Marxist theory because it took historical tendencies or propensities (geschichtliche Tendenz) for faits accomplis (vollendete Tatsache).¹⁹¹ Who then were the uncompromising economic determinists, Marx or the respected and recognised interpreters of Marx? Engels left no doubt that his self-effacement was in order to sweeten the pill of a new and more daring strategy that he wanted to present to his audience. Clothing it in apologetics and in respectful references to contemporary socialist leaders and how they could not refuse to see that his propositions were in the logic of their past actions, there is reasonable evidence to conclude that the first section of the introduction was a tactical exercise. Engels explained his purpose to Laura Lafargue pointing out that he had to modify his introduction to make it acceptable to the Berlin socialists with their exaggerated fears of repression and in order to make his main points.¹⁹²

Indeed, in the following sections of the introduction, Engels argued in such a way as to repudiate the essence of many of his initial premises. In essence, he presented his argument about how a particular issue, event or circumstance could be used to catalyse the proletariat and to gain a strategic advantage

over the bourgeoisie. He asked rhetorically, does the sober panorama he presented of the 1848 revolution and his and Marx's mistaken judgments mean that the kind of battle fought at that time is now a thing of the past?¹⁹³ Not at all, he replied, there were any number of mistakes in 1848, one can say that the reaction of the proletariat was both premature and passive, but these errors in no way rule out streetfighting and the use of the barricades per se.¹⁹⁴ There are situations where they are useful and necessary and situations where they can be dangerous for those resorting to their use. I am only suggesting that in the present circumstances they would do more harm than good, he said.¹⁹⁵

The barricades of 1848, Engels wrote, were extremely useful in the circumstances as visible symbols of the proletariat's declaration of war against the bourgeoisie. Although, in the final analysis, they never more than delayed the passage of the army, the erection of the barricades galvanised the working class and served as its declaration of independence. The barricades rallied the working class to combat and led them to try to attain their hopes and aspirations.¹⁹⁶ They stirred the proletariat to action and, for a brief moment, were responsible for its shedding of its traditional submissiveness and deference to established social values.¹⁹⁷ For a fleeting moment, the proletariat had fought on a terrain of its own choosing and under conditions that made an effective riposte against them difficult and hazardous. Whilst under present circumstances the erection of barricades in Berlin and the industrial cities of Germany was inappropriate, he maintained, the contemporary proletariat must find some issue, event or create circumstances that would play the catalytic role of the barricades. Through its understanding of society it must try to ascertain that the issue would be more favourable. The task of contemporary socialists, he concluded, was to find such an alternative.¹⁹⁸

Engels then analysed the characteristics of contemporary German society in order to explain how the issue he proposed, the campaign for meaningful universal suffrage, could play such a role.¹⁹⁹

Engels argued that the Germans, taking up the cudgels from the French proletariat after the Commune, rendered two great services to the international proletarian movement. They showed how universal suffrage could be used effectively and organised the strongest, best disciplined and swiftly growing organisation to use that weapon (die stärkste, die disziplinierteste, die am raschesten anschwelende sozialistische Partei).²⁰⁰ How was universal suffrage the schärfsten Waffen of the time in Engels' view?²⁰¹

If Engels argued in a similar fashion to Bebel and Bernstein, he would have categorically stated that universal suffrage completely and irrevocably replaced the need for "violent" revolution. He did not.

He specified two reasons why he thought universal suffrage was an important weapon in the hands of the contemporary socialist party. In the first place the election campaign itself demonstrated the strength of the movement to the working class.²⁰² The meetings and rallies were tremendously important to a social group that had the utmost difficulty in expressing its aspirations and needed considerable assurance. Secondly, so long as the votes received by the SPD continued to increase in the spectacular way they had during the 1890's, the working class, measuring its growing strength, aware of its party as the strongest party in Germany, would gain confidence in itself and its own independent ideas and proposals.²⁰³ In that way the German socialists:

"... haben das Wahlrecht, in den Worten des französischen marxistischen Programms, transformé de moyen de duperie qu'il a été jusqu'ici en instrument d'émancipation."²⁰⁴

Engels continued, even the most ardent opponents of using the ballot in former times had been convinced of its efficacy. The French adopted the "German example" and were engaged actively in persuading the largest sector of French society, the peasantry, of the value of socialism and undertook valuable parliamentary activity.²⁰⁵

Engels' example of the French use of universal suffrage is as curious as his apologia for his and Marx's mistaken analysis of 1848 and 1849. Engels criticised the French for not making propositions to the peasantry that would engage them in the struggle and for their refusal to use parliament in a creative way by proposing those kinds of laws that would gain the socialists a decided advantage.²⁰⁶ Is this another example of Engels praising German tactics and soothing German pride in order to make modifications of their behaviour more acceptable to them?

He continued to praise the Germans whom he characterised as the citadel (Gewalt-haufen) of the international proletarian army.²⁰⁷ He wrote that if the present impetus behind the movement and its growth were maintained, by the turn of the century it would become the decisive power in the land before whom all other powers must bow:

"Geht das so voran ... und wachsen aus zu der entscheidenden Macht im Lande, vor der alle andren Mächte sich beugen müssen, sie mögen wollen oder nicht."²⁰⁸

But, he argued, the most important task of the movement was to hold its assembled power intact for the decisive moment (sondern ihn intakt zu erhalten bis zum Tag der Entscheidung, das ist unsere Hauptaufgabe).²⁰⁹

Is the decisive moment the day the socialists win over fifty percent of the vote? Although commending the use of the ballot, Engels never maintained that the party would come to power through the ballot box. On the contrary, the decisive day will be the day when the socialists win a substantial electoral victory and the bourgeoisie reacts.²¹⁰ The bourgeoisie and its associated strata of classes would be constrained, Engels wrote, to disown their own legality:

"Sie rufen verzweifelt ... la légalité nous tue ... "²¹¹

A socialist majority or substantial plurality calling for meaningful reform, having triumphed in elections to the powerless Reichstag facing a bourgeoisie intent through all the means at its disposal to defend its economic power would set the scene for the decisive confrontation. Should the proletariat have attained the majority, or even if it were still struggling for that majority, the confrontation would be on the terrain of its own choosing. For that reason he cautioned the socialists against actions (Vorhutkämpfen) that could not lead to such a confrontation.²¹² The defensive war which was an offensive war was the kind of engagement that he had been seeking for years. The proper use of universal suffrage, the emphasis on republican liberties leading up to the confrontation, was an example of such a strategy. The enemy could well be compelled to fight a struggle whose outcome was uncertain on a terrain not of his choosing, where the contradiction between his theory and practice would become evident. The attack on the "intelligent force", as Clausewitz called it, in such a strategy could well be decisive.

The socialists prevailed upon Engels to change several passages of his introduction because of the tricky situation in Berlin.²¹³ Engels noted that their fears were "exaggerated" but, in the end, he wrote, "under the circumstances I had to give way".²¹⁴ At the same time the Partei Vorstand, without consulting Engels, made other changes. The most important changes were that the section

stating that streetfighting and barricades were not ruled out categorically but only in the present situation was dropped so that it appeared that Engels ruled them out forever.²¹⁵ His previous arguments that certain tactics were no longer applicable were thus altered to sound as if "no longer" meant "never" rather than "no longer in the present situation". The sections where Engels argued that the proletariat must maintain its power intact for the coming struggle were dropped so that the text seemed to say that the proletariat would come to power peacefully through the power of universal suffrage alone.²¹⁶ All other qualifications about the use of universal suffrage were dropped as well as Engels' arguments about under what conditions streetfighting should and could be fruitful and the need to be prepared properly before one engaged in military battle.²¹⁷

Engels, convinced that the culprit was, as usual, Wilhelm Liebknecht, complained to Paul Lafargue:

"Liebknecht vient de me jouer un joli tour. Il a pris de mon introduction aux articles de Marx sur la France 1848-50 tout ce qui a pu lui servir pour soutenir la tactique à tout prix paisible et anti-violente qu'il lui plaît de prêcher depuis quelque temps ... Mais cette tactique, je ne la prêche que pour l'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui, et encore sous bonne réserve ... et pour l'Allemagne, elle pourra devenir inapplicable demain." 218

He complained to Richard Fischer that the party had become too concerned about legality and to Kautsky, when excerpts from his introduction were published in the Vorwärts under the general title "Wie man heute Revolutionen macht", that the editors had turned him into a peaceful exponent of legality.²¹⁹

"Zu meinem Erstaunen sehe ich heute im "Vorwärts" einen Auszug aus meiner "Einleitung" ohne mein Vorwissen abgedruckt und derartig zurechtgestutzt, dass ich als friedfertig Ambeter der Gesetzlichkeit quand même dastehe." 220

He requested that the entire introduction be published in the Neue Zeit and that the pamphlet be widely circulated. When the introduction appeared in the Neue Zeit the censored phrases and paragraph were not restored. When the pamphlet was published, it was still the censored version and the printing run was cut back to 5,000, an unusually low run for the party's publishing house.²²¹

The repercussions of the affair on the party, Bernstein's biographer comments, were probably greater than those caused by any other text.²²² Bernstein based much of his argument in the Voraussetzungen on the modified text. He argued that it was Engels' "political testament" and he, Bernstein, was merely taking Engels' arguments to their logical conclusion because Engels did not have the time to understand what he judged to be the necessary revision of his theory.²²³ Yet Bernstein, the literary executor of Engels, refused to publish the unedited text which he had in his possession. Despite Kautsky's plea, Bernstein refused to allow the publication of the manuscript.²²⁴ Even Rosa Luxemburg thought that in the light of the manuscript, Engels had modified his position. Bernstein only handed over the uncut version in 1926 and it was published for the first time in 1930.²²⁵

Why did the socialists suppress some of the most important sections of the text? The fear of the reactivation of the Sozialistengesetz was certainly strong in some circles but Engels' scathing criticism was something they did not want to make public. Indeed, the tone of the introduction is very much a severe dressing down of the party leadership. Engels' argument can be interpreted as his saying that you have misunderstood the role of theory and practice once again. Because you have never grasped the central problematic of industrial society, you have never been able to develop a viable and proper strategy. You are still very much the "socialist philistines" I denounced in my critique of the Erfurterprogramm. My purpose here is to demonstrate once again what needs to be done practically if one wants even to talk about the process of universal liberation. This cannot be done without awakening the proletariat to an understanding of its own oppression. As I showed in my text on the Commune, the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a synonym for party organisation.

Indeed, in the text the role of agent was never specified. The party in the case of universal suffrage played an obviously important role as a legal contestant for political power and the initial galvaniser of the proletariat. Engels argued that the party's duty was to propagandise the proletariat and provide those issues that would allow the proletariat to arrive at a level of consciousness that would lead to the social revolution. The party in that sense had a precisely defined role to play and was not an end in itself.²²⁶ It did not comprise the essence of historical truth. Engels' suspicions about

the bureaucratisation of the party, his criticisms of party ends and the lack of reality leads one to suspect even more strongly that the party was not the unique instrument for the social emancipation of the working class but a vehicle for that liberation and the propagation of the idea of liberation at a particular historical juncture.²²⁷

For example, by emphasising the struggle for republican liberties and by the skilful use of universal suffrage, the party could begin to reveal the essence of exploitation to the working class. Engagement in the struggle was only the first step, but in any case the struggle could only be engaged over a concrete issue because, as Marx had argued, reality was concrete in all its determinations. The struggle could neither be engaged for its own sake nor generated around an artificial issue.

These reservations are necessary because without an overt statement one is reduced to talking about certain tendencies and trying to bridge one criticism to another. There are certainly grounds for such an operation. Marx and Engels were astute tacticians. We have seen their astuteness in their manoeuvring during the lifetime of the Second International. If the party were limited historically to being a possible agent that could catalyse the movement, then their letters to party leaders and their dealings with the party had to be tempered. Where they would be freer to criticise would be in more theoretical questions or questions where the accusing finger was pointed at an adequate substitute. By showing his errors they could perhaps by implication open the way for the party to see the errors of its own ways. They both said that no matter what form the working-class movement took, it still had the potential of liberation in any of its activities - hence the Commune - and this had to be developed.

If this is the case, one could begin to suspect that their texts were intended to play the role of igniters and that each text was the occasion for a skilful attempt to again open the way for the party to meditate upon its strategy. It would stand to reason that if Marx and Engels could talk about strategy, they would also practise strategy. If that is the case then the process of revolution could occur independently of the party and the problem of organisation was not a problem which could be discussed only as mustering a force which does not muster itself. The force can be prodded and it can be catalysed.

Indeed, the role of the party might well be to develop the initial thrust like the Comtéstists and Proudhonists in the Commune and, as Marx pointed out on many occasions, like Lassalle in Germany. After that point the process would transcend the initial fighting force as well. Why? Because in the dialectic it would become obsolete. New problems would emerge and new solutions would have to be found.

There are indications of these themes in the writings of Marx and Engels. The argument is supported by Marx and Engels never having intervened in the question of organisation as it was developed within the SPD or the POF. They shunned such questions. But what they did raise were specific "hot points" of intervention. What they did emphasise were the possibilities that each of these points opened in generating the process of liberation. For Engels, such points of intervention had been the army in Germany, universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy in Germany as for Marx, much earlier, they had been simple political and economic demands. At the end of his life he re-emphasised these kinds of demands in his attack on the POF draft programme. He actually prepared a document that can be described as a prod to the party and the working class. The use of the questionnaire can be described as the initial catalyst. All of these again seem to demonstrate the durability of this theme.

To summarise our argument to this point, we have seen that Engels stated that the essence of socialist strategy was based upon the dictatorship of the proletariat. In previous sections, we have traced the genesis and notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the writings of Marx. He set up his problem by looking at the prevailing form of social relationships and social exchange and the degree to which these were incapable of supplying satisfaction to those who produced exchange value within this society. The problem can be summarised not only as a radical transformation of society but more immediately finding a way to cause or abet the proletariat to transcend its normal pattern of adjustment, as negative as it might be, to existing society and to transcend (aufheben) that society. The process was characterised as the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We have interpreted Engels' study of war in particular and his study of conflict in general as an investigation of these same problems. Engels came to the conclusion, much to his own initial astonishment, that the Kampfplatz was

not only where one assumed the battlefield to be. One had also to engage and attack the assumptions that led to the constitution of that battlefield. This involved a much more generalised attack upon society, a thorough understanding of how it operated and was supposed to operate and, finally, devising a strategy that would subvert that society at its most vulnerable point. In that sense the theories of political power from Blanqui and Bakunin to Bebel were wrong in that they all saw political power as different from social and economic power. Blanqui could therefore propose a simple formula for seizing power, the coup d'état, and Bebel could reduce Engels' suggestions about relying on universal suffrage to the idea that victory at the polls meant total victory. The real Kampfplatz, in Engels' estimation, lay in the everyday and even banal battle for existence where the proletariat most readily and most concretely experienced its own powerlessness and lack of self-definition. These were the battles that must be expanded and enlarged. These were the battles that must be shown to be political battles. The battle had to be a total war that did not respect any of the rules, norms and expectations of existing society. That lack of respect was its greatest weapon.

Engels' general theory can be described as the activation of the proletariat to seize social time and space by using those weapons and tactics that enlarged the struggle and facilitated the collapse of capitalist society. The line of argument remained constant from the Forderungen to the introduction to Marx's Klassenkämpfe. From the day-to-day concrete battle the consciousness of existence, aims, aspirations and expectations would be raised - the consciousness striving towards the unity of man and nature. This is what was at stake. The battle had to be organised but the organisation must not hinder the growth and creativity of that consciousness. The agents of propaganda and battle at each succeeding stage could not be permanent organisations. They had a role to play but the role was limited. For the moment the problem was how to initiate the process of revolution. The initial stages required a series of catalysts, prods or agents suitable to the possibilities inherent in each concrete situation.

In that sense, Marx and Engels made two kinds of arguments. The first is the general argument we have just reviewed. The second is what we can call a concrete argument. The second argument cannot be specified because, in all of

its determinations, it depends upon each existing situation. The general argument can be characterised as a guide, perhaps even a shrewd guide because it was based upon assessments and experiences. A shrewd guide based upon experience, according to Clausewitz, was the only kind of strategy that could be discussed when one was not on the actual battlefield itself in the midst of the struggle. The general argument could but:

" ... bring out prominently the little that
there is of principle or rule ... " 228

We will now consider some additional concrete arguments and examples of the strategy of Marx and Engels.

NOTES

1. Betrachtungen über die Folgen eines Krieges der Heiligen Allianz gegen Frankreich im Falle einer siegreichen Revolution im Jahre 1852, (1851), AMS, Band 2, p. 218; "Die Emanzipation des Proletariats wird auch einen besondern militärischen Ausdruck haben, wird eine aparte, neue Kriegsmethode erzeugen. Cela est clair." It was not published until 1915 when it appeared in the Neue Zeit with a sufficiently chauvinist title to suit the war fever of the SPD: Möglichkeiten und Voraussetzungen eines Krieges der Heiligen Allianz gegen Frankreich im Jahre 1852.
2. Some interesting insights in Stepanova, pp. 43-52 and in Tartakovskij, "Friedrich Engels velikij master revoljucionoj taktiki proletariata." in Voprosy Istorii, KPSS, 1906, pp. 81-98; Mayer hardly mentions Engels' abiding interest in military theory.
3. The Italian War against Austria can hardly be described as a war of liberation and the only other war of liberation as such in Europe was that fought by Kossuth in Hungary.
4. The only work to my knowledge that emphasises both this point and the importance of strategy for Engels is Jehuda Wallach, Die Kriegslehre von Friedrich Engels, Frankfurt/Main, 1968.
5. Engels to Weydemeyer, 19.6.51, AMS, Band I, pp. 166-68: "Von deutschen Sachen hab' ich nichts, doch muss ich mir einiges besorgen; ich denke zunächst Willisen und Clausewitz. Was ist an den zweien, und was ist der Mühe wert und was nicht? so wohl theoretischen wie historisch." Engels to Marx, 7.5.52, AMS, Band I, pp. 232-33.
6. Engels to Marx, 7.5.52, AMS, Band I, pp. 232-33.
7. ibid.,
8. ibid.,
9. He wrote a series of articles for the "New American Cyclopedia", on various technical aspects of warfare and military innovation, AMS, Band I, pp. 511-742; and also a series of articles called Die Armeen Europas, (1855), AMS, Band I, pp. 397-472 again analysing the purely military aspects.
10. Engels to Marx, opcit.; Vorbemerkung, AMS, Band I, p. v.
11. Marx to Engels, 16.4.56, MEW, Band 29, p. 47, "The whole thing in Germany abhängen von der Möglichkeit to back the Proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasants' war."
12. The Spanish guerrilla fighters of 1808 crop up repeatedly in Engels' writings. Der Krieg in Italien, (1849), AMS, Band I, p. 148; Kriegführung im Gebirge, (1857), AMS, Band I, p. 479; and notably in Über den Krieg, (1870-71), AMS, Band II, p. 453, the Hungarians in Ungarn, (1849), AMS, Band I, pp. 155, 160, MEW, Band 10, p. 714, Engels to Marx,

MEW, Band 30, 17.2.63, p. 327, and the Chinese most prominently in Persien-China, (1857), AMS, Band I, pp. 480-86. The American civil war in Die Lage auf dem amerikanischen Kriegsschauplatze, (1862), AMS, Band II, pp. 301-05, where Engels discussed the possibilities of the South waging a guerrilla war, p. 304.

13. Betrachtungen, pp. 218, 221.
14. ibid., pp. 218-19, 221.
15. I will review all of these points in detail in my analysis of the Betrachtungen below. Revolution und Konterrevolution, AMS, Band I, pp. 198-99.
16. in AMS, Band I, pp. 49-141.
17. F. L8with, Die Hegelsche Linke, Stuttgart, 1962, argues that the failure led to the break-up of the Young Hegelian movement.
18. Klassenkämpfe, p. 11; Die 18. Brumaire, p. 117; "Die sozialen Revolution des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts kann ihre Poesie nicht aus der Vergangenheit schöpfen sondern nur aus der Zukunft." Marx to Kugelmann, 12.4.71, MEW, Band 33, p. 205.
19. Die Reichsverfassungskampagne, p. 72.
20. ibid., p. 50.
21. ibid., p. 55; Revolution und Konterrevolution, p. 202.
22. Reichsverfassungskampagne, pp. 61, 66, 127, 140.
23. ibid., pp. 73, 134, 137, 139; Revolution und Konterrevolution, pp. 204-05.
24. Reichsverfassungskampagne, pp. 132-33.
25. Revolution und Konterrevolution, p. 205.
26. Reichsverfassungskampagne, pp. 95-96.
27. ibid., p. 49.
28. Revolution und Konterrevolution, pp. 198-99.
29. Reichsverfassungskampagne, pp. 77-78.
30. ibid., pp. 87-88, 118, 140.
31. Revolution und Konterrevolution, pp. 201, 203.
32. Reichsverfassungskampagne, p. 79. Engels listed what he considered to be the military ingredients for the success of the movement: avoiding unnecessary risings in fortified towns or towns near military encampments, creating a diversion in the countryside, rush all available forces onto the Right bank of the Rhine and organise a democratic army. But the petite bourgeoisie lacked the audacity to accomplish let alone understand these tactics, pp. 62-63.

33. ibid., p. 139.
34. ibid., p. 140 .
35. ibid., p. 50.
36. ibid., p. 139.
37. ibid., p. 140.
38. Betrachtungen, pp. 207-08.
39. Reichsverfassungskampagne, p. 141, and the proletariat was confirmed as the only revolutionary class.
40. Der Krieg in Italien, (1849), AMS, Band I, pp. 148-151.
41. ibid., p. 148.
42. ibid., p. 148.
43. ibid., p. 150, "Aber der Aufstand in Masse, die allgemeine Insurrektion des Volkes, das sind Mittel, vor deren Anwendung das Königtum zurückschreckt. ... Das sind Mittel, deren Ausführung gewöhnlich den revolutionären Terrorismus voraussetzt, ..."
44. ibid., p. 150; "Aber freilich! Revolutionskrieg, Massenerhebung und Terrorismus - dazu wird die Monarchie sich nie verstehen." Engels also summarised what he felt were the creative elements of previous peoples' wars, Spain 1808, (p. 148), and France 1793, (p. 150).
45. Engels to Bernstein, 27.9.83, MEW, Band 36, p. 54, where he alludes to the importance of an audacious policy of attacking where least expected.
46. Klassenkämpfe, p. 105-07; Reichsverfassungskampagne, p. 139: "Die Reichsverfassungskampagne ging zugrunde an ihrer eignen Halbseit und innen Misere. Seit der Juniniederlage 1848 steht die Frage für den zivilisierten Teil des europäischen Kontinents so: entweder Herrschaft des revolutionären Proletariats oder Herrschaft der Klassen, die vor dem Februar herrschten. Ein Mittelding ist nicht mehr möglich."
47. In AMS, Band I, pp. 207-231.
48. ibid., pp. 214-15, 221.
49. ibid., p. 215, 219.
50. ibid., p. 216.
51. ibid., pp. 210, 221.
52. ibid., p. 215.
53. ibid., p. 217.
54. ibid., p. 218.

55. ibid., p. 215.
56. Engels to Marx, 7.5.52, AMS, Band I, p. 233.
57. Die Revolution in China und in Europa, (1853), MEW, Band 9, p. 95.
58. Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, p. 582.
59. Bloch, Über Methode und System bei Hegel, pp. 36-45.
60. K. Bekker, Marx' philosophische Entwicklung. Sein Verhältnis zu Hegel, Zürich, 1962; M. Rossi, Marx e la dialettica hegeliana, Roma, 1960.
61. Marx, Die Revolution in China, opcit., p. 95: "Ein sehr tiefgründer, doch etwas phantasiereicher Erforscher der Bewegungsgesetze der Menschheit."
62. Much of my exposition of the Hegelian dialectic comes from André Gluckmann, Le discours de la guerre, Paris, 1967, where Hegel and Clausewitz are contrasted.
63. M. Sobotka, Die idealistische Dialektik der Praxis bei Hegel, Praha, 1965.
64. Introduction to The Philosophy of History, pp. 29-31.
65. ibid., the state is the embodiment of rational freedom, pp. 47-448; freedom is property and its possession, p. 448; also Adorno, pp. 59-60.
66. J. Ritter, Hegel und die französische Revolution, Köln, 1957, pp. 83-85, 111-115.
67. According to Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, ed. Raymond Queneau, Paris, 1947, pp. 322-43.
68. F. Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, Aalen, 1962.
69. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 320.
70. Engels to Marx, opcit., p. 233.
71. Betrachtungen, p. 215, though in later years he seemed to argue that the system could become uncontrollable, Kann Europa abrüsten?, (1893), MEW, Band 22, pp. 369-99.
72. Betrachtungen, p. 215.
73. ibid., pp. 217-220.
74. ibid., pp. 220-221.
75. ibid., pp. 212, 218.
76. ibid., p. 215.

77. Engels to Marx, 26.9.51, AMS, Band I, p. 206.
78. Betrachtungen, pp. 219-20.
79. ibid., p. 218.
80. ibid., p. 212.
81. ibid., p. 215.
82. ibid., p. 217.
83. ibid., pp. 221-22.
84. ibid., pp. 218, 222.
85. ibid., p. 229: "Auf die Chancen, die durch Aufstände in Deutschland, Italien pp. der Revolution gegeben werden können wir gleich zu sprechen."
86. ibid., p. 215.
87. Der Aufstand in Indien, (1857), AMS, Band I, pp. 487-93; Persien-China, (1857), AMS, Band I, pp. 480-86; Die Einnahme Lucknows, (1858), AMS, Band I, pp. 490-500; Der Aufstand in Indien II, (1858), AMS, Band I, pp. 501-510.
88. Persien-China, p. 484; Engels contrasted the Chinese way of fighting to the Persians, who having adapted the Western form of military organisation failed because they tried to fight on a kind of battlefield they could never hope to master, ibid., pp. 480-83.
89. ibid., p. 484; he found all of these forms of warfare had one element in common, they were a "Form des Defensivkrieges ... das ist ... einer nationalen Erhebung und Partisanenkrieg ...", Kriegführung im Gebirge, (1857), AMS, Band I, p. 478.
90. Persien-China, pp. 484-85.
91. ibid., p. 480
92. ibid., p. 484: "Kurz, anstatt über die schrecklichen Grausamkeiten der Chinesen zu moralisieren, wie es die ritterliche englische Presse tut, täten wir besser daran, anzuerkennen, dass es sich hier um einen Krieg pro aris et focis handelt, um einen Volkskrieg zur Erhaltung der chinesischen Nation ... aber dennoch um einen Volkskrieg."
93. ibid., p. 485.
94. ibid., p. 486
95. ibid., pp. 484-85.
96. ibid., p. 486; also Marx, Die Revolution in China und in Europa, (1853), MEW, Band 9, p. 102; Engels to Sorge, 10.11.94, MEW, Band 39, p. 310.
97. Persien-China, p. 486.

98. The text appeared in English in the Pall-Mall Gazette during 1870-71, unsigned by Engels. It only appeared in 1923 in an edition prepared by Victor Adler thus still another of the long series of Engels' writings that were either severely changed or held back.
99. Über den Krieg, pp. 373-75, 378, 379-82, 397-401, 446-50.
100. ibid., p. 375, 381.
101. ibid., pp. 474, 487, 489.
102. ibid., pp. 476, 487, 494.
103. Einleitung, (1891), pp. 192-93; Erste Adresse des Generalrats über den Deutsch-Französischen Krieg, MEW, Band 17, pp. 3, 7.
104. Über den Krieg, pp. 486-87, 489, 491-92.
105. ibid., p. 489.
106. ibid., pp. 491-92.
107. Marx to Bolte, 23.11.71, MEW, Band 34, p. 332.
108. ibid., p. 333.
109. Über den Krieg, pp. 491-92.
110. Einleitung (1891), pp. 192-93.
111. Einleitung (1891), p. 193; Engels to Sorge, 4.3.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 45.
112. Kuczynski, pp. 32-38.
113. Die Bauernfrage in Frankreich und Deutschland, (1894), MEW, Band 22, pp. 498, 504.
114. Die Wohnungsfrage, (1872), MEW, Band 18, pp. 209-87.
115. Kuczynski, pp. 64-72; Annemarie Lange, Berlin zur Zeit Bebels und Bismarcks, Berlin, 1959, pp. 50-53.
116. Vorbemerkung zu "Der deutsche Bauernkrieg", (Ausgabe 1875), MEW, Band 7, p. 536.
117. ibid., p. 537.
118. ibid., p. 537; Engels to Bebel, 20.1.86, MEW, Band 36, pp. 424-28.
119. ibid., p. 537; Engels to Lafargue, 22.11.94, Correspondance, tome iii, pp. 324-26; Engels to Liebknecht, 24.11.94, MEW, Band 36, pp. 330-32; Engels to Sorge, 4.12.94, MEW, Band 36, pp. 334-36; Engels to Sorge, 12.12.94, MEW, Band 36, pp. 338-9; Engels to Adler, 14.12.94, MEW, Band 36, pp. 340-44.

- 120. Vorbemerkung zu "Der deutsche Bauernkrieg", p. 541.
- 121. ibid., p. 529.
- 122. ibid., p. 541.
- 123. ibid., p. 541.
- 124. ibid., p. 541.
- 125. ibid., p. 542.
- 126. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 31.3.84, Correspondance, tome ii, p. 184.
- 127. Engels to Bebel, 30.12.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 260.
- 128. ibid.; Engels to Bernstein, 11.11.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 234; Bebel to Motteler, 31.8.84, Bebel Archive, IISH.
- 129. Bebel to Engels, 28.3.81 and 24.11.85, Briefwechsel, pp. 106, 199 respectively.
- 130. Bebel to Engels, 24.11.85, p. 199.
- 131. Bebel to Engels, 7.12.85, Briefwechsel, p. 248.
- 132. Engels to Schmidt, 27.10.90., MEW, Band 37, p. 488.
- 133. Engels to Bernstein, 11.11.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 234.
- 134. Engels to Bebel, 18.11.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 240.
- 135. The reply was negative. Bernstein to Engels, 15.11.84, Bernstein Archives, IISH.
- 136. Lidtke, p. 264; Bebel, Aus meinem Leben, p. 309.
- 137. Bebel to Engels, 7.12.85, Briefwechsel, p. 248.
- 138. Bernstein to Engels, 24.11.84, Bernstein Archives, IISH.
- 139. Bebel to Engels, 28.12.84, Briefwechsel, p. 207; Sozialdemokrat, 22.1.85; 29.1.85; 5.2.85; 12.2.85; 19.2.85; 12.3.85; and led to a row over the management of the newspaper: Bebel to Liebknecht, 28.4.85; 9.5.85; 23.5.85; 27.5.85; 30.5.85, in Liebknecht Archive, IISH; Liebknecht to Motteler, 10.7.85, Liebknecht Archive, IISH.
- 140. Engels to Liebknecht, 29.12.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 259; Engels to Bebel, 30.12.84, MEW, Band 36, pp. 261-62; Engels to Bebel, 11.12.84, MEW, Band 36, pp. 253-54.
- 141. Engels to Bebel, opcit., pp. 261-62.
- 142. Engels to Liebknecht, opcit., p. 259.

143. Engels to Bebel, 20.1.86, MEW, Band 36, p. 424.
144. ibid., pp. 424-5.
145. Engels to Bebel, 30.12.84, opcit.; Engels to Bebel, 20.1.86, MEW, Band 36, pp. 424-5.
146. Engels to Schülter, 15.12.84, 24.12.84, 13.2.86, Bebel Archives, ILSH; in the end the party decided to vote for the subsidies so long as the ships were German built. Sozialdemokrat, 26.2.85.
147. Engels to Bebel, 30.12.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 260.
148. Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmwurfs, (1891), MEW, Band 22, pp. 225-240; Einleitung (zu Karl Marx' "Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848 bis 1859", (1895), MEW, Band 22, pp. 509-27.
149. Engels to Paul Lafargue, 13.1.95, Engels to Laura Lafargue; 28.3.95, Correspondance, tome iii, respectively, pp. 386, 3981
150. Engels to Schülter, 14.6.90, MEW, Band 37, p. 423; Engels to Bebel, 20.1.86, MEW, Band 36, pp. 424-25; Engels to Bernstein, 24.3.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 128.
151. ibid., p. 127; Engels to Laura Lafargue, 14.10.92, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 218.
152. Engels to Bernstein, 24.3.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 128; Engels to Paul Lafargue, 3.4.95, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 404.
153. Engels to Bernstein, 24.3.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 128.
154. ibid., p. 128.
155. Engels to Bebel, opcit., p. 424.
156. Engels to Lafargue, 19.1.95, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 391.
157. Bebel to Engels, 7.12.85, Briefwechsel, p. 248.
158. ibid., p. 248.
159. Zur Kritik, p. 235.
160. Bebel, opcit., p. 248; Bebel to Engels, 24.11.85, Briefwechsel, p. 106.
161. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 28.3.95, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 386; Engels to Paul Lafargue, 19.1.95, p. 391.
162. ibid.; Engels to Paul Lafargue, 22.11.94, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 373.
163. ibid.,
164. Engels to Laura Lafargue, opcit., p. 398.

165. Kautsky, Der Parlamentarismus, die Volksgesetzgebung und die Sozialdemokratie, Stuttgart, 1893, p. 118.
166. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 28.3.95, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 398.
167. R. Fischer to Engels, 6.3.95, quoted in MEW, Band 22, p. 644; Engels, "Antwort an die Redaktion der "Sächsischen Arbeiter-Zeitung" ", in Sozialdemokrat, 7.9.90, 13.9.90.
168. Engels to Liebknecht, 10.8.90, MEW, Band 37, p. 321.
169. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 28.3.95, opcit., p. 398.
170. Engels to Kautsky, 1.4.95; MEW, Band 39, p. 452; Engels to Fischer, 8.3.95, MEW, Band 39, p. 424: "Ich bin der Ansicht, dass Ihr nichts dadurch gewinnt, wenn Ihr den absoluten Verzicht aufs Dreinschlagen predigt. Glauben tut's kein Mensch, und keine Partei irgendeines Landes geht so weit, auf das Recht zu verzichten, der ungesetzlichkeit mit den Waffen in der Hand zu widerstehn."
171. Angel, pp. 249-50; yet Engels blamed Liebknecht in his letters to the Lafargues, Engels to Paul Lafargue, 3.4.95, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 404.
172. Einleitung (1895), p. 509.
173. ibid., p. 509.
174. ibid., p. 510.
175. ibid., p. 510.
176. ibid., p. 511.
177. ibid., p. 513.
178. ibid., p. 514-5.
179. ibid., p. 519.
180. ibid., p. 522.
181. ibid., p. 521.
182. ibid., p. 521.
183. ibid., pp. 520-22.
184. ibid., p. 521.
185. Marx/Engels, Der langweilige Krieg, MEW, Band 10, p. 380.
186. ibid., p. 522.
187. ibid., p. 518.
188. See Chapter II above.
189. Engels to Schmidt, opcit.

190. Engels to Schmidt, 1.7.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 129.
191. Engels to Kautsky, 14.10.91, MEW, Band 38, p. 179.
192. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 28.3.95, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 398.
193. Einleitung, (1895), pp. 511-12, 515.
194. ibid., p. 522.
195. ibid., p. 522.
196. ibid., p. 521.
197. ibid., pp. 520-21.
198. ibid., pp. 523, 526-27.
199. ibid., pp. 523-24.
200. ibid., p. 518.
201. ibid., p. 518.
202. ibid., pp. 519, 523-24.
203. ibid., p. 524.
204. ibid., pp. 518-19.
205. ibid., p. 518.
206. Engels to Sorge, 10.11.94, MEW, Band 39, pp. 308-09; Mayer, Band II, p. 494.
207. Einleitung, (1895), p. 524.
208. ibid., p. 524.
209. ibid., p. 524.
210. ibid., pp. 524-25; he made a similar argument to Laura Lafargue, 14.10.92, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 218.
211. ibid., p. 525.
212. ibid., p. 524.
213. Mayer, Band II, p. 497, gives an account of the pressure put on Engels.
214. Engels to Laura Lafargue, opcit.
215. Einleitung, (1895), p. 522, the paragraph in brackets.

216. Einleitung (1895), pp. 524-25.
217. ibid., pp. 519, 521, 523.
218. Engels to Paul Lafargue, 3.4.95, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 404.
219. The Fischer letter has been lost. It was dated 14.3.95. See MEW, Band 22, p. 644; 30.3.95, Vorwärts; Engels to Kautsky, 1.4.95, MEW, Band 39, p. 452.
220. ibid.,
221. Bebel told Engels that he misunderstood what the party had done, 11.3.95, then told him he had no right to complain because his article was published 20.4.95, 6.6.95, and finally tried to strike a compromise, 17.6.95, in Briefwechsel, respectively pp. 795-6, 798, 803, and 803-04.
222. Angel, pp. 249-50.
223. Voraussetzungen, p. 26.
224. Neue Zeit, 1899, Band II, p. 47.
225. Angel, p. 250; MEW, Band 22, p. 645.
226. Engels to Liebknecht, 10.8.90, MEW, Band 37, p. 321.
227. Engels to Lafargue, 23 or 24.8.94, Correspondance, tome iii, p. 369.
228. Clausewitz, III, iii, p. 251.

CHAPTER V

THE 'ENQUÊTE OUVRIÈRE' AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF STRATEGY
PROPOSED BY MARX AND ENGELS

Aside from a brief introduction to the second Russian edition of the Manifest, repeating the theme advanced in his letter to Vera Sassulitsch about the feasibility of a revolution based on the peasantry, Marx only produced two further published texts either on his own or in collaboration with Engels.¹

The first was the Enquête ouvrière, written during the first half of April, 1880.² The Enquête is a long survey-questionnaire comprising over one hundred questions inquiring into the working and living conditions of factory workers and their families. Marx wrote the questionnaire on the request of the Revue socialiste, a journal published by the newly-launched Parti ouvrier français, (POF). The text was written in English.

Three weeks later, Marx penned a brief introduction (Considérants), in French, to the Programme du parti ouvrier.³ He also revised the subsequent sections of the programme, in his view impregnated with what he called the vulgar errors of bourgeois economics.⁴

The chambres syndicales and local working-mens' associations that united to form the POF constituted, Marx hoped, the beginning of the first organised workers' movement in France (die erste wirkliche Arbeiterbewegung).⁵ Taking advantage of his acquaintance of Lafargue and Guesde, Marx made several important tactical suggestions to the fledgling party. True to his criticism of the Gothaerprogramm, he presented them with a short concise action programme (Aktenstück)⁶ as well as a valuable tactic, the self-administered questionnaire.⁷

I will argue that Marx's intervention into the affairs of the newly constituted POF is an example of the application of the strategy proposed by himself and Engels. I will further argue that the Enquête was not merely conceived as a survey to discover the general living conditions of the French working class but as a text whose application could easily arouse the workers' hidden and sublimated opposition to capitalism by making them examine the social meaning of their labour. Marx felt, I will argue, that from the praxis of the research groups a movement based upon the real needs and problems of the working class could emerge. Secondly, I will argue that Marx's introduction to the Programme, the Considérants, is an example of the kind of action programme Marx

and Engels referred to in their battle over the Gothaerprogramm. It is the only document where Marx discusses how the political party can be used to encourage what he called "demands which have clearly and spontaneously sprung from the working class itself" (die reell aus der Arbeiterbewegung selbst spontan hervorgewachsen sind). Finally, I will suggest that Marx regarded the party as an agent to launch the social revolution.

A survey of factory conditions, factory organisation and the living conditions of factory workers was not something new in France. By the 1880's the survey was a well-established instrument of research.⁸ The Second Empire, interested in rapid economic expansion, had encouraged industrial development and industrial research. The government directly and indirectly sponsored research into the natural and human resources that could be used to promote industrialisation. Villermé's massive study of the cotton industry in Alsace and Lorraine was not only a landmark in the development of the industrial questionnaire but was immediately useful because it determined the availability, needs and the possibility of developing manpower resources.⁹ Turgan conducted a study of manufacturing processes and factory organisation that ran to a dozen volumes.¹⁰ These and subsequent studies shared the assumption that the general direction of social development, if not the existing social structure, was correct. As Hilda Weiss points out, the researchers and their sponsors were not concerned with the problems of their labour force.¹¹ They did not bother to find out how the worker experienced the factory. Considering the factory the necessary foundation of modern society, they sought to adjust the worker to the rhythms of his work in the name of industrial efficiency.¹²

There is probably some truth to the argument that Marx's immediate interest in the survey may have been to reveal its antecedental and implicit ideology.¹³ Again he may have been interested in producing a scientifically accurate picture of the exploitation of the working class. The problem of such an interpretation, however, is that Marx did not always use the term science as a synonym for describing the traditional theory of knowledge and its methodological procedures.

In an article comparing Marx's Enquête to those used by the 19th century researchers and trying to relate it to Marx's earlier works, Hilda Weiss argues that Marx's survey concentrated on two axes.¹⁴ The first, she conceded, could be characterised as an application of the traditional theory of know-

ledge. It was an attempt to gain an accurate or objective picture of French industry, and its workers.¹⁵

But Marx was far from an upholder of such a theory and was not interested in the kind of still-photography that it implied. If the essence of his problematic was consciousness and man changing society, there must be a teleological aspect to his questionnaire. Hilda Weiss argues that the second aspect of the Enquête is precisely an application of teleological science.¹⁶ The questionnaire into working-class life, she wrote, would be undertaken by the workers themselves. The confrontation between subject and object, she argued, was Marx's stimulus to the worker's understanding and changing his society.¹⁷

In general terms, one can argue that the essence of any questionnaire, no matter how it is structured, is that it involves a dialogue between the surveyor and his subject. Usually that dialogue takes place within a framework supplied by the researcher whose study is conditioned by his aims and those of his society.¹⁸ Implicit in the questionnaire itself is a definition of normal, abnormal, acceptable and unacceptable. These limits are governed by what the researcher can envisage. His questionnaire will not allow the respondent to step outside those limits. Usually the framework is supplied by the researcher so that the respondent must choose from a finite set of responses implicit in the researcher's design. In many cases the question is so constructed that a response is already lodged within the assumptions that led to its being asked.

One can argue that, in Marx's view, society at large imposes frameworks of reference on the order of the questionnaire and conducts an unequal dialogue. The working class can be taken as equivalent to the respondent or subject of the questionnaire. But should the questionnaire be so designed that the dialogue is between the workers as subject and surveyor, the situation changes. The essence of social revolution, as expressed by Marx, was the working class actively discovering the essence of its conditions of life and changing them. The initial process can be described as constant self-questioning or interrogation, of its role, others' role, the usefulness of social institutions in an open, equal and free dialogue. If the researcher is also the subject then the objective and subjective sides of existence are brought into confrontation and he can begin to grasp his own problems and their solutions. In that sense the Commune can be described as the communards' constantly questioning themselves without pre-determined or imposed patterns, deciding upon a course of action and taking that course of action.

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What evidence do we have to support this thesis?

The conventional or most apparent side of the questionnaire concerns industrial development and the changes in the form and content of work resulting from the beginnings of the division of labour in certain manufacturing processes.¹⁹ As we have seen, Marx and Engels were well aware of these changes and commented many times on the effect of the streamlining of production procedures on the worker.²⁰ They pointed out to the social democrats the importance of understanding the immediate work situation and its relation to the life styles of workmen outside the factory.²¹ Given their premise that one must have a clear picture of the structure and organisation of the factory and how these gave rise to the problems of the working class, such a survey would bring them important information.

We can find evidence of the unconventional side of the questionnaire dating from as early as 1866. When Marx drew up the Statutes of the International he devoted an entire section to the preparation, elaboration and administration of a questionnaire (Allgemeine Statistik der Arbeiterklasse).²² Normally one would assume that such a questionnaire would be an addendum to the work of the International. On the contrary, Marx wrote that it was one of the most important activities of the International.

"Die statistische Untersuchung der Lage der arbeitenden Klasse aller zivilisierten Länder unternommen von der Arbeiterklasse selbst, ist an sich schon ein grossen internationales Werk." ²³

To understand the importance Marx placed upon the questionnaire, we must first look at the Statutes of the International itself.

Firstly, we find that the Statutes do not specify any other activity that all subscribing groups should engage in.²⁴ Secondly, we find that the Statutes specify that the constituent groups of the International should be local groups and that the qualifications for membership were that they adhere to the Statutes.²⁵ As Marx commented, the Statutes were written so that working-class organisations subscribing to any of the current socialist ideologies would still feel at home in the International.²⁶ The central body's role was restricted to serving as a clearing house for correspondence and informing the constituent groups of the activities of other groups.²⁷

It can be argued that the reason for such a loose organisation and the absence of national groups was that in many countries nationally organised groups espousing the aims of the International were illegal. But there appear to be other reasons. As Riazanov argues, Marx and Engels fought for a fluid or open kind of organisation of the International.²⁸ They felt it should not be a centralised and statutorily rigid organisation. The role of the International was limited to registering opinions and Marx and Engels fought hard for that structure against Bakunin who saw the International as an instrument rather than as a clearing-house.²⁹ Moreover, Marx felt that it was necessary to find out what the problems articulated by local groups were.³⁰ The development of industry was uneven and different localities experienced different problems.

In the Statutes the one specified activity of local organisations is that they undertake a survey based on the outline in the Statutes.³¹ Marx wrote that the questionnaire would provide the worker with a reference-framework to thinking about and discussing his work and style of life. The framework would encourage him to investigate his thoughts and to discuss them with his fellow workmen. The framework would encourage him to relate his work day to his activities outside work.³² In fact the questionnaire could not be answered without the close cooperation of workmen in the same establishment, in the case of small enterprises, and workmen from different workshops, in larger establishments.³³ To answer the questionnaire would already require an organisation of those facing the same day-to-day problems. The collecting of data would engender organisation. In that sense the discovery of the nature of exploitation would be directly linked to organisation. The questioning phase and the organisation phase could lead to a political phase. At that point the problem of further organisation on something more than a local basis would be posed. Hence Marx concluded his plea for the survey by saying:

"Um erfolgreich zu wirken muss man das Material kennen, worauf man wirken will. Durch die Initiative eines so grossen Werks beweisen die Arbeiter zu dem ihre Fähigkeit, ihre eigenes Geschick in ihre Hand zu nehmen." ³⁴

Here then is evidence of the teleological aspect of the questionnaire. In Marx's view it would enable/compel the worker to "take his fate into his own hands".³⁵

Hence even the primitive questionnaire of 1866 was designed to accomplish something more than gathering information. To a large extent, the role of the International was to sponsor the setting-up and operations of such groups. Hilda Weiss wrote that the questionnaire was "pedagogical".³⁶ The worker would learn about his own situation which he also shared with other workmen. Here we find the basis for a political movement. If the Commune is an example of a school of socialism accidentally born, as Marx put it,³⁷ then the Enquête can be described as a means that could encourage such a process of self-discovery and organisation.³⁸

The circumstances under which the questionnaire appeared were such that very few working-class organisations existed in France. There were instances of sporadic activities but little continuous organisation.³⁹ The role of the questionnaire was to begin to focus those activities by concentrating on the articulated problems of the working class.

The 1866 questionnaire was short and its format skeletal. Marx suggested that the local groups elaborate the questionnaire themselves.⁴⁰ He wrote that the questions had to be altered in the light of changing conditions and problems.⁴¹ He was more concerned with the method of the Enquête than the actual spelling out of a detailed questionnaire. In the 1871 version of the Statutes, the questionnaire appeared again with Marx commending it to the attention of socialist groups.⁴²

The 1880 Enquête, written on the request of Guesde, Lafargue and Malon,⁴³ provided Marx and Engels with a more suitable opportunity to test the survey. Rather than being prepared for socialist groups in n number of countries, it was prepared for one national organisation that could administer and organise the questionnaire. It could provide them with information and also help to set up socialist groups based upon their directly experienced and articulated experience of exploitation.

The 1880 survey is much more detailed than the 1866 version. Whereas the 1866 version consisted of 12 rubrics of which all but one dealt only with factory organisation, the 1880 version was divided into four distinct sections: (i) the factory seen as an institution and factory organisation; (ii) the worker's view of his role in the factory; (iii) the relationship between work and the outside world; (iv) organisation and struggle.⁴⁴ The questionnaire

is written in extremely simple language but is extremely long. By modern standards it would be judged cumbersome because it would take too much time to complete. Questions such as "Give the names of the capitalist employers or of the directors of the company"⁴⁵ could take the workman days to find the answer - provided that the only rationale of the questionnaire was to provide such factual information. Such a question would demonstrate to the workman the remoteness of those who owned the company from those who worked in the company and produced its goods. It would perhaps require him to work with and hence discuss with other workmen.⁴⁶ There are, as we will see, many questions of that kind that require cooperation, time and organisation between groups of workmen, cause them to think why their factory and their lives were organised as they were and to reflect upon the totality of their activities.

We have seen that the form and proposed use of the Enquête were in line with Marx's teleological concept of science. The questionnaire can be described as a preparation for understanding one's milieu by providing a framework that could transcend the barriers to that understanding. Moreover, the phase of understanding was tied to the phase of organising to change that milieu. The content of the Enquête of 1880 emphasises these elements to an even greater extent.

The usual aim of asking a question is to gain information about objects, relations or processes about which the questioner knows little or nothing. Many of the questions and series of questions in the Enquête are not of that form. Many can be called provocative questions that encourage the person asking the question to see things in a new light or to devise a new series of questions.⁴⁷

For example, one series of questions opens by inquiring what kinds of machines are used in the factory and then asks how these machines affect the immediate working conditions of their operators and what carry-over effect they have on the worker when he leaves the factory.⁴⁸ The following question asks how the health of the worker is affected by the machine.⁴⁹ For example, how the intensiveness of the effort required to operate or respond to the rhythms of the machine causes nervous or physical strain. How the effluents, exhaust and fumes affect his respiratory system and how the minutia of detailed work or work in bright light deteriorates his eyesight. The series is terminated by a question asking whether medical facilities are available in the workshop and if the employer is legally responsible for accident and disability compensation.⁵⁰

The opening questions about the machines are largely factual. Given that many enterprises were now converted or converting to a very primitive form of the assembly-line process, like the Creusot works, workmen in one shop might not know what machinery was used in other shops.⁵¹ If they wanted to know, they would have to ask workers from the other shops. Contact, if it were not already established, would be opened, and if it were established, would be reinforced by discussion of work techniques and processes.

To answer the question about how the machines affect the worker, hinder his enjoyment of activities outside the factory, dull his attentiveness to family problems and undermine his health, the subject-researcher must consider how the machine controls and dominates not only his hours in the factory but can affect his hours away from the factory. To ask such a question relates the world of work to the world supposedly independent of work. The fallacy propagated by many socialist groups that the two were independent would become clear. The factory as a system based upon the rhythms of the machine rather than the rhythms of the worker would also be demonstrated.

The questions concerning the availability of medical facilities and compensation in case of accidents cannot be classified as factual questions by any stretch of the imagination. It was often pointed out that small factories usually had no on-the-spot medical facilities and calling an outside doctor was a lengthy process. Very few large factories had medical facilities as the factory reformers active in the 1880's pointed out.⁵² Finally, by 1880 there was not a single country in Europe that required its employers to provide compensation in the case of accidents or disability. These were the subjects of long campaigns in many countries. Why did Marx insert these questions? The purpose was to show the extent to which the system of production treated the worker callously. They related his lack of control over production rhythms to his lack of control over the rhythms of his life. The point was to demonstrate how the exploitation of the factory system was also social exploitation. In his investigation, the worker would begin to inquire why there were no laws providing compensation, why medical facilities were so poor if existing at all and why research was not devoted to control the disabling effects of the machines rather than on providing machines that produced more in a shorter period of time.

Each of the four sections of the questionnaire asks questions of this order. The first section deals with the structure of the factory, the second with the worker's experience of the factory, the third with the effect of the exploitation of the factory upon his home life, the chances of his children in life, and the final section with how to organise to change the system.

The first and the most factual section of the questionnaire concentrates on the organisation of the factory and the organisation of all the phases of the mode of capitalist production from the production of a good, to the integration of marketing procedures, financing and the role of the State as a guarantor of these procedures. The questions progress from those focusing on the worker's own factory to those relating the operations of that factory to the capitalist market system in general. The purpose of the first section is to reveal the powerful mechanism of the capitalist system and the helplessness of the individual worker, or a group of workers in one small shop, to fight not only the factory but the complex political system underwriting the entire system of production.

Within that section, a series of questions is opened by inquiring what fuels are used to make the factory run, how far the division of labour has been introduced and to what extent the State is involved in underwriting costs either directly or indirectly by preparing manpower, taking over certain social costs, and encouraging consumption.⁵³

In this section the worker is treated as an observer and not a participant. The purpose is to give him a basic understanding of how the capitalist system operates. Questions concerning the involvement of the State in underwriting investment, but in refusing to provide insurance for the worker, are designed to lay the foundations for the attack on the Lassallean and Proudhonian concepts of the State, as Hilda Weiss points out, that are found in the last section of the questionnaire.⁵⁴

If the first section deals with the factory as part of the capitalist system, the second section deals with the workers' own experience of the organisation and day-to-day operations of the factory. It presents questions dealing with the social organisation of work and preparation for work.⁵⁵ The second section concentrates on the contradiction between exchange value and use value by relying on a contrast between the aims of work as envisaged by the worker and the aims of work as envisaged by the capitalist system.

At the outset questions are asked concerning the worker "selling" his labour, the conditions governing the sale of his labour and what he gets in exchange for his labour.⁵⁶

Many of the questions contain understatements. For example one question talks about the "normal increase in hours"⁵⁷ during periods of increased production. Another talks about the worker labouring "gratuitously" for the entrepreneur.⁵⁸ Another talks about the determining role of the market system in whether there will be employment and how much the worker will be rewarded in return for his labour.⁵⁹ Another takes the form, "State the holidays during the year", when holidays were few, usually unpaid and a less frequent occurrence than layings-off.⁶⁰

The purpose of these questions is to contrast the implacable logic of the system of production where the worker is used like a cog in a machine against the idea that one should be able to control the rhythms of one's life. The discussion of the workers-researchers would gravitate towards talking about their own experience of work, their lack of control over the social organisation of their lives within and without the factory. The essence of these questions is to encourage the worker to see his "utility" to the system as a commodity.

The third section of the questionnaire extends the inquiry from the factory into the home. Having investigated the worker as a producer, the worker as a consumer now becomes the focus of attention.

The worker is asked to draw up a budget and calculate how much he spends on food, rent, clothing, education for his children and leisure activities.⁶¹

Questions are asked about the influence fashion exerts on expenditure.⁶² And finally at the end of the section questions are posed comparing the price of the articles produced by the worker with the price of the services or labour he provides and asking him to compare the value of his labour to his rewards and how they are enjoyed.⁶³

This section bridges the world of the producer and the world of the consumer. As Halbswachs remarked in his study of working-class patterns of consumption, the worker normally tended to think of the world of work as totally different from the world of non-work in which he somehow rejoined society and experienced enjoyment.⁶⁴ The questions in this section are designed to demonstrate how expenditure patterns are determined by the demands of work and how those items and activities termed "necessities of life" are strongly influenced if not

completely determined by the world of work. The worker is required to measure his evaluation of himself, his creativity and his enjoyment against the rewards that society gave to him.⁶⁵ The contradiction between exchange value and use value is demonstrated as the contradiction between an imposed set of values (including consumption) and the ability to determine activity, needs and wants freely. The powerlessness to control the rhythms of work is now expanded to include the powerlessness to control the rhythms of life away from work.

Not only does the third section synthesise the preceding two sections, but it expands the research group. Halbswachs points out, and Marx could not have been unaware, that the wife was concerned with running the household, buying food and seeing to children's education.⁶⁶ She alone would be able to answer the questions concerning expenditure. She would have to be consulted and her interest if not her collaboration would be gained to the research group. Given that the separation between work and leisure, or productive and consumptive functions, was reproduced in the separation of functions between husband and wife, this could be a way of making the family a solid and fighting unit. Marx must have been aware that women who played no direct role in production were often hostile to strikes and undermined morale. He noted that women in combat were usually more steadfast and less hesitant than men.⁶⁷ Here was a way of making them aware of problems and gaining their support for whatever form of organisation grew out of the Enquête.

The point of Kapital, Marx wrote, was to reveal the "real conditions of life".⁶⁸ The first three sections of the Enquête, in many ways, seem to parallel Marx's discussion of the capitalist system in Kapital underlining the contradiction between exchange value and use value. They also underline the role played by a central coordinating body, like the State, in the management of such a system. The difference is that in the case of the Enquête, Marc does not provide an argument as complete as Kapital. He leaves the worker to fill in the outline and draw his conclusions. The direct contact, the awakening made possible by the Enquête-method, the needs to understand the system and to work together as a team towards such an understanding provide the impetus for the worker "... ihre eigenes Geschick in ihre Hand zu nehmen."⁶⁹

The last section talks about organisations to fight for the ends of the working class, and the role of the State. Principally, it inquires whether there are organisations not only to defend the working class but to take the offensive.⁷⁰

In France, at this time there was still very little trade-union organisation. Those trade unions that existed were those organised by skilled craftsmen.⁷¹ Very few unskilled workers or workers in the newer crafts, like metal foundrymen, belonged to trade unions. The point of the final section of the Enquête was to demonstrate the necessity of organisation. Indeed, if the worker had answered all the questions in the Enquête to this point he was undoubtedly already working in a group. Such a group would already have raised many practical questions and discussed the problem of actively changing conditions in the course of its work. Moreover, it grew from the progressive discovery of the workers' own daily problems and possibilities. The group had its own dynamic, and Marx hoped its investigation would have rid it of its Proudhonian leanings.⁷²

The questionnaire therefore raises the need for organisation of a defensive nature. But the need for an offensive organisation is already indicated because the problem is not merely one of making some minor adjustments in the organisation of the factory or obtaining a system of collective bargaining, but finding the means of changing the form and content of the totality of experience.⁷³

The questionnaire does not specify what actions should be taken or what kinds of organisations should be founded. To do so would have been presumptuous and premature. It was premature because the movement was still at its inception and presumptuous because one could not prejudge the situation. The point of the questionnaire was to sow Marx's famous dragons.⁷⁴ The role of the POF, as the role of the International before it, was to sow the dragons. It was to be an agent or fomenter of revolution.⁷⁵

The Enquête is an example of the kind of tactics that Marx and Engels spoke about in their criticisms of the Gothaerprogramm. As Hilda Weiss pointed out, the Enquête method was not scientific in the normally-accepted sociological sense of cataloguing a preconceived landscape. It was "pedagogical" or "scientific" in a sense foreign to the tradition of the natural sciences and those disciplines aspiring to the status of a natural-like science. It was an attempt to make the subject conscious of the full extent of his problems and to pose the path of a possible solution.⁷⁶

We also find that Marx and Engels implicitly specified what the initial role of the POF was to be. The POF was to organise the Enquête and to "gather" the results. From those results it could decide what course of actions were

open to it and begin to organise its perspectives upon the "results" obtained. Having looked at the theme of teleology as it was used in Marx's and Engels' writings from their first attempts to concretise the Hegelian dialectic to the last works produced by Marx, I will now summarise my general argument.

A persistent assumption in Marx's writings is that science is purposeful or teleological. In the ultimate sense I doubt very much if there is such a thing as a non-teleological argument. By that I mean the teleological side of a statement may well have been raised to the level of the kind of universal assumptions found in political economy.⁷⁷ Traditionally, a teleological statement means that the end or desire is part of the definition of an object. Modern science, for a variety of reasons, has tried to abolish that special status for the subject. Marx endeavoured to restore that status and also to do something more.

A persistent theme in Hegel, very attractive to both Feuerbach and Marx, is the notion of man searching for a satisfactory object for his desire.⁷⁸ The word "desire" does not occur anywhere in Marx's writings to the best of my knowledge. What one finds in its place are notions like "sensuousness" and "human governed activity".⁷⁹ Marx's point was that although desire governed activity and defined action, it could not do so satisfactorily until the relationship between subject and object had been resolved, until the search had been terminated successfully.⁸⁰ The solution lay in the marriage of man and nature. The only true relationship between man and object and other men, which the perceiver necessarily cast in the mould of objective relationships, was this sensual unity. Such could only exist if the social laws governing the alienated relationship were abolished.⁸¹

In a teleological science, rationality is also defined by purpose. Truly rational activity would be the activity leading to the end of the alienated society and man's estrangement alternatively from his own definition of himself and the world and the definition of himself and the world imposed upon him.⁸² The path of liberation must be defined and carved by those who by their exploitation in the alienated society are potentially the most susceptible to the conclusion that the solution lies in their changing the world.⁸³

I have maintained that these themes are not only present in Marx's earlier works but also present as assumptions in his later works. I have tried to

show that these ideas are implicit in his political texts and the notion of awakening to rationality by starting one's campaign in the language and everyday concerns of those most susceptible to the revolutionary conclusion governed the purpose and form of such an impenetrable book as Kapital. We argued that the Gotha critique made the same point as Kapital. It pointedly put the earlier philosophical arguments in a concrete but still teleological form. Compulsion to work subordinated man to things. It provides at the same time confusion in the valuation of things and devaluation of the human body. If Marx maintained his argument about the sensuous side of things and science as telos, then Kapital could never have been a book in the tradition of the natural sciences as some prominent writers have maintained.⁸⁴ If so, then we can begin to talk about a unity, a teleological unity in Marx's life. That unity encompasses his critiques of the non-teleological (his critique of political economy), his political texts and his political activity. If Marx spoke of the interrelatability of all sides of activity in any human action the same argument must apply to him. Riazanov's concept of Marx's life as such a kind of political battle: the philosopher who stumbled upon the teleological conclusion trying to concretise his conclusions - is important to understand the nature of Marx's combat.⁸⁵ In that sense, Marx's problematic was how to create a revolution given the teleological side of all action. The sense of his battles was to restore that notion and show it to be the wider battle facing humanity.

The same idea is rooted in the notion of the process of liberation we found in the Address. Here at last, Marx said, is the way the process can be engaged. Here at last is the way out. The argument is a more concrete argument. It is the product of Marx's research into the mechanism of the capitalist system and is centred on the prevailing social relations of production in that form of society. The fundamental contradiction of man in such a society is the contradiction between exchange value and use value. Exchange value is the objective or imposed evaluation and use value is the subjective or potentially imposing evaluation. Political economy was the science of exchange value. The science of use value is the science Marx was after.⁸⁶ But it was a science that had to be made. In order to make one had to unchain. Therefore, Marx's science of use value was what he called revolutionary praxis. The theme is a persistent theme from the Thesen über Feuerbach to the first draft of the Address.⁸⁷

The Enquête method is one such example. Its aim is to secure a radical rupture with imposed reality. The aim was to encourage the formation of a motor-force to secure that rupture. The contradiction between exchange and use value in the eyes of Marx and Engels was the greatest stumbling block. Desire was misdirected and aims and means were at variance. As Engels pointed out, in normal circumstances the proletariat lived that contradiction by alternatively oscillating between a total acceptance of existing values and an alienated rejection that exploded in violence and adherence to utopian ideology. But the Commune showed that the obstacle could be overcome and the Enquête method was designed to overcome that obstacle. The strategy was to attack at the weakest point and the weakest point was this conscious disjuncture. Marx designed the questionnaire to take account of the problem of activating consciousness. For that reason in one breath it encompasses concrete and abstract concepts. It moves rapidly between questions dealing with exchange value and questions dealing with use value, as if the constant stressing of the contrast would awaken the researcher-worker from his nightmare.

We now have something approximating Marx's notion of strategy. But we still have a major problem to deal with. Granted that our description of the Enquête method is an example of how to engage the process of liberation and granted that Marx and Engels had doubts about the usefulness of the socialist party once the process was started, we still have the problem of the role of the political party as an agent, because when Marx revised the introduction to the POF's programme he still wrote:

"Considérant,
Que cette appropriation collective ne peut sortir
que de l'action révolutionnaire de la classe pro-
ductive - du prolétariat - organisée en parti
politique distinct".⁸⁹

We know that Marx had a healthy disrespect for the French socialists and, in particular, Guesde.⁹⁰ Marx, in fact, completely revised Kapital for the French so that they might possibly understand it.⁹¹ The quotation prefacing this essay was uttered by Marx referring to the French. When Guesde prepared the POF programme and submitted to Marx he wrote caustically to Sorge pointing out how Guesde had consistently repeated all of the errors of Lassalle and how he, Marx, had to take the matter in hand.⁹²

How did he do so? The introduction, as he indicated to Sorge, presents the aims of communism in a straight-forward and harmless way.⁹³ It restates the Manifesto's call for an independent working class and the need for the working class to secure its own liberation.⁹⁴ But the second part of the programme lists a series of political demands stemming from the existing day-to-day problems facing the working class. As Marx wrote to Sorge, these demands are comprehensible to the proletariat but just that one step ahead of them to compel them to act. He wrote in particular:

"... Wenn das französische Proletariat noch so kindisch, solcher Koder zu bedürfen, so is it not worth while drawing up any programme whatsoever, besteht dies sehr kurz Aktionstück, ausser Einleitungsworten, wo in wenigen Zeilen des kommunistische Ziel definiert in seinem ökonomischen Teil nur als Forderungen, die reell aus Arbeiterbewegung selbst spontan hervorgewachsen sind." ⁹⁵

The "... demands that spring spontaneously and naturally from the working class ..." is the central phrase in Marx's letter to Sorge. The programme is a banner.⁹⁶ The programme emphasises working-class unity in the abstract sense as a necessity and again in the practical sense as the means of obtaining these immediate demands. Once again we find the pattern of the Forderungen repeated. The fact that the Enquête was seen by Marx as a splendid way to launch the new party underlines this interpretation.⁹⁷

We have seen that on many occasions, Marx and Engels commended the use of the party as an agent or fomentor of revolution. But the circumstances of that use were circumscribed by the concrete situations themselves. Such an organisation could play an important role in defending the working class and in serving as a storehouse of accumulated knowledge. The party was the most important working-class institution of the epoch and could play an important role in unchaining working-class consciousness, the alienated and truncated creativity sublimated by social structures and invisible pressures. The sense of this argument is that the party could be an assembler or disseminator. But at the same time, Marx and Engels strongly criticised the socialist parties of their era for their failure to understand the human problematic.

There have been three general interpretations of the intentions of Marx and Engels. One argument has been that the ideology of the social democrats reflected their organisation. So bureaucraticised had these organisations become, that they must be destroyed.⁹⁸ The second argument was simply a suggestion that a bad leadership must be replaced by a good leadership.⁹⁹ The third argument maintains that the relationship between the party as an organisation and the party as an historical tendency must be rethought.¹⁰⁰

This last notion suggested by Lukács seems the best fit to our reading of Marx and Engels. Marx maintained that when he spoke of party he used the term in two different ways. On one hand, he spoke of the institutions themselves and secondly he spoke of "die Partei im grossen historischen Sinn",¹⁰¹ (the party in the great historical sense). The notion of "historical sense" is derived from Hegel, where it is used to refer to the kindling process preparing the arrival for the great "Idea" that would resolve the human problematic. Marx's resolution came through changing the context of human existence through human praxis and that, it appears, would rely upon a host of weapons and organisations to obtain its end. In that sense, the party-as-an-institution was a weapon that was suitable to a terrain under certain circumstances. We have seen that Marx and Engels felt this was the case in the Germany of the 1880's. But at the same time their view of the Commune strongly implies that at a certain stage the party would become outmoded. It would have performed its tasks, outlived its usefulness and been replaced by some other agent. The party in the great historical sense can be equated to the fund of "possible" or potential consciousness, or as Bloch has argued,¹⁰² the potential actualisation of utopia.

If we look at one of the major schools of thought where a teleological view of action has not been read out of court in our society, we can find a very rough approximation to the description of the work of Marx and Engels that has emerged from our reading. In their daily work with the socialist movement, Marx and Engels seem to have laboured like the psychoanalyst aware of his own inevitable fallibility and humanity but nonetheless trying to make his patient aware of his own possibilities. They intervened at any number of points, now scratching the surface to find a vital point of entry, now touching a vital nerve, now stumbling upon a non-problem. They laboured to make the patient aware of himself through himself so that he would act to erradicate the problem

of which, until that point, he could see no more than the vague contours. They did not teach a method nor a set of conceptual elements but tried to help foster the emergence of strategies that could only grow from the patient's awareness of his own situation. Their role was the role of suggestion and their concept of strategy could easily be called therapy.

Indeed, there is much to suggest that their message was that when therapy becomes universal then it must be called revolution. When the masses undertake their own Enquête, then the process of social liberation has commenced.

NOTES

1. Marx to Vera Sassulitsch, MEW, Band 19, pp. 242-43; Vorrede zum zweiten russischen Ausgabe des "Manifests des Kommunistischen Partei", MEW, Band 19, p. 297.
2. The edition I will quote from is found in Karl-Marx - Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, ed. T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, London, 1969, pp. 210-18.
3. The edition used here is found in Jules Guesde, Textes choisis, ed. C. Willard, Paris, 1959, pp. 117-19.
4. Marx to Sorge, 5.11.80, MEW, Band 34, pp. 475-76.
5. ibid., p. 476.
6. ibid., p. 476.
7. ibid., p. 475.
8. The argument is made by Hilda Rigaudia-Weiss, Les enquêtes ouvrières en France entre 1830 et 1848, Paris, 1936.
9. Villermé, Tableau de l'état physique et moral des ouvriers et des employés dans les manufactures de coton de laine et de soie, Paris, 1840.
10. Julien Turgan, Les grandes usines, 10 volumes and 2 supplements, Paris, 1870-74.
11. Hilda Weiss, "Die "Enquête Ouvrière" von Karl Marx", Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Jhrg V/1936, pp. 76-77.
12. For example, the statement of purposes of the Rapport Ducarre (1875), Archives Nationales C.30 18-3026. Weiss, p. 79, Georges Duveau, La vie ouvrière en France sous le second Empire, Paris, 1946, p. 267.
13. Weiss, pp. 77-78.
14. ibid., p. 83.
15. ibid., p. 82.
16. ibid., p. 83-84.
17. ibid., p. 86.
18. Harold Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology, Berkeley, 1966, pp. 64-76.
19. These are found in the first sections, Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 210-211.

20. Marx to Danielson, 10.4.79, MEW, Band 34, pp. 371-72; Engels to Bracke, 30.4.78, MEW, Band 34, pp. 328-29; Engels to Hirsch, MEW, Band 39, p. 441.
21. Randglossen, p. 27; Engels to Hirsch, opcit.
22. Allgemeine Statuten und Verwaltungs-Verordnungen der Internationalen Arbeiter-assoziaton, MEW, Band 17, pp. 448-49.
23. ibid., p. 448.
24. Local groups were given complete freedom of action and were not called upon to subscribe to any one philosophy, p. 447.
25. ibid., p. 447
26. ibid., pp. 448-49.
27. ibid., pp. 447-48.
28. Riazanov, p. 103-04; Abramsky and Collins, pp. 40-45.
29. Abramsky and Collins, pp. 231-32.
30. Allgemeine Statuten, p. 447.
31. "Jede lokale Gruppe ist verpflichtet zur Ernennung eine besondern statistischen Komitees, damit sie stets, soweit ihre Mittel gestatten, bereit sei, vom Föderalrat ihres Landes oder vom Generalrat gestellte Fragen zu beantworten.", p. 448.
32. Weiss, p. 88.
33. ibid., p. 83; Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 212, 214 questions 14 and 43 need organisation.
34. Allgemeine Statuten, pp. 448-49.
35. ibid., p. 448.
36. Weiss, pp. 82-83.
37. Marx to Nieuwenhuis, 22.2.81, MEW, Band 35, p. 159.
38. Weiss, p. 87.
39. Marx to Sorge, opcit., p. 476.
40. Allgemeine Statuten, pp. 448-449.
41. ibid., p. 449.
42. ibid., p. 448-49.
43. Marx to Sorge, opcit., p. 476.

44. Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 211-18.
45. ibid., p. 211.
46. Weiss, pp. 86-87.
47. Weiss, p. 85.
48. Bottomore and Rubel, p. 212 (questions 13-17)
49. ibid., p. 212, question 18.
50. ibid., pp. 212-213, questions 18-26.
51. Turgan, tome vi, pp. 65-68.
52. Weiss, pp. 87-89; Gustave Delory, Aperçu historique sur la fédération du Nord du parti socialiste, Lille, 1921, pp. 34-35.
53. Bottomore and Rubel, p. 212.
54. Weiss, pp. 95-99.
55. Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 213-214.
56. Bottomore and Rubel, p. 214.
57. ibid., p. 214, question 42.
58. ibid., p. 214, question 43.
59. ibid., question 42.
60. ibid., p. 213, question 31.
61. ibid., p. 216, question 69.
62. ibid., p. 216, question 71.
63. ibid., p. 216, question 76.
64. Maurice Halbwachs, La classe ouvrière et leur niveau de vie, Paris, 1913, pp. 115-19, 133, 414.
65. Weiss, p. 87.
66. Halbwachs, pp. 411-14, 457-62.
67. Marx to Kugelmann, 12.12.68, MEW, Band 32, pp. 582-83. "Jeder, der etwas von der Geschichte weiss, weiss auch, dass grosse gesellschaftliche Umwälzungen ohne das weibliche Ferment unmöglich sind. Der gesellschaftliche Fortschritt lässt sich exakt messen an der gesellschaftlichen Stellung des schönen Geschlechts (die Hässlichen eingeschlossen)."

68. Kapital, MEW, Band 25, p. 278.
69. Allgemeine Statuten, p. 449.
70. Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 217-18.
71. I will argue this in Chapter VII.
72. Weiss, pp. 98-99.
73. ibid., p. 99
74. Engels to Lafargue, 27.8.90, Correspondance, t. iii, p. 407.
75. Marx to Sorge, cpcit., p. 476.
76. Weiss, pp. 83-6.
77. Grossman, p. 28.
78. Certainly not in the later works.
79. Sinnlichkeit in the Thesen über Feuerbach, Band 3, pp. 5-7; and in the Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844, in Ergänzungsband Schriften bis 1844, Erster Teil, p. 573.
80. Kapital, Band 25, pp. 835-38.
81. Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, pp. 562-65; Kapital, MEW, Band 25, p. 136.
82. ibid.
83. Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, MEW, Band 1, p. 390; Die heilige Familie oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik, MEW, Band 2, p. 38.
84. Kautsky, "Die Entwurf", Neue Zeit, 1891, Band II, p. 781; Die historische Leistung, Berlin, 1908, p. 30; Althusser, Introduction, Capital, p. 27.
85. Riazanov, p. 211.
86. Thesen über Feuerbach, third thesis, p. 6; Zeleny, p. 324.
87. Georg Lukacs, "Die Deutsche - eine Nation der Spätentwickler?" in Goethepreis, 70, Neiwied, p. 112;
88. Engels to Bernstein, 28.10.81, MEW, Band 35, pp. 228-34.
89. Guesde, textes choisis, p. 117.
90. Engels to Bernstein, p. 229-30.

91. Marx to Sorge, pp. 475-76.
92. ibid., p. 476.
93. ibid., p. 476.
94. Engels to Bernstein, p. 233-34.
95. Marx to Sorge, pp. 475-76.
96. Engels to Bebel, 18/28.3.75, MEW, Band 35, pp. 228-34.
97. Marx to Sorge, p. 476.
98. Daniel Guérin, L'anarchisme, Paris, 1966, pp. 22-23.
99. Alain Krivine, Ce que nous voulons, Paris, 1970, pp. 2-3.
100. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, pp. 234-37.
101. Marx to Freiligrath, 29.2.60, MEW, Band 30, p. 495.
102. Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, pp. 723-29.

SECTION II :

Marx's heritage and the rise of
the Marxist savants.

Marx's heritage and the rise of the Marxist savants.

That the thread of Marx's argument was difficult for the social democrats to follow is clear even from our brief glimpses at the way Kautsky and Bernstein went about editing and re-interpreting some of Marx's and Engels' most important texts and letters. That the reasons for their admitted difficulties and others' "judicious" additions and omissions are complex should be equally clear. Indeed, it was to take an entire political generation faced with the horrific reality of the total collapse of the social-democratic world in the 1914-1918 war and with the problematic they set themselves: (i) how could the invincible "party", the culmination of history, commit suicide? (ii) how could a genuinely socialist movement be formed?; to rediscover some of the lost concepts of Marx which they variously labelled "consciousness", "cultural hegemony" and "general staff of the working class" etc. But the absence of some of Marx's and Engels' most telling texts is far from a sufficient explanation of social-democracy's difficulties.

Lukács was able to reconstruct the basic arguments of Marx's texts which marked his transition from philosophical to political argument without being aware of the 1844 manuscripts. Rosa Luxemburg was able to write the Juniusbroschüre without the benefit of Engels' ideas on day-to-day strategy. The written word itself was not as important, one must conclude, as the way in which texts were read and the phenomenology, we might say, of their interpretation.

Engels, for one, constantly chided Kautsky, Lafargue and Conrad Schmidt for either not having been aware of the existence of certain texts or not having read others. Although he could maintain that Kautsky's theoretical position within the German party was to be applauded and entrusted Kautsky with the task of editing the Theorien, he nonetheless commented to Victor Adler after the débâcle over the Erfurterprogramm that Kautsky:

"... die Fühlung mit der lebendigen Partei-
bewegung verloren." 1

"Lack of feeling for the movement's day-to-day struggles" ... a repetition of Engels' main criticism of the Erfurterprogramm. What does it indicate? That the theorist was separated from the movement, that the theorist could not possibly "understand" the movement, and that the theorist was not a militant. For in the place of the militant grew a generation of Marxist savants - keepers

of the doctrine. How did this come about? I would suggest that it stemmed from the nature and situation of the turn-of-the-century working class and the way that the "Marxist" savants were condemned to read and interpret its situation. For, indeed, the many failings of the movement catalogued by Marx: lack of a coherent strategy, lack of an understanding of the relationship of theory to practice, failure to understand the day-to-day relationship between use and exchange value; accumulated rather than diminished in the years after his death. How can one explain how the party which claimed to encompass Marxism and to be the scientific application of the new science discovered by Marx and Engels exacerbated these failings?

Here we are presented with a series of "ifs":

- IF my intention is to underline the major differences between the strategy outlined by Marx and Engels and the strategy practised by their inheritors, to highlight these differences and to show their consequences for the subsequent development of socialist, and later, communist praxis;
- IF we are to understand the corollary to this problem: why the socialist movement found it necessary to hide these differences beneath a cloud of praise and to glorify Marx whilst systematically altering, bowdlerising or hiding his texts;
- IF we are to understand their substitution of an ersatz and mummified Marx for Marx the political actor;
- IF we are to begin to understand the socialist movement's chronic inability to profit from obvious revolutionary situations, their horror at anything resembling the beginnings of a revolutionary situation and their publically acknowledged wish to suppress any openly revolutionary movement;

..... then we must look more closely at their day-to-day strategy.

For the sake of clarity and continuity since my argument has centred on the French and German movements, it is best to concentrate on later developments in these movements. Moreover, these were the groups and parties most insis-

tent upon their debt to Marx and who most loudly broadcast their claim to embody the essence of "Marxist" strategy. These were the first to call themselves "Marxists", and the first who tried to put his ideas into practice.

And here our logical starting point is with the oldest, largest and most experienced party, the German SPD. From the Olympian heights it occupied within the Second International, it dispensed justice and issued its theoretical imprimaturs. Indeed, the SPD was considered to be the very fountainhead of socialist wisdom.

NOTES.

1. Engels to Victor Adler, Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe, Wien, 1922, p. 89.

4

CHAPTER VI

KAUTSKY AND THE DIALECTIC OF ORTHODOXY

The artisan and the scientist:

One of the strands in my argument has been that there is considerable evidence to support the view that the suppositions and assumptions underlying the strategy of the socialist movements that developed in France and Germany during the 1880's and 1890's were of a different order than those proposed in the works of Marx and Engels. Looking at those works and the situations that occasioned their writing, we found that the teleological theory, evident in their earlier works, formed the basis of their strategy. A teleological view of science demands that the subject, himself, orders the relationship between himself and the objectivised elements that compose the outside world. A strategy starting from such a supposition must be directed towards compelling/enabling (zwingen/befähigen) the subject to act in such a way.¹ Hence I argued that the strategy of Marx and Engels was encapsulated in the notion of praxis. On the other hand, a strategy starting from a non-teleological standpoint, like those developed by the socialist theorists appeared to be, well within the tradition of 19th century positivism, and strongly flavoured by an application of Darwin's theory to society, left out the conscious or human element.

In the first sections of this essay, I briefly listed the cardinal principles common to the most widely accepted theories and the concepts of strategy deduced from them during the period of the socialist "take-off". When I discussed the critiques of the Gothaer- and Erfurterprogramme as expounded by Marx and Engels, I necessarily mentioned some of the strategic consequences that resulted from those principles. Whereas in a teleological theory, the essence of ordering the relationship between subject and object and of obtaining satisfaction depends on the actions of the subject, the ideas of the social democrats, thoroughly encrusted with the spirit of the natural and biological sciences of their day, accorded no such privileged status to the subject. Determined by a definition of concrete needs independent of the subject's perception of those needs, their ends were immutable. Whereas in a teleological theory, the question of organisation must depend on activating the subject to consciousness of himself whilst taking extreme care not to

lumber him with a set of priorities and concepts not of his own making; in a non-teleological theory, organisation means guiding and leading the uninitiated. The guides are those who understand the precise, unchanging and eternal structure of needs and aims. In that sense science and party take on a status not accorded to them in a teleological theory.

In this section, I will look at the construction and structure, or one might say, the internal logic of such theories in detail. I will discuss the position they occupied in the socialist movement and how they were applied. How they were applied will lead us to specify a series of problems that will lead us still further to question why the theory and its mode of application seem to be two very different things. In the following section, after having examined the approach developed by the POF, I will try to be a bit more suggestive about the role such theories played in the socialist movement and the reasons they were adopted and maintained, and finally, their consequences for Marx's original revolutionary project.

Our logical starting point is the citadel of post-1890 socialism, the German social-democratic party. In Engels' estimation, the SPD moved to the centre stage of the proletarian struggle after the crushing of the Commune and the world proletarian movement looked to Germany for its leads and was judged by the pronouncement and actions of the SPD.² The German party was the first large socialist organisation and because of its special status both the promoter and guardian of the development of the Second International and its ideology. By all accounts the architect and interpreter of its theory was Karl Kautsky, the joint-executor of Engels' literary testament along with Eduard Bernstein. According to Langner, Kautsky was the clearest thinker in the SPD.³ He was the undisputed populariser and interpreter of Marx and Engels in the view of Matthias.⁴ Kampfmeyer sees him as the most penetrating intellectual in the party,⁵ and Li Fu, Li Szu-wen and Wang Fu-ju go further and see him as the most renowned and characteristic theorist of the Second International.⁶

Unfortunately, despite his importance in the socialist movement, Kautsky has not been accorded any of the erudite biographies that have been written about Rosa Luxemburg, Bernstein or Bebel. Writers have in the past been barely more than suggestive about the origins of Kautsky's theory, and the role his theory played in the subsequent development and evolution of the SPD.⁷ Kautsky's

Mein Lebenswerk, a short autobiographical sketch, hardly helps matters.⁸ Written towards the end of his life at a time when he was denied access to his early writings and the records of the SPD, it is full of the kind of self-censorship that seems to occur when a work is written from memory alone. Engelberg, Fricke, Arnold and the other Eastern European historians of the period see Kautsky as an opportunist, at best, or a traitor who, shedding his earlier allegiance to Marxism, went over to the enemy's camp.⁹ Except for Benedikt Kautsky, no scholar in the West, even during the no-holds-barred attacks on Marxism at the height of the Cold War, ever showered praise on Kautsky.¹⁰ Nettl hardly veils his dislike for Kautsky.¹¹ Cole regards him as a mystifier and Halevy something of an anachronism.¹² The task of understanding the relationship between Kautsky's work and the development of the SPD is not made any easier by what Nettl has called his formalism and tendency towards pedantry¹³ and what Matthias, in a more ad hominum evaluation, labels his coldness and remoteness.¹⁴

Amongst all the snapshot evaluations of Kautsky, the most important extended analysis is Matthias' Kautsky und die Kautskyianismus.¹⁵ Matthias argues that Kautsky's Marxism was an appendage to his much more basic belief in Darwin and that Engels' Anti-Dühring, the text that converted Kautsky to Marxism, formed the principal influence on his subsequent theoretical development.¹⁶ In common with Rosenberg and Korsch Matthias maintains that Kautsky's work was remarkably consistent. From the outset, he preached a message of pacifism and his objective role in the SPD was that of a Mittelfunktionäre¹⁷ espousing an Integrationsideologie¹⁸ in the name of Organisationspatriotismus.¹⁹ I will extend Matthias' argument by maintaining that the consistency in Kautsky's work came from his interpretation of Marxism as a new form of political economy, the problematic of the working class as the insufficient distribution of the existing stock of social values and the political party as the means to protect the institutions built by the working class to fight for its articulated needs.

The Sozialistengesetz had already been in force for two years, when Kautsky made his debut in the SPD. From the outset, the party leaders were highly gratified by his rigorous concept of socialism and his style of scientific exegesis.²⁰ One of the first of a new generation of party militants to have been educated at a university, Kautsky was not only a source of pride for the party but managed to put on paper thoughts that rang true to the experiences of the majority of the architects and leaders of the party.

Men like Paul Singer, Ignaz Auer, Albin Gerisch, August Geib, Pfannkuch and Bebel himself were all in their earlier days highly skilled artisans or craftsmen.²¹ Many came to the old SDAP not for economic reasons but because the struggle for political liberation showed them the inconsistencies of the more bourgeois liberal parties.²² The picture Bebel paints of himself as a young man in Aus meinem Leben is one of a highly skilled artisan in a deteriorating situation where his talents are less and less appreciated, seeking some kind of social recognition.²³ Their formative years at work were during an epoch when respect for craftsmanship was waning, and the gradual rise of the factory system was first evident. Singer, Auer and Bebel were still able to make the transition from employed craftsman to owner of a small business. Auer and Singer, besides their work in the administration of the party's organisation and parliamentary group, continued to manage their printing establishments for the party. The others we have mentioned and many more like them in the parliamentary group were to spend the remainder of their active lives as full-time employees and managers of the party. These printers, carpenters, cigarmakers and turners held all the seats on the presidium (Vorstand) of the party from the 1880's until at least 1906.²⁴ The only new faces were experienced organisers, like Friedrich Ebert, who were added to the secretariat when it expanded between 1904 and 1906.²⁵ The watchdog of the Parteivorstand, the Kontrollkommission, was again dominated by artisan workers, most of whom had become full-time employees of the party. Kaden, Geck, Kühnen, Meist, Metzner and Brühne were re-elected overwhelmingly, with no more than token opposition, at every party congress from 1890 until they either resigned their positions or died.²⁶ During the period 1890-1910 less than five percent of those who stood for election to the Kontrollkommission had been workers in even medium sized enterprises.²⁷ The party organisation and the management of the party was left completely in the hands of a generation most of whose work experience was gained prior to the industrial transformation of the 1870's and many of whom had joined a socialist organisation before the founding of the SDAP in 1875.

If we read through the biographies of Auer and Bebel and Bebel's autobiography, we get a picture of immense respect for learning and craftsmanship.²⁸ We find what one might call the artisan's ideal: self-reliance, decorum, self-respect and organisation. Bebel emphasised these qualities in his dealings and Auer brought them to the organisation of the party.

From the outset, Kautsky not only echoed these ideas but justified them by indicating that they were the essence of the true course of history, and economic and social progress. He emphasised two principal qualities, the role of the scientist as an independent thinker interested in applying his learning for the benefit of the proletariat, the need for learning, the need to be able to enjoy and have access to the cultural refinements made possible by successive industrial revolutions and the need for disciplined organisation.

Kautsky became acquainted with social Darwinism about the same time as he entered the socialist movement in his native Austria. The message he drew from his readings was that society evolved through successive stages until it arrived at the final flourishing point of human culture.²⁹ Each stage of history, he wrote, presented the raw material to be moulded into potential enjoyment and happiness.³⁰ The modelling was the job of those who most perceptively and clearly grasped the general drift of history.³¹ Upon his reading of Anti-Dühring, Kautsky modified his schema slightly so that each stage of history was marked by a battle between conservative forces (Thesis) and the newly-born opposition to those forces (Antithesis) out of which a new and higher stage of culture would develop (Synthesis).³² Finally, Kautsky argued that social evolution was composed of immutable laws and those same clear and perceptive thinkers could mould them into an applied science that would hasten the transition to the last stage in the development of mankind.³³

I will argue that Kautsky subsequently developed and refined these ideas into a justification for any and every action undertaken by the party. In this "primitive" theory we find all the elements of his developed theory: the proletariat as the negation of bourgeois society, the party as the infallible guide to hasten the transition to the final stage of human development and the immutable laws as the laws of dialectical materialism.

To justify the role played by the scientist and the immense influence he was to wield, Kautsky developed a corollary that originated in his thinking about aesthetics and the artistic spirit.³⁴ Kautsky wrote that although the artist was affected by material conditions in his work that were similar to those experienced by the craftsman, he was fired by a unique creative spark that could only find true fruition in bringing pleasure to society.³⁵ The scientist, like the artist, drew his power from his commitment and by placing his superior

knowledge and abilities and insight at the service of the progressive social forces. In other words, these "great men"³⁶³⁷ were somehow immune to the social forces that moulded society.

Kautsky saw the role of the intellectual and organiser in that light. He founded the Neue Zeit with the expressed aim of instilling science into the working class and as a spokesman for the most intelligent strata of the proletariat.³⁸ Its aim, he wrote, was to "cram" (einpauken) knowledge into the masses.³⁹ He saw his role and that of the party leadership as one of guiding the working class, because they had mastered science. He saw the party as the fountain of wisdom and the theorist as its sculptor.⁴⁰ According to Rosa Luxemburg, he saw himself labouring in the wake of those who had discovered the truth of history in order to refine and propagate their ideas and to defend them against pollution.⁴¹ He rarely intervened in party debates, he never held an elective post in the party and spoke only when a matter of principle was at stake. Bookish to an extreme, Kautsky, whose poor knowledge of day-to-day events shocked his contemporaries,⁴² assiduously maintained silence when his special gifts were not required and in his style of life itself served as a justification of his theory.⁴³

Below I will argue that his socialism was built on the foundations of evolution and its application to society by a body of savants and leaders acting in the name of science and, through the organisation of the labouring classes, also justified every and all of the actions of the party in its content as in its form.


Kautsky and Marx:

Throughout this essay I have on many occasions referred to differences in the theories of Marx, Engels and Kautsky. I have also mentioned that both Marx and Engels were chary not only of some of Kautsky's basic ideas about economics but about his general style and manner. Marx found him an over-punctilious clerk, by nature a philistine and suited to be a statistician⁴⁴ and Engels commented upon his proven ability to make simple problems more complex.⁴⁵

Before analysing Kautsky's theory in more detail, I will review the principal differences between his approach and that developed by Marx and Engels.

	Marx	Kautsky
Economics	An ideology: distribution of values in a pre-determined system.	A science: distribution of values based on needs.
Needs	Socially defined through the contradiction of exchange and use value.	Needs as defined are concrete or inherent. They are independent of time and space.
Aim	Appropriation of time and space. Conquest of the power of definition.	Appropriation of needs through science. A better distribution of existing values. Access to existing culture.
Means or negation	Process of liberation: cannot be separated from aim. Defined in <u>medias res</u> through action of the working class. Dictatorship of the proletariat.	Scientific application: the political party.

Finally, it is possible to depict Kautsky's schema of the political development of the working class in the following way.



Each theory, utopian socialism, economism, and scientific socialism, has a corresponding level of political development. Thus the proletariat gradually evolved from utopian socialism to historical materialism and from a primitive and sporadic form of struggle to scientific organisation. I will now show how Kautsky developed and justified this schema.

The proletariat as an object:

The text most incisively summarising and integrating the themes found in Kautsky's earlier writings is his Karl Marx' Ukonomische Lehren.⁴⁶ It was first published in 1887 and, according to commentators, is one of the foundation texts of the Second International.⁴⁷ This, indeed, was as Kautsky intended. Like Bebel, he was preoccupied by the continuing strength and popularity of unsystematic and opportunistic ideas amongst the members of the Reichstag Fraktion. He was convinced that those schooled in Marxist economics must appeal over the heads of the recalcitrant members of the Fraktion to the most intelligent strata of the working class.⁴⁸ He sought to exorcise the remnants of utopian and Lassallean ideology in his analysis of Marx's ideas by clearly demonstrating the essence of Marx's theory and its consequences for the socialist movement in a popularised form.⁴⁹ Accordingly, Kautsky hammered home three principal themes that are found in various guises in all his subsequent books and pamphlets.

The opening sections of his work analyse Marx's theory of economics and its relationship to the aims of the socialist movement. Kautsky argued, that Marx's great innovation was his discovery of the notion of surplus value, or how the worker was insufficiently rewarded for the effort he expended in producing those goods that were socially necessary.⁵⁰ Since these goods were per se valuable, he continued, one of the principal aims of socialism was to increase their availability.⁵¹ The worker must not only be more justly rewarded for his labour by being able to enjoy the benefits of goods commensurate with the time he spent labouring but must also work more "natural" hours.⁵² Whereas Marx spoke of seizing and controlling the "means of life" and of reordering the relationship between what his society called work and what it called leisure, Kautsky restricted his propositions to striving after an eight hour day. He argued that in the long run, mechanisation would play an important role in reducing the length of the working day and would simplify tasks in the factory,

but in the short run work was still necessary because there was no other way of increasing the stock of social values.⁵³ A socialist society, he argued, as Bebel did in Die Frau, would ensure that these innovations would be made as rapidly as was possible and that the worker, rather than the capitalist, would benefit from the economic consequences of innovation.

Secondly, Kautsky observed that social change could hardly be initiated by the organised workers' movement. As Lidkte has commented, in Kautsky's view social democracy was almost a "peripheral factor" to revolutionary change.⁵⁴ Drawing upon Darwin as much as from Marx, Kautsky argued that there would be no need to precipitate or hasten the collapse of capitalist society.⁵⁵ All societies were governed, as Marx had demonstrated, by natural laws. These laws (Naturnotwendigkeit) showed that human society was developing progressively and dialectically towards the inevitable collapse of capitalism resulting from the inner contradictions of its mechanism.⁵⁶

Concluding his argument, Kautsky specified what in his view was the raison d'être behind the socialist party. If it did not exist to provoke or encourage the coming of the revolution, its purpose was to organise the working class for the morrow of the revolution.⁵⁷ It had to instruct the working class in how to manage scientifically. Its peripheral organisations like the cooperative societies and the trade unions played such a useful role. At the same time the party had to protect the working class and its institutions and to fight for their right to function as freely as possible. In that sense it could use the parliamentary forum not only to propagandise the working class but to fight for reforms to allow working-class institutions to function as openly and efficiently as possible. Finally the party existed to instruct the working class and to make sure it absorbed the teachings of Marx.⁵⁸

Kautsky never deserted these themes for a moment. As we have already seen, the Erfurterprogramm summarised the gist of his economic argument. Indeed, the fourth paragraph of the programme argues that a society cannot function efficiently without a high degree of economic planning. A socialist society, he argued, could marshall natural and human resources more efficiently than a capitalist society.⁵⁹ In later years Kautsky argued that the aim of socialism was to raise the productive capacity of the working class.⁶⁰

The conclusion drawn from his second and third themes, that the working class must not engage itself in rash and precipitous actions, was the foundation of Kautsky's argument in his Sozialdemokraten Katechismus (1893).⁶¹ He wrote that the SPD was a revolutionary party rather than a party that made revolutions ("eine Revolutionäre, nicht aber eine Revolutionären machenden Partei"),⁶² and that there was no need for the party to intervene because history was on its side and the outcome was assured in its favour, ("Wir können die friedliche Entwicklung nur gefährden durch allzu grosse Friedlichkeit").⁶³ Indeed, he introduced a new theme that was to recur in the writings of German social democracy on many future occasions, that it was dangerous for the party to intervene because it had more to lose than it had to gain.⁶⁴

Hence, from his reading of Marx, Kautsky formulated the idea that the role of the party was to instruct the working class for the morrow of the revolution and to organise a body of astute and able leaders from the ranks of the most class-conscious and intelligent sections of the working class to make sure that the party neither deserted its theory nor the practice inspired by that theory.

The books and pamphlets that Kautsky wrote after the Erfurterprogramm, rather than opening up new areas, explained in detail specific points, elaborated consequences, or summed up his argument in the light of contemporary problems. The Erläuterungen zum Erfurter Programm (1892) discussed the social consequences of economic evolution in more detail and analysed the nature of the major classes of contemporary German society.⁶⁵ The Grundsätze (1892) summarised the arguments against the historical development of capitalism.⁶⁶ In Eduard Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm (1899), Kautsky sought to demonstrate the aptness of his argument to the changing conditions in turn-of-the-century Germany.⁶⁷ In the Soziale Revolution (1902),⁶⁸ he retraced his argument about the inevitable collapse of capitalist society and in Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung (1906) the educative role of socialism.⁶⁹

We can summarise the core of Kautsky's argument in the following way. Man was composed of many "instincts", he argued, and the chief instincts behind his actions were the instinct of self-preservation and a need for society.⁷⁰

Often in the past these two instincts entered into conflict because the grounds for ensuring that individualism and sociability could both be satisfied simul-

taneously did not exist.⁷¹ The industrial revolution, hallmarked by the division of labour and the need for cooperation in the production of socially necessary goods altered the landscape. The material conditions for the eventual marriage of self-preservation and sociability existed for the first time in history.⁷² The resolution of the conflict was possible through the working class, Kautsky wrote, because in the working class the native instinct of cooperation was enforced by its day-to-day experience in the factory and the impulse towards marrying individualism and sociability was therefore appreciably greater than in any other social group.⁷³ That impulse, Kautsky wrote, was responsible for the beginnings of the working-class movement and, in more recent times, for the organisation of the working-class political party. In the final stage, Kautsky argued, it would lead to the final satisfaction of another instinct that he called internationalism.⁷⁴

Rather than arguing that the will to resolve social conflict and order society along cooperative lines meant that the working class would and should fight for those ends, Kautsky maintained that whilst the working class had an instinct for organisation it did not have a strong enough instinct to make a revolution.⁷⁵ It was incapable of any greater effort than understanding the need for organisation. The working class lacked any native understanding of how society should operate and how, correspondingly, it should react.⁷⁶ How society operated and how to act were deducible from the "proletarian philosophy" discovered by Marx and Engels, he wrote.⁷⁷ Only a small segment of the working class was capable of understanding the consequences of Marx's theory and they were vested with control of the working-class movement through its political organisation.⁷⁸ They were guardians of the word and, indeed, guardians of the working class. In fact, Kautsky argued that traditional ethic systems were no longer pertinent to the existing social problems nor could they provide solutions. They had been superceded by a new imperative that Kautsky called "ethical idealism",⁷⁹ faith in the party and all its undertakings and, by extension, in its leadership. In other words the party, acting in the name of the working class and as the guide of its basically social instinct, could do no wrong.

How did Kautsky defend his argument?

In his Erfurter Programm (1892), Kautsky drew a horrifying picture of the effects of industrialisation on the working class. Wages, he wrote, were only high enough to support the worker to the extent that he would be able to continue to work and to reproduce children in sufficient quantity that the market's insatiable demand for cheap and readily available labour would be answered.⁸⁰

The worker was incapable of little more than mere survival. His home life was destroyed, women were forced to work thereby weakening the bonds that held the family together as a unit. Many resorted to prostitution in order to make ends meet.⁸¹ Depraved, without the time or energy to think, the worker could hardly begin to devise a programme to change the society that oppressed him, Kautsky argued.⁸²

In Die soziale Revolution (1902) Kautsky amplified his argument. Denied his just rewards, the worker was reduced to exist as an appendage of the machine he operated during those periods he was lucky enough to be employed.⁸³ Even the right to work was denied him. He was haunted by unemployment, Kautsky argued,⁸⁴ at any moment he could be thrown out of employment and sink into misery. All his effort not expended in producing was expended in worrying about whether he would be able to bring home enough to eat and keep his family together.

Kautsky's argument is based upon two major premises. He wrote that work is not only a right, as the most radical of the bourgeois economists argued, but that the worker had to be given the means to compensate for the boredom, fatigue and depression of work as well as the means to enjoy the self-respect that should come from a labour well done.⁸⁵ Whereas Marx called for the enfranchisement of human activity meaning a total transformation of society and social mores, Kautsky's argument did not go that far. In the light of Kautsky's definition of value and social utility, work was a necessary prelude to enjoyment. Moreover, the worker, he wrote, would enjoy his labour so long as he was sure that he was performing a socially useful act - accumulating for the further benefit of society.⁸⁶ Kautsky finally argued that security meant not only the right to work but the right to enjoy the accumulated stock of existing social values. His solution to the social problematic was not only to achieve wider distribution but to increase production and guarantee employment.⁸⁷

Kautsky said that the nature of work in capitalist society, compounded by the fear aroused by unemployment, made the worker, in normal circumstances, inca-

pable of reasoning and finding the clue to his own exploitation.⁸⁸ They awakened what Kautsky called a "social instinct" and the idea of cooperation, but never the means to enfranchise that cooperation.⁸⁹ The worker on one hand was driven to strive for the knowledge to discover and understand his exploitation and his identity. His attention was increasingly directed towards the whole society rather than small areas of that society and the attraction of the most difficult enigma to master.⁹⁰ But he could never attain that knowledge on his own. Not only was the subject matter far too complex, Kautsky argued, but the worker's own identity had been so crushed by the machine and the problems of his daily life that he was denied that measure of freedom that would allow him to understand his problems.⁹¹ The adjunct of the machine, driven every which way by the capricious demands of the market system, he was thrust into the depths of abject misery. Fatigue and worry made it impossible for him to develop a coherent understanding of his own situation.⁹² "Instinctually" he perceived hazily the need to change.⁹³ He exhibited, Kautsky wrote, an impulse to revolt, but in the web of social relationships and contradictory demands that confounded his universe he "lost himself in the clouds".⁹⁴

The clouds on one hand were his acquiescence to existing society and his inability to propose new and viable means of changing that society.⁹⁵ On the other hand they were the "spurious" ideas and actions he developed to change his situation.⁹⁶ These spurious forms of action were the short-term organisations utilised by the working class, like cooperatives and trade unions, and the adventurist actions undertaken from time to time by the working class that could only spell chaos and threatened the existence of working-class institutions themselves.⁹⁷

Marx wrote that the trade unions and the cooperative organisations were schools for socialism.⁹⁸ The participants would not only be forced to engage authority in trying to run the organisation but would also gain experience in working within organisations. Kautsky, however, restricted the educative function of party-sponsored organisations to preparing the working class to manage society on the morrow of the revolution. He regarded the more activist activities of these organisations with trepidation.⁹⁹

Cooperatives, he argued, were important for the working class because they eased the workers' daily struggle for existence to the extent they replaced commercial undertakings and provided the workers' families with marginally cheaper necessities. The cooperative movement, however, was no long-term solution to the ills of the working class because rather than slowly eroding the power of the capitalists, as such proponents of cooperation as Eduard David argued, Kautsky felt that the movement would be engulfed by the capitalist system.¹⁰⁰ The danger of the consumer cooperatives was that the most intelligent workers would expend too much effort in their organisation and maintenance and deny the political party their support.¹⁰¹ Kautsky never envisaged for a moment that the cooperative movement could generate a battle that would make the worker more aware of his own exploitation and the web of social relationships that determined his existence.¹⁰² Moreover, his form of analysis, examining an institution by its role in relationship to a set series of aims and ruling out any possibility of its role changing, established a theoretical guideline subsequently used by the party. If certain activities were a priori considered to be of little possible revolutionary content, then if too much effort were expended in that direction the duty of the party was to actively hinder, if not stop, those activities.

One such purposeless activity, in Kautsky's mind, was the economic strike, the strike initiated by workers in a factory or in a group of industries to obtain a higher salary or to obtain an improvement in working conditions.¹⁰³ He argued that strikes were inimicable to the movement because they were outside the realm of useful political activity and also because they could, like the miners' strike of 1889 and of 1905, cause serious disruption within the movement as a whole.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, in his refusal to support the miners' strike and his active support of Otto Hué's attempts to curb its spread, Bebel fell back upon Kautsky's theory as a pretext for his actions.¹⁰⁵

Kautsky argued that the trade unions, like the cooperatives, were schools for socialism. He wrote that they exhibited three qualities that were useful to the movement.

- (i) The trade unions, he wrote, were a necessary step in the progress of the workingman from his instinctual opposition to capitalism towards his final discovery of the party as

the representative of his ultimate needs. The trade unions through their activities, he argued, channelled and filtered the instinctual discontent of the working class and prepared them to accept the necessity of organisation.¹⁰⁶ They institutionalised working-class discontent.

(ii) The trade unions were the most important example of purely working-class institutions, Kautsky wrote. They were not only entirely self-sufficient, but organised efficiently and democratic. They were an example of the capacity of the working class for uniting those two qualities, and in that sense, also a training school for the moment when the working class would have to take charge of society, manage its productive facilities and organise its consumptive capacity.¹⁰⁷

(iii) The trade union movement, in Kautsky's estimation, was a crucial step in the evolution of the working class towards the realisation that "the political struggle is a more far-reaching and more incisive manifestation of the economic struggle", (der politische Kampf ist eine weitergehendere und eine schneidendere Manifestation des ökonomischen Kampfes).¹⁰⁸

The day-to-day struggles of the trade unions instilled the importance of cooperation and solidarity in the working class as well as the still more admirable virtues of respect and allegiance to the efficiency of discipline and firm organisation.¹⁰⁹ The experience of the advantages

and limitations of trade unionism led to the formation of the capacity and the need for "spiritual ties" (geistliche Zusammenhänge)¹¹⁰ to bind the various components of the working-class movement together to form an "irresistible whole" (ein unwiderstehliches Ganzes)¹¹¹ for the moment when the working class would take charge of society.

Because trade unions played such an important role in Kautsky's schema, he argued that they must be free organisationally to exercise the right to strike without fear of victimisation, and that the right to negotiate contracts, to be recognised legally as the official representatives of workers in the various industries they organised and to organise working-class opinion in support of their actions must be granted.¹¹²

On one hand, these demands required an overhaul of the German legal system. Who was to do this? Arguing against Bruno Poersch's idea that the only way the trade unions could obtain a properly constituted legal framework was to attenuate their relationship with the SPD and by practising moderation widen their appeal to embrace the majority of Reichstag deputies,¹¹³ Kautsky wrote that only a strong political organisation representing the sum and total of working-class interests could wage such a fight.¹¹⁴ Only the party had the power to unite competing sections of the trade union movement, he argued, in agreement with Karl Legien, the head of the Generalkommission,¹¹⁵ and help the trade unions to preserve a united front.

Secondly, in the name of unity Kautsky argued against diversity. The working class could ill afford internal dissidence and those groups that refused to accept the authority of the trade union movement, like the skilled workers in Hamburg, had no place in the party.¹¹⁶ Extra-institutional action was irresponsible and dangerous to the future of the established political movement and must be punished.¹¹⁷

Hence, Kautsky argued that whilst the proletariat was the only class that could lead society into the era of communism, it could have little direct role in initiating the revolutionary process itself. In the Soziale Revolution he argued

that the era of the urban revolution was over, only a catastrophe would bring about the end of capitalism.¹¹⁸ The task of the party was neither to push for nor to prepare the revolution.¹¹⁹ During the important debate on the general strike at the 1905 party congress, Bebel, whilst concurring in its usage in certain instances repeated Kautsky's argument verbatim.¹²⁰ The proletariat was the instrument of the revolution or the raw material from which the future society would be hewn. The artisan-hewer was the party conscious of its expertise, conscious of the outcome of the struggle. To the party the working class owed complete fidelity and obedience.¹²¹ Its duties were to make certain that the working class was aware of its final aim (Endziel)¹²² and that the door on working-class evolution, from primitive consciousness through trade unionism to political awareness, was never closed.¹²³

The theory of theory and its consequences:

Kautsky noted in his introduction to Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung that the text was written at the height of the economic and political strikes sweeping Germany and at the apogee of the Soviet movement in St. Petersburg.¹²⁴ Whereas Rosa Luxemburg was inspired by these events to propose a strategy of active intervention and encouragement of the strike movements on the part of the party, Kautsky was not only distinctly less than laudatory of the revolutionary potential of the strike movement,¹²⁵ but steadfastly refused to see any need to modify his theory.¹²⁶ The text not only restates and summarises his earlier arguments but goes on, in the face of Bernstein's onslaught on the consistency of the Marxism preached by the SPD, to call for continued faith in all the party's endeavours and actions as both scientifically and practically necessary.¹²⁷

Kautsky starts by summarising the essence of his earlier arguments about the socialist instinct of the working class but its native inability to realise that instinct. Acknowledging his debt to Darwin, he argued that the hallmark of the industrial age was the division of labour and the cooperative labour it engendered.¹²⁸ To produce more efficiently and humanely society needed to practise social cooperation. Such cooperation would come about on the morrow of the collapse of the capitalist system either by the system falling to pieces because of a mechanical breakdown or through the voluntary abdication of the middle classes in the face of the superior theory preached by the working class.¹²⁹ Having reiterated the Zusammenbruchstheorie, with the addendum of a

notion of social change acceptable to Bernstein, Kautsky then went on to argue that such changes were only possible if the proletariat would ignore invitations to adventurist actions and remained loyal and steady to the principles guiding the party.¹³⁰

Kautsky then argued that the proletariat provided the grounds for a correct and scientific understanding of historical evolution and the future. The party, having absorbed the "proletarian philosophy" invented by Marx and Engels,¹³¹ incorporated that knowledge and acting upon its accumulated wisdom became the firm and unfailing guide of the proletariat.¹³² In other words, in Kautsky's view, the party constituted an unchallengeable and infallible guide. It was, he wrote, the scientific élite, that would eventually be put at "the head of civilisation".¹³³

The party, he wrote, had replaced the older outmoded forms of idealism with a new ethical idealism.¹³⁴ Because the new ethic was discovered scientifically, it could not be challenged.¹³⁵ For that reason the working class must remain unflinching in its support of the party.

How could it be argued that the laws of historical materialism apply to all the universe but not to their own discovery? It is a curious theory indeed that cannot account for its own generation in terms of its own supposedly universal laws.

The property of every ethical system in a society based upon an unequal voice in deciding what the values of that society are to be is that there is one system of rules and norms for the common people and another for those who understand the "laws" governing that society.¹³⁶ Kautsky's metaphysic, or his explanation of the discovery of the laws of society, is in no way different from any of the "bourgeois" theories of the origin and genesis of ideas that he attacked. Such a theory of inspiration has been used in a political sense to maintain an elite in power. I am not saying that Kautsky wanted to do this but that his theory creates the grounds for such a view to take root and flourish. Finally, no matter how materialistic in appearance his theory in the end does not rest on social or human praxis as does that of Marx, but upon divine inspiration. Marx's third thesis on Feuerbach, that such a theory inevitably leads to the opposite of human liberation, can just as easily be taken as a criticism of Kautsky.¹³⁷

Kautsky's Der Weg zur Macht. Politische Betrachtung über das Hineinwachsen in die Revolution (1909)¹³⁸ is the final summary of his argument. He wrote that in the most favourable circumstances trade unions, cooperative organisations or any ancillary organisations attached to the party could only defend the working class against the worst excesses of capitalism. Their philosophy only allowed them to fight for limited ends and they needed the guidance of the party to prevent their integration into capitalist society.¹³⁹ At best they could only whet the workers' appetite for greater knowledge and change.¹⁴⁰ The movement as a whole sorely needed proletarian science and organisation. The trade union movement was no more than a preface to true organisation.¹⁴¹ The party was the infallible guide of the proletariat, the integrator of its activities and the embryo of the new society in waiting.¹⁴²

In short, Kautsky's theory can be characterised as a theory justifying any and all actions undertaken by the party. But it gained its cogency at the price of internal inconsistency. Kautsky was forced to invent two theories of knowledge and could only explain the genesis of the superior form of knowledge by reference to divine inspiration. Correspondingly he was forced to espouse a concept he called "ethical idealism" to explain why that superior knowledge should be supported. I will explore the way such a theory suited the development of the SPD in a few minutes but before that I must deal with another problem. Kautsky saw himself as defending the revolutionary position of the party against the onslaught of the revisionists. His concepts of ethics and faith in the party were his answer to their attack. If we read most commentators on the history of the SPD they see the party jolted by revisionism and the controversy that raged as the most important event in the social-democratic world at the turn of the century.¹⁴³

I will maintain that this was far from the case, because the differences between the two contending groups were differences of form more than of substance. I will argue that Bernstein's Weltanschauung differed little from that developed by Kautsky; but that Bernstein called upon the social democrats to end the glaring inconsistency between their theory and their practice. I will maintain that such was the heart of the controversy and the forces that most strenuously resisted Bernstein's call for consistency were the trade unions, thoroughly "reformist" in practice but nonetheless firmly wedded to the rhetoric encasing the political movement in an impregnably holy aura.

What was the source of the revisionist controversy? According to most commentators it was that by the middle of the 1890's Bernstein became convinced that Marxism was not a science of the kind Kautsky claimed it to be because it failed to predict the evolution of capitalism.¹⁴⁴ Its main theoretical underpinnings, the theory of impoverishment (Verelendungstheorie), its theory of systematic collapse (Zusammenbruchstheorie) and its theory of surplus value were not borne out by the facts.¹⁴⁵ Bernstein, schooled in the same version of Marxism as a natural science as Kautsky, was appalled by the failure of his beliefs to measure up to reality.¹⁴⁶ Angel argues that the essence of Bernstein's argument was that the movement should repudiate Marxism when Marx's revolutionary concepts were incompatible with reality.¹⁴⁷ Bernstein argued that in its practical work the party revised Marxism in any case. Therefore he concluded that the time had come to revise theory as well. Socialism was not a science, he wrote, but a system of morals and people had to be convinced of its usefulness.¹⁴⁸ If that were made clear the spirit of reform and the party's theory would be in perfect accord.¹⁴⁹

Bernstein's views were expounded in a series of texts starting from a series of articles casting doubt on different aspects of socialist theory known as the Probleme des Sozialismus¹⁵⁰ that appeared in the Neue Zeit. In this series he answered the criticisms of Bax and Plekhanov. He first argued for theoretical consistency in Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (1899),¹⁵¹ and a collection of articles grouped under the general title Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozialismus,¹⁵² (1901) intended as a reply to Kautsky as well as a more restricted text discussing the problem of science and morals, Wie ist der wissenschaftliche Sozialismus möglich?, (1901).¹⁵³

In full polemical flight in Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm, (1899), Kautsky nonetheless wrote that both he and Bernstein were agreed upon the usefulness and, indeed, necessity of democratic, social and political reforms.¹⁵⁴ Several years later Albert Thomas reported that Bernstein consistently maintained that there were no differences between the "revolutionaries" and "reformists" concerning ends or means.¹⁵⁵ If that is the case, then what was Bernstein revising? Ritter notes that the term revisionism covers a multitude of sins for there was no single or united standpoint amongst those calling themselves revisionists.¹⁵⁶

In the opening sections of the Voraussetzungen, Bernstein attacked the widely held theory of economic determinism and outlined his alternative. The correct side to the economic deterministic argument, he wrote, is that man is determined to a large extent by his milieu.¹⁵⁷ The incorrect side, he argued, is that the milieu automatically leads to the revolutionary political conclusions and the theory of Zusammenbruch espoused by Kautsky and Bebel.¹⁵⁸ Kautsky mixes the "is" (scientific perception of reality) with the "ought" (the conclusion that socialism is inevitable) whereas socialism, Bernstein argued, following the theoretical guidelines established by Cohen, Rank and the other neo-Kantians, is a possible way of transforming reality to make it more liveable, whereas science is "agnostic", dealing in facts and examining reality.¹⁵⁹

The reality of the working class, he continued, was that it is insufficiently rewarded for what it produces. The worker did not receive an adequate share of the existing stock of social values.¹⁶⁰ Value, he argued, was a product of labour and could be maximised by greater production. In other words, quantity could be alchemised into quality. Use value, he wrote criticising Marx, was no more than a function of exchange value.¹⁶¹ In that sense the duties of socialism were to increase the stock of social values, make work more humane and create institutions to oversee the social distribution that were both more approachable and more visible.¹⁶²

Moreover, the working class was not yet ready for socialism because it was neither knowledgeable or experienced enough to know how to manage a communistic society.¹⁶³ To prepare it for the eventuality of such a society was a laudable aim, Bernstein maintained, and the immediate task of the party was to open all channels of social communication and campaign for a democratisation of governing processes. The party should serve as a guide and a teacher.¹⁶⁴

The industrial infrastructure was necessary to society because the progress, learning and knowledge that accompanied industrialisation civilised society.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, if the ultimate aim was a redistribution of the values of industrial society, Bernstein wrote, how could one envisage so callous an action as waiting for the impending collapse of that industrial structure?¹⁶⁶ It would not only set back the educative campaign waged by the party because it would disorganise the working class, but would engender such chaos that society would

be destroyed to its fundamental. Socialism, Bernstein concluded, could only be achieved through the transformation of the State and not through its destruction. Therefore the aim of socialism was education rather than class warfare.¹⁶⁷

There was moreover little or indeed negative evidence that such a collapse was imminent because differences between classes were, if anything, being attenuated.¹⁶⁸ By that Bernstein meant that because the basic needs of the working class for housing, education, sanitation and higher wages were being satisfied, their opposition to the middle classes was disappearing.¹⁶⁹ At the same time he noticed that the vituperation of the middle class had all but vanished.¹⁷⁰

Indeed, if one starts from Kautsky's premise that needs are inherent and the list of needs put forward and agreed to by both Bernstein and Kautsky are gradually being satisfied, then it is impossible to fault Bernstein's argument that social peace is on the cards and is desirable.

One can argue that the essence of Bernstein's argument about economics is that if Kautsky's initial definition of the working-class problematic is correct then his conclusions must be modified for ones espousing cooperation and gradualism.

But the party, in Bernstein's eyes, was no less the integrating force that defended the working class and its institutions and strove to fulfil its ideal than it was for Kautsky. The party was the organisation of the most intelligent sectors of the working class who through study and experience came to accept what Bernstein called the moral doctrine of socialism.¹⁷¹ Far from commending the trade unions, Bernstein argued even more strongly than Kautsky, that they needed the party to defend them and fight for those reforms they could not hope to obtain independently of a working-class political organisation.¹⁷² In later years, Bernstein was even to argue that a general political strike was a weapon that must be used judiciously if all other attempts at reform were blocked.¹⁷³ The view, of course, was hotly contested by the trade unions who could not countenance any invasion of their activities by the party and who reacted against Bernstein's ideas with hostility.¹⁷⁴

Hence Bernstein specified that the party existed to uphold and fight for the new modern ethic by education and by reform. Secondly the immediate task of the party was to fight for the initiation and application of day-to-day reforms.¹⁷⁵

Here he did not rule out a general strike judiciously organised by the party when all other means failed. The duty of the party was to channel the native and unarticulated demands of the working class into fruitful and reasonable actions.¹⁷⁶ For that reason he accepted Kautsky's view that the party was an organisation of theorists and organisers leading the working class. But where he differed from Kautsky was in his view that to clothe the process in the mystique of revolution was dishonest and perhaps even harmful. If one really believes that the emperor has no clothes, Bernstein argued, then one must say so.

Bernstein did not disagree with the principles underlying Kautsky's analysis. Kautsky's concept of the working class, the ends and aims of the working class and the means to achieve those ends were never challenged by Bernstein. His only difference was in his often repeated view that Kautsky's science and his conclusions were inconsistent with their premises. Agreeing with every other facet of Kautsky's analysis from the model of social action, to his concept of needs and desires, to his solution of schooling in socialism and the need for organisation, Bernstein located the basic contradiction between Kautsky's claim that all social events were determined by the economic setting and the supposed ability of the party as an institution to transcend that setting. He called for consistency.

Far from a decisive break with the accepted view of strategy in socialist circles, Bernstein's view was extraordinarily consistent with that view. His attack was thus both the most damning indictment of the theory preached in the Second International as well as its most lyrical defence. Why? Bernstein's Marxism was not Marx but the same theory as developed by Kautsky. His rejection of Marx was in fact a rejection of orthodoxy in the name of making orthodoxy consistent. His having accepted its arguments wholeheartedly led to his rejection giving them their clearest expression. Indeed, the very core of orthodoxy, the idea that meaning is a property of an object and that value is derived from the utility of those properties finds its most poignant expression in Bernstein's scattered writings from his earliest contribution in the Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,¹⁷⁷ the article he wrote whilst he was editing the Sozialdemokrat in the 1880's, and the three major texts of "revisionism", Die Voraussetzungen, Zur Geschichte, and Wie ist der wissenschaftliche Sozialismus möglich? .

Finally, according to Angel, there was little real agreement about priorities, or even principles, amongst the intellectuals who were classified as, or who called themselves revisionists.¹⁷⁸ Eduard David, an ardent supporter of the small farmer, whilst given to proclaiming himself Bernstein's principal advocat, never accepted Bernstein's unwavering belief in the necessity of a party as the supreme working-class institution.¹⁷⁹ Paul Göhre quickly transmuted Bernstein's use of the categorical imperative into his own brand of Lutheran populism and pre-determination.¹⁸⁰ Albert Südekum, the German correspondent of Humanité, refused to take Bernstein's advocacy of a general strike for political ends seriously.¹⁸¹ Hugo Lindemann tried to use Bernstein's ideas to justify the party's intervention in communal elections and communal affairs.¹⁸² Max Schippel, the most vocal of the imperial social-democrats, used Bernstein's highly conditional support of colonialism, to justify his support of every turn of the Empire's search for colonies and foreign markets.¹⁸³ Wolfgang Heine and Friedrich Nauman tried their best to convert socialism into a brand of nationalistic socialism.¹⁸⁴

Amongst trade unionists and party managers one finds a similar conversion of Bernstein's ideas or outright rejection of his principles.

The chief beneficiaries from the devolution of powers to the Länder due to Auer's reforms all paid lip-service to Bernstein's ideas. Wilhelm Kolb, one of the leaders of the SPD organisation in Baden, wrote that Bernstein demonstrated that the party had to choose between a seriously revolutionary or revisionist policy and that evolution, the basic law of nature, could not be ignored.¹⁸⁵ Frank in Baden, Grillenberger and Timm in Bavaria and Keil in Württemberg all echoed these ideas.¹⁸⁶ But in their practice, they never supported Bernstein's call for democratisation of the party. As Schorske has shown, despite a superficial appearance of democracy the devolution of power to the Länder reduced the powers of local organisations and subjected them to the intervention of the state organisation.¹⁸⁷ Schorske traces the history of the Württemberg organisation to show how any opposition was systematically crushed.¹⁸⁸ Secondly, they never supported Bernstein's concept of the general strike. Kolb in particular was extremely hostile, pointing out how the general strike would crush the party.¹⁸⁹ Why did they claim to be followers of Bernstein?

Since Bernstein emphasised the importance of practical day-to-day work and called for a no nonsense theory of socialism, one would have suspected that

he would have gained some significant trade union support. Aside from von Elm, the leader of the increasingly less important cigarmakers union,¹⁹⁰ Bernstein was never enthusiastically supported by the trade union movement. Bümelberg dismissed Bernstein as no more than a member of an intellectual canaille.¹⁹¹ Legien, the head of the trade union organisation, consistently voted against all of Bernstein's proposals.¹⁹² One could understand his opposing Bernstein's concept of party and his espousing of the general strike, but during the revisionist controversy, Legien never once deserted the line espoused by Bebel and Kautsky that one could not allow an attack upon the revolutionary principles of the Erfurterprogramm.¹⁹³ He even went so far as to support a motion disciplining Bernstein.¹⁹⁴ How can we understand this?

We have so far argued that revisionism did not revise and that it accepted the same strategy as the party orthodoxy. Bernstein's achievement was to reveal the contradiction between the theory and the action of the SPD. Perhaps, the only answer to the two questions I posed above is that Bernstein went too far even for those who really wanted to change the course of the party's development. By that I mean that Bernstein's challenge was not important for the content of his argument but because it challenged and raised awkward questions. Auer wrote that Bernstein had blurted out what was at the back of everyone's mind but that no one could tolerate his having revealed inconsistencies.¹⁹⁵ This can explain, for example, why Kautsky could justify his version of scientific socialism by appealing to an ethic, much like that proposed by Bernstein, whilst pointedly attacking Bernstein's attempted revision of party orthodoxy in the name of continuity. For if the party had to be an institution above society and immune to the uncertain currents of history, as it was in Kautsky's cosmology, then all of its actions, no matter how discontinuous, must be seen as continuous. If, as Legien argued on several occasions, the party's role for the trade unions was to galvanise the entire working population irrespective of different aims and outlooks,¹⁹⁶ then the appeal clothed so brilliantly in the 19th century code of divinity, science and progress, and so popular with a working class in its quest for some form of respectability, must be unshakeable.

Our investigation of the theories developed by Kautsky and Bernstein has revealed that they completely agreed not only about the nature of the social problematic but about the means to solve the problematic. Kautsky envisaged the party as the application of a rigorous science and Bernstein saw it as a moral force. In both cases it came down to much the same thing. As Kautsky wrote as early as his first critique of Bernstein, Marxism has no utopia, only organisation and education.¹⁹⁷

Kautsky's theory and social-democratic praxis:

Matthias and Korsch argue that the essence of Kautsky's theory is support of the party under every and all conditions (Organisationspatriotismus).¹⁹⁸ We have seen that Kautsky's theory of economics and of the working class leads in such a direction. I will now argue that the day-to-day activities sponsored by the party communicated such a message through their form and content. I will then turn to the problem of what was responsible for such "conservatism".

In an interesting study of German social democracy in 1903, Edgar Milhaud writes of the fervour of party meetings and the charisma of Bebel, whose photo adorned the wall of a surprisingly large number of working-class homes.¹⁹⁹ Later commentators note the enormous crowds mourning the death of Paul Singer in 1911. In Berlin alone over 400,000 people attended his funeral.²⁰⁰ We know from Strauss, Jackh and Laufenberg that in the small industrial towns of Saxony and Brunswick party cooperatives, insurance associations, clubs, and even fortune tellers constituted the entire universe of the worker.²⁰¹ In the large cities party clubs, bars and social clubs were a refuge against the outside world.²⁰² A French journalist's description of Bebel notes that his appearance could have been that of the medieval monarch blessed with healing powers.²⁰³ The party was thus concretely and spiritually a refuge of hope.

The sponsored activities and means of communication used by the party communicated the need for solidarity and translated the fellowship of the party into acceptance of firm organisation.

The SPD ran a large publishing empire whose total press circulation was well over one million by 1905.²⁰⁴ In addition to a large number of local daily and weekly newspapers, some with a circulation of over 50,000 like the Leipziger Volkszeitung, Volksstimme (Chemnitz), Landbote für Schleisen, Dresdner Volkszeitung, and the Hamburger Echo, the party issued a specialised press catering to every possible constituency and interest of its members and fellow-travelers.

The Neue Zeit, (6,400) published scientific, literary and theoretical articles as well as cultural reviews and short novels. Die Gleichheit, (28,700), dealt with feminine news, publishing household hints as well as introductions to Marxist theory and even ran a presse du coeur serial.²⁰⁵ Children and youth

were catered for by the Arbeiter-Jugend, (9,000), Die Arbeitende Jugend, (10,000), and Die Junge Garde, (4,000). There were a bevy of highly popular publications dealing with athletics and body-building (Arbeiter-Turnzeitung),²⁰⁶ (Jugend und Sport),²⁰⁷ (Athletik),²⁰⁸ (Moderne Körperkultur);²⁰⁹ health, (Volksgesundheit);²¹⁰ music, (Deutsche Arbeiter-Sängerzeitung);²¹¹ bibliophiles, (Der Bibliothekar);²¹² hiking and travelling, (Der Wanderfreund);²¹³ cycling (Der Arbeiter-Radfahrer)²¹⁴ with a phenomenal circulation of 168,000, as well as a widely-read satirical magazine, (Der wahre Jacob),²¹⁵ and a sober journal for teetotalers, (Der abstinente Arbeiter).²¹⁶

Many of these magazines were published for and by an organisation affiliated to the party. For example, the Athletik was issued in the name of the Arbeiter-Athletenbund. This only begins to indicate the wide range of sporting and cultural activities catered for by the party. Amongst the leisure activities provided by the SPD we find a multitude of clubs and societies running the range from clubs organised around specific hobbies, to hiking societies, sporting teams, organised into leagues, holiday services, choral societies, childrens' groups and a large number of youth clubs.²¹⁷ The party seems to have provided for every imaginable form of free-time activity.

According to observers, these activities communicated the importance of discipline, solidarity and team-work. Vinnai in his study of working-class sporting societies argues convincingly that the teams helped to cement workers from different occupational backgrounds into a coherent and solid organisation.²¹⁸ Aside from the obvious example of sports, if we take the far less obvious example of cycling clubs, we again find evidence of the inculcation of discipline. Participants in these clubs report the importance of rules, many of which made no sense in themselves. Whereas one could defend a rule to keep one's cycle in good repair, the intrinsic value of wearing "respectable" clothes, almost one's Sunday-best according to one report, seems somewhat far-fetched.²¹⁹ In addition to the traditional yearning for respectability and feeling part of society, as Veblen and Halbwachs argue,²²⁰ do we not also find an example of education for solidarity in the fact that one could be expelled for the smallest misdemeanour?

If we examine the newspapers and magazines intended for working-class youth, we find articles discussing the importance of work and how it could make the world a better place to live in, a strong emphasis on vocational pride and calls for

rigorous organisation.²²¹ Others discuss the importance of the family, preaching the need to respect parental decisions, abstinence of all kinds, moral virtue and warning the reader of the danger of rash and precipitous decisions.²²² The serials provide a picture of the ambitious working-class youth who knows his job, never quarrels with his family, intends to join his trade union organisation and work for the party.²²³ At no time do the magazines ever raise the implications of socialism for freer sexual behaviour, raise the possibility of communal life or of fundamentally altering the day-to-day relationships between people living together in a community. Ludwig Frank, the party's "youth expert" never once touched upon these problems. In his "Die jugendlichen Arbeiter und ihre Organisationen", he mentions the importance of preserving all of one's spare energy for party work.²²⁴ Is the reason for avoiding such fundamental problems for youth that such activities, with their exploratory and experimental sides, could be inimicable to the kind of organisation the party fathers had in mind? Was it felt that the solidarity needed for the daily battle would be undermined by such curiosity and the process of self-discovery? Can the puritanism of the youth movement, that came down to accepting existing social mores, and the party's threat to disband youth organisations when they began to raise such questions, be explained by the need to educate youth to respect hierarchy and organisation?

If we look briefly at another activity, we find that the Deutsche Arbeiter-Sängerzeitung, the journal of the immense number of choral societies, wrote that the highest form of musical expression known was the chorale. Rather than discussing the virtues of chorale music as such, the paper spoke of the wonderful effect of each person performing in conjunction with others and how the group enhanced the individual's enjoyment of his effort and how the individual enhanced the group.²²⁵ If we look at their repertoires we find that not only was there a penchant for "big" music, but aside from songs praising party and working-class organisation meant for special occasions, they almost invariably sang Bach and Handel, both of whom had experienced a revival in turn-of-the-century German society.²²⁶

The party schools, as Kosiol argues, arranged courses on economics, economic history, party history, the Erfurterprogramm, science and scientific development, temperance, philosophy and sometimes ran retraining courses.²²⁷ By 1913

there were some 791 organised course centres.²²⁸ Few were permanent schools like the sozialdemokratische Parteischule where Rosa Luxemburg and Hilferding taught economics, Pannekoek history and social theory and Mehring history. Most were weekend or day schools organised around immediate themes and problems. In all cases, according to Ulbricht and Pieck,²²⁹ the schools were run along traditional lines with very little scope for "deviance" of any kind. Indeed, one of the charges brought against Rosa Luxemburg by the trade unions was that she tolerated students' straying from the set syllabus and time-honoured social-democratic truths.²³⁰

Whereas Marx regarded education as the worker's conscious self-discovery of the rules and norms binding him to his role in his society and emphasised the importance of encouraging free discussion and self-expression to aid that process; the activities of the party were conceived in terms of discipline and organisation that would seriously impede such independence and curiosity from developing. The "cue" of organisation and the acceptance of discipline could well be carried over from leisure activities to society, leading to social integration rather than encouraging a struggle against society. Whereas Marx emphasised the necessity of giving "cues" to challenge society, Kautsky's theory and social-democratic practice moved in the opposite direction.

Why was such a form of development seen to be a necessity?

Kautsky wrote that the proletariat must be educated to accept the decisions of the party as binding.²³¹ The proletariat, he argued, had to be taught how to work together under the most difficult circumstances. The party's role was that of educator and organiser.²³² To prepare the worker for the struggle, he continued, the party had to instill the clearest possible understanding of its aims as expressed in the party programme and to teach the necessity of discipline.²³³ Indeed, Kautsky's view that proletarian knowledge was knowledge of a precise scientific system in its content made rote teaching all the more possible.

Finally, Kautsky argued that of all the party's tasks, the most important was organisation.²³⁴ Whereas internal democracy was a praiseworthy aim, it could not always be tolerated. Ordinary members of the party and their elected representatives to the yearly party congress could hardly have the time or knowledge to make major decisions that were always correct.²³⁵ In many cases, he wrote, these had to be left in the hands of the tried-and-true experts, and the proletariat

should understand that it could only arrive at its Endziel if it accepted those decisions and maintained order and discipline.²³⁶

But if, as Kautsky and Bebel believed, the collapse of capitalism was to occur automatically without the intervention of the working class, what was the purpose behind preparing the worker for the struggle? What struggle was he being prepared for? Here, indeed, is the crucial question. Kautsky's specified role for the party boils down to education and organisation, but one may well inquire, education and organisation for what?

We can begin to understand the extent and nature of this problem by looking at two cases in which Kautsky invoked the problem of discipline. They will provide us with a clue of what direction to take in order to answer the question we have just posed.

In 1901 the party congress assembled at Lübeck was faced with two important disciplinary cases. The first involved Eduard Bernstein's revisionism and what attitude the party should take to his having addressed meetings and criticised the party without prior reference to the Parteivorstand. The second case was a dispute between the trade unions and a special party tribunal set up to examine the expulsion of several craftsmen who had been expelled by the Hamburger party organisation on request by the Generalkommission, parliamentary committee, of the national trade union federation. It is known as the Akkordmauer case.

Kautsky argued that he strongly disagreed with Bernstein's call to revise party doctrine but that, in the end, he regarded Bernstein's "heresy" as no more than a difference of opinion within the party.²³⁷ For that reason he said there were no grounds to exclude Bernstein from the party. Whereas, he concluded, should one act in defiance of organisational and disciplinary decisions there he would find grounds for exclusion.²³⁸

The Akkordmauer case was an extremely involved affair that started from the refusal of craftsmen in the building industry to join their less skilled workmates in a strike. The Generalkommission, very much dominated by the federations of unskilled workers that grew up during the 1890's and emerging from a war against craftsmen federations, demanded that the offenders be expelled from the party.²³⁹ It argued that an infraction against trade union discipline was also an infraction against the laws of the party. The skilled masons, all

of them old social democrats who had been active in the organisation of the Hamburger party during the period of the Sozialistengesetz, appealed to the party executive. A tribunal organised under the chairmanship of Ignaz Auer granted their appeal. The trade unions and the Hamburger party, which they controlled, appealed to the Lübeck congress arguing that expulsion must be granted.²⁴⁰ Bernstein argued that the party could not be responsible for the activities of its members in trade union organisations and Auer maintained that strikebreaking was not a sufficient cause for expulsion.²⁴¹ Legien, making one of his rare public speeches at a party congress, said that the party existed to teach workingmen the importance of solidarity. If it tolerated strikebreaking at any level and at any time it could hardly hope to survive.²⁴²

The party adopted a supposedly compromise motion that stated that strikebreaking was against the spirit of the movement and that in future local federations would decide all questions of membership. Since, as Shorske has shown, the majority of party organisations were in the hands of the Legien-style unionists, this marked a considerable victory for them.²⁴³ In practice it meant that the party recognised the importance of trade union solidarity and would not in the future take decisions without consulting the trade union movement. Indeed, Kautsky argued that the decision made a firm and equal working alliance between the party and the trade unions possible.²⁴⁴

These two incidents seem to suggest that the solidarity preached and practised by the party was a solidarity necessary to wage the mundane struggle for higher wages, the fight against unemployment and for job security rather than for the Zukunftsstaat. Can one describe Kautsky's theory as a window-dressing, a ritualised expression to make such a message palpable? Here we must look more closely at the needs and demands formulated by the Legien-style unionists.

The SPD and working class reality:

In the remainder of this section, I will argue that the German trade union movement experienced an important transformation during the 1880's and 1890's. From a movement based upon the demands of skilled craftsmen and an organisation based upon local organisation, it became an organisation espousing the demands of the relatively unskilled industrial workers. The shopping list of the movement was not only drastically changed, but the organisation itself underwent a metamorphosis because of the new shopping list. Amongst the many requirements of the

new style trade unions, were the need for means to coordinate its activities on a national basis, the need to maintain a united front of all workers no matter what their skills and a need for a galvanising ideology whose essence would be to communicate the imperative of solidarity and discipline. An organisation offering some hope, no matter how faint and distant, of obtaining satisfaction of the kinds of demands requiring legislation was also useful. However, the trade union movement developed relatively late because of the Sozialistengesetz and had difficulty in demarcating areas of interest between itself and the party. The movement only began to assume its definitive form, as Cassau argues,²⁴⁶ after 1895. I will also suggest that by redefining the range and scope of party activities, the trade unions were responsible for the growth of what Michels was to call the party bureaucracy.²⁴⁷ Finally, I will suggest that the party restricted its range of activities and tailored them to the demands of the trade union movement.

With the notable exception of the highly skilled crafts, whose organisation predated working-class political movements by several decades, the Sozialistengesetz destroyed the German trade union movement.²⁴⁸ Organisations like the printers and specialised glove makers who functioned independently of the party and were more mutual insurance and social societies than organisations to fight for higher wages and better working conditions survived the imposition of the repressive laws.²⁴⁹ Schmüle argues that craft trade unionism had made headway in only the largest cities, like Leipzig and Dresden, or in one-industry towns, like the textile towns in Saxony.²⁵⁰ If we examine the list of participants at the 1877 trade union congress, we find the builders of Hamburg, the carpenters of Leipzig, the glass workers of Lößtau and the gold beaters of Schwäbisch-Gmünd representative of the unions at the congress.²⁵¹ The trade union movement was composed principally of groups of workers from different crafts organised into local trade union organisations that can be broadly compared to the British trades union councils or the French bourses du travail.²⁵² In most cases, as Laufenberg and Jackh argue, these councils were indistinguishable from the party.²⁵³

For that reason, the merger of convenience between party and trade union organisations into an organisation run by the party that came about because of the Sozialistengesetz, was easily facilitated and achieved. Ritter reports that

the majority of trade union militants became active in the new organisation.²⁵⁴ Many of them became local coordinators and contact men, (Vertrauensmänner), who were responsible for not only maintaining a flow of socialist information as Engelberg has shown,²⁵⁵ but also seemed to have adjudicated disputes between contending trade union groups and served as a clearing house for information about where work was available and for strike news.²⁵⁶ As we have seen, many officials of the recently organised national craft federations, like Auer, Geib, Gerisch, Pfannkuch and the principal organiser of the semi-underground system of information,²⁵⁷ Julius Motteler, henceforth worked exclusively in the party organisation. On the local level, we find that many trade union and cooperative officials, like Adolf Geck in Baden,²⁵⁸ embarked on careers as party organisers, never to return to trade union work as such again.²⁵⁹

Ritter also argues that with the exception of the highly-skilled organisations, like Rexhüser's union of printers, the new leaders of the trade union organisations that began to emerge when the enforcement of the penal clauses of the repressive laws was not so harshly enforced after 1883 were younger men who were to remain firmly in control of the trade union organisation until well into the present century.²⁶⁰ These were men like Bringmann, Schlicke, Leipart, Legien, and Segitz who wrote new ideas about organisation to the trade union movement. Whilst Ritter's argument is true, evidence suggests that a much more important transformation took place within German trade unionism than a change in personnel.

It seems that three different kinds of trade union organisation existed or developed during the 1880's. Firstly, by necessity the most important form of organisation continued to be the reinforced local organisations that functioned like the British trades councils and the French bourses du travail. In areas where few workers of any craft were congregated, these organisations were a necessity. For the most part, commentators indicate that these organisations tended to group workers from highly skilled crafts and seemed to have little contact with unskilled workers.²⁶¹ Secondly, in areas where one industry dominated, such as in the weaving towns in the vicinity of Leipzig, Chemnitz and Dresden, the organisations were composed of workers from one craft, and as Heilman argues,²⁶² were extremely powerful organisations.²⁶³ In the larger cities, like Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Essen, Barmen and Elberfeld, where the number of workers from any one group were relatively high or where there were large-sized enterprises, these organisations, called Fachvereine,

flourished.²⁶⁴ Whereas the local organisations that included workers from many crafts tended to be close to the party, the Fachvereine, particularly in the textile and metal industries,²⁶⁵ where factory concentration and the division of labour were the norm, tended to espouse demands that were much more clearly trade union demands.²⁶⁶ Like the carpenters of Berlin and Hamburg and the steel workers in Altona they were the first organisations to start strikes under the repressive laws. A third group of organisations was composed of workers from some of the newly developed industries, like transport,²⁶⁸ who were unable to develop contact with their fellow workmen outside of their local area. They tended to be active in the Fachvereine but left as soon as the opportunity for organisation was presented.²⁶⁹

The organisations composed of workers from various crafts and those outside the largest cities tended to be synonymous with the party organisation. This was certainly the case in the region of Nürnberg, according to Gärtner.²⁷⁰

Schlemmer reports the same phenomenon for the industrial centres of Baden and Württemberg²⁷¹ and Schneider for the Rheinpfalz.²⁷² These organisations were extremely loose. According to Engelberg aside from distributing literature and arranging a system of unemployment benefits and insurance, they did little else.²⁷³ Here the role of the rote Feldpost was extremely important and the coordination supplied by the party's underground network a necessity.²⁷⁴

The second kind of organisation, the Fachvereine, composed of workers from the advanced industrial sector or industries that had been recently transformed by industrial and marketing innovation, like the metal industry, began to emerge during the 1880's.²⁷⁵ The Zentralverband der Vereine der Tischler was founded in 1883, followed by the first organisation that attempted to group all workers in the metal industry, the Vereinigung der Metallarbeiter Deutschlands in 1884.²⁷⁶ There were builders' strikes in Hamburg in 1885 and 1887, in Berlin in 1885 and metal workers went on strike in Hamburg and Leipzig in 1888.²⁷⁷ Finally, in 1889-1890 Germany witnessed a series of mass strikes of workers from the heavy industrial sector. In addition to the great miners' strike, there were strikes of building workers and industrial workers in most large industrial sectors. Engelberg argues that these strikes were responsible for Bismarck's downfall,²⁷⁸ the end of the Sozialistengesetz and led to the founding of the Generalkommission of the German trade unions.²⁷⁹

The third kind of organisation, were those local organisations that included workers from those industries who found it difficult to launch national federations. As the Correspondenzblatt reports, these organisations served as funnels for the trade union organisation until the climate for the building of national federations was created.²⁸⁰

The structure of German industry and of the German working class changed significantly during the 1880's. Dawson and Kuczynski report the growth of new industries and the transformation of many traditional industries.²⁸¹ The main characteristics of these changes were a growth of large enterprises, a decline in craftsmanship, the dequalification of some workers and the rapid growth of the number of relatively unskilled workers.²⁸² Statistics show that not only was there a rapid growth in the percentage of the population employed in industry as such but an extraordinarily rapid growth of workers employed in heavy industry.²⁸³ The industry where the expansion and transformation was most keenly felt was the metal industry.²⁸⁴ Hommer notes that during the 1880's the transformation of the work situation all but dissolved the differences between crafts, faced them with similar problems and the need for organisation overriding differences in craft.²⁸⁵ Not only was the work situation as such transformed, Cassau notes speaking of a similar development of workers in the production of wooden instruments, implements and furniture,²⁸⁶ but the rapid industrialisation transformed the urban community and gave rise to demands for services and improvements that helped to override traditional differences between crafts.²⁸⁷ These laid the foundations for the great craft and industrial trade unions that were to be founded during the 1890's. Bringmann,²⁸⁸ in his history of the carpenters, notes similar changes and the beginnings of demands of a very different nature than those voiced by the older crafts who could satisfy their claims, as Müller,²⁸⁹ in his history of the lithographers, notes, through local tariffs. According to Krahl even in the highly skilled printing industry the introduction of new machinery threatened the craftsmen tradition and many began to turn towards those preaching a more aggressive form of trade unionism.²⁹⁰

By 1914, Ritter notes, over 60 percent of trade unionists were unskilled workers from the metal, transport, textile industries or those simply classified as factory workers.²⁹¹

According to Legien the demands of these workers were for job security, improvement of the work situation including demands for more comprehensive accident insurance, better working conditions, guarantees of employment, and better social services.²⁹² The only way to achieve these demands, he argued in company with Wende, was through rigorous organisation.²⁹³ The only effective working-class riposte in a situation where qualifications did not count, was through the building of trade unions that were so strong that employers would not risk a strike or attempt a lock-out.²⁹⁴ Practically, the organisational requirements were for a strong centralised body of workers in the same industry working in coordination with workers from other such organisations to band together to obtain those demands that could only or most easily be met by legislation. As Legien noted in the Organisationsfrage,²⁹⁵ the solution lay in building a small number of powerful trades union federations coordinated by a central body whose duties lay in providing information, coordinating national demands and strike movements.²⁹⁶ The older style of trade unionism with its emphasis on mutual insurance funds and the setting of local tariffs had to be replaced by organisations backed by strong strike funds. Again the metal workers set the pace and by 1892 had established a national organisation that by 1905 had over 233,000 members.²⁹⁷ Whereas in 1892 the largest trade unions were still craft organisations like the bookbinders and printers, shoemakers and cigarmakers, by 1905 the largest unions were, in addition to the metal workers, the federation of workers in the wood industry, factory workers, textile workers and transport workers.²⁹⁸

The 1890's witnessed the rise of the Generalkommission of the trade union movement that reflected the industrial changes of the previous two decades and spearheaded the demands of the workers from the heavy industries.²⁹⁹ The party conference at Halle in 1890 called upon the trade union movement to be organised into strong federations (Zentralverbände).³⁰⁰ At first this was difficult because a majority of workers in the national federation still came from the older craft industries. Not only did they resent the attempts of the newer trade unionists to set up the trade union organisation as an equal of the party organisation, but they strenuously resisted the trend towards amalgamation.³⁰¹ The battle of the local trade unions was a rearguard action. They could not exist without a national federation and yet they would soon be swallowed by

the new craft and industrial federations. At the same time the new federations required the support of the still large craft sector and a series of compromises allowing local organisations some autonomy were effected during the 1890's.³⁰²

In 1892 although the principle of Zentralverbände was accepted the implementation of the motion was left to an unspecified date.³⁰³ In 1894 the metal workers threatened to withdraw from the national federation if the rules of all member organisations were not brought into line with the 1892 motion and if funds were no longer "wasted" on mutual-aid projects rather than on organisation and building up strike funds.³⁰⁴ In 1896 the system of voting at trade union congresses was reconstituted so that the larger federations could make their numerical preponderance felt.³⁰⁵ In 1902 something of a purge occurred on the trade union Vorstand. Representatives of the older craft trade unions were replaced by members from the newer trade union organisations and permanent trade union officials.³⁰⁶

If the aim of the trade union movement was maximum unity, the need for coordination between the different sectors of the movement, an increasing need for improvement not only in the work situation but in the community, a political movement was still a major requirement. At the same time the trade union movement was being transformed the relations between the SPD and the trade union movement underwent a complete revision.

Legien along with the majority of the leaders of the newer trade union federations was adamant in his view that the party and trade union movement must work together.³⁰⁷ He regarded that the party had a useful role to play in galvanising the working class and instructing it to recognise the importance of solidarity. But he was equally adamant in his view that the party and the trade unions were on an equal footing and each had their separate sphere of activities.³⁰⁸ To maintain a presence Legien, for most of the period between 1890 and 1910, was a member of parliament for Kiel and attended practically all party conferences. He rarely spoke and only intervened at length when the question of party-trade union relations was on the agenda or when a matter arose, like the Akkordmauer affair or the discussion on the general strike, that appeared to endanger his conception of party-trade union equality and coordination.³⁰⁹

The Köln congress of the SPD in 1893 marked the first in a series of demarcation disputes between the party and the trade union organisations. Several delegates, members of the older craft trade unions and active as Vertrauensmänner during the years when the repressive laws were in force, argued that the trade unions were "Vorschule für die proletarische Bewegung".³¹⁰ Legien argued that the trade unions were preparations for the coming battle, but they must be allowed to function freely without hindrance from the party.³¹¹ He accused the party of actively inciting strikes, pointing out that if the job of the trade union movement was to teach the need for socialism to the working class, the party was preventing them from doing their job.³¹² He succeeded in having a motion passed that recognised that the two organisations were separate organisations each with their own sphere of activity.³¹³

The second dispute was in fact of a series of problems that arose between 1900 and 1901 of which the Akkordmauer affair was but one example. Having succeeded in securing a separation between the activities of the party and the trade union movement, and in building up a movement composed of large national federations, the Generalkommission was anxious to be sufficiently free from the party to negotiate with the Christian and Liberal trade union organisations as well as to call upon the party for help when it was required.³¹⁴ Quoting Kautsky, Robert Schmidt, the head of the Zentralarbeitersekretariat of Berlin and a leading figure on the Generalkommission, argued that the proletariat was not ready for socialism and therefore the party must not intervene in trade union affairs.³¹⁵ At the same time, he said, the party must support the trade union movement in its negotiations and in making it an effective organisation.³¹⁶ Büchelburg threatened the party with a split unless it acted in the interests of the trade union movement³¹⁷ and Segitz argued that the party must act as a wedge in the interests of the trade unions.³¹⁸ He wrote that if the Zusammenbruchstheorie was correct the job of the party was to build up organisation to the hilt and the way to do that was to work in concert with the trade union movement.³¹⁹

In the dispute over the general strike that rocked the party between 1903 and 1905, Legien made it clear what he meant by aiding the trade union movement. The party, he argued, must clear all of its decisions with the Generalkommission.³²⁰ In practice, even if a decision was passed by a majority at a party congress, it still had to be referred to the GK for its approval. A secret meeting between the GK and the Partei Vorstand agreed upon that formula.³²¹

When the party congress in 1905 passed a motion favourable to a general strike if the suffrage laws were changed to reduce the number of social-democratic voters, the GK invoked the agreement and forced Bebel to agree to not calling a general strike without the support of the trade union movement.³²²

During this period, Ritter³²³ argues, the party organisation changed in the light of its changing priorities. Unable to encourage political strikes, restricted in its ability to influence workmen directly in their places of work, it became increasingly an organisation trying to win electoral influence and to coordinate trade union activity. Auer's reforms not only made the party a more efficient electoral machine by organising it according to parliamentary constituencies³²⁴ but, according to Ebert, the most important job of the greatly enlarged administration was to maintain support for all of the party's decisions and to act against those who broke organisational rules.³²⁵ Indeed, it is interesting to note that the three new secretaries, added to the Parteivorstand as a result of Auer's reforms, all had their first political experiences as organisers for unions composed of industrial workers.³²⁶

Yet Legien, Segitz, Bömbelburg, and Schmidt were frequent in their praise of the party's principles.³²⁷ Whilst speaking against the general strike, Legien referred to the inseparability of the party and the trade union, and how one day socialism would triumph as a result of their daily efforts.³²⁸ But to prepare the coming of the new dawn, he argued, no one must deviate one iota from the course used by the party. Without that solidarity and without that unity, the Endziel would never be reached, socialism would remain no more than an impossible dream.³²⁹

The trade union movement was the organisation of the workingmen linked through their places of work or crafts that fought for their everyday bread-and-butter demands. Not only did the trade unions have to be immensely practical and wary organisations, but they urgently required a degree of solidarity and unity previously unknown in working-class organisations. The fight for a socialist society was certainly a hard fight but one should not forget that the battle for everyday life, the struggle to maintain a decent level of existence, was so hard that the struggle for socialism often took second place.³³⁰

Owing to the rapid growth of industry, an increase of industrial specialisation and the mushrooming of vast urban communities, the day-to-day shopping list of workers expanded enormously. Most commentators agree that there was a clear deterioration in living conditions as a result of the rapid industrial expansion of the 1880's and 1890's.³³¹ The sudden growth of the dormitory communities hastily appended to the principal industrial cities was accomplished at the price of sanitation, a shortage of social and public facilities like social services to mind children because both parents often had to work, education and even the domestic conveniences made necessary by the introduction of shift work and the doubling and even tripling of time spent travelling to and from work. As Halbwachs argues,³³² and as I will try to demonstrate in the next section, the greater loss of autonomy accompanied by the introduction of a greater range of self-governing machinery and the monotony of work were compensated by a desire for replacement objects. So the desire for higher consumption based as much on replacement objects as on the need for new domestic appliances, means of transport to compensate for the penury of public transport, were added to the list of immediate demands.

Secondly, the traditional problem of a replacement army of labourers from the countryside grew worse in the 1880's. As the machines did away with long periods of apprenticeship, labourers from the country districts could be immediately introduced into the factory.³³³ Whereas the shopping list of demands that resulted from the transformation of industry forced the trade unions to think about ways and means of fighting for the new demands, the problem of a reserve army of labourers forced them to think about expanding and tightening up their organisations.

Thirdly, they not only had to face a legal system that discriminated heavily against their activities, but from the 1880's German industrialists organised themselves into unions of manufacturers to force the trade unions into impossibly weak negotiating positions and to maintain a solid front in the case of local strikes.³³⁴

Under these conditions, the trade unions required every possible means to achieve solidarity, their only weapon. In a practical sense the party preaching a message of solidarity, of the benefits of unity, and of an escape from the industrial world and the eventual enfranchisement of the worker, was

of immense value. Secondly, the party allowed a forum for contact between the industrial workers' federations and those of the craft workers. Through their joint belief in the coming of the Zukunftsstaat, a feeling of brotherhood could be created to prevent the two different sections of the working-class movement from undermining each other's efforts.

The trade union movement was the organisation of the workers to fight for their immediate demands and in normal circumstances was the organisation that channelled those demands. Since many of them required coordination that the trade unions themselves had neither the facilities nor the time to develop, the party was a valuable adjunct.

We have seen that Kautsky's theory preached a message of attentisme. Firstly, it encouraged the working class because it argued that work alone was the creator of all value. Its message that the workman was the carrier of human progress and the embryo of the new society where work as a commodity would disappear made it possible for the worker to endure his society. Its message that the collapse of society would come about automatically allowed him to concentrate all his efforts on maintaining a minimal existence. In a sense, the theory can be called a ritual or a rite that like all rites and rituals serves as a regulator that makes normal existence palatable by maintaining that perseverance alone would lead to deliverance.³³⁵

The hypothesis in the above paragraph must be a tentative hypothesis because I have only discussed what can still be called a series of coincidences: that Kautsky's theory, despite its revolutionary window-dressing, was a theory of integration, that the trade union movement "converted" the political party into an organisation that would help it solve its new problems, and that Kautskyism can be seen as a "justification" for the actions of the trade union movement.

What I must demonstrate is that the contradiction between theory and practice found in the party was a contradiction between the everyday theory and practice of the working class. I have only spoken in generalised terms about who that working class was. Most of my sources have been interpretations of trade union and party history written by people active in the movement. I have drawn upon a series of suggestions in their chronicles and memoirs to build

up my hypothesis. What I must do is to look more closely at the movement itself. This is what I will attempt to do in the next section where I will look at the socialist movement in France. Because there is a greater abundance of statistical material at hand, I have been able to test these ideas and take them further than the suggestions I have made in this section. However, before dealing with that material, I must first show that the socialism preached in the POF and its ancillary organisations had all of the same characteristics as the socialism of Kautsky and Bebel.

NOTES

1. Randglossen, p. 17.
2. Einleitung (1895), p. 517.
3. Albrecht Langner, Einleitung. Karl Kautsky Texte zu den Programmen der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1891-1925, p. 9.
4. Erich Matthias, "Kautsky und der Kautskyianismus", in Marxismusstudien 2. Folge, Tübingen, 1956, p. 154.
5. Paul Kampffmeyer, "Die Gründung der 'Neuen Zeit' und die Intellektuellen. Eine persönliche Erinnerung", in Die Gesellschaft, ein Sonderheft der Gesellschaft zu Karl Kautskys 70 Geburtstag, Berlin, 1924, p. 86.
6. Li Fu, Li Szu-wen, Wang Fu-ju, "Karl Kautsky", in Hung-ch'i, no. 8-9, Peking, 1962, p. 5.
7. Despite Werner Blumenberg, Karl Kautskys' literarisches Werk. Eine bibliographische Übersicht, S'Gravenhaage, 1960, a monumental listing of all of Kautsky's known writings, and a few articles written by people like Kampffmeyer during the 1920's, we have no thorough biography on the scale of Peter Nettl's Rosa Luxemburg. Benedikt Kautsky's introduction in Ein Leben für der Sozialismus. Erinnerungen an Karl Kautsky, Hannover, 1954, is quite sketchy.
 - Mein Lebenswerk, in Ein Leben für der Sozialismus, pp. 11-34.
 - Engelberg, Die rote Feldpost, pp. 55-57; Fricke, Zur Organisation und Tätigkeit, pp. 16-17; Arnold, egs., NEW, Band 22, xv.
10. Matthias, p. 155.
11. Nettl, volume i, pp. 28, 248.
12. Cole, volume ii, p. 43; Halévy, L'histoire du socialisme européen, Paris, 1948, pp. 109-110.
13. Nettl, p. 7.
14. Matthias, p. 155.
15. He repeated his argument in a slightly different form in "Idéologie et pratique: le faux débat Bernstein-Kautsky", in Annales, janv.-fevr., 1964, pp. 19-30.
16. Matthias, p. 156; Kautsky, Mein Lebenswerk, p. 13, 17; A. Rosenberg, Geschichte der deutschen Republik, Karlsbad, 1935, p. 57; Korsch, Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, pp. 117-18.

17. Matthias, p. 158.
18. ibid., p. 165.
19. ibid., p. 178.
20. Engelberg, pp. 152, 159.
21. Singer was a small businessman, Bebel started as a craftworker and soon took on his own business, Auer became a printer, Gerisch, Geib were in the metal trades and Pfannkuch a carpenter.
22. Eduard Bernstein, Ignaz Auer. Eine Gedenkschrift, Berlin, 1907, pp. 12-14.
23. Bebel, Aus meinem Leben, Band I, pp. 24-52.
24. If one looks at the voting results published in all the Protokolle, one finds they monopolised the votes and little correlation before 1906 between the votes cast for candidates and political opinions.
25. Molkenbuhr in 1904, Ebert in 1905 and Müller in 1906 all of whom were trained trade union and/or party organisers.
26. Kaden (1890-1910), Geck (1890, 1892, 1898-1910), Kühnen (1893-1910), Meist, (1893-1906), Metzner (1894-1901), Brühne (1898-1910).
27. Many like Kaden, Geck and Kühnen gave up their occupations to work full-time for the party.
28. Bebel, opcit., pp. 25, 35; Bernstein, opcit., p. 13.
29. "Darwin und der Sozialismus", 16, 23, 75 Gleichheit, Wien.
30. ibid.,
31. "Darwinismus und Sozialismus", 24.4.79, Sozialdemokrat.
32. ibid.,
33. ibid.,

34. "Die materielle Lage der Kunstler in ihrem Einfluss auf die Kunst", 10.80, Zeitschrift für Plastik; Wien; "Die Kunst und die Gesellschaft", 11.81, Zeitschrift für Plastik; "Kunstler und Arbeiter", 2.84, Zeitschrift für Plastik; "Kunst und Kultur", 9.84, Zeitschrift für Plastik.
35. "Kunst und Kultur," opcit.
36. Die Kunst und die Gesellschaft, opcit.; "Die Partei und die Wissenschaft", 3.10.77, Vorwärts, Leipzig.
37. ibid.; "Die materielle Lage der Kunstler in ihrem Einfluss auf die Kunst", opcit.; in later years, Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, Stuttgart, 1906, p. 30.
38. Kampffmeyer, pp. 82-83; Kautsky to Victor Adler, 13.6.92, Kautsky to Bebel, 23.10.98, Victor Adler, Briefwechsel, respectively, pp. 92, 274.
39. Kautsky to Bebel, opcit.
40. "Die Partei und die Wissenschaft", opcit.
41. Nettl, p. 376.
42. Bömelburg, Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, Köln, 1914, Berlin, n.d., p. 221.
43. Nettl, ibid.
44. Marx to Jenny Longuet, 11.4.81, MEW, Band 25, p. 178: "Er ist eine Mittelmässigkeit von kleinen Gesichtspunkten, überweis, Besserwisser, in einer gewissen Art fleissig, macht sich viel mit Statistik zu schaffen, liest aber wenig Gescheites heraus, gehört von Natur zum Stamm der Philister, im Überbringen in seiner Art ein anständiger Mensch, ich wälze ihn möglichst auf amigo Engels ab.";
45. Engels found him a "weniger doktrinäre", Engels to Bernstein, 12.3.81, MEW, Band 35, p. 169; and quoted in Yeh Ssu-chieh-p'an no-wa, Biography of Engels, Peking, 1958, p. 221: "... a pure pedant and a scholastic philosopher, who not only could not classify complex problems, but made simple problems more complex."
46. Karl Marx' Ökonomische Lehren, Stuttgart, 1887.
47. Lenin, State and Revolution, p. 78; Matthias, p. 156; Angel suggests Bebel's economics come from that work, pp. 84-5.
48. Mein Lebenswerk, p. 17.
49. ibid., p. 13.
50. Karl Marx', p. 246.
51. ibid., pp. 245, 247.
52. ibid., pp. 14, 64-71.

53. ibid., p. 244
54. Lidkte, pp. 288-89.
55. Karl Marx, pp. 20-21.
56. ibid., p. 21.
57. ibid., p. 248; Das Erfurter Programm, pp. 106-07.
58. Karl Marx, pp. 247-49.
59. ibid., p. 248.
60. "Die Maifeier", N.Z., 1912, Band 2, p. 15.
61. "Ein Sozialdemokratischer Katechismus", in N.Z., 1893, Band 2, pp. 361-69, 402-410; I am quoting from the edition published in Der Weg zur Macht, (1909), 3. Aufl., Berlin, 1921, pp. 57-64.
62. ibid., p. 59.
63. ibid., p. 64.
64. ibid., p. 65; Protokoll, Stuttgart, 1898, Berlin, 1898, p. 212; Protokoll, Hannover, 1899, Berlin, 1899, p. 76.
65. Erläuterung zum Erfurter Programm, Stuttgart, 1892.
66. Grundsätze und Forderungen der Sozialdemokratie, Stuttgart, 1892.
67. Eduard Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm. Eine Antikritik, Stuttgart, 1899.
68. Die soziale Revolution, Berlin, 1902.
69. Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, Stuttgart, 1906.
70. Kautsky spoke of "ein tierischer Trieb", in "Leben, Wissenschaft und Ethik", in N.Z., 1906, Band 2, pp. 516-529; the theory was widely accepted in the movement. Otto Bauer "Marxismus und Ethik", N.Z., 1906, Band II, pp. 485-99; expressed also in the Grundsätze, pp. 19-20.
71. Das Erfurter Programm, pp. 174-75.
72. ibid., p. 173.
73. ibid., p. 177.
74. ibid., p. 175.
75. ibid., p. 174.
76. Die soziale Revolution, p. 6.
77. Ethik, p. 67.
78. ibid., pp. 68-69; "Leben, Wissenschaft und Ethik", p. 521; "Akademiker und Proletarier", N.Z., 1901, Band II, pp. 89-91; "Die Revision des Programms der Sozialdemokratie in Österreich", N.Z., 1901, Band I, pp. 72-76.

79. Ethik, p. 125; "Leben, Wissenschaft und Ethik", p. 513-14.
80. Das Erfurter Programm, p. 171.
81. ibid., p. 171.
82. ibid., pp. 171-2.
83. Die soziale Revolution, p. 5.
84. ibid., p. 5.
85. ibid., p. 6-7.
86. ibid., p. 7; Das Erfurter Programm, p. 172.
87. Die soziale Revolution, pp. 9-11.
88. Das Erfurter Programm, p. 171.
89. Ethik, pp. 25-26.
90. Das Erfurter Programm, pp. 172-3.
91. ibid., p. 173.
92. ibid., p. 175.
93. ibid., pp. 174-5.
94. ibid., p. 175.
95. ibid., p. 175.
96. ibid., p. 175; Protokoll, Hannover, 1899, p. 181.
97. Grundsätze, pp. 20-21.
98. Marx to Engels, 30.9.69, MEW, Band 32, p. 375.
99. "Partei und Gewerkschaft", Neue Zeit, 1898, Band I, pp. 420-23; Legien, Protokoll, Köln, 1893, Berlin 1893, pp. 102-04.
100. Das Erfurter Programm, p. 172.
101. ibid.,
102. ibid.,
103. Ethik, pp. 78-81.
104. ibid.,

- 105 . Johann Fritsch, Eindringen und Ausbreitung des Revisionismus in deutschen Bergarbeiterverband bis 1914, Leipzig, 1967, pp. 43-45; Max Koch, Die Bergarbeiterbewegung in Ruhrgebiet, Düsseldorf, 1954, pp. 107-38.
- 106 . Ethik, pp. 56-57.
- 107 . Ethik, pp. 57-58; "Partei und Gewerkschaft", p. 421.
- 108 . Das Erfurter Programm, pp. 174-76.
- 109 . ibid., p. 175; Ethik, p. 55.
- 110 . Die soziale Revolution, p. 3.
- 111 . ibid., p. 4.; "Die Neutralisierung der Gewerkschaften", Neue Zeit, 1900, Band 2, p. 496.
- 112 . "Partei und Gewerkschaft", p. 422.
- 113 . Bruno Pörsch, "Politik und Religion in der Gewerkschaftlichen Organisationen der Arbeiter," Neue Zeit, 1898, Band I, pp. 403-07.
- 114 . "Partei und Gewerkschaft!" pp. 420-1.
- 115 . Karl Legien, Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1903, p. 323.
- 116 . "Partei und Gewerkschaft", p. 422.
- 117 . ibid., p. 423.
- 118 . Die soziale Revolution, pp. 5-6.
- 119 . ibid., p. 6.
- 120 . Bebel, Protokoll, Jena, 1905, Berlin, 1905, pp. 288, 298, 305-06, 308.
- 121 . Bebel, ibid., pp. 305-06; Kautsky, "Akademiker und Proletarier", pp. 90-91.
- 122 . ibid., p. 91; Das Erfurter Programm, p. 178.
- 123 . Die soziale Revolution, pp. 9-10.
- 124 . Ethik, p. x.
- 125 . ibid., pp. x-xii.
- 126 . ibid., pp. xi, 125.
- 127 . ibid., pp. 120-24.
- 128 . ibid., pp. 242-58; Lucio Coletti, Introduzione a Bernstein, I presupposti del socialismo e i compiti della socialdemocrazia, Bari, 1969, p. xxxviii.

129. ibid., pp. 78-81.
130. ibid., pp. xi, 120.
131. ibid., p. 69.
132. ibid., p. 65.
133. Das Erfurter Programm, p. 174; Materiellen für Organisationsleiter, Berlin, 1909, pp. 3-4.
134. Ethik, p. 120; Die historische Leistung, pp. 23-26.
135. Ethik, pp. 125-7; Materiellen, p. 6
136. So Marx argued against the "true" socialists in the Thesen über Feuerbach, pp. 5-7.
137. ibid., p. 6; Goldmann, p. 292, and Recherches dialectiques, Paris, 1959, p. 59; Nettl, "The German Social Democratic Party", p. 66.
138. Der Weg zur Macht. Politische Betrachtung über das Hineinwachsen in die Revolution, Berlin, 1909.
139. ibid., p. 176.
140. ibid., pp. 4, 81.
141. ibid., pp. 45-47.
142. ibid., pp. 86-87, 119, 130, 175-76; Protokoll Internationalen Arbeiterkongress, Paris, 1900, Paris, 1900, pp. 150-172, Kautsky argued that the task of the party was to wait.
143. Shorske's thesis depends upon this dichotomy; Nettl assumes it; only Korsch, Coletti and Matthias seem to doubt it; Shorske, pp. 3-8; Nettl, introduction, Korsch, pp. 14-16, Matthias, pp. 177-78.
144. Bernstein to Bebel, 20.10.98, Adler Briefwechsel, p. 262; he also told Bebel that "Kapital" was incomplete, 18.10.98, p. 261.
145. Voraussetzungen, p. 198.
146. Sozialdemokratische Lehrbuch, 1872-88, Berlin, 1928, p. 114.
147. Angel, p. 379; Bernstein, Protokoll, Dresden, 1903, Berlin, 1903, p. 391.
148. Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, Berlin, 1901, p. 176.
149. Bernstein to Adler, 13.9.98, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 254.

150. According to Ritter, p. 196, the first place where they were expounded in depth; in particular Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie und die Revolution der Gesellschaft, Neue Zeit, 1896, pp. 235-49.
151. Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie, Berlin, 1899.
152. Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozialismus, Berlin, 1901.
153. Wie ist der wissenschaftliche Sozialismus möglich?, Berlin, 1901.
154. Eduard Bernstein, p. 166; Kautsky argued that Bernstein's ideas were not harmful and turned down articles for the Neue Zeit that were, in his view, overly critical. Neue Zeit, 1898, Band I, p. 470; see also his comments in Die Volkswirtschaftslehre der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, hrsgg. K. Meiner, Leipzig, 1924, p. 19.
155. In Humanité, 1.6.04.
156. Ritter, p. 176.
157. Voraussetzungen, pp. 23-25.
158. ibid., p. 27.
159. ibid., p. 33; "Zurück auf Kant", Neue Zeit, 1898, Band II, pp. 205-35.
160. Voraussetzungen, pp. 14, 184.
161. ibid., p. 15.
162. ibid., pp. 15-17; Sozialistische Monatshefte, 2.3.02, p. 10; similar to his early arguments in Sozialdemokrat, 7.1.79, 24.8.82, and in Gesellschaftliches und Privat-Eigentum. Ein Beitrag zur Erläuterung des sozialdemokratischen Programms, Zürich, 1885.
163. Voraussetzungen, p. 184.
164. Voraussetzungen, p. 164; Zur Geschichte und Theorie, p. 122.
165. Voraussetzungen, pp. 18-22.
166. ibid., p. 19.
167. ibid., pp. 112-14, and the aim of socialism was to make the worker a "Bürger", p. 144.
168. ibid., p. 117.
169. ibid., p. 92; Der Revisionismus in der Sozialdemokratie, Amsterdam, 1909, p. 41.

170. Zur Geschichte, p. 139.
171. "Eine Partei ist der Sachwalter der Interessen der Klasse, die hinter ihr steht", Protokoll, Dresden, 1903, Berlin, 1903, p. 398.
172. ibid., p. 399.
173. Der politische Massenstreik und die politische Lage der Sozialdemokratie in Deutschland, Breslau, 1903, p. 25.
174. Bommelburg, opcit.; Legien reported in Humanite, 28.4.05.
175. Voraussetzungen, p. 106.
176. ibid., pp. 107-09.
177. Where he collaborated with Karl Hochberg; Paul Frulich, introduction, to Rosa Luxemburg, Berlin, 1925, p. 16; Auer agrees that there was little difference between Bernstein and Kautsky, Auer to Adler, Briefwechsel, 19.9.99, p. 296.
178. Angel, p. 235-8.
179. Angel, p. 239; Protokoll, Hannover, 1899, Berlin, 1899, p. 152.
180. Paul Gohre, Wie ein Pfarrer Sozialdemokrat wurde, Berlin, 1902, stressing the relationship between social democracy and universal Christian brotherhood.
181. Angel, p. 385.
182. H. Lindemann, Kommunale Arbeiterpolitik, Berlin, 1905.
183. Angel, p. 359.
184. Angel, p. 363; Friedrich Naumann, Bebel und Bernstein, Berlin, 1899, pp. 11, 15.
185. Wilhelm Kolb, "Das Probleme der Taktik", Sozialistische Monatshefte, xi, pp. 702-07, xiv, pp. 1184-86.
186. Ludwig Frank, Aufsatze, Reden und Briefen, hrsgg. H. Wachenheim, Berlin, n.d., pp. 183-86; W. Keil, Erlebnisse, Band I, pp. 242, 262.
187. Shorske, pp. 120-21.
188. ibid., pp. 132-35.
189. Kolb, opcit., p. 704.
190. Protokoll, Lubeck, pp. 142-46.
191. Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, Koln, 1905, Berlin, n.d., p. 221.

192. Protokoll, Jena 1905, Berlin, 1905, p. 254; he called it a mere battle of words.
193. Humanité, 28.4.05.
194. Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, p. 165; Protokoll, Hannover, 1899, p. 191.
195. "Mein lieber Ede, was Du verlangst, so etwas beschliesst man nicht, so etwas sagt man nicht, so etwas tut man." Auer to Bernstein, Bernstein Archives, IISH.
196. Warum müssen die Gewerkschaftsfunktionäre sich mehr am inneren Parteileben beteiligen, Berlin, 1915, pp. 2-3.
197. Eduard Bernstein, p. 32.
198. Matthias, p. 178; Korsch, p. 177.
199. Edgard Milhaud, La démocratie socialiste allemande, Genève, 1903, pp. 115-118, 204-13; Pierre Bertaux, La vie quotidienne en Allemagne au temps de Guillaume II, Paris, 1962, p. 183-84.
200. Report in Vorwärts, 5.2.11.
201. R. Strauss und Kurt Finsterbusch, Die Chemnitzer Arbeiterbewegung unter dem Sozialistengesetz, Berlin, 1952, pp. 19-25; Gustav Jackh, "Die Leipziger Arbeiterbewegung von 1868-1878", in Die Gründung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. Ein Festschrift der Leipziger Arbeiter, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 42-47; Heinrich Laufenberg, Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Hamburg, Altona und Umgeburg, Hamburg, 1911, pp. 64-66; Georg Eckert, Die Braunschweiger Arbeiterbewegung, Braunschweig, 1961, pp. 143-67.
202. Eduard Bernstein, Die Berliner Arbeiterbewegung 1890-1905, Berlin 1924, pp. 32-35; Bertaux, p. 181; Nettle, German Social Democracy, p. 76.
203. Maurice Soir, in L'Année politique, 1913, pp. 83-96.
204. Fricke, pp. 132-36; Ludwig Kantorowicz, Die sozialdemokratische Presse. Eine soziologische Untersuchung, Tübingen, 1922, pp. 6-13.
205. This appears to be a regular feature. According to Kantorowicz's calculations, over two-thirds had happy endings always accompanied by some kind of material success within the established social norms, ibid., pp. 54-57.
206. circulation of 50,000 in 1905.
207. circulation of 10,000 in 1905.
208. founded in 1907, circulation of 8,000.
209. circulation of 15,000, also sponsored contests of all kinds.

210. founded in 1911, achieved an enormous success according to Fricke, p. 162; it never discussed the origin of health and sanitary problems but only how to deal with symptoms.
211. started in 1895 - very popular in the mining districts.
212. reviews of latest books.
213. the organ of youth clubs.
214. the organ of racing clubs, evidence of a strong competitive spirit.
215. attaining a circulation of 193,000 in 1905.
216. a circulation of 5,000 in 1905, concentrated on how drink impaired one's ability to work.
217. Milhaud, pp. 156-89.
218. Gerhard Vinnai, Fussballsport als Ideologie, Frankfurt/Main, 1970, pp. 15-21.
219. Taped conversation with Herr Gottfried Schneider, former textile worker from the region of Leipzig who belonged to such an organisation.
220. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York, 1956, pp. 43-52; Halbwachs, pp. 408-09, 455.
221. I investigated Die Arbeiter-Jugend, Die Arbeitende Jugend and Jugend und Sport, taking a random sample in each case for a period of two years, and found that articles that dealt with the future all emphasised the need for careful and rigorous training, and at least one article in each issue dealing either with the inventiveness of working men, their prowess or the importance of work.
222. In the magazine for girls, the importance of homemaking, obedience to the husband during trying circumstances and the need to maintain family links were stressed, in the magazines for boys the need to control their instincts, the need to make proper decisions and the need to practise self-control.
223. January-May 1909.
224. Dr. Ludwig Frank, Die jugendlichen Arbeiter und ihre Organisationen, Berlin, 1906, pp. 30-32; Protokoll, Mannheim, 1906, Berlin, 1906, p. 380; Shorske, pp. 97-109.
225. May, July, 1908.
226. May 1908.
227. Alexander Kosiol, "Organisationen für die theoretische Bildung der Arbeiterklasse", Neue Zeit, 1906, Band 2, pp. 65-69.
228. Ritter, p. 222; Heinrich Schulz, "Zwei Jahre Arbeiterbildung" in Neue Zeit, 1908, Band II, p. 883.

229. Walter Ulbricht, Freiheit, Wissenschaft und Sozialismus, Berlin, 1959, pp. 122-23; W. Pieck, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften, Band I, August 1904 bis Januar 1919, Berlin, 1959, pp. 112-14,
230. Protokoll, Jena, 1913, Berlin, 1913, p. 12; Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, volume I, p. 392.
231. Der Weg, p. 172.
232. Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, Berlin, 1901, pp. 155-56; Protokoll, Halle, pp. 216-17, 222.
233. ibid.; "Was ist ein Kompromiss?", Neue Zeit, 1898, Band I, pp. 356-65.
234. Taktische Stürmungen, p. 7.
235. "Was ist ein Kompromiss?", opcit., pp. 360-61.
236. ibid., p. 365.
237. Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, Berlin, 1901, p. 103.
238. ibid., pp. 104-05.
239. Ritter, pp. 121-22; Legien, Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, Berlin, 1901, pp. 95-101, noting that an attack against the trade unions was also an attack against the party.
240. Heinrich Laufenberg, Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Hamburg, pp. 67-70; Protokoll, Lübeck, pp. 97 -259.
241. ibid., pp. 87-88.
242. ibid., pp. 83-84; Nevertheless Auer was close to the GK, Robert Schmidt, "Auer und die Gewerkschaften", Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1907, pp. 351-57.
243. Protokoll, Lübeck, pp. 98-99; Heinz Josef Varain, Freie Gewerkschaften, Sozialdemokratie und die Staat. Die Politik der Generalkommission unter der Führung Carl Legiens, Düsseldorf, 1956, pp. 89-93, where he argues that Legien was under great pressure to even consider taking action against the party.
244. Shorske, pp. 134-56; most of the local party organisations, particularly in areas where heavy industry was dominant, tended to be in the hands of or closely associated to the policies of the GK.
245. Kautsky, "Die Parteitag in Lübeck", Neue Zeit, 1901, Band I, pp. 13-20.
246. Theodor Cassau, Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Ihre Soziologie und ihr Kampf, Halberstadt, 1925, pp. 32-40.
247. Political Parties, New York, 1952, pp. 12-14.

- 248 . Schmüle, p. 74; A.C. Maier, Der Verband der Glacéhandschuhmacher und verwandten Arbeiter Deutschlands 1869-1900, Leipzig, 1901, pp. 123-48.
Ludwig Rexhäuser, Das Prinzip der Organisation und des Tarifs im Verder Deutschen Buchdrucker, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 2-5.
- 249 . Schmüle, pp. 35, 56, 76-81.
- 250 . Rexhäuser, pp. 9-14.
- 251 . Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1877, pp. 1-5.
- 252 . Schmüle, pp. 23-29.
- 253 . Laufenberg, p. 42, Jackh, pp. 45, 123-8.
- 254 . Motteler Archive, IISH, Ritter, p. 110.
- 255 . Engelberg, pp. 82-89.
- 256 . Fricke, Bismarcks Prätorianer, Berlin, 1962, pp. 148-49; K. A. Hellfaier, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie während des Sozialistengesetzes, Berlin, 1959, pp. 43-47; W. Krieler, Die geheime Organisation der sozialdemokratische Partei, Berlin, 1887, pp. 3-17.
- 257 . Ritter, p. 113.
- 258 . Ritter, pp. 114-15; Shorske, p. 111.
- 259 . Cassau, pp. 78-79.
- 260 . Ritter, pp. 112-13; Ludwig Rexhäuser, Zur Geschichte des Verbandes des deutschen Buchdrucker, Berlin, 1900, pp. 4-11.
- 261 . Hermann Müller, Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Sachsen-Altenburg, Jena, 1923, pp. 15-19.
- 262 . Ernst Heilman, Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Chemnitz und dem Erzgebirge, Chemnitz, 1912, pp. 54-56; Wehrner Döhler, Die ökonomische Lage der Zwickauer Arbeiter im vorigen Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1963, pp. 76-79; Ulrich Böttcher, Anfänge und Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in Bremen von der Revolution 1848 bis Aufhebung des Sozialistengesetzes 1890, Bremen, 1953, pp. 18, 23-27.
- 263 . Ritter, p. 105; Heilman, pp. 57-58.
- 264 . Schmüle, pp. 81-82; Ritter, p. 107; Paul de Rousiers, Hambourg, Paris, 1902, pp. 2-4.
- 265 . Heilman, pp. 68-73; Laufenberg, pp. 34-36.
- 266 . Laufenberg, pp. 56-58; Heilman, pp. 76-77; Ritter, pp. 107-8.

- 267 . Theodor Cassau, Der deutsche Holzarbeiterverband, Leipzig, 1909, pp. 16-19; Laufenberg, pp. 109-110.
- 268 . Ritter, p. 114; Wende, Die Konzentrationsbewegung, pp. 32-35.
- 269 . Wende, pp. 35-38; August Bringmann, Geschichte der deutschen Zimmerer Bewegung, 2 Bände, Stuttgart, 1903-05, Band I, pp. 78-109.
- 270 . Georg Gährtner, Die Nürnberger Arbeiterbewegung, Nürnberg, 1908, pp. 32-36.
- 271 . Hannelore Schlemmer, Die Rolle der Sozialdemokratie in den Lantagen Badens und Württembergs und ihr Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der Gesamtpartei, Frieberg, 1953, pp. 12-18.
- 272 . Erich Schneider, Die Anfänge der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung in der Rheinpfalz, Mainz, 1956, pp. 13-21.
- 273 . Engelberg, pp. 143-45.
- 274 . ibid., pp. 144-47.
- 275 . Otto Hommer, Die Entwicklung und Tätigkeit des deutschen Metallarbeiterverbandes, Berlin, 1912, pp. 25, 35-39.
- 276 . Bringmann, Band I, pp. 14-18; the first confederation of workers in the metal industry did not last long, it seems to have broken up because of craft jealousy, Hommer, pp. 42-43, Segitz, pp. 14-15.
- 277 . For the most part the strikes were of short duration and many appear to have started as lock-outs rather than strikes. Hommer, pp. 25-27; Bringmann, Band I, pp. 45-47; Cassau, pp. 56-57.
- 278 . Engelberg, pp. 229-30; Koch, pp. 123-25.
- 279 . Engelberg, p. 230; Carl Legien, Die deutsche Gewerkschaftsbewegung, Berlin, 1901, pp. 12-13.
- 280 . Correspondenzblatt, 1891, no. 14; Ritter, p. 114; Wende, pp. 26-30.
- 281 . Dawson, pp. 119-30; Kuczynski, Darstellung der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1900, Berlin, 1900, pp. 34-39; Pierre Benaerts, Les origines de la grande industrie allemande, Paris, 1932, pp. 14-23.
- 282 . Cassau, p. 374; G. Aubin, Entwicklung und Bedeutung der Mitteldeutschen Industrie, Halberstadt, 1924, pp. 27-35; Kuczynski, p. 24.
- 283 . H. Kisch, "The textile industries in Silesia and the Rhineland. A comparative study in industrialisation", in Journal of Economic History, volume 19, 1959, pp. 541-73; the census returns show that between 1871 and 1907 the number of people in the metal, textile and chemical industries tripled.

284. Cassau, p. 376; according to census returns the increase was greatest in the non-skilled categories, though these figures should be treated with caution as the categories themselves were often incomparable from one census to another. Berufsstatistik in Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, Bände 2, pp. 14, 110, 151, 202.
285. Hommer, pp. 135-38,
286. Cassau, Die Holzarbeiter, pp. 68-71; Bringmann, Band I, pp. 231-36.
287. Ritter, pp. 122-24; Cassau, Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung, pp. 321-26.
288. Bringmann, pp. 230-31.
289. Hermann Müller, Die Organisation der Lithographen, Steindrucker und verwandten Berufe, Berlin, 1917, pp. 145-48.
290. Willi Krahl, Der Verband der deutschen Buchdrucker, Berlin, 1916, pp. 89-92.
291. Ritter, p. 125; according to the membership figures released by the trade unions themselves we find that between 1891 and 1907 the percentage of all trade unionists who were members of the textile trade union increased from 0.6 to 7.0 percent; from 17.5 to 29.7 for the metal workers, and from 2.5 to 6.7 for transport workers; correspondingly in the building trade unions the figure fell from 26.0 to 18.0 percent and from 9.2 to 4.7 for the tailors and other clothing workers.
292. Legien, pp. 2-6.
293. ibid.; "Ein Jahrzehnt gewerkschaftlichen Entwicklung", Neue Zeit, 1905, Band I, p. 43; Wende, pp. 24-25.
294. Legien, pp. 43-45.
295. Die Organisationsfrage, Hamburg, 1891, pp. 1-5.
296. Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1892, pp. 58-61.
297. Hommer, pp. 5-13; Cassau, p. 92.
298. Respectively in 1892, Miners, 44,000; metal workers, 26,000; carpenters, 18,000; printers, 16,000; cigarmakers, 11,000; shoemakers, 10,000; in 1905, metal workers, 230,000; woodworkers, 120,000; builders, 15,000; miners, 125,000; "factory" workers, 67,000; textile workers, 67,000; and transport workers, 47,000.
299. Cassau, pp. 76-79; Ritter, pp. 112-15; starting as a coordinating agency the GK expanded its activities from providing statistical information and coordinating strike funds to active policy management; Correspondenzblatt, no. 11, 1891.
300. Protokoll, Halle, 1890, Berlin, 1890, pp. 217, 229.

301. Wende, pp. 26-36; P.A. Koller, "Das Massen- und Führers- Problem in den Freien Gewerkschaften", in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, xvii, Tübingen, 1920, pp. 67-80; Varain, p. 119; F. Sturm, "Die Aufgaben der Gewerkschaftskartelle und die Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands. Eine Organisationsfrage", Neue Zeit, 1897, Band 2, pp. 714-26.
302. Such as by allowing the local organisations to continue to function, but by restricting their activities, Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1899, pp. 214-20; Correspondenzblatt, 4.12.99; Heilbron, pp. 30-34; indeed, the differences were so great that the trade union movement in Berlin came near to splitting, Ritter, p. 115.
303. Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1892, pp. 57-59; it was resisted by Kloss of the carpenters, Correspondenzblatt, no. 27, 1891; but when the federation of woodworkers was organised in 1893 the opposition disappeared, Correspondenzblatt, no. 8, 1893.
304. Ritter, pp. 121-2, 151.
305. Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1896, pp. 111-112.
306. The executive was enlarged from seven to nine. Aside from Legien the only member carried over was Sabath, a tailor. Two were elected from the metal federations and Schmidt, the head of the Berlin federation, and Legien's right-hand man, was elected for the first time.
307. Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1903, p. 323.
308. ibid., "Neutralisierung der Gewerkschaften", Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1900, pp. 367-83.
309. Protokoll, Lübeck, 1901, p. 89.
310. Protokoll, K8ln, 1893, pp. 102-04, 184, 204.
311. ibid., pp. 103-04.
312. ibid., p. 104.
313. ibid., p. 204.
314. Varain, p. 92.
315. Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1901, p. 539.
316. Schmidt, Protokoll, Jena, 1905, p. 244.
317. Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1906, p. 246.
Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1902, p. 274.
318. Segitz, Das Unterstützungswesen, p. 36.

319. ibid., p. 37.
320. Varain, p. 107.
321. Reported in Einheit, June 1906. The meeting was called by Bebel and took place between the 19th and 23rd of February.
322. The trade union pushed for the expulsion of the radicals, Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1906, pl 190.
323. Ritter, pp. 51-59.
324. Kotowski, pp. 65-68.
325. ibid., p. 69.
326. Ritter, p. 57.
327. Korrespondenzblatt, 20.4.00; Protokoll, Gewerkschaften, 1906, p. 111; Sozialistische Monatshefte, 1903, p. 323.
328. Legien said: "Partout les deux organisations tendent à devenir autonome, indépendant l'une l'autre. Mais qu'un parti du travail se constitue comme en Angleterre ou que le parti socialiste devient officiellement la porte-parole des syndicats, les relations régulières tendaient à s'établir entre l'action économique et l'action politique." Reported in Humanité, 28.4.05; repeated Protokoll, Mannheim, 1906, p. 275.
329. Kautsky said that the trade unions must be represented as a body on the Parteivorstand otherwise the movement would collapse. Reported in Humanité, 18.9.05.
330. Halbwachs, p. 235.
331. Kuczynski, pp. 145-49; Kisch, pp. 544-45; Benaerts, p. 26.
332. Halbwachs, pp. 235-6.
333. ibid., p. 236.
334. G. Kessler, Die Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 18-27.
335. C. Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage, Paris, 1965, pp. 13-19.

CHAPTER VII

The Parti ouvrier français and the French working class

In our discussion of Kautsky and the SPD, we concluded that the strategy preached by the German party could be amply described as a strategy of ascending steps, and that the roots of the strategy were founded in the belief that social satisfaction could be attained through a wider distribution of the existing stock of social values. I will argue that the strategy—and its antecedents—of the French movement can be described in a similar way.

An analysis of the French socialist movement is beset by many initial barriers and difficulties that are not encountered in an examination of the SPD. Firstly, whereas the SPD was a relatively homogeneous organisation and tactical differences, such as the crisis over steamship subsidies, could be contained within the party, the history of the French socialist movement is a complex chronicle of repeated vituperative scissions and competing organisations.¹ Until 1905 there were a multiplicity of socialist organisations rather than a single and durable socialist party. If one takes the emergence of the Fédération du Parti des Travailleurs socialistes de France (Parti ouvrier or Parti socialiste français) at the conference of Marseille in 1879 as one's starting point, one finds that it had to face a competing organisation, the Comité révolutionnaire central (Blanquistes), and by 1881 had itself split into two factions. By 1897 in addition to the Parti ouvrier français, claiming ancestry in the original FPTSF, there were at least six competing national organisations. Moreover, the POP, the party that most adamantly claimed to be Marxist, was apparently never as disciplined or organised as the SPD. Between 1884 and 1890 it hardly existed as a national organisation, and as we will see, its Parisian section, called the Agglomération, was often out of contact and almost invariably out of step with its remaining provincial organisations.²

Secondly, we find that the leaders of the movement were so few and so preoccupied by the multiplicity of immediate tasks facing them, that the theoretical production so characteristic of the German movement was absent.³

The splintering and proliferation of the socialist organisations is of immense sociological interest, particularly once one begins to look at the social and regional bases of the various organisations. For the sociologist interested in the relationship between expressed ideology and social conditions, the extreme regionalisation of French industrialisation provides a fruitful area for research.⁴

If our initial purpose is to examine the strategy of the movement, our first problem is one of deciding which of the many movements to look at.

Here historians are in rare agreement, in their almost unanimous insistence that the POF set the tone because its claim that the political party was the essence of revolutionary strategy was adopted by all other organisations without question. Writers as different as Charles Mauger, Léon Blum, Alexandre Zévaès, Paul Buis, Charles Rappoport, and historians closer to our own time, like Daniel Ligou, Madeleine Réberieux and Claude Willard, see the POF as the pace-setter of the movement.⁵

Their assertion is not backed up by sociological evidence. They maintain that the POF was the harbinger or, indeed, the essence of working-class strategy because it had absorbed the teachings of Marxism. Apparently absorbing the principles of Marxism leads straight away to its corollary, the organisation of the working class into a political party. Charles Mauger, the first historian of the French socialist movement, asserts that the history of French socialism began in earnest with the POF's conversion to Marxism. Prior to that time, organisation had been impossible. But the moment Jules Guesde and the other founders of the POF were converted to Marxist economics, they could begin to organise the working class effectively.⁶ Alexandre Zévaès, whilst disputing Mauger's view of the POF's effectiveness, nonetheless still sees the rise of the POF as the hallmark of the French socialist revival.⁷ According to Ligou, the POF was a solid Marxist party.⁸ Réberieux points out that the rigorous Marxism of the POF provided the backbone for the amalgamated socialist movement when the vast majority of the socialist organisations united in 1905.⁹ Concluding a massive study of the POF, Claude Willard concedes that the party was far from the paragon of Marxist virtue and wisdom described by other writers. Indeed, he continues, it could hardly be compared to the efficient organisation of the SPD.¹⁰ He asserts, nonetheless, that it did introduce the labouring masses to Marxism and was thus the vital step on the path towards the foundation of the true Leninist party.¹¹

Another reason developed by some historians for their view that the POF was the harbinger or pace-setter is that it was the French equivalent of the SPD. It was an organised party. It was a party of the working class. Its respect for Marxist theory was the same and the relationship between theory and practice was spelled out in the same way as in the SPD. According to

Cole, the POF was strongly influenced by the SPD and worked in much the same way.¹² Ligou and Louis make much the same point. I find these claims dubious.¹³ With the exception of Willard, the historians' judgment is based upon speeches and claims made at party congresses and espoused in party propaganda. The idea of the SPD model was dear to the heart of the POF in its battles with other parties.¹⁴ To take such arguments as evidence I find an extremely dubious practice.

Finally, the historians assert that Marxism was introduced and defended in the party, principally by Jules Guesde and, in a less noticeable way, by Paul Lafargue. Even Willard accepts this view. If the POF did not succeed, it was only because the French working class was politically immature.¹⁵ Thus Guesde's ideas are accorded considerable weight. Indeed, on reading the historians, we find that in most cases Guesde's views are recounted in detail while those of others are never given space. That is, if one assumes that the POF operated like the SPD and was, in a very similar manner, a dispenser of Marxism, then it follows that someone functioned approximately in the same way as did Kautsky.¹⁶ The schema adopted by the historians does not allow them to work in any other way.

It boils down to an implicit assumption which we have already encountered. That assumption is that the party is the application of a revolutionary strategy. Revolution strategy is the product of the labours of the theorist. Theory is then applied by the party organisers and a mass party is created and/or nourished.¹⁷ But one must look in vain for a shred of evidence to back up this assumption. When I say we have already met this assumption, it was - ironically - in our recounting of the essence of Kautskyism. Are the historians guilty of turning Kautsky's theory into a methodology ?

The notion that Guesde "dominated" the party is widely stated. The reason for the inverted commas around dominated is because in some cases the domination was felt to be organisational, in others only in terms of preparing theoretical guidelines, and in still others both.¹⁸ Even an historian with as vigorous a concern for sociological data as Claude Willard, does not dismiss this view.¹⁹ The form of his study is orthodox. It starts with a long exposition of guesdisme theory. Whilst Willard does cast some doubt on the role played by guesdisme in the movement, once he presents his depth

studies of regional POF organisations, he never erases the view that guesdisme was the guiding ideology of the POF. Indeed, according to Willard, the only problem he sees with regard to the POF was that it failed to understand thoroughly the organisational principles of Marxism. So Willard cautiously suggests that the POF must be regarded as a stepping-stone on the route to the organisation of the true working-class party - the PCF.²⁰

There are a host of possible objections to the formulation imposed by the historians on their choice of data and the use they make of them. Firstly, there is mounting evidence - much of which is supplied by Willard's studies of regional organisations - that the POF was far from a monolithic or hegemonic party.²¹ Within the POF one finds a multiplicity of tactics which a reading of Guesde fails to reveal. Secondly, I shall suggest that guesdisme is far from the solid ideology presented by the historians. The theories propounded by Guesde were surprisingly pragmatic. They were responses to situations faced by the party. Those aspects of guesdisme which appear to be enduring - its theory of value, its theory of power and its theory of the correct working-class response - coincide remarkably with the changing needs of a new form of trade unionism which grew up in the wake of industrial mechanisation. Here Guesde becomes much more the publicist than the leader.²² Thirdly, the relationship between theory and application spelled out by the historians is far from helpful in understanding the development of the POF and the party's relationship to the French working class. By assuming that the party is the chef d'oeuvre of the maturing working class, the historians provide us with a lens for our microscope cut to allow them to see what they think they should find. For these reasons in the following section, I shall place much more weight upon the disjuncture between party ideology and the structure of the French working class than previous writers have done. In the last section I have suggested that the disjuncture between the theory of party developed in German social democracy and the nature of the German working class was an important element. I have on several occasions mentioned Engels' view that such a disjunction leads more to an integrated than revolutionary working class and was, in fact, the "normal" comportment of the working class. The compensating role played by ideology or, as psychoanalysis teaches, its sublimating role, means that the subject can never grasp the essence of his

own oppression. Sublimation only allows certain temporary forms of alleviation. Marx constantly emphasised the importance of imposed reality, disjuncture and contradictions as the basic starting point for a strategy. But neither he nor Engels actually applied this as a methodological principle to the study of the post 1871 working class. In the case of France we have a wealth of data on regional development, regional party organisation and their histories. It is possible to be a bit more suggestive than we were when we dealt with Germany where such studies are in their infancy.²³ We can begin to suggest some possible reasons for the disjuncture between ideology and working-class reality hallmarking the turn-of-the-century socialist movement.

The "Ideology" of the POF

From its inception the POF broadcasted that it was a Marxist party and was twinned with the SPD. Guesde was keen to obtain Marx's personal approval of his proposed activities and sought his advice, as we have seen in composing the party's programme.²⁴ Paul Lafargue, Marx's son-in-law and a favoured correspondent of Engels, made the party's credentials appear to be impeccable.²⁵ Guesde and Lafargue were also acquainted with Wilhelm Liebknecht and made a show of courting his advice. How were these links useful to the POF ?

Before 1879 there were no nationally constituted socialist movements in France. Trade-union activity, regulated by the 1865 laws was restricted and no more than a very local phenomenon.²⁶ There was no existing political organisation that could pretend to undertake an active propaganda campaign to rouse the working class. The Marxist and German links were the POF's way of saying we represent a strong movement, such as we have not had until now, and a coherent and simple doctrine.²⁷ If we look at the newspapers set up by the party during this period, the German card was often played. The Germans, they wrote, have organised a strong party because they have a proper political appreciation of their situation. We share that heritage with them and will achieve the same in France. In his propaganda tours, Guesde emphasised the need for a coherent doctrine and continuity in organisation. The links with the SPD and Marx were vital to convey the idea that the POF was different from existing socialist groups and intent upon forming a truly revolutionary party. The POF was the inheritor of

France's revolutionary tradition was a theme often evoked by Guesde during this epoch.²⁸

When the POF broke up in 1881, the majority faction, the F.T.S.F., led by Paul Brousse and Benoit Malon emphasised the national heritage of French socialism. Malon dismissed Marxism as a foreign-inspired pernicious doctrine and called for a socialism whose content was gradual municipal reform, restoration of the crafts, maintenance of the social position of artisan workers and political cooperation with the most favourable sections of the radical bourgeois political groups, such as the radicaux led by Geogres Clemenceau the former mayor of Montmartre.²⁹ Needless to say, the appeal of the FSTS, or "possibilistes" was most favourably received in areas where the old crafts were strong and where living conditions had not yet deteriorated as a result of the growth of the new industrial system based upon coal, textiles and metals. In these areas, on the other hands, sterner measures were required and Malon and Brousse had little influence after 1882. Guesde's invocation of the party that was the epitome of the kind of organisation the industrial workers of the Nord and Allier felt they required and of the theorist whose name was linked to that organisation was extremely popular as we will see. Indeed, after seven years in the wilderness, the re-emergence of the POF as a national organisation was celebrated by its sponsorship of an international congress of socialist workers timed for the Centenary of the French revolution. The attendance of such luminaries as Bebel, and Liebknecht in addition to the warm endorsement of Engels was beneficial.³⁰

How serious were Guesde and Lafargue in their attachment to Marxism and in their adoption of the organisational principles of the SPD?

Willard, for one, insists that one should take the POF's claims to be a Marxist party with a grain of salt because there were very few of Marx's works available to the reader at that time.³¹ The POF lacked the means and facilities to set up a publishing house.. The Imprimerie ouvrière was not opened by Delory until the 1890's and even then worked more for the départemental federation than for the national party. For the most part, Willard concludes, Marx was a symbol of respectability.³² Guesde read Kapital only superficially and neither Lafargue nor Deville were regarded by Engels as conversant in Marxism.³³ Engels chided Lafargue for substituting Ricardo's theory of value for Marx.³⁴ But during the yearly years of the POF

almost as many of Marx's texts were available in France as were in Germany. Kapital was published in installments between 1872 and 1875. Marx described to both Büchner and Bebel the special care he took with the French edition to drum the Proudhonian nonsense out of French heads and to make them see clearly.³⁵ Engels edited several sections of Anti-Dühring, leaving out his criticisms of the German philosophers and expanding the sections on Proudhon in a work called Socialisme utopique et socialisme scientifique.³⁶ Marx prefaced the work with a special introduction consecrated to highlighting the differences between his and Proudhon's theory of value. Large sections of La misère de la philosophie were published in Guesde's own journal, L'Egalité, in 1880.³⁷

What were the missing texts which had been available to the German movement? The Manifest was not published until it was translated by Laura Marx in 1885. The Second Address did not appear until 1887. The Randglossen were first published in 1894, Engels' Kritik in 1901, Marx's critique of Hegel in 1895, Zur Kritik in 1899, Kapital II and III between 1900 and 1902. But as we have seen, the texts that were available certainly contained sufficient material for the social democrats to understand Marx. Moreover, the missing texts to which Willard alludes, with only one exception, were also missing from Germany during the same period. I think one can fairly conclude that the leaders of the POF, like Guesde, Lafargue, Deville, Delory, Dormoy etc., could have had a reasonable idea of what Marxism was about from simply reading the already available material. One must either conclude that they did not read Marx's texts or that they did not "understand" what he said.

Marx's and Engels' judgment of the POF compels us to investigate the second hypothesis. They were not charitable towards Guesde's interpretations of their ideas. Marx told Sorge, and Engels told Bernstein, how Guesde did not understand the first thing about economic conditions nor the nature of social exploitation.³⁸ Engels recounted to Bebel how appallingly weak was the penetration of Marx's ideas into France.³⁹ Marx was reluctant to consider Lafargue as a translator of the Manifest. Even after ramming the rewritten Considérants down Lafargue's throat, Marx still called him "das patentierte Orakel des socialisme scientifique", attacked him for his theoretical brittleness and labelled him the last of the Bakuninists.⁴⁰ Engels wrote openly to Lafargue that the reason for the POF's atrophy was that it did

not understand French society, and the reason that the POF did not understand French society, was that it did not understand Marxism.⁴¹ When Deville produced a popularised version of Kapital, Engels found it closer to Lassalle than to his and Marx's work.⁴²

Some writers claim that Guesde slowly evolved towards Marxism. The sources of Guesde's Marxism were Emile Aollas, Karl Hirsch and Gabriel Deville. Aollas was an academic who had some contact with Marxist emigrés. He developed a theory of exploitation whose main contention was that property was a fruit of labour.⁴³ We have already seen that in Marx's view this theory's pedigree was Ricardo and Smith. In La Misère, he specifically sought to demonstrate how such a theory was at the heart of Proudhon's anti-revolutionary doctrine. Hirsch had close attachments to Lassalle's movement. Deville's version of Kapital fails signally to distinguish between exchange value and use value. Lafargue's Le droit à la paresse sees the benefits of socialism as providing a temporary escape from work.⁴⁴ Guesde, like his SPD contemporaries, boasted of his debt to Lassalle.⁴⁵ In this light Guesde's Marxism seems hardly Marxist. Moreover, Guesde's notion of the form and substance of social exchange within his society shows little evidence of any significant change over time. If we look at his Essai de catéchisme socialiste (1878)⁴⁶ and compare it to his lecture, Le collectivisme (1891),⁴⁷ we find that several crucial themes endure. The essence of capitalism, according to Guesde, is the extraction of surplus value. Surplus value is equal to the profit accrued by the capitalism. Capitalist exploitation reduces the worker to the level of subsistence.⁴⁸ The worker is denied the just rewards of his labour and the enjoyments of the benefits that are rightfully his. This system of unequal exchange so benumbs the worker that he is unable to see the solution to his problems.⁴⁹ These ideas, very similar in many ways to those expressed by Kautsky, remained the underpinning of Guesde's notion of strategy.


Guesde wrote enthusiastically to Marx in 1879 when the POF was being organised:

"... je suis persuadé qu'avant de songer à l'action il faut avoir constitué un parti, une armée consciente au moyen d'une propagande aussi active que continue . . . je pense que pendant plus ou moins longtemps l'impulsion, la direction devrait venir d'en haut, d'eux qui savent davantage."⁵⁰

To a large extent, Guesde's declaration of intent is a précis of the strategy he subsequently expounded in all his writings. Moreover, I will argue, the majority of Paul Lafargue's more erudite works are cast from the same mould. I will argue that Guesde's statement is just as descriptive of his works written well into the new century as his earlier writings where an overt influence of Lassalle and Proudhon is evident and that his theory of exploitation led him logically to his conclusion that the party was the infallible guide, organiser, wet-nurse, and guardian of the working class:

"... c'est le terrain exclusif sur lequel nous nous plaçons, sur lequel le Parti ouvrier s'est organisé, et sur lequel il nous faut nous maintenir pour envisager tous les événements et pour les classer." 51

I will maintain that his notion of organisation is rooted in the theory of economic materialism that he, Lafargue and Deville claimed to find was the essence of Marx's contribution to the "communist ideal". It can be depicted as follows:



As I have pointed, out, the circumstances under which the French socialists developed and propagated their theories were much less favourable than those that allowed the SPD savants the luxury of producing erudite tracts and studies of particular problems in the light of their view of Marxism. The tradition of the social scientist and philosopher was deeply-rooted in the German socialist movement and the over-precipitous and overzealous productions of the French, of which Marx and Engels despaired, were rare in number. There was neither time nor finance to support a community of scholars in France. Willard claims that Guesde played a similar role to Bebel as an organiser and popular public orator, Lafargue fitted somewhat uneasily into the French copy of Kautsky's mantle, and Deville was both a "vulgariser" and economist.⁵¹ In reality, resources were so meagre, that the trio were forced to fill all these functions to the extent that complaints were frequently made about their neglect of small but important matters that needed attending to. Hence we should not be surprised that the well-polished text characteristic of Bernstein or Kautsky was never written by any member of the trio. Lafargue's contributions, were more often than not, few and written hastily. Guesde's writings were always in the form of a short pamphlet or a speech delivered on his many tours. The luxury of having the time to write a book or make a thorough going analysis of France on the

often and purposefully made his arguments tentative. With Guesde and Lafargue the conditional argument all but disappears.

The Bases of Strategy: The Iron Law of Economics and its Consequences

Guesde and Lafargue were convinced materialists, like Kautsky, of the eighteenth century mould. Lafargue's writings stress the rationalistic and Cartesian heritage of socialism. Few of his conferences did not include a rapid excursion through the scientific firmament.⁵² Mathematics, physics, chemistry and the earth sciences were the first sciences, he declared. Socialism, the science of man, was a relatively new development. And with it, the proletariat laid claim to represent the progress of the human race.⁵³

According to Guesde and Lafargue, social life in all its detail and complexity was determined by economics. Whereas Engels, with a critical eye cast towards Kautsky and Lafargue, specifically ruled out such a causal model of explanation in his penultimate work, Einleitung (1895), Lafargue, nonetheless, continued to espouse a rigorously materialistic philosophy.⁵⁴ Lafargue insisted that there was no such thing as the Hegelian problem of consciousness. In a debate with Jean Jaurès, who - rare amongst French socialists - had been influenced by Kant and Hegel, Lafargue insisted that any theory allowing for differences in the perception of the external world was idealistic and subjective. There could only be one correct perception to match an object and scientific socialism was the discipline that had discovered those sets of perceptions and objects that composed social life.⁵⁵

A similar concept of materialism and determinism occupies a central position in Guesde's writings. His Essai de catéchisme socialiste (1878) is a popularisation of this view.⁵⁶ La loi des salaires et ses conséquences (1879) spells out the formulae in some detail.⁵⁷ His and Lafargue's commentary on the Considérants drawn up by Marx in 1881, Le programme du parti ouvrier, son histoire, ses considérants, ses articles (1883),⁵⁸ presents the laws of economic determinism. We find that in his written material, like Le socialisme au jour le jour (1899),⁵⁹ and his speeches like the one dealing with his refusal to support a pension scheme (1910) Guesde to the very last never wavered from the materialistic perspective.⁶⁰

Gabriel Deville, according to Willard, the economist in the Guesde-Lafargue-Deville triumvirate, was equally adamant. In his introduction to his version of Capital (1878), Deville speaks piously of Marx's work as a scientific excursus in the best tradition of the natural sciences.⁶¹ Lafargue and Deville rejected Marx's notion of history as the history of exploitation and possibilities, but saw it as the history of economic development whose general drift was leading towards the day when the most evolved section of mankind, the proletariat, would come to power.⁶²

Guesde's basic and unflinching message was delivered as early as 1879:

"J'ai pu et dû constater, avec tous les Économistes, que le salaire ne pouvait pas s'élever au-dessus du strict nécessaire à la survivance du salairié et à sa reproduction."⁶³

Guesde's arguments seem to approximate Kautsky's Verelendungstheorie as well as the notions of impoverishment found in the works of Lassalle and Proudhon. Guesde effectively shares with them the notion of the iron-law of wages that never allows the proletariat to rise above the subsistence level.⁶⁴ To what does capitalism owe its much-vaunted progress, he asks? To the surplus it has extracted from its army of labourers. Despite Marx, Guesde argues that property is theft.⁶⁵ The worker is denied the true fruits of his labour. The social problematic is how to obtain just rewards for the working class.⁶⁶ Here is the starting point of the socialist strategy.

Both Zévaès and Willard argue that this text was written before Guesde became thoroughly acquainted with Marxism. He had not yet met Marx and had not yet been shown the errors of Proudhon.⁶⁷ This argument is mistaken. In 1883 Guesde and Lafargue published a fairly long commentary on the Considérants drawn up for the POF by Marx. Here one would expect to find evidence of Guesde's accepting a Marxist perspective. The text starts with a long section tracing the history of industrial development and arguing strongly against the then popular notion that wealth was a creation of individual initiative.⁶⁸ This is followed by a section pointing out that modern industry is increasingly dependent upon cooperation. The "conditions of production" are becoming "collectivised".⁶⁹ but enjoyment and possession of the means of production are far from collectivised. The architects of progress and the creators of universal wealth have been robbed of the fruits of their labour.⁷⁰ These must be restored to them. The duty and sine qua non of the socialist movement was to seek

such a restoration.

Is this a mistake? Lafargue's explanation of Marxism repeats the same idea in almost identical terms: "... il vole le salarié des fruits de son travail."⁷¹

In 1910 Guesde took the same line. He argued that, over the many years he fought for the working class, he never once faltered in his view that they had been robbed of their just rewards.⁷²

Is it not possible to interpret Guesde's argument in another way? We have already seen that when Marx spoke of the subsistence theory he meant lack of control over the "means of life". Exploitation was relative to a society. But, according to Guesde's and Lafargue's general formula, the lynchpin of Marx's argument - consciousness - was a red herring. They maintained that exploitation was both concrete and objective.⁷³ Subjective experience was unscientific. The strict minimum referred to physical subsistence. Exploitation meant the denial of just rewards. Perhaps because industrialisation in France was a relatively new phenomenon and there was no experience of change within capitalism, no hint that new needs could develop, such an idea never occurred to the socialists. Their own experience of capitalism was limited. Because they could not find their way to a teleological form of explanation, they opened the door on a theory whose main components were progress, evolution and materialism. Indeed, only those socialists who, like Jaurès and Vaillant, had read Hegel in the original, or had experience with vastly different societies, like Marcel Mauss and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, moved tentatively in the direction of a teleological theory.⁷⁴

The 1883 commentary on Marx's Considérants long remained the guiding theoretical statement of the POF.⁷⁵ Given the theory of exploitation it presented, the notion of socialist appropriation does not mean appropriation of the means of life, as Marx and Engels argued, but only the existing stock of social values. Guesde and Lafargue reasoned in the following way.

At the outset, Guesde and Lafargue develop a proposition that underlies all their future arguments. They maintain that the essence of socialist appropriation involves seizing the profits from the capitalists and redistributing them among the producing classes.⁷⁶ We have seen that

the notion of Marx and Engels of seizing the "means of life" meant a good deal more than seizing the means of economic exchange. Yet Guesde and Lafargue do not develop this theme. Marx's notion of surplus value meant both the accumulated economic surplus, as he argued in Kapital, and the distortion and truncation of the workers' "means of life", as he argued in the Randglossen. Guesde and Lafargue defined the surplus in purely economic terms.⁷⁷ They assumed that the benefits accruing from an industrial system are good in themselves and that all that is amiss is their distribution. We have met a somewhat similar argument in the works of Kautsky and Bebel. Like Bebel, Guesde and Lafargue fail to distinguish between industrial development and social development. Once one decides that the products of industrialisation are intrinsically good and fulfil needs, such a conclusion is inevitable.⁷⁸ Therefore, one should not be astonished that, in Guesde subsequent texts and speeches, the idea that the essence of exploitation is the denial of just rewards for the worker is a constant assumption. We find that Guesde's notion of working-class exploitation, like that of Lafargue, leads to a notion of liberation that can be summed up as giving the working full value for his labour.⁷⁹

In Le droit à la paresse, (1883), a tract against socially unnecessary work, Lafargue develops these ideas more cogently.⁸⁰ In particular, the assumptions about the intrinsic value of industrial products are spelled out more clearly. Lafargue's main point is to demonstrate that the worker has a right to enjoyment. Enjoyment, in his view, means the right to more free time or leisure. The industrial system, he argues, allows society to accumulate and the worker must benefit from that accumulation. In other words, the worker must work in order to enjoy free time or time away from work.⁸¹ He must have free time to enjoy or consume the products he has produced or transformed. Lafargue, never for a moment, discusses the possibility of transforming the nature of work. He never for a moment feels that the drudgery of work could be transformed. Instead, he writes that work is necessary, a preface to enjoyment, which he defines as an escape from drudgery and also the power to consume a range of cultural products previously available only to the bourgeoisie. Can a culture as a whole be a repressive culture? Could one say that bourgeois culture played an important role in reinforcing or sublimating drives with the result that the working class was "adjusted to" society? Lafargue does not think so.⁸² If a good or a commodity is intrinsically good, it follows that the only real problem is to ensure that it is widely distributed and produced in sufficient quantity. Indeed, if the very essence of working-class exploitation has

been that the worker is deadened and robotised by the system and cannot absorb the niceties of culture, these must be made available to him. In other words, culture provides the great escape into freedom.⁸³

But Lafargue's argument begs the question in two ways. Firstly, someone is still defining what is culturally desirable and culturally undesirable. By what right are they deciding? Lafargue maintains the theory that the working class, because it is exploited, cannot be creative. But those middle-class cast-offs, like himself, who managed to emancipate themselves from the ills of their societies could produce works of eternal value. These are the philosophers, the artists and the scientists.⁸⁴ Secondly, there is an implication in Lafargue's argument that he side-steps. Lafargue realises that, according to his theory, work is necessary because only through work can there be accumulation. He goes on to insist, like Bebel, that in the future machines will do all the work and man will be relieved of drudgery.⁸⁵ But, unfortunately for Lafargue, there is a meanwhile - and the implications for this meanwhile are that if we work harder we can produce more, accumulate more and therefore enjoy more. But working harder means working the machines more efficiently and operating the distributive mechanism more quickly and assiduously.⁸⁶ Does that not mean more drudgery? Are we not in fact back at the theory criticised so severely by Marx?

Guesde and Lafargue appeared not to think so. Like Kautsky, they were certain that the rewards made possible by the industrial system were well worth the effort.⁸⁷ Man had to labour to produce his moments of freedom. Indeed, Guesde went so far as to insist that capitalism was a prerequisite to socialism because capitalism had given birth to that wondrous industrial system that would make leisure a possibility for the working masses.⁸⁸

Having defined their aim, it remained for Guesde and Lafargue to elucidate the strategy to obtain those ends. They wrote:

"... cette appropriation collective ne peut sortir que de l'action révolutionnaire de la classe productive - ou prolétariat - organisé en parti politique distinct."⁸⁹

We have seen with Kautsky and Bebel that the formulation of a strategy depends not only upon ends but upon means. We saw that Kautsky's ends involved a

notion of working class, its revolutionary potential and the kinds of organisation suitable to the working class. Broadly Kautsky distinguished between two radically different kinds of consciousness. The first was what one might call the ordinary or normal consciousness of the working class. This was the consciousness of the politically unorganised working class or, under the most favourable circumstances, trade-union consciousness. Kautsky maintained that, although the working class was the negation of the capitalist system, like the acid initiating a chemical reaction, someone had to oversee and guide its activity. The second form of consciousness that Kautsky identified was revolutionary consciousness. It was the property of those who understood the laws of dialectics and its organisational corollaries. These, the initiated, were to be the leaders of the working-class party. Kautsky thus developed a theory of the guiding elite that justified both the hierarchical organisation of the SPD and its attacks against working-class "spontaneity".

In our discussion of socialist appropriation we saw that Lafargue subscribed to a very similar theory of consciousness. When the POF was discussing various projects to unify the French socialist movement in 1900, Lafargue produced an important pamphlet that spelled out all the implications of this argument, Le socialisme et les intellectuels.⁹⁰ Lafargue starts with the materialist adage that all ideas come from experience. The ordinary proletariat's experience is debilitating so that he cannot understand society. He can never get more than a few brief and unconnected glimmers of the nature of his own oppression.⁹¹ It follows that the actions he undertakes are either insufficient - like the actions of trade unions, or are sporadic and spontaneous - in much the same way as Durkheim's famous "cry of pain". There is a special class of proletarians and déclassés bourgeois whom Lafargue calls intellectuals. The intellectual, too, is determined by his social experience. But, unlike the ordinary workman, he operates in the realm of ideas.⁹² Once he enters the realm of ideas, he has the possibility of understanding society and the process by which it operates. (This holds, of course, so long as knowledge does not contain a teleological element.) Hence, for Lafargue, the intellectual's accession to socialism potentially provides the movement for social liberation with the guiding and leadership qualities that it requires. The intellectual needs the proletariat. Living out his alienation in the realm of ideas he does not have the means to change the world.⁹³

Here he must unite with the proletariat. His isolation that made possible his idealistic formulation of socialism is also responsible, Lafargue insists, for his need to seek an alliance with the proletariat. Hence the intellectual must inculcate the idea of socialism into the proletariat. He must give it a sense of mission and he must lead the proletariat, and in return the proletariat will deliver the goods.⁹⁴

Marx, as we have seen, spoke of the need to enfranchise the totality of man's activity. He spoke of the affirmation of one's total self and its potentials. This is clearly incompatible with Lafargue's Marxism as the objective science of potentials or the science of what one may call the predefined. Lafargue's union of intellectuals and proletarians is unequal. The proletariat is at every point of its journey towards socialism incapable of understanding. Its leaders must come from without. It is like the rat running the maze and the intellectual's job is to show the proletariat how to run the maze more efficiently. If we ask the question where do these liberating ideas, that Lafargue attributes to his committed intellectuals, come from, we enter a paradox. Lafargue maintains that the world is a world of material and what is valuable is intrinsically valuable. Yet the metatheory of his materialism is clearly idealistic. We have seen that this was Marx's critique of Feuerbach, Proudhon and the economists. Indeed, the essence of his notion of liberation was a liberation from the rat maze. Yet here we find the socialists constructing a new maze whose only distinction from the earlier mazes is that its access is freer and its reward is greater. The relationship of man to the maze that Marx wanted to alter is not altered by Lafargue. Given the relationship between consumption and distribution that Lafargue and Guesde espoused, if there is any tendency to change that relationship between man and the maze it is probably to enforce it. Concretely, this would mean that in Lafargue's industrialising society work would have to be made more efficient. But if part of man's exploitation, as Marx maintained, is the brutal split in his active life between work and inactivity, this - according to Lafargue's argument - would be strengthened. Moreover, because efficiency again requires leadership, even under socialism the worker would be subject to leadership. His compensation would be more free time and culture: that is, a temporary respite or escape from the realm of necessity. For Marx, at

the end of Kapital the essence of socialism is the dissolution of the distinction between freedom and necessity. For Lafargue, socialism depends upon a rigorous distinction.

The socialists, of course, never came to power so they never had to continue the argument that starts from an objective or material Weltanschauung to its bitter and paradoxical conclusion. Those who know must guide. The socialists never used the term rule because socialist guidance was supposed to be qualitatively different from capitalist organisation. The difference resided in the fact that it gave the worker "freedom" in return for his labour. It gave him a fair price. But the worker's role in determining social value was minimal due to the initial theory of materialism.

Is this why, in a late text, Guesde maintains that a body akin to the state must be in charge of distribution? Whilst Guesde never compromised his hostility towards the bourgeois state, like Bebel and his notion of the "Volksstaat", Guesde saw the solution to the problematic, as he saw it, in terms of a market regulator.⁹⁵

We can sum up the tendencies in Lafargue's theory as follows: (i) the general need for efficiency demanded that those who possessed knowledge lead; (ii) in terms of organising the working class, it meant that it must be guided along the road to communism with a very firm hand that would prevent spontaneity and contamination from outside forces; (iii) under the reign of communism, it follows that the party must continue to guide the working class. I have not seen this last argument spelled out thus specifically either by the SPD savants or by any other Second International theorists. Yet, given their starting point and given their ends, it is an inevitable outcome. Indeed, if our argument that Marx's critique of the underlying assumptions of political economy was also an argument against what he took to be the mistaken strategy of the socialist movement holds water, the notions of command, authority and the use of knowledge to manipulate that he found in Lassalle and Proudhon are clearly applicable too in the case of Lafargue, Guesde, Kautsky, etc.

Guesde expressed Lafargue's abstract theory of the working class and working-class organisation in much more down-to-earth terms in his speeches

and, particularly, in his newspaper articles. According to Guesde, those working-class organisations which were not guided by the aim of collective appropriation could never generate a revolutionary situation. His argument was aimed at two kinds of organisation. The first were the cooperative societies founded and/or supported by the municipal socialists like Brousse and Malon. The second was the expanding trade-union movement supported by Allemane and Vaillant. Due to the relative importance of the trade-union movement, Guesde's wrath was often turned in their direction. ⁹⁶

The trade unions, Guesde declared, were not part of the general evolutionary tendency leading towards socialism. They were bound hand-and-foot to the capitalist system. They were concerned only with the problem of raising wages and never with the more important social issues. But they did have a distinct advantage. ⁹⁷ They were working-class organisations and, as such, provided an easy recruiting ground for the socialist movement. Whereas for Marx the trade unions were what he called active schools of propaganda for socialism, Guesde, with his very authoritarian model of education, saw them as organisations which led the working class astray, and organisations which the socialists must take over and guide if the working class was to be put on the path towards socialism. ⁹⁸

Guesde reserved his ammunition for a frontal attack on the trade unions' main weapon, the strike. The strike, he wrote, can never generate a revolutionary situation because, on the one hand, it is never fought for a revolutionary purpose and, on the other hand, it could never be organised. Strikers, he wrote, could not be militarily organised. A strike is ⁹⁹ chaotic, it raises too many issues at the same time and defies organisation. Look at Décazville and Fourmies, he noted; they prove conclusively that a strike decimates one's own ranks rather than those of the opponent. ¹⁰⁰

Hence, Guesde wrote:

"Il faut faire sortir la grève de son état chaotique, la conditionner à un plan général, établir une organisation préalable afin de ne pas entrer en campagne sans discipline, sans munitions ... Il faut organiser les syndicats en unions nationales de métiers ... encourager cette organisation, la ¹⁰¹ diriger en la pénétrant, c'est la tâche du parti ouvrier."

Guesde's rejection of the general strike as a waste of working-class energy and a glorification of a pre-political form of consciousness reveals an interesting paradox in his strategy. On the one hand, Guesde could not conceive of working-class action outside a disciplined organisation where there was a firm distinction between the leaders, who alone formulated the strategy, and the led, those who might have an inkling of what was wrong but who could never attain that level of understanding to launch the process of liberation.¹⁰² Indeed, it is clear that his rejection of the strike is much more firmly based upon his fear of working-class spontaneity than upon its inherent weakness. A theory which maintained that the strike is an action which potentially could be revolutionary as the worker comes to question yet further¹⁰³ his role as a producer and a consumer never entered Guesde's mind. A theory that the strike was really a result of an unconscious discontent with the totality of one's social life and a symptom of oppression never held water with Guesde, who insisted on seeing things at their apparent face value. The idea that, during the strike, the worker was especially ripe for socialist propaganda which built upon his discontent and widened his protest was unthinkable. A dialectical theory of revolution based upon ripening consciousness could never be accepted by those who started from a theory of intrinsic objective value.

Guesde certainly was in favour of using the strike, but by insisting to the strikers that their efforts were in vain, unless they saw reason and deserted the economic battle for the political battle. Unless they accepted organisation, guidance and discipline, they would have little hope of success.¹⁰⁴ A worker engaged in a strike during a period when commitment to strike action involved more than loss of pay but also the potentiality of being fired and imprisoned, would hardly look upon such an argument with favour. Nor were they impressed when Guesde conceded that trade-union activity was important - with the telling addendum that the trade unions could push up wages to such a level that they would cause unemployment and therefore hasten the revolution.¹⁰⁵

As we shall see, Guesde - with his attack on trade unionism - alienated the very groups he should have attracted. To speak in guesdiste terms,

why should a general turn around and fire at his potential recruits, in fact the only ones? We shall return to this theme after having looked at the form of organisation the guesdistes claimed was necessary to liberate society from oppression.

The Panacea: The Political Party

These various strands led to a strategy emphasising:

- (i) The need for a political organisation which was disciplined, coordinated, and almost military in its structure.
- (ii) The need for an élite made up of savants and organisers who had mastered dialectical materialism.
- (iii) The need for constant propaganda to instil the working class with the ideology and knowledge of its own social conditions, aspirations, and means to liberate itself.

According to Guesde and Lafargue, intellectuals who by the correct study of society arrived at the need to change society, and workingmen who managed to see beyond what one might call the perceptual limits that chained them to, at best, a trade-union strategy, were united together in the political party.¹⁰⁶ This constituted the first and most vital step. The general evolution of society, Guesde and Lafargue noted, was towards collectivism. The more intelligent workingmen noted that the collectivisation of the means of production, as Guesde characterised the advent of the large-scale factory system, led logically to social collectivism.¹⁰⁷ These elements united to form the political party in order to achieve the second and third steps of his strategy.

If we refer back to the Considérants, we find this argument developed in some detail.¹⁰⁸ After having spelled out the essence of exploitation, one would expect Guesde and Lafargue to begin to discuss how to organise for the coming revolution. We find nothing that approximates such an argument. The argument always stops as soon as the need for organisation is stated. In no subsequent text is that point ever passed. What is probably most important of all is the fact that Guesde and Lafargue argue that the revolution will occur independently of the socialist movement.

"Elle jaillira des complications politiques internationales et des perturbations fatales qu'élaborent le développement industriel de l'Europe et la concurrence agricole de l'Amérique et de l'Australie."¹⁰⁹

The implications of this argument lead clearly to the Zusammensbruchstheorie, the notion that capitalism would collapse because of its own internal economic conditions. But if this is the case, why all the talk about the need for a political party? If socialism is inevitable, and if socialism would come about automatically like the last step in some evolutionary pattern, why must one organise a political movement?

Clearly, we have a problem. If collectivism is inevitable, why bother about organisation? We shall turn to this theme in a few moments.

Despite his apparent belief in the inevitability of collectivism, Guesde was a formidable proponent of organisation. Willard estimates that between 1882 and 1889, Guesde delivered something like 1500 speeches throughout France.¹¹⁰ His constantly reiterated theme was the necessity of unifying the working class through an organisation led by those who knew, and were capable of instructing, the proletariat.

"Constitué dans un parti de classe ou du travail, le prolétariat, qui est composé de beaucoup plus que des soi-disants manoeuvres mais comprend ... tous les producteurs industriels, agricoles et scientifiques ... est doté d'une mission historique ... il doit saisir le pouvoir politique pour advenir au gouvernement - le facteur de la loi." 111

Guesde's formula was disarmingly simple. The party represented the organised working class. The party was the culmination of thousands of years of philosophy. It was the marriage of the oppressed and science. It was both the means to destroy the old society as well as the new society in embryo. Its duty was to instruct the working class and teach the laws of society and revolution. Therefore, the working class must join the party and accept the strictures and rules of the party.¹¹² But the limited political intelligence of the working class, its subservience and economism, demanded the foresight and vision of those schooled in scientific socialism.

But if the teachings of scientific socialism boil down to the inevitability of the collapse of capitalist society, then what was the use of the party? Was the party to wait with a new team of leaders in the wings? Guesde seemed to imply this was the case. Nowhere in his writings do we find the duty of the party as anything other than educating and guiding the working class towards a correct understanding and away from spontaneous

activity.¹¹³ Somewhat incongruously, Guesde insisted that there could be no change in society without violence and force-of-arms.¹¹⁴ Yet, despite all his allusions to the need for military-like organisations and discipline, Guesde never suggested that the party should be organised and prepared for military battle. If we look at the statutes of the party we find, as with the SPD, that commitment to the party's Considérants was the only qualification for membership.¹¹⁵ Alongside the bellicose rhetoric of Guesde, we find a very moralistic expression of commitment. All previous revolutions failed, Guesde declared, because they were insufficiently organised. The party will supply the necessary organisation. But organisation was conducted only in the light of winning adherents to the party programme. Again we find, as the SPD, a very revolutionary and near-putschist rhetoric worthy of Dühring's concept of naked force as the deus ex machina of history, cohabiting with a notion of the inevitability of socialism.¹¹⁶

Before trying to explain this paradox, I shall demonstrate that: (i) Guesde never practised what he preached; (ii) the organisation of his party was never in line with his contentions; and (iii) the political line taken by the local FOF groups and federations, faced with the day-to-day struggle, was something very foreign to the theories of Guesde and Lafargue.

Guesde in Action

Guesde's position was one of intransigence. He opposed municipal socialism. His Services publics et socialisme (1884)¹¹⁷ was a robust attack against the idea of socialists taking over municipalities and running services for the working class. He fought against the general strike, because he felt it would undermine the party, to the point where the trade-union movement split and any future cooperation between party and trade union was dashed for some time to come.¹¹⁸ He opposed elections as a sham.¹¹⁹ He was against giving critical support to a Radical government even as a tactic. He refused to support the campaign to reinstate Dreyfus on the grounds that it was a quarrel within the bourgeoisie and did not concern the proletariat.¹²⁰ He opposed the general strike on the grounds that the outcome would be uncertain.¹²¹ From these propositions he never varied. The Guesde of the 1881 split is the same as the Guesde who almost split the SFIO in 1907 over the question of how to work with the trade unions. Like a paragon

of revolutionary virtue, Guesde preached the coming revolution, the need for organisation, the possible accomplishments of an united proletariat, and the advent of the day when machines would produce and men would enjoy.

This was Guesde the propagandist, the pamphleteer and the journalist. Indeed, here we might say is Guesde the moralist. Yet we find another Guesde of equal cunning: the Guesde of the party machine and the Guesde who was a tactician. According to Willard, Guesde the tactician was a new Guesde, who had deserted the earlier more intransigent notions for a more subtle approach.¹²² I hope to demonstrate that this is not the case but that Guesde the reformer was as old as Guesde the fiery revolutionary.

Benoit Malon and Paul Brousse were co-founders with Guesde of the POF in 1879. Malon had participated in the Commune and was intent upon a programme developing communal liberties. Whereas Marx and Guesde, in different ways, saw the Commune as a failure because it had not channeled its violence properly, Malon struck a very divergent theme. The Commune was a failure because it was too violent.¹²³ Rather than marshalling one's troops for revolution as Guesde proposed, Malon called for permeating the capitalist system from within. He was in favour of cooperation with radical middle-class parties, like the Parisian radicaux, in order to develop a programme of municipally sponsored reforms. The disagreement culminated in a split.¹²⁴ Guesde wrote a pamphlet, Services publics et socialisme, which pilloried Malon's proposals. His hostility to partial reforms, and reforms made in isolation continued, as we have seen. Yet we find another Guesde.¹²⁵ At the Lille congress (1890) - the first congress the POF had been strong enough to hold since 1884 - a bevy of motions was presented, calling for the party to propose a list of municipal reforms. The following year the congress assembled at Lyon voted a fourteen-point programme of municipal reforms:

"... des revendications immédiates, rentrant dans la compétence du pouvoir communal".¹²⁶

In substance the reforms were the same as those proposed by Brousse and Malon in 1881.¹²⁷

Guesde welcomed the propositions. He declared that municipal socialism would allow the party to establish areas of support in capitalism's strongholds, and thereby to prepare "insurrectionary" actions.¹²⁸ The

party would have the facilities that would enable it to spread its revolutionary message more easily. By 1892 he went further in his recognition of the potential of municipal reform by taking up Delory's arguments about how the control of education, the reform of the system of local taxation, the creation of municipalised industries through the control of local councils to award building and services contracts would encourage good building, alleviate local unemployment, and foster the development of producers' cooperatives. Through its control of local authorities, Guesde concluded the party could demonstrate the superiority of socialist management over capitalist management.¹²⁹

Guesde did not propose radical changes in how authority would be exercised because in his view the expert played an important role in deciding how the social product should be distributed. Not only did the building of new local facilities such as public baths, tramway lines, distribution centres and new schools require experts, but experts were needed to guide and test opinion. Delory argued that one could hardly run a large municipality efficiently if one had to engage in endless rounds of consultation with people who could not have the ability to judge what was best for the community. Guesde argued that the reason for the creation of the new facilities was to make it possible for the ability of those from poor social backgrounds to rise to the surface.¹³⁰ The socialist mayors like Delory and Félix Augagneur were models of efficiency and undertook the alleviation of many of the immediate ills caused by the great industrial expansion that took place within their areas, but they did little to revolutionise the proletariat and change its position vis-à-vis authority.¹³¹ Indeed, the socialist municipalities never envisaged they could accomplish such an undertaking.¹³² Ironically whereas Marx considered the value of the reform on whether it raised proletarian consciousness or not, Guesde who adamantly ruled out reforms ended by supporting reform programmes whose liberating content was not very great and denied by those who undertook the reforms.

Like the SPD, the POF had a great deal of difficulty in formulating an agrarian policy. By 1896 there were still more people working in agriculture than in industry and over half the population still lived in rural areas. In other words, it is probably safe to conclude that at least sixty percent of the population depended on agriculture in one way or another for their livelihood. The smallest proportion of those who worked in the fields were wage labourers. Most were métayer or peasant farms which,

even at that time, were probably too small, or too dispersed, to allow them to earn a decent living.¹³³ Traditionalism, dependence, high tariffs, fear of industrialisation made them the backbone of resistance against the radicaux and the socialists. The peasantry was beset by debts, inadequate tools, dispersion of property, and was forced in many areas to emigrate to the cities in order to find work. They were not only the political backbone of the Third Republic and its army of reserve labourers, but also the source from which the army drew almost all its recruits. In many ways, the conditions of the French peasants were similar to those of the Prussian peasants. Yet Marx, and Engels even more so, insisted that a revolutionary strategy could not be made without the peasantry.¹³⁴ In the Address, Marx noted that the turning point for the Commune was its failure to make contact with the peasantry. Socialist ideas that spoke of expropriation were terrifying thoughts to the peasant who fought to the point of starvation to defend the land which the Revolution of 1789 had won for him. Engels, as we have seen, chided Bebel for overlooking the fact that if one wanted to paralyse the army and police, this could only be done by cutting them off from their source of manpower. It required producing a series of demands that would radicalise the peasantry. Guesde was even more stubborn. According to his theory, only the workers could be revolutionary. Yet Guesde the tactician, because he could not envisage the peasantry becoming a radical force, thought it possible to make them "gifts" to neutralise them in the coming struggle.¹³⁵ In the light of reports from POF groups, he supported Jaurès' proposals for reforms despite Engels' attack on them.¹³⁶ Much to the irritation of Engels, Lafargue produced a fourteen-point programme for the peasantry which promised certain reforms, and which - in Engels' eyes - could only benefit the richer peasants and speed the day when they would be able to buy up the farms of the poorer peasants at very favourable prices.¹³⁷ Lafargue wrote an introduction to the programme, two years later, noting that the peasantry was doomed to disappear and that the POF, whilst it ought not to hasten that disappearance, ought neither to defend the smaller and less efficient peasants.¹³⁸

By adhering to their evolutionary schema of the development of the class struggle, Guesde and Lafargue not only made it impossible to engage the peasantry in the struggle against capitalism, but reinforced the process

of the spread of capitalist-style enterprises to the countryside. Were they torn between the proletarian demands for cheap food and the peasant demands that would have involved higher prices, as Argerton insists?¹³⁹ Were they certain that efforts to help save the smaller peasants from extinction would be to no avail? It is difficult to say. But, in any case, Guesde's proposed strategy made it impossible to build up a revolutionary strategy based upon the social contradictions faced daily by the peasantry. He failed in the countryside for the same reasons he failed in the towns.

Another reason for the split of the original POF in 1881 was a sharp disagreement over tactics. Brousse, noting that the socialist groups failed abysmally in the elections that year, declared that each local group should decide its own electoral strategy.¹⁴⁰ In some areas it was opportune for the party to form an alliance with some of the left-wing bourgeois parties. In other areas the party should stand down in the second round for non-socialist parties. In still other areas the party should refuse to stand down. Guesde declared that the point was not to win elections but to use the electoral campaign as a platform to propagandise the masses. Elections were a farce, he argued, and would solve none of the working-class' problems.¹⁴¹ The sine qua non of the party was its militant unity. Guesde declared, as late as 1900:

"Il a suffi qu'une première fois le Parti socialiste quittât fragmentairement son terrain de classe, il a suffi qu'un jour il nouât une première alliance avec une fraction de la bourgeoisie, pour que sur cette pente glissante ... il menace de rouler jusqu'au bout." 142

The Dreyfus affair presented Guesde with another occasion on which to emphasise proletarian purity. Allemane and Jaurès, after some initial hesitations, joined the campaign demanding a retrial for Dreyfus. Guesde opposed the Dreyfus campaign on the grounds that it was a quarrel within the bourgeoisie and did not concern the proletariat.¹⁴³ Jaurès, however, argued that the Dreyfus case was important for two reasons. Firstly, it allowed the party the opportunity to raise the issue of republican liberties. The majority of the working class seemed, he maintained, not to heed socialist propaganda because, like the utopian socialists criticised by Marx, it was propaganda that come from above. The principle of the socialist party must be the class struggle engaged at the immediate level of proletarian consciousness. Since the uncommitted

majority were keenly worried about republican liberties, since they lived and were aware of the Third Republic's hypocrisy of inculcating egalitarian ideas through the educational system and imposing a very unegalitarian society in the real world, here was a golden opportunity to win over these groups. Jaurès also pointed out that the 1890's was a period of the erosion of the many rights won by the proletariat at the beginning of the decade. The Dreyfus case was being used by the industrialists and reactionaries as an excuse to erode these liberties still further. Unless the proletariat stopped sitting on the sidelines, it would soon find itself imperiled. Hence, tactically, the case for Dreyfus had to be fought.¹⁴⁴

There was an immediate tactical corollary to Jaurès' position. If he maintained that the Dreyfus case was the harbinger of an attack against the proletariat and demanded that the socialists use their power to defend the Republic, it was only logical that they should cooperate with the radicaux. But how far should that cooperation extend? After a series of negotiations a radical government led by Waldeck-Rousseau, and seemingly pledged not only to defend Dreyfus and republican institutions but to extend them, was established. An independent socialist and former radical, Alexandre Millerand accepted a seat in the cabinet. If we are to believe Jaurès, he was unaware of these negotiations and only knew of Millerand's acceptance after the fact.¹⁴⁵ Jaurès and a large number of socialists accepted Millerand's decision and decided that they would lend the Waldeck-Rousseau government critical support.

Meanwhile, the socialist groups had been moving towards unification. A first conference had been held in 1899.¹⁴⁶ The conference debated the issue. Guesde declared that it was a matter of principle and that a socialist entering a bourgeois cabinet would destroy the proletariat's faith in the party.¹⁴⁷ Three years later he attacked Jaurès in the following terms:

"En éveillant, par une simple apparence d'avènement au pouvoir, des espérances que vous ne pouvez pas réaliser et en préparant ainsi pour demain des déceptions inévitables, vous n'aurez donc pas défendu la République, vous l'aurez livrée à la désespérance des masses."¹⁴⁸

Guesde carried the issue - but at a price. Socialist unity was shelved.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, in the elections of 1902, the guesdistes lost many of the municipalities they had held since the mid-1890's, whilst the socialists who lent critical support to the Millerand "experiment" were reinforced.¹⁵⁰

Yet Jaurès demanded no more than what he called critical support of the Waldeck-Rousseau government. The Guesde who answered that Jaurès defied socialist principles was also the Guesde who, several years before, lent critical support to the first radical cabinet, led by Léon Bourgeois. The extreme right intent on putting an end to Bourgeois' government proposed that the lois scélérants against trade unions be repealed. They hoped that the socialists, in voting for repeal, would provide the margin needed to put the radicaux in the minority. Guesde rallied to the defence of the Bourgeois cabinet.¹⁵¹ How could this Guesde then turn around and wreck the possibility of socialist unity in a situation that bore many points in common with his support of Bourgeois ?

Guesde's hostility towards lending critical support was an old argument. In the Considérants, he and Lafargue declared that for the proletariat a republic was no better than an absolute monarchy.¹⁵² It was still oppressive, and still denied the fruits of its labour. The proletariat must oppose all reforms en bloc so long as it was not in power.¹⁵³

On all issues of principle Guesde maintained a firm stand against working with the bourgeoisie. Yet he accepted working with bourgeois parties in municipal elections as early as 1892. He declared that when the socialist party could not win a seat, then its voters were at liberty to vote for the least reactionary candidate in the second round of the elections.¹⁵⁴ In the heat of his debates with Jaurès in 1900, he declared that the proletariat should take no action that was illegal. "L'armée collectiviste" would, he declared, inevitably and in the near future become master of the Republic.¹⁵⁵

What did Guesde mean ? We have seen that Engels saw the battle for the Republic and reforms in terms of the degree to which they raised working-class consciousness. We have seen that Guesde never supported such a formulation. Reforms destroyed proletarian faith in the party, he maintained. A refusal of the party to take a firm stand against any kind of collaboration jeopardised the party. Yet by the same token, the proletariat must not take any action on its own because the party leadership had the ability, the duty, and the necessity to prepare! - but prepare what ? How could Guesde talk about preparation when, according to him,

as he wrote in the Considérants, the revolution would be the result of an economic crisis? ¹⁵⁶

We have seen that Guesde was a firm advocate of the case for proletarian organisation and the need for organisational discipline. The source of his advocacy was the earnest belief that the proletariat was the raw material out of which the revolution would be hewn, but like all raw material needed to be handled properly. Handling properly and with circumspection and appropriate caution was the role Guesde gave to the political organisation of the proletariat. Finally, we have seen that in Guesde's view a series of questions, like defending republican liberties, the Dreyfus case and its results, participation in elections, and lending critical support to a bourgeois government, were classified as issues of principle. Yet in every case, we have found that Guesde practised the opposite of what he preached.

How can we begin to account for these very important and fundamental contradictions?

The crux of our argument has been that by and large the differences between Guesde-the-man-of-principle and Guesde-the-socialist-leader are so great, that we might as well be talking about two different persons. But principles and practice were, nonetheless, held together by Guesde's most enduring theme, the need for proletarian organisation.

If we look back at some of his characteristic statements of principle like the Considérants or his most adamant speeches in the Chamber, and his contribution in the Deux méthodes controversy with Jaurès, we find at a very minimum a strong plea lodged in the body of his argument for a strong and robust working-class organisation. ¹⁵⁷ In many cases, Guesde's plea seems oddly out of place, and in others, as in the Considérants, the plea simply does not follow logically from his previous arguments. Yet the constantly reiterated plea is Guesde's only indication of what action the proletariat can, and must take. That Guesde and Lafargue, in their economic theories, made such action appear to be gratuitous never once led them to extract a call for organisation. According to observers like Zévaès and Weill, Guesde's speaking tours emphasised the coming crisis and always terminated on a note calling for a disciplined proletarian organisation. ¹⁵⁸ Guesde, the socialist leader and principled propagandist, lauded the municipal socialism in Lille, praised Lavigne's and Ferroul's pacts with the radicaux respectively in Bordeaux and Narbonne, and continued to emphasise the same

message found' in his statements of principle:

"Un parti ne vit que de discipline ... et ... compte que sur la centralisation ouvrière pour avoir raison de la centralisation capitaliste." 159

The popularity of Guesde's triple call for discipline, centralisation and organisation was such that he was constantly in demand as a speaker for important occasions. ¹⁶⁰ According to Weill, a typical meeting took the form of a speaker glorifying the spirit of the working class and working-class solidarity, followed by Guesde who would speak of the consequences and benefits of organisation.

"... c'est le tour de M. Guesde, et la note change. Après une brève réfutation ... il commence le tableau de la société future, du paradis collectiviste, où chacun recevra le fruit de son travail ... les auditeurs ouvriers écoutent avec passion, dans un silence religieux. La parole a porté; plus d'un jusque-là indifférent, sortira de cette réunion convaincu ...". 161

The tone would rise and the audience would be dazzled by the message of working-class solidarity. The future is yours, Guesde seemed to declare, and organisation is the key. Even as poor a speaker as Paul Lafargue was greeted by fervent, idolising crowds of such magnitude and vigour that little could be heard. ¹⁶² The mere presence of a speaker for the working class was sufficient to arouse such rapture in the crowd that Laura Lafargue feared that the behaviour of the audience would turn into the kind of thaumaturgia that today we usually associate with pop-idol mobs. ¹⁶³ Somehow the crowd found in the speaker someone who awakened hidden emotions, who opened the crater in the volcano and allowed their energy to burst forth. The theme, constantly hammered home in a thousand different ways, with a skill and effect that even Guesde's most bitter enemies could never deny, was always the trinitarian message of discipline, centralisation and organisation. ¹⁶⁴

But even in the question of organisation we find an enormous difference between what Guesde preached and what actions he actually undertook.

Together with Lafargue, Benoît Malon and Paul Brousse, Guesde drew up the organisational statutes intended to transform the hastily assembled congresses of the working-class organisations of 1878 and 1879 into the Parti ouvrier or Fédération du Parti des travailleurs socialistes de France.

With Guesde's clear support, the Parti ouvrier adopted a federal as opposed to a centralised form of organisation. The organising committee's suggestions were accepted without debate and without a murmur. Accordingly the party was to be composed of six regional organisations based on the party's urban strongholds: (1) The Union fédérative or Fédération du Centre centred on Paris; (2) the Fédération de l'Est centred on Lyon; (3) the Fédération du Midi centred on Marseilles; (4) the Fédération de l'Ouest based on Bordeaux; (5) the Fédération du Nord based on Lille; and (6) the Fédération de l'Algérie based on Algiers.¹⁶⁵ Unlike the early SPD, the regional organisations of the POF were extremely powerful. They were to determine their own form of organisation. They alone were to determine the rules of membership and what kinds of tactical alliances they would make with non-socialist groups.¹⁶⁶ In all of these matters their annual conferences were not to be answerable to the national organisation of the party. The statutes were extremely vague.¹⁶⁷ Article I stated that a member must uphold the Considérants and spread socialist ideas "autant que possible" (as much as possible).¹⁶⁸ But who was to determine how much was possible? The answer was the regional federations who, in practice, varied from those refusing to have anything to do with non-socialist groups, like the Fédération du Nord, to those groups which - as Willard points out - went so far as to deny the need for the abolition of private property.¹⁶⁹ As Blum succinctly put it:

"Ainsi le congrès avait eu un programme, une doctrine, mais le Parti n'en avait point."¹⁷⁰

The statutes laid down that a congrès national, which was to meet annually, would elect a comité général exécutif of nineteen members whose limited duties were to coordinate federal activities, organise correspondence with fraternal organisations at home and abroad and arrange speaking tours. The comité was not responsible to the entire party but to the central organisation of the town that had been host to the congress which had elected the comité. We have seen how the SPD had adopted, from the outset, a centralised form of organisation. During the period of the Sozialistengesetz, even the relatively loose organisation of the Vertrauensmänner system was still held to be responsible to the party congress, and for the period it was not sitting to its elected Vorstand. But in France we find that no such system was ever utilised by the Parti ouvrier or any of its successors.¹⁷¹

It can be argued that the first priority of Guesde and Lafargue was to channel the fervour of the workmen's congresses of 1878 and 1879 gradually towards centralisation.¹⁷² In that case, one could maintain that they were not inconsistent with their ultimate organisational ideas when they adopted a system of organisation much closer to Brousse's federative ideas than to their own notions of rigorous discipline and centralisation. This is in line with the idea, voiced by many historians, that one of the principle precipitating reasons for the split in the Parti ouvrier in 1881 and 1882 was over the question of whether the comité général should have the power to impose a uniform electoral tactic on all the party's regional organisations.¹⁷³ But the protagonists themselves tell quite another story. Guesde and Brousse both cited the quarrel over principles as the reason for the split; Brousse called for peaceful evolution towards socialism whilst the Considérants did not rule out violence.¹⁷⁴ What lends credence to this argument and makes the historians' argument doubtful is the fact that the guesdistes' forces who reassembled at Roanne in 1882 in order to rebuild the Parti ouvrier along guesdiste lines regarded their most important statement as the reaffirmation of their support of the Considérants.¹⁷⁵ The tone and direction of the organisational statutes was not altered in the direction of a more centralised and disciplined organisation.

Indeed, the proposals of the congress went in the opposite direction ! The congress recognised the basic unit of the party as the local group or organisation.¹⁷⁶ Blum maintains that this action weakened the regional organisations. I suppose one could then argue that this would de facto increase the power of the Conseil national (the new name for the comité exécutif). But given the inability of the party to organise regional organisations and, in the one region where there was a semblance of organisation, the inability of local groups to come together, one wonders if instead of a policy of divide-and-rule the Parti ouvrier was not simply facing up to reality and conceding that it was an agglomeration of very disparate and independent elements. Indeed, the Conseil was henceforth not only to be dependent on the host city but to be elected by the host city.¹⁷⁷

All evidence points in this direction. After 1882 the Parti ouvrier was reduced to a handful of urban balliwicks, mostly textile centres, like Lille, Roubaix (Nord), Calais (Pas-de-Calais), St-Quentin (Aisne), Reims (Marne), Montluçon, Commentry (Allier), Lyon (Rhône), and Bordeaux (Gironde). But the Conseil functioned in a void. According to Lafargue it had little idea of what was happening outside of Paris.¹⁷⁸ According to Laura Lafargue, despite the activity of local groups in the provinces, the Conseil followed rather than precipitated events.¹⁷⁹ It functioned without a permanent staff and without even a permanent address.

In 1890 the militants met at Lille for the first time in six years to reorganise the party.¹⁸⁰ The euphoria of the SPD's recent electoral success and its role in precipitating the pending lapse of the Sozialistengesetz seemed to augur well. The recently established press of the Parti ouvrier saw the SPD's successes as the resurgence of socialism. To many militants the situation in France seemed equally hopeful.¹⁸¹ The party in the Nord finally seemed to be organised on a viable basis, and 1888 was hall-marked by a string of electoral successes. The town-halls of Commentry, Cette and Narbonne were in the hands of the Parti ouvrier, and the party was strongly represented in Lille, Roubaix, Calais and Montluçon. Its trade unions were growing rapidly, and with the fading of boulangisme, the working class, particularly in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais, seemed to be turning to the party.¹⁸² 1889 was marked by continued electoral successes, this time in the national elections, and the party's success against the possibilistes in organising the founding meeting of what was later to become the Second International. Guesde, Lafargue, Delory and Dormoy toured the country in a spirit of anticipation.¹⁸³ Once again, Guesde took up his theme of organisation in much the same language as his 1879 declarations.¹⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the party's press in the newly-organised agglomérations of the Nord took up the theme of organising the party in a viable form. Editorials spoke warmly of the SPD's new organisation which, in their view, was responsible for its string of victories. Writers emphasised how closely the newly-launched POF would resemble their brother party.¹⁸⁵ Indeed, militants were anxious to forget the earlier history of the Parti ouvrier and were at pains to emphasise that they were starting what amounted to a new party based firmly on the Considérants.

Despite all the anticipatory publicity and ballyhoo, we find that the militants who assembled at Lille signally failed to organise a centralised and disciplined party. The organisational statutes varied little from those of 1879 and 1882.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, the famous Article I was to be interpreted according to the wont of the federation.¹⁸⁷ In the North the novice was required to undergo a three month apprenticeship, during which time he was to study the programme.¹⁸⁸ The congress completely abandoned the notion of regional organisation. It opted for the smaller unit of the departmental federation. The basic units of the party were the sections or agglomérations responsible for organising meetings, propaganda and coordinating local activities.¹⁸⁹ These were encouraged to organise themselves on a departmental basis. In the Pas-de-Calais and the Nord this proved to be difficult, due to the rivalries between the mining areas and the centres of the textile industry.¹⁹⁰ The Fédération du Nord initially grouping the two departments was not set up until 1893, a year after the Fédération du Gironde and in company with the Fédérations de l'Oise and de l'Aube. As we will see the département became the most powerful element in the party. The Conseil national was still a weak or - in the words of the Lille statutes - an "administrating" body.¹⁹¹ The most important members were the secretaries for internal and external affairs, respectively Guesde and Lafargue, who served almost without a break during the remainder of the decade. That the task of coordinating the federations was put into the hands of a single secretary, on a par with a secretary who dealt with foreign correspondence, shows how little power was concentrated in his hands.¹⁹² Not until 1896 was the party equipped with a permanent secretary. Indeed, the Conseil national's right to veto federation candidates was disallowed. Its right to mediate in internal federation disputes was sharply curtailed.¹⁹³ It was consistently starved of finance. The Fédération du Gard, when it quit the party in 1897, declared that it was leaving because the Conseil national was in such a state of chaos that it was serving no useful function.¹⁹⁴

This opinion seems to have been shared by observers. Laura Lafargue told Engels:

".... les Français ne manifestent plus de mauvaise humeur quand on les invite à s'organiser."¹⁹⁵

Wilhelm Liebknecht, who was invited to and participated in the debates at the 1892 Congress at Marseilles, a city supposedly a POF stronghold, was amazed by the haphazard organisation he saw. He commented in a letter to Guesde: "Je ne vois pas d'organisation sérieuse."¹⁹⁶

If the Considérants are to be taken seriously, and if we are to believe Guesde, then POF strategy depends upon the primacy of the organised party over all other bodies. This means that the elected officials of the party chosen by the party's national congress must take all major decisions. Clearly, the implication is that the Conseil national must be a powerful body. Guesde strongly defended this principle. The socialists elected to parliament in 1892 were a disparate lot. Some broadly adhered to the POF, others were blanquistes and still others were indépendantes like Millerand.¹⁹⁷ Still others were broadly independent yet announced that they supported the POF programme, like Jaurès. During the debates on agriculture Guesde, much to Engels' pleasure, attacked Jaurès and Millerand for trying to make parliament the centre of socialist activity. Parliament, in Guesde's view, was a corrupt and corruptible body and the attention that Jaurès attracted to parliament mystified the proletariat and distracted it from its revolutionary enterprise.¹⁹⁸ But Guesde did nothing to supply an alternative centre of socialist activity. For all intents and purposes, the socialist caucus functioned as the central authority of the socialist group. Between 1893 and 1894 the Conseil national sat rarely. As important a POF leader as Lafargue did not attend one meeting of the Conseil national that year.¹⁹⁹ By 1894 complaints from the federations were streaming in, noting that the Conseil had not met in months. By 1897 the party seemed on the verge of disintegration.²⁰⁰

From this mass of evidence, we can only conclude that Guesde's claims to the contrary - despite the many clear opportunities he had to organise a party in accordance with his principles, the POF was, and remained, a highly decentralised organisation with an extremely weak national executive. Insofar as one can speak of a national centre of deliberation, planning and decision-making, this was clearly the parliamentary group of all the socialist parties and factions. The post-1890 POF was larger and better organised than the early Parti ouvrier.²⁰¹ But, if anything, it was an amalgam of local parties - sometimes grouped into departmental federations. The central body of the party existed only to coordinate and never to lead. Indeed, this may be the reason why the parliamentary delegation was a much more suitable central organisation than the Conseil national.

How closely did the various constituent groups and federations conform to guesdisme? During the period between the demise of the old POF and the re-launching of the party, Guesde's main efforts were directed towards propaganda. We have already seen the number and the effectiveness of his barnstorming tours throughout France. His travels were combined with the Parti ouvrier's attempts to establish an official newspaper. According to Guesde, the newspaper was the tribune of the party's leadership. Its purpose was to instruct and propagandise the masses and to imbue them with the party's principles.²⁰² In that way it would:

"... préparer la formation d'un grand Parti qui puisse, le moment venu, mettre sa force au service du droit."²⁰³

The newspaper would be the way the class-conscious sections of the working class would communicate with the masses.²⁰⁴

In these principles we once again find the notion of centralisation and discipline. We find also that, in practice, the propagandising mission of the party was never anything on the scale that Guesde's statements of principle seem to imply. Guesde and Lafargue actively collaborated with a number of non-POF newspapers like Vallès' Cri du peuple, L'Action and later with Le Petit Sou; and then to a lesser extent with La Petite République. Periodically, they managed to float ephemeral official newspapers like the various series of L'Egalité that appeared sporadically between 1879 and 1882, La voie du peuple (1887), and Le socialiste that appeared with some breaks between 1885 and 1904. The party's provincial press, whose existence was even more ephemeral until well into the 1890's, often "syndicated" articles by Guesde and Lafargue. Engels shared Guesde's wish to have a regular socialist paper such as Vorwärts. The press, he pointed out, had an important role to play in communicating necessary news to the working class about their own conditions and about movements in other countries.²⁰⁵

But if we look at the longest-lived of the POF's newspapers, Le socialiste, we find that it bears scarce resemblance to Engels' model.²⁰⁶ Most of the space was taken up by long theoretical articles explaining the party's principles. Reports on strikes emphasising tactics, and attempting to draw up a balance sheet, were extremely rare. In their place were articles lauding every strike as a victory. In other words, the paper never played a role of instructor. What it communicated was more a sense of solidarity than a sense of organisational needs and lessons to be drawn from experience.

Political activity of federations was, again, never judged. Statistics about membership were falsified and reports of the successes of socialist groups outside the POF were often distorted if reported at all.²⁰⁷ Like L'Egalité, its predecessor, Le socialiste was both polemical and served as a rallying-cry. Its language was difficult. As Willard points out the guesdiste jargon alone all but assured that only the most zealous militants would subscribe.²⁰⁸ Its circulation rarely climbed higher than 1000 compared to about 4000 for the Cri du travailleur and its successors (Lille) or 5000 for Le droit du peuple (Grenoble).²⁰⁹

If we compare Le socialiste with Vorwärts, we are immediately struck by their differences. Vorwärts, it is true to say, was a daily whereas Le socialiste appeared much more rarely. As a daily newspaper, and one which never quite lost its Berlin identity, one would expect that Vorwärts would have had more news coverage. But, indeed, it did more than that. It devoted a considerable amount of its column space to local news, and contained not only extensive analyses of national and international news but usually carried a feuilleton and reports on cultural events and various pot-pourri. It certainly carried theoretical articles but they were much more tied into current problems and were both less polemical and less distorted than the kindred articles of Le socialiste. Not until the founding of L'Humanité in 1904 by an eclectic group of socialists led by Jaurès, Renaudel and De Pressensé, did such a newspaper exist in France. But, de jure, "Huma" was never more than an unofficial socialist paper.²¹⁰ Guesde forced the unity congress to adopt Le socialiste as the SFIO's official newspaper.²¹¹ Whereas L'Humanité thrived with a circulation rising to 100,000, the principled Socialiste, which imbued the working class with the dialectic, barely had one-fiftieth that figure.²¹²

We have already seen that the provincial press maintained much larger circulations than the official party newspaper. The differences did not stop there. The opinions of the provincial press were amazingly heterogeneous and bore, in many cases, little resemblance to the line laid down by the POF's Conseil national. In the early days of the POF, the provincial press seemed to echo Guesde's idea that a socialist newspaper is a platform for teaching scientific socialism to the working class and educating them for the revolution. The voice of the Fédération de L'Est, Lyon socialiste, pointed out that its aim was the edification of the

working masses and to serve as a guardian of socialist principles.²¹³ L'exploité, published in Nantes, declared that socialism was not only the true and unique science of humanity but was equally at home with the principles of the French revolution as with scientific and technological development.²¹⁴ Such claims, closer to Comte's positivism than Guesde's brand of Marxism, were common currency; even Le forçat, the first of a series of newspapers to speak in the name of the future Fédération du Nord, threw caution to the wind, declaring that socialism was the final stage in the evolution of mankind.²¹⁵ The combination of moral righteousness, historical inevitability, working-class ideology as the truth of history and the ethic of technological progress were oft repeated themes. They prepared the ground for Guesde's declaration that only he who ran the machine was capable of acting according to historical truth.²¹⁶ Yet the comfort of feeling that one's views, perhaps the only property possessed by the industrial working class, no matter how unpopular conformed to history could also have a ring of social conformity; is there not a curious twist to socialism found in the assertion of Le travailleur, (Angers) that socialism was part of the French philosophical tradition?²¹⁷

The moral tone of Guesde's declaration was more than reproduced, according to our evidence, in the press organised by the POF; so, indeed, were the vigorous warnings against reformism, half-hearted militancy and having truck with the bourgeois enemy.²¹⁸ The Forçat drew the attention of its readers to the view that all reforms were chimeras,²¹⁹ and that the socialist movement could never compromise. Whereas many socialists were relieved by France being a Republic, the Forçat heaped scorn on the notion that a republican government could offer greater chances for socialism than a regime like the German Empire.²²⁰ It lambasted the chambres syndicales as naive organisations, and trumpeted that the revolution must involve a bloodbath, because only blood could cleanse the human race of the evils of capitalism.²²¹

Yet alongside these tout ou rien messages, and lurid political justifications, the Forçat nonetheless was an important source of information about employment possibilities, trends in wages and machine technology. Other POF journals might well preach how socialism was synonymous with the full flowering of science, but they campaigned vigorously against machines displacing hand looms and cottage industries.²²² L'action socialiste, speaking for the Lyon POF,

whilst praising technology, fought a long battle to defend the canuts against the factory.²²³ Trade-unionism might well be reformist and incapable of generating the revolution, yet the Forçat praised the fight for shorter working hours, praised cooperation as a means of alleviating the lot of the worker, acted as a clearing-house for employment before the growth of municipal exchanges and the bourses du travail, and commended the miners on forming a trade union led by Basly, whom they had specifically singled out as a reformist.²²⁴

In principle, the regional press was ultra-guesdiste: yet in practice, what the guesdistes would have labelled reformist. Delory's Cri du travailleur sponsored a campaign for the eight-hour day, protection of workers, and supported an industry-wide strike.²²⁵ L'Action sociale (Lyon) maintained that a republican form of government could easily initiate the reforms required by the proletariat.²²⁶ In contradistinction to Guesde and Lafargue, it editorialised that the Republic is the sine qua non of proletarian liberation. Le Peuple (Toulouse) preached the gradual conquest of political power.²²⁷

Hence, the one theme common to guesdiste newspapers of all regions after 1889 was their emphasis on trade-unionism and the viability of short-term reforms. The only modicum of guesdisme remaining in them was the emphasis on unity for political action.

The co-existence of a trade-union-orientated theme with the theme of political principles did not survive the resurgence of the local and federal party organisations after 1890.²²⁸ The new federal press was both more stable, better produced and had a much larger circulation than the pre-1890 press. The almost nihilistic attack on working-class organisations practically disappeared. The new press was far more concerned with problems arising from the burgeoning trade-union movement and the problems of the first socialist municipalities. A solid guesdiste like Ghesquière was alarmed by the party's drift towards "reformism" which he saw in the Fédération du Nord's immersing itself in the running of socialist municipalities in Roubaix, Lille and Calais, and the fact that it appeared to be easily influenced by Renard's Fédération du textile and the miners' groups hostile to Basly and Lamendin.²²⁹ The extent of this current is witnessed by the new press. The newspapers of the Fédération du Nord, the stéphanois textile areas and in Limoges had regular and detailed columns not only on the labour market but also legislative projects.²³⁰ Where socialist municipalities had been elected, the press devoted considerable coverage to local reforms, education, pensions and social service improvements. Their proposals were

for better training for jobs, higher wages, access to higher education, and state grants to pay for these measures.

But far from the 1890 watershed marking a drift away from Guesde, he was more popular than ever. He attracted readership to such an extent that many local newspapers would have died out without his contributions. The apparent drift away from guesdiste principles went hand-in-hand with Guesde's various barnstorming tours, Lafargue's election in Lille, and Guesde's eventual triumph in Roubaix.²³¹

But we also find no change in the persistent popularity of the unity theme. More than ever, party organisers emphasised the need for a coherently-organised movement. Here, as we have seen when we looked at Guesde's tours, the emphasis is on working-class unity. Guesde personalised unity.²³² Lafargue provided a scientific explanation of society whose message was the need for unity, and the local press distilled their theme to show what unity meant in practice.

The change in direction is confirmed by Le Cri du travailleur. The organisation of the working class, they editorialise, is achieved by the proletariat's working with its socialist allies.²³³ Does the writer wish to convey the idea that the guesdistes are not the essence of the movement but its adjuncts? He implies as much when he argues that socialism is a science whose aim is to study and explain social law. Thus socialism deduces principles. It is a guide whilst the organised working class itself will determine how those principles are to be used. The usefulness of the socialists is that they provide an argument and a theme to unite the disparate coalition of forces, that is, the contemporary working class, and to help them to find the necessary unity to obtain their practical ends.

What were these practical ends? Why did they suddenly arise towards the end of the 1880's and not before? To what did they owe their popularity? The new movement was based upon the trade unions in the textile, mining and metallurgical industries. These were all industries which experienced tremendous growth and a movement towards mass-production during the final two decades of the nineteenth century. They were particularly concentrated in the North. Between 1884 and 1890, we shall argue, the POF became the party of large-scale industry. The disparity between the demands made by the constituent sectors of the new party often led to serious internal disputes which threatened to undermine its unity. The party was increasingly

interested, during this period, to find grounds for the unity of not only these groups but of all the active socialist organisations. Renard, the founder of the first operative textile workers' federation, Evard from the miners' trade union and other trade unionists who played an active role in the rebuilding and refurbishing of the POF, pursued a policy of cooperation. The party managers, like Delory and Ghesquière with their experience of the movement in the Nord were also interested in building a unified socialist movement on the German model.

But these trends and tendencies begin to take us very far from the seminal doctrines of the POF, guesdisme. No matter what their policies and programmes all the local organisations of the POF swore their loyalty to the doctrine of guesdisme. How can we understand this apparent contradiction?

Contemporary writers were aware of the strength, if not the independence, of the local organisations of the POF. Blum went so far as to acknowledge that the essence of the POF was its local organisations.²³⁴ Yet neither he nor the historians of the POF like Louis or Zévaës ever discussed the local organisations in depth nor how they served as stepping stones in the building of the new departmental and regional federations. Aware of these changes, Willard tries to demonstrate that the post-1890 POF was, in effect, a mass organisation in comparison with the earlier party; but that, in his view, the penetration of Marxism was still too shallow and the party insufficiently "working-class" to allow the POF to be called a truly revolutionary party. He concludes that despite these drawbacks the POF, during the 1890's, was on its way to becoming a party representative of the working class.²³⁵

Despite many interesting and important discoveries, Willard weakens his argument by making some unwarranted assumptions. Before proceeding to investigate the social background and power struggle within the POF, I will list these:

- (i) Willard sees the POF as a step in the organisation of a revolutionary party. He argues that the more working-class such an organisation is, the more likely it is to be such a party. I will argue that this view is mistaken. Willard apparently thinks that "more working class" means more influenced and guided by workers from mass industry. I will argue that these, the industrial workers, made far from revolutionary demands. Indeed, the industries specified by Willard, textiles, coal and metallurgy, seem to have inspired the most "reformist" demands. They certainly, engendered the need for a national political organisation, as I will argue, but this organisation was far from the revolutionary political party that Willard alludes to.²³⁶

- (ii) Secondly, Willard never raised the problem why such a patently reformist Weltanschauung required such an unyielding and obdurate ideology as guesdisme. He sidesteps the problem by arguing that the working class was still not ripe for a full measure of Marxism - though he fails to explain why this should be the case - and the haphazard ideology of guesdisme was well suited to its stage of development.²³⁷ I will argue that guesdisme played a totemistic role for the working class and that working-class reality was much more complex than Willard suggests.
- (iii) In Willard's argument, there is an assumption that Marxism - interpreted as the call to organise a political party - was the conclusion the working class must inevitably draw from its experience and that an ideology includes its own form of practice, that is, one acts in accordance with one's beliefs.²³⁸ However, if one argues that guesdisme played a totemistic role, it can be further argued that the message of unity we found ensconced in its argument had to be ornamented by a bevy of justifactory catch-words and "catch-ideologies" like positivism, scientism and historicism as well as considerable ritual in order to make that message hold.

Much of the evidence we have presented thus far seems to point in such a direction. In order to see if this hypothesis is tenable, I will now look more closely at the nature of the groups supporting the POF, their demands, how they were formulated, the changes they made in the party and the role the unbending and doctrinaire form of the guesdisme message played in the socialist movement.

Many writers have been struck by the contradiction between working-class ideology and working-class practice. Its cause, in the eyes of one school of writers, was the growing bureaucratisation of the working-class parties and trade unions.²³⁹ Robert Michels' study of the SPD and Italian movement is probably the best known of these.²⁴⁰ The argument made by Lukács against Michels - that he lost sight of the configuration of events and elements that led to and enforced the bureaucratic phenomenon - suggests the need for a more sociological perspective.²⁴¹ Despite its drawbacks, the value of Claude Willard's study is that it moves in that direction. Willard studied the social and industrial origins of not only the POF leaders but of the most active party members in the departmental federations, and as we will see, discovered some startling facts.

However, at this point I would like to criticise some of Willard's methodological assumptions that tend to spoil his findings and blunt his argument. According to Willard, an artisanal social configuration was a poor background for Marxism. Marxism could only flourish, in his view, in the more alienating environment of the large factory and heavy transformation industry.²⁴² I think

that a large number of writers would not accept Willard's presupposition that Marxism cannot take root and flourish outside of an advanced industrial configuration and that the more industrialised an area the more likely it was to have developed a revolutionary movement. Secondly, Willard commits a striking methodological error in his collection of data. He does not make an allowance for the fact that some regions had a great many more members of the POF than other regions with the result that the more backward regions are given too much weight.²⁴³ His conclusion that guesdisme whilst popular in the most highly industrialised regions was still, by and large, more popular in the less industrialised regions is open to some question. Moreover, communities were made up of both workers in advanced and backward industries in some cases and not exclusively of artisanal or industrial workers. In many cases the POF seems to have been a regional party. For that reason we should look at the regions more closely, study the relationship between groups of workers at different stages of development and changes within a community as a whole rather than sharing Willard's unilinear assumption of political development.²⁴⁴ For that reason I will introduce material pertaining to the work-situation, the relative and absolute level of regional industrialisation and the relationship between various balances of working-class groups within regions.²⁴⁵

The most crucial variable to be taken into consideration in the case of France is regional development. Unlike Germany and England, the development of industry in France was really neither continuous nor homogeneous. We will see that it was not only regional but that the pace of industrialisation was different from one region to the next.²⁴⁶ Whereas one region might well be entering Phase II of industrialisation (the development of the coal, textile and metal industries), another region would be entering phase I (the development of workshops). For that reason, and in order to have a more manageable unit than the 89 départements of the pre-1914 epoch, I have divided France into 27 regions. The population of these regions varies from 100 thousand, (Corse), to 2108 thousand, (Seine), according to the 1901 census. The smallest unit is the département (three cases) and the largest six départements (one case). Despite the variance in population 18 out of the 27 regions fall within the range of 600 - 800 thousand, and all but four regions have populations between 500 - 900 thousand. I have also tried to take into account certain historical and geographical factors. My regional divisions correspond closely to those devised by Pouthas for his study of the French population in the 19th century.²⁴⁷

I realise that in one or two cases it is difficult to justify the inclusion of a département in a particular region, but the long French history of regional reform seems to suggest that any grouping of départements will cause a raised eyebrow or two. In any case, I think that my results bear out the general usefulness of my choices.

I shall henceforth refer to these regions by an index number. The numbers of the regions and the départements they include are as follows.

- 1 Seine
- 2 Eure-et-Loir, Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne
- 3 Aube, Côte d'Or, Yonne, Nièvre, Cher
- 4 Allier, Saône-et-Loire, Puy-de-Dôme
- 5 Rhône, Loire
- 6 Lozère, Haute-Loire, Cantal, Lot, Tarn-et-Garonne, Lot-et-Garonne
- 7 Indre, Indre-et-Loire, Loiret, Loir-et-Cher
- 8 Vienne, Haute-Vienne, Corrèze, Creuse
- 9 Ille-et-Vilaine, Mayenne, Sarthe
- 10 Loire-Inférieure, Maine-et-Loire
- 11 Charente, Charente Inférieure, Vendée, Deux-Sèvres
- 12 Finistère, Morbihan, Côtes-du-Nord
- 13 Manche, Calvados, Orne
- 14 Seine-Inférieure, Oise, Eure
- 15 Somme, Pas-de-Calais
- 16 Nord
- 17 Ardennes, Aisne, Marne
- 18 Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Vosges, Haut-Rhin
- 19 Haute-Marne, Doubs, Jura, Ain, Haute-Saône
- 20 Haute-Savoie, Savoie, Hautes-Alpes, Basses-Alpes
- 21 Isère, Drôme, Ardèche
- 22 Alpes-Maritimes, Var, Vaucluse, Bouches-du-Rhône
- 23 Aveyron, Gard, Hérault, Tarn
- 24 Pyrénées-Orientales, Ariège, Aude, Haute-Garonne
- 25 Basses-Pyrénées, Hautes-Pyrénées, Landes, Gers
- 26 Gironde, Dordogne
- 27 Corse

The second important element is data on industrial development, the size of enterprises and the kinds of industries. I have collected the material I use from the censuses and industrial surveys undertaken in 1856, 1896, 1901 and 1906.²⁴⁸ The data for 1856 are useful because the Third Empire, using the financial infrastructure developed during the 1840's, was a period of concentration upon homogeneous industrial development much like that undertaken at later dates by Germany and Japan. By 1856 a marked shift away

from the traditional industrial regions (5, 13, 14) had started, and the development of the areas of high industrial specialisation and concentration (15, 16 and the areas lost to Germany during the 1870-71 war) was well underway. With increased specialisation, areas where artisan metallurgy had been important were in relative decline (23, 24, 26) in comparison with the growth of the foundaries in the East (16, 18, 19 and Alsace). The industrial censuses of 1896 and 1906 not only encompass the period of French socialist history of special interest to us but were the first far-reaching national industrial censuses for quite some time. They used a complex system of industrial classification, to which I have adopted all other material that I shall use in the course of my argument. These classifications are as follows:

- 3A Mining
- 3B Quarrying
- 4A Miscellaneous transformation industries
- 4B Food industries
- 4C Chemical industry (including tobacco)
- 4D Paper, rubber industry
- 4E Printing and publishing
- 4F Textile industry
- 4G Clothing
- 4H Industries based on straw and feathers
- 4I Leather and skin industries
- 4J All facets of wood construction
- 4K Foundaries
- 4L All industries where metals are used
- 4M Precious metals
- 4N Precious metals
- 4P Precious stones
- 4Q Construction and stone-masonry
- 4R Potteries
- 5A Transportation
- 5B Transportation

There are several problems with data and data collection which affect my conclusions in a minor way.

- (i) Size of establishment: The census figures show the number of enterprises falling into categories according to size, e.g. enterprises employing 500 - 1000 workers, 1000 - 2000 workers, etc. In only about fifty per cent of the cases is it possible to collect data on the exact number of workers in each enterprise in these categories. I have been forced to interpolate by subtracting the number of workers from establishments of a known size from the national totals and striking an average. On the whole, the average appears to be a fair approximation. ²⁴⁰If anything, it probably tends to underestimate the size of establishments in the most heavily

There was a tremendous growth in the population of the heavily industrialised regions, a relative stagnation in the regions like the Rhône and Loire, and a net fall in the artisanal regions. The population of the Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Vosges and Haut-Rhin all expanded between fifteen and thirty percent in the years 1881-1911. The population of the Loire and Rhône increased by between ten to fifteen percent. The Allier and Saône-et-Loire lost between one and five percent; the Nièvre and Yonne between ten and thirty percent. ²⁵³

The number of people engaged in industry is even more revealing. By 1906, the industrially-active population of the Nord was 523 thousand, 277 thousand in region 15, and 262 thousand in region 18. In region 3 it was 178 thousand, 150 thousand in region 4, 169 thousand in region 23, and 95 thousand in region 24. Figures for the largest enterprises are yet more revealing. In region 16, 143 thousand worked in enterprises employing more than 500 workers, 86 thousand in the Pas-de-Calais and only 23 thousand (of which over 10000 were in one enterprise) in the Saône-et-Loire, and 8.7 thousand in the Allier.

- (ii) Concentration of the Largest Enterprises: Between 1896 and 1906, the percentage of workers employed in enterprises which employed more than 500 workers expanded rapidly. Within this category, the number of workers in enterprises employing over 2000 workers grew roughly twice as fast as those employing between 501 and 2000 workers.

In 1896 there was still a marked tendency for many of the largest enterprises to be scattered over many regions. By 1906 they tended to be clustered in the fast-growing, heavily industrialised areas. In that space of time, whereas the percentage of workers in the enterprises employing over 500 grew from twenty to twenty-six percent for France as a whole, in region 16 it grew from twenty-nine to forty-two percent.

In 1896, fifteen out of forty-three of the enterprises employing more than 2000 workers were in the départements of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais. If we add the départements of the Meurthe-et-Moselle, Vosges and Haut-Rhin, we find that nineteen out of forty-three - or forty-four percent - of enterprises in the over-2000 category were in those five départements. By 1906 the figures increased to twenty-two out of sixty-four for the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and thirty out of sixty-four - or forty-eight percent for the five départements.

- (iii) Concentration of the Heavy Industries: In 1906, a total of 178 thousand miners worked in enterprises employing over 500 workers. Of that total, sixty-one percent worked in regions 15 and 16 alone. Of the 179 thousand in textiles, over forty-one percent worked in region 16 alone, and over sixty percent in regions 15, 16 and 18. Of the 59 thousand who worked in the over-500 enterprises in metallurgy, over thirty-two percent worked in region 18 alone, and sixty-three in regions 15, 16 and 18.

We should start with some general comments on the relative importance of each of the industrial categories used in the census calculations.

The 1896 census indicates that 1074 thousand workers were employed in category 4G, 825 thousand in 4F, 532 thousand in 4J, 499 thousand in 4L, 441 thousand in 4Q, 305 thousand in 4B, and 274 thousand in 4I. Many of these industries were small craftsmen and artisan industries. Moreover, we find that in many cases even the textile and metals industries were simply geared to a local market. In those cases, neither the specialisation nor re-organisation of the work process characteristic of industries producing for the market were developed. If we look at the industrial breakdown for 1856 and even for 1896 we find that a majority of the regions were still agricultural and, with the possible exception of one plant, were producing only for the needs of that kind of community. The major artisan industries were 4G, 4J, 4Q, 4B and 4I. The major heavy industries were 4F, 4L and 3A.²⁵¹ Where specialisation existed it depended upon a configuration of factors: power, ore resources, transport that all but ruled out most regions. In that sense one finds possibly two sorts of industrial development: production of scale for a large market and specialist production for the region or the manufacture of luxury goods. Two kinds of working class developed: a working class based upon heavy industry and a working class based upon light industry and artisan practices. Indeed, in some regions, as we shall see, there was a fine balance between these two groups.²⁵²

- (i) Kinds of industrial development: Comparing the active population engaged in industry in 1856 to 1901, we find a tendency for the most industrialised regions to become yet more industrialised. The regions in the North-East, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, developed - absolutely and relatively - more rapidly than the former leading industrial areas, 1, 5, 13 and 14. What is responsible is the growth of heavy industry and its tendency towards regional concentration. The disparity is most marked in categories 3A, 4C, 4F and 4K. Between 1896 and 1906 the trend is accelerated. If we assign the value one-hundred to France in 1856 and 1901, and put the regions on a scale using that as a base number we find, in particular, that the départements of the Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Meurthe-et-Moselle were the principal growth areas. Département like the Rhône and Loire, the leading industrial départements during the first phase of capitalist development in France, grew much less rapidly and the index numbers for départements where light and artisanal industry predominated, like the Saône-et-Loire and Allier, fell.

industrialised regions. If one looks at the known figures, establishments in these regions within the census categories tend to be somewhat larger than those in the relatively less-developed regions. This affects my conclusions by making them appear to be more conservative than they need be, rather than really changing them at all. It is likely that the percentage of workers in establishments employing more than 500 workers is higher in the most industrialised areas and lower in the other areas.

- (ii) Data drawn from the 1856 census presents two distinct problems. In 1856 the occupational tables still included the entire family under the husband's occupation. It is likely that this leads to an underestimation of those employed in industries where there was a large proportion of women and children in employment (categories 4F, 4G, 4H). Secondly, in adapting the 1856 schema to the 1896 schema, one finds that some occupations change their definition so completely that comparison becomes impossible. Since the number employed in any of these groupings is less than 2000, I do not think that my figures are prejudiced by anything more than a percentage point or two.
- (iii) There are some errors in the 1896 and 1906 censuses. In addition to many easily correctible misprints, in one case the sum total of workers employed in a particular category obtained by adding up the sums for each département is greater than the census reporters' own calculations by about one percent. For this reason, my figures in all cases are based upon the sum total obtained by adding up the departmental totals, rather than the sum totals supplied by the census reporters.
- (iv) Finally, in the 1896 and 1906 censuses, a peculiarly loose category of worker called travailleur isolé is appended to the owners, and manager, employees, and workers.²⁵⁰ As far as I can see, they are a pot-pourri of artisans, people in home and part-time work, and in some cases self-employed workmen. In some cases under category 4G they total sixty-two percent listed. They are not included in the calculations of the percentage of workers employed in the different sized categories of enterprises. This is important because it makes the official French comparison of enterprise-size to Germany worthless. It means that the percentage of workers in enterprises is grossly exaggerated. On the whole, I calculate that the exaggeration runs between 28.8% and 32.7%; within particular categories, it runs from less than one per cent in 3A to over sixty-two percent in 4G. Whilst using the official French calculations of size of enterprises, I have therefore also appended a calculation about the number of travailleurs isolés, who - for want of a more precise definition - I have treated as artisans.

(iv) Levels of Regional Industrialisation during the POF Period:

If we take 100 as the national index number representing the proportion of workers employed in the heavy industries, 3A, 4C, 4F, 4K, 4L for 1896, we can measure the relative difference between the nine regions scoring above the national average.

16	163
5	148
15	141
23	131
18	129
19	127
17	124
21	116
4	114

Although this gives us an idea of the most heavily industrialised regions, the measure is somewhat imprecise because categories 4F and 4L in many regions still contained a large number of workers labouring in semi-artisan conditions.

If we now take 100 as the national index number representing the proportion of workers employed in the same industries but in enterprises employing more than 500 workers, the picture is somewhat changed.

16	125
15	117
17	114
18	109
5	89
19	84
21	75
23	63
4	49

What we find is that region 5, still predominantly a textile region, but mainly a producer of luxury textiles, an area of small declining mining industries, and a region of small enterprises, falls considerably.²⁵⁴ The other industrialised regions outside the North-East regions 21, 23 and 4 all fall considerably below even the national average. ²⁵⁵

If we look ten years ahead to 1906, our thesis of the growth of the heavily-industrialised North-East as a trend is further confirmed. If we again take 100 as the national index number representing the proportion of workers employed in the heavy industries, we get the following picture:

16	(163)
15	(153)
5	(152)
18	(146)
19	(130)
23	(128)
21	(128)
17	(116)
4	(110)

If we take 100 as the national index number representing the proportion of workers employed in the same industries but in enterprises employing more than 500 workers we find more evidence of the trend we have discovered.

16	128
15	122
19	122
18	112
4	92
17	78
5	75
23	53
21	40

- (v) Travailleurs isolés: We have not taken into account the proportion of workers in each category who worked as artisans or on their own. We have restricted ourselves only to workers in enterprises. If we take 100 as the national index number for the percentage of travailleurs isolés of all workers in each of the categories 4G, 4F, and 4L, we find that the areas outside of the North-East - with the exception of region 5 - have an index number many times greater than areas 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19.

	1896			
	Index	4F	4L	4C
16	125	32	35	0
15	117	80	105	50
17	114	80	65	50
18	109	80	85	50
5	89	132	55	50
19	84	75	65	75
21	75	65	140	450
23	63	100	230	100
4	49	317	150	550

The same holds true for other industrial categories. We find that concentration in categories 4B, 4G and 4Q is much greater in the five northeastern regions than elsewhere. The index numbers for the food industry are, for example: 16 (62), 15 (77), 17 (62) and 21 (177), 23 (200) and 4 (146). In other words, even the less concentrated industries tended to be relatively larger in the North-East than in the less developed industrial areas.

Hence, in both absolute and relative terms, with regard to industrial development, industrial concentration and size of enterprise, by 1896 the regions 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 were on all counts the most industrialised and homogeneously industrialised regions of France and, judging by the census reports of 1906, their lead over the other regions tended to lengthen.

According to Willard, the membership of the newly unified socialist party after 1905 was hardly a replica of the French working class.²⁵⁶ Indeed, if we take the reported membership of the SFIO at the four congresses held

between 1905 and 1907, obtain an average and again let the national percentage of workers in all industries who are members of the SFIO represent 100, we obtain the following index numbers for the regions.

26	277
3	250
4	238
23	241
24	185
16	198
8	165

Out of the seven most socialist regions, only three appeared on our list of the most industrialised. The most industrialised region falls rather far down the list and the other two regions, judging from our findings, were also regions with high artisanal concentrations and relatively few large industries. Indeed, on the 1896 scale for workers employed in heavy industry employing more than 500 workers, we find that region 26 scores 34, region 3 scores 68, region 24 scores 22, and region 8 no more than 65.

If, on the other hand, we look at the number of workers engaged in enterprises employing less than 100 workers we find that four out of seven areas score above 100, two are no more than ten percent below the average. Only region 16 has a low score (55).

If we look at the percentage of workers in the categories where artisanal labour predominated, we find that regions 26, 3 and 24 score well above the national average, with only regions 4, 23 and 16 below.

From these data, it appears that the socialist regions fall into three general categories:

- (i) Region where large-scale production, industrial concentration and large concentrations of workers in large enterprises predominate. Here the socialist penetration was relatively high only in regions 15 and 16. Regions 17, 18 and 19 evidenced very little socialist support.
- (ii) Regions like 4, 23 and, marginally, region 5 where some large-scale industry existed alongside a relatively backward and large artisanal sector. Here socialist penetration tended to be high.
- (iii) Regions like 26, 3 and 24 where there was very little industrial concentration, and a high proportion of the population in artisanal labours. The concentration of travailleurs isolés

was also high. These, the most industrialised of the artisan regions, generated a higher level of support for the socialist movement relative to the working-class population of the region than did either types i or ii.

One should hesitate before concluding that the socialist movement drew its strength from regions where smaller enterprises predominated and where traditional industries were most deeply implanted. It is true that relative to the working-class population, this form of socialism was stronger than the socialism of the more industrialised regions. But since a movement is also a product of numbers, one should not forget that in numerical terms the movements found in regions of type i were extremely influential in the party.

We have seen that, in Willard's view, the POF was increasingly becoming a working-class party. By that he meant that it drew its membership in an increasingly large proportion from the heavy industrial sector.²⁵⁷

At first glance, his argument does not appear to be totally mistaken. If we place the list we established showing the level and intensity of industrialisation against the results of the 1893 general election, with 100 representing the national index number of the percentage of socialist votes cast, we find that three regions of type i and two regions of type ii are amongst the seven most guesdiste regions:

24	216	type iii
16	165	type i
4	126	type ii
23	110	type ii
17	108	type i
15	107	type i
22	104	type iii

If we make the same analysis of the 1898 elections, we find that the results point to a conclusion that destroys Willard's contention.

9	232	type iii
4	159	type ii
10	156	type iii
16	138	type i
24	134	type iii
23	128	type ii
22	120	type iii

Regions 15 and 17 no longer appear on the chart. The relative strength of the POF in region 16 declines. The POF appears to be relatively stronger in type (iii) regions than any other. One is tempted to conclude that it was much more the party of the artisans and workers in medium-sized industry than the workers in large-scale and heavy industry.

Put in a nutshell, these conclusions represent Willard's findings. But I think his argument can be faulted in two ways. Firstly, one must not forget that the party was dominated by the Nord and Pas-de-Calais after 1891. They were the cornerstones of the POF. In terms of votes in 1893 fully 37.1 per cent of the party's voters resided in those two départements (39.4 per cent in regions 15 and 16), and even in 1898 when the POF, in Willard's view, was becoming less a working-class party, over 28.2 per cent of its votes came from the two northern départements. In terms of membership, the dominant position of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais was absolute. In 1900, 56.3 per cent of the membership came from those two départements. We have already seen that they were responsible for the regeneration of the party, its organisation, its statutes and its programmes. The drive to organise a coherent national party came from the North. The conseil national was composed in its majority of people representing the North.

Secondly, given the evidence of clear and basic ideological differences between regions, we have found supplemented by what are clearly very great socio-industrial differences, could we not just as easily conclude that there were a multiplicity of POF's, that the POF was an amalgam of regional organisations, and that the call and response to organisation had very different meanings according to the socio-industrial composition of a particular region? Perhaps we should tend towards the view that the POF was not a party in the modern sense but a coalition of workers whose Weltanschauungen varied according to the conditions under which they laboured and that these conditions were broadly responsible for different needs, the postulation of different solutions and very different strategies. Did the one element shared between these strategies come down to a need for a nationally-organised political voice? Rather than insisting that the growth and the transformation of the POF proceeded unilaterally and unidimensionally as Willard does when he says that, after 1889, it became an organiser of the masses, we should concentrate on the multi-dimensionality of the political organisation of the French working class. By looking at

that multi-dimensionality we might then begin to hypothesise the reasons for the flagrant contradiction between guesdiste theory and practice.

Our setting out in this direction is supported by Willard's figures on party membership. Analysing party membership for the period 1894-99, Willard was able to classify members of the POF by the following categories: workers, artisans, officials, publicans, peasants, and students, and people in the professions.²⁵⁹ As we have noted, Willard did not make an allowance for workers in the textile and metal industries to be artisans. Not only are his figures for artisans far too low, but in the light of our data it is safe to say that they are relatively lower in the areas of artisanal and light-industry than in the relatively more industrialised regions. If we make an allowance for artisans, we find that the following picture emerges.

Only in the départements of the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais can the majority of party members be classified as workers in medium and heavy industry (respectively sixty-three and fifty-four percent). In the intermediate départements like the Rhône and the Loire, the figures are respectively thirty-two and thirty-five percent. In the more artisanal areas, the figures are: Allier - twenty percent, Isère - seventeen percent, Gard, Aude and Hérault taken together - nine percent, and the Gironde - four percent. If we add the category of publicans café owners dependent upon the goodwill of local party groups, we find that our thesis that the POF was at least two parties is strikingly confirmed. In the North, we find a party in socio-industrial terms that was based upon heavy industry. Elsewhere, and in varying degrees, in France we find a party that was dominated by artisanal groups.

	% Artisans	% Artisans with <u>cabaretiers</u>
Nord	12	28
Pas-de-Calais	12	32
Rhône	38	53
Loire	20	49
Allier	27	40
Isère	49	66
Aude		
Gard	42	54
Hérault		
Gironde	46	66

If we make a three-fold classification of the regions where the POF was strongest on our socio-industrial index, we find that the histories of the local POF federations and the analyses of the conditions of the working class in such towns as Dijon, Besançon and Belfort point in the direction of our hypothesis.

(i) The Artisanal Areas of High Socialist Concentration:

For the purposes of testing my hypothesis, I have examined artisanal regions covering different areas in France and exhibiting different properties. Region 3 is an example of an area where the POF and its supposedly bitter enemy, the syndicalist-dominated trade-union movement, were both very strong. In earlier times, it had been one of the most important areas for the manufacture of luxury clothing.²⁶⁰ Region 24 was an area where the municipal socialist movement was implanted quite early and region 8 an area where the socialist movement, whilst growing rapidly, developed quite late.²⁶¹

The membership of the POF federations of region 3 was based upon artisan craftsmen and woodhewers from the countryside. The urban centres like Bourges, Vierzon, Dijon, Troyes and Auxerre, had a long history of craftsmanship.²⁶² These towns were typical of the dozens of largish towns servicing an agrarian hinterland and developing a specialised craft or two, like Troyes and Romilly, for a market wider than the immediate region.²⁶³ In the countryside the woodhewers were organised into Fédération des bûcherons in 1891, but the failure of a strike movement in 1891-92 drove them to seek wider support from the urban workers.²⁶⁴ The failure of the early fédérations du métier to establish themselves in the regions outside the largest urban centres, such as Paris and Lyon, led the artisans of the towns to look for a means to coordinate common aims on a local and regional basis. The Dijon section of the POF was composed of tobacco workers carpenters, railwaymen, and tailors - all of whom had made unsuccessful attempts at organising federations.²⁶⁵ The only successful craft trade-union organisation was that of the shoemakers. In Troyes we find the same to be true of the declining clothing industry, and in Nevers of the small glass industry.²⁶⁶ The Fédération nationale des travailleurs de l'habillement was only founded in 1893 and then appears to have been almost exclusively a Parisian trade union. Other trade unions which could have recruited a fair number of worker like the Fédération ouvrière des cuisiniers, pâtisseries et confiseurs de France founded in 1887 again never penetrated the region.²⁶⁷

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Region 3 was a region of declining industry. Close to the developing areas and to Paris, the artisans engaged in industries threatened by mass production, metals, wood and clothing, and the workers in the specialised clothing industry, began to suffer from still competition from about 1890. The clothing industry in the Aube, in particular, suffered a catastrophic decline.²⁶⁹ Touring the area some ten years later, Griffuëlhes noted that the bastion of syndicalisme révolutionnaire and anti-parliamentarianism was desolate and poor, and its hostility was directed mainly towards the workers in mass-production industries.²⁷⁰ The crafts it had prized for generations were in full decline, emigration destroyed the family, workers were working

sixteen-hour days in order to make ends meet, the pride and self-esteem of the craftsmen were destroyed, and in rage and despair they turned towards the grève générale.²⁷¹ For Griffuelhes, to whom the grève générale was characterised by an optimistic view of the future, the regressive millenium of the Burgundian artisans came as a shock.²⁷²

The POF had early successes in the region.²⁷³ It provided the forum for organising workers of different crafts across the region and giving them access to information and the possibility of making contact with similar workers in other regions. The early POF's emphasis on the impending social collapse, the declining standard of living and the need for violent revolution was attractive to workers whose one common bond was the decline of their trades.²⁷⁴ In Dijon a socialist Maison du peuple was founded, which provided all kinds of social services - uniting the artisan community and even providing certain financial aid.²⁷⁵ The POF's call to defend crafts was interpreted as meaning the defence of the artisan trades. This was true until the party, caught between the demands of the workers of mass industry in the North and its older supporters, began to issue ambiguous messages, and finally supported the demands of the industrial workers. But during the early 1890's the POF was still used as a coordinator, and later it was still used at times as a means to obtain subsidies for local trade-union groups and as a means of avoiding the conflict between artisan and industrial workers - by diverting them from their common aims.²⁷⁶

Initially, the POF provided an ideological basis and the facilities to unite artisan movements around their common aims. From about 1893 the party's influence began to decline. In 1893 the tobacco workers left the POF, having organised a federation of about 500 members.²⁷⁷ The groups in Dijon, Bourges and Nevers based mainly upon the clothing industry left to form a bourse du travail.²⁷⁸ Vaillant's party, which emphasised the importance of the artisan crafts and the bourses du travail, began to replace the POF in Dijon, amongst the Nièvre glassworkers and established its base of power amongst the bûcherons and in Bourges and Vierzon. The bourses du travail seem to have replaced the POF because of its apparent change in ideology.²⁷⁹ After 1890 the party began to emphasise the demands of the industrial workers for the eight-hour day, factory inspection, national insurance etc., demands that required them to forgo the long hours and negligence of factory regulations which still made artisan life possible and which also required working through parliament that the artisans could not tolerate.²⁸⁰ The bourses, on the other hand, campaigned for the protection of crafts and the restriction of entrance into established trades. Little by little they replaced the POF in the region. Here we find one interesting example. In Troyes, where a Société générale des ouvriers chapeliers existed, mechanisation split the organisation. The mechanised workers gravitated towards the POF whilst the artisans left it for the bourse du travail.²⁸¹

The party, however, survived in some urban areas because it had become a power in municipal politics.²⁸² In some rare cases it acceded to power directly, but in other areas it was a force to be reckoned with and could dispense a certain amount of patronage.²⁸³

The bourses required subsidies and, in that sense, even the most ardent of syndicalists like Pouget was not beyond accepting state-aid. The POF could still be useful. In return, much of the propaganda of the national POF was toned down. This explains why the POF's in the artisan regions were so different from those in the more industrial regions.²⁸⁴ But the POF survived as a voting machine. To garner as many votes as possible it emphasised collaboration rather than conflict and, as Willard notes, seems to have conquered a fair share of the traditional anti-clerical, but by no means socialist, vote in the Centre and Midi.²⁸⁵

Finally, the POF served as a means to try to work out compromises between the artisan and industrial workers. Within the trade-union movement the fédérations du métier and the bourses were hardly on speaking terms, and the party could provide certain facilities to alleviate the conflict between them.²⁸⁶ This was particularly important as we shall see, in areas where large concentrations of industrial and artisan workers lived together.²⁸⁷

Region 24 was again an area of small industries and an area where industry almost without exception was geared to the local market.²⁸⁸ Its isolation from Paris and the industrial areas of the North shielded its artisans from the swiftness of the decline that overcame artisan workers in region 3.²⁸⁹ Neither Toulouse, a "large village" according to Griffon-Delvalles, nor Narbonne developed sizable enterprises, and Narbonne - to a greater extent than any of the other cities in region 3 - was a market city.²⁹⁰ For these reasons, the hostility between the trade unions and the POF was less than in region 3 and the work of the bourses du travail rarely contradicted the work of the party.²⁹¹

The party's main interests were in municipal improvement. Narbonne is one of the best examples of municipal socialism. The party and the trade union were often indistinguishable. The socialist municipality led by Dr. Ferroul, whose socialist qualifications were read with suspicion bordering on hostility by Lafargue, supported the artisan movement by subsidising the bourse quite heavily and through awarding municipal contracts.²⁹² Ferroul emphasised socialism by example. Since the town was the largest employer it could influence the level of wages and could save crafts from extinction. The emphasis of Ferroul's POF was on maintaining republican values and transforming the Republic into a "république rouge". The party claimed that it was not only the party of the workers but also the party of the employees, teachers, shopkeepers, small industrialists and workers in the fields.²⁹³ In Toulouse we find a very similar situation.²⁹⁴

In other words, so long as the POF remained the spokesman and the adjunct of the artisans and the upholder of their values, it could survive intact. The party specialised in providing municipal services and did not interfere with the trade-union movement. So long as the reverberations of the conflict between the artisanal and industrial workers did not reach region 24, the artisan party survived.

Region 8 was slightly more industrialised than regions 3 and 24. A high-quality glass industry and pottery industry developed in the area of Limoges.²⁹⁵ But during the 1890's it was relatively unmechanised, enterprises were small and artisan crafts still flourished. The other large towns, Châtellerault, Tulle and Poitiers were in many ways replicas of the towns of region 3. In 1880 an attempt to organise the building workers in Châtellerault failed and a branch of the FSTS replaced the trade-union movement as a co-ordinator of artisan activity.²⁹⁶ The tobacco workers were initially involved in the POF but left as soon as it was possible to launch a viable national federation. In Limoges the failure to organise a Fédération nationale des verriers also led to a period of POF activity until the federation became viable.²⁹⁷

From our examination of these three regions, we can see a general pattern emerging. The POF was initially an artisan party emphasising the social values of the artisan movement. It co-ordinated their activity. It was instrumental in uniting workers from various crafts because its ideology could be interpreted as a defence of the craftsman tradition. The POF was a substitute for trade-union federations. When they became viable propositions, it either became a municipal party, or where the contradictions of artisanal life became harsh the party was replaced by the bourses and declined.

It is impossible to date this process for the simple reason that industrialisation occurred at such an uneven pace that the POF as a co-ordinator of the artisan workers appeared at very different times in different regions. From our three examples it is clear that, by 1895, the party almost disappeared from region 3, was well-established in region 24, and was only springing into activity in region 8. This lack of uniformity makes any generalisation which is not a sociological generalisation based upon the regionalisation of French society impossible. This is why Willard's phase-theory of the POF's development must be substituted by a multiplicity theory.

(ii) Areas Balanced between Large-Scale Industry and Artisan Industry:

Our interest in these areas is because they show evidence of a slow transition from an artisan and infrastructural economy towards an industrial economy, and they show evidence of a conflict between artisan and industrial workers that tore apart the POF. They also demonstrate the limits imposed upon such a conflict and how, in some instances, the socialist party had to take on a "neutralist" allure in order to step into the urgent role of mediating the conflict. We shall deal with two regions: region 4, an area containing some of the largest industrial enterprises in France and some of the best organised artisanal trade unions; and region 23, primarily a region of artisanal crafts but also containing a large mining area in the Gard and Tarn.²⁹⁸

Our socio-industrial index shows region 4 to be an odd region. It is both a region of large enterprises and of very small enterprises. It is also one of the most socialist and trade-union conscious regions of France. It contained a fairly important, but declining, mining district stretching from Commentry in the Allier into the Saône-et-Loire. The mines encouraged a metal industry, primarily centred on Montluçon and the largest industrial enterprise in France, the Creusot works in the Saône-et-Loire. Besides these works, the metal industry never really developed beyond artisanal production.²⁹⁹

Before the turn of the century, the large enterprises and the artisan enterprises developed side by side with very little contact between them.³⁰⁰

The Allier was one of the earliest of the POF strongholds. The party first emerged in the towns dominated by the metal workers, Montluçon and - by the miners - Commentry.³⁰¹ In Montluçon the Syndicat des travailleurs métallurgistes was inseparable from the party. It was a combination based upon the craft workers in the metallurgical industry fostered by the party and created after its victory in the 1892 municipal elections.³⁰² If we read through Dormoy's statements, it becomes clear that the party saw its first task as forming a trade union of the the metal workers, particularly as they had up till that time been unable to form a trade union.³⁰³ The federation of metal workers collapsed because the craftsmen would not tolerate the demands of the unskilled workers who entered the industry when mechanisation was introduced. The Fédération des ouvriers mécaniciens left what remained of the federation in 1895. Indeed, after 1891, the crafts workers tended to support the general strike and drifted away from the POF which, by that time, was emphasising the demands of the industrial workers.³⁰⁴ The Fédération in the Allier appears to have also followed that course. In that sense, the Allier metal workers' organisation appears to have followed a similar course to that of the bourses du travail in the artisanal areas. The second element of the POF in the Allier was composed of the Commentry miners.³⁰⁵ Living in self-enclosed, relatively homogeneous communities, the history of the miners in France is very different from that of any other group. Their federations tended to be independent of alliances with other trade-union groups, and for the most part they shied away from political attachments until the relationship between their demands and political organisation was clearly spelled out and until the changes in their conditions of work made membership in a national party essential. The chambres syndicales in the Allier were a failure in the early 1880's, probably because of the smallness of the miners' community.³⁰⁶ As such, the miners - unlike those in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais - leaned heavily on the party. The party was an outside organisation not quite so susceptible to pressure from the mine-owners and managers as would be a relatively weak organisation on the spot. As such the miners of the Allier, Saône-et-Loire and Puy-de-Dôme were allied to the POF, and when a Fédération nationale was relaunched in 1894 they supported Rondet's idea of an alliance with the POF against Basly's and Lamendin's idea of political neutrality.³⁰⁷

In the Allier the POF was initially a coalition between the metal workers and the miners. Strong enough to dominate many town councils it retained the support of the miners. Because the transformation of the metal industry did not actually occur within the département before the 1900's, with the exception of one or two localities where the PSR of Vaillant replaced the POF, the federation held firm. But this was only possible because the 1898 congress declared that all fédérations were free to make their own alliances and decide their own tactics.³⁰⁸ Because the artisan crafts suffered from the advent of industrialisation however, the party remained a party partially tied to municipal socialism and party partially tied to artisanal demands.

For the most part, the Saône-et-Loire and the Puy-de-Dôme resemble the artisanal regions.³⁰⁹ The bourses du travail were very active in both départements after 1891 and because the POF was not strong enough in either Clermont-Ferrand or the artisanal towns of the Saône-et-Loire to have much municipal influence, it declined sharply in the artisanal areas with one notable exception.³¹⁰

The Saône-et-Loire presents a curious picture. It had one of the best organised artisanal trade unions and also some of the largest enterprises in France.³¹¹ Aside from the declining mines, there was Creusot. Until 1899, Creusot was relatively isolated from the rest of the département's industry since most of its workers were recruited from outside. Since the 1871 Commune, the managers had attempted to guarantee social peace by isolating their workers into company towns, with company churches, schools, stores so that there was no contact with the artisanal movement. Until the late 1890's, working conditions in the factories were still artisanal and the mines were still in operation; after about 1895, machines were introduced, which destroyed the crafts, workers began to be ³¹² recruited from the nearby regions, and the craftsmen were de-classified. The immediate result was a violent strike that politicised the workers. The longer term result was a violent conflict within the Saône-et-³¹³ Loire POF between the artisan workers and the industrial workers. Here we find an example of the transformation of the POF from an artisanal party into an instrument to attempt to heal differences between two irreconcilable sections of the working class rather than its transformation into a party of the industrial workers. Because the national organisation was so thoroughly tied to the demands of the industrial workers, the fédération as a body left the POF and became autonomous. Hence, in the Saône-et-Loire we find an example of the artisan workers of the bourses du travail and the CGT, despite their disdain for parliamentarianism and demands they called reformist still in need of a co-ordinating body to attempt to make as common a front as possible with the industrial workers who, despite their very different demands, due to their relative isolation from a larger population of workers in similar conditions and an absence of some of their more acute problems, also required the support of an artisan movement.³¹⁴

The history of the federations in region 23 resembles both that of the fédérations of region 24 and the Saône-et-Loire.

Overall, there was very little industry in the Hérault, Gard, Tarn or Aveyron that was not based upon the mines or artisanal in character.³¹⁵ There appear to be two kinds of POF federation. The first kind was based on the artisanal industries. In Nîmes, for example, as in the other small cities, we have looked at the relative weakness of the trade unions leading to the establishment of the POF and then of a bourse. The POF then became a party based on municipal socialism. We find very much a similar situation in the cities of the Hérault. The second kind of federation was based on the mines.³¹⁶ As in the mining areas of region 4, the mines were in decline and the concentration of miners was relatively small.³¹⁷ Here again the organisation of the miners was accomplished by the party. However the party could do little to protect the party. A series of violent strikes in the 1890's, which ended in the Décazville strike (Aveyron), distanced the miners not only from the national miners' federation, but transformed the POF organisation into a body espousing the general strike.³¹⁸ The need for federation still remained, but the combined

disenchantment of the miners and artisans led to their leaving the POF (1897 in the Gard and 1902 in the Hérault) and establishing autonomous federations until, as the conseil fédérative of the Gard³¹⁹ declared, the POF would grow out of its state of chaos and indecision.

In these transitional regions we find a graphical-illustration of the fate of the POF in the light of conflict between artisan and industrial workers. We find that, depending upon local conditions, its fate was either to be superceded, to be transformed into a municipal socialist party, or to be transformed into an autonomous federation to gain those demands in common for both artisans and industrial workers.³²⁰ What has also emerged is that the national POF was completely transformed as a result of the socio-industrial changes in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais. In essence they played the major role in the party after 1890. We have demonstrated how the POF was nonetheless a coalition of workers under different conditions. But now we must describe these changes in order to explain more fully how the party became so greatly identified with the demands of industrial workers that the political arm of the French working class had to be completely rebuilt from scratch in 1905.

(iii) Regions of Heavy Industry and High Socialist Concentration:

We have already seen the extent to which heavy industry in France was concentrated in the two most northerly départements, the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais. They were both relatively and absolutely the most industrialised départements. In every industrial sector the degree of concentration was higher than anywhere else in France. In 1896 twenty-seven percent of all workers in the Nord were employed by enterprises having more than 500 employees. In 1906 the percentage increased to thirty-six. The figures for the Pas-de-Calais are even more startling. They are respectively forty percent in 1896 and fifty-three percent in 1906.

The Nord was dominated by the textile industry concentrated in the Lille-Tourcoing-Roubaix triangle. About forty-seven percent of its active industrial population were employed in the textile industry in 1896. Of these, some 51 thousand worked in enterprises employing more than 500 workers. By 1906 the number of workers in category 4F barely increased (179 thousand), but the percentage in enterprises employing more than 500 workers increased dramatically to forty-two, or in absolute figures 74 thousand. Moreover, there were now twenty-one enterprises employing more than 1000 workers. The second largest industry, the metallurgical industry, was in its infancy in 1896. It employed 34 thousand of whom some 6 thousand worked in seven enterprises employing more than 500 workers. In 1906 this had increased to 46 thousand workers of whom 15 thousand worked in eleven enterprises employing more than 500 workers. The foundries employed more than 10 thousand workers in enterprises employing more than 500 workers in 1896 and over 15 thousand in eleven enterprises of that size in 1906. The third largest sector was the mining sector. In 1896 the number of workers increased to 33 thousand. Concentration in the vital mining/textile/metals sector also encouraged large enterprises in the service sectors: chemicals, printing, clothing, building and the food industry. In addition a fairly large glass industry grew up.

The Pas-de-Calais was dominated by its mines. In 1896 46 thousand (or forty percent) out of a total industrial population of 116 thousand worked in the mines. All were employed in enterprises employing more than 500 and three mines had more than 5000 employees. Of the 51 thousand employed in enterprises employing more than 500 over ninety percent were in the mines. As we have already pointed out there were few other industries of any size. The textile industry was backward and employed no more than 13 thousand, and the metallurgical industries no more than 8 thousand. By 1906 the mining sector had grown phenomenally both absolutely and relatively. There were now 76 thousand in the mines or about forty-nine percent of the entire industrial population. There were seven mines employing more than 5000 workers. The next largest industries were the relatively unconcentrated textile industry - 19 thousand, and the metallurgical industry - about 12 thousand. In other words, the Pas-de-Calais was completely dominated by its mines and industrialised later than the Nord. Whereas the Nord was beginning to diversify, the process had not yet started further to the South.

We have already seen that there were a number of other départements with almost such great industrial concentrations as the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais. The Meurthe-et-Moselle and the Haut-Rhin, in particular, had large foundry and metallurgical industries. Why did they not develop large trade-union movements and strong socialist parties ?

One can specify a number of related factors to account for the unique development of the northern regions.³²¹ In the case of the Nord, industry grew organically and a large community of workers notwithstanding different industrial experiences was formed through their sharing a host of common problems and proposing a list of common aims.³²² Based upon the development of local resources, the development of the mines led to the concentration and expansion of the already-existing textile industry and the textile industry led to the development of a metallurgical industry in addition to a host of service enterprises of larger than average size in the bursting urban centres created by the textile industry.³²³ Only in the Nord did the conditions exist to encourage such growth. The large factories of the Lorraine and Franche-Comté were appended to the regions as a result of the loss of Alsace and the emigration of industries to the West. The development of the iron mining complexes came towards the end of our period. The Ets. Japy at Belfort are an example of the kinds of isolated self-contained factory communities in Lorraine.³²⁴ The emigration included not only factories but a bevy of social institutions that for quite some time separated these vast industrial establishments from the rest of the community. The extension and concentration of the industrial areas of the Nord were not found in the East. In the Nord, the nature of industry, the concentration of the textile factories, and a growing similarity between the working and

living conditions of workers in the large and mechanised industrial establishments provided the setting for the development of the socialist movement.

The concentration was not only an industrial concentration but the sudden and drastic deterioration of living conditions as Halbwachs indicates may well have been just as instrumental in encouraging the social solidarity that was a prelude to the trade-union and socialist movements.³²⁵ The expansion of the towns and cities in the Nord began in the 1860's, the industrial changes in the factories began in the textile industries in the 1880's, and mechanical innovations adopted in the 1890's. Between the 1880's and 1900 industrial growth was not only rapid but factories were beginning to be reorganised.³²⁶ Evidence is that the specialisations of the vast workshops began to go out and were replaced by the beginnings of mass- and the forerunner of assembly-line production. Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing and, to a lesser extent, Dunkerque and Valenciennes were perhaps the only cities in France to experience the sudden and violent expansion that accompanied the social consequences of the coal, textile and metal industrial transformations.³²⁷ Whilst not growing at anything near the prodigious rate of Elberfeld or Essen, the cities nonetheless experienced a steady influx of workers to labour with the new machines during the 1860's and 1880's. One part of the influx came from the adjacent farming areas. But since an agrarian revolution was also underway in the countryside, the influx was small. The next largest group were the artisans who were forced to abandon their workshops for the large factory. But the largest group came from Belgium.³²⁸ In 1882 thirty percent of the population of Lille, thirty-five percent of the population of Tourcoing and forty percent of the population of Roubaix were Belgians.³²⁹ Ordinarily such an influx of foreigners would have been expected to precipitate conflict within the working class. But because the industrial transformation, the influx from the countryside and the influx from Belgium occurred all at once, nothing of the sort happened. So rapid was the transformation of the urban landscape and so serious were the problems of overcrowding, sanitation, education, the rise in the cost of living, and a thoroughly insufficient urban infrastructure, that all groups seemed to start anew tabula rasa.³³⁰ A new working-class community was formed with aims far exceeding those the artisan communities. Delory comments that the ideas of cooperation, community organisation and solidarity and the chambres syndicales were imported from Belgium.³³¹ To the extent that many of the Belgian immigrants had already had experience of homo-

geneous industrial communities, this is true. But the fact that such a movement developed organically and without dissension is also an indication of how swift the transformation was. ³³²

Another indication of the forging of what can well be called a new working class is the lack of conflict between the artisans within the Lille-Tourcoing-Roubaix triangle and the new industrial workers. Handicraft industries remained important, particularly in the luxury trades. Other industries, such as building, masonry, carpentry, were not susceptible to mechanisation and concentration at this time. It is true that these crafts were relatively more concentrated than elsewhere in France, but it is also true that these artisans shared the experience of the deterioration of the urban community with the textile and metal workers. ³³³ Only in areas of artisan concentration away from the great textile areas is there any evidence of dissension. Indeed, the self-destructive battle within the Calaisien section of the POF ³³⁴ proves our point rather than disproves it.

Some commentators have been struck by the fact that workers in the East tended to remain Catholic and those in the North seem to have given up their Catholicism. ³³⁵ They insist that this is one of the principal inhibiting factors in the development of socialism in the industrialised regions of the East. Catholicism was certainly absent in the communities in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, but according to local studies its absence was due to its displacement by a new form of solidarity based upon a transformed social existence. ³³⁶ But theirs was an immigrant culture plunged into a countryside with which they had little contact. Their cultural heritage was a part of their process of implantation. In that sense, their Catholicism was both a form of community solidarity and reaction against their new environment. Hence, what is most important is the complete transformation of the daily lives of the workers in the newer industries. These changes led not only to a new series of needs and demands and organisations, but the birth of a new Weltanschauung to cope with the problems of transformation and to compensate for the insurmountable difficulties they faced. We must look at both the solidarity which their existence encouraged and the institutional forms which grew from that solidarity, as well as the contradictions these industrial workers faced ³³⁷ and how they thought they could overcome them.

Our first step is to examine how changes in the principal industries of the two départements affected the working class and to see how this influenced and fed the launching of the new POF that was growing up during this period.

I shall first look at the transformation of the textile industry in the Nord and then at the mining industry in the Pas-de-Calais.

(a) The Textile and Metal Workers

By the end of the 1880's the growth of the cotton industry had transformed the textile enterprises in the Nord.³³⁸ The average enterprise had grown enormously and employed between 500 and 1000 workers. The mechanisation of work processes ushered in the era of the unskilled worker dominated by the machine and the beginnings of work organisation. In the eyes of contemporaries, the Northern textile mills worked with the precision of a modern army. Mechanisation entailed the simplification and growing repetitiveness of work.³³⁹ The rhythms of the worker were controlled by the speed and operations of the machine. Whatever margin of freedom of manoeuvre and creation the worker in the pre-mechanisation era exercised was reduced. The advent of standardisation of work tasks, products marked the end of the craftsman. It also meant that the differences between crafts that had hindered the creation of large trade unions were attenuated.³⁴⁰ Perceiving these long-term trends, Victor Renard, an official of a small textile trade union, began to campaign in the 1880's for the formation of a federation of all textile workers. His appeal was based on the necessity of organisation.³⁴¹

Mechanisation, standardisation and organisation were introduced to a still greater extent in the small metal industry, which was growing up to service the textile industry and the expanding markets in the northern regions.³⁴² The products lent themselves even more to standardisation and the structure of the industry to the scientific organisation of tasks that was to develop in the following decade.³⁴³

These changes in the nature of work were long-term trends. They were accompanied, according to observers, by the introduction of a new system of wages that caused a series of long and bitter strikes, culminating in the Fourmies massacre in 1891, which provided the immediate encouragement to organise trade unions.³⁴⁴ Previously, wages had not been completely standardised. There were differentials based upon the quality of work and, as one would expect, based upon skill and craftsmanship. The machines reduced these differences sharply, the craftsman found himself at the level of the unskilled worker, and wages were now based solely upon quantity. The end of the 1880's, in particular, saw a series of sporadic and universally unsuccessful strikes.³⁴⁵ They were organised by the very informal chambres syndicales still based upon divisions within crafts. As Carette discovered in Roubaix in 1890 the divisions within the movement permitted the factory owners, with the sometimes open support of town officials, to put down the strikes.³⁴⁶ The control of these officials - particularly after Fourmies - became an extremely important problem for the textile workers, and clearly a reason why, as Rouger points out, they never hesitated in linking their trade-union activity with their political activity.³⁴⁷

If we look outside the immediate work situation, we find what some commentators have termed a deterioration in the quality of life. By quality of life, I do not mean that wages declined absolutely but that changing needs and expectations which emerged from the industrial transformation of 1880's found the urban environment inadequate.³⁴⁸ Halbwachs indicates the growth of an explosive tension among textile workers resulting from a loss of control over how their daily activities were to be organised.³⁴⁹ The destruction in the potentialities of obtaining even a modicum of satisfaction in their work by standardisation,

transformed work into an onerous task and, as De Man writing about a similar area in Belgium indicates, this in turn created tensions in the family and community.³⁵⁰ Police figures for the period do indicate a rise in the crime rate, particularly amongst the young, a rise in destructive crimes committed for "no reason", and both Halbwachs and De Man speak of a listlessness that other less attentive writers put down to the lack of intelligence and drive of the working class.³⁵¹

According to Halbwachs, the urban environment of the late nineteenth century industrial towns created a host of new needs. He lists them as follows: the need to rest from the rhythms of the machine, the need to be able to organise the rhythms of life away from work so that one can return to work and conform more easily to the social patterns of the work situation, and the need to escape completely from work.³⁵² These, in turn, raised a series of demands for changes within the factory and for changes outside the factory, such as accommodation, education, low-cost food, health and sanitation services, etc. To these needs, Halbwachs appended another list which, were it not for his Durkheimian origins, he might well have called psychological needs. These boil down to a list of sublimating or replacement activities to make the return to the factory bearable, and the creation of a Weltanschauung that would have made such an adjustment possible.³⁵³ Friedmann and Touraine have divided these needs into two general categories: immediate needs to allow one to function effectively and efficiently as a worker, and compensatory needs to make up for the loss of control over the rhythms of one's life.³⁵⁴ Neville maintains that these basic conditions hardly changed until the 1950's.³⁵⁵

Amongst the immediate needs, we can identify transport (since the workers lived at increasing distances from their work-places and working hours were unchanged thus necessitating efficient and cheap transport), the means and products with which to perform household tasks more quickly and effectively (the rhythms of factory work required efficient means of cleaning, child-minding, buying food and convenience products), educational retraining (changes in work tasks required a general knowledge which could only be acquired and kept up by schooling), facilities during the daytime for children (particularly important in textile towns, where the vast majority of women worked), clinics (to deal with occupational diseases and the general rise in sickness brought about by the changed urban environment) and so on.³⁵⁶ All of these immediate needs required organisations to fight on their behalf. The organisations had to be efficient because the amount of time the worker at the turn of the century could spare for such activities was small. Discussions as Milhaud noticed were short, and what counted were organisations that could act.³⁵⁷ Moreover, the trade union could only fight for certain demands restricted to the immediate work situation. One could well proclaim that the transport problem, for example, was caused by the advent of mechanisation, but in order to remedy that problem and those not immediately resolvable in the factory - like the demand for the eight-hour day - an organisation that coordinated these activities and worked with the trade union was an importance requirement.

Among the compensatory needs, we find those that allow the worker to control, no matter how spuriously, the rhythms of some activity created and governed by himself and an activity that allowed him to dominate some kind of mechanical or ersatz mechanical process.³⁵⁸

According to Vinnai and Magnage, sports and games - both products of this period - emphasised the social solidarity in their form and also the manoeuvring based upon mechanical precision in their content which permitted this "acting-out" of tension.³⁵⁹ According to Friedmann, gambling allowed the worker to play directly against fate: something that the endless repetitiveness of the machine did not allow. Hence, leisure became a kind of compensation in the form of a ritualised acting-out of tensions. The second kind of need, also a creation of this period, was the escape from the world of work represented either by immersion into culture or, more usually, holiday-making. The workers' pension and the notion of travel to an environment totally different from the factory towns are also products of this period. Again these compensatory needs required organisation.³⁶⁰

Do we find that the textile workers made these demands and founded organisations in order to obtain them ?

From the early 1880's we find that the demands of the textile workers fall into two general categories: the demands for the reorganisation of work, higher wages and security; and demands to allow the worker to consume and accumulate replacement objects and to immerse himself in compensatory activities.³⁶¹ The chambres syndicales, the cradle of both the future textile trade unions and the POF, according to Delory were established in the most industrialised sectors of the industry during the 1870's.³⁶² Their concrete demands were for job security, limitations on hours spent in the factory, and for community control of social services.³⁶³ The first attempt at federation in the textile industry and at the formation of a national trade-union federation came as a result of pressure from the textile workers affiliated to the POF: Roussel, Pédron, Renard and Delory.³⁶⁴ The demands of the FNS again falls clearly into these categories. In the meantime, we find a significant change within the POF. The national party supported the fight for the eight-hour day and used its offices to encourage a national federation of textile workers.³⁶⁵ Within the département before its reorganisation in 1893, the POF began to concentrate on municipal reforms to obtain transport, crèches, local insurance schemes, employment offices, schooling, cultural activities and sporting activities.³⁶⁶

Contemporary commentators recognised that these were radically new demands.³⁶⁷ Yet it should be noted that demands which were absent from the shopping list of the workers in the newer industries had some significance. These can roughly be called qualitative demands, or demands for a totally new life-style. The enunciated demands were always for products that society already manufactured in limited quantity and for activities that had a high social and cultural value. These can be called demands for higher consumption. Excluded from consideration are demands which would require the alteration of the new relationship between work and leisure, or demands which would entail what several commentators have called the active appropriation of one's life-space rather than the passive consumption of replacement objects and the search for succour in compensatory activities.³⁶⁸ If we look at the worker's life-style, it is clear that work is devalued and becomes, as Juliette Minces noted in her study of the Nord, a time of mental and emotional paralysis. Leisure and the accumulation of objects represents a liberation - but obviously a liberation based on suffering. Qualitative demands for the construction of a society no longer based on a truncation of life were not made.³⁶⁹

Touraine claims that the limiting factor was the form of production. Mallet maintains that the level of technology determined consciousness and made such a revolutionary perspective impossible. The demands for quality were thus unthinkable.³⁷⁰

The demands of the textile workers required new forms of organisation. We have already seen that local and community consumers' organisations, insurance societies and "social clubs", existed from the 1860's.³⁷¹ By the 1870's large cooperative societies, like l'Humanité in Lille, existed in the textile region and served as a bond between the textile workers and workers from other industries.³⁷² They could not cope with the number and scope of the escalating demands.

The chambres syndicales originated both in the factories and in the communities.³⁷³ They provided a double-bond. These were the organisations that were represented at the founding congress of the POF and responsible for the organisation of the party. They were poor and could hardly manage to engage in trade-union activities, let alone seek to coordinate them with community activities. For that reason Roussel, Pédron and Renard proposed two parallel forms of organisation in 1883. The Lyon congress launched a separate trade-union federation that would deal with demands in the factories.³⁷⁴ The trade-union federation would be united to the party organisation that would engage in community and directly political organisation. All of these failed because the chambres syndicales were so poor that they could hardly afford to finance two organisations. The party still had few resources and the strikes of the 1880's weakened the movement.³⁷⁵ Within the chambres syndicales quarrels between those textile workers who still worked under semi-artisan conditions and those already working in the mechanised factories tended to paralyse the movement. The actual coordination between chambres syndicales appears to have been haphazard at best. It depended upon the publicans, who provided meeting rooms for the local organisations, and seem to have played a role similar to the Vertrauensmänner in Germany.³⁷⁶ Many of the future leaders of the POF were originally publicans, like Delory and Carette. The strikes in 1889 and 1890 caused the leaders of the chambres syndicales to consider a new form of organisation. By 1889 Delory, a trade-unionist from Lille working with Ghesquière and Carette, devised a new model organisation.³⁷⁷

In the first instance, it was important to have a large trade-union federation of all the textile workers. By 1893, Renard - who gave himself over exclusively to that task - finally succeeded in organising all the textile workers of the Nord into a single federation. It was not until 1903 that he was able to organise a national federation. The organisation was based upon plant rather than locality so that, at times, of crisis, the chain of command would be clear. The party - with its support in other major textile areas like St-Etienne and Lyon - helped.³⁷⁸ In 1895, Guesde told the Cholet congress of textile workers that they must organise syndicats d'entreprise. In return, the trade union supported the party.³⁷⁹ Every conference of the textile workers clearly spelled out how the party could help them obtain demands that encompassed more than the factory. Renard, like Legien, maintained that the trade unions must work with the party to obtain those ends that required conquering a municipal council and obtaining parliamentary legislation.³⁸⁰ Finally, the trade-unionist occupied many of the responsible posts within the party and many other officials who worked exclusively in the party were originally textile workers.

The second element of the strategy was the re-organisation of the party. The basic unit of the party was the quartier.³⁸¹ It took over many of the chambres syndicales activities. It took over, ran or established cooperatives, sporting clubs and federations, youth clubs, educational societies, literary and music societies, and its own network of pubs. The organisations of the quartier were responsible to the municipal organisation, which in turn was responsible to the conseil central of the region.³⁸² Party workers were required to undergo a three-month programme of studies based on the party's programme and aims. On a local level, the party not only coordinated activities but organised mutual aid during the strikes, solidarity meetings, and communicated news from workers of one industry to those of another.³⁸³ On a municipal level, it was organised to take power and re-organise municipal services which it did in Roubaix in 1892 and in Lille in 1896.³⁸⁴ Here it could organise transport, crèches, education and aid trade unions through municipal contracts. Delory records the advances of municipal socialism in his history of the POF in Lille.³⁸⁵

The programmes of the local and municipal parties emphasised practical ends and aims of the textile and metal workers.³⁸⁶ Delory realised that conditions in the rest of France were very different. For that reason he never sought to impose the Northern model on the other POF federations. Moreover, he needed their cooperation in the fields of trade-union organisation and in drawing up a list of common demands to be presented by the socialist group in parliament and for national campaigns. Hence, whereas Delory was a vigorous proponent of organisation in the Nord, when he addressed the national party he spoke only of the need for unity.³⁸⁷ Whereas Guesde addressed his audiences in lofty terms, talking about what could be possible if one worked together and evoked "scientific" justifications for his optimistic arguments, Delory restricted himself to practical problems and practical details. Indeed, if one can speak of a Bebel-Legien tandem in Germany, in France it would be Guesde-Delory or Guesde-Renard.³⁸⁸

The Northern model was interpreted by the artisan workers and craftsmen as a model subordinating the trade-union organisation to the party: a party whose tasks were local organisation, municipal socialism and where parliament had no place in the artisanal firmament. The syndicaliste révolutionnaire leaders attacked Guesde as a dictator who sought to impose his demands on the working class.³⁸⁹ Lagardelle saw the POF as a non-revolutionary party, because to be revolutionary meant to support the notion of the trade union as the basis of social organisation.³⁹⁰ In the North an organisation led by Delasalle, and for a time Delcluze, emphasised the primacy of artisanal demands. It was strong in regions where mechanisation was impossible, and where artisanal traditions were still held firm.³⁹¹

Despite the ideology of syndicalisme révolutionnaire, Renard - requiring a national trade-union federation - kept the textile federation in the CGT. And in response to the CGT's refusal to accept cooperation with the fledgling SFIO, Charte d'Amiens, Renard summed up his position by outlining how the party was in fact an adjunct of the trade-union movement. He declared that, given their demands, the trade unions required a political arm.³⁹² But the CGT saw this as subordinating the syndicat to a political cause.³⁹³ Ghesquière's statement that the trade union must be strong in order to negotiate and the role of the party was to help formulate a legal framework in which the trade unions could operate was interpreted by the syndicalistes révolutionnaires as meaning that the trade unions were so weak that they had to lean upon a non-revolutionary body which could impose its will upon them.³⁹⁴

Indeed, Ghesquière was stating quite the opposite and the difference between the Charte d'Amiens and Renard's document appears to be astonishingly small. Hence, we find that the POF in the Nord was a new party based upon the demands put forward by the workers in the new industries. We find that these demands were for a better distribution of the existing stock of values and for the time and possibility of using them. We find that, in order to obtain these demands, a new kind of organisation was necessary. We shall now look at the development of the POF in the Pas-de-Calais, and then try to explain how a revolutionary rhetoric was the language in which these very modest demands were made.

(b) The Mining Workers

With the exception of the tulle industry in Calais, the POF in the Pas-de-Calais never became an important organisation until the late 1890's.³⁹⁵ The reason for its late development was that the majority of the working population were miners and the nature of their daily lives, later to turn them into the most stalwart of party members, hindered them from entering the POF until conditions so altered that they were compelled to join en masse.

The great mining "bassin" was a band about twelve kilometers at its widest, stretching across the Nord from the Belgian border as Crespin, through the mining centres of Douai, Lens and Béthune in the Pas-de-Calais, and reaching as far West as Ligny.³⁹⁶ The first mines to be opened were those in the Nord. By the eve of the 1870-71 War, 4500 miners were employed at Anzin and 2800 at Aniche. The mines in the Pas-de-Calais were opened later, grew faster, larger and hence richer. In 1896, 46 thousand worked in the mines in the Pas-de-Calais. In 1906 there were 76 thousand.³⁹⁷ The area from Douai through Lens to Béthune, in particular, became a vast conglomeration of mines, depôts, and hastily-erected mining villages built by the mining companies to house their workers.³⁹⁸ This area became the focal point of the activity of the miners' trade union. The towns were cut from the same pattern, terraces of small two-storey houses, company stores leading to the centre of the town, dominated by the church built by the company to preserve the morals of its workers. There were few other facilities. The larger towns like Lens were almost a series of dormitories, each servicing one of the mines that cut the town into small pockets. In the Nord the mining region was cut off from the textile centres, with the exception of Valenciennes. In the Pas-de-Calais, industry which drew directly on the mines grew up late and was strenuously resisted by the mining companies. More than the Ruhrgebiet and Durham, the mining regions were isolated.³⁹⁹

The mining communities in France, by all accounts, were much more company towns than their counterparts in Germany or England. The mining companies at first had no choice but to supply the region and provide schooling and services but, later, given their desire to keep an ample supply of labour, they did everything in their power to increase that isolation. Oddly enough, this fueled the miners' militancy.

More than the other professions, the miners demanded a high degree of solidarity in their fight against unemployment, for higher wages and better working conditions. The proximity of work and home, and the controls exercised by the mining companies over every facet of their lives, demanded complete unity. For that reason the early attempts at forming miners' trade unions on a less than regional basis were failures. The attempt to create a federation in 1883 was met with wholesale eviction by the companies, and the 1884 strike also ended in disaster.⁴⁰⁰ The nature of work encouraged cooperation. Indeed, solidarity was even inculcated through the mass leisure activities that grew up in the mining communities.⁴⁰¹ Many of our modern team sports are derived from the mines. Clubs of every description, usually based on an out-door theme, flourished. Choral societies and youth clubs became a blending force in the communities.⁴⁰² Unlike any other profession, the miners formed a relatively closed community. Their needs were different from those of other workers and their solutions also.⁴⁰³

The social exclusiveness that was the basis of life in the mining towns led not only to militancy but also to political exclusiveness.⁴⁰⁴ The miners were the first to organise large trade-union federations and were among the first to send deputies to parliament.⁴⁰⁵ From their inception, the trade unions were independent of the bourses, FNS and, later, the CGT. They maintained a respectable distance from political organisations. Initially strong enough to put their own demands they saw the textile-based POF as an intruder. When Guesde praised the miners' federation in 1891 and announced his support for the eight-hour day campaign and emissaries were sent to convert the miners' leaders,⁴⁰⁶ Lamendin saw this as an attempt to divide the socialist movement in the mining areas and weaken the miners' movement.⁴⁰⁷

Led by Basly and Lamendin, the miners rarely intervened in the political battles within the Fédérations of Nord and Pas-de-Calais. Whilst espousing many similar demands, like national legislation for insurance and pensions and supporting the drive for the eight-hour day, the miners spoke only of the mining communities and never worked with the POF.⁴⁰⁰ Their alliances depended only upon what was immediately necessary for the community. Hence Basly and Lamendin led the miners' groups out of the national federation when the miners from the Midi voted for the general strike.⁴⁰⁹ But in 1893, after having finally organised a viable regional federation and after having been defeated in the great miners' strike of 1893 by the strength of a national organisation of mine-owners, Basly returned to the miners' federation which he took over by 1896.⁴¹⁰ From 1896, he laboured to organise the miners' communities into a fighting force. A very complex organisation based upon regional secretariats was set up, and a central organisation to sift claims and decide upon what action to take was founded. Basly's aim was to have the organisation recognised as a negotiating body and in that way to head off strikes. But the corollary to his organisation was the need to control local organisations when they seemed to get out of hand.⁴¹¹

Indeed, by 1900, the situation did get out of hand. Fearful of the POF, Basly entered into a socialist federation with the autonomous section of the Calais POF-dissidents. Many of the miners, particularly from the Nord, like Rondet, felt that the only corollary to Basly's "scientific" organisation was to enter into an alliance with the only viable socialist force in the region, the POF.⁴¹² In the Nord, where the mining population was smaller, support from the textile workers in particular could have been useful. And, in fact, Rondet's arguments appeared to become increasingly accepted. In the period 1894-99 only 17.8 percent of the POF's membership in the Pas-de-Calais was made up of miners. By 1900 this had increased to 57.8 percent.⁴¹³ Rondet's campaign was not the only reason for this sudden influx. Important changes were taking place in the mining communities as a result of the introduction of machinery and the re-classification of jobs. The wage structures were altered to the disadvantage of the craftsmen, and most of the unskilled workers did not benefit from the older forms of paternalism. There were being progressively withdrawn so that housing, schools, and insurance became just as pressing for the miners as for the textile workers.⁴¹⁴ Finding that Basly's centralised organisation did little to prevent these changes, many areas exploded into periodic strikes as much against the

trade union as against the owners. Finding their demands ignored, they went so far as to join the guesdistes in what was called the Jeune syndicat. In the short run, the federation controlled the movement but the vituperation and charges of collusion with the mine-owners almost destroyed the trade union. By 1905 the need for unity, the evaporation of differences between the miners and industrial workers, and the attraction of the new socialist party, proved sufficient for Lamendin to adhere to the new party and for the miners as a block sufficient to move into the SFIO.⁴¹⁵

In other words, the POF became the political arm of the workers in heavy industry. This is important not only in the case of France but because the kinds of workers and situations we have just been describing were the most prominent and normal in Germany. That is, our hypothesis should hold for the German experience also.

It now remains for us to advance hypotheses as to why the party—clearly the weapon of workers seeking satisfaction outside work through consumption—should have also espoused aims that were revolutionary.

The Uses of the P O F

We have argued until now that it is possible to speak of two distinct kinds of POF, broadly based on a distinction between the party that flourished in a community where artisanship and craftsmanship were the dominant forms of production, and a community transformed by mechanisation where industrial workers accounted for a majority of the working-class population. We have argued that in its initial phase the POF, with its largest musterings in areas of high artisan concentration, reflected the problems and the Weltanschauung of the artisan worker and craftsman. The party that was established in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais as a result of the textile-mining-metals industrial transformation reflected the Weltanschauung of the industrial worker.

We have seen that the artisan party was a fosterer and guardian of the artisan crafts, traditions and aspirations. When the party could no longer fulfil all these tasks in toto, it disappeared from the artisanal community and was replaced by institutions that defended the artisans' traditions more vehemently.⁴¹⁶ These were the institutions that led to the emergence of the philosophy of syndicalisme révolutionnaire, the post-1888 bourses du travail and their appendage, the small-union dominated Confédération générale du travail.

But our interests lie more in the direction of examining the party created by the industrial workers. The advent of the mass socialist party in France was a result of the growth of heavy and mechanised industrial complexes. The industrial workers were responsible for the transformation of the party from a sect on the national level and a series of coordinating bodies on the local level into a national organisation. The industrial transformation responsible for the rise of the industrial workers' party in France occurred in Germany at least ten years previously. The artisan workers all but disappeared by the time the party was reorganised in 1891 and within the party and trade-union movements the transition to an industrial workers' party occurred earlier and more smoothly than in France. If we look at the Arnsberger and Düsseldorfer Regierungsbezirke, two areas comparable in size and industrial development to the Nord and Pas-de-Calais taken together, we find that already in 1882 the percentage of workers engaged in heavy industry was as high as it was in the two Northern départements in 1906. Moreover, the percentage of workers engaged in heavy industries employing more than 500 workers was as high in 1882 in Arnsberg and Düsseldorf as it was in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais in 1896. The heavy metals' industry engaged sixty percent more workers in Arnsberg and fifty percent more workers in Düsseldorf in 1882 than in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais in 1906. In 1895 the figures for the two German Regierungsbezirke are respectively eighty percent and sixty percent higher and for Düsseldorf in 1907 almost three-hundred percent higher. Hence, what we say about the relationship between socialism and the industrial workers in France has some pertinence to the German case not only because the theories of Guesde and Kautsky were similar but also because the German working class and the SPD had long been composed in their majority of industrial workers.

Moreover, the initial conditions leading to the rapid development of the textile/coal/metals phase and a high degree of industrial concentration were the hallmark of turn-of-the-century Germany. France was still a largely agricultural country and, comparatively speaking, her industry was as much devoted towards the production of luxury goods produced by artisanal labour as more heavy-duty goods produced only in small quantities outside the North and East. Britain, long the leading industrial power, for a host of reasons never developed her metal industries nor the newer power industries (gas and electricity) to the extent to which they were being developed in Germany. If we compose an index based upon the production

of fuels, textiles, metals and the development of transport using the appropriate figures for Britain in 1850 to equal 100; we find evidence of the rapid development of Germany.⁴¹⁸

	<u>1850</u>	<u>1870</u>	<u>1880</u>	<u>1890</u>	<u>1900</u>	<u>1910</u>
Britain	100	239	377	546	532	602
France	22	95	142	200	269	351
Germany	23	124	218	288	533	834

The changes were due to the development of the industries based on metal manufacture. As we have pointed out, the working and living conditions were most typical of the industrial workers who formed the turn-of-the-century socialist organisations. What we say about the relationship between socialism and the industrial workers in France would seem to have some pertinence to the German case. We know that the German working class and the SPD had long been composed in their majority of industrial workers. Not only are there strong resemblances between the theories of Guesde, Lafargue and Kautsky, but also in the way they were accepted and used. Clearly a study of the relationship between expressed ideology, class and party along the lines we have been outlining for the French case is called for in studying the SPD. As I have indicated before, I cannot undertake this investigation here because the material is still not available. The tradition of the Grünberger Archiv was broken by the War and its ideological hangovers. Abendroth and Hoffmann have done much to renew the tradition, but until we have more material like the local studies for France and the synthetic studies done by people attached to, or fellow travellers of, the Annales group, my argument in the case of Germany, can be no more than the suggestion of a hypothesis.⁴¹⁹

In the last section, I schematised the normal life-style of the industrial workers and suggested why their requirements for security, improving the work regime in the factory, the way in which they had to fight for wage claims and their many demands outside the factory initiated a need for solidarity and a political organisation to fight for their ends that went far beyond the political needs of the artisan workers and craftsmen.

We also found that the principles underlying their demands were reflected in the basic principles of the POF. The theory of distribution at the core of their demands is clearly expressed in the writings of Lafargue, Guesde and

and Bebel. We found that guesdisme played a mobilising role, but that it was remarkably inconsistent. Its notion of capitalist exploitation was based purely upon an economic evaluation - the denial of the just rewards of work. The essence of Marx's theory, the contradiction between exchange value and use value as it is experienced and the strategic consequences he drew from that theory never entered into the guesdiste universe. Like their German cousins, the guesdistes could never reconcile their view that capitalism would perish from its own internal economic contradictions with their emphasising the need for working-class unity and organisation. Are we about to suggest that the Weltanschauung and practice of the industrial working class were responsible for this continuing contradiction? Indeed, are we about to concede that the industrial working class at the turn of the century could not be a revolutionary class?

My argument will be that under normal conditions the industrial working class could not be revolutionary and that the institutions it created were defensive institutions created for normal conditions. But under extraordinary conditions, such as strikes, various political forms of unrest, etc. there is some evidence that this class could be revolutionary. Its propensity to revolution was latent or potential. It was blocked not only by its material conditions but by the workings of its own Weltanschauung. That Weltanschauung proposed an ersatz notion of liberation which in fact was an ideology of social adjustment. The institutions of the industrial working class were formed to operate within that Weltanschauung. One should, therefore, not be surprised that in times of stress, as we shall see, one of the first things to be discarded was the trade-union movement - and the party.

To defend this hypothesis I must distinguish between what one might call the general conditions of working-class existence and the specific or experienced conditions during this period. The former, broadly speaking, is subjugation to a system of social norms over which the individual has no control, and the latter the way in which the general condition was perceived, interpreted and acted upon.

To a large extent, the bugbear throughout our study has been the vast chasm separating socialist intentions from socialist action. We should be far from surprised that intentions and actions do not coincide nor that intentions often contradict actions, and actions can be interpreted and described by the actor as justifications and sublimations rather than an analysis of what

was actually done.⁴²⁰ We should accept the contradiction and try to explain it rather than labelling actions as inconsistent and leaving it at that. Writers as different from each other as Nietzsche, Freud and Lévi-Strauss would call such a contradiction the normal state of man in society (though they would sharply disagree whether it is just capitalist society or any society they are discussing).⁴²¹ The data of the contradiction, they would maintain, are what allow us to begin to describe that society and that social group which is the focal point of its contradictions. Thus, having first surveyed the theoretical background or - as Lévi-Strauss would say - the myths of that society and then the concrete background of the daily lives of the industrial working class, we can now engage in some theoretical guess-work.

The essence of the general condition has been the theme of industrial sociologists of the human relations school like Blauner and Walker,⁴²² the historico-sociologists of the sociologie du travail tradition like Friedmann, Naville, Touraine, Mallet and Chombart de Lauwe.⁴²³ They all agree that the factory is the most consummate embodiment of Marx and/or Freud's notion of alienation. The sharp division between working activity and non-working activity which hallmarked the mechanisation of industry at the beginning of the century alienated the worker in two ways: firstly, he could not control the rhythms of his labour in the factory and, secondly, the activities he engaged in outside the factory were spurious and superficial replacement activities for work. Although he yearns for, and defies an escape from work, non-work because it consummated his denial of the importance and meaning of work only heightened his alienated condition. In other words, the worker exerted no control over the rhythms of his life and the general forms and directions of his activities were categories which he at no stage helped to create. His general condition was thus one of social alienation. Indeed, Touraine and Mallet insist that awareness of this state will eventually lead to the cultural revolution of which the socialist parties at the turn of the century were supposedly the initiators.⁴²⁴

But why should the general condition, if it is a true description of the state of the industrial working class, not be apparent? Why were the industrial workers not aware of their conditions? Here we must examine their specific conditions, or how the general conditions were perceived, interpreted and acted upon.

We have already seen that all socialist literature and trade-union literature emphasised that work was largely instrumental to escaping from work and to seeking compensation through the accumulation of sought-after products and activities. Halbwachs' study of working-class needs, De Man's study of the mining and metal workers in Belgium, Dubois' study of cultural aspirations, and the demands of trade-union organisations we have examined all agree on this point. The satisfaction and pride characteristic of a labour in which creativeness and completeness are present were absent. Control over rhythms and over the decisions on what was to be produced, and under what conditions, escaped the worker. For example, whereas the artisan and craftsman still produced a finished product, could still feel pride in their work and still obtain certain social rewards stemming from recognition of their craft in their communities, all of these were absent in the world of the industrial worker. His rhythms were controlled by machines and the decisions about the speed at which to operate the machines were made by an increasingly - and even physically - remote chain of command. All evidence points to artisan-satisfaction being dependent upon a return to a past life style.⁴²⁵ The writings of the artisan movement, as we have seen, emphasise the primordial value of the small craftsman and his craft organisation. Their own product was valued and all they sought was the social recognition of that value. We never find consumptive demands being made by the artisan workers.⁴²⁶

For the industrial workers, however, in whose lives all the elements of artisanal satisfaction were lacking, their recourse was to compensate for their condition in activities where they could control the rhythms of their labour and to seek satisfaction in replacement goods that either gave a semblance of control or through their completeness made up for the atomisation and thwarted desires of the work situation.⁴²⁷ The return to the old life style was impossible because the very essence of existence away from the work place had changed so drastically. The huge factories, the tenements, the endless cities - supposedly the products of progress - could not be so easily destroyed as carrying out the artisan propositions would obviously have entailed. These, as a product of their own labour, could all be improved so that they could constitute a viable world of escape from work.⁴²⁸

In that sense the industrial workers constructed a world of leisure and pleasure that was an exotic reversal of the world of work.⁴²⁹ Away from work, they

dressed, or dreamed of dressing, in white impractical, linen suits, for which they even - as Halbwachs indicated - would forego many basic necessities⁴³⁰. They engaged in activities that not only gave them the semblance of controlling rhythms of intricate mechanical processes but were the very opposite of their working conditions.⁴³¹ According to Janine Larrue, metal workers who produced components in the factory spent their free time producing little machines. Potters who worked on mechanical wheels produced their own hand-made pots.⁴³² Miners expressed themselves through music in contrast to the cacophonous howling of the machines and pressure drills. Along with the other workers enclosed in noisy and dirty workshops, they emphasised sports, fresh air, javelot, cycling and other sports which allowed one to exercise one's muscles more freely, such as boxing and football. They gambled to the point of compromising their families' welfare as a defiance of life.⁴³³

For the artisan life in the workshop and life outside the workshop still had the semblance of unity.⁴³⁴ For the worker who found this unity broken, the only succour lay in the direction of escape and substitution, the search for replacement quality in objects and their accumulation.⁴³⁵

We have already seen that a long list of needs rose directly from the need to be better prepared to work: transport, housing, education, health, crèches and time to spend at home with the family. Could one expect total satisfaction from the possession of objects which made work possible and allowed one to save enough time or rest sufficiently to be fit to work again?

But all other forms of leisure activities seem, in part, to make one fit for the norms of regulations of work. In their analyses of leisure activities, Magnage Vinnai, Habermas and Friedmann conclude that the kinds of leisure practised by the industrial working class inculcate values and reinforce a series of responses that made the work process itself appear to be unalterable.⁴³⁶ If we look at sporting activities and replacement activities, we find that they are composed of a series of principles which reinforce the pattern of work. Most sporting activities and mechanical games emphasise competitive principles racing against a clock and making the most efficient possible use of mechanical-like processes. They also emphasise working together as a team. Other leisure activities - collection clubs, cycling clubs and consumers' groups - emphasise what Veblen called conspicuous consumption, and served to prepare the worker to be a better consumer.⁴³⁷ Most leisure

activities relaxed muscles by permitting them to be exerted under conditions where physically the worker would have control over his rhythms, and thus reduced tension arising from the lack of control over rhythms at work. Hence, not only do leisure activities allow one to "act out" problems of work but also inculcate the principles of the mechanised factory. Each of these principles is necessary for the proper working of the factory and the maintenance of order within the community.⁴³⁸ In other words, leisure seems to be not so much an escape into freedom as a resting period which, nonetheless, conditions the worker for his life in the factory and for the acceptance of work as a necessary task. It dictates to him that leisure time is the only other imaginable activity outside work, and that the rules and norms of work are eternal and necessary. In other words, no other form of social organisation is feasible. To think of reforming work and imbuing it with enjoyment and pleasure which allowed the exertion of creativity was even abstracted from the definition of work.⁴³⁹

We can see how the principle of social stability or the eternity of existing social relations was enforced by another activity - the holiday. According to Larrue and Minces,⁴⁴⁰ the notion of the holiday was a product of the new industrial system. Bussel and Chombart de Lauwe show that the holiday at the beginning of the century was not yet a widely practised form of leisure, for the good reason that few workers could afford it.⁴⁴¹ In the Nord, in particular, owing to the proximity of the Channel coastal resorts, holidays began to become a not infrequent practice towards the end of the last century. But the holiday was a shared experience.⁴⁴² It was usually organised by the trade unions; vacationers shared accommodation and meals. It was a group activity and an activity over which the organisers exercised complete control. The holiday, moreover, contributed something of the exotic into the workers' life. In addition to the sea or country landscape, the places of accommodation were given exotic names - or names suggestive of aristocratic idleness.⁴⁴³ Activities were clothed in a mystic, and the décor of the accommodation was of the South Seas, or other such exotic areas.⁴⁴⁴ All of these contributed to creating an image that banished any thought of the world of work. Yet the very refusal to evoke the world of work heightened its reality. The activities and the planning were arranged hierarchically, with the participants exerting no control over choice or selection. Could this not but enforce the notion that all activity must be organised from above? The holiday was built around the notion of total idleness: there was no way in which creativeness could be expended. Did this not, as Halbwachs stressed, suggest

to the worker, that a return to normal activity was without an alternative? Did not his already strong affirmation of himself through his own labour and the marginal feeling of usefulness it gave him combine with the "inevitability of normalcy and lead him to see work as the "source of all value"?⁴⁴⁵

Accordingly, we find a pattern. Work demands relaxation, a change in rhythms and leisure, but the form and content of leisure enforced the readiness and willingness to work as well as communicating a message of the eternity of the existing form of social relations. The daily activities of the industrial working class were imbued with this message and one should be scarcely astonished that the industrial working class' own interpretations of its activities communicated the inevitability of work and the impossibility of taking any radical alternative seriously.

Halbwachs' conclusion that the activities of the working class, the way they were perceived, digested and acted upon contributed to social integration is one that makes sense.⁴⁴⁶ The party can be seen to have played an important role in this integration through the content and form of the message it supplied as an aggregator and organiser. The content of the party's message, the ideology of the party supplied by its theorists, communicated the idea that the products of industrial civilisation and the desire to consume are the hallmarks of progress and civilisation. The emphasis of Bernstein and Kautsky on the backwardness of the Chinese, and the refusal of Guesde to thoroughly condemn imperialism, demonstrate the pride in industrial society.⁴⁴⁷ The factory and the civilisation it created were considered to be the essence of human progress and the key to the solution of all human problems; Bebel argued that these gains must, in fact, be stoutly defended against any and all comers.⁴⁴⁸ The pride of the workman in the construction of the new civilisation was encouraged and this pride helped guard him against any dangerous actions that might jeopardise the future of that civilisation. The ethic of consumption that the party was built to defend meant that one must work in order to achieve the right to consume. We find that this echoed the native Weltanschauung of the industrial working class. All of the messages delivered by the party, as we have seen, enforced these fundamental feelings. Indeed, one can say that the distributive ideology of Kautsky and Guesde hampered the worker from perceiving his own general condition.

But what explosive and violent forces must be contained in that civilisation, as Freud wrote, that was but the sum of rules and regulations to protect men against their natural desires and to adjust their mutual relations to a society where endeavour and investment in labour far exceeded any possible satisfaction. ⁴⁴⁹ Is not the sudden growth of what the police called crime against property in the industrial areas signs of these explosive qualities? ⁴⁵⁰ Medical records, too, indicate an immense growth in the number of mal-adjusted and insane. Unfortunately we shall never be able to know what these forms of maladjustment were. According to Halbwachs, the true plight of the industrial worker - of which these occasional outbursts and breakdowns were symptoms - was a Weltanschauung which made any alternative unimaginable because imagination was already directed towards fulfilment within the existing form of society. ⁴⁵¹ Freud despaired at any solution. The marriage of Eros and Thanatos and the destruction of the super-ego were, in his mind, even an impossibility for his patients who at least had the signal advantage over the industrial worker of being above social mores. ⁴⁵² But to Freud, the industrial worker was the child of society seeking satisfaction in quantity and capable of no more than outbursts of temper. ⁴⁵³

From these suggestions, one can establish a hypothesis that the Weltanschauung of the industrial working class played a capital role in preventing that class from grasping the nature of its own general conditions and proposing a strategy which would secure its release.

Ordinarily one thinks of imagination as a creative force. Imagination is generally supposed to be our way of overcoming barriers which hinder us in our pursuit of objects and activities that will bring us satisfaction. Or imagination is our way of discovering new ways of obtaining satisfaction in our lives. All the theories we have examined concur that the industrial worker's imagination was distorted and deformed because he neither controlled the rhythms of his activities nor the luxury provided by that control, the freedom to develop an imagination which could scale the barriers before him. As Halbwachs noted, the producer of the goods providing the basis of exchange in capitalist society was condemned in all the facets of his life to be no more than a consumer. ⁴⁵⁴

Based on the assumption that satisfaction could be obtained through commodities and the accumulation of commodities, the industrial worker's Weltanschauung was his greatest barrier in grasping the general conditions of his existence. In the course of his daily life he could not develop a counter-theory.

Our examination of the ideas behind the strategy of the mass socialist parties revealed that they could hardly be the means to make the industrial working class aware of its general condition. We found that the seminal notion of the wider distribution of the existing stock of social values implies the acceptance of many of the mechanisms of existing society rather than opposition. Nonetheless, socialist literature and activities are resplendent in images of a future classless society. Guesde, once he outlined the practical reasons for a strong working-class movement, would then launch into depicting a dream world where the international brotherhood of man would come into being and a society based on the theorem "from each according to his ability to each according to his needs" would apply. In Die Frau Bebel painted a society of plenty where all the cares of the industrial world would disappear, where man would be liberated from labour and the claustrophobic social bonds of capitalist society. If only the working class would organise, Bebel shouted from the platform, then all its dreams would become possible.

Guesde and Bebel were publicists and propagandists for an ideal and for the means to obtain that ideal. The ideal was not to change fundamentally the forms of social activity of capitalist society but to increase consumption. According to the socialists, the essence of increasing consumption was to give the worker the time and the means of enjoying the fruits of his labour. This is the same as the idea that one can be rewarded only after one has toiled and one has degraded oneself. What was the purpose of evoking a utopia when the immediate aim was not that utopia? Why was the response to utopia so great? Why was socialist rhetoric always so thick with the imagery of utopia, and why were socialist icons designed to deify utopia?

The organisation that Guesde and Bebel exhorted the workers to join was itself formed to fight for immediate ends. These immediate ends themselves made it all but impossible for the worker to obtain a global picture of his own immediate condition. We know that to organise a political movement at the beginning of the century was difficult. In Germany there were innumerable laws which hindered political organisation. In France, as well as in Germany, membership of the socialist party could often cost a worker his job. Because organisation was so fraught with danger for the ordinary workingman, does this mean that the rhetoric was the sauce added to the message of organisation? Evoking the image of a durable world where all existing social relations would be abolished and where the machine would be so completely at the command of the worker that he could no longer have to raise a finger clearly stirred the imagination of the ordinary

industrial workman. A world which was the complete opposite of the world of toil was a dream, and like all dreams it was too good to be true. But its mere evocation raised the fervour and spirits of the workman. Bebel's crude theory of electricity as the deliverer of the workman was telling. The book was reprinted fifty times before 1914. In a dangerous and contradictory world, a myth was necessary not only to make the message that one must organise more palpable and to enforce the solidarity necessary to make the trade union and the party organisations a serious interlocutor, but also to counter the workers' unconscious scepticism about quantity being somehow alchemised into quality. In the rhetoric of the socialist movement, do we not find a repetition of the message of the myths of the Northwest Indians to make one feel that one was fortunate even to lead a totally futile life and to be grateful for even the meagre existence that one led? Outside was a world of unemployment, the past was the devalued existence of the peasant and there was no way of achieving utopia without totally destroying the existing world and with it one's own means of subsistence.

The very essence of the utopian message was to warn the worker away from taking extreme action and to have faith in the party. It does this by setting up a contradiction between satisfaction and enjoyment and the means by which they are to be obtained. The notions of collective enjoyment of the fruits of labour contradicted the more fundamental idea that satisfaction through possession or through an activity could only be individual satisfaction. Yet the means must be collective. If satisfaction can only be individual, how could it be communal? If satisfaction, as we have seen, through goods and replacement activities led to frustration and unhappiness, where else could the worker find meaning in life?

The message propounded by Guesde and Bebel was that the working class could only hope to attain its immediate ends through the actions of the party. In Bebel's words, organisation must come first and the process of liberation after.⁴⁵⁵ The party clothed the immediate demands of the working class with the idea that the demands were all it could fight for. It fought against the dissatisfaction with replacement objects and activities by demonstrating that there was no other path. With its belief in its own historical infallibility and the principle that the party's theorists were there to guide the working class towards its utopia, the party served as an unflinching guarantor that, by adhering to the straight and narrow, the working class would eventually achieve its own society. In that subtle way, the party was a strong bulwark against the working class's ever becoming aware of its own

general condition and devising a strategy of liberation based upon the thorough understanding of that condition. So high did they build their defences, one might say, that they themselves could never scale them to pass to the attack.⁴⁵⁶

We can now advance a hypothesis that accounts for what I earlier called the irreconcilability of the party that worked for practical and immediate ends and the party that preached revolution. The party, indeed, played both role simultaneously. We have seen that it was the aggregator of immediate working-class demands; it was the institution designed to obtain the greater distribution of the existing stock of social values that formed an intrinsic part of the normal Weltanschauung of the industrial working class. I have now contributed a second argument; that the party played an important role in stopping the working class just short of fighting for its utopia by convincing it that the battle for increased consumption and distribution was the only battle that could be engaged. The rhetoric and imagery of the party are rich in the futurism of utopia; but these are dream images. I mean that to fight for utopian immediately would have meant stepping into the unknown and stepping into the unknown, in party rhetoric, invoked images of self-destruction. The pride of the worker could hardly brook his destroying his own creations under normal circumstances. It was sufficient of the party to remind him of this, as we shall see, to hasten his retreat.

I have so far been describing what could be called an ideal type, and like all ideal types, it assumes constant and unchanging conditions. I have specified what the demands of the industrial working class were under normal conditions, and how its Weltanschauung eased its acceptance of those conditions. I have tried to show that its institutions can be interpreted as defensive institutions as well as institutions designed to obtain immediate demands. We have also seen evidence that these demands were insufficient because they did nothing to alter the general conditions of the industrial workers.

We can see this more clearly if we look at those events where the normal condition of the working class was drastically altered. We find that the shopping list of consumers' goods and the channeling of demands through existing institutions changes. These situations are those in which the working class is compelled to fight for its ends: strikes that tend to involve the home as well as the factory, general political campaigns such as the battle against the proposed suffrage reforms in Germany and in Belgium.

The information about such events is not available in sufficient detail to make a thorough appraisal. Strikes were reported by the party and trade-union

press. It is only natural to suppose that a strike raising issues that embarrassed either institution or challenged their authority would not be fairly treated. Indeed, if we look at the party press in France during the great miners' strike of 1903 and the Korrespondenzblatt during the German miners' strikes of 1889 and 1905, we find reports about anarchist activity and solemn warning to party and trade-union members not to fall into their clutches.⁴⁵⁷ We find trade-union leaders speaking about adventurists and people jumping the gun. They contrast these "isolated individuals" with the loyal masses of the party and trade union fighting for the immediate aims of the strike and refusing to be dragged into "utopian dreaming".⁴⁵⁸ Local police reports are also unreliable.⁴⁵⁹ In the mining communities it is fair to suppose that their informers would be few and in other communities it is fair to assume that they would place whatever information they received under their pre-conceived categories of agitation and working-class agitators. Yet, here again they do raise some interesting points: they reported that the trade union during the 1903 miners' strike seemed unable to control their members and again during the great miners' strike in the Ruhr that the trade union seemed out-of-tune with the desires of the working class. They were not allowed to address meetings and their authority was challenged at every turn.⁴⁶⁰

Perhaps the best study we have of such a situation is Koch's study of the miners in Germany because it focuses squarely on the problem.⁴⁶¹ Koch indicates that the strike, like most strikes at that time, started spontaneously and against the wishes of the trade-union leaders and the party leaders who saw a chance to recruit the miners into the party. We find a similar process in both the 1903 miners' strike in France and the strike of the textile workers that same year, where Renard tried to put down a strike declared months before he deemed it appropriate.⁴⁶² In both cases, we find a tendency for the normal demands to be superceded. Koch notes that the miners' strike raised questions about the finality of work and about community.⁴⁶³ The miners were dissatisfied when told that their strike was only a strike about wage rates and that community problems had nothing to do with trade-union activity. In several towns union officials were driven away. Otto Hué, a miners' leader and a member of the Reichstag delegation, told Bebel that the movement must be brought under control because it threatened to destroy the trade union and posed a serious problem for the party if it were to spread.⁴⁶⁴ In the French strike of 1903 the trade union seemed to be just as much under

attack as the mining companies. Basly was condemned for moving too slowly and for not showing sufficient interest in the miners' claims. What were their claims? Guesde, galvanised to attenuate the miners' feelings, told them that their initial claims had been rational demands but now they exceeded what the trade-union could give them, and they were straying on to the territory where the party fought for working-class interests.⁴⁶⁵

These incidents seem to show that when normal conditions no longer prevailed, the industrial working class lost its perceptual landmarks. It began to make claims that not only exceeded its demands for distribution and consumption but transcended the boundaries of its normal Weltanschauung. The new demands it made were for an appropriation of its living space. Neither trade union nor party could accede to these claims for the simple reason that neither institution was capable of responding to such pressure. The party was the aggregator of immediate demands, and because it was the aggregator it also imposed and defended a framework of thought and a framework of action. Under abnormal conditions, it is easy to see why the party was attacked and why, once under attack, it defended the framework of its action. The framework and strategy alone seemed rational and any action that undermined its distributive theory was classified as irrational. As such, the party was a product of the working class's own alienation and dilemma. The working man's incapability in "normal" times to perceive the path of his own liberation and its tendency to construct institutions for those aims led to institutions whose weight would crush him in abnormal times.

Indeed, Max Weber commented to Michels upon visiting the Mannheim Congress of the SPD in 1906 that the German bourgeoisie had nothing to fear from its working class as its leaders were stern "spießbürgerliche" task-masters, interested in order, control and rational thinking.⁴⁶⁶ He marvelled at the way that Bebel and Legien were able to quell the fervour stirred by events in Russia with references to party tradition and the mere phrase, "Unsere Schwäche".⁴⁶⁷

Our findings suggest that any analysis of the POF should take into account that the role of the party was to defend the working class and fight for the alienated demands it made. The POF was an organisation based upon the normal demands of the industrial working class and it was encapsulated in a mystique to make those demands seem attractive and satisfying. Not enough attention has been paid to the attacks made by the party against

irrational demands and irrational actions. Irrationality was called anarchism and associated with images of social destruction and disintegration. Moreover in France the party was able to draw convincingly on the CGT as an example. To the industrial workers the demands of the artisans smacked of irrationalism.

The main problem of the industrial working class was the strength of its ideological ties to its imposed existence and its inability to conceptualise and actualise the path of its own liberation. The party rather than being a vehicle of revolution was a practical weapon for limited demands and a sublimator of non-actualisable utopias. The rhetoric and festivities of the party were ceremonies of acting out frustrations and, like most rituals, communicated a message that the present - no matter how unpalatable - was omnipresent and eternal.

Neither the theory of the POF nor the structure of the industrial working class which supported the party and to whom it pitched its message permitted the party to be the vehicle of revolution of which Marx and Engels spoke. We found evidence of this in the fact that the POF, and indeed the SPD, could not comprehend the occasional explosions of the working class. There is a great deal of truth in the view expressed, perhaps inadvertently, in Le socialiste where some unknown editorialist wrote:

"Le parti socialiste ... , dont la mission est à organiser toute la classe ouvrière dans un parti, impose à ses militants le devoir à exprimer leur foi ardent dans ses doctrines d'émancipation dans tous les élections générales." 468

There remains an implication in this hypothesis which became important in the future. The idea that the notion of socialism depended upon obtaining a wider distribution of the existing stock of social values combined with the notion that the party was guide, protector, organiser, wet-nurse and task-master of the working class was enacted in a consequential way.

NOTES.

1. The original FTTSF split into the POF, (the adherents of Guesde) and the FTTSF (or possibilistes) in 1881 and 1882. In turn the FTTSF split once more into the Parti ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire (allemanistes) and a new FTTSF (broussistes) in 1890. The CRC split in 1889 over the Boulanger question, the vieux Blanquistes led by Rochefort, being extinguished the same year and the Parti socialiste révolutionnaire, led by Edouard Vaillant continuing to function. By 1896 a group of former radicaux and unaffiliated members of parliament coalesced into a group called the Socialistes independantes, led by Jean Jaurès and Alexandre Millerand. All of these organisations came together temporarily between 1899 and 1900 through the Comite d'entente and the Comite d'unité. They then divided into the Parti socialiste de France, led by Guesde and Vaillant and the Parti socialiste français led by Jaurès and Allemane. Finally the two organisations merged in 1905 to constitute the Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière-Parti socialiste unifié, in 1905. Many of its notables, Gerault-Richard, Briand, Augagneur left in the autumn of that year and eventually set up the Parti républicain socialiste. The unity achieved between 1899 and 1900 was more apparent than real according to L. F. Pelloutier, Le congrès general du parti socialiste français, Paris, 1899; and Leon Blum, "Les congrès ouvriers et socialistes", in L'oeuvre de Léon Blum, tome i, 1891-1905, Paris, 1954, pp.477-82, 486-89.
2. Laura Lafargue was a penetrating observer of these events. Despite Bottigelli's three volume collection of the Lafargue-Engels correspondence, it is probable that many of the most critical letters were judiciously destroyed (Maurice Dommangeat, introduction, Paul Lafargue, Le droit à la paresse, Paris, 1968, pp. 4-5; Laura Lafargue to Engels, 20.5.89 and 18.4.91, Correspondance, tome ii, pp. 268-69 and tome iii, pp. 38-40; Paul Lafargue to Engels, 8.8.88 and 16.10.90, Correspondance, tome ii, pp. 427-29 and tome iii, pp. 165-67.
3. Most of the writings of the party militants who considered themselves to be in the Marxist tradition took the form of articles and short pamphlets. Many of the pamphlets were, in fact, transcripts of public meetings, and Lafargue never wrote a book of the length of Kautsky's efforts, whilst Deville, for the most part, restricted himself to exegesis during his Marxist phase. Willard, pp. 25-26.
4. There are few sociological studies as such. The first is that by Ernst Posse, Der Marxismus in Frankreich 1871-1905, Jena 1930; the most recent is that of Claude Willard, Le mouvement socialiste en France, Les Guesdistes, Paris 1966; many writers like Touraine, Mallet and Rioux have been suggestive but none have yet produced a work of the order of Ritter and Matthias. Alain Touraine, La conscience ouvrière, Paris, 1966, Serge Mallet, La nouvelle classe ouvrière, Paris, 1969 edition; Lucien Rioux, Notions d'histoire du mouvement ouvrier français, Paris, 1962.

5. Charles Mauger, Les débuts du socialisme marxiste en France, Paris, 1908, pp. 10-12, a doctoral thesis based exclusively on an analysis of the theoretical writings of the party; Blum, pp. 393-95, 407; Alexandre Zévaès, Sur l'écran politique, ombres et silhouettes, Paris, 1908, the closest thing to a maverick in the POF, many of Zévaès' conclusions bear the scar of personal quarrels, pp. 56, 79; Daniel Ligou, L'histoire du socialisme en France, 1871-1961, Paris, 1962, pp. 67-68; Madeleine Réberieux, "Le mouvement socialiste en France", Annales, sept.-oct. 1965, pp. 523-24, since that time Mlle. Réberieux seems to have changed her mind, introduction, Jean Jaurès, L'armée nouvelle, Paris, 1969, pp. 34-38; Willard, p. 28; Paul Louis, Le parti socialiste en France, Paris, 1912, pp. 5-6, Louis was one of the organisers of the early SFIO and a party historian, the present volume is part of the Compère-Morel series. Charles Rappoport, Précis du communisme, Strasbourg, 1929, pp. 12-13; Willard, Textes choisis, p. 24.
6. Mauger, pp. 11-12; Zévaès, Jules Guesde 1845-1922, Paris, 1928, p. 193; Daniel Halévy, L'histoire du socialisme européen, Paris, 1948, p. 190.
7. Zévaès, opcit., pp. 102-108.
8. Ligou, pp. 63-64.
9. Réberieux, pp. 524-25.
10. Willard, Le mouvement socialiste, p. 52.
11. ibid., pp. 53, 599-600; this theme is more explicit in his earlier Textes choisis, p. 38 where he talks of Guesde occupying the "... premier rang de ceux qui ...auront préparé la victoire du socialisme en France."
12. Cole, vol. iii, part i, pp. 320, 325.
13. Ligou, pp. 86-87; Louis, pp. 19-21; Zévaès, pp. 45-48; R. Aron, Karl Marx et les marxistes français, Paris, 1948, makes substantially the same point, pp. 12-13.
14. The first sign of this is found in an article by Guesde, "Le 16 mai et les socialistes allemands", that appeared in Hüchberg's Die Zukunft 18.7.78, the theme was popular in the first wave of the guesdiste press Lyon-socialiste, 9.11.84; and later in the Nord when the party was relaunched at the beginning of the 1890's; Le cri du travailleur, 27.8.90, 31.8.90; Le cri du peuple, 11.6.92; Guesde/Lafargue, La démocratie socialiste devant l'histoire, Lille, 1893, praising the political acumen and organisation skill of the SPD and emphasising how the POF was a party of the same order.
15. Georges Bourgin, "Jules Guesde", Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus in der Arbeiterbewegung, Band 14, Leipzig, 1929, pp. 88-101; Willard, opcit., p. 37, where he describes the proletariat at the mercy of reformist ideology because it had not been taught how to organise; the same message appears in a somewhat less boistrous form in Le mouvement socialiste, pp. 599-600, where it is summarised, Willard again maintaining that the Leninist party is the only suitable form of political organisation for the "mature" working class but without presenting a shred of evidence in support of his argument.

16. Ligou, pp. 53, 65; Zévaès, p. 149; Mermeix, Le syndicalisme contre le socialisme, Paris, 1908, p. 118; Willard, Textes choisis, pp. 37-38; Leslie Derfler, "Reformism and Jules Guesde, 1891-1914," in IJSH, (12), 1967, pp. 66-80; Willard, Le mouvement socialiste, p. 596;
17. The view is challenged by Posse, pp. 61-68; R.P. Baker, "Socialism in the Nord", IJSH, (12), 1967, pp. 357-89.
18. Ligou, p. 65; Willard, opcit., pp. 12-13.
19. Willard, Textes choisis, p. 37.
20. Willard, Le mouvement socialiste, pp. 597-602; in Textes choisis, p. 24, caution is thrown to the winds.
21. I have not seen this multiplicity argument developed in any analysis of the PCF. Is this because we have a tendency to see political parties, particularly those that claim strong ideological motivations, as much more single-purposed and homogeneous than they are in reality? I will set out this theme in the concluding sections of this chapter.
22. Reberieux, "Le mouvement socialiste en France", p. 532; though under the influence of the Il Manifesto group and through her research on Jaurès and activity in the Politique Aujourd'hui group her divergence with Willard on this issue has become more pronounced.
23. The majority of local studies for Germany appeared during the first decades of this century and were written by SPD militants who had been active in that locality. Only recently have historians, particularly those from the DDR, begun to examine this problem. Unfortunately, German industrial statistics are not strictly comparable to those gathered in France.
24. Marx to Sorge, 5.11.80, MEW, Band 34, pp. 474-76 reports the meeting; Engels to Bernstein, 25.10.81, MEW, Band 35, pp. 231-33.
25. Willard, Le mouvement socialiste, pp. 27-29.
26. Edouard Dolléans, Histoire du mouvement ouvrier en France, tome I, Paris, 1926, pp. 281-85; Blum, pp. 392-93; and indeed the sectarian and utopian side of the movement, Georges Duveau, La vie ouvrière sous le 2 Empire, Paris, 1956, pp. 267, 545.
27. Guesde/Lafargue, La démocratie socialiste allemande, pp. 4-6; Lyon-socialiste, 8.11.84, that the SPD was the model of socialism; Le cri du travailleur, 9.1.90, that it was the centre of the revolutionary movement, and 31.8.90, that its organisation was exemplary; Georges Lefranc, Essais sur le problème socialiste et syndical, Paris, 1970, pp. 61-69, 87, shows how close many of the personal ties were and how respected were the German theorists amongst the members of the PCF
28. Willard would have it that Guesde dropped his Lassallean phraseology during the 1880's, but we find that his invocation of the French revolutionary tradition to restore the goods of which the workers had been robbed was a constant theme. In 1878 he said that only way to power was a forcefully seizing the centres of control and in 1900 he still spoke of the need for the working class to storm the Bastille of Capital; Aux salariés, Paris, 1878, p. 5; Les deux méthodes, Lille, 1900, p. 35.
29. Benoit Malon, Le socialisme intégral, Paris, 1886 spells out the theory in detail, Le nouveau parti, tome I, Paris, 1881, pp. 78-80; L'évolution morale et le socialisme, Paris, 1889, pp. 123-24.

30. Engels to Bebel, 25.8.81, MEW, Band 35, p. 221, arguing that the Parisian workers were largely artisans (Handwerk); Engels to Laura Lafargue, tome ii, 11.6.89, pp. 285-56; Engels to Paul Lafargue, tome ii, pp. 299-300.
31. Willard, pp. 28-29.
32. Willard, pp. 28-29; seconded by Lefranc, p. 88; and Samuel Bernstein, The Beginnings of Marxist Socialism in France, New York, 1965, pp. 54-57.
33. Zévaès, p. 33, in his estimation Guesde did not read Kapital before the end of the 1870's although the Roy translation was available in 1872, Engels informed Marx that he found the French translation of the sections of Kapital dealing with the factory extremely bad, Engels to Marx, 29.10.73, MEW, Band, 33, p. 94; Engels to Laura Lafargue, 21.2.84, tome i, p. 177 where he complained how little Marx was read by the French socialists; Willard, p. 30.
34. Engels to Paul Lafargue, 6.3.91, tome ii, pp. 23-24; as late as 1891 Engels explained to Lafargue, as diplomatically as he could, that Lafargue still did not grasp the basis of Marx's theory of value.
35. Marx to Bücher, MEW, Band 31, 1.5.67, p. 544; Engels to Bebel, 28.10.85, MEW, Band 36, p. 378; a scathing letter condemning the French for their inability to grasp the simplest philosophical concepts.
36. Published as a series in the Revue socialiste in 1880; Marx to Sorge, opcit.
37. Including an introduction to Socialisme utopique, by Marx, MEW, Band, 19, pp. 181-85; Willard, p. 28.
38. Marx to Sorge, opcit.; Engels to Bernstein, opcit.; Engels' letters to Bernstein during 1881 and 1882 give us a valuable running account of his and Marx's relations with the POF. They provide an important contrast to his letters to Paul Lafargue.
39. Engels to Bebel, 25.8.81, MEW, Band 35, p. 221; Engels to Bebel, 28.10.85, MEW, Band 36, p. 378.
40. Marx to Engels, MEW, Band 35, 11.11.82, pp. 109-110; "Paul Lafargue, das patentierte Orakel des socialisme scientifique ... Longuet als letzter Proudhonist und Lafargue als letzter Bakuninenist! Que le diable les importe (sic)!"
41. Engels to Paul Lafargue, 22.11.94, tome iii, pp. 373-74; Engels' anger was stirred by the Programme agricole produced by Lafargue for the party congress at Nantes that year.
42. Engels to Kautsky, 9.1.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 81; Engels to Lavrov, 5.2.84, MEW, Band 36, p. 100; Engels to Laura Lafargue, 3.10.83, 17.1.86, tome. i, pp. 146-47, 334-35.
43. Gabriel Deville, Biographie du citoyen Emile Accolas, Paris, 1876, pp. 29-32; Zévaès, pp. 36-38; Lefranc, pp. 62-65, maintains that the theory came from Lassalle via Hirsch.

44. Gabriel Deville, Le Capital de Karl Marx, résumé et accompagné d'un aperçu sur le socialisme scientifique, Paris, 1883; Paul Lafargue, Le droit à la paresse, (1883), Paris, 1968, I will develop this theme below in my discussion of the work.
45. Guesde, La loi des salaires et ses conséquences, Paris, 1879, pp. 6-7, "Le salaire moyen ne saurait normalement dépasser le tantum de subsistance nécessaire - dans un temps et dans un milieu donné - pour que l'ouvrier puisse vivre et se reproduire."; Charles Limousin, "Sur Dühring", in Revue et mouvement socialiste, juillet, 1880, pp. 234-40, shows the relationship between such a theory and putchism; E. Berth, introduction to Georges Sorel, D'Aristote à Marx, Paris, 1935, pp. iii-x, spells out this theme in some detail.
46. Essai de catéchisme socialiste, Bruxelles, 1878, pp. 4-7, far from Marxist in Willard's estimation, Textes choisis, p. 16;
47. Le collectivisme, Lille, 1891, pp. 11-13; yet this text written long after Guesde became acquainted with Marx repeats both the Lassallean theme and that of Dühring.
48. Essai, p. 5; Le collectivisme, p. 9; La loi des salaires, pp. 7-8; Le problème et la solution, Paris, 1883, p. 9.
49. La loi des salaires, p. 26, "... ils n'ont devant eux que la perspective d'une misère éternelle et toujours égale à elle-même."; Le problème, pp. 6-8; Le collectivisme, p. 8.
50. Cited in Le combat Marxiste, no. 19, mai, 1935.
51. Willard called this a trinity arrangement, Le mouvement socialiste, p. 25; it did not last a long time as Deville "retired" during the early 1890's and relations between Guesde and Lafargue became cool if not totally extinguished by 1896.
52. Lafargue, Le matérialisme économique de Karl Marx, Paris, 1885, pp. 2-3; Engels who commented on many of Lafargue's works had nothing to say about this work. Did he not see it? Is this a case of a letter that has disappeared?; Lafargue, "Socialism and Darwinism", in Progress, volume ii, pp. 65-66; Guesde, Les deux méthodes, Lille, 1900, is an example of Guesde's belief in science.
53. Idéalisme et matérialisme dans la conception de l'histoire, (1895), Paris, 1946, pp. 19, 31-32, "L'idéal du communisme revit d'une nouvelle flamme dans nos intelligences; ... nous sommes des hommes de science ..."; "Socialism and Darwinism", pp. 67-68; Guesde, Le collectivisme par la révolution, L'Egalité, 21.1.80.
54. Le communisme et l'évolution économique, Lille, 1892, pp. 4-5; Idéalisme, where Lafargue sees the roots of materialism in Descartes and Locke, pp. 22, 24.
55. Idéalisme, pp. 20-21.
56. Essai, pp. 8-9; Aux salariés, pp. 4-5
57. La loi des salaires, pp. 14-15; Collectivisme et révolution, Paris, 1879, pp. 2-3.
58. Guesde/Lafargue, Le programme du parti ouvrier, son histoire, ses considérants, ses articles, Paris, 1883, pp. 14-16.

59. Guesde, Le socialisme au jour le jour, Paris, 1899, pp. 96-98.
60. Journal officiel. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés. 9ième législature. Session ordinaire de 1910. 30 mars 1910, p. 1803; alone of all the SFIO deputies, Guesde refused to vote for a pension scheme not only because it was state-financed but because it might well dull the revolutionary fervour of the working class.
61. Deville, pp. x-xii.
62. Lafargue, Idéalisme, p. 20; Le matérialisme économique, pp. 15-16; Deville, opcit.
63. Guesde to Clemenceau, 29.8.81, cited in Textes choisis, p. 29.
64. La loi des salaires, pp. 6-7, 26; Le collectivisme par la révolution, p. 16; Ça et là!, Paris, 1914, p. 188; Le cri du peuple, 31.1.87.
65. La loi des salaires, pp. 6-7; again one of the principal arguments in Le programme du parti ouvrier, pp. 13-14.
66. La loi des salaires, pp. 7-8; Le collectivisme par la révolution, where the "valeurs sorties de ses main" are what industry produces, and giving the worker his due is to make certain that "la richesse seront réellement le fruit du travail, puisque ceux-là seuls qui auront produit pourront consommer ou jouir; proportionnes au travail..." pp. 17-18.
67. Zévaès, p. 26; Willard, pp. 25-26.
68. Le programme du parti ouvrier, pp. 5-6.
69. ibid., pp. 6-7; a repeat of the theme in Le collectivisme par la révolution, p. 16; Le collectivisme, pp. 3-5.
70. Le programme du parti ouvrier: "La mise en commun des moyens de production doit fatalement, nécessairement, amener à une mise en commun des moyens de jouissance.", p. 8.
71. Le matérialisme économique, pp. 16-17.
72. Journal officiel, opcit.
73. Lafargue most forcefully argued this in a polemical piece against the economist Leroy-Beaulieu, "La théorie de la plus-value de Karl Marx et la critique de M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu", Journal des économistes, tome 27, no. 9, Bruxelles, 1884, pp. 367-84; Guesde saw work as the source of all wealth, Ça et Là!, p. 187.
74. Maurice Dommanget, Edouard Vaillant, un grand socialiste, 1840-1905, Paris, 1956, pp. 102-06, Vaillant a communard, was University educated and spoke German fluently, he emphasised the importance of creating a movement through understanding the day-to-day problems of the working class; Jean Jaurès emphasised the importance of consciousness from his reading of Hegel and Kant and through his contacts with his friend Emile Durkheim, he wrote that property was more than a "fait matériel" and correspondingly the solution to the social problematic must be a "solution totale", "L'action socialiste", in Le mouvement socialiste, 1899, pp. 450-51, p. 455; his classical statement is in L'armée nouvelle, Paris, 1911, where he discusses the problem of consciousness in the light of the need to construct a socialist strategy at length, pp. 140-289 (1969 ed.);

- Marcel Mauss, introduction to Emile Durkheim, Le socialisme et St.-Simon, Paris, 1908, pp. 34-35; Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Jean Jaurès, Paris, 1921, pp. 21-22; the relationship between conscience collective, fait total, consciousness, and between Durkheim and Jaurès is a theme that demands research.
75. so writes Willard, p. 25.
 76. Le programme du parti ouvrier, pp. 12-13; Guesde, Ça et là, pp. 197-98, Lafargue, Le matérialisme économique, p. 13.
 77. Le programme du parti ouvrier, pp. 12, 14-15; Lafargue, opcit., pp. 12-13; Guesde, Le collectivisme par la révolution, pp. 16-17.
 78. and is found in most of their writings: Le programme du parti ouvrier, p. 13; Guesde, Le problème, p. 15; Lafargue, "La théorie de la plus-value", pp. 368-71; De la propriété, origine et évolution, Paris, 1895, pp. 4,8; Idéalisme, p. 32.
 79. Guesde, Le collectivisme par la révolution, p. 16; Lafargue, Le communisme et l'évolution économique, p. 4; Idéalisme, p. 32.
 80. It first appeared in serial form in Egalité during 1880; one can conclude that it was relatively close to Kautsky's socialism because he judged it to be an excellent synopsis of socialist theory, Humanité, 30.11.11.
 81. Le droit à la paresse, (1883) Paris, 1968, pp. 141-43.
 82. Because the riches that society now produces are intrinsically valuable and will satisfy needs, ibid., pp. 133, 141; close to Guesde's ideas in Le collectivisme par la révolution, pp. 15-18.
 83. Le droit à la paresse, pp. 131, 136; Guesde, Le socialisme, pp. 123-25; echoed by the guesdiste press, Le cri du peuple, 22.10.92; and repeated in Lafargue's disarmingly simple and positivistic formula in Idéalisme, p. 32: "Mais lorsque les moyens de production, arrachés des mains oisives et impuissantes de la classe capitaliste, seront devenu la propriété commune de la nation, la paix et le bonheur reflouriront sur la terre, car la société domptera les forces économiques, comme ont déjà été domptées les forces naturelles: alors, et alors seulement l'homme sera libre ... Le règne de l'inconscient sera clos."
 84. Lafargue, Le socialisme et les intellectuels, Paris, 1900, pp. 16-18.
 85. Le droit à la paresse, pp. 134, 144-5, 153; a popular theme, Guesde, Le collectivisme par la révolution, p. 16.
 86. Le droit à la paresse, p. 142.
 87. Ibid., pp. 143-44; Guesde, Le socialisme, pp. 134-36.
 88. Le collectivisme, p. 19.
 89. With the agreement of Marx, Le programme, p. 4; an earlier version - perhaps the version Guesde showed Marx in London? - specified that appropriation meant taking over industrial establishments, Programme et adresse des socialistes révolutionnaires français, Paris, 1879, p. 2.

90. The syndicaliste révolutionnaire movement, which by this time had taken over the CGT, attacked the socialists for being revolutionary in rhetoric and collaborationist in action. To no small measure, they blamed this upon the intellectuals, who, in their view, dominated the socialists movement. F. Pelloutier, Lettre aux anarchistes, Paris, 1899, H. Lagardelle, Les intellectuels et le socialisme, Paris, 1900, pp. 17-18; Lafargue's pamphlet was a response to these arguments.
91. Le socialisme et les intellectuels, pp. 5-7.
92. ibid., pp. 7-8.
93. ibid., p. 11.
94. ibid., p. 15.
95. Le socialisme au jour le jour, p. 361; interestingly Durkheim whose work on socialism was inspired by Jaures' fervour and by the growth of the POF saw the consequences of the POF's demands as a form of state socialism, Durkheim, opcit., pp. 61-63.
96. In its earliest form it was directed against the collectivist who assumed that the trade unions should set up producers' cooperatives, these were the cooperativists who organised the first workers' congresses in 1876. Séance du congrès ouvrier de France, session de 1876, pp. 14-15; Séances du congrès ouvrier de France: 3^e session 1879, pp. 12-14; Guesde in Egalité, 13.1.78, 30.6.78.
97. ibid.; and again at the Congrès national tenu à Nancy, 1906, where he attacked Jaures' acquiescence to the Charte d'Amiens, pp. 45-46.
98. La loi des salaires, p. 6; Congrès Nancy, pp. 49-50.
99. Congrès, Roanne, 1882, pp. 2-3; an attack against the allemaniste wing of the FTSF.
100. Le cri du peuple, 18.4.84, 15.6.86;
101. Le citoyen, 16.5.82.
102. An attack on those trying to force the textile trade unions in the Nord into a strike, L'avant-garde, 1.9.97.
103. Willard, pp. 33-34; 85.
104. Congrès, Nancy, 1906, pp. 45-48.
105. Pelloutier called him a dictator, opcit., p. 17; to Briand he was Torquemada with a monacle, reported in Ligou, p. 87; Pouget made him the main point of his attack against the socialists, Emile Pouget, La C.G.T., Paris, 1908.
106. Guesde, Le collectivisme, p. 8; Le forçat, 14.7.82; Lafargue, Le socialisme et les intellectuels, p. 7.
107. Lafargue, "Le POF, son but, ses organisations et ses moyens d'action", Almanach du Parti ouvrier français, 1892, Lille, 1892, pp. 24-25 "... les engage et les dirige dans la lutte..."
108. Le programme, pp. 7-8; Le collectivisme, p. 14.
109. Le programme, p. 8.

110. Willard, p. 32; A. Compère-Morel, Jules Guesde, le socialisme fait l'homme, Paris, 1937, p. 45.
111. Le collectivisme, p. 28.
112. ibid., pp. 28-29; the argument in Le programme du parti ouvrier reiterates the same theme, pp. 15-16.
113. Though according to Zévaès, Lafargue did not state that if the revolution came the party would no longer have a function and should be dissolved, p. 89.
114. Le socialisme au jour le jour, pp. 222-23, where he asked rhetorically if his audience had ever heard of a revolutionary change that did not involve an immense amount of bloodshed; and as late as 1900: "... il s'agit de recruter, d'augmenter la colonne d'assaut qui aura ... à prendre la Bastille féodale ... notre émancipation ... ne peuvent s'opérer que révolutionnairement." Les deux méthodes, p. 35.
115. Congrès national Roanne, 1882; Congrès national St.-Etienne, 1909; p. 3.
116. Le socialisme au jour le jour, pp. 396-97.
117. Occasioned by his desire to voice his opposition to the claims made by Brousse in his demands for municipal socialism that opened the door to "...toutes les compromissions avec la politique et les partis bourgeois..." Egalité, 25.12.81, and whose theory was a "logomachie", Egalité, 1.1.82.
118. Congrès national, Marseille 1892, where he argued against Briand, pp. 23-31; Congrès national Paris 1897, p. 15; Congrès national Nancy 1906, pp. 42-44, where according to Dommanget he almost split the SFIO, Dommanget, Eduard Vaillant, p. 111.
119. Congrès national Marseille, 1892, p. 92; Les deux méthodes, pp. 21-25.
120. ibid., pp. 28-30, who was a man "...fort riche du vol opéré sur les ouvriers exploités par sa famille ..."
121. Congrès national Nancy, 1906, p. 43
122. Though this hardly tallies with Willard's view that Guesde was far too rigid, Willard, pp. 213-14; Zévaès maintains the contrary, Zévaès, pp. 111-14.
123. Malon, L'évolution morale, Paris, 1889, pp. 43-54.
124. Reported in lurid terms in Le prolétaire, 24.12.81 where Guesde and Lafargue were called those "qui s'estiment des autorités préemptoires, mais reçoivent leurs directives de Londres".; Guesde, Egalité, 25.12.81. Blum, pp. 426-30.
125. Guesde, Services publics, Paris, 1889, pp. 4-8; we will see later that given that the PCF had its most signal successes in local elections in 1888, Guesde could hardly maintain his earlier position unless he wanted to risk another split.
126. Congrès national, Lille, 1890, pp. 65-68; these motions were shepherded by Gustave Delory the architect of the Fédération du Nord, and long-time mayor of Lille.
127. Services publics, pp. 25-26; Blum, p. 454; Almanach 1892, p. 25.

128. ibid., p. 26.
129. Delory, Aperçu historique sur la fédération du Nord du parti socialiste, Lille, 1921, pp. 56-58; Guesde's change of tune can be seen as early as 1884, Le cri du peuple, 8.6.84; Courdurier and Siaux note that Guesde approved of municipal reforms and that they could be exemplary: Louis Courdurier, Une ville sous le régime collectiviste, Paris, 1908; p. 7. Georges Siaux, Roubaix ou quatre ans de gestion municipale ouvrier, Lille, 1892, pp. 12-12.
130. Reported in Humanité 11/12.8.07; Delory, pp. 57-61.
131. Victor Cambon, La France au travail: Lyon, St.-Etienne, Grenoble, et Dijon, Paris, 1914, for an appreciation of Augagneur whom he praises for his role in releasing the vital talents needed by industrial society, pp. 23-48; Delory, opcit.;
132. Compte rendu du cinquième congrès national de la Fédération des conseillers municipales socialistes de France, Paris, 1895, pp. 13-16; given that importance of local organisations in the POF one can surmise that the FCMSF must have been an influential organisation but we lack a study of their growth and organisation.
133. Compère-Morel, Le socialisme agraire, Paris, 1920, pp. 144-29.
134. Robert Argerton Les doctrines agraires du Marxisme, Paris, 1936, pp. 15-32, tries to demonstrate that the socialists were not ignorant of the emphasis placed by Marx and Engels on the need to attract agrarian workers and peasants.
135. Engels, Die Bauernfrage, pp. 483-96; Zévaès, Sur l'écran, p. 250.
136. Letter from the Fédération du Gard, dated 15.11.97 in Guesde Archive, IISH.
137. Engels to Paul Lafargue, 6.3.94, tome iii, pp. 353-55; Engels to Laura Lafargue, 8.1.90, tome ii, p. 376; Engels to Paul Lafargue, tome iii, pp. 373-74.
138. Programme agricole du parti ouvrier, Lille, 1893, calling for a minimum wage for agricultural labourers, credits for farmers in debt and distributors' cooperatives. It was adopted with some changes at the Congrès national, Nantes 1894, pp. 22-25.
139. Argerton, p. 79.
140. Brousse, Les pouvoirs communales, p. 16; Blum, pp. 430-31; Zevaes, pp. 22-34; J. Dormoy, Rapports des congrès ouvriers 1876-1883, Paris, 1883, pp. 14-17; Engels to Bernstein, 20.10.82, MEW, Band 34, p. 373.
141. Guesde, Congrès national Nancy, p. 44.
142. Les deux méthodes, p. 33.
143. ibid., pp. 29-31; Lafargue privately wanted to support Dreyfus but loyally maintained silence rather than break the unity of the party he held so dearly. Kautsky Archive, DXV139, IISH, also Duveau to Guesde, 7.11.98, Guesde Archives.

144. Jaurès, Les deux méthodes, pp. 11-13, 18-20; Zévaès, p. 139.
145. Reported by Charles Andler, La vie de Lucien Herr, Paris, 1932, pp. 135-42; Zévaès, p. 133.
146. Le socialiste, 24.7.98, published a manifesto calling for unity, and laying the basis for coöperation between the various socialist organisations; Jean Jaurès, "L'unité socialiste", in Le mouvement socialiste, 1899, pp. 61-65; F. Pelloutier, Le congrès general du parti socialiste français, Paris, 1899, for a commentary.
147. Blum, pp. 480-82, Bracke, Onze ans d'histoire socialiste, Paris, 1901, pp. 112-16.
148. Reported in Humanité, 27.8.04, in its report of the Amsterdam Congress. This was Guesde's characterisation of how Jaurès acted during the 1899-1901 period of tentative socialist unity.
149. The 1900 conference collapsed in shambles according to all commentators, Blum, pp. 480-82; Bracke, Leur congrès, Paris, 1901, pp. 16-19.
150. The loss of Roubaix was particularly shocking, Siauve, Le cri du travailleur, 15.11.02; Blum, pp. 486-89; Zévaès, pp. 149, 154-55; Willard blames Guesde's stubbornness for the losses, Willard, pp. 154-55.
151. Report in La petite république, 16.11.95, Zévaès, p. 120, in whose view supporting Dreyfus would have been more acceptable.
152. Le programme du parti ouvrier, pp. 14-15; Humanité, 27.8.04.
153. Reported by Jean Longuet, "Die Situation der sozialistischen Bewegung in Frankreich", N.Z., 1901, Band I, pp. 652-59.
154. L'avant-garde, 19.9.97; Congrès national Marseille 1892, pp. 32-33.
155. Les deux méthodes, p. 25; although almost in the same breath declaring: " ... le jour où le prolétariat organise ... pratiquerait la lutte de classe sous le forme du partage du pouvoir politique avec la classe capitaliste, ce jour-là il n'y aurait plus du socialisme ...", p. 26; also in L'avenir, 29.9.01.
156. Le programme du parti ouvrier, p. 16; Rosa Luxemburg despite a wish to side with Guesde against Jaurès found the former brimming over with "dogmatic fantasies", "Die sozialistische Krise in Frankreich", N.Z., 1901, Band I, p. 682.
157. Le programme, p. 12; Les deux méthodes, pp. 34-37; in neither case following from the previous argument.
158. pp. 109-112; Georges Weill, Histoire du mouvement socialiste en France, Paris, 1924, pp. 256-61.
159. Le socialisme au jour le jour, p. 1.
160. Lafargue to Engels, 6.2.84, 23.3.93, tome i, pp. 168-69, tome iii, p. 274.

161. Weill, pp. 288-89.
162. Willard, pp. 32,60; Lafargue's campaign in the 1891 by-election was the apogee of the movement starting with the organisation of the trade unions in the textile industry, the election of Carette in Rouxbaix the spread of Delory's influence in Lille itself, and the final and definitive establishment of the Fédération du Nord. As Zévaès writes, p. 58, Lafargue became the symbol of the lillois workers' self-affirmation.
163. Laura Lafargue to Engels, 22.11.91, tome iii, pp. 132-33, she points out that the crowds seemed to come from many areas far beyond the constituency, hardly listened to the speeches and seemed consumed by a frenzy she had never hitherto observed in men; Michels confirms that such adoration was also found in Germany, opcit., pp. 67-69.
164. Mermeix, pp. 61-62; Compère-Morel, Jules Guesde, pp. 258-62. Zévaès, pp. 185-89.
165. Séances, 3^e session 1879, pp. 512-19; very few of these federations every got off the ground. The Fédération du centre became the stronghold of the possibilistes and, for all intents and purposes, was the FTSF. The Fédération du Nord survived longer than any of the others, from 1881 to 1883.
166. Séances, pp. 513-514; Blum pp. 417-18.
167. ibid., p. 418; and hardly worked in practice, J.A. Clarke, "French socialist congresses, 1876-1914", in the Journal of Modern History, vol. xxxi, no. 2, (1959), pp. 122-29.
168. Séances, p. 517.
169. Willard, p. 96.
170. Blum, p. 415; Séances, p. 518.
171. Article 3; Séances, p. 517; the national organisation was never given the right to intervene in local affairs without being invited as an adjudicator by the parties in dispute; the dispute between Salembrier and Delcluze in Calais is an example of this.
172. This is Willard's argument and that of Mauger, Willard, pp. 154-55; Mauger, p. 18.
173. Reported in Egalité, 25.12.81; Derfler, pp. 69-71.
174. Brousse, opcit., p. 42; "Encore l'Union socialiste", Le Prolétaire, 19.11.81.
175. Congrès Roanne 1882, pp. 24-28; Willard, p. 25.

176. Blum, p. 431; but it also concealed a redistribution of power amongst the social groups adhering to the party and a change in the balance of power in favour of the industrial workers and to the detriment of the artisans, as I will argue below.
177. Congrès Roanne 1882, p. 32; Blum, p. 432; whereas in Germany when this occurred in 1894 when the entire Partei Vorstand was elected from the Hamburg organisation because of the fears of the imposition of a new Sozialistengesetz, there were hardly any legal reasons for this move in France.
178. Lafargue to Engels, 24.1.82, tome i, p. 96.
179. Laura Lafargue to Engels, 20.5.89, tome ii, p. 268; she called it "squabbles time", and pointed out that the provincial organisations refused to accept the advice of the Agglomération and wanted to decide the terms for the forthcoming congress of what was to emerge as the Second International.
180. Congrès Lille 1890, pp. 6-9.
181. Le socialiste 21.9.90, compared the re-emergence of the party in Germany with that in France, and saw the movement towards international revolution as a now irresistible force.
182. Zévaès, Au temps du Boulanger, p. 114, notes that as soon as the fervour for Boulanger dropped in the Nord the party sprung into prominence - is this a case of the evolution from a primitive to a political consciousness? - Louis, pp. 78-80; Willard, p. 71.
183. Zévaès, Jules Guesde, p. 113; Lafargue, "Les dernières élections", in Almanach 1894, pp. 15-29, where he points out the changes during 1889 and 1890.
184. His conference Le collectivisme, p. 14-17; Le socialiste 21.9.90.
185. Delory's Le cri du travailleur, 27.8.90, 31.8.90, spoke of the possibility of building the kind of political organisation needed by the workers in the Nord in collaboration with the workers of all France.
186. Congrès national Roanne 1882, pp. 27-28; Congrès Lille 1890, pp. 32-33. the only difference was that the new statutes spoke of starting new federations initially based on local groups and being, if possible, not larger than a département.
187. ibid.,
188. Willard, p. 98; though whether this was the case is difficult to establish; the workers from the region I interviewed claimed to have never heard of such a requirement but since their working lives began about ten years after the Lille congress, the requirement may well have been dropped or enforced in some localities and not in others.
189. Confirmed in Almanach 1892, pp. 17-25; Le socialiste, 14.2.92.
190. A.D. Pas-de-Calais M596/1,2,3.
191. Le socialiste, 21.9.90; Blum, p. 451.
192. Congrès national Lille 1890, pp. 25-26.
193. Congrès national Montluçon 1898, p. 54; Le socialiste, 18.9.98; Le peuple, 18.5.02.

194. Guesde Archives, IISH, opcit.
195. Laura Lafargue to Engels opcit.; and earlier, End of November 1889, tome ii, p. 363.
196. Guesde Archive, IISH.
197. L'année politique pour 1893, pp. 167-69.
198. Guesde, Le socialisme au jour le jour, pp. 134-36.
199. Reported by Willard, p. 101.
200. So Willard deduces from his examination of Guesde's correspondence, and the effects of the Dreyfus affair, pp. 101-02, 188-89.
201. ibid., pp. 106, 111; A.N. 12490, 12497-503.
202. A.N. F7 12.488; Zévaès, p. 38; Michelle Perrot, "Le premier journal marxiste français", L'Egalité, de Jules Guesde (1877-83)", in Actualité de l'histoire; no. 28, juillet-sept. 1959, pp. 1-26.
203. Egalité, 7.8.81.
204. Perrot reports Guesde saying, Perrot, pp. 19-20.
205. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 26.7.87, tome ii, p. 35; but that there were sometimes more urgent tasks than creating a newspaper.
206. Engels to Laura Lafargue, 16.4.90, tome ii, p. 391; wondered if it were not a waste of time.
207. Willard, pp. 135-36.
208. ibid., pp. 136-37, 153-55; a study on why all socialist groups used such inflated and remote language, as it seems to be something like a tradition, would be useful.
209. A.D. Isère 52467; Fédération du Nord, Congrès régional, Fresnes 1902, Lille, 1902, p. 23.
210. R. Andrieu, (ed.), En feuilletant l'Humanité, Paris, 1954, pp. 5-6.
211. I^e et II^e congrès nationaux tenus à Paris en avril 1905 et à Chalon-sur-Saône en octobre 1905. Compte-rendu analytique, Paris, n.d., pp. 33-35.
212. Andrieu, p. 4-7; Willard, p. 154.
213. Lyon-socialiste, 9.11.84.
214. L'exploité, 17.9.82.
215. Le forçat, 14.7.82.
216. Report in Le forçat 21.7.82; Guesde repeated the same argument later Le cri du travailleur, 9.2.90.
217. Le travailleur, 10.11.88.

218. Le forçat, 25.11.82
219. Le forçat, 17.6.83.
220. Le forçat, 4.3.83.
221. Le forçat, 24.11.82; declaring: "Il n'y a pas de progrès sans révolution sanglante."
222. L'avenir, 14.4.01; the Lyon press seemed keen to defend the handworkers in the luxury industries and was often highly critical of industrial technology.
223. L'action-socialiste, 10.11.89 and 22.12.89; praising the artisan because of his intelligence and application and condemning the industrial worker who "...tout frais des champs" was no better than a poor relation.
224. Le forçat, 4.3.83; we will see how great was the influence of the miners and the reorganisation of the textile industry on the policies of the POF in the Nord.
225. Le cri du travailleur, also published many of Brousse's articles on local government reform, particularly after it conquered the mairie of Roubaix in 1888 and that of Lille in 1892, 22.3.91, 8.6.90, 19/26.1.90; Delory acknowledged his debt to Brousse, Delory, p. 12.
226. L'action socialiste, 15.9.89.
227. Le peuple, 20.4.02.
228. Le cri du travailleur, 1.3.91, spoke of the need to marry principles and action.
229. Henri Ghesquière, Congrès national Montluçon 1898, pp. 67-68; though he later seems to have changed his ideas, "L'action des municipalités socialistes", in Le mouvement socialiste, nos. 2,4,6,8,13,18, 1899.
230. Le cri du travailleur, L'avant-garde and L'avenir would devote several columns to such information.
231. So writes Willard, pp. 362-64.
232. ibid., p. 363; Action-socialiste, 7.12.90 is an example of this kind of deification.
233. Le cri du travailleur, 19/26.1.90 and 9.2.90; one finds the same argument in L'action socialiste, 8.9.89.
234. Blum, p. 446.
235. Willard, pp. 360, 386, 597, 600-01.
236. ibid., pp. 219-21; though Willard's claims are more muted than those, as we have seen, in his introduction to Textes choisis.
237. ibid.,
238. ibid., pp. 601, 597.

239. Halévy, pp. 190-91; Pouget, p. 18; Lagardelle, pp. 45-47.
240. The thesis is found in Political Parties, New York, 1952.
241. Lukács, Rezensiön, in Organisation und Partei, Frankfurt, n.d., pp. 139-4, Lukács called Michels' work an example of "Dilettantismus", and of a "völlige Unwissenschaftskeit" (p. 144).
242. Willard, pp. 344-59, but he offers no evidence why this should be so, and never explains why a political organisation is seen as the answer to the industrial workers' problems.
243. ibid., pp. 219-21; this methodology makes it impossible to contrast the development of the POF in various regions because Willard insists on seeing a homogeneity supplied by the ideology of the POF; an ideology can have different meanings in different circumstances and because Willard does not make an allowance for such a contingency he runs into difficulty that mars an otherwise excellent and important work.
244. ibid., pp. 597-601; There is no reason to see the PCF as the outgrowth of the POF for the reason that it represents different social groups acting under different circumstances, Annie Kriegel's work points this out. Annie Kriegel, Aux origines du parti communiste français, 2 tomes, Paris, 1964, introduction.
245. The plea has been made often and Willard's and Annie Kriegel's works are amongst the first signs of a movement in that direction. We also now have two important local studies that get beyond the reformist-revolutionary, political-party vs. syndicalisme révolutionnaire syndrome, Daniel Vasseur, Les débuts du mouvement ouvrier dans la région Belfort-Montbéliard 1870-1914, Belfort, 1967, the most scholarly, and Juliette Minces, Le Nord, Paris, 1966, whose first sections are suggestive, and are still waiting Jacques Julliard's massive study on syndicalism which promises to be as important, if not as unwieldy and bulky as Mme. Kriegel's doctoral thesis; Madeleine Reberieux, "Une histoire du socialisme français", in Annales, xviii, no. 4, p. 812, in a destructive review of Ligou's history makes this point as do Lucien Febvre, "Géographie socialiste", in Annales, xviii, p. 370 (1946), and Georges Haupt, La deuxième Internationale étude critique des sources, Paris, 1964, p. 70.
246. Albert Demangeon, La France, deuxième partie. France économique et humaine, Paris, 1927-48, p. 126; I shall refer to this work, which, despite its age, thanks to the presiding spirit of Vidal de la Blache, still remains the best kind of geographical cum sociological study of its kind.
247. Indeed, my divisions are more equitable than those proposed by de Gaulle for his 1969 referendum; Charles Pouthas, La population française pendant la première moitié du 19^e siècle, Paris, 1956, pp. 12-19; because the French population expanded but little after 1850 our divisions also remain of a manageable size; the reader is advised to keep in mind that what are today called the départements of Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin were incorporated into Germany between 1871-1918 and that during this period Haut-Rhin was used to designate the Territoire de Belfort; The Seine-Inférieure is no longer Inférieure but Maritime as is Charente-Inférieure, whereas the Loire-Inférieure is now Loire-Atlantique and the Seine-et-Oise has become 3 départements and the Seine.⁴ Needless to say some of the new divisions have been made in such a way as to render any attempt at statistical comparison between 1900 and 1971 a perilous task.

248. The works I have used to gather my statistics are as follows: Les associations professionnelles ouvrières, 1899-1904, Paris, 1904, this lists the total membership of each trade-union organisation by département and is probably somewhat more reliable than the statistics given (when they were given) at C.G.T. congresses; Annuaire statistique de la France, 1886-1910, had a section on trade unions; Annuaire des syndicats professionnels, industriels, commerciaux et agricole, Paris, 1892, the first list of trade-unions and membership by locality that I could find; Statistique générale de la France: Enquête industrielle de 1861-65, Paris, 1872, a surprisingly good industrial census though many problems of conceptualisation; Statistique des industries principales en 1873, Paris, 1874; Statistique des forces motrices, Paris, 1892-1900; Repertoire technique des noms d'industries et de professions, Paris, 1909, an extremely useful guide to all the changes in nomenclature between 1856 and 1906; Résultats statistiques du recensement général de la population, 1856, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 1906, 1911; Résultats générales statistiques du recensement des industries et professions pour 1896, 1906; French industrial statistics are as good as France was industrially backward, the breakdown here is by département, unfortunately the exact size of many enterprises are not given - though in many cases they can be figured out - and some, for some reason are given in the introductory write-up on each département.
249. The problem is greatest in the category 501-1000 employees but in this category the variance is smallest.
250. The worker is only defined obscurely in the introductions to the censuses themselves. Perhaps nationalism is the best reason that can be proffered to explain why these were excluded from the calculation of number of workers per enterprise; useful definitions are given in: M. Bouvier, Histoire du travail en France, Paris, 1957, pp. 167-71; Albert Aftalion, Le développement de la fabrique et le travail à domicile dans les industries de l'habillement, Paris, 1906, pp. 25-32; Claude Fohlen, Le travail au XIX^e siècle, Paris, 1967, p. 47.
251. The following works make this point: Pierre Bard, Les industries chimiques en France, Paris, 1931, pp. 32-45; N. Brants, La petite industrie contemporaine, Paris, 1902, pp. 3-16, 89-93; E. Benezit, Petits métiers, petites industries, Paris, 1908, pp. 12, 15, 64-71; Jean Levanville, L'industrie du fer en France, Paris, 1922, pp. 25-28; V. Le Verrier, La métallurgie en France, Paris, 1894, pp. 11-13; L. Lindet, L'outillage de l'industrie chimique, agricole et alimentaire, Paris, 1922, pp. 23-25, 56-58, 99-103; La sidérurgie en France, (ed.) Comité des Forges, Paris, 1920, passim.
252. Suggested by Aftalion, pp. 23-45; Turgan, tome i, pp. 134-56; tome iv, pp. 43-69, tome ix, pp. 342-49.
253. A. Armengaud, La population française au XIX^e siècle, Paris, 1971, pp. 23-26, 41-47.
254. Cambon, pp. 18-28.
255. Lucien Gros, Histoire générale économique des mines de la Loire, St.-Etienne, 1902, pp. 69-80; Cambon, pp. 92-96.
256. Willard, pp. 588-89, it was much more artisanal, but again, his over emphasise of relatively backward areas might be responsible for this conclusion.
257. ibid., pp. 357-58.
258. ibid., pp. 358, 597.

259. ibid., pp. 219-21.
260. Aftalion, pp. 43-45; Victor Grieffuelhes, Voyages révolutionnaires, Paris, 1909, pp. 34-35, the one-time secretary of the C.G.T., he recounts his travels through the regions where the syndicaliste révolutionnaire tradition was strong, his journal written from the standpoint of a man who was trying to marry his revolutionary ideology with the reality of what he saw is of immense value, and written sympathetically.
261. E. Clouzot, "Petites industries rurales et régionales", in La formation professionnelle, nov. 1934, pp. 13-41; Benezit, pp. 112-13; Most of the information on the implantation of the socialist movement in this section comes from Hubert Rouger, La France socialiste, 3 tomes, Paris, 1912-21: Cher, tome ii, pp. 205-19; Nièvre, tome iii, pp. 406-23; Côte d'Or, tome iii, pp. 51-59; Aube, tome ii, pp. 462-72, and the archives départementales.
262. Lafargue to Engels, 24.6.84, 8.9.89, t. i, p. 210, and t. ii, p. 327; Grieffuelhes, p. 35, Demangeon, p. 471.
263. Philippe Ariès, Histoire des populations françaises et de leurs attitudes devant la vie depuis le xviii^e siècle, Paris, 1948, p. 334, is an important work explaining many of the traditional artisanal ideas of the time. Jean Recommand, La bonneterie à Troyes dans le département de l'Aube, Paris, a study of the industry with some interesting glimpses of the trade-union movement. passim; Aube A.D., 446M2g on Romilly and Riceys.
264. Rouger, iii, pp. 409-11; A.D. Cher serie M not classified.
265. Grieffuelhes, p. 21; Rouger, iii, p. 55.
266. Grieffuelhes, p. 22; Aftalion, pp. 52, 49-50.
267. Rouger, iii, p. 56.
268. Demangeon, p. 471; Aries, p. 333; Grieffuelhes, pp. 22-25.
269. Aftalion, p. 51.
270. Grieffuelhes, pp. 23-24.
271. ibid., p. 25; Luc Benoist, Les compagnonnages et les métiers, Paris, 1966, p. 38.
272. Grieffuelhes, pp. 25-26.
273. Rouger, ii, pp. 462-63, 207-09, tome iii, 407-09; A.D. Aube 792M3c2; Cher, serie M, not classified.
274. ibid., according to police reports of meetings.
275. Rouger, pp. 55-56, Blum, p. 460.
276. According to Rouger the party smoothed over differences between trade-union groups, iii, 58-59, iii, pp. 58-59; A.D. Aube, 792M3c2.
277. Rouger, ii, p. 55.
278. Rouger, ii, pp. 210, iii, 56, 420.

279. Mermeix, pp. 45-47; Rouger, i, pp. 147-49; reported in Le tocsin de Berry, 26.1.01.
280. Rouger, i, pp. 147-59.
281. Léon Jouhaux, Syndicalisme et la C.G.T., Paris, 1920, pp. 62-80.
282. Lagardelle, pp. 7-9; Rouger, opcit.
283. A.D. Aube 446M2g.
284. Rouger, i, pp. 178-83.
285. Willard, pp. 382-84.
286. Rouger, i, p. 183; Grieffuelhes, p. 25.
287. Blum, p. 496 makes this point.
288. Demangeon, p. 494; Cambon, p. 123.
289. Rouger, iii, pp. 29-37; A.D. Aude, série M, not classified.
290. Grieffuelhes, p. 40.
291. Rouger, iii, p. 36.
292. Cambon, pp. 75-84; Le peuple 20.5.02, is a good example of this style of socialism.
293. ibid.; Ferroul had a very wide appeal amongst the artisan workers, Cambon, p. 80.
294. Grieffuelhes, opcit.
295. Demangeon, pp. 495-96; but the enterprises were quite small.
296. A.D. Vienne, M unclassified.
297. A.D. Haute-Vienne, M1133,34,35.
298. Demangeon, p. 758.
299. ibid.
300. Turgan, iv, p. 421. particularly in the Saône-et-Loire.
301. Allier, serie M. not classified.
302. ibid.; Rouger ii, pp. 57-59.
303. Dormoy, pp. 18-21; Rouger, ii, pp. 46-47.
304. Rouger, ii, pp. 70-72.
305. Demangeon, p. 761; Rouger, pp. 60-64.
306. Rouger, ii, pp. 72-73.
307. A.D. Puy-de-Dôme MD16.
308. Reported in Le socialiste, 18.9.98.

309. Demangeon, p. 498; there was little industry in the Saone-et-Loire outside the isolated Creusot works.
310. Rouger, iii, pp. 454-75; 511-19, for a description of the organisations in these areas.
311. Demangeon, pp. 763-64; Turgan opcit.
312. Duveau, p. 215; discusses the development of trade-unionism in the establishment and relates its growth to changes in the work-situation.
313. Rouger, pp. 512-13.
314. ibid., pp. 518-19.
315. Demangeon pp. 694-95, and judging from our industrial survey; also Pierre Giron, Le Gard industriel, Paris, 1917, makes the same point about the area as a whole.
316. A.D. Herault, 4M 345-352, 4M 372; A.D. Gard 6M 1201-1202.
317. Giron, pp. 33-34.
318. Willard, p. 256; A.D. Aveyron, série M not classified.
319. Rouger, ii, pp. 322-31.
320. And this occurred at different times in different areas, thus tending to confirm our argument about multiplicity.
321. Demangeon, p. 694; A Lasserre, La situation des ouvriers de l'industrie textile dans la région lilloise sous la monarchie de juillet, Paris, 1952, pp. 123-46, both speak of the relative organic growth of industry in the area, the only region Demangeon maintains that resembled the industrial areas of Britain, Belgium or Germany.
322. Lasserre, ibid.
323. H. Mettrier, Lille et la région du Nord en 1905, Lille, 1908; pp. 12-14; Demangeon, pp. 695-96; Pard, pp. 76-79; Geogres Chaumel, Histoire des cheminots et leurs syndicats, Paris, 1952, pp. 34-37, points out how even the railwaymen had a regional loyalty in the Nord.
324. Vasseur, pp. 54-55; Mettrier, pp. 13-15; Duveau, p. 545.
325. Halbwachs, pp. 70-71; Delory argues similarly, Delory, pp. 55-56.
326. Pierre Pierrard, Lille et les lillois, Lille, 1967, pp. 235-38; Paul Razous, Installation des ateliers et des usines, Paris, 1900, passim; Le Verrier, p. 18.
327. A contemporary account of these changes is made in Le forçat, 19.11.82; Pierrard, pp. 233-34; Lasserre, pp. 145-46.
328. Aried, p. 374; Armengaud, pp. 68-71.
329. Delory, p. 67; Charles Feron-Vrau, Des habitations ouvriers a Lille, Lille, 1899, pp. 3-4.
330. Delory, opcit.; my interviewees spoke of some hostility, however, hence it is difficult to say whether Delory was trying to whitewash the situation or they were reporting some local and temporary phenomenon.

331. Delory, pp. 69-72; Lafargue to Engels, 6.2.84, tome i, p. 169; A.D. 154/80, M596/1, tend to confirm this, the latter talking about "les agents provocateurs belges".
332. Le forçat, 15/22.10.82, after much of the influx was over, spoke warmly of the Belgians.
333. Fohlen, p. 47, there was never a tramp system in the Nord; Mettrier, pp. 24-27, speaks of the lack of dissension between craft workers and industrial workers. In the light of the dispute at Calais, one wonders if this is still not an exaggeration.
334. Willard, pp. 225-228; A.D. Pas-de-Calais, M2439, M4863.
335. Willard, pp. 228-29; Halevy, pp. 191-92.
336. Y.-M. Hilaire, "Remarques sur la pratique religieuse dans le bassin houiller du Pas-de-Calais dans la second moitié du xix^e siècle", Charbon et sciences humaines, S'Gravenhaage, 1966, pp. 265-79.
337. ibid., pp. 278-79.
338. Demangeon, p. 694; Lasserre p.146; Pierrard, p. 234.
339. Discussed in Rene Gonnard, La femme dans l'industrie, Paris, 1906, for the textile industry in particular; Razous, pp. 2-5.
340. Dureau, pp. 107, 234-35; Bard, pp. 78-79.
341. Le cri du travailleur, 27.9.90; M.D. Nord, M596/16, M596/2.
342. Pierrard, p. 70; Demangeon, p. 694; Razous, L'assainissement des ateliers et des usines, Paris, 1900, pp. 64-69; Bard, pp. 67-70.
343. Levanville, pp. 190-91, Robert Pinot, Les oeuvres sociales des industries métallurgiques, Paris, 1924, pp. 76-82.
344. Pierrard, pp. 76-77; Le cri du travailleur, 27.9.90; A.D. Nord, M596/16.
345. A.D. Nord, M596/17, 33; Zevaes, Au temps de Boulanger, pp. 15-19; Le cri du travailleur, 19.10.90; Lafargue to Engels, 27.11.88, ii, pp. 83-84.
346. Delory, p. 67.
347. Rouger, ii, p. 444; Pierrard, pp. 214-15.
348. There was a depression in 1890-95, but this seems to have stopped rather than helped trade-union and party growth; Halbwachs, p. 111.
349. ibid., pp. 111-115; these can be described as changes in life styles and expectations that ran much deeper than changes due to wage rates.
350. Henri de Man, La joie du travail, Paris, 1935, pp. 32-39.
351. Halbwachs, p. 112; de Man, p. 38; confirmed by A.D. Nord 154/40, M154/80.
352. Halbwachs, pp. 118-30.
353. ibid., pp. 128-30.

354. Georges Friedmann, Le travail en miettes, Paris, 1956, pp. 16-21; Alain Touraine, La conscience ouvrière, Paris, 1966, pp. 28, 335-36.
355. Pierre Naville, La vie du travail et ses problèmes, Paris, 1954, p. 12.
356. Delory lists these, Delory, pp. 78-80; Siauve, pp. 15-18.
357. Milhaud, p. 346 was discussing a comparison between Germany and France, confirmed by A.D. Nord, M154/84, M456/49.
358. Marc Dubois, L'aspiration ouvrière vers la culture et les loisirs des travailleurs, Paris, 1937, pp. 56-61; Habermas, p. 221.
359. Winnai, pp. 20-25; Magnage, pp. 31, 72.
360. Friedmann, pp. 67-72; Minces, p. 23; Emile Basso, Les colonies de vacances, Lyon, 1906, passim; A. Renouard, Les institutions ouvrières du Nord, Lille, 1889, pp. 24-26.
361. Le forcat, 14.11.82; A.D. Nord, M596/14-17.
362. Delory, pp. 43-47.
363. A.D. Nord, ibid.
364. Louis Osmin, Figures du jadis, Paris, 1934, pp. 100-132; Rouger, i, pp. 162, 167, 354.
365. A. Renouard, Les institutions ouvrières du Nord, Lille, 1889, pp. 45-52; A.N. F⁷ 12885.
366. A.D. Nord 154/66,68,69-70; Delory, p. 64.
367. Le socialiste, 13.1.95
368. M. Petitcollet, Le syndicalisme ouvrier dans l'industrie textile dans l'arrondissement de Lille, Lille, 1909, pp. 15-19; Halbwachs, pp. 112-17.
369. Juliette Minces, pp. 37-49; Touraine, pp. 334-35.
370. ibid.; Mallet, pp. 12-28.
371. Pierrard, pp. 71-72; A.D. Nord M455/24.
372. Pierrard, opcit.
373. ibid., pp. 212-13; A. Devaux, Les sociétés coopératives de consommation dans le Nord, Lille, 1907, pp. 18-20.
374. Congrès national Lyon, pp. 23-25.
375. A.D. Nord, M154/84, M153/32, M39/2-6; Zevaes, pp. 15-19;
376. Le forcat, 5.8.82.
377. A.D. Nord M455/24.
378. Willard, pp. 235, 257, 569-70.
379. Pierrard, p. 217. Willard, p. 257.

380. Le travailleur, 25.2.94, 14.10.94.
381. Pierrard, p. 213; Willard, p. 95.
382. Willard, p. 98.
383. Pierrard, p. 220; Petitcollet, pp. 56-72.
384. Siauve, pp. 16-21; Le cri du travailleur, 8.6.90, 22.3.91; Delory, p. 14.
385. Delory, pp. 78-80.
386. Almanach 1892, pp. 22-26.
387. Congrès national Marseille, 1892, p. 56; Congrès national Paris, 1897, p.28.
388. Réberieux, opcit.
389. Pouget, opcit., p. 46; Mermeix, p. 15.
390. Lagardelle, Le syndicalisme et le socialisme en France, Paris, 1908, pp. 44-46.
391. Jean Maitron, Le syndicalisme révolutionnaire: Paul Delesalle, Paris, 1952, pp. 123-30.
392. Congrès national 1905, pp. 87-89; but that the political movement should not take precedence over the trade-union movement; both must act responsibly towards each other.
393. Grieffuelhes, L'action syndicale, Paris, 1908, pp. 4, 49.
394. "Le syndicalisme ... ne peut être plutôt réformiste que révolutionnaire, ni révolutionnaire que réformiste ... Son rôle est d'éviter les grèves et de recouvrer à la conciliation avant les conflits, à l'arbitrage dès que la guerre se déclare." Le travailleur, 2.3.05; Lagardelle, p. 47.
395. A.D. Pas-de-Calais, M2116.
396. Histoire des territoires ayant formé le département du Pas-de-Calais, (ed.) Archives départementales, Arras, 1946, pp. 9-19; Demangeon, p. 293.
397. Annuaire statistique du département du Nord, Lille, 1869-1900: Histoire, pp. 21-22.
398. Richard Marius, Le régime minier, Paris, 1911, p. 56; Pierre Macqueron, L'oeuvre du syndicat des mineurs du Pas-de-Calais, Lille, 1904, pp. 12-14; Ghesquière, La mine et les mineurs du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais, Lille, 1901, pp. 3, 6, 17-21.
399. Demangeon, pp. 703-04; Ghesquière, pp. 45-46; Georges Michel/André Renouard, Histoire d'un centre ouvrier (les concessions d'Anzins), Paris, 1891, pp. 7-18.

400. Marcel Gillet, "L'affrontement des syndicalistes ouvriers et patronaux dans le bassin houiller du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais de 1884 a 1891", Bulletin de la société d'histoire moderne, 1957, no. 1, pp. 12-15, 18-23; Rene Houdart, Etude sur le comportement des mineurs du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais, Lille, 1952, pp. 39-50.
401. Gillet, pp. 19-21.
402. Houdart, p. 52.
403. Mincez, p. 82; Jean Beaudemoulin, Enquête sur les loisirs de l'ouvrier français, Paris, 1924, pp. 114-31; what is needed is a study on the mythology of the mining communities.
404. Willard, pp. 35, 485-90; confirmed by A.D. Nord, M154/60.
405. Basly and Lamendin sat continuously for either a Paris constituency or for Lens from 1889.
406. Houdart, p. 67; Willard, pp. 486-87; Guesde in Le cri du travailleur, 15.3.91.
407. Lamendin in Le socialiste, 24.6.91.
408. Houdart, pp. 21-22; Willard, p. 488.
409. Rouger, i, p. 366; Willard, p. 490.
410. Macqueron, pp. 54-60.
411. ibid., p. 61.
412. ibid., pp. 65-67; A.D. Pas-de-Calais, M2116.
413. Willard, pp. 486-87.
414. Macqueron, pp. 116-123; Gillet, pp. 55-57;
415. Le réveil syndical, 27.4.03, showed Lamendin's interest so long as there was a united socialist movement.
416. Brécy, p. 87.
417. Statistisches Reichsamt, opcit.; Statistique générale, opcit.
418. The index is composed in equal portions of coal, textiles, railways, iron and (when applicable) steel.
419. Wolfgang Abendroth, Soziale Geschichte der europäischen Arbeiterbewegung, Frankfurt/Main, 1965; Werner Hoffmann, Stalinismus und Antikommunismus, Frankfurt/Main, 1967.
420. Veblen, The Instinct of Craftsmanship, N.Y., 1918, p. 55.
421. F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, N.Y., 1956, pp. 168, 214; Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, London, 1950, p. 38; Claude Levi-Strauss, "Le geste d'Asdiwal", in Temps modernes, 1949, p. 115.
422. Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, New York, 1962, pp. 24-34, 172; Charles Walker/Robert Guest, The Man on the Assembly Line, Cambridge, Mass, 1952, passim.

423. Pierre Naville opcit, emphasises the role of the machine in determining political consciousness; Touraine opcit; ties this in to phases of industrial development, as does Mallet opcit; Chombart du Lauwe, La sociologie des aspirations, Paris, 1969, Images de la culture, Paris, 1967, suggests casting the net wider and examining consciousness as determined by a multitude of elements both in and out of work.
424. Mallet, pp. 38-46; Touraine, pp. 355-56, arguing against Halbwachs.
425. Halbwachs, p. 177; Dubois, pp. 145-47; De Man, pp. 76-79; if we look at the literature of the syndicalistes révolutionnaires itself we find as Halévy pointed out a romanticisation of the past (opcit., p. 123), Pouget, opcit. defining le syndicat as the basic cell of the perfect society, and constructing an image of society based upon guilds of artisans.
426. The list of demands have more to do with restoring the social position of the artisan. Grieffuelhes, p. 43; Pouget, p. 22-23.
427. Touraine, pp. 351-53; Halbwachs, pp. 469-74; Dubois, p. 8.
428. Beaudemoulin, pp. 205-08; Halbwachs, ibid.; my interviewees spoke of their leisure as a time to create something for themselves and in many instances they chose to create an object that was at least marginally related to the product they produced in the factory.
429. Naville, pp. 123-27; close to Freud's theory of sublimation, Civilisation and its Discontents, London, 1957, passim.
430. Halbwachs, p. 414; a host of activities can be defined in this way, the show of the Sunday parade of workmen and their families on the Boulevard, the choice of clothes for the outing, impractical but flashy, all signifying a wish to be part of society.
431. ibid.
432. Janine Larrue, Loisirs ouvriers chez les métallurgistes toulousains, La Haye, 1963, pp. 67-71; Louis Delperrin, Les colonies de vacances, Paris, 1908, pp. 23-26; Beaudemoulin, pp. 191-93.
433. Friedmann, pp. 56-58, discusses the compulsion to gamble.
434. Grieffuelhes, p. 8 lauding the unity of artisan life; Lucien Febvre, L'apparition du livre, Paris, 1971, pp. 191-97 in discussing the living conditions of the printers during the 16th century notes how this served as a body for the artisans of his youth.
435. Touraine, opcit.
436. Magnage, pp. 145-48; Vinnai, pp. 67-70; Habermas, opcit.; Friedmann, p. 169.
437. Veblen, The theory of the leisure class, pp. 75-82;
438. Vinnai, pp. 134-37; Magnage, pp. 165-68.
439. A. Pacaud, Essai sur l'organisation des loisirs ouvriers, Nancy, 1929, pp. 43-46; De Man, opcit.

440. Larrue, pp. 165-66; Minces, pp. 123-25.
441. Boussel, pp. 25-27; Chombart du Lauwe, pp. 213-14.
442. As described by interviewees. The party organisation organised all activities that were arranged, according to Mme. Lavigne with military precision.
443. ibid.,
444. Basso, pp. 56-57.
445. Halbwachs, pp. 116-18, 384-86.
446. ibid., pp. 414-15.
447. Willard, p. 32; Lafargue, Idealisme, p. 20; Protokoll, Bremen 1904, pp. 234-36; Haupt, p. 81.
448. Protokoll, Jena 1905, p. 321.
449. Freud, p. 82; Gaston Bachelard, L'eau et les rêves, Paris, 1942, pp. 33-35.
450. A.D. Nord, 158/33.
451. Halbwachs, p. 384.
452. It led to a "weary resignation" that was potentially dangerous, Freud, p. 19.
453. ibid., pp. 63,68.
454. Halbwachs, p. 414.
455. Protokoll Jena, 1905, p. 351.
456. Touraine, "Contribution à la sociologie du mouvement ouvrier: Le syndicalisme de contrôle, Cahiers internationales de sociologie, 1960, 1960, pp. 80-81.
457. Report in Vorwärts, 19.12.05, Michels, p. 258 discusses strikes of textile workers in Crimmitschau and metal workers in Mannheim.
458. The best report we have from contemporary sources is from Conrad Hähnisch in the Städtische-Arbeiterzeitung, xvi, nos 51-58; he shows the power of the trade union leaders to condemn a strike that they could not control.
459. Fricke, p. 275.
460. Hähnisch talks of workers storming the platform, destroying speakers notes and forbidding trade-union and party leaders from speaking. They even went so far as to attack party headquarters. The local M.P. also a member of the GK, Sachse, had to be escorted to the station by the police in order to avoid a severe beating.
461. Koch, p. 189-92.
462. Reports in Le réveil syndical, 20.9.03, and Le travailleur, 5.11.03, show a pattern similar to that described by Hähnisch and Michels.
463. Koch ibid.; and in France Le réveil syndical, opcit. indicates that the miners made similar demands.

464. Schorske, pp. 92-94.
465. Le travailleur, opcit.
466. Gesammelte Politische Schriften, München, 1921, p. 22.
467. Nachlass Weber, 9.2.08.
468. Le socialiste, 9.2.00.

CONCLUSIONS.

I would have preferred if the last section of the last chapter could have appeared as a decisive conclusion to my study. However, it cannot because my suggestions for an interpretation of the uses of ideology in the socialist movement demand considerably more research both in the fields of sociology as well as in the field of economics.

In the first place, I have been unable to provide data for Germany comparable to data for France because of the immense difficulties in relating the categories of the various German censuses to those undertaken in France. The French in 1907 suggested how such a comparison might be undertaken. It would require adjusting some thirty categories of both sets of data and even then many of the rubrics themselves can never be strictly compared.

In quantity there are more regional and local studies about the socialist movement in Germany than for France; but most of these studies date from the first decade of this century and tend to be chronicles rather than analytic works. The paucity of regional studies in France has led to my resorting to looking at police and departmental records for some areas but since my purpose has not been to examine them in depth my findings must be taken with the scepticism that must accompany any research that may suggest hypotheses rather than proposing firm conclusions.

Finally, my interpretation, on the whole, has been a sociological interpretation. I have examined the influence of the immediate social environment on the development of working-class movements and how institutions, norms, and Weltanschauungen appear to be related through some kind of dynamic, dialectical interacting whole. I have neglected one very important area, namely, the influences of the market system through wage and tariff rates, cyclical economic patterns and changes and how they encourage and impede trade unions and political movements. I would suggest that any future research must try to combine the sociological and the economic once the sociological has been more clearly understood and developed.

In the first sections of this essay, I have tried to find a constant theme in the writings of Marx and Engels in keeping with their political commitments. I tried to demonstrate how their notion of strategy and its underlying principles could be found in all of their writings. A recent and also ancient controversy amongst Marxologists has been about the role of Kapital.¹ Some see it as a definitive scientific statement and others who rather forget about much of Kapital and concentrate on the themes developed in Marx's early writings about alienation and reification. I would suggest that there are grounds to interrelate these two themes and that the notion of strategy provides the means to do so. However, until we have all of Marx's notebooks in print, particularly those from which Engels prepared the second and third volumes of Kapital and from which the Theorien have been extracted, I would caution against any overhasty conclusion. My purpose has been to demonstrate the existence of a tendency.

Finally, one final area that I think should be investigated is the relationship between the theory developed by the social democrats and that enunciated by Russian communists like Stalin. Werner Hoffmann suggests that they are similar and one can interpret Stalinism as an outgrowth of Kautsky's interpretation of Marx.² The years that have passed since the many scars of the Stalinist controversy have begun to heal would make such a study timely and, indeed, extremely useful.

1. I mean of course the school of Althusser.
2. Hoffmann opcit..

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I have adopted the following conventions for the presentation of bibliographical material.

- (A) The general plan of the bibliography is as follows:
- (i) Works of Marx and Engels that have been cited in the text.
 - (ii) Works about Marx and Engels that have been cited in the text.
 - (iii) Interviews with former members of the pre-1905 German and French socialist parties.
 - (iv) Official and governmental sources.
 - (v) Archival sources:
 - (a) Government and official
 - (b) Local
 - (c) Libraries and private
 - (vi) Collections of letters.
 - (vii) Journals and newspapers.
 - (a) Journals and national press
 - (b) Local press
 - (c) Specialised press
 - (viii) Congresses and reports of congresses.
 - (ix) Theoretical works by German and French socialists and party publications.
 - (x) Works about socialist theorists and the implantation of the socialist movement
 - (a) General and theoretical works
 - (b) Works about Germany
 - (c) Works about France
 - (d) Historical and sociological journals
- (B) Because of the large number of materials, I have only listed works cited directly in the text, or of more than general importance.
- (C) The dates in brackets refer to the first date of publication, or when the work was not published until recently, the date it was written in the case of the works of Marx and Engels.
- (D) In all other cases, the date refers to the date of the edition I used.

(E) In the case of newspapers, the date in brackets refers to the year or years consulted.

(i) Works of Marx and Engels that have been cited in the text:

Wherever possible, I have cited editions that appeared in the original language of the text in question. In the case of much of the correspondence, however, this has proved impossible because many of the original letters are only available in German or Russian translations.

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- Herr Hermann Georg, a former turner from Essen.
- Herr Gottfried Schneider, a textile worker from the region of Leipzig.
- M. Michel Cousin, former woodcutter from Vierzon.
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(vi) Isère

53M67 activity in Grenoble.

(vii) Loire

10M95-9 reports 1891-92.
10M100-103 reports 1893-1894.
10M107-119 reports 1895-98.

(viii) Nord

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M39/2-6 Reports on Delory, Ghesquière, etc.
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M154/66-70 POF 1896-1899.
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M 455/24 cooperatives
M456/1-62 cooperatives

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|------|---|-------------------------------------|
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| | M596/1-3 | trade unions 1883-1903. |
| | M625 | textile strike 1903. |
| | M626 | miners' strike 1903. |
| ix | <u>Rhône</u> | |
| | M368-370 | independent socialists, 1882-98. |
| | 7M | trade-union movement. |
| x | <u>Somme</u> | |
| | Mfs93406-7 | |
| | Mfs95815-18 | monthly dossiers. |
| xi | <u>Pas-de-Calais</u> | |
| | M2116 | Lens socialists and trade unionists |
| | M2439 | Calais 1891 |
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| | M4863 | strikes 1888-1896. |
| xii | <u>Puy-de-Dôme</u> | |
| | MD16 | police reports. |
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Frankfurt	1894	Dresden	1903	
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