

Attitudes and Values

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Summary

Attitudes are our likes and dislikes towards anything and anyone that can be evaluated. This can be something as concrete as a mosquito that is tormenting you during the night or abstract and broad as capitalism or communism. In contrast, human values have been defined as abstract ideals and guiding principles in our life, and are considered as abstract as well as trans-situational. Thus, while both attitudes and values are important constructs in psychology that are necessarily related, there are also a range of differences between the two. Attitudes are specific judgements towards an object, values are abstract and trans-situational; attitudes can be positive and negative, values are mainly positive; and attitudes are less relevant for our self-concept than values.

A range of studies have investigated how values and attitudes towards specific topics are associated. The rationale for most studies is that people's values guide whether they like certain people, an object, or an idea. For example, the more people value universalism (e.g., equality, broad-mindedness), the more they support equal rights for groups that are typically disadvantaged. However, these associations can also be complex. If people do not consider an attitude to be a relevant expression of a value, it is less likely that the value predicts this attitude. Further, it can also matter for our attitudes whether our values match those of the people in our country, are similar to other social groups (e.g., immigrants), and whether we think our own groups' values are similar or dissimilar to the values of other groups. In sum,

the literature shows that the links between values and attitudes are both entrenched and malleable and that these interrelations have many important consequences for understanding social-political divisions and well-being.

Keywords:

Attitudes, values, prejudice, protecting the environment, persuasion

In this chapter, we provide an overview of attitudes and human values from a psychological perspective. We first define attitudes and values, show how values are associated with attitudes, how values can influence attitudes, and discuss variables that moderate the value-attitude link.

Attitudes

Attitudes have been defined in many different, yet overlapping ways (e.g., Eagly & Carli, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). For example, Maio et al. (2019) defined an attitude as “an overall evaluation of an object that is based on cognitive, affective, and behavioural information” (p. 4). To put it simply, attitudes are our likes and dislikes towards anything and anyone that can be evaluated. This can be something as concrete as a mosquito that is tormenting you during the night or abstract and broad as capitalism or communism.

Attitudes can differ in their valence, that is whether they are positive or negative, in their strength, and in their moral conviction, that is the belief that something is moral or immoral (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Skitka et al., 2005). For example, someone may like or dislike riding rollercoasters, feel very certain (or not) about the attitude, but not associate it with any moral conviction (or instead see rollercoasters as relevant to personal morality). An overall attitude towards an object or person can further influence

subsequent judgements. For instance, people who dislike rollercoasters might perceive rollercoasters as less safe or aesthetically pleasant compared to a person who likes them. Similarly, if we like a person, we agree on average more with a statement that is attributed to them than if the statement is unattributed, and agree less with it if it is attributed to a person we dislike (Hanel, Wolfradt, Maio, et al., 2018).


Attitudes have a powerful effect on how we simplify and make sense of the world (Fazio, 2000; Maio et al., 2019). If we are in a restaurant, for example, it saves us a lot of time (and is less distressing for those who are with us) if we just consider the menu options for the type of meal we like most (e.g., vegan, fish, meat), rather than all options. Moral conviction might also impact our choice (Skitka et al., 2005): Even if we have a strong positive attitude towards the steak because of past experiences, if we now believe that eating animals is morally wrong, we will likely not order it (cf. Brandt et al., 2015; Feinberg et al., 2019). Indeed, a related function of attitudes is that they can express our values (Katz, 1960), which we discuss below in the subsection “Value-Expressive Functions of Attitudes”.

This function is also relevant to political attitudes in particular. Values emerge as being relevant in research that has tried to discover clusters of political attitudes (Ashton et al., 2005). The authors argued that placing people’s political attitudes on a single left-right continuum was an oversimplification that does not capture the complexity of political attitudes. They tested in a sample of 922 US-American adults whether 27 political attitudes could be placed alongside two dimensions instead of one continuum. Examples for attitudinal objects were prayer in public schools, raising the minimum wage, doctor-assisted suicide, and reducing defence spending. Two factors emerged from the analysis of patterns of association between attitudes: ‘compassion vs competition’, and ‘moral regulation vs individual freedom’. Of particular interest, these dimensions are also relevant in research on human values, as we outline below.

Values

Human values have been defined as abstract ideals and guiding principles in our life (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Values are considered as abstract, trans-situational (Schwartz, 1994), and mainly positive (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). Further, values can be ordered in a two-dimensional model (Gouveia et al., 2014; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). In one of the most influential models of human values, Schwartz (1992) found that 56 core values provide good coverage across most cultural contexts. These 56 values can be grouped into 10 value types, which in turn can be grouped into 4 higher-order value types: openness to change values, which contrast with conservation values, and self-transcendence values, which contrast with self-enhancement values (Figure 1). The closer that two value types are in the model, the more similar are their underlying motives. For example, the underlying motive for universalism and benevolence are concerns for other people. In contrast, the further away that two values are, the more likely that the underlying motives are opposing. An example is self-direction and security: motives for freedom are likely to clash with motives for national security. The structure of values displayed in Figure 1 has been replicated in over 80 countries (Schwartz, 2018) and across a range of methods and analytical approaches (Coelho et al., 2019).

Figure 1. Schwartz's (1992) model of human values. Values (normal font) are grouped into 10 value types (bold font), which in turn are grouped into 4 higher order value types (large font).



An important feature of this quasi-circumplex model is that, if one variable is positively correlated with one value, it will likely also be positively correlated to the adjacent values and be uncorrelated or negatively correlated with opposing value types (Schwartz, 1992). When the value types are plotted along the x-axis and the strengths of the correlation on the y-axis, the pattern of associations will resemble a sine wave (a line that regularly goes up and down similar to waves in water). For example, ingroup attitudes are negatively correlated with universalism, uncorrelated with openness values and benevolence, and positively correlated with power and conservation values (Boer & Fischer, 2013; Feldman, 2020). This feature of the quasi-circumplex model is further supported by experimental evidence: changing one value type causes adjacent value types to change in the same direction, leaves orthogonal values unaffected, and changes opposing value types in the opposing direction (Maio, Pakizeh, et al., 2009; see also Bardi et al., 2009). This

characteristic of the quasi-circumplex model often enables the derivation of hypotheses for the associations of all values with an external variable (e.g., attitudes towards a specific object). For example, if we believe that attitudes towards religion are most strongly positively correlated with tradition, it follows that the correlations with the opposing value types of hedonism and stimulation are less strong and potentially even negative, whereas the correlation with orthogonal values (e.g., power and universalism) likely lie in between (cf. Saroglou et al., 2004).

When people are asked which values are most important, we again find an almost universal pattern: People in most countries value benevolence most followed by universalism, security, and self-direction, and attribute the least importance to power (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). This hierarchy implies that value priorities of people between countries are similar (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011). Indeed, 80 to 94% of people in over 70 countries agreed to a similar extent with the importance attributed to each of the 10 value types (Hanel et al., 2019). Even larger similarities in values were found for other social groups, such as people holding different education levels or belonging to different religious denominations. Importantly, this does not mean that each individual within these groups necessarily has very similar values. In fact, in any large group there will almost certainly be a range of people who have very different value priorities. Indeed, as we outline in more detail below, most social groups (e.g., British citizens, people whose highest degree is a PhD, Christians), are quite heterogeneous, which leads almost unavoidably into high similarities between groups (cf. Figure 2 below, top panel).

The finding that people across countries place on average similar importance to any given value might be surprising, given apparent substantial cultural differences between countries. One obvious example is the universalism value of equality. While people in most countries report that equality is very important to them as a guiding principle in their life

(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), gender equality varies substantially across nations (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). This suggests that people instantiate (understand) equality differently (Hanel et al., 2017; Maio, 2010). Indeed, Hanel et al. (2018) found that people across Brazil, India, and the UK instantiate equality and 22 other values (e.g., family security, success, freedom) partly with different examples (instantiations). Specifically, the authors asked participants to think about situations in which a value is relevant, the people in this situation, and what they are doing. Some people thought about equality as treating all children equally, others considered the issue of paying women and men the same salary, and others thought about abolishing racism. While there were some cross-cultural differences (e.g., only Indians mentioned discrimination based on caste), there was still substantial heterogeneity within each country. That is, people in each country instantiated equality and the other values differently, with rarely more than 50% of participants mentioning the same instantiation. In the subsection “Value Instantiation and Attitudes” we discuss how value instantiations can help us to better understand the link between values and attitudes.

How Values Influence Attitudes

While both attitudes and values are important constructs in psychology that are necessarily related, there are also a range of differences between the two. Attitudes are specific judgements towards an object, values are abstract and trans-situational; attitudes can be positive and negative, values are mainly positive; and attitudes are less relevant for our self-concept than values (cf. Maio, 2016).

Because values are guiding principles, they are thought to guide our behaviour (Roccas & Sagiv, 2017) through a range of variables including attitudes (Homer & Kahle, 1988). That is, values influence how we feel towards specific objects or people, which in turn influences our actions (Thorne et al., 2020). For example, openness values predict specific attitudes towards hunting animals, which in turn predict self-reported hunting

frequency (Hrubes et al., 2001). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study to date has investigated the value-attitude-behaviour link using actual rather than self-reported behaviour (cf. Fischer, 2017). This might also be because the attitude-behaviour link itself depends on a range of factors. For example, the attitude-behaviour link is stronger when the measurement of attitudes and behaviour corresponds in terms of action, context, target, and time (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Also, the behaviour domain matters: voting is more strongly predicted by relevant attitudes than abstinence from drugs is predicted by attitudes (Kraus, 1995; McEachan et al., 2011). In addition, attitude-behaviour links are greater for attitudes that are held strongly (e.g., highly certain, easy to retrieve, important), and attitude strength and other moderators have been the focus of extensive investigation (e.g., Maio et al., 2019; Thorne et al., 2020). There is also initial evidence that the value-behaviour link is stronger when the focus of values and behaviour measurement correspond in time: Foad et al. (2020) found that values were more strongly associated with behaviour intentions when they both matched in time. For example, future values ('how important will value X be in the future to you') predicted future behaviour intentions better than present or past values. Below, we look more closely into the different ways with which values and attitudes are associated, and the processes underlying how values influence attitudes, considering both correlational and experimental studies.

Correlational Evidence of the Value-Attitude Link

A range of studies have investigated how values and attitudes towards specific topics are associated. The rationale for most studies is that people's values guide whether they like an object or an idea. For example, Ashton et al. (2005) predicted and found that the dimension of self-transcendence vs self-enhancement values is correlated with the dimension of political attitudes 'compassion vs competition'; and the dimension of openness to change vs conservation values is correlated with the 'moral regulation vs individual freedom'

dimension of political attitudes. This pattern emerges because, for example, positive attitudes towards increasing the minimum wage, an attitude of the compassionate vs competition factor, reflects an action that transcends the self because support for the minimum wage entails being concerned for the welfare of others and self-transcendence values have concern for others as their core motivation (Schwartz, 1992).

Substantial research has investigated associations between values and pro-environmental attitudes and (self-reported) behaviour (Bouman et al., 2018; Hanel, Litzellachner, et al., 2018; van der Werff et al., 2013). For example, environmental researchers argued that biospheric and altruistic values are motivationally distinct even though they are part of self-transcendence (de Groot & Steg, 2008). Biospheric values express support for the environment, whereas altruistic values express more direct support for other people. Indeed, research showed that biospheric values were more strongly associated with pro-environmental attitudes and beliefs than altruistic values (Bouman et al., 2018; de Groot & Steg, 2008). Other research tested whether materialism is associated with pro-environmental attitudes. Materialism is a self-enhancement value that falls in between achievement and power, and focuses on the possession of materialistic objects (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). This suggests that the underlying motive is self-focused and thus opposes concerns for other people and the environment (Schwartz, 1992). Indeed, a meta-analysis (a study that averages the results of primary studies to get a more robust estimate of an effect) found that materialism was negatively associated with pro-environmental attitudes and behaviour (Hurst et al., 2013). That is, people who valued materialism tended to be less concerned about the environment.

A third body of research investigated how values and attitudes towards immigrants are correlated (Davidov et al., 2014; Long et al., 2020; Souchon et al., 2017; Vecchione et al., 2012; Wolf et al., 2019). This research consistently found that self-transcendence in general,

and universalism in particular, were positively correlated with attitudes towards immigrants, while conservation values were negatively correlated. As noted in the section “values” above, self-transcendence values refer to concerns for the welfare of others beyond one’s family and friends (Schwartz, 1992). In contrast, conservation values refer to maintaining the status quo and valuing tradition. Therefore, people who value conservation may perceive immigrants as a threat to their safety and values (González et al., 2008) because immigrants typically bring new ways of life and traditions that are less well-known.

Some studies suggest that the strength of the value-attitude associations is moderated by the tightness of a country, that is how closely people follow social norms. Boer and Fischer (2013) found that value-attitude associations tended to be stronger in countries where people follow social norms less (i.e., in more individualistic countries), because people are freer to act in line with their attitudes and values (see also Fischer & Boer, 2016). More specifically, Ponizovskiy (2016) postulated and found that the link between universalism and attitudes towards immigrants was stronger in Western European countries compared to Eastern European post-communist countries, which are less individualistic compared to the former.

The Role of Values in Persuasion

The link between values and attitudes led researchers to contemplate whether manipulating people’s values can impact their attitudes. The rationale behind this approach is that persuasive messages often aim to directly impact people’s attitudes, and these aims can be too obvious especially when people are not motivated to change their attitudes (Blankenship et al., 2012). Because values are rarely questioned and thus defensiveness for one’s values is low (Maio & Olson, 1998), it could be possible to change attitudes indirectly through attacking values. Indeed, Blankenship et al. (2012) found that when the value of

equality was attacked, attitudes towards affirmative actions changed more than when the authors attacked affirmative action attitudes directly.

For example, research by Bernard et al. (2003) found that reading and rating reasons for and against the importance of equality made participants more resistant to changing their ratings of the importance of this value following a persuasive attack against it, which then led to more positive equality-relevant attitudes. That is, thinking about the importance of equality resulted in less change of the value and related attitudes following an attack (reading an essay why equality is not important; see also Maio & Olson, 1998).

Other persuasion research found that including important (vs unimportant) values in a message impacts whether a message can change people's attitudes (Blankenship & Wegener, 2008). While it is not surprising that stronger messages are in general more persuasive than weaker messages, stronger messages are only more persuasive than weaker ones if they include references to normatively important values (vs relatively unimportant values).

While this experimental approach sounds promising, Manfredi et al. (2016) argued that values cannot be changed on a societal level because they are “deeply embedded in the social–ecological context” (p. 778) and therefore stable. Also, values have a significant genetic component, which further increases their stability (Schermer et al., 2011). Manfredi therefore argued that changing people’s attitudes or norms would be more effective to increase pro-environmental behaviour. This rather pessimistic outlook on value research has been challenged (Ives & Fischer, 2017), and it remains disputed whether norm and attitude change cannot be achieved quicker than value change (Inglehart et al., 2017). This is an important topic because some evidence suggests that values influence more strongly socioeconomic development and democratisation than socioeconomic development and democratisation influenced values (Schwartz, 2006). Thus, identifying ways in which values can be changed might be beneficial. However, (extreme) economic conditions or events can

also impact values. For example, the 2008 global financial crisis led to an increase in conservation values among young Europeans (Sortheix et al., 2019).

Value-Expressive Functions of Attitudes

One of the reasons why values and attitudes are associated is because attitudes allow us to express our values (Katz, 1960). For example, people who value protecting the environment will be more likely to have positive attitudes towards cycling and buying local products. This is because people seek to be consistent across their beliefs (Festinger, 1957): Holding positive attitudes towards objects that threaten our values can result in psychological inconsistencies and discomfort (Rosenberg, 1960, 1968). This implies that people refer to different values when justifying opposing attitudes towards a specific topic. For example, many people indicate that they are favourable to increased access to abortion because they value freedom, whereas others say that they are unfavourable because they value sanctity of life. By reasoning with different values, values are used to both shape such attitudes and act as post-hoc justifications (Kristiansen & Zanna (1988).

Understanding whether people believe that attitudes express certain values helps to explain whether a value predicts an attitude. For example, Maio and Olson (1994) found that values predicted participants' attitudes towards a social event, but only for those participants with value-expressive attitudes toward the event (see also Maio & Olson, 1995). This suggests that values and attitudes are associated primarily when people draw a connection between their attitudes and their values.

Value Instantiations and Attitudes

Value-expressive functions of attitudes are closely related to value instantiations. A value instantiation is a "mental representation of concrete examples that promote or threaten a value" (Maio, 2016, p. 259). Instantiations are important because they help us to bridge the gap between the abstract value and a concrete behaviour. As noted above, people instantiate

values differently which can have implications for our attitudes and behaviour. For example, some people might argue that we should not discriminate against women or minorities because this discrimination threatens the value of equality, but do not see discrimination against people with different attractiveness, stature, or body weight as also violating equality (Maio, 2010; Maio, Hahn, et al., 2009). The latter features are much less common in discussions of discrimination despite abundant evidence that they matter a great deal, and this atypicality may undermine associations between the value of equality and attitudes to these unusual instantiations of the value.

The importance of value instantiations is supported by research that investigated whether typicality of instantiations moderates the attitude-behaviour link. For example, people's attitudes towards gay men predicted more strongly their intentions to interact with a gay man when the person was described as a prototypical gay man (i.e., matched the stereotypes of gay men) than when the person only partly matched the stereotypes (Lord et al., 1984). Building on this research, Maio, Hahn, et al. (2009) found that people showed more egalitarian behaviour after reflecting about equality in a typical scenario than an atypical scenario. In one of the studies, participants were asked in the typical instantiation condition to list reasons why equality is important when choosing between a female and a male candidate for a job. In the atypical condition, participants were asked to list why equality is important when it comes to selecting a left-handed or a right-handed person. As the authors argued, because discrimination based on gender is more common than based on handedness, more instances of equality should be made salient or activated, making it more likely that participants behave more egalitarian in a subsequent task. This is exactly what the Maio et al. found: Participants who reflected about equality in a typical context showed more egalitarian behaviour – measured through lower ingroup bias – compared to participants in the atypical condition and a control condition in which participants were asked to provide

reasons why they like their favourite beverage. It remains an open question whether reflecting about equality in a typical context also changes people's attitudes, for example towards groups of people which are often considered disadvantaged, but not towards groups that are rarely considered as disadvantaged (e.g., very tall people who struggle with leg space when traveling, suitable clothing is more expensive etc).

Impact of Value Similarities on Attitudes


Many people believe that they score higher on positive attributes than the average person, and lower on negative ones (Alicke et al., 1995). This so-called better-than-average effect can also be observed in values (Bernard et al., 2006; Fischer, 2006). For example, in one study, around 75% of people perceived their own self-transcendence values as more important than those of their fellow citizens, whereas 65% perceived their fellow citizens to value self-enhancement more than they did (Hanel, Wolfradt, Coelho, et al., 2018). In short, people have a tendency to overestimate differences between groups (cf. Maney, 2016), as well as between themselves and their reference group. This tendency is likely even larger when people are asked to assess a disliked outgroup (e.g., supporters of the US-Democratic party assessing US-Republicans; Graham et al., 2012).

However, as noted above, social groups often show substantial similarities in how much importance they attribute to each value (Hanel et al., 2019). The question then arises: What happens if people are made aware that they likely underestimate the extent to which groups of people are similar? This question is important because previous research found that highlighting similarities between groups of people can have positive effects on intergroup attitudes (Byrne et al., 1986).

In a series of experiments, Hanel et al. (2019) tested whether making participants aware of real value similarities improves intergroup attitudes. In one experimental condition, the authors showed participants graphs that highlighted similarities and differences in values

between groups of people, such as British and Polish people. The top panel of Figure 2 illustrates an example, displaying the importance over 2,200 people living in the UK and 1,600 people living in Poland attributed to security (1: Not important, 6: Very important). The higher the curve, the more people selected a specific response option. The majority of people in both countries selected a response option above the scale midpoint of 3.5, suggesting that security is important to them, which replicates previous research (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Participants in the other condition saw the same data, but in a way that emphasises the difference between the groups. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the averages (arithmetic means) from both groups with a truncated y-axis. While this practice of truncating the y-axis has been criticised for decades, because it makes differences appear larger than they are (Huff, 1954), it is common among social scientists (Hanel et al., 2019). Participants in this particular study were all British. As expected, people who viewed graphs displaying similarities and differences in values reported more positive attitudes towards Polish people, compared to those who saw graphs displaying only differences. Further, those participants also perceived British and Polish people to be more similar and closer. These findings suggest that intergroup attitudes can be changed through illustrating value similarity.

Figure 2. The same data displayed in two ways: The top panel highlights both similarities and differences, whereas the bottom panel only highlights differences.



There are several reasons why emphasising value similarities can improve intergroup attitudes (Wolf et al., 2020). For example, highlighting similarities and differences between groups likely rectifies misperceptions towards the outgroup by displaying that two groups are less different than many people assumed. Further, highlighting similarities blurs the boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, which according to the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) is important to reduce prejudice. In addition, common values suggest shared goals, which is another important mechanism for reducing prejudice (Sherif, 1958). There are also potential roles for reshaping ingroup identities

among other mechanisms, and the interplay between these mechanisms is an important topic for future research.

Impact of Perceived Values on Attitudes

How we perceive other people's values is also associated with our attitudes. Some research has investigated whether we consider other people's values at a general level, without evaluating their specific content, as a threat to our own values. In contrast, other research has differentiated between values, mainly using Schwartz's (1992) model.

A study by Gonzales et al. (2008) found that perceiving Muslim immigrants as a threat to one's values predicted prejudice more strongly than perceiving immigrants as an economic threat. In other words, immigrants are perceived more as a threat to one's values than to one's jobs and standards of living. This finding is in line with integrated threat theory (Stephan et al., 1999), which postulates that the "feeling that your values are threatened is a cause of prejudice" (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 28).

Other research built on Schwartz's (1992) value model. For example, Sanderson et al. (2019) found that perceiving one's fellow countrymen as placing importance upon self-transcendence values was associated with more positive attitudes towards civic engagement. Further, Bouman et al. (2020) found that perceiving one's group as placing higher importance on biospheric values was positively associated with willingness to reduce one's energy consumption and other self-reported environmental behaviour. Importantly, this only occurred when the identification with the group was strong, but not when it was weak. In both studies, the authors statistically controlled for people's own values. This is because people's values and how they perceive other people's values is positively correlated (Hanel, Wolfradt, Coelho, et al., 2018).

However, it is unclear what causes this association between self-transcendence values and attitudes and intentions. Does a belief that people around us are selfless make us more

motivated to also do something for them? Or do those who engage more in selfless behaviour more often meet people who place higher importance on self-transcendence values? In any case, the findings are in line with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987) which predict that group members can influence us.

Impact of Value Congruence on Attitudes

Other research has found that congruence between our values and those of others around us can matter for our attitudes and well-being (for a review see Wolf et al., 2020). For example, Du et al. (2019) investigated in a sample of over 171,000 people from 78 countries whether national pride would be higher among people whose values match those of people living in the same country as they do (i.e., show higher value congruence). The authors reasoned that value congruence would allow individuals to more easily live in line with their values and thus fulfil their goals, which should in turn generate positive feelings about their country. The findings suggest that whether, and how, value congruence is associated with national pride strongly depends on the value type. For example, for self-direction, tradition, benevolence, and universalism, national pride was higher when individual-level and country-level values matched at the scale mid-point. That is, when people valued self-direction somewhat and lived in a country in which people's self-direction values were also moderate, they reported higher national pride than people, for example, who valued self-direction a lot and lived in a country in which people also valued self-direction a lot. In contrast, for stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and power, national pride was higher if individual-level and country-level values matched at the more extreme levels of the scale rather than at the mid-point. That is, when people valued stimulation a lot (or a little) and lived in a country in which, on average, people shared their values, their national pride was higher than when they matched around the scale midpoint (i.e., valued stimulation

somewhat). Together, these findings suggest that value congruence can impact people's attitudes towards their own countries (i.e., national pride).

Further research focused on congruence between one's own values and the perceived values of other groups. For example, Wolf et al. (2019) investigated whether perceiving the values of immigrants as more similar or dissimilar to people's own values impacted upon people's attitudes toward immigrants. Participants who scored high on conservation values (e.g., tradition) and perceived immigrants to be high on openness values (e.g., stimulation) reported more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Importantly, this finding emerged when controlling for participants' own values and the perceived values of immigrants. The authors speculated that people high in conservation values might feel more threatened by immigrants they perceive as valuing openness values than, for example, people valuing openness and perceiving immigrants to value conservation. This may arise because people valuing openness report lower ingroup identification (Roccas et al., 2010). Thus, this finding also raises questions about the links between values, attitudes, and social identification.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed a range of studies showing that people's abstract ideals (i.e., values) predict what people like and dislike (attitudes). These associations can be straightforward. For example, the more people value universalism, the more they support equal rights for groups that are typically disadvantaged. However, these associations can also be complex. If people do not consider an attitude to be a relevant expression of a value, it is unlikely that the value predicts this attitude. Further, it can also matter for our attitudes whether our values match those of the people in our country, are similar to other social groups (e.g., immigrants), and whether we think our own groups' values are similar or dissimilar to the values of other groups. Together, these findings show that the links between

values and attitudes are both entrenched and malleable and that these interrelations have many important consequences for understanding social-political divisions and well-being.

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