Terrorist Hostage-Taking in Civil War

Hostage-taking has reached unprecedented levels in civil war. Every year, thousands of individuals are abducted by militants. The incidence and sophistication of these attacks is increasing over time. Despite the upward trend, scholarly work on hostage-taking remains limited. To extend focus on this form of violence, this dissertation provides answers to important questions on the dynamics of hostage-taking in civil war. First, I consider the most common form of hostage-taking: kidnapping. I ask why some insurgents resort to kidnapping in civil war and what explains variation in its selection and intensity over time and space. At a macro- and micro-level, I find organizations resort to kidnapping to generate support and reinstate bargaining capacity when they suffer losses on the battlefield, and to enforce loyalties and display strength when they face violent competition from other militants. Second, I consider why organizations decide to kill hostages. Using novel data on the Islamic State in Iraq, I find hostage victims accused of acts that undermine the rebel regime are more likely to be killed than those taken for other purposes. Finally, I move the discussion to the state and explore when governments negotiate with organizations for the release of hostages. Utilizing original data on the Philippines, I find states are more likely to negotiate for the release of high-profile victims compared to other victims. This dissertation makes several contributions to existing work on conflict and development. By examining a diverse set of organizations across various conflicts, introducing novel data drawing attention to domestic victims of violence, and highlighting the unique nature of hostage-taking as a tactic employed in a demand-intensive environment, the dissertation emphasizes and deconstructs the politics deeply intertwined with violence and responses to it, offering informed insights to counter violent extremism in civil war.