Symeonidis, George Cartel Policy, Non-Price Competition and Market Structure: Theory and Evidence from the UK (Revised version published in Economica, vol.67 (August 2000), pp.437-456). [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Symeonidis, George Cartel Policy, Non-Price Competition and Market Structure: Theory and Evidence from the UK (Revised version published in Economica, vol.67 (August 2000), pp.437-456). [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Symeonidis, George Cartel Policy, Non-Price Competition and Market Structure: Theory and Evidence from the UK (Revised version published in Economica, vol.67 (August 2000), pp.437-456). [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of price competition on advertising/R&D expenditure and market structure. General theoretical results are derived which restrict the space of possible outcomes regarding the behaviour of concentration and advertising/R&D expenditure following an intensification of price competition. The theoretical predictions are tested using UK data on the evolution of competition, concentration and advertising over 1954-1977. The econometric results suggest that the introduction of restrictive practices legislation in the UK cause a rise in concentration in previously cartelised high-advertising manufacturing industries and probably also a fall in advertising intensity.
Item Type: | ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined] |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Market structure; price competition; cartels; endogenous sunk costs; advertising; UK manufacturing. |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 16 Aug 2012 10:27 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:40 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/3705 |