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## **Chapter 23**

# **The Political Economy of Peacekeeping: Unemployment, Violence, and Support towards Peacekeepers. Evidence from Somalia**

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### **Introduction**

What are the conditions at the local level that determine why some individuals support peacekeepers more than others? How is their support towards the peacekeepers affected by their perception of security? In particular, are the poor who make the majority in conflict settings where resources are scarce likely to support peacekeepers more, or less? This research aims to build on the recent literature on the question of effectiveness in peacekeeping by focusing on how conditions such as an individual's economic status lead to trust and support towards peacekeepers.<sup>1</sup> Peacekeeping operations require trust and participation of the local population for it to be sustainable and, a pressing challenge that peacekeepers face on top of containing violence is the deteriorating economic livelihoods as a result of armed conflicts and the job scarcities that follow. Considering these circumstances, a person's financial well-being resulting from peace is often an incentive for support towards peacebuilding efforts—especially their support towards peacekeepers.

Micro-level empirical research on peacekeeping operations is beginning to focus on the impact of peacekeeping operations on the socio-economic aspects of the communities and individuals. They suggest that the presence of peacekeepers can increase the local economy by creating local security bubbles (Mvukiyehe and Samii 2021), increasing agricultural products (Caruso et al. 2017), using information technology (Martin-Shields & Bodanac, 2018), increasing individual household consumption, and improving subjective well-being (Bove et al., 2021). The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between the local economy and support towards the peacekeepers in the same vein. We emphasize two factors: respondents' economic status and

their perceived insecurity. We theorize that relatively poorer citizens express stronger support for peacekeepers. Our core argument is that in war-torn or post-conflict societies, unemployed and financially impoverished citizens are more sensitive to economic changes in the local economy than others (Ćumurović & Hyll, 2019). They are therefore more likely to value the stable, peaceful, and secure environment. When peacekeepers are deployed in such areas, this group is more likely to support and trust the external interveners, whose mere presence marks the commitment to peace.

We examine our hypotheses with a survey of 700 Somali citizens across the three cities of Somalia: Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa in South Central Somalia, where the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been deployed to fulfill the Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate for more than a decade.<sup>2</sup> In particular, we evaluate how perceptions about economic conditions and local security shape their trust towards peacekeepers and other local security institutions in these Somali cities. Our results indicate that trust towards peacekeepers is more substantive among unemployed individuals, who are in a relatively worse off economic situation and harbor perceived fear about the local insecurity. We argue that unemployed individuals tend to bear the financial brunt because of the insecurity in their communities. Therefore, these Somali citizens' are more supportive of the deployed peacekeepers, as they expect the interveners to help their economic well-being. Citizens perceive peacekeepers capable of providing stability which in turn is seen as a source of income and employment. On the flip side, our findings also mean that the support towards host security institutions such as the police is low among the unemployed. Upon further examination, we find that poor individuals attribute their security guarantee to the peacekeepers more than the government security institution. Our findings do not discount AMISOM's contribution in establishing the Somali National Police Force since the local police, to some extent, have gained recognition and acceptance, contributing to the positive narrative in Somalia's transition. By examining peacekeeping from the local economic perspective, this study helps demarcate the baseline conditions and factors shaping local's trust towards peacekeepers.

The following section examines past studies on peacekeeping and local security, its impact on the local economy, and how the interaction of these factors shapes local opinion on

peacekeepers. After a brief review of recent works on these topics, we elaborate on our argument. We then introduce the survey design in Somalia to test our conjectures. Results and their implications are discussed next, followed by the conclusion.

### **The Economic Impact of Peacekeepers**

The focus of the extant economic literature on peacekeeping has mostly centered around peacekeeping budget and expenditures and their subsequent impact on peacekeeping operations (Gaibulloev et al. 2015). A detailed analysis of the impact of peacekeeping on different economic research agendas is a relatively new phenomenon (Beber et al. 2019), which is surprising given that peacekeepers are also known to have positive impacts beyond security, such as in the areas of the rule of law (Blair, 2021) and other peacebuilding efforts directly targeting the managing of former combatants (Phayal et al. 2015). Even when peacekeepers do not use coercive force, monitoring and reporting alone can deter aggressors and lower violence against civilians at the local level (Phayal 2019), which the local citizens seem to be aware of (Müller & Bashar, 2017).

While the literature overwhelmingly agrees that peacekeepers positively impact local security and the rule of law (Di Salvatore, 2019; Hultman et al., 2013, 2014; Nomikos, 2021; Ruggeri et al., 2017), empirical works examining the socio-economic impact of peacekeepers point to mixed results. Sambanis (2008) and Collier et al. (2008) do not find the long-term economic impact of peacekeeping operations with effects most substantial only in the first few years. Ernst et al. (2014) also do not find evidence that peacekeeping operations impact the GDP growth rate. But in their survey of 39 conflict-afflicted countries between 1980 and 2010, they find that peacekeeping operations increase the GDP per capita by nearly 2 percent in relatively high-income countries. Others point to peacekeeping operations helping to stimulate a country's economy locally by providing a secure environment for business. Carnahan et al. (2006) argue that peacekeeping operations boost economic activities at the local level. In particular, the authors discuss the positive impact of peacekeeping due to spending by international and national staff, local procurement, and the labor market when recruiting national staff. They further posit that peacekeeping provides stimulus to the local economy through these

mechanisms and helps check the widespread inflation, despite some negative consequences such as rises in price and wages of the scarce-skilled labor in the country.

Peacekeeping can also affect the local economy indirectly. Caruso et al. (2017) discuss the indirect effects of peacekeeping in increasing agricultural products in South Sudan, thus contributing to the country's economy. In another study, Martin-Shields and Bodanac (2018) use theoretical models to show that the peacekeepers' use of information technology helps boost the local economy of the host nation. Using the World Bank Survey data in South Sudan, Bove et al. (2021) show that the proximity of peacekeepers' military bases correlates with improved security perception, which helps to revitalize the local economy and individual subjective well-being. However, Beber et al. (2019) caution that such a boost may not be sustainable since demands are mainly in the low-skill service sectors. Another strand of literature looks at the impact of peacekeeping on the economy through cooperation among local actors. According to Ruggeri et al. (2013), rebels and government are more likely to cooperate in the presence of large UN peacekeeping forces, thus helping build local-level peace and economy. Mvukiyehe and Samii (2021) also posit that peacekeeping operations help to create local security bubbles and revitalize the local economy.

Yet, despite the extant literature showing a robust positive association between peacekeeping and enhanced security or better socio-economic outcomes, the mechanism and drivers behind this association is still unclear. For instance, prior reports using panel surveys carried out in Somalia indicate that despite improvement in the local security because of AMISOM's presence, citizens' trust and support towards the AMISOM peacekeepers have been weak or have become worse over time (Williams, 2018a, p. 291). On the one hand, citizens' expectations of peacekeepers might be low initially, and support might gradually increase over time. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, peacekeepers might fail to fulfill their mandate, causing public support to wane over time. Ruggeri et al. (2013) show that the number of cooperative events among belligerent parties tends to decrease when peacekeepers deploy in a mission for 4.5 years or longer. Dorussen (2015), using a survey with almost 300 Timorese, found that concerns related to the exit of peacekeepers were mostly driven by respondents who had security and safety concerns. As much as the increase or decrease in support might be a function of security, what is

less known is citizens' expectations from the stabilization that peacekeepers are mandated to bring. As noted by Walter et al. (2019), a pressing challenge that exists in the extant peacekeeping literature is identifying the mechanism behind how and why it works.

**EMPLOYMENT, LOCAL SECURITY, AND TRUST IN PEACEKEEPERS**      The legitimacy and the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions among host-nation populations deemed essential for UN operations hinges on local trust. In the absence of local trust, peacekeepers can face challenges ranging from lack of cooperation to outright hostility (UN DPKO, 1999; Gordon & Young, 2017). In other words, to study the effectiveness of peacekeeping, it is essential that we first look at the relationship between individual economic dynamics and individual security and how this relationship affects citizens' support towards the peacekeepers. Studying citizens' trust and support for peacekeeping is essential, even though local trust, in general, is low in post-conflict contexts, where armed violence has been the norm.

Despite the low average trust level, there is significant variation in how individuals trust the deployed peacekeepers. A study by Bove and Ruggeri (2019) helps demarcate the baseline conditions and factors that shape local trust in peacekeepers. The authors find that the peacekeepers' cultural and linguistic closeness with the locals can help generate some level of cooperation. We build on this recent attempt to look at trust and support towards peacekeepers but argue the difference between the employed and unemployed individuals in a post-conflict context substantively impacts this relationship since they are likely to value peace and stability differently. Our primary hypothesis is that economic opportunity arising from peace and stability is much greater for the unemployed. We should, therefore, expect these individuals to express more support and trust towards deployed peacekeepers.

### **Case Study: AMISOM Peacekeepers in Somalia**

The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) case provides a unique opportunity to extend the inquiry on the relationship between employment and support towards peacekeepers. AMISOM is mandated under the UN Security Council Resolution (2297) to provide security and stability to Somalia's Fragile Government. The AMISOM peacekeeping operation has approximately 22 000 military troops provided by the African Union, logistically supported by the United Nations

Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). The mission has three fundamental functions, (1) to fight terrorism and Al-Shabaab, (2) to provide support and protection to the Somali Government in Somalia, and (3) to foster peace, reconciliation, and political stability (AMISOM, 2017). The AMISOM peacekeepers and Somali Army troops fight side by side to combat Al-Shabaab terrorists who have begun a relentless campaign of violence in South Central Somalia since 2007.

Qualitative work suggests that AMISOM, despite many internal and external challenges, may have had greater success in stabilizing the security situation in Somalia than a traditional UN peacekeeping mission does typically. Some of the notable achievements that can be directly attributed to AMISOM are its success in preventing Al-Shabaab topple the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) after the Ethiopian withdrawal in January 2009, its success in pushing Al-Shabaab not only from Mogadishu but from every major urban area in South Central Somalia by 2014, and its contribution to the two electoral processes that produced new Somali Federal Governments in 2012 and 2017 (Williams, 2018b).

The UN carried out two extensive surveys in Somalia to gauge the support level for AMISOM. The surveys look at the Somali citizens' support for AMISOM peacekeepers across five cities in 2014 (n=1976) and 2016 (n=2306) to track public opinion security, governance, gender, and democratization process in Somalia. In the surveys, Somali citizens were asked to rate how much support they had for AMISOM on a four-point scale: "a lot of support," "some support," "no support at all," and "indifferent." Results from the survey are presented in Figure 23.1. As shown in the upper panel (Figure 23.1), the overall support towards AMISOM declined significantly from 64 percent in 2014 to only 28 percent in 2016. Likewise, the lower panel indicates that Somali citizens perceived that the general economic conditions in 2016 also did not improve compared to 2014. The economic condition got worse for 52 percent in 2014, and then in 2016, relative to this lower baseline of economic condition, things got worse still for twice as many Somalis as had experienced improvements in 2016 (33 percent vs. 17 percent). These descriptive results indicate a real dip in both AMISOM support, since the modal response went from "a lot of support" in 2014 to "no support at all" in 2016, and the economic conditions. These results, however, do not reveal a clear association between the dwindling economic

conditions and peacekeeper support. We, therefore, carried out a survey in 2020 in order to specifically explore a possible association between economic conditions and support for peacekeepers.

[Figure 23.1 about here]

**DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN** Our primary data source for this study is an original and recent survey of 723 subjects carried out across 75 communities in the three cities of Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa in South Central Somalia. We present the descriptive statistics of the dataset in Table 23.1.

**Table 23.1: Summary Statistics, 2020 Survey**

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Observations
<b>City</b>					
Kismayo	0.32	.46	0	1	723
Baidoa	0.32	.46	0	1	723
Mogadishu	0.35	.48	0	1	723
<b>Demographics</b>					
Age	31.40	8.96	18	75	719
Dominant Clan	0.76	0.42	0	1	723
Education	1.59	1.00	0	3	723
Male	0.44	0.49	0	1	723
<b>Outcomes</b>					
Employment	0.43	0.49	0	1	723
HH Economic status	2.00	0.41	1	3	723
Personal Security	2.38	0.83	1	4	723
AMISOM Support	1.91	0.99	1	4	689
Somali Police Support	3.01	0.86	1	4	706

Descriptive statistics from our 2020 survey data show a greater level of dissatisfaction with AMISOM, which is in line with the past UN survey (Figure 23.2). Support towards AMISOM is only 27 percent compared to the 28 percent in the UN survey 2016, which is striking, primarily since the two surveys are four years apart. However, we find an increased level of support for the Somali Police, from 67 percent in 2016 to 72 percent in 2020. We observe that the mean support for AMISOM (out of 1-4) is only 1.91 compared to the mean support of 3.01 for the Somali Police Force. Likewise, 8.5 percent in our 2020 sample say that their household (HH) economic



condition is relatively better than others in their community, 83.5 percent say it is the same, and 8 percent say it is relatively worse than others in the community. Support for the United Nations, however, seems to significantly increase from 43 percent in 2014 to 52 percent in 2020.

[Figure 23.2 about here]

As highlighted in the previous section, the two results from the citizens' support towards AMISOM peacekeepers and citizens' economic conditions from the UN 2014-2016 survey and our 2020 survey are somewhat similar. The level of satisfaction with AMISOM's performance is much lower in the 2016 and 2020 surveys compared to 2014. Citizens, however, also state in our survey that the general economic conditions have slightly improved. Can this improved economic condition at the household level be attributable to the peace dividend in Somalia due to the AMISOM peacekeepers' security operations? To explore the relationship between economic well-being and support towards peacekeepers, we rely on a mediation analysis to understand how individual perception of insecurity mediated the relationship between unemployment and support towards AMISOM.

Figure 23.3 shows the intuition behind our empirical approach, where the total effect (path c) of an **independent variable (IV)** on a **dependent variable (DV)** consists of a direct effect (path c') and an indirect effect (path  $a \times b$ ) via a proposed mediator. Path a represents the effect of the IV on the mediator, and path b represents the mediator's effect on the DV. In our analyses, *“unemployed”* or not having a job is the IV,<sup>3</sup> and respondents' *“level of trust in AMISOM's ability to provide security”* is the DV.<sup>4</sup> The mediating variable is the perception of *“Insecurity-personal and family security not guaranteed.”*<sup>5 6</sup> The 95 percent confidence interval [CI] is estimated using bootstrapping with 1000 sampling replications, a method considered preferable to the Sobel tests for testing the significance of indirect effects because it does not assume a normal distribution and therefore reduces the likelihood of type 2 error (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We use the *sgmediation* command in STATA, which calculates total, direct, and indirect effects and tests the significance of the indirect effect using the Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Sobel, 1982). A 95 percent CI that does not include 0 indicates a significant indirect effect at  $p < 0.05$  (Preacher et al., 2007). For robustness, we also ran mediation models using perceived

personal household economic situation relative to others in the community as the Independent Variable.

[Figure 23.3 about here]

AMISOM SUPPORT, POVERTY AND SECURITY      This section presents a preliminary analysis of the three variables discussed in Figure 23.3, using OLS regression, before presenting the results from the mediation analysis. The OLS results are shown in Figure 23.4 where the leftmost panel shows coefficient plots for the impact of unemployment status on the DV “*level of trust in AMISOM’s ability to provide security.*”<sup>7</sup> For robustness, we additionally include results using two other IVs—respondents’ perceived “HH economic situation” and “education level.”

[Figure 23.4 about here]

Figure 23.4 shows that those unemployed (left graph-top) are 24 percent more likely to support AMISOM ( $\beta=0.239$ ;  $s.e.=0.076$ ;  $p=0.002$ ). Similarly, those who perceive that their household economic situation is relatively poorer than other households are 20 percent more likely to support AMISOM than others ( $\beta=0.205$ ;  $s.e.=0.105$ ;  $p=0.051$ ). We also use formal education attainment as our IV since education positively influences income level (De Gregorio and Lee, 2002). Results indicate that if respondents are illiterate, they are 21 percent more likely to express support towards AMISOM ( $\beta=0.214$ ;  $s.e.=0.104$ ;  $p=0.040$ ).

For comparison, the middle panel in Figure 23.4 shows coefficient plots for the impact of unemployment status on the second Dependent Variable, “Somali Police Performance Satisfaction.” We notice that all three coefficients, in this case, are negative, suggesting that the poorer (wealthier) individuals tend to have lower (higher) support towards the Somali Police Force. The rightmost panel depicts coefficient plots (from OLS results) of the relationship between the IV and the mediating variable “security guarantee.” It shows that economically destitute respondents tend to have a negative perception of their security guarantee and feel less secure in their communities.

## MEDIATION ANALYSIS

Table 23.2 presents the main results from the mediation analysis shown in Fig. 18.3 (path c, path c', and indirect effects).<sup>8</sup> It shows that there is a significant indirect and positive effect of the IV *unemployment* via the mediator *perceived insecurity* on the DV, *level of trust on AMISOM* ( $\beta=0.037$ ;  $s.e.=0.014$ ; 95% CI 0.070; 0.066). The effect ratio indicates that perceived individual and family insecurity explains just under 20 percent of the total positive effect of *unemployment* on trust towards AMISOM, which is statistically significant at  $p<0.05$  ( $\beta=0.190$ ;  $s.e.=0.075$ ). There was also a direct and positive effect of *unemployment* on trust, but not statistically significant. The findings are similar when we use *poverty* or *perceived HH economic status* instead of *unemployment* in our model, indicating a statistically significant and positive indirect effect of poverty when mediated by *perceived insecurity* (our mediating variable) ( $\beta=0.038$ ;  $s.e.=0.017$ ; 95% CI 0.005; 0.087). The indirect effect of *poverty* is also nearly 20 percent of the total effect and reaches the conventional level of statistical significance ( $\beta=0.191$ ;  $s.e.=0.094$ ). These results suggest that poorer and unemployed respondents whose perception of security is comparatively lower tend to trust AMISOM peacekeepers more.

**Table 23.2: Models testing mediation of the associations between Unemployment/Poverty and Level of Satisfaction with AMISOM's Performance by Perception of Personal and Family Insecurity**

Models testing mediation of the associations between Unemployment/Poverty and Level of Trust in AMISOM's Performance via Perception of Insecurity					
	Coeff.	SE	p*	Bootstrap 95% CI	Effect ratio
<b>Unemployment</b>					
Total effect (path c)	0.222	0.075	.004	-	-
Direct effect (path c')	0.190	0.075	.012	-	-
Indirect effect (via mediator)	0.037	0.014	.011	[0.070; 0.066]	0.193
<b>Poverty</b>					
Total effect (path c)	0.229	0.078	.003	-	-
Direct effect (path c')	0.191	0.094	.042	-	-
Indirect effect (via mediator)	0.038	0.017	.023	[0.005; 0.087]	0.199
*p values shown for indirect effects are derived from the Sobel test for consistency with total and direct effects, however bootstrap 95% confidence intervals provide a more robust indication of significant mediation.					

We also ran the mediation analysis to examine the local trust in the performance of the Somali Police. Table 23.3 summarizes the results of the analyses. It shows a statistically significant,

indirect, and negative effect of *unemployment* on the level of trust towards Somali Police performance, mediated by *perceived insecurity* ( $\beta = -0.070$ ;  $s.e. = 0.024$ ; 95% CI -0.116; -0.024). The effect ratio indicates that perceived individual and family insecurity explains just under 40 percent of the total negative effect of *unemployment* on trust towards Somali Police performance. The direct effect of the variable is also negative but at  $p < 0.1$  ( $\beta = -0.112$ ;  $s.e. = 0.061$ ). We observed similar results when using variable *poverty* instead of *unemployment* in our model. As shown in the table, *when mediated by perceived insecurity*, *poverty* has a statistically significant and negative indirect effect on trust towards police ( $\beta = -0.076$ ;  $s.e. = 0.030$ ; 95% CI -0.147; -0.005), which explains around 32 percent of the total effect. *Poverty* also has a direct negative effect on trust towards police at  $p < 0.05$  ( $\beta = -0.160$ ;  $s.e. = 0.075$ ). These results paint a unique picture of the micro-level mechanism of trust towards peacekeepers in Somalia. When the *unemployed* and the *poorer* respondent in Somalia perceive insecurity in their communities, they are less trustworthy towards Somali police but are more likely to trust AMISOM peacekeepers.

**Table 23.3: Models testing mediation of the associations between Unemployment/Poverty and Level of Satisfaction with Somali Police Performance by Perception of Personal and Family Insecurity**

Models testing mediation of the associations between Unemployment/Poverty and Level of Trust in Somali Police Force Performance via Perception of Insecurity					
	Coeff.	SE	$p^*$	Bootstrap 95% CI	Effect ratio
<b>Unemployment</b>					
Total effect (path c)	-0.182	0.065	.005	-	-
Direct effect (path c')	-0.112	0.061	.068	-	-
Indirect effect (via mediator)	-0.070	0.024	.004	[-0.116; -0.024]	0.629
<b>Poverty</b>					
Total effect (path c)	-0.236	0.080	.003	-	-
Direct effect (path c')	-0.160	0.075	.034	-	-
Indirect effect (via mediator)	-0.076	0.030	.009	[-0.147; -0.005]	0.478

\* $p$  values shown for indirect effects are derived from the Sobel test for consistency with total and direct effects, however bootstrap 95% confidence intervals provide a more robust indication of significant mediation.

Since our mediation analyses indicate that around 20 percent of the association of poverty with trust towards peacekeepers passes through the perceptions of physical insecurity, we can infer that the poor in Somalia seem to appreciate peacekeepers' attempt to lift Somalis out of poverty – that the support of the poor towards AMISOM is about much more than physical security.

Perhaps by improving security, AMISOM enables improved mobility, access to services, and better health and education for the poor. Unsurprisingly, the poor also express less support towards the local police. Studies indicate that the higher poverty level leading to higher distrust in local police is common in other parts of Africa (Boateng, 2018; Fry, 2013). But the findings in this study unveil an interesting possibility for future studies to delve into: the lack of trust towards police among the economically poor likely explains their tendency to turn towards foreign peacekeepers when they perceive insecurity.

**ROBUSTNESS CHECK** We conduct a separate robustness test to investigate respondents' trust level on AMISOM's ability to carry out their duties and responsibilities to establish peace in Somalia but using two different explanatory variables instead of *employment*. We hypothesized that the level of poverty and individual insecurity indicates the economic risk, in the face of which individuals are more trustworthy towards the peacekeepers. In our robustness check, we operationalize and test this concept by directly using two indicators: respondents' perceived economic challenge and the actual physical risk they face in their surroundings. The first explanatory variable for the robustness check comes from a survey instrument asking respondents' perceptions of the current biggest challenge Somali citizens face. The variable is coded as 1 if they mention that the country's economy is the biggest challenge.<sup>9</sup> We use the ordered logit model to test our argument since the DV, *trust towards AMISOM*, is on the ordinal scale. In Table 23.4, models (1) and (3) show results with and without various control variables. Model (3) in the table, which is the main model, shows that individuals who feel that the country's economy is the biggest challenge are also more likely to express trust towards the peacekeepers. The main explanatory variable is positive in both models and statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$ . However, those who feel that external intervention is the biggest challenge are less likely to trust peacekeepers.

Second, to test this further, we proxy respondents' insecurity and economic outlook with their exposure to actual violence. We create an index of violence using ACLED data, which captures the summation of the inverse of distances from each respondents' survey location to all violent incidents in the country within the past 30 days since the survey. A higher index value represents a greater number of violent events occurring closer to the respondent's location. Results are

displayed in Table 23.4, models (2), (3), and (4). Similar to our previous results, and as expected, we find that the coefficient of the index is positive and statistically significant for model (2) at  $p < 0.1$  and model (4) at  $p < 0.05$ . These results suggest that individuals who live physically closer to violent events within the last 30 days since the survey are more likely to express trust towards the peacekeepers. In other words, citizens are more likely to express trust towards the peacekeepers when they feel more physically insecure about their well-being. The other significant variables are the location dummies, which indicate variations by cities on trust towards peacekeepers. Respondents in Kismaayo, the baseline city, tend to trust peacekeepers more than the other two cities. But despite controlling for these variables, the overall results in Table 23.4 indicate that host-nation citizens' trust towards deployed peacekeepers is driven primarily by their economic outlook but mediated through their insecurity and vulnerability.

**Table 23.4: Robustness- Local Economy and Citizens' Trust towards Peacekeepers in Somalia**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	AMISOM sp	AMISOM sp	AMISOM sp	AMISOM sp
Biggest challenge economy	0.361* (0.189)	0.175 (0.187)	0.849*** (0.203)	0.884*** (0.202)
Biggest challenge foreign int	-0.823*** (0.229)	-0.902*** (0.234)	-0.579*** (0.223)	-0.533** (0.220)
Violence index (30 days)		0.266* (0.144)		0.754** (0.308)
Gender			0.188 (0.143)	0.165 (0.143)
Age			-0.001 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)
City dummy (Mogadishu)			-0.726*** (0.157)	-1.347*** (0.319)
City dummy (Baidoa)			-1.397*** (0.276)	-1.730*** (0.233)
cut1	-1.550*** (0.262)	-0.149 (0.104)	-1.470*** (0.425)	-0.621** (0.296)
cut2	-0.371 (0.237)	0.969*** (0.106)	-0.210 (0.414)	0.630** (0.292)
cut3	1.194*** (0.209)	2.526*** (0.146)	1.398*** (0.402)	2.249*** (0.296)
AIC	1658	1693	1602	1605
BIC	1685	1720	1647	1650
Observation	689	689	685	685

**Note:** Above results are from the ordered logit model and the dependant variable is “*trust*” that AMISOM peacekeepers can carry out their duties and responsibilities to establish peace in Somalia. \*p<0.1 \*\*p<0.05 \*\*\*p<0.01.

## Discussion and Conclusion

This study asks whether citizens' economic condition shapes their trust towards peacekeepers in conflict-torn communities where peacekeepers operate. Using a survey and a mediation analysis, we find that the unemployed are driving support towards peacekeepers as they perceive the need for more security. It should, therefore, be no surprise that Somali citizens' support towards AMISOM peacekeepers hinges on their hopes that the peacekeepers will guarantee citizens' safety and economic well-being. After all, a perceived security guarantee is tied to citizens' expectations for improved economic conditions at the household level (Bove & Elia, 2011). In a context like Somalia, trust levels are generally low among the populace, reflecting the unstable political and economic outlook and the prevailing anxiety due to uncertainty. When asked if most people can be trusted, only 14 percent agree that they can, while 81 percent mention that one needs to be very careful.<sup>10</sup> When comparing it to the World Values Survey of 2017-2020, 41 percent of citizens in select European countries<sup>11</sup> agree, while 57 percent mention that they need to be very careful in trusting others. In sum, trust, in general, is low in the context of armed conflict, which is not surprising.

The positive relationship between personal wealth and a number of indicators such as happiness and well-being is undisputed in the literature (Howell et al., 2008). Also, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that higher economic status is associated with several desirable outcomes, such as increased life expectancy, reduced malnutrition, and lower infant mortality (Moya & Carter, 2014; Welsch, 2008). But the main finding in this study showed that unemployed individuals, who perceive greater insecurity in their surroundings, are more likely to express support for peacekeepers. This finding indicates positive expectations among this group of citizens vis-à-vis peacekeeping units deployed in nearby areas. The results dovetail nicely with other recent studies focusing on peacekeepers' need for local legitimacy and support (Gippert, 2016; Whalan, 2017). For instance, Whalan (2017, p. 313) posits 'fragmented local audiences' as the key reason for the difficulty in legitimizing peacekeepers. But rather than fragmentation along social environment and identity, our results indicate that an individual's unemployment status and perception of insecurity play an essential role in shaping the level of local support for peacekeepers. The study also raises several questions that future research could explore. Are we likely to find local support for peacekeepers wane as post-conflict societies



become more peaceful and economically prosperous? Is the finding in this study showing the inverse correlation between local support for police and foreign peacekeepers more generalizable? If so, should peacekeepers strive to achieve high local support for police before the exit?

## Notes

[Please place endnotes to Chapter 23 here]

## References


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
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
**Figure 23.1: Past Survey Response carried out by the UN in 2014 and 2016**

*Note:* Exact numbers from the report “Citizens Perceptions of Peace and Stabilization Initiatives in Somalia, 2016” Joint study by the UNSOM and AMISOM Offices in Somalia. A sample of 2,000 Somali citizens were interviewed across four cities in 2014 baseline survey whereas a total of 2306 Somali citizens were interviewed across five cities in 2016.




**Figure 23.2: Survey Results-2020: Descriptive Stats**

*Note:* Survey carried out in 2020 across the three cities of Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa.



**Figure 23.3: Mediation model of associations between Unemployment/HH Economic Well Being and Level of Trust in AMISOM’s Ability to Provide Security via Perception of Insecurity**



**Figure 23.4: OLS Results**

**Note:** The three panels in the figure above show the results of mediation analyses, depicting the correlation between the three variables used in the mediation analyses. Results are with controls and city fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the community level.

<sup>1</sup> Webster dictionary defines “trust” as “the belief that someone or something is reliable, good, honest, effective, etc.” (see <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trust>), which we use as a proxy for “support” towards peacekeepers.

<sup>2</sup> This study is approved under University of Essex IRB (ETH2021-0163)

<sup>3</sup> Captured in a dummy outcome: 1 or 0 in response to the question- “Do you hold a job that guaranteed you some kind of daily/weekly or monthly payment?”.

<sup>4</sup> Captured in a scale from 1-4 (least to highest level of trust) in response to the question- “How much do you trust in AMISOM in its ability to provide security in your community?”

<sup>5</sup> Response to the question “To what extent do you feel that your own personal, as well as your family’s safety and security, are currently ensured?” (fully ensured, ensured, not ensured, not ensured at all).

<sup>6</sup> In our mediation model represented in Figure 23.3, an alternative way of understanding support towards AMISOM (our outcome-DV) could also be understood as unemployment as the mediating variable in the association between insecurity and support towards AMISOM.

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However, the primary hypothesis of interest in our mediation analysis is to see whether the effect of our independent variable (treatment) – “unemployment” on the outcome “support towards AMISOM” can be mediated by a change in the mediating variable “security perception”.

<sup>7</sup> For ease of interpretation, we just present the figure for key variables and do not include the full table associated with the figure.

<sup>8</sup> Mediation analyses results presented without controls. Results with controls are almost identical.

<sup>9</sup> Exact question is: “What is the biggest challenge facing your community today?” The response included a number of pressing issues related to politics, security and economics.

<sup>10</sup> 5 percent either do not know or give no answer.

<sup>11</sup> Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the UK.