Ascencio, Sergio and Chang, Han Il (2024) Do primaries Improve Evaluations of Public Officials? Experimental Evidence from Mexico. Political Behavior. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09926-w (In Press)
Ascencio, Sergio and Chang, Han Il (2024) Do primaries Improve Evaluations of Public Officials? Experimental Evidence from Mexico. Political Behavior. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09926-w (In Press)
Ascencio, Sergio and Chang, Han Il (2024) Do primaries Improve Evaluations of Public Officials? Experimental Evidence from Mexico. Political Behavior. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09926-w (In Press)
Abstract
Do nomination rules shape how voters evaluate their representatives? Some scholars argue that, in places where trust in political parties is low, primary elections can be an electoral asset by improving how politicians are regarded by voters. Yet, this claim has received little empirical scrutiny. A survey experiment in Mexico, where parties have employed several nomination rules in recent years, allows us to assess this argument. We find that, by and large, providing information about the method by which a politician was nominated to office—relative to not providing such information—has virtually no impact on how voters evaluate the politician. At the same time, we uncover evidence of a relative advantage of primary elections over more centralized nomination rules. Specifically, learning that a politician was nominated in a primary election—relative to learning that they were appointed by party elites—improves voter perceptions of politician quality and increases their reported willingness to vote for the politician in the future. Our results have important implications for political parties in many developing countries and new democracies, where intraparty democracy is increasingly popular.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Party politics; Nomination rules; Primary election; Survey experiment; Mexico |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 05 Feb 2024 16:44 |
Last Modified: | 07 Aug 2024 15:29 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/37733 |