Kuvalekar, Aditya and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2024) A Fair Procedure in a Marriage Market. Review of Economic Design. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4
Kuvalekar, Aditya and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2024) A Fair Procedure in a Marriage Market. Review of Economic Design. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4
Kuvalekar, Aditya and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2024) A Fair Procedure in a Marriage Market. Review of Economic Design. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4
Abstract
We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Deferred acceptance algorithm; Fair procedure; Two-sided matching |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Apr 2024 12:17 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Apr 2024 14:00 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/37865 |
Available files
Filename: A Fair Procedure.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0