

The Political Participation of British Muslims

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CHAPTER 1

Thesis Introduction

1.1 General Background


Western societies have long been dominated by one religion: Christianity. Christian beliefs and Christian institutions provided Western societies with their most familiar codes and symbols. In the post-war period the domination of Christianity has been challenged by a growth in atheism, agnosticism, and other forms of spirituality. It was also challenged by migration from non-Christian countries that has shifted the balance of beliefs. Many western societies now contain significant numbers of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and other adherents of non-Christian religions. The secularization of western societies is largely thought to have benign consequences for democracy and may have even promoted stronger liberal values and greater political participation (Dalton, 1988). The growth of non-Christian religions, by contrast, has sometimes been said to represent a threat to democracy and/or reduce participation.¹ Among those non-Christian religions, Islam is often singled out and said to be uniquely incompatible with democracy and liberalism. It has also sometimes unfairly been linked with violence (Huntington, 1996; Moutselos, 2020).² Non-Muslims often agree with the proposition that Islam and Muslims are incompatible with democracy. This is illustrated by a wide range of survey evidence (IPSOS, 2018). To be sure, most of this data provides a snapshot of opinion at a particular time and is commissioned when the issue is ‘topical’ (e.g., following a terrorist attack) and not typical. To understand the depth of the concerns we need to examine data that covers a long period. YouGov have regularly asked their panels survey whether Islam is compatible with ‘British values’ or whether there is a

¹ It is worth remembering that the same western societies treated fellow Christians with suspicion. In Britain, Catholics did not obtain the vote until The Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829

² The growth of Muslim populations may stimulate increased participation by non-Muslims if they are viewed as a threat by the ‘native’ population. This is something that has not been examined to date.

fundamental clash with British values (de Waal, 2016). The YouGov question is not ideal. The phrase ‘British values’ is vague. The question does not directly ask about democracy. Nor does it distinguish between majority rule and individual or minority rights. Nevertheless, democracy is undoubtedly a ‘British value.’ The wording of the question undoubtedly reflects the language used in national debates. David Cameron, the former prime minister, regularly demanded that Muslim groups express support for ‘British values’ before his government engaged with them (Wintour, 2011).

FIGURE 1.1: COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAM AND BRITISH VALUES, 2015-2019




Source: YouGov (de Waal, 2016)

The response of the public to the YouGov question is displayed in Figure 1.1. At first it appears that there are no clear trends in the data. The proportion of people thinking that there is an inevitable clash between Islam and the values of British society varies over time. It tracks up from the mid to high 50s in 2015/16, down to the mid to high 40s by 2017 and 2018.

There is also a slight drift upwards in the proportion of people who think that Islam is compatible with British values.³

FIGURE 1.2: COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAM AND BRITISH VALUES, 2015-2019, NET SCORES



Source: Author's calculations

The trends become clearer if we simplify the data a little. Figure 1.2 displays the net scores (proportion thinking that Islam is compatible minus the proportion that think it is not).⁴ This shows that on balance there is considerable scepticism about the compatibility of Islam with British values: net scores are always negative, indicating that more people think that there is an inevitable clash than think that there is not. Nevertheless, there is an upward trend. Public attitudes are always sceptical, but they are somewhat *less* sceptical over time. Pew Research (2019) asked a similar question “How you feel about Muslims” in 2009, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2019. The responses displayed in Figure 1.3 below confirm that Britons hold


³The full wording is: “Thinking about religion and society, which of the following statements comes closest to your view? <1> Islam is generally compatible with the values of British society <2> There is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society <3> Neither <4> Don't know

⁴ Table A.1 in the appendix A shows the percentage and the net score.

increasingly favourable attitudes towards Muslims⁵. This may reflect the fact that memories of terrorist events like the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the 7/7 London bombings in 2005 have faded and the association between Muslims and terrorist acts weakened in the popular consciousness. It may also reflect on the efforts of Muslim institutions and other civic groups to resist fear mongering on social media and provide factual information to counter anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim media content. Islamic institutions encouraged British Muslims to get engage via social media with matters that concerned them (MCB, 2016).⁶ Studies have shown that young British Muslims used online platforms such as Facebook to educate and correct misconceptions about Muslims and Islam (Peace, 2015). Other things being equal, this upward trend may be expected to continue as older generations die out and are replaced by younger cohorts. These newer citizens have no memory of events such as 9/11 and 7/7. Continued engagement by Muslim as organizations with the media, social media, and political parties are likely to challenge misrepresentations of both Islam and Muslims.

⁵ Table A.2 in the appendix A shows the percentage.

⁶ In chapter 4 I will discuss the role of Islamic organisations in depth and will provide some documented evidence on their political discussion with political parties and British Muslims.

FIGURE 1.3 FAVOURABILITY TOWARDS MUSLIMS AMONG BRITONS, 2009-2019.

Source: Pew (2019) & author's calculations

The UK is now a multicultural society that is home to many ethnic minorities. This makes it possible to investigate the validity of concerns about the compatibility of Islam with liberal democracy and the ability of Muslims to integrate into such societies. Participation is a key indicator of the health of democracy. In this thesis I explore British Muslims' political participation to clarify the relationship between Islam and democracy. The behaviour of British Muslims reflects their religious values. If Islam is incompatible with democracy and British values, many British Muslims will not participate, and their religious institutions will not enhance political participation and integration. Democracy depends on active citizenship and participation (Dalton, 1988). A nation with a multicultural population, such as the United Kingdom, needs citizens with democratic values and principles to function. Values provide motivation for individuals' decisions (Mill, 2010; Almond & Verba, 1963 van Deth & Scarbrough, 1998). Participation in politics is a voluntary activity, and individuals decide if they want to get involved. Islam is a religion with values and principles that some suggest are incompatible with democratic principles. The same, of course, has been said of Christian sects

such as Roman Catholics – especially given the historic notion of ‘papal infallibility’ (Lipset, 1959). Few today seriously support such claims. And, as various umbrella organisations, such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) make clear, Islam *is* compatible with democracy. British Muslims are like members of other religious groups and wider society. Their behaviour is rooted in – but not determined – by their values. They vote, protest, boycott, donate and engage in collective action for their political and social benefit.

The best response to these claims is to explore British Muslim participation. We know very little about Muslim political participation both in the UK and other western societies. The limited literature to date focuses on the impact of the religious institutions of Islam, particularly the ‘Mosque’ on voting and turnout (see Jamal, 2005; Dana *et al.*, 2011; Fleischmann *et al.*, 2016; Westfall, 2019; McAndrew and Sobolewska, 2015). Some studies break down analyses into subdivisions, such as those that focus on participation by Muslim youth (e.g., Bullock & Nesbitt-Larking, 2013). Others focus on the participation of Muslim women (e.g., see Easat-Daas, 2017; Westfall *et al.*, 2017; Finlay & Hopkins, 2019; Easat-Daas, 2020). In the UK context, McAndrew and Sobolewska (2015), examined the role of mosques in promoting electoral and other forms of political participation. This research suggests that mosques appear to have a positive impact on British Muslim’s level of turnout, but no effect on other forms of political participation. Others such as Sobolewska. *et al.* (2015) examined the impact of religious attendance on both electoral and non-electoral participation for ethnic minorities in the UK. Attendance at religious institutions has a positive impact on voting and other forms of political participation for all minority groups. Both these studies used the EMBES dataset that I use in chapter 3. However, there are large gaps in the literature. We know little about impact of British mosques on voting or other forms of political participation or *how* mosques influence participation. These are important

omissions or gaps in our understanding. Islam is the fastest-growing religion, and the second-largest religion in the UK, with the potential to double to 8.2 per cent of the population by 2030 (Pew Research, 2011; Oskooii & Dana, 2018). The political participation of British Muslims deserves more attention.

According to the MCB, which analysed a recent release of the 2021 Census, British Muslims are 6.5 per cent of the total, and 40 per cent of them live in the most deprived areas (MCB, 2022). British Muslims are a growing portion of the UK public, but little is known about what drives and what limits their political participation. In this thesis I use individual level data to assess how participation varies across individuals and individual characteristics (such as age, gender, education, income, psychological forces, mosque attendance and exposure to mobilising rhetoric.). I examine how participation varies at the aggregate level, across time and space (parliamentary constituency). I also pay some attention to the impact of institutions on participation. This is important because British Muslims have faced discrimination and Islamophobia that has limited their ability to fully participate in British democracy (Oskooii & Dana, 2018). Some of these adverse environments are created by politically established institutions such as political parties. I expect this affects their level of political participation or may direct some forms of participation.

1.2 What is political participation?

Political participation is important because democracy is founded on the belief that every individual has moral worth (Birch, 2007; Mill, 2010). Their opinions matter and should be recorded and weighed. Participation is important because involvement increases engagement and information.

Any effective democracy needs a certain level of political participation (Mill, 2010). As many scholars pointed out the level of turnout reveals the states of democracy health (Ezrow &

Krause, 2023, p. 86). In most western democracy the level of turnout has significant decreased (Pattie *et al.*, 2003). This raises concerns. If this decline continues, it may reduce the ability of democracy to record and reflect the preferences of all the people. However, some scholars have argued that political participation has transformed and evolved because of the growth of the internet, globalization, and privatisation (Norris,2002: Fox,2014). No doubt, the level of political participation in any forms may indicate the level of satisfaction in a democracy among the citizens. It is true that democracy is the majority rule, but it is also for all groups in the society. The level of participation among minority groups, it may indicate their sense of citizenship and belonging. Before reviewing the literature of political participation, it is important to highlight the meaning of the term to establish the context of this thesis.

Clarity and precision about terms should be the *sine qua non* of good science (King *et al.*, 1996). Yet, as is often the case in political science, there is surprisingly little agreement about what 'political participation' means. This confusion could lead to a different conclusion for those who are studying the same phenomena and applying the same methodology but using a different concept. A good example that illustrates this point in the literature on political participation is the debate about turnout in Western societies. Kostelka (2017), among many others, claims that there has been a decline that could damage democracy. Others maintain that there has been a rise in turnout (Van Deth, 2014). As one scholar has observed, “conclusions about important changes in democratic societies depend on the participation concept used” (van Deth, 2014, p. 350). Different definitions of the same concepts have led to different conclusions. The literature on political behaviour overlaps with other literatures. There is some overlap between political participation and concepts such as civic engagement, political activism, and political action (e.g., Pattie *et al.*, 2003; Norris, 2007; Sigel *et al.*, 1980). All these terms refer to acts that link ordinary citizens to politics. It is true that political

actions may focus on nongovernmental actors (Fox, 2014). It is also true that political actions may be symbolic. Whiteley (2012) pointed out that talking to others to influence their political views can be political participation. Reading political news may also be considered a form of political participation. It is crucial to be precisely define the concept of political participation to be able to measure it effectively. There is no true definition of political participation (Verba *et al.*,1978; Fox,2014). I simply adopt Verba *et al.*, (1995) definition of political participation as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (pp. 38-39). To make my study tractable, and to make it possible to measure political participation, I define it as an action that aims to influence state political institutions. This definition underlines the importance of physical activities such as voting, a donation to a cause, contacting, and political campaign, protesting, petitioning, and working with other people on issues and distinguishes it from psychological participation, such as simply thinking about politics, forming opinions or evaluations and knowledge.

1.3 What is known about political participation?

The literature on political participation has produced various theories and models to explain why people participate in politics. One of the most prominent is the ‘civic voluntarism model’ (‘CVM’). According to this model people do not participate in politics because “They can’t, they don’t want to, or nobody asked them to” (Brady *et al.* 1995, p. 271). Political participation is a function of resources (money, time, and civic skills), psychological engagement with politics (values, interest, efficacy, party identification and group consciousness) and recruitment (mobilisation) by political-non-political organisations. Religious institutions may create or sustain a sense of group identity and promote political

participation. Calhoun-Brown (1996) found that attendance in religious activities increased political trust, efficacy, and group consciousness. Black churches were effective in increasing group racial consciousness. Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) found that members of the Latino church are involved in political actions because these institution churches increase a sense of ethnic community. (In chapter 3 I will highlight additional literature on the role of religious institutions). The literature on social groups reveals the importance of identification in political participation (Parenti, 1967). Groups can develop strong norms of participation (Verba & Nie, 1972; Nelson, 1979). African Americans participated at higher rates than white Americans after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Verba & Nie, 1972). Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that people define themselves socially based on the groups to which they belong. They also conform to group norms to maximise group benefits. This represents rational group behaviour. African American political decisions are strongly related to racial group interests (Dawson, 1994).

The cognitive engagement model (or 'CEM') provides another explanation of why individuals participate. This is based on the observation that political participation is usually positively correlated with education, political interest, political knowledge and policy satisfaction and the ability to access information (Verba *et al.*, 1995, p. 5, p. 22). Civic knowledge increases political participation, and knowledgeable citizens are more likely to participate in public matters (Galston, 2001).

In addition to CVM and CEM, sometimes people participate because they are unhappy with the system, distrust those who are in charge or feel relatively deprived or discriminated against. Emotional or grievance approaches may significantly add to our understanding of why people participate – and they link behaviour with the activities of political leaders. A comprehensive theoretical framework for political participation needs to consider the role of

relative deprivation and grievance theories to fully understand what influences participation and how religious institutions shape it.

Grievance theories and relative deprivation play a substantial role, especially in social movements. Relative deprivation occurs where there is a: “perceived discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970, p. 37). If an individual believes they receive less than they deserve or expect, they feel relatively deprived. Feelings of relative deprivation occur when people compare themselves unfavourably with others (Folger, 1986). There is also an important distinction between personal deprivation and group deprivation (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996). Personal or group deprivation happens when individuals or groups compare themselves with others. Relative deprivation is mainly linked to political movement ‘protest’. Individuals who feel deprived and belong to the disadvantaged group are more likely to protest, as Foster and Matheson (1995) stated. Others suggest that relative deprivation decreases civic life. Individuals who feel deprived are less likely to have civic engagement. (Grasso *et al.*, 2019).

Other research suggests that values and political satisfaction will influence the type of participation that people engage in. Political dissatisfaction might promote political protest (Barnes *et al.*, 1979; Dalton, 1988). The perception that voting will not change anything (political efficacy) and political trust in government are also sources of protest behaviour (Milbrath & Goel, 1977, pp. 57-74). This makes sense. If voting achieved one's goals, there would be no need to protest. If there was trust in political representatives, there would be no need to protest (Stoneman, 2008). The impact of variables may depend on the type of political participation under consideration. Political trust, for example, might motivate some forms of political participation. Trust is negatively associated with protesting, boycotting, and signing a petition (Hooghe & Marien, 2013). This again makes sense. Why should people protest if they trusted their representatives to make the same decisions that they would?

Other research has explored the impact of social capital on participation. This suggests that turnout is more than an individual's resources – it is influenced by social connection and integration. Television may also have a significant impact on reducing civic motivation in the long run (Putnam, 2000; c.f. Norris, 2000). Others believe age has an influence on the form of political participation that people engage in. Younger people are more likely to protest, and older people are more likely to participate in electoral participation (Melo & Stockemer, 2014). This is in part related to biology – the older tend to be less mobile and less willing to march than the young.

1.4 Religious institutions and political participation

Religious institutions may have an important influence on political participation. An institution is simply a “stable, valued, recurring pattern of behaviour” (Huntington, 1965, p, 394). Several studies have explored the role of religious institutions in political participation. Such institutions do not usually have political purposes or – if they do – these are subsidiary to their main purpose. Nevertheless, some scholars highlight the political 'spillover effects' of engagement with religious institutions. The reason for the association between participation in a religious institution and political participation is not obvious and requires explanation (Peterson, 1992). The CVM may explain religious institutions involvement. According to the CVM political participation is a function of resources, psychological engagement, and recruitment. Religious institutions can provide resources (Brady *et al.*, 1995). Religious institutions can develop civic skills and social networks and increase perceptions of political efficacy that might, in turn, increase political participation – all necessary skills for participation (Jamal, 2005; Djupe & Grant, 2001). Attendance in religious institutions boosts the psychological resources that lead to increases in non-electoral political participation (Sobolewska. *et al.*, 2015). Some churches provide support on how to communicate with a

government official, public speaking, and attending a meeting or gathering with other members will lead to involvement in the political process (Verba *et al.*, 1995). Studies suggest that Sikh 'Gurdwaras' can mobilise their community by enhancing their skills and providing resources (Singh & Tatla, 2006).

Religious institutions can also have a 'psychological effect' on their member's consciousness. These institutions mediate between 'this world' and 'the next'. Leaders of these institutions are different from any other leaders. Most religions are hierarchical. There is sometimes an obligation to obey the instructions of their leaders – though the most important form of behaviour in the polling booths cannot be monitored. At the very least, the leaders' directions can have significant moral power. Somewhat less dramatically, religious institutions can disseminate information that can stimulate political actions (Djupe & Gilbert, 1999). It is easier for political elites to establish a connection with these institutions than to contact individual adherents of a religion. Institutions can mobilise people by holding a meeting with a candidate or political leaders. African-American churches have been shown to increase political activity (Calhoun-Brown, 1996). Others highlight that religious institutions foster political participation by enhancing group identities and group consciousness. Harris (1994) points out that African-American churches play multiple roles in mobilizing their followers. These churches increase group identity and group consciousness. These things in turn encourage political participation. (Harris, 1994). Attendance at these churches enhances resources and creates a group consciousness (Calhoun-Brown, 1996). Some studies reveal that religious institutions are a site for mobilisation. Smidt (1999) pointed out that Christian churches have been important institutions for political mobilization. Roman Catholic priests in post-war Italy, for example, regularly urged their congregation to support Christian Democratic candidates (Bellucci & Heath, 2012). Some have argued that "organisations stand

between national and local political leaders and ordinary citizens” (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, p. 87). Churches can provide meeting places, funding, and leadership ((Djupe & Grant, 2001).

1.5 Questions and structure of the thesis

This brief review of the literature on participation shows that to understand the political participation of British Muslims we need to examine variation across both the individual level and across the aggregate level. Ideally, we need to examine a general model of participation that includes individual level socioeconomic and psychological variables and external stimuli (such as mobilisation by mosques). Yet since political participation varies across time, we also need to examine the role of political and non-political institutions. These change over time in response to systemic changes. Institutions are important mediators that may promote or frustrate political participation (e.g., by mobilizing, forming group identities and group consciousness) or creating a negative political environment (e.g., feelings of deprivation or discrimination) and may have a positive or negative correlation with some forms of participation (e.g., Positive with forms associated protest activities or negative with Voting, donation). For reasons outlined in chapter 4, I need to draw on documentary evidence to examine the impact of institutions.

I propose three questions to produce a comprehensive investigation of the political participation of British Muslims:

- 1) To what extent does the political participation of British Muslims vary across time and space (chapter 2).
- 2) To what extent does the religious institution ‘mosque’ impact the political participation of British Muslims (chapter 3).

3) How the political environment associated with key institutions, such as the two major political parties, impact British Muslim political participation (chapter 4).

As I shall emphasise in my conclusions this thesis is constrained by data. No available data source enables me to construct a model of participation such as that laid out in the first paragraph of this section that incorporates individual-level data, aggregate level data and institutional data. Instead, I use as much data as I can, from wherever I can. These sources include: the British Election Panel Study (BEPS), the British Election Study (BES), the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES), EuroIslam and Pippa Norris's Westminster constituency database. To address the third question about the impact of political institutions in chapter 4 I will draw on textual evidence and information from media and authoritative sources, supported with some empirical evidence. The central finding of this thesis is that British Muslims are very similar to other religious groups in their response to political events. There is no difference between them and other groups in terms of political integration. At aggregate level constituencies with higher proportions of Muslim constituencies have a higher rate of turnout compared to otherwise identical constituencies. Mosques plays a significant role in their participation, whether electoral or other forms of participation. These institutions encouraged protest activities such as boycotts, petitions, and demonstrations. This may be because British Muslims receive less attention, especially in tackling Islamophobia and discrimination from the mainstream political parties "Conservative and Labour". This creates a negative political environment, this may a tendency to protest activities were among British Muslims in 2010.

This thesis makes a significant contribution because it is one of few studies that highlights and examines the political participation of British Muslims comprehensively. It provides a new insight into the political engagement of British Muslims and the role of Islamic institutions (e.g., Mosque and umbrella organizations). It also highlights the political

environment created by the discourses between the political established institutions (e.g., Political Parties) and Islamic institutions. This thesis is unique in terms of its time coverage and the diversity of data sources. It uses YouGov polling data (in chapter 1), the BES, Euro-Islam 2010, Pippa Norris's Westminster constituency database (in chapter 2) and EMBES 2010 (in chapter 3). In chapter 4, I use a wide range of qualitative evidence, which based on a range of secondary data such as documents, speeches, and reports. The evidential base – although it is very wide – is still far from ideal. In the conclusions I will outline better research designs.

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CHAPTER 2

Exploring the political participation of British Muslims: A study across time & space

Abstract

In this chapter I explore the political participation of British Muslims across time and space. I first compare British Muslims intention to vote in general elections across time and compare them with nonreligious and other religious groups by using the British Elections Panel Study (BEPS) between 2014 to 2020. I use Euro-Islam dataset to compare across space to compare the electoral participation of Muslims, and the impact mosque attendance, across three different Western democracies: the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. I then use Pippa Norris's Westminster constituency database to examine how turnout varies with the proportion of Muslims in constituencies across time. The BEPs data show that intentions to participate among British Muslims fluctuate but track other religious groups. These shared dynamics suggest that Muslims respond in similar ways to other groups in society. It also shows a significant spike in British Muslim's intentions to vote in 2015-2016 that may be associated with the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in September 2015. The comparison across the three Western nations, education and being born in Pakistan all increase the probability of voting in the general election of 2010. Nevertheless, mosque attendance did not appear to be associated with increased turnout among British Muslims. Finally, the constituency level data shows that turnout is higher in those constituencies where the Muslim population is higher.

2.1 Introduction

In this paper I gather as much information as possible from available reliable data sets. I should note at the very start that the data is far from ideal. This is a problem that confronts anyone who carries out research on minority groups in the UK. Representative samples of the UK population contain few minorities and even fewer Muslims.⁷ The small number of Muslims in most samples means that levels of participation cannot be estimated with precision or confidence. Nevertheless, by making use of all the available data I try to increase confidence in the estimates, attempt to observe a pattern of British Muslim participation across time and space, and compare it with the wider population and other minorities. Comparisons with other groups will help establish the reality of British Muslim political participation and whether it is compatible with democratic values and principles.

Comparison forms the basis of every method used in scientific research (King *et al.*, 1994; Landman, 2008) Some natural scientists, such as chemists and physicists, compare pre and post-test outcomes in controlled conditions and can manipulate variables like the chemical added the force applied. Social scientists compare outcomes but are rarely able to control conditions, other than on a small scale. It is only natural to compare to explore the mysteries of human behaviour. The drive to compare runs deep. From the early stage of human existence, comparison was used to determine their similarities and differences. A child or an adult may compare himself with other children and then start to judge his parent's interaction. In a multi-cultural society, disadvantaged groups compare themselves with other groups to

⁷ This is also the case for Jewish and Catholics groups (see Barclay, 2020; Clements, & Bullivant 2022).

define their position and improve their situation. A state will not go to war or escalate conflict without comparing their power. It is rational to compare to calculate the cost and benefit before any decision is made. Indeed, it is an essential aspect of human activities. As Landman (2008, p. 4) stated, ‘to compare is to be human.’

The comparative method uses for four scientific objectives: contextual description, classification, testing of the hypothesis-building theory, and, finally, prediction (Landman, 2008, p. 4). What makes a comparative method ‘scientific’ is the logic of inference. As the authors of the canonical text note we use “facts we know to learn something about facts we do not know” (King *et al.*, 1994, p. 119; Landman, 2008, p.13). Three types of comparison are used in political science, comparison between many countries (large-N), a small number of countries (Small-N) and a single country. The N simply refers to the number of observations. Even if we compare within a single country, we still may have a large-N of observations. The 2010 BES ethnic minority booster that I use in the next chapter, for example, contains well over one thousand cases. It is necessary to apply all rules of comparative of large-N (King *et al.*, 1994, pp. 51-2). Each method of comparison has its own limitations and merits, in relation to inferences. Researchers can overcome these by comparing as much as possible -- across time and space – to make more reliable inferences (Landman, 2008, p. 27).

To reach accurate conclusions about the British political participation I compare British Muslim cross-time using British Election Panel Study (BEPS) data. This data will help produce a trend of British Muslims’ intention to turn out and vote in general elections during a series of items that may be linked to political events that concern the public. It also will also enable me to compare Muslims with other groups’ intentions. I identify the similarities and differences between 1) the British Muslims themselves and 2) the other religious and non-religious groups. Second, I compare aggregate turnout across space using the British General Election Constituency Results database produced by Professor Pippa Norris, which shows

aggregate turnout within the United Kingdom. Thirdly, I examine the participation of Muslims across three Western democratic societies. This helps observe the similarity and differences beyond the political system and allows us to observe the religious institution's involvement.

2.2 Variation across time

In this section I track changes in the reported likelihood that Muslims will vote in general elections. I link variations in this series with political developments over the same period. I observe changes in the pattern and trend of British political participation using a high-quality British Election Panel Study (BEPS).

TABLE 2.1: THE NUMBER OF BRITISH MUSLIM IN EACH WAVE

Wave	Fieldwork	Total N	Muslim	% Muslim
1	Feb-Mar 2014	30,590	260	0.8
2	May-Jun 2014	30,219	255	0.8
3	Sep-Oct 2014	27,839	224	0.8
4	Mar-Mar 2015	31,328	238	0.7
5	Mar May 2015	30,725	221	0.7
6	May-May 2015	30,027	214	0.7
7	Apr-May 2016	30,895	242	0.8
8	May-Jun 2016	33,502	259	0.8
9	Jun-Jul 2016	30,036	231	0.8
10	Nov-Dec 2016	30,319	308	1
11	Apr-May 2017	31,014	257	0.8
12	May-June 2017	34,464	264	0.8
13	Jun-Jun 2017	31,196	240	0.8
14	May-May 2018	31063	249	0.8
15	Mar-Mar 2019	30,842	268	0.9
16	May-Jun 2019	37,959	358	0.9
17	Nov-Nov 2019	34,366	371	1.1
18	Nov-Dec 2019	37,825	323	0.9
19	Jun-Jun 2020	32,177	256	0.8
20	May-May 2021	31,468	387	1.2

Source: BEPS, 2014-2020 (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2020).

All datasets have limitations. Estimates suggest that Muslims represent 4.2 per cent of the electorate in 2019 (Hussain, 2019; Park, 2022).⁸ Muslims are under-represented in most surveys. Even when they are well-represented, they comprise a small number of individuals. This makes it difficult to draw reliable inferences.

Table 2.1 displays the total N and total number of Muslims in each wave of the BEPS. This shows that Muslims represent somewhere between 0.7 and 1.2 per cent of each wave of the BEPS. Some of the difference between the census and the sample data may be due to how religion is measured. Nevertheless, I need to recognise that Muslims are under-represented. Fortunately, there are – at least – many self-reported Muslims in the sample.⁹

British Election Panel Study, 2014 -2020

The British Election Panel Study (BEPS) is a high-quality data set popular among social scientists.¹⁰ Each wave can be used as a cross-section and the marginal distributions can be examined to produce useful time series. The data can also be used to track change at the individual level. The questions are well organised and pre-tested. BEPS survey questions have a good reputation for reliability and validity. These panel studies collect data at specific points in time (waves) that are chosen to shed light on electoral processes, particularly general elections (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2021).

What makes this data particularly useful is that it was collected over an interesting period in political terms. During this period, there were critical political events: three general elections in 2015, 2017 and 2019 and the referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union. Perhaps most importantly, in 2015 Jeremy Corbyn was elected Labour leader. Corbyn was a former chair of the 'stop the war coalition' and had opposed western military intervention

⁸⁸ Approximately 2000000 British Muslims were eligible to vote out of 47074846 *Electoral registrars* for *Parliamentary election*.

⁹ Religious groups are more likely to overreported turnout. This is because, religious people feel guilty if they did not vote as it a moral obligation based on their religious teaching (for example see Bernstein, *et al.*, 2001).

¹⁰ The data was downloaded from: <https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/wave-21-of-the-2014-2023-british-election-study-internet-panel/>


throughout the Middle East (Whiteley *et al.*, 2018). Muslims have traditionally supported Labour in the UK (Anwar, 1986; Saggar, 2000; Heath *et al.*, 2013). As I explain in chapter 4, the loyalties of this group were tested after the 9/11 attacks, the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, as well as domestic developments such as attempts by the New Labour government to secure detention without trial for up to 90 days for terror suspects and an unpopular programme to stop radicalisation of Muslim youths, called ‘Prevent’ (Toynbee & Walker, 2011). There was some evidence that Muslims had switched to the Liberal Democrats, who had opposed most of these developments, in the 2010 general election (Heath *et al.*, 2011). The election of a new Labour leader who had opposed both these interventions – and who was widely expected to change policy on the Middle East -- might be expected to produce a ‘Corbyn effect.’ Muslims might be expected both to switch back to Labour and be more likely to turnout out and vote because of his opposition to the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan and support for the cause of Palestine. This data will allow us to observe any Muslim political participation changes before and during the Corbyn election.

One of the questions in the BEPS asked the respondent about their intention to vote ‘*Many people don't vote in elections these days. If there were a UK General Election, how likely would you vote?*’ Respondents could answer ‘Very likely that I would vote’, ‘Fairly likely,’ ‘Neither likely nor unlikely,’ ‘Fairly unlikely’ or ‘Very unlikely that I would vote.’

There are several studies across ethnic minority groups in the UK (Heath *et al.* ,2013; Heath *et al.*, 2011; Sobolewska. *et al.*, 2015). Ethnic groups include Pakistani (overwhelmingly Muslims), Indian, Bangladeshi, and Black. We know little about these groups and the majority populations. It is informative to compare British Muslims and the majority populations. According to the 2021 census 46 per cent of British identified themselves as Christian, 37 per cent no religion, and 6 per cent as Muslim (Roskams, 2022). Therefore, I

will compare British Muslims with the majority populations (non-religious, members of the Church of England and Roman Catholics). Political participation varies by group and over time, and any observed variation among Muslims could be common across other religious and non-religious groups. To control for this possibility, I compare British Muslims with other religious groups to evaluate whether there is any change in the level of participation among British Muslims and whether it is a common change among all groups. I also would observe if a ‘Corbyn effect’ occurs among Muslims.

FIGURE 2.1 FAIRLY AND VERY LIKELY VOTERS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, 2014-2020



Source: British Election Panel Study and author’s calculations.

Figure 2.1 displays the proportion of each group who were either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ likely to vote from 2014 to 2020¹¹. According to this evidence at least, Muslims were less likely to


¹¹ The percentage is reported in Appendix A, tables A.3 and A.4

intend to vote than other groups (such as members of the Church of England and Roman Catholics) and the non-religious. Nevertheless, variations in the likelihood of turnout among Muslims appears to track other groups. These shared dynamics suggest that Muslims were responding to the same developments as other groups. To this extent, Muslims seem to be integrated within the British system – they move to the same beat of the political drums. Closer inspection of Figure 2.1 suggests that there may be two spikes or increases in participation. The first occurs in late 2014 as the proportion of Muslims who are ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ likely to vote increases from the low 70s to the mid-80s. This may be the result of efforts by Labour to reengage with Muslims under the leadership of Ed Miliband (see chapter 4). The second ‘spike’ occurs after Jeremy Corbyn came to power in 2015/16. Figure 2.1 also indicates a similar but far less visible increases among Catholics, members of the Church of England and the non-religious. This spike in willingness to vote coincides with the national referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union in mid-2016 (Clarke *et al.*, 2017). It is possible that there might have been a double effect of the two events, ‘Corbyn and referendum’. It is tempting to say that Muslims were more affected by Corbyn than other groups, given what we know about his appeal to Muslims given his activities with the ‘Stop the War Coalition.’ The effect, however, is short-lived. By late 2016, any effect seems to have worn off. It may be that initial enthusiasm wore off as Corbyn was challenged by his parliamentary colleagues and he was challenged for the leadership by Owen Smith (Whiteley *et al.*, 2020). I must concede that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about whether the election of Corbyn or the referendum is the cause, especially with a small number of Muslims in the sample.

Other parallel evidence suggests that there may have been a ‘Corbyn effect’. It is worth mentioning that before the Labour leadership election in 2015, there was a significant increase in the party membership with 198,000 new members (Whiteley *et al.*, 2018). Figure 2.2 below

demonstrates the considerable jump in party membership for the labour party (see the red line). Some believe that Jeremy Corbyn's candidacy for the party leadership was the main drive for this growth (Whiteley. *et al.*, 2018). Those who felt deprived, earned less income, were anti-capitalism and desired a new style of politics were behind this growth (Whiteley, *et al.*,2018). Undoubtedly, many British Muslims were deprived and poor. Many have struggled in the last two decades because of government policies (as chapter four will discuss in more detail). Jeremy Corbyn was a leader who promised to change their life for the better. It seems possible that the Corbyn effect may explain the observed spike in vote intentions among British Muslims in 2016, before his leadership was challenged after the vote to Leave the EU. It also can be concluded that there are significant differences between British Muslims and other religious and non-religious groups. Nevertheless, most of the trends shown in Figure (2.1) are similar across groups. This may indicate that British Muslims are integrated with mainstream politics and events as the more prominent public. The British political context affected their intention to participate in the same way the other groups anticipated.

FIGURE 2.2 PARTY MEMBERSHIP BETWEEN 2002 AND 2018



Source: Whiteley. *et al.*, (2018).

Turning to other forms of participation, it would be beneficial if we could produce similar trends as we did in Figure 2.1 comparing other forms of participation associated with protest activities. This might help establish whether forms of participation are complements or substitutes for each other and identify what drives electoral participation and protest participation. Unfortunately, the BEPS mainly focused on electoral participation. In general, electoral participation has much attention from political scientists. The BEPS survey has questions on other forms of participation, but it is measured only in some waves and repetition is essential to make comparisons and observe change. The questions asked the participants if they had participated in different forms of political activity (retrospective reporting). In contrast to electoral participation, respondents were asked about their intention to vote (prospective) *and* if they voted after general elections and the referendum (retrospective). This difference in dealing with the types of political participation makes it difficult for us to benefit from this sample at its extreme.

2.3 Variation across space

In this section, I compare the participation of Muslims across space. I compare British Muslims with Muslims with two other European nations (Germany and the Netherlands).

Muslims in European nations

Comparison across space increases our confidence in our inferences and ability to generalise across space and time. It is logical to add another dimension in the comparison to increase the number of observations and to observe patterns by comparing similarities and differences between Muslims across nations. The logic in this section is to compare British Muslims with other Muslims in a different countries and different political environments (the liberal-

democratic environment, of course, each of these nations have different type of system).¹² The main objective of this comparison is to observe any pattern that can be generalized to the British Muslims political participation and all Muslim minorities in the western world.

The Euro-Islam Project was a European project funded by the European Commission. The study aimed to gather information at a cross-national level to highlight the similarities and differences between immigrants in general and Muslims in six nations: Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK (Euro-Islam, 2020). The survey took place in 2010, the same year as the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Booster that I examine in chapter 3. It measured attitudes, cultural norms, and values. It also measured gender relations, family values, ethnic, religious, and national identity, and integration with other minorities. This survey recorded cultural and religious practises, such as attending religious services or wearing a headscarf, and political participation in the form of voting.

The sample sizes in the six countries are quite large. This makes it possible for us to generalise about Muslim populations within those countries with a degree of confidence. The survey contains a range of variables including age, sex, education, employment status and income, that have been found to be associated with participation (Dalton, 1988; Verba *et al.*, 1995; Bartels, 2008; Schlozman *et al.*, 2012; Gilens, 2012).¹³ Importantly, it also contains an

¹²All three countries were classified as free and had comparable scores on the Freedom Index in 2010. All three were rated 1 on political rights and 1 on civil rights. See https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/FIW_2010_Complete_Book_Scan.pdf

¹³ Two questions asked in the Euro-Islam purported to measure adherence to Islamic traditions 1) “Shows religious beliefs by covering hair” and 2) “Shows religious beliefs by wearing religious symbols”. There is a conflict between these two sets of questions that may lead to misunderstanding among the respondents. After careful consideration, I did not include them in my Models. The first question should be asked of the female respondents only because it seems related to the Hijab. The second question is better worded and can be a good indicator of Islamic traditions. Because Euro-Islam included both questions it seems to have led to misunderstanding among the respondents. I cross-tabulated these questions based on gender. The results of this exercise confirmed my skepticism. In the UK sample, none of the Male respondents answered the question yes while 24 per cent of females answered yes. For the second question “Shows religious beliefs by wearing religious symbols” 19 per cent of male respondents answered yes while 3 per cent of females answered “yes”. I cannot use any of these two questions as an indicator of Islamic tradition.

indicator of mosque attendance. The mosque is by far the most important institution in Islam. It is particularly significant for migrants living in non-Muslim countries. It provides a sense of familiarity and possibly a connection with their country of origin. There are good grounds for believing that mosque attendance will increase participation in a variety of ways – by increasing group identities, supplying politically relevant information, or providing a convenient place where mobilisation can take place (Moutselos, 2020). In this section I focus on the impact of this variable.

Before proceeding it should be noted that there are some several features of the Euro-Islam study that limit its usefulness. The survey focuses exclusively on electoral participation and has nothing to say about all those other important forms of participation – including party membership, petitioning and protest. These are an important part of citizenship in liberal democracies, particularly for minorities who may need to protest to assert or defend their individual or minority rights (Dalton, 2008; Pattie *et al.* 2004). There are other technical issues. The principal investigators' account of the sampling methods is not entirely clear.¹⁴ This naturally raises concerns about the application of standard significance tests. Most importantly, there is no data about whether and how mosques communicate with members and whether they motivate them to participate. As I show in chapter 3, this is an important variable that appears to condition the impact of mosques. The omission of the variable on the Euro-Islam survey is unfortunate.

The Euro-Islam study provides limited evidence about electoral participation because three of the six countries must be excluded. In Belgium voting is compulsory. This means that there is little or no variation in the dependent variable. The Swiss questionnaire did not include a

¹⁴ See Euro-Islam (2016, pp. 9-13) for further details.

question about whether people were eligible to vote. In the French case, there had not been a recent election and there was no question about voting. These features make the survey less useful than it would otherwise be. It goes without saying that the data would be much more useful if it included some questions on other forms of participation.

Despite these reservations, the data is still valuable. Rather than speculate about the relationship between characteristics and turnout, we can examine the evidence – always bearing in mind the limitations noted above. This allows me to examine the impact of the mosque attendance on electoral participation and increase my confidence in my findings about what motivates Muslims to participate. After excluding countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, and France for the reasons we still retain three interesting cases the United Kingdom, Germany, and Netherlands. All these three countries have almost the same size Muslim population. In 2016, around 6.1 per cent of German, 6.3 per cent of Britons and the 7.1 per cent of Dutch voters were Muslim (Pew Research, 2020). The origins of the Muslims in those countries varies. All three had colonies or historical alliances that influenced the flow of migration in subsequent years. In the United Kingdom, most Muslim immigrants come from former British colonies of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Malaysia. Most Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands are migrants from the Dutch East Indies, Suriname, Turkey, and Morocco (Alba & Silberman, 2002). Muslim immigrants in Germany were a result of the alliance with Turkey during World War I and the subsequent increase in ‘Gastarbeiters’ (Hess & Green, 2016; Özyürek, 2015).

It is also important to highlight some differences in institutional features between these countries that may affect mosque effectiveness to impact electorate behaviours. Some institutions in these nations are more tolerant towards immigrants and religions. Muslims and their institutions are more visible in the United Kingdom compared to Germany and the

Netherlands. Indeed, we know little about Islamic institutions in Germany and the Netherlands. Islamic institutions in the United Kingdom are successful when it comes to lobbying the government for the benefit of their communities. Islamic institutions Netherlands and Germany seem to face difficulty preventing governmental legislation that harms their liberty. In the Netherlands for example, Islamic veils have been prohibited since 2006 (Vasta, 2007). The hijab is prohibited for Muslim teachers to wear in eight states in Germany (BBC News, 2018). This may indicate there are barriers that reduce the efficacy of Islamic institution's efficacy in these countries. The political system in Germany is divided into three levels of government. Germany is a federal state consisting of 16 states, each with its own government “Bundesländer”, constitution and legislature. At the national level, there is a separation of power between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches. The legislature (“Bundestag”) contains members who are elected every four years and parties must get 5 per cent of all votes to gain any seats (Grotz & Schroeder, 2023). It is plausible to suggest that ethnic minorities in Germany may play a more significant role in state-level politics because their votes are more valuable if they are concentrated in certain areas. This may be why Hijab wearing is prohibited for Muslim teachers in eight states in Germany. Muslims in the remaining states are in sizable population and their voices matter. At the national level, the portion of German Muslims is not sizable, however, the separation of power between political branches and the existence of the constitution protects their liberties and rights. I expect that mosque in Germany plays a positive role in electoral participation at least in state-level elections. This balance and separation of power is diminished in the United Kingdom. Parliament is sovereign in the United Kingdom (Bogdanor, 2019). The system is weakly bi-cameral because the Commons can override the House of Lords after a one-year delay and only this lower house can pass a vote of no confidence in the government (King, 2009). The Commons consists of 650 members representing constituencies. To form a

government a party needs to gain a majority of seats in the Commons. The first past post electoral system invariably results in a majority. Indeed, 18 of the 21 post-war elections have produced a single party majority government (Bartle, 2020).

British Muslims are highly concentrated in certain constituencies. Figure 2.3 in the following section shows the percentage of Muslims by constituencies. There are 26 constituencies where Muslims represent 20 per cent or more of the electorate. This allows Muslims to be more attractive to political parties especially. Some research suggests that Muslim voters could swing as many as 30 marginal constituencies (Sherwood, 2019). I expect that mosque has a positive role in the electoral participation of British Muslims as parties think these institutions might sway the behaviour of the faithful in constituencies. We would not expect mosques in the Netherlands to have an impact on voting because of the complexity of the Dutch political system. The Dutch parliament consists of two chambers “Eerste Kamer and Tweede Kamer”. The Eerste Kamer “Senate” has 75 members elected by the provincial council and the Tweede Kamer has 150 members elected directly by the Dutch electorate. Both chambers have the right to pass a vote of no confidence on ministers or the government. If the majority is reached in one or both these chambers the government must resign (NIMD,2008). Votes are counted nationally rather than in districts. In these circumstances, mosques are unlikely to attract the attention of parties or play a role in Dutch Muslim's voting behaviours.

I begin my analysis by simply cross-tabulating mosque attendance and voting. The Euro-Islam survey had a question that measured mosque attendance: ‘How often do you go to the mosque or other place of worship?’ with four options to answer ‘Daily’, ‘Weekly’, ‘Rarely’ and ‘Never’. In my models I coded these responses as a binary variable. Those who attended ‘daily’ or ‘weekly’ are coded as 1 and those who attended ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ are coded as 0.

This replicates the coding practice in a study by Moutselos (2020). It also makes sense. Very few people attend mosque daily (fewer than 5 per cent across the six countries and just 4.1 per cent across the three countries that I analyse here). It seems reasonable to label those who attend daily or weekly together because they are likely to be exposed to the same messages delivered from the mosque. In Islam, there is one prayer, 'Friday Prayer', that imams deliver a sermon to address any issues of concern, and Muslims are obliged to attend. However, there are some exceptions. Those who did not attend mosque at least for Friday Prayer do not follow Islam teaching. They may have acceptable reasons for not attending (such as illness, traveling, working or any forces beyond individual capacity). Those who rarely or never attend mosque, however, are likely to miss mosque communications and not be exposed to mobilisation efforts. Any political involvement cannot be linked to the mosque effects, and it is logical to code them the same as those who never attend.

Table 2.2 below shows the percentage of all Muslims participating in general elections for all three countries together and then each country separately. Across all three nations around 69 per cent of Muslims reported having voted and 31 per cent did not. Among those who attend mosque daily or weekly around 74 per cent reported that they had voted in the most recent election, while 26 per cent reported that they did not. Among those who attend mosque rarely or never, 68 per cent reported that they voted in the most recent national election and 32 per cent reported that they did not. This 6-point difference provides the first indication that mosque attendance may increase electoral participation.

This general difference is reflected in varying degrees in the three countries. In Germany, the difference between those who attend daily or weekly (around 68 per cent) and those who attend rarely or never (around 63 per cent) is some 5-points. In the UK the difference is around 8-points. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the difference is just 2-points.

TABLE 2.2: CROSSTABULATION BETWEEN MOSQUE ATTENDANCE & GENERAL ELECTION

Mosque attendance	Did not vote %	Voted %	N
<i>All countries</i>			
Rarely or never	32.5	67.5	1389
Daily or weekly	26.3	73.7	482
All	30.9	69.1	1871
<i>Germany</i>			
Rarely or never	37.1	62.9	361
Daily or weekly	31.6	68.4	133
All	35.6	64.4	494
<i>UK</i>			
Rarely or never	38	62	573
Daily or weekly	30	70	160
All	36.3	63.7	733
<i>Netherlands</i>			
Rarely or never	22	78	455
Daily or weekly	19.6	80.4	189
All	21.3	78.7	644

Source: Euro-Islam Study.

These simple cross-tabulations provide a useful starting point, but the observed differences are potentially misleading. We cannot rely on bivariate crosstabulations to draw conclusions about the impact of mosque attendance in these countries. Other variables may cause both mosque attendance and political participation. Variables such as age, level of education, language and employment are associated with political participation (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Dalton, 2008; Pattie *et al.* 2004). It is necessary to use an appropriate multivariate statistical analysis tool to determine whether the mosque directly impacts its members or if other forces have some explanation for Muslim behaviour (Campbell *et al.*, 1980; Miller and Shanks, 1996). To assess the impact of mosque attendance on electoral participation in these countries, I run four models using logistic regression (Menard, 2002). I begin with a model that examines the effects for all Muslims across the three countries. The

other three models will explore each Muslim group in each country. All will include control variables such as age, sex, education, employment, and host country language fluency.

Table 2.3 displays the coefficient estimates for my first model. These suggest that mosque attendance has a marginal effect on turnout in Muslim groups in all target countries together ($b=0.23, p=0.1$). The effect is smaller than those reported by Moutselos (2020) using the same data.

In addition, age ($b=0.03$) has a statistically significant impact. Age is an important indicator for Muslim political participation. Older Muslim voters are more likely to vote than younger voters. This finding supports several studies of political behaviour (Pattie et al. 2004; Dalton, 2008). Older voters are more willing to participate for a variety of reasons. They typically have much more time on their hands than the young because they may have retired or moved into part-time occupations. The resources and civic voluntarism model suggest that free time increases political participation (Verba *et al.*, 1995). Individuals with free time are more likely to be exposed to the news, increasing their political interest (Stromback *et al.*, 2013). Older people are likely to have more experience, knowledge, and a sense of duty. These variables are, in turn, associated with increased political participation (Goerres, 2009).

Employment-status ($b=0.28$) has a statistically significant impact on electoral participation. The coefficient also shows employment status is an important factor for Muslims regarding voting in the election. The more likely that a Muslim is in paid employment, the more likely they will participate in the election. The reason for this seems to be that employment, particular the professional type of employment, enhances individuals experience and skills. The workplace is an opportunity for individuals to engage with others and build social networks. Human beings seek connection with others and value people like themselves. They naturally adopt social norms and sometimes may affect their political opinion, efficacy, and

political behaviour (Brady *et al.* 1995; Pateman 1970; Mackie *et al.* 2008; Smith *et al.*, 2014). Fluency in the host language has a marginally positive impact on electoral participation ($b=0.56$). This finding again makes sense. Language is vital to follow and understand political discourses. It allows those who fluently speak the language to receive political messages without needing an interpreter. They are more likely to understand political discourses and get engage with politics.

Other findings in table 2.3 are more surprising. The coefficient for the education variable unexpectedly shows that the education level of Muslims has no impact on electoral participation. This finding contradicts the literature on political behaviour. Education is a powerful predictor of political participation in general in western democracies (Nie *et al.*, 1996; Brady *et al.* 1995). These findings contradict the idea that education promotes active citizenship. It may simply be that Muslims are different from other native groups. If the education variable was negatively associated with the level of turnout this might be taken to indicate that educated Muslims felt socially and politically excluded or that educated Muslims understood that their group is a minority or disadvantaged. It might reflect that educated Muslims understand that they, will not change the political outcomes if they participate. However, this is not the case here because education level has no effect at all. The real explanation for the lack of any significant findings here may lie in the difficulty in measuring education, in comparative studies (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik & Warner, 2006). Education may play an essential role for Muslim individuals by increasing their knowledge, political efficacy, or sense of duty as a proxy variable, but the limitation of this data prevents us from going further with our examination.

These findings match what is understood about the influences on political participation in previous studies and in the following chapter of this thesis and other research on participation (Verba *et al.*, 1995; Dalton, 1988; Pattie *et al.* 2004). The individual's country of origin also

has an effect. Those born in Morocco ($b=0.35$) or Pakistan ($b=0.48$) are both significantly more likely to report having voted than those from the former Yugoslavia. This suggests that either prior experiences or differences in the effectiveness of socialisation influences political behaviour. Being fluent in the host language also seems to have a marginal effect ($b=0.56$, $p<0.1$). This finding makes sense. The more fluent one is in the host language, the easier it is to follow the debates, understand the choices at state and engage with politics. It also presumably makes it easier for parties and candidates to communicate with and mobilise voters. It is for this reason that language tests are required to acquire citizenship (Bonotti & Willoughby, 2022).

There are also differences between the three nations net of all the other factors. Muslims in the Netherlands ($b=0.81$) are more likely to participate net of all other factors than otherwise identical individuals living in Germany, despite the smaller differences in model I. This reinforces the importance of applying appropriation statistical controls. This may be a consequence of the highly proportional electoral system that is used in the Netherlands, that makes every vote count towards representation (Blais & Carty, 1990). The German system is also proportional but has the 5 per cent threshold for parties. Otherwise, identical individuals living in the UK, however, are no more or less likely to participate than their German counterparts. It is finally worth noting that some variables appear not be associated with electoral participation at all. In contrast to some previous studies males are no more likely to vote than females. Strikingly and surprisingly, education has no impact on participation in the general election in this study (cf. Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Verba *et al.*, 1995; Dalton, 1988). The education variable is not statistically significant in Model I. Nor is it significant when we omit both employment status and language fluency – variables that are likely to be caused by education. As I mentioned earlier, this finding – about the insignificance of education – is interesting. This is something that is not difficult to understand. It may

underline the position of disadvantaged groups in a representative democracy. Individuals who belong to a minority may feel that their votes do not make a difference, even if they are educated. This may be why the education variable was insignificant, or it might be because of one of the reasons we mentioned earlier.

I then ran three separate logistic regressions for Muslims in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, using the same variables in Model I (except the country dummy variables that are no longer relevant) to assess the impact of mosques on electoral participation. Table 2.2 displays the results country by country. The coefficients that exceed a statistically generous threshold of $p < 0.1$ are highlighted in bold. In general, we observe fewer significant variables because the smaller N's increase the standard errors. Nevertheless, it is still possible to extract key – and potentially important – findings. Starting with our principal variable of interest, mosque attendance has a marginally positive affect on the turnout for those living in Germany but no effect for British and Dutch Muslims. This is surprising because Moutselos, (2020) found different results about British mosque involvement and I expected mosques in the UK would have a positive role due to the unique institutional features I discussed earlier. It may be mosque has an indirect role to play such as mobilizing their followers. I could not test this hypothesis as the data is limited and did not have an indicator for mobilisation. However, there is an existing dataset such as EMBES with a sizable number of British Muslims. It also covers the same period of the Euro-Islam and includes an indicator of mobilization. We allocated the following chapter to examine the role of mosques in the political participation of British Muslims using EMBES,2010 dataset. Age positively influences those who live in Germany and Netherlands, but not British Muslims. Fluency in the host language significantly increases turnout among German Muslims, but not British and Dutch Muslim political behaviours. Being born in Pakistan positively affects British Muslim's electoral behaviours, but it is not the Dutch and German Muslims.

Education has a positive influence on electoral participation for British Muslims, but not Dutch or German Muslims. This reinforces the point in the previous section on why the education variable was insignificant. It is plausible to think that educated British Muslims understand that their community are significant groups in around 31 marginal constituencies that may make a difference in the general election. This is not a certain explanation. We need further investigation for future research.

These analyses could be summaries for German Muslims as those who are older and or speak the language fluently participated in general elections. For Dutch Muslims, older people are more likely to turn out and vote in General Election. For British Muslims, those born in Pakistan and or with a high education level are more likely to participate in the general election.

TABLE 2.3: MODEL OF TURNOUT AND MOSQUE ATTENDANCE (MODEL I & MODEL II)

Variables	Dependent: Turnout							
	Model I		Model II					
	Countries Combined		Germany		UK		Netherlands	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Age	0.003***	0.006	0.048**	0.013	0.011	0.008	0.036***	0.014
Male	-0.069	0.122	-0.17	0.246	-0.09	0.177	0.166	0.262
Employment	0.27**	0.118	0.379	0.246	-0.155	0.178	0.384	0.24
Education	0.129	0.255	-0.384	0.436	0.975**	0.446	0.088	0.576
Born in host country	-0.018	0.15	-0.348	0.304	0.29	0.228	-0.196	0.307
Fluency	0.563*	0.325	1.231**	0.584	0.622	0.536	-0.599	0.736
<i>Lives</i>								
UK	0.079	0.142						
Netherlands	0.808***	0.156						
<i>Origins</i>								
Turkish	0.288*	0.168	0.492	0.338	-0.047	0.243	0.715*	0.399
Moroccan	0.354**	0.177	0.201	0.296	0.252	0.322	0.59	0.37
Pakistani	0.483***	0.178	0.247	0.362	0.837***	0.268	0.161	0.404
<i>Key IV</i>								
Mosque Attend	0.233*	0.142	0.441*	0.27	0.226	0.22	-0.008	0.296
Constant	-1.543***	0.438	-2.514***	0.823	-0.955	0.732	-0.111	0.87
Nagelkerke R Square	0.086805		0.137201		0.066203		0.097067	
N	1543		406		656		481	

Notes: The dependent variables Voted in Elections. Independent variables, age of respondents in years, the respondent's employment status the respondent's level of education. The respondent's fluency in the host language. Key independent variable is the respondent's Mosque attendance. N is the Total Number of observations, B is the coefficient and SE is the standard error. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

2.4 Variation across Time and Space

As I mentioned early, it is important to increase the number of observations. I compared turnout among British Muslims cross time and space separately in previous sections. I now compare them across time and space with one dataset. I compare aggregate turnout in areas with high and low numbers of Muslims in different locations inside the United Kingdom during four general elections (2010, 2015, 2017 and 2019).

UK constituencies during four general elections

It is now useful to compare British Muslims across the UK during four general elections. The United Kingdom is divided into 650 constituencies. Most of these are in England (533), followed by Scotland (59), Wales (40) and Northern Ireland (18). The 2011 National Census for England and Wales, suggests that Muslims make up on average 4.1 per cent of the population in a constituency. This conceals a lot of variation. The highest percentage was 52 per cent in Birmingham Hodge Hill and Bradford West and 48 per cent Birmingham Hall Green they made up nearly half the electorate in 2011.¹⁵ Muslims make 20 per cent of the populations in 26 constituencies. These seats include Luton South, Rochdale, Westminster North, Brent Central in London, and Birmingham Yardley (Mendoza, 2015). They represent more than 10 per cent of the population in 80 constituencies. Many constituencies have much smaller levels. In some places the Muslim population is vanishingly small. The lowest percentages of Muslims in constituencies were in St Ives, Forest of Dean, North Ayrshire and Arran, North Cornwall, North Herefordshire, South-East Cornwall, Selby and Ainsty Tiverton and Honiton. In these areas less than 0.2 per cent (one in 800) were Muslim.

¹⁵ This is not the same as the electorate. Muslims tend to be younger than the non-Muslim population, so they presumably represent a smaller portion of the electorate.

Figure 2.3 displays all those twenty-six constituencies with more than 20 per cent Muslim populations in 2011. Labour won all but three of these seats in the 2010 general election. The other seats (Bradford East, Brent Central and Birmingham Yardley) were won by Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrat candidate in those seats benefitted from their party's opposition to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2010. Labour won all three seats at the next three general elections (in 2015, 2017 and 2019) following the collapse of the Liberal Democrats after their participation in the Coalition government between 2010 and 2015 (Quinn & Clements, 2011; Curtice, 2018; Bartle, 2020).


In this section I explore and compare the relationship between turnout and the percentage of the population who are Muslim in Westminster constituencies. This section draws on the dataset collected by Pippa Norris. This contains the results of the UK General Elections (2010, 2015, 2017, 2019), including party vote shares and the size of the winner's majority by parliamentary constituencies. It is also linked with contextual data from the 2011 census, showing the socio-economic structure of the constituencies, the age, the race, and social class of voters and the religious affiliations of voters.¹⁶

It is essential to understand the limitations of this type of data. The most significant is the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950; Selvin, 1958). This is always a danger when we use aggregate data to try to draw inferences about individual behaviour. Researchers often want to understand the behaviour of individuals but cannot collect information about them directly for various reasons (King, 1997, p. 1). It is sometimes dangerous make inferences about individuals from data about geographical units. In general, we should not use aggregate data to draw inferences about individual behaviours. Scholars have attempted to overcome ecological fallacy by developing methods to conclude individual behaviours using aggregate

¹⁶ The census data comes from 2011. The socio-economic characteristics of an area are likely to be stable over time. Nevertheless, since areas change over time this data is likely to be less accurate over time.

data. Goodman's, Bounds and King's (Bayesian approach) methods were developed to address the problem of ecological fallacy. In this section I use simple regression methods to assess if there is any relationship between the proportion of people in a constituency who are Muslim and the level of turnout at four general elections. I will not draw any inferences about individuals' behaviour. I simply observe whether British Muslims are associated with higher turnout at general elections using aggregate data.

FIGURE 2.3: CONSTITUENCIES WHERE MUSLIMS COMPRISE 20 PER CENT OR MORE OF THE POPULATION (2011 CENSUS)



Notes. Red bars denote seats held by Labour in 2010, orange denotes seats held by the Liberal Democrats. In 2015, 2017 and 2019 all these seats were held by Labour.

2.4.2 Aggregate analysis

The literature on political participation suggests that individuals participate because they can, want, and are asked (Verba *et al.*, 1995, Pattie *et al.*, 2003). Resources, psychological forces, and mobilisation play a vital role in making individuals participate. I expect to find participation is higher in those areas where many people have individual characteristics that make it easier to participate, make them want to participate or are easier to be mobilised. If education is related to participation at the individual level, I expect to find that turnout is higher in those areas where there are more educated people. I similarly expect participation to be lower if many people have individual characteristics that are associated with less participation. Ethnicity is often associated with participation. A constituency with many members of a minority group may have less participation than otherwise similar constituencies because individuals in those groups are more or less likely to vote.

These intuitions, based on individual level characteristics, might be wrong. Individual characteristics are not the only things that make people participate in politics. Human beings are social animals. They are influenced by people in their neighbourhoods (Mackie *et al.*, 2008). A low-income and young person (with limited resources) may cast a ballot in the election because his neighbours did so. Members of a minority may be less likely to vote because people like themselves are less likely to think that they should vote. Alternatively, they might feel more efficacious if they live among people like themselves. Aggregates can behave in different ways to individuals. Inequality *within* a constituency, for example, might have a different impact than inequality *between* constituencies (Bartle *et al.*, 2017). Almost half of British Muslims live in constituencies or areas that are most deprived (MCB, 2022). Therefore, it makes sense to examine the relationship between aggregate levels of religious affiliation and turnout. Some studies used constituencies level data to investigate the impact of factors on the

level of turnout. Denver et al., (2003), examine the impact of constituency marginality on the level of turnout in Britain. Denver and his colleagues controlled several socioeconomic variables associated with constituencies. They found out that marginality has a positive impact on the level of turnout (for similar findings see Johnston & Pattie, 2005; Denver and Hands, 1974; Mughan, 1986). Meaning that the level of turnout in marginality constituencies was higher compared to safe constituencies. They also found out that parties strongly campaign in marginal constituencies. Johnston & Pattie (2005) take this further by comparing both constituency-level and individual-level data to investigate the perception of individuals on the level of turnout. They found that if individuals know that they live in a marginal or competitive constituency, they are more likely to vote. This makes sense. As Heath and Taylor (1999) pointed out, the level of turnout in elections is associated with the competition between parties. If the outcome of the election is a foregone conclusion, the level of turnout is lower (also see Pattie and Johnston, 2001). Table 2.4 displays regressions of turnout on socio-economic variables for each of the four general elections since 2010. I ran four OLS regressions on the general election of 2010, 2015, 2017, and 2019. I focus on the relationship between the percentage of Muslims in the population and turnout controlling for age, ethnicity, education, and wealth (as indicated the number of cars). Most of the variables relate to 'can' in participation. I have data on the age, race, education, and wealth of constituents. These variables all influence participation. One of the variables, the size of the winning candidate's majority at the previous general election, is more related to the 'want to' and 'asked to' components of participation. The closer the result, the more likely any individual voter is likely to be in that constituency. Since that constituency is likely to be pivotal, the more likely parties are to campaign in those constituencies (Denver and Hands, 1997). I expect that the larger the majority, the lower the turnout.

The aggregate models all control for gender and age-groups, which may have an impact. Men have been found to be more likely to vote than women in some studies (i.e., see Córdova and Rangel, 2017; Kostelka *et al.*, 2019) Every study has found that younger voters are less likely to vote than older voters (Gray & Caul, 2000; Melo & Stockemer, 2014). In a constituency with a high number of younger or female voters, I expect turnout to be lower. To help interpret the coefficients, I recoded the age variable into five categories, from the youngest to the oldest. Ethnicity and religion are also controlled. Ethnic background is more closely related to – and likely to be a cause of—religion. Pakistanis, for example, are more likely to be Muslim. Wealth is also a significant factor in participation. Wealthier people are more likely to vote because they have more ‘at stake’. Poorer people are less likely to vote because they have less at stake. In the models I include an indicator of the proportion of the households without a car. I expect this to be negatively related to turnout.

The years between 2010 and 2020 contained four general elections. This enables me to run regressions of the relationship between the percentage of Muslims in a constituency and turnout across time, using the same data source – the 2011 census. Since places change over time the independent variables are likely to be a less accurate reflection of those places. This should bias the coefficients towards zero.

Table 2.4 below shows the regressions between turnout levels in all four general elections, and the Muslim population. After controlling all relevant variables, the aggregate models and the coefficients illustrate the higher percentages of Muslims in a constituency, the higher the turnout level at each of the four general elections. The size of the coefficient appears to increase ($b=0.155$ in 2010, $b=0.135$ in 2015, $b=0.198$ in 2017 and $b=0.292$ in 2019).

Conversely the coefficient for the proportion of Christians is negative and varies with no clear trend. Education has the expected relationship with turnout. The coefficients for the

proportion of graduates in a constituency are positive in each of the four general elections.

The more graduates there are, the higher the turnout at each one of the four general elections.

The coefficients for the proportion of males in a constituency were significantly negative in 2015, 2017 and 2019. This means a higher percentage of males is associated with lower turnout. This is unexpected as several studies indicate that males are more likely to participate than females (Córdova and Rangel, 2017; Kostelka *et al.*, 2019). This may be because males are overreported voting in most of the surveys. For example, Stockemer & Sundstrom (2023) tracked survey data with the official electoral records of 73 elections and found that men over-reported voting. Women were more likely to vote on average compared to men (Stockemer & Sundstrom 2023). The coefficients for the proportion of people without qualifications is negative in all four elections. The greater the proportion of people with no qualifications, the lower the turnout. Similarly, the higher the proportion of households without a car the lower the turnout in each election. Finally, the winner's majority has a negative coefficient in all four cases. The 'safer' the seat is, the lower the turnout – presumably because voters are less likely to believe that they will be decisive (Downs, 1957; Denver *et al.*, 2003; Johnston & Pattie, 2005).

We must be aware of the ecological fallacy if we take these findings and apply them to the individual level. We might be tempted to conclude, for example, that turnout is higher because individual Muslims are more likely to vote. This conclusion would be misleading. It may be correct, but the data we are using here is not at the appropriate level to draw such an inference. We need at least data that can give us more information at the individual level to confirm such a hypothesis. The association between Muslim population and turnout might be because the presence of Muslims stimulates higher turnout among white or non-Muslim voters, just as economic inequality stimulates higher turnout (Bartle *et al.*, 2017). It may be

Muslims are better mobilised in constituencies with larger Muslim populations because, as it may seem, their voices and actions matter, and they can make a difference. If the latter is correct, it makes sense because a highly populated Muslims constituency, have more mosques and larger in size which somehow enhance mobilization. As I shall demonstrate in chapter 3 British Muslims who receive mobilisation messages from mosque are more likely to vote and participate in protest. These constituencies are likely to attract the attention of umbrella Islamic organizations, such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). Some of the materials, I present in chapter 4 certainly support this. On the other hand, it would be invalid to assume that Muslims within these constituencies has less level of turnout compared to other groups in the same constituencies. I would assume that within these constituencies mosques and Islamic organizations operated differentially and booster the level of turnout via mobilization. However, because it is ecological data, it would be misleading to make such inference. Consequently, for the purpose of this chapter, I conclude that a constituency with a sizeable British Muslims population has a higher level of turnout because it could be one or all the following 1) a high competition between Muslims and other group who they may feel threatened and/or 2) Mosques and umbrella Islamic organizations operated effectively to increase the turnout among British Muslims. Future research should include measures of local level mobilisation and use data from both the individual and aggregate level in multilevel models (see Bartle *et al.*, 2017).

TABLE 2.4: AGGREGATE MODELS—MUSLIM POPULATION AND TURNOUT IN THE UK CONSTITUENCIES

IV	DV: Turnout							
	Election 2010		Election 2015		Election 2017		Election 2019	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Majority	-0.078***	0.010	-0.026***	0.010	-0.027***	0.008	-1.084	0.000
<i>Age Groups</i>								
18 to 29	0.056	0.111	-0.025	0.116	-0.046	0.102	0.171	0.116
30 to 44	0.376**	0.164	0.041	0.170	-0.049	0.150	0.268	0.170
45 to 59	0.730***	0.217	0.369*	0.224	0.648***	0.197	0.844***	0.225
60 to 64	-0.111	0.349	0.362	0.359	-0.056	0.316	0.033	0.358
65 plus	0.588***	0.125	0.241*	0.130	0.270**	0.114	0.577***	0.130
<i>Gender</i>								
Male	-0.173	0.209	-0.716***	0.217	-0.476***	0.191	-0.726***	0.217
<i>Ethnicity</i>								
White	0.138***	0.037	0.072*	0.039	0.161***	0.034	0.149***	0.039
Black	0.306***	0.062	0.137**	0.064	0.275***	0.056	0.163***	0.066
Asian	0.100**	0.049	-0.022	0.051	0.104**	0.044	0.008	0.051
<i>Education</i>								
None	-0.150***	0.056	-0.375***	0.057	-0.417***	0.050	-0.503***	0.057
University	0.248***	0.040	0.188***	0.041	0.258***	0.036	0.272***	0.041
<i>Wealth</i>								
No cars	-0.258***	0.027	-0.176***	0.029	-0.088***	0.025	-0.124***	0.029
<i>Religious Groups</i>								
Christian	-0.094***	0.023	-0.090***	0.024	-0.055***	0.021	-0.077***	0.024
<i>Key IV</i> Muslim	0.155***	0.045	0.135***	0.046	0.198***	0.041	0.292***	0.047
(Constant)	41.110***	12.840	96.000***	13.180	73.010***	11.580	69.150***	13.260
Adj R-Square	0.7771		0.7342		0.7572		0.7865	
N	572		572		573		573	

Notes: Dependent Variable is the level of turnout in a constituency. Independent Variables are the Winner's majority in the previous election, age groups divided into five categories, the percentage of males in a constituency, Ethnicity groups "White, Black and Asian", None Highest qualification, University Degree, No car or van in the household, the percentage of Christians in a constituency. The key independent Variable is the percentage of Muslims in a constituency. N=Total Number of observations, B=b-coefficient and SE= Standard error. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

2.5 Conclusion

The main objective of this chapter is to explore the political participation of British Muslims.

The best approach is to explore them across time and space. This will help observe and track any British Muslim political participation pattern. First, I analysed British Muslim's intentions to participate in general elections for 20 waves of the BEPS between 2014 and 2022. I examined the trend of their intention together with the trend for each other major groups. All groups trended together. These shared dynamics indicate that British Muslims are integrated in the political system. British Muslims are impacted by the same factors that drive the British public as a whole. The short period covered in this dataset is unique because it contained three general elections and a national referendum. I expected that such political events have a powerful impact on their intentions to participate. If we look at the trend closely, we see a rise in the likelihood of participating. This is also true for all other groups. Many explanations could be drawn here, and the literature is full of explanations of long-term factors (social and demographic forces) and short terms activities (mobilisation, parties, campaigns, candidates) that may have an impact (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Hillygus, 2005).

Another notable observation from this analysis are the two spikes in intention to vote among Muslims in 2014 and 2016. As I discuss in chapter 4 the increase in 2014 may be associated with renewed efforts by Labour to attract Muslims after New Labour had alienated them. It is also tempting to link the remarkable spike in the intention to vote in 2016 clearly to the election of Corbyn as Labour leader and/or the Brexit referendum. Both are possible explanations behind this peak. However, since relations between British Muslim and the Labour party were still poor, it seems plausible to suggest that this had some effect. Some documented evidence (chapter 4

presents some of this evidence) reveals that most British Muslims voted Lib Democrats in the 2010 general elections. After that, the relationship improved, but when Corbyn became a leader, many British Muslims (85 per cent) voted for Labour in the 2017 general election (Clements, 2017). This suggests that it was more likely to be the driving force behind this peak. For many British Muslims, Corbyn was a leader they can trust because of his vocal support of Muslims' most concerned issues, such as his opposition to wars and Prevent program and his support for Palestine (see chapter 4 for more evidence and discussion). These findings demonstrated that British Muslims are less likely to participate in electoral participation than all other groups, but their intention to vote increased before all three elections. This indicates that short-term forces such as parties' competitions, campaigns and mobilisation play a role. Mobilisation could be by the parties or Islamic organisations such as MCB and Mosques. It might also suggest that British Muslims are willing to participate in elections when they believe their demand will be represented. Whether the jump in British Muslims' likelihood of participation is explained by either long forces (social and demographic forces) or short activities (mobilisation, parties, campaigns, candidates), it is very important in the remaining chapters we further investigate the potential institutions (Mosque, Islamic institutions, and Political parties) that may drive the political participation of British Muslims.

From my comparison cross space "the UK, German and Netherlands", I found that British Muslims who were born in Pakistan and or have a higher educational degree participated in the general election. However, regarding the key variable 'Mosque attendance' in this section, Mosque does not seem to impact British Muslims turnout. This finding contrasts with several studies on religious institutions as discussed in the introductory and the following chapter (For example see Sobolewska. *et al.*,2015; Jamal, 2005; McAndrew & Sobolewska, 2015; Moutselos,

2020). Moreover, the analysis of mosque attendance impact on turnout seems to have different results. For example, for the whole sample, Mosque seems to have a positive marginal effect on the turnout and the same impact on the German Mosque. It might be the small number problem with the British sample, or indeed the Mosque has no role to play in that period. I could also conclude from these differences that the Mosque operated differently based on various forces, including the political system and its environment. The institutional features may have an impact on the role of the mosque. I expected that mosques would play a positive role in electoral participation in Germany and the United Kingdom and was sceptical about its role in the Netherlands. My expectation was correct for German and Dutch mosques and not for the British Mosques. As I mentioned earlier it would be ideal if we could include test mosque mobilization. It may be mosque has an indirect involvement. Unfortunately, I could not test this hypothesis because there were not any indicators that measured mosque mobilisation in the dataset. Such an indicator would raise our certainty and confidence in the findings. The result is still interesting especially as it is in contrast with Moutselos, (2020) who used the same dataset and found a different result. Moutselos, (2020) found out that mosque attendance increased voting in general elections in both Germany and the United Kingdom. In the next chapter I examine these issues in greater depth using a high quality of dataset (e.g., EMBES).

From our comparison of British Muslim constituencies during the last four general elections, we found that a British Muslim constituency has a higher level of turnout in all previous elections. Our interpretation was forced to be the context of the aggregate level. We could not give any further interpretation regarding the individual level. The interpretation may lay to be one or more of the following 1) the large of Muslims in a constituency motivates other groups to participate in elections, 2) Mobilisation forces; I expect that British Muslims are exposed to a high level of

messages by a variety of institutions (i.e., political parties, Mosques, and Islamic umbrella organisations). It is logical to think that with a large population of British Muslim community, the number of mosques and size will increase. Also, Political parties and Islamic umbrella organisations may operate differently in these areas. Other explanations are also possible; however, the existence of British Muslims in large numbers in a constituency is the main force that drives the high turnout. Political participation is as much a social as an individual action.

Based on the findings of this chapter, the evidence is now twofold to suggest that our thesis structure is correct. It is necessary to examine 1) the religious institution's Mosque impact on the political participation of British Muslims. EMBES datasets will provide a sizable number and reliable indicators to the impact of mosque in a scientific way. 2) it seems there is a need to investigate the impact of the political establish institutions (e.g., political parties) on the political participation of British Muslims. This can be seen clearly from the result of the British Muslim's intentions to vote (Corbyn effect and the possibility of mobilisation from Islamic institutions) and the different outcomes of the Mosque's impact on turnout (i.e., mosques operated differently when we compare British with German Mosque). I am sure that it will be better if, in the following two chapters, we examine 1) the impact of Mosque attendance on political participation (chapter 3). 2) The discourses between political parties and Islamic religious institutions and its implication on the political participation of British Muslims. It will highlight the impact of the political environment produced due to the discourses between the parties and the Islamic institutions. It will also highlight how the latter shapes British Muslims' perceptions.

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CHAPTER 3

The influence of Mosque attendance and the political participation of British Muslims

Abstract

In this Chapter, I use the British Election Study Ethnic Minority booster sample 2010 (EMBES) to investigate the unique impact of mosque attendance on electoral- and protest-participation. To isolate the impact of mosque attendance, I control for a range of socio-economic characteristics, including gender, age, education, housing ownership and trade membership as well as a range of psychological variables, including identity, trust, relative deprivation, discrimination, social integration, and political knowledge. I use appropriate statistical models for non-experimental data (logistic and linear regression) to examine the impact of mosque attendance. I find that mosque attendance had no effect on participation in elections (voting in both the 2010 general and local elections). However, when I add an indicator of whether mosques mobilised their attendees, it has a positive impact. Mosques appears to have a positive and direct impact on protest participation when they mobilise their congregations. I find mosque attendance influenced participation in protest activities.

3.1 Introduction

In chapter 2, I used EuroIslam data to explore Muslim political participation in three different nations (UK, Germany, and Netherlands). One of the primary findings of that analysis was that Mosque attendance no impact on turnout among British Muslims. I am somewhat sceptical of this result because 1) the number of British Muslims who attend mosque regularly in the EuroIslam sample is surprisingly low, 2) the EuroIslam questionnaire does not contain data on key variables relating to mobilisation and other psychological variables. These shortcomings limited my ability to perform the proper analysis. In addition, the literature on religious institutions shows that religion and its institutions often play an essential role in promoting political participation in the most advanced democratic Western nations. Various research has suggested that religious institutions promote political participation (Peterson, 1992; Verba *et al.*, 1995; Jones-Correa & Leal, 2001). Most studies focus on those religions and those religious institutions associated with the native majorities. More recent studies have investigated the influence of minority religious institutions on the political participation of immigrants in Western Europe. (e.g. see Moutselos, 2020, Sobolewska. *et al.*, 2015; McAndrew & Sobolewska, 2015) Countries, such as the United Kingdom, have received many immigrants and now have substantial Muslim minority populations (slightly above 6 per cent in the recent release of the Census). This is partly a legacy of the empire (Hansen, 2000). Many people from the former colonies of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Malaysia migrated to the United Kingdom since 1945. France has similarly received many migrants from their former Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia colonies (Alba & Silberman, 2002). The Netherlands received migrants from the Dutch East Indies and Suriname but also Turkey and Morocco (Vasta, 2007). On the other hand, the significant level of Muslim migration to Germany resulted from the historic alliance with Turkey. Islam has also made many converts (Hess & Green, 2016; Özyürek, 2015). These

developments have fuelled the growth of right-wing populist movements and inspired white supremacist acts of terror for the avowed purpose of defending a Christian, secular or white European ideal.¹⁷

Mosques are the main places of worship for Muslims. These institutions can influence Muslims' views on political issues and encourage them to participate. Muslim clerical leaders (Imams) can influence attendees through sermons and activities. Mosques can also provide a platform for those interested in politics and attract the attention of political organisations seeking support. Mosques, like any other religious institution, can also provide opportunities for political mobilisation (Jamal, 2005). Put simply, it is easier for social groups to be mobilised if participants are gathered in the same place.¹⁸

In this chapter, the central objective is to investigate in depth the role of mosques in the political participation of British Muslims. Another task is to highlight on who participated among British Muslims in 2010 by testing a wide range of psychological variables. This is motivated by several considerations. The first is simply that the impact of mosques in the United Kingdom received far less attention than other countries, such as the United States (see Sobolewska. *et al.*, 2015; Oskooii, & Dana; 2018). The British election study (BES) in 1997 produced a booster for ethnic minorities (EMBES) that mainly focused on ethnicity, there were around 705 in the sample from Black or Asian origins (Sobolewska, 2005). Several studies have used that booster to explore the characteristics of ethnicity and political attitudes (e.g. Sobolewska, 2005). However, the 2010 British Election Study included an ethnic minority booster sample (EMBES) that contains a far larger number of Muslim respondents than any other previous study (Heath *et al.*, 2013). This

¹⁷ The terror attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011, illustrate the response of some far-right movements. Anders Brekvik killed around 77 Norwegians to provoke a war between native Europeans and Muslims.

¹⁸ There are parallels with the emergence of largescale industrial organisations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that made it easier for political parties – particularly social democratic parties – to mobilise workers.

makes it possible to examine political participation of British Muslims in greater depth, controlling for a wider range of variables (Davis, 1985; Miller & Shanks, 1990). The 2010 elections were also the first elections that Muslim organisations launched a national campaign to mobilise Muslims to vote by a campaign called YouElect (Peace, 2015, p. 47). Here I will examine mosque attendance on both electoral participation in both local and general elections.¹⁹ I will also examine mosque attendance on protest participation.²⁰ I will also test a wide range of hypotheses to understand the characteristics of those who participated in 2010 among British Muslims. I will adapt the civic voluntarism model (CVM) labels “Can, Want and asked” in my analysis to interpret my findings. Both electoral and protest participation are important forms of participation in a democratic society. Protest activities is particularly important to groups such as Muslims, that often face discrimination and from generalised prejudices that might be labelled Islamophobia (Heath *et al.*, 2013).

3.2. Background & hypotheses development

This section reviews of the existing literature on the Islamic religious institution ‘the Mosque’ and provides a summary of political participation theories briefly discussed in Chapter 1. It will help formulate research questions, hypotheses, and help develop a model of casual mechanisms by which mosques influence political participation.

3.2.1 The institution of Islam ‘the Mosque’:

In 2011 there were 2.5 million Muslims in the UK. This represented about 4.4 per cent of the total population (Sundas, 2015). By 2021 this had risen to 3.9 million or around 6.5 per cent of the population (MCB,2022). Muslims are now the second largest religious group in the UK. The

¹⁹ In local election, the sample sizes smaller than general election.

²⁰ Protest activities such as demonstration, signing petitions and participation in boycotts are important to every group in society. They are likely to be particularly important to migrant groups that are not integrated into native systems of political representation.

2011 Census suggests that some 47 per cent of Muslims were UK-born and 33 per cent were aged 15 and under. This represents 19 per cent of this age-cohort across the UK population.

TABLE 3.1: PARTICIPATION IN RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

Religious Services Attendance	Percentage
At least once a day	25
At least once a week	30
At least once a month	11
Occasionally (less than once a month)	12
Only on festivals	8
Not at all	13

Source: EMBES, 2010 (Fisher *et al*,2012).

The EMBES 2010 asked: “In the past 12 months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals?”²¹ Over half of Muslim respondents are very active. About 13 per cent do not attend at all (See table 3.1). For some Muslims at least, their religious identity is little more than nominal.

According to the Muslims in Britain organisation, there were estimated 1934 mosques in 2017 (Naqshbandi, 2017). Decision-making in most mosques is in the hands of the executive committee or board of directors (Naqshbandi, 2017). Most mosques are associated with umbrella organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), British Muslim Forum and the UK Islamic Mission (Naqshbandi, 2017). These organizations play a vital co-ordinating role. The

²¹ The EMBES team drafted a question that could be applied to all respondents and so did not include the word mosque in the question. I interpret participation in religious activities as taking place at mosques.

MCB, for instance, helps Muslims to register vote before the election to encourage those who attend a mosque to vote.

Several studies have indicated that there is a positive correlation between mosque attendance and political participation (Jamal, 2005; Ayers & Hofstetter, 2008; Fleischmann *et al*, 2016; Moutselos, 2020). Some studies claim that mosque attendance increases political participation among Muslims in the United States (Jamal, 2005). Attendance is positively associated with greater involvement in organizations that help the poor and neighbourhood or community groups (Jamal, 2005). The Muslim ethnic groups that dominated Mosques in the United States are drawn from African, Arab nations and South Asia (Jamal, 2005, p.525). There is considerable variation in their approaches to politics between these communities. Arab Americans are more active in political and civic activities than other Muslim groups. African American Muslims tend to have a somewhat higher the level of collective group consciousness. South Asians, however, appear to have higher civic participation than political activity (Jamal, 2005, p 537). Group consciousness refers to “ideology regarding the group's relative positions in the society and along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests” (Miller *et al.*, 1981, p. 495). Civic participation refers to “civic skills, civic norms, community interests, and civic recruitment” (Putnam, 2000, p. 35).

The mosques associated with Arab Muslims are actively involved in politics. The activity of Arab Muslim is motivated by a strong group consciousness (Jamal, 2005). For both African and Arab Muslims, the mosque is a platform that highlights Muslim community issues in American society (Jamal, 2005, p. 537). For the South Asian Muslims, Mosque increases their civic participation and has no effect on their political participation and group consciousness (Jamal, 2005, p. 537). Others have investigated the political engagement of American Muslims, and the

role of religious characteristics, political awareness, resources, and structure on political participation. American Muslims were more active in comparison with the public population. They also have higher rate of political participation that makes them model citizens. Religious beliefs (e.g., the importance of religion) negatively impacted political engagement, whereas mosque attendance positively related to participation (Ayers & Hofstetter, 2008, p.21). Participation was positively associated with political resources and political awareness. Both these things increased after 9/11, as the Muslim community both felt the need to mobilise both to demonstrate their commitment to the US and defend their 'inalienable rights' (Ayers & Hofstetter, 2008).

Some studies of the mosque in Western European nations draw parallels with Christian Churches (Oskooii & Dana, 2018). Mosque attendance increases civic and political participation. Studies found no link between mosque and violence (Oskooii & Dana, 2018). Other studies have investigated whether mosques promote segregation and participation in civic and political activities. McAndrew and Sobolewska (2015) investigate whether mosques promote segregation and radicalization or integration with the rest of British Society. They compared mosque attendees with non-attendees to see whether those who attend mosque are more "insular and suspicious of white British" or have a social connection with people outside their ethnic group. They also investigated whether mosques promoted participation in civic and political activities. They analysed the *EMBES, 2010* dataset and found that those who attend mosques are like those who did not. Both do not live a separate life from the British society. Mosque attendance increases the level of turnout, but it does not promote other forms of political involvement. This study is important for this chapter, I use the same dataset (EMBES) but I control a wider range of variables and adopt different analytical strategies. Other studies have examined whether the

mosque mobilizes members in the Netherlands (Fleischmann *et al*, 2016). This study focused mainly on Turkish and Moroccan minorities and concluded that attending religious institutions, such as the Mosque, increased participation by both Moroccans and Turks. Turks were more engaged in civic life and more politically active whereas, Moroccans who attended mosque had increased civic involvement but a low level of political trust that reduced participation. Another study examined the impact of mosque attendance on turnout in three established democracies: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Moutselos, 2020). This suggested that there is a strong relationship between mosque attendance and turnout in both Germany and the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, the level of turnout is associated with individual religiosity (measured by responses to the question ‘How often do you go to the mosque or other place of worship’?) It concluded that the mosque's impact on voting was a result of the acquisition of relevant political information (Moutselos, 2020).

3.2.2 Who participates?

The civic voluntarism model suggests that there are three answers to this question (Verba *et al.*, 1995). These are both highly plausible and memorable. The first answer is those who “can” or are “able to participate”. Education, income, and age are significant predictors of participation. Older and educated people are more likely to turn out and vote. This is because education and experience increase their ability, knowledge, and skills. These, in turn, reduce the difficulty of participation. The second answer is those who “want” or are “willing to participate”.

Psychological factors distinguish between those who do or do not participate and how much people participate. Political interest, efficacy, partisanship, and grievance emotions are predictors of participation. The final answer is those who are “asked” to participate. Those mobilised,

contacted, or exposed to media messages or join political-non-political organisations are more likely to participate.

In this chapter, I will use these three categories (can, want and asked) in my model to remind the reader and to link the result with the literature on political participation theories. These labels will also help to determine who participated among British Muslims in 2010.

3.2.3 Hypotheses development

British Muslims are more likely to participate in protest activities (Heath *et al.*, 2013). However, I expect that the mosque will play a significant role in promoting electoral participation as well. British Muslims are concentrated in some constituencies and these constituencies are marginal (Sherwood, 2019). This is illustrated by the findings of the previous chapter that those constituencies with more Muslims have a higher level of turnout. It is plausible that more individuals attend the mosque, the more likely to participate in electoral and protest activities. I also expect individuals who receive messages from the mosque are mobilized and will participate in electoral and protest activities. In short, Mosque attendance and/or exposure to the messages and communications for mosques will increase the political participation of Muslims. The central question of this chapter is straightforward “Does Mosque attendance impact the political participation of British Muslims?” the main hypothesis in this chapter is that: (H1) Mosque attendance increases political participation (both electoral and protest participation).

My second question is, “Who participated in 2010 among the British Muslims?”, I will test related hypotheses based on the existing literature:

I. Those who “Want” or “Willingness to Participate”:

Emotions and psychological factors are associated with collective actions. Individuals who feel relatively deprived, share a strong group identity, and those who have experienced discrimination are more likely to participate in a collective action (Heath *et al.*, 2013). McAndrew and Sobolewska, (2015) who measured religious salience among British Muslims, found that it positively correlated with non-electoral participation. According to Heath *et al.* (2013), grievances may stimulate protest among British Muslims. This is because the war in Iraq and Afghanistan supplements them with collective resources which lead to political actions. I expect that negative emotion (such as feeling relatively deprived and discriminated against) promotes participation in protest activities for British Muslims. Stronger identities collective action such as protest activities needs a strong identity (Heath *et al.*, 2013; Phalet *et al.*, 2010; Oskooii 2016). I expect that a strong group identity increases participation in protest activities. Political trust in the major institutions of democracy should increase electoral participation (Nyckowiak, 2009). I hypothesise the following:

H2) British Muslims who feel relatively deprived, are more likely to participate in protest activities.

H3) British Muslims who have an experience of discrimination, are more likely to participate in protest activities.

H4) British Muslims who trust political institutions are willing to participate in electoral participation.

H5) British Muslims who have strong religious identity are more likely to participate in protest activities.

II. “Can” or have “Ability to Participate”

The impact of psychological resources or cognitive engagement on political activities has been discussed by many scholars (Verba *et al.*, 1995; Brady, 1999; Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014). Civic skills, education, and political knowledge are important factors that may increase the level of political participation. Political knowledge increases political interest and efficacy which in turn increases political participation (Persson, 2011). For British Muslims, I expect that knowledge is an important predictor for their electoral and protest participation. This is because they know their group position was a disadvantaged group and the only way to make their voice heard is by protesting. Formal knowledge increases social status and networks, and individuals need to maintain them by participating in electoral activities (see Persson, 2011; Campbell, 2009). For the same reason, I expect social integration to promote participation in elections. Therefore, I hypothesise the following:

H6) British Muslims who are socially integrated are more likely to participate in electoral participation.

H7) British Muslims who are politically knowledgeable, are more likely to participate in electoral and protest activities.

III. “Asked” to participate

Many studies highlighted the importance of mobilization in promoting political participation. Religious institutions mobilized their members to participate in all forms of political activities (see for example, Djupe & Grant, 2001; Dana *et al.*, 2011; Jamal, 2005). I expect that mobilization plays a significant role in promoting political participation among British Muslims. I hypothesise that:

H8) British Muslims who are mobilized are more likely to participate.

3.3 Funnel of causality and analytical strategy:

To assess the impact of mosque attendance on political participation I adopt the “funnel of causality” heuristic (Campbell *et al.*, 1960, Miller and Shanks, 1996). It is also important to outline a plausible causal mechanism between the mosque and all other variables before I propose mosque attendance location in the funnel of causality. Previous studies suggested that those who attend mosque are more likely to participate in politics (Mouteselos, 2020). Mosque attendance is not, however, the only variable that might influence participation. Other variables have their own unique impact. Any attempt to isolate the unique impact of mosque attendance must take these into account. My models recognize the multivariate influences on participation. Mosque attendance is both caused by and causes other variables. It is likely to be influenced by age (life cycle and generational influences), gender and education (since western education may encourage young people to challenge religious authority). Mosque attendance might influence other variables. Attending this religious institution may, for example, increase political participation indirectly by increasing political knowledge, the sense that one’s group is not receiving what they are entitled to (or as much as other groups) (‘relative deprivation’) or it may increase one’s sense of being a Muslim (‘identity’). Alternatively, relative deprivation and/ or identity might lead to mosque attendance. People who feel that the established British institutions are failing them may turn to the mosque for support and solidarity. The complex causal relationship among the very large number of potential causes makes it challenging to estimate the unique contribution of mosque attendance. I propose three mosque mechanisms that may promote political participation based on the existing literature followed by a model strategy that I will use to determine the causal order among all giving variables in this chapter.

3.3.1 *Mechanism*

Based on the existing literature mosque foster political participation by one or more of the following mechanisms:

I. *Willingness to participate*—*Mosque attendance increases sense of discrimination, relative deprivation, and group identity.*

The answers to the question ‘who am I’ shapes how individuals perceive and evaluate the world around them. Joining a group, either formally or informally, helps to define one’s values and beliefs. Many scholars have pointed out that group identity increases political participation (Miller *et al.*, 1981; Stokes-Brown, 2003). Groups create norms that members feel obliged to conform to (Verba and Nie, 1972; Nelson, 1979). Group members “maximize between-group differences and minimize within-group differences” (Fiske & Taylor 1991, p. 166). Scholars have used a group consciousness to explain political participation within ethnic groups (Verba & Nie, 1972).

Group identity or consciousness can increase if minorities feel discriminated against or receive less attention from the political organisations. Group consciousness is enhanced when the group feels deprived (Miller *et al.*, 1981). Collective actions and group consciousness are associated with religious institutions. Black churches enhance group identity and group consciousness by encouraging their members to participate politically (Harris, 1994; Calhoun-Brown, 1996 & Stokes, 2003). Ethnic political group actions can be increased if the level of perception of discrimination is higher among the group (Lien, 1994; Schildkraut, 2005). In the US Latinos prefer to elect a Latino over the white candidate (Stokes-Brown, 2006). Group consciousness creates common interests that facilitate Latino's collective action (Sanchez, 2006). Ethnic-religious institutions activate their member's psychological predispositions, group identities, and

consciousness around issues that matter to the group (Jamal, 2005). Other studies of minorities such as Africans, Mexicans, and Asians and found no link between group consciousness political participation in the US (Leighley, 1996; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). The negative image of Islam in many western societies after the 9/11 attack, may have increased group identity among Muslims, encouraging them to change the public stereotype of the Muslim community by taking political actions or challenging the institutions that promote the negative perception (Phalet *et al.*, 2010; Oskooii 2016).

Mosque attendance might increase political participation by creating or sustaining norms that increase group identity or may create distrust, relative deprivation, and discrimination. The EMBES dataset has several questions related to perceptions of discrimination, relative deprivation and group identity that can be used to establish the causal effect of mosque attendance.

***II. Able to Participate*—Mosque attendance increases skills that enable Muslims to participate such as political knowledge and integration.**

Civic skills are predictors of political participation. They can be gained through non-political institutions such as religious institutions (Brady *et al.*, 1995). Religious attendance increases civic skills, such as information related to a political decision- making (Moutselos, 2020).

Churches, synagogues, and mosques provide their members with skills that encourage political and civic engagement. (Dana *et al.*, 2011). Minorities often lack those skills that are needed for political participation. Religious institutions are social networks that encourage members to participate in politics and public affairs (Campbell, 2004; Djupe & Grant, 2001). They help to improve civic skills such as writing petitions, public speaking, organizing, and attending meetings and contacting government officials. (Djupe & Grant, 2001). Mosques can increase

civic skills and knowledge among Muslims that in turn increase political participation. Both political knowledge and social integration can mediate the effect of the mosque on political participation.

III. Asked to Participate—*Mosque attendance makes it easier to mobilise.*

The shortest route between two points is a straight line. Politicians and parties who seek votes go where individuals gather. In the UK they may stand outside shopping centres, schools and even football matches. Mobilisation is all about catching the attention of those who are willing to participate. Religious institutions are venues for recruitment and mobilization. They provide social network with ordinary people who are willing to participate. Mobilisation by such personal contacts increases political participation (Blydenburgh, 1971).

The scholarship of mobilisation has identified religious institutions as important sources of mobilisation. Indeed, mobilization strategies are not all the same. It differs from one institution to another. Religious institutions have similar strategies (Dana *et al.*, 2011). They mobilise by providing information related to important issues of their community and create group consciousness or by endorsing candidates (Djupe & Grant, 2001; Dana *et al.*, 2011; Jamal, 2005). Religious institutions enhance civic skills, provide information, and reinforce group consciousness by recommending candidates.

Mosques either mobilise Muslims or enable Muslims to be mobilised. The institution of the mosque may encourage people to participate by signing a petition, engaging in protest, and donating money to a political organization or campaign or it may simply provide a venue where mobilisation takes place. Those who attend mosque are more likely to be mobilised than those who do not.

3.3.2 Analytical strategy

After reviewing the existing literature on mosque mechanisms in promoting political participation. I assumed that mosque attendance was located before all psychological variables in the funnel of causality. To establish a plausible model of the funnel of causality, it is necessary to understand that all explanatory factors are allocated to a series of blocks, and these blocs are arranged in the most plausible order. In Figure 3.1 below, I allocated all variables into four categories or blocks. The first represents all variables that are fixed, and the degree of stability is higher. In other words, we started with demographic or social factors that are clearly exogenous (i.e., determined outside the system) variables such as age, gender, level of education, and income. The mosque and its associated variables (e.g., Mosque mobilization) are in the second block. For less stable variables, “psychological variables” I put them into two different blocks because they differ in their characteristics. Some may be caused by the other to some degree. The third and fourth blocks represent the psychological variables, and emotions (e.g., discrimination, relative deprivation, and distrust) in the third bloc. In the fourth block, I located other psychological variables related to cognitive engagement such as political knowledge and political integration. It is plausible, to think that identity, discrimination, distrust, and relative deprivation (especially among the disadvantaged group) have a negative impact on their behaviours. Therefore, it might determine the level of integration and to some degree the level of political knowledge. Technically, I examine these hypotheses using causal modelling techniques that arranges variables into the most plausible causal order $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots, X_n$ to approximate the ‘funnel of causality’ (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Bartle, 1998, 2003). Using such technique will help to assess the impact of the mosque on political participation. Explanatory variables can have a direct and/or indirect impact on the dependent variable,

depending on their assumed position in the causal order (see figure 3.1). To estimate the unique impact of mosque attendance on political participation I examine whether the association between X_2 and Y persists once controls are added for variables that are assumed to cause both participation and mosque attendance (X_1). Therefore, I will use these three models to assess the impact of Mosque attendance (X_2) on political participation (Y) as follows:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + \dots + b_nX_n + e$$

$$\text{Model I) } Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + e$$

$$\text{Model II) } Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + e$$

$$\text{Model III) } Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + e$$


Where Y is the dependent variable which the political participation. X_1 = the independent variables that I labelled as control and stable variables (there are five variables: age, gender, education, home ownership and trade union membership), X_2 = the key independent variable the mosque attendance, and X_3 = the independent variable which the mosque mobilization. X_4 = the independent psychological variables, b_0 = y-intercept (value of y when all other parameters are set to 0), b is the regression coefficient, and e is the model error.

To gauge the indirect effect of mosque attendance, I will examine what happens to b_2 in models of participation when I add controls for variables that are assumed to be located after mosque attendance ($Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4$). It will also help us to confirm whether the location of the mosque proposed in Figure 3.1 is accurate. Model III will enable us to lay out whether those who can, want, and/or asked participated among the British Muslims.

Regarding the causality between mosque and other psychological variables, unfortunately, it cannot be conclusively demonstrated in this chapter with data at my disposal. The causal order proposed here is plausible, but proof is a matter for future research. If I had multi-wave panel

study data on mosque attendance and other variables, we could determine the casual order among those variables (Miller, 2000). I could examine the relationship between mosque attendance and for example, Muslim identity. If I could measure both these concepts over time, I could assess whether variations in on between t_1 and t_2 are associated with subsequent changes between t_2 and t_3 . The problem we have is that I only have cross-sectional data to hand. Since I cannot draw those causal inferences, I must impose assumptions about casual order based on a range of theoretical and practical considerations. These assumptions are summarized as ‘the logic of casual order’ or ‘the funnel of causality’ (Davis, 1985; Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Bartle, 1998; Bartle, 2003).

FIGURE 3.1 THE CAUSAL ORDER AMONG ALL VARIABLES



Source: Author.

3.4 Data and measures

In this chapter I use data provided by the British Election Study “Ethnic Minority booster” (EMBES) sample collected by Anthony Heath and his colleagues in 2010. The main objective of that survey was to explore electoral behaviour in Great Britain. The booster focused on five minority groups: black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi. The EMBES interviewed a total of 2787 individuals, including a total of 1140 Muslims. Fully, 83 per cent of the sample were interviewed “face to face” (Fisher *et al.*, 2013) (see table 3.2 for more information). In the following sections, I examine the connection between mosque attendance and political participation based on the 1140 Muslim in the sample (see table 3.2). I distinguish between two types of political participation: electoral participation (general and local election turnout) and protest participation.

TABLE 3.2 RELIGIOUS PROFILE FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE OF THE EMBES 2010

Religious Profile	Numbers	Percentage %
Refused	1	0
Christian	841	30.2
Jewish	1	0
Hindu	234	8.4
Muslim	1140	40.9
Sikh	164	5.9
Buddhist	3	0.1
Other	26	0.9
Total	2410	86.5
Missing	377	13.5
Total	2787	100

Source: EMBES, 2010 (Fisher *et al.*,2012).

Dependent variables

Political participation takes many forms. I distinguish between electoral and protest participation.

Turnout in general election is measured by responses to a question “Did you manage to vote in the general election?” and for local election is measured by “did you manage to vote in the local

election or wasn't there one in this area?"). These questions have been found to produce a reliable and valid indicator of electoral participation, though there is a tendency to over-report.²²

Participation in protest activity is measured by respondents' reports of whether they had engaged in three other types of participation: protesting, signing a petition, and boycotting products or services.²³ These variables were factor analysed and the resulting scores used as the dependent variable. (See table:3.2 for more information on EMBES questions). It is true that protest, boycott, and petition are different activities. Boycotting and signing a petition require less time compared to participation in a protest. The latter is more collective and needs more commitment (see Dalton, 2019 for more information). However, when it comes to disadvantaged groups such as British Muslims, these forms of participation "protest, boycott and petition" share a similar features. As Melo & Stockemer (2014, p. 35) stated "petitions and protest are tools for the voicing of grievances, and to call attention to issues that are often neglected by the elites.". Since British Muslim is disadvantage minority and they are more likely to participate in one or more of these forms It is reasonable to combine them into a single dependent variable.

3.4.2 Independent variable: "Mosque attendance"

The EMBES does not have a question that asks directly about 'mosque attendance' (the key independent variable). The booster survey that was fielded in 2010 was designed to assess the behaviour of a range of ethnic groups. The term 'mosque' was not appropriate to all faiths (Hindus go to 'temple', while Christians go to 'church'). Mosque attendance is the product of two questions. The first is "Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?".

²² There is a literature on the reliability and validity of self-reported vote (Karp & Brockington, 2005).

²³ The donation variable does not load as much as heavily as the other three variables. Donation loaded at 0.44 while Protest loaded at 0.71, Boycott at 0.73 and signing a petition at 0.78. Therefore, I excluded donation from our analysis and use the factor score of protest, petition, and boycott as the dependent variable "participate in protest activities".

Respondents could reply ‘Muslim’ and so on. Those individuals who indicated that they had faith were then asked: “In the past twelve months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals?”. I assume that those respondents who indicate that they are ‘Muslim’ and engage in public forms of worship attend the mosque.²⁴ This seems entirely plausible.

3.4.3 Control variables

Since, I focus on the effect of mosque attendance on participation, many variables that are ‘causes’ of both political of mosque attendance and political participation. To estimate the unique impact of mosque attendance on political participation, I need to control for these variables (Davis, 1985). The EMBES data set includes a range of socio-economic variables such as level of education, age, and gender. These factors are stable or fixed at birth (e.g., age and sex) will be controlled for in the statistical analysis (Bartle, 1998). None of these variables can plausibly be said to be caused by mosque attendance. Other social characteristics, such as education, homeownership and trade union membership are acquired over time and, although stable, are changeable over long periods of time. In general, these variables can generally be assumed to be causes of both mosque attendance and political participation.²⁵ They appear later in ‘the funnel of causality’ but I control for them too. Education and income can be thought of as relating to the “can” participate as the CVM suggests. Nevertheless, I labelled them as “control

²⁴ This does not seem like a problematic assumption. Some people may meet with others for prayers outside of a mosque content. Eid prayer for example, sometimes held outside of mosques because, it is conducted in large numbers which required a large open space.

²⁵ Education is usually acquired in one’s youth. If I was studying the effect of these variables on vote there would be a problem of self-selection. Labour voters might join trade unions, for example, because they are Labour voters. Similarly, people may buy their own home if they are Conservatives. It is more difficult to see how political participation might cause these characteristics.

fixed & stable” because they differ in terms of their degree of stability compared to the psychological variables. I will them as relating to “can” in the discussion and conclusion. The data set also includes a range of psychological factors that might have an impact on political participation. These include trust in institutions, relative deprivation, experiences of discrimination, political knowledge, social integration, religious identity and mobilization. These variables are both independent influences on participation and potential causes of mosque attendance. Those who feel that the system does not give them what they deserve (‘the relatively deprived’), who do not trust institutions, who are dissatisfied with democracy, have a strong religious identity, feel discriminated against, for example, might all be more likely to attend mosque. Yet equally a sense of relative deprivation, dissatisfaction with democracy, religious identity and perceptions of discrimination might be caused by mosque attendance as attendees discuss politics with fellow adherents. If I had multi-wave panel data on all these variables, I might be able to determine the most plausible causal order among these variables (Miller & Shanks, 1996; Miller, 2000). Without such data, I must make assumptions about the most plausible causal order and assess how my conclusions would be altered if those assumptions were wrong (Bartle, 1998).

The table 3.3 shows the psychological variables and the questions of EMBES. These are difficult to measure reliably and validly (Spector, 1994). In general, it is better to have multiple indicators for each of these concepts we are going to test. There is always some slippage between the concept and operational indicator (Miller & Shanks, 1996, p. 120). As a secondary user of data, I must rely on the data to hand. I will use those measures that the survey designer constructed to measure concepts. Most of these concepts are operationalised using a single

indicator. For multiple indicators, I will take the mean score (see the table 3.3 & table B.2 in the Appendix B for more information on how I measure these concepts).

The variables can be summarised by reference to the civic voluntarism model developed by Brady *et al.* These authors suggested that people participate in politics if they can, if they want to, and/or if they are asked to. This neat summary suggests that people participate if they have the resources (education, skills, and knowledge), if they are motivated to (are interested etc) and finally if they are asked (since this creates a sense of obligation).

TABLE 3.3: VARIABLES AND THE EMBES SURVEY QUESTIONS

Variables	Measurements	Questions Wording in EMBES survey
DV		<i>Political Participation</i>
	<i>Turnout</i>	
	General Election	Talking with people about the general election on May 6th we have found that a lot of people didn't manage to vote. How about you, did you manage to vote in the general election?
	Local Election	Thinking now about the local election that was held in some parts of the country on May 6th this year. We have found that a lot of people didn't manage to vote. How about you - did you manage to vote in the local election, or wasn't there one in this area?
	<i>Protest Activities</i>	
	Protest	In the last 12 months, have you participated in a protest, like a rally or a demonstration, to show your concern about a public issue or problem?
	Boycott	In the last 12 months, have you participated in a boycott of a particular product or service?
	Petition	In the last 12 months, have you signed a petition, to show your concern about a public issue or problem?
IV		
Key Independent	Mosque Attendance	In the past 12 months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals?
Other Independent		
<i>Control</i>	Age	What was your age last birthday?
	Gender	TO OBSERVE AND RECORD: GENDER OF RESPONDENT
	Education	Taking your answers from this card, which is the highest British qualification you have?
	Income/Wealth	Does your household own or rent this accommodation?
	Trade Union	Are you now a member of a trade union or staff association?
	Ethnic Background	Could you look at this card and tell me which of this best describes your ethnic group?
<i>Mobilisation</i> (Asked?)	Mosque Mobilisation	During the election campaign did your local place of worship encourage members to vote in the election.
	Party Contact	Did any of the political parties contact you, either in person or over the phone, during the recent election campaign?
<i>Psychological</i> (Want?)	Relative deprivation	Big gap between what people like me expect and reality
	Trust in institution	How much trust you have for: A-Parliament B-Politicians C-Police.
	Religion Identity	Some people think of themselves first as (Religion). Others may think of themselves first as British. Which best describes how you think of yourself.

Some people think of themselves first as (Religion). Others may think of themselves first as (Black/Asian). Which best describes how you think of yourself.

Discrimination In the past 5 years, do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in the UK because of your ethnicity, race, skin colour, language, accent, religion, age, gender, sexuality or disability?

<i>Psychological</i> (Can?)	Political knowledge	<p>Polling stations close at 10.00pm on election day.</p> <p>The minimum voting age is 16.</p> <p>The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for setting interest rates in the UK.</p> <p>Any registered voter can obtain a postal vote if they want one by contacting their local council and asking for a postal vote.</p> <p>The Labour party has the most MPs from ethnic minorities.</p>
	Integration	<p>Do you or your family do any of the following things?</p> <p>a. Send Christmas cards. b. Send Valentine cards. c. Send a card to your mother/father on Mother's Day/Father's Day. d. Put up a Christmas tree e Wear a poppy on Remembrance Day. f. Give presents at Christmas.</p>

Source: EMBES,2010 & Author contribution.

3.5 The empirical analysis

This section will analyse the relationship between mosque attendance and political participation using an appropriate data source: EMBES. It will include data information, measurement, output of analysis and followed by a brief discussion. It also will present what I think the causality of order between variables that my cause or impact political participation of British Muslims. The findings represent this thesis contribution and identifies further research questions.

3.5.1 Results

In this section, I examine the impact of mosque attendance on political participation (voting and protesting activities). Second, I assess the influence of the three components of the CVM (can, want, and/or asked) on participation among British Muslims.

3.5.1.1 Participation as voting

I start with voting turnout in the general election and elections to local authorities held in May 2010. To estimate the impact of variables on electoral participation, I run a logistic regression model. controlling for age and sex, which are fixed at birth and education, which is acquired early in the political life cycle and is a cause of participation.²⁶ I also control house ownership and trade union membership, variables that are associated with participation.

The table 3.4 below shows the logistic regression on turnout of general and local elections. I run the analysis in three models. In the first model, I run the regression by controlling variables I mentioned above and mosque attendance only. The estimated coefficients displayed in table 3.4 suggests that simply attending mosque has no visible impact on turnout in the general election in 2010. This finding is repeated for the smaller sub-set who were able to participate in the

²⁶ See Liao (1994) for reference on logistic regression.

elections to local authorities. In both cases those who attended mosque were no more likely to turn out and vote than those who did not.

Previous studies have suggested that mosque attendance has an impact on turnout. In principle these differences could be either because the UK or the 2010 general election are different in some ways. Since other studies have found that mosque attendance increases turnout in the UK, it may be that 2010 differed in some way. Mosque attendance only has an effect when they communicate the need to participate to the attendees. In model II, I added mosque mobilization variable. The EMBES question was “During the election campaign did your local place of worship encourage members to vote in the election?” This evidence suggests that some 366 out of 1140 individuals (32%) received mosque mobilizing messages. The coefficient suggests that those who received a message from the institution of the mosque that they should turn out and vote were indeed more likely to vote. Mosque attendance has an impact on turnout in both general and local elections in 2010 when it is associated with mobilization.

In model III, I add psychological variables that might have an impact on electoral participation. The estimated coefficients for these variables and their degree of significance suggest that age, home ownership, mosque mobilization, party contact, trust in institutions and political knowledge increase the probability of voting in general and local elections net of other factors (H4, H7, and H8, are supported). Males are less likely to vote than females controlling for all other factors. Being a member of a trade union, holding a religious identity, being integrated with the society, feeling relatively deprived or receiving discrimination, have no visible impact on turnout in both elections. Having an educational degree has a marginally negative impact on voting in the general election for British Muslims. This means that those who have a higher degree were less likely to vote in the general election of 2010. It is very odd that the level of

education did not increase political participation as the literature suggests. In the previous chapter, we found the level of education did not affect the electoral participation of all Muslims in the three nations combined. One of the explanations we proposed is that may be because British Muslims are a disadvantaged group and those who are educated understand their position. Voting does not make any difference for their group. I will keep monitoring educational variables for the protest activities before I draw inferences. Educated British Muslims may have participated more in protest activities than otherwise identical individuals. It may be that educated British Muslims understand their group positions and that voting does not make any difference for their community.

All independent variables in the equation are either dummies or scaled so that they range from 0 to 1.²⁷ This makes it easy to interpret the effect on the probability of voting.²⁸ Moving from the youngest Muslim in the sample to the oldest, the probability of electoral participation increased by 1 percentage point in voting in both elections, net of all other factors. Being Muslim and male decreases the possibility of voting by 11 points in both elections. Resources seems to have a marginal net impact. A Muslim who owns his/her house increased the probability of voting by approximately 6 points in both elections. Similarly, Muslims who have been asked to vote seems to have a little effect on participation. A Muslim exposed to a message via mosque to encourage him/her to vote, the probability of him/her will turn out and vote rises by around 6 points net of all other variables. Those who were contacted by a party were more likely to vote than those who did not receive contact from a party by 11 points and 10 points respectively in general and local elections. Wanting to vote seems to have a bigger role in Muslim's participation in both

²⁷ Age variable" was not measured on a scale of 0 to 1. The youngest person in the sample was 18-year-old where is the oldest one was 97 years old.

²⁸ See the Appendix B table B.1 for more information on how I calculated the effect of voting using STATA command.

elections. Moving from the minimum to the maximum score on trust for institutions increases the probability of turning out vote in the general and local election by 21 points.

Having the ability and political information seems like the most effective motivation for Muslims to participate in both elections. The most knowledgeable Muslims are 27 points more likely to turn out and vote than those who score 0 on that variable. This finding underscores the importance of psychological engagement on both forms of electoral turnout. This suggests that a programme of civic education might increase turnout.

TABLE 3.4 MODELS OF TURNOUT AND MOSQUE ATTENDANCE AT THE 2010 GENERAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS, LOGISTIC REGRESSION (INCLUDING 3 MODELS)

Variables	DV Turnout											
	Model I				Model II				Model III			
	G-Election		L-Election		G-Election		L-Election		G-Election		L-Election	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Fixed & Stable</i>												
<i>“Controls”</i>												
Age	0.087***	0.020	0.096***	0.030	.087***	0.020	0.098***	0.030	0.072***	0.030	0.073***	0.030
Age Square	-0.001***	0.000	-0.001***	0.000	-0.001***	0.000	-0.001***	0.000	-0.001**	0.000	-0.001*	0.000
Male	-0.427***	0.160	-0.422***	0.160	-0.438***	0.160	-0.440***	0.160	-0.649**	0.180	-0.625***	0.180
Educ. Degree	-0.249	0.200	-0.267	0.200	-0.265	0.200	-0.288	0.200	-0.346*	0.210	-0.262	0.220
Home-Owner	0.517***	0.150	0.440***	0.150	0.480***	0.150	0.406***	0.150	0.332**	0.160	0.301*	0.170
Trade Union	0.513	0.320	0.316	0.310	0.478	0.320	0.281	0.310	0.417	0.330	0.205	0.320
<i>Less Stable “Asked?”</i>												
Mobilise Mosque					0.464***	0.160	0.529***	0.170	0.320*	0.180	0.369**	0.190
Party Contact									0.634***	0.180	0.545***	0.180
<i>Want?</i>												
Religious ID									0.166	0.190	0.123	0.200
Trust Institutions									1.123***	0.350	1.119***	0.370
Rel. Deprivation									-0.004	0.340	0.016	0.350
Discrimination									-0.191	0.180	-0.203	0.190
<i>Can?</i>												
Integration									0.340	0.300	0.302	0.310
Pol Knowledge									1.458***	0.350	1.449***	0.360
<i>Key IV</i>												
Mosque Attend	0.293	0.220	0.129	0.230	0.207	0.230	0.027	0.230	0.354	0.260	0.203	0.270
Constant	-1.18**	0.510	-1.37***	0.540	-1.26***	0.520	-1.48***	0.540	-2.700***	0.680	-2.710***	0.710
Nagelkerke R Square	0.072		0.079		0.083		0.093		0.153		0.149	
N	1048		943		1048		943		942		850	

Source: EMBES,2010 and author analysis.

Notes: P-value in in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is voted in General and Local elections. The independent variables are the age of the respondent's in years, The respondent's being male, the Educational level of the respondent, the respondent's owned his home, the respondent's being a member of trade union, the respondent's received encouragement from the mosque to participate, the respondent's being contacted by political parties, the respondent's religious identity, the respondent's level of trust in political institutions, the respondent's being relatively deprived, the respondent's has experienced discrimination, the respondent's level of integration, the respondent's level of political knowledge. The Key independent variable is the respondent's Mosque attendance. N=Total Number of observations, B=b-coefficient and SE= Standard error.

Participation as protest

Most studies of participation focus on voting – sometimes to the exclusion of all other forms of participation. There are a wide variety of ways that citizens can try to alter political outcomes.

Protest may be particularly important to Muslims since, as I demonstrate in chapter 4, they have often felt failed by the existing institutions of representation – the Conservative and Labour parties. By the time of the 2010 general election, many Muslims felt that they had a great deal to protest about. The New Labour government had supported the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, had tried to introduce plans for detention without trial and had introduced the Prevent programme that singled them out as being vulnerable to ‘radicalisation’ (Toynbee & Walker, 2010).

To assess the impact of mosque attendance on protest participation I replicated the method laid out above. The dependent variable in these models is a factor score that ranges between [min score] and [max score]. I ran linear regression models on factor score of protest controlling for age, gender, education, house ownership and being a member of trade union. I followed the same steps to estimate the impact of mosque attendance on protest. In the first model I run a regression incorporating controls plus mosque attendance (see model I Table 3.5). The coefficients displayed in table 3.5 suggest that mosque attendance has a significant impact on protest activity (H_1 is conformed regarding protest activities). It seems that not all forms of political participation is the same.

In the second model (see table 3.5 below), I again added mosque mobilization variable. Yet again it seems that those who mobilized by the mosque were more likely to protest (H_8 conformed). In contrast to the findings for turnout, mosque attendance seems a significant predictor of protest activities even when I added mosque mobilization variable. The indicator for

mobilization is based on a question that asks about voting not for other forms of participation.²⁹ Nevertheless, it seems plausible to assume that if a mosque mobilized their members to vote, it may also communicate the importance of other forms of participation and lead their members to sign petitions, take part in protests and join boycotts.

In the third model, I added other variables in the equation. The resulting coefficients are displayed in table 3.5 below. Age and education (degree) were statistically significant. Age was negatively related with protest controlling for all other factors. This again underlines that not all participation is the same. Older voters are less likely to engage in protest activity than the young. Those holding a degree are more likely to protest. It seems that education provides individuals with the confidence or ability to communicate their demands or concerns to those in power in the UK. Alternatively, as I proposed, educated British Muslims may be more aware of their group position and protesting is the only way to make a difference and make their voices heard. Mosque attendance continues to be significant and is associated with greater protest. Psychological factors such as discrimination, religious identity, integration, political knowledge, and mosque mobilization all have a positive impact on participation (H3, H5, H7 and H8 are confirmed). Those Muslims who reported experiencing discrimination, who were knowledgeable or exposed to mosque messages, had a higher level of participation during that period. Trust in institutions is negatively related with protest participation. Muslims who had a trust in political institutions, had a low level of participation in protest activities (H4 is supported). However, sex, home ownership, a trade union membership or relative deprivation were not associated with protest, controlling for all other variables. The marginal effects give us a better understanding of

²⁹ EMBES question: During the election campaign did your local place of worship encourage members to vote in the election? There are 366 out of 1140 (32%) were mobilised.

who among Muslim group participate in protesting, petitioning, and boycotting.³⁰ Those who were young, were more likely to participate. Moving from the oldest to the youngest individual in the sample, the probability of participation increased by just 2 points, net of all other factors. Muslims who had a degree are more likely to participate in such forms by 27 points compared to those who did not have a degree controlling for all other variables. Those who were asked by the mosque to participate in elections were more likely to get engaged in these forms by 30 points compared to those who reported not to received mosque mobilizing messages. Having a desire to participate seems to drive Muslims to get involved in these activities. Holding a strong religious identity increased the probability of engaging in these forms by 15%. Muslims who had distrust in governmental institutions, were more likely to become involved in these types of activities by 56 points. This finding illustrates the difference between types of participation since trust is associated with higher electoral turnout. Being able to participate seems the main driver for Muslims group on participating in these activities. Being knowledgeable increased the likelihood by 44 points. Another example of being able to participate is integration. Muslims who are integrated with the native society – who engage in the same social activities as the ‘native’ population appear to be more involved in protest activity. Indeed, the probability of participating in protest increases by 27 points as one moves from the minimum to the maximum score on that variable. Emotional motivations also drive participation in these activities. Those who reported receiving a discrimination, were more likely to participate by 33 points compared to those who do not receive discrimination. drive participation in these activities. Those who reported experiencing discrimination, were more likely to participate by 33 points compared to those who do not experience discrimination.

³⁰ I have used STATA command MFX to calculate the marginal effects, see the Appendix B table.B.1 for more information.

TABLE 3.5 MODELS OF PARTICIPATION AS PROTEST AND MOSQUE ATTENDANCE, LINEAR REGRESSION (INCLUDING 3 MODELS)

Variables	DV Protest Activities					
	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Fixed & Stable "Controls"</i>						
Age	-0.028***	0.010	-0.029 ***	0.010	-0.028***	0.010
Age Square	0.000**	0.000	0.000 **	0.000	0.000**	0.000
Male	0.065	0.064	0.052	0.062	-0.012	0.066
Educ. Degree	0.413***	0.084	0.394***	0.083	0.292***	0.084
Home Ownership	0.120**	0.059	0.088	0.059	0.065	0.062
Trade Union	0.262**	0.114	0.242**	0.112	0.085	0.114
<i>Less Stable "Asked?"</i>						
Mobilise Mosque			0.396 ***	0.063	0.302***	0.066
<i>Want?</i>						
Religious ID					0.153**	0.073
Trust Institutions					-0.569***	0.136
Rel.Deprivation					0.004	0.129
Discrimination					0.337***	0.069
<i>Can?</i>						
Integration					0.276***	0.114
Pol Knowledge					0.446***	0.131
<i>Key IV</i>						
Mosque Attend	0.270***	0.091	0.194 **	0.090	0.248***	0.099
(Constant)	0.325	0.217	0.271	0.213	0.040	0.264
Adjusted R	0.055		0.088		0.153	
N	1080		1080		981	

Source: EMBES,2010 and author analysis.

Notes: P-value in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is protesting activities. The independent variables are the age of the respondents in years, The respondent's being male, the respondent's level of education, the respondent's owned his home, the respondent's being a member of trade union, the respondent's received encouragement from the mosque to participate, the respondent's being contacted by political parties, the respondent's religious identity, the respondent's level of trust in political institutions, the respondent's being relatively deprived, the respondent has experienced discrimination, the respondent's level of integration, the respondent's level of political knowledge. The Key independent variable is the respondent's Mosque attendance. N=Total Number of observations, B=b-coefficient and SE= Standard error.

3.5.2 The place of mosque attendance in the funnel of causality

In this section I return to the issue of causality that we proposed in Figure 3.1. The estimated effect of mosque attendance is only as reliable or valid as the assumptions about causal order. When I added indicators of psychological variables (in Model III) mosque attendance remained significant for protest activities and Mosque mobilisation remained significant for turnout. The assumptions about the location of the fixed and stable social characteristics are uncontroversial (Davis, 1985). The relationship between psychological variables and political participation are far more complex. Political participation might conceivably influence identity, trust and perceptions of discrimination or relative deprivation. In short, the causal arrows might flow the other way or both ways. This can only be assessed by studying the evolution of these variables over time in a panel study design. It might also be informative to use a technique such as Structural Equation Modelling to gauge the causality pathways mathematically. Yet again, the assumptions underlying such techniques are crucial, and this is something that I cannot address in this chapter. This is a matter for future research.

3.5.3 Euro-Islam vs EMBES

Before, I conclude the findings of this chapter, it seems crucial to link it to the findings of chapter 2. As I acknowledged in the previous chapter the Euro-Islam study has some limitations. It does not measure mosque mobilisation and other forms of political participation. Fortunately, the EMBES does measure mosque mobilisation and other forms of political participation beyond voting. In chapter 2 particularly in the geographical comparison, I controlled standard variables such as age, gender, wealth, level of education, born in the host country, language fluency and ethnic background (see Table 2.2 chapter 2). EMBES has indicators that can be used to replicate the model in chapter 2. In this replication, I dropped all psychological variables because it is irrelevant to this objective. Table 3.6 below

shows the result of the analysis. This confirmed that mosques have no impact on British Muslims on their electoral participation unless they mobilized, and it has a positive impact on protest activities. Mobilising messages have a positive effect on participation in protest activities. Born in the United Kingdom or speaking the English language fluently has no impact on the electoral participation of British Muslims. This is very much as we found in the previous chapter. British Muslims who were born in the UK, are more likely to participate in protest activities while those who speak the language fluently are more likely not to participate in these activities. The origins background seems does have a significant role in British Muslims' electoral participation, and negatively impacted protest activities. It seems Asian origins share the same dynamic, it does not matter whether the respondents are of Pakistani, Indian, or Bangladeshi origins, all have participated in both elections and not participated in protest activities.

This replication result shows that any data set that aimed to measure the role of religious institutions on political participation should have a measurement of mobilization. If it does not we will not be able to draw reliable inferences. It also shows the importance of measuring other forms of political participation, especially when it comes to minority groups.

TABLE 3.6 MODEL TO REPLICATE THE ANALYSIS OF EURO-ISLAM STUDY IN CHAPTER 2

Vairables	DV Turnout				DV Protest Activities	
	Local Election		General Election		B	SE
	B	SE	B	SE		
Age	0.097***	0.027	0.087***	0.026	-0.017*	0.010
Age Square	-0.001***	0.000	-0.001***	0.000	0.000	0.000
Male	-0.537***	0.169	-0.538***	0.164	0.060	0.062
Education Degree	-0.265	0.210	-0.277	0.202	0.359***	0.082
House Ownership	0.250	0.180	0.305*	0.173	-0.018	0.066
Trade Union Membership	0.298	0.315	0.539	0.328	0.205**	0.111
Born in Host Country	-0.122	0.196	-0.006	0.190	0.299***	0.074
English Fluency	-0.111	0.185	-0.161	0.177	-0.185***	0.070
<u>Origins</u>						
Pakistani	1.563***	0.474	1.753***	0.460	-0.462***	0.188
india	1.573***	0.559	1.747***	0.540	-0.412**	0.217
Bangladeshi	2.035***	0.492	2.254***	0.477	-0.400**	0.192
Black African	0.662	0.503	0.958**	0.486	-0.576***	0.202
<u>Key IV</u>						
Mobilise Mosque	0.606***	0.177	0.548***	0.168	0.404***	0.062
Mosque Attend	0.110	0.242	0.314	0.233	0.233***	0.089
(Constant)	-2.800***	0.764	-2.830***	0.729	0.439	0.288
Nagelkerke R/Adjusted R	0.146		0.137		0.116	
N	943		1048		1066	

Source: EMBES,2010 and author analysis.

Notes: P-value in in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variables are turnout in elections and protesting activities. The independent variables are the age of the respondents in years, The respondent's being male, the respondent's level of education, the respondent's owned his home, the respondent's being a member of trade union, the respondent's born in United Kingdom, the respondent's Fluency in English language. The Key independent variables are the respondent's received encouragement from the mosque to participate, and the respondent's Mosque attendance. N=Total Number of observations, B=b-coefficient and SE= Standard error.

3.6 Conclusion

These results underline that – just like the population as a whole – many factors shaped participation by British Muslims in 2010. The influence of variables varies depending on the precise form of participation. Nevertheless, in terms of the civic voluntarism model, participation is a matter of ability to participate [Education, Wealth, Political Knowledge, and Integration], willingness to participate [Religious Identity, Trust in institution, Relative Deprivation and Discrimination] and being asked to participate. Mobilisation whether by the parties (or other bodies) or mosques is important. This again is true of the whole population, but it is likely to be particularly important among immigrant groups who have less experience of politics. Future generations of young Muslims who are socialised into the British system may be less influenced by mobilisation. To make my findings in this chapter clearer, table 3.7 summarises the comparison result in model III by CVM labels.

TABLE 3.7 COMPARISON BETWEEN ELECTORAL & PROTEST ACTIVITIES (MODEL III RESULTS)

British Muslims Characteristic		Political Participation			
		Electoral		Protest activities	
		General	Local		
Religious	Mosque Attender				Positive
Want to Participate!	Religious ID				Positive
	Trust Institutions	Positive		Positive	Negative
	Rel. Deprivation				
	Discrimination				Positive
Can participate!	Education	Negative			Positive
	Wealth	Positive		Positive	
	Pol Knowledge	Positive		Positive	Positive
	Integration				Positive
Asked to participate!	Mobilise Mosque	Positive		Positive	Positive
	Party Contact	Positive		Positive	

Source: Author analysis. Notes: It highlights in blue if $p < 0.1$ and the sign of b-coefficient is positive and in red if $p < 0.1$ and the sign of b-coefficient is negative, in grey if $p > 0.1$, in white if variable not included.

I. Those who want to participate among British Muslims in the 2010 elections, are those who have a high level of trust. This makes sense, without trust in the institutions of democracy,

people would not participate in elections (Nyckowiak, 2009; Dalton, 2005). Those who want to participate among British Muslims in protest activities are those who have a strong religious identity, less level of trust and/or have experienced discrimination.

II. British Muslims who participated in the 2010 elections are those who are less educated and have a higher level of wealth and political knowledge. British Muslims who can participate in protest activities are those who have a higher level of education, and political knowledge and are socially integrated.

III. British Muslims who attend mosque and are asked to participate in general elections, are more likely to participate than those who have not been asked to participate. British Muslims who attend mosques are more likely to participate in protected activities and they participate when they have been asked to be involved in these activities.

The mosque is typically viewed as only a place of worship – where the Muslim faithful gather to worship, read from the book and pray. Yet the mosque is also a social institution and people are social animals who are influenced by their social milieu (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). Social groups are engaged with politics. My findings suggest that the mosque is also an important source of political participation. This fits in with previous research. Several studies, especially those related to African American literature, have demonstrated that the church has an important role in political participation (Peterson, 1992; Olsen 1970; Verba *et al.* 1995; Jones-Correa & Leal 2001; Calhoun-Brown, 1996) Other studies have highlighted the role of mosques in political participation. Most of these studies have reached a similar conclusion to church studies. Jamal (2005), for example, found out that mosques increased the political participation of American Muslims. Similarly, Fleischmann *et al.* (2016), found that mosque attendance increases the political participation of the Muslims minority in the Netherlands. Moutselos (2020), found a

similar result of mosque involvement in promoting political participation in Muslims groups in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. My findings make sense given what we know from studies relating to mosques were conducted in countries where Islam is viewed as a religion of minorities. It is natural for an individual to belong to a group share the same value and belief or simply form a sense of obligation to support fellow adherents. The mosque is the most obvious place where they interact with each other. This may explain why mosque attendance continues to have a direct effect on protest activity once controls are added for mobilisation by the mosque (see table 3.5). Some mosques may also feel an obligation to lead and organize to maximize its followers' benefits as the churches did with African American. The ultimate benefit for minorities is to be heard by those (largely native politicians) who oversee the system. Within this context, mosque encourages or increases participation in their followers. This chapter suggests that attendance in the mosque increases turnout in both general and local elections if Muslims are asked by the mosque to participate. Both communication by the mosque and attendance increased participation in protest activity. The education variable shows that those who had a higher level of education were less likely to participate in electoral participation and more likely to participate in protest activities. This indicates to importance of taking account of the political context and the political environment during that period. More importantly, every variable (except relative deprivation and wealth) we included in the regression showed an influence on the protest activities of British Muslims (see Table 3.7). Why would British Muslims and their religious institutions see protest activities as a way to communicate with established political institutions? It may be because as Heath *et al.* (2013) pointed out if “electoral participation fails to secure redress of one’s grievances, perhaps because one’s views are unpopular or because one’s agenda is excluded from mainstream party politics, and one does

not have the clout through conventional lobbying or pressure group politics, taking to the streets may be the only alternative left”(Heath *et al.*, 2013, p, 177). These provide a justification for my fourth chapter that I need to explore the political environment that may create a protest tendency among British Muslims and highlight the role of Islamic institutions such as mosques and umbrella organizations. To have a comprehensive understanding not only the role of Mosque or these organization, but it will also outline the psychological forces that drive the British Muslims political participation.

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CHAPTER 4

British political institutions and the political participation of British Muslims

Abstract

Previous chapters suggest that the impact of institutions, such as the Mosque, on political participation may vary cross space. In-depth analyses using the high-quality data set “EMBES” indicated that mosques promoted protest activities. Such activities provide challenges to the authorities and established institutions. This suggests that national institutions matter for participation. The most important institutions in the UK political system are the political parties. In this chapter, I focus on the impact of the two major parties of government on participation by British Muslims. I also examine how other British Muslim institutions encourage participation and mediate between individual Muslims and British institutions. I show that the relationship between the parties and Muslims has varied over time. This variation reflects different approaches by the parties and the growing complexity of the social coalitions that make up the Conservative and Labour parties. Many Muslims feel that both parties act as if there is a ‘hierarchy of racism’ within society and that Islamophobia is viewed less seriously than other prejudices, such as antisemitism.³¹ Such beliefs, whether they are right or wrong, reduce the willingness of Muslims to participate and fully integrate in British democratic institutions and may promote protest activities.

³¹ Hierarchy of racism means when groups or individuals viewed less important or superior to other groups or individuals.

4.1 Introduction

In chapter 2, I explored the political participation of British Muslims. The chapter shows how it varies across time and space and how much is common with other groups and the wider population. The impact of mosque attendance on participation was one the primary focus of my analysis. When I compared the impact of mosques in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, it seemed that the impact of mosques differs across those three countries. This may be because the activities of mosques varied or because the political and institutional context of those countries varied. I was cautious about this finding because the Euro-Islam data has no indicator of mosque mobilization. Another finding was that the level of turnout of Muslim-populated constituencies was higher compared to other constituencies. I proposed an explanation that with a sizable Muslim population, I expect that the number of mosques is higher and sizable and parties and Islamic institutions pay more attention to these constituencies which may increase campaigns and British Muslims be mobilized. Nevertheless, I also flagged a note of caution about the “ecological fallacy”. Both these findings indicated the need for an in-depth of the mosque's role in the political participation of British Muslims.

In chapter 3, I examined the impact of mosque attendance on the political participation of British Muslims. Mosques did not appear to affect British Muslim turnout unless they received direct messages from the Mosque (and as I show below, these messages are overwhelmingly exhortations to participate in the political process). More importantly, attendance at the Mosque positively impacts protesting activities (such as protests, boycotts, and petitions). This is a striking finding. Why would British Muslims who attend Mosque be more likely to participate in activities characterised as protesting the government?

This merits further exploration. It might be that British Muslims are like those individuals who “feel that none of the mainstream parties adequately represents them are inclined towards protest and dissent” (Heath *et al.*, 2013, p 186). I assume that this is because of the negative political environment that is created by the discourses between the politically established institutions and the Islamic institutions. Protest activities such as “protesting, boycotting and petitioning” are forms of participation that can be characterised as extra-institutional or “elite-challenging activism.” They aim to challenge the authorities (Melo & Stockemer, 2014; Heath *et al.*, 2013). Boycotting and petitioning are individualistic orientated behaviours. Protesting is a more collective behaviour (Dalton, 2019). However, when we look at them from a different perspective, especially in the case of those who attended mosques it seems that these forms of participation are promoted by attending mosque. It is logical to think that participating in these forms was more collective orientated rather than individualistic. These collective actions were aimed “to express political grievances, voice opposition, and challenge authorities” (Norris, 2002, p. 5).

Mosques play a role because they mediate between their members and the wider society. There is evidence that religious institutions shape political behaviour. Mosques are organized by Islamic umbrella organizations. Mosques provide a natural site for all the dialogue between the established political institutions “political parties”, Islamic umbrella organisations, and the Muslim community. Muslim umbrella organisations bring together smaller institutions (such as mosques, schools or federations of mosques and schools) who interact to coordinate activities and/or pool resources. Like trade unions, they embody the belief that ‘unity is strength.’ These bodies influence what type of activities and messages mosques operate and deliver. Mobilization and political discussion on issues that most affect British Muslims such as Islamophobia and

discrimination are raised in mosques, particularly as part of the Friday prayers. This may increase the group consciousness that produces a collective action such as participating in protesting activities. Islamic umbrella organizations use mosques to deliver their messages and increase political awareness among their members.

However, the politically established institution plays a role to some degree. Discrimination against a group of people may make these people more politically active or isolated (Oskooii, 2016). The view of British Muslims on the political parties is not encouraging, according to recent figures, 40 per cent of British Muslims believe that parties want their votes, not their opinions (IPSOS, 2018). This may indicate a disconnection between British Muslims as a community and the established political institutions. The level of hostility against Muslims may shape their interactions. Policies, discrimination, and grievances may influence how British Muslims interact with political institutions (see Heath *et al.*, 2013; Martin, 2017). The political environment created by such discourses.

No doubt, British Muslims like any other minority group seek representation through the major parties that were established long before Muslims arrived in the UK (Bartle, 2020). There are now many British Muslims in parliament (mostly the House of Commons) and many more who serve their communities on local councils. Table 4.1 shows the number of MPs from minority ethnic groups including Muslims elected in the House of Commons since the 1992 general election.

TABLE 4.1 THE NUMBER OF MPs FROM MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS INCLUDING MUSLIMS MPs.

G-elections	EM MPs	Muslims MPs			
		Lab	Con	SNP	Total
1992	7	0	0	0	0
1997	9	1	0	0	1
2001	12	2	0	0	2
2005	15	4	0	0	4
2010	27	6	2	0	8
2015	42	9	3	1	13
2017	53	12	3	0	15
2019	66	14	3	0	17

Sources: (Ubero & Carthew, 2023; Chapman, 2017; Chapman, 2019)

The British political system appears to provide Muslims with opportunities for participation and representation. Muslims are still under-represented. As shown in Table 4.1 by 2019 there were only 17 British Muslim MPs – just 2 per cent of the House of Commons. To refract the population of British Muslims, it needs to be around 42 MPs. This is also the case for other ethnic minority groups such as Sikh and Hindu. Jews, on the other hand, are overrepresented (Chapman, 2017). Some British Muslims, believe those individuals (MPs) are not acting in the community's interest and are symbolic characters. They think that representation is an illusion. Indeed, I will provide some textual evidence to support this later in this chapter. Being under-represented or the lack of representation within the British political system, may led British Muslims to cast their voice and concern via protesting. Protest activities are a form of collective action (Olson, 1965). Groups overcome problems of collective action by pooling resources. In addition to the underrepresentation, policies such as ‘Prevent’ targeted only British Muslims and created distrust and a sense of deprivation among them (Toynbee & Walker, 2011; Hammonds, 2018; House of Lords, 2018). The level of hostility and negative messages received from parties may create a negative environment. Mosques may play a significant role in making their attendees more aware of what is happening around them. This may lead mosque attendees to

work collectively to participate in protest activities. To fully understand the political participation of British Muslims and their religious institutions, we need to pay some attention to the political environment.

In this chapter, I will explore the political environment and the mechanism that may make mosque attendees participate in protest activities, by highlighting 1) the trend of the relationship between political parties and British Muslims, and messages delivered by the established political parties that are addressed to British Muslims, 2) the mechanism or how Islamic institutions (umbrella organisations and mosque) mediate or influence the behaviours and actions of British Muslims. I focus here on the two major parties because only they can reasonably expect to form a government and are the cornerstone of political participation. Parties organise choice in representative democracies (Budge et al., 2012; Budge, 2019). If British Muslims are to achieve their political goals; they must focus on the two governing parties. I explore how parties interact with Muslims because these actions influence Muslims to participate in various ways. A second side of this relationship is the Mosque and the umbrella organisation. These may shape and drive Muslims' political behaviour toward established institutions. No doubt, human behaviour is shaped by diverse factors and motivations. My analyses in chapter 3 necessarily assumed that only the variables in the EMBES survey mattered. Yet, as I showed in chapter 2, participation varies across time and space. The British political system and its institutions vary over time because Britain has slowly evolved into a multicultural society. This has produced new challenges (Bartle, 2020). There can be little doubt that the Iraq War damaged Muslims' views of their government (Khan, 2008). Immigration bills or policies such as "The Nationality and Borders Bill" were often viewed as hostile acts by many Muslims. Allegations of Islamophobia against a political party negatively feed distrust of the parties felt by many British Muslims.

These are just a few examples of why British Muslims may react in specific ways, such as protesting the government.

It is difficult to assess the impact of these things in a quantitative study. I draw on evidence from various sources, including biographical accounts of Muslims and reports in the media. I also examine the evidence of the various reports produced by organisations such as Citizens UK and the Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND), House of Lords Reports, and reports from mainstream and ethnic minority media. I also supplement these with survey evidence (e.g., IPSOS, 2018; Webb, Bale and Poletti, 2019). Practically, I will first, focus on the political parties and provide an overview of their existence in relation to minority groups. This will help to provide insights into the role of interaction between British Muslims and established institutions. I will then examine each party separately to produce a historical trend that may help us to put the textual evidence in the historical context. Second, I will then turn to the Islamic institutions to highlight 1) how they interacted with the established institutions like political parties, 2) how they increased their follower's consciousness and mobilize them to take collective action. Third, I will discuss and conclude the findings of this chapter and link it with chapter 3 findings.

4.2 British Muslims and British political institutions

Most Muslims in Europe are second or third-generation migrants. The first generation arrived in the boom years after the Second World War (Anwar, 1986; Ansari, 2004; Gilliat-Ray, 2012). They were drawn by the demand for labour across Europe and the historic links between their origin and host nations. In the British case, many migrants came from the former empire: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Later they were joined by migrants from East Africa who were expelled by Idi Amin (Gilliat-Ray, 2012). When the first generation arrived, they focussed on getting a job, a house, and education for their children. To ensure they got access to public

services, were treated fairly, and gained their fair share of public services, migrants had to become politically active. To integrate within this political system, Muslims had to work within the host country's existing political institutions. In both social and political terms, Muslims were a *minority*. The host countries were liberal democracies governed by electoral *majorities*. To ensure that they obtained social and economic rights, Muslims had to become members of an electoral coalition comprised of different social groups (Webb & Bale, 2021).

The UK political system is centred around the sovereign Westminster Parliament and House of Commons (Bartle, 2020; Webb & Bale, 2021). The convention that governments must have the confidence of the Commons and the mechanical and psychological effects of the plurality electoral system mean that elections to this body are dominated by two major parties. The UK has experienced just one peacetime coalition since 1945 (Bartle, 2020). This means that most migrants who wanted to affect governing parties had a choice between the Labour and Conservative parties. The option of forming a Muslim party was sometimes discussed but mostly dismissed (Gilliat-Ray, 2012). Even if Muslim MPs could be elected in Muslim constituencies such as those noted in Figure 2.3, they would still have to work with non-Muslim MPs in Parliament. Most Muslims were drawn to Labour because it advocated social and economic equality via government activity and collective action (Heywood, 2017). In fact, Labour was attractive for other minority groups have been attracted toward Labour (Bruce, 2011). Muslims usually gained acceptance among Labour's middle class. The white working class who comprised a large part of Labour's electoral base, however, viewed migrants' with suspicion (Jeffries, 2014a; Sobolewska & Ford, 2020). These tensions were initially based on racial resentments. They were amplified by responses to events like the 9/11 attacks in the US, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and domestic terrorist incidents like the 7/7 bombings heightened

tensions (Archer, 2009). After the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, some Muslims gravitated towards the Respect party founded by Salma Yaqoob and George Galloway that grew out of the Stop the War Coalition (Peace, 2013).³² Others moved to the Liberal Democrats, who opposed ‘New Labour’s’ wars (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2006).

Muslims had to adapt to British institutions. Those institutions in turn had to adapt to Muslims and assist in their political integration. The new migrants represent a growing portion of the population. Local authorities-built links with the Muslim community (House of Lords, 2018). Existing religious institutions established relations with other believers (Loss, 2020). Public service broadcasters altered their content to reflect a diverse and multicultural society.³³ Parties had to recruit voters, party members and potential candidates to ‘modernise’ themselves. I examine how parties may have influenced the political participation of British Muslims, by highlighting the discourses within the Conservative and Labour parties toward British Muslims. The political environment and opportunity created by these parties’ discourses make British Muslims participate in certain ways.

4.2.1 The Conservative Party

The Conservative Party is one of the most successful political parties in the world (Seldon & Ball, 1994, p. 1). It dominated the British government for most of the twentieth century and remains extraordinarily successful in the early twentieth-first century (Bartle, 2020). The party’s emphasis on tradition, personal responsibility, and markets might attract Muslims. Nevertheless, the Tory party was not the obvious party for Muslims to join. Religion played a role. The party

³² Respect was founded in 2004 and dissolved in 2016. George Galloway held the seat of Bethnal Green and Bow from 2005 to 2010. He also won the seat of Bradford West from 2013 to 2015.

³³ BBC Charter 6 (4) “The BBC should bring people together for shared experiences and help contribute to the social cohesion and wellbeing of the United Kingdom.”

was associated with the Church of England. In the 1950s and 1960s the ‘established church’ was a conservative institution. It had not yet become the more liberal body that it is today, though it was sympathetic to some Muslim demands for a role for shariah law in the arbitration of disputes (Loss, 2020). Social class played a role. Many migrants obtained low-skilled occupations (Gilliat-Ray, 2012). Most had little formal education. Most tended to live in large cities where Labour was already dominant. If Muslims wanted to join a party that might change their lives locally, they had to join Labour (Warsi, 2017, p. 262).

Conservative ideology also made the party unattractive to Muslims. In the immediate post-war period, the Conservative party was still the party of empire. Racist attitudes were found in all the major parties but were most likely to be found in the Tory party. There were over 1400 complaints within the party regarding Islamophobia between 2015 and 2020 (Singh, 2021). Some Conservatives opposed the British Nationality Bill in 1948 that gave Commonwealth Citizens the right to settle in the UK (Schofield, 2013, p. 90). In the 1964 Smethwick by-election, Peter Griffiths, the Conservative candidate, used the slogan ‘If you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote Labour’ (Butler & King, 1966; Jeffries, 2014a). Griffiths later published a book that advocated a UK version of apartheid. Most famously, in 1968, Enoch Powell, a senior Conservative, made his ‘Rivers of Blood speech’ that attacked mass immigration and warned of political consequences. Powell was sacked by Edward Heath, the Conservative leader. Nevertheless, the party became associated with opposition to immigration. This may have helped the party win the 1970 General Election (Studlar, 1978). Until the late 1990s the debate in UK politics was not related to religion and ethnicity, it was mainly focused on immigration. Nevertheless, many Conservative party members supported white rule in Rhodesia and apartheid in South Africa. Some groups, such as the Monday Club, expressed anti-immigrant sentiments:

“...conservative nationalism may also serve to promote intolerance and bigotry. By insisting on the maintenance of cultural purity and established traditions, conservatives may portray immigrants, or foreigners in general, as a threat, and in the process promote, or at least legitimize racist and xenophobic fears.” (Heywood, 2017, p. 202).

It was widely accepted among the party candidates could ‘play the race card.’ Conservative sympathisers sometimes supported the repatriation of immigrants and campaigns to ‘send them back.’ Even senior figures expressed sympathy for such ideas. In 1978 Margaret Thatcher said:

“If we went on as we are then, by the end of the century, there would be four million people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather *swamped* by people with a different culture” (Jeffries, 2014b).

Most anti-immigration sentiment did not distinguish between immigrants from the Caribbean, South Asia, or Africa. Nevertheless, even those Muslims who might be inclined to support the Conservatives on grounds of economic interest were deterred from joining the party. This political incivility continued to be used as a campaign strategy by some party members. In 2000 William Hague, the then leader, made a speech in which he claimed that Labour was making the UK into ‘a foreign land.’ He promised ‘We will give you back your country’ (Bale, 2010, p. 123). Hague said this was focussed on the EU, but it was widely interpreted as an attack on immigration that had been tolerated or encouraged by the Labour government (Bale, 2010, p. 123). Hague later signed the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) pledge not to play the race card in the general election. The party became immediately involved in scandal when John Townend MP claimed that ‘homogenous Anglo-Saxon society’ had been undermined ‘by Commonwealth immigration’ (Bale, 2010, p. 125). These things confirmed the fears of Muslims that many Conservatives were hostile.

The Conservative Party suffered three successive defeats in 1997, 2001 and 2005. A new generation of Conservatives concluded that the party would continue until it modernised (Bale,

2010). David Cameron became a leader in 2005. One important part of this process of modernisation was efforts to make the party more representative of modern Britain (Bale, 2010, p. 268). He emphasised the need for greater female and ethnic minority representation in the party. Francis Maude, who Cameron appointed as party chairman, pointed out that:

“Far too many Conservative MPs are like me: white, middle-class, English, based in the south-east – identikit Tories. And it doesn’t look like modern Britain, where 52% of the electorate are women and 8% are ethnic minorities. If we don’t look like we are capable of representing that 52% of the electorate who are women, we won’t secure their support” (Woodward & Branigan, 2006).

Lord Davies, Chairman, of the Welsh Conservative Party, admitted that the party was full of “slightly old-fashioned and dominated by grey-haired men. In the past, the party has not paid homage to diverse backgrounds or represented the proper cross-section of society” (Singh, 2021, p. 41). This strategy was designed not just to recruit more women and ethnic minorities but to appeal to social liberals who might otherwise vote Liberal Democrat. Cameron enhanced his reputation as a modern ‘liberal’ democracy by spending a couple of days living with a supposedly ordinary Muslim family in Birmingham. This photo-opportunities and a good press in the liberal media (Bale, 2010, p. 332).

Cameron’s introduced the ‘A’-List to fast-track the selection of preferred candidates. The list was very diverse with new faces to attract voters, ‘A’-List included around 150 individuals, only four of whom were Muslim.³⁴ In 2010 large numbers of the list succeeded and were elected to the House of Commons. Some candidates failed to win seats that were historically associated with the Tory party. Sayeeda Warsi said that Cameron aimed not only to open the door for others to join the party but to encourage them to come in. The ultimate purpose is to gain their votes, it

³⁴ The four were Amar Ahmed, Tariq Ahmad, Syed Kamall and Sayeeda Warsi. Sajid Javid became an MP in 2010. He was of Muslim origin but was not on the A-list.

is necessary they feel people who look like them are welcome to join the party that “they matter to them” (Warsi, 2017, p. 270). This policy was successful, but the party dropped the A-list in 2012. This decision was possibly because the Conservatives had ‘won’ an election and felt less pressure to demonstrate that they represented the country. It may also have been the result of opposition from local associations who were guarded their right to select candidates. The party adopted the ‘A-List’ strategy to shed its image as an old, white majority interactive to a more diverse and attractive party. More Muslims had been selected as candidates by local associations, even if they were not on the A-list. Some such as Sayeeda Warsi, and Sajid Javid, became symbolic of a modernised and open party. Warsi was appointed party chairperson from 2010 to 2012 but was criticised for her performance. Other Muslims became Tory MPs, including: Sajid Javid Rehman Chisti (2010) Nus Ghani (2015), Saquib Bhati and Imran Ahmad Khan (2019). Other changes were more ‘bottom up’ than ‘top down’. In 2005 Lord Sheikh established the Conservative Muslim Forum. This became a ‘recognised organisation’ in the Conservative party and subject to the party’s constitution. It has some branches across the UK and organised various events and dinners at Westminster and for the party Conference. The Forum website states:

We believe that the fundamental values of Muslim Britons, such as the importance of the family, scepticism of state control, a belief in private enterprise, low taxes and personal responsibility make them natural Conservatives. Our Party’s task, in which we play our full part, is to convert this potential into support and membership.³⁵

The Forum’s goals laid out on the website were largely related to political participation of British Muslims³⁶. Despite these intentions, relations with the rest of the party have been strained. Some have criticised the party. In 2018, the Forum joined calls for an investigation into Islamophobia

³⁵ <https://www.conservativemuslimforum.org/>

³⁶ See appendix C table C.2.

in the Conservative party. In Mohammed Amin, the chairman of the forum, was expelled from the party for criticising Boris Johnson's 'moral integrity' (Amin, 2019).

David Cameron was the first leader to attempt to build a good relationship with the Muslim community. In 2006, in Cameron's foreign policy speech and he insisted that must gain the trust of the majority of British Muslims. (Warsi, 2017 p. 266). His visit to a Muslim family in their home in Birmingham was memorable – if only for its rarity. These soft touches came at a time the Muslims felt disconnected from the wider society and the government under Labour control and Cameron's in all his speeches insisted on inclusion (Warsi, 2017, p. 267)

Things changed when the Conservatives returned to office. In 2011 David Cameron made a speech in Munich that marked a change in the tone. He set out rules to differentiate 'bad' and 'good' Muslims. Muslim individuals or organisations who believe in human rights, law, democracy, and integration are welcome to join and engage with the party (Warsi, 2017 p. 194). This is very acceptable as a principle and any rational individual would not oppose it. Many Muslims felt excluded because these tests only applied to them. They were seen to incorporate a double standard since other groups were never asked to meet the same standards. British Muslims received negative messages. All government messaging about Islam dealt first with security issues, while other communities received only positive messages. Mohammed Amin noted that David Cameron "struggled to talk about Muslims without mentioning security" (Singh, 2021, p. 44).

Since 9/11 British Muslims faced policies related to counterterrorism that have huge negative impact on their community. Leaks about internal discussions suggest that the Conservative Party decided to pursue Muslim voters and instead pursue other minorities: Jews and Hindus (Warsi, 2017, p. 213). Lynton Crosby, the Conservative strategist, advised the party to stop worrying

about the ‘fucking Muslims’ (Warsi, 2017.p. 213). The Conservative Party itself is a coalition of groups. Like all leaders, Cameron had difficulty managing the party. Many members opposed his modernising approach. Opposition to his attempts to integrate Muslims reflected a more general resistance to his policies. It is very difficult to maintain a good relationship with everybody, especially if there is interest conflict among the party coalition (including Jews and Hindus). Cameron’s relationship with British Muslims started to take a different path, from softer to harder. He proposed to integrate Muslim women by improving their language skills, within two and half years, Muslim women will be tested (Mason & Sherwood, 2016). Whoever fails the test will be forced to leave. This plan faced criticism from many Muslims and non Muslims because it was solely focused on Muslim women. In 2015 Cameron blame the Muslim community for feeding Islamic extremist ideology. In the same year, Theresa May, the Home Secretary, accused British Muslims that they do not believe in British values. The Conservative party, instead of building bridges with the Muslim community and encouraging them to be a part of British society and built walls and used them as a punchbag for political gains. The Conservative party followed a foreign policy that supported Israel and gave little hope to Palestinians. It also implemented domestic policies aimed exclusively at the Muslim community. Muslims felt that they were treated as foreigners in their own country. The government’s ‘Prevent’ programme, aimed at stopping the radicalisation of young Muslims was viewed with suspicion (Home Office, 2011, p. 7). These developments made the situation of Muslims worse. Many felt excluded and had lost trust in the political institution. As Awan (2012) points out as a result of the Prevent program, British Muslims as a community were depoliticization from the wider society which makes them feel they are the suspect community. Cameron blames the British Muslims for this situation by saying “Be more British” (Allen, 2018, p12). The Conservatives made the Muslim

community responsible for integrating with society. This is also illustrated by a letter sent by the Communities' secretary, Eric Pickles, under Cameron's leadership, to one of the British Islamic leaders. Eric Pickles asked an Islamic British leader:

“You, as faith leaders, are in a unique position in our society. You have a precious opportunity, and an important responsibility, in explaining and demonstrating how faith in Islam can be part of British identity” (Wintour, 2015).

The Conservative party has a long history of allegations of Islamophobia. Even their voters believe Islam is a threaten to their society. According to a recent poll conducted by YouGov which shows that 57% of conservative voters think that Islam is a threat to the British way of life (Jones & Unsworth, 2022). The Conservative party was accused of Islamophobia by some Muslim members. These complaints could not be easily dismissed in the way that they could if made by political opponents. Warsi was a chairperson of the party in the Cameron government and accused her party of Islamophobia. Former Conservative minister Nusrat Ghani said the chief whip had told her that colleagues were uncomfortable because of her religion (Tidman & Cowburn, 2022). Some viewed Muslims in terms of threat and security. Fatima Rajina said:

“Muslims are not a priority for this government, when it comes to looking out for our concerns it's not an issue, but when it comes to safeguarding, then we become a priority, through the lens of security and counter-extremism legislation.” (MEND, 2019a).

In 2018, an all-party parliamentary group on agreed on a definition of Islamophobia as “Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expression of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness” (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 11). The Conservative government objected to the definition because it was not clear enough and may cause confusion when it comes to counter-terrorism policies. They also suggested that it may lead to a violation of the freedom of expression (Singh, 2021, p. 21).

When Naz Shah, a Labour MP, asked Ms Leadsom about the government's rejection of the definition of Islamophobia, Leadsom responded that Ms Shah "can discuss this with Foreign Office ministers" (MEND, 2019a, p. 39). Leadsom's response illustrated the depths of Islamophobia in the party. She did not think the issue related to the UK.

Within the Conservative party around 727 incidents were reported to CCHQ, most of these incidents can be described as anti-Muslimism (Singh, 2021). In March 2019, the Guardian reported that the Conservative party readmitted 15 councillors who were suspended for being anti-Islam or sharing discrimination against Muslims. A few months later, it investigated Islamophobia within the Conservative party and found that around 25 former councillors in the party posted anti-Muslim materials on social media (Murphy, 2019).

A recent poll showed that half of the Conservative members believed that Islam is 'a threat to the British way of life.' More than 30 per cent think that British Muslims are hostile to Britain and 6 out of 10 of them believed that there are some territories in the UK operated under 'sharia law' (Ullah, 2020). Evidence from the Party Members Project (PMP) surveys illustrates the problem (Bale *et al*, 2019). Table 4.1 below shows Conservative members' responses to the question 'To what extent do you believe that more or fewer MPs in Parliament should come from Muslim backgrounds?' in 2015 and 2017. In 2015 around 17 per cent thought that they should be more Muslim MPs while almost half thought that the number was about right. 24 per cent believed that the number of Muslim MPs within the party should be reduced. The results two years suggest more polarisation. In 2017 around 22 per cent indicated that there should be more, while around 30 per cent thought that there should be fewer.

TABLE 4.2: CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS VIEW ON BRITISH MUSLIMS MPs.

Year	More MPs should come from a Muslim Background?	Con-Members	Percentage
2015	A lot more	33	2.6
	Slightly more	193	15.4
	Same as currently	597	47.7
	Slightly fewer	98	7.8
	A lot fewer	199	15.9
	Don't know	131	10.5
	Total	1251	100
2017	A lot more	25	5.1
	Slightly more	82	16.8
	Same as currently	236	48.4
	Slightly fewer	39	8.0
	A lot fewer	106	21.7
	Total	488	100

Source: Party Members Project (PMP) 2015 and 2017.

These changes may reflect the idea that the Conservative party had done enough, with the elevation of people like Sajid Javid, from a Muslim background. Since there are so few Muslim MPs, they can also be said to reflect the depths of Islamophobia in the party.³⁷ More evidence of hostility towards Muslims was provided by the Conservative party's London mayoral campaign in 2018. This contest between the Tory, Zac Goldsmith and Sadiq Khan, the Labour Muslim candidate, showed the Conservatives were prepared to play 'the Muslim card'. The campaign illustrated how the Conservative party not only failed to tackle Islamophobia but draws on it. Goldsmith and his campaign team attempted to link Sadiq Khan with extremists. Goldsmith said Sadiq Khan had 'given platforms, oxygen and even cover – over and over and over again – to those who seek to do our police and capital harm.' He added Kahn 'has tried to silence questions

³⁷ In 2015 the same question was asked about ethnic minority candidates. The results were 5.1 per cent of Conservative members wanted a lot more ethnic minority MPs, 31.8 per cent wanted slightly more, 47.3 per cent wanted the same as currently, while 5.9 per cent wanted slightly fewer and 3.7 per cent wanted a lot fewer.

about his links [to extremists] by shamelessly accusing anyone who raises them of being Islamophobic' (Ramesh, 2016).

Others, such as Boris Johnson and Theresa May raised a concern about Sadiq Khan's background in attempting to link him to extremists (Ramesh, 2016). This 'dog-whistle' campaign led Sayeeda Warsi to request a full independent inquiry within the Conservative party (Warsi, 2017). This provided evidence of discrimination. One Conservative MP said that discrimination against his Muslims exists at a local level. Party members told him that 'they could not choose a Muslim to be their MP' (Singh, 2021, p. 39). Another MP mentioned that "It is not about religion per se, but rather people might think someone who held such strong Muslim values might conflict with other British values. For instance, people might assume that the individual had views about women" (Singh, 2021, p. 41).

These concerns increased following Boris Johnson's elevation to the leadership in mid-2019. The new leader had written an article before coming leader that compared Muslim women who wear a burka to 'letter boxes' and 'bank robbers' (BBC News, 2018). These disgraceful words illustrated the lack of leadership in the Conservative party. Some members of the party undoubtedly do not tolerate any kind of discrimination. At the senior level discrimination based on religion is less visible – though Nus Ghani's experience suggests that there are some problems even at senior levels in the party. The party seems diverse and has some members at the top level from ethnic backgrounds. Sajid Javid who is a Muslim served as Home Secretary (2018-2019) and Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (2021-2022). Javid's conference speech (2018) said: 'So, what does the Conservative party offer a working-class, son-of-an-immigrant kid from Rochdale?' You made him Home Secretary' (Amrani, 2019). Many viewed him as a working against British Muslim interests. In December 2018, Mr Javid stated that any

individual's criticism of the Prevent program is 'on the side of extremists.' When he was a Home Secretary, he said that the MCB 'does not represent Muslims' (Heffer, 2018). Since then, the Conservative government has not dealt with the MCB. This comes after a complain raised by the MCB toward the Conservative party islamophobia incidents. Iman Amrani said Javid 'plays on his background when it suits him, but in office, he fails to represent those who need him most' (Amrani, 2019).

By early 2023 it was clear that, despite the efforts of well-meaning reformers, parts of the Conservative party had a problem with Islamophobia. It is plausible to suggest that this deters many Muslims from participating in politics – joining the party, campaigning, and forging a career. Many Britons are denied full rights of participation and not successfully integrated, simply because of their faith. This problem may have other effects too. It may dissuade Muslims from lobbying the party or make the party a focus of protest.

4.2.2 The Labour Party

The Labour Party was established in 1900 as a coalition between the working class, trade unionists and usually middle-class socialists (Bartle, 2020).³⁸ At the time, the UK was ethnically homogeneous and divided along lines of class and religion (Butler & Stokes, 1974). The aim of the new party was to ensure that the voice of labour was heard in parliament (Worley, 2009). It also reflected the views of non-conformist Christians who opposed the established churches. In 1918 the party adopted a socialist programme of nationalisation. In 1924, the first Labour government was formed. Since then, Labour has been one party in a two-party system – either the government or the official opposition. The two parties have framed the choices that voters have made ever since and forged coalitions within parties. In office, Labour passed legislation to

³⁸ This division is well-illustrated by the title of Hilary Wainwright's book: *Labour: A Tale of Two Parties*

represent their coalition interests related to a variety of themes such as education, social insurance, employment, and housing. The establishment of the NHS in 1948 was a notable Labour achievement, as was the expansion of council housing. Many of the immigrants who came to the UK in the post-war period worked in the NHS or public services and became council tenants. These things drew them to Labour. Socialist ideology associated with middle class intellectuals promotes social justice and equality and can be positioned on the political spectrum toward the centre left. Labour passed The Race Relations Act 1976 that prohibited racial discrimination in employment and established the Commission for Racial Equality.³⁹ Some white working-class people viewed immigrants with suspicion, and some were hostile. This hostility centred on race rather than religion. Frank Soskice, the Labour Home Secretary said: “If we do not have strict immigration rules, our people will soon all be coffee-coloured” (Ponting, 1989, p. 331)

From the 1960s Labour politicians were aware that immigration was a potential ‘wedge issue’ that might break the party’s coalition (Butler & Stokes, 1974, pp. 414-15). This made the leadership reluctant to increase the visibility of minorities within the party. The Labour government also passed legislation to reassure those white voters concerned about migration. The Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968 barred the future right of entry to those born there or who had at least one parent or grandparent born there. This had negative implications for Muslims in Pakistani and Bangladeshi families (Ponting, 1989).

The Conservative party’s ideology was in some ways more attractive to British Muslims but as Warsi accepts that many British Muslims tended to view the Conservative party as “the lot that doesn't like our lot’ (Warsi, 2017, p. 262). Many Muslims became Labour by default. Many were

³⁹ The functions of the CRE were transferred to the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2007.

poor or employed in the public sector and more likely to favour Labour for simple reasons of economic interest. The Labour party coalition became more diverse compared to other parties and the obvious vehicle for political participation by British Muslims. As Mohammed Amin, a member of the Conservative party acknowledged 'If you look at the membership of the Labour Party, the Labour Party has far more ethnic minority members proportionately than the Conservative Party does' (Singh, 2021, p. 40) Nevertheless, many minorities experienced racism in parts of the Labour party. The Smethwick by-election in 1964 illustrated that working class voters could be mobilised by race. Some Labour Clubs in the West Midlands operated a colour bar (Jeffries, 2014a). In 1968 London dockers marched in support of Enoch Powell's 'rivers of blood speech' that opposed immigration from the Commonwealth and advocated repatriation. Others went on strike to signal their discontent (Schofield, 2013). Most of the debate focussed attention focussed on West Indian immigration but these events, together with the speeches of Enoch Powell, cemented the Conservatives reputation as the major party most opposed to immigration. Labour leaders made speeches condemning Powell but were worried about his appeal. From the late 1960s onwards, far right parties such as the National Front campaigned to gain working-class voters. Many of those who remained loyal to Labour still expressed support for Powellite ideas.

By the early 1980s, many black people had joined the Labour party. This led to demands for non-white members for more representation and more participation in decision-making (Wainwright, 1987, p. 188). There was a debate within the party to establish 'black sections' for all non-white members. Many non-white Britons experienced discrimination and created a unity of purpose across diverse ethnic and religious groups. The main aim of the 'black sections' movement was to promote three strategies Registration, Recruitment and Representation

(Wainwright, 1987, p. 195). Many non-white members felt discrimination within the party

Narendra Makenji, a Hindu, gives an example from his own experience:

“You’d go in at election time and say, ‘I want to go out canvassing.’ ‘Oh, no, no, no. We’ve got better things for you to do; they’d spend the time, out of sight, sitting stuffing envelopes. You mustn’t underestimate the level of racism in the party.” (Wainwright, 1987, p189).

Another example of prejudices within the Labour party was described by Hassan Ahmed a Muslim member of the party during that period.

“I heard many stories of how black people had tried to get nominated for the council, but they never got through. Or they’d try to become officers and never get support. Yet when the Labour party wanted their support, these black members went to their community to get their support and they did get it. After that, they were just forgotten. They were just used. They were never looked at as political equals” (Wainwright, 1987, p. 192).

The Labour Party has had a history of discrimination. During the 1960s, many Labour clubs had a colour bar. Harbhajan Dardi described the bar by saying: ‘People like me couldn’t drink there.’ (Jeffries, 2014a). British Muslim Labour members have experienced prejudice in the Labour Party. In the 1960s and 1970s, this seems to have been based on race. From the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 onwards, Muslims, uniquely among minority groups, became the focus of hostility or suspicion.

After the attacks in New York and Washington, Tony Blair and New Labour leadership adopted foreign policies that had disastrous results for Muslims in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Many British Muslims became alarmed because UK foreign policy sided with Israelis and their neo-conservative allies in the Bush administration and against Palestinians. After 9/11, the New Labour government sought to reassure other Britons that they were defending the West against external threats (Toynbee & Walker, 2005; Quinn, 2006). The Labour government supported the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Many Britons opposed the war. Around one million people of all races and all faiths marched in London in February 2003. The

Blair government pressed ahead with the war. Many opponents of the war began to question whether Labour was the right party for them and whether democracy worked. At home many Muslims began to feel that they were treated as an 'enemy within'. In July 2004, after the war but during the resulting Iraqi civil war, Labour lost the seat of Leicester South in a by-election to the Liberal Democrats (Daily Mail, 2004). Leicester South is seat with a high proportion of ethnic minorities and Muslims. There is little data on the participation of British Muslims, but some became active outside the party system and members of the Stop the War Coalition, that were critical of Labour.

The Labour government continued its aggressive counter-terrorism policies became a theme and a box for all Muslims who live in the UK to deal with. Islamophobia became common in the UK, and Islam was viewed with suspicion (Braginskaia, 2015). For instance, a report published in 2004 by The Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI), by Stephen Lawrence "government adviser" concluded that British Muslims feel exclusion in Britain from the wider society and this may lead to a boiling over (Stone et al., 2004). In this report Ahmed Versi stated 'We have reported cases of mosques being firebombed, paint being thrown at mosques, mosques being covered in graffiti, threats made, women being spat upon, eggs being thrown. It is the visible symbols of Islam that are being attacked' (Stone et al., 2004, p,31). Another documented statement in this report was pointed by Rashad Yaqoob who described the relationship between the British Muslims and the government by saying; 'British Muslims feel completely ignored and demonised. Blair has probably let down Muslims more than anyone else because we backed him. He has repaid us by reneging on all his promises, and it's a complete betrayal of trust. We have been through an emotional rollercoaster watching our Muslim brothers die. It makes us feel like cannon fodder' (Stone *et al.*, 2004, p,4).

The government passed many counter-terrorist measures (Toynbee & Walker, 2005). The Prevent programme was introduced to prevent the radicalisation of young Muslims but alienated many (Hammonds, 2018). Muslims felt that they were targeted, and their liberty was at risk. Many British Muslims were under surveillance, detained without trial, and searched without a warrant. The Prevent program did not distinguish even between children and adults. The European Court of Human Rights and other organisations opposed Terrorism Act and the Prevent because they violated human rights. The relationship between the British Muslims and the Labour party was seriously damaged under the Tony Blair and Gordon Brown governments. As Sadiq Khan noted, ‘The war in Iraq and its aftermath have seriously damaged the Labour party relationship with the Muslim electorate’ (Khan, 2008, p. 3) Since other groups did not experience such a similar change in fortunes, the interests of Muslims and other ethnic minorities began to diverge. Some Muslims within the party tried to heal the wounds. Sadiq Khan criticised the Labour government’s relations with Muslims ‘The Labour government has been criticised for the way we have engaged with British Muslims over the last 11 years we should admit that we have frequently got it wrong and we should learn the lessons’ (Khan, 2008, p. 57). Even when the Labour party attempt to engaged British Muslims after the 2005 bombings, the party dropped the consultations:

“In response to the terrorist attacks on London in July 2005 the government set up the Preventing Extremism Together consultations. Over 1000 British Muslims and the community led local groups took part and the consultation produce 64 recommendations for the government and communities at the end of 2005. But nearly three years later the perception is that the government has acted on just four of these” (Khan, 2008, p.59)

Labour lost the 2010 general election. Many British Muslim voters voted for Liberal Democrats, who had opposed the invasion of Iraq (Patel, 2012). As Ismail Patel responded, ‘We had an

opportunity to punish Labour in 2005, and it didn't happen, there wasn't any real alternative last time round' (Wander, 2010).

The relationship between British Muslims and Labour started to take a different path under Ed Miliband's leadership. The Labour leader voted against the coalition government's proposals for air strikes in Syria (Bale, 2015, p. 189). In 2012 Labour lost the seat of Bradford West to George Galloway of the Respect party. The defeat could be dismissed as the result of unique local factors, an unpopular candidate, and other features of a campaign. In early 2013 the Labour leader Ed Miliband with around 20 Labour MPs visited the London Central Mosque to reconnect with the Muslim community. Around 500 representatives of Islamic organizations and groups around the UK attended the meeting. Many issues were discussed that concerned the Muslim community such as Islamophobia, legislation on discrimination and counterterrorism, foreign policy, and British Muslim engagement.⁴⁰ This positive trend continued as Ed Miliband attempted to win Muslims' votes in the 2015 general election by saying to Muslims:

"We are going to make sure it is marked on people's records, with the police to make sure they root out Islamophobia as a hate crime. We are going to change the law, so we make it clear of [sic] our abhorrence of hate crime and Islamophobia. It will be the first time that the police will record Islamophobic attacks right across the country" (Pearson, 2015).

The Labour party manifesto in the 2015 general election was aimed to target all minorities groups, by promising to fight hate crimes and increase the number of non-whites in top jobs (Taylor, 2015). Labour lost the election again, around 64 per cent of British Muslims voted Labour and 25 per cent voted Conservative (MEND, 2017).

After Labour's defeat, Jeremy Corbyn became the leader of the Labour party. Corbyn was very respected by many British Muslims for his positive attitude toward issues related to the Muslim

⁴⁰ London Central Mosque Trust & The Islamic Cultural Centre, 'Leader of the Opposition & Leader of the Labour Party meets with the UK's Muslim Community Organisations', 17 January 2013, https://iccuk.org/page.php?section=media&page=ed_miliband, (accessed on 8 April 2023).

community. Corbyn had opposed the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. He was the chair of the Stop the War Coalition. Corbyn made a speech as a leader of the Labour party, apologising for the unjustified invasion of Iraq; Corbyn said, ‘Politicians and political parties can only grow stronger by acknowledging when they get it wrong and by facing up to their mistakes... So, I now apologise sincerely on behalf of my party for the disastrous decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003’ (Freeman, 2019).

Statements like these could be seen as Corbyn trying to restore trust in the party not only for ethnic minorities but for the whole population. Other statements were clearly addressed to Muslims. Corbyn criticised the Prevent programme by saying:

"I think what Prevent has often done is seen to target the Muslim community, not anybody else, looks to say there is a kind of suspicion over the whole community and it's often counter-productive" (Merrick, 2017).

Corbyn's leadership had a positive impact on reconnecting British Muslims to the Labour Party. In the general election of 2017, 85 per cent of British Muslims voted for Labour, and 11 per cent only voted for the Conservatives (Clements, 2017). Party membership increased under Corbyn's leadership (see chapter 2). Some new members included those who had left because of the Iraq War. Others were associated with the Stop the War coalition. This resulted in tensions within the party. Some of these new recruits made statements about Israel or Jews that led to accusations of antisemitism. Jackie Walker, the vice chairperson of the grassroots Momentum campaign, was expelled (Elgot, 2019). Chris Williamson MP was suspended (Syal, 2019). The left of the party that supported Corbyn tended to deny accusations of antisemitism and suggest that their critics conflated legitimate criticism of the state of Israel with antisemitism. When the report into antisemitism was published in 2020 Corbyn claimed that antisemitism within Labour had been ‘dramatically overstated for political reasons by our opponents inside and outside the party, as

well as by much of the media' (Walker & Elgot, 2020). The former leader was suspended from the Labour party, readmitted, but was suspended from the parliamentary Labour Party, and unable to stand as a Labour candidate (Reuters, 2023).

The controversy about antisemitism has pushed concerns about Islamophobia to one side.

Nevertheless, Labour sometimes stood with British Muslims and criticised the Conservative party. The Labour party chair Anneliese Dodds wrote to her opponent:

"It comes as recent figures show anti-Muslim hate crimes are on the rise in the UK, and an investigation into alleged Islamophobia by a Tory MP continues. "It is deeply concerning that I must again raise the issue of Islamophobia directly with the chair of the Conservative Party" (Mathers, 2022).

British Muslims favour Labour more than Conservative. A recent poll shows that 72 per cent of Muslims identify themselves with Labour, compared to the 2019 general election, this figure decreased by 11 per cent (Gayle, 2021). This decline may be by one of the following Starmer's leadership is less attractive to British Muslims compared to the Corbyn era. Or it may be that other parties become more attractive.

In 2020 the Labour Muslim network suggested that one out of four Muslims experience Islamophobia with the party. As one member said:

"There are undercurrents of Islamophobia within the Labour Party, stemming from ignorance and systemic racism which may not be overt but does exist." (LMN,2020, p. 8)

The same sources suggest that around 40 per cent of Muslim members believe that the party did not take Islamophobia seriously. Many do not trust the complaints procedure. As one of the Muslim members pointed out that "The complaints system remains unfit for purpose. The sophistication of racism and Islamophobia today is not recognised or accommodated by procedures." (LMN, 2020, p .13).

When David Abrahams donated to the Labour party in 2020, many British Muslims urged the Labour leader to refuse his donation. Abrahams was accused Islamophobic views by British Muslims. Some Muslim Labour members lost faith with the current leadership and with party itself. As Mish Rahman, a labour NEC member said “We now know that the majority of Muslim members do not trust the leadership to deal with Islamophobia effectively. Failing to act on these outrageous comments will deepen these concerns and provide further evidence that there is a hierarchy of racism within the party” (Gayle, 2020). It seems that this sentiment or feeling was proven correct. According to Forde who investigated the Labour party procedure and allegation of discrimination, within the labour party “Anti-black racism and Islamophobia is not taken as seriously as antisemitism” (Adu, 2023).

The British party members survey provides some evidence that there may be worrying attitudes. Table 4.2 displays responses to the same question that was posed to Tory members in Table 4.1. Labour members are far less hostile to Muslim candidates than Conservative members but some 12 per cent of Labour members thought that there should be fewer Muslim MPs in 2015 and some 10 per cent thought that in 2017, even after two years of Corbyn’s leadership. This is a possible indication of Islamophobia in the party.

TABLE 4.3: LABOUR MEMBERS VIEW ON BRITISH MUSLIMS MPs

Year	More MPs should come from a Muslim Background?	Lab-Members	Percentage
2015	A lot more	185	15.1
	Slightly more	369	30
	Same as currently	388	31.6
	Slightly fewer	46	3.7
	A lot fewer	115	9.4
	Don't know	126	10.3
	Total	1229	100
2017	A lot more	90	33.5
	Slightly more	100	37.2
	Same as currently	54	20.1
	Slightly fewer	8	3.0
	A lot fewer	17	6.3
	Total	269	100

*Source: Party Members Project (PMP) 2015 and 2017.*⁴¹

There is clear evidence that there is some resistance to the full participation of British Muslims in the two major parties. The evidence is particularly strong in the case of the Conservative party but may extend to parts of Labour too. The annual reports of the Tell MAMA website provide evidence of Islamophobia across wider British Society, far beyond that associated with the far right ⁴²(Tell MAMA, 2018). Islamophobia may deter Muslims from participating in the British system but can also engender resistance and participation (Finlay & Hopkins, 2020, p. 564). The new Labour leadership is reluctant to appear ‘woke’ and this also discourages it from making efforts to tackle the problem. The political integration of British Muslims is likely to remain unachieved – particularly as both parties court other social groups or focus on discrimination against other groups.

⁴¹ In 2015 the same question was asked about ethnic minority candidates. 37.2 per cent of Labour members wanted a lot more. 38.2 per cent wanted slightly more, 19.0 per cent wanted the same as currently, only 2 per cent wanted slightly less and only 0.8 per cent wanted a lot fewer.

⁴² Tell MAMA is an independent, non-governmental organization aimed at tackling anti-Muslim incidents.

4.3 British Muslims and Islamic Institutions

I have presented the political parties' actions, statements, and messages toward British Muslims. In the case of the Conservative party seems to be creating a negative political environment that could cause less trust and deprivation among many British Muslims. Labour has also disappointed Muslims, had made them feel taken for granted. In this section I discuss how Islamic institutions, such as mosques and umbrella organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) shape British Muslims' consciousness, inform them about politics, and influence their political participation, by interacting or responding to the narrative within the political parties.

British Muslims must interact with established political institutions by voting, joining political parties, forging careers, and lobbying governments and political parties to ensure that Muslim voices are heard, and their interests represented (Jordan & Richardson, 1987). In the UK there are several organizations that mediate between the Muslim community and established institutions. Some have vital roles to play in informing British Muslims politically and in lobbying on their behalf.

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is the largest Islamic umbrella organization in the UK, with over five hundred institutional members, including many religious institutions such as mosques and schools (Khan *et al.*, 2020, p.1). The move to create an umbrella organization followed the controversy surrounding the publication of *The Satanic Verses* by the author Salman Rushdie. This book was thought to be blasphemous and led to the issuing of a fatwah by the Ayatollah Khomeini. This led British Muslims attempted to make representations to the Conservative government but their claims to represent the whole of their community were unverifiable. In 1995 Michael Howard, the Home Secretary, advised them to "Speak with one

voice should they wish to exercise more influence over government” (Khan *et al.*, 2020 p. 2).

Despite this advice, the Muslim community was slow to co-ordinate and organize and remained characterized by many smaller groupings. The MCB was finally established as an umbrella organization to represent British Muslim interests and voices in 1998 (Peace, 2015). It scored an early success by including a question on religious affiliation in the 2001 Census after a long campaign “What is your religion?”⁴³ (Khan *et al.*, 2020, p. 4).

Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) is another Islamic organization. It was established in 2014 to tackle Islamophobia and empower British Muslims politically. It provides training and resources to Muslims who want to become politically active. Both MCB and MEND have very substantial efforts to empower and lobby on behalf of the Muslim community. The following paragraphs will show how these institutions, inform (educate) and mobilise and lobbying on their behave.

In every general and local election, the MCB, MEND and other Islamic institutions such as the major Mosques (e.g., Waltham Forest Mosque and East London Mosque) have worked collectively with many institutions at the local and national levels to ensure Muslims have a role to play, engage in the democratic process and make their voices heard. These institutions encourage participation and often launch campaigns, MCB and some mosques held ‘voter registration day’ and MEND launched a ‘Get out and Vote’ campaign (MEND, 2019b). In the 2010 general election, MCB encouraged British Muslims to get involved by reminding them that as Muslims they have ‘an obligation to join hands with others to elect those who will seek the common good’ (MCB, 2010). It encouraged mosques and Imams to deliver this statement to

⁴³ This wouldn’t happened without a collective effort of individuals and groups. However, MCB played a vital role in this matter (see Peace, 2015, Braginskaia, 2015).

British Muslim prayers at Friday prayer sermon. Harun Khan the MCB Secretary-General also stated that before the 2019 general election:

"We have been one of the leading voices for Muslims' concerns this election. This has ranged from driving the first-ever National Muslim Voter Registration Day to identifying the marginal constituencies where Muslims have the biggest role to play, to challenging both the political and media class on Islamophobia. Muslim concerns are simply too significant to be ignored"(MCB, 2019d).

The MCB in some elections hold meeting with candidates and party leaders⁴⁴ (MCB, 2005).

Both institutions released media materials before the campaign and identified those issues that matter most to Muslims. Education and information are key materials and help British Muslims cast their votes for the party that best supports their community. For the 2019 general election, MCB produced a document containing ten key issues or Pledges that it sought from parties (MCB, 2019b). These pledges were based on concerns expressed in specially commissioned surveys of British Muslims. The MCB produced a press release comparing the main political parties' manifestos to their pledges, and the result was:

"On ten key pledges, the Labour manifesto achieved a "Pass" on nine out of the ten, the Liberal Democrats achieved a 50% pass rate, and the Conservatives did not achieve a "Pass" on a single one of the policy areas but were recognised as making progress on various issues" (MCB, 2019c).

Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) went further. It produced a list of favoured policies pledges and asked political parties to adopt them in their manifestos (MEND, 2019b).

British Muslims are supposed to use this comparison to vote for the right party (See table C.1 in the Appendix C).

The MCB encourages Imams and mosques to highlight the importance of voting. One part of the sermon highlighted the risk of not participating in the election⁴⁵(MCB, 2019e). The MCB

⁴⁴ For full quotations see Table C.3 in the appendix C, Quotations number 1.

⁴⁵ For full Quotations see Table C.3 in Appendix C, quote number 2.

recommended that Imams should include practical steps such as the deadline for registration and mobilizing the household and friends to register to vote.

The ‘Mosque’ is not the only place for worship and religious gathering. Nevertheless, it plays a substantial role in promoting participation and shaping British Muslim political views. Navid Hamid, from Medina Mosque stated that:

“We have engaged with our local MPs and councillors to promote the importance of voting and democratic participation. During this Friday’s prayer, there was a sermon which involved the general election to promote the importance of registering to vote and making your voice heard” (Percival, 2017).

Mosques can also help to maintain stability in the local community. In 2021 a teacher showed offence cartoons of Prophet Mohamad peace upon him, and many parents protested outside the school. The local mosque played a vital role to calm down protestors. As Akooji Badat, from the local Mosque, said:

“We’re working together with the parents and the teacher, and the school have been kind to all the sectors by suspending the teacher so there’s no real cause for a peaceful protest outside the school. The school has done its job and cooperated well with us” (Arab News, 2021).

Both MEND and MCB have encouraged Imams and mosques to deal with the issue of Islamophobia and use Friday a prayer sermons Template to increase consciousness. The MCB template encouraged Muslims to take peaceful action and mobilise them to use social media to complain about Islamophobia:

“Too often we complain about the negative media portrayal; and it’s our right to complain. However, to avoid becoming someone who just moans about everything, you must couple your complaints with action...You can air your views and you can speak about issues. Social media has given you a voice, so use it.” (MCB, 2016).

The MEND sermons template is similar but less practical: ‘So what CAN you do in order to fulfil your obligation of preventing evil and working for the sake of your community when it comes to a problem like Islamophobia?’ (Mahmud, 2018). MEND suggests some steps to

counter Islamophobia and can be summarized as Muslims should be educated themselves and inform non-Muslims of the negative impact of Islamophobia. Also, MEND provided Mosques with posters of the campaigns to ensure that those who attend prayers understand the impact of Islamophobia. From all these examples, it seems these institutions play a significant role by promoting participation and sometimes they indirectly guide British Muslims to vote for suits their concerns via “policies pledges”. The Mosque seems to act as a mediator between these institutions and the British Muslims. Friday prayer is the obvious place where the mobilization, political discussions and education take place.

The umbrella organizations are not only interested in raising the turnout level or raising political awareness among British Muslims. They recognise that to survive as a minority in a majoritarian system they need to defend human rights. International treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) help protect their community's existence. MCB, for example, made a submission to Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Counter Terrorism & Border Security Bill in June 2018 (MCB, 2018a). In 2023 it called on the government to abandon the proposed Illegal Immigration Bill (MCB, 2023). It also made submissions on proposals to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights on Freedom of Speech in Higher Education (MCB,2018b). Lobbying and monitoring the government is one form of participation in their strategy. On some occasions, they lobby the government and express Muslim concerns. For example, after the Conservatives won the election in 2019, the MCB released a statement to share the concern of British Muslims about the negativity of the Conservative Government in tackling Islamophobia (MCB, 2019f). When the Conservative government rejected the islamophobia definition, the Head of Media Monitoring for the MCB, Miqdaad Versi said:

“It is regrettable that the Conservatives have refused to take our concerns seriously or that of their own Conservative peers. Furthermore, the current Conservative-led government has also

decided to reject a definition of Islamophobia as accepted by the MCB and key Muslim stakeholders, which leads us to question, what message do the Conservatives want to send to Muslim communities?" (MCB, 2019a).

MEND also responded to the removal of Lord Carlisle, the Independent Reviewer of the PREVENT programme:

"MEND is of the firm belief that PREVENT should be repealed and further calls on policymakers to commit to independently reviewing all counter-terrorism legislation enacted since 2000 with a view to curbing the encroachment of counter-terrorism policies on civil liberties. We are currently monitoring the situation and working with other organisations to ensure that an independent review of PREVENT is fit for purpose" (Begg, 2021).

MEND has based its opposition to the Prevent programme on its incompatibility with the European Convention of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. They have argued that the programme conflicts with article 9 (freedom of religion) and article 10 (freedom of expression). They have also argued that it conflicts with the Equalities Act 2010 that prevents discrimination based on protected characteristics. Lawyers associated with MEND have also pointed to the large number of 'false positives' that the programme has produced. Muslim groups have been able to participate in the processes of policy formation and review that characterise British institutions.

MEND and MCB in some circumstances have asked MPs to act about policies that may have an enormous impact on British Muslims (MEND, 2021). The MCB in some cases encourage Muslims to act and contact their local MPs (MCB, 2022). They have provided some tools on their website on how to write a letter to MPs and identify the local MPs. MCB encourage whoever reads their materials to share it in social platforms such as Facebook, Whatapp, Twitter, and LinkedIn. These institutions have social network accounts to publish their press materials and have email sign up for those who are interest in receiving news.

Another form of democratic participation is to encourage protesting, boycotting, or petitioning the government. Many mosques boycott the government Prevent program. The council of mosques in Waltham Forest stated that:

“The project itself and Prevent in general is an ill-conceived and flawed policy. It is racist and overtly targets members of the Muslim faith. This has been demonstrated by organisations who are collecting data on referrals to the [anti-radicalisation] Channel programme ... We see the Brit project as another tool being used (like the Prevent strategy) to spy and denigrate the Muslim community and cause distrust. We have no confidence in the Brit project and the Prevent strategy overall” (Taylor,2015).

Irfan Akhtar, a member of the council of mosques pointed out that:

“Prevent is a toxic brand. We are fighting the implementation of Prevent and will not let it into the mosques. We want to work closely with all teachers on safeguarding of children of all faiths and none. We think that Waltham Forest is a testing ground for Prevent programmes and this is a wake-up call that we are not just going to accept Prevent in our community” (Taylor,2015).

In 2006, MCB organized a peaceful demonstration in London to protest offensive cartoons waves across Europe, the aim of this protest according to their press release to “help British Muslims to express their feelings peacefully”⁴⁶ (MCB,2006).

East London Mosque organized a petition and encouraged Muslims to sign it. The petition aimed to block a far-right march in Tower Hamlets, the Mosque stated that:

“On Saturday 21st October, an organised group of people with known connections to far-right, racist and violent activities were permitted to assemble and then march through Tower Hamlets. They marched along Whitechapel Road and past the East London Mosque and the London Muslim Centre as a flagrant sign of their hatred and contempt for British Muslims” (East London Mosque, 2019).

The websites and social media profiles of organisations like MCB and Mends, together with other community-based sites (such as local mosques) suggest that a great deal of political activity is focused on protest. Large parts of the Muslim minority remain outsiders in the British system. This perhaps explains why some Muslims, such as Afsana Salik, at least are training to become

⁴⁶ For a full press release see Table C.3 in the appendix C, quote number 4.

community organisers who can communicate demands to those ‘on the inside’ (Citizens UK, 2021, p. 7).

4.4 Discussion and concluding remarks.

The relationship between the parties and British Muslims has evolved against the backdrop of general attitudes towards Muslims among the British public. There is little time series data on this beyond that presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (see Chapter 1) This indicates that there is some scepticism about whether Islam is compatible with ‘British values.’ These attitudes make both parties nervous about encouraging participation by Muslims in their parties. They think this will meet with a negative response among the white/non-Muslim Christians.

Before 2010 the Conservative party under Cameron's leadership was open to including and opening the door for British Muslims to step in. However, after winning the election in 2010, the party became more antagonistic. The A-list is no more than a party strategy to become appealing to minority groups' electorates. Party strategists have occasionally indicated that they are no longer pursuing British Muslim voters. Some members go beyond this and accuse British Muslims of divided loyalties (MEND, 2019a, p. 6). Issues such as Islamophobia, discrimination, counterterrorism policies targeting their community and cutting relations with one of the most representative bodies of the Muslim community seems it reduces the possibility of British Muslims integrating into British society. The party's refusal to accept a definition of Islamophobia that all other parliamentary parties agreed on, also has a negative psychological effect on British Muslims. When the party promotes some individuals, this seems largely symbolic, and provide a useful defence to demands for inclusion and integration with the community. Sajid Javid is a good example. It seems for the Conservative party British Muslims

are less priority compared to other ethnic minorities such as Hindus and Jewish (Warsi, 2017, p. 211). One of the most important institutions for Muslim participation seems unwelcoming. This will limit full participation and integration in the UK political system because the Tory party has been in power since 2010.

For the Labour party, the relationship with British Muslims is closer but has fluctuated. British Muslims naturally used to associate themselves with the Labour party. This was in part because Muslims had no choice. The first past the post electoral system compelled them to become part of the Labour coalition. The relationship became strained during Tony Blair and Gordon Brown's leaderships (Toynbee & Walker, 2005; 2011). By 2010 it came close to falling apart. The war on terror and its aftermath damaged the relationship with British voters (Khan, 2008, p 3). When Labour passed counter terrorism legislation such as Prevent many British Muslims turned to the Liberal Democrats, who had opposed the invasion of Iraq (Fieldhouse *et al.*, 2006). The relationship recovered somewhat before 2015. Ed Miliband, the new leader, addressed some of their concerns and mobilised British Muslims in the 2015 general election. When Jeremy Corbyn become a leader in 2015, many Muslim activists returned to associate themselves with the party. As I demonstrated in chapter 2 intention to vote increased significantly. The party under Corbyn's leadership was very open to the Muslim community, and British Muslim MPs were selected (See table 4.1). The party supported a definition of Islamophobia and criticized the Conservative government's approach toward British Muslims, especially the Prevent program. It also requested an investigation into Islamophobia within the Conservative party. Whether the party will become less supportive once in office is unclear. Islamophobia and discrimination are less visible in the Labour party but exist. There is also a growing feeling that Islamophobia is less important than antisemitism. In general, the vast majority of British Muslims believe there is

more prejudice against them compared to other religious groups (IPSOS, 2018). Many British still feel that they are excluded and targeted by the Labour government. This will inevitably reduce orthodox participation but might lead to more protest and unorthodox participation, especially among the young (Finlay & Hopkins, 2020, p. 564).

British Muslims understand that the parties are motivated by electoral concerns:

“We were made false promises by the Labour party and they left us feeling humiliated. All we wanted was a mosque to pray in but what happened was an absolute shamble. We were told one thing to our face and then they stabbed us in the back. We have been left so disillusioned” (Shaz Saleem, quoted in Parveen, 2019)


Data show that two in five British Muslims believe that political parties are seeking their votes not for their opinions (IPSOS, 2018). Both parties shared or had something in common; they largely ignored the concerns of British Muslims when they are in government. They become more concerned about migration, targeting British Muslims, passing legislation that harms them and sometimes islamophobia. According to MEND independent review submitted to the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government:

“In recent times, both the Conservative and Labour parties have become embroiled in accusations of Islamophobia.....minority communities are at risk becoming disenfranchised, not just from political life, but also from social, civic, and economic life through the perceived acceptability of discriminatory practices, institutionalised racisms, and structural exclusions” (MEND, 2020, p.3).

The prejudice may have differed between both parties to some degree, but it has a deeper psychological negative impact on British Muslims. The relationship between the parties and Muslims has varied over time. Islamophobia and discrimination may, reduce British Muslim's willingness to participate and cause protest activities.

To draw out the implications of this chapter, figure 4.1 below demonstrates a map to link the trend of what we identified in this chapter and the findings of the previous chapter especially regarding mosque-promoting protest activates.

FIGURE 4.1 THE IMPACT OF THE NEGATIVE DISCOURSES BETWEEN ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIS.



Source: Author

Islamic institutions such as MCB and MEND, and mosques play a vital role in making British Muslims aware of the government, mainstream politics, and their ability to participate in that system. These institutions are respected in the Muslim community. For example, the majority of British Muslims view MCB as doing a good job of representing them and their community view (IPSOS, 2018). They have used elections to educate British Muslims on key policies that they should think about before determining which candidate they will vote for. Both institutions used

the mosque as a platform to deliver their messages to the British Muslim audience. Friday prayer is a key not only to delivering their messages but also, the opportunity to mobilise them to be involved in politics and participate more. Social media and press materials are important methods to connect British Muslims with the latest news and politics. The mosque is a site not only for voting participation but other forms of participation, such as petitioning, protesting, and boycotting. British Muslims have become better informed through these sites, especially the Mosque. The discourses between these Islamic institutions and the established political institutions will have an impact on ordinary Muslims. Yet many feel deprived and do not trust whoever is in government. Some 25 % of young British Muslims felt that the British government is anti-Muslim. Most young Muslims believed anti-terror legislation applied unfairly to their community (Field,2011). Feelings of exclusion and marginalization may drive British Muslims toward protest activities. This is in line with what Mustafa, (2015) found about the political activities of young British Muslims. They are more attracted to boycotting and protesting. This underlines the importance of my findings in chapter 3. Mosques as they appear from this chapter and the previous one, as a site not only for mobilization but for grievance and deprivation.

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CHAPTER 5 Thesis Conclusion

5.1 Thesis Findings

This thesis consists of three chapters to investigate British Muslim political participation comprehensively. Three main questions were proposed 1) To what extent does the political participation of British Muslims vary across time and space? 2) To what extent does the religious institution of the "mosque" impact the political participation of British Muslims? 3) How the political environment impacted British Muslim political participation? My analysis was limited by some factors, which I will discuss in the following sections.

5.1.1 chapter 2: I explored the political participation (solely electoral participation) across time and space. I relied on three sources: British Election Panel Study (BEPS), EuroIslam and the Pippa Norris's Westminster constituency database. These datasets are diverse. The BEPS enable us to explore cross-time, EuroIslam cross space and Pippa Norris's parliamentary constituency data cross-time and space. The main finding was that the trend of intentions to participate in voting of British Muslims tracked all other groups (including the non-religious). This is important. These shared dynamics suggest that Muslims respond to political developments in similar ways to the majority public in society. Islam is compatible with British and democratic values.

This source also shows a significant spike in British Muslim's intentions to vote in 2015-2016. This may be associated with the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in September 2015, someone who opposed the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and who was known to be sympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians. While this interpretation makes sense, I cannot exclude the possibility that this spike was caused by other developments, such as the 2016

referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union. This may also have affected Muslims more than other religious groups. A 'Corbyn effect' is entirely plausible. It seems that the British Muslim's representation within the political parties is an important factor that affects their level of political participation. This reinforces the importance of looking carefully at the relationship between the political parties and British Muslims (this provides a motivation for chapter 4).

Nevertheless, it made sense to examine participation across three countries with sizeable Muslim populations: the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. My models suggest that the origin countries have an impact. Those who were born in Morocco or Pakistan are more likely to vote than those from the former Yugoslavia for the whole sample. When I divided the sample into individual nations the main findings were that education and/or being born in Pakistan could be explanatory factors in electoral participation for British Muslims, age, and language fluency for Muslims living in Germany and, age and Turkish origins for Dutch Muslims. The Mosque was a significant variable in this analysis. It appeared that it has no effect on British Muslim voting participation, but in Germany, mosques seem to have a marginal effect. This suggested that the relationship between mosque attendance might vary across different systems or depend on the strategies employed by Muslim institutions in those countries. This provides a rationale for a more detailed analysis of:

- 1) The mosque on the political participation of British Muslims using more reliable datasets such as EMBES, 2010 (this provides a motivation for chapter 3).
- 2) The political environment associated with the discourses of UK institutions – both the existing political parties and those groups that claim to represent the British Muslim community. This again provides a motivation for chapter 4.

I also compared British Muslims across time and space using Pippa Norris's Westminster constituency database. This examined turnout across constituencies at the last four general elections. The finding was positive: the more Muslims in a constituency, the higher the turnout. To be sure, I could not draw inferences about the individual level because I was using aggregate data. I assume that with many British Muslims in any given area, the number of mosques is higher. Also, the political parties and umbrella Islamic organisations will treat these constituencies differently. I anticipate that British Muslims in these areas would be more exposed to mobilisation messages from the parties, mosques, and Islamic organisations.

5.1.2 chapter 3: I examined the impact of mosque attendance on political participation. This investigation is crucial for the objective of this thesis. To produce a comprehensive examination of any religious group's political participation, we must assess the role of its institutions. My findings in chapter 2 suggest (contrary to Moutselos, 2020) that the mosque attendance *per se* has no impact in the UK. I believe that this finding is compelling. I used a high-quality dataset, the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) that was collected at approximately the same time as the EuroIslam data (Heath *et al.*, 2013). This source contains a much larger number of British Muslims, and various variables and forms of participation are measured. The findings in this chapter are more reliable and informative than other sources. Mosque attendance seems to have no effect on the electoral participation of British Muslims (the finding of Chapter 2 confirmed). However, mobilisation messages delivered by the Mosque appeared to increase electoral participation in 2010. This shows the importance of including an indicator of mosque mobilisation in the analysis. Mosque attendance appeared to positively affect protesting activities in 2010. The data are cross-sectional but enable us to compare these findings with those from EuroIslam because the data relate to the same period. From the latter results, the evidence is now

threefold to explore the political environment that creates a protest tendency among British Muslims. Protest activities are elite-challenging forms of participation. This suggests that it is important to look at the political parties because these institutions control government and Parliament. Parties can pass policies and legislation that creates negative feeling (grievance, deprivation, exclusion) among British Muslims. Participation in parties is an important part of democratic citizenship. Since messages from mosques stimulate participation, it is useful to examine the activities and influence of other Muslim institutions, such as the various umbrella organisations.

5.1.3 Chapter 4: I adopted a different methodological approach but applied the same logic of scientific approach to getting an accurate inference (King *et al.*, 1994). I primarily focused on how well the two main political parties, Conservative and Labour, have incorporated Muslims and allowed them to participate in the British political system. I also examined how two leading Islamic umbrella organisations, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and Muslim Engagement and Development (MEND) facilitated participation. This chapter was based on textual evidence but was supported by some survey evidence. I concluded that British Muslims received many negative messages that were driven by the discourses with or between the political parties. Labour initially seemed more open and supportive toward British Muslims than the Conservatives but was also concerned not to alienate the white working class that made up a large part of its electoral coalition. Tony Blair and New Labour's decision to support George Bush's 'War on terror' and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 alienated many Muslims who were concerned about their fellow adherents in those countries. By the 2010 general election, there was mounting evidence that Labour was at odds with many British Muslims. Examples included the Prevent strategy, targeting Muslim individuals, proposals to

detain without trial and the two major wars against Muslim countries. The Conservatives were in opposition made efforts to become closer to British Muslims under David Cameron's leadership and some Muslims rose to the most senior levels. Things dramatically changed when the Conservative Party took the lead in the government in 2010. The new Labour leadership under Ed Miliband opened the door to British Muslims, and the Conservative party became hostile again. It seemed that whatever party was in government became hostile toward British Muslims, and whoever was in the opposition became supportive and tolerant. This may be understood by knowing the British political system and how it functions. A winning political party need to alliance with others to reach the majority to form a government. Labour or Conservative themselves consist of coalitions. These alliances with other parties and the coalitions within the party itself may affect policymaking. Unfortunately, British Muslims were the victims of electoral politics. Of course, time and context matter a great deal and the era of post 9/11 had its implications. Because of this negative political environment, many British Muslims formed a negative image of the government and felt excluded, aggrieved, and deprived (this was documented in a CBMI report see chapter 4, & Heath *et al.*, 2013). The Mosque and Islamic organisations such as MCB and MEND help inform British Muslims and update them on these discourses. The political environment in the last two decades was hostile. This created negative feelings of exclusion, grievance, and deprivation. These feelings are associated with increased protest activities. The Mosque is the natural site for information and mobilisation, this may be the reason why it promoted protest activities (chapter 3). To put together all findings, the main conclusion of this thesis is that British Muslims are very similar to other religious groups (overwhelmingly the British majority) in their response to political events. This also indicates they are politically integrated. British Muslim constituencies have a higher rate of turnout.

Mosque plays a vital role in their political participation, electoral or elite-challenging forms of participation. The mosque indeed encouraged protest activities. British Muslims were disadvantaged and received less favourable policies than they could have expected from the mainstream political parties “Conservative and Labour”. Islamophobia and discrimination were higher among these institutions but received less remedial attention than other equally troubling expressions antisemitism. Protest activities were among British Muslims in 2010 because of the negative political environment.

5.2 Challenges and limitations

In this section, I highlight some of the challenges and limitations that may impact or drive the output of this thesis. The outbreak of Covid-19 was frustrating in many aspects. I returned home to Saudi Arabia after almost a year. These extraordinary circumstances slowed my progress. In addition, a theme such as the political participation of a minority group is very challenging in terms of the scarcity of data. To illustrate this statement clearly, I will highlight the challenges and limitations of each chapter separately:

5.2.1 Chapter 2: Political science is the search for laws that apply across space and time (Budge, 2019). Unfortunately, there is still little data on the political participation of British Muslims across time and space. There is very little panel data that allows us to explore the change in British Muslim's attitudes and fewer that enable us to assess or track the impact of changes in the political environment on their behaviours. In most of the existing panel datasets, the number of British Muslims is very low. As a result, the uncertainty attached to any estimates will be correspondingly will be high. The Euro-Islam study was limited for comparison across geographical locations. It focused on just one form of participation (voting), included one country with compulsory voting (Belgium) and two other countries with no data on participation

(France and Switzerland). Some questions of proven significance, such as mobilisation by the religious institution, were asked in this dataset. This reduces our ability to strengthen the inferences that we draw. This was clearly proven when I replicated the model of “Euro-Islam” with EMBES in chapter 3 which measured mosque mobilization. Mosque attendance shows no effect on electoral participation but if we include an indicator of mobilisation by the mosque, it has a visible impact. We can conclude that mosques have a positive role. This shows the importance of indicators such as mobilization especially if the theme of the investigation was a religious institution. The Norris dataset is useful but there was no data about the number of mosques in constituencies or other indicators of mobilisation. The data is aggregate, and it is not possible to draw inferences about either individuals or groups. Despite all these shortcomings, all these datasets are unique in other aspects, as most scientists rely on the data available to perform their analysis. Data with limitations is better than no data at all, or speculation.

5.2.2 Chapter 3: The British Election Study- Ethnic Minorities Booster (EMBES) was a very useful dataset, it measured a wide range of variables, and there is a sizeable number of British Muslims. However, it is cross-sectional data that covers the 2010 general election only. There have been no further ethnic minority booster samples so it is not clear whether the findings for 2010 can be generalised to earlier or later years. The 2010 general election was unusual because it followed a prolonged period Muslim alienation from the Labour Party. It would be better to have panel data that has a similar size of British Muslims and measure mosque attendance to assess the impact of Mosque over time. In section 5.3 below I say something about the structure of an ideal research design.

5.2.3 Chapter 4: The initial plan for collecting information on what goes in and around mosques that might stimulate political participation (both in terms of elections and protest activity) based

on preliminary evidence collected from, the websites of the umbrella organisations (e.g. Muslim Council of Great Britain), the websites of major mosques, the local newspapers in areas with high Muslim population, the local authority websites and any other relevant sources such as Electoral Commissions in London. The purpose of this is to broaden and deepen the evidential base and to identify specific questions to follow up in the interviews.

This phase will help to identify potential informants who can explain what happens within mosques about political participation. I successfully obtained the ethical approval to conduct interviews. Despite the negative impact of covid-19 and its lockdown, I sent many invitations to potential informants, which made me adopt strategies such as virtual interviewing.

Unfortunately, the response rate was low – just two successful interviews. Since I was unable to extend my ethical approval, I was not able to use any information provided by the two interviewees. In fact, both interviewees did not add anything new to what is already known about the political participation of British Muslims. This low-rate participation may be because the respondents have trust issues with these types of studies due to the impact of Prevent program. When it comes to a disadvantaged group such as Muslims in the UK, a program such as Prevent may have a negative effect. Informants may have negative feelings toward these studies and all research associated with institutions may be subject to suspicion. The ethical approval became out of date and subsequent applications became bogged down as the University committee sought further clarification and failed to decide. I changed my strategy to add a survey to increase the overall rate. However, the process could have been faster, and sometimes unnecessary steps were applied. As a result of the time limit, I have decided to rely on presenting textual evidence from authoritative and media sources. The amount of evidence is considerable.

Chapter 4 could have been far longer. Most observations could have been supported using many quotations from those who had already set their thoughts down in publications or on the net.

5.3 Further research

This thesis's findings added to the existing literature on many themes. Generally, it can be categorised in the literature on ethnic minorities, religious, and political participation. British Muslims are integrated with British politics, and the Mosque tends to promote protest activities due to the negative political environment fed by the established institutions' negative messages. In the UK context, this finding is new which is required further investigation as the following section will highlight.

As Gary King (1995) insists that "Political science is a community enterprise; the community of empirical political scientists needs access to the body of data necessary to replicate existing studies to understand, evaluate, and especially build on this work" (p.1). From this perspective, it will be crucial for British society and the Muslim community to continue exploring British Muslim political participation. It will be relevant to replicate the comparison of the impact of mosques in different Western societies and the broader sense of the Muslim community's political participation within these regions. Given the increasing importance of Muslims in British and other European political systems, I hope that funds will be found for a major survey. The ideal research design would track political participation over time and be sufficiently large to track Muslims as they move out of their traditional communities to more mixed areas. Such a study should contain indicators of exposure to mobilising discourse. If the rules relating to the use of social media evidence are relaxed, we may be able to incorporate evidence from these sources too. Finally, these survey and quantitative studies can be supplemented by ethnographic studies of communities. King's comment that political science is

a community exercise can be broadened and qualified to state the social science is a community exercise. Sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists may add to our understanding of Muslim political participation too.

Based on the evidence in Chapter 4, the political environment plays a significant role in the British Muslim participation approach. This finding needs further investigation with a different approach and method.

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Appendix A

TABLE A.1 YOUGov IS ISLAM COMPATIBLE OR CLASH WITH THE VALUES OF BRITISH SOCIETY.

	Compatible %	Clash %	Neither %	DK %	Net Scores Compatible - Clash
Feb-19	24	45	14	16	-21
Nov-18	25	48	13	14	-23
Jun-18	25	46	12	17	-21
Mar-18	25	44	14	17	-19
Nov-17	24	47	12	17	-23
Jun-17	29	44	12	14	-15
Feb-17	25	46	12	17	-21
Oct-16	22	52	12	13	-30
Jul-16	25	49	14	13	-24
Mar-16	22	51	10	17	-29
Feb-16	20	56	12	12	-36
Jan-16	25	51	11	13	-26
Dec-15	25	50	13	13	-25
Oct-15	19	59	10	12	-40
Sep-15	20	58	9	13	-38
Aug-15	20	53	12	15	-33
Jul-15	20	56	10	13	-36
Jun-15	20	59	9	12	-39
May-15	19	58	9	14	-39
Mar-15	22	55	10	13	-33
Feb-15	23	52	12	13	-29
Jan-15	23	52	12	13	-29

TABLE A.2 PEW “HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT MUSLIM?”

Years	Very Favourable %	Mostly Favourable %	Very Unfavourable %	Mostly Unfavourable %	DK/Refused %	Total %
Spring-2019	33	45	11	7	4	100
Spring-2016	15	48	17	11	9	100
Spring-2015	22	50	11	8	9	100
Spring-2014	17	47	16	10	10	100
Full-2009	15	46	17	10	12	100

TABLE A.3 FAIRLY AND VERY LIKELY VOTERS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, 2014-2020

Waves	Non-religious %	Church of England %	Roman Catholic %	Muslim %
1	86	92	90	72
2	88	93	92	77
3	88	94	92	82
4	89	93	92	83
5	91	95	94	85
7	91	95	93	84
8	91	96	94	84
9	93	96	94	90
10	88	93	89	82
11	90	94	92	82
12	90	95	91	86
14	87	93	90	82
15	84	87	84	82
16	85	89	86	80
17	87	92	89	84
18	89	93	90	83
20	87	93	88	84

TABLE A.4 INTENTION TO VOTE BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, 2014-2020

		Waves	1	2	3	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	12	14	15	16	17	18	20	
		Begin	02 /2014	05/ 2014	09/ 2014	03/ 2015	03 /2015	04/ 2015	05/ 2016	06/ 2016	11/ 2016	04/ 2017	05/ 2017	05/ 2018	03/ 2019	05/ 2019	11/ 2019	11/ 2019	06/ 2020	
			(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	
Non-religious	Unlikely	Very	7	5	6	6	5	4	4	4	6	5	6	7	9	8	7	7	7	
		Fairly	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2
		Neither	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	2	3	4	4	3	3	4
	Likely	Fairly	13	10	11	10	8	10	10	10	8	11	9	8	11	10	10	10	8	10
		Very	73	78	78	78	83	81	82	85	77	82	82	77	74	75	78	81	77	
Church of England	Unlikely	Very	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	7	5	4	4	4	
		Fairly	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	1
	Neither	Neither	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	4	4	3	2	3	
	Likely	Fairly	12	10	10	9	8	9	9	7	10	8	7	9	10	11	8	7	9	
		Very	80	83	84	85	87	86	87	89	84	87	88	84	77	79	84	87	84	
Roman Catholic	Unlikely	Very	4	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	5	4	5	5	9	8	6	6	7	
		Fairly	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	3	2	2	2	
	Neither	Neither	4	3	3	3	2	3	3	2	4	2	3	4	4	4	3	3	4	
	Likely	Fairly	13	10	11	10	7	9	9	7	10	7	7	10	9	11	9	8	10	
		Very	77	82	81	82	87	84	84	87	79	85	84	79	75	75	81	82	79	
Muslim	Unlikely	Very	11	7	4	6	7	4	4	1	5	6	4	7	7	6	6	6	6	
		Fairly	5	5	6	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	4	2	4	2	2	
	Neither	Neither	13	11	9	9	6	10	9	6	10	10	7	9	8	12	7	10	8	
	Likely	Fairly	22	21	21	19	18	20	23	20	25	23	20	23	23	22	22	20	23	
		Very	50	57	61	64	67	63	61	70	57	58	66	59	60	57	62	63	61	

TABLE A.4 SYNTAX FOR EURO ISLAM ANALYSIS

Variables	Questions in EuroIslam	Scale	Notes on measurements
Mosque Attendance	How often do you go to the mosque or other place of worship?	4-point Likert scale	Recoded as 0 to 1.
Gender			Recoded 1 as Male ,0 as Female.
Employment	Has paid work for more than 12 hours per week?	Yes. No (binary variable)	
Level of Education	Highest education attained in COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	5-point Likert scale	Recoded from 0 to 1 (1=0) (2=0.25) (3=0.5) (4=0.75) (5=1) 0 as no diploma ,1 as University degree
<i>Fluency in the language</i>	How often problem with conversation in NATIONAL LANGUAGE	5-point Likert scale	Recoded from 0 to 1 (1=1) (2=0.75) (5=0.5) (4=0.25) (5=0) 1 as Never , 0 as Always
Did you vote in last national election?		Yes/No Questions	Recoded 0 to 1
Country	RECODE country (1=1) (ELSE=0) INTO country_BE . RECODE country (2=1) (ELSE=0) INTO country_CZ . RECODE country (3=1) (ELSE=0) INTO country_DE . RECODE country (4=1) (ELSE=0) INTO country_FR . RECODE country (5=1) (ELSE=0) INTO country_UK . RECODE country (6=1) (ELSE=0) INTO country_NL .		

Appendix B

TABLE B.1: MARGINAL EFFECTS USING STATA COMMAND MFX FOR TURNOUT (GENERAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS) AND PROTEST ACTIVITIES.

Vairables	Marginal Effects		Protest Activitives
	General Election	Local Election	
Age	0.0133	0.0140	-0.0277
Age Square	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0003
Male*	-0.1198	-0.1186	-0.0120
Educ. Degree*	-0.0679	-0.0523	0.2921
House Ownership*	0.0620	0.0580	0.0645
Trade Union*	0.0705	0.0375	0.0852
Mobilization Worship*	0.0578	0.0684	0.3017
Party Contact*	0.1122	0.1005	-
Religious Identity	0.0308	0.0236	0.1534
Trust Institutions	0.2086	0.2141	-0.5689
Relative Deprivation	-0.0007	0.0030	0.0042
Discrimination*	-0.0363	-0.0396	0.3370
Integration	0.0631	0.0578	0.2764
Political Knowledge	0.2708	0.2771	0.4463
Mosque Attend	0.0658	0.0388	0.2485

Note: (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.


TABLE B.2: VARIABLES AND QUESTIONS ASKED IN EMBES SURVEY:

Variables	Questions in EMBES survey	Scale	Notes on measurements
<i>Relative deprivation</i>	Big gap between what people like me expect and reality.	Agree/Disagree. 5-point Likert scale	Recorded from 0 to 1.
Trust in institution	How much trust you have for: A-Parliament B-Politicians C-Police	0 to 10 scales	Recorded between 0 to 1. I take the average mean between them to use it as indicator.
Religion Identity	Some people think of themselves first as (Religion). Other think of themselves first as British. Which best describes how you think of yourself.. Some people think of themselves first as (Religion). Others may think of themselves first as (Black/Asian). Which best describes how you think of yourself.	5-point Likert scale	These Two questions are related to religion, national and ethnic identities. Recorded on 0 to 1 scale. Then I took the average mean between them.
Mobilisation	Worship: During the election campaign did your local place of worship encourage members to vote in the election. Party Contact: Did any of the political parties contact you, either in person or over the phone, during the recent election campaign?	Yes/No Question Yes/No Questions	

Discrimination	In the past 5 years, do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in the UK because of your ethnicity, race, skin colour, language, accent, religion, age, gender, sexuality or disability?	Yes/No Question	
Political knowledge	<p>Polling stations close at 10.00pm on election day.</p> <p>The minimum voting age is 16.</p> <p>The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for setting interest rates in the UK.</p> <p>Any registered voter can obtain a postal vote if they want one by contacting their local council and asking for a postal vote.</p> <p>The Labour party has the most MPs from ethnic minorities.</p>	Yes/No Questions	I took the average mean between them.
<i>Integration</i>	<p>Do you or your family do any of the following things?</p> <p>Sent Xmas cards -Sent Valentines cards -Sent parents day card -Put up Xmas tree -Wear poppy -Give Xmas presents.</p>	3 Scales	Recoded 0 to 1 and took the average mean between them.

Appendix C

TABLE C.1: COMPARISON OF THE FOUR MAJOR PARTY'S MANIFESTOS AND MEND'S MANIFESTO PLEDGES



Source: MEND (2019b)

TABLE C.2 THE OBJECTIVE OF CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM FORUMS

N	Objectives
1	Engage with Muslims of all persuasions and encourage them to participate in political life at all levels, from grassroots to Parliament.
2	Engage with Muslims and all other communities and encourage them to support and vote for the Conservative Party.
3	Undertake campaigning for the Conservative Party at elections and other times.
4	Encourage Muslims to make effective and positive contributions to the development of an inclusive and cohesive society in the United Kingdom.
5	Work to maintain and build bridges with all communities and religions within the United Kingdom.
6	Strive to maintain unity, brotherhood, tolerance and goodwill between all persuasions of Muslims and with the wider community and strengthen its social and cultural heritage
7	Collate factual information on issues and circumstances relevant to Muslims of all persuasions in the UK.
8	Create an enabling environment to influence policy development from within the Conservative Party and safeguard the interests of Muslims.
9	Strive to improve the quality of life of all Muslims through addressing issues including health, education, women's issues, disability, integration and mentorship of prospective Parliamentary and other candidates within the Conservative Party's wider objectives.

TABLE C.3 ADDITIONAL TEXTUAL EVIDENCE FROM MCB.

N	Source	Quotation Text
1	MCB (2005)	“The MCB will also be revealing their selection of constituencies around the UK with substantial Muslim populations where they shall be holding regional hustings meetings with parliamentary candidates. The MCB shall also be holding public meetings with leaders of the main political parties, the details of which shall be announced at the launch”.
2	MCB (2019e)	“...do not participate and use our vote, we will be responsible for the unhealthy outcomes of any elections. Our failure to vote for the right candidates can mean that some others will win the elections easily; and if they have discriminatory policies or attitudes, then that would impact the whole of society, including Muslims.”
3	MCB (2019f)	“Following the result of the UK General Election last week returning Boris Johnson as Prime Minister, we understand some Muslims across the UK are growing increasingly concerned about their safety and their future in the UK. The Muslim Council of Britain fully appreciates and shares the concerns of British Muslims about the negative impact the current Conservative Government may have on Muslims and Muslim communities. As is widely documented, the Conservative Party has an immense problem with Islamophobia which has been highlighted many times, yet it refuses to take meaningful action”.
4	MCB (2006)	“..this rally will aim to help British Muslims to express their feelings peacefully and will call upon the newspapers concerned to recognise and apologise for the enormous offence and needless distress they have caused to millions of Muslims across the world....The MCB commends the vast majority of British Muslims for the restraint and dignity which they have demonstrated to date and calls upon them to continue to be vigilant and resist provocation by extremist elements. All of us together must ensure that our protests remain firmly within the bounds of the law at all times.”