

**Why is death as a topic not included in a school curriculum?
The psychosocial reasons for the denial of death in UK schools.**

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Abstract

Death is a human concern and yet, the topic of death is one which is rarely discussed in an open and frank way between adults and children. A genealogical approach is used with the concept of habitus as a set of dispositions and a way of being. The changes in socialisation practices are mapped and psychosocial reasons are offered for the denial of death in UK schools.

Using a psychodynamic theoretical framework, the thesis explains how stressful experiences are demonstrated through practices in the field of education, and how schools as containers, use collective defence mechanisms to guard against their primitive survival anxieties.

Equal importance is given to the practical logic of everyday action as well as the objective structures within which the action takes place. Semi structured texts are used to access current practises in school alongside autoethnography and an anti-narcissistic form of reflexivity which considers the teaching practice of the researcher as a potential source of information.

For the inclusion of the topic of death in a curriculum there has to be a transformation to current practices in some schools. This involves addressing the anxieties which defend against discussions of the topic of death and adopting school practices to enable a commensal relation in a containing environment.

Key Words.

Socialisation, Habitus, Education, Social Defence Systems, Containment

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Introduction

Death is an intriguing subject because it is everywhere but nowhere. Death is something everyone will experience for themselves, but no one can ever really know. We cannot comment or reflect on our own death after the fact, and we can only experience and survive it indirectly as we live through the death of others. Death is indeed a fascinating topic, but it is one which is rarely discussed in an open and frank way especially between adults and children.

Death is an emotional topic, but this should not be a reason for restricted conversations. As a topic, death is one which should be discussed more freely and more often by everyone. Education plays a crucial role in developing attitudes and if the topic of death were discussed in schools, eventually the conversations about death would become more commonplace in wider society. Yet, death as a topic is not included in a school curriculum.

It may be that the producers of the National Curriculum consider children as being too young to engage with discussions of death or indeed that the topic itself is unimportant. However, given that the core purpose of the National Curriculum itself is to prepare children for the future and death is an inescapable part of our future, it is a topic worthy of discussion, especially in light of the Covid 19 pandemic.

This led me to question the reasons why death as a topic is not included in a school curriculum.

Death is spoken about in school through narratives such as Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*. In subjects such as Personal and Social Health Education, the emphasis is on the prevention of death because the discussions focus on the dangers associated with undesirable and dangerous behaviours such as drug and alcohol abuse. Some, aspects of education focus on death through the lens of religious education and the possibilities of an Afterlife.

Death is an important topic because it has an impact on the social identity of the living. The bereaved become a widow, or an orphan and yet, when a parent loses a child there is no actual word for this loss. It is as though the pain of this loss goes beyond the capacity of a word. The experience of loss is often communicated through music or the arts because it brings the bereaved into contact with powerful emotions which at other times are repressed.

Cultural practises play a large role in the ways emotions concerning death are expressed. For example, a new-born child in Borneo is only given their own name if all of its siblings are alive, if not, the child takes on the necronym of the last dead sibling which can only be abandoned after the birth of a new sibling (Levi-Strauss 1966: p192). This practice serves a purpose because it gives the family time to process the loss whilst at the same time reminds them of the lost child as a spirit in a living body. A similar practice happens in our society when adults give children a middle name taken from a late relative as this can often serve as a memory of the dead. However, although this can ignite a conversation about the person who has died, it is not necessarily a discussion or consideration about one's own death.

Discussions of death are generally restricted to a professional situation where 'experts' such as those in the medical profession confirm the prognosis of a premature baby, the terminally ill or the infirmed. Death is addressed by insurance companies to explain 'critical life cover' and legal professionals talk about probate or 'dying intestate'. Death is 'managed' away by funeral companies to relieve the bereaved family of the burden. Yet, death belongs to us, and we should be able to talk about it beyond a professional space.

Death can be a difficult subject to broach and as the professional is outside of the situation this can help to remove the emotions from the topic. Professionals often use technical language, and this is an indication of their high level of expertise. This level of knowledge convinces others of the expert's competence and provides people with greater confidence in the professionals' abilities. This is especially the case when there is an indicator that life is coming to its end or after a person has died.

Death is rarely discussed with children as there are some adults who hold the idea that childhood itself is a period of innocence. Yet, talking about death in school could help to remove its obscurity which is often contextualised through narratives and clouds death as a topic (Bettelheim 1975). If death were discussed more openly in school, it would benefit people as a source of therapeutic intervention. Conversations about death may provide additional reassurance to that which is currently offered in schools because as institutions, schools have different cultures. Thus, the fundamental differences between schools and any discussions about death which take place depend on the ethos of the school and the context.

Although death is an emotional topic, the practices within schools may not address the emotional aspects of teaching as a profession. Teachers are involved in a web of interconnected relationships in and beyond the workplace with the child as the shared focus (Youell 2006). It may be that there is an inherent emotional aspect of teaching which is incompatible with the actual purposes and demands of the profession itself. In our rapidly changing society, the responsibilities associated with protection and education are complex and teaching is considered to be the third most stressful occupation in the UK.¹

Conversations about death could result in great upset, especially for someone who is recently bereft, but they may also provide a therapeutic opportunity for a person to express their emotions. Indeed, if death was spoken about more often, the identification of complicated cases and subsequent referrals to an expert would be easier. Or perhaps in time, there would be no need for an expert as the conversation about death would become more commonplace. In a paradoxical way, life and death weave a fascinating pattern of interrelationships and the more we understand the pattern, the more we can actually live our lives (Pincus 1976). Instead, our discussions about death are often in the abstract or we talk about the death of others in a third person way. This is very different to discussing and contemplating the prospect of one's own demise.

¹ All You Need to Know About Teacher Stress [33 Stats for 2021] (markinstyle.co.uk) July 26th, 2021.

Research question and aims of the thesis.

The principal research question asks why is the topic of death absent in a school curriculum?

The aim of this thesis is to identify the psychosocial barriers to discussions of death as a topic in schools and suggest ways of removing the barriers to enable such discussions.

Objectives

Emerging from the aims are four objectives.

1. To trace, map, and explain the psychosocial progression of habitus as a set of anxious dispositions which are associated with the child and regenerated through primary and secondary socialisation practices.
2. To explain why the dispositions are a barrier to having open discussions about the topic of death.
3. To explain how schools defend against the dispositions of habitus through their practices.
4. To suggest alternative way of practices in school which enable discussions about the topic of death.

Ontological position

I am influenced by Martin Heidegger (1927/2015) and the idea that our 'being' is in the world and we are an ingredient just like the land, oceans, and mountains. As a part of the world, human animals like non-human animals have a fundamental purpose and this is to teach the young of the species how to survive being in the world.

Our being in the world is a complex process because we interact with the world on a psychosocial level and how we fulfil our responsibility towards the young of the species is more often than not determined by the rules of a given society. Yet, we also bring our own childhood experiences to the role of parenting which means that there are discrepancies between individual experiences and the socialisation demands and expectations of society.

Society has evolved and the ways in which we address the notion of survival have changed. Yet, death as one of our ultimate concerns, is a part of the human condition. Regardless of our social conditions or even our age, death as an ultimate concern is a universal constant and therefore an intrinsic part of our being. Thus, death as the extinction of life is the 'sameness' of our being.

The ontological sameness of beings comes before everything else. Heidegger's notion of 'thrownness' explains this as us all being flung into a world, and we are therefore thrown into its conditions. However, this is not my attempt to dismiss important individual factors such as ethnicity, gender, and class which impact social conditions, but rather

to emphasise the ontological sameness of the species itself. Thus, in this thesis I focus on the different *ways* of being in the world and to do this I use the concept of habitus.

Epistemology

As a species we are complicated and there are a multitude of reasons why we do the things we do. We have been 'civilised' to behave in a particular manner, yet if we were transported to an epoch in the past we would view our society at that time as 'uncivilised' (Elias 1994).

As we are 'in' the world, we cannot divorce ourselves from our involvement with history because we are the very embodiment of the past, present, and the future. We cannot disregard our notions of time because this is how we make sense of who we are and our place in the world. Seen in this way, 'history' itself is socially and psychologically created and the 'unconscious' is never anything other than the forgetting of history (Bourdieu 1977 p79).

Death is an ultimate human concern and I use an interdisciplinary lens to interpret the psychosocial influences of changes to socialisation practices, assess the purposes of the practices and offer explanations about why we 'unconsciously' reproduce certain practices in structures (Bhaskar 1979 p44).

There is no single origin to historical developments but rather a multiplicity of factors which converge to produce an event (Nietzsche 1878/1994). This thesis explores the convergence of events and the subsequent psychosocial barriers to having open and frank discussions about the topic of death between adults and children. In this

genealogical way and given that death is a shared human concern, I aim to show why the topic is not included in a school curriculum.

Structure of the thesis

There are multiple interrelated factors which are barriers to having open and frank discussions about the topic of death between adults and children however for the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the following three.

The first factor involves the ambiguities associated with the shifting definitions of death. The second factor involves the construction and meanings associated to the child which make discussions about death difficult. The third factor is based on the ways in which the other two factors are repeated through the process of socialisation. As such, in Chapter One I review the existing literature with a focus on these three factors.

How did we get to this position?

In Chapter Two, I use my version of genealogy to contextualise the three factors mentioned above and employ the concept of habitus to trace their development and progression. I explain how the ambiguities associated with the changing definitions of death and the subsequent constructions of the child are generated through socialisation practices to the extent, that there is an assimilation between social and mental structures. Thus, habitus is subjective in terms of its dispositions and also

objective because it is a way of being which is demonstrated through action. As such, habitus is regarded as 'natural' and can hardly be distinguished from the field of its production (Costa 2015 p.7). Habitus also serves as a justification for the actual approach to practices because it is an internal archive of personal experiences (Bourdieu 2000 p.138). Therefore, the concept of habitus is used to objectively show the subjective in terms of our psychosocial engagement in the world.

In Chapter Three, I use a psychodynamic theoretical framework to explain how we respond to the world in which we are thrown into. I focus on the biological mechanisms we use to guard against our ultimate concern of death and how these defences are used in practices in social systems. I discuss the notion of emotional containment as a way to enable discussions about the topic of death.

In Chapter Four, I discuss Bourdieu's Logic of Practice (1992) as this underpins my ontological and epistemological position and explains my research approach.

Bourdieu draws on his own fieldwork and anthropological text to unfold a theoretical perspective which offers equal importance to the practical logic of everyday action as well as the objective structures within which the action takes place. I draw upon my own practises in the objective structure of a school in which action takes place and refer to experiences provided by current practitioners in schools.

In Chapter Five, I refer to the theoretical framework and discuss how current practices in UK schools guard against discussions about the topic death through their practices. In this research, I explain how the practices within schools are used to defend against primitive anxieties and therefore instead of considerations of death the focus is on continued existence. I offer suggestions on how schools can transform from places

which unconsciously defend against the emotions associated with death to environments where death as a topic can be discussed.

Chapter One Literature Review

There are three interrelated factors which I consider to be the main barriers to having open and frank discussions about the topic of death. The first factor involves the ambiguities associated with defining death itself, which is a clear indication that it is not actual death but the knowledge of death that creates problems (Elias 1985 p5). Indeed, if instead we consider the term survival, then in simple terms non-survival is the end of life which is death. However, defining the term death is not a simple matter because some people create and change the definitions. As such, the term death is used to denote the state of being dead, the event of death and the process of dying (Scarre 2007 p5). As such, I will first focus on each of these in turn before I address the other two barriers.

The State of Being Dead (Medical Explanations)

Although the state of being dead seems obvious, the definitions of the actual state are disputed. Prior to the 1960s, from a biological standpoint human death was primarily understood and diagnosed using the cardio- pulmonary criteria.² However, the advancement in medical technology has meant that these biological functions can be artificially maintained or replaced. A later document in 1979 stated that brain death represents the stage at which a patient becomes truly dead, and this is point at which

² The confirmed absence of the heart and lungs as two vital signs meant that the person was declared dead.

all functions of the brain have permanently and irreversibly ceased.³ Yet, during the 1980s and 1990s there was further medical uncertainty against this diagnosis as the definition of death changed to the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness, combined with irreversible loss of the capacity to breathe.⁴

On the one hand, defining death in this manner, highlights the practical pressures which shape the consensus. Yet, on the other hand, this also highlights the ways that we avoid death at all costs. The changing definitions and practices used to extend life emphasise the difficulties with accepting that life has to end. There is no actual consensus as to why brain-dead patients can be treated as dead because the decision is based on a prognosis. Yet, a prognosis is not the same as a present status, just as dying in the future is not the same as being dead. Such definitions of death also highlight the divisions between those who believe brain death as death as a whole body, or as the signal the irreversible end of mental life.

As this definition of death is determined by physical indicators, some also question the ethical issues associated with the rise in technological innovations, especially in terms of human reproduction and this raises the question of when human life actually begins and ends (Heitman, 2002: Shilling, 2003: Brown and Webster, 2004: Ettore, 2002).

³ Conference of the Medical Royal Colleges (1979) "Diagnosis of death" *British Medical Journal* i 332; also, *Lancet* i 261-262.

⁴ Working Group of Royal College of Physicians (1995) "Criteria for the diagnosis of brain stem death" *Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London* 29, 381-382.

A recurring theme in the work above suggests that considerations of death are shifted further away from the subjective towards an objective position. The state of being dead is a legal declaration which is bound up in bureaucracy, and processes. On the one hand, this demonstrates how discussions about the topic of death itself are firmly within the professional domain of medicine and the law. Yet on the other hand, the definitions and subsequent meanings and practices themselves are ascribed and carried out by individuals. Furthermore, the assumption is that some individuals such as those in the medical or legal profession can actually halt being subjective, but this can only be demonstrated on a surface level through their practices. We cannot detach ourselves from our subjectivity because it is part of our being, yet this highlights how some people have developed a set of dispositions which try to separate their subjective self.

The Event of Death (Philosophical Explanations)

Although we can experience the death of others as a witness and through this, we may feel a sense of loss, we have no access to the loss of Being which the dying man suffers (Heidegger (1927/2015) p 282). Living involves dying at the same time but the actual state of being dead is neither of these two and there is little doubt that such considerations of the state of being dead are difficult.

Firstly, the uncertainty associated with the changing medical definitions of the state of being dead, have meant that the topic of death itself is even harder to address because death has moved further away and into the unknown. Secondly, technological advancements have meant that considerations of being dead are

distant, unlike in the past when life expectancy was limited. Yet, I am not suggesting that discussions of death were easier because we can only die our own death.

I am suggesting that those who have a set of dispositions which separate the subjective from the objective have a goal to extend life rather than a consideration of death.

Death is our 'own most possibility' yet it poses a critical obstacle in our ability to be aware of ourselves as 'being' (Heidegger (1927/2015 p 248). Thus, the enigma surrounding death itself means that it never truly belongs to us because we have not actually died our own death. However, once we are dead, we no longer have any possibilities and therefore, by 'being- in- the-world' and 'being towards death' one can live authentically to live their possibilities.

Authenticity and inauthentic are two modes or conditions by which beings determine their own possibilities. However, the 'conditions' do not derive their meaning or value, they just are what they are. In the authentic mode, one can win over oneself, or conversely lose and never win oneself, whilst inauthentic is a mode in which one forget that one can choose and win oneself. (Heidegger 1927/2015 p 53). Thus, inauthenticity as a mode is one which only embodies the reality that being has been 'thrown' into. This mode of being means that we live life without ever considering the possibilities at our disposal about other ways of living our existentiality. Yet, the world we are thrown into as infants is one which relies on the practices of other people.

On the one hand, to experience authenticity, we have to make sense of 'nothingness' because this is what throws us back to the sense making world with an awareness that there is no ground under our feet and that we are doing this alone. Yet, on the other

hand, the only route to nothingness is through somethingness. Yet, 'nothingness' in a philosophical sense is in relation to existential consciousness (Heidegger, 1927/2015).

When we consider the term itself, 'nothing' it is used as a way to describe the absence of substantive matter, whether this be physical, material, ideal or symbolic.

Metaphysically, nothing represents one half of a binary, paired with positive quantities of something, anything, and everything (Scott 2019) or spaces of infinity and eternity (Levinas 1979). The term is further disambiguated into two distinctive forms:

'nothingness' is the absence of something specific, while 'nothing' is the total absence of everything. For example, Mathematics uses zero to denote a null or missing value and Physics recognises vacuums and cosmological black holes (Barrow 2000). The cultural performing arts of music, comedy and drama play subversively with silence and display negative space (Green 2011). Yet even nothingness and nothing is always relational to something and somethingness.

In other words, when we actually consider our life, there is a 'compulsion' to also consider the alternative possibility. One way we consider the 'nothingness' is therefore to create a paradigm which provides an explanation of the unknown and in doing so nothingness is materialised into something. This may be a reason why religion plays an important role in life because an explanation is provided for that we cannot know.

Heidegger uses the term *Das Man* which is the socially constituted set of norms that we necessarily belong to, but the ongoing development of authenticity also involves an immersion of one's facticity which embraces what Heidegger calls our 'historicity'. In other words, being in the world has a historical origin and beings have developed

through history. Historicity determines the structure of existence but in such a way that the authentic human being is never an isolated individual. Yet, developing authenticity is a lifelong process and actually involves radically considering the possibilities at our disposal. However, an authentic being can never rebel against or overcome its own socio-historical situation because a being is always already a historical being.

Therefore, when we are thrown into the world, we are part of those existing conditions. Although one's death does have an impact on others, Heidegger's considerations of death have been deemed as 'morbid solipsism'. Heidegger assumes that only oneself and one's experience exists and by doing so overlooks the social and cultural dimensions of death. As such, Heidegger does not consider the idea that some people want to actually live because of other people and that death marks an end in their relations with other people. In other words, as beings we are 'parts' of each other's world (Solomon 1998 pp 152-176).

Yet, the consideration about death for Heidegger is in the first instance a fundamental condition of the ontology of 'being' because when we are dead, we cannot engage with the concept. Furthermore, Heidegger's ontological focus does not overlook a consideration of the social world because he recognises our 'being' towards others. The recognition of different social practices of a specific culture make up the 'world' of that culture and the shared public 'worlds' constitute the standards by which 'beings' of a culture act. Therefore, rather than thinking of 'in' as a spatial indicator, it is actually an indication of the involvement with no distance existing either physical or mental between us and our world. In other words, *Das Man* as the socially constituted set of norms that we necessarily belong and distantiality are equally inescapable differences that sets us apart from others. However, they each provide a framework without

inhibiting the possibility of an authentic existence. The key point this highlight is that social norms are made by humans and therefore the reluctance to discuss death is one which has been passed on through generations.

Heidegger's emphasis is that an acceptance of one's own inevitability allows us to consider the impact of our absence on others whilst we are still alive and in doing so, we enable others to do the same. However, as death is a ubiquitous human experience, some individuals react to loss with a greater intensity (Bonanno & Kaltman 2001; Stroebe et al. 2007). Heidegger does not overlook the fact that death is an emotional consideration but rather that discussions about death before the event is a bridge to an acceptance of the inevitable for all, including those who are left behind.

Whether or not we would prefer to live, or die is not really an option as death is inevitable. Heidegger makes an important point in that the social world in which we are thrown into already has a history. We inherit our social and personal histories, but this does not mean that we have to totally reject these in order to be authentic. Rather, we oscillate between the modes, and we coexist with other beings who do the same. Thus, despite our relationality, open and frank conversations about death are rare especially between adults and children.

The meanings we associate with death are shared and reproduced through social practices which unite people. Yet, the meanings associated with the practices are constructed by humans. On the one hand, this connotes a beautiful togetherness but on the other hand, ontologically it adds to the distantiality of the self from the self because it dissolves one's own care into the care of others.

Heidegger is not against caring for others, but his prime focus is on achieving the mode of authenticity because an acceptance of one's own death allows for possibilities. However, as there is a grand movement of inauthenticity, Heidegger suggests that we have all given up our otherness to others. Yet, the fact that we do this, highlights how difficult it is to address the fact that death is a natural end of life. Nielson proposes that we should 'just face' it (2000 p 155) but death is not a comforting fact to accept.

Furthermore, the notion that Heidegger does not consider the idea that some people want to actually live, put forward by Soloman 1998, also overlooks the fact that some people may want to die. Indeed, both these positions are possible for any one of us at given time in our lives however, euthanasia and assisted suicide are illegal under English law.⁵ This is not to say that if someone wanted to take their life that such laws would prevent them from doing so. Rather, that both the medical and legal frameworks focus on the extension of life and the prevention of death. This approach suggests that life and death are separated but this is clearly not the case as each day we live we die a little.

The Process of Dying (Psychosocial Explanations)

It is difficult to image the world without me and although I can imagine my funeral and do so as a living onlooker (Scarre 2007 p9). In *Psychology and the Soul* (1950) Rank argued that the primitive belief in the body and soul was an expression of a deep-rooted belief in immortality. The belief was that which made people deny rather than

⁵ SN04857.pdf (parliament.uk)

fear their death because the idea of an immortal body soul comprised a denial of death and this cancelled all possible threats.

The facts of death and one's denial of death brought the idea of the soul into being and therefore the problem of death seemed to face primitive man less. In primitive society there was a belief in unrealistic spiritual forces whereas the modern world largely denies spirituality and is instead realistic (Rank 1950 pp11-14). However, I suggest that the 'realistic' is achieved because of the uncertainty about the existence of spiritual forces and that science provides some of the population with a 'perceived' certainty. Indeed, the shift from primitive to modern society itself was through the efforts of some of the population who were not content to accept beliefs which could not be explained and others who were able to convince people of a spiritual force, I suggest that the notion of a soul was a way to manage our ultimate concern about death. Indeed, the spiritual aspect of considering life and death involves the idea of immortality because the soul itself is a simple entity without parts and is therefore imperishable (Plato, Phaedo in Rouse trans 1956 pp 460-521). This is not problematic in terms of discussing the topic of death because such beliefs provide some people with comfort. However, the actual narratives are created and propagated by people because they serve a range of purposes which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter Two.

The state of being dead and the event of death are different to the process of dying as in some instances, dying is not the process which necessarily terminates in the sudden event of death. We cannot know death directly and the research about the topic has generally been based on the individual's experience of loss and grief (Freud (1917; Bowlby 1980; Parkes 1972; Klass., Silverman., Nickman 1996; Strobe & Schutt

1999; Bonanno 2002). Yet, dying is a process in which life is gradually extinguished (Scarre 2007, p8). As such, this definition is one which considers the psychosocial processes not only of the individual who is dying, but also the impact of the death itself on others because death cannot be reduced or separated from life (Lifton 1979). Literature such as Tolstoy's (1866) poignant novella '*The Death of Ivan Ilych*' applies a first and third person perspective and this allows the reader to consider death as a psychosocial process. Tolstoy's novella is an example which illustrates how death not only marks the end of one's own experiences and existence, but the ways the actual event lives on in other people's lives. Although death, dying and being dead are all human considerations reflecting on one's own death is a very difficult task, but the task is one which is not unsurmountable.

The Kübler-Ross (1969) approach brought death into the domain of the living, and this was a means to highlight how unconscious defence mechanisms are experienced not only by those leaving life but also by those who have not. As such, death is highlighted as an experience and is something which one goes through, but the process is shared as although one person is dying physically, they are both dying emotionally.⁶

Although 'in our unconscious, death is never possible in regard to ourselves' Kübler-Ross ran educational seminars about dying (Kübler-Ross, 1969 p2). This work highlighted how even the dying can and should benefit from talking about death. Through this ground-breaking research the topic of death is discussed more than before, but largely within the context of the end of life and the discussions largely

⁶ I discuss defence mechanisms in greater detail in Chapter Three as part of the theoretical framework.

remain restricted to Hospices. As such, the conversations about death take place when life is ending rather than discussions about the topic in the here and now.

Notwithstanding, the work of Kübler-Ross was highly influential and invoked other stages of analysis for dying and bereavement such as shock and despair (Averill 1968: Parkes:1972). However, stage theories generally are critiqued for their deterministic pathways because these implicitly encourage labelling if there is any deviation (Kastenbaum 1975, Germain 1980, and Charmaz 1980). In recent decades there has been a broadening of attention which considers cognitive, social, cultural, and spiritual dimensions of the study of grief with a greater emphasis on the reconstruction of meaning as the critical issue in grief (Niemeyer and Sands, 2011 pp9-22). Yet, the fact that we construct and reconstruct meanings through our experiences and practices highlights that the function itself serves an intrinsic purpose. Indeed, the reconstruction of meanings and subsequent practices have made frank and open conversations about the topic of death even more difficult.

Overall definitions of death are complicated as the meanings we ascribe are personal and based on our experiences of loss. For the purpose of this project the definition of death I use is the complete absence of a physical material body which has also been buried or put to rest. I use this definition because the dead 'live on' in the subjective sense through one's memories and also if a person is not physically present this does not necessarily mean that they are actually dead.

We are all engaged in the process of dying and as it is a universal concern it is worthy of having open and frank conversations about the topic. However, although we are

thrown into 'history', we are not self-sufficient because we depend on others who are already in the world. As such, the nature of death changes in the course of social development and ideas and rituals themselves become an aspect of socialization. (Elias 1985, p5). This point brings me to the second barrier to having open and frank discussions about the topic of death and involves the meanings and construction of childhood and the child.

Meanings and construction of Childhood

I have explained some of the difficulties associated with definitions of death and this is also the case in terms of defining the child and childhood. The understanding of childhood and the view of children is very much an adult projection as we often 'unconsciously' see them as what we are not, as what we fear and what we miss (Mouritsen 2002, p. 34). Thus, the emotions we feel as our adult self are connected to our child self, and this is an example of the psychosocial oscillation between the past and future. However, childhood and the history of children are two different things, as 'childhood is a shifting set of ideas' (Cunningham 1995: p1). This immediately raises two issues.

The first point is that childhood is an adult construction and to address this I provide a brief overview of the definitions of childhood from a range of different perspectives. However, the second point is more complex because discussions of childhood cannot be isolated from history. Yet, as the periods of history or 'epistomes' are organised around a specific world view, what we are today cannot be traced back to an original moment or event (Foucault, 1973). As such, there is no single origin to historical

developments but rather a multiplicity of factors which converge to produce an event (Nietzsche 1994 [1878]).

For the purpose of this thesis, discourse is defined as practices and forms by which individuals imbue reality with meaning.⁷ 'Meaning' therefore, is my understanding and interpretation of these emotional states and this emphasises my epistemological position. Although we are in 'the world' and interact with our environments psychosocially, we absorb our environment differently, and the ways in which we respond to the environment involves our past experiences. Furthermore, our 'being in the world' is also influenced by our experiences with other 'beings in the world' and the ways we respond to others depend on the context, social roles, positions, history, and the interaction of these emotional states. Therefore, the way I interpret the events are based on my experiences and interactions in the world and thus the genealogical approach I adopt is my version of the events.

Brief overview of the definitions of childhood

Childhood has been described as a spectrum of everyday attitudes and professional discourses which can be understood as socially constructed and are specific structural components of many societies (James and Prout 1990). Childhood has also been explained as a product of culture (Kehily 2008) or a distinct life stage that occupies a

⁷ Ruiz, J.R. (2009) *Sociological discourse analysis: Methods and Logic*. Forum: Qualitative Social Research 10 (20 Article 26).

separate status from adults (Pilcher 1995). However, the shift in practices and a greater trend towards providing the same rights for children and adults means that childhood is disappearing (Postman 1994). Yet, childhood is a separate culture which is created by children and is separate to adults (Opie 1993).

There is no single universal experience of childhood rather it is based on a range of features such as class, gender, and ethnic differences (Bhatti 1999; Bonke 1999; Brannen 1994; Cunningham 1995; Howard 2001; Hillman 1993; Woodruff 1993). Although humans go through the same physical process of ageing, different societies construct or define this process differently (Pilcher & Wagg 1997).

Childhoods are therefore defined differently, depending on the discourse and age categories and are to some extent, arbitrary divisions that are subject to the development of societal, ideological, and political discourses (Plastow 2015).

However, discourses are more than just ways of thinking and producing meaning because they constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind, and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern' (Weedon, 1987: 105).

We can only really 'experience' life emotionally and regardless of the various forms and many manifestations, the notion of childhood is emotional in its nature. However, it is difficult to define emotions because they are complex states and there are many questions which remain regarding their essential nature (Lawler 1999; Marcus: 2000). Although it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition most importantly, is the fact that emotions are never neutral, they are always about 'something'.

Emotions as physiological states are usually autonomous bodily responses to certain external or internal events. As physiological states, emotions are generated

subconsciously and the ability to experience emotions depends on the depth of information processing. We have emotions without having feelings, however we cannot have feelings without having emotion. Thus, feelings are the subjective experiences of emotions and involve four components, the situation, the details, an appraisal, and a response. Although, the response to feeling an emotion includes physical changes such as blushing and behaviours such as crying, the interaction between each of the four components of the emotion produce the individual experience (Gross 2007 p 2-24).

For Hockenbury, & Hockenbury, (2004), emotions are complex psychosocial states which respond to change and subsequently influence our thoughts and behaviour over time, and this raises three important points. The first point is that our emotions are physiological components, but they are shaped and acquired in the social context, and how one behaves in a given situation often depends on social norms and rules.

The second point is that one cannot determine exactly how the emotions themselves interact on a psychological level because individuals respond differently.

The third point is that social norms are historically and culturally variable and therefore open to change, but our emotions are associated with our experiences. As such, it can be said that emotional experiences underpin the changes in historical and cultural practices.

We do not experience isolated emotions, one at a time, nor do the emotions constitute static states in time because our emotional lives are dynamic processes of multiple sequences and emotional structures (Williamson, 2011). Thus, the meanings and practices associated with death and indeed the child are based on the norms and expectations of a given society. However, we are the creators and producers of meaning

and the connection between the child and death at the very basic level of understanding is the dichotomy of beginning and end, or simply life and death.

In terms of having conversations about death, some adults have concerns about a child's actual understanding of the concept and base this on the 'relationship' between age and comprehension of death (Nagy, 1948). Yet, this concern comes from an adult perspective and highlights the tendency to overlook the importance of a child's own experiences of death. To address this, there is an increased emphasis on childhood participation. Bowie (2000) focused on students' and teachers' views on the subject of death education in school curriculum with 73% of the students stating that death and dying is a topic they think about. The study also supported the belief that a curriculum teaching death and dying needed to be developed to assist in educating students prior to the occurrence of a death.

Jackson & Colwell (2001) looked at children's views of when to teach about death. Sixty-five percent of the students believed that the topic of death should have been introduced at primary school, 62% of students reported that it would be better to talk about death than to avoid it, and 58% of students reported they wanted to know more about death. Importantly, although they often experience a death with little or no anticipatory guidance or knowledge, children are willing to discuss death (McGuire et al 2013). These studies suggest that it is a teacher who is reluctant to have conversations about death rather than the child. There are charities, teachers and academics who have consistently highlighted the need to integrate grief education into the statutory curriculum in England (Dawson, et al. 2023). Such studies highlight that there is a need to express and share the emotions associated with death as a human

concern as unresolved grief can affect a child's emotional and physical wellbeing (Fauth et al, 2009; Akerman & Stratham, 2014; McLaughlin et al, 2019). However, such studies also assume that adults have resolved their grief which is not necessarily the case especially as the topic of death is one which is not discussed between adults and children in an open and frank way.

In this society, childhood is a distinct period, and the parameters are reinforced through practices which are informed by legal frameworks. In terms of childhood innocence, the discourse focuses on protection and sexual abuse (Kehily 2008). Even though child sexuality itself was discussed in greater detail in the early in 20th century (Freud 1905), childhood innocence discourse would probably object to such discussion and refute the notion that children have sexuality.

The child innocence discourse is a means to socialise the whole of society because it not only monitors all human behaviours in relation to the child, but also defines the meaning and expectations for all those who are outside of the childhood construct. Therefore, although the child is an active being with the capacity to understand, adults determine the suitability of material for them to understand. This brings me to the third factor which is the process of socialisation because other two factors I have discussed are reproduced through socialisation practices.

The Socialisation Process Parsons and Erikson

Socialisation is the mechanism through which individuals internalise values and are motivated to act in relation to specific norms that define the social structure (Scott 2020). In *Social Structures and Personality* (1964) Parsons was influenced by the work of Freud and focused on ego development in terms of socialisation into the wider community

In his explanation Parson began with the mother- baby dyad and with the family as a whole. From here the ego is developed through peer groups and the education system and at each stage the ego becomes stronger. For Parsons, people oriented towards one another in expressive ways because they seek to achieve some sense of solidarity and shared meaning. As such, the relation of love epitomized expressive orientations but in addition to personal love, Parsons regarded patriotism as an example of an expressive relation (Scott 1995, p48).

In terms of primary socialisation, Parsons saw the family as the vital emotional centre of its members lives and one that was differentiated from the instrumental of work and life. The family are loved for what they are, but in the outside world, status depends on achievement. Although Parson's highlighted a psychosocial interplay, his application of Freudian language reinforced a functionalist determinism.

The notions of family Parsons presented were based on the nuclear form and the responsibilities of the family are associated to such ascription. Indeed, the 'family' exists in nearly every society, but takes many different forms and in terms of biological

functioning a woman bears a child. Yet just because one is a mother or indeed a father does not necessarily mean that a child is 'loved' because the concept of love itself is socially constructed.

The social construction of what love 'looks like' is tied to a set of expectations which are reinforced by a particular ideas and subsequent meanings that one should be responsible for that which has been created. Indeed, the actual changes to the ascribed meanings of love are created by some of the population and then demonstrated through socialisation practices. Thus, the feelings one has towards their offspring do not necessarily align with expectations of a given society because they involve personal histories inherited by their own experiences.

There is a notion of consensus which is evident in Parsons's view of the psyche, and this overlooks any internal conflicts because the most important adjustment is one between the individual and society. Yet, personality develops as inborn desires clash with social constraints and although development is social, it is in response to biological drives (Craib 1989). Furthermore, although Parson's concept of internalization is a way to understand the relationship between culture and personality, it is one which is closer to Mead's (1934) conception of growth and the self through the internalisation of a 'generalised other' role taking and general social expectation (Lemert 2017: p168). Parson's account of socialisation also suggests that it is a linear and smooth process rather than one which is complicated (Waddell 1998). Indeed, socialisation is 'naturally' a complex task because adults bring their own unique experiences to the process.

In the 1950s, Erickson built upon Freud's (1905) Theory of Psychosexual Development and drew parallels in childhood stages. Erickson (1902 –1994) expanded and extended the stages and included the influence of social dynamics and psychosocial development.

Erikson

Erikson's used the notion of epigenesis to explain that all growth and development follow an analogue pattern 'the healthy child if properly guided can be trusted to conform to the epigenetic laws of development (Erickson 1959/2013: p 28). In other words, organs develop through a sequence of steps in which the cells differentiate. In the sequence of steps each organ has its time of origin. However, if the organ misses its time of ascendance it is doomed as an entity and the whole hierarchy of organs are endangered. Therefore, the result of 'normal' development is a proper relationship of size and function amongst all body organs.

Erikson examined the stages of personality changes and the development of self via stages in relation to social constraints, and the idea that new decisions are faced throughout the lifespan. The decisions or turning points occurred during childhood, adolescence, and adulthood and each stage of development is defined by two opposing psychological tendencies. One psychological tendency is positive and termed syntactic, and the other tendency is negative and termed dystonic. An ego strength or maldevelopment develops from this psychological tendency.⁸

⁸ Knight ZG. A proposed model of psychodynamic psychotherapy linked to Erik Erikson's eight stages of psychosocial development. Clin Psychology Psychotherapy. 2017 Sep;24(5):1047-1058.

Ego

The term ego has different meanings, in Scholasticism it referred to the unity of the body and soul.⁹ In philosophy the ego is the permanency of conscious experience (Erikson 1959/2013 p89: 2013). Thus, the ego is a part of the 'psychic apparatus' which has experiences and reacts to the demands of the social and physical environment (Rycroft p43 :1968). For Erikson, if the ego strength is adopted, it can help to resolve decisions or conflicts. The adoption of an ego strength assists with subsequent stages of development and as such contributes to a stable foundation for core belief systems in relating to the self and the outer world. However, the opposite is also true with the adoption of the maldeveloped quality.

Although adopting syntonik attributes are clearly beneficial, extreme ego identity can result in fanaticism, which can create unhealthy interactions with the self and others. As such, instead of only striving for the positive quality, one must navigate the two opposing values in each stage to find a balance. Thus, straying too far towards the positive tendency can be maladaptive, while leaning too far toward the negative can be malignant. For Erikson, adult development is culturally variable and reflects the particular pattern of social relationships in which an individual is involved as they age.

⁹ I mention Scholasticism here because I discuss this medieval school of philosophy and how it was applied in education at various points in the thesis.

Furthermore, the process of adaptation would happen regardless of a society because it is something which living 'things' do, but the actual task of socialisation is not a simple process. Although all living things adapt, they do not necessarily do this at the same time because the ways we internalise the external world are different. I discuss these points further in the theoretical framework in Chapter Three.

An important aspect of Erikson's work is that consciousness, and a sense of self are central aspects of what it is to be human, and to have a social existence, whilst also highlighting that much human activity itself is unconscious (Scott pp 247-249: 2011).

Socialization is a task which relies on other humans and the outcomes themselves are dependent on a given society, time, and experiences. Erikson stages, refer to a period which can coincide with a biological state but, I suggest that over time the stages themselves are delayed or accelerated by society. On the one hand the social world is constantly moving and yet on the other hand, our experiences and the associated emotions are rooted in the past. The changes in the social world do not move at the same pace as biological ones and for some there is a lack of synchronisation. Thus, when new socialisation practices are introduced to one generation, they are overlaid onto previous practices without the time to fully process the associated meanings. Therefore, it is not necessarily the actual biological state which has altered but rather the biological response and their interaction with the social world.

In terms of social and emotional development, Erickson's work emphasises the point that if a child successfully develops trust, they will feel safe and secure in the world. As such, parents shape their child's perception and future relationships, yet as trust and mistrust exist on a spectrum there are times when an infant's needs go unmet, but this is not an issue. As infants we need to have a certain amount of mistrust of our environment to prepare us as adults to be cautious and protect ourselves when the need arises.

The key in all of Erickson's work is the importance of balance and in terms of trust, an infant's trustworthy relationships and interactions should outweigh for the most part the untrustworthy ones. As such, this will provide a child with a better sense of how to trust themselves and the world around them.

Erikson emphasised the importance of balance, but this is influenced by the conditions in which one finds themselves. On a physical level, improved health and technology means that we appear to keep pace with changes. However, on an emotional level we have attachments to practices from the past and these may not always be positive experiences. Indeed, such rapid social change can mean that some unpleasant experiences from one's past are not addressed but instead unconsciously passed down from generation to generation through the process of socialisation. I highlighted this point previously in terms of unresolved grief and I will discuss this in greater detail in the theoretical framework in Chapter Three.

Some habits and dispositions which were acceptable in the past are deemed as unsuitable or deviant in the present and I illustrate this using my version of genealogy in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the 'extended family' and the processes involved in

socialisation have altered largely in response to declining birth rates, increased life expectancy, changes in child rearing responsibilities and ageing populations. Thus, differentiation is such that more specialized institutions have emerged to take over a range of 'functions' that were once performed by the 'family'.¹⁰ As such, the functions themselves are based on observable and objective tasks which assumes an absence of the subjective.

Secondary Socialisation and Corporate parenting.

In this society, an adult parent or carer has, in most cases, a responsibility of primary socialisation before the child begins compulsory education. This is usually a term before they are 5 years old. However, there are childcare settings in which an infant can be cared for as early as 6 weeks old. In such circumstances, the actual practices associated with secondary socialisation have morphed into those associated with primary socialization.¹¹

The various processes involved in primary socialisation, which were once the remit of the parent and the family, have gradually been absorbed into wider society under the remit of 'professional' adults who perform their 'duties' on mass. However, this overlooks the fact that whilst a professional will satisfy their remit through practices, they bring their own experiences into the workplace. Contemporaneously a child is not a passive object and will respond according to their experiences. Thus, education is

¹⁰ Although there are various forms and types of family, I have used the term to signify the shift in responsibilities to other social institutions.

¹¹ In a similar fashion, a person has to stay in education or training until they are 18 years old, even though legally one can become a parent when they reach 16.

unavoidably conducted in the context of relationships which extend beyond the workplace. Furthermore, apart from the family, there is a matrix of relationships which can also involve other Agencies.¹² Although, the shared focus is always the child (Salzberger-Wittenberg 1973; Youell, 2006; Jackson & Berkeley, 2020) the actual relationship between adults and children for corporate parents is one which objectively separates the subjective nature of the actual relationship through observable practices.

In this Chapter I have reviewed the literature which is pertinent to this thesis and discussed the interrelated factors which are barriers to having open and frank discussions about the topic of death between adults and children. In Chapter Two, I will use my version of a genealogy to trace the psychosocial progression of habitus as a set of anxious dispositions which are regenerated through socialisation practices. I will explain why the dispositions are a barrier to having open discussions about the topic of death.

¹² Social Services, Health Services and various branches of the Juvenile Crime Services.

Chapter Two Part A

In the previous chapter, I focused on the interrelated barriers to having open and frank discussions about the topic of death which are reproduced through socialisation and innocence discourse. In this Chapter, I use my version of genealogy to trace, map, and explain the psychosocial progression of habitus as a set of anxious dispositions which are associated with the child and regenerated through primary and secondary socialisation practices. Through this process I will explain how the constructions of the child correspond with the changing definitions of death.

Section 1A: Socialisation through depictions of the child

The notion of innocence is associated with Christianity which arrived in Britain in the 1st Century BCE, however this was not as an organised attempt to convert the population. Indeed, as a mission Christianity came with Augustine in 597 BCE (Needham 2014: p275). To understand how the notion of innocence became associated with the child, I refer to Aries landmark text *Centuries of Childhood* (1962) and consider several critical issues which are pertinent to this thesis.

Aries used artefacts to demonstrate the historical changes in the depiction of children and made a comparison between the classical Greek period and the Romanesque period. In the former period, children were depicted in physiological forms appropriate for their age, yet in the latter period they were depicted as warriors. Such depictions

represented shifts in social thought as Greek art focused on the aesthetic nature of childhood focusing on beauty rather than the transient reality (Aries 1962: p32).

However, social thoughts rely on the mental cognitions which are brought to situations, and one had to be aware of the ways in which the artefact was represented in the first place in order to change it. Thus, the creator of an artefact was influenced by the social conditions of a given time in addition to their previous experiences.

Furthermore, as social conditions are dictated by a range of events the artefacts which are produced largely depend on the victors of conflict.

A decade prior to the Norman Conquest.

The religious conflicts between Christian and Islamic faiths and divisions within the Catholic Church resulted in the great East and West schism (Green, B (2010). This marked the formal separation of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox branches of the Catholic Church (Enns 1989: p433). The 11th century conquest meant that the English lost control over the Catholic Church and during this period children were depicted as 'little adults', this may have been because they dressed like adults or took adult responsibilities. However, given the Norman conquest, the changes in the depiction of children could have been used as a means to socialise the population. Indeed, 'Artists were unable to depict a child except as a man on a smaller scale' (Aries 1962: p8).

Beyond the tensions of the Catholic Church, religious friction impacted social practises, but to varying different degrees all of which depended on the organised religion. For example, in the religion of Islam, images or idols are forbidden and if a

Christian region was conquered, the symbolic references were removed and replaced with a different art form such as calligraphic, geometric, or abstract patterns (Khalili 2005). This was also the case in those regions taken by Christians. Yet, as all Christian imagery depicted human form, society was represented, through Jesus as the man and child, and Mary as the woman and mother (Sgarbi 2014). The population recognised themselves through such depictions and gradually internalized the expectation associated with each role (Parsons 1964).

Religious Indoctrination

The Catholic Church played a pivotal role in moulding social behaviours and the adaptations made to artistic depictions of children were in part responsible for changes in social practices between adults and children. Yet, the changes to the depictions of children also corresponded with key moments of social upheaval which posed religious and political challenge to the Catholic Church and papal authority.

Religious indoctrination created fear amongst the population as they had to follow the imposed social practices. Although, Freud was prone to 19th century prejudices, he offers great insight to understanding the notion of real fear. Adopting an evolutionary approach, Freud (1920) explained real fear as linked to basic survival and carried with it the instinct for self-preservation. However, real fear is rational and knowledge dependent in terms of its external world. Thus, the practices themselves did not necessarily determine their actual beliefs, rather it was the fear of non-compliance which drove their practices. Furthermore, the uncertainty and confusion of not knowing who was the 'right' God, provoked anxiety, especially since the practices and rituals

differed depending on the belief system and were often contradictory (Needham 2016).

The fact that children were depicted as 'little adults' highlighted that the population at that time did not feel the need to define childhood separately. The Church had yet to decide upon which imagery to use as the changing depictions and iconography were a response to the ongoing threats to power. I use Foucault's definition of power as productive rather than repressive (Foucault 1994). This definition is used because my standpoint is that everyone has power as a possibility of their being, but we are often unaware that this is the case. This is also a way to consider Heidegger's notion of authenticity as a mode of being which I discussed in Chapter One.

The imagery of the child presented by the Church from the 11th century onwards also influenced the population's perception of the mother. Later angelic paintings of the child with a mother corresponded to the mystery surrounding motherhood and the child as a baby Jesus. The imagery had connotations associated to motherhood which influenced social behaviours and idealized the mother's role (Voragine 1993). The Christian depictions of the child explained by Aries (1962) defined what it was to be a child and the appropriate characteristics and expectations of the mother in relation to the child. Yet, as the imagery was created by those who were socialised through Christianity, the depictions may have been an idealised representation of their own mothers.

Although imagery of the child's body was rarely shown in the paintings, when the body was exposed, it showed the 'musculature of an adult even shortly after birth'. For Aries, this was actually the adult's refusal to accept child morphology and was based

on the rapid transition of childhood in the 10th and 11th century (Aries 1962: p32).

However, as an adult, an artist knew what a naked child actually looked like and therefore their depiction should have been more accurate. This leads me to consider the reasons that artists deliberately painted something which was inaccurate.

One explanation is that there was pressure to depict a child in a particular style and in this case the image of baby Jesus. Another explanation as to why the artist changed the depiction of the child was based on the range of ongoing theological contradictions and the confusion led to inconsistencies in the imagery.¹³

A further explanation was the fear of non-compliance led to an unconscious refusal to depict the child in the ways demanded by the Church. These variations in the depictions of the child led me to consider the impact of such changes on the population generally.

Prior to Christianity, the artist's depiction of the child corresponded with Paganism and Early Christian art generally was regarded as 'Jewish' because it was based on the teachings of the Old Testament. (Jenson 2018)

You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness, of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. (Exodus 20:4)

As such, the imagery of Early Christianity symbolised more than just the child. Imagery was a means to socialise a population differently to that of Judaism. Furthermore,

¹³ Dr. Nancy Ross and Dr. Evan Freeman, "The life of Christ in medieval and Renaissance art," in Smarthistory, / August 8, 2015, accessed April 12, 2022, <https://smarthistory.org/standard-scences-from-the-life-of-christ-in-art/>.

Jesus himself was a practicing Jew and he did not propose or start a new religion.

Jesus and his family would have been observant of Torah and its laws and therefore, the notion of a Christian Jesus, does not fit the actual context as he would have lived and died as a Jew (Fruchtenbaum 1981).

The depictions of the baby Jesus with the face of a fully grown man but in a smaller frame symbolised the idea that Jesus was born already grown, all knowing and ready to change the world.¹⁴ The contradictions associated with the imagery are an indication that the final version was yet to be decided. Yet, as Jesus was depicted in a human form the population could identify with the image. Furthermore, the depictions of Jesus as a child and then as a man not only signified the lifespan itself but this was also a means to differentiate between the life stages.

Chapter 1. Section 2: The Hellenistic Period.

A main representative of an early world view come from the poet Hesiod's Theogony in the 8th Before the Common Era (BCE). Theogony classified the origins, genealogies of the gods and the events that led to the establishment of Zeus as their king (Hesiod1966). The difference between the depictions of children to those in Christianity was that Greek gods were depicted as adults rather than infants. The

¹⁴ Dr. Nancy Ross and Dr. Evan Freeman, "The life of Christ in medieval and Renaissance art," in Smarthistory, / August 8, 2015, accessed April 14, 2022, <https://smarthistory.org/standard-scences-from-the-life-of-christ-in-art/>.

Greek population also had higher levels of literacy and therefore they had greater access to a narrative.

This was described in *Works and Days* which offered practical advice for a living a 'good' life but was based on Hesiod's life and family not that of a deity (Hesiod 1966: p38). The depictions of the child after this period illustrate how Christianity sought to organise society in a different way.

The Hellenistic Age ran from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE. to the end of the Roman Republic (31 BCE). Following Alexander's conquests there was a vast expansion of Greek civilization eastwards. Greek civilization later penetrated deeply into the western Mediterranean world, and this was assisted by the Romans who were political conquerors of Greece (Long 1986). However, philosophy throughout this time remained a predominantly Greek activity and the most influential thinkers in the Hellenistic world were Stoic.

Stoic forms of thought were aimed towards the elite, but Christianity appealed more to the masses (Munroe 1918). In this sense, Christianity offered the greatest boom to those classes who were neglected in the economy of Pagan society and Grecian culture. Christianity also had its roots in both Roman thought and Stoic philosophy and so there was also a familiarity with these ideas especially for the intellectuals.

The Romans promoted duty as their highest expression of moral life, and Stoic philosophy deified the conscience the sole authority of life. Unlike Christianity there were no firm beliefs in life after death and therefore duty had no connection with any

reward (Rasimus 2010). Thus, Stoic thought influenced the population differently to that of Christianity.

Christianity and the Stoics exalated virtue however they did so through different ways. Virtue for the Stoics was obtained only through the development of reason, and this was only obtainable by a few whose intellect had developed. As such, Stoic society was organised based on four cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance which were largely identified with the classes of the city (Plato Book IV, 419c–434c). In contrast, Christianity obtained the same results but on a mass scale because the Stoics cardinal virtues were retained but added to these were faith, hope, and love as the universal emotional nature of virtue.

The emotional nature of virtue promoted by the Church was a means to create a collective understanding that all beings were equal in the eyes of God. Yet, the virtues themselves were conditions which also ensured a compliant population because each of them were mutually dependent.

Faith was a trust and reliance on God, hope was powered by faith and love was shown through the acceptance of faith and hope. In contrast to the Stoic cardinal virtues which focused on the present, hope is always directed exclusively towards the future. Indeed, hope for one's salvation required that one already had faith. Thus, hope required that one remain steadfast even in the face of despair whilst providing one with a presumption of the future.

In the Stoic system, the masses were socialised not to expect anything outside of that which was guaranteed by their nature and natural causes. Yet, the Christian emotion

of hope focused on the future, and this provided the masses with a distraction from their lives in the present. Yet, as hope was dependent on faith it was therefore also illusionary and distracted the masses away from the reality of their situations. This was possible because the masses were socialised in a system whereby, they were uninformed and ignorant.

In the previous Stoic system, the masses had a set of dispositions towards the child which were demonstrated through socialisation practices and were compatible with that system. Yet, as Christianity appealed to the masses as well as the Stoic intellectuals this suggests that Christians were also intellectual because they were able to reason and adopt aspects of Stoic knowledge and incorporate them into their framework. Indeed, this also highlights how Early Christians were socialised in a different way because their ideas were based on their experiences which they brought with them. Yet, the Christian virtue of hope during this period also created a mass dependency, as for the Greeks, hope is the last, the most dreadful, of the ills left inside Pandora's box, 'contrary to the general belief, hope equals resignation...to live is not to resign oneself' (Camus 2005: p14). Indeed, socialising a largely illiterate population through art was not only the most appropriate means to convey an expectation, but also as a creative medium it was an emotional expression which considered the child as something different than they had done previously.

An examination of 12th century art showed that childhood was not known and nor was there an attempt to portray it. This was 'not necessarily due to neglect or incompetence, but more probably due to there being no place for childhood in the medieval world' (Aries 1960: p31). Yet, the idea that children were treated with

indifference during this period has been challenged and instead the claim is that they were much loved (Pollock 1983).

Christianity introduced their concept of love, and I would argue that this is a name given to a collection of emotions which cannot be fully understood. The feelings of love interweave with emotions of anxiety, guilt, and fear and respond to a criterion of socially constructed meanings and action. Indeed, love can only be understood in terms of cultural and contextual conceptions (Gergen 1985). Therefore, initially through imagery, the Church directed their definition and expectations of love to a population who were already practicing their own version towards their young.

In the depictions of the child in the 12th and 13th centuries there was a greater emphasis on religious iconography, and this was prompted by Religious wars. The religious depictions and increase in imagery were a series of ongoing attempts by the Catholic Church to suppress religious heretics and recruit a greater following (Ennes1995: p433). The Catholic Church must have been successful in its efforts because the depictions of children and religious iconography remained constant until the 14th century. In the following section, I will examine some of the key factors which facilitated the shift in ideas about children.

Section 2A: The Italian Renaissance and the Catholic Church

The Renaissance was a rebirth because the period involved a 'modern' way of thinking which was expressed through science, literature, and art. Yet, the birthing

process itself was considerably more complicated as it involved thinking about the world in addition to thinking about one's place in that world. The common theme which united scientific and artistic achievements was underpinned by the idea of *humanitas* which was a way of thinking rather than a doctrine and focused on human nature (Gay 1995). The depictions of children in the 14th century coincided with European conflicts between the French and Italian Church over Papal coronation and residency (Tuchman 2017).

Although the theme of Holy Childhood continued, artists now stressed the graceful, affectionate, and naïve aspects of early childhood (Aries 1960: p34).

The Italian Renaissance grew from the religious turmoil and political intrigue which involved the influence of the Roman Catholic Church and their patronage for artistic and architectural splendour (Dobson 1984).

The Roman Catholic Church had reached the pinnacle of its power and as the Renaissance flourished in Europe, the depictions of the Christ child also evolved. The images showed a more tender, humanised baby and by the High Renaissance, artists such as Raphael and Michelangelo created beautifully believable, devotional images of the Holy Family, and accompanying angels.¹⁵ However, as in previous times the depictions of the child did not physically resemble children themselves. Yet, the difference during this period was that the Church financially invested in art and therefore they not only dictated the artistry, but also the artist (Coppstone 2002).

In Rome, 'wherever the bankers lived the artist would not be far away' (Braudel 1982 Vol 2 p408). There is a shift not only in the way that the child was depicted but also in

¹⁵ <https://www.nationalgalleries.org/art-and-artists/features/children-art>

the means by which the art itself is produced. The artist was financially rewarded for depicting imagery directed by the Church whereas in earlier times the Church dictated the imagery. In this way, the Church was paying for the 'creativity' of the image rather than the image itself because the original depictions of Jesus were already embedded.

Section 3A: Art as an emotional expression

There was an objective transaction between the Church and the artist involved in the production of the imagery. Yet, as the artist was given free rein to depict the child, there was also a greater subjectivity involved in the creation. Therefore, as the depictions of the infant were so different the production highlights that they were based on the idealised experiences of the artist. The artists depictions were construed through the retrospective nostalgia of adults and projected back onto childhood. In broad terms, childhood is reconstructed as an idealised trouble-free period even though this is not always necessarily the case but nostalgic experiences in general can make people feel better if they are feeling sad.¹⁶

With the exception of Christ, no other figure is so frequently portrayed in Renaissance art, as that of the Virgin Mary. The Virgin Mary was the personification of grace and purity, Mary is the merciful mother and different symbols are used to idealize her devotional characteristics. Symbols such as the Sun and the Moon are used as attributes of the Virgin Mary referring to the 'women clothed with the sun, and the

¹⁶ Wildschut, T., Sedikides, C., Arndt, J., & Routledge, C.D. (2006). *Nostalgia: Content, triggers, functions*. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 975–993.

moon under her feet' (Revelations 12:1). Yet the same symbols are also often used in representations of the Crucifixion.

The official recognition of Christianity by the Roman state was in the early fourth century and prior to the 5th century, the Crucifixion itself was not realistically represented but was symbolized by a lamb (Ferguson 1961: p20). By the sixth century, however, representations of the Crucifixion became numerous.

In contrast to Islam, who regarded Jesus as a prophet and human, the Crucifixion reinforced the idea that Christ's nature was simply divine and therefore invulnerable.

As such, in the early depictions of the Crucifixion, Christ was alive, with open eyes and with no trace of suffering, triumphant and victorious over death.

However, in ninth century Byzantine art, the imagery showed a dead Christ, with closed eyes but the West did not adopt this version until the 13th century (Kazhdan 1991). The depictions in the crucifixion had an ever-increasing emphasis on the actual suffering of Christ.¹⁷

The imagery is also an expression of the sorrow of loss that Mary as a mother has at the death of her son. Contemporaneously, the imagery shows that Christ himself as omnipotent, dies in an unimaginably painful way and the Sun and Moon symbols also connote a notion of time. (Ferguson 1961). Art influenced the population because it was connotative imagery which assigned a deeper meaning, and this also applies to the person who created the art.

The child did not resemble the art, but the connotations of beauty, innocence, and love became associated to the imagery of the child. Although social behaviours were

¹⁷ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2022, September 8). crucifixion. Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/crucifixion-capital-punishment>

moulded to meet the expectations of the Church, the population responded because they were socialised through their emotions and the imagery held associatory emotive meanings.

Imagery can evoke emotion in a number of ways such as having a direct influence on emotional systems in the brain or an overlap between processes involved in mental imagery and perception which can lead to responding “as if” to real emotion-arousing events.¹⁸ However, this is not to say that this had the same level of influence on the whole of the population because people respond differently. Across time, certain aspects of everyday life and experience evolve in meaning and associated significance which makes them symbols of something besides what they actually are. Indeed, regardless of the level of influence, the imagery itself is symbolic (Heidegger 1971). Yet, the same imagery does not evoke the same emotion in all people because some people may focus on different aspects of the same imagery. Our experiences of our own childhood would not necessarily equate to the imagery, but there are some adults who see the child as they suppose themselves to have been as children (Berges and Balbo 1994).

Section 1A-3A Summary

¹⁸ Holmes E & Mathews A. *Mental imagery in emotion and emotional disorders* Clinical Psychology Review 30 (2010) 349–362

Although Christianity as a doctrine defined the emotional nature of virtue, individuals and groups defined the doctrine of Christianity. Furthermore, we all have emotions, but defining their meaning and nature was also a way to construct a value system.

The early Pagan population were socialised by Christians who themselves were socialised by a set of Judaic principles. The change to religious dogma suggests that successive populations were socialised by Christians whose practises were directed by those in the Church. Furthermore, as the changes were in response to external threats, it can be said that the changes were put in place to protect Christians as a group.

The changing depiction of the child illustrates how the population were directed through their emotions. The earlier depictions of the child were less defined than the later depictions and this may have been because the imagery itself had not been decided and therefore it was difficult to direct what the ideal child would look like.

Furthermore, the depth of information processing was such, that many of the early population found the task too complicated. The changes to the depictions of the child corresponded not only to the ongoing challenges faced by the Church but also to an increase in information processing which over time meant that the depictions of the child required less conscious awareness. Thus, social, and mental structures turned into an assimilation of a 'natural' habitus, yet it is the body itself which is the locus of habitus (Costa 2015). Therefore, habitus was not only a set of dispositions towards the child, but also habitus was a way of being demonstrated through practices which defined a Christian. The depictions of Jesus as an infant, a man and his crucifixion were internalized by the population and symbolically represented the beginning and the end of life. In the next section I refer to Aries landmark text *The Hour of Our Death*

(1981) and illustrate how the emotional virtues of love faith and hope as a Christian habitus became psychosocially associated with meanings of death and the child.

Section 4A: Death in the Early Middle Ages

In the Early Middle Ages, depictions of death were created by the aristocracy and imposed on a class of scholarly clergymen through imagery, stories, and the written word (Aries 1981: p5). Those in 'powerful' positions dictated the depictions of death and the expectations on the ways to die. This may have been used as a way to influence armies to fight. Yet, the fact that the knights had to be convinced by someone else that their death was nothing to fear highlights death as a universal ultimate concern which can be relieved by discussions.

During this period, death did not come as a surprise but rather 'that it gives advance warning of its arrival' and 'warriors fearless and brave swooned on every occasion' (Aries 1981: p6). As the knights' depiction of death was retold by the clergy, this was a way to direct social conduct. As recited prayers were found in epic poems and the knight was associated with saints and martyrs, the prayers reinforced an acceptance of death (Aries 1981: p 98). The recitals did not call for forgiveness or awaken remorse for sins, because the knight had already been forgiven. However, the knight's actual acceptance of death was underpinned by Christian doctrines rather than the Stoic acceptance of the fact that all that lives must die (Seneca trans 1977)

Unlike the knights, the masses did not know when they were going to face death whereas the devout monks had a forbearing of death which 'sometimes had a supernatural quality' (Aries 1981: p7). This perpetuated the notion that someone who was devout had some indication of their impending death because they were 'closer' to God. Given that the majority of the population did not occupy this position, they strove to be closer to God through their behaviours. This was also a justification for social stratification as the closer one was to God the higher, their position on the social strata. Aries used the term the 'tame death' to describe the Early Middle Ages. During this period death was familiar and had an associated attitude which remained unchanged for thousands of years. The mentality of the tame death appeared within a clearly defined period of history which began around the fifth century A.D. and disappeared at the end of the eighteenth century (Aries 1981: p29). There could be a number of explanations for this, however, the changes correspond first to the rise of Christianity and then to the challenges of the Enlightenment period.

Practices prior to Christianity

Prior to Christianity, Pagan practise ensured that the dead were kept apart from the living as a way to prevent them from coming back and to stop the dead from contaminating the living (Hutton 2015). All cemeteries were outside of the city walls, however, this practice changed with new Christian attitudes towards the dead and both Christian and Pagans were buried within the same walls up until the 18th century (Aries 1981 p:30).

The Church changed the Pagan attitude from repugnance of the dead to familiarity with the dead by using theology, but this was a gradual process. On the one hand, this

approach avoided reservations and anxieties about the changes in practices. Yet on the other hand, the adaptations themselves increased the populations anxieties about death. The changes in practise coincided with changes in Christian theology and ideas about death.

Section 5A: The shift in practise and the Last Judgement

Although there were variations in the Christian ideas of the resurrection of the body, in the West, Christianity resorted to theology and the final events of the individual.

A focus was on the Last Judgement, 'he who goes unburied shall not rise from the dead' and as the dead were waiting for the Day of Judgement any violation of the grave jeopardised the awakening of the deceased (Aries 1981: pp30-32).

These ideas served a number of purposes. One purpose was that it created a more 'civil' society in terms of respect for the deceased because some may have been related. Another purpose was that it served as a reminder of the inevitable end of life.

A third purpose was that as the consideration of being buried relied on the practices of others, some people became more mindful of their positions in relation to others. Thus, there was a consideration of their own fate in the hands of others. However, the threat of not actually rising from the dead came later as the theology surrounding the Last Judgement underwent a series of changes.

The Last Judgement

Although, the population lived under the shadow of the Church in the Middle Ages, this did not mean that there was a total acceptance of Christian dogma because 'certain symbols' were chosen in preference to others. Indeed, the symbols better expressed the underlying tendencies of collective behaviour' (Aries 1981: p96).

However, as the Middle Ages was a turbulent period, Non-Christians and their collective behaviour was invariably regarded as a threat. The threats were addressed by making adaptations to some of the key ideas about the Last Judgment.

In the Western world the earliest belief about death was that one rested like the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus which awaited the day of Christ's return. The Last Judgement was not the dominant depiction of the end of time, rather it was viewed as the return of Christ as an awakening. (Aries 1981: p97). This view did not inspire fear, however, the shift in ideas and changes to imagery about the Last Judgement influenced thoughts and practices and by doing so aroused anxieties concerning death.

In 12th century Christian iconography of The Last Judgement, depictions are overlaid with imagery of separation of the just and the sinner and their respective destinations of heaven or eternal fire. The Church used subtle methods to embed 'new' ideas and the established iconography and images were superimposed with other imagery which depicted a mystical reflection on the Word Made Flesh, Jesus Christ.¹⁹

On the one hand, the imagery was a way to introduce new ideas and socialise the population. Yet, on the other hand, the imagery reinforced uncertainty because the collections of superimposed imagery interacted with the population on an emotional level.²⁰ Thus, the depictions of the Last Judgement and ideas about salvation

¹⁹ Gospel According to Saint Mathew on the Revelation of Saint John.

²⁰ As discussed in Chapter Two Section 3A

provoked an existing human concern of death (Yalom 1980).

The Early Christian doctrines about death were altered and the subsequent changes in imagery, sermons and scriptures about the Afterlife, The Last Judgement and Salvation all contributed to the creation of actual fear in the population. On the one hand, the Christian virtues of hope and faith were emotional antidotes to despair, but on the other hand both of these emotions elevated the populations ultimate concern about death. The detailed imagery also showed some of the clergy being swallowed into hell and this reinforced the idea that no one was assured of salvation. Previously, the clergy were regarded as closer to God and their behaviours, would have been forgiven by God because they were 'devout' however, this was no longer the case. The changes in imagery coincided with the Crusades and also reflected the chaotic power relationship between the Norman Kings and the Church. As a whole, the population not only experienced social unrest but also psychological uncertainty which was provoked by ongoing changes to imagery and theology. Yet, the changes to the imagery and theology were promoted and to some extent directed by only some of the population but they were adopted by the many who accepted the changes. The masses in particular initially had 'real' fear which was based on the consequences of their actual non-compliance. However, I suggest that overtime real fear dispersed into a chain of neurotic anxieties which are provoked by those with 'superior knowledge' (Freud 1920). At that time, 'superior knowledge' was depicted through imagery and articulated through Christian notions associated with redemption which were subsequently reproduced through socialisation practices.

Section Summary

The imagery and changes to theology addressed everyone in the population and served as a reminder of the consequences of their actions in this life on the afterlife. This may have been in response to some of the population who considered conversion from Christianity to Islam or for those who completely rejected religious dogma. Indeed, as the clergy themselves were literate they also posed as a threat to the orthodoxy of others in the Church.

Increasing the population's anxiety about death was a way to ensure compliancy, yet this would suggest that some in the population were not as concerned about death as others. However, this was not necessarily the case because the terrifying depictions of Hell in imagery was also a means to express one's own anxieties about death. The acceptance of Christian practices may have been based on the actual fear of non-compliance but the imagery itself aroused further uncertainty about death.

Some people accept a socially sanctioned religious belief in order to manage their death anxiety (Yalom 1980) and use religion because they are unable to manage the fact that they will die. Indeed, as organised religion increased the anxiety of death it would suggest that some people used religion as a way to rid themselves of their own anxiety. The clergy as a group took instructions from others in more powerful positions within the Church. Yet as individuals, the clergy faced a 'real' fear of death which was based on the possible consequences for not following the instructions of those in higher positions within the Church. Therefore, the actual fear of death used in the example above is different to having an anxiety about death itself.

The concept of habitus is a way to understand how a range of interlinking factors are involved in the process of socialisation and the ways the ideas are internalised and

subsequently demonstrated through practices. However, although practice changes, the emotions which underpin them have not been addressed and this is highlighted through a second model of death which Aries (1981) termed the death of the self.

Section 6A: The death of the self

The death of the self was associated with the increase in Christian iconography which was depicted in architecture and also in the reading of liturgical drama which introduced the notion of destiny. The 'religious language that one can discern the new anxieties stirred in man by the discovery of his destiny' (Aries 1981: p99).

This kind of imagery reinforced the idea that there was no longer guarantees about salvation. Instead, the guarantees were replaced with imagery which gave a greater awareness of being abandoned forever to the power of Satan (Aries 1981: p151). The lack of certainty created a largely subservient population because they had gradually gained a greater consciousness of themselves, others, and God.

I suggest that as the population were socialised through the imagery of the infant Jesus and the mother Mary this gave meaning to their social roles and the socially desirable attributes of motherhood. In the same way, the depiction of the adult Jesus, gave meaning to the social role, expectation, and attributes of man. Furthermore, as God exists in three parts as the Father, as the Son and as the Holy Ghost, these 'persons' defined the overall meaning of man.

As God the Father he was a protector, as God the Son he sacrificed his only child for the benefit of humanity, and as God the Holy Ghost he was ever present.²¹ Overall, the early imagery showed no suffering involved in the crucifixion, but over time the change in the depictions corresponded with challenges to the Church.

The changing iconography of the Last Judgement and justice heightened the anxiety for some of the population. On the one hand, there were no guarantees of Salvation but on the other hand there was no definitive end of existence. Furthermore, although the physical body had died according to the Last Judgement the moment of death was postponed to the end of the world (Aries 1981: p106). Although some of the population would have perceived the moment of death as an extension of life, for others the possibility of being in a 'resting' place for an eternity, waiting for the Last Judgement increased anxiety rather than provide solace. However, as these changes were gradual and 'managed' they merged with existing social practices and fostered new habits. The population were gradually socialised through such ideas and on the surface, this made the process easier because the changes were subtle. However, as I will explain in the theoretical framework, the ways our emotions respond are based on previous experiences and although they are manifested in practices, they are not always obvious.

²¹ I discuss the idea further in terms of projective identification in the theoretical framework in Chapter Three

In terms of Christian burial practices these spread to all areas and although there were a few regional differences, the result was the same. The process began with the accumulated of bodies in small spaces particularly in churches but later involved the relocation of bones to charnel houses and then to larger cemeteries (Pounds 2000: p. 423). The gradual move from Pagan burial sites to Christian graveyards and beyond resulted in the daily 'presence of the living among the dead' (Aries 1981: p92). Thus, the changes were incorporated within society and gradually overtime they evolved into common practices (Tönnies 1887/1963; Vago 2004). I suggest that the changes to the practises around death and dying served a purpose because they were reminders of the consequences of ones conduct in this life and the subsequent Judgement in the Afterlife. However, I am not suggesting that the changes in practices were made to actually meet this purpose but rather that they served as a reminder for the shortness of life. Therefore, the practices themselves were a way to alleviate the anxieties of death but inadvertently they increased the ultimate concerns.

Although death was depicted differently from one century to the next, the overall depictions of death in the Middle Ages found expression in startling pictures of the macabre and assigned an increasingly important role to the actual moment of death in a bed. Yet, this is hardly surprising given the turmoil and the ongoing presence of death from war and the Plague. Indeed, as the population were socialised through Christianity, I suggest that the emotions surrounding death were intrinsically entwined with those of the child.

Christians were moved by the sight of the Infant Jesus playing on his mother's knee yet, the macabre depictions which personified death urged them not to forget the end of all earthly things (Rapp 1998 p210). In other words, the feelings of love for the child were interwoven with thoughts of the future and the inevitability of death.

Thus, 'love' interacted with the neurotic anxiety of the unknown which could only be soothed by hope and faith. On the one hand, this psychologically reinforced Christian ideas but on the other hand, considerations of death induced more anxieties because they had a greater association to the child. Furthermore, the association to the child is also one which an adult identifies as part of their own past. Thus, the considerations of the child and death became an extension of the concern we have about our own death.

Section 7A: Iconography in the 15th century

In the fifteenth century, the Last Judgement iconography was replaced. Although the iconographies were new, they remained similar to ancient depictions which showed a figure in bed, which was the traditional place of death.

The new iconography appeared in books which were developed by the printing press. The treatises in the books focused on techniques of how to die 'well and were illustrated so that the individual could catch meaning' (Aries 1981: p107).

This practice was a means to ensure that everyone in the population could access material about death. On the one hand, this was a way of addressing the notion of death and would have meant that discussions could be had about the topic. Yet on the other hand, the population were socialised in such ways that they had already reproduced

earlier considerations about death through their practices. Thus, the shift itself represented changes in thoughts and practices about death in wider society generally.

The iconography depicted the contemplation of death for an individual and the site of the imagery was displayed in the home. This suggests that as the population were socialised through their emotions, their actual fear of death was gradually transferred into a set of anxieties which were maintained beyond the Church and into the home through imagery. As such, there was a constant visual reminder of death which was internalised by children and passed on by adults through their socialisation practices. The imagery prompted the anxieties of death, and this triggered the Christian emotions of hope, faith, and love. In the new imagery, death was transported into the home and through the depictions of the Crucifixion the individual visualised themselves on their own deathbed. Such imagery reinforced appropriate conduct because it served as a constant reminder beyond the Sunday ritual of the Sermon in Church. One was not only reminded of their day to day conduct but also the consequences and concerns associated to the Last Judgment and the Afterlife.

A powerful rendition of Christian imagery is Michelangelo's *Last Judgement* from the mid-16th century because it implicates the viewer. The imagery shows that which is yet to happen, and the viewer is among those whose fate is determined (Hall 2005). The changes in the depiction of death were no longer the way people imagined the final end because 'the idea of judgement had become separated from the idea of resurrection'

(Aries 1981: p106). This meant that before one could die, they had to be judged and their resurrection depended on the outcome of the judgement.

The changes in imagery during the mid-16th century signified the future. Individuals could no longer imagine their place in heaven and hell because Michelangelo's imagery left nothing to their imagination. The art was funded by the Catholic Church yet the artist who produced their work in the 16th century did not necessarily do so under the threat of death and as such did not have real fear. Rather, the art was undertaken as a labour of love, and as such the art itself was a means of expressing their own ultimate concern of death.

After the sixteenth century this imagery was more or less abandoned and 'beneath the illusion of permanence.....an unconscious devaluation of old attitudes is beginning to appear' (Aries 1981: p297). The instability created in the Reformation increased uncertainty about life and death as

...moralists, the religious and....friars exploited the new anxiety for purposes of conversion....and in doing so are actually anticipating a tendency of the collective unconscious (Aries 1981: p298).

This suggests that certain groups intentionally exploited the populations anxieties about death, and this raises three assumptions. The first assumption is that they themselves did not believe in The Last Judgement. The second assumption is that they repressed their own anxieties in order to conduct their duties. The third assumption is that because they believed, they wanted to use every possible way to encourage the ignorant public to believe too. There were qualitative differences in terms of the psychological impact

of death on the collective because individuals responded differently based on their own experiences of socialisation.

After the sixteenth century the role of any warning of death was diminished and was replaced by illness. The focus shifted from death to the fragility of life,

'...death has become something metaphysical and when dualism was beginning to penetrate the collective psychology, the thought of death is associated with the breakdown of the combination that makes us human' (Aries 1981: p300).

Dualism within religion was a way to separate the inner from the outer world because it provided and defined the meaning of good and evil. In the social context, behaviours were observable and were punished, shamed, or held as an example (Foucault 1980). I suggest that the social definitions of sinful behaviours psychologically interacted with our ultimate concern about death because guilt and shame became associated with love and the child. As such, some of the population developed retrospective guilt based on their previous practices.

Further changes were made to religious dogma which increased the severity of punishment as the consequence for sinful behaviours. However, as the punishments reached beyond the living world, they interacted with some of the population's anxieties about death. Not only did the outcome of one's conduct in the living world result with them being assigned a place in heaven or hell, but also as the definitions of sins were socially defined, new ones could be introduced at any time.²²

The designated place of Heaven for the entirely good and Hell for the entirely bad had also been extended to include one or two indeterminate categories of purgatory. In the

²² I discuss this further in Chapter Two Section 2B.

intermediate category the dead would have to wait to undergo some kind of purgation, for some of the population it was the Last Judgement and for others it was the preceding state (Le Goff 1984).

The concept of habitus in this sense denotes how knowledge and practices are generated in a structure. As such, a structure is a site of action because we generate the knowledge and subsequent practices, however, the changes to knowledge have to be deemed as worthy in the first place. For example, the supporters of dualism largely focused on the separation of human from nature and mind from matter. Yet, perhaps of more importance is the fact that they wanted to separate these elements in the first instance. Knowledge was developed and generated by those with a set of dispositions and who were by and large socialised through Christianity. On the one hand, 'new' knowledge rejected the knowledge from the previous field. Yet on the other hand, the knowledge did not overtake that from the previous field but rather 'co-habitated' alongside it. Indeed, dualism materialised in many different ways and was evident in Aries (1981) third model of death.

Section 8A: Death during the Enlightenment period.

The third model of death was remote and imminent and throughout the 17th and 18th centuries this appeared in the simplicity of funeral rituals and last testaments.

During this period, the authors of wills stopped making their own arrangements for their funerals and left them in the hands of the executor. This did not mean that people were

necessarily disinterested but instead this represented a desire to let go of earthly things. Aries described this as period as one which represented the impersonality of mourning. This may have been partly based on some of the structural changes in society which were becoming enshrined and defined by the State and Laws. Some people may have wanted to express their grief but instead it was channelled through rituals and after a period of mourning no further personal demonstrations of grief were deemed necessary or tolerated.

Yet, the response to feeling an emotion includes physical changes in behaviours but it is social conditions which determined the responses. I suggest that social rules inhibited individuals from physically demonstrating the feeling of the emotion and as a result this aspect became 'lost' or misplaced amongst the other components.

Although physical change in behaviour is a means of communicating with others, this aspect of the emotion was controlled in the presence of others. Overtime the physical emotional response may have also become hidden from oneself and as such the need to express this was suppressed. However, funerals provided an important function, and served as the first step to bring healing for the bereaved. The ritual of funerals can be a rite of passage which create a sense of 'fruitful chaos' whereby we emerge with a new 'take' on life (Grainger 1988). Yet, the desire to simplify the sentimental importance of burial and mourning was inspired by the notion of Christian humility which itself is paradoxical.

On the one hand, the assumption is that no one is of special importance in relation to others. Yet on the other hand, Christian humility encouraged a psychological mindset

because the behaviour itself implied that one who exhibited certain behaviours was a bigger or better person.²³

Section 4A-8A Summary

Social attitudes and behaviour towards death were shaped by the Church. The changes were gradual and involved a shift in the narrative and imagery of the Last Judgement. The changes made were in response to external threats and challenges to the Church, and the population therefore had a real fear for their basic survival and self-preservation. However, real fear is rational and knowledge dependent in terms of its external world and as the shifts in imagery and narratives were based on the unknown, they interacted with the population on an emotional level. I suggest that the actual biological state in terms of survival altered for some of the population as a response to the perceived threats in the social world.

Death as an ultimate human concern became entangled with the Christian definition of love which held connotative meanings. Over time, the meanings of love which were first associated with the omnipotent baby Jesus materialised through the actual child. The individual's ultimate concern about their own death became embroiled in a concoction of dispositions collectively defined as love which gradually developed into an unconscious association with the child. However, the associations between the emotions of love and a consideration of death created unpleasant and intense feelings. Therefore, the way to counteract the unpleasant feelings between death and

²³ I discuss this further in Chapter Two Section 10B Shaping habitus as a set of dispositions in the 19th century.

love, was through the emotional virtues of faith and hope which underpinned Christian doctrine.

Some people were motivated to promote these ideas because not only was this a way to maintain a compliant population, but this also alleviated their own anxieties.

Furthermore, for some of the population the promotion of such ideas satisfied some 'desire'. However, it is far too simplistic to suggest that it served the same desire but there is always a purpose for an action even though we are not always aware of the reason (Bourdieu 1980).

The Early Christian doctrines about death altered and the subsequent changes in imagery, sermons and scriptures about the Afterlife, The Last Judgement and Salvation created actual fear in the population. On the one hand, the Christian virtues of hope and faith were emotional antidotes to despair, but on the other hand both of these emotions elevated the populations ultimate concern about death.

The actual consideration of our ultimate concern about death was buried beneath other socially induced anxieties and some of the population acted in such a way without knowing the actual reasons themselves. The changes in socialisation practices did not address previous notions of death but rather built upon them and therefore our consideration of death was psychosocially superimposed. In this way, habitus evolved in the social milieu but was contained within the internal archives of personal experience (Bourdieu 2000: p138)

Real fear of death is largely biological and responds to the social environment. As such, real fear is something which generally reduces through one's interaction with their environment, although, if the environment is unpredictable this would not necessarily be the case. I suggest that our ultimate concern about death is a neurotic anxiety because it is something which is yet to be discovered and could not be known. However, Christian practices and narratives informed our neurotic anxiety because they provided an answer. Yet, the answer itself increased our neurotic anxiety because it led to further questions which were framed by Christian theology and entrenched in the emotional virtues of love, faith, and hope.

Indeed, habitus as a set of dispositions included love for the child, but this also involved a psychological association to death or survival and the only way to relieve this anxiety was through faith and hope. Habitus as a set of dispositions was transported by individuals through their socialisation practices. However, it was through the field of education that the dispositions of habitus and the ideas of love, the child and death became further psychosocially embroiled in socialisation practices.

Section 9A: The Church and the development of Education

In England, education first dates to Roman Britain but provision was limited and most of the population remained illiterate (Lawson and Silver 1973: p7). In 590 CE the Catholic Church engaged in widespread efforts to convert pagan peoples to Catholicism and this was the beginning of the enormous political and military power controlled by Catholic popes (Moody 1989: p433).

Education became a priority in England with the arrival of St Augustine in 597 whose concept of education derived from the Romans appreciation of the more mature Greek civilization. The Romans recognised the advantages to be drawn from a knowledge of oratory and Greek was an international language known to many of their adversaries. Thus, this was a period of Catholic indoctrination with education derived from Roman and Hellenistic schools of rhetoric, liberal arts, and sciences (Orme 2006: p18).

Prior to Christianity, doctrines had not concerned themselves with the future life, and did not have the means to enforce moral teaching upon the unintelligent masses (Munroe 1918). As such, the conscious objective of the early schools was a focus on moral socialisation through education. Christianity defined morality and shaped behaviours through the ideas of good or bad and subsequently, good behaviours were rewarded whilst bad behaviours were punished. However, during this period the population had to wait for their rewards in the afterlife.

Early schools were attached to cathedrals and to monasteries who trained priests to conduct and understand the services of the Church, to only read the Bible and the writings of the Christian Fathers. This addressed concerns that students would read a wide range of Latin literature and 'pagan' philosophy' (Williams 1961: pp128-130). However, Viking invasion interrupted the development of education and 'in two generations, monasticism and an educated clergy disappeared' (Lawson and Silver 1973:12). Viking invasion also brought their practices which influenced social thought, and this disrupted the process of establishing the Christian notion of innocence in education. From the ninth century onwards, some areas in England resisted Viking control and education was reconstructed. The old Roman religion had lost all its

previous relationships to aesthetic culture and literature and its power over the population had diminished (Fisher1936:183).

As such, the monasterial revival gave Christianity as a religion a new basis which became reassociated with ethics and politics and involved a readjustment of the vital interests of education (Munroe 1918: p 227). Although, the dominance of Christianity was evident in education, the actual practices were directed by the Church. Prior to the Norman Conquest, smaller parish churches staffed by a single priest began to be built across England, but this had educational implications. 'On the one hand parish clergy needed to be educated; on the other, once trained, they had the potential to act as teachers themselves' (Orme2006: p39). The result of this was an array of 'superstitious' and corrupted versions of Christianity taught by individual clergy. As such, whoever has a position of power is able to restrict, define and direct that which is deemed as worthy knowledge (Rabinow 1984). As such, the Church directed the suitability of knowledge, and changes were often based on the events which not only challenged their authority but also posed a risk to their survival.

The 11th century Norman conquest was a period of consolidation and reform which included constitutions issued to guide monastic life. During this period, the 'primacy' of the position of Archbishop of Canterbury was established.²⁴ Norman kings and clergy became involved in founding and reorganising cathedrals and oversaw the teaching which had ethnic and linguistic effects on education. The Conquest had legal and

²⁴ A History of Canterbury Cathedral in 20 Documents - Canterbury Cathedral (canterbury-cathedral.org)

documentary effects as prior to 1066 there are no surviving charters that deal with education. However, after the Conquest there are ones that refer to schools as distinct activities or institutions and therefore the conquest was a political and social process that recognised the importance of education (Orme 2006:47). However, the conduit of education was a way to socialise the population on mass.

Section10A: A Collaboration and fusion of knowledges

The new era in intellectual life in Western Europe brought English learning and higher education into the main current of European civilization. The institution of the university itself came from the Muslim world and was a channel for the mathematical, scientific, and philosophical knowledge to flow into Western academic institutions (Needham 2020: p261). Indeed, the influx of knowledge created intellectual debate but also created theological disputes mainly in regard to faith and reason, 'a new approach to the works of Aristotle made the twelfth century one of epidemic scholastic excitement' (Lawson and Silver 1973: pp18-21).

Muslim scholars translated Aristotle's work in the 12th century from Greek into Arabic to benefit the Islamic world. Christian scholars translated the Arabic into Latin for the benefit of the Western Catholic world (Abu-Lughod 1989; Needham 2020: p261). Whoever translated the work did so from their religious position and some were directed to do so from a person in a higher position. Yet, the changes preserved 'powerful' positions and the meanings which they ascribed to life and death were established through these religious frameworks. Indeed, in the 12th century, discussions about

religion and science as 'structural bodies' involved the interconnected study of the natural world, history, philosophy, and theology. However, this meant that theology was competing with all other knowledges. (Harrison 2015: p3).

In the 13th century Scholasticism became a dominant philosophy because it was a means of harmonization and reconciliation (Hampson 1990: p 6-9).

Scholastic theology relied increasingly on the philosophy of Aristotle which provided a framework to question the general assumptions about the nature of knowledge and truth (Grant 2004). As such, Scholasticism was a means to address the challenge to truth from knowledge because it defined Theology as a discipline in its own right.

However, not only did Scholastic theology justify the positions of those in authority but it also gave the Church credibility because it was underpinned by 'knowledge' and 'truth' the truth of God and the 'knowledge' one has to acquire to question such truth.

Furthermore, Scholasticism was incorporated within pedagogical practices, and this was a way to ensure that the doctrines of truth remained intact despite the challenges.

Yet, as Aristotelian philosophy itself was Pagan, Scholasticism was an inheritance from a previous system. Indeed, the fact that Scholastics were educated in ancient text as well as 'modern' theological understandings made them a valuable asset or a formidable foe. These scholars separated knowledge from truth but used knowledge to justify truth and subsequently Christian Theology was reconstructed, and practices were altered accordingly. Yet these changes were largely in response to threats and events across Europe and beyond. In this way Islam also accepted the same knowledge but rejected the truth of Christianity and vice versa which embedded the notion that knowledge was everchanging, but truth remained everlasting.

Section 11A: Struggles within the Catholic Church

It would be wrong to assume that The Catholic Church itself was a cohesive body because individuals within any group bring with them their own experience. During the 14th century there were ongoing power struggles with the upper clergy in the Catholic Church, which coincided with an extreme vocation crisis in the lower clergy caused by the Bubonic Plague (Bollet 2004). The large number of clergy deaths created a vocational crisis and incompetent and inadequately trained candidates were appointed for Holy Orders. As a result, there were unreliable clerics because the candidates brought with them superstitious and ignorant practices (Wickham 2017). Yet, those who were deemed as inadequate were usually those who posed a threat to the 'truth' of the Church.

The Bubonic Plague impacted the way the population thought about their everyday lives and maverick priests held great appeal for the masses during this period. Such conditions helped to create the Lollards empower the peasants and began the decline in the feudal system (Rex 2002). To maintain some stability, the Church had to adapt its approach. However, the previous methods used by the Church did not appeal to the new 'population' largely because their social conditions had changed, they had experienced loss, faced death and they had greater access to knowledge through improved literacy. These conditions contributed to a greater intervention within education by the Church than previously.

To resolve the issue of poor practices by 'unsuitable candidates' the Catholic Church reinforced the word of the scriptures and introduced trained theologians. In today's

terms this would be classed as an organisational restructure and involve a change in job descriptions and responsibilities. In a similar fashion, the Church reorganised its staff and developed systems to ensure that practices were standardised, and I suggest that this was an early form of a rationalized bureaucratic system (Weber 1920). The restructure was also a means of reuniting a divided Church to promote unity for the General Council of the Church which would mean that they would have greater authority than the Pope (Hitchcock 2013). Not only did a dispersed framework of power assert the freedom of the Catholic Church in France, but this was also a part of a wider pattern of social changes in England.

The end of Scholasticism

Scholasticism lasted until the end of the 15th century, and although the great universities of Europe were founded and established by Popes, Kings, or Emperors, they were all controlled by the Church. Of the twenty-one colleges making up the University of Oxford, at least sixteen were founded by clergymen or at the suggestion of clergymen (Munroe 1918). In terms of the child, theology was underpinned by the notion of innocence and the Last Judgement was propagated by Catholic scholars through higher education. Indeed, the great theologians were now university professors who not only earned a living by teaching doctrine, but this group also had the highest authority of knowledge aside from the Church (Needham 2020 p264). Furthermore, as the structure of education was built upon the principles and wealth of Catholicism, the Church owned the means of knowledge production (Bourdieu 1986). Thus, the dispositions of habitus associated with the child, innocence and death were emotionally embedded and were therefore repeated through the process of socialisation through practices in education.

Chapter Two Part A: Summary

In this Section of the Chapter, I traced and mapped the psychosocial progression of habitus as a set of dispositions associated with the child. I discussed how the depictions of the child were underpinned by the meanings associated to the emotional virtues of love faith and hope and explained how the virtues are also associated with death and the Afterlife. The population were socialised through the imagery of the infant Jesus which showed the Christian version of love and contemporaneously, death was depicted by horrific imagery, which reinforced the social expectations of Christianity. The Christian definition of love was one which was a contradiction of interwoven emotions. The notion of hope breathed life into an anxiety associated with death because many of the population had a greater consideration of the future. The only means to alleviate that newly awaken anxiety was to have faith. However, this also breathed life into an anxiety because when some gained knowledge they questioned faith, and this created further uncertainty.

The emotional virtues of Christianity became habitus as a set of dispositions and a way of being which was repeated through socialisation practices and reproduced through education. The Church was the main authority of socialisation practices, and their ideas were reproduced through education by the clergy who were now established as the authorities of knowledge, only second to the Church.

Formal education was not a threat to truth because pedagogy was structured to answer questions in a rational way and as scholasticism overlooked the emotional level of theology, the original concern about death was not addressed.

Thus far I have discussed how the changing notions associated with death not only created further ambiguity about the topic but also how the emotions were associated with the meanings and construction of the child and repeated through socialisation practices. In the next section of Chapter Two, I focus on events in the 16th century because this period marked a shift in approaches to socialisation and a change to knowledge. I will explain how, despite the changes in knowledge and practices, the dispositions of habitus and the association between the child and death were regenerated through the process of socialisation.

Chapter Two: Part B

In the first part of this Chapter, I mapped the psychosocial progression of habitus as a set of dispositions associated with the child. Using my version of genealogy, I highlighted how the emotional virtues of love faith and hope became psychosocially associated with the child and concerns about death. I explained how the dispositions of habitus were regenerated through practices in education.

In this section of Chapter Two, I focus on events in the 16th century because this period marked a shift in socialisation practices and I highlight how that the changing definitions and ambiguities associated with the child, strengthened the psychosocial barriers against having open and frank discussions about the topic of death.

Section 1B: The Reformation, Religious and Political challenges

There was a continuous resistance to Catholicism and from the mid-16th century to the end of the 17th century the disagreements between different versions of Protestantism shaped childhoods (Cunningham, 1995). On the surface these disputes were based on theology, but I suggest that the driving force underpinning the differences were the anxieties associated with emotional uncertainty. Although, the victors of such disputes would ultimately 'control' or manage the population, the challenges to the Catholic Church were also an opportunity to reconfigure society and reshape practices, just as

Early Christianity had done with the previous Stoic system. Thus, in some ways, the acquisition of power over others can be seen as a means by which to direct the victor's own uncertainty.

The challenges to the Catholic Church were in part associated with a broader religious and political movement which affected the practice of Christianity in Europe. However, in England, the Reformation began as a political difference with Rome which allowed growing theological disputes to come to the fore and this in part created significant socio-political change (Scruton 1996: p 470). Protestantism came in different forms, such as from the Puritans who desired a complete disassociation from the Roman Catholic Church by an elimination of any ceremonies and practices not rooted in the Bible (Enns 1995: p476). However, whatever the form, the collective focus of the dispute was a rejection of the superstitions and authority of the Papacy. As such, the Reformation period was one which involved ongoing political struggles which were embroiled in theological disputes.

For Protestantism, a theological means to reinforce obedience and responsible behaviour was to reject the sacraments. Thus, the Catholic doctrine whereby after Baptism the child was relieved of its original sin and was thought as innocent, was rejected by Protestantism.

The importance of the downgraded sacraments altered the dynamic between God and the individual. The role of a priest who administered sacraments was also demoted and

this meant that an individual had to deal directly with God. Furthermore, as the priest no longer provided a means to atonement, this became one's own responsibility.

This process was a widescale project, similar to that used by the Church which gradually replaced Pagan practice with Catholicism. Yet, the shift in practices from Pagan to Catholicism was probably less distressing for the population because the Pagan was gradually weaned away from their social habits (Hutton 2014). Furthermore, given that the Pagan population were largely illiterate, the methods initially used to change the Pagan mindset was underpinned by the notion of love. Indeed, as the population were emotionally socialised over a longer period of time, habitus as a set of dispositions was a way of being for a Catholic. Thus, the Christian emotion of love was supported by faith and hope which were psychosocially embedded through practices.

The ongoing changes to religious dogma correlated with events such as The Crusades and The Plague, both of which challenged the authority of those in the Church. Yet as the events themselves involved threat to survival this also highlights the ways we respond to death. I suggest that these challenges offered some of the population an alternative way of life because events such as the plague helped them realise the fact that no one is exempt from death. The habitus promoted by the Church was under question by some of the population because they became less fearful of the physical and 'supernatural' authority of the Church and in response, the religious doctrines and dogma became more intense. Thus, when real fear subsided or lessened, the changes in religious narratives not only helped to maintain the Church as an authority of truth but the actual responses to the changes demonstrated their own survival anxieties.

For example, although Confession was a social mechanism to monitor and control behaviours, the actual process itself allowed people to relieve their worries. This was a

paradox as on the one hand the Church had moulded the emotions which became a habitus and created the concerns, yet on the other hand they provided a means for their followers to shed their burden. In this way, the clergy represented a power which went beyond the natural world but individually they would have also had such concerns. In contrast, the Reformation gave the population ownership of their conscience, however, removing the ritual of confession meant that individuals carried guilt and the anxieties which arose from that emotion, within themselves. Furthermore, rather than weaning the population away from the dependency of a Catholic habitus, the Reformation thrust them towards independence in the shape of a Protestant habitus.

The Protestant habitus evolved from a Catholic habitus and therefore the emotional virtues of love, faith and hope were psychosocially embedded but entangled. However, I suggest that the proponents of the Reformation responded to the threats of survival differently because they were educated and by and large they were socialised by the well-read. As such, the actual process of socialisation for the proponents of the Reformation had greater consistency because their parents themselves were socialised in a particular fashion. This group were the 'producers' of change and they may have felt they had greater control of their lives and as a result they responded differently to survival threats. However, the anxious dispositions of habitus associated with the child, love and death were not directly addressed but instead manifested through socialisation practices which I will discuss next.

Section 2B: The Reformation and child discourse

A key aspect of Protestantism was a focus on teaching the young and the responsibility of socialisation shifted further away from the Church and more towards parents. The dissemination of ideas, practices, and habits were quicker than in previous times and this was in part due to the development and invention of the printing press which made texts more readily available. This not only increased circulation of the Bible but also increased the transmission of new knowledge which initially influenced ideas, especially amongst scholars (Boorstin 1983: p 543). Many of the texts were produced in order to reinforce duty and expectation. The principles of Protestantism were summarised, and religious teaching was reinforced using question and answers. The printing press provided Reformers with 'spiritual weaponry' which was already being spread far and wide throughout Europe (Eisenstein, 1980).

The importance of obedience and the parental rule was reinforced through the written word in conduct books. These, texts provided parents with instructions on the use of corporal punishment and through the written word new habits were created, which I suggest initially caused emotional turmoil and confusion for parents. Indeed, prior to the Reformation, the emotionally defined principles of love faith and hope guided practices.

Yet, during the Reformation, expectations and responsibilities shifted to the position whereby parents followed instructions according to the conduct books on how to socialise their children. As such, the process of socialisation was formulated and failure to follow the instructions was regarded as a dereliction of parental duty. Furthermore, the additional responsibility caused some parents to be incessantly

worried because the changes in practices were underpinned by changes to the ideas about Salvation.

Salvation

In the late 15th century, Catholic Europe had already produced moral plays and *Everyman* in particular highlighted that the fear of death was a universal emotion. The only way to overcome such fear was through a spiritual victory over death in a triumphant expression of Christian faith and the Catholic doctrine (Cawley 1993 p195). However, the foundation of the entire system of Protestantism (Calvinism) at that time was the doctrine of the sovereignty of God and the doctrine of Predestination was the external decree by God.

The Calvinist doctrines held that believers could no longer depend on their salvation on the institutionalised means of grace found in the Catholic Church through Confession, Eucharist, and Baptism. Nor could they depend on the intermediary role of the priests to elevate their guilt through confessional. Instead, individual faith in Christ as a personal saviour of sinful humanity became the key element of Protestant doctrines (Enns 1989: pp481-485). However, as only the elect were predestined for Salvation, Calvinists did not have complete confidence in their own personal salvation. The uncertainty of not knowing if one had done enough to have a place reserved for them in heaven elevated their anxiety. Therefore, the ultimate concern about death was now surpassed by what came after it.

Parents and socialisation

In terms of a Protestant mindset, the responsibility of reinforcing the ideas of virtuous living became the responsibility of parents. Yet, this could also be regarded as an efficient use of resources. The shift in responsibilities from the Church to the home reduced the number of clerics required for tasks such as confession. Furthermore, the practices associated with the shifts maintained the anxiety of salvation.

Indeed, Puritan parents agonised over their children and were the first to write extensively for them (Cunningham 2006: pp 67- 69). Yet, the parental responsibility of instilling virtuous living in their child must have already been a socialising practice for some of the population. For such parents there was a recognition that a child was someone who was able to engage and understand the same themes as adults. Indeed, an infant would not have had the same habitus known to their parents, as if they had, there would not have been a need to reinforce the consequences for not living a virtuous life. Thus, not only do adults pass on their concerns and anxieties through the process of socialisation, but these were also passed on by their parents. Indeed, the Reformation did not seek to remove the fear of salvation, originally instilled by the Church, but rather removed Salvation and this no doubt added to the parents' own original concern. Given the increased uncertainty associated with Predestination, the parent often reinforced virtuous living in the child because of the intense anxiety they felt for themselves. In such cases, the practices reinforced the parents own neurotic anxieties, which were subsequently reproduced in the child through the parents' practices.²⁵

Parents were increasingly anxious about the state of their children's soul because infant mortality was high there was an even greater urgency to save the child's soul

²⁵ I will discuss this further in the theoretical framework in Chapter Three.

from a very early age. Thus, the uncertainty and the omnipresence of death itself raised parental anxiety.

Although the Reformation had a transforming impact on society, children became central to the everyday, and this involved a range of conflicting child discourse. On the one hand in Scriptures, the child was seen as wicked yet on the other hand their innocence was highlighted. (Cunningham 2006: p 12). As such, there was a shift in practices as a response to the changes to meaning and construction of the child. Yet, I suggest that although the meanings associated with child innocence were no longer socially 'valid' in terms of practices, the emotions associated with the child and death could not be removed because they were associated with survival and the experiences of these were passed on through socialisation practices. I discuss this further in Chapter Three.

During the Reformation, the practices which defined love and definitions of the child were inverted. I suggest the changes created emotional conflict and an increase in anxiety for some of the population. The increase in anxiety involved one's own feelings of inadequacy not just in terms of the actual responsibility itself but whether the practices were good enough in terms the unknown consequences of salvation.

Parental love in the Reformation period involved stricter practices and anxieties about death were expressed through these practices because parents were not only anxious about their own salvation but also that of their child.

Furthermore, for some parents the practices interacted with guilt and uncertainty but there was no way to unburden these feelings. Therefore, for some parents there was a

psychosocial conflict between the practices and the emotions associated with the child which were connected to the anxieties associated with death and survival.

The emotional confusion based on the changes to the definitions of the child also increased anxieties. Adults were socialised to accept the innocence of the child, and this corresponded to the definitions of the infant Jesus. Yet, to consider the child as wicked required a completely opposite mindset because the connotation had an association with Satan and Hell.

The confusion created by these definitions increased parental anxiety because they had to acknowledge the possibility that the child was born wicked, yet they could not emotionally discard that love they had for the 'innocent' child. Furthermore, the parent themselves had to consider the notion that they too were born wicked. Therefore, the 'wicked' child served as a reminder and a consideration of their own past deeds which would impact their salvation. As a result, although death was discussed with children, it was instructed through the lens of organised religion and taught by highly anxious parents.

Section 3B: Roles and Social Organisation

In contrast to Catholicism, which placed an emphasis on the importance of Mary and motherhood, the Protestant doctrine emphasised the father as the King. The father was now one who stood like God and his rule was seen as absolute within the household. The restructuring of ideas from the proponents of the Reformation corresponded with European ideals and appealed to followers from the intellectual and merchant class (Mitterauer & Sieder 1984). The changes demonstrate how some of the population used the principles of Protestantism to deny death because there was a

shift away from a total reliance on the supernatural (Rank 1950). For example, the position of the father was the embodiment of God and as such he was a figure to fear. Furthermore, the repositioning of the father in the household also shifted the importance of the father away from the Church. However, the shift did not devalue the importance of the mother but instead created a set of meanings which became symbolic in terms of love and the child.

The conative meanings associated with love and a mother were embedded through the depictions of her in relation to the infant Jesus. Yet, these depictions were used as a means to socialise the population in a particular way and thus overlooked the biological connection between mother and child. Indeed, during the Reformation period, defining the importance of the father redefined the meaning and subsequent associated emotions of love and practices because the father were initially established through fear. The Reformation created a powerful structure which challenged the Catholic Church as a powerful institution. Yet, just as Early Christianity had retained some of the Stoic Cardinal Virtues, the Reformation also retained the practises which were proven to be successful, and the organisation itself was restructured accordingly. The common thread is that those who advocated changes were educated and the power to do this was productive rather than repressive (Foucault 1994).

Section 1B-3B Summary

The proponents of the Reformation were largely well read and promoted a habitus which on the one hand introduced new knowledge but on the other hand the knowledge overlaid the embedded dispositions from the previous habitus. As more of the

population were literate, the practices and expectations were conveyed through conduct books. The anxious dispositions from the previous habitus interacted with the habitus of the Reformation because the doctrines which underpinned salvation had changed. This change increased uncertainty because it was based on the doctrine of Predestination. The responsibilities of reinforcing religious dogma shifted from the Church and became the remit of the parent and the doctrine of Predestination underpinned socialisation practices. However, the changes in doctrine breathed life into uncertainty and as an anxiety this interacted with the emotions of love, faith, and hope. Indeed, uncertainty had a greater interaction with the emotions because it drove hope which helped to redirect the anxieties associated with love and death. Yet, although a reliance on hope and faith soothed the anxieties, they also took some of the population further way from an actual consideration about their own inevitable death.

More of the population were literate, and the ways habitus was transmitted were different. The dispositions of this habitus were transported through text and the written word and therefore the meanings and definitions held even greater ambiguity which increased uncertainty. The result of this was that the process of socialisation became more emotionally complex.

Those responsible for the development of the conduct books were proponents of the Reformation and were 'educated' It is highly likely that their own parents were also educated and therefore their process of socialisation evolved differently to those in the masses. The dispositions of habitus of those who introduced Christianity was already 'established' and these ways of being were subsequently passed on to their children.

In contrast to the masses who were socialised in a different way which means that their initial 'starting point' was different.

As such, the actual process of socialisation for some of the population had greater 'consistency' because the habitus as a set of dispositions and subsequent practice were shared from generation to generation with minimal disruption or change. Indeed, these were the ones who initiated the changes in practices. As such, some adopted an ego strength which contributed to a stable foundation for their core belief systems in relating to the self and the outer world (Erickson 1902–1994).

The Protestant habitus was one which placed importance of having a direct relationship with God. However, most of the population had relied on the clergy to negotiate with God on their behalf because they had been socialised in this way. Therefore, the changes to social practices meant that the anxieties associated with love, the child and death were internalized and suppressed.

The actual methods used to communicate social expectations were such that for some of the population there was a 'gulf' in their understanding and also it is not easy to remove the emotional attachments to those previous practices because they were regarded as 'natural'. For the proponents of the Reformation this way of being was an 'easier' transition because their habitus was such that it already questioned religious dogma. However, the 'newer' practices created other anxieties because the imagery was ever present in the home which served as a constant reminder of one's conduct. In some ways this could be likened to the earliest form of surveillance but in terms of scrutinising oneself. It would be wrong to suggest that these anxieties were restricted to

a particular group of the population as although the proponents of the Reformation were more widely read, the theology itself was very similar to Catholicism.

The Church had organised society by emotionally regulating behaviours through their ideas of love, the child and death. Indeed, there was no clear break from one system to another because beings created the system and therefore, they are the system. In other words, the habitus as a way of being and the associated dispositions are the embodiment of a system. Furthermore, as the conflict between the Church and the Reformers did not completely change the habitus, the ideas provided by the Reformation strengthened the existing psychological element of the previous habitus.²⁶ Therefore, habitus as set of dispositions which sees the child as innocent and has associations with love and death are psychosocially passed on through socialisation practices, as are those dispositions associated with ideas of salvation.

Thus far I have shown how the dispositions of habitus are relational to the structures of their production and how these are shown through subsequent socialisation practices and transmitted through education. As I have stated there is no separation between the subjective and objective worlds and the structures of production involve individuals and groups as a collective.

Indeed, the intellectual Stoics, the Early Christians and the proponents of the Protestant Reformation were educated and were highly influential in terms of implementing changes to socialisation practices. Although groups consist of individuals who

²⁶ I have focused on socialisation and Christianity, yet this habitus is also built upon previous practices and corresponding dispositions.

experience the world in different ways, the common feature of this group was that the anxious dispositions of habitus associated with the child and death were not directly addressed. As such, in the next section, I will continue to map the psychosocial progression of habitus and show how the dispositions and ways of being were reproduced beyond the framework of religion and focus on the work of influential Enlightenment thinker John Locke (1632-1704).

Section 4B: Religion, Politics, Education, and the child- Locke

In the previous section, I discussed how habitus as a set of emotional dispositions associated to the child was demonstrated through socialisation practices. I explained how the anxious dispositions of love, hope and faith were psychosocially associated with the child and interacted with our ultimate concerns of death. I highlighted how the doctrines of Protestantism inverted the meanings of love and introduced the notion of Predestination which influenced socialisation practices. In this section, I will focus on the work of Locke (1632-1704) and illustrate how the shift in the dispositions of habitus and subsequent socialisation practises not only correspond to the emergence of the State, but psychosocially regenerated anxieties associated with the child and death.

Locke's (1632-1704) ideas are underpinned by Calvinism, and therefore rather than the power of Salvation being held in the hands of designated people within the Catholic Church this was now in the hands of the individual. This shift in ideas meant that it was the adult who held responsibility for forming the character the child. Yet, as the characteristics Locke endorsed were virtuous, they corresponded to the beliefs he

held and his rationale for promoting the ideas of virtue may have been underpinned by his own anxieties of salvation.

The advice Locke prescribed was practical and was in response to the events of the Glorious Revolution (1688–89) and the turmoil in Europe. On the one hand, Locke's advice was a forecast to prepare the population for the social difficulties ahead as resilience was needed to face future adversity. Yet on the other hand, the advice itself was intrinsically linked to the anxieties of Predestination and consideration of the future. Locke's ideas were incompatible with the Catholic monarch because he was a supporter of the Protestant Parliament, and as such he was exiled until after The Glorious Revolution (1688–89). This event not only marked the removal of an absolute monarchy and a change in monarchy from Catholic to Protestant but also marked a shift in the constitution. Sovereignty was placed in the people which further limited the authority of the Crown and the urgency to organise society was based on ideas which could be applied practically, and this was a psychosocial response to the external threat.

The proponents of the Reformation were socialised through the same set of dispositions as the rest of the population however, the doctrines of Protestantism inverted the meanings. This suggests that some of the population had 'outgrown' the previous habitus and developed a 'new' set of dispositions in response to the external threats. Furthermore, as the 'new' set of dispositions were in response to previous meanings rather than a reduction in the anxieties associated to the child and death, there was an increase. Indeed, this habitus was one with dispositions and practices that corresponded with the formation of the State.

The Glorious Revolution (1688–89) itself must be viewed from different political standpoints. On the one hand, the event was a means to stabilise the country and avoided the bloodshed which occurred later in the French Revolution. On the other hand, it was not a revolution but a coup by the political and financial elite in order to consolidate the establishments power (Vallance 2007). Yet, although the outcome did avoid a violent uprising, this would not have necessarily been known at that time. Notwithstanding, it was orchestrated by the those who by and large shared a set of dispositions which also corresponded to their positions on the social strata. Although the systems which were in place with Catholic control were changed, the actual process involved in the shifts in habitus had greater complexities. Undoubtedly there were a number of other factors which informed the events, but Locke's ideas were influenced by Calvinism and Protestant Reformers, and this was the ideological framework used to provide a 'modern' constitutional theory to build upon (Skinner 1978: p239).

Indirectly Protestantism particularly Calvinism contributed to substantial albeit the slow growth of political liberty and the establishment of an ethic of individualism. This was largely due to increased literacy which provided some of the population with an ability to interpret the Bible themselves, and individuals could make their own choices. Yet the choices were limited as one could face salvation through hard work, thrift, sobriety, and a work ethic or if they rejected these, they could face damnation (Weber [1905] (1984). As such, the habitus required to build and drive a Capitalist economy was one which embraced a set of compatible dispositions, yet these were underpinned by the

anxious dispositions of the previous habitus. Furthermore, although the population were socialised with an emphasis on the virtue of emotion, Protestantism was a return to the importance of Stoic virtues which corresponded with a rise in ideas about the importance of rationality.

Moral education and the return of Stoic principles.

For Locke, moral education was more important than any other education and he emphasised the importance that a person should be one who was socialised and Christianized. This corresponded with the ideas of Christianity, however, the overall aim of education for Locke was to instil the Principle of Virtue. The purpose of instilling the Principle of Virtue was to subvert one's immediate desires to the dictate of reason which was learnt through example by the parent or tutor. In this way, Locke's approach was closer to the Stoic cardinal virtues and politically similar to a form of Conservatism.

Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693/1959) was an instruction manual written by Locke which explained distinct methods on how to educate the tabula rasa mind. However, the work itself was written for an aristocratic friend concerning the education of his sons and Locke himself stated that it only had a specific application. Nevertheless, the ideas within the treatise were influential in terms of education because some considered that Locke's 'rules' could be applied generally. Given that education prior to this period was predominantly Catholic, the treatise offered a way to organise society

differently to the previous system, and by doing so produce a habitus based on that particular social milieu.

Due to the events of the Reformation, Latin had not only ceased to be the language of religion and the clergy, but it also ceased to be the exclusive language of the universities. Yet, in terms of the educational system and procedures, Latin and its associated practices had been perfected and embedded for over two hundred years. As such, Humanism education as it was known, was regarded as a 'stable' cultural mode because it was based on a 'tradition and conservatism which had the most tenacious of any professional loyalty' (Munroe 1905: p506). However, as the system no longer had a direct connection with the practical demands of the time, a 'newer' theory of education was put forward.

Education as a discipline

Education as a discipline was concerned with the process of learning rather than the thing learned. Indeed, all of Locke's underlying thought in terms of the proper method of intellectual, moral, and physical training is encapsulated in the word 'discipline'. The disciplinary conception of education as a theory introduced a new practice of realistic education and was based on Aristotle's philosophy of realism. This approach not only satisfied the religious view of education on the pedagogical side because it was a disciplinary one but also on the moral side because religious thought furnished the theory of disciplinary education. Thus, there was a return to the Aristotelian position from the Medieval past which focused on the training of various faculties of the mind by appropriate disciplines formulated into schoolroom procedures (Munroe 1918 pp 506-508).

The Principle of Virtue in education which Locke put forward, was essentially based upon what he saw as the eradication of the evil character of human nature. Intellectual virtue primarily originates in teaching, but for Aristotle, moral virtue came about as a result of habit. As such, there is a causal connection between good habits and virtues. Indeed, virtues are regarded as states of character rather than passions or faculties and this is why they can only be created through a process of habituation.

Furthermore, good habits give rise to consistent patterns of action and in doing so mould the passions to feel pleasure and pain rightly. Thus, virtue requires making consistently good choices and choosing an action for its own sake (Aristotle, NE II:1, 1103a-1103b). On the one hand, good habits are instrumental in meeting the requirements of virtue, yet on the other hand because Locke like Aristotle regard the mind as a *tabula rasa*, the emotional experiences of those who are responsible for instilling good habits are overlooked. Yet for Aristotle as a Pagan, good habits were instrumental in meeting the requirements of virtue because their formation are essential to the good life at which virtue aims. In contrast, Locke and other proponents of the State applied the same principles post Christianity. I suggest that adopting this habitus was an attempt to deny the emotional dispositions of the previous habitus and by doing this the deeper associations between the child and death were not addressed.

The mind as a *tabula rasa*

The desirable habitus during this period was similar to those in the Stoic period prior to Christianity. Revisiting past practices is a recognition that some practices in the present have to change or improve. Yet, the set of dispositions advocated by Stoics focused on the importance of rationality and this habitus denies the fact that we bring past experiences to form impressions of the world.

Locke's starting point is that the human mind begins blank, and that virtues are worked into it externally through the formation of habits through discipline. Education had to begin in early infancy because this is the period when the child is at its most sensitive. Although an infant obtains virtues through others, Locke overlooked the psychosocial elements of socialisation and the ways that emotional dispositions are passed on through practices. However, this can also be seen as a way that was used by some of the population to eliminate their own turbulent past experiences because the focus was firmly on the future. In other words, a way to cope with emotional past experiences is to deny them by creating other ways of practice.

Indeed, given the Reformational changes, many in the population had to make their own choices which increased their anxieties because the consequences of the choice was unknown until the afterlife. Indeed, proponents of the State such as Locke himself regarded happiness or misery partly of one's own making (Locke 1693 Part 1: p1).

Yet, as happiness and misery are emotional states of mind, their healthy development is dependent on the environment and experiences are imparted through socialisation practices. Indeed, as the proponents of the Reformation and the State were educated, the ways that they responded to their social world was based on how they were socialised. There is a kind of phylogenetic endowment involved because we inherit experiences and unconscious inherited images which are passed down through many

generations of repeated experience (Feist & Feist 2010). As such, the set of dispositions and corresponding socialisation practices play a crucial role in the development of the emotional states of mind. Therefore, we are always in a state of some conflict with our actual nature because we are not only embedded in the particular history and culture in which we are shaped but also the histories of others. Locke assumed that human nature had an evil character, yet the meanings and definitions of evil are socially defined. The desirable dispositions of habitus have to be those which corresponded to the opposite of the definition of evil. As such, some of the practices which were previously overlooked or defined as worthy became socially unacceptable and psychosocially led to a development of retrospective guilt. Overtime, the ideas about good, evil and morality were a benchmark for acceptable social behaviours and for some of the population there was a greater consideration of practices from their own childhoods.

The idea of love

The definitions and meaning of love and the child are rooted in Christianity and to some extent Locke agreed with the Biblical ideas which assumed that the child has a foolish heart. However, he was not in favour of the excessive use of punishment. Nor did he agree with the notion of 'He who spares the rod hates the son, but he who loves him disciplines him diligently' (Proverbs13.24.) Instead, Locke believed that physical punishment should only be used in very rare circumstances.

As such, Locke saw the first power that adults have over a child's mind is achieved by fear and awe and then in the later years love and friendship. Furthermore, severe

punishment caused great harm in education and children who have been 'most chastis'd seldom make the best men' (Locke 1693 Part3: Section 43 p15).

This reinforces the notion that the early years are the most important in terms of developing the Principle of Virtue. Although children should not be physically punished, Locke also highlighted they should neither receive rewards in the way of sweets or toys because this inverted the order of their education. The reward became the purpose of their education rather than the virtue itself. Instead, Locke proposed that behaviour in children should be motivated by the 'esteem or disgrace' they receive from their parents because 'children (earlier than we think) are very sensible of praise and commendation' (Locke 1693 Part 3: Section 52 pp17-18).

There is a recognition that children have the capacity to respond to both positive and negative interactions with others and also the impact of such interactions in their later life. However, Locke overlooks the fact that as adults were once children they also developed through positive and negative interactions.

On the one hand, a child was born wicked but on the other hand this brings the assumption that an adult was not. This would imply that the parent was raised as a Catholic or that their parents had socialised them in the ways which Locke prescribed. As such, there is the assumption that adults can successfully complete the task of socialisation without bringing their own experiences. Yet, the process of socialisation itself involves previous emotional experiences, yet, for Locke the dispositions of habitus and practices towards the child were based on 'objective' outcomes

Although the mind was regarded as a tabula rasa, Locke accepted that a child had inclinations or tendencies. Yet, I suggest that the inclinations were stronger because they had to be mastered by adults, as for Locke it was God who stamped certain

characters upon the mind, which could not be totally altered or transform. Instead, everyone's natural genius should be carried as far as it could (Locke 1693 Part 3: Section 66 p21).

God was the ultimate power, and as the infant was born evil, it was the responsibility of adults to instil virtue. Yet, if the administration of this task was successful, eventually the evil element of human character would ultimately be mastered by humans themselves. I suggest that this was a way to make God 'redundant' in terms of social organisation but still maintain God as the ultimate arbitrator in the judgements in the Afterlife.

According to Locke, the character of some individuals could not be completely altered, and this element of his work is controversial because it determined one's place in society and assumed that some individuals were incapable of higher achievements. This is also a return to Stoic social organisation and raises two important issues.

The first point is that if we are born with a mind which is a tabula rasa our rational capacity is age dependent and the habits which are formed earlier in life correspond with some of our age related capacities. The second point highlights that although we are thrown into the world and its conditions, we are components of our history and our 'starting' points. For example, the habitus of the masses during the Stoic period was different from those who Christianised them. However, this does not mean that the masses all had the same mentality because they too were socialised by someone who brought with them their own experiences. Locke himself digested the world psychosocially through the socialisation practices of others. I suggest that this highlights a concerted effort to change practices as a way to defend against the anxieties

associated with the child and death and to achieve this aim, the focus is directed on the future in terms of survival.

Educating the tabula rasa mind

The principles of dualism led to Locke's proposal of three distinct methods to educate the tabula rasa mind, the development of a healthy body; the formation of a virtuous character; and the choice of an appropriate academic curriculum.

In the instruction on how to develop a healthy body Locke provided key areas that the child had to avoid in terms of food such as the over consumption of particular fruits as 'Our first parents ventured Paradise for it and tis no wonder our children cannot stand the temptation' (Locke 1693 Part2: Section 20 p7).

Although this point was directly linked to the temptation of Adam and Eve, Locke's warning was against those fruits with excessive sugar such as grapes and peaches. He suggested that apples and pears could be eaten at any time and prescribed a bland diet of much bread and very little meat for healthy bones and body.

Aside from diet Locke also highlighted the importance of sleep as the major contribution to health and growth especially when the child is young. He went as far as saying that children should become accustomed to early rising and early going to bed, but as they get older, they should have eight hours sleep and not spend too much time in bed.

(Locke 1693 Part 2: Section 20 p8). Both diet and lack of sleep are currently key concerns in terms of our health and wellbeing. The items which Locke endorsed are those products which were readily grown in England. On the one hand, this may have been a tactic to nation build given the political upheaval across Europe. Yet on the other

hand, it can be seen as sound advice because it was means to prepare the population for difficulties such as food shortages or famine. Such advice is as sound now as it was then given the events post Brexit and societal changes as a result of the Covid 19 pandemic.

Despite the vast differences in time and space and technological advancement, the principle of such advice is still highly relevant in terms of basic survival. Indeed, socialisation practices are always in response to social conditions, however we create the conditions. Thus, the changes in socialisation practices are fundamentality in response to the emotional dispositions associated with the child and survival.

Experiences shape a person, and Locke demonstrated this point in his discussion about the bed in which the child sleeps because he believed it should be hard as 'tis sleep only that is the thing necessary' (Locke 1693 Part2: Section 22 p9). In other words, it was sleep rather than comfort, which was the necessity, and although this implies that there was an absence of care, I suggest that this was quite the opposite. If a child was accustomed to hard lodgings at home when they were away from that environment their sleep would not be impacted. Therefore, the advice offered by Locke was given to build resilience in the child and ensure their survival, but this was also based on Locke's own Calvinistic upbringing as the notions of frugality were linked to Predestination anxieties. In today's terms we recognise that sleep is affected by a range of factors other than comfort and yet, sleep itself is a basic biological requirement. However, the knowledge which was generated during that time was underpinned by dualism which was intent on separating the mind and body. Therefore, although some of the population promoted these ideas, the foundations themselves were emotional because we cannot detach

ourselves from our experiences. This is not my attempt to dismiss the knowledge itself but rather to highlight how knowledge and practices are regenerated psychosocially because they are contained within a history of experiences.

Locke's focus is on establishing habits earlier in life because this enabled the person to survive in a range of situations and environments. This advice was aimed at the aristocrats because it was far removed from their existing practices, unlike the poor who were hardier in terms of their physicality. However, for Locke, the strength of the body lay chiefly in being able to endure hardships as did the mind.

'A sound mind in a sound body, is a short but full description of a happy state in this world' (Locke 1693 Part1 p1). For Locke, children should always comply to the will of their parent, and this must be imprinted in infancy. The reason he gave for this was that it was easier to manage disobedience when the child was younger rather than trying to instil obedience when they are grown. In other words, if the parent is strict from the beginning the child will be more likely to submit because they have known nothing different. The differences in historical and social context are important because a critique of Locke's ideas are from a contemporary position and habitus. Such ideas may make some people feel uncomfortable because this habitus is incompatible with current social thought and practices.

Yet, the implication of this is that habitus is demonstrate through a dominate set of dispositions which are approved by a given society. Thus, those who have a different habitus are socially defined in ways that are perceived as negative and as such their practices are used as a way to conceal their dispositions.

Furthermore, a focus on power inequalities between children and adults are based on contemporary ideas and context. Even the notion of protection in contemporary society can be regarded as a form of inequality because children are more dependent and therefore subject to greater adult control than previously (Firestone 1979; Holt 1974). Yet, as an adult is responsible for the wellbeing of the child, even the notion of equality is difficult term to define.

The Spirit of Capitalism

Locke's principles were also underpinned by Calvinism which had a particular set of values and corresponded to the development of the economic system of Capitalism (Weber 1905). For this particular branch of Protestantism, pastoral counselling maintained that the answer to Predestination anxieties could be found in a secular vocation, self-control, and communal service. As such, a Calvinist habitus involved a set of values which were based on the spirit of hard work and progress.

The religious devotion or worldly ascetism was a habitus which required some of the population to live ascetic lives but not to withdraw from the world. Although ethically speaking wealth and acquisition were bad, this was only in terms of them being a temptation to idleness and a sinful enjoyment of life. As such, a Calvinistic habitus was one which involved self-reassurance through their industry, and this was a key factor in the growth of Capitalism.

Calvinists built up business which generated wealth but as they believed in virtuous living, they were thrifty and instead of spending their money they reinvested. Thus, the practices of habitus through such dispositions were conducive to the evolution of an

economic system. In this way, the dispositions of habitus had a history which generated history (Bourdieu 2000 p138). Hence, those individuals who promoted this habitus as a way of being still had the emotional remnants of the previous habitus.

Locke's instruction manual was intended for the nobility which were a small group in society, and the purpose was to prepare their children for the hardships of life. Yet, as the nobility were wealthy, the ways they used their wealth was incompatible with Calvinist doctrines. Furthermore, prior to the Reformation, the nobility were Catholic and encouraging them to reinvest their wealth was an objective means of demonstrating their commitment to a different way of living through their actions. Therefore, habitus as a collective of dispositions was made visible through practices and actions.

Locke's view of school

Schools were not the ideal place for the child to learn because they did not provide the close attention that children needed. Instead, Locke emphatically urged families to school their children at home themselves or with a tutor because this was the only way that children would be taught according to their temperaments. Furthermore, schools, were places where children lose their individuality, and it is easier to learn bad manners. As such, Locke saw it as the responsibility of the parent to bring interesting people into their home and in this way, children would engage in conversation and learning.

This critique of schools underpinned the ideas of good habit forming because keeping the child at home limited unwanted experiences, especially given the multitude of competing ideas. Indeed, schools were underpinned by the doctrines of Catholicism, with a different set of dispositions to the ones advocated by Locke and his supporters.

As such, children who were socialised through Calvinistic or Protestant principles generally focused on the rewards of hard work and the future in terms of Predestination.

Section 4B: Summary

The shift in religious thought and subsequent practices demonstrates how habitus as a set of dispositions was transported and reproduce through socialisation practices.

Locke's work illustrates how the shift in habitus and socialisation practises

corresponded with the emergence of the State. I suggest that some in the population who were socialised by the proponents of the Reformation were subsequently advocates of the State as their dispositions of habitus corresponded with Capitalism.

The meanings associated with love and the child were inverted, and subsequently the child who was socialised through innocence, overtime became the parent who socialised their child as one born with sin. As such, the previous habitus was a personal collection of experiences which justified and reproduced practices through socialisation. Love, faith, and hope as an established set of dispositions became entangled with the inverted meanings and definitions. The use of punishment reinforced obedience but triggered guilt because of the contradiction in the meanings of love, the child, and the association with death.

For some of the population, no amount of faith or hope guaranteed a place in heaven nor did religious practices give assurances of Salvation. Yet, some of this population, invested their money into capitalist ventures and the foundation of these practices were built upon the dispositions of faith and hope which were formed by the previous habitus. These changes demonstrate that socialisation practices were informed by a

collaboration between the Church and the State. Yet, the Church and the State itself was birthed by individuals and reproduced through action. On the one hand, the practical ways and character building which Locke endorsed were a way to deny death because such principles denied the importance of emotions. Yet on the other hand, for some of the population the set of dispositions which saw the child as innocent flourished. I will explain this further in the next section with a focus on Rousseau's work (1712-1778). Indeed, although Rousseau was influenced by Locke's work, his philosophic approach was based largely on Romanticism and therefore he placed a greater importance on what he saw as the nature of humans.

Section 5B: Religion, the Child, Education- Rousseau

In the previous section I discussed Locke's (1632-1704) work and explained how despite the changes in practices, the previous set of dispositions associated to the child and death were not addressed but rather buried and therefore embroiled amongst other emotions. I explained how Locke and the proponents of the State had a habitus which focused on the future and why the practices were not only compatible with capitalism as an economic system but also how the dispositions were used as way to deny death.

A key moment in the last 500 years in the history of childhood can be placed in the works Rousseau and within Romanticism as philosophy, which placed its emphasis on an emotional self-awareness (Cunningham 1995). As such, in this section, I focus on the work of Rousseau (1712-1778) who was prone to 18th century prejudices, yet his work provides an insight into how some of the population psychosocially denied death. I discuss these points in greater detail and refer to Rousseau's influential treatise *Emile* (1762/2007) which served as the inspiration for what became a new national system of education during the French Revolution (Bloch 1995).

Emile

Emile as an imaginary pupil is used as a model to depict Rousseau's ideal type of education and the roles that parents play in child rearing. Rousseau emphasised the important role of the mother and the father and his philosophical standpoint is purely based on nature which I agree with purely in terms of biology.

Biologically a male and a female each have the elements which enable reproduction and thus our existence and the birth mother is immediately present in terms of basic early survival of the child.²⁷ Indeed, this shift in thought highlights three important points. The first point is that Catholicism focuses on the role of the mother and depicts this through the relations of Mary and her son Jesus. The second point is the Protestantism focuses on the role of the father in terms of a manifestation of God. The third point is that Rousseau focuses on the importance of the mother, the father, and

²⁷ Although there are numerous considerations associated with reproduction, my focus is purely in terms of biological functions.

the State. Indeed, Rousseau's considerations are based on building an ideal society and developing the State and political organisation of France during a series of severe social upheaval. As such, his return to nature is associated with the notion of freedom which is central to Rousseau's philosophy.

Nature

When considering a tutor for *Emile*, Rousseau regarded the European as wiser and this view supported his emphasis on nature in terms of adaptation and the natural environment. The ideal tutor according to Rousseau would be European because those people who live in environments with extreme climates have difficulty adapting to other extremes and he used Lapland and New Guinea as examples.

Rousseau focused on environmental and cultural variation and as Europeans were geographically in the middle, they suffered half the variation than those in the extremes of Lapland and New Guinea. In this context, Rousseau assumed that the brain was less perfectly organised in these two extremes, and that neither were as wise as Europeans because the proximity to nature simply meant that their wisdom is applicable to the requirements of that world (Book 1 pp18-19). Therefore, the spread of 'civilization' had not made human society more perfect but had corrupted it and this was one reason why Rousseau favoured natural environments.²⁸

Rousseau's philosophy was one which also opposed the domination of organised religion as well as those paradigms which overlooked the importance of nature. Thus,

²⁸ Rousseau's work has been interpreted through various lens and practices were adopted to legitimise inequality and support ideas of genetic superiority.

far I have illustrated how the meanings and definitions associated with the child and death were psychosocially regenerated through practises. Indeed, Rousseau himself was socialised through these principles but he advocates a different set of dispositions which is based on his understanding of nature. I suggest that this represents his return to a Paganistic way of life before Christianity. Furthermore, although Rousseau wishes to return to a similar 'period' as Locke, each internalised the set of dispositions of habitus differently based on their experiences. Locke was affiliated to Reformation thought and the move towards the formation of the State which was clearly underpinned by Calvinistic doctrines and Stoic virtues. Whereas Rousseau experienced Catholicism and Calvinism and although he rejected organised religion, he did not reject God.

Anti-organised religion

Emile (1762/2007) was banned, and the text was burnt by the Church in Paris and Geneva because in one section Rousseau wrote a lengthy sermon. The sermon focused on what he called the religion of the heart which highlighted that he was not an atheist, but he was anti organised religion. Rousseau stated that his belief was one where the world was governed by a wise and powerful will which he could feel. Yet, he questioned whether 'this same world' had always existed or whether it had been created.

For Rousseau, there were so many religions which mutually exclude or proscribe to each other, another religion cannot be condemned unless all had been examined. Furthermore, if after examination, there are objections they must be compared with evidence because there can only be one which is true if indeed any one of them is

true. Thus, Rousseau insisted that he would not argue about the nature of God unless he was driven to this by his own feelings (Rousseau 1762/2007 pp225-250).

I suggest that Rousseau represented a threat to organised religion but the fact that his ideas resonated with so many others illustrates that the population also wanted to return to a place which they had never actually experienced themselves. Furthermore, a return to the past is a way to avoid thoughts about the uncertain future especially since the conditions at that time were ripe for revolution.

On the one hand, looking to the past is a way to manage the anxieties associated with survival and death. Yet, on the other hand, some in the population were prepared to die in pursuit of a different way of living for the future of their children. I suggest this was partly based on the contradictory nature of the emotions associated to the child and death.

For some, and I would include proponents of the State such as Locke, habitus was such that it continued to forge ahead and by doing so denied death. Their dispositions were such that their practices kept some of the population preoccupied and this was a way to deny death. However, it is far too simplistic to suggest that the population were in two separate camps with separate sets of dispositions. Rather as the dispositions themselves were passed on through socialisation practices, successive generations internalised a fusion of dispositions which were informed by experiences but involved a concoction of contradictions. Indeed, Rousseau was anti organised religion and also anti competition, yet his insistence on having evidence for a 'true' religion also highlights the influence of Empiricism.

It is important to recognise that prior to the French Revolution (1789) the conditions in France were markedly different to those in the UK. Indeed, the complexities associated with the Revolution itself are extremely intricate and deserve far more attention than this thesis can give. Suffice to say that a key aspect of the Revolution was dechristianization because the Church owned landed estates and large amounts of money.

Having abandoned his own children, Rousseau was attacked for not following the principles of his own advice in *Emile*. However, Rousseau defended his actions because he did not have the means to educate them, and he reasoned that they would be better raised as workers and peasants by the State.

Rousseau's position is that the State is responsible for those children whose parents cannot educate them. Furthermore, Rousseau's own children were illegitimate, and they and their mother had been shunned by society (Cranston, 1983). Illegitimacy itself was defined by organised religion and strongly linked to sin and the stigma was justified as a punishment by God especially from 1660 until the mid to late 1800s (Gibson 2022). Therefore, as the mother of Rousseau's children was uneducated, he claimed she would not be able to fulfil the 'earliest education which was the most important and is undoubtedly a women's work' (Book 1 p6).

Rousseau's own mother died when he was 9 days old, and his upbringing fell to his father. Although he did not have a formal education, he inherited his mother's large collection of books and was encouraged by his well-read father who inspired in him a love of Nature, the classics and history. (Wolker 2001). This highlights two important points.

The first point is that the recognition of an intrinsic relationship between the mother and child is one which was not socially constructed, but rather one that was emotional in its nature. This may have been based on Rousseau's earliest experience of losing his own mother and as a result the focus of his work was not purely about the child, but the importance of relationships with the child.

The second point is that his own experiences of education and childhood are reproduced throughout his work. Indeed, it could be said that his own father was a representation of the ideal tutor he advised for *Emile*. Of crucial importance is that both Locke and Rousseau agree on the unsuitability of mass education. I suggest that this demonstrates their desire to return to a way of life which is maintained by a smaller network of people in close relationships, rather than a specific environment through formalised instruction on mass.

Self-love

Rousseau's idea of self-love is a means of self-preservation, and he suggests that this is a child's first sentiment and the second is derived from that. Yet, the self-love that Rousseau is referring to is not the 21st century version depicted practices such as taking a selfie, wearing a slogan, or purchasing merchandise which shows everyone else that one loves oneself. Rousseau would argue that practices have contaminated self-love because selfishness, anger and hatred derived from comparing oneself to others. Indeed, Rousseau had a distaste for competitiveness and instead focused on the importance of 'preserving the child's innocence, by 'surrounding him by those who respect and love him' (Book V1 p 169). In other words, showing the child respect and love enabled them to be fulfilled as a person rather than looking outside of themselves

to make comparisons. In terms of nature, we were not kings or nobles, and we are all likely to face the sorrows of life because, we are all condemned to die. Therefore, for Rousseau, it was the study of the essentials of humanity that really constitutes mankind (Book 1V p173).

For this reason, Rousseau believed that a child has to be introduced to humanity at an early age and they must not admire the brilliant life of others. An adult must ensure that they should show the child life in its more sorrowful aspects to arouse their fears. In this way the child obtains their own way to happiness without interfering with happiness of others (Book V1 p 175). Therefore, the focus has to be on one's own life and possibilities. Although this suggests that the notion of self-preservation involves ignoring the plight of others, however this is not the case, but rather this is a recognition that one could face such a plight themselves. This is a means of developing a deeper understanding of oneself first and then one can recognise the condition of another. Therefore, Rousseau is not necessarily 'protecting' the child but rather ensuring that the child learns self-preservation as a means to protect themselves. The aim of this was if children were showed unpleasant elements of life, they may become self-motivated to ensure, as far as is possible, that they too are not in such a position. In other words, the experience the child has is through observing the experience of others and then considering themselves in that position.

The Purpose of Education

A key element of Rousseau's work is the idea that whilst society can be an arena, it ought to be a forum and that cooperation makes one happy. It is an idealistic

approach which on the one hand sees humans as good, yet on the other hand, their interactions with other beings can lead them astray because they move away from their own intrinsic nature. For Rousseau, education is something which is thrust upon the child from another person who has also had it thrust upon them. In contrast, nature is the child but instead of 'training man for himself you try to train him for others' and that 'Plants are fashioned by cultivation and man by education' (Book 1 pp6-8). In this way, the child never knows their own nature but knows that of others, and this sentiment applies to each of us because we are not raised in isolation. It is unrealistic to consider that a child can be raised in such conditions as they rely on others for their survival. Yet, given that Rousseau is presenting Emile as an 'ideal type' his work illustrates how knowledge is constructed and reconstructed and shared through practices. This may be a reason why Rousseau highlights the importance of an educated mother, yet we all construct and reconstruct knowledge based on our experiences.

Rousseau and Education

The central question in Emile is 'How will a man live with others if he is educated for himself alone' (Book 1 p9). Seen in this way, *Emile* was a project which was used to highlight the existing domination, power of ideas, and provide an alternative model. Locke's representation of the child was one whose emotions had to be mastered and which was illustrated through his socialisation advice. In contrast, *Emile also* represented the child, but he was not abstract nor was he omnipresent as depicted in

religious imagery. This representation reflected Rousseau himself as *Emile* and connoted the meanings of love and hope but differently.

Given the disruptions in France at the time, *Emile* offered hope to the masses because he was a human child who represented a fresh start and many of the population related to this idea. Furthermore, *Emile* represented the positive possibilities of the future, and this was a different type of hope because the focus was on developing healthy individuals who would subsequently become ideal citizens.

In contrast to Locke, who thought education trained the child, for Rousseau education came from external aims which conflicted with one's nature, and the contradictory demands would subsequently cause inner conflicts.

Yet, Rousseau's consideration of the external and inner worlds was also in conflict with the dominant knowledges of the time which focused on the separation of mind and body. Although Rousseau agreed with Lock's blank slate analogy, he placed the emphasis on the innate nature of the child as good as opposed to being nothing or indeed evil. In other words, it was the child's interaction with the external world that 'contaminated' the child.

The Natural Good

Emile is divided into five books and in each one Rousseau considers the life of a child before they become a man. At the beginning of the work Rousseau admits that his advice does not necessarily suit all conditions as it depended on a given society, but

he used examples of Switzerland and France. The comparison itself reflected the impact of his early childhood experiences and the influence these had on his later thoughts. Rousseau was born in Geneva which was a small Calvinist state surrounded by Catholic nations but it was protected by natural barriers from invasion. Although its political culture was a Republic, it was in the midst of duchies and monarchies (Wolker 2001: p2).

As such, Switzerland was a society divided into small Cantons in contrast to France but particularly Paris which was a large city. Through this scheme, Rousseau emphasised the positives of smaller relationships in small states which he believed would contain the 'natural' goodness of a child and this was one of his fundamental ideas. As 'God makes all things good; man meddles with them, and they become evil' (Emile Book 1 p 6) it was this sentiment that Rousseau set out the ways natural good could be protected as *Emile* developed.

The protection of goodness allowed each child to form their own conclusions from experience to avoid the domineering influence of others. Rousseau suggested that this was a gradual process because the aim was to avoid contamination. As such, if the child generated a sense of self that was egocentric this would create Paris in the child, but by keeping the child in the Canton, it was safe. Unlike the city, the Canton was more likely to have forms of religious beliefs which were less oppressive and therefore, their relationships would be better.

Rousseau's ideas were a combination of his political ideals and religious contradictions. Although he was born into Calvinism, he later converted to Catholicism,

but this was because he could not claim citizenship in Geneva, he than later converted back to Calvinism.²⁹

The notion of the child Rousseau presented resonated with many of population because these ideas provided a way to resolve retrospective guilt and forgive themselves for previous practices. This can be seen as a move away from Catholicism and the confessional towards a position of Protestantism and a direct relationship with God. Contemporaneously, Rousseau's depiction of the child and goodness was associated with innocence and omnipresence and the connotation was that the child was born into a world of sinners.

Although Rousseau's depictions of the child was offered during a period of massive social upheaval, the suggestions were unlike those made during the Reformation period. Indeed, the rejection of organised religion suggests that some of the population wanted freedom to live their lives without religious constraints. However, the sets of dispositions and their association to the child and death were deeply embedded.

The practical suggestions offered by Locke were observable through actions which were visible to others and aligned to a set of dispositions which were passed on through socialisation practices.

I suggest that as the ideas of the child presented by Rousseau were based on an ideal type, they were psychosocially influential. Not only could some of the population

²⁹Bertram, Christopher, "Jean Jacques Rousseau", *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/rousseau>

imagine the possibilities of a brighter future, but they could also actually create the ideal child through reproduction. This way of thinking gave some of the population a second chance and provided them a way to elevate their retrospective guilt. This shift away from hope and faith as depicted through organised religion was one that was directed towards the child. Thus, the emotional dispositions associated with the future were redirected and became a romanticised preoccupation which focused on the child as a project and the notion of innocence regenerated the cherubic imagery of the past which was as a way to deny death.

Section 6B: Rousseau's impact on representations of childhood

The Romantic era was a creative artistic, literary, and intellectual movement that originated in Europe towards the end of the 18th century, and in most areas was at its peak in the approximate period from 1800 to 1850. The movement cohabitated with existing Enlightenment ideas and both artist and scholar turned to the emotions for guidance. However, although Romantic sentiment came to be accepted as a 'source of a kind of knowledge to which intelligence could not aspire, Reason remained in command'. Thus, there was an albeit reluctant acceptance of the complex interplay between emotions and reason because this constituted a 'modern' sensibility (Hampson 1990: pp186-188).

In the previous section I discussed the work of Rousseau and the habitus as a set of dispositions which were underpinned by the idea of nature and the notion of freedom. These ideas reduced the anxieties about the future because Rousseau provided an

alternative paradigm to that of organised religion. Yet, as the dispositions and associations of innocence were already embedded, I suggest that some of the population expressed their concerns about death through the arts and imagery of the child.

Rousseau's depiction of the child was internalised and creatively expressed in different forms. Writers recognised a numinous vision of the natural child as one who possessed a deeper insight into reality than the opaque, disenchanted conventional adult and this was echoed in Wordsworth's *Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood* (1807) and 'Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey' (1798). Rousseau's *Emile* governed the depiction of the 'natural' child's fragile innocence in Blake's *Songs of Innocence* (1789) and *Songs of Experience* (1794) and the idea that imagination is a sacred vessel of the infinite, 'the emancipator of the bound human mind and is the means by which eternal realities came to expression and consciousness' (Tarnas 1991 p369). The thematic aspects of nature and *Emile* were used in children's fiction such as Kipling's *The Jungle Books* (1894-1895), the narrative of Burroughs's *Tarzan of the Apes* (1914) and Burnett's character Mary Lennox and her natural education in *The Secret Garden* (1911).

The ideas Rousseau presented in *Emile* had a profound impact on later nineteenth- and twentieth-century representations of childhood because there was a wider acceptance of the range of human faculties considered necessary for genuine cognition (Bateson 2002). Yet, although imagination and feeling joined sense and reason which encouraged a deeper understanding of the world, it did not necessarily

address aspects of the self. I suggest that the child was depicted in such ways because it was a way to deny the threat to survival in a rapidly changing world. For some of the population creative and idealisation of the past was a way to avoid considerations of the future and its inevitabilities. Yet for others, focusing on the future in the here and now was a way to manage Predestination anxieties and I will discuss this next with a focus on 19th century habitus.

Section 7B: The 19th Century Curriculum as progressive

In the quest to discover the relationship between individual development and the evolution of species and lineages demonstrated in the age and stage theories, 19th century biology modified Aristotelian theories (Gould 1977). These theories were applied in a social context (Spencer 1861; Durkheim 1886) and were also used later to explain age related development stages and clearly identifiable structural changes (Piaget 1952). Such ideas not only supported a deficit conception of childhood but also the meanings and connotations restricted the range and value of the relationships between adults and children.

Although relationships are a fundamental aspect of stage theories, a key characteristic of the 19th century was fragmentation. A range of different priorities developed post French Revolution (Saint-Simon, 1760-1825., Comte, 1798-1857) and each of the sciences developed their own direction which had to be supported by empirical

evidence. I explain this point further in Chapter 4 Section 2 because this has bearings on the approach, I use to address the research question.

Medieval practices involved ages and stages and these informed society of expected behaviours and as discussed in Chapter One these were initially introduced by the Church. However, these ideas were later supported by a variety of explanations with a focus on the cognitive and social processes involved in the absorption and retention of learning. The theories were later formalised in different ways through the curriculum (Dewey 1902: Piaget 1952: Maslow:1968 Vygotsky:1978). Indeed, 'owing to this development our modern theory of man lost its intellectual centre' (Binswanger 1950: p154).

Unlike Comte (1798 – 1857) who wanted sociology as a guide to building a better society, Spencer (1820-1903) was of the view that the new 'science' should not interfere with the natural process occurring within society. It is important to recognise that unlike Comte who was socialised through Catholicism and was responding to the aftermaths of the French Revolution, Spencer was an only child raised by predominantly male religious dissenters and educated in empirical science by his father. Women were excluded from Spencer's early childhood and his mother was submissive to a domineering husband (Francis 2007, pp25-28). This is a relevant point because I have highlighted how habitus as a set of dispositions are passed on through the process of socialisation. Indeed, Spencer unlike Comte rejected sentimentalities and religion and instead focuses on the application of science. As such, there is a concerted effort to separate the subjective and emotional aspect of humans and focus purely on the objective observable outcomes of practices.

As a principal proponent of evolutionary theory, Spencer provided a systematic account of his views in biology, sociology, ethics, and politics. The idea was simply that those societies that evolved developed into more advanced societies and those that did not would disappear.

Spencer's key text *Education, Intellectual, Moral and Physical* (1861) provides an 'ideal type' of habitus for 19th century society. The text sets out a formulated curriculum with a focus on human development in terms of social evolution.

Thus, the dispositions Spencer described as needed for survival were 'natural' but objective. In other words, there was an attempt to 'separate' the subjective which I suggest reflected his experiences and resonated with some others in the population.

Spencer's views on the child and schooling are different to those advocated by both Locke and Rousseau. In *Education* (1861) Spencer highlighted that the curriculum of that time did not provide students with the skills they needed for the modern world. For Spencer, both religion and fields of the humanities were impractical and unrelated to contemporary life and the focus of education had to be on knowledge which had the most worth (Spencer 1861: p5). The decision should not be based on the actual worth of a mathematical or classical education or knowledge because who could say what this was. Furthermore, deciding the value between two types of knowledge was akin to 'ascertaining whether or not bread is more nutritive than potatoes!' (Spencer 1861: p5). Instead, Spencer proposed that the decision should be based on the relative importance.

For Spencer, religion was a waste of time and this view corresponded to the capitalist

economic system of that time. I suggest that Spencer's set of dispositions had evolved through socialisation practices associated to Stoicism, the Protestant Reformation, Political Reformation, the State and Capitalism. Indeed, when Spencer considered time, he did so in relation to money and as time was money, there was very little to be 'gained' when time is wasted. This set of dispositions and practices focused on the importance of accumulation as opposed to a consideration of time itself. The previous habitus expressed time differently.

For Locke, time was of great importance in terms of behaviours and conditions associated with Predestination whilst for Rousseau, time was important in terms of life and experiences. In contrast, Spencer's notion of time was associated with having something in material form or that which could be used and as such he saw the accumulation of knowledge for knowledge's sake of little worth. Yet, there is a similarity to Locke's ideas about the importance of practical education.

Although Spencer rejected religion in a curriculum, he acknowledged that the way to live in a society is an essential question, but it extended beyond the material sense. As such, he gave greater priority to the knowledge that could be actually used, and that which was rewarded. His position was that to devote years to a subject which fashion suggested would be wasted time and we 'must ever bear in mind our limited time for acquisition' (Spencer 1861: p29).

Yet, I suggest that Spencer's focus on limited time have an association to the anxieties of Predestination which helped to develop the spirit of capitalism because wealth was reinvested in commerce and business. Indeed, as a result of this success, and the various advancement in the sciences, the 19th century for some, required a set of

dispositions which were based on competition and demonstrated through practices of acquisition.

The classification of the importance of educational courses

For Spencer, the function which education had to discharge was to prepare the population for a complete living. As such, Spencer used a 'rational' mode of thinking to classify the importance of those activities which constitute human life.

In Spencer's classification the first activity which constitutes human life was that which directly attended to self-preservation. This would align with Maslow's much later hierarchy of needs (1943,1954) as the first level of basic physiological requirements needed for survival.

Although, this assumes that everyone has the means for survival, Spencer's explanation is one which is based on an actual function. The implication is that some of the population have a set of dispositions whereby they can 'detach' themselves from the object of their interest, however, all of us are primarily concerned with survival. Spencer is no different in this sense because his focus is on the elements which interrupt the process of survival.

In contrast to Rousseau's idea of self-love, Spencer's discussion is based on the rational idea of self -preservation rather than a focus on its nature. Spencer's adoption of nature is underpinned by the notion of survival of the fittest in terms of adaptation to the physical environment. As such, the focus is on those aspects of life which can be observed through practices and are regarded as having greater importance than those who carry out the task. Yet, given his childhood experiences, his own anxieties of survival were of paramount importance.

Spencer based the second level of classification on those activities which, by securing the necessities of life indirectly minister to self-preservation.

Indirect self-preservation is self-maintenance and is gained by acquiring the means of living. This level of classification corresponded with the changes in the modes of production in an industrial society. Paradoxically, Spencer discusses the needs of society as separate from the population. Yet the needs of society are the needs of the population as one exists because of the other.

Work could be considered as an intrinsic part of living because we are involved in whatever task we do. Yet, the set of dispositions required in this type of economic system involved shaping habitus to think, act and approach the world in a different way. This is made clearer in the third level of Spencer's classification because it was based on those activities which focused on the rearing and discipline of the offspring. For Spencer, the knowledge needed for self-maintenance has stronger claims than knowledge needful for family welfare. This level is closely linked to the fourth level as activity, which are those activities involved in the maintenance of proper social and political relations.

For Spencer, as the family came before the State, raising children is possible before the State existed, or indeed when it has ceased to be. However, as Spencer's definition of family is that which was defined by the State, the family he refers to prior to the State did not share the same form. Indeed, if we consider Rousseau's responsibilities to his family it would look completely different to that of Spencer's. In this way, Spencer considers the State as a structure which somehow exists independently without human involvement.

Furthermore, although Spencer saw socialisation as the responsibility of parents, in order to fulfil the previous tasks, a parent needed to socialise their child to meet the States requirements at any given time or social milieu. As I have illustrated, knowledge influenced socialisation practices however, habitus as sets of dispositions were passed down through experiences. Indeed, as with Rousseau, Spencer's childhood was one in which the mother was absent, and I suggest that this is a crucial factor in their future considerations of family life. Although Spencer's mother came from a lineage of non-conformist, she conformed even in the face of cruelty. Spencer felt responsible for his mother's destruction even though he was not responsible, and this distorted his relationships with women (Taylor 2007 pp20-21).

The fifth level of the classification was based on miscellaneous activities which fill up the leisure part of life and are devoted to the gratification of the tastes and feelings. Spencer saw the forms of pleasurable occupation which involve music, poetry, painting and so on as those which implied a pre-existing society and that the subject-matter was grounded in social sentiments and sympathies. Comte regarded the imagination as subordinate to reason and the Arts generally as intellectually dangerous. In his system of positivism, Art was the ideal representation of fact and in this way was coextensive with that of Science, as one explained fact and the other beautifies fact (Comte 2009 [1865] pp144-145). For Spencer, it was society that supplied the conditions to their growth and the ideas and sentiments that they expressed. Consequently, in education preparation for that part of human conduct which 'constitutes good citizenship must rank before that which goes out in accomplishments or exercise of the tastes' (Spencer 1861: pp 6-10).

Given Spencer's standpoint this view is unsurprising, however, this attack on the arts added greater value to those subject areas which were regarded as rational. Indeed, proponents of such views overlooked the fact that creative thinking coexisted alongside rational thought. Furthermore, rational thought cannot be separated from emotions, however for Spencer, the 'sentimentalities' were unimportant, and I suggest that this was the beginning of a 'new' way of being and a shift in habitus.

Habitus as a set of dispositions required in an industrial society denied the importance of social sentiments. Yet, social sentiments tied people together because they were often based on previous 'shared' experiences and emotionally expressed.

Furthermore, such sentimentalities were used as a way for some of the population to express feelings that have no words, yet the 'new' way of being saw these dispositions as serving no function. Habitus as sets of dispositions which were once deemed as desirable were overlaid with observable contradictory practices. Yet, given Spencer's experiences and the nature of his upbringing he was unsure about *how* to express his own emotions in later life (Francis 2007 p27).

Spencer's intention was to classify educational courses based purely on a rational mode of being, but he accepted that each of the levels were intricately linked and inevitably there was variance within each division. However, he also insisted that the divisions were subordinate to one another because the corresponding divisions of life make one another possible in that order' (Spencer 1861: p11).

Spencer rejection of religion was demonstrated through his classification system because it devalued the role of emotions. Yet, it may well have been because emotions themselves are complicated and science cannot 'prove' their existence or provide an

overall 'scientific' definition. Or it may have been easier to dismiss the emotions because in that way there is no need to address them directly. Indeed, although Spencer's system highlighted the importance of family and socialisation there is the assumption that the process itself is devoid of emotion or relationships. In his experience this may have been the case.

Spencer's approach corresponded with Locke's emphasis on hard work and reward. However, working hard for Spencer, meant a reward in terms of the here and now rather than the uncertainty of the reward of Predestination.

I suggest that the anxieties associated with uncertainty were also increased through the notion of time in the here and now and this was demonstrated in practices and the urgency to accumulate. Habitus in the 19th century, was one which prioritised a set of dispositions for an industrialised society where people were employed in production, preparation, and distribution of commodities. Science not only played a major role in these processes but also helped to maintain the population's health and wellbeing and in the absence of science, the needs of the economy would not be met. Indeed, civilised life itself was made possible and depended on scientific knowledge which had been ignored in schools in favour of religion' (Spencer 1861: p18). I suggest that this was an important shift because the notion of civilised life was one whereby behaviour could be observed and judged in terms of expectations of civil society in addition to those which were prescribed by organised religion. Indeed, both Humanities and Religion which were once regarded as being the most important subjects in education, were now 'demoted' from their positions.

For 19th century society to function successfully there was a kind of harmonisation of habitus and field. Spencer's curriculum is an example of how practice and knowledge are contained and generated in the field of Education and through the process of socialisation. However, this suggests that in the 19th century, schools shared the same habitus, or they were 'forced' to adopt the practices but neither of these were the case. Developing habitus as a way of being is not linear nor is it straightforward. The changes to habitus were not based on power because individuals are the 'vehicles of power, not its points of application' and we are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power (Foucault 1980 p.98). Rather, the practices which are generated in fields are regarded as 'natural' in the sense that they are reproduced in any given society through socialisation. Indeed, although socialisation is regarded as 'natural' the process itself is only ever in response to the social world. Indeed, how we raise children is not 'natural' because we are socialised by other people who bring their own experiences to the process. Habitus adapts socially and mental structures assimilate, and the ways of being can only be observed through practices. As such, the practices themselves are a way to determine if we are 'natural' in our way of being. I discuss this further in the theoretical framework in Chapter Three.

Section 8B: Child Saving Movements

Spencer's approach highlighted a shift from the previous ideas of schools as places to be avoided to one which sees mass education as desirable. Yet, as the parent's prime responsibility was to meet the child's survival needs this implied that emotions were somehow left outside of education.

The ideas underpinning Spencer's curriculum were evident in the ways that society was organised in the late 19th and early 20th century. Changes in education and schooling coincided with the rise in industrialisation and also offered a solution to the problem of the 'idleness of children.' Some schools were places which offered convenient child-minding services for those not old enough to work (Cunningham 1995).

The 1908 Children's Act established juvenile courts, so that children would be prosecuted according to different standard from adults. Yet, the 1908 Act also introduced a formal register of Foster Parents which was State approved. As such, the State could take over those children who had been removed from their biological parents because they had suffered abuse. Yet, for some of the population, this was also a way to address their own experiences as children and their own anxieties of survival and salvation. Indeed, the legislators themselves were socialised through a set of dispositions which were focused on trying to repair or improved the present and these practices were evidence of how they used their 'time'.

It could be said that education was 'forced' upon the masses by outside agencies and the increase in philanthropy and child saving movements were an indication of retrospective guilt. Indeed, child-saving was heavily influenced by some women who extended their roles within the home into public service. (Cunningham 1995).

The emphasis was that social order was dependent on the proper socialization of children which further promoted ideas of cause and effect beyond the realms of religion. The responsibility of raising children was taken away from those women in the mass population and provided by women who were wealthier. This sort of practice

generated the notion that those from wealthier backgrounds were better mothers. Furthermore, through these practices the suggestion was that socialisation was a women's responsibility but was not necessarily the remit of the biological mother. This relates back to Rousseau's discussion about the importance of an educated mother and her role in terms of child raising. (Rousseau [1762] Book 1 p 6). However, in terms of child saving in the 19th century, the importance of mothering in practice was recognised but the emotions associated with the 'natural' mother were overlooked. Thus, the practices associated with this habitus denied the emotional connection between a mother and child. Indeed, the practices of mothering corresponded with the practices of an industrialised society whereby a production line mentality was one which was detached from the object they produced. Yet, the emotions associated with the child do not simply vanish.

For some of the population, child saving was linked to the notions of innocence and survival because the practices removed the child from the evil of 'man' and this denied the fact that a child has their own experiences. Furthermore, these practices also regenerated habitus as a set of dispositions associated with Christian depictions of the ideal mother as Mary which I highlighted in Chapter Two Section 3A.

There is a nostalgia for the past but during the 19th century, childhood itself became a socially designated period. I suggest that such legislation was introduced as a way to alleviate their own anxieties of salvation and survival, but the practices which developed were in response to the legislation and generated retrospective guilt.

At the end of the nineteenth century, child saving movements helped to create special judicial and correctional institutions for the labelling, processing, and management of

'troublesome' youth (Platt 1977). Yet, this way of being was aligned to a set of dispositions associated to predestination, wickedness, and child salvation which I discussed in Chapter Two Section 2B.

Although the actual practices changed, habitus as a set of dispositions were reproduced through one's own experiences of socialisation. Indeed, the fact that those women were not 'forced' to undertake the responsibility of socialising other people's children is also telling. I suggest that for some women, their own child may have been raised by a governess and as such the experience may have influenced them to care for someone else's child. Furthermore, this was not necessarily because they could do a better job but rather there was an inherent need for some women to care for children. In some cases, retrospective guilt was a factor and saving the child was a way to address their anxieties. Or it may simply have been because the ways in which they had been socialised resulted in 'better' outcomes for the child in the future. Yet, the gradual shift towards improving the moral and physical existence of the poorest class which was advocated initially by Saint Simon (1760-1825) was actually only achievable through labour. Thus, subsequent practices of socialisation were underpinned by the importance of work which became the common denominator because sections of the population were stratified based on their labour type. Thus, the role of motherhood for some of the population was secondary because the function of a worker took priority. I suggest that this shift in socialisation practices overlooked the emotional importance of the mother and child relationship.

Section 6B - 8B Summary

The ideas presented in *Emile* were expressed through the arts generally and this illustrates how deeply the notions of the child penetrated the heart and minds of some of the population. Unlike the early depictions of the child which were directed by the Church, during the 18th century the depictions were created and received by a more articulate audience, at a time when there was a greater number of challenges to religious orthodoxies. Organised religion had dominated many of the populations thoughts and these emotions were passed on by successive generations through socialisation practices.

Rousseau's depictions of the child and childhood were used as a way to understand the child as a younger version of oneself but within the framework of nature, rather than organised religion. This provided some with an opportunity to reflect on the actual nature of the child and through this process they reflected on themselves as a child and their own experiences of childhood.

Rousseau was anti organised religion and anti-competition, yet his philosophy of freedom inspired hope for many of the population. As with the Renaissance period, Romanticism as a movement reflected a period whereby creativity was used as an emotional expression. The world was even more complicated than in previous times and as reason was regarded as a superior form of knowledge, emotional expression through creative activities was a way to express anxieties. Furthermore, through these creative endeavours the population did not pose a threat to organised religion or to competition because indirectly the same dispositions were also reproduced through their creativity. Contemporaneously others in the population focused on the objective world as a way to understand society. Therefore, the population responded to the

aftermath of the French Revolution and their survival anxieties through practices which were used as a way to deny death.

Post French Revolution habitus was one which responded to the events of the past and some of the population turned to politics and science for explanations rather than to religion. Although, the quest to 'rebuild' society was underpinned by key religious principles, the importance of a mother and the role she played in socialisation gradually shifted. However, some women wanted to save children and this practice highlights how the anxieties associated with predestination and salvation have been passed on through socialisation.

Overall, the set of dispositions which I have highlighted were those which focused on improving society as a whole. Yet the ways that the issues were approached involved a separation and a denial not only of one's subjectivity but also the important emotional connection between a mother and child. Thus, instead of directly addressing the anxieties associated with death, habitus as a set of dispositions denied these emotions and the focus was redirected towards survival and the continuation of life. In the next section I will explain how the ideas in Spencer's curriculum framework transformed habitus in an industrial society.

Section 10B: Shaping habitus as a set of dispositions in practices.

In earlier chapters, I highlighted how Christianity and Islam derived from Judaism and how in some respects there are similarities as well as differences. There is history or a

connection although the practices are different. I explained how a Christian identity developed through the notion of child innocence which was distinctly different to that of a Jew or Muslim. In a similar fashion the rational organisation of society evolved from Darwinian ideas and were used to socialise the population on mass through a national identity. Thus, the practices were underpinned by an amalgamation of past dispositions of habitus.

The National identity

Poetry amplified and exaggerated stoicism such as Kipling's 1895 poem *If*, which engages with themes of masculinity, success, and defeat. Tennyson's 1854 poem *The Charge of the Light Brigade*, deals with the theme of patriotism in conflict and chronicles the history and legacy of the ill-fated charge, whilst Henley's *Invictus* 1875 speak of resilience and determination in the face of great hardship. These creative endeavours highlight two points. The first point is that they are unlike the previous works I mentioned post Rousseau because they do not idealise childhood. Indeed, the works are more similar to the epic poems retold by the clergy in the Middle Ages which I discussed in Section 4A. The second point is that the poetry focuses on character attributes which were advocated by Locke (1632-1704) and instead of prayers reinforcing an acceptance of death (Aries 1981: p 98), one was expected to master their emotions and maintain a 'stiff upper lip'. Indeed, this notion itself is rooted in Darwinism.

Darwin and the emotions

Although Darwin linked emotions to their origins in animal behaviour, through such ideas, practises were justified in terms of the organisation of society. For example, in the statement below the English and men rarely cry unless there is a severe reason. The connotative meaning not only implied that the English are stronger, but also that men are more controlled.

‘savages weep copiously from very slight causes while Englishmen rarely cry, except under the pressure of the acutest grief ‘(Darwin, 1872 pp156-157).

Yet, Darwin insisted that cultural factors played a secondary role in the shaping of expression. Indeed, the term ‘stiff upper lip’ which is used to describe a set of characteristics, referred to the actual facial expressions and the motions of muscles beneath the skin as explained in Darwin’s (1872) work.

Emotional expression of feeling are key in social interactions and are conveyed through language, vocal tone, actions, and facial expressions. However, the relationship between internal experience and external expression is complicated and confusing. Emotional expression cannot be reduced to an internal state because it is orientated towards communication with another. Thus, an emotional expression manifests in the context of social interaction (Thoits 1996; Brody, 1999; Marinetti et al., 2011). However, those emotions which are negatively defined are more often than not the ones which are expressed in social interactions. As such, some emotions are suppressed because there is a risk associated with expressing them in social interactions.

In the 19th century the meanings ascribed to emotions not only defined appropriate social behaviours but also assigned value to characteristics which would later be associated to a National Identity and became synonymous with being British.

Therefore, the desired attributes in the 19th century were an amalgamation of past histories. Stoic practices adapted to Christian ways of being which adapted to the ways of capitalism and industrialisation. Thus, the proponents of Darwinism had a set of dispositions and practices which went beyond the supernatural because they also defined the identity of Nation and Empire.

I suggest that although some of the population rejected organised religion in favour of Science, they could not eradicate the histories and meanings associated to the child and death. As such, the displays of emotions which were deemed as socially undesirable were repressed rather than expressed.

The histories of dispositions which saw love through the innocence of the child and faith and hope as a means to address our ultimate concern of death did not evaporate but were overlaid by salvation anxieties. These concerns could not be addressed because they were in opposition to the connotations and meaning associated with national identity. Furthermore, these anxieties were redirected towards the principles of capitalism and industrialisation, and this was made possible because in the 19th century, laws grounded ways of being and attention was drawn to practices in the here and now. This was similar to the practise in the Reformation period with the introduction of conduct books to instruct parents on how to socialise their children. Indeed, as with the conduct books, laws inadvertently increased the concerns about death and the Afterlife. I will illustrate this with a focus on attitudes and practices towards death from the 19th century onwards.

Section 11B: The social organisation of death from the 19th century onwards

From the 19th century onwards, the narratives about death moved beyond the paradigm of Christianity and towards a system which prioritised value-rational thought and action. In the context of modernity, rationalisation as a process was one characterised by efficiency, speed, and the most cost-effective way to achieve a profit (Waters 2015). On the one hand, the process of bureaucracy removed ambiguity in terms of actual practises. Yet on the other hand, the depersonalised nature of bureaucratic working meant that emotions were buried. As such, bureaucracy in practice was devoid of meaning other than the immediate task at hand.

Ideas in the 19th century, focused on dread and anguish as divinely appointed purposes which were there to teach the believer about finitude. Having a total dependence on God strengthened the believer to face difficulties in life and the afterlife.³⁰ The God who was being referred to was Christ and existed within an ideological framework. On the one hand, the practices were comforting because they helped to alleviate the anxieties associated to the Afterlife, Salvation and Predestination. Yet on the other hand, the practices themselves were a result of those associated anxieties.

Indeed, the Victorian period was one which saw the Queen herself as someone who turned mourning into the chief concern of her existence for several years (Kendall 2022). Thus, the expression and responses to death through one's emotions were tied up with ideas about acceptable social behaviours. Given that the Queen was a mother, wife and

³⁰ The concept of dread: Soren Kierkegaard: Internet Archive 17th July 2021

daughter, her behaviours and appearances depicted an 'ideal' type of woman and the social expectations of a widow. This process socialised the nation in terms of their emotional responses to death and reinforced those characteristics and subsequent behaviours which defined nation and identity.

Science had revolutionized transportation which facilitated the growth of industry, commerce, and agriculture. Many in the population had to adapt to the rapid changes in the physical world. The world of work included machinery and production and some people had to move from their environments to towns to find employment.

Yet, I suggest that for some of the population this experience was a rebirth because in their previous way of life there was little instant gratification. Indeed, the rewards for hard work in an industrial society could be seen and for some of the population this was an incentive. However, work was also a distraction from considerations of the purpose of life itself because work was all consuming.

Western modernity physically separated death from life because the dying were removed to an institution. From the 19th century onward, fewer dead bodies were buried in the church yard and in the 20th century, increasing numbers were taken out of the town cemetery to a crematorium (Walter 2017). The economic changes in the 19th century, often meant that the main mourners had set up their own household and as such were geographically separated from other family members. The shift in ideas about death corresponded with the changes in the economy, and other misguided notions of progress (Illich 1977).

As the physical presence of death was removed from the home to another institution, this suggested that the presence of death provoked unease. Thus, the appropriate practice was for the 'bodies' to be removed so they could die in isolation and save others from the embarrassment. (Aries 1981 pp577-558).

Yet, I suggest that the removal of the physical body also demonstrated the 19th century mindset of some in the population. Indeed, such practices illustrated the notion that if something could not be observed then it did not exist. Furthermore, this was also a way to deny the process of dying and highlights how some of the population assumed that, out of sight was out of mind which was not the case.

Overtime the removal of the dying from their home environment into larger institutions is symbolic because the environments resemble scientific laboratories clinical and efficient. The practices separate the living from the dying and therefore, the task of managing death is one that requires an expert.

Indeed, the removal of the physical body did not remove the emotions associated with death and the embarrassment associated with social behaviours were not based on morality. Rather, there was a combination of values which changed meanings in terms of emotional expressions.

I suggest that the embarrassment was largely based on actually expressing one's emotions at inappropriate times and in public places because such behaviours defined character typology. As such, the meanings ascribed to emotions not only defined appropriate social behaviours and characteristics, but also reinforced habitus as a national identity which became synonymous with being British.

Habitus as a set of dispositions was demonstrated through practices and the fields of production. Science was defined by a set of dispositions and a preference for behaviours which exhibited observable characteristics and practices. Furthermore, the ways of being were reflected through mechanical systems which were devoid of emotional or creative involvement (Marx & Engels [1844] 2011).

There was a misguided notion of progress which originated from the late Victorian period which led to the belief that scientific medicine would overcome death itself (Cannandine 1981). Yet, this was hardly surprising given the practical applications of science as the evidence of progress was clear. However, the proponents of science were mainly from the same line as the educated proponents of the Reformation and knew that death was unavoidable. I suggest there are a number of possible reasons why some of the population regarded science in this way.

One reason was that they wanted to 'protect' the population from considerations of death with a focus on the improvements science had made to life. Thus, their belief in science was a way for some people to deny death.

Another reason was that for society to progress it had to have a workforce in place who were focused on production, and this relates back to the earlier section in the discussion about Spencer's curriculum recommendations.

A third reason was that this way of being accepted that death was inevitable and by doing so they were able to direct others to develop society. By this I mean that, some of the population accepted that their life would be over, but they had altruistic dispositions associated with the ideas presented by Comte which I were briefly referred to in Section 7B. Suffice to say that such dispositions considered the world after one's death. I suggest that through altruistic deeds one continue to live on after death because

the world was a representation of their 'afterlife' Thus, for some of the population knowing what the afterlife looked like gave them a sense of certainty.

The fourth reason was that education itself was a way to deny death because the knowledge this generated alleviate some of their own anxieties. Yet, as we all bring different experiences to situations, a combination of all of these factors are perhaps more likely.

The causes of death, its social distribution and the social organisation of dying have changed dramatically since the 19th century. Indeed, the process of dying itself is rationally organised and to a considerable degree death and dying have been taken under human control (Walter 1990). The rich historical evidence provided by Aries, is written in a Romantic spirit because he does not acknowledge that dying can also be full of torment and pain. However, Aries work demonstrates that death was spoken about more openly and frequently than is the case today (Elias 1985: p14).

Indeed, the ideas about death in the 20th and 21st century have increasingly focused on progress and a tenacity to extend life and prevent disease to such an extent that there is a 'refusal' to acknowledge or accept the fact of death. Indeed, this would be one reason why the state of being dead is constantly being redefined in medical explanations.

Section 12B: Legislation, Politics and Socialisation

In Section 7B, I briefly referred to Saint-Simon's (1760-1825) and his philosophy influenced Comte's (1798-1857) formulation of Positivism as a scientific scheme to systemise social life. Yet, Saint-Simon's work also influenced 20th century politics.

The early 20th century, saw a demand for a new political party to represent the interests and needs of the urban working class as this demographic had increased in number (Thorpe 2008).

As a political party Labour appealed to the masses because they had gradually developed into a distinct group with shared characteristics in terms of their work.

However, unlike the working class descriptions provided by Saint Simon in France post Revolution, this group represented the masses rather than the population as a whole. In some ways this population represented the masses who were Christianised because this group were overlooked but this was based on their working conditions, salaries, and job security which were objective measures of inequality. As such, the ways in which the matters were addressed were objective and the emotional aspects of their concerns were overlooked. I suggest that habitus as a set of dispositions still saw the masses as an 'unloved' population, however, the characteristics associated with the national identity were such that the ways love was demonstrated separated groups from each other. I explain this further in Chapter Three as part of the theoretical framework of the thesis.

Industrialisation itself was a key point in bringing about the modern idea of childhood and new laws changed the objective status of children. On the one hand, this was an acceptance of ages and stages as objective categories, and this meant that childhood

could be formalised as a distinct group separated from adulthood. Yet, on the other hand, these were not completely new ideas as they had already been articulated by Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau. Although the ideas were developed over time, the practices themselves were formalised in response to a range of external threats. In terms of the 20th century, the World Wars, changes in the economy and a variety of largely political ideas were all concerned with the organisation of society (Hendrick 1997). In the previous section, I discussed how social and mental structures assimilated and how ways of being were a 'natural' habitus. I suggest that WW1 best encapsulates habitus as a way of being during this period because huge numbers of young soldiers gave their lives for their country.

The living population by and large did not publicly express their emotions but instead, creative, and symbolic rituals commemorated the war dead whilst also expressing motives and the horror of war (Walter 2006). Yet, World War 1 poems were different from those that came before because they were first hand and based on the experiences of young soldiers returning home. Thus, rather than a glorification of warfare the poems described the terror of the trenches and the futility of war (Clapham 2017).

In response to the horrors of WW1, a wide range of social welfare legislation was introduced and included a range of significant educational developments which characterise the 20th century as a whole. Education schemes under The 1918 Fisher Act aimed at providing training and began an immense wave of post war enthusiasm

which sprang largely from moral and emotional sources and had little connection with the hard facts of social realities (Mays 1962: p163).

Although further reform initiatives were limited because of the economic demands of the 1930s, the decade was marked by the expansion and reform of secondary education. This included an increase in the number of 'free' places in grammar schools and the acceptance of a test at age eleven as the basis of selection. However, the implementation of the Education Act 1936 was largely nullified by the outbreak of the Second World War.

Chapter Two Part B: Summary

Spencer's curriculum is a key example of the 19th century habitus which sought to explicitly separate the rational and the objective from the emotional and subjective. The separation coincided with economic changes, industrialisation, and changes in the division of labour. Indeed, the demarcation between the functions described the emotional and subjective as sentimentalities. However, I suggest that this was an attack on religion rather than the emotions themselves. Spencer was after all showing concern about survival and highlighted theoretically that parents could raise their children without being educated for that purpose. Spencer stressed the importance of parents 'naturally' raising their children. Yet, as Rousseau indicated, the idea of nature itself had been contaminated through its interaction with humans. Therefore, nature is that which is deemed as such by a given society.

Spencer's work highlighted that the curriculum at the time when he was writing did not meet the needs of society. From a social evolutionist perspective, society had to adapt

in order to survive. Yet, the idea of society itself is meaningless without humans and therefore, the notion of social evolution corresponds with the ideas of those who advocate development and progress. This set of dispositions shifts further away from considerations of death and focuses on extending life and survival.

Thus, the ways that some of the population delivered and exchanged the message of death shifted.

I highlighted this notion in the introduction in terms of the legal and medical professions and also in Chapter One with the changing medical explanations of the state of being dead. The promotion of Science as a subject in education involved a relegation of Religion as a topic. Science was a body of knowledge which could extend life and rather than suffering, the population including the masses, could have a better life in the here and now. The process was similar in some ways to how the masses were socialised through Christianity. The dispositions associated with the child and death were already deeply embedded and reproduced in practices, and such discussions about the topic were framed by fear. Similarly, the language of science was only available to some of the population and those who did become doctors were trained in a particular way with a particular habitus. Seen in this way, knowledge and practices are contained and generated so that death as a topic is a discussion to be had with doctors or representatives of law or religion.

Thus far, the challenges to an existing habitus which I have discussed in this thesis have come from those who were educated, the majority of whom were socialised through Christianity and the Church. As such, through socialisation the educated parent produced children who were 'trained' earlier and could meet or adapt the

demands of society. Furthermore, their ideas were built on firmer foundations from very early on which gave them the capacities to create alternative ways of being. Social evolution itself is manufactured by some of the population and does not necessarily meet the actual needs of a society because such needs are also manufactured. This was what Rousseau alluded to when he highlighted that one is not socialised to meet one's own needs. Locke's ideas and later Darwinian notions adapted into a set of dispositions which were incorporated in practices and were by and large favoured by the State. Yet, I suggest that the actual process of trying to separate reason from feelings was also symbolic because it was an indicator of how some of the population responded psychosocially to the changes in terms of the anxieties associated with survival.

The curriculum framework became the blueprint for 19th century habitus and created identities with behaviours that defined Britishness and Empire. In this way of being, emotional displays were seen as a sign of weakness and maintaining a 'stiff upper lip' was regarded as a desirable characteristic. The foundations of these ideas can be found in Stoicism but as I have illustrated thus far, habitus brings with it previous experiences and dispositions which are repeated through socialisation practices. Indeed, the ways some of the population addressed the loss of life in WW1, was to invert their anxieties associated to death and direct them towards survival which materialised as improvements in education and welfare provisions which were embedded in legislation. As such, education and welfare reforms were also a way for some of the population to 'distance' themselves from considerations of death. In the next section I will discuss how changes to legislation and reforms post World War 2

reproduced habitus as a set of dispositions associated to the child and how subsequent practices were psychosocially used as a way to deny death.

Chapter Two: Part C

In the previous section I discussed how the curriculum framework became the blueprint for 19th and early 20th century habitus as a way of being. In this section, I discuss how habitus as a set of dispositions addressed the conditions post WW2 with a focus on mass education.

Section 1C: Post World War 2 Habitus

The impact on the development in education and changes that took place from 1944 onwards were significant and had an impact on the socio-political climate. Prior to this period, The Butler Act 1944 sought to provide education for all, beginning from the ages of 5-14 and this was raised to 15 a few years later. Secondary education was to begin at the age of 11 and this created the system by which there was a ministry responsible for schools, but it was administered by Local Education Authorities.³¹ A legal partnership was established between the Church and the State in 1944 and this allowed for the distinctive nature of Catholic schools.

The Butler Act 1944 introduced the Tripartite system which established three different types of secondary school. This was influenced by the idea that children had three different kinds of ability which were fixed by the age of 11 and unlikely to change. During the 1960s the tripartite system came under increasing attack because the 11+ exam was seen as unfair, unreliable and an inaccurate selection test which disadvantaged children from working class backgrounds. It could be said that by and large the working classes were the masses. Furthermore, prior to industrialisation, this group were those who were more likely to have been inspired by the notion of freedom and the ideas of Rousseau, Therefore, the working classes were those who had been overlooked in some way or form and their needs were now being practically addressed by politicians and governments.

³¹ <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/butler-act.htm>

The tripartite system was seen as a means to prepare children for their adult lives in terms of employment. Some of the population saw the system as deterministic and one which perpetuated class differences as there was an assumption that a child's ability was fixed at a certain point which meant that late developers were disregarded. Furthermore, as the focus was on age, it was an objective means by which to construct child legislation and develop educational policies accordingly. The focus on age also meant that anyone functioning at a different rate to their designated age in terms of their physical, emotional, or intellectual development was classified using the definitions deemed appropriate at that time. I suggest that these ideas were built upon Spencer's 19th century curriculum because some in the population were sorted and allocated to the subject based on their abilities. Indeed, this set of dispositions in terms of socialisation also resonated with Locke's ideas of natural genius which I discussed in Section 4B.

The legal partnership between the Church and the State in 1944 allowed for the distinctive nature of Catholic schools which is still practically embodied in terms of following legal requirements and provision. As such, the set of dispositions associated with the child and death is reproduced in Catholic education. Furthermore, although education has evolved the foundations are built upon these dispositions. Therefore, changes in practices have not directly addressed the dispositions but rather increased the concerns associated with the child and death. I imagine the partnership as a legal 'marriage' between the Church and the State with education as a metaphorical system of reproduction. The Church as the mother, the State as the father and education is a conduit by which the child receives its nourishment and preparation for the demands

of the social world. In other words, everything the Church ingests as a mother feeds the child through the umbilical cord. In reality if a mother abused drugs or alcohol the physical affects would be apparent when the child is born, however, emotions operate in a different way. The expression of an emotion such as crying is a physical indication of a socially defined behaviour which says that one is unhappy. Yet, the emotions which contribute to that state of crying are complex and interrelated. Thus, the expression of the emotion is not always about the obvious or the immediate. I discuss these ideas further as part of the theoretical framework in Chapter Three. Before then I will discuss how habitus as a set of dispositions responded to post WW2 conditions.

The welfare state.

The consideration of social inequalities led to the formation of a welfare state and problems were identified to address areas which prevented the population from 'bettering themselves'. The problems were known as the Five Giants and were defined in terms of cause and effect. *Want* was caused by poverty, *ignorance* was caused by a lack of education, *squalor* caused by poor housing, *idleness* was caused by a lack of jobs and *disease* was caused by inadequate health care provision. Although, there is little doubt that these problems contributed to inequality, yet each of the five areas were also an objective means by which to define and sort the population using cause and effect. Furthermore, social inequality was addressed but in doing so, it highlighted the negative connotation associated with being in one of the socially defined categories.

I suggest that during this period, love itself was gauged by quantity and measured by the environmental conditions in which the child was raised. Furthermore, sections of

the population were defined through such categories which interacted with the anxieties associated to shame and guilt. Shame was felt because one's living conditions were deemed as inadequate by others, and then guilt because children were raised in such 'dire' conditions. As such, the way to relieve such feelings was through hope for a better future. Indeed, as a grand movement of inauthenticity, some of the population gave up their otherness to others (Heidegger 1927/2015).

Habitus as a set of dispositions associated with love for the child was further fuelled by anxieties which focused on the importance of 'having' as opposed to 'lacking' In other words, a parent who provided what was deemed as important by the State, was somehow a better parent who loved their child more than one who had to rely on welfare. On the one hand, this was a way to motivate some of the population and increase their work ethic. Yet on the other hand, it widened a subjective gap between people because the material differences between them became of greater importance than an actual concern about others.

Love was measured in terms of possessions. For example, documentary films highlighted the plight of homelessness in the 1960s. Heart wrenching scenes from Ken Loach's (1966) *Cathy Come Home* showed a child being dragged from its mother by social services at a train station because the mother is homeless. This depiction overlooked the fact that there was an emotional bond between the mother and the child but instead determined that the mother was unfit because she did not have a home. Such depictions reenergised guilt and shame amongst some of the population, especially as those who defined the meanings and social expression of love towards the child did not share the same set of dispositions. Therefore, the focus on

observable measurable objective definitions of love were advocated by some in the population as a way to deny the emotions associated with the child and their anxieties about survival.

In section 2, I discussed how Lock's ideas of the State guarded against comfort and instead focused on the importance of virtues and building resilience to combat future hardship. Yet, the State itself is a collection of individuals with a set of dispositions that focus on the future. I suggest that given the social conditions post WW2 that there was little option other than to rebuild the nation. Indeed, this was similar to the conditions which Locke addressed but in post war Britain the infra structure of the whole country had to be reorganised. Yet, structures are an abstract idea created by some of the population and made concrete by other people who occupied the space.

Indeed, given that the population had already faced hardship and experienced loss, some had greater resilience. I suggest that after such experiences the population also had a greater conscious consideration of the inevitability of death, and this realisation may have led them to question their own purpose. For others, the experience of war gave them a sense of hopelessness and despondency however, the horrific aftermath of war actually brought the population closer to a consideration of death.

This realisation may have released some of the population from their anxieties and provided them with the opportunity to reassess their lives. Yet, for others, the way to deny death was through the dispositions associated to Predestination and Salvation. Yet, the fact that some people came so close to death also involved some to invert the meaning of the notion of frugality.

The population had already faced death and suffered loss and through these experiences some may have become desensitised. In order to adapt to the social conditions there had to be a reformulation of habitus, which involved addressing the dispositions associated with love and the child.

On the one hand, the introduction of a welfare state was a way to address social inequality. Yet on the other hand, it was a way to redirect the dispositions of love faith and hope. As many of the population were socialised through the Church, they had developed a Catholic conscious and passed this down through socialisation practices. Their neurotic anxieties interacted with the dispositions of love and the original concern of death, and this by and large regulated behaviours.

The population were socialised by the State through legislation which did not focus on supernatural notions of heaven and hell, but rather actions in the here and now.

Therefore, the population were still socialised through the emotion of love faith and hope, but their rewards were tangible, and in a similar fashion the State became the manifestation of God.

The State provided the population with the means to survive, and this was an expression of love. Furthermore, as some in the population were provided with their basic needs it was an actual demonstration of love by the State. Furthermore, the State also punished inappropriate behaviours, and this was an expression of God's wrath. However, most importantly the love demonstrated by the State corresponded with practices which preserved life and therefore, the focus shifted to thoughts of life

rather than of a consideration of death.

In contrast to the Reformation State, where notions of frugality underpinned the doctrine of Predestination and Salvation, welfare in the 20th century was provided by the State. The population were provided with food, shelter, access to education and health care. Although people still had to live frugally it was no longer a condition which determined their Salvation. Rather, the population could have whatever they wanted in the here and now.

On the one hand, this could be seen as the State's rejection of supernatural notions of an afterlife. Yet on the other hand, the dispositions associated with Predestination created a work ethic which drove the spirit of capitalism. I suggest that the population discarded their 'spirit' of capitalism because their experience of war reflected their reality, and this dented their belief in supernatural forces.

Furthermore, the experience had brought some people closer to their ultimate concern of death and they were able to address their concerns about their death themselves. A similar process happened in response to the periods of the Bubonic Plague whereby the population recognised that no one was exempt from death. Indeed, the practices during periods of upheaval involve the nurturing of a habitus with a different set of dispositions but without addressing the original concerns or the associated dispositions. For example, some of the principles set out by Saint-Simon (1760-1825) in terms of social organisation were embedded as were the ways and practices used were those advocated by Comte (1798-1857). The proponents of Saint-Simon and later derivatives of Socialism were acutely aware of the injustice inflicted upon the majority of mankind in civilized communities by the inequalities of education and wealth. However, the knowledge of such elements were advanced using a positivist

approach to science and the study of society. Although, this highlights the subjective and objective consideration of the issues, however, the focus of attention was based on material differences between humans. Indeed, the fact that there is a relationality between humans was overlooked and this suggested a detachment between the individual and society. Yet, the focus on material inequalities was a way to ensure survival and by doing so deny the inevitabilities of death. Therefore, this set of dispositions not only overlooked the actual experiences of the masses but in doing so also avoided addressing their own. The State depicted their love post WW2 through their actions because they provided the material conditions for survival. As such, the notion of hope was redirected and redefined. Hope was something which could be worked towards and realised in this life through improvements in education, employment, and health. Therefore, despite the population's experiences of loss and considerations of death, proponents of the State unlike the Church, directed the population away from such thoughts and towards life and possibilities of the future. Yet, the dispositions of love, the child and our original concern of death did not simply vanish, rather they were covered over by a 'clean sheet' of redefined dispositions. On the one hand, socialisation practices were still informed by some of the population just as they had been previously. Yet, on the other hand, rather than religion, mass education was a means by which to promote hope and the future. For some, the anxieties associated with the child and death were destroyed by the harsh realities and experiences of war. Yet, in the next section I will discuss how these anxieties were reenergised through the promotion of hope.

Section 2C: The Education Reform Act 1988

Throughout the 1980s Comprehensive schools were under greater scrutiny for not meeting the needs of employers and industry. The Education Reform Act 1988 (ERA) was the most important and far reaching piece of legislation since the Butler Act 1944 because it altered the basic power structure of the educational system.

ERA 1988 increased the powers of the Secretary of State for Education and Science and gave central government powers over the curriculum.

Although the UK education system had separated children based on their ability and age, ERA 1988 introduced key stages which created another division. The change in the hierarchal structure was also extended to higher education because Universities and Polytechnics were brought more firmly under the Secretary of State through changes in their funding. In the years leading up to 1988 there were teacher pay disputes which continued for over a period of 3 years. These disputes ended with a new teacher contract which was enforced by the Teachers Pay and Conditions Act 1987 and empowered the Secretary of State to impose teachers' pay and conditions and National political power gained superiority over local political power (Maclure 1988). ERA 1988 was actually responding to the economy which had become 'producer dominated' and habitus as a set of dispositions are relational to the field of education.

The Education Reform Act and the 80s as a decade

As a decade, the 1980s was tumultuous which included the disintegration and rebuilding of the Labour Party and the formation of the Social Democratic Party.

During the 1980s there were changes in foreign policy which included greater involvement in the European Union, a war in the Falklands, and at the end of the decade a collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (Garnett 2018). Financial houses and banks were deregulated which 'freed' them to take advantage of 'new opportunities' through technology, globalisation, and financial innovation.³²

The ideas associated with meritocracy which were dominant from the late 1940s onwards provided a way for the population to work hard and improve their living standards. However, some of the population had improved their lifestyles and wanted more whilst others were either satisfied or disenchanted. I suggest this was not solely based on their lack of material goods but rather, it represented a historical pattern of repetition. For example, there are relationships between the challenges to the Church from some of the population and the subsequent change to religious doctrines. The biggest challenge to the Church came from educated proponents and resulted in the Protestant Reformation which led to further changes in religious dogma. These changes overlaid the set of dispositions associated with love the child and concerns about death. During the Enlightenment period, these ideas were articulated through a range of different ways but all with a shared aim which was to improve society. However, the proponents of the Enlightenment period also transported their own dispositions associated with the child and death.

³² Amel, D, Barnes, C, Panetta, F and Salleo, C (2004), 'Consolidation and efficiency in the financial sector: a review of the international evidence', *Journal of Banking and Finance*, Vol. 28, Issue 10, pages 2,493–519.

From the 19th century onwards, the population were reminded of habitus as a way of being through education and welfare laws which corresponded with mental structures an assimilated as 'natural'. In the 20th century, some of the populations were socialised through the Welfare State and the principle of meritocracy. It is not my intention to make comparisons between Christianity and the Welfare State. Instead, this is used to illustrate how habitus as a set of dispositions which are associated with love the child and death are repeated albeit in different contextual forms.

I suggest that through the welfare system the population especially the masses had access to education, health, and welfare. However, for some their considerations turned to the social positions of others because this underpins the notion of meritocracy which I discuss further in section 3C. As such, the dissatisfaction that some of the population had with their own lives were in comparison to someone else life. The dissatisfaction was objectively presented because it was based on material conditions. Despite, the fact that material conditions had improved, for some of the population, the principles of meritocracy added envy to habitus as a set of dispositions.

Envy is a realisation that one could not achieve or possess the same as another person. Envy was defined by Aristotle as pain at the sight of another's good fortune and is 'stirred by those who have what we ought to have'.³³

I suggest that through the principle of meritocracy, the disposition of envy spread amongst some of the population. Furthermore, envy separated people from each

³³ Rhetoric by Aristotle, (Trans)W.R. Roberts, The Internet Classics Archive.
<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.html>

another because success was measured by material goods and accumulation.

This fuelled a disposition of envy in some because others had greater access to obtaining more material goods. Contemporaneously, those in the population who were successful were motivated to accumulate more. As such, each of these positions had different mindsets which created a subjective gulf between them.

Therefore, many of the population were distracted away from the considerations of their own lives towards a consideration of other people's lives. Yet, in this context consideration towards others was not necessarily based on care but rather this was about thinking about another person's life rather than thinking about one's own.

I suggest that some were disillusioned by the principles of meritocracy because the opportunities made available to them meant they could not have the same material goods as others in the population. Furthermore, the principle of meritocracy was a motivation which changed some lifestyles, but this also meant that they were no longer part of their original group because there were greater difference in their habitus. As such, The Education Reform Act, (1988) itself was developed by some in response to the turbulence of the decade and the threats of survival.

New Right

The Education Reform Act, (1988) reflected a New Right perspective on education and influenced both Labour and Conservative governments. An underlying key feature of the Act was the principle of marketisation which involved the creation of an education market. The principle of marketisation was added to the 'doctrine' of meritocracy, but I suggest that marketisation was not implemented to address the challenges or indeed the 'needs' of the masses. Rather, marketisation was directed

towards those in the population whose habitus had adapted to the principles of meritocracy through their socialisation in mass education. Indeed, this group by and large were socialised by parents who had greater access to health and education themselves.

Furthermore, although the political proponents of the welfare system had different sets of dispositions their aim was quite clearly to ensure that all of the population survived as everyone had access to education and health. Yet, the welfare system also inadvertently meant that some in population were socialised through anxieties because they were dependent on the State in terms of their survival. Indeed, habitus was a concoction of contradictory emotions and experiences which were passed on through the process of socialisation and associated practices. As such, although the social and mental structure of habitus assimilated as natural, the actual anxieties associated to death were not addressed. Therefore, the notion of discussing death was regarded as unnatural.

Section 3C: Education on Mass and the Myth of Meritocracy

The Labour Party introduced the Comprehensive system in 1965 as a means to overcome the class divide in the tripartite system (Ball 1994). However, although Comprehensives helped to reduce the class gap in terms of achievement, the system continued to reproduce class inequalities through streaming and labelling (Douglas 1964: Becker 1971). Yet, as the measure of class inequalities was based on socially defined categories, we do not know if the individual themselves actually wanted to achieve more. On the one hand, welfare provided the basic needs for the individual in terms of food and shelter. Yet on the other hand, it was the State's expectation that

the individual wanted more, when in reality some may have been content with what they had. This highlights how some in the population had a set of dispositions which were incompatible with the practices of a capitalist system. Furthermore, the urgency to ensure that everyone accesses education illustrates the set of dispositions associated with survival but through accumulation.

The Myth of Meritocracy

The Comprehensive system of education addressed the idea of inequality but through the 'myth of meritocracy'. Meritocracy advocates the notion that ability and effort determine where one eventually ends up in terms of employment and life chances. It was a 'myth' because it was based on the notion of opportunity and rather than create equality it reproduced social class, inequality, and poverty. However, I suggest that meritocracy as a myth had a deeper emotional impact on some of the population because the notions regenerated the existing set of dispositions associated with love the child and our original concern of death.

Poverty was something to feel ashamed about and adults had to ensure that their child did not suffer this plight. The social conditions interacted with the dispositions of guilt and shame and when children did not achieve the same or a better standard of living as their peers, parents blamed themselves. Thus, blame reignited the dispositions of guilt and shame, but the way this was achieved was a similar process as that during the Reformation period.

Meritocracy in education reinforced a notion that regardless of ones starting points,

children had the equality of educational opportunity which forecasted higher occupational status. However, as this could only be achieved on the actual recognition of one's talent, skill, and educational qualifications, I suggest that this myth has similarities with religious doctrines.

Indeed, if one followed a prescribed path and completed what was expected of them, they received a reward. The difference is that with meritocracy the reward is in the here and now. As such, the myth is made possible because there are symbolic representation of such success in terms of material goods. Yet, I suggest that it is the child's actual starting point which has an impact on their attainment.

Poverty was not the ultimate reason for the child's lack of attainment but rather their parent's dispositions which were generated by the idea of being poor. The State objectively defined the conditions which created social inequality, but they did not consider the fact that individuals respond to the same things in different ways. Indeed, meritocracy as with religious dogma, served a number of purposes other than as a means to address social inequality.

Comprehensive School Systems

Comprehensive schools had ability streams, and this carried with it an expectation that children were responsible for their own educational outcomes and there was a recognition that a child had the drive to motivate themselves. Yet, this overlooked habitus as a set of dispositions which are passed on through the process of socialisation. Often, it was habitus which determined the stream the child occupied because the ways we involve and interact in the world are subjective.

The process of socialisation itself involves the reproduction of the adult's personal histories and therefore these dispositions are required by the fields which produce habitus as a way of being. Yet, in post war Britain, the habitus as a set of dispositions conflicted with previous ways of being because the 'myth of meritocracy' was a means to motivate the child directly. As such, a child was responsible for their own destiny. Those children socialised by adults who probably had first hand experienced of the War had dispositions passed on through socialisation practices, and these had an influence on their children's attitudes towards life and death.

For some people, their dispositions may have been rooted in ideas of patriotism but through their experiences they became disillusioned and focused on the present rather than the future. However, this habitus as a way of being was incompatible with building a post war economy.

One way of dealing with the tragedies and aftermath of post war Britain was to focus on the future and imagine a 'better' world. This is how beings repeat practices in different periods with the intention of improving conditions, but it is a way to deny death rather than addressing the inevitable (Becker 1973). Yet, I suggest that Comprehensive mass education itself is a way to deny death because the practices are such that they separate people from each other. They practise avoid relationships between people, and this is a way to deny the anxieties and emotions associated to death.

The ability streams in Comprehensive Schools not only changed the dynamic between the teacher and the child but also between children themselves. Paradoxically, fewer demands were placed upon teachers in terms of ensuring academic success but the

relationships with the child was not just academic. That is not to say that the teacher did not encourage those who had potential or that they did not recognise talent and ability. Rather, that the Comprehensive system was such that the habitus as a set of dispositions associated with love and the child underpinned practices, particularly for those who taught in the lower ability streams.

Comprehensive schools were large and many of the children placed in lower sets were mainly from working class backgrounds (Wills 1977; Bowles and Gintis 1976). I suggest that the teachers who taught in the lower ability streams prioritised socialisation over teaching. Furthermore, the values of some of the population may not have aligned with those expected from the State. In such cases, the kind of education which was on offer in school would not have been regarded as important to these children. Yet, this overlooks the fact that some teachers wanted to fulfil this task and that some children wanted an adult to respond to their basic needs. This point was highlighted in Section 8B whereby some women, often those from wealthy backgrounds, saw the socialisation of children in terms of their 'duty', which assumes that they had no choice. Rather, it may have been because they had experienced motherhood and wanted to share their experiences with children who may not have had those benefits. However, the difference in the two situations is that in the Comprehensive system, teachers were employed to educate children. Indeed, for those children in higher ability groups the focus was on teaching and learning, but for others it was a means to socialise them in line with the expectations of the State. I suggest that the myth of meritocracy in education generally during the 1960s was a large scale strategy used to socialise a particular group.

Furthermore, the shared characteristics in this group were objectively defined in terms of poverty and occupations, and as Locke (1693) had previously suggested this group probably had greater resilience.

Habitus and relations with others

During the Comprehensive Era, habitus as a way of being had altered because teachers were faced with discipline issues on a larger scale than previously. Such, situations interacted with the confusing dispositions associated with the child love and death. On the one hand, the myth of meritocracy had developed a mindset towards the masses which defined them in the language of pity. Yet, on the other hand, their behaviours were incompatible with what the State defined as success in the future. As such, children had to be disciplined to ensure their future success. This was a similar process to that of the Reformation period because the dispositions of love, faith, and hope are embedded within the doctrines of innocence. However, during the Reformation, the disposition of love was defined through the doctrine of original sin. Thus, the inverted version of love towards the child is entangled with the original definitions and the associated meanings.

On the one hand, the adult has to forgive the child because their actions come from innocence and love is protection. As a set of dispositions and a way of being this perpetuates anxieties about the child. Yet on the other hand, the adult has to punish the child because they are wicked, and this love protects them. The dispositions associated with this way of being also perpetuates anxieties. However, the key factor in both of these situations is the experiences and influences of one's own socialisation which is passed on through practices.

The Reformation shifted the responsibility of socialisation away from the Church and towards the parent. Socialisation practices were influenced by the Scriptures and in a similar fashion, meritocracy as a 'doctrine' gradually shifted the responsibility of socialisation away from the parent towards mass education.

Many of the population in post war Britain were likely to have been disillusioned with supernatural ideas. Yet, the notion of opportunity associated with meritocracy reignited the dispositions of hope, the future and ideas about the child which indirectly provoked the anxieties of love and death from habitus of the past.

Teacher and parent relationship

Adults often hold an opinion about school and teachers based on their own experiences and educational outcomes. The relationship between a teacher and child is influenced by their parents' experiences and the relationship between teacher and parent is complicated. The Comprehensive school system was implemented to address social inequalities, but by addressing the inequalities, the recognition actually created a wider gulf between the parent and the teacher.

Although the expectation of Comprehensive education was founded on meritocracy, the child was central in the relationship between the teacher and the parent. For some parents the dispositions associated with the child were infused with the original concern of death. The teacher represented someone who 'took' the child away from the parent, and meritocracy was something which led to a better life.

A parent had to rely on the same set of dispositions which are associated with the

future and death. In other words, to love a child one has to have faith in teachers, and this provides some certainty or hope for the child's future. During this period, parental anxiety about children is similar to that of the Puritans. However, the difference here was that parents were no longer solely 'responsible' for their child's salvation.

Meritocracy gave responsibility for the future directly to the child which increased the parent's anxiety. Furthermore, as meritocracy implied that through hard work, life in the future, was better than the one in the present, parents developed retrospective guilt. This reenergised the notion of salvation because if the child did not achieve, they faced a future of damnation in the guise of poverty. Thus, the legislation which addressed social inequalities also breathed new life into the dispositions associated with love and our ultimate concern of death.

Overall, meritocracy can be likened to a 'doctrine' which regenerated the dispositions associated with Christianity. Indeed, those in the population who developed such ideas were by and large socialised by the sets of dispositions and subsequent practices which focus on the future. Furthermore, the notion of meritocracy moved the population further away from thoughts of death and towards ideas of survival, in a similar way to how the meaning of love was inverted during the Reformation Period. Therefore, staying alive itself was a way to deny death.

Teacher Roles and responsibility in the Comprehensive system

Education had a greater involvement in socialisation and teachers moved from the position of being a subject specialist to one which involved delivering a range of subjects. This process diluted the quality of the subject content, lowered the standard of teaching, and increased the ambiguity in terms of the purpose of education. As

such, the same inequalities as the previous system were reproduced because it perpetuated a self-fulfilling prophecy for the child which developed a mentality which was reproduced in generations of families (Hargreaves 1975: Rosenthal 1968).

I suggest however, that the definitions of social inequalities and the means by which they are addressed themselves actually removed the necessity for the individual to strive for 'better'. Indirectly, the welfare state itself removed motivation and habitus with the dispositions of 'love' inadvertently created a situation where the masses generally stayed in their social positions but may have thought they were advancing. Teachers were faced with large scale disciplinary issues and their role become more differentiated. These conditions may have been due to staff shortages or difficulties in teacher retention and recruitment. Indeed, the aim of Comprehensive education as a system was to address social inequality on a mass scale. However, teaching training had not been developed to address the demand. The Comprehensive school system was not only implemented to address social inequalities, but it was also a means to socialise society on mass. Indeed, especially as the first five experimental comprehensive schools were set up after the Second World War (Medway & Kingwell 2010). Thus, the Comprehensive School system was one which was devised through the idea of welfare and repeated a similar process to that of Early Christianity but through a system of mass education.

Section 4C: The principle of Marketisation

The development of a free market in education increased competition between schools and gave parents as 'consumers' the choice of school (Maclure 1988). Although market

forces were stressed, this also increased government intervention because ultimately the State held two important roles.

The first role of the State was the enforcement of the framework on schools within which they had to compete. This was manifested through Ofsted publications of reports and league tables of a schools' exam results. The State was to provide parents with this information so that they could make informed choice between schools. Supporters of marketisation argued that in an education market, power shifts away from the producers and towards the consumer which in this case is the parent (Chubb & Moe 1990). However, in reality 'parentocracy' was a myth because it merely disguised the fact that schooling continued to reproduce inequalities (David 1993: Ball 1994). Yet, as some in the population were disillusioned with meritocracy, this was addressed by providing greater choice for parents. The choice was an illusion because those in Government created the choices but also created greater uncertainty for some parents. The blurred lines between the roles of parents and the responsibilities of education also increased anxieties. In Section 7B, I explained how Spencer's curriculum had clearly defined the purpose of education and the role of the family. However, there was a contradiction between the New Right's support for parental choice and the second role of the State which was the imposition of a single National Curriculum.

Section 5C: The National Curriculum (the second role of the State)

ERA 1988 highlighted the core knowledge skills and understanding that children of different abilities were expected to have by the end of each key stage. As the key stages were fixed if a child was either struggling or exceeding their target, they remained in the age allocated Key Stage. In such cases the content of the subject was differentiated to 'meet' the child's needs. On the one hand, the use of ages and stages within mainstream

education overlooked the fact that children have their own experiences which informs their knowledge beyond the content determined in the National Curriculum. Yet on the other hand, the purpose of the National Curriculum is to transmit the knowledge deemed as worthy by the State to the specific age group who were defined by the State as old enough to access it. Yet, the fact that these ideas were implemented highlights how some in population focused on certainty in the future and accumulation in life.

Indeed, a National Curriculum makes assumptions largely about children and about what is best for them (Jenks 2005: p 77). The Key Stages and the National Curriculum was a system of scrutiny which went beyond educational attainment and involved a focused on the child's life outside of school.

The National Curriculum itself is based on the same 19th century principles in terms of subject hierarchies advocated by Spencer (1861). However, Spencer saw socialisation as the responsibility of parents, yet since that time there has been a gradual increase in the shifts of socialisation responsibility from families to schools and other agencies. I referred to this point in Chapter One with a discussion about the role of corporate parenting. Furthermore, although the shift towards mass education is a way to ensure the positive contribution of the population to society, through this process the actual purpose of education itself has become lost. Indeed, there is a legal requirement that every state funded school must offer a curriculum which is not only broad and balanced, but also one which promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental, and physical development of children. A curriculum must prepare pupils for the opportunities and experiences of later life and all state schools must teach religious education.³⁴ As such, the demarcation between the roles and expectations of home and school are blurred.

³⁴ 'The national curriculum in England: Framework document', September 2013, p.4

Section 6C: Academisation

Academies were introduced by the 'New' Labour Government from the early 2000s onwards and they were designed to replace those schools considered as 'failing' by Ofsted. However, academies were not 'maintained' by local authorities but instead, they were 'sponsored' by businesses, individuals, churches, and voluntary bodies. The sponsors contribute to the capital costs and then ran the schools, but the revenue costs are met directly by central government. As such, the principles of marketisation underpin the practises in academisation. In 2018, almost a third of publicly-funded schools in England were 'academies' (22 per cent of primary and 68 per cent of secondary schools), rather than 'maintained by' local authorities.³⁵

Although, there are some trusts who run 'stand-alone' academies, most are in 'chains' and in 2017, 73 per cent of academies were run by Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs). The schools themselves no longer exist as legal entities and cannot decide to leave the MAT.³⁶ Thus, Academies are not only large organisations, but they are also not too dissimilar to other types of business in terms of their processes. Although Labour introduced the welfare state, the proponents of New Labour adopted some Conservative principles particularly in terms of the economy.

³⁵ West, Anne and Wolfe, David (2018) Academies, autonomy, equality, and democratic accountability: reforming the fragmented publicly-funded school system in England. London Review of Education. ISSN 1474-8460

³⁶ Ibid

Sponsoring bodies established trusts which were private companies with charitable status who entered into funding agreements or contracts with the Secretary of State.³⁷ In 2009, the requirement for sponsor financial contributions was removed but academies were expanded by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition from 2010. Indeed by 2018, almost a third of publicly-funded schools in England were 'academies' (22 per cent of primary and 68 per cent of secondary schools), rather than 'maintained by' local authorities.³⁸

As academies are owned and run by not-for-profit private trusts, they are registered with Companies House. As such, rather than being purely governed by statutory education laws as for maintained schools, they are subject to company law with some statutory education law. Furthermore, academies are controlled and funded directly by central government by contract and therefore, in order to maintain and renew a contract, academies have to satisfy central government.

In terms of subjects, Academies have to teach a broad and balanced curriculum which must include English, Mathematics, Science, and Religious Education. They are still subject to Ofsted inspections and follow the same examination pathways as mainstream school. However, as Academies are not required to adhere to the National Teachers' pay and conditions, this has an on impact on teacher retention in maintained schools especially for the core subjects. Indeed, those who teach a core subject are 'worth' more

³⁷ House of Commons Library Academies under the Labour Government Standard Note: SN/SP/5544 Last updated: 20 January 2015 Author: Robert Long, Social Policy Section

³⁸ Ibid West, Anne and Wolfe, David (2018)

because they are not only paid a higher salary but also there is a public prestige attached to the actual subject. However, a teacher in an Academy may not have the financial and job security offered in a mainstream school because the school generally has a large scale business culture. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that teachers in such schools have a set of dispositions which are related to the field of their production.

The National Curriculum and Teachers

ERA 1988 defined 'recognised awards' to tackle the long term nuisance of bogus degrees and these were determined by the Secretary of State (Sections 214-217). This means that the qualifications needed to practice as a teacher are standardised to ensure that teachers have the knowledge required to deliver a particular subject. Unlike the previous Comprehensive School System, the focus has been redirected in terms of teacher specialism in an academic subject.

On the one hand this meant that a teacher was an expert in a specific subject and therefore the quality of provision would be better than in the previous Comprehensive system. On the other hand, the subject itself is often more important than the individual who taught it. Indeed, as in the 19th century curriculum promoted by Spencer, there was a hierarchy of subjects, and some were worth more not only in terms of value but in terms of salary. As such, some people are defined by the subject they teach rather than their skill as a practitioner. For example, there are specific connotations associated with someone who teaches Science or Maths which are different to those who teach Art or Music.

The principle of marketisation created a competitive arena in education. This often resulted with teachers leaving a school because they could earn a larger salary based on their specialist subject. As such, some schools in more challenging circumstances were left without subject specialists and this meant that children were not accessing a quality provision. In some respects, this mirrors the Comprehensive System when teachers focused on pastoral care rather than education. The system of mass education dilutes the actual quality of teaching because it assumes that the needs of every child in the classroom are being met. Indeed, the assumption is that a teacher is someone who can help every child to achieve their educational potential, but this overlooks the subjective nature of the task of teaching.

Through the principle of marketisation a blame culture developed in schools and beyond. Some teachers and parents blamed each other for the child's lack of attainment. This not only undermined each of their capabilities as a teacher or parent but through such practices the dispositions associated with innocence and the child were reproduced.

On the one hand, children were 'objects' to observe and cultivate, and this approach overlooked the child's experiences of interactions. Yet on the other hand, the 'separation' of the subjective implies that the object, in this case the child, is something different from us. Indeed, through these ideas the child is one who becomes omnipresent and the distance between adults and children has become greater. Yet, this situation has been created by adults through successive socialisation practices. Indeed, the set of the dispositions associated with the child and love are reproduced

through primary and secondary socialisation practices to the extent that the anxieties associated with survival are such that to manage them we have to create a greater emotional distance.

Furthermore, the changes in socialisation practices also had an impact on the actual relationships between adults such as teachers and parents. The relationships became fragmented, and this reinforced the notion that children are passive vessels, and their experiences have no influence on their attainment. Yet, the experience of education always involves others, such as parents, peers, and teachers. Therefore, for some of the population, the changes in socialisation practices meant that the dispositions associated with the child were joined by blame, suspicion, and mistrust of other adults who also shared socialisation responsibilities.

The National Curriculum was the embodiment of meritocracy, the principle of parentocracy and marketisation. There is a relationality between education as a field and habitus as a set of dispositions which involve the future of the child.

Yet, the parent had to decide on which school to send their child and if the school was good enough. However, to make this decision a parent referred to Ofsted judgements, and exam results. As such, the basis of parental decisions about education were largely based on the definitions provided by the State. However, I suggest that although knowledge and practices are contained and generated through school, there are contradictions because education is also unavoidably conducted in the context of a range of relationships (Salzburger-Wittenburg, 1973, Youell, 2006). However, there is an assumption that professionals are able to separate their subjective selves which is only based on one's actual objective practices (Pareto 2017).

Section 7C: Teaching as a professional body

The idea of a professional body implies 'status' and this had much attention from sociology. Hoyle (2001) argued that the idea of 'status' is a generic term embracing three independent phenomena, prestige, status, and esteem.

Occupational prestige is the public perception of the relative position of an occupation in a hierarchy of occupations. The second, occupational status, is, 'the category to which knowledgeable groups allocate a particular occupation' in other words to what extent do other 'professional' groups view teaching as a profession.

Finally, occupational esteem is defined by Hoyle as 'the regard in which an occupation is held by the general public by virtue of the personal qualities which members are perceived as bringing to their core task' (Hoyle 2001: pp 139 -147). Yet, as these meanings have to be ascribed in the first place, occupational esteem itself cannot be divorced from the individual's own perception of their profession.

In an illiterate population, teaching has occupational prestige, occupational status, and occupational esteem. As I discussed earlier in the chapter, ideas in the past were enforced and absorbed by a fearful and thus compliant illiterate population. In other words, the illiterate did not question the 'truth' of Christianity, but I suggest this was largely because Early Christians socialised the population through their definitions of love and these emotions were different to those, they had previously experienced.

This point was discussed in Section 1A.

However, the changes in religious dogma were in response to external threats and directions from those in higher positions within the Church. As a result of these changes many of the population were fearful of the consequences of their lack of compliance in the here and now and also the Afterlife. Thus, when more of the population become educated their knowledge questioned the 'truth' and therefore the 'truth' became weakened. This point was raised through the work of Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Comte (1798-1857) with a focus on the evolutionary nature of societies.

For writer such as Foucault (1978) occupational status, is produced out of power struggles with knowledge and truth between different fields, disciplines, and institutions. Yet, we are the producers and creators of fields, disciplines, and institutions and we all have power. As such, fields like habitus have a historical background. This has been highlighted in the thesis so far as the Church as a field of religion has a history and schooling has a history in the field of education. Indeed, through this genealogical process I have highlighted how some of the population had a set of dispositions and a way of being which was used to further their knowledge and truth to defend against external threats to their survival. Yet, as I have illustrated despite the changes in practices, the original anxiety and ultimate human concern has not been addressed.

The Comprehensive system addressed ignorance by providing mass education.

During this period teachers were faced with non-education issues and large numbers of children. Some teachers in the 1960s were socialised by educated parents in a post war society. Their own parents had to adapt not only to the devastation of post war

Britain but also greater demographic changes which included mass immigration and changes in the division of labour. These factors had an influence on socialisation practices, and in many ways, there was disharmony between habitus as a set of dispositions associated with the child and education as a field. In other words, the actual purpose of education was overtaken by a set of dispositions which were reinforced because of post war experiences.

By the 1980s the Comprehensive School system had already socialised and had prepared some teachers to work in large schools with disaffected children. This process is not too dissimilar from the socialisation of the masses who I discussed in Section 1A. I suggest that mass education was a means to address retrospective guilt because the masses had been overlooked. Furthermore, for some of the population, the social and mental structures of habitus had assimilated, and this was regarded as natural. In other words, it was 'natural' for teachers to have large numbers of disaffected children and it was 'natural' that the children of the masses were disaffected.

Yet, mass education provided a level of perceived certainty in terms of *survival* and through this system all children were 'safely' in one place and could be socialised on mass in the same way. Of course, this overlooked the fact that we respond to the same things differently and although practices may be consistent the ways we internalise them are different.

Indeed, not all schools were Comprehensive and by and large those who attended Public Schools were socialised with the dispositions more akin to Stoicism and the practices were those which were advocated by Locke. Furthermore, the purposes of education were more aligned to Spencer's curriculum mainly because the children

who attended these schools were socialised in a particular way. As such, these dispositions had been passed on and regenerated through socialisation practices.

In the discussion about Spencer's 19th century curriculum, I highlighted how certain subjects had greater prestige in education than others. This idea translates to the late 1980s onwards as some teachers who are subject specialist within education as a field have greater occupational status and occupational esteem than others. In this way, a school can be regarded as a site of struggle because some people strive for a position and a place in that structure. Yet, as I have discussed, subjects such as Science are defined as desirable but one of the reasons for the definition is that the knowledge extends life. Furthermore, the actual positions within a school belong to someone who is perceived as having legitimate disciplinary knowledge. Yet, a position does not always mean that they have greater disciplinary knowledge than another teacher, but rather that it is legitimate because it has a title. As such, within a school itself each 'expert' has to report to a higher authority within the organisation and beyond the institution. A School reports to a Local Authority or the District Diocese, who in turn report to a higher authority, a similar process to how practices were directed from the Church as the highest authority.

Schools are hierarchal bureaucratic structures in terms of the final word and everyone within a school knows who this sits with because there is an organisational chart. This is usually placed inside the entrance of a school with photographs of the staff with their names placed in a hierarchy from Headteacher downwards. This ensures that all

visitors to the school all know who does what. However, some places of education use an organisational chart which is in alphabetical surname order and the titles are added after the name and this system connotes one which is egalitarian.

Indeed, the construction of a profession is a way of distinguishing one from the lay person and the professional is someone who 'controls' interactions and responses. For example, the professionalisation of teaching focuses on the 'objective' modes of inquiry which involves a consideration of classroom management, competence, and curriculum control (Lacey 1977; Ginsburg 1988).

Yet, teaching is multifaceted and a complex occupation which involves a plethora of activities, roles, and emotional elements.³⁹ Furthermore, teaching as a process is always relational but the discourse about the teacher role is entrenched in contradictions. On the one hand, a teacher is someone who is highly organised and can manage a range of competing demands and behaviours. Yet, on the other hand there is the idea that one is a 'born' teacher and this leads to assumptions of an 'ideal teacher' which a teacher then has to live up to. A teacher is someone who has innate characteristics, and this approach can be seen in the examination of 'teacher knowledge' or craft which defines professional teaching competence (Calderhead 1987).

The notion of profession itself is dangerous because 'it is a folk concept which has been uncritically smuggled into scientific language and which imports in it a whole social unconscious' (Bourdieu 1989: p37-8). This is especially so in teaching as '...its

³⁹ Journal of Teacher Education, Vol. 56, No. 5, November/December 2005 411-417
DOI: 10.1177/0022487105282112

recognition as a profession by political and related reference groups continues to remain ambiguous' (Hoyle 2001: p147). Indeed, the discourse about teachers' carries with it an assumption that as the responsibilities involved can be objectively measured and observed a teacher is someone who can separate their subjective self. As such, teaching like other professions, denies subjectivity.

The teaching profession offers a perceived status, greater financial reward with extended holidays and whilst this may be the case, it does not explain why there are difficulties in recruitment and retaining teachers. This may be because teaching is also viewed as a 'calling' which involves service and sacrifice (Hargreaves & Fullan, 2012). I suggest that there are a set of dispositions associated with this view of teaching which add further ambiguity to the already complex role. Indeed, sacrifice involves 'giving something up' for a greater cause. Furthermore, the connotations associated with this definition are emotional and embedded in the notions of love, the child, and the future. I suggest that as teachers are trained through the principles of meritocracy this involves a set of dispositions which are emotional not only because of the unavoidable context but the principles themselves are underpinned by hope for the child's future. Furthermore, legislation in the 1980s extended the remit of education beyond teaching and learning with a greater focus on child welfare.

The 1980s saw legislation which focused on the importance of children's welfare and the requirements and expectation of anyone with a duty of care to a child. As such, whoever came into contact with children as part of their job, had to understand the laws

that affected their work which included in their actions in emergency situations and preventing any child from facing danger at home.⁴⁰

Care was deemed as a duty for any adult who worked with children, care in this context is demonstrated through one's actions as a professional. Yet, it could be said that habitus as a set of dispositions and one's own experiences, influence the level of care invested. However, the 'care' as depicted in law is underpinned by observable routines and therefore the assumption is that we can 'separate' the subjective dispositions of habitus from the rational notion of care.

The dispositions associated with the child are incompatible with definitions of 'care' in a professional capacity, however they cannot be separated. Furthermore, adults can demonstrate care for the child through their practices and this is a way to gauge professionalism. However, the tasks themselves are undertaken on an emotional level. By and large, the population are socialised through the emotion of love and the child, yet this can create a complex web of conflicting emotions for some professionals. On the one hand, individuals are meant to demonstrate love and care with their own children. Yet on the other hand, love must not be demonstrated in a school and instead care should be shown. This is an interesting dilemma especially for those children who have never experienced the defined parental love and I will explain this further in relation to important legislation.

Section 8C: The Children Act 2004

⁴⁰ Children Act 1989 (legislation.gov.uk)

The Children Act 2004 was developed from the original version. Much of the original Act remains the same but several aspects were amended. One such amendment was that local authorities had the duty of partnering with other local safeguarding agencies to improve the wellbeing of all children in their area. Another key amendment was to ensure that services such as the police and healthcare providers had systems in place that considered the safety and wellbeing of children who were involved in their work.

Responsibilities are taken away from those adults who are deemed as unsuitable by the State. Yet, the State itself consists of people who do not necessarily share habitus as a set of dispositions but follow the regulations which are used to organise structures. In turn, structures consist of individuals who follow regulations and are responsible for ensuring that others do the same. As such, when the responsibilities are taken away from the parent, they are not given to a faceless structure but to other individuals and groups. Therefore, the child is socialised through regulatory practices by a range of professionals who all follow the same guidelines.

I suggest that this is a 'process' notion of care and a child who is socialised through these channels can only make comparisons with the care they previously received.

Often, the process notion of care is one where the child is given care through possessions and material goods which they may not have had previously. Or indeed if they had these elements, their impressions of care are reinforced by previous experiences.

Furthermore, the time allocated to a child is based on quantity rather than quality and there is a succession of different adults who are doing a job. That is not to undermine the role of the professional but to highlight how the notion of love for the child is somehow replaced with the notion of care which is observed through objective criteria.

The Children Act 2004 was prompted by the murder of Victoria Climbié, an eight year child who was killed by her guardians in 2000. The inquiry into her death led to the development of the 'Every Child Matters' green paper, which was produced in 2003.⁴¹ This paper outlined the Government's proposals to reform and improve child welfare across the country and the initiative outlined five key principles that all children have:

- The right to stay safe.
- The right to be healthy.
- The right to enjoy and achieve.
- The right to achieve economic well-being.
- The right to make a positive contribution.

Every Child Matters Agenda was used in all services which involved children. In terms of education, it was added to the National Curriculum Document and there were some schools where teachers had to demonstrate how they were applying each of the five principles in their lessons. The acronym SHEEP was used to annotate where ECM was demonstrated in lesson planning.⁴² In other words, the principles of care were demonstrated through practices and reproduced in the field of education.

⁴¹ Every child matters - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

⁴² I taught in a number of Secondary Schools which used this practice and Safety, Health, Economic, Enjoy and Positive were written into lesson planning.

There is no doubt that Every Child Matter Agenda was of crucial importance because the that there are some children who face extreme suffering was exposed. Yet, such cruelty had already been exposed in the 19th century and therefore this was not something new and this highlights two key points.

The first point is that despite State intervention there are some people who treat others with extreme cruelty. Indeed, despite addressing certain principles associated with these acts of cruelty and greater interventions by a range of agencies, such practices continue. Furthermore, adults bring their own histories and experiences of childhood which are different to current practises and could now be regarded as unsuitable. This is not to say that we should not address the issue but rather that the issue *itself* has not been addressed, which leads into the second point.

Habitus itself is nurtured through education and therefore teaching is an emotional task yet, the ways in which education is conducted avoids addressing the emotions themselves.

The ECM Agenda is a reformulation of the doctrine of meritocracy because the principles corresponded with those of the welfare system but are directed exclusively for the child. Indeed, although a child is recognised as someone who has rights, they are not expected to have responsibilities. This is a shift from ideas which I discussed Section 2C in terms of children being responsible for their educational outcomes during the early stages of the Comprehensive System.

I suggest that the introduction of legislation in the millennium reenergised the anxieties associated with innocence and omnipresence. A child is socially omnipotent because every adult in our society is hyper aware of their own behaviours in relation to the child. This is a reformulation of the original ideas associated with Christianity where the infant

Jesus is symbolically omnipresent. Furthermore, the assumption remains that a child is a passive vessel and does not have the capacity to manipulate a set of circumstances. I suggest that this is a gross underestimation of a child's capacities because intentions aside, a child has learnt from its own experiences. There is a set of assumptions which overlooks the fact that an infant is an adult in miniature and underdeveloped form.

From the 19th century onwards, habitus as a set of dispositions towards the child was gradually formulised in practices through legislation. However, from the 1980s onwards a body of legislation was developed which actually monitored practices towards children. Over time, adults in society monitor the behaviours of other adults to assess if their intentions towards children are appropriate or a cause for concern. In Section 5C I highlighted how this practice increased suspicion between some of the population and how this was subsequently passed on through socialisation practices. Uncertainty and doubt are ways to avoid the anxieties associated with death because these are drivers of knowledge. Yet suspicion is based on trust v mistrust, and this is the first stage of psychosocial development which was highlighted in Chapter One (Erikson 2013).

Chapter Two Part C: Summary

The State is an advocate of mass education and as Academies are schools which are large scale operations, they are places of mass socialisation. Yet the ways in which children are socialised, reflect the detached, efficient manner which assumes that individuals can separated the subject from the object. Thus, the changes in socialisation practices which respond to legislation are a way to deny the concoction of emotions adults associate with a child.

Teaching as a profession has been crafted in legislation and education has become more corporate like. Yet, education is created and conducted by people for people and yet the ways in which academies operate insist that adults have to emotionally detach themselves from children and this is demonstrated through their practices. As such, children become 'products' because as with all business environments, the focus is on targets, results, and finances.

On the one hand, a teacher shows 'care' for the child through the practices of assessment, marking and making sure the child achieves their 'predicted' academic outcomes. On the other hand, the meanings and connotations of good teaching is rooted in the emotions that one invests in their calling, which assumes an intrinsic nature associated with being a teacher. I suggest that this is not necessarily the case but rather that the emotions associated with the child are deeply rooted. A parent in the 21st century trusts a teacher to exhibit the professional standards which are laid out in legislation. Yet, a parent also expects a teacher to 'like' their child and there is an underlying expectation that the child likes their teacher. However, this is measured through the child's attainment rather than a relationship between teacher and pupil.

Indeed, the corporate parent role aligns with the marketisation of education and through the practices people drift away from others and towards a focus on procedures with others. In terms of children, they are a product of education rather than a person who is educated, and the processes ensure that the relationships between adults and children in school are formalised. Therefore, habitus is not 'natural' but rather a set of socialised dispositions which are generated through the field of education.

Thus far I have used my version of genealogy to map and explain the psychosocial progression of habitus as a set of anxious dispositions which are associated with the child and death and are regenerated through primary and secondary socialisation practices. I have offered explanations as to why the dispositions are a barrier to having open discussions about the topic of death.

At the beginning of Chapter Two I explained how socialisation practices varied because Early Christianity coexisted with Paganism. I illustrated how socialisation responsibilities gradually shifted from the home to education as a mass system and discussed how socialisation practices became legally formalised. I illustrated how despite these changes, the anxious dispositions of habitus and their associations between the child and death are never directly addressed. Through this process I have highlighted how the changes in socialisation practices were more often than not in response to external threats and I explained some of the interrelated factors which were involved. In Chapter Three, I adopt a psychodynamic framework to explain how habitus as a socialised subjectivity is internalised and subsequently demonstrated through practices which are used to defend against our ultimate concern.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework

In Chapter Two, I used a genealogical approach to explain how the ambiguities associated with defining death, the child and childhood itself are reproduced through socialisation practices. Using the concept of habitus, I traced a set of dispositions and a way of being and showed how the anxieties associated with survival are reproduced through the process of socialisation. Habitus is a way to explain how and why we conceive and reconstruct the social world in which we are thrown into. Yet, as we are not passive vessels, we internalise the perceptions and beliefs of the social world.

As such, in this chapter, I adopt a psychodynamic theoretical framework to explain how we internalise habitus and to do this I focus first on with the conditions before we are actually thrown into the world.

Section 1D: Object Relations Theory

According to Object Relations Theory, we are born with an unconscious phantasy life rather than a 'blank slate' which means that our subjective experiences are affected by the outer world (environment) and the inner world (psychic reality). Infants have an innate knowledge of objects, and these objects make unconscious mental representations of subjective experiences as unconscious phantasies. Although, the term 'object' could be used to refer to a science demarcation of the subjective versus objective, I follow Hinshelwood (2018, p39) and use the term object to mean a person. As an infant cannot express itself to itself, we are what we believe we are (Hinshelwood p366, 1991). In very simple terms, an infant is a body of biological 'cells' some of which are immature. The immature cells at this stage do not have the biological capacity to make sense of the external world. Instead, we use unconscious mental representations of bodily sensations and emotional experiences which exist as phantasies. It is through these phantasies that as an infant we experience the outer world, in our inner world.

An infant's unconscious phantasies are experienced as internal objects and part objects with which to relate to the inner world. The objects are not inanimate but rather they are humans or related to humans in the external world and as an infant we can only deal with experiences through a rudimentary and unintegrated ego (Klein 1975). In this explanation our original neurotic anxiety is a fundamental element of human existence because it is our first experience of the external world. I touched upon neurotic anxieties in Chapter Two Section 5A in the discussion of real fear (Freud 1920). In Chapter Two, I also explained how certain practices in the external world

added to our original neurotic anxiety. In as much as habitus, as a set of socially induced dispositions indirectly 'provoke' our original neurotic anxiety.

Our neurotic anxiety is not directly about death but rather a sensation associated with the unknown. I illustrated how the changes in imagery and narratives about the child, death and the Afterlife created anxieties because they were associated with the unknown. As death is the greatest unknown and the ultimate human concern it is therefore the original neurotic anxiety.

Both mother and child share the painful experience of childbirth and although the mother knows what is involved in the labour process, there is still a concern for her own and her child's survival. Through, Klein's work we can grasp some understanding of the huge challenges faced before we are 'thrown' into the world. Indeed, regardless of the social conditions we are thrown into, the actual physical and psychological experience itself must also be terrifying for one who is yet to be born.

The unborn child is accustomed to the world in the womb and the experiences associated with childbirth disturb that actual condition and not only is the journey arduous but the experience itself is unknown. The original anxiety is based on our first experience of life, but in most cases, it is very quickly replaced by other experiences. This means that we could not 'know' or recall the actual experience of being born but the sensations of other 'uneasy' experiences are familiar in an unfamiliar way. Therefore, although we will not remember the actual experience, there are associated sensations felt through other experiences.

It is fair to assume that humans all suffer from a fundamental anxiety which is caused by the trauma experienced at birth and the sensations of hunger, frustration, and tiredness. An infant has only ever experienced its existence in the womb and after such a traumatic journey into life and a new environment, they may want to return to that place which is 'known'. Indeed, the experience of birth itself is felt as an attack which is inflicted on to the infant and as an organism an infant is under threat. Thus, it is our instinct to survive which stirs up the fear of annihilation or the fear of death.⁴³ Even when fight or flight responses are activated on a physiological level, the unborn child cannot physically react to either other than demonstrate its distress through changes in heart rate and defecation. Fight or flight may have been experienced by the unborn child in response to a problematic pregnancy and the possible early onset of labour. In such cases, the unborn child may have had the distressed feeling but without being born. However, as we can only actually be born once into the outer world, the feeling is one of an unknown danger and this is original neurotic anxiety.

The pre-natal state and the mother

One can never return to the actual pre- natal state, but innate factors contribute to an infant's first object relation which is the relation of the mother's breast and to the mother (Klein 1957). The reason is that the breast is instinctively felt to be the source of nourishment or of life itself. Furthermore, if the primal object (breast) is introjected

⁴³ Klein, M (1950) On the Criteria for the Termination of a Psycho-Analysis. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 31:78-80 Pep Web

and takes root in the ego with relative security, this forms the basis of satisfactory development. Thus, the mental and physical closeness of pre-natal unity is to some extent restored.

As such, the pre-natal state is a 'wholeness' or 'oneness' with the mother but when the child is born an element of the whole is missing. When the infant takes in the good breast or 'life' this becomes part of their ego and the mother is now inside of the child. This process restores the security and unity of the pre-natal state, but it can only ever be an 'artificial' state of the original. As a result, the struggles between life and death impulses are felt in primitive ways (Klein p 178-179, 1957). This explanation suggests that the anxiety arising from the perpetual activity of the death instinct is never eliminated but is counteracted and kept at bay by the power of the life instinct.⁴⁴

The idea that our inner world is rooted in primal phantasy, implies that rather than being born 'innocent' or 'wicked' we are born anxious. This offers a way to understand how social conditions interact with our inherent emotional nature and it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that we are born anxious because the first experience of life is unpleasant. Although we are neither innocent nor wicked, the inner world we occupy is dark. There are aggressive forces in the inner world with damaged, injured, and dead objects as content. As such, the atmosphere is charged with death and destruction, and this gives rise to great anxiety concerned with the survival of the self. However, the extent of this 'darkness' is based on the satisfaction of our frustrations as infants.

⁴⁴ Klein, M. (1948) A Contribution to the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 29:114-123 PEP Web

As such, we can consider the psychosocial connections between events in the external world and how they manifest in the internal world and vice versa.

Furthermore, the definitions of the infant as innocent or wicked are culturally bound and instead psychodynamic theories offer a way to understand humans ontologically. Humans are not passive vessels and I have illustrated thus far how habitus as a set of dispositions are demonstrated through practices. Thus, the mother and unborn child relationship cannot be passive and the ways we respond to an actual or perceived external threat has to involve biological and physiological processes. In the next section I will discuss psychodynamic theories to explain the strategies we use to protect ourselves from the anxieties which arise from such threats.

Section 2D: Mechanisms used to navigate being in the world.

Defence mechanisms are rooted in Freud's theory of personality and the three duelling forces of the id, the ego, and the super ego. The id is unconscious and contains our primitive urges and the super ego is a partly conscious drive toward moral and social values. The ego is a partly conscious force which moderates the id and the super ego. In this paradigm, anxiety emerges when the needs of the id clash with the needs of the superego. To mitigate the tension, the ego deploys strategies of self-deception which is a way to avoid the discomfort, thus the unacceptable thought or emotion may be denied or rationalised or projected onto someone else (Freud 1926). Therefore, unlike other evolved systems, defence mechanisms are unconscious strategies which are used to protect ourselves from anxious thoughts or feelings.

However, Klein (1882-1960) differed with Freud on this point, as in her view we are born with a basic, developing ego structure. Thus, Klein placed less emphasis on

biological based drives such as in the id and instead focused on the internal objects coloured by unconscious phantasy (Abrahams 2021). As we are born with a rudimentary ego structure, not only do we use an object to satisfy our drive for hunger and survival, but also the object is used to form intrapsychic relations. As such, the process is not so much biologically driven but is an emotional force whereby we seek out a primary relationship with the object which is the mother.

I largely agree with this idea because a human infant is like any other mammal and the biological drive is aimed at survival. Yet, our survival as an infant is dependent on others for a far longer period of time than for other mammals. Therefore, the emotional force Klein refers to is more likely based on *how* survival is actually met.

Splitting as a Primitive defence mechanisms of the Paranoid-Schizoid Position.

Klien used the term position to define a set of psychic functions which correspond to a given phase of development. The paranoid- schizoid position is characteristic of the earliest months of life and refers to a collection of anxieties, defences, and internal and external object relations. Although the psychic functions always appear during the first year of life, they are present at all times thereafter, which means that they can be reactivated at any time. The chief characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position is the splitting of both self and object into good and bad, with at first little or no integration between them.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Melanie Klein Trust – (melanie-klein-trust.org.uk)

According to Klein, we have two opposing sets of feeling and impulses which are libidinal and aggressive, and these are the constructs of life and death instincts. As infants we feel omnipotent as infants because our belief is literal in terms of the power held by the life and death instincts. Furthermore, we also attribute similar feelings to other people and important parts of people and in this way our psychic and physical experiences are interwoven. Therefore, through this process we build up an inner world in which we exist in a form which is largely determined by our phantasies.

According to Klein our earliest and most primitive defence mechanism is splitting and this is employed to cope with a very uncertain environment. For example, the comfort given after birth particularly the first feeding experience are felt to come from a 'good' breast, whereas the feelings of destruction and frustration are directed to the 'bad' breast. This point was discussed briefly in the section about pre-natal unity, and a mother's breast can be good or bad based on if it is providing the infant with milk or not. However, although the breast is the source of survival, when an infant is hungry and becomes frustrated, the breast is a bad object. The reason for this is that in the paranoid schizoid position, we are unable to comprehend that the breast is the same object and as such we split the mother into two distinct types of breasts. The bad breast is hated with a passion, and we want to bite and destroy the object of frustration, whereas the good breast is revered with an equally but more benevolent intensity. In other words, as infants we are purely concerned with our own survival and self-preservation, but the 'bad' breast is a threat to that aim. Furthermore, given the uncertainty involved in the experience of being born we make our decision of 'good' and 'bad' object based on that which provides satisfaction or causes frustration. Yet, the only comparison that we can make as an infant is made in relation to the

experience of being born. Thus, anything that provides the sensation of comfort must initially ease that original anxiety but thereafter hunger is a need that has to be satisfied. Therefore, unlike Freud who highlighted our primary conflict is centred on the life versus death instinct, Klein emphasized the conflict as one which was between the states of love and hate (Waddell p 30, 2002).

Section 3D: The depressive position

The second position is one whereby we come to terms with the 'reality' of the world and our place within it. The depressive position involves complicated psychological reactions because this is when we realise that our love and hate are directed towards the same object which is the mother. As such, we understand that the mother is a real separate whole person, which involves an acknowledgement of the co-existence of good and bad and the ambivalence of our feelings toward them.

On the one hand, the split heals in the depressive position, yet on the other hand, the ambivalence gives rise to guilt and anxiety. Reparation as a defence, is the making good of damage which is imagined as having already been done and therefore it is used to specifically reduce the sense of guilt (Rycroft 1995).

Reparation is used in practice because it relieves some people of their anxiety and guilt. For example, as I explained in Chapter Two the changes to socialisation practices during the Reformation period involved the use of physical punishment by parents because the child was defined as 'wicked' yet previously the child was

depicted as omnipresent and innocent. The definitions created a collection of emotional contradictions which raised parental anxieties and reparation through education was a way to relieve their sense of guilt.

Reparation is used in current practices especially with children, as on the one hand, working mothers have more money to spend on gifts for their child, yet on the other hand, providing their child with material goods is also a way to relieve their guilt of not being with their child. Furthermore, the changes in legislation and subsequent socialisation practices have meant that many adults would have indulged in behaviours which were once deemed as acceptable. However, over time the same behaviours are deemed as perverse, unhealthy, or cruel. As such, providing copious unnecessary material goods is a form of reparation which reduces the sense of retrospective guilt.

At the heart of depressive position is loss and mourning because with the greater appreciation of reality and the recognition of the complete object, the part object is lost. In other words, as a child we mourn the separation of the self from the mother and the objects we hurt or destroyed through aggression and envy.⁴⁶

Anxiety is also felt on behalf of the object in the depressive position because there is a kind of recognition and a realisation that those aspects can never be returned. Indeed, the depressive position is one in which some adults face more frequently than others.

⁴⁶ Klein focuses on envy and gratitude as attitudes which are the most potent factors in understanding feelings of love and their effect on the earliest relation- the mother (Klein 1957).

Yet, not everyone makes it to the depressive position as some people can get stuck in the mode of primitive splitting of the paranoid-schizoid position.

Section 1D-3D Summary

Object Relations Theory is a way to understand how we make sense of the world before we have a grasp on the rules of a given society. The ideas allow us to consider the notion of a child as something which is on the one hand separate, yet on the other hand, an entity as one which we can all relate to. The paranoid and depressive stages are a way to understand how we internalise the external world but the definitions themselves are bound by their cultural meanings and applications.

In Chapter Two, I highlighted how Christianity brought its definition of love to a population who were already practicing their own version. Yet, in terms of an infant the state of 'love' in the very earliest stage is one which satisfies the survival anxiety, and this is a universal given.

One can never return to the actual pre- natal state, but innate factors contribute to an infant's first object relation which is the relation of the mother's breast and to the mother (Klein 1957). The reason is that the breast is instinctively felt to be the source of nourishment or of life itself. Furthermore, if the primal object (breast) is introjected and takes root in the ego with relative security, this forms the basis of satisfactory development. Thus, the mental and physical closeness of pre-natal unity is to some extent restored. In Chapter Two, I highlighted how the changes in habitus and subsequent ways of being, were in response to external threats but the tendency was

to 'return' to previous ways which can be a desire to return to the pre-natal state of wholeness. Furthermore, as infants were socialised by adults who were anxious themselves their own original neurotic anxiety was never addressed and in the next section, I will refer to psychodynamic theories to explain how these anxieties have been passed on.

Section 4D: Projective identification and the process of thinking

Projective and introjected identification is a process and explains how we actually absorb the external world. Although projective identification is an unconscious phantasy which interacts reciprocally with experiences, as a complex single mechanism projective identification involves projection and introjection as components. This process forms the individual's intellectual and emotional characteristics (Spillius et al 2011).

The projective element of identification represents a primitive form of communication which is used by us as infants to convey states of great distress. Yet, the process itself involves a social dimension because the response we receive from the communication is introjected and this is an intrinsic element of being with others in the world. We make sense of the world through a series of interactions, the younger one is, the more influential these can be. As we get older the range of interactions usually get wider. On the one hand, this suggests introjection and projection is a lifelong process. Yet, on the other hand, as we age our ideas may be more fixed and as such some may use projection as a form of defence. This could be regarded as negative by because it

suggests that there is reluctance to embrace new ideas. However, the previous ideas are often the springboard for the development of 'newer' concepts. Whilst newer ideas may appear to be the pinnacle of progress, as I have shown in the Chapter Two, the foundations of such ideas are deeply rooted and often repeated albeit unintentionally. Indeed, Given the 'progress' and developments in our society, the topic of death is one which is rarely discussed in an open and frank way especially between adults and children. Indeed, the fact that death as a topic is absent from a school curriculum implies stagnation rather than progress. This point can be understood further as I will focus on theories from the Kleinian tradition which offer explanations on how thinking and concepts are formulated.

The Process of thinking

Bion (1962) transformed Klein's theories of infantile phantasy into an epistemological 'theory of thinking' with emotional experience at its core. In *The Psycho-Analytic Study of Thinking* (1962) Bion created a model which in practice constitutes the source of a hypotheses which is translated into empirical terms.⁴⁷ However, I will focus on the theoretical model Bion proposed because this provides an explanation of the development of thoughts and thinking. Indeed, rather than a paranoid-schizoid and the depressive position as two subsequent developmental points, for Bion, there is a life-long oscillation between these two positions.

⁴⁷ At this point Bion is giving psychodynamic practice the status of an experimental science, however he revises his early opinions and warns against experiencing the feeling of safety because this prevents further discoveries of unsolved problems (Bion 1984)

My understanding is that Bion (1962) built on and expanded Klein's concepts to explain the interplay between the two positions as a kind of dynamic equilibrium. This would mean that in terms of processes they occur at the same rate and therefore balance each other so that there is no net change to the system overall. The balance is healthier because it avoids the extremities of each of the positions. The idea of balance was discussed in Chapter Two through the work of Rousseau and his explanation of nature and climate. Balance is also an important feature in the work of Erickson (1902 –1994). Yet, for Bion, (1962) the notion of balance is based primarily on the biological 'workings' of the system and provides a framework to understand abstract mental faculties which 'exist' and their functioning role in the development of thoughts and thinking.

Developing thoughts and thinking

For Bion (1962b) 'thoughts' are classified according to the nature of their developmental history. As such, the process begins with the first 'thoughts' which are pre-conceptions, which then become conceptions/thoughts, and finally concepts which are named and are fixed thoughts (Bion1962b: pp306-310)

For example, when an infant is hungry, they experience hunger pains which are bodily sensations. The infant's pre-conception of 'food' is realised when the mother gives them a feed and the internal phantasised experience is matched with outer reality. Thus, this experience allows an infant to develop the pre-thought of 'food/breast' as a mental representation which can then be 'thought' about. Although an infant has some instinctual pre-conception of 'food' in terms of the existence of the mother's breast, it is

the experience itself that forms the thought.⁴⁸ The combination of a pre-conception with a realization initiate the thought which will be expected to be constantly conjoined with an emotional experience of satisfaction. (Bion 1962b :306-310). Bion's model recognises the fundamental principles involved in the process of thinking and that there is an emotional connection.

Alpha Function

Bion explained the process of transformation from raw bodily sensations into mental representations and used the term 'function' to explain the mental activity of a number of factors which operate in consort.⁴⁹ The actual process is unknown because there involves a range of factors to convert bodily sensations into mental representations which is referred to as '*alpha function*'.

Alpha function takes in raw bodily sense data and from this generates mental contents of meaning. As a process of conversion, the *alpha function* goes through a series of stages and itself is a process by which meaning accrues to sense data and when the conceptions are established, they repeat the history of pre- conceptions. In this way *alpha function* is a way of animating the psyche and imbuing it with a sense of subjectivity (Symington and Symington 1986). However, when the process of alpha functioning does not occur, the sense data remains unassimilated. This means that

⁴⁸ Bion's theory of thinking consist of a mating of the pre-conception and a realisation which resulted in conception and a step in building thoughts and theories (Hinshelwood p249 1991)

⁴⁹ This explanation is used by Bion to emphasise the possibility of adopting a deductive approach as the factors can only be deduced by their functions. Therefore, 'functions' allowed for a wider variety of usage whist maintaining a paradigm (1962b p2)

the bodily sense data are not converted into mental content and instead there is an alternative aim of projective identification.

Beta Elements

When *alpha function* does not work another kind of mental content is generated which Bion (1962b) referred to as *beta elements*. *Beta elements* are undigested particles of raw sense data which accumulate because of those occasions when the pre-existing expectation and the realization is not met.

The accumulation of *beta elements* are not processed by thinking as in the *alpha function* but instead they are usually evacuated through projective identification. The aim of this kind of projective identification is to violently evacuate a painful state of mind often with the aim of an intimidating control of the object (Hinshelwood p 184, 1991). Therefore, instead of the mind developing an apparatus for thinking, it becomes an apparatus for 'ridding the psych of the accumulation of bad internal objects' (Bion 1962a p112).

This explanation allows us to consider how pre-conceptions as 'empty thoughts' become thoughts based on their realizations. Bion's explanation is a way to understand not only the complexity involved in thinking but also the nature of thought in terms of its developmental history.

As thoughts have a developmental history, the rate in which they progress is different and each experience an infant has reinforces the thought before it becomes a concept or fixed idea. Yet, I suggest that the concept would be established sooner depending on the severity of the experience. For example, the proponents of change were closer to the realisation of thought because in simple terms, they had a 'head start' and by

and large their apparatus was used for mating the pre-conception and realisation. However, for some of the population, the apparatus needed to develop thinking is used for another function which implies that it is not fit for that original purpose and may or may not be repaired.

Indeed, as Bion cannot specify the actual processes involved in *alpha function*, the apparatus itself may have adapted albeit inappropriately to protect itself from the demands of its environment. In other words, the rapid changes in socialisation practices had a greater impact on the mass population because by and large they were not the group who instigated the changes. In contrast, for some of the population, the changes were slight and therefore easier in terms of adaptation.

Section 5D: Projective identification and Containment

As a process, projective identification is complex because both good and bad objects are introjected, re-projected and re-introjected. The nature of projective identification is not only the basis of many anxiety situations, but it also used by an infant to modify fear. Bion (1962b) used this aspect of Kleins projective identification theory as a way of understanding emotional containing and its relation to personal development.

A container is that in which an object is projected into, and the object that can be projected into the container is contained (Bion 1962b p90). As an abstract model, the mother is the container for the infant's projected needs, and unwanted parts.

The process is one whereby the mother provides emotional containment because when the projections are metabolised by the mother, the experience is returned back to the infant in a nurturing way, and this helps the infant to feel contained.

For example, if an infant feels anxiety or fear in the paranoid-schizoid position, these are projected into the mother who is experienced as 'bad'. As the infant's experience is beyond words, they need the mother to receive the projections of the experience of anxiety and fear in order to make sense of them. The mother contains these feelings and metabolises them. In doing so she can respond to the infant's anxiety and fear in a soothing, nurturing way. Thus, the infant is able to introject the 'good' feelings of being held, understood, and cared for.

Yet, if the mother's mind is littered with other concerns, she could be unavailable for the child. As such, the mother's mind is a vital component of the external world and if she is unavailable there would be a containment break down. This means that in such situations the mother would be an inadequate external object because the infant's emotional experiences are returned to them without being modified or metabolised. In addition, the infant's experiences may also be amplified by the mother's distress or frustration, and this may result in some form of mental suffering for the infant.

Therefore, the infant requires its mother to have a particular state of mind to be a container.

Section 6D: The maternal mind, the state of reverie and alpha function.

For the mother to be a container, she has to adopt a state of maternal *reverie*. This is a mental state in which the mother can not only absorb her infants' projections but also feel and make sense of them. In other words, the mother has to also process the

projection in her response to the infant. In an ideal world this process would be simple, however, as I have demonstrated this is not always possible. The demands of society are such that it is difficult for some mothers to absorb the infant's projections because their own psychic content and emotions may be underdeveloped. Indeed, changes in political and economic practices influenced socialisation practices which impacted the role of a mother and the perception of motherhood itself.

The notion of container is a way of understanding how particular states of mind are processed and passed on from generation to generation. Indeed, Bion's ideas highlight how the demands of the external world play an intrinsic part in our first relationship which is generally with one's mother. Yet, the notion of 'container' is also a useful concept which can be applied to understanding relationships in organisations.

Section 7D: Container, Contents, and the Containing Relationship

Bion (1970) developed a typology of containing and described the relationship between the container and contents. He used examples which are explicitly social to describe three situations with three types of relations which he termed commensal, symbiotic, and parasitic.

A commensal relationship is where two objects share a third and all three benefit and a symbiotic relationship is where one depends on another and there is mutual benefit.

A parasitic type represents a relationship in which one depends on another to produce a third which is destructive to all three (Bion 1970 p95).

The configuration of scenarios included in a container could overwhelm and crush the life out of its contents, or the contents explode the container, or the container and the

contents manage to accommodate each other, and, in the process, both develop and grow (Hinshelwood 1987 pp 230-231).

The barriers to open and frank discussions about death could be removed in education if adults established commensal relationships with parents and children for the benefit of all three. However, professionals in education often build up a defence against the anxieties associated with children and survival which is taught through their basic training and establishes a professional identity (Miller-Pietroni 1999 p412). As such, a school can be regarded as a social defence system.

Section 8D: Social defence Systems

A social defence system is one which develops over time and is the result of an often unconscious and collusive interaction and agreement between members of an organisation. A key characteristic feature of a social defence system is to avoid the experience of anxiety, guilt, uncertainty, and doubt. This is usually achieved by eliminating situations, events, tasks, and relationships which evoke anxiety rather than an attempt to positively help each other to confront the anxiety.

A school as an institution is one which establishes permanent ways of working and provides for the individual's defensive needs (Hinshelwood 1987: p 72). However, although defence mechanisms are unconscious, 'history' itself is socially and psychologically created and the 'unconscious' is never anything other than the forgetting of history (Bourdieu 1977 p79).

In terms of institutions, the occupants of a role are required to take into themselves the impulses or objects of other members and may absorb them (Jaques 1955: p497).

Therefore, unlike an individual, in a group there is a collective nature to defence mechanisms and the group acts as a whole.

In the next section, I will discuss the work of Menzies Lyth (1988) who wrote in the Kleinian tradition but formulated a way of looking at social structures as forms of defences. This is a way to explain the use of individual defence mechanisms but in terms of a collective.

The Primary Task

Although there are a number of interacting factors which influence an organisation crucial amongst all of these is its primary task. In theory, the primary task is that which the enterprise must perform in order to survive. However, from the viewpoint of an efficient institutional performance it must also be clearly defined in practice (Menzies Lyth 1988: p222).

Although Menzies Lyth (1988) focused on the primary task in a general hospital, the model is a useful way to understand other institutions. In terms of a hospital, the structure is in place to care for people who are ill, and as such this is its primary task. Nurses are responsible for the primary task which is to provide full time care all year around. Therefore, the nursing staff will bear the concentrated impact of the stresses that arise from patient care. The stresses faced by the nursing staff are complex and intense because the objective features of the work stimulate primitive anxieties which can be traced back to those of earliest infancy which I discussed in earlier in this chapter.

Through her study Menzies Lyth (1988) highlighted the considerable anxieties experienced by nurses as part of addressing the primary task and also the techniques used by the system to contain and modify the anxieties. The techniques diffused anxiety from the individual to the whole, however the benefit came as a cost because not only was individual growth stifled the anxieties themselves were not addressed. I discuss the primary task of education in further detail in Chapter 5.

Education is organised by legislation which is unconsciously underpinned by habitus as a set of dispositions associated with the child. In Chapter Two I illustrated how the meanings and definitions associated with love were demonstrated through socialisation practices which are deemed as 'natural'. In contrast, love from a Kleinian approach it is one which is 'felt' and therefore it is emotional. Often primitive defences are used in institutions, and these prevent more mature forms of coping with anxiety to emerge. For example, the defence of splitting was used in the nurse –patient relationship as a nurse can experience high level of anxiety the closer and more concentrated the relationship (Menzies Lyth 1988 p51). However, a nurse embarked on their career knowing that they would be faced with patients who are unwell or facing death. Therefore, instead of having a framework whereby the emotional impact of these experience could be addressed directly, it was avoided.

Through the process of depersonalisation an individual distinctiveness is eliminated. At the time Menzies Lyth was writing patients were referred to by their bed number rather than their name. On the one hand as there was a large turn over in ward

numbers this was an efficient way to minimise risk of mistaken identities. Yet on the other hand, using such practices depersonalised the individual. Although this practice has since changed and patients are referred to by name, it does not really remove the depersonalisation because the relationship between staff and patients itself has also changed.

The social constructed defences

Menzies Lyth highlighted how social constructed defences created a standardization of the nurses themselves into an objective category whose behaviour was symbolised through their uniform. This contributed to the denial of the significance of the nurse as an individual. Indeed, detachment and denial of feeling are a key defence which is necessary for the entrant into any profession that works with people. Not only does wearing a uniform indicate one's professional status, but this is also a way to minimise mutual interaction of personalities (Menzies Lyth 1988 pp54 -68). Thus, the importance of stable relationships are implicitly denied by the system. Although hospitals and schools are different environments, there are similarities in terms of a working stress. The attitudes to the work and practices that 'grow up in an organisation' protect their members from the 'fullest awareness of the stress' and therefore largely unconscious practices support the individuals' psychological defences (Hinshelwood 2009: p512).

As with any individual, a teacher has their own defences and will use these to enable them to work within a school environment. However, there is the risk that they become

intolerable to other members of the institution who are more adapted to the social defence system. In other words, a teacher has to adapt to the social defence system by neglecting their own defence system. This increases the individual's anxiety and has an impact on their wellbeing which may result in them not being able to continue within that field (Menzies Lyth 1988 p73). Yet, in a residential school for emotionally disturbed children, work practices were influenced by implicit organizational practices which Menzies Lyth (1979) argued were based on unconscious anxiety and defences. As the children were abused and disturbed the teachers as *loco parentis* felt the need in themselves to do better than the actual parent. This led them to adopt a therapeutic purpose rather than an educational one (Hinshelwood 2009 p512). I suggest that there is no real reason why a therapeutic and educational purpose cannot co-exist. However, the notion of therapeutic has to be clearly defined before this can happen. Indeed, the teacher–student relationship is qualitatively different to that of nurse–patient relationship because the actual care provided by a nurse is different to that of a teacher. A teacher can learn from a child but the nature of nursing itself could increase a patient's anxiety because the nurse often 'knows' more about the patient's actual condition. In other words, the knowledge a teacher has can be further enriched by that of children and vice versa and as such there is a reciprocal relationship.

Menzies Lyth's 1988 paper *The development of the self in children in institutions* highlighted those institutionalized children find the most significant models for identification within the institution itself. This idea of the institution as a therapeutic environment would mean that the primary task would have to be defined as providing the condition for healthy development (1988 p236). A school as a therapeutic

institution allows a broader consideration of the primary task of education and I suggest that this model could be applied generally in schools. However, the notion of healthy relationships in a school is one which is currently based on professional behaviours and practices which defend against the emotions associated to the child. Indeed, such notions have established a depersonalised mindset which sees the child as a product and the teacher as someone who is an object. Indeed, as I have illustrated this is not a recent occurrence but one which has been reproduced through social practices to defend against the anxieties associated with survival and therefore our ultimate concern of death. I suggest that any definition of healthy relationships has to be one which addresses the emotional wellbeing of children and teachers because depersonalisation assumes that there is no emotional connection. As such, there is a paradox because as socialisation practices evolve to meet the demands of a society we shift further away from our ultimate concern of death. Furthermore, because we are avoiding the ultimate concern, we create further anxieties. Therefore, the changes in successive socialisation practices have reached this point because the ultimate way to deny death is to suppress the emotional relationality between adults and children.

Chapter Four: Methodology

In the previous chapter I used a psychodynamic theoretical framework and explained how we internalised habitus to such an extent that habitus becomes 'natural' but this is because we use defence mechanisms which guard against primitive anxieties. In this

chapter, I will explain how I approached the principal research question and the reasons for using such techniques.

Section 1E: Ontology

In the previous chapter I discussed psychodynamic theories which was a way to explain the species ontologically before we are 'thrown' into the world. Although, it is debatable whether this is our 'natural' state I suggest it is probably the only means by which we can make a comparison to our state before birth. Object relations theory provided a non-value explanation because it is fair to suggest that the first experience of life is harrowing for every infant regardless of the world that they are born into. Psychodynamic theories are a way to understand how the human species as a whole have a set of inherent emotional mechanisms which are used as protection from internal conflicts as well as outer stressors. Through, the work of Bion (1962) I explained the processes involved in thinking and forming impressions of the social world and highlighted the importance of a maternal mindset needed to perform the function.

Being in the world is a position which always involves others. As such, the world is a complex matrix of relations because we are in the world with others who also bring with them their experiences and defences. My own subjectivity is attributed to the world because I am a social being who understands reality in accordance with my experiences and living context. The objective world on the other hand, can be seen as a world that lies beyond the influence of a single individual. Although, I employed the

concept of habitus as a way to overcome the interconnected dichotomies of structure/agency, subjectivism/objectivism, theory/practise, my own habitus as a researcher is a barrier and I explain the reasons for this in greater detail in Section 5E. One way of understanding our distinctive existence is through the concept of *Dasein* ...'which is ontologically distinguished' by the fact that in its being, this being is concerned about its very being' (Heidegger 1927, p 11). As such, *Dasein* is a way to understand our actual 'being' which is inescapable and involves each of us in the state of being because we are 'being there' 'being in the world', 'being with others' and 'being towards death'. As each of these states belong to *Dasein* they invariably have an influence on that state and subsequent involvement with the world. Thus, each person is *Dasein* in the circumstances of each one's own existence.

For example, *Dasein* as 'being-there' refers to the average-everydayness where there is a pre-understanding of Being because *Dasein* is part of it. In other words, before anything else, we exist, we are there, and as such this is how we should conceive of ourselves if we are going to understand our experiences. *Dasein* indicates a structure that human beings have as their own rather than in relation to other 'things' In terms of the average-everydayness it is the way *Dasein* relates to daily living in a temporal sense rather than an exceptional existence. Yet, in order to access and interpretate *Dasein* in its average everydayness, it has to be done so that it can show itself to itself in every mode of its facticity (Heidegger 1927, pp16 -17). In other words, whatever makes the fact the fact, it is a definite way of being for *Dasein*. Therefore, as I am *Dasein*, if I interpret another, this would be the common denominator because my

everydayness plays a part in the process. Yet, this is not to say that the actual interpretation can be the same as another *Dasein* but rather that it is a fact of being *Dasein*. In other words, it is just what we do as a part of being *Dasein* and I return to this point in Section 3E.

Section 2E: Epistemology

The term 'first philosophy' was used to refer to the most fundamental principle, on which all philosophy or all knowledge rest. For Husserl, (1859-1938) phenomenology was first, and the roots of this idea began in the work of Brentano (1838-1917) who highlighted the importance of conscious experience.

Both Freud (1856-1939) and Husserl (1859-1938) were students of Brentano (1838-1917). Husserl focused on conscious and transcendental phenomenology and was Heidegger's (1889-1976) teacher and later, became Husserl's teaching assistant.

Whilst Freud (1856-1939) directed our attention to the unconscious. On the one hand, there is a relationship in terms of the chain of ideas from teacher to student. Yet on the other hand, the methodological debates, in all of the above should be understood in relation to the rise and success of the natural sciences because this was being interpreted by thinkers at that time.

The late 19th century was an important time for the study of the mind and consequently there was great interest in either combining or separating existing disciplines and

establishing them as new sciences. As I discussed in Section 8B, the 19th century was a period of fragmentation. Brentano (1838-1917) was ordained as a Catholic Priest and was influenced by the work Aristotle and British Empiricism. As such, Brentano aimed to establish Psychology as a new science whilst at the same time revive the Scholastic theory of intentionality (Rickaby 1908). I briefly discussed the influence of Scholasticism in education in Sections 9A and 10A. The way the theological contradictions and the subsequent resolution was achieved was through the concept of intentionality which is not a material reality but a mental state.

Intentionality, therefore, is the actual capacity whereby the mind can contemplate non-existent objects and states of affairs. Intentionality is always about something and our way of looking at something and our awareness of that something. Thus, intentionality is a fundamental property of consciousness.⁵⁰

Therefore, for Brentano intentionality is the essential structure of experience rather than the cause of the experience. On the one hand, this highlights how Brentano as a Catholic Priest mediates between science and religion with a return to Scholastic philosophy. Yet on the other hand, Brentano's reluctance to focus on the subjective nature of experiences also highlights the importance given to 'objective' explanations. Indeed, Brentano attempts to detach his own subjective nature from his explanations. Yet, as I discussed in Chapter Two, the proponents of Scholasticism were those who were on the one hand uniting different groups yet on the other hand separating them through differentiation. Indeed, these practices highlight that a way to deal with uncertainty is to 'bridge' competing disciplines because this helps to disperse the

⁵⁰ The theory of intentionality bridged the classical opposition between immanentism and empiricism and established a credibility for the subjective satisfaction that the faith gave to the believer (Brentano 1995 [1874], p. ix).

anxieties of uncertainty and the consequences in terms of being right and wrong.

Notwithstanding, the concept of intentionality is important because it is an inherent human component and highlights that we have a capacity to respond to the external world in a variety of ways. However, we are not always aware of what the 'aboutness' is actually about because we are always in the world, and we bring with us our own individual histories. As such, we cannot overcome this element of our actual being.

Although Brentano established the beginnings of the idea of phenomenology in terms of a conscious structure, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) pioneered the phenomenological approach. However, to achieve this position, Husserl himself had to systematically reject existing theories of knowledge. As such, Husserl had to use the processes identified by Brentano to identify and satisfy the epistemic requirements of the phenomenological critique of knowledge.

Husserl (1859-1938)

I have discussed how during 19th century there was an ever-growing importance given to scientific methodology and the emphasis placed on following empirical procedures and producing evidence. As such, the shift away from supernatural explanations highlight how some of the population turned to science because they needed to find 'certainty'

Although Husserl was influenced by his teacher's ideas, his later work showed a shift in his philosophy. For Husserl, all sciences were imperfect because their doctrinal system was either incomplete due to the fact that knowledge is never left to rest and also because there were defects in the established content which are remnants of a lack clarity. Furthermore, philosophy claimed to be a rigorous science because it

satisfied the highest theoretical framework which enabled one to live a life governed by pure rational norms. However, philosophy as a discipline had been unable to satisfy the claim because as a discipline, philosophy had a different imperfection to science which was simply that it did not have a doctrinal system. Therefore, it was not an imperfect science but rather that it was yet to begin as one when measured by the standard of objectivity and justification. Husserl's makes an important point because knowledge and truth were defined in terms of objectivity. Indeed, science could not be science without philosophy because the first thing one does in any scientific project is to hypothesise. To hypothesise is a mental activity which cannot be seen, contained, or measured and as such does not initially pass the objective criteria. Indeed, one must mentally sift through the content to erase those aspects which are deemed subjective and yet the process itself is subjective.

In the context of that historical period Husserl was trying to establish the importance of other types of knowledge and this is the purpose of the discussion of philosophy as a rigorous science. Philosophy was not just a scholarly discipline but one that could aspire to the status of a 'strict science' but was not reducible to factual scientific explanations. Indeed, for Husserl both naturalism and historicism are pitfalls which not only threatened the quest for rigor but also for thought and reflection.

In terms of this project, thought and reflection are key to any discussions of death because there is no one framework whereby the subject can be placed. This being the case, death as a topic lends itself to reflection through discussion and also although it requires no scientific rigor it does need an empathetic framework. On the one hand, those people who are able to discuss the topic have somehow managed to address

their own anxieties. Yet on the other hand, the fact that they may want to discuss the topic highlights their need to express an anxiety.

Dualism

Although Descartes had already highlighted the act of thinking as an absolute however, it would have been more logical to assume that the act of thinking was indisputable, without deducing a being that thinks (Preester 2002: p636). As such, Husserl highlighted that something which is already in place had been overlooked because Descartes reified the ego or the I as a thinking substance rather than one that remained within the transcendental sphere.

For Husserl, the term 'the ego' or the 'I' is used for the first person but in several different ways and Brentano's influence in *Logical Investigations* (1901) is evident because the ego is 'empirical'. Yet, Husserl expressed scepticism towards the existence of a stable, abiding ego and at times he refers to the 'psychological' ego, which is the subject of experiences, and provides identity across experiences (CM § 11) or the 'pure' or 'transcendental' ego (*Ideas I* § 57, § 80).

However, all of Husserl's considerations of the ego tend to begin with the embodied human self in the world as the 'ego subject' (*Ideas I* § 29). In fact, Husserl sees the ego as always part of a community of other egos and so strictly speaking, there can never be an ego on its own. Thus, the ego is always related to a world that forms its environment (CM § 36). In other words, the ego always remains in the transcendental

sphere as it has encounters with objectivity and other egos through its 'self-experience' and its 'other experience'.

Consciousness is not an empty container into which ready-made objects of knowledge, or its representatives, are simply inserted. Consciousness is a highly complex temporal system of mental processes (Husserl 1907/2010: p9). For Husserl in every case of knowledge there is a strict correlation between the real and the intentional. This aspect of Husserl's work is complicated, and although it was further developed in *Ideas* (1913) it has been interpreted in several ways.

My interpretation is that although Husserl used the term 'act' in the same way as Brentano to denote conscious processes, he moved away from how we attain knowledge from the external world to exploring the relationship between the internal and external world. In doing so Husserl established the point that there was a correspondence between the two. As such, the intentional act has characteristics which include perceiving as well as evaluating, remembering and so on and therefore there is a transcendental element.

Husserl provided two fundamental structural elements of experience which gave the intentional act meaning. The 'noema' gave the characteristic its sense and the 'noesis' bestowed the sense which constitutes the meaning of what it grasps. A third fundamental element of experience is the one whose experience it is, what Husserl referred to as the ego (Cerbone 2006: p32). This idea can be located within a Platonic framework as the term noesis derived from Plato and means the highest

type of knowledge even beyond maths (Blackburn 1994: p263). Thus, the noesis is the real content of real character and it is the part of the act that gives the character to a thing. Whereas the noema is the ideal essence of the character and this is the vehicle to connect the thought of liked as liked or judged as judged towards an intentional object.⁵¹

The intentional act and the intentional object are distinct because it is possible for the same kind of intentional act to be directed at different objects. Although the noema and the noesis are radically different, they are always a necessary correlation of one another as they are directly related by the intentionality of consciousness. Thus, every phenomenon is intuitively present but grasped by the subject under a profile and no object is given in its totality, but every profile conveys its essence under the form of meaning for consciousness (Gregory 1987: pp 613-615). However, to reach the essence of any object one must proceed through the multiplicity of possible profiles.

Section 3E: Phenomenology

Husserl highlighted that phenomenology could not follow the same epistemology as science because the assumptions of science and the validity of knowledge rested on the success of transcendence on the part of consciousness, and this was not the case for phenomenology. Furthermore, phenomenology cannot assume the existence of a world of transcendent objects in causal relation with each other or provide a causal

⁵¹ See Blackburn 1994 p 263 – dictionary definition of the term noesis.

account of knowledge or explain knowledge as a 'natural fact' Phenomenology will not engage in theoretical constructions of the hypothetical-deductive sort, and it cannot borrow from empirical disciplines. (Husserl 2010 [1907]: pp 41-43).

Instead, Husserl proposed a specifically phenomenological version of the correspondence relation between act and object, the strict correlation between the real and intentional components of knowing through a process he called 'reduction' (Husserl 1907/2010 p p24).

Heidegger (1927) pointed to the medieval period and argued that Descartes was dependent on Scholasticism and used its terminology, but with this discovery nothing was gained. Kant was the first and only one who began to investigate the dimension of temporality but could not gain insight into it because he dogmatically adopted Descartes position (Heidegger 1927 pp 23-24).

Heidegger noted that 'to be' is always 'to be temporal' because temporality makes up the primordial meaning of existence and the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time (Heidegger, 1927 p 40).

Temporality refers to our experience of time and this is at the heart of what it means to exist and therefore, our understanding of the present always involves the past and a projection of our future (Langridge 2007, p30). This has been made evident in this thesis as I have used my version of a genealogy to interpret conditions in my absence and yet my interpretations, are based on other interpretations of the 'events'.

Facticity and phenomenology

Heidegger was opposed to Husserl's pure phenomenology because there was an attempt to isolate conscious experiences which distorts the phenomena which are the most fundamental. For Heidegger, they are the phenomena within which the world and our own existence are manifest. As such, Heideggerian phenomenology seeks to interpret our everyday activity because the meaning of 'phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation' (Heidegger 1927: p 26). This aspect of Heidegger's work focuses on a way to understand phenomenology as a concept of method which is its 'everydayness'. Heidegger uses the term facticity to explain the 'innerworldly' being that we all have as part of our 'being in the world' (Heidegger 1927: p56).

Section 4E: Reduction and the Hermeneutic Circle

The process of reduction is a means of getting to the pure essence of a phenomenon and the qualifier of 'pure' indicates the role of the phenomenological reduction because the all important first step is to 'isolate' the stream of consciousness. Thus, reduction involves suspending judgements to focus on the analysis of experience through bracketing (*epoche*) or phenomenological vigilance (van Kaam 1966, p259). However, the most important lesson the reduction teaches is it the impossibility of a complete reduction (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p xiv). Indeed, as we are always in the world and in the circumstances of our existence, I take the position that we cannot actually bracket our experiences.

Heidegger offers the hermeneutic circle as an explanation for the actual 'process of understanding' the everydayness rather than this being a technique. As we begin to understand and interpret something, our foresight which are our bias or judgements are revised. Indeed, the hermeneutic circle would be used for the everyday kind of

analysis, however, although our understanding itself is enabled, it is always limited, because of our pre- understanding and our horizons (Gadamer 1975).

Section 1E-4E Summary

All methodological approaches are limited but this is unavoidable. There is always the possibility that more information can be 'discovered', and it is through the limitations that opportunities arise for further enquiry. Furthermore, this is the mode in which we 'operate' in order to conduct 'life' in the first place. Although the transcendental nature of Husserl's phenomenological method was rejected by Heidegger, he accepted that understanding itself is a movement of transcendence. Indeed, the development of understanding lies in interpretation, and as an aspect of our ontological state of Dasein, we interpret the world before we can understand it.

In the theoretical framework, I discussed how infants interpretate the world in terms of objects and explained how the maternal mind in the state of reverie performs what Bion (1961b) terms as alpha function.

Thus, psychodynamic theories explained *how* we make our first interpretations of the world and why these are subjective and emotional. Indeed, as we are thrown into the world and its conditions, we absorb the world through interpretation before we can understand. As such, Dasein forms an intelligibility of the world within this 'thrownness' by way of projecting its own possibilities. Thus, the everyday intelligibility remains implicit and is a general mode of being for Dasein. The intelligibility that Heidegger refers to is the actual capacities we have to be subjective and emotional. Indeed, our ways of knowing have moved beyond the limitations of twentieth century modernism.

Qualitative researchers embark on the depth of understanding that can come from first-person research methods such as Autoethnography (Ellis, 2004), Heuristic Inquiry (Moustakas, 1990). Methodology such as Soliloquy is used within one's own experience but is informed by the pure phenomenology of Husserl. This kind of research approach uses specific methods of Experiencing, Epoche retreat, Epiphany, Explication and Examination (Vallak 2015) However, I do not accept that humans can actually bracket because we are informed by our experiences without necessarily having a conscious awareness that this is the case. As such, I have adopted an approach presented by Bourdieu because he draws on the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, but he rejected the dualities between body and mind. Bourdieu refused to establish any sharp demarcations between external and internal, the conscious and the unconscious, the bodily and the discursive (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 p19). Instead, the relationship between the social agent and the world is not that between a subject or 'consciousness' and an object, but rather an ontological complicity or mutual possession (Bourdieu 1989 p10). In the following section I focus on the ideas presented by Bourdieu as these underpin the approach, I use to address the research question.

Section 5E: Bourdieu and the hidden condition of all academic activity

For Bourdieu methodology includes the process of determining how knowledge is acquired, used, and influenced by a researcher's theoretical position. In *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977) Bourdieu set out a series of 'breaks' from empirical knowledge, from phenomenological knowledge, and from scholastic (theoretical)

knowledge itself. He claimed that they only have one thing in common, the fact that they are opposed to practical knowledge (Bourdieu 1977: pp.1-3). However, Bourdieu does not reject these theoretical positions but introduces a fourth type of theory which is structural knowledge. Each, theoretical position is retained and incorporated into an overarching theory of practice in which structural knowledge is the key to the integration of the theoretical break.

The two central terms to practice theory are practice, as in what people do, or an individual's performance carried out in everyday life. The other key idea for practice is habitus as 'a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices' (Bourdieu 1984: p170).

Bourdieu endeavoured to replace objective knowledge with reflexive objectivity and practical rationality with praxeological knowledge. For this reason, habitus and field have to be embodied and actualised as intense epistemological matrices.⁵² In this way, habitus is the ontogenesis of social structures themselves which are issued out of historical work of succeeding generations -phylogenesis.

Habitus in practice has a set of dispositions. I have highlighted how the dispositions were produced and illustrated how these were added or altered by those in the population who separated body and mind through their emphasis of objective practices. Using a psychodynamic theoretical lens, I discussed how habitus as a social way of being was internalised and how survival anxieties were defended against using primitive biological mechanisms which manifest through practices. Indeed, the fact that

⁵² Bourdieu also includes the term capital.

some of the population needed to separate in the first instance also highlights their use of splitting as a primitive defence.

My epistemological position is that we cannot be separated from knowledge and reality as we know it. This is because they are constructed intersubjectively through meanings and understandings which are developed socially. As such, there is no separation of subject and object, which means that my values are inherent in all phases of the research process. As a person, I have a set of dispositions and a way of being and as a researcher, I am still that person because I exist in a preconstructed world.

Section 6E: The construction of the Research object

As a researcher the topic choice itself is shaped by our own academic background and trajectories. Thus, the research activity involves a state which is relational to the academic infrastructure and all that it entails. Bourdieu highlighted how words are presented as value-neutral, yet they are socio historic assumptions and as such it is easy it is to take constructs as things in themselves rather than a set of relations.

Bourdieu focuses on the 'scientific' habitus which is *modus operandi* and presupposes a definite mode of perception, yet the rule is 'man-made' As such, the rigor of the construction of the research object is of great importance for Bourdieu because this involves a mode of thinking which constitutes socially insignificant objects into scientific objects (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992 p221).

In taking this approach Bourdieu highlights the practical logic of everyday action and the objective structures within which the action takes place. Indeed, the scientific habitus is

a 'man-made' barrier which also requires a set of 'man-made' dispositions. Thus, one has to escape from the realisms of structures and the assumptions that these are entities which exist outside of history.

Contemporaneously, Bourdieu does not advocate a shift to subjectivism because this is also incapable of giving an account necessity of the social world. Instead, Bourdieu suggests that one has to return to practice in terms of the site of the objectified products of historical practices of structures and habitus (Bourdieu,1992: p53).

In the previous chapter I used psychodynamic theories to explain how defence mechanisms are used to guard against anxiety. However, my position is that the 'unconscious' is never anything other than the forgetting of history which can be interpreted through practices (Bourdieu 1977 p79).

Furthermore, this process not only allows me to consider other people's practices but also use reflexivity in terms of on my own ways of being when I was associated to that field and my relationality to others in the field.

Section 7E: Participant Objectivation and Reflexivity

I am unable to separate myself from the object of the research and this is a crucial aspect of what Bourdieu calls reflexive practice. For Bourdieu, to express one's class, gender or ethnicity does not fully expose one's biases in research.

The most essential bias which is overlooked is my own scholarly gaze which I cast upon the social world. I cannot retire from the world in which I am in, but yet in the discussions of the world I 'step away'. Although this implies that I have had no input in the ways the world has been constructed however this is not the case because I 'know' its construction.

I suggest that Bourdieu's notion of the research object and the process of reflexivity removes Heidegger's notion of the hermeneutic circle from the inner world to the 'outer' world. Indeed, the process of understanding and revision is an aspect of our being but because it is something which we just do, it is taken for granted. Bourdieu does not want this to be the case, he wants the practitioner to consider their practice on a deeper level rather than a superficial one.

This raises the most obvious question and one which is directed to me. Why do I really consider the topic of death as important? I have already established that it is not a widely held view, otherwise it would surely be included in a school curriculum. Indeed, the fact that I have chosen the topic itself raises the possibility that death may haunt me more than others.

Bourdieu uses himself as an example of this when as an ethnographer he constructed a genealogy in terms of 'kinship' in Kabylia. The fieldwork was conducted amid tragic circumstances of the Algerian war, and it is the starting point for Bourdieu's ideas about the social sciences generally.⁵³ In this way, Bourdieu was reflexive of his previous practices and used his experience as a 'starting point' to highlight that theoretical knowledge alone is limited because of the conditions under which it is produced omit actual practice.

I referred to the idea of superior knowledge in terms of the promulgation of fear in Chapter Two (Freud 1920). I suggest that Bourdieu rejected the notion of 'superior' knowledge because it comes with a set of assumptions that imply there is nothing

⁵³ In this example Bourdieu highlights the differences between constructs and meaning and how the lack of commonality between them does not address or solving problem. Yet the study of Kabylia itself had striking parallels to his later study of his own native region of Bèarn in Southwestern France.

else beyond, and therefore discards other forms of knowledge as inferior.

Furthermore, the practices by which such knowledge is obtained implies that those people are also superior because there is no need for them to consider their own motivations for engaging in the practices in the first instance.

The form of reflexivity which Bourdieu advocates is one which he calls *anti narcissistic*. I understand this to mean that there is no real arbitrator for what constitutes as knowledge because on the one hand knowledge is everchanging as it is constructed and reconstructed by us as humans. Yet on the other hand, knowledge and practices are reconstructed in the same ways. As such, reflexivity involves an ongoing consideration of one's own positions and ways of 'doing' things as this is one way to address or indeed change knowledge and practices. Therefore, although practices are informed by theory and theory is informed by practice, consideration has to be the practice of the practice itself.

Throughout the thesis I have focused on habitus as a subjective way of being which is acquired through socialisation. As such, the objective circumstances of one's family and individual experiences are internalised into dispositions. These dispositions orient our future actions and therefore habitus is both structured and structuring which means that like every other person I am the product of structure, a producer of practice and the reproducer of structure. Yet, despite this apparent awareness, I was 'operating' with a habitus which separated the objective from the subjective and this is a highly relevant aspect of the thesis which I explain further in the following section.

Section 8E: Habitus as a researcher

Initially I considered using an ethnographic approach to identify the shared patterns of teachers as a group. At that time, the reason I rejected the method because I understood school culture (Bernhard, 2000). I also considered a case study approach which would have allowed me to obtain 'thick description' which is essential to the context and situation, because a case study is based on depth and is holistic and exhaustive (Geertz 1973). Case studies are used in psychoanalysis, and this is an excellent way to uncover unconscious motivations but as I am a non-trained analyst, I could not use the technique.

After initially eliminating all these options, I decided to use semi-structured interviews with teachers. My rationale for this choice was that if changes were implemented and death as a topic was included in a school curriculum, such change would impact a teacher first. For this reason, I decided to ask teachers a series of questions about their classroom experiences and their views about teaching death as a topic on a school curriculum.⁵⁴

I also asked teachers if they were interested in joining a focus group to discuss and capture their experiences and share their views about the National Curriculum (Bradbury-Jones et al:2009).⁵⁵

⁵⁴ I have included the material in Appendix A

⁵⁵ All of the teachers included declined.

My own practices during this period 'denied' my subjectivity and the fact that I had chosen a method which implied that I could be separated from the research did not cross my mind and I continued with this methodological process.

Before the Pandemic, the interviews were going to be conducted in an educational environment however, this became an unviable option as schools introduced strict measures following COVID-19 Government advice. The ongoing restrictions and Tier systems meant that the only suitable option available was to use video communications via Zoom because this is the closest a researcher can get towards resembling a face-to face (Hanna 2012).

Having worked in different phases of education for over 25 years, the participants were people who I once worked with, however, during the interviewing process I thought in the language of Empiricism. Indeed, the notions of validity, rigour and evidence were of greater priority than a consideration of the importance of those who were involved in the process. This 'objective' way of being was guarded and the exact opposite to that what Bourdieu described as *anti-narcissistic*.

On reflection I know this was an attempt to validate my research because my own mindset was operating within a paradigm which required proof and evidence. I realised that this not only contradicted my epistemological position but also that I was actually trying to 'separate' knowledge and practice. Yet, we cannot suspend all belief in the existence of the world or action, but I came to this realisation through the actual process itself.

The fact that I was 'separating' the subjective from the objective was based on my own primitive anxieties. An example of this was whenever the conversations drifted, I was determined to bring the respondents back to the question. However, I only realised this

was the case after collecting the information and going through the actual process of analysing the 'data' Indeed, the realisation came to me after the experience, and this highlights how easy it was to assume that as a 'researcher' I could actually detach myself from the research.

Yet, the actual material I collected from the interviews is of great importance because research is for and about humans. Furthermore, although the topic of the research holds importance for me, death is an ultimate human concern and through the research the concern is one which is shared. Therefore, the human response and themes from the questionnaires are pertinent to this thesis and are included as part of my discussion in Chapter Five. Most importantly it was only after initially eliminating each of the methodological approaches that I came to the realisation that these are all taken for granted aspects of what we do in our everyday lives. Thus, the approach I have taken is first and foremost autoethnographic because I cannot escape my subjectivity.

Section 9E: Habitus in Practise

In terms of my practices, I have escaped the 'realism' of the structure and rather than my subjectivity being regarded as a hinderance, it is actually a potential source of information (Hinshelwood, 2009 p514).

The 'tradition' in which I stand as an interpreter, establishes 'prejudices' and will influence how I make my interpretations. Yet, these prejudices are not something that hinders my actual ability to make interpretations but rather, they are both integral to the reality of being, as they 'are the basis of our being able to understand history at all' (Palmer 1969 p182).

I convey my experiences of habitus as a set of dispositions and a way of being in a range of different schools. Yet, my recollections of practices are outdated or somehow romanticized or dramatized. I was not immune from the collective habitus or the subsequent defences when I was practicing in school. Indeed, the 'fieldwork' I conducted is a snapshot of practices to show how defences are used currently to guard against anxieties in schools. Therefore, it could be said that my distance out of school allows me to objectively consider subjective practices and by doing so address the principal research question.

Section10E: Bourdieu's methodological approach in three levels

Bourdieu was asked to explicitly sum up his methodological approach and he describes it in terms of three distinct levels (Wacquant 1992 p104-107). The three levels clearly set out a way of conducting this research and although the levels do not have to be conducted chronologically all three levels are needed. I have made slight amendments to some of Bourdieu's definitions, and I clarify the reasons.

The first level is to analyse the position of the field vis-a via the field of power. As I have previously stated, the intricacies involved in power are vast and the definition of power I have used is meant in terms of its productive nature rather than as repressive (Foucault 1994). As such, I take the position that we all have power, and this means that we all have choice.

Furthermore, a field for Bourdieu, does not have parts or components and as such the concept of field can be used at different levels of aggregation. Education is a field because it is a structure, however for the purpose of this research I define a school as a container because there are parts and components. Thus, a school is a

container of people who all have power and regenerate habitus as a set of anxious dispositions through their practices. Thus, the contents of the container respond to the dispositions of habitus with collective defences which are manifested through their practices.

As such, the first level is an overall approach because my positions in the field and the productive nature of my practices cannot be separated from each other, and these inform the thesis itself.

For the second level Bourdieu suggests that we map the objective structure of relations between the positions occupied by people who compete for the legitimate forms of specific authority of which the field is a site. Yet, the objective structures refer to those which cannot be separated from mental structures as we internalize 'objective' structures (Ritzer, 2003). As such, in the second level, the focus is on the actual positions that are occupied within the school as a container. As I have occupied most of the positions but in different schools, I will explain how the collective habitus operates in terms of professional practices and relationships within these schools as containers.

The third level for Bourdieu involves analysing the habitus as a system of dispositions acquired and internalized as a deterministic type of social and economic condition. The economic conditions are important, and, in the thesis, I have briefly referred to the influence of such changes in terms of industrialisation, the curriculum and primary socialisation practices. However, as I have focused on habitus as a set of dispositions and a way of being, in the third level, the dispositions I refer to are those which are internalized and defended against in practice. Therefore, in the discussion, I focus on

how the practices in education defend against primitive anxieties associated with survival as a way to deny death.

Chapter Five: Discussion

The principal research question asked why the topic of death is absent in a school curriculum. I utilized the concept of habitus to denote a set of dispositions which are associated to the child and survival and using my version of a genealogy explained how this became a 'natural' way of being. I illustrated how socialisation responsibilities had shifted from the home to a system of mass education and explained how schools have gradually become corporate parents.

I adopted a psychodynamic theoretical framework to explain how the dispositions of habitus are internalized and processed as states of mind which are then passed on from mother to infant from generation to generation.

In this chapter, I discuss schools as containers of stressful experiences which are transported by adults and children as the content. The notion of the child is ambiguous, and, in this discussion, I use the term child/children to define anyone who is legally not an adult in the school environment. I explain how the practices in school guard against primitive anxieties of survival.

Section 1F: The Primary Task

In Section 8D, I highlight how the primary task was crucial in terms of influencing an organisation. In theory, the primary task is that which the enterprise must perform in order to survive and yet, the notion of survival itself provokes anxiety. On the one

hand, an efficient institutional performance must be clearly defined in practice (Menzies Lyth 1988: p222). Yet, on the other hand, the institutional performance of a school is practiced 'through' other humans as children.

In terms of a school, the primary task is to educate however, there is no overall definition of what that actually looks like or means as I discussed in earlier chapters (Locke, 1632-1704; Rousseau, 1712-1778; and Spencer, 1820 –1903). There is no overall definition of what education actually is but rather only what it *does*.

Indeed, as I discussed in Section 12 B, from the 1980s onwards the measures of success in a school are based on academic performance and outcomes. However, this adds to the ambiguity of education because this assumes that emotional development does not play a role in cognitive activity. Furthermore, this perpetuates an idea that children do not bring their own experiences into school and as a result schools are defined through the academic successes or failures of the child which define a teacher.

Education itself is a focus on the future which brings us into the realm of uncertainty. In Chapter Two I highlighted that by and large the proponents of change were educated but they were socialised through religious dogma which provoked the anxieties of uncertainty in the afterlife. Yet, the quest for knowledge itself is often in the pursuit of certainty. Therefore, the search for certainty is never completely satisfied but rather increases uncertainty. However, in terms of a school, a child is an object, I use this term object to mean a person (Hinshelwood 2018). A child reflects the subjective past of an

adult, and this provides some people with a distraction because the past is *thought* to have 'certainty' I discussed this notion in relation the depictions of innocence and the reflections of the child through creative endeavours at particular periods such as the Italian Renaissance and later through Romanticism.

Yet as discussed in the theoretical framework, the dispositions associated with the child are 'emotionally' rooted and are fundamentally based on our own survival concerns. Therefore, not only do the contents of a container interact with these states, but they defend against the anxieties through practices.

Section 2F: Practices and Defending against Anxiety

When organisations face challenging circumstances there are increased levels of staff absence, but generally schools deny ill health. Children are reminded that absences impact their future achievements and prizes are awarded for excellent attendance and concerns for safety and welfare are raised when attendance is poor.

Schools measure attendance and correlate them with attainment. On the one hand this practice is used to socialise the child because they internalize the expectations of a society (Parsons 1964). Yet on the other hand, the practise is used to defend against the anxieties associated with survival.

Home has to contact school on the first day of a child's absence to inform them of the reasons for non-attendance. Thereafter, the expectation is that home will update the school daily before 9.30 and if this does not happen, schools as corporate parents makes a daily welfare call home.

The anxieties of uncertainty are transported between home and school and defended against using these practices because they provide a level of superficial certainty

through this monitoring function. Home and School sharing the same practices to defend against their primitive anxieties are projected through the child. The practices defend and provoke anxieties because they perpetuate doubt, and this is intrinsically associated to mistrust. These anxieties are projected and introjected by the child as the object who then reprojects the anxieties into their objects. Thus, this becomes a tangled web of projection, introjection and reprojection with other objects. Corporate parenting is discussed at regular intervals because the responsibilities play a key role in guarding against anxieties.

Staff who feel unwell are reluctant to have time away from work because the child 'needs' the teacher and if they are absent, it will have a detrimental impact on their progress. These are remnants of the anxieties of Predestination and Salvation which I discussed in Chapter Two Part B and are repeated and regenerated through subsequent socialisation practices.

When staff are too unwell to attend work, the professional expectation is that in their absence they provide something which shows their presence. Their physical absence is compensated through the work that they have produced.

In this way, the work itself becomes symbolic because the staff still 'care' about the future of the child despite their physical absence. This practice defends against the guilt of their physical absence. The objective material is a representation of the subjective but as the practice is a professional expectation it depersonalises and denies the emotions associated with children.

Contemporaneously, producing the work when one is unwell, elevates the significance of the child as staff perform their 'duties' to ensure that the child does not suffer even

though the child is not unwell. This notion was illustrated in Chapter Two in the discussion about the ways in which the imagery changed and how the depictions of the omnipotent innocent child was repeated and regenerated by some of the population as an emotional expression of the past. This was used as a way to deny the uncertain future but contemporaneously, depictions of judgment and the afterlife had conative associations with the imagery of the child. Those emotions associated with the child, which provided some with certainty and emotional comfort, were also embroiled in the anxieties associated with survival.

The actual quality of cover work also defines how much staff care about the child because a staff member has to deliver the lesson. It is often not enough to expect a child to work independently and follow the instructions from a book.

In the teacher's absence the cover work can be seen as an expression of more than just the lesson it is an objective representation to others about the habitus of the absent teacher. The absent teacher who does not produce cover work is defined as someone who does not 'care' about the children, or as someone who is always off 'sick' Comparisons are made with other teachers and the 'good' teacher is one who rarely takes time off because they care about the child. These definitions question competency and are embroiled in a set of values. Staff go into work when they are unwell because their absence increases guilt. These are remnants of dispositions associated with the Calvinistic ethic because the anxieties of uncertainty and guilt 'drive' the practices and in doing so defend against the ultimate concerns of death.

Splitting

Splitting, as defined in Chapter 3 Section 2A, is the earliest and most primitive defence, and is used to cope with a very uncertain environment. Through splitting staff can project their resentment onto an absent teacher because they are the object who has increased their workload. The 'unwell' teacher who continues to work projects their resentment onto the class which in practice means a poorly planned and delivered lesson. The lesson itself is a means to rid the teacher of their anxieties because they are projected onto the class. Yet, resentment is also taken into the classroom by the cover teacher. As such these experiences and associated anxieties are introjected and reprojected by children.

In terms of the child and their thinking and construction of thoughts, such experiences mean that the mind as an apparatus for thinking, becomes an apparatus for 'ridding the psyche of the accumulation of bad internal objects' (Bion 1962a p112).

In terms of a cover teacher, splitting is used to defend against the anxiety of delivering an unfamiliar subject to children who they may not have taught before and expectations in terms of work output and behaviours are lowered. The uncertainty of a new situation increases anxiety, and some children defend against this when they 'pretend' that they have already done the work in previous lessons. This situation is one which also increases anxiety for some because there is the uncertainty and risk associated with falling behind or failing assessment which builds even greater resentment towards the absent teacher.

A cover teacher who is an existing member of staff is assessed by the class in terms of their subject expertise. A modern language teacher who covers a maths lesson does not have the same standard of knowledge as the subject specialist. There is a

depersonalisation of the individual because they are identified by the subject that they teach rather than the person they are.

As such, the competence of the teacher is already 'judged' in the eyes of the pupil, especially so in Key Stage 4, but projection, introjection and retrojection involve all the contents of a container because it is how we 'communicate'. However, often schools are containers with large populations and uncertainty is repeated through practices which defend against it. I referred to Rousseau's 1762 treatise *Emile* in Chapter Two Section 5B, and discussed the recommendations he made in terms of the positive aspects of smaller relationships. The dynamic in a classroom really does depend on the types of relationships that exist in the school as a container which the following example highlights.

Agency Teaching

A teacher told me how agency staff are unintentionally treated as 'outsiders' by other members of staff. There are common systems in all schools, but they operate differently, and agency staff have to rely on others for assistance. Agency staff are often 'devalued' in terms of their dedication or commitment because they do not have the responsibilities associated with permanent contracts. Yet, this is based on the anxieties associated with safety and protection of the child. On the one hand, the reluctance to 'employ' outsiders to fulfil such roles is understandable, because the people who are already employed in the school know how the system works and this saves time and is more efficient. Yet, on the other hand, the practice itself highlights how schools, as corporate parents, defend against the anxieties associated with 'losing a child' However, the constant drive to ensure the safety and

restrict interactions with 'others' are used to guard against the unknown itself. A way to defend against this anxiety is to cling to that which is familiar.

The notion of educating the child and restricting their interactions is not new as both Locke (1693) and Rousseau (1962) advocated these practices. Furthermore, both highlighted the importance of teaching the child about life in order for them to understand death. This illustrates how considerations of death have always been a human concern, yet the fact that survival rates in this society are high has paradoxically increased our anxieties about death. Hence, death is denied and defended against through practices.

Children recognise that the agency staff do not belong to the school because they are unfamiliar and do not have their own space. The child has introjected the projected anxieties and as a result these classrooms can be disruptive, and lessons are 'unproductive' in terms of work output.

Contemporaneously, as the agency teacher is regarded with suspicion by other staff, they distance themselves which results in less support in terms of behaviour management. Children introject these anxieties and reproject them when they are taught by outside agencies.

Furthermore, as agency staff are not permanent staff members, they have fewer responsibilities in terms of marking and assessment. For some, their defences against the anxieties associated with failure are lower and this is perceived by other staff as unprofessional. This split between teachers and agency teacher in terms of practices is projected onto children. Through this projection the agency teacher is perceived as less capable than the subject teacher. Yet, the projection itself is based on anxieties

associated with the corporate parent responsibility and the welfare of the child.

Therefore, instead of an elimination of those situations which evoke anxieties, the practices generate anxieties which then have to be defended against by the contents.

When the absent teacher returns to school, the expectation is to mark the work that was completed in their absence. As the standard of work is generally lower during these periods, a collusive relationship forms between children and teachers. Agency staff are blamed for not teaching properly or having insufficient subject knowledge and the return of the teacher is a reaffirmation of the important role they play in the life of children. Contemporaneously this is also the source of anxiety as it connects to the deep rooted emotions of survival. To defend against such anxieties some staff, cover above their hours of allocation.

Yet staff do not always know what their cover allocation actually is because they hold additional responsibilities. This is a purposeful obscurity which creates uncertainty because the boundaries and content of certain roles are unclear. The practice defends against the anxieties of guilt associated with not being present to 'save' the child.

Although staff rarely refuse to cover lessons above their allocation, this is not to say they are happy about doing extra hours. The acceptance defends against guilt because there is no one else available to perform the task.

Schools project the anxieties which perpetuate the notions that the absence of a teacher has a negative impact on the child's future and that an individual teacher can

change this outcome. Furthermore, as practices in school fixate on the future and outcomes of the child this evokes the anxieties associated with survival and salvation. The delegation of responsibility is a way for senior leaders to detach and deny their feelings and avoid confrontations with a member of staff.

The allocation of additional responsibilities are also a way to retain staff or indeed recruit new staff into the profession. Yet, the diffusion of roles in a school are such that a classroom teacher may work very closely with senior leaders and attend some of the meetings. This practice creates a number of difficulties in terms of splitting and creating a 'them and us' culture. Some, staff are on the periphery of a number of groups and there is a lack of clarity in terms of what they are actually meant to be doing.

In practice, staff who wear 'too many hats' introject anxieties and this contributes to them not fulfilling their actual role. They can be perceived as incompetent because this projection defends others from recognising their over delegation of responsibility. Furthermore, the additional responsibilities deprive staff of personal satisfaction in terms of actual teaching and their 'identities' as teachers are fragmented and as a result some are deskilled. The fact that these responsibilities are allocated in the first place illustrates how anxieties are projected and passed on to others in school. Yet, as with the contents of any container the process of projections and introjections is ongoing.

As I discussed in earlier chapters, the Church passed their anxieties of death and change to religious dogma regarding the Afterlife to the clergy. In a similar way, there is purposeful obscurity in schools whereby at senior management level the

responsibilities are more onerous, and protection is felt to be necessary (Menzies Lyth 1988). Senior level staff have a distanced interaction with children compared to those staff in the actual classroom. Children are either sent to a Senior Leader to address serious disciplinary issues, or to be rewarded for exceptional achievements.

Spitting the interactions between children and senior staff is a way to defend against anxieties because it defines the actual purpose of the interaction and the necessary response. This practice is repeated in terms of meeting with parents because the nature of the meetings are usually about extreme behaviours or an exemplary achievement.

I discussed the reasons why meritocracy is a myth in Section 12B, and the myth is repeated and regenerated through practices in school. A wide range of data is used to address a child's starting point in terms of their cognitive abilities and this is cross referenced to data about their families. Rather than a consideration of actual relationships between home and school, *correlations* are used to explain why a child has not achieved their target.

The dispositions associated with meritocracy perpetuate the primitive anxieties of survival and guilt. Contemporaneously, the denial of a child's experiences defends one against their anxiety of the future because data and target predict the future, and this provides a level of certainty. Yet, the equality of educational opportunity, which meritocracy promotes, overlooks the fact that we bring our experiences to situations. Furthermore, excessive data in school also provokes anxieties of doubt because the overuse implies that the data is unfit or incorrect which feed into the anxieties of uncertainty.

I illustrated in earlier chapters how the practices used to relieve the uncertainty of not knowing during the Protestant Reformation were repeated through socialisation. Such practices were based on the anxieties of uncertainty and the considerations if one had done enough to have a place reserved in heaven. Thus, the constant revisiting of data and testing as practice is one which not only evokes survival anxieties but also is used to deny death.

As corporate parents, schools are responsible for safeguarding children and the data is fundamental in this process. Yet, the data is also a way to deny the anxieties associated with guilt because it is used to shift blame. For example, when a child does not attain their target, some schools blame the conditions such as home and offer additional ways to improve the attainment of the child. These practices defend against the anxieties of Salvation. Contemporaneously, parents relieve their anxieties about the child and their future by projecting them onto the school in the form of blame. The common object of their concern is the child however, the child also introjects these projected anxieties and reprojects them onto others.

As such, the actual relationships between them is underpinned by the experiences of suspicion, mistrust, and uncertainty. These experiences are brought into the container daily and therefore play a crucial role in terms of containing relationships. Indeed, in an ideal containing relationship, an adult introjects the child's projections and can reproject them into the child in a modified form. We are engaged in lifelong struggles against primitive anxieties however, and as I have illustrated, these dispositions have been regenerated though socialisation practices and mass education.

In earlier chapters I referred to key ideas presented by Locke (1632-1704) and later Rousseau (1712-1778). Despite their differences in terms of the nature of the child, each of them were anti mass education. Although, this is incompatible with the demands of our society, this does not mean that the actual practices which regenerate primitive anxieties within schools cannot change. Yet, as we are responsible for the practices and their regeneration it can be said that they are used as a way to deny death.

I discussed the ways that the arts generally depicted children and how creative activities are a way to express emotions because they are subjective. Yet, there is less time available for creative activities in schools. I also discussed the formulation and hierarchy of the 19th century curriculum, and this highlighted how creative subjects were defined as less important in terms of society's needs. Yet, this mindset overlooks the fact that we are society and also highlights a denial of death because structures are defined as objective. In other words, objective structures are perceived as everlasting whereas we are not.

Furthermore, as I will show now, the current National Curriculum is an example of how the anxieties of survival are projected, introjected, reprojected, and regenerated through practices.

Section 3F: The National Curriculum in practice

The curriculum is a framework which sets out the type of knowledge to deliver and its purpose.⁵⁶ On a national level the curriculum directs what is taught and provides specific details of the content and the ways that these are to be assessed and measured. The regulatory framework is an objective means by which to observe practices. However, no two schools are alike because the contents of a school are the 'power' which regenerate the knowledge and practices.

Habitus, as a set of dispositions, are an intrinsic part of the 'workings' of a school and this is organised through the curriculum framework. The curriculum is broken down into subjects and this provides predictability to avoid uncertainty. In practice everyone 'knows' where they should be and what to expect in terms of the subject. This efficient way of being defends against the anxieties of uncertainty.

Yet, the curriculum also evokes anxiety, and this is made evident through reoccurring patterns of absences at specific times. Yet, the reasons for the absences are rarely explored, rather the focus is on the impact of the absence in terms of the future successes or failure.

A curriculum developer allocates the time given to each subject and these are divided into classes which by and large equate to top, middle, or bottom. Children are allocated to groups based on their levels and targets. This practice defends against the anxieties associated with the child through depersonalisation. Their names are

⁵⁶ The curriculum also determines what knowledge is of value and as such there is a notion of capital associated to certain types of knowledge which is a key aspect of Bourdieu's field and habitus framework.

largely irrelevant because children are identified through the poles of success and failure.

Children are 'known' because of their outstanding achievements and the possibilities in the future. Or children are 'known' because of their non-conformity or their lack of attainment. Yet, through this process of detachment, staff can deny their feelings toward the child and this way of being denotes the habitus of professionalism which I discussed in Chapter Two Section 7C. Yet the notion of professionalism has been ascribed by some of the population and implies that not only can a teacher teach any group of children but that the practice is one which is devoid of emotion or subjectivity. Experienced teachers of core subjects get classes with the higher performing children because this practice is a 'guarantee' that results obtained will meet the whole school target. As with testing and assessing, these practices are used to defend against the anxieties associated with failure and survival.

The system of marketisation, which I discussed in Chapter Two, defines a school by its exam outcomes but through this procedure the 'contents' identify as successes or failures. To defend against the anxiety, staff work longer hours and take work home. Yet these practices evoke the anxieties associated to the child because teachers are reminded about the future through the work that children produce.

The benchmark of success is always objective and measured in terms of grades and targets, and the quality of the teacher is measured through the grades of the children. A good teacher is one who gets the children good grades, and this regenerates the notion that a child is a passive vessel.

In Chapter Two, I discussed how the depictions of the child and imagery of death influenced some of the population on an emotional level. In a similar way, staff take subjective manifestations of children home with them through the books they mark. The marks are often assessments which are used as evidence that the child is making progress however, the marking itself is an emotional endeavour.

Indeed, if children are not making progress the practices of some teachers are akin to those conducted by Puritan parents who produced large quantities of resources and obsessively taught their children. Cunningham (2006) matched the high level of parental anxiety of Puritans with the level of those in the early 21st century. Yet, schools have greater corporate parenting responsibility than ever before, and this only adds to the anxieties.

Safety

A school is regarded as a 'safe' place for the contents because of the routine and procedures which are in place. Yet, the notion of safe is contradictory because although as an environment the school is protected, there is an ongoing anticipation of the possibilities of the unexpected in relation to the child. As such, 'safeguarding' results in the notion of safe equating to one of hyper vigilance or pathological anxieties (Menzies Lyth 1988).

For example, a teacher told me that school trips are irregular occurrences and there are some children who have never had such experiences. Although offsite school trips are encouraged, there are a range of decisions which have to be made beforehand. Risk assessments need to be completed and agreed before a child can be taken

outside of a school environment and enough staff have to be allocated so that they are prepared for every eventuality. This process reinforces the anxieties associated with the child and the apparent dangers associated with the outside world and their survival. As such, it is often the case that there are not enough available staff to support these trips because there is no available 'free' time on the curriculum.

In Chapter Two, I focused on Rousseau's (1762) treatise regarding education and nature and there is no disputing the fact that children learn many things off school sites. Indeed, children learn that all things must die through an interaction with the natural world. Furthermore, the activities offsite are such that it enables trust to build between home and school and this can encourage the development of positive relationships. However, the paperwork and risk assessments associated with these ventures are a way to defend against the anxieties associated with uncertainty. The emphasis on the lack of time and the importance of curriculum subjects not only provide certainty because of the routine practices but contemporaneously evoke the anxieties associated with time. Offsite activities evoke primitive anxieties associated with safety and survival.

School sites physically defend against the unknown. They are fenced or have iron railing and intercom systems to ensure that only adults with permission can enter a school. Visitors to a school sign in and are always accompanied by a member of staff. Visitors wear lanyards and through such practices people in school are protected against dangers. Yet, the practices also increase a sense of mistrust of those who do not belong in a school.

A school's boundaries were traditionally considered as a transitional space between the secure intimacy of the family and the riskier public openness of life in the outside world. Yet the corporate parenting responsibility of the school does not only consist in preparing the child for the larger world but also protecting the child from the shortcomings in the intimate sphere of the family. (Arendt 1978: pp173-196).

The legal responsibilities of corporate parenting involve a duty of care which involves a denial of feeling and detachment associated with professionalism. Yet, the anxieties associated with this responsibility mean that the contents are in a state of vigilance which heighten the anxieties of the container.

Practices in school are regulated and formalise the relationships between staff and children, however, the core of the anxiety situation itself lies in relation to the child.

The numbers of children in a class and the expectations in terms of targets and progress prevent staff from effectively coming into contact with the totality of any one child (Menzies Lyth 1988).

However, splitting up of teacher-child relationship does not defend against anxiety for all the contents because some staff are actually employed to work on a one to one basis with a child. These practices encourage a concentrated relationship which is more likely to evoke anxiety and a splitting between staff, parents, and children.

Relations

There is a matrix of relations in a container which extend beyond the school. These relationships are qualitatively different, but they are knitted together through a

collective school habitus or way of being. There is a hyper-awareness of 'others' in relation to the child and anxieties about safety associated with Safeguarding legislation and Corporate parenting. Some of these relations continue to function outside of school informally and the ways of being in school are such, that there are increased anxieties associated with safeguarding practices. People who are employed in schools are hyper aware of their actual 'state of being' not only in relation to the child but in relation to the intentions of others towards the child. The responsibility of corporate parenting evokes primitive anxieties because it is based on the unknown and our ultimate concern of survival.

School Inspections

Poor student outcomes or safety concerns result in school inspections. When a school is deemed unsatisfactory in an Ofsted inspection, it is more difficult for teachers to gain employment in a school elsewhere which is judged better. This is because the worth of a teacher is based on objective criteria such as success rates in exams and teaching observation outcomes. Yet this judgement overlooks the nature of teaching and the risks of being overwhelmed by anxieties.

A teacher told me about her experience of having an observation during an Ofsted inspection. Depending on the circumstances of the inspection, teaching staff do not know who will be observed beforehand. The observation usually lasts about 15 minutes and in this example was conducted by two inspectors with an 'objective' criterion. The ultimate goal is for a teacher to demonstrate that all children are making progress. During the observation, an inspector walks around the classroom and looks

at the children's current and previous work. The teacher can find out the outcome of their observation at the end of the school day.

This example highlights the projection and introjection of anxiety in a classroom. The fact that teachers must show progress for every child is not difficult, but the time restrictions in place around this expectation provoke anxieties. Some children defend against the anxieties of uncertainty and can resort to behaviours which inadvertently have an impact on the observation outcome. In such situations it is difficult to further defend against primitive anxieties because all the practices in place are defences. In such situations, the experience itself is one which involves an over exaggerated performance to 'show' the inspectors how good a teacher one is. This is the way to defend against the anxieties of doubt and provides validation and some certainty in terms of the future. Indeed, as the criteria is based on that which can be seen, the classroom during observations is actually an artificial experience.

I have taught in schools whereby the overall actual judgement of the inspection itself is not discussed with staff until after the report has been published which is usually about 4 to 6 weeks. In this situation, only the Head teacher and some of the senior leadership team have this information and in terms of a container this practice highlights a mistrust between the contents and despite not being told, staff and children 'know' what the outcome is by the change in practices post inspection.

In some schools, a poor inspection outcome results with shame and blame behaviours. Staff blame the class for their poor observation grade because they were not well behaved. Children introject this projection and experience anxieties because they are

publicly shamed as not good enough through their association with the school. The cycle of anxieties continue with guilt, blame and doubt in their abilities.

In some schools, senior leaders address the weaknesses of the inspection using twilight session training, which is meant to support staff, yet as these sessions are after school, they are perceived as a punishment by some staff rather akin to a detention. As such, the weakness of an inspection is introjected as a weakness of one's ability and can perpetuate the anxieties of self-doubt for some staff.

After school sessions can also evoke anxieties associated with guilt for some staff because they have to extend childcare for their own children. Additionally, alternative times have to be found to complete the tasks associated with teaching such as marking and assessments. As such, for some staff guilt and doubt are projected as resentment and blame towards senior leaders and others in the container.

The later publication of the inspection itself is a judgement which defines everyone who is in the container. In this way the school as a whole is defined by splitting good practice and bad practices. After an unsatisfactory outcome, collective primitive defences are used to guard against perceived external threats.

After the publication of an unsatisfactory inspection, parents are invited to a school meeting to address the issues. In some schools, the meeting 'skates' over the improvement criteria and instead emphasises all the good practices and positive elements of the report. This is a way for some schools to reassure parents that their children are in 'safe' hands and this practice also avoids confrontations which provoke anxieties.

In Chapter Two, Section 1A, I highlighted how the dispositions of faith and hope were a way to 'alleviate' anxieties. In a similar way some adults use these dispositions in practices because focusing predominantly on the positives settle the anxieties regarding children and their future.

The avoidance of sharing and accepting the negative aspects of practices also defend against facing the issues that raise such anxieties. Parents know the outcome of the inspection before a school meeting, and some staff rely on defensive techniques to manage anxious situations. However, the situation itself is an anxious one because of the tensions in the relations between home and schools.

Home school relations

Some parents blame school for poor outcomes and use splitting to defend themselves from the realisation that their child is also part of the school, and they are part of the child. However, schools are also blamed for the child's poor performance because some parents project their anxieties which are based on 'loss' because the corporate parents has greater responsibilities than the parent.

In Chapter Two Section 10B-11B, I focused on the introduction of Comprehensive education as part of the Welfare State reforms. I highlighted how some teachers who were responsible for lower attaining sets, focused on socialising children rather than educating them. I discussed this further in terms of meritocracy and explained how education became associated with notions of salvation in the here and now. For some parents, teachers represented the clergy because next to God, teachers could secure a child's future through education and 'save' the child from suffering in terms of poverty.

Yet, this meant that a parent had to sacrifice their children by giving them to education. In this way, some parents felt a sense of loss because by and large their children were better educated than they were but also those who educated them had provided them with a better future.

Furthermore, since the 1980s there has been a greater scrutiny on the suitability of parenting itself. The sense of loss is based on the fact that if a parent is deemed as 'inadequate' they run the risk of actually having their child removed from them. In this way, some of the relationships between schools as corporate parents and actual parents are underpinned by various levels of envy, mistrust, and resentment.

Indeed, the gradual shifts in responsibilities associated to parenting from the 1980s, onwards have similarities to the practices during Early Christianity which created a greater sense of helplessness and dependency on others. Although a major difference is that in some cases, parents may also be employed in schools as corporate parents. Therefore, in this sense of 'loss' a parent may no longer feel equipped or adequate to perform their role as a parent because someone else is perceived as 'better' or more qualified.

Throughout the thesis there has been a reoccurring theme of the maternal role and the mother. I discussed the mother in terms of the infant Jesus, and I highlighted the importance of an educated mother and the child relationship through the work of Rousseau. In the theoretical framework I explained the experience of birth itself as a great danger for the mother and child and discussed containment in terms of maternal reverie. Therefore, in this sense 'loss' is more acute for some because not only is the time that they have with their infants limited, but the demands, expectations, and idealizations of motherhood itself are great.

Some schools project their anxieties by blaming home for the child's lack of attainment on poor socialization practices. This 'tug of war' defends against the primitive anxieties associated with child welfare but are introjected by the child who reprojects them in practices. For example, some children project their reprojected anxieties onto an adult who their parent has 'vilified' and this can be manifested through disruptive behaviours or a refusal to complete work.

Staff report anything which is a cause of concern and as a corporate parent the practice supports detachment and denial of feelings for children. Although the practice is a means to prevent staff from being flooded by unmanageable anxieties, it does the opposite.

The concerns fuel primitive anxieties of survival and safety for some staff. In other words, the anxieties of concern for safety evoke the practices which defend against the anxieties. However, the nature of the anxiety *is* the relationship to the child and therefore, in some schools the relationships between teachers and parents is not commensal but rather a parasitic type which is destructive to all three (Bion 1970 p95)

Section 4F: The teacher-child-home relationship

As I have discussed, the core of the anxiety situation for some staff lies in relation to the child. A teacher told me about her responsibility for pastoral care as a form tutor. In this example, a form tutor is responsible for a group of thirty children in addition to their teacher responsibility. All concerns about the behaviour or attainment in a subject of these thirty children were 'passed' to a form tutor. However, in addition to the responsibilities of a form tutor they had a teaching workload. As such, they were

at considerable risk of being flooded by intense anxieties through excessive projective identification with their form group.

A form tutor can be with the same group of children for five years and often has a qualitatively different relationship with home than a subject teacher because there is a perceived level of trust for some parents. However, the professional responsibility involves a detachment and denial of feeling which is confusing for all concerned. On the one hand, such practices are a way to build bridges between home and school to create stable relationships for the child. Yet on the other hand, an excessive projective identification involves a blurring of boundaries and can result in a fusion with the object.

Excessive projective identification comes about because in some circumstances a tutor may live in close proximity to children in their form. The relationship extends beyond the boundaries of school and parents and form tutors 'befriend' one another. In this case, the boundaries between parent and teacher and teacher and child become obscure and run the risk of overfamiliarity and in terms of the other children in the form this is perceived as favouritism.

Furthermore, if the 'friendship' between the parent and tutor ends this has an influence on the teacher and child relationship and involves splitting which may impact their attainment.

A further example of excessive projective identification is if a parent relies too heavily on a school. In such situations, dependency is a projection of a parent's anxieties about their own capabilities regarding the wellbeing of their child and they may be seeking out reassurance from 'experts' The projection can also highlight

how some parents find it difficult to separate themselves from their child especially as children can attend educational facilities when they are very young. In such situations, mothers may need to work but do not feel ready to leave their child in the care of others and this concern may be based on primitive anxieties for her child's survival. As such, excessive projective identification can form symbiotic relationships in some schools whereby there is a mutual benefit but one which does not address the primary task of education.

Defending against the anxieties associated with uncertainty can also result in excessive pastoral involvement with children which is transferred beyond the school. At all levels in school, staff have a duty of care towards the child and the corporate parent responsibility has heightened the anxieties associated with safety for some. When staff are offsite, some are hyper vigilant. For example, if they observe their pupils engaged in perceived unsafe behaviours, they have a legal obligation to report the incident.

Some staff report incidents 'just in case' the child is at risk or to avoid being falsely accused of untoward behaviours.⁵⁷ These practices highlight how anxieties of safety, doubt and retrospective guilt are defended against through practices, however, this also highlights how practices can be inefficient because staff report and log the same incident. Yet, this would also highlight staff concerns and the fact that they are indirectly sharing these through a reporting system.

⁵⁷ For example, I have had staff highlight their concerns because children in Year 11 are with Post 16 students in nightclubs where teachers are socialising.

In the past, schools had designated officers who led on safeguarding and reporting. On the one hand, the school anxieties are projected onto the person responsible. Yet on the other hand, the cases are reported once and the person who has the responsibility can reassure the reporter. In such cases, the safeguarding officer was a 'container' because they were able to introject the projections and return them in a modified form to the member of staff reporting the concern. However, as the safeguarding officer had nowhere to safely 'offload' their anxieties they were at serious risk of being flooded.

The corporate parenting role aside, children are an 'ever present' concern because they are the practice. An example of this is there is limited time allocated for non-teaching responsibilities. Staff are encouraged to complete their marking in their non-teaching periods. These periods are also allocated for the purpose of planning, preparation, line manager meetings and so forth. The time limitation means that staff either stay longer in the school which is a container of anxiety or take the work home.

A teacher told me they take books home to mark 'otherwise' they would never get out of school. In this way, the child is an aspect of the adult's life beyond the container. As with any other job when someone takes work home, they adopt a mindset which focuses on the work. As such, the stresses and anxieties associated with the child are transported with them because their work *is* the child.

In Chapter Two, I discussed how imagery can evoke emotion in a number of ways, but imagery does not have the same level of influence on everyone because we respond differently. However, imagery can have a direct influence on emotional systems in the brain or an overlap between processes involved in mental imagery and perception which can lead to responding “as if” to real emotion-arousing events.⁵⁸ Certain aspects of everyday life and experience evolve in meaning and associated significance which makes them symbols of something besides what they actually are. One example involves practices in some primary schools. The post-summer holiday task is generally one whereby the children write and draw a picture about their time away from school. As I discussed in Chapter One, imagery and narrative can be introjected by some adults and the depictions themselves are representations of a child’s whereabouts when school is closed. In other words, the work is a snapshot of the child’s life beyond school. For some staff, the anxieties associated with safeguarding responsibilities can increase uncertainty and doubt because some may over analyse the imagery or the story. In other words, as the safety of the child is paramount this becomes a priority which extends beyond the school for some adults. As such, the anxieties of uncertainty are relieved because some staff report concerns ‘just in case’ they have missed something which more than likely was not there. However, the practice itself is one which relieves anxiety.

Sharing information from Primary to Secondary School

⁵⁸ Holmes E & Mathews A. *Mental imagery in emotion and emotional disorders* Clinical Psychology Review 30 (2010) 349–362

When children leave Primary school, their history is 'shared' with their Secondary School. Sharing information is important because it guards against the anxieties of uncertainty. Furthermore, through this practice the child is already defined because the information tells a story. The attainment and attendance data categorise the child as good or bad because the objective measures connote subjective meanings.

The practices in classrooms often reflect these definitions and the drive to ensure that every child meets their targets overlooks the 'genius' which Locke discussed in his essay *Concerning Education* (1693). A child may have talents, but the National Curriculum is such that these possibilities cannot be explored and as such the rigidity means that it is used to defend against the anxieties of uncertainty and doubt.

Thus, if a child's conduct in the classroom is deemed as disruptive, they are defined by the behaviour. Yet, there are other possible reasons for such behaviour. A simple explanation may be based on the fact that the child has completed what was expected of them and the teacher had not planned for this possibility. However, the expectation is that a good teacher always plans for any eventually and this defence is used to guard against uncertainty but is unrealistic in many cases.

In such situations, the disruptive behaviour can also be used as a reason to have a child removed from the classroom by a senior member of staff. In practice this is an example of projection because the teacher is getting 'rid' of something which is 'bad'. However, a teacher who asks for such assistance from a senior member of staff can be defined in the same ways as the child in terms of their practices. The fact that a child has to be removed from a class can define a teacher as someone who cannot manage behaviours. As such, the teacher's behaviour is introjected by a senior

member of staff who may reproject and rid themselves of the 'disruptive behaviour' onto the child and to the next person who takes charge of the child.

Trust Versus Mistrust

I discussed the first stage of psychosocial development as trust v mistrust through the work of Erickson (1902–1994) in Chapter One. Trust is important in all relationships and practices. Sharing attainment data is considered as 'transparent' practice, yet, in September the Secondary Schools I worked in retested the children because they had been away from school for the six weeks Summer holiday. This practice highlights the anxieties associated with uncertainty and doubt. Not only is the data provided by a Primary school not trusted but the child is not trusted to remember what they have learnt prior to the summer holidays.

This practice highlights the anxieties associated with failure and an urgency to ensure that children do not 'fall' behind. Yet, children are with their family which is a separate space to school and this practice highlights two key points.

The first point is that there is a lack of trust between schools which is amplified by the principles of marketisation and competition. In Section 5B, I discussed Rousseau's (1762) considerations of competition and how this took people away from their own nature and created selfishness. Yet, as I discussed in Section 1D, we are born anxious, and this is our nature, but practices defend against anxieties and therefore move us further away from addressing our nature.

Indeed, given that all schools have a long summer holiday and children are tested in their Secondary School, this suggests that the 'data' provided by Primary Schools is to 'show' that *they* have met their targets rather than the children. Thus, the school as a

container is defending against external threats surrounding judgement and projecting these on to the next container.

The second point is that the anxieties associated with the corporate parenting responsibility has led to a lack of trust between school and home. I discussed the vast changes in child welfare legislation in Chapter Two Section 8C and the tragic circumstances which led to corporate parenting. Yet, the implication of this responsibility are far reaching in terms of home school relations and anxieties.

School holidays are an important time because staff and children are away from container with their respective families, which is important because this time represents a demarcation between home and school.

However, I have worked in some schools which resemble a chaotic family life because children bring their own experiences into the container. Indeed, there is splitting and projection between their absent parents and other adults outside of school and these fragmented relationships are introjected by children who then project these experiences in different situations. Contemporaneously, staff are involved in their own experiences and will project their anxieties in a school environment. Indeed, life itself is rarely smooth and therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that schools are generally anxious places.

In the earlier discussions about education and the child, the recommendation was to teach the child at home. Although this may be a solution in some situations, but generally speaking it is not necessarily the way forward for everyone but ideally, schools should be smaller nurturing environments.

Primary School

In a primary school, teachers are generalists and teach across the curriculum.

Although Primary schools tend to include greater creative elements to learning the emphasis is firmly on 'assessments' levels, and outcomes. The creative element of subjects are a limited aspect of lesson time, and this highlights how knowledge and practices are regenerated because the foundations of such ideas were formalised in the 19th century curriculum which I discussed in Chapter Two Section 7B. Therefore, the limited time made available for such subjects reinforce the idea that subjective and creative development is less important than rational approaches.

Indeed, although practical subjects provide a creative opportunity to channel one's emotions through an object, in schools there is a lack of time assigned to these subjects. Therefore, although a creative opportunity presents itself because of the lack of time available, the activity is one which provokes anxieties.

For example, all subjects currently taught on a school curriculum have regular assessments and the expectation is that students have to make progress. However, there is limited time allocated to practical and creative subjects, yet students still have to make expected levels of progress. This would also appear to be the case even at primary school level given the demand of assessments and outcomes for core subjects.

A music teacher who works in Primary and Secondary Schools told me that as her subject is non-core, only children who have access to a musical instrument attend class. Furthermore, at GCSE level the topic is not what most children expect as there is a greater emphasis on the theoretical aspects of music rather than the actual practical and creative element.

Yet, through such activity children are able to express their feelings and an adult plays a key role in this process. However, the National Curriculum dictates what is taught in schools, how this is taught and how it is assessed. Often schemes of work are already in place but they are only updated to reflect the changes in the National Curriculum.⁵⁹

One teacher told me that the schemes of work in her department were not regularly updated because they used the same exam board and knew what to expect. This practice highlights the importance of perceived control which guards against the anxiety of failure. This practice was also used as a way to save time because when changes to the National Curriculum do occur, they are slight and as such the schemes of work do not require any major amendments. Yet, this practice itself highlights how knowledge is contained and repeated in subject areas. For example, the subjects which Spencer (1861) defined as the most important which I discussed in Chapter Two Section 7B, remain the core subjects on the current National Curriculum. Yet, the reasons he put forward for the hierarchy of curriculum subjects no longer reflect the needs of this society.

Section 5F: Core and Non-Core subjects

Core subjects are given more value than other curriculum subjects. This is demonstrated by greater timetabled allocation. On the one hand, there is less uncertainty for core subject teachers because they have more teaching time. On the

⁵⁹ The discussions are in the appendices.

other hand, as they teach a core subject every child is expected to achieve a grade C minimum.⁶⁰

Yet, staff who do not deliver core subject also face challenges as they have less time to meet the expectations set out in the curriculum. Non-core subjects such as Food Technology, Design and Art are allocated less time despite being practical subjects which need more time in terms of preparation. A teacher told me that her subject was 'bottom of the pile' because it is a non-core subject. Yet, given the level of concerns regarding obesity and healthy eating habits this demonstrates a reluctance to actually address the issues of survival. Indeed, non-core subjects also tend to have larger cohorts of disaffected children. Yet, the physical environment is such that it poses risks in terms of health and safety and the use of appliances. These conditions raise anxieties because danger is perceived to be everywhere and, in some cases, there are actual risks.

The tools are dangerous if used incorrectly and these are actual possibilities associated with workshop and kitchen classrooms. Furthermore, the unpredictability of some of the children's behaviours in the classroom raise anxieties. In some schools, these are real fears as there have been actual incidences involving injuries or loss of life. In terms of a container, this type of school would be one whereby some of the children have destroyed the teacher's confidence to such an extent that they are unable to complete their actions in practices.

A teacher told me that the time constraints mean that there is a greater urgency to complete the aims and objectives of the lesson, and this removes the actual

⁶⁰ GCSE Grades changed to numerical forms in 2014. The weighting of coursework was reduced, and grades were decided in final exams. A grade C is equivalent to the numerical value of 4*

appreciation of what was meant to be considered. Yet, the actual practical in non-core subjects measure the outcomes of the activity and is used at a later date to define failure or success of both teacher and pupil. As such, the practical classroom in some schools can be one which involves a considerable degree of pathological anxiety for the contents (Menzies Lythe 1988 p75).

In schools generally, there are a series of benchmarks a child has to meet or miss before they are defined as disaffected. If after a series of interventions, a student does not engage with the core subjects they are passed to those teachers who deliver practical subjects but the decision to allocate the child is made at senior level. As such, a disaffected child is often placed in a class based on the habitus as a set of dispositions of the teacher. Yet, a classroom teacher such as this may already have the task of engaging students in chaotic classrooms for the reasons I have mentioned. Furthermore, the allocated teacher is usually identified by other staff as someone who 'won't mind' or as 'good' with those 'types of kids.'

In such cases, the teacher has introjected and accepted the definitions and subsequently projects this into disaffected children, some of whom may develop excessive identification with this teacher and vice versa. These practices not only foster dependency in some children but also fulfil a need within some teachers who believe that they can do a better job than the actual parents. Contemporaneously, some parents also believe that schools can do a better job than themselves, and the anxieties associates with their child's survival is projected into certain members of staff.

In some schools, techniques are used to defend against the anxieties of disaffected children as Middle management pass decisions to senior level even though there is little need. Yet, the practice defends against the anxieties of making the wrong choice and therefore passing a decision is a way to protect oneself from uncertainty.

Furthermore, through this practice, a disaffected child knows the seriousness of their conduct. In some situations, this practice satisfies the disaffected child because their conduct is being addressed by the person at the top of the organisation. This response, however, is really no different to that of an adult who is discontented with a level of service and who demands to see the manager, apart from the fact that one is a child and the other is an adult.

When a decision has been passed to a senior member of staff this can also relieve some of their anxiety because they know that processes have been followed.

Furthermore, the practice itself reminds them of their seniority which for some leaders offer them a way to detach from other members of the school.

Yet, there are also occasions, when decisions are made by senior leaders, but they bypass the middle manager and instead the anxieties are projected directly onto the classroom teacher, often with little consultation. In the example of a disaffected child, the classroom teacher has established their habitus as a set of dispositions in terms of how others perceive them, and their defence mechanisms have responded to the scenario. Menzies Lyth (1988) discussed this type of situation but in relation to nurses and highlighted how they were at considerable risk of being flooded by intense and unmanageable anxiety (Menzies Lyth 1988 p50).

In situations such as the example above, a teacher has to manage their own anxieties and 'contain' a classroom of disaffected children who have to manage their anxieties in relation to each other. Teacher and pupil relationships in this situation are more concentrated and therefore they are more likely to experience the impact of anxiety. This risk is similar for staff in schools because the nature of their profession is one which oscillates between the past and the future or life and death. Not only does the child represents the past as a subjective recollection of the past, but the practices in school are always aimed towards the future because there is a continued focus on progress and development.

Collusion and Redistribution of responsibility and irresponsibility

There is a collusive element in some of the schools in which I have worked, and this is used to guard against anxiety. Some subjects have limited resources but are expected to meet their targets in terms of student outcomes and some teachers who are allocated disengaged students are also given specific additional responsibilities.

For example, a teacher told me that they have the SENCo responsibility and that they are ultimately 'responsible' for those children with additional needs.⁶¹ As a SENCo they are responsible for allocation of support staff to assist in classroom for those children. The teacher may be allocated a child for who they are directly accountable for in terms of their SENCo responsibility and educational provision.

On the one hand, this responsibility guards against anxiety because the teacher can use the dual role to ensure that there is extra support in such classes for those

⁶¹ SENCo is a Special Educational Needs Co-ordinator.

children who need it. Yet on the other hand, the child has been 'given' to a particular teacher because in other subject areas they have been unsuccessful and this adds to anxiety rather than reducing it.

This type of arrangement suits the school because the anxieties associated with the child who is 'different' are concentrated in one area. Yet, although the person with the responsibility for inclusion ensures that the student has access to education, it is the support assistant who actually does the job. Therefore, there is a collusive social redistribution of responsibility and irresponsibility (Menzies-Lythe p56). However, this is not only based on hierarchical positions or leadership roles.

Invariably the relationship between some teachers and support assistants has a conflictual nature. On the one hand, the teacher is responsible for the whole class including the support assistant. Yet on the other hand, the support assistant has specific responsibility to certain children. A support assistant relies on a teacher for the learning material but is also responsible for ensuring that the child they are responsible for, behaves in an appropriate fashion and completes the work. A teacher also 'educates' the support assistant because they are often unfamiliar with the subject matter. In such situations the classroom assistant is also a student.

There is projective identification between the child and the support assistant where sometimes the relationships are collusive and can also involve parents.

There are also occasions when the child who is being supported does not require assistance. In such cases, as an additional adult in the classroom, the assistant is in the position to support any child but rarely does because they do not have the same relationship with other children in the class. In such case, a support assistant uses the

job title to assert that it is not their responsibility. The title protects the support assistant from uncertainty but is introjected by a teacher as an unwillingness to support them with large numbers of children and builds resentment. Such situations happen more often in large secondary schools which tend to have greater behaviour management issues and staff shortages.

One teacher who worked in Secondary Schools and Pupil Referral Units told me that because of staff shortages, behaviour management became a greater priority than learning. When there are staff shortages in schools' teachers show greater anxiety through their practises and in their ways of being. Contemporaneously, children exhibit their anxieties through actions and practices, and this results in a web of projection and introjection where some schools can be sites of struggle because staff and children as contents project their emotional experiences but without the means to modify or accommodate them.

A child's behaviour is a barrier to their learning as well as being a disruption for the rest of the class. As such, success relies on the assistant's skills at modifying the student's behaviour and to ensuring that they complete the work set by the teacher. Although this is a challenging role, support assistants generally do not have actual positions of responsibility and can be 'blamed' by some teachers based on their poor behaviour management skills or the child's lack of work output or quality of the work. Yet, a classroom assistant is an unqualified teacher who earns less salary and often faces the greatest challenges in terms of behaviours. On the one hand, the assistant is a person who has a relation with the student because they mainly work with the

same children. Yet on the other hand, this means that as individuals they absorb some of the anxieties which are guarded against in the school as an institution.

In terms of the example above, the denial of feeling is a part of the projected emotional experience introjected by a child. Yet, denial is a defence which is used to separate the emotional aspects involved in nurturing a child at its most primitive level, survival is a human concern. Given the responsibilities associated with a child's welfare this experience evokes anxiety.

Section 6F: Splitting and Containing relations.

The core of the anxiety situation in schools lies in relation to the child because the emotional connection between adults and children is denied. Indeed, mental, and social structures of habitus have assimilated to the extent that such practices are deemed as 'natural' Yet, if this were the case, we would be having open and frank conversations about the topic of death because death is natural. Instead, our biological defence mechanisms respond to habitus and guard against the primitive anxieties of survival. As Bourdieu (1977 p79) states, the unconscious is never anything other than forgetting history and therefore the situation can be changed. Yet, as I have highlighted changes to practices were in response to threat and the ways in which they were implemented created fear which developed into anxiety. However, this was because those implementing the changes were anxious themselves and therefore projected these onto the population.

In Section 9A, I discussed those teachers who did not work within the paradigm of prescribed education were described as a heretic. The equivalent nowadays is that a teacher is labelled as 'unprofessional' and a child who does not conform is defined as disruptive or somehow 'broken' and attempts are made to 'fix' them.

In some situations, parents are deemed as inadequate, but this is only by today's standards and the meanings of love for a child are culturally bound. However, the primitive defence of splitting is used to separate good from bad and this mechanism protects people from the unknown.

For example, a teacher who brings different ideas challenges existing predictable and 'safe' practices. Similarly, a child who presents as challenging in a mainstream setting evokes anxiety in staff because there is a need to consciously consider that particular child and the practices involve additional planning as a contingency to avoid uncertainty.

Yet, my experience and practices in schools involved the dispositions of habitus which focus on the future, and this is associated with the notions of Predestination and Salvation which I discussed in Chapter Two Part B. My experiences and practices in other schools, involved prioritising behaviours over education and this set of dispositions are underpinned by notions of innocence which regard the child as a passive vessel. Indeed, as I have highlighted these sets of dispositions are such that they are not simply one or the other, rather they are a complex collection of anxieties which are regenerated through socialisation practices and mass education.

Furthermore, habitus including mine was shaped according to the practices of the particular school in which I was employed.

In this discussion I have explained how practices in some schools defend against primitive survival anxieties using the mechanisms of splitting, projection, introjection, reprojected and identification. Some of the examples were provided by current practitioners in the field of education who are employed in different types of schools. Other examples are from my own practices in schools at different stages of my career. The schools which are referred to in this thesis do not currently fulfil the requirements of emotional containment because they operate as social defence systems.

Indeed, these schools are currently not engaged in a commensal containing relationship and rather than home and school 'sharing' the responsibilities of the child for the benefit of all three, schools share the legal responsibilities of parenthood, but parents do not legally educate their children.

Although parents are encouraged to support their child's education at home, the actual responsibility of education is seen as belonging to schools. Contemporaneously, schools as corporate parents can undermine actual parents because the relationship between home and school is unbalanced in terms of responsibilities. Parents do not have to 'educate' their children, but schools have to parent.

This type of containing relationship is somewhat parasitic because schools and parents do not necessarily depend on each other but there is an expectation of each other which overlooks the child and as such is destructive to all three. The reluctance by some adults to accept the fact that children are not passive has led to them being uninvolved in the relationship and for some a dismissal of their own emotions. This process was discussed in Section B with a focus on the depersonalised nature of 19th century practices whereby emotions were buried. As such, in some cases parasitic relationships

have been reproduced through socialisation practices which overlook the fact that technically children are miniature adults but with elements that need time to develop. Contemporaneously, adults are miniature children because some of their elements have not had the time to develop. This point was explained in the theoretical framework in terms of the alpha function and the ways we construct thinking.

Section 7F: Containment in practice

The fourth objective of this thesis was to suggest alternative ways of practice in school which enable discussions about the topic of death. To achieve commensal containing relationships in a school involves addressing habitus as a set of dispositions which are associated to survival anxieties. Yet, for this to happen adults have to have the capacity to acknowledge their own concerns before they establish commensal containing relationships. Furthermore, there are difficulties in establishing commensal containing relationships in some schools because the primary task of education itself is vague. The differences between the culture of a school and home mean that commensal containing relationships can be difficult to establish in terms of a whole school approach. However, this does not mean that these differences cannot be addressed but rather that the changes take time and because they raise sensitive issues, the ways the changes are approached have to be sensitively considered.

One way to develop schools as containing environments is through staff development. The Initial Teacher Training Programmes could incorporate ways of addressing anxieties and as a result, newly qualified teachers would not only be better prepared

for the actual responsibilities of corporate parenting but also have a greater understanding of their own deep rooted survival anxieties. Through this process there would be a deeper understanding of the actual relationality between parents, children, and teacher. By having this 'state of mind' schools can build better relationships with home and the child which benefit all three.

However, as this process takes time, in the interim, an inexperienced member of staff is at risk of becoming a vessel for the anxiety projections of children and parents without the appropriate means to reproject.

Currently, professionals in school have to adopt a 'thick skin' because this defends against the projections of others, but this also inhibits appropriate responses to such projections. Thus, whilst professional distance is necessary, it can also be overdone and become a protective 'habit' which is worn to convey confidence and purity (Miller-Pietroni 1999 p413). In the previous section, I highlighted how in some schools, senior staff tended to minimise their interactions with children and staff detach but this distance is also a way to minimise the mutual interaction of personalities which might lead to attachments. Contemporaneously, the denial of feelings towards others, adds to the primitive anxieties of survival.

There is a fundamental emotional connection between humans but to acknowledge this is a contradiction to the meanings and connotations associated with professionalism. Thus, the first step needed in order to establish commensal containing relationships between home and school involves 'shedding' one's own skin.

In terms of reflexive practices, teachers generally tend to review their lessons to consider what went well or what needs to be improved, However, this reflexive

process is different to that proposed by Bourdieu. We accept our habitus as 'natural' and as such there is little need for deeper considerations. However, reflexivity as a process involves an individual consideration of one's own 'history' of experiences which is always relational.

A way that schools can enable discussions about the topic of death is by establishing a reflexive culture which accepts that not only are we all born anxious but also that death itself is a human concern. This type of school culture is one which understands and supports each other regardless of one's position in the hierarchy. As such, there is a collective 'state of mind' which can re-introject modified anxieties. Yet, to establish such a containing environment, the contents have to be 're-socialised' so that they can adopt this mindset.

For a school to have containing relationships, all adults should be able to absorb the projections of children and reproject them into the child in a modified way. However, schools are not a replacement for parents rather they should work together with parents and the child. Yet, as I have already highlighted the responsibilities of socialisation have become more corporate and this way of being has created a greater distance between parents, children, and staff in schools.

In some schools the lack of trust and suspicious nature associated with childrearing and safeguarding has increased anxiety for all concerned. Thus, to establish commensal containing relationships, there first has to be commitment and investment in all of the staff. Yet, the process itself takes time and initially a workplace is not necessarily the best environment to reflect on one's practices. An ideal scenario is that a school has a

few weeks residential during the summer holiday for a group of staff who occupy different levels of responsibility.

Not everyone responds in the same way and being in a neutral space would help some to express their anxieties because the environment feels safer. Furthermore, as some of the defences of professionalism become less guarded, individuals may recognise that others in the group are just everyday people who share the anxieties associated with the task of teaching. Importantly, the process of embedding such a culture is one which takes time and has to be 'built' into the calendar. This is especially the case in those schools with a high turnover of teaching staff because paradoxically, they may actually be in greater need of developing a reflective culture to establish commensal containing relationships.

School environments have physical barriers and generally only invited adults can enter the environment. The reasons for these practices are clear and yet to develop commensal containing relationships there has to be a genuine desire to involve parents in the life of a school. However, mass education has inadvertently increased the anxieties associated to the child in terms of survival and risks. As such, the fact that some schools are large containers with high numbers of content means that they do not actually lend themselves to developing commensal containing relationships. Inadvertently, these types of containers defend against such relationships because logistically they are impossible to form.

This also highlights how some containers defend against predestination anxieties because saving large numbers of children is a way to Salvation. Furthermore, the notion of saving is intrinsically linked to accumulation in terms of material gain which I

discussed in Section 8B. In some schools, a way to psychosocially deny death is through an accumulation of life via children. Thus, large numbers of children in schools represent a vision of hope for the future when adults are no longer a part. Indeed, the notion of mass education was developed in response to the devastation of World War Two. I strongly suggest that the ways we response to the Covid 19 Pandemic in terms of practices in education should be addressed. The advice offered by Rousseau (1762) in terms of education was sound because a smaller container is better in terms of establishing 'genuine' commensal containing relationships and therefore benefit teachers, parents and importantly children.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The principal research question asked why the topic of death is absent in a school curriculum. The aim of this thesis was to show the psychosocial reasons why the topic of death is not included in a school curriculum. There were four objectives emerging from the aim.

Objective One

The first objective was to trace, map, and explain the psychosocial progression of habitus as a set of dispositions associated with the child which are emotional and regenerated through socialisation practices.

To meet the first objective, I used my version of genealogy and traced habitus as a set of emotional dispositions and a way of being towards the child and death from the 6th century to the present. Using this technique, I highlighted key ideas and events and explained how the dispositions of habitus were produced and reproduced through socialisation practices. Through this process I explained how the changes to socialisation practices were always in response to external threats and were instigated by those with a particular habitus. I concluded that the emotions associated with death and the child were never directly addressed but were reproduced through mass education.

Objective Two

The second objective was to explain why the dispositions are a barrier to having open discussions about the topic of death. To meet this objective, I referred to psychodynamic theories particularly from the Kleinian tradition. The dispositions of habitus are a social subjectivity and psychodynamic theories explain how we

internalise and process the external social world. These theories highlighted that rather than entering the world innocent or wicked and being socialised in terms of these definitions, we enter the world anxious which is based on our first experience of actually being born. However, as we are not socialised to accept that this is the original anxiety, we protect ourselves from anxious thoughts or feelings using defence mechanisms which actually guard against our ultimate concern of death and these anxieties are demonstrated through practices.

Psychodynamic theories explained the intrinsic relationship between a mother and child in terms of emotional containment and provides an understanding of how particular states of mind are processed and passed on from generation to generation. Indeed, the three factors which I focused on in Chapter One show how we create and recreate meanings which are ultimately concerns about life and death and these are repeated through the process of socialisation. Thus, although there are many possible reasons why we do not have frank and open conversations about the topic of death, these are all passed on through the process of socialisation and subsequent practices. The shifts in socialisation practices highlight how some of the population attempted to separate the emotional from the rational, the subjective from the objective and nature from nurture. Thus, as the changes in socialisation practices were in response to external threats, the defence of splitting was used by some of the population as a way to cope with the anxieties of uncertainty.

In Chapter Two, I explained how some of the population psychosocially denied death through their practices which focused on extending life through science and to alleviate their predestination anxieties through accumulation. Thus, the ambiguities

associated with the shifting medical definitions of death which I discussed in Chapter One is also used as a way to deny the inevitable.

Indeed, the early notion of formalised education itself was generated by some of the population who subsequently also taught in schools. Thus, the set of dispositions associated with the child and anxieties of the future are regenerated through secondary socialisation practices through mass education.

A reason why death is not a topic on a school curriculum is because the core subjects in education are those which were defined as important in the 19th century by Spencer (1820-1903). Although 'new' content has been added to the core subjects, the subjects themselves are still deemed as having the greatest importance. Mass education itself was organised by those in the population with a particular habitus and who were also the 'producers' of knowledge as they themselves were educated. Thus, the quest to provide everyone with a standardised education is also a way to psychosocially deny death as predestination anxieties are directed towards accumulation in this life in the hope of salvation in the afterlife. Indeed, the National Curriculum itself give priority to those subjects which guard against emotional expression.

Inadvertently the ongoing endeavours to deny death overlooked the intrinsic emotional nature of the mother and child relationship. I highlighted this process at various points in Chapter Two beginning with the Christian notions of love and the depictions of the mother. I discussed how Reformation thought focused on the role of the father and the influence this had on socialisation practices. The importance of the mother and child relationship in terms of education was highlighted through the work of Rousseau

(1712-1778). Yet, Post French Revolution thought focused on the transformation of society and the ideas presented by Saint Simon (1760-1825) emphasised the importance of the population as a whole in terms of industry. As such, the unique emotional relationship between mother and child gradually became immersed in the observable world of work.

The expectations associated with motherhood were articulated through legislation and demonstrated by observable practices which were grounded in the application of science (Comte 1798-1857). Post World War Two legislation introduced compulsory education and in many cases this process was also used to socialise children on mass. Some adults focused on providing children in the lower sets with maternal reverie and emotional containment. Contemporaneously, such children provided some teachers the opportunity to mother and there was a recognition that a fundamental aspect of education is based on relations. Yet, as discussed in Chapter One and also in Section 8C, from the 1980s onwards the increase in legislation and the associated responsibilities of corporate parenting has redefined these relationships.

The introduction of a National Curriculum, the principle of marketisation and academisation, as discussed in Section 4C, 5C and 6C, showed how schools had gradually adopted a habitus which separated the subjective from the objective and focused on observable practices and outcomes.

Furthermore, some schools are large institutions and although education is unavoidably conducted in the context of relationships, schools are containers with too many contents. Yet, as I discussed through the work of Rousseau in 5B, the

relationships between adults and children are better in smaller environments. Thus, schools as large institutions guard against anxieties because the relations are depersonalised. This led me to the third objective which was to explain how schools defend against the emotional dispositions of habitus through their practices.

Objective Three

The third objective which was to explain how schools defend against the emotional dispositions of habitus through their practices. To meet this objective, I referred to my own practices in the field of education and in schools as containers. I also described the experiences of teachers which I collected using semi-structured interviews during the Covid 19 lockdown period.⁶²

Through this process I reflected on my teaching experiences and realised how my habitus was regenerated through practices in school. The reflective process involved a greater consideration of the complexities involved in my relations with others in a school container. Through this process, I understood how as adults we may not have had our own basic emotional needs met because we were socialised by mothers who did not have a particular state of mind to be a container. As a result, the *alpha function* was inadequate or unmet. As such, in terms of education, some schools are containers with adults whose own anxieties have not been modified through emotional containment and therefore they do not have the mental state to absorb and return a child's projections.

⁶² The transcripts are in the Appendix section.

In such schools, the contents project, introject, and reproject anxieties on mass which paradoxically reproduces the anxieties which are being defending against because the practices themselves guard against emotions.

Therefore, to have frank and open conversations about the topic of death between adults and children, the defences which guard against anxieties have to be removed and this can be achieved through the creation of containing relationships.

Objective Four

The fourth objective of this thesis was to suggest alternative way of practices in school which enable discussions about the topic of death. To meet this objective, I offered solutions in terms of staff training and also highlighted the associated challenges involved. I discussed this in Chapter Five Section 7F.

Contribution of this study

The key points this research has raised is that although we are born anxious, habitus as a set of dispositions guards against addressing anxieties through practices. My version of genealogy highlighted how the shifts in socialisation practices were in response to external threats and through the notion of emotional containment I explained how primitive anxieties have been passed on.

Although schools have additional corporate parenting responsibilities this implies that schools can separate the subjective from the objective. However, the contents in a school container have their own anxieties. Therefore, just as there are mothers who

cannot provide emotional containment, nor can teachers as corporate parents because their professionalism guards against emotions.

Furthermore, although schools have greater corporate parenting responsibilities the relationships between some parents and some schools is built on mistrust and blame.

The additional responsibilities of a school adds to the ambiguity of the primary task of education and some schools are too large and some practices in school defend against anxieties.

Limitations

The method I used to conduct the research is based on my experiences in school and these are supplemented by the experiences of other teachers. However, they are merely snapshots of experiences and although practices in schools generally are standardised, the actual relations within a school may be such that they are conducive to having open and frank discussions about death. Thus, future research could be based on observing containing practices in different types of school.

Another limitation of the research is that the focus is primarily on Christianity, and this overlooks the spirituality that some people have beyond the paradigms of organised religion. Future research could focus on the ways that some people address the notion of death and how this helps with the ultimate concern.

A third limitation is that the genealogy I put forward is my version of events which is based on another interpretation of events yet as discussed in Chapter Four, this is how we create and recreate histories. The position I take is that we are born, and we will die because from my standpoint death as an ultimate human concern. However,

future research could focus on qualitative differences in terms of age, gender, ethnicity and so forth.

The obvious limitation of this research is that we cannot know death directly. Yet, the fact that death is a human concern means that as a topic, death is one which is worthy of discussion. Therefore, addressing the fundamental anxiety of survival through containment is a way to enable open and frank conversations about the topic of death.

The principal research question asked why the topic of death is absent in a school curriculum. Death as a topic is one which currently cannot be discussed in an open and frank way because the schools used in this thesis are defensive containers and such practices are successful at keeping members at a distance from their own experiences. Therefore, the schools in this research are not conducive environments for discussions about the topic death.

Appendix

Question guide

Tables

Provide a brief introduction about the focal point of the research. Then ask subjects to describe their lived experiences of teaching. The questions that frame the discussion are below and * are those areas which will be explored to generate more detail regarding the childhood innocence discourse, death as a topic and the role of a teacher, parent, and the relationships within the structure of their school. Ultimately to find out some reasons why death is not discussed as a topic on the National Curriculum

- 1) Tell me about your role and types of schools you have worked in
Discuss generally and then specific responsibilities,
- 2) Describe the National Curriculum and if there any topic areas that you think should be added or removed from the curriculum?
**Discuss the topics and explore the reasons for additions or removal*
- 3) What do you think is the most difficult aspect of teaching?
- 4) Speaking as a corporate parent, what topics do you think are important to discuss?
**Discuss the ages of their own children, and the type of schools they attend*
- 5) Describe the purpose of the Teachers Standards Document?
**Discuss the ways it is implemented within the classroom and beyond*
- 6) Given the current Pandemic how do you feel about discussing the topic of death with your children?
**Discuss the feelings*
- 7) Given the current Pandemic how do you feel about discussing death with students?
** Discuss the feelings*
- 8) In which circumstances, if any, does the subject or issue of death arise?
**Discuss the formal curriculum guided lessons, informal discussion, in pastoral work*
- 9) Do you think Is school the kind of place issues around death can be discussed?
**Discuss the reasons why or why not*
- 10) Describe the contact you have with parents and carers?
**Discuss the occasions and reasons*
- 11) How do you feel about discussing the topic of death with colleagues?
**Discussions within and beyond their department*
- 12) In what ways has Covid 19 affected the way you do your job?
**Discuss the points raised and relationships with pupils, parents, and colleagues*
- 13) Are there any ways in which Covid 19 has affected your role as a parent?

The first step of the research process was to conduct the interviews. After the interviews were completed the second step was to read each individual transcript at least once in its entirety. This was because I wanted to understand the participant's whole story. Initially, I was going to delete any irrelevant or unnecessary repetitive statements or filler linguistics such as 'um' or 'you know'. However, after reading the transcripts I realised that these statements brought the participant to 'life'. Indeed, by removing the everyday aspects of how we communicate with each other removes the human from that which is uniquely human (Heidegger §34).

Language is part of our being. A pause or a hesitation can be an indicator of a deeper emotional consideration as a human response. Each interview is a narrative of experiences. As the researcher, I have been a part of the participants retelling of their experiences. I have also been a part of the participants experiences not only based on our relationship in the past but also in terms of the actual interview experience. This means that the experience of the interview itself continues to exist on a conscious and unconscious level. It could be said that this is an element of the interview process which is an intrinsic element of any human interaction. However, it is important to have an awareness that this is the case. As such, each participants 'data' has a life because it is the 'object' formation of relationships with a life. Given this, the linguistic fillers remained in the participants transcripts.

During the second stage of the research, there was an increased realisation that the participants were people. Originally, I was going to code participations using numbers as identifiers (see table below)

However, after reading the participants whole story I realised that codes has indeed depersonalised the individual because they were a barrier to my involvement with the actual process. To overcome this barrier, I contacted each of the participants via email. I asked them individually if they could choose a pseudonym. As all the participants had previously stated that they had no preference between a code or pseudonym all individuals agreed.

I sent a welcome email to each of the individuals in the group and provided them with the category 'superheroes'. I asked each participant to choose their pseudonym based

on the everyday name of superheroes rather than their superpower. The reason I chose this as a category was because I read one of the transcripts which stated *'I don't know about the NHS being heroes, I feel like a bloody superhero on some days.*

The email was sent to each individual participant in the group and asked them to choose from a list of superheroes. There were two occasions when someone choose the same name and so I had to let each individual know which limited their choice. The process continued until all of them had a pseudonym. Given that all the participants did not want to be involved in a focus group, this activity unintentionally provided a form of interaction. Each individual knew that there were other participants in this research and indeed as it was a snowball sample they were employed in the same school.

Although I chose the overall category, the choice of superhero was the participants. As such, it could have been an unconscious reflection of the way they see themselves in the school as an institution. When this was task was completed, it felt right because the data was embodied, and I felt engaged with it.

In each of the emails I emphasised that this was their choice because I did not want them to feel pressured into participation. All of the participants agreed to have a short term group email to complete this task.

Bruce	Diana	T'Challa	Ororo	Salena	Susan	Pamela	Peter
Batman	Wonder Women	Black Panther	Storm	Cat Women	Invisible women	Poison Ivy	Spiderman

Step 3

The interview was designed around three major themes and focused on teaching, death as topic, and anxiety.

In step 3, 'meaning units' from the elements in the transcript had to be developed Before, I did this I separated the individual responses to each question and added them to other responses to the same question. There were 15 questions in total and I created 15 separate eight row tables. Each row represented the participants response.

Each of the 15 tables contained each of the participant responses to the same interview question. When this process was completed, each question was colour coded. As an example, below is an extract from Q1. The response to the question provided details

which answer another question or indeed shed light on other areas which I may not have considered. As such, the responses consist of elements of one of the three major themes, but they overlap into other themes.

I coded the responses using letters, T for teaching, D for death and A for anxiety.

Q1 Tell me about your role and types of schools you have worked in	
Bruce T D A	<i>Yeah, so I mean, I teach math.... I've worked in Secondary schools and PRUs.... So maths does have a higher sort of status within the National curriculum, or certainly in schools and education across the board. You know, its just down to the kind of... the the importance of what GCSEs children achieve.....When I was a Deputy Head that annoyed me that....</i>

By coding the questions using colour I developed a set of general categories or subsets of the major theme.

The teacher
Position
Subject Taught
Teaching Experience
Responsibility

The questions which focused on teaching as an occupation were coloured yellow. These questions were designed to explore the world of the teacher and the meanings they give to professional discourse and the teacher as a corporeal body. This set of questions provided me with demographic data. A teacher has

different levels of occupational experience, different subject specialisms, and additional responsibilities.

Death as a topic
As a Parent
As a teacher
With a colleague
With a parent

The questions which focused on death as a topic were coloured blue and the questions are relational. Each question explores the spatial and relational position of an individual as a teacher, as a parent, with colleague and with a parent and discussions about the topic of death with and about children.

These questions focus on death as a topic. These questions also explore the childhood innocence discourse as spatial and transitional in terms of

home and school and relational in terms of students and own children. As such, the same question was asked but with a consideration of different positions.

Q4 What are your thoughts about discussing the topic of death with students?	
Diana T D A	<i>Maybe it may be because maybe because as the teacher, as the teacher, you're there to perhaps protect the students and the students is post 16 and may actually object to the idea that they're being still being safeguarded as such, because it's an interesting set of legislation, the whole sort of safeguard and protection of the child. Especially as we have started going up to 19 now, don't we? So?</i>

Anxiety
Responsibilities
Environment School
Relationship
Environment Home

The questions which focused on anxiety as a topic were coloured pink. These questions focus on those areas which could provoke anxiety. Each question explores responsibilities and relationships in the spatial and temporal worlds of school and home. The responses to these questions will relate back to social defence systems

and schools as false containers of anxiety. These questions relate to the emotional aspect of teaching and therefore, will overlap with the sub themes in the professional and death as a topic.

In step 3, I used each of 15 tables and highlighted reoccurring themes in their colour

What are the thing you like most and least about teaching?	
Pamela T D A	<i>Other teachers haha...no seriously I'm joking it's all the politics and the the amount of work I have to do at home...but its ok...sometimes I stay till late and miss the rush hour traffic, finish the work ..its ok but its tough yeah</i>

code as meaning units and were grouped separately.

Step 4

In step 4, I sorted the general themes into their major theme category and a single table was created which contained all of the themes. This expressed an entire thematic cross-case description for all the participants in the study. This process allowed an overview as a snapshot of responses and assisted with initial interpretations.

Entire thematic cross-case overview

Major Theme	Bruce	Dian	T'Chall	Pamel	Salena	Susa	Ororo	Peter
Gen Theme		a	o	a		n		
Teacher								
Position	Teacher	Head	Teacher	Teacher	Teacher	Head	SENCO	Teacher
Subject	Maths	S.SC I	PSHE	MUSIC	Literacy	Maths	All	All
Experience	25	18	20	20	16	35	30	40
Responsibility	HOD	*WS	TUTOR	SENCO	*WS	*WS	SEN	N/A
Death Topic								
As a parent	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
With a parent	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
As a Teacher	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colleagues	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Anxiety								
Responsibility	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
School	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Home	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Relationships	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

* WS refers to whole school

Summary of steps 3 and 4

All of the participants were experienced teachers, and their roles did not reflect the years of experience. All teachers had additional responsibility apart from one who was employed on a supply basis. This information was used in the next step

Step Five

From the entire thematic cross-case overview in step four I removed the whole of death as a topic section and focused on the Teacher and Anxiety sections. There were two reasons for doing this. The first was because the focus of this research is to explore the reasons for the absence of death as a topic on a school curriculum. As such, it was the most important question to ask teachers. However, all of the teachers except for two would discuss death as a topic. As such, the responses from the two participants who would not discuss death as a topic will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter. The second reason for removing this section was because although death anxiety is a given, unconscious processes repress and deny death. Therefore, I focused on anxiety.

In the major theme of anxiety, the interview questions focused on the relationships teachers have with parents and carers and the impact of Covid 19 on their teaching and as a parent. These questions also explored the areas of teaching which were most and least enjoyed and asked participants if a school as an institution the best place to actually discuss death.

In step five, the general themes were further sorted into piles of specific themes which were taken as further meaning units from the interview responses. The sorted piles of meaning units were labelled with the participants name and were placed into life worlds. This will be discussed further in step six.

The teacher
Position
Subject Specialism
Subject Taught
Responsibility

In the major theme of the teacher, I removed the general theme of experience in terms of years teaching. I replaced this with the specific theme of teacher specialist subject. The reason for this was to establish if the teacher was delivering their subject in terms of their expertise.

Anxiety
Workload

Environment School
Relationship School
Children

In the major theme of anxiety, I removed the general theme of home environment and replaced this with the specific theme of children. I removed the general theme of responsibility and replaced this with the specific theme

of workload.

Thematic cross-case Teacher and Anxiety

Major Theme Specific Theme	Bruce	Dian a	T'Chall o	Pamel a	Salena	Susa n	Ororo	Peter
Teacher								
Position	Teache r	Head	Teache r	Teache r	Teache r	Head	SENCO	Teacher
Subject T	Maths	S.SC l	Literac y	MUSIC	Literacy	Math s	All	All
Subject S	Maths	PE	PSHE	MUSIC	DT	RE	PSY	All
Responsibility	HOD	*WS	TUTO R	SENC O	*WS	*WS	SEN	N/A
Anxiety								
School Rel	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
School env	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Children	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Workload	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

As a part of this process, I placed the teachers in a school culture category. The four teachers in the Catholic School culture are all based in the same school.

Thematic cross-case Teacher and School Culture

Catholic School Culture

Major Theme	Salena	Susan	Ororo	Peter
Specific Theme				

All teachers work in the same Primary and Junior Catholic cultured school

Teacher

Position	Teacher	Head	SENCO*	Teacher
Subject T	Literacy	Maths	All	All
Subject S	DT	RE	PSY	All
Responsibility	*WS	*WS	SEN	N/A

* SENCO is peripatetic and works in a range of Catholic Schools

Anxiety

Relationships	No	Yes	Yes	No
Major Theme	Bruce	Diana	T'Challo	Pamela
School	Yes	Yes	No	No
Children	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Theme				
Workload	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Secular School Culture

Teachers are from four different Secular Secondary schools.

Position	Teacher	Head	Teacher	Teacher
Subject T	Maths	S.SCI	Literacy	MUSIC
Subject S	Maths	PE	PSHE	MUSIC
Responsibility	HOD	*WS	TUTOR	SENCO

Summary of step 5

All of the participants are parents, but some have adult children who no longer live at home. A

Anxiety

Relationships	No	No	Yes	Yes
School	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Children	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Workload	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Step 6

The sorted piles of meaning

units were labelled with the participants name and clipped together and placed into 'life worlds'.

Teacher as a Professional

- 1) Tell me about your role and types of schools you have worked in
Discuss generally and then specific responsibilities,
- 2) Describe the National Curriculum and are there any topic areas that you think should be added or removed from the school curriculum?
**Discuss the topics and explore the reasons for additions or removal*
- 3) Describe the purpose of the Teachers Standards Document?
**Discuss the ways it is implemented within the classroom and beyond*

Death as a Topic

- 4) Given the current Pandemic how do you feel about discussing death with students?
** Discuss the feelings*
- 5) Speaking as a teacher, what topics do you think are important to discuss at home?
**Discuss the ages of their own children, and the type of schools they attend*
- 6) Given the current Pandemic how do you feel about discussing the topic of death with your children?
**Discuss the feelings*

7) Speaking as a parent, what topics do you think are important to discuss in school?

**Discuss the ages of their own children, and the type of schools they attend*

8) How do you feel about discussing the topic of death with colleagues?

**Discussions within and beyond their department*

9) In which circumstances, if any, does the subject or issue of death arise?

**Discuss the formal curriculum guided lessons, informal discussion, in pastoral work*

Anxiety

10) Describe the contact you have with parents and carers?

**Discuss the occasions and reasons*

11) Has Covid 19 affected the way you do your job?

**Discuss the points raised and relationships with pupils, parents, and colleagues*

12) Are there any ways in which Covid 19 has affected your role as a parent?

13) Do you think school is the kind of place the topic of death can be discussed?


**Discuss the reasons why or why not*



14) What do you think is the most difficult aspect of teaching?

15) What are the things you like most about teaching and least?


**Discuss the reasons why*

Flow Chart of Steps





Step 4 and 5



Step 6

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