Myths of the Nation: A Discursive-Genealogical Investigation of Scottish Nationalism

Craig Love

Supervisor: Prof. David Howarth

A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

Ideology and Discourse Analysis

Department of Government

University of Essex

October 2023

Abstract

The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum was a momentous and transformative event in recent Scottish political history. Curiously, despite the attention given to the referendum in commentary and academic study, there is a comparative lack of engagement with the driving force behind these events. That being Nationalism. This is in part due to the subsequent developments in both Scottish and British politics but is mainly the result of the deficiencies of orthodox theories and approaches to nationalism in grasping the agency and context of nationalism as a political phenomenon. This thesis contributes to nationalism studies in addressing these shortcomings by utilising contributions from Essex School Discourse Theory, establishing nationalism as a discourse that constructs the nation for specified political ends. By returning to Gramsci's writings on Organic Intellectuals and Language, and supplementing this with Voloshinov's concept of multi-accentuality, the thesis presents the reactivated concept of Intellectual Function as an analytical tool to supplement the discursive conception of nationalism in getting to grips with the agency and context of nationalism and nationalist practices. To operationalise these advancements, the research adopts a Logics approach alongside Foucault's genealogical method to identify 4 myths crucial to the development and constitution of modern Scottish nationalism from the 1960s-2014, providing a critical examination and evaluation of its development and expressions in this period. Following this the research, through the application of intellectual function provides a critical evaluation of how the practices and expressions of nationalism articulated these myths during the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. In doing so, the thesis contributes a conception and method for approaching and grasping the specificity of the agency and context that were operant during the 2014 referendum, thus producing new forms of knowledge on both nationalism and its specific Scottish manifestation.

Acknowledgements

The last 6 years have been a literal rollercoaster, numerous ups and downs and plenty of inversions! Pursuing a PhD during the Covid-19 pandemic as well as recovery from shoulder surgery have combined to make this journey interesting to say the least! I have been extremely lucky to have shared my journey with some of the most incredible people I have ever had the pleasure of meeting, offering emotional and professional support and putting up with my 'humour' and infectious positivity!

I would first like to extend my most sincere and deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. David Howarth. From our first meeting during my Masters Degree here at Essex in 2015, David has been a constant source of support and motivation, often in particularly trying and difficult times and without his guidance and interest in my work, ideas and development this project would not have been possible. I also wish to thank Prof. Jason Glynos and Prof. Rob Johns, both of whom sat on my PhD panel meetings. Their encouragement and insights have been invaluable, and I thank them both for engaging and taking interest in my work and development. I would also like to thank both my examiners Ewen Speed and Benjamin De Cleen for their engagement and encouragement of my work and for making the Viva a truly enjoyable experience.

PhD life in the University brings you into contact with a variety of special people who make life and work all the more enjoyable. To my friends and colleagues in cIDA: Julius, Reid, Daniela, Claudia, Anne, Sebastian, Scott, Joash. Thank you for your insights and comments when reading my work during our seminars and for your friendship and camaraderie during these interesting times that we live in! And to my friends and colleagues in the wider Essex PhD community: Anam, Sarah, Laura, David Liao, Phil, Samira, Lydia, Nihad, Teo, Johanna,

Malte, Lorenzo, Dafni, Marco, and many others, thank you! Lunch by the Lakes/Common Room at 1 and our traditional Friday nights in Top Bar will forever be one of my fondest memories of my time in Essex. Thank you all!

To Neil Diggens and Luke Patrick, two of my managers whilst working in the bars of the Student Union. Thank you for your accommodation and understanding that allowed me to balance working and pursuing my studies and for your support and encouragement during some less than pleasant times!

I would like to reserve special thanks to four further people. To Jimena & Kostis, Liz & Ryan For your kindness, advice, and support when I have been struggling through various aspects of completing my PhD, whether this has been reading my work, hearing out ideas or with teaching. For your reassurance and calming influences, always being sure to keep me straight when things have gone all peely wally and I have been less than positive! For looking out for me in general and putting up with my rants and silliness, especially when it comes to football! I will forever cherish our meals, drinks, snooker, pool, walks and adventures together. I love you all and thank you!

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my parents Keith and Kathryn. Your unending and unwavering support of your daft wee boy's dreams and ambitions is something that I will be forever grateful for. Your love and support have been invaluable, your encouragement and understanding when I have havered and stumbled, I cannot put into words just how lucky I have been to have you in my life. You often tell me that whit's fur me'll no go by me, and nothing could be truer of you, and I could not have possibly made this journey without you. I love you dearly and thank you for everything!

Contents

Introduction

2014 was an eventful year in Scotland to say the least. It was declared the Year of Homecoming by Scotland's tourism boards, inviting people to take part in a variety of events ranging from food and drink to arts and culture running alongside the already well-established Edinburgh Fringe and Celtic Connections festivals. The 2014 Commonwealth Games held from the 23rd July-3rd August, saw tens of thousands descend on Glasgow and the surrounding area. Amidst these pageantries of culture and sport, one event dominated domestic, public and political life in Scotland. On the 18th September 2014, 3,623,344 Scots (84.6% of the eligible electorate) voted in a referendum on Scottish Independence from the United Kingdom, with the end-result being 55% in favour of remaining part of the UK and 45% voting for independence. While the official campaign period did not begin until 30th May 2014, both pro-Independence and pro-Union groups had been established and were engaging the public since June 2012. The referendum campaign saw unprecedented levels of activism and engagement and record-breaking turnouts across Scotland's local authorities[1] in what was a truly seismic and transformative period in Scottish politics and public life, when, if only for a fleeting moment, Scotland captured the political attention and imagination of the world.

Despite the attention afforded to the referendum as well as the events and campaigns they inspired, coverage in terms of media, commentary and academic research has tended to view the events through the narrow lens of politics as political theatre. This might have been a fair reflection of parliamentary and electoral behaviour, but these perspectives often fail to 'acknowledge the richer, more nuanced and sophisticated forms of politics and political

[1] The lowest recorded turnout was in Glasgow with 75% and the highest being East Lothian with 91%. My own home area West Dunbartonshire saw 87.9% turnout as well as being one of the four authority areas to deliver a majority Yes Vote alongside Glasgow, North Lanarkshire and Dundee.

activism that were taking place outside of Holyrood and Westminster bubbles,' (Mitchell, 2016b: 7-8). The research presented here is both prompted and inspired by these richer and nuanced forms of politics and activism as well as the events leading to and surrounding the referendum and the campaigns that followed them. Given the obvious nationalistic dimensions involved during the referendum, it is surprising that there has been relatively little attention paid to nationalism as a key driver and organising principle behind the drive for an independence referendum as well as the political practices and activism witnessed during in the campaign groups. As James Mitchell has effectively argued, within studies of Scottish politics, there has been a tendency to view Scottish nationalism through the prism of the latest political developments as if the current strength in support for independence or the SNP was the latest development in an inevitable process, and even when this is avoided, the focus on the national movement has often obscured the wider context, (Mitchell, 2014: 2). This then is our starting problematic – studies of Scottish nationalism and nationalism more generally often argue that support for policy x or holding identity y = nationalism or national identity, without much qualification as to the processes of how and why people have come to hold these views and identities, how these became associated with Scottish nationalism in the first place and how political actors have subsequently utilised these identities and ideas in their actions.

Crucial here, is the need to engage with nationalism as a frame of reference in which we interpret the world around us and how this can be utilised to capture the specificity of political practices in each context. To wield nationalism in this way requires reassessment of the ways in which nationalism has been theorised and applied. Rather than reifying nationalism through searches for essences or origins, that are then used to identify and compare cases, the research advocates for a shift of focus, asking instead what role nationalism is playing here both as a

descriptor of the case being studied and what it adds in terms of explanatory value to instances of nationalism that we observe in the world today. To this end, we may ask how the nation is constructed in a specified context; How and why the Scottish nation is constructed in each scenario? How have certain moments in Scottish political history influenced the selection and articulation of materials into ideals of the Scottish nation? How and why have people drawn relationships between the nation and these elements in specific contexts and more specifically here the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum.[2] Approaching nationalism in this way elevates and deepens our understandings of certain events and movements, moving beyond simplified labels and understanding of what nationalism is and does. It helps us to develop critical accounts and explanations of how specific manifestations of nationalism are operant at the micro level, and how the context of the political moment both informs and influences the conduct and content of nationalism and nationalist movements. Such a move facilitates a shift towards a problem-driven approach to nationalism, nationalist movements and practices which privileges understandings of how nationalist contents are articulated and under what conditions and away from searches for essences and generalisations, (Laclau, 2005b). A discursive definition and approach to nationalism then is the first step in helping us to better come to terms with the heterogeneity of Scottish nationalism as well as the discursive struggles that influenced its specific constitution and expressions during the 2014 referendum.

Theorising and analysing nationalism in this manner draws heavily from a post-structuralist discourse theoretical approach as advanced by Laclau & Mouffe (1985) and subsequent developments in the Essex School of discourse Analysis. As such, the thesis identifies discourse and discursive practices as central elements to nationalism and nationalist

[2] To paraphrase comedian Kevin Bridges, "we should not ponder why, but demand how!" The full sketch can be found via the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwELepvBAVY

movements, and it is only through understanding how meaning is conducted and expressed, how nationalist ideas and symbols are constructed and for what purpose are we placed to develop a clearer understanding of the systematic and discursive forces underpinning their constitution. In this way we want to ask not just how conceptions of the nation and national identity are constructed through nationalism, but why and for what purposes. This understanding is then operationalised through Glynos & Howarth's (2007) Logics approach, which advocates for problem-driven research programmes, privileging questions of meaning, in terms of both their construction and reception by political subjects. In doing so, discursive approaches foreground issues of agency and context when engaging with meaning, through a 'conceptualisation of subjectivity and the structures and context that produce meaning which drives the selection of different methods or techniques, whether these are qualitative, quantitative, or mixed,' (Glynos et al, 2009: 6). The adoption of the Logics approach is complimented by the inclusion of Foucault's genealogy as the primary empirical method. Genealogy in this sense, is not about signalling to different regimes of truth, rather it moves to 'explain the changes between them through an analysis of the relations between praxis and knowledge,' (Vazquez Garcia, 2021: 25). In adopting this method, the analysis of Scottish nationalism seeks to identify the fault lines in the constitution of modern Scottish nationalism and to illustrate these processes, the research focuses on the discursive construction and expression of several prominent political myths within Scottish nationalist discourses, offering insights in terms of the possibilities open to Scottish nationalisms developments and critique with regards to the practices related to these myths constitution and expressions as well as their context.

Thus, nationalism, within the context of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum serves as both a framing device and target of problematisation within this research project. In the

first instance, we can explore and interrogate Scottish nationalist discourses and examine the extent to which they constitute and guide the construction and performance of the nation. Secondly, we interrogate the work that nationalism does as both a descriptor and concept in its application and contribution to the study of these cases. Despite the recent advances of discourse theoretical approaches to nationalism (e.g. De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Custodi, 2021) there remains some persistent critiques of discursive approaches more generally with regards to their theoretical assumptions and question of methodological applicability (e.g. Arditi, 2007; Martilla, 2016). Whilst some of these criticisms are wide of the mark, they do raise crucial questions regarding the specificity of discourse analysis and the concepts and grammars it employs with a wider approach to nationalism and by extension the present case of Scottish Nationalism in the context of the 2014 referendum. It could then be argued that discourse theory's 'distinctive concern with the emergence and transformation of specific nationalist discourses can often be lost amidst the concerns for broader philosophical and social issues or processes,' (Griggs & Howarth, 2019: 464). However, this research does not intend to take discourse theory and apply it as is. To problematise and get to grips with specific social and political phenomena, it is necessary to 'reconceptualise the content of analysis and explanation at the level of form to produce novel insights, puzzles and challenges to our theoretical frameworks and analytical tools,' (Flitcroft, 2021: 201).

As Stuart Hall argued, 'without its specific histories, identity would not have the symbolic resources with which to renew itself. Without its various languages, identity would be deprived of its capacity to enunciate, to speak and act,' (Hall, 2017: 128). The same logic can be applied to nationalism and national identity. Without their specific histories and expressions, nations lack the social, political, and cultural resources with which to construct the nation and national identity; and without the unique language and expression of identity,

nationalism's agency is diminished. Thus, both the agency and context of nationalism and nationalist movements are crucial to grasping the phenomenon at hand. As Griggs & Howarth note, 'paradoxically, for an approach that extols the linguistic model in re-thinking political practice, discursive approaches often occlude the specific materiality of language in its method,' (Griggs & Howarth, 2019: 464). Utilising readings on organic intellectuals and language in Gramsci and social multi-accentuality in Voloshinov the research reassesses and reactivates Laclau's notion of Intellectual Function as an analytical tool for engaging with Scottish nationalism and its discursive construction. In essence, the concept speaks to the translation of experience and the linking of and expression of demands of actors in a particular moment. This re-imagined concept is posed at a level of abstraction that foregrounds the agency of both nationalism and those who utilise its discourses as well as the contexts in which they operate.

Privileging issues of context and agency when engaging with the construction of meaning by political actors is especially pertinent to a discursive approach to nationalism. Intellectual function as re-imagined here provides us with a grammar and concept to examine and interrogate the relationships between different and specific discursive and political practices within Scottish nationalism whilst acknowledging context. Furthermore, it is at this level that nationalism is posed as a particular political logic that shapes and is in turn shaped by is specific contextual environment. The task of the analyst here then is to make use of these concepts and grammars to illuminate and flesh out the specific articulations, expressions and practices of nationalist discourses within the case of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Intellectual function acts here as the guiding force and rive behind this research, a desire and need to better account for agency and context within Scottish nationalism and nationalism more generally. This is then in turn operationalised through the Logics approach,

with the Logics acting as the means of methodological elucidation of intellectual function, and intellectual function providing an analytical elaboration of agency and context of Scottish nationalism through the concepts and grammars provided by the Logics. In so doing, the research problematises nationalism in such a way that seeks to assess the work it does as both a concept and frame of reference, thus clarifying both its analytical status and contribution to the study and evaluation of nationalist ideas and practices and wider implications that we may draw from these.

A note on the position and reflexivity of the researcher

It is important to acknowledge some general implications and reflections on the positionality of myself as the researcher in this project. Following Mondon & Winter, 'claims that the study of politics can be conducted just as other scientific research has led many to ignore their own standpoints, privilege and accountability with respect to the matter they study,' (Mondon & Winter, 2020: 3-4). Similarly, Hassan notes that our personal stories and histories matter in this. They tell us something of how we interpret and frame the world around us. In the case of studying Scottish politics, too few accounts acknowledge the role of the personal, instead they talk of the abstract, of theory, events and history, with the role of individual left unstated as if such things can be neutral, (Hassan, 2014a: 43). As Özkirimli argues, nationalism is a 'fundamental organising principle, the ultimate source of legitimacy, a ready-made cognitive and discursive frame that not only structures our perceptions and interpretations of reality but also impinges on our analytical perspectives as academic researchers,' (Özkirimli, 2010: 2). There are significant consequences for studying nationalism that follow from a failure to acknowledge the above, namely that the social sciences have treated nationalism in a narrow and limited way, resulting in 1) defining it in restricted ways, as an extreme surplus phenomenon, projected onto 'others' while 'ours' is overlooked; 2) naturalising nationalism

by reducing it to a psychological need, thus nationalism stops being a problem to be investigated, (Billig, 1995: 16-7; Özkirimli, 2010, 174).

I had been closely following developments in Scottish politics since 2009, which influenced my decision to pursue politics at university. During this period, the SNP won an unprecedented majority in the 2011 Scottish Parliament Elections setting the ground for the possibility of a referendum. I completed my undergraduate studies in the summer of 2014, just as the independence debate was beginning to intensify and the official campaign period was to begin. The university campus, which had always been a hotbed for political activity and debate, now intensified, several family members and friends were asking for my opinion, and I was often asked for my views at my part-time job; everyday conversation was often dominated by the looming vote. In this sense, I was immersed and in awe of the discourses, pageantries and debates that were an everyday part of Scottish public life during this period. My lived experience of and participation in the referendum and Scottish politics more generally, as well as my familiarity and interest in historical and socio-political developments in Scottish society have undoubtedly influenced my understanding of several events as well as how I and others have interpreted these and put them to political work as it were. My understandings of Scottish nationalism and nationalism more generally stem from these experiences as well as my dissatisfaction with the ways in which nationalism has been theorised and analysed more generally as well as with regards to the 2014 referendum. After all, the myths, symbols, and institutions of the nation that one identifies with are 'partially if to differing degrees constituted by what people think and feel about them,' (MacIntyre, 1971: 263).

A central aim and contribution of this thesis is to engage with nationalism both as an analytical concept and a cognitive frame with which we understand the world and how we may use these to capture something specific about political practices of nationalism and nationalist movements. Approaching Scottish nationalism in this way requires a careful and thorough deconstruction of its discourses and what can at times be perceived as common sense within said discourses, but which often prevents us from pushing beyond abstract boundaries and simplistic as well as problematic good-bad distinctions. It also requires that the researcher be aware of and address their own positionality in relation to the object of research, in this, my position as a Scottish researcher, studying one of the most significant events in recent Scottish history has undoubtedly influenced my interpretations and understandings of nationalism and nationalist practices. There is a tendency in qualitative research projects to suggest that themes 'emerge' from data sets and materials that they engage with. This follows from the assumption that the only job of the researcher is to identify pre-existing themes, however, rather than unearthing pre-existing elements and themes, these are constructed by the researcher and are subsequently shaped and reshaped through a cyclical process of analysis and interpretation[3], which itself is informed by our positions in relation to the objects of research. To a certain extent, qualitative researchers are storytellers; we organise and structure data and materials through various stages, and from these interactions, we weave stories, construct narratives and tell tales, (Lumsden, 2018). The research presented here is no exception in this regard.

As such, intellectual function as introduced and elaborated in this thesis, serves a dual purpose. As noted above, intellectual function is presented as an analytical tool, purposefully developed and applied for the study of Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014

[3] Or what is otherwise referred to as retroduction within the Logics approach.

Independence Referendum. Secondly, it serves as a tool of translation of my own experiences and position with regards to the discourses of and surrounding Scottish nationalism. This is reflected in the choice of Scottish nationalism as an object of study, as well as in the materials and elements identified as suitable objects that the research presented in this thesis attempt to analyse. This does not necessarily require an explicit statement of my own positionality, although this may be useful in some cases, but acknowledgement of their influence is a crucial aspect to both the conduct and operation of intellectual function throughout this thesis. Intellectual function is thus a conceptual and analytical tool which researchers can utilise in the weaving of their own stories and narratives. It is a tool of translation so to speak, in the sense that it assists translate the researcher's positions and experiences with regards to the topic at hand as well as the materials and data that we engage with. To put this slightly differently, through the development and application of the concept of intellectual function, this thesis constitutes an attempt to translate my own experiences into the language of discourse analysis and discourse theoretical studies. It is a means of foregrounding and acknowledging my own agency as a researcher as well as the context in which the research is both carried out and written. Crucially, and in keeping with the principle of retroduction[4] within the Logics approach and radical contingency within discourse theory more generally, this translation does not constitute a definitive account. It is but one offering and interpretation that provides a unique interpretation of the events and practices surrounding the referendum that is open to contestation as much as it is open to further development.

[4] See Glynos & Howarth (2007) pp. 18-49

Thesis Structure and Chapter Summary

Chapter 1 provides an overview of prominent theories and approaches to nationalism and their attempts to grapple with Scottish nationalism. The chapter will call attention to the key contributions of the literature as well highlighting the drawbacks and inadequacies they present which are centred around the two interconnected dimensions which we will call problems of agency and context.

Chapter 2 outlines and elaborates on a discursive approach to both understanding and researching nationalism. It will outline and problematise the approach before engaging in a critical re-assessment and evaluation of the concept of intellectual function. Utilising readings from Gramsci and Voloshinov, this chapter will put forward a reactivated conception of intellectual function as an analytical tool suitable for engaging with the problems of agency and context in nationalism studies and the Scottish independence referendum.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of Glynos & Howarth's (2007) Logics approach as a methodological framework and ethos that guides the research project. It will outline the key steps to the approach while acknowledging and addressing some objections and concerns to its application. The chapter then addresses the object of myths and its suitability for engaging with Scottish nationalism. Finally, the chapter will introduce Foucault's genealogical method to compliment the application of the Logics approach in terms of empirical engagement.

Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of Scottish constitutional and political history from 1967 to the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012 signalling the formal and legal transfer of powers allowing the Scottish Government to hold the 2014 independence referendum. This serves to orientate the reader and the research with some of the finer details of the major

developments in Scottish political history during the period as well as foregrounding the main empirical component of the genealogical analysis in the following chapter.

Chapter 5 provides a detailed engagement with several key moments during the period discussed in Chapter 4 which has strongly influenced the development of modern Scottish nationalism. The analysis here relies on various materials from contemporary writings to written histories and academic investigations. Utilising intellectual function, the research will highlight the conditions and practices that saw the emergence and constitution of several prominent myths of Scottish nationalism and the movements for devolution and subsequently independence. In doing so this chapter reconstructs the context in which Scottish nationalism has developed until the point of the 2014 referendum, whilst also revealing the intricacies of the practices and articulations of these myths in response to their context.

Finally, Chapter 6 provides a discussion and evaluation of the various practices and articulations of the dominant myths of Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014 independence referendum. The chapter highlights three campaign groups for their specific role here, Yes Scotland, National Collective and the Radical Independence Campaign. Utilising intellectual function, the chapter considers and evaluates how and why appeals and articulations to certain elements of these myths were made and the context in which certain practices were adopted for this purpose. In addition, the chapter will also consider more individual acts and the general atmosphere of the referendum campaign, similarly adopting the tool of intellectual function to gain further insights into the agency displayed through Scottish nationalism and its context.

Chapter 1 – How do you Solve a Problem like (Scottish) Nationalism?

1.1 A Nationalism of a Different Colour?

> "Bagehot says that the nation is one of those phenomena that we understand so long as we are not asked, but that we cannot explain in brief and succinct terms. But science cannot rest content with an answer of this kind; it cannot abandon the question and concept of the nation if it wants to speak of it." (Bauer, 2012: 39)

First published in 1906, Otto Bauer's *The Nation* opened with the above consideration and more than 100 years later, nationalism continues to provoke intense debate, with the phenomena being interpreted as both 'a malignant metastasis as well as under the smiling signs of identity and emancipation,' (Anderson, 1996: 1). Much ink has been spilt in political theory and political science more generally on the topic of essentially contested concepts[5] and nationalism could easily be considered one such concept with its definitions, content and prescriptions as varied and contested as the movements that are 'anointed with' or claim the nationalist moniker. As Atsuko Ichijo has effectively argued, 'since many of the terms we associate with the study of nationalism are taken from everyday language, some of these require clarification before proceeding into any meaningful analysis,' (Ichijo, 2004: 7). We will begin with some brief introductory remarks on defining the nationalism and national identity and the context of studying nationalism in Scotland.

Anthony Smith provides a useful baseline definition of the 'nation' as:

> "a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions, and values, inhabit, and are attached to

[5] See Gallie (1956)

> historical territories or 'homelands', create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardized laws." (Smith, 2009: 29)

Following from this definition of the nation, Michael Keating has argued that 'nationalism' can be understood as 'doctrine of self-determination; yet the definition of the group entitled to self-determination and under which conditions is still hotly contested,' (Keating, 2001: 1). To this understanding it can be added that nationalism is not simply 'shared sentiment or consciousness but an active movement inspired by ideology and symbolism of the nation,' (Smith, 2009: 61). Aside from general definitions and clarifications that we may make, some scholars have argued that the heterogeneity of the national phenomenon defies mono-causal explanations; others go as far as to suggest that there is no valid explanatory theory of nationalism, only several ways of describing and comparing the various forms that nationalist politics have taken; and there are those who warn against efforts to minimize the differences between various conceptions of the nation in the interests of political neutrality or explanatory simplicity, (Nimni, 1991: 3; Breuilly, 1993: 338; Benner, 2018: 22). These are all pertinent points that we will keep in mind throughout this engagement with nationalism studies.

It has become something of a tradition in the study of Scottish nationalism to suggest at the outset that there is something different about it, a nationalism of a different colour as it were; resulting in Scottish nationalism commonly being referred to as 'the dog that did not bark,' (Nairn, 1981; Morton, 1999; McCrone, 2001; Ichijo, 2013). This has contributed to the development of a rich and varied literature; however, this has also led to the development of a theoretically and empirically sterile environment. Whether or not Scottish nationalism is in fact a nationalism of a different colour is not of interest here; rather the current chapter is concerned with how and why this conception has become the dominant interpretation, and what are the consequences for 'imagining' Scottish nationalism in this way. In addition,

despite the curiosity surrounding Scottish nationalism as a general phenomenon, studies on its specific nature and expression during the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum are surprisingly thin on the ground and limited in their scope.

There are multiple levels of abstraction to navigate in this sense. On one level, there is a consideration of the wider theories of nationalism and on another, is their application and relevance to the Scottish case and context: both in terms of Scottish nationalism and politics more generally and specifically within the context of the 2014 Independence referendum. The literature on Scottish nationalism is varied and draws from several traditions and theories. The predominant approach to studying Scottish nationalism and Scottish national identity has tended to come from a Modernist perspective (Soule *et al*, 2012: 4), however, there are also strong and noteworthy contributions from Ethno-symbolism. The chapter will also address Marxist contributions before considering Social Constructivist approaches which have found fertile ground for development, though their engagements with Scottish nationalism and the 2014 referendum are more limited. The discussions that follow outline the key contributions of these respective traditions to both nationalism studies and their applications to the Scottish case whilst also highlighting their shortcomings with regards to accommodating agency and context in their accounts. Through these engagements, the chapter argues that there is scope for a more dynamic approach to engaging with nationalism both as a general concept and in its specific manifestations than is currently offered. The chapter will conclude by suggesting that contributions from Social Constructivist theory are best suited for development of an appropriate approach to nationalism that privileges agency and context in its applications.

1.2 Modernism: The Break-Up of Britain?

The development of the modernist account of nationalism has been largely credited to and influenced by Ernest Gellner's influential analysis in *Thought and Change* (1964), and its subsequent refinement and development in later texts.[6] The core of Gellner's theory is that nationalism is a phenomenon 'connected not with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but with their uneven diffusions which in turn have generated sharp social stratifications,' (Gellner, 1964: 166). In the first instance, 'a modern society is growth driven and features a complex division of labour, whilst it is also a society open to rapid change and increased occupational mobility,' (Gellner, 1973: 6). Here Gellner stressed the role of the intelligentsia in the production and maintenance of a shared culture and later revised that 'a shared minimum of literacy and numeracy could not be inculcated by traditional units and required elaborate public education systems,' (Gellner, 1973: 10). As a result, the passing of knowledge relied on a standardised and regulated education system which taught loyalty to the modern culture, which only the modern nation state was competent and sophisticated enough to sustain, (Gellner, 1983: 26; Smith, 1998).[7] This cultural production was itself a form of nationalism in the sense that the linguistic culture of the state was and would continue to be taught as a symbol or aspiration of the nation.

Where several distinct cultures may exist, adherence to the common linguistic culture of the state overrode the differences between them, preventing conflict. Gellner uses the analogy of a child playing with multicoloured plasticine, which, over time becomes an indistinct grey mass, and while there are still some definable colours, they are gradual and non-extreme and

[6] See Gellner (1973) & (1983)

[7] Benedict Anderson (2016) employs a similar logic and line of argument regarding the role of print capital and media in *Imagined Communities.*

therefore acceptable, (Gellner, 1964; 1973: 12). Social conflicts arise where differences are not so easily assimilated into the common culture of the state and such markers can then be excluded, with skin colour and religious differences being the most common examples, (Gellner, 1964; 1973). For Gellner, this was the result of the hypothetical tidal wave of modernisation striking two territories in succession (A & B); 'the fact that the wave strikes A first results in the situation that when the misery of B is at its height, A is re-approaching affluence,' (Gellner, 1964:166).[8] Nationalism then develops from the desire to participate in 'the modern, growth driven world, as it is the only means with which to be accepted and treated as an equal,' (Gellner, 1973: 15). The disadvantaged territories then attempt to construct their own 'high' culture and standardised medium that they are taught to communicate, which becomes the core of the loyalty to the 'new' nation, (Gellner, 1983: 57; Smith, 1998: 34). To briefly summarise, from a modernist perspective, 'nationalism invents nations where they do not exist for the purposes of participation and acceptance in a growth orientated modernised world, though it does require differentiating raw materials to work on, even if these materials are purely negative in nature,' (Gellner, 1964: 168).

One of the most influential accounts to take up the modernisation thesis and apply it to the Scottish case was developed by Tom Nairn in a series of essays later collected and published in *The Break-Up of Britain* (1981).[9] Nairn argued that the nationalisms of the 19th century were modernising ideologies, developed by middle-class intelligentsia to mobilise mass populations against the uneven developments of capitalism, (Jackson, 2020: 71; Nairn, 1981). The conventional wisdom was that Scotland should have seen a nationalist movement develop

[8] See Gellner (1964) pp. 166-168 for the full discussion of this example.

[9] I cannot do justice to progression and intricacies of Nairn's thought here given the constraints of the chapter and thesis more generally. What follows in this section is a brief sketch of the key points in Nairn's thought and we will return to the more explicitly Marxist/socialist elements in a later section of this chapter. For an excellent and detailed account of Nairn's intellectual journey and development see Jackson (2020) Chp.3 Britain in Decline

during this period but did not. For Nairn, this was the result of two factors: Scotland's relative overdevelopment and the mass emigration of her intelligentsia. As Nairn explains, 'where other nations had to think away millennia of oblivion and 'invent' the nation, Scotland could remember the reality of sovereignty and had preserved many of its cultural, legal, and religious institutions,' (Nairn, 1981: 105-6). These institutions came to be responsible for what in today's terms would be regarded as social policy. For example, 'the Kirk[10] governed school curriculum and provided local aid; local burghs regulated trade, levies, and taxation, while prominent landlords saw to the upkeep of infrastructures,' (Brown *et al*, 1998: 5). Consequently, there was no 'real' material dilemma of underdevelopment apparent for the Scottish middle-class and intelligentsia to tap into, (Nairn, 1981: 117). This contributed to a mass intellectual migration, seeking the benefits and fortunes associated with the expansion of the British Empire, and the English language being the 'preferred mode of communication for and so there were few barriers to participation in the 'British' mode of modernisation,' (Anderson, 2016: 90). As such, members of this 'émigré intelligentsia were strong advocates of the British model and while a Scottish consciousness was strong, there was no political need for a national movement,' (Davidson, 2014: 11).

Nairn would subsequently turn his attention to 'neo-nationalisms', which he argued 'occurred at a later stage of modernisation, where a territory suffers from relative deprivation and is drawn to political action, but the function and purpose of nationalists movements here differs greatly,' (Nairn, 1981: 128). Nairn would further argue that nationalism's ambivalent nature was an expression of its '*raison d'être*, that is, through nationalism, societies seek to propel themselves towards a certain goal *by a certain sort of regression* and inward focus on

[10] Common shorthand name for Church of Scotland.

indigenous cultural resources,' (Narin, 1981: 348).[11] This led Nairn to characterise nationalism as 'Janus faced'. 'Thus, does nationalism stand over the passage to modernity for human society. As humankind is forced through its doorway it must look desperately back into the past, to gather strength wherever it can be found for the ordeal of development,' (Narin, 1981: 348-9). Nairn explains that 'society calls upon its latent energies, assuming these will subside once no longer required. However, once these well-springs had been tapped, there is no guarantee these energies could be controlled beyond doing what they were intended,' (Nairn, 1981: 349). In sum, Nairn saw nationalism as the result of modernisation and its uneven effects. To this end, nationalism makes use of the past and cultural materials to brace for the upheavals of modernisation or the attainment of a particular social or political end. Scotland presents an anomaly to this framework in the sense that despite fertile ground for nationalism, no movement emerged, and the Scottish nationalism beginning to emerge at the time of Nairn's writings were better described as 'neo-nationalism' whose function and purpose, claimed Nairn, had more in common with anti-colonial struggles than classical nationalism.

Squaring the Circle? Critiques of Modernism

Having briefly outlined the key contributions of Modernist theory and Nairn's attempts to translate this to the Scottish experience, we now move to considering the critiques and shortcomings of the approach, both more generally and specifically in relation to their applications to the Scottish case. The objections here are centred around functionalist tendencies, the role of intelligentsia and the focus of such approaches, all of which relate back to our central concerns regarding context and agency in studies of nationalism.

[11] Emphasis in Original.

A common objection raised against modernism is that nationalism is ‘too complex to be explained by a single factor (i.e., economic development)’ (Özkirimli, 2010: 123). For example, modernism tends to ‘reverse the normal direction of explanation, seeing the end state of processes as somehow responsible for their occurrence, glossing over any difficulties or contradictions,’ (Day & Thompson, 2004: 53). As such, modernist arguments are often presented so broadly and generally that they cannot cope with the complexity of actual existing nationalisms and the relevant features of their social and political environments, (Day & Thompson, 2004; Breuilly, 1993). To a certain extent, this tendency can be explained through the fact that Gellner was more concerned with nationalism’s role in integrating modern societies, but there ‘remains a need to avoid universal forms that can be contained within a single explanation,’ (Day & Thompson, 2004: 54). The objections raised above demonstrate clear reservations with regards to the difficulty modernist theory has faced with the complexity of actual existing nationalisms. Nairn’s attempt to rework Gellner’s formulations given the specific context of Scottish politics and society of the time can be seen as a clear example of this.

This ‘functionalist’ dimension of modernist thought leads Breuilly to argue that we are still left asking ‘why nationalism serves the function that it does? The argument that nationalism helps in the process of modernisation does not in itself explain why nationalism helps in this way,’ (Breuilly, 1993: 419). Critics use this line of critique to argue that Gellner portrayed nationalism in ways that are alien to experience. ‘Compared to the passion and dedication it provokes, Gellner’s vision of a well-defined, educationally sanctioned, and unified culture is remarkably bloodless,’ (Day & Thompson, 2004: 53). Alongside the objection raised above on the grounds of context, we can add some questions regarding the agency of nationalism. Why does nationalism play the role of modernisation? To a certain extent this is answered

through the creation of unified culture, however, what both Gellner and Nairn fail to elaborate is how nationalism performs this role in specific contexts? In addition, why nationalism? Why is nationalism privileged as *the* agent of modernisation from among the pool of social and political phenomenon we observe? While Gellner's formulation can offer an explanation in terms of what nationalism is, it is insufficient for addressing how and why nationalism operates in the specific and differential ways that we observe.

Anthony Smith argues that 'modernism too often identifies the structural conditions which encourage nationalism but stop short of discussion of the content of these nationalist movements,' (Smith, 2009: 26). For example, Scottish modernist David McCrone goes as far as to suggest that 'it is not the content of a box that matters so much as the box itself or at least the space that it marks out and while it may appear odd to favour context over specific and particular content, the latter runs risk of essentialising the nation itself,' (McCrone, 2001: 185). In the sense 'modernist approaches underestimate the significance of local cultural and social contexts, where what determines the intensity character and scope of nationalism is the interaction between mechanisms of modernisation and the local variants, not the mechanisms alone, which tell us little about the emergence, scope and political goals of these various nationalisms,' (Smith, 1995; Özkirimli, 2010). We can also point here to Smith's characterisation of national identity as chameleon-like, 'taking its colour from its context and capable of endless manipulation. Though we should guard against reading each specific instance of nationalism (i.e., the colour it takes on) as a specific generalised nationalism as each specific nationalism changes according to its respective contexts,' (Mitchell, 2014: 2). To suggest that content and structure are separate and distinct elements of nationalism is a naïve proposition. As Stuart Hall has argued, 'once conjecture unrolls, there is no going back, history shifts gears, and the terrain or structure has changed, and we arrive at a new moment,'

(Hall, 1988: 162). Again, we return here to issues of context and agency. The socio-political structures that influence the development and content of nationalism are as fluid and prone to change just as much as the content or colour that any given nationalism may take. In this sense, understanding the context of those structures and how they came to be in place is vitally important to understanding the manifestation of nationalism. Likewise, with regards to agency, what do people knowingly and unknowingly engage with when it concerns the nation? What are the passions, ideals, and structures that nationalism interacts with and how do political subjects in turn interact with these? In reducing nationalism to the outcome of economic processes, beyond the control and comprehension of people, returns us to the question of why nationalism out of the myriad of socio-political phenomena that could serve this role. In addition, modernist accounts leave us questioning how and why people engage and interact with nationalism, and how nationalism itself influences the conduct of these interactions.

A consequence of the above modernist assumptions to the Scottish application 'has been to stresses the role of public institutions and people's participations in and with the public culture,' (Soule *et al*, 2012: 5). Modernists often characterise Scottish nationalism as an example of civic as opposed to ethnic nationalism in the sense that 'it is the participation in, not possession of civil institutions that marks Scottish nationalism as civic,' (Keating, 2001: 233). Put another way, 'members of the political community do not share civil institutions as we might share a dram of whisky, but in the shared experience, in the way that a dining table is common to those seated around it,' (Parekh, 1994: 501-2). A popular method employed by modernist studies to substantiate this claim is the use of Moreno-style question in surveys, which asks individuals to self-measure their levels of Scottishness in contrast to Britishness. This method has been particularly useful and productive since it allows for mass sentiment to

be framed in terms of support for policy and preferences as a means of describing them as distinctly Scottish, (Leith & Soule, 2011; Leith, 2012). For example, Brown *et al* (1998); McCrone (2001) and Keating (2001) all utilise mass survey evidence as a means of measuring and assessing identity and policy preference, which in turn allows modernists to claim that nationalist arguments are focused more on practical policy solutions and institutional configurations, making it one of the least romantic nationalist movements,' (Keating, 2001: 221). Several studies of the 2014 referendum follow this trend, for example, Curtice (2014); Henderson & Mitchell (2015) and Henderson *et al* (2022) provide in-depth breakdowns of the referendum vote and the influence of identity on voter choice and preferences. Similarly, Botterill *et al* (2016) note clear identification with the 'open, inclusive, and civic nature of Scottish nationalism during the referendum in minority groups in opposition to England with some subtle discontinuities,' (Botterill *et al*, 2016: 127-9).

There are two issues that this style of analysis presents with regards to Scottish nationalism. First is 'the tendency to emphasise what can be easily measured as opposed to what might be theoretically important', and second, is a further tendency to focus on 'readily observable phenomenon (i.e., voting) rather than deeper structural forces at play in a given society,' (Sanders, 1995: 65-6). The strength of such approaches is that they offer snapshots of a given time; however, they are less attuned to the mediating effects of social and political currents that shape and frame the way people both see and engage with their environment. We can highlight here a clear issue with regards to context, in the sense that we may well be able to provide some information regarding attitudes and preferences, but the consequence being that these are removed from the specificity of the moment in which they were expressed. That is to say, they are static and less capable of accounting for and explaining how and why people come to identify with certain positions, values, or images or why they change over time.

These blind spots arise from core assumptions of rational choice, ‘where it is not easy, if at all possible, to have even a basic understanding of actor’s motivations and perceptions, and so rationality must be imputed by the researcher and in most cases after the fact,’ (Özkirimli, 2010: 124). The consequence of empirically mapping popular sentiment onto constitutional preference is that it becomes ‘extraordinarily difficult to account for the preferences of specific individuals, groups, or state directly and thus such research tends to shy away from these issues, both theoretically and empirically,’ (Sanders, 1995: 66). As a result, modernist approaches and assumptions often exclude or underestimate the affective power of things like nationalism or individual actors in shaping the acceptable limits and agenda of discourse. The matching of certain policy positions and preferences to strength of feeling in terms of national identity would seem to be a clear example of ‘imputing’ rationality into possible motivations and preferences in such a way that underestimates the power and influence of both the agency of nationalism as a political phenomenon and people’s agency in interacting with it.

Despite the sophisticated nature of modernism, it struggles to address the role of elites in the selection and mobilisation of ethnic and national identity. People are not passive recipients of rhetoric, and they have reasons for identifying and adopting identities and preferences. By reducing identity to interests, modernism makes a categorical error which conflates what people want with what they aspire to, (Özkirimli, 2010: 129-130; O’Leary, 2001: 150-1). This is evident in Keating’s assertion that ‘civic nationalism tends to start from the individual and builds up to the nation, rather than deriving individual rights and duties from common nationality,’ (Keating. 2001:7). Similarly with regards to the 2014 referendum, Hild (2016) noted that ‘SNP leaders and prominent Yes Scotland figures actively encouraged and were consistent in pushing forward a vision of Scotland defined as a civic nation, ‘implying that Scottish national identity was defined as a socio-political identity, equating Scottishness with

a specific set of socially progressive and egalitarian values, keeping with the rhetoric of civic nationalism,' (Hild, 2016: 157-8). However, as Breuilly argues, 'to see nationalist politics and sentiments as the work and achievements of the intelligentsia or broader political movements has little value as the emergence of national sentiments is related to far more complex processes than the simple diffusion of doctrine from its intellectual creators,' (Breuilly, 2012: 147). This is a pertinent point considering that civic nationalism as understood in the Scottish context seemingly denies the multiplicity of referential elements that individuals interact with. In this sense agency is crucial to the operation of nationalism in the sense of how individuals interact with one another and their contextual environment, and what they take from these interactions can tell us a great deal about national identity and preference formation in each instance.

What we have seen here through engaging with modernist theory, is an approach that has greatly influenced the understanding of Scottish nationalism as well as influencing they ways in which it has been studied, and inherent in the approach is an assumption the nationalism and the nation is to some degree constructed which provides a useful base and distinction. However, despite these advancements, modernist theory suffers from a series of complications related to its assumptions of nationalism as a concept and its role as a socio-political phenomenon that is insufficiently attuned to addressing issues of context and agency. Furthermore, this initial foray into the literature has shone a light on how these two elements are not separate in a strict sense, but rather are intimately connected and crucial for furthering our understandings of Scottish nationalism. We will now move to discuss contributions from ethno-symbolism, which whilst offering their own unique critiques and contributions, will be shown to suffer from similar blind spots as modernism.

1.3 Ethno-Symbolism: Scots Wha Hae![12]

While the modernism can be considered as the orthodox and dominant approach to studying and engaging with nationalism, alternative accounts have been built in part in response to the critiques raised above. Anthony D. Smith has argued that 'modernism and ethno-symbolism agree on several points, ranging from the status of nations as real and dynamic sociological communities to their contextual specificity,' (Smith, 2009: 14). However, whilst ethno-symbolism accepts the modernity of nations, it stresses that the 'emergence of nations cannot be sufficiently understood without recognising the ethnic groups that have preceded it and that the ethnic and nation form a continuum where it is not the form, but the persistent group perceptions and sentiments that matter,' (Smith, 1998; Leith & Soule, 2011). For example, where modernist conceptions of civic nationalism stress the role of common values, practice, and civil society; ethno-symbolists stress the importance of cultural history and long memory in the formation of national identity and movements. In this sense, 'modern nationalisms tap into the symbolic structures of pre-existing communal memory even if the territory associated with those memories does not correspond to the boundaries of the modern nation,' (Craig, 2018: 34). Therefore, while ethno-symbolic approaches accept the modern emergence of nationalism, they also argue that nations are not simply 'invented' in the modern era, rather they rely on a variety of materials and symbols drawn from pre-modern 'ethnic' communities.

Taking Scotland for example, throughout its history, various peoples, and tribes have made the territory which is now Scotland their home: Picts; Scots; Gaels; Normans; Norse, all of whom brought their own cultures, languages, and traditions. Furthermore, 'Scots can just as

[12] English Translation: 'Scots Who Have' – Title of a poem/song written by Robert Burns whose lyrics are styled as a speech delivered by Robert the Bruce before the Battle of Bannockburn 1314 (Which was about a quarter past 1 I believe!)

easily recall the medieval Wars of Independence just as readily and affectionately as the writings of the Enlightenment or the more contemporary legends of Red Clydeside and anti-Thatcher traditions,' (Ichijo, 2004; Leith & Soule, 2011). Ethno-symbolism therefore argues that this produces a conception of a nation's existence beyond modernity, 'but a prolonged historical memory must be given shape and form and there are strict limits which are set by the cultures of the public in question, their language, law, music etc,' (Smith, 1998: 129). Smith argues that it is unlikely that most people would be duped by propaganda or ritual unless they expressed and amplified pre-existing popular sentiment. But not any element can form the basis of nationalism, it must hold some prior resonance to make it viable for inclusion in a nation's new political culture, (Smith, 1998: 130; 2009: 31). Thus, the nation does not simply emerge out of modernity, but feeds off prevalent popular sentiment and utilises this to political ends.

Two exemplar applications of the ethno-symbolist perspective in the Scottish case are worth highlighting here. The first is Graeme Morton's *Unionist Nationalism* (1999). Morton rejects the notion that 'nationalism must equate to independence and instead defined nationalism as an articulation of the desire to improve one's standing within a larger framework,' (Ichijo, 2013: 58). Similarly to Nairn, Morton argued that the autonomous status of Scottish civil society and subsequent benefits it received from the Union, 'meant the middle class had no reason to pursue independence, rather it sought Scottish equality within the Union,' (Morton, 1999: 138). In addition, Morton argued that 'incorporation into the British state was as much a threat to 'mental as opposed to national independence, and so Scotland marched on England in terms of mind and intelligence,' (Morton, 1999: 175). Far from being 'absent' as Nairn claimed, Morton argues that the Scottish intelligentsia were busy maintaining and enhancing a

distinctive Scottish identity.[13] For example, the 1800s saw the construction of several monuments to prominent Scottish 'heroes' such as the Wallace Monument in Stirling and the Walter Scott Monument and partly built National Monument of Scotland in Edinburgh. 'While Scots were not itching for statehood, they were concerned with who they were and working to maintain aspects of Scottish identity,' (Ichijo, 2013: 58). In addition, Cairns Craig notes that 'Walter Scott's presentation of Scotland's past in his novels were designed to discount its contemporary significance and ease the path by which Scots were integrated into the British model,' (Craig, 2018: 74). Scott became an icon of Scottish self-definition in the sense that he had made Scotland not only recognisable, but important in British, European, and imperial culture.[14] In this way, the activities described above were not guided towards assimilation with the British state, rather they served to promote Scotland's continued national existence and importance within the Union and the wider developed world, (Morton, 1999; Craig, 2018). The thrust of Morton's critique was that analysis of Scottish national identity and nationalism focusing on parliamentary activity and political membership while valid can only produce a partial answer to the problem of Scotland's 'missing' nationalism, and so, 'in developing the concept of unionist nationalism, Morton attempted to root the language of identity and nationalism to its sociological moorings,' (Morton, 2008: 130).

A further account that utilises the ethno-symbolic approach with regards to Scottish nationalism is provided in several pieces by Atsuko Ichijo. Much of Ichijo's work has developed around asking the question 'when is the nation?' This leads Ichijo to formulate a

[13] See Morton (1999) pp. 155-188 for his full discussion.

[14] For example, the prominent role Scott played in the visit of King George IV to Scotland in 1822 and the subsequent 'tartan pageantry' this involved. The visit of George IV was the first time that a reigning British/Scottish monarch had set foot in Scotland since the coronation of Charles II as King of Scots in 1651. The visit would go on to play a significant role in the 'revival' and popularity of the 'highlands' culture among the nobility and upper classes. A feat all the more fascinating given that the kilt had been banned (with the exception of armed forces) for 35 years in the aftermath of the 1745 Jacobite rebellion as a means of supressing highland culture.

theoretical understanding of nationalism in the sense that it 'highlights the differences in understanding formed concerning the question what is the nation? providing insights into the roles and ideas that nations and nationhood play, setting up the possibility of addressing 'why is the nation?' (Ichijo, 2002: 72). To this end, Ichijo has explored the relationship between Scotland and Europe, arguing that this relationship has been justified by referring to the historical experience; the Auld Alliance with France and the sending of children to the continent for further education are presented as evidence of Scotland's affinity to Europe. In this way Scotland's past is rediscovered, reinterpreted, and utilised to support conceptions of Scoto-European relations, (Ichijo, 2004). Crucially, Ichijo argues that 'Europe is more a tool to differentiate Scotland from England and so ponderings of Scoto-European relations are an activity of identity building and maintenance aided by a wealth of historical memory,' (Ichijo, 2004: 132). Ichijo has also utilised Morton's unionist nationalism concept when investigating the effects of devolution in 1999 on the articulation of national identity by political elites within unionist discourses and utterances. Utilising speeches as well as parliamentary debates, Ichijo argues that, as a result of the devolution process, claims that Scotland's interests are best served in the Union have a concrete and institutional expression, which has broken down the old dichotomy of nationalism/unionism in such a way that there a now multiple contrasting yet legitimate ways in which to express Scottish national identity. (Ichijo, 2012: 35)

Whose Past? And to what End? Critiques of Ethno-symbolism

Like modernism, ethno-symbolism has also been subject to critique across a range of positions and perspectives, many of which are shared, and as we will demonstrate below, the complications raised stem from a lack of attention to agency and context. A first complication we can raise is the over exaggeration of elites. For example, Smith argues that most

nationalisms are ‘led by intellectuals and/or professionals and are the main purveyors and disseminators of national ideals and so their role is pivotal else the national movement will disintegrate,’ (Smith, 1998: 56-7). Likewise, Leith & Soule (2011) argue that ‘national political elites in Scotland employ nationalist symbols and myths to support their political programmes and other commentaries from political leaders are abound with symbolic statements and national myths,’ (Leith & Soule, 2011: 41).[15] As will be recalled from above, ethno-symbolists argue that the selection, reconstruction, and reinterpretation of ethnic materials has limits. However, this is where enquiry should begin, not end. ‘Who does the selecting? What is considered authentic and for what purpose? Which materials are selected, and in what ways are these reinterpreted and to what extent?’ (Özkirimli, 2003: 347). For example, the suggestion in the accounts above, is that Scott’s invention of the historical novel was an expression of ‘anti-history in that history is not a neutral medium, but the rhetorical means by which to construct a narrative of the past in accordance with the values of the present,’ (Craig, 2018: 125). That ethno-symbolism reduces the selection and shaping of national symbols to the preferences and goals of elites means that it ‘cannot address the wider context and outcomes of such machinations and mobilisations of national symbols and myths, which risks drifting towards an agency-less approach to and account of nationalism,’ (Conversi, 2007: 25).

Following this theme, ethno-symbolism’s elite centrism results a failure to account for the emotional appeal and passions associated with nationalism and national identity. As Guibernau argues, ‘members of a nation tend to feel proud of their roots and the selective use of history produces a collective memory filled with moments and experiences which increases

[15] See also these other works from the same authors that continue this focus of elite driven nationalist discourses in Scotland for further examples: Soule et al (2012) & Leith (2012)

self-esteem and feelings of belonging,' (Guibernau, 2004: 137). This is clear in Ichijo's work where she finds Scottish past and symbols have been frequently employed to signal Scottish alignment with continental Europe as well as distinction from England. What matters then is not the presence or existence of ancient pasts or symbols, but their selection and applications, or 'how they are used and abused and to what ends?' (Özkirimli, 2003: 347). How people engage with nationalist symbols and discourses and to what end is a key concern here, or to put this slightly differently, 'the way people respond to the appeals of nationalist ideals and figures is largely influenced by the socio-politico and cultural context and so there is a danger that we can take the idea of resonance for granted,' (Özkirimli, 2003: 349). What is required is a shift in focus from a macro-level of analysis to the micro-level, to the experience of people and individuals in relation to nationalism and the materials it employs, rather than generalised and abstracted engagements. From this position, 'there is nothing inevitable about how people respond to nationalism and the conditions under which national myths and symbols appeal and are used to appeal to people must be identified and explored,' (Ozkirmili, 2003: 350). Again, we see here how significant agency and context are to approaching nationalism, and that these elements must be considered as mutually dependent and accounts of nationalism that neglects these elements of the phenomenon can only ever offer a partial evaluation of its applications and affective power.

Smith has noted that the 'complex interplay of factors and models usually results in two or more visions of national destiny competing for political influence at any given moment, especially in times of perceived crisis or decline,' (Smith, 2009: 39). For example, Torrance (2018) has utilised Morton's Unionist Nationalism concept to argue that the Scottish Unionist Party (1912-1965) adopted a form of 'nationalist unionism', which while modern, 'had deeper ethno-symbolic roots, repeatedly drawing on the myths and symbols of previous epochs, with

the Union seen as something that explicitly protected Scottish distinctiveness,' (Torrance, 2018: 182). In this way, Scottish nationalism has spoken with several voices, 'but those voices told a story of Scottish identity and the nation's place not only within the UK but in a changing world,' (Torrance, 2017: 52). A similar theme is raised by Jonathan Hearn in relation to experiences of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum in that people can be defined by ethnicity, language, and history almost indefinitely; and in the case of Scotland, 'politics more generally is characterised by competing nationalisms, each advocating their own preferred conception of Scotland and its best interests,' (Hearn, 2014: 508). Similarly, and in a more explicitly ethno-symbolist inspired approach, Whigham has argued that the discourse of the SNP during the 2014 referendum campaign strongly resonated with the ethno-symbolist theoretical perspective, emphasising the ancient ethnic roots of the Scottish nation to normalise their contemporary vision of an independent Scotland, (Whigham, 2019; Whigham, 2023).

Despite these acknowledgements, this appears to undermine ethno-symbolist accounts on the grounds that we are left asking which narrative or vision is the 'authentic' narrative? For example, 'if sources of national identity are to be found in popular culture and sentiments and then who discovers the authentic out of the plurality? In addition, if the realisation of national identity requires active interventions of elites, then why such an emphasis on popular culture or the past at expense of the present?' (Ozkirmili, 2003: 351). Kerr (2019) raises a similar critique based on a thought experiment in the form of a knockout tournament where each participant is defined by a distinctive ethnic marker. The nature of the competition varies from round to round, and the outcomes of brackets can be determined by chance, skill, or strength, but unless one can demonstrate a causal mechanism in each bracket, continuity cannot be related to any one dominant element or marker, (Breuilly, 2005; Kerr, 2019). To

put this slightly differently, ‘whilst there are things to be gleaned from the past, this is incidental next to the purpose for which it is used for,’ (Kerr, 2019: 113). The objections raised here relates to the ability or possibility that nationalism and more broadly national identity is malleable and subject to machinations of both individuals, collectives as well as the socio-economic conditions in which it operates. How is engaging with what elements, why have they chosen these over a myriad of alternatives and for what purposes? This brings us back to our key concerns regarding agency and context. The abstracted nature of ethno-symbolist accounts occludes the possibility of choice as well as the condition in which these choices are made. Taking Hearn’s comments above as an example, if people are defined by a variety of markers and Scottish politics characterised by competing nationalisms, which of these markers were being employed at any given time, how were they being articulated with one side and under what conditions were such practices happening? Without sufficient recognition of the roles of agency and context, ethno-symbolism falls short in answering these questions.

A final complication that we can raise here is the tendency of ethno-symbolist accounts to reify the nation. Day & Thompson note that this stems from conceiving the nation as ‘a unified, culturally homogenous entity, which has come under increasing criticism by social theorists who stress that the nation is always subject to contestation, especially in terms of ‘who’ it belongs to,’ (Day & Thompson, 2004: 83). Reading nations in this way means that ethno-symbolist conceives nationalism as ‘nothing more than ideological forms which obscure deeper underlying objectivities which may be revealed by drawing away the veil of manipulation which they seem to construct,’ (Norval, 1996; Özkirimli, 2010). Ethno-symbolism’s apparent ‘rejection of symbolically constituted forms of nationalist identification in favour of uncovering some objective reality is problematic in that it claims to a realm of

truth alien to those who engage in the construction of their own identities,' (Norval, 1996: 62). The consequence being that ethno-symbolism tends to 'accept myths and symbols at face value, treating large-scale social actors as if they are representative of singular and recognisable wills. As such naked ethno-symbolism cannot do justice to specific complexities within nationalism,' (Conversi, 2007; Özkirimli, 2010). Taking Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014 referendum as the case in point here, why has a particular narrative or any specific variant of the nationalist narrative come to dominate in that specific setting? This can only be addressed within specific 'contexts of local history, the nature of the contemporary environment, and the potential and actual competitions over the narrative of the nation and national identity,' (Calhoun, 1997: 25).

While sharing several assumptions on nationalism as modernist approaches, ethno-symbolism has found fertile ground as an alternative explanation of the nationalist phenomenon that seeks to incorporate more socio-cultural elements into its accounts which are vital to engaging with the topic. Several applications of this thesis have proven influential in the study and understanding of Scottish nationalism, however, as wee have demonstrated above, ethno-symbolist accounts suffer from similar complications to modernism in that their accounts often occlude the roles and significance of agency and context to engagement with nationalism. These are rooted in ethno-symbolism's tendency to reify the nation as well as the emphasis on the role of elites. Both complications further highlight the co-dependent nature of context and agency in the theorising of nationalism and nationalist politics, and while we may make use of ideas of cultural elements, we must do so in a way that puts context and agency at their heart.

1.4 Marxism: The Case for a Left-Wing (Scottish) Nationalism?

Marxists approaches are often criticised for their failings in relation to nationalism, with Nairn going as far as to argue that nationalism represented 'Marxism's greatest historical failure, both in terms of theory and political practice,' (Nairn, 1981: 329). This is not to say that Marxists perspectives and analysis have not attempted to engage with nationalism and there have been efforts to re-evaluate this supposed failure. For example, Erica Benner considers that 'neither Marx or Engels were able to devise theories capable of explaining the relationships between national liberation and democratically inspired demands, not least because no one at the time saw the two as an interconnected element of an overarching phenomena,' (Benner, 2018: 16). Therefore, when considering Marx & Engels' engagements with nationalism, 'it is probably best to situate them within the politics of their day, they were men of the times, they were not disembodied; and they were politicians, not sociologists,' (Munck, 2010: 45). There are however several elements of Marxist theory developed in relation to nationalism that are worth noting in their applications both generally and to the Scottish case.

Statements in the Communist Manifesto such as "The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not," have led to an assumption that Marx & Engels assumed 'that class and national consciousness were mutually exclusive forms of identification and so dismissed national manifestations as false consciousness,' (Benner, 2018; Marx & Engels, 2002). However, as Benner highlights, Marx & Engels would go on to 'unequivocally state that no effective international action could be taken by the proletariat before they had brought class struggle to a head at the national level,' (Benner, 2018: 49).[16]

[16] See Marx & Engels (2002) pp. 223-4 & 241 for examples of passages that have been highlighted as clearly demonstrating Marx & Engels internationalist outlooks and the

Benner further comments that most English-speaking readers are not aware that Marx & Engels do not disavow nations, rather, their 'evaluative distinction is not between national and international classes, but between conservative class-statist forms of nationality and national movements aimed at social transformations on the other,' (Benner, 2018: 54). This leads us to consider Marx & Engels' understanding of the emergence and development of the modern nation-state. As Nimni (1989) summarises, for Marx & Engels, the modern nation was 'the direct outcome of feudalism being superseded by capitalism, causing profound changes in social organisation and encouraged social formations to evolve on a linguistic basis,' (Nimni, 1989: 299). This is what Nimni has described as the pattern "State-Language-Nation", where social transformations initiated by capitalism required new mediums of communication, which Marx & Engels argued was the role adopted by Western European languages, emerging to consolidate recognisable cultural and political units into "modern nations, (Nimni, 1985; 1989). This allowed Marx & Engels to distinguish between modern and ancient nations on two criteria: 1) modern nations must hold a sufficient population to allow for division of labour; 2) modern nations must occupy a cohesive and sufficiently large territory to allow for a viable state, (Nimni, 1989; 1991). This leads Day & Thompson to comment that there was not a single definitive answer to the national question, and unlike class movements, decisions on the viability and support for national movements required careful consideration in terms of their utility to advancing working class interests,' (Day & Thompson, 2004: 24).

A significant break from this orthodoxy worth raising here comes from Otto Bauer. As Nimni argues, 'Bauer's purpose was to try and understand the national community as a discrete unit and the result of complex ensemble of social forces, elaborating a theory which was capable of grasping the nature of the national phenomenon as a dynamic process of transformation and change,' (Nimni, 1991: 146). From this standpoint, Bauer's understood national character

‘as a historically modifiable characteristic which culturally links members of a national community…And as with any other social characteristic, the national character is modifiable by historical forces,’ (Nimni, 1991: 148-9). For Day & Thompson, Bauer, was arguing that the maintenance of nationality was not incompatible with economic development or the needs of socialism ‘since socialism would strip national culture of its class connotations and conflict, thus allowing for their coexistence without loss of distinctiveness,’ (Day & Thompson, 2004: 35). This explanation resonates with Marx & Engels’ understanding that through the development and interaction of language and literatures, an international working-class language may develop. However, Bauer warned against the imposition of one species of socialism over others, rather, ‘any international movement must take national differentiation into account seeing that it is the promotion of international unity within national diversity,’ (Özkirimli, 2010: 22). Bauer’s argument then is that ‘the nation’ constitutes a social phenomenon in that the qualities that appear as distinguishing features are social products, and by this reasoning national character and by extension nationalism is not an explanation, but something to be explained, (Nimni, 1991; Day & Thompson, 2004).

Marxist accounts have proven highly influential to understandings of Scottish nationalism with ‘the pages of the New Left Review seemingly an unlikely location for the intellectual origins of modern Scottish Nationalism, yet this journal of rigorous Marxist analysis has just as strong a claim to that title as any other,’ (Jackson, 2020: 63). As discussed above, Nairn’s work drew heavily on Gellner’s modernist approach, but his initial forays and contemplations drew heavily from the Marxist tradition and some of these contributions are worth examining here. It is important to note that Nairn’s position and line of thought on nationalism and more specifically Scottish nationalism was not static, with subsequent essays and discussions documenting ‘a complex intellectual journey that was characterised by an increasingly

sympathetic interpretation of and attitude towards Scottish nationalism,' (Jackson, 2020: 71). Nairn's most explicit and coherent Marxist understanding of nationalism was set out in the essay *Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism*. Nairn argued that the nationalism of the SNP in the late 1960s was no different to the bourgeois nationalism and his broad position at this stage was that cautious unillusioned support for Scottish independence was necessary to sustain demands for further power, enable greater popular participation and striking a blow against British Imperialism, (Nairn, 1968; Jackson, 2020). There are some clear resonances here in Nairn's account and the justifications or conditions for the emergence and support of nationalist movements within classical Marxist thought, specifically in terms of liberation and emancipation. For example, Nairn argued that only through a socialist nationalism that true emancipation or 'cultural liberation from Scotland's pervasive myths as a precondition of political action that must condemn and seek to escape the provincialism and parochialism of the SNP's bourgeois nationalism,' (Nairn, 1968: 17-18). Nairn summarised this perspective in his closing statement by arguing that 'is it really impossible that Scotland should produce a liberated and revolutionary nationalism worthy of the name and times?' (Nairn, 1968: 18).

By Nairn's own admissions, his initial forays and contemplations of nationalism and the national question were rooted in orthodox Marxist thought, he credits Stephen Maxwell for 'putting him right about both the cases and likely character of Scottish nationalism in a period where he was wedded to the fossilised remains of Internationalism' (Nairn, 2013). For Fotheringham (2021), one of Maxwell's key strengths was putting class at the forefront of the case for Scottish independence. This was something Maxwell himself had criticised in a review of Nairn's Break-Up of Britain, where he noted a lack of attention given to the Scottish working class, 'appearing only in the role of Cinderella waiting for the kiss of the bourgeois intellectual Prince Charming to arouse its populist nationalist energies,' (Maxwell,

2013: 68). A strongly sovereigntist, participatory and autarchic model of a socialist Scotland and the strategies that underpinned this were given their clearest expression in Maxwell's 1981 essay *The Case for a Left-Wing Nationalism*. A key argument here was that Scottish nationalism must disregard romanticism and build its appeal on social and economic interests. 'This does not mean that nationalism is nothing but camouflage, a sense of national identity can be a genuine bond between classes and interests and once aroused spur social discontent into political action,' (Maxwell, 2013: 77). The working class would remain a central theme in Maxwell's formulations, and he summarised this importance by arguing that 'the challenge of Scottish nationalists is to articulate working-class interest into a new sense of political nationality capable of challenging the defensive and self-indulging variant that helps attach the working class to the Labour Party,' (Maxwell, 2013: 97). In this sense, any appeal to Labour voters, Maxwell argued, must be a left-wing one, 'including major extensions of the public sector, improved public services and finances, cooperative ownership and public control of financial institutions,' (Jackson, 2020: 110).

Theory over Practice? Critiques of the Marxist Approach

It should be noted at the outset of this section that while there are several rich engagements with Scottish nationalism from a Marxist perspective more generally, engagements with nationalism in the context of the 2014 referendum are more limited. Marxist approaches share with modernism and ethno-symbolism the characterisation of nationalism as a distinctly modern phenomenon and as such several of the issues raised are applicable here, but there are some specific issues in Marxist approaches that we can raise here. As we have seen from the above discussions, 'it is difficult, if at all possible, to refer to the Marxist approach because of the variety of approaches taken by those who consider themselves Marxist. Broadly speaking we can identify interpretations that stress class conflict within societies, and economic

conflict between different societies,' (Breuilly, 1993: 407). We have seen above, how both Nairn and Maxwell's justifications for supporting nationalism as the means to an end for working-class politics and several more recent Marxists accounts of Scotland and its relationship with nationalism share this class focus. For example, Gluckstein & Fotheringham argue that it was the life experiences of the working class in Scotland that resulted in the shift of support from Labour to the SNP and nationalism more generally since they were seen to be best suited to produce measures to benefit them, (Gluckstein & Fotheringham, 2021: 38). Likewise, Foley *et al* argue that nationalism entails the belief that what unites the nation is more significant than what divides it, with class being a key example of the latter, 'but Scottish independence does not and should not adhere to this principle,' (Foley *et al*, 2022: 74). For Nairn, this reflected a need within Marxism for a plausible way of approaching national movements, which 'required an agile and imposing non-position which would allow Marxists to keep their options open as it were,' (Nairn, 1997: 39).

However, Breuilly argues that the division and justification of supporting certain nationalisms considering their class bases and objectives 'amounts to a refusal to understanding nationalism as such and a major reason why Marxism has never got to grips with the subject,' (Breuilly, 1993: 410). This brings us back to a recurring theme in approaches to nationalism, that is, there is a tendency to underestimate the agency of nationalism and influence in political and social life. To suggest that class interest accounts for political action is to argue that there is an 'objective class interest independent of the interests of individual members of that class, and that this objective interest can be readily identified by the observer,' (Breuilly, 1993: 410). Finn (2023) argues that classical Marxism works from the assumption that national consciousness was something that socialists could not simply wish away, however, orthodox Marxists made little effort to explain or understand why people identified with

nations. Similarly, Day & Thompson note that a consequence of this is a blindness to the reality that 'class was subject to a myriad of variations and people are never in a position where a single identity or interest never overrode all others,' (Day & Thomspon, 2004: 23). Nationalism's complexity and plurality makes such a position untenable. The reasons why any individual, from any class, identifies and invests in elements and symbols of nationalism is vital to understanding the phenomenon. In the same way, the ways in which objectives and interests are expressed through these symbols informs and influences the form nationalism will take in each context.

A further dimension to consider here is economic reductionism. For example, Avineri argues that 'Nairn reduces nationalism to uneven development, meaning that all examples of nationalism are subsumed under it,' (Avineri, 1991: 647). Similarly, Day & Thompson argue that 'the economic lens with which Marxism views social organisation, with class as the primary social category results in an under-appreciation of social relationships and lived experiences,' (Day & Thompson, 2004: 22). In this sense nationalism is too pervasive, complex, and varied to be reduced to class or understood solely as a reaction against economic disparity, (Breuilly, 1993: 414). Modernity then is a qualitative not quantitative concept since it denotes a 'species of social being which is heterogeneous and to understand it we must put this into comparative perspective,' (Greenfield, 1996). We can just as readily make the same assessment of nationalism. Nationalism is a qualitative, not quantitative concept and we observe several different species of nationalism in the world today. To put nationalism into comparative perspective is not to search for its emergence as a general trend, but to investigate the specificity of nationalism in its given context and how the conditions of modernity, as Greenfield puts it, have influenced, and informed the adoption of national identity in all its variety. Undoubtedly resentment of economic disparity can be considered a

factor, but it is one of several that inform and constitute the context in which nationalism operates. As such, we must seek to ‘go beyond generalisations and attempt to engage with more local specific connections, something that orthodox Marxist approaches are ill-suited for,’ (Breuilly, 1993 p. 413-4).

We can see this difficulty play out in several Marxist inspired accounts of Scottish nationalism. For example, while Nairn was correct in drawing the connections between wider cultural trends in the 1960s and Scottish nationalism as a local expression of these, the contrast between these and the SNP of the time was not as stark as Nairn suggested. ‘While by no means socialists, the SNP at the time was youthful and dynamic, highlighting the contrast between British political structures and those desired in an independent Scotland,’ (Jackson, 2020: 71). In his scathing critique of Nairn, Hobsbawm claimed that the ‘irony of nationalism is that the argument for the separation of Scotland from England is analogous to the argument for the separation of the Shetlands from Scotland; and so are the arguments against both separations,’ (Hobsbawm, 1977: 13). However, this line of thinking lacks an appreciation of the ‘bases and markers that nationalism is built upon, where Scotland is only a nation because of the constellation of the cultural and political markers that constitute it as such,’ (McCrone, 2013: 5). It is on this basis that McCrone claims Hobsbawm never really understood nationalism or Scotland. In other words, Scottish nationalism only took on the form it did during the Nairn-Hobsbawm exchange, and subsequently only takes on the form it does in contemporary settings because of the constellation of markers that themselves have been influenced by their contextual environment. The Scottish nationalism of the 1960s is not the same as that of 2014. This can also help us to understand the difficulty that Marxists accounts have had in evaluating nationalism in specific settings. For example, nationalism is almost entirely absent from Neil Davidson’s account of the 2014 pro-independence campaign,

arguing that it was defined ‘not by nationalism per se, but through a desire for social change expressed via the demand for self-determination,’ (Davidson, 2014a; 2014b). These are not mutually exclusive and evaluating how and why nationalism comes to embody social change and vice-versa beyond simple reaction to an economic order is crucial to critically assessing its power and agency in contemporary politics.

What we can draw from these discussions is that Marxist ‘failures’ to engage with nationalism are less on a ‘theoretical level and more on the practical level, blind to the overwhelming importance on the world stage of nationalism and ethnicity in all its variants,’ (Munck, 2010: 49). As Aveneri argues, the basic flaw in Marxist analysis is in its reduction of nationalism to socio-economic causes, and while this is only one element, this insistence makes it ‘extremely difficult for Marxists to assess, evaluate and critique concrete and specific nationalisms and national movements,’ (Aveneri, 1991: 649). The recurring theme here being that Marxist accounts of nationalism are insufficient in terms of incorporating agency and context in their analysis and evaluations, meaning we are only left with fragmentary accounts.

1.5 Constructing the Nation: Scotland is all Around Me!

A final perspective that we will cover here, whilst perhaps less prolific than those discussed above, provides some potentially fruitful avenues for developing an approach to nationalism that is better suited to incorporating agency and context. Broadly speaking this approach can be defined as social constructivist, with the emphasis of these approaches focused on ‘contingency, rather than determined outcomes of the machinery of social forces and structures,’ (Day & Thompson, 2004: 85). Social constructivism is varied in its application and draws from several disciplines, including those discussed above. We will briefly outline two accounts of note here: Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (2016) and Michael

Billig's *Banal Nationalism* (1995). The social constructivist perspective is less prolific in its engagements with Scottish nationalism and consequently, engagements with Scottish nationalism specifically in the context of the 2014 referendum are few and far between. As such, the discussion presented here is more abstracted, but will highlight the potentials and complications of the various applications of a social constructivist approach with regards to agency and context.

Imagining the Nation

First published in 1983, Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities is one of the most influential texts on nationalism in which Anderson makes a decisive, if not necessarily intentional contribution to the emergence and development of social constructivist perspective in nationalism studies, (Day & Thompson, 2004). Anderson himself commented that the book was written specifically for an English-speaking audience, who held specific and self-conscious prejudices as well as being a response to Nairn's Break-Up of Britain, (Anderson, 2003: 226, 238). In addition, Anderson believed it was necessary to widen the scope of Nairn's critiques while at the same time producing an account that de-Europeanised nationalism studies, (Özkirimli, 2010; Anderson, 2016). Anderson's point of departure was to conceive nationalism and national identity as cultural productions, and to understand these, we must ask how they came to be, how their meanings have changed, and why they possess such affective grip. Therefore, a persuasive account of nationalism 'should not confine itself to specifying cultural or political factors that facilitate growth of nationalism, rather the challenges lie in demonstrating how and why these cultural artefacts arouse such deep attachment,' (Özkirimli, 2010: 106).

To this end Anderson defines the nation as an imagined community – imagined, limited and sovereign. It is imagined in the sense that even in the smallest unit, most members will not know each other; it is imagined as limited since nations have finite, if elastic boundaries; it is imagined as sovereign since it was born in the age of enlightenment where divine right was challenged; and it is imagined as a community because regardless of inequalities, it is conceived as a deeply horizontal relationship, (Anderson, 2016: 6-7). It is important to highlight here that invention for Anderson did not mean false. This is something that Anderson accuses others, specifically Gellner of doing, where they conflate 'invention with fabrication in their pursuit to show nationalism operates under false pretences, which implies that true communities in fact exist and can be juxtaposed to nations,' (Anderson, 2016: 6). For Anderson then, nations possess tangible underpinnings, they are not simply invented out of nothing, and what distinguishes nations from other units is the way they are conceptualised, 'filled the simultaneous activity of vast numbers of like-minded people,' (Day & Thompson, 2004: 88-9).

Banal Nationalism

Michael Billig's Banal Nationalism is founded on a critique of the several orthodox assumptions about nationalism which tend to associate it with the struggle for statehood and with extreme-right wing politics, (Özkirimli, 2010). For Billig, nationalism does not simply vanish once its objectives have been achieved or acquires a political roof, rather, it becomes absorbed into the environment of the host nation, (Billig, 1995: 41; Özkirimli, 2010: 171). Billig argues that there is no readily available term to describe the collection of ideological habits, practices or beliefs which reproduce established nations as nations. And to this end Billig called for the expansion of the term nationalism to account for the ideological means by which nations are reproduced, coining the term banal nationalism to address these habits of

reproduction, (Billig, 1995: 6). It is in this sense, that Billig describes the metonymic image of banal nationalism, ‘not as a flag waved with fervent passion, but the flag hanging unnoticed atop a public building,’ (Billig, 1995: 8). Under this conception, national identity is not a political accessory which people can recall and use at any moment, there must be some preconceived notion about what the nation is. As such, a flag is not the only image to conjure the nation; monuments, postage stamps, sports, infrastructures, everyday language; the flagging of the nation occurs near the surface of contemporary life, in those familiar habits which act as constant reminders of nationhood, (Billig, 1995: 93). As Day & Thompson note, in their ubiquity, these symbols and markers form an ‘elemental support for the everyday constitution of national awareness…above all, linguistic markers are continually employed to indicate the scope and limits of the nation,’ (Day & Thompson, 2004: 99). A further dimension of Billig’s critique relates to the status and role of the researcher. Billig argues that social science has often treated nationalism in a narrow and limited way, resulting in 1) projecting nationalism by defining it in restricted ways, as an extreme surplus phenomenon, projected onto ‘others’ while ‘ours’ is overlooked; 2) naturalising nationalism by reducing it to a psychological need, thus banal nationalism is not nationalism and stops being a problem to be investigated, (Billig, 1995: 16-7; Özkirimli, 2010, 174). Nationalism then constitutes a way of thinking about the world, and if this way of thinking seems commonplace and familiar, ‘it nevertheless includes mystic properties that have become habit of thought,’ (Billig, 1995: 61).

Jigsaws falling into place? Critiques of Social Constructivism

The emphasis on imagination in Anderson’s account has led to some criticism, such as from Anthony Smith, who argues that while imagination may help us to understand how the ideal of the nation is spread, we are still left asking ‘why should the nation be spread in the first

place and what is it specifically about the nation that should have such an emotional impact on people that they feel bound to this imagination?' (Smith, 1998: 137). Similarly, Breuilly argues that Anderson's approach is adept at explaining how new ideas about the nation and its organisation can develop, at least among cultural and political elites, but it cannot offer an explanation in terms of 'why these ideas should evoke such powerful responses across the social strata,' (Breuilly, 2012: 159-160). In this sense, Anderson is strangely quiet in terms of how the imagined community can extend across social classes, standards of life, customs, and literacy standards, and although he stresses the importance of 'popular vernacular nationalism, he pays little attention to how the nation might be imagined from the bottom up,' (Day & Thompson, 2004: 92). This prompts us to return to the general concern of agency where Anderson argues that individuals have great capacity for invention and that the national identities individuals form do not simply reflect macro-social forces. However, this capacity for imagination is posed at the level of language, specifically 'writing done *in* one language and pays less attention to the utterances *of* language whilst also marginalising other aspects of communality,' (Day & Thompson, 2004: 92-3). This is something Billig picks up on, arguing that while nations may be imagined, but 'the patterning of their imaginings cannot be explained through differences in language since language may be imagined as distinct entities,' (Billig, 1995: 36). As such, agency here is restricted to a specific mode of expression and one that in Anderson's account is strictly in the purview of political and cultural elites, which in turn marginalises the expressions and agency of individuals in wider society to engage with and imagine their own conceptions of the nation. This does not preclude the possibility of extending the concept and analysis, indeed, this is something that is both practical and desirable for the study of nationalism but is not developed in Anderson's account.

Several studies of Scottish nationalism have taken up Anderson's concept in various ways. For example, Haesly argues that while people hold different ideas about what constitutes Scottish culture, it is imagined as 'heterogeneous enough for people across the country to invest a strong sense of pride in aspects of Scottish culture,' (Haesly, 2005: 254). In terms of the 2014 Independence Referendum, Anderson's concept has been mentioned in passing on several occasions. For example, Mullen (2014) re-asserts the claim that nations are subjectively defined as imagined communities, where people 'believe themselves to belong to community which follows that the boundaries of state and nation need not coincide,' (Mullen, 2014: 635). Mullen goes on to considers several elements that could be associated with this imagination such as the holding of conflicting or dual identities, industrialisation, and religion but his discussion is limited and ponderous. Bennie *et al* (2021) utilise the concept to explain the surge in party memberships following the unprecedented levels of activism during the 2014 referendum arguing that party membership did not equate with activism but as 'being part of an imagined community and making a contribution, suggesting that a sense of collective belonging rather collective action was key to meeting expectations,' (Bennie *et al*, 2021: 1195). The above accounts lead us to an issue of context. For example, Anderson's account, while designed to explain the development of new ideas, cannot simultaneously account for the development and emergence of nationalist movements or sentiments. Until ideals of the nation become 'fixed in their attachment to movements and navigating institutions and society, these ideals remain vague and discontinuous,' (Breuilly, 2012: 160). As a result, we are forced to probe deeper into the conditions and context under which communication of the nation is intensified and expressed in nationalist terms, (Breuilly, 1993: 406-7). Again, this is something that Anderson's approach and social constructivism more generally does not necessarily prohibit but it requires further consideration and elaboration.

Turning to critiques of banal nationalism, while we have come to appreciate the power and significance of the concept, 'there has been difficulty in generating research and evidence in terms of how this banality operates. How do we know that we do or do not notice the flagging of the nation?' (Fox, 2017: 27). Billig was more concerned with the social reproduction of social categories as opposed to our investment in those categories, with identity located in the embodied habits of social life, with these being situated physically, legally and socially, (Hearn, 2007: 659; Billig, 1995: 61). In this way, the positioning which lends individuals to national identity is 'multidimensional and consist of a great variety of symbols, markers and practices,' (Day & Thompson, 2004: 100). However, Antonsich & Skey note, 'the intermittent character of the nation compels us to consider when, where how and why the nation is called into existence,' (Antonsich & Skey, 2017: 843). Billig has conceded this point, noting that as the dominant ideology, 'nationalism determines what politics can be seriously practiced and what can only be seriously imagined,' (Billig, 2017: 319). What is problematic here is that the discussion of national identity is 'precisely the reduction of matter to a conceptual opposition between personal and social identity and a relative lack of appreciation for the role intervening structures and contexts through which these interact,' (Hearn, 2007: 659). Developing such an approach that is sensitive and attentive to the interdependent nature context and agency will allow us to take ideas of social reproduction in Billig forward.

Law (2001) provides a direct application of banal nationalism thesis to the Scottish print press as Billig had done in England. Contrary to Billig, Law finds that Scottish nationalism and national identity was explicitly enunciated, with only those instances of mundane administration where the Scottish press were able to rely on the semantic devices of banal nationalism, (Law, 2001: 314). In response to Law's conclusions and similar critiques, Billig

acknowledges that the concentration on English media in his original study contained obvious gaps and failed to probe 'the rhetorical complexities of banal nationalism that it claimed to demonstrate,' (Billig, 2017: 314). Elsewhere, in a case study of a bank merger (one Scottish, one English), Hearn finds that the Scottish bank served as a vessel and object for the symbolisation of Scottish identity. Although Hearn is unconvinced by Billig's general thrust, he argues that this can be considered an example of banal nationalism 'owing to its apolitical character; with nationalism appearing banal outside the spheres of formal politics,' (Hearn, 2007: 661-2). Application of banal nationalism to the context of the 2014 referendum is more limited. The most explicit engagement comes from Breeze *et al* (2015), who through a series of interviews with pro-independence voters, seek to demonstrate the banal nationalist qualities and rhetoric in their responses, however there is little engagement in terms of how these aspects constitute banal nationalism for the respondents.

Through these applications, we return to a question of agency that can be framed and elaborated through Cohen's concept of personal nationalism. 'If individuals can be distinguished in so many ways from other individuals; why then do individuals identify or imagine themselves and others in terms of the nation?' (Cohen, 1996: 802). To elaborate, people participate in and interpret habits and rituals in the same way people engage with symbols and receive rhetoric; they render it meaningful by attributing understanding through their own words as it were, (Cohen, 1996: 807). The markers and symbols of identity are not necessarily loud and assertive, they can operate in the background and in a context in which identity and nationalism is constituted. For example, Scotland produces different banknotes to England; the Scottish saltire is flown in a different manner to the cross of St. George; Scotland has different rules and regulations for house buying etc. These all contribute to making Scotland a distinctive and concrete entity; however, these elements can be articulated

in various ways, and just because a set of routines, markers and symbols exists is no guarantee that the work of constructing the nation is done, (Day & Thompson, 2004; McCrone, 2001). Duchesne (2018) makes a similar argument, noting the tendency of everyday nationalism to treat people as receivers (a position that Billig strongly refutes), but human creativity has 'a capacity to discuss and to deny, to identify and to oppose, to categorise and to particularise,' (Duchesne, 2018: 851). This leads us to consider not only how nations are imagined, but in what ways and for what purpose as well as considering what materials they make use of to achieve these ends. In addition, if the nation is imagined in one instance, then it stands to reason that it can be re-imagined across time and to differing ends, incorporating, or altering the meaning and use of cultural materials. Both Anderson and Billig's make significant contributions in terms of beginning to approach these issues, but both require further development to achieve this.

1.6 Conclusions

Despite the theoretical sophistication of modernist and ethno-symbolism, they contain deterministic and universalistic tendencies that are geared towards finding favoured factors at the root of nationalist movements, describing general processes with limited applicability to specific cases, (Sutherland, 2012: 29). While these respective approaches may unearth and identify certain family resemblances, 'the promotion of generalisations cannot capture their dynamic, nuanced and multi-dimensional expressions,' (Freeden, 1998: 751). More generally however, the discussions above have raised two specific, albeit interconnected issues with regards to approaching nationalism, these being agency and context.

With regards to agency, a focus on elite construction or emphasis of specific social groups such as class leaves questions regarding who constructs nationalism in the prerogative sense,

by what means and for what purpose? Equally important is the fact that nationalism constructs a sense of space in which a political/social movement is to be conducted and the acceptable horizons of political activity; but this in turn constructs and reconstructs the nation itself, for different purposes. This is what we refer to here as the agency of nationalism. The agency and influence of nationalism to structure social and political relations, as well as the agency of the individual to interpret and operationalise the nation for specified ends. In this sense, 'nationalism is a hegemonic agent as opposed to some neutral irremovable force that can be exploited for the greater good.' (Ryan & Worth, 2010: 58) This in turn leads to further questions of the reception and articulation of nationalism both by the individual and amongst individuals as well as considerations of how ideas of the nation itself constructs and informs action.

The second and related issue refers to the context of nationalism. Privileging the role of agency can only produce nuanced understandings of nationalism where the social organisational context in which agency and practice occurs is considered; the activities, interactions and feelings that underpin forms of national organisation, practice, and imagination are just as crucial as the acts themselves (Antonsich & Skey, 2017; Hearn & Antonsich, 2018). In this sense we must consider not only the materials nationalism employs but also the socio-politico and economic environment through which these interactions occur as well as how this context influences the selection of these elements. Prevalent approaches to nationalism tend to minimise or generalise the differences and specificities between concrete nationalisms we see in the contemporary world, 'which restricts the opportunity for formulating the means of engaging with the diverse forms of really existing nationalism that confront us,' (Benner, 2018: 8-9). Thus, while we may analytically separate issues of agency and context, they remain mutually interdependent concerns with regards to understanding and

critically engaging with nationalism and nationalist politics that is underdeveloped in orthodox approaches.

What is required then, is to adopt a more dynamic approach that views nations and nationalism, like any other social phenomenon, in a state of constant flux, and the forms that we move to investigate are just one of any number of manifestations that the nation or nationalism can take, (Ichijo, 2013: 55). This does not require a universal or generalised theory, indeed this should be avoided as they can only offer a partial explanation of nationalism, and so what we must focus our energies towards developing an approach that is sensitive to specific practices and their differential contexts, (Özkirimli, 2003: 354). To put this another way, a single thread does not make the tapestry, but the tapestry cannot exist without precise stitching, and how we stitch and combine these threads will depend on the product that we are trying to make. Through the discussions of this chapter, we have identified agency and context as necessary threads for this task. What is now required is to select the needle and technique suitable for the purposes and aims of the research.

The contributions of social constructivist approaches offer the most fruitful path in this respect. However, the burden of social constructionism is that nationalism is not special, we could conceivably apply the same analytical lens to other categories such as class, race, sexuality etc, (Day & Thompson, 2004: 103). Therefore, what is now required is to probe deeper into the processes of constructing nations and nationalism, and to identify the mechanisms through which they are sustained, and just as importantly, resisted or challenged,' (Özkirimli, 2010: 198). Recognising the core elements, symbols and features of nationalism relies on explicit and implicit social norms and practices encourages us to 'examine the multiple realities and alternative constructions of the nation hidden behind

seemingly rigid and static categories, (Day & Thompson, 2004: 104). This is how we may deepen our understanding of the specific manifestation and expressions of Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014 Independence Referendum, probing the articulations that tied a multitude of issues, symbols and ideals to the idea of the Scottish nation. It is to this task we now turn in the following chapter where we will outline a discursive approach to and understanding of nationalism, setting the ground for the development and introduction of Intellectual Function as our needle of choice.

Chapter 2 – Discourse, Agency and Context in the Study of Nationalism: Introducing Intellectual Function

2.1 Discourse Theory: Contingency and Articulation

The following chapter serves two purposes. The first is to set out and outline a discursive understanding and approach to studying nationalism that foregrounds agency and context in its theorising. The discursive conception and understanding of nationalism we will elaborate here, as well as the research project more generally draws heavily on the Essex School Discourse Analysis.[17] While there is a plurality of meanings attached to discourse, 'when we move to put discourse to work, clarity and specification remain a necessity,' (Carpentier, 2017: 15). The Essex school draws on a range of disciplines, grammars, and concepts to produce robust and critical research, and so prior to elaborating a discursive conceptualisation of nationalism, we will sketch out the key elements and assumptions that underpin the Essex School approach as well as some critiques.[18] The second is to develop the analytical tool of Intellectual Function as a means of wielding this discursive conception and in so doing, laying the foundation for critically engaging with Scottish nationalism observed during the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Here the research utilises Gramsci's concept of Organic Intellectuals and his readings of language alongside the theory of language advanced by Voloshinov to situate and facilitate this move.

At the outset, DT proposes a middle ground between structure and agency in political analysis, rejecting a rational choice logic of viewing actors as self-interest maximisers, whilst

[17] Another common name for Essex School Discourse Theory and Analysis is Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PDT). For the sake of simplicity, the research will refer to the Essex School Discourse Theory as DT or Essex School.

[18] For a more comprehensive overview and discussion of Essex School Discourse Theory see Torfing (1999); Howarth (2000) and Glynos & Howarth (2007)

also rejecting structuralist approaches that subsuming political practices under the reproduction of structures, (Torfing, 1999; Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000; De Cleen, 2015). For example, a subject might identify with a specific faith or with certain principles, but 'how we relate to our thing will be vital for how we relate to others and their own identifications,' (Howarth *et al*, 2016: 102). As we have seen in the previous chapter, this is especially important to understanding nationalism by focusing our attentions to the need for critical evaluation which privileges 'the political construction of meanings and identities, questioning the sharp separation between questions of fact and questions of value,' (Griggs & Howarth, 2013: 16-17). Discourse is not as an abstract system of beliefs and words; but a constitutive dimension of social relations which does not simply describe or make known a pre-existing reality, but serves to bring reality into being for subjects, (Griggs & Howarth, 2013; Gottweis, 2003). DT therefore seeks to identify the structures of meaning that different utterances and texts draw upon, reproduce and contest, thus revealing how discourses are embodied in a range of text, speech, and signifying sequences of all sorts, (De Cleen *et al*, 2021; Howarth, 2005) DT should not be considered as 'a *method* of linguistic discourse analysis in any strict sense: it remains a discursive *approach* to social and political phenomenon with significant theoretical ambitions that remain central to its project,' (De Cleen *et al*, 2021: 29).[19]

DT begins with the assumption that 'all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is the product of historically and contextually specific systems of norms and practices,' (Howarth, 2000: 8). For example, kicking a spherical object in the street and kicking a ball during a football match share the same physical act, but its meaning is radically different dependent on the context in which the act is performed, (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987:

[19] Emphasis added.

82). Discourse then is a social and political construction that seeks to establish 'a system of relations between objects and practice whilst simultaneously establishing a range of positions which agents can identify with,' (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000: 3). As a result, DT understands that the stability of any given discourse is vulnerable, and constructions of meaning are specific to themselves and their historical and contextual moment. As Laclau & Mouffe argue:

> "The impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial fixations – otherwise the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be *a* meaning. If the social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a *society*, the social only exists, however, as an effort to construct the impossible object. Any discourse is a constituted attempt to dominate the field the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of difference, to construct a centre". (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 112)

Any apparent stability or attempts to fix or challenge meaning is understood as the outcome of hegemonic struggle; with hegemony being understood as a type of political practice involved in the construction, contestation and maintenance of rules, practices, policies, and norms and so forth. Here, DT emphasises the role of logics of equivalence and difference to this hegemonic performance, where the logic of equivalence refers to the simplification of political space and the establishment of frontiers via the linking different social demands and identities. The logic of difference speaks to its expansion and increasing complexity where demands are negated, disentangled, and mediated by various institutions, (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Howarth *et al*, 2016).[20] For Laclau, a relationship of equivalence does not imply the collapse or disappearance of difference, rather the relationship is one where, while difference

[20] See Laclau & Mouffe (1985) pp. 127-134 for their full discussion; See also Glynos & Howarth (2007) Chp. 5; Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) pp. 11-16

remains active, 'equivalence eliminates the *separation* between demands, not the demands themselves,' (Laclau, 2005b: 161-2). Each link within an equivalential chain retains some elements of its identity, but the 'purely privative character of these elements is weakened through its participation and involvement in the equivalential chain,' (Laclau, 2014: 18).

The inherent tension between these two logics is what results in the radical contingency of meaning and the impossibility of fixity in the final instance. The openness and incomplete nature of social structures, identity, practices, and agency, 'produces the possibility of developing novel interpretations and evaluations of their character and mutual dependencies in the construction of relational systems,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2008: 157). As such, 'we cannot avoid the concrete analysis of historical conjectures in order to explore the conditions in which the radical contingency of structures, meaning and relations are made,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2008: 163). Borrowing from Laclau & Mouffe's formulation[21], we could argue that DT is post-*structuralist* in the sense that it focuses on how meaning comes about through relations and the focus of structures of meaning being the analytical lens that permeates DT studies. At the same time, DT is *post*-structuralist in its belief that meaning is contingent and changeable because all meaning is continuously reproduced, sedimented, contested and transformed through discursive practices, (De Cleen *et al*, 2021: 25).

As indicated above, discourse is an articulatory practice, with articulation defined as any practice that seeks to establishes relations amongst elements in such a way that their meaning is modified. Furthermore, these practices are only possible given the assumptions outlined above with regards to the radical contingency, and the structured totality that is the result of

[21] See Laclau & Mouffe (1985: 4)

such practices is what we will call discourse, (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Howarth, 2005) Any political project, such as nationalism, will attempt to articulate different elements to dominate or organise a field of meaning and to partially fix the identities and practices in ways that are to their political advantage. 'DT then investigates the ways in which social practices articulate and contest the discourses that constitute social reality,' (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000: 3). On the one hand then, articulation refers to the ways in which elements in a discourse can be both linked and decoupled; on the other way it is a vital component of a critical explanatory process.

If we understand discourse as the structured totality of meaning that is the product of articulation, then the differential positions or demands that find themselves as objects of articulatory practices 'can be described as moments within a discourse and those positions or demands that are not object of articulatory practice are referred to as elements,' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).[22] This presents something of a paradox as 'if all social practices and meaning is contingent, and the transition from element to moment never complete, how is it possible for any identity or social formation to maintain some sense of stability?' (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000: 7-8). To resolve this tension, we can further qualify our understanding and application of articulation by noting that these practices consist of the construction of nodal points. These 'partially fix meaning and derive from the openness of the social, as a result of the constant overflowing of discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity,' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 113). Nodal points then are 'privileged reference points that act as a binding agent for a particular system of meaning, occupying a central position of a discourse, while moments are located around the periphery,' (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000; De Cleen &

[22] See Laclau & Mouffe (1985) pp.105-114 for the complete discussion.

Stavrakakis, 2017). As moments rotate around the centre, they acquire new meanings through their relationship and relative position to the nodal points. In this way, DT emphasises the importance of 'multiplicity and pluralisation to open new ways of articulating elements, which are deemed necessary or essential,' (Howarth, 2013: 83). Put another way, the discursive field and radical contingency are necessary conditions for the conduct of articulatory practices, thus establishing relationships of meaning with the multiplicity of subject positions within a discursive space.

Nationalism as a Discursive practice

Having outlined some of the key elements that underpin Essex School, discourse theory, we now move to elaborating the perspectives' understanding and approach to nationalism. What matters for discursive approaches is that nationalism 'structures collective identity in a particular way and that this particular collective identity forms the core of nationalism and nationalist projects,' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017: 309). To this end, recent scholarship has sought to differentiate nationalism from populism in this operation, defining populism as a dichotomic discourse where the "people" are juxtaposed to the "elite" along the lines of a down/up antagonism, (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Custodi & Padoan, 2023). Conversely, 'nationalism is a discourse structured around the nodal point nation and is envisaged as a limited and sovereign community that exists through time and is tied to a certain space, constructed through a horizontal in/out opposition,' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017: 308). Therefore, both populism and nationalism are types of discourse in that they are 'particular ways of understanding and interpreting social reality and political stakes by interpellating social subjects and calling them to action,' (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2017: 393).

This understanding draws heavily from Anderson's concept of *imagined community*. To briefly recap; Anderson defined the nation as an imagined community on four bases. The nation is imagined as since most members will never meet or know each other. It is limited, because the nation has finite, if elastic boundaries. It is imagined as sovereign to combat the legitimacy of the divinely ordained. Finally, the nation is imagined as a community because the nation is always conceived as a deeply horizontal comradeship,' (Anderson, 2016: 6-7). A discursive approach accepts that national traditions are invented and that traditions refer to a set of practices, governed by accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour, which implies continuity with the past, (Hobsbawm, 1983). In adopting this position, discourse theorists do not seek to establish the antiquity or authenticity, rather what is of interest is to deconstruct the products of the ideological project in the act of inventing and the dynamics of dissent and resistance they create, (Sutherland, 2005; Sutherland, 2012).

From a discursive perspective, nationalism plays a major role in naturalising and reproducing ideological conceptions and values that have been ascribed to the nation and their attempts to modify these conceptions and values, (Custodi, 2021; Finlayson, 1998). In addition, the processes of identification with people or nation bear specific meanings and social practices, and 'while there is some considerable overlap, a greater coincidence of meaning does not imply that they are identical, rather they are political articulations that carry different sedimented meanings for the receiver,' (Custodi & Padoan, 2023: 416). In this sense no two nationalisms are the same, a point that might seem 'too obvious to be noticed but is often obscured by the search for generalisable truths of nationalism,' (Finlayson, 1998: 100). Aside from studying the forms of nationalist identifications, we must also to take into consideration

‘the type of investment which confers on the nation its force as a desirable and often irresistible object of identification,’ (Stavrakakis, 2007: 192). Several questions arise here:

> “What level do we locate the play of national identification? What exactly is at stake in the process of identification? Is the construction of identity restricted to semiotic play? And what accounts for the pervasive, long-term appeal and fixity of some identifications over others?” (Stavrakakis, 2007: 193)

A discursive approach to nationalism facilitates and provides the necessary conceptual framework with which to begin to probe and deconstruct these questions. In this way, a discursive approach prompts a move away from searches for the essences of nations in favour of accounts that scrutinises the identification of the contingencies of discursive constructions of the nation, (De Cleen, 2015: 40).

A discursive approach to nationalism seeks to unpack and reveal its constitutive elements and internal tensions, and in so doing demands that we take account of context. This requires is a non-essentialist, interdisciplinary approach which is attuned to the nuances of the cultural production and reproduction of meaning through political practices and discourses, (Sutherland, 2005; Munck, 2010). To this end, discourse theory provides the means to account for how the ideological construction of the nation aims to achieve a hegemonic re-articulation of the national nodal point, ‘therefore it can theorise the dynamics of conflicting nationalisms as they compete for conceptual hegemony over their subject matter,’ (Sutherland, 2005: 185-86). Application of the concepts of contingency and articulation lay the groundwork for a discursive approach to privilege context and agency in their explanations of nationalism. By understanding discourse and nationalism more specifically as an articulatory practice, we foreground issues of agency in terms of how nationalism

structures meaning and relations within a community as well as how political subjects interact with and utilise nationalist ideas in their actions and interpretations of social reality. The centrality of the nation does not mean that nationalists necessarily or exclusively use the term to refer to the national group, what matters is that nationalism and nationalist practices are 'structured around the claim to represent a group constructed in a specific nationalist way,' (De Cleen, 2016: 72). Similarly, by assuming the openness and incomplete nature of social structures, the concept of radical contingency allows a discursive approach to remain sensitive to the contextual environment in which the expressions of agency occur. As we have seen in the previous chapter, orthodox approaches risk simplifying the plurality of ways in which nationalism and national identity is imagined and practiced in different contexts. Therefore, 'imagining or discursively constructing a nation should not be downscaled to nominal normative categories, because manifestations of national identity are shaped by a common logic as indicated in a discursive definition of nationalism,' (Custodi & Padoan, 2023: 416). Thus, a discursive understanding and approach to nationalism provides a foundational framework with which to approach and engage with various instances and expressions of nationalism while remaining sensitive to their different individual contexts and the specificity of the practices that constitute them.

Critiques of Discourse Theory

Having outlined a discursive definition of nationalism that we will take forward, we now turn to some objections and critiques that have been raised against DT more generally and its engagements with nationalism. While we will argue that several of these critiques are wide of the mark, some do raise interesting questions about the specificity and applicability of a discursive approach and ones that we must consider in the development of this research project.

Howarth & Stavrakakis (2000) have noted that despite the apparent solution of nodal points; there are still questions to be answered regarding their emergence and constitution of partial fixations. As Laclau argued, an equivalential chain cannot be the result of a 'fortuitous coincidence, it must be consolidated through the emergence of elements which gives coherence to the chain by signifying its totality,' (Laclau, 2005b: 160). However, under the presuppositions of DT, the emergence of elements also cannot be fortuitous and must be the result of continuous and conflictual articulations. For example, when considering the form and construction of the chains of equivalence, Laclau noted that 'which particular difference becomes the locus of equivalence effects requires the study of a particular conjuncture,' (Laclau, 1994: 71). Therefore, the analysis of any specific social formation depends on the grasping of its principal articulation: 'the fits between different instances, different periods and epochs…The same principle is applied, not only synchronically, between instances and periodisations within any moment of a structure, but also, diachronically, between different moments,' (Hall, 2019: 198).

A poststructuralist framework is open to criticism on these grounds given that it leaves the 'internal elements of any structural combination unchanged, with change or transition being limited to the variations through which elements are combined – thus weakening the historicity of such an approach,' (Hall, 2019: 201). While a *post*-structuralist conception of articulation acknowledges radical contingency and the openness of social structures, it is less clear on how this process is anything other than highly abstracted. For example, Arditi argues that for Laclau & Mouffe, hegemony cannot work in a scenario where the possibility for articulation is minimal and they do not specify 'the threshold required for the enactment of the hegemonic form of politics, so we have no way of determining how minimal the requisite condition of this minimal area is,' (Arditi, 2007: 207). Similarly, the degree of success that

social movements can achieve is dependent on the resources and opportunities available to them. 'Where social groups move to engage with dominant hegemonic blocs or discourses, they are likely to face repressive forces in response, therefore diminishing the capability to present a solid front,' (Tarrow, 1994: 20). This leaves us considering at what point do repressive measures produce such a minimal space that the articulation of counter-hegemonic blocs becomes untenable, or in other words, what are the contexts that restrict and the agency of political actors in attempting to construct the nation?

Lacalu & Mouffe have been criticised for their conception of society as an open discursive field in the sense that there is no reason to believe why anything is or isn't potentially articulable with anything, (Legget, 2013; Hall, 2019). For example, Tomas Marttila argues that it has resulted in a lack of 'operationalising the contextual determinants of discursive practice and how these contextual determinants regulate potential practices,' (Marttila, 2016: 61).[23] The danger here is that this becomes its own form of reductionism and abstraction 'in the sense that, the metaphor of *X* operates like *Y*, becomes *X=Y*,' (Hall, 2019: 240-241). Contingency is the vindication of political inventiveness in the face of structural determinations, however, 'the question of how to articulate never presents itself as a serious issue for Laclau & Mouffe, since if articulation is hegemony and vice versa, there can be no practice outside the hegemonic form of articulation,' (Arditi, 2007: 209- 210). If we assume no necessary correspondence between structures but are nevertheless 'required to think of these relations as an ensemble of relations, then we must turn to the nature of the articulations between them,' (Hall, 2019: 202).[24] Social formations and structures, especially those in periods of upheaval may themselves be an 'articulated combination of different modes of

[23] See also Martilla (2015) & Leggett (2013)
[24] Emphasis added.

practice with specified, shifting terms of hierarchical ordering between them,' (Hall, 2019: 198). As such, attention to agency and context becomes crucial in a discursive approach, and this focus requires further development of Laclau & Mouffe's formulations.

In this sense, we need to inquire into the processes that make 'contingent and contextually specific images appear natural, and secondly, we need to investigate the failure of existing images, and the resulting possibility of constructing new identifications,' (Norval, 2000: 329). Glynos & Howarth (2008) have noted that subjects often find themselves in situations not of their choosing, but that they have the capacity under certain conditions to act differently and that the key question is how best to account for these conditions. Thus, the analyses of both the 'mechanisms through which contingent political identities and practices become naturalised and decontested, as well as those processes of (re)contestation are of crucial importance,' (Norval, 2013: 162). Therefore, any attempt to conduct articulatory practice must simultaneously engage and break with structure in question, discursive or otherwise. However, 'many different conceptions of the world can sediment into a common sense, often in chaotic and contradictory ways and that this imprinting of differential elements is the signal that certain ideas have influenced practical thinking and are present in the observed effective actions of a group or class,' (Hall, 1986: 37). What can often be obscured or overlooked in discursive approaches is which of these elements or ideas are drawn upon in any given instance and the rationale behind their adoption. If we only identify is the physical conditions and the abstracted reaction to these conditions (i.e., the articulatory practice), we can still say very little with regards to the choice of practice and exact nature of the contents the practice attempts to act upon as well as their contextual environment.

Critiques of Discursive Nationalism

Having raised some general points regarding critiques of DT, we now move to considering some specific objections raised against discursive approaches to nationalism both from outwith and within the discursive tradition. Like in the previous section, some of these critiques are wide of the mark, while others provide some useful food for thought that can be taken forward. For Heiskanen the lack of reference to some concept of political power in the discursive definition of nationalism is surprising given the emphasis on a place of power in definitions of populism. Added to this, the fact that several accounts of nationalism stress the significance of the state which Heiskanen claims produces the culturalisation of politics and the politicisation of culture that is characteristic of nationalism, (Heiskanen, 2021: 341-2). However, in defining nationalism as a discourse that constructs the nation, DT explicitly moves away from the conception of nationalism being wedded to the state. As De Cleen argues, nationalism is not limited to institutionalised politics, and conceiving nationalism as a hegemonic discourse allows a discursive approach to 'understand nationalism in relatively independent and autonomous societal spheres such as culture and sport,' (De Cleen, 2015: 40-1). While there is a close association between a sense of nationhood and the desire to create 'a political forum, which may well be a sovereign state, this is one conceptual proximity among many,' (Freeden, 1998: 753-54). Put another way, nationalism acts as well as being acted upon. Its emphasis on the existence of the state is contingent to the political or social moment in which it finds expression. What a discursive approach provides is the means with which to deconstruct nationalist discourses, locate its key elements and where these attentions are directed to a place of power and to what ends, whether this be full sovereign independence, autonomy, or even the existence of a 'national' sports team. The key question that follows from this becomes how do we account for and explain the various practices of nationalist politics to these ends and in what context?

A further dimension of critique has been raised through a recent debate between Rogers Brubaker and De Cleen & Stavrakakis. Firstly, while sympathetic, Brubaker is more sceptical of the move to purify populism, arguing that it is more fruitful to construe the concepts of populism and nationalism as 'analytically distinct, but not analytically independent: as intersecting and mutually implicated though not fully overlapping phenomena,' (Brubaker, 2020: 45). Secondly, Brubaker argues that distinguishing sharply between vertical and horizontal appeals and assigning them to populism and nationalism respectively, 'externalises the ambiguity of the people, removing ambiguity from populism and nationalism as an object of analysis,' (Brubaker, 2020: 53). For De Cleen & Stavrakakis, the suggestion that the difference in their respective approaches is between for (Brubaker) and against (De Cleen & Stavrakakis) impurity and ambiguity is misleading. Instead, they argue that the crucial question is exactly how this ambiguity can be accurately registered and productively employed in the analysis of the relations between populism and nationalism. In this sense, 'Brubaker exaggerates their position, which cannot be reduced either to excluding nationalism from populism or to using contingency to relocate – and thus minimise – the importance of the ambiguity at stake,' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020: 315). While De Cleen and Stavrakakis agree that populism and nationalism are most fruitfully construed as analytically distinct and not independent, where they differ is that these 'intersections and interpellations of the people or nation are best studied through concepts that do not themselves overlap too much by trying to capture their mutual implications *a priori,*' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020: 318). As such, a discursive conception of nationalism is formulated on minimal grounds and at a level of abstraction that allows for engaging with the contextual specificity of nationalism, whilst also being attentive to agency through nationalist expressions and practices that follow from this context.

From within the discursive tradition, Anastasiou argues that populist totalities are invariably articulated with nationalist hegemonic arrangements that 'overdetermines their content, thus, the effectiveness of any political articulation is contingent on success in aggregating extant social arrangements in reference to other potential arrangements,' (Anastasiou, 2019: 338). Anastasiou further argues that it has proven difficult, if not impossible, to empirically disentangle nationalism from populism, rather, they argue nationalism is best understood as a 'symbolic dispersion of the signifier nation in the spatiality of social life, producing nationalist milieu, and populism better understood as the temporal unfolding of political subjectivities,' (Anastasiou, 2020: 218). Vulović & Palonen share a similar outlook, suggesting that we need to acknowledge the ontological dimension as more than specific articulations or sedimented repertoires. For the authors, 'nationalism is an ontic, articulated or sedimented discourse that we can analyse empirically – a content to fill the ontological form of populism,' (Vulović & Palonen, 2023: 552). However, this approach is problematic. We should not privilege the ontological over the ontic or vice versa here. It is only through an appreciation of these two dimensions deeply interconnected interplays that we can begin to produce suitable accounts of the agency and contextual specificity and character of the expressions of nationalism we observe. But a question remains in terms of how to best accomplish this.

To rephrase De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 'it is only by treating nationalism's various expressions and character as contingent that we can ask about more local forms of nationalism,' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020: 320). Nationalism does not simply reproduce sedimented meanings and conceptions of national identity or the nation, it is capable of 'subverting these based on different values, thus modifying the ways in which we imagine both the nation and national identity,' (Custodi, 2021: 707). In other words, the form nationalism takes influences the

content that it attempts to articulate into its discourse, and equally, the content that nationalism acts and draws upon can alter the structure of nationalist discourses. As discussed above, the meanings of elements around which the nation is imagined are the result of conjunctural articulations – they only make sense within specific discursive regimes, at a given point in time. Any meaning ascribed to the nation is subject to challenge and change, and different meanings will often co-exist within the same conjuncture and the hegemonic battle for meaning that this entails further influences the meaning and form that any nationalism can invariably take, (Finlayson, 1998; Laclau, 2003; Custodi, 2021). Following Custodi, the fact that different meanings and articulations of national identity exist does not make them any less nationalistic, rather it serves to highlight the importance of 'recognising the existence of the differential ways in which political projects can articulate nation, which is something that should not be overlooked because it differs from an idealised form,' (Custodi, 2023: 115). In this way we can consider nationalism as one of several potential political logics in operation at any given time as opposed to considering it (or populism) as *the* political logic.

De Cleen & Stavrakakis' framework serves as a basis for empirical analysis of how populism and nationalism interact in real politics; it is not an endpoint, rather, it is 'a conceptual framework facilitating nuanced accounts on interactions between populism and nationalism on the ground,' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020: 316). Therefore, populism and nationalism are most useful as conceptual tools to study political and social phenomena 'when the concepts clearly identify their specificity. This is not to say they are empirically separate phenomena, but the aim is to 'develop a model that accounts for their intricate interactions,' (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2020: 317). However, as Flitcroft (2021) argues, Brubaker's critique is useful in the sense that preserving ambiguity represents a strategy that articulates as many agents as possible with the respective signifier. However, the contention is that the

‘weaving is not constitutive of populist or nationalist discourses, and this remains a problem of abstraction that De Cleen & Stavrakakis’ model does not fully address,’ (Flitcroft, 2021: 226). For example, in Flitcroft’s own project, he demonstrates the weaving of both horizontal and vertical registers within UKIP discourses, where circularity can only ensue when posing questions about whether individuals are constituted by a nationalistic or populistic logic. ‘We are free to dismiss ideological and rhetorical covers, but this is problematic in that such dismissals potentially obscure and lose something crucial to the operation of these discourses,’ (Flitcroft, 2021: 228). To adapt De Cleen & Glynos’ comment on minimal definitions of populism:

> “a minimal definition forms a good basis for identifying nationalist politics and capturing the nationalist dimension. However, such definitions cannot and should not do more than that. They cannot grasp the specificity of nationalist politics, nor explain their prominence or normatively evaluate them in any conclusive manner”. (De Cleen & Glynos, 2021: 181)

What we can say then, is that the discursive definition of nationalism acts as our starting point for engagement but this still requires the development of some further tools and grammars to interrogate the specificity of nationalist politics in terms of their contextual environment and agency.

Essex School discourse theory has developed the means of accounting for the structural conditions in which articulatory practices occur, and likewise how articulatory practice redefines or maintains structures; but its abstract nature presents complications for addressing specificity of articulatory practices as well as their conditions of possibility within certain contexts. While the highly abstract nature of Laclau & Mouffe’s original presentations of contingency and articulation present a series of complications, they also provide sufficient

grounds for development and elaboration that can enable us to think how specific and varied practices – articulated around contradictions which do not all arise in the same way, at the same point, in the same moment – can be adopted by any given political project in order to articulate a coherent identity or set of demands. In addition, we have argued that a discursive minimalist approach to nationalism is well suited for initial forays into addressing these questions. However, what remains is to develop the means with which to better address agency and context from this starting point. Through engagements with Gramsci's theories and concept of organic intellectuals and language, alongside Voloshinov's concept of multi-accentual discourse, the following section will introduce and elaborate the concept of intellectual function as an appropriate analytical concept and tool for this task.

2.2 Return to Gramsci: Organic Intellectuals & Intellectual Function

As Laclau & Mouffe once called for a return to Gramsci's work, we make a similar move as a means of confronting the issues raised in relation to Essex School discourse theory and its conceptualisation of nationalism. Despite the centrality of Gramsci to DT, the concept of intellectual leadership, 'while central to Gramsci's theory of hegemony, has been overlooked in Essex School DT and wider post-Marxist studies,' (Sunnercrantz, 2017: 21). Specifically, Gramsci's concept of organic intellectuals has been underutilised and underdeveloped in DT inspired work and research, and it is through this concept that several considerations are of interest to developing and refining a discursive approach to nationalism. In addition, and somewhat paradoxically, discourse as 'an approach extols the importance of the linguistic model, but often occludes the specific materiality of language in its method' (Griggs & Howarth, 2019: 464). To this end, we will further consider Gramsci's writings on language and their connections to his writings on organic intellectuals before moving to supplement these understandings with Voloshinov's concept of social multi-accentuality. Taken together,

these contributions provide the necessary elements with which to develop the analytical tool of intellectual function that can be applied to the discursive approach to nationalism to bring agency and context to the fore of the analysis.

The Organic Intellectuals[25]

The concept of organic intellectuals is at the heart Gramsci's theorisation of knowledge production, 'but grasping the concept requires careful reading seeing that Gramsci does not provide a capsule definition,' (Crehan, 2016: 28). Firstly; 'every social group coming into existence on the terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, numerous *strata* of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its function in the economic, social, and political fields,' (Gramsci, 1971: 5).[26] Secondly; 'every essential social group which emerges out of the economic structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, finds categories of intellectuals already in existence and which seem to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated of radical changes in political and social forms,' (Gramsci, 1971: 6-7). Those intellectuals emerging amongst a given social group are what that Gramsci refers to as *organic*, and those already existing are referred to as *traditional*. Gramsci explains that in the case of organic intellectuals, these are 'specialisations of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type which the new emerging social group has brought into

[25] Within this section I refer to various collections of Gramsci's works in the Notebooks and other writings. Many of these contain the same essays and notebooks as the others although in some cases the translations and editorial differences have resulted in some minor differences such as exclusions and especially with regards to notes to the texts. I have utilised all these resources in my reading of Gramsci and selection of different sources to reference in different areas has largely been down to the text at hand at the time, but also that rendition which best serves the purpose of the points being raised. Where I have referenced the full collections of the notebooks, I have noted the exact notebook and stanza being referenced.

[26] Emphasis added.

prominence,' (Gramsci, 1971: 6). In other words, organic intellectuals are born *from* and *within* the historical, socio-political, and economic environment that their respective social group is located. They are produced in response to changing conditions that the group both experiences; which is contrasted to traditional intellectuals who 'experience through an *esprit de corps*, an uninterrupted continuity and special qualification; they perceive and present themselves as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group,' (Gramsci, 2000: 303).

Gramsci noted that it is difficult to find a single criterion that characterises the 'disparate activities of intellectuals and, at the same time, distinguishes them in an essential way from the activities of other social groups,' (Gramsci, 2011b: 200).[27] Gramsci's initial discussion of this point leads to the declaration that 'all men are intellectuals, but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals,' (Gramsci, 2000: 304). Gramsci qualifies this through the consideration of the role between intellectuals and production as 'an indirect relationship that is mediated through two forms of social organisation; (a) by civil society and the ensemble of private organizations; (b) the state,' (Gramsci, 2011b: 200).[28] For Gramsci this relationship produces the notion that intellectual activity can be differentiated by levels that in moments of extreme opposition become a genuine difference in quality – 'on the highest rung, we find the creators of various sciences, philosophy, discourses; on the lowest, the humblest administrators and disseminators of intellectual wealth – but taken as a whole, they have a sense of solidarity,' (Gramsci, 2011b: 201).[29] The creation of a new culture then does not rely on original discoveries, rather it consists of the critical diffusion of truths, 'their socialisation

[27] Notebook 4 §49
[28] Notebook 4 §49
[29] Notebook 4 §49

as it were, and making them the basis of vital action,' (Gramsci, 1971: 325). This implies that the organic intellectuals perform an educative function by making class culture coherent by imparting the truth of shared values with members of the social group as the means of establishing a hegemonic bloc.

Gramsci stressed the importance of the relationship between knowledge and passion in this intellectual project, arguing that:

> "the error of the intellectual consists in the believing that one can *know* without understanding and, above all, without feeling or being impassioned: in other words, that the intellectual can be an intellectual if he is distinct and detached from the people. One cannot make history-politics without passion, that is, without being emotionally tied to the people, without feeling the rudimentary passions of the people, understanding them, and hence explaining them [and justifying] them in the specific historical situation and linking them dialectically to the laws of history, that is, to a scientifically superior conception of the world: namely "knowledge." (Gramsci, 2011b: 173)[30]

As such, the educative function of the intellectual can only be accomplished with and in close reference to the passions and feelings of the social group to which they are attached. But this is only one of the necessary elements, as it is only when the relationship between intellectuals and the masses is one of organic cohesion in which passion becomes understanding of group position, only then is the relationship 'representative and it is in this state that the exchange or socialisation of elements between the different strata becomes possible and the historical bloc comes into existence,' (Gramsci, 1971: 418). To produce organic intellectuals is to produce

[30] Notebook 4 §33. Emphasis in original.

two necessities for any cultural, social, or political movement. The first is to never tire of repeating arguments (albeit offering variation in form), 'seeing that repetition is the most effective didactic means for such a project. The second is to provide character to the otherwise amorphous mass element, producing *élites* of intellectuals that arise from the social group but remain in constant contact with them,' (Gramsci, 1971: 340). Associational free spaces then afford workers the opportunity to share in collective experience and participate in the exchange of ideas and socialisation of a new common sense and subsequent organisation of the social group into a historical bloc.[31]

What we have teased out here is that Gramsci's concept of organic intellectuals is intimately related to agency and practice. While Gramsci explicitly understood the practices of intellectuals to be primarily educative, there is an acknowledgement of differing degrees of intellectual activity that hints at an expanded role or understanding of what such practices entail. What does it mean to be educative and organising? In addition, Gramsci's insistence on the connections between intellectuals and the passions of the social group lead us to consider the role of context in the activities and practices of intellectuals. What passion are they tapping into and why? What is stoking these passions and how are they influencing the ways in which intellectuals engage and interact with them and the social group itself. It is from this point that we can introduce Gramsci's writings on language as well as beginning to tease out some initial formulations of intellectual function.

[31] See Billings (1990) p. 7; Gramsci (1971) pp. 147-57 & 330-43

Gramsci, Language, and Intellectual Function

While it is important to make gradations of intellectual activity, what was crucial for Gramsci is their function, which is directive and organisational, i.e. that it is educative and leading, (Gramsci, 1971: 16). However, Gramsci included an important caveat when considering the limits of what we can characterise as intellectual activity or practice.

> "The most widespread error, it seems to me, has been to look for the essential characteristics in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activity rather than in the system of relations wherein this activity (and the group that personifies it) is located within the general ensemble of social relations." (Gramsci, 2011b: 200)[32]

The problem here is the tendency to treat intellectuals as an actor *a priori* recognised by society as belonging to 'a specialised caste or by assuming the role of an intellectual at a given moment. However, if we were to assume that no such conception of an intellectual existed what then could be said about those practices that are attributed to intellectuals?' (Sunnercrantz, 2017: 25). Nimni argues that Gramsci's conception of intellectuals was a deviation from earlier formulations, which was inherently tied to the upper classes and so Gramsci was suggesting a 'reassessment by distinguishing between the intellectual aspects inherent in every form of human existence from the intellectual function,' (Nimni, 1991: 101). As noted above, for Gramsci, the intellectual function was primarily educative. Similarly, Foucault argued that 'the work of an intellectual is not to mould the political will of others; it is, through the analysis that they do in their own field, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dispel common-sense

[32] Notebook 4 §49

beliefs, to take new measures of rules and institutions…it is a matter of participating in the formation of a political will,' (Foucault, 1991b: 11-12). For Laclau, 'the intellectual dimension cannot be conceived as *recognition* but as construction; it is for that same reason that intellectual activity is not the exclusive to an elite: it arises from all points of the social fabric,' (Laclau, 1990: 196).[33] Thus, the construction of a hegemonic will is dependent on 'political initiatives that are not the necessary effects of infrastructural laws of movement and the increased the role of the intellectual function in widens the scope of identification of intellectuals,' (Laclau, 2000: 287). In this way, intellectual function becomes synonymous with articulation in Laclau.

Despite Laclau's insistence on the significance of the intellectual function, he wrote remarkably little on the subject, and was 'less than clear regarding how we might research and investigate this relationship in empirical analysis,' (Sunnercrantz, 2017: 23-25).[34] Like his predecessors, Laclau identified a series of actors that he understood as 'constituting organic intellectuals: union organisers, technicians, social workers, film makers and other consciousness raising groups,' (Laclau, 2000: 287).[35] While the scope of *who* can be an intellectual may have widened, there is a residual level of abstraction that identifies practitioners of articulation with the specific tasks and activities. While education and organisation may correctly be understood as aspects of the intellectual function, this focus continues to obscure what can be said about the material realities of the practice as well as the myriad of other activities intellectuals engage in. This leads us to consider to significance of

[33] Emphasis in Original
[34] See also Laclau (1990) pp. 195-6 & Butler *et al* (2000) pp. 286-88
[35] Emphasis added.

language within Gramsci's conceptualization of intellectual activity and by extension, hegemonic politics.

If we recall from above, that all 'men' can be intellectuals, they can be said to participate in a particular conception of the world and contained within this spontaneous philosophy is: '1) Language itself, which is a totality of determined notions and contents and not just words grammatically devoid of content; 2) Common sense and good sense; 3) Ways of seeing things and acting which surface collectively under folklore,' (Gramsci, 1971: 9, 323). Gramsci stresses that language could also mean culture and philosophy, and so the "fact of language" is a multiplicity of facts, organically coherent and co-ordinated. In this sense, every individual possesses a personal language, reflecting their own way of thinking and feeling, 'whereas culture at its various levels unifies in a series of strata, to the extent that these personal languages encounter each other, a greater or lesser number of individuals who can comprehend each other's mode of expression,' (Gramsci, 2000: 347). However, Gramsci also warned against seeing culture as encyclopaedic knowledge, 'with people as mere receptacles to be stuffed full of empirical data and as a mass of unconnected facts to be drawn upon in response to various situations,' (Gramsci, 2014: 10-11). Culture therefore emerges through organisation and 'a coming to terms with one's own personality and attainment of an awareness with which to understand one's function and obligations to the social group,' (Gramsci, 2014: 11). From this position, Gramsci sought to tie language to culture, philosophy, and ideology; and in so doing, utilised language to emphasise that these elements cannot be divorced from politics and the operations of power, (Ives, 2004). Following this line of thought, intellectual practices and by extension agency of and within nationalism cannot be divorced from their contexts, and considerations of language and its role in the discursive construction of the nation is the means with which we can elucidate these links.

For Gramsci political intuition was the ‘swiftness in connecting seemingly disparate facts, and in conceiving the adequate means to particular ends—thus discovering the interests involved, arousing passions and directing these towards a particular action,’ (Gramsci, 1971: 252). However, Gramsci also noted that historical acts can only be performed by a collective, and this presupposes the attainment of a cultural-social unity through which ‘a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in emotion or permanently (where the intellectual base is so well rooted assimilated and experienced that it becomes passion),’ (Gramsci, 1971: 349). If it is true that every language contains traces of a conception of the world, then it could also be said that from anyone’s language one can ‘assess the complexity of their own conception. Someone who only speaks dialect, or understands the standard language incompletely, necessarily has an intuition which is limited and provincial, fossilized and anachronistic in relation to the major currents of thought which dominate world history,’ (Gramsci, 1971: 325). This has profound implications for Gramsci’s distinction between common sense and good sense and subsequently how we should approach the purpose of intellectual function.

The Italian notion of common sense *(senso comune)* does not refer to good or practical sense, rather it refers to a normal or average understanding, while at the same time, good sense *(buon senso)* is something more distinct from common sense in English, (Ives, 2004: 74). For Gramsci, common sense is always ‘disjointed and episodic; it is historically specific in the sense that several philosophies and conceptions of the world have sedimented into it, often in rather chaotic and contradictory ways,’ (Hall, 1986: 37). Gramsci recognised that there are always cases of individuals belonging to more than one ‘private association, and often they

belong to associations that are in conflict,' (Gramsci, 2011c: 108).[36] In this way, the imprinting of different ideologies into a common sense is the 'signal that certain ideas have influenced practical thinking and are present in the effective actions of social life,' (Hall, 1986: 37). If we consider that for Laclau, the intellectual function consisted of the *invention of languages* then the unity of the historical bloc is produced by organic ideologies that articulate into new projects fragmented and dispersed elements; 'the production of those ideologies becomes the intellectual function *par excellence*,' (Laclau, 1990: 196).[37] However, while it is not always possible to learn several foreign languages, it is at least necessary to learn the 'national' language properly. A great 'national language with historic richness and complexity, can be translated into other great cultures and this can become a world-wide means of expression. A dialect cannot do this,' (Gramsci, 1971: 325). It is not then a matter of *invention*, but a matter of *translating* the necessary elements and ideas of culture. Organic intellectuals do not simply describe social life, but *articulate*, through the language of culture, passions, and experiences where sophisticated and elaborate knowledge is transformed into life and politics through intimate connections to the expressions, experiences and passions felt by people, (Fontana, 2015; Crehan, 2016).

This is why Gramsci stressed that intellectual activity develops both quantitatively and qualitatively, which makes Laclau & Mouffe's assertion that for Gramsci, the ultimate hegemonic core of the subject's identity is constituted at a point external to the space it articulates problematic given their insistence on the significance of articulation.[38] However, 'it is precisely because identities are constructed within discourse, that we need to understand

[36] Notebook 6 §136
[37] Emphasis added.
[38] See Laclau & Mouffe (1985) p.85

them as being produced in specific historical and institutional sites, within specific discursive formations and practices, and by specific enunciative strategies,' (Hall, 1996: 4). Therefore, organic intellectuals are not a particular kind of intellectual, rather, 'they are the form in which knowledge generated out of lived experience with the potential to become hegemonic achieves coherence and authority,' (Crehan, 2016: 29-30). In addition, the emergence of new kinds of intellectuals is an essential aspect of social organisation, since it is the nature of the social relations 'underpinning a given class that call them into being, it is impossible to know in advance what form its organic intellectuals will take,' (Crehan, 2016: 34). This is why Hall argues that we should attend this riveting of Gramsci to the notion of difference, to the specificity of the historical conjecture: 'how different forces come together, conjuncturally, to create new terrain on which a counter hegemonic projects are built,' (Hall, 1988: 163). By re-assessing the concepts of articulation and contingency through Gramsci's contributions on organic intellectuals and language, we can take the first steps towards rendering articulation and articulatory practices as both explicitly spatial and contextually specific, (Hart, 2013).

To briefly summarise the above discussions, through Gramsci's understanding of language and its intimate connections to the development of culture, we can reassess the role of intellectual function as one that does not invent elements in the strict sense but translates them as a means of giving them coherence. In the present case, this entails the translation of experience into a 'national discourse' that promotes cohesion and unity of the social bloc in question, i.e. the Scottish Independence movement. Furthermore, this can only be conceptualised in and through the contextual environments in which these practices of translation occur. What now follows is to elaborate on this idea of translation for which we turn to the writings of Voloshinov.

2.3 Voloshinov & Social Multi-Accentuallity[39]

The Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies drew from Valentin Voloshinov's *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (1973) with Stuart Hall suggesting that they did so without grasping the centrality of the dialogic principle where the self is constituted only in relation to the other, where meaning belongs to a word in its position between speakers, (Hall, 1993). According to Hart (2013) this 'dialogic' principle resonates and significantly overlaps with Gramsci's writings on language, and this presents an interesting avenue for further developments of intellectual function. Following from the considerations above, this second step towards involves considering Voloshinov's concept of *social multi-accentuality*. We will briefly outline the key elements of the concept before exploring the implications and understandings for re-activating and operationalising intellectual function for the purposes of critically engaging with Scottish nationalism in the 2014 referendum.

Voloshinov argues that everything ideological possesses meaning: 'it represents, depicts or stands for something outside of itself – it is a sign, and without signs there is no ideology,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 9). In this way signs only emerge through 'processes of interaction between individual consciousness, which are themselves filled with signs, and only becomes consciousness once it has been filled with ideological (semiotic) content, which can only be achieved through social interaction.' (Voloshinov, 1973: 11) The real place of existence of the ideological is in the social material of signs, and its specificity consists in the fact that it is

[39] On a point of context, compared to other linguistic theorists such as Levi-Strauss, Saussure or Bakhtin, Voloshinov is a relatively obscure figure. Voloshinov himself was a member of the Bakhtin circle and there is some debate as to whether the works attributed to Voloshinov were in fact written by Bakhtin. While this claim has been challenged and Voloshinov's authorship generally accepted, the comparative lack of material that bears his name, alongside the minimal availability of English translations of his work has certainly had some impact on the recognition of his works outside of linguistic studies.

'located between organised individuals, in its being the medium of their communication,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 12). We can draw some similarities here with Gramsci's assertion that culture is not imposed from above but rather is achieved through critical diffusion. Which is to say that consciousness takes shape in the material of signs that are constructed by a given social group through the social interactions of its members. The logic of consciousness is therefore 'synonymous with the logic of ideological communication, and if we deprive consciousness of its semiotic and ideological content then it would be left empty and hollow,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 13).

It is from this perspective that Voloshinov considers the ideological phenomenon *par excellence*[40], and that two properties exist that allow for this. First, every form of semiotic material is specialised to some extent for a particular field, with each field possessing its own materials and formulating its own signs and symbols that are specific to that field. The word on the other hand is a neutral with respect to specific ideological functions as it can perform ideological functions of *any* kind. Second, while the reality of the word is inherent in the ensemble of social relations; 'it is at the same time *produced* by an individual and the word is available in this sense for inner employment and can function as a sign in a state short of outward expression,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 14). A verbal reaction is only possible with reference to and within the 'conditions of a social environment and the connections that a word is employed to establish are the results of the process of organised and multi-lateral contact amongst individuals,' (Voloshinov, 2012: 29). Therefore, no sign or word, once taken in and given meaning by a specific social group, remains in isolation: 'it becomes a part of the unity of the verbally constituted consciousness and it is the capacity of consciousness to find

[40] Not unlike Laclau's assertion the construction of the "people" was the political act par excellence.

verbal access to a sign, thus producing ripples of response and resonances form around ideological signs,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 15).

Voloshinov goes on to note that any explanation must preserve the qualitative differences between 'interacting domains and consequently must trace the stages through which ideological change travels,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 18). What we can say here then, is that speech interchange operates in association with their immediate conditions (social, political, economic etc.) and they exhibit a remarkable sensitivity to fluctuations. Therefore, the ideological *forms* that any sign can assume is conditioned by the social organisation of participants involved and by their immediate conditions; consequently, only as a part of the social whole does an individual become historically real and culturally productive, (Voloshinov, 1973; 2012). At this stage Voloshinov introduces the notion of accent, insisting that ideological accents are social accents 'insofar as they have claims to social recognition, and only with this recognition are they made outward use in ideological material,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 22). We can draw some comparisons here to the Laclauian understanding of the operation of the logics of equivalence and difference. Recognised demands that form chains of equivalence are privileged in that they are communicated through ideological outputs or signs. Crucially then, each ideological sign has a theme[41] and these themes are always 'socially accentuated, and the source of these accents is not individual consciousness, but in interindividual interactions. Therefore, the content and structure[42] of ideological signs are inextricably bound together and are separable only in the abstract,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 22).

[41] Independence or sovereignty as a theme of the sign nation for example.
[42] Theme and Form in Voloshinov's original formulation

From this position, Voloshinov introduces the concept of social multi-accentuality. The extended passage in which Voloshinov discusses this concept is worth quoting below in full.

> "Existence reflected in sign is not merely reflected but *refracted*. How is this refraction of existence in the ideological sign determined? By an intersecting of the differently orientated social interests within one and the same sign community, i.e. *by the class struggle*.
>
> Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community, which is the totality of users of the same sets of signs for ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently orientated accents intersect every ideological sign. Sign becomes the arena of class struggle.
>
> This social *multiaccentuality* of the ideological sign is a very crucial aspect. By and large, it is thanks to this intersecting of accents that a sign maintains its vitality and dynamism and the capacity for further development. A sign that has been withdrawn from the social pressures of the social struggle – which, so to speak, crosses beyond the pale of the class struggle – inevitably loses force, degenerating into allegory and becoming the object not of live social intelligibility but of philological comprehension." (Voloshinov, 1973: 23)

What this concept provides is a way of engaging and approaching the dynamism and vitality of ideological signs and markers in terms of both agency and context. How they are re-interpreted and re-purposed for specific ideological and social struggles? How through the process of articulation and contingency, ideological signs and markers come to take on their form and content in a specific context? However, the interplay of social accents is also what produces 'a refracting and distorting medium in that various intersecting accents of competing social groups will attempt to fix an eternal character to the sign and remove all evidence of struggle to make it *uni-accentual*,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 23). We can further relate this to

Laclau and DT more generally with the operation of empty signifiers, the removal of meaning from a sign such that it comes to represent the totality. A final point to be made here is that, like Nairn with nationalism, Voloshinov, considered ideological signs to be Janus-faced; but this inner-dialectic quality only reveals itself in moments of extreme social upheaval or dislocation in the vocabulary of DT. What remains is to utilise both Gramsci and Voloshinov's contributions as a means of re-activating Intellectual Function.

2.4 Re-activating Intellectual Function

Both Gramsci and Voloshinov sought to challenge romantic conceptions of the individual so that 'language would no longer be considered individual artistic expression, but the material of art, a social product and form of cultural expression,' (Brandist, 1996: 98). In this sense, to it is necessary to consider the results and consequences of political struggle in language because it does not simply play out without producing specific ideological effects. In other words, if we focus on which accents or meanings are dominant, 'what we see is that a specific way of thinking is being produced in the moments that we choose to study,' (Sućeska, 2018: 184). To put this slightly differently, if we assume that all utterances within a debate have a performative aspect, then we can treat the act of saying as an act of doing, (Sunnercrantz, 2017). To further qualify this in relation to social multi-accentuality, if verbal interaction is the basic reality of language, dialogue in the narrow sense between individuals is only one form verbal interaction. The conception of dialogue can then be 'expanded to refer to verbal communications of any kind; print (i.e. books, newspapers, academic texts), in music, film etc,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 94-5). In this way, we broaden the scope of articulation and articulatory practice, bringing in the realms of sound and vision across the spectrum of social

interactions[43] while continuing to acknowledge the role and significance of contingency in their expressions.

If we consider that each discourse, language, or accent articulates a worldview, then a discourse becomes hegemonic when one such worldview is accepted by other social groups. This does not mean that hegemonic struggle only consists of a conflict of *hegemonic principles*. In Brandist's view, 'discourses seek to bind other discourses to themselves under two principles: 1) by establishing a relation of authority between the enclosing and target discourses; or 2) facilitating the further advancement of the target discourse *through* the enclosing discourse,' (Brandist, 1996: 103).[44] This resonates with Essex School formulations of hegemony and the operation of the logics of equivalence and difference, however, Brandist is critical of this perspective on the grounds that the ambiguity in Gramsci's considerations on language has 'allowed writers to separate the notion of hegemony from classism, where meaning is solely the unstable effect of shifting relations of difference,' (Brandist, 1996: 108). As we have shown above, issues with a poststructuralist approach stem more from a lack of engagement with Gramsci's rich writings on language as opposed to an undeveloped conception of language in Gramsci. If we consider Gramsci's account of language as a medium of cultural production and translation of experience, we can begin to account for how the immediate conditions that 'inaugurate a new element of reality into the social, that make it socially meaningful and interesting are the same conditions that produce forms of ideological communication, which in turn shapes the forms of semiotic expression,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 22-3).

[43] As David Bowie once wisely asked, "Don't you wonder sometimes about sound and visions?"
[44] Emphasis in original.

The concepts of articulation and contingency as presented by Essex School approaches, would encourage us towards privileging dominant accents and structures in the way suggested above by Sućeska. While this is not necessarily problematic, it risks overlooking and obscuring a crucial dimension to the construction and maintenance of hegemonic discourses and in the case of nationalism how these discourses compete for and structure meaning of the nation. By applying Gramsci and Voloshinov's contributions, we broaden the scope and horizon of what is possible and desirable for discourse theoretical research when it comes to nationalism. For example, such an approach would allow us to consider those elements that may well have been incorporated into an equivalential chain but are not and have not been utilised in the expression of a nationalist project's collective demands. In addition, by acknowledging the multi-accentual dimension of sign construction and maintenance, we can push discursive approaches to consider and acknowledge the deeply interconnected relationship between form and content in nationalist appeals. After all, the selection and 'voicing' of demands will ultimately influence the structure of any social movement and vice versa in the sense that the structure and form of a movement is deeply influenced by the demands that it attempts to include within an equivalential chain. Therefore, reassessing the role and purpose of intellectual function in and through Gramsci's and Voloshinov into discursive conceptions of articulation and contingency allows us to foreground the (political) contextually specific practice of articulations of language within nationalist discourses.

Social multi-accentuality as sketched out above bears resemblance to Derrida's understanding that the 'relational ontology of meaning gives reason to assume that the meaning of any given sign is contextually determined and consequently depends on the sample of other signs that surround it,' (Derrida, 1997: 53). For example, a specific structure is constructed for the light and casual causerie of a drawing room, and we find 'special forms of insinuation, half-sayings

and an intentionally non-serious atmosphere, where a random assortment of people gathers, exchanges will start, finish and be constructed in a completely different manner,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 97). What makes the variation of language unique is not only their belonging to different genres or contexts, but the fact that each of these contexts 'ascribe different and sometimes opposite meanings to the same words,' (Sućeska, 2018: 182). Problems of language are important because language equals thought, and the way we speak indicates not only the way we think and feel, 'but also the way we express ourselves, the way we make others understand and feel,' (Gramsci, 1985: 129). Therefore, verbal performances 'engage in ideological colloquy of a large scale: responding, objecting, affirming, and anticipating response,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 95). If we further recall Gramsci's assertion that the two necessities of the production of intellectuals are the repetition of argument and to provide character to the otherwise amorphous mass, then we can begin to conceptualise the interaction of individuals and the meeting of accents as the driving force behind the articulation of various elements and a key element of intellectual function.

This is why Voloshinov stresses that the complex apparatus of verbal interaction also functions when the subjects say nothing but only undergoes them in himself, thus a process of '*inner* speech/dialogue occurs which is just as material as outward expression,' (Voloshinov, 2012: 27). In this way, Voloshinov furnishes us with a set of conceptual tools with which to conduct a thorough political analysis of language, whereas Gramsci's places an emphasis on the practical and political value of these insights. (Sućeska, 2018) Thus, what Gramsci and Voloshinov can contribute to a discursive approach is a conception of the subject 'steeped in a theory of language as productive of meaning as well as being inseparable from the practice and constitution of the self in relation to others,' (Hart, 2013: 313). In this way, a revitalised conception of intellectual function foregrounds the importance of agency and context in the

study of nationalism. This allows us to present and understand nationalism and the subjects of its discourses as immersed in the production of discursive structures and content; and by bringing form and content of nationalist discourses into dialogue it becomes possible to critically appraise and engage with historically specific and contingent forms that nationalism and national identity takes.

Laclau & Mouffe (2014) noted that social actors occupy differential positions within the discourses that constitute the social fabric, and, in this sense, they are all strictly speaking, particularities. In addition, Laclau argued that once a demand is submitted to the articulatory attempts of a plurality of antagonistic projects it lives in a no-man's-land acquiring a partial and transitory autonomy,' (Laclau, 2005b: 159). However, given the discussions above, this understanding becomes inadequate for DT moving forward. Through Gramsci and Voloshinov, we can argue that for any signifier or sign to maintain its trajectory and capacity for development, there is a reliance on political subjects to be attuned to and react to the social context in which a signifier has been utilised or acted upon. As such, we are drawn to consider the means through which the applications of language and accent contribute to the production, maintenance, and contestation of meaning within a discourse and social groups. For example, Stuart Hall raised the issue of a trend in British politics where, when asked about policy, voters consistently showed preference for Labour; yet when asked about image, Thatcher was often held in high regards. Hall suggests that the electorate was (and still is) thinking politics increasingly in terms of image as opposed to policy, which does not mean that policies do not matter, but that policy does not capture the political imagination unless articulated with an image with which they can identify, (Hall, 1988).[45] We can draw some

[45] See Hall (1988) *Blue Election, Election Blues* for the full discussion and context.

parallels here to the study of nationalism. As discussed in the previous chapter, several policies and identities have often been associated with support for Scottish nationalism, however this is not necessarily how people express their positions. In acknowledging the role of image and how political subjects utilise image as a language or accent of expression or translation of experience, the concept of intellectual function is capable of accounting for these acts of agency whilst at the same time locating them within a specific context thus offering insights into seemingly contradictory outlooks and positions that we might observe.

For Kipfer, the key concepts through which Gramsci's theory of hegemony emerged were 'developed through recognition and understanding of their historical and geographical specificity,' (Kipfer, 2013: 85). Likewise, Jessop comments that Gramsci's theory of language as the 'medium of hegemony and hegemonic politics was not just historical but also highly sensitive spatially,' (Jessop, 2005: 423). Jessop highlights three concepts of Place, Space, and Scale that are crucial to Gramsci's theory and practice that can also conceivably be applied to Voloshinov given the discussion above. For Jessop, Place refers to sites of direct interactions, whose boundaries provide strategically selective settings that privilege some identity and interests over others. Space comprises socially produced horizons of social life and offers a series of strategically selective possibilities with which to develop social relations. Finally, Scale refers to the nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of different sizes which is typically the result of social struggle for power and control, (Jessop, 2005).[46] Crucially, as we have discussed above, the sites of language, accent and cultural production cannot be understood outside of the specific sites of their constitution. Gramsci himself was particularly interested in conjunctures: historical moments that 'articulate the punctual

[46] See Jessop (2005) pp. 424-426 for his full discussion and elaboration.

temporality of the event with longer-term forms of the historical duration, thus, temporal rhythms are spatialised,' (Kipfer, 2013: 86). Therefore, verbal communication is always accompanied by non-verbal social practices, and it is through this that language acquires life, and historically evolves, in 'the concrete verbal communication, and not in the abstract linguistic system of language forms, nor in the individual psyche of speakers,' (Voloshinov, 1973: 95).

If we accept the multiplicity of subject positions and the over-determination of meaning in Laclau & Mouffe, then the operation of a hegemonic logic presupposes the existence of a social field inhabited by overlapping social antagonisms and an availability of contingent elements that can be articulated by various political projects striving to confer meaning to them. (Howarth, 2000; Howarth 2005) In this sense, we can envisage a discursive field as being populated by a multiplicity of social accents all competing to confer meaning to available elements and signs. However, the connections drawn between political sign and concept is often more haphazard and are subject to 'arbitrary human choice or casual selection, as well as extra-human and socially determined rhythms. The result being the permanent existence of multiple paths through which signifiers elements can travel and associate,' (Freeden, 2021: 54). Such processes 'cut through the political at a level of abstraction that tends to obscure the crucial patterns churning beneath the surface,' (Freeden, 2021: 55). Rather than promoting a general theory of radical political agency, 'we need to remain sensitive to the specific historical contexts in which different kinds of subjectivity come into play, and various identities are constructed,' (Howarth, 2013: 185). To this end, the reassessing the role and purpose of intellectual function through Gramsci and Voloshinov constitutes an attempt to further refine a poststructuralist conception of articulation that allows

us to conceptualise the specificity of political practices, analytically distinguished, without losing its grip on the ensemble that they have been adopted to constitute, (Hall, 2019: 63-64).

To put this slightly differently, if certain signifiers become more central than others, 'acting as nodal points in particular discourses, this is only possible because we feel some signifiers are more important than others,' (Zienkowski, 2016: 57). But how and why do we come to feel so strongly about these elements, especially when we consider the multiplicity of elements that we invariably have some feeling towards? Why nation over people? Why people over class? Any attempt to understand this must re-emphasise the contingency of those signifiers and their position within a discourse. Part of the answer lies in the historical-contextual environment but additionally, one may feel equally strongly on a selection of elements and yet a signifier, the nation for example, becomes central. Ideologies reshape themselves to press diverse points simultaneously against different competitors and 'this ideological fluidity cannot be understood without heeding the medley of non-hegemonic elements circulating in any discursive terrain that continuously alter the meaning and significance of elements within a discursive formation,' (Freeden, 2021: 56). If we reflect on the centrality of the 'nation' as a nodal point or privileged signifier in nationalist discourses, we must consider what the specific construction of the nation is in that instance. Furthermore, we must consider the differential elements that are and can be articulated to sustain the prevailing conception. So, if we presuppose the centrality of 'nation' across all approaches to nationalism, the question remains, how do we account for the specificity of the nation within nationalist discourses in relation to the multiplicity of elements that surround and inform it in each moment? Reassessing the concept of intellectual function in and through Gramsci and Voloshinov allows us to develop the conceptual means with which to address these questions.

To conclude this chapter, we can propose the following amendment to the discursive theoretical and conceptual definition of nationalism. Following De Cleen & Stavrakakis (2017), nationalism here is conceived as a discourse that is structured around the nodal point nation. Nationalism seeks to ascribe the nation with specific meanings in line with the demands and values of a hegemonic bloc, constructed through an equivalential logic towards a specified end. The exact construction is varied and dependent on the context in which a nationalist discourse operates as are the practices of articulation that nationalist discourses utilise in their project. What remains central, is that any practices and meanings revolve around the project to discursively construct "the nation." From this foundational position we can begin to develop conceptual tools that allow us to engage with specific constructions and practices of nationalism. It is to this end that we have proposed a re-activation and re-imagining of the intellectual function by utilising readings of both Gramsci and Voloshinov. intellectual function here is conceived as a complementary analytical tool and concept that can be applied to the study and evaluation of discourses. The concept is posed at a relevant level of abstraction that understands political practices as a means of translating experiences and ideas into forms that represent and express the position of the political subject in relation to both their wider contexts and participation in social groups. Conceptualising intellectual function in this way allows for an expanded appreciation of agency and context in discursive constructions by incorporating both linguistic and non-linguistic expressions and practices that seek to ascribe specific and intelligible meaning within the specific context and structures of their interactions.

This is not to say that the reformulation of the concept is geared only towards analysis of nationalist discourses. This re-activation is posed at a level of abstraction that is attuned to specific and differential engagements with a variety of social and political phenomena to the

extent that its application can be adapted for the task at hand. As argued by Carpentier & De Cleen, DT provides 'little toolboxes' for analysis, where the application of DT can be understood as a process of 'opening these toolboxes, and if we want to use particular ideas, sentences or analysis like a screwdriver or wrench in order to short-circuit, disqualify or break-up systems of power […] well, all the better!' (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007: 266). By combining Gramsci's writings on organic intellectuals and language with Voloshinov's concept of social multi-accentuality, intellectual function is conceived as the logic and impetus behind the selection and material practice of articulation within a discursive project. Under the assumptions of articulation and contingency, there is a multiplicity of both practices and elements available for the construction of a nationalist discourse, which as discourse theorists we assume no necessary correspondence. Conceiving intellectual function as a logic of and not articulation in the abstract sense, produces a conceptual tool capable of evaluating and assessing the specific and differential expressions and constructions of nationalism that we observe.[47] Intellectual function then, is a means of elucidating

[47] I draw an analogy here with Swedish heavy metal band Sabaton and their 2012 album Carolus Rex (King Charles). The album's content is focused on the rise and fall of the Swedish Empire in the 17th and early 18th centuries and was written in its entirety with both Swedish and English lyrics, in effect creating two different albums. Given the historical content it makes sense for a Swedish band, to write and sing about Swedish history in the Swedish language, even though the remainder of their back-catalogue is written with English lyrics. According to band members this was a necessary evil due to the difficulty of translation, but it holds another consequence. The Swedish lyrics have specific and different meanings to Swedish listeners than it will have for non-Swedes. In some cases, the songs remained similar in content and style, whereas in others there are drastic changes. Two examples: the song En Livstid I Krig [A Lifetime of War] is written in English as a more general lament of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), whereas the Swedish lyrics are written from a distinctly personal point of view of a Swedish soldier participating in the conflict. Ett Slag Färgat Rött [A Battle Coloured Red] or Killing Ground in English; covers the Battle of Fraustadt in 1706. At one point the Swedish lyrics explicitly recall and condemn the massacre of Russian POWs in the aftermath of the battle. In the English, the event is alluded to, but no explicit reference is made. The band themselves have commented that this event needed to be addressed as it is a particularly dark and shameful moment in Swedish history. In these examples, Heavy Metal can be said to act as the language, while the English and Swedish lyrics act as accents; each have a different meaning and structure for their intended audience, but the central message remains largely intact. That is to say that the use of different accents alters the content and meaning of the topic for the native listener without detracting from the overall narrative.

articulation, the process and contexts through which strategies, practices and elements are elaborated and then pursued. It should also be pointed out here that intellectual function is not a tool developed solely for the purpose of research. It is also a tool of translation and reflection for the researcher. We can turn its gaze to our own actions and choices in such a way that our research choices and objects can be understood as being discursively constructed by our own practices and social positions and chosen expression of these, assessing them appropriately on the planes of agency and context.

Through this chapter, a theoretical and conceptual foundation with which to build an engagement with Scottish nationalism has been established. The following chapter will shift to considerations of the methodological and empirical means with which to operationalise these theoretical insights. To this end, the research introduces and elaborates on the Logics alongside Foucault's genealogical method as being appropriate for this task.

For any military history buffs and heavy metal enthusiasts, I highly recommend the Youtube channel Sabaton History which covers lots of these nuances in Sabaton's music! The two episodes covering the above-mentioned songs are copied below.
En Livstid I Krig: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RT2FLNvzoPQ (Conducted in Swedish w/English subs)
Ett Slag Färgat Rött: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VCGOO3_f03c (Conducted in English)

Chapter 3 – Ways Forward: The Logics Approach and operationalising Discursive Nationalism

3.1 Initial Steps

Through an engagement with Essex School Discourse Theory, the previous chapter has outlined and elaborated on a discursive approach to and conceptualisation of nationalism that we will take forward. Utilising a series of concepts and grammars such as articulation and contingency, a discursive approach and definition is poised to engage with nationalism at both the ontic and ontological levels, conceiving them as deeply interconnected. In addition, the emphasis on articulation and contingency seeks to integrate the contextual richness of hermeneutical explanations provide, but in such a way that these explanations are both contextually specific, but also allow room for some measure of comparative work by adhering to specified criteria and principles. In developing and reactivating intellectual function as a complementary analytical and conceptual tool to the insights of discursive approaches, the theoretical basis of a discursive approach is enhanced, by providing a closer appreciation of the contextual specificity of discursive regimes and practices. The purpose of the following chapter is to elaborate on the methodological and empirical means with which to operationalise these theoretical insights and developments. The chapter begins with some initial thoughts and discussion of research strategy before moving to introduce Glynos & Howarth's (2007) Logics approach as a suitable framework with which to proceed. Following this, Foucault's genealogical method will be put forward as an appropriate and complimentary empirical method for Logics inspired research. The research will then situate the engagement with Scottish nationalism through the construction and development of several myths, highlighting the usefulness and suitability of myths for investigation. The chapter will then conclude with a brief note on the corpus of materials that will be consulted.

Voloshinov argued that in the study of ideology three methodological principles are to be followed. 1) Ideology cannot be removed from the material reality of the sign; 2) The sign cannot be removed from concrete social intercourse; 3) Communication and all its forms cannot be removed from their material basis, (Voloshinov, 1973). We can adapt these principles for the current research project by posing that:

1) Scottish Nationalism as a discourse cannot be removed from the material reality of the signs and symbols it employs.

2) The signs and symbols associated with Scottish nationalism cannot be considered independent from the practices through which they are discursively constructed and employed.

3) The specific articulatory practices that constitute contemporary Scottish nationalism and their associated signs and symbols cannot be considered independent of the material reality in which they are expressed.

This is not to say that each of these principles are independent, indeed, the application of any research on nationalism will see significant overlap. Outlining these research principles in this way helps us to mark out the purpose of the research project and provide critical analysis of. We must emphasise two crucial points here before we proceed. The first is to avoid the temptation of fetishising questions of method. There is no ‘perfect’ method so to speak, and we should not endeavour to promote or seek out a one size fits all or anything goes approach to methodology. A degree of flexibility and a pluralistic understanding of method is therefore required. Any methodology employed must be attentive to the historical and contextual

environment in which the problematised phenomenon occurs and by extension, discursive approaches must acknowledge the different forms of knowledge and data that various methods of empirical analysis both engage with and produce, and what can reasonably be drawn from the results given the discursive framing and background of the research. In this way, the Logics approach as advanced here is no more than one of several approaches open to us, and one that produces a certain body of knowledge that has been identified as being particularly useful for producing a critical account of Scottish nationalism. Furthermore, the selection of the Logics and genealogical method, alongside the focus of this research can be translated through applying intellectual function to our own processes as well the objects we study.

3.2 The Logics Approach

Glynos & Howarth's (2007) Logics approach has sought to develop an ontological stance and grammar of concepts, together with a 'particular research ethos which makes it possible to construct and furnish answers to empirical problems that can withstand charges of methodological arbitrariness, historical particularism and idealism,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 7). In addition, the development of the Logics approach is a concerted effort to bring DT into 'dialogue with debates in philosophy of science as well as its conceptualisation in relation to other traditions of thought,' (Glynos *et al*, 2021: 64). Before elaborating on the insights and process of the approach in more detail, it is important to take a small step backwards to briefly sketch out the understandings of the concept of logic.

Laclau understood logic as the type of relation between entities that makes the operation of a system possible, while grammars refer to the 'rules of a particular language game, logic speaks to how entities have to be in order to make those rules possible,' (Laclau, 2000: 283-

4). Building on this understanding, Glynos & Howarth refer to logics as 'the rules of practice as well as the conditions which make them possible and vulnerable.' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 136) Taking football for example, on the one hand it is possible for us to discern and reconstruct dominant patterns that encompass strategy, tactics, and formation. Consider the classic 4-4-2 formation or the often maligned 'long ball' tactic! In addition, there also exists a set of presupposed entities and types of relationships, or in other words, the fundamental rules of the game, the offside rule, conditions for fouls and disciplinary actions and so on. Together, these form the general rules or 'grammars' of playing the game of football. While the practice of playing the game allows for the elaboration and innovation of new strategies and tactics – from Pep Guardiola's *Tiki Taka* to Jürgen Klopp's *Gegenpress* – the fundamental rules themselves are also subject to changes in both circumstances and demand – for example, the much maligned introduction of VAR![48] In sum, this conception of logics is designed to capture the point, rules and ontological preconditions of policy, practices and regimes. However, these logics are not independent of their specific historical context in which they operate or the ontological frameworks and empirical circumstances in which they are rooted, (Howarth, 2015: 261; Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 136). While the category of logics plays a vital role in Glynos & Howarth's approach, they are by no means the sole element. The Logics approach consists of five interconnected and mutually dependent steps and while these may be separated in an analytical sense, for the conduct of empirical research they are necessarily interlinked. These steps are: Problematisation; Retroduction; Logics; Articulation and Critique (PRELAC) and are broken down further below.

[48] Both Laclau (2000) and Glynos & Howarth (2007) use the example of playing chess, but I will be forgiven for utilising intellectual function in attempting to translate this example to one more familiar and for my sins one I am more passionate about. Regardless, the rationale is applicable to any such example or anecdote.

1) **Problematisation:** Consists of the construction of an object of study as problematic at a requisite level of abstraction and complexity.

2) **Retroduction:** Process of producing and testing tentative proto-hypothesis to account for the problematised phenomenon via a back-and-forth engagement with empirical material thereby offering a form of explanation.

3) **Logics:** Content of explanation. A means of capturing the rules that govern regimes and practices as well as the conditions and objects that make them possible. Three *logics* serve this purpose: *Social; Political* and *Fantasmatic.*

4) **Articulation:** Process of linking together a plurality of logics to account for problematised phenomenon, modifying each element as process proceeds.

5) **Critique:** Employment of *political* and *fantasmatic* logics to explain and expose contingency of the above processes and relations of the problematised phenomenon.

(Adapted from Howarth *et al*, 2016: 100)[49]

Through the process of approaching a phenomenon as puzzling, problematisation reminds us that these are constructions of our own design and consequently this shapes that way we approach them, while at the same time assessing how the puzzle has been constructed and interpreted by others. For example, the ways in which we have discussed and evaluated

[49] See Glynos & Howarth (2007); Griggs & Howarth (2013) pp. 40-50 and Howarth *et al* (2016) for a more in-depth discussion of these steps.

respective approaches to Scottish nationalism has formed a vital aspect of this step. Following from this, retroduction is the process through which we establish initial explanation or hypothesis regarding our puzzles, which in turn will be revised and reassessed as we move between theoretical and empirical discussions in a cyclical method, before producing an account that, however tentatively, is accounts for the puzzle at hand, (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 26). In this way, the step of retroduction and the retroductive cycle provides us with the form of explanation, and following from this, it is the Logics as elaborated above that provide the content of these explanations. The fourth step of articulation consists of the practices and means of linking and breaking of elements within a discursive field, however this step also refers to the ways that we as researchers utilise the logics to construct accounts of political phenomena. In the analysis of discourse, one may identify several of the above logics at play simultaneously, 'yet individually this does not tell us if, or how, they refer to one another to produce a stable and effective discourse,' (Flitcroft, 2021: 49). Articulation as outlined in the Logics approach accounts for the attempts at producing a stable discursive structure. Finally, critique here refers to ways in which our explanations seek to probe and illuminate moments of dislocation in which 'contingency becomes visible which becomes an important condition of possibility for the emergence of political practices in addition, to examining the public contestations of norms and logics in the name of something new, as well as the ways in which subjects identify with such practices,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 192-3). For example, in the following chapters, by positing nationalism as a political logic, the process of critique addresses how contestations are made and evaluate how they are articulated within Scottish nationalist discourse.

It is worth making some further comments regarding the respective logics within the Logics approach. *Social* logics refer to particular social practices or regimes that are conditional and

contextually specific systems of sedimented practices, (Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Howarth, 2005). If we recall the football example above, social logics can be considered the dominant patterns that inform tactics and strategies. These logics then speak to the way in which various practices and values appear natural, existing in the synchronic dimension. *Political* logics invokes Laclau & Mouffe's understanding of logics of equivalence and difference, which provides the means to explore the conditions of possibility of social practices by focusing on their contestation and institution operating on a diachronic dimension. By appealing to existing social norms or by advocating for alternatives, political logics seek to draw equivalences and differences between practices, groups, and individuals, allowing us to 'trace the contingency associated with institutions or regimes of practices, facilitating the imagination and construction of new meanings, practices, and identity,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 15). Finally, *Fantasmatic* logics draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis in the sense that, if we understand *political* logics as a frame within which to explain *how* practices and regimes are sedimented and contested, then *fantasmatic* logics provides insight into '*why* specific practices and regimes grip subjects,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 145). At the same time, fantasy conceals the contestability of social relations 'by naturalising relations of domination in discourses and meaningful practices, therefore, we can argue that fantasmatic logics operate on the ideological level,' (Howarth et al, 2016: 100). To reiterate a point from above, the steps described here are not mutually exclusive and are necessarily intimately interlinked and reinforcing elements in developing explanations of social and political phenomenon.

Logics and Intellectual Function

Two issues are worth briefly addressing here that are pertinent to the application of intellectual function to the approach, and these can be broadly defined as conceptual and

methodological objections. In terms of conceptual objections, Marttila argues that there is little reason:

> "to analyse social logics in place of discourse because discourse serves the purpose of rendering visible the relatively coherent patterns of social practices. Moreover, in comparison to social logics, discourse is phenomenally elaborate enough to allow for its empirical observations in various socio-historical contexts." (Marttila, 2016: 120)

Marttila's critique rests on the assumption that logics and discourse are competing categories that we forced to choose between. However, in stressing that discourse is an articulatory practice, 'the conception of discourse that is applied in the logics approach problematises the need to reconcile discourse and materiality,' (Glynos et al 2021: 67). Secondly, the logics approach does not allow researchers to 'effortlessly' pick out logics as Marttila contends, rather these logics are constructed by the researcher as a means of conceptualising the dominant regime of practices that are observed within a discourse. Logics are not reducible to the empirical phenomena that they are designed to elucidate, nor are they accorded a fully transcendental role, they are borne out of close and attentive study of the phenomenon and material, and they are not self-evident or somehow naturally occurring. In this way, any fully fledged explanans contains a plurality of different kinds of logics and concepts. (Howarth, 2005; Glynos & Howarth, 2008) In addition, through the retroductive cycle[50], any construction or presentation of logics by the researcher are subject to re-evaluation and re-examination in terms of their explanatory value, as engagement within the research develops. The application of intellectual function with the Logics approach can then serve as a means of translation and justification of the specific logics we employ in this research. As noted above, logics are constructed by the researcher, meaning that the ways in which we as researchers

[50] See Glynos & Howarth (2007) Chp. 1 & Glynos & Howarth (2019)

both construct and interact with these logics can be conceptualised as an articulatory practice in and of itself through intellectual function that seeks to translate our own experiences and utilise these within our explanations.

With regards to methodological concerns, it has been argued that there is a tension between those who argue that a *de facto* pluralism keeps with the ontological assumptions of DT; where there is no single methodological approach for conducting DT informed research; and those who argue for more concrete heuristic guidelines that allows researchers to articulate concepts and practices with one another in innovative ways, (Zienkowski, 2012; Hawkins, 2015; Glynos et al, 2021). For example, Remling argues that research employing the Logics approach rarely provides an explanation of how the three logics were brought to bear on the empirical material, and that such accounts provide the reader with 'limited understanding of the analytical process that eventually leads to the identification of different logics in a discourse,' (Remling, 2018: 2). Remling further argues that this results in two significant implications; the first being that it requires a leap of faith on behalf of the reader as to how the concepts and logics have been applied, and secondly, it limits the potential for learning from empirical analysis and building, refining, and developing the Logics approach, (Remling, 2018). Intellectual function can be introduced here as a supplementary concept within the Logics approach to alleviate these difficulties. By posing articulatory practice at the level of translation of experience into the language or accent of specific social group, we can conceptualise how and why individuals and groups latch onto and utilise these logics in the way they do whilst at the same time providing critique in terms of their public contestation. Therefore, intellectual function provides a means of bringing the Logics to bear on the empirical material as suggested by Remling.

The Logics approach can be considered as one of many methods that can help us to understand and explain empirical phenomena, however, the purpose and aim of DT research is to produce 'new interpretations either by rendering visible phenomena previously undetected, and/or by problematising existing accounts and articulating alternatives,' (Howarth, 2005: 320-1). As discussed in the previous chapter, the various methods and grammars can be thought of as different tools in the toolbox of DT, each tool with their own purpose and producing different results based on the task at hand. Crucially, however, these should not be considered universal in their choice and application. Rather, they are a complimentary set of interpretive grammars and concepts that can be applied to data collection and empirical analysis, (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007). The same can be said of intellectual function. It constitutes a particular tool that can be applied to the objects of research, whose utility is determined by the researcher as a result of their interactions with the material and topic at hand, thus further emphasising the self-reflective component of the concept. This allows us to 'conduct discourse analysis in ways that produces nuanced insights, as well as sharpen the concepts and grammars DT has developed,' (Torfing, 2005: 26). The Logics approach keeps with a pragmatic attitude where the selection of method and concept is akin to the selection of appropriate tools from the toolbox for the task at hand, the utility of which is determined by the researcher through close contact with objects of research. Understood in this way, we can utilise the Logics approach and the resources of linguistic philosophy and rhetoric to problematise and elucidate a wide range of puzzling phenomena, (Glynos et al, 2021: 68).

Through the Logics approach, researchers can give shape and form to various elements of discourse, constructing them as pieces of the jigsaw so to speak. It is the role of the researcher to consider and investigate the ways in which these pieces have been utilised by political

actors in the construction of narratives and discourses. This is vital consideration given that applications of the Logics have often been to policy analysis, social movements, or entire political traditions where we find a host of practices beyond speech such as organisational practices, political actions, and legal frameworks, etc. (Glynos et al., 2021; Flitcroft, 2021). The application of intellectual function then follows a process of reassessment and commensuration inherent to the approach given its emphasis on contingency. Intellectual function can therefore be considered an attempt to translate the language and grammars of the logics into wider languages or accents of linguistic philosophy as well as our personal experiences and contact with the research topic as researchers to illuminate the range and contexts of articulatory practices observed within nationalist movements and discourses. Having elaborated a methodological framework with which to proceed, attention now turns to consideration of empirical techniques and materials that can best elucidate the contributions of the Logics approach and the application of intellectual function.

3.3 Genealogy

As we have noted above and in previous chapters, any attempt to engage with Scottish nationalism both more generally and within the contexts of the 2014 referendum requires an appreciation of and close attention to the trajectory and development of events, ideas and structures that have influenced and shaped the present conjuncture. One method that compliments the Logics approach in this task is Foucault's genealogical method[51] which is 'concerned with the processes, procedures and apparatuses by which truth and knowledge are produced within discursive regimes of the modern era,' (Tamboukou, 1999: 202). The

[51] Foucault never fully fleshed out or named his genealogical method and its status as a phase in his work is subject of intense debate amongst Foucauldian scholars. Suffice to say here, Foucault discussed this approach in various works but has found its most comprehensive expression in his works *Nietzsche, Genealogy and History* (1977) and *Discipline and Punish* (1991a).

following section will sketch out the thought and assumptions that underpin the approach and how these are suited to Logics inspired research as well as highlighting the ways in which intellectual function can be brought to bear on its outputs.

As Foucault notes, conducting genealogy requires 'great patience, knowledge of detail and is dependent on an accumulation of materials and relentless erudition of the topic and subject at hand,' (Foucault, 1977: 140). However, genealogy rejects inquiries into origins, instead favouring analysis of 'the ignoble beginnings of social phenomena through investigation of those unpredictable events and stressing the clashes of political forces in crucial historical conjunctures,' (Howarth, 2002: 128). Genealogy then is not opposed to history, rather, 'it rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies, thus it opposes the search for origins,' (Foucault, 1977: 140). In Foucault's own words:

> "Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map out the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of the descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us." (Foucault, 1977: 146)

Visker elaborates on this point by explaining that 'genealogy clarifies the nature of the reason we employ and the historical consequences of that reason, whilst it also points to the limits and dangers associated with this reasoning,' (Visker, 1995: 101). Where traditional historical accounts take history as an objective process distinct from the gaze of the researcher, genealogy is committed to 'a thoroughgoing perspectivalism in which events are perceived from the point of view of a situated researcher,' (Howarth, 2002: 128).[52] In this way

[52] Emphasis in original.

genealogy compliments the self-reflective element of intellectual function in that it acknowledges the role of the researcher in their interpretation and translation of events. If genealogy then is a method of situating the researcher, intellectual function becomes a tool of orientating both researcher and reader to their positionality with regards to the topic.

Glynos & Howarth make an important distinction here between Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods. Where archaeology makes possible the examination of forms, genealogy accounts for their contingency, thus a genealogical approach seeks to analyse 'the constitution of objects through historical practices from which they were constructed, thus enabling the researcher to illustrate the contingency of identity and practice while foregrounding possibilities foreclosed by hegemonic logics present in that instance,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 233n2). A genealogical approach then begins with problematising a topic and seeks to examine its contingent emergence, 'uncovering the interplay and conflict of dominations that have served to produce a given phenomenon and the subsequent identities and subject positions that it creates,' (Howarth, 2000: 72-3). In this way, a genealogical method compliments and enhances the logics approach by sharing a common starting point in their process. In addition, genealogy contains an inherent function of critique that pertains not only to 'an object of knowledge, but to the procedures of knowledge production, as it is only through contexts marked by struggle and marginalisation that we can properly grasp the *political force* of knowledge,' (Hook, 2005: 4-5).[53] In this sense, 'the point of reference in genealogy is not…the great model of language and signs, but…that of war and battle,' (Lemke, 2019: 50). This focus resonates with the Logics' step of critique in the sense that it seeks to illuminate moments of contingency and the contestation of norms and practices, with

[53] Emphasis in original.

the added dimension of logics and intellectual function providing an impetus for widening the scope of enquiry with regards to these clashes.

Taking the above into consideration, a genealogical investigation implies ‘tracing possible ways of thinking differently, instead of accepting and legitimising what are already the truths associated with the topic,’ (Tamboukou, 1999: 203). Therefore, genealogy as a critical method applies itself to knowledge production in ‘a tactical way that truths are capable of opposition and resistance as opposed to truths that are static or factual,’ (Hook, 2005: 8). Through conducting genealogy, we do not simply describe norms, practices, or contradictions, we evaluate the import of these elements together with the various practices with which they are constituted. Genealogy then requires discerning the meaning of practices within a given discourse, and from this position they are called to evaluate a movement’s goals, strategies and *modus operandi*, (Howarth, 2002; Hook, 2005). Put another way, genealogical analysis can bring several predominant logics into focus, whether these are political, social or fantasmatic, whilst also providing the necessary contextualised reading of an event that allows the researcher to critically examine their varied but specific emergence in each moment. Furthermore, application of intellectual function to this reading allows us to further probe the specific articulations and practices associated with this emergence and subsequent expressions within a wider movement or discourse.

A final point that is to be made here is on method or lack thereof. Foucault stated that genealogy is ‘grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary, operating on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times,’ (Foucault, 1977: 137). In this sense, it is risky to think about Foucault’s general theorising as anything more than a tool for a specific purpose, therefore it makes more sense

to approach genealogy primarily through Foucault's 'practice of the method as opposed to his scattered and not necessarily consistent methodological pronouncements,' (Gutting, 2005: 50). Crucially, the deployment of the genealogical method can never be exhaustive or finalised and the 'originality of Foucault lies in the strategic use of different discourses and approaches when writing genealogies,' (Tamboukou, 1999: 215). This keeps with the spirit of retroduction within the Logics approach in the sense that the conduct of genealogy requires a continuous movement between theory and empirical material, and which acknowledges this as an ongoing cycle as we posit various explanations and accounts until arriving at one which provides some degree of clarity on the matter.

However, it is also our understandings of certain concepts that drive the methodological specificity of genealogy. Lemke notes how it is Foucault's conception of experience that drives his project in *History of Sexuality*, where Foucault does not 'chart sexual conduct or catalogue ideas on sexuality, rather he sets out to analyse sexuality as an historical experience,' (Lemke, 2019: 277). Therefore, rather than following a rigid set of methodological steps, Foucauldian genealogy creates a 'methodological rhythm of their own, weaving around a set of problematisations established by the researcher, producing unexplored and potentially unthought areas of investigations with no methodological certainties,' (Tamboukou, 1999: 215). Genealogy then invites us to question why society is set up in a certain manner, which is never accidental. It highlights that it is 'precisely one of power's most influential mechanisms which leads us to believe and accept the apparent natural character of regimes of truth and the practices that stem from them,' (Vazquez Garcia, 2021: 25). We can adapt this for the study of nationalism in the sense that a genealogical investigation allows us to question how and why Scottish nationalism took the form it did during the 2014 referendum. Furthermore, through the Logics approach and intellectual

function, the role and purpose of genealogy as an empirical method is a tool for bringing the contributions of these concepts to bear on empirical material thus allowing us to question and probe the character and practices that emerged during the referendum campaign as a direct result of the form that nationalism took.

Having established genealogy as a suitable empirical technique that capable of operationalising the Logics approach as well as the theoretical insights of intellectual function, what remains is to comment on the materials with which these techniques, grammars and concepts will be brought to bear in the task of producing a critical analysis and evaluation of Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014 independence referendum. To this end, we now turn to role of myths and myth-making in nationalism.

3.4 Why Myth(s)

Nationalism takes on several monikers and crucially, none of these manifestations will ever be the same, whether this is in terms of their content, goals, or temporal/spatial manifestations, (Finlayson, 1998; Sutherland, 2012). We could therefore direct our focus to any conceivable element or component of nationalism. The language and imagery of myths remain a common feature of nationalism, and it would be naïve of us as researchers of nationalism to simply dismiss them out of hand for lack of historical accuracy or grounding. As historian Richard Finlay argues, the factual invalidation of myths by academics has never invalidated myths as 'complex icons of social, cultural, and political belief, and Scots have shown a dogged determination to believe what they want to believe when it comes to the myths of Burns, Wallace and the Jacobites, and in such a scenario what is more important – destroying the myth or understanding it?' (Finlay, 1997: 122-3). Put another way, the accuracy of a myth is 'less interesting than the political use to which it is put,' (Maxwell,

2013: 16). Myths contribute to the construction of identities as points of reference and as such is not a 'fixed, universal or transcendental spirit inside us that history has not made any fundamental mark on. It has its histories – and histories have their real, material, and symbolic effects,' (Hall, 2021a: 260-261).[54] Myths then can be considered to play a significant role in the development and application of nationalism and nationalist discourses, and the ways political and cultural myths influence and shape potential subject positions and the subsequent practices and norms, are just as significant to understanding nationalism and nationalist movements. Some brief comments are required in terms of commensuration of the idea of myths with the theoretical and empirical frameworks elaborated above.

David McCrone argues that like traditions, myths connect with past realities in 'a process that involves selective exclusion as well as inclusion, thus, myths become a contemporary and active force, producing a reservoir of legitimation for belief and action,' (McCrone, 2001: 91). The importance of myths in political and social contexts is in their being believed or accepted by a significant body of people, sufficient enough to shape attitudes and inspire action, (Mitchell, 1990; Hassan & Shaw, 2012). If we take myths as legitimators of norms and practices, then they become attractive objects of research that employs discursive concepts and frameworks. For example, Goetze argues that for us to grasp the fuller meaning of myths researchers must seek to 'reveal their position-ascribing social structures as well as the struggles that precede their establishment and utility in the dominant discourse,' (Goetze, 2016: 97). The Logics approach and intellectual function provide us with the theoretical and conceptual means with which approach such a task, while the application of genealogy allows us to locate the emergence of these structures and practices in their appropriate context. In the case of Scottish nationalism, Stephen Maxwell noted that in the mid-1970s 'Scottish national

[54] Emphasis in Original.

politics proved itself to be a prolific breeding ground of myths as Scottish cultural politics once was,' (Maxwell, 2013: 15). Likewise, Richard Finlay notes that the wealth of Scottish historical myths have played a significant role in the development of the Scottish nation, 'either as vehicles of change in themselves or as expressions of the dominant political culture of the time,' (Finlay, 1997: 122). Utilising the grammars and concepts of DT alongside a genealogical investigation provides us with the necessary tools with which to evaluate and assess myths in this light with regards to practices and expressions of Scottish nationalism.

Despite the negative connotations often associated with nationalism, 'it is useful to remind ourselves that nations can inspire love and profound self-sacrifice, and the cultural products of poetry, prose fiction, music, plastic arts display this affection in endless forms and styles,' (Anderson, 2016: 141).[55] The development and evocation of national myths could also be considered a cultural product of nationalism, where myths often relate to tales and events of history that inspire affection for and pride in the nation since culture is not an organism, nor a totality, nor a unity: it is the site of a dialogue, it is a dialectic and a dialect, (Craig, 1996; McCrone, 2017). Myths of the nation can therefore be understood and considered as products of such processes, where myths evoke certain interpretations of the world, and it is these that provide sources of inspiration for action and identification or conditions of possibility in discursive parlance. The validity of myths does not depend on their correspondence to an objective realm of fact and the 'forms of knowledge that are produced by myth are not comparable with forms of knowledge produced by science or history,' (Benner, 2008: 29). If we consider that myths work in a similar manner to image as suggested by Hall in relation to Thatcherism as discussed previously, then a policy or identification alone may not resonate

[55] Sport can no doubt be added to this list of expressions. We need only look to the outpourings that followed Scotland's recent qualification for and eventual elimination from the 2020 European Championships to gain a sense of the power sport has in the Scottish context; myself included as friends and colleagues will confirm!

with a particular section of society, but when articulated with a specific image or myth, the reach and grip of the policy is amplified. Through the application and elucidation of the Logics approach via genealogy and intellectual function, the research presented here seeks to highlight this interplay of image, myth, and policy (or identity) in such a way that critically assesses their constitution and expression.

Given the above, there is some recognition that myths serve purposes or perform functions in social life that we do not expect from science or history. For example, they provide 'a sense of identity, they locate collective and individual achievements and failures in a wider temporal perspective, forming a normative environment that helps bind people through shared structure of values,' (Benner, 2008: 29). A crucial question we could then pose regarding the conception of myth with regards to nationalism is to ask what makes a myth *political?* For Tudor this is its subject matter, 'just as nature myths deal with natural phenomena and religious myth deals with deities and worship, so political myths deal with matters of politics,' (Tudor, 1972: 17). However, as Bottici & Challand argue, there may be cases where a myth's content is explicitly related to political matters, but it is just as likely that myths whose subject matter is unrelated to politics can and often do become political themselves. What then renders a myth specifically *political* is the 'relationship between the myth's narrative of reality and its manner of communication in which it addresses social, political, and economic conditions of its target audience,' (Bottici & Challand, 2006: 317).[56] Approaching nationalist myths and discourses from a discursive perspective allows us to take a significant step in approaching the emergence, constitution, and expression of myths in this way.

Through discursive grammars and concepts, we can say that myths are specific articulations of various contingent elements and they 'retain their validity for those who generate them so

[56] Emphasis in Original

long as they fulfil certain normative or political purposes,' (Benner, 2008: 29). For example, Hutchinson uses the term mythic overlay to describe a process in which fresh myths are generated in place of those that have lost their potency. Crucially however, old mythic structures do not disappear but are instead moved to the periphery, where their content remains readily available to be acted upon. (Hutchinson, 2004; Kerr, 2019) This process of mythic overlay bears some similarity to concepts of contingency and articulation in DT. For example, where dislocation occurs, we may expect attempted 'articulations of new principles or myths for (re)interpreting, and thus reconstructing, the political/social order,' (Norval, 2000: 328). Myth in this context can be understood to constitute an attempt to suture dislocation in that a myth becomes a novel principle of reading, attempting to reconstruct the social as objectively given; whose purpose is to reconstitute an absent unit of society via the naturalisation of its divisions and a universalisation of the demands of a particular group, (Laclau, 1990; Norval, 2000). Thus, myths can be understood as a constitutive dimension of social relations, which have the potential to 'shape a complex ensemble of institutions, practices, and policy and any attempt to study and research myths should seek to disentangle their components and their various instantiations, while also assessing the complex relations between their elements,' (Griggs et al, 2020: 92).

If the work of a myth is to suture the dislocated space through the constitution of a new space of representation, then the 'effectiveness of any myth is essentially hegemonic, in that it involves the formation of a new objectivity by means of rearticulating dislocated elements,' (Laclau, 1990: 61). Furthermore, if myths can be considered as a vehicle of articulation or re-articulation, then myths themselves must also be capable of re-articulating their contents and elements in response to social stimuli and crisis. It is not that a dislocation completely obliterates a myth, rather it displaces elements attached to a myth and in this moment of

displacement, novel articulations of myths are understood as attempts to suture the dislocation, while at the same time retaining as much of the original as possible to avoid severe trauma. This can help us to explain and understand both the potency and longevity of myths as discursive constructions in the sense that dislocation can provide the impetus for renewal and re-evaluation of a myth's purpose and content in response to the socio-politico context in which a dislocation occurs. To bring in the language of the logics approach, utilising social, political and fantasmatic logics adds another layer of explanation with regards to this process with regards to their articulations into objects such as myths that serve to suture the space opened by dislocation. In addition, genealogy serves the purpose of revealing these moments of dislocation and through intellectual function, we can critically assess the choice, expressions, and articulations of these logics in each moment.

From this position, we can begin to map out the trajectory of myths in covering dislocations in very precise and intricate ways, utilising various elements as well as remnants of old myths. Key for our understanding of Scottish 'myths', is that their (re)constitution is the effort and response to suture dislocation; or put another way, 'the myth becomes the grit in the oyster, pressing for resolution such that it brings practice into line with aspiration,' (McCrone, 2017: 222). Which is to say that myths become a significant element with which we can reference and understand the ways in which Scotland and Scottishness have been constructed and expressed, and myths that emphasise difference have been a prominent expression of precisely these traits, (Hall, 1992; Brown et al, 1998). In this way, myths present an 'idealised image of the nation, exhorting people to aspire to the ideals they portray, whose practical success lies in the fact that fictional elements give it far greater mobilising power than reasoned political argument,' (Benner, 2008: 30). We must also be attentive to multiplicity of ways in which practices stemming from myths are performed and invoked in nationalist

discourses. To this end, the concepts and grammars of the logics approach, through social, political and fantasmatic logics facilitate the assessment of the conditions of possibility of both myths and their associated expressions, whilst intellectual function provides the means with which to interrogate their specific manifestations in their given contexts. In addition, a genealogical analysis of Scottish nationalism centred around myths thus seeks to identify the fault lines of their constitution and offer insights in terms of the possibilities open to Scottish nationalisms developments and offer critique on its subsequent forms. Genealogy as employed here, is not about signalling to different regimes of truth, rather it moves to 'explain the changes between them through an analysis of the relations between praxis and knowledge,' (Vazquez Garcia, 2021: 25).

Myths, as we have discussed here, can be considered the culmination and products of the articulation of specific logics, and through the application of intellectual function to these respective logics, alongside a genealogical investigation, it becomes possible to elaborate and critically assess these myths constitution in key moments as well as their range of expression. Genealogy then is the methodological process through which we can identify prominent myths of Scottish nationalism in terms of their emergence, crystallisation, and subsequent renewed expressions during the 2014 referendum campaigns. Alongside the observation and characterisation of Scottish nationalist discourses, genealogy examines both linguistic and non-linguistic practices, focusing on their logics of constructions of equivalences and differences, as well as the roles of metaphor and myth in the articulation of their discourses, (Howarth & Griggs, 2006). Through conceptualising myths as the outcome of a specific articulatory practice within a broader discursive repertoire we can utilise a genealogical approach as means to critically examine the means in which they are articulated as well as the

content and purpose of such constructs in response to social, political, and economic stimuli through the language and grammars of the Logics and intellectual function.

3.5 A Note on the Corpus

Prior to initiating the genealogical analysis, it is necessary to provide some clarification regarding the identification and gathering of the materials that are to be considered. Chief amongst these was the original intention of the research to conduct a Q-methodology study, and as such, the initial identification and selection of appropriate materials was done under this assumption. This process consisted of establishing a concourse of debate surrounding the 2014 referendum, with the underlying principle being to provide a representative sample of the full range of communications on the topic and to construct a set of statements reflective of this. This was to be achieved through engagement and reference to a variety of sources and materials including, but not limited to, interviews, participant observations, popular literature, media output and academic literature etc, (Van Exel & de Graaf, 2005). The initial forays into material collection and viewing took place during several visits to both the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh and the Scottish Political Archive at the University of Stirling in August and September 2019. The focus of these visits was on materials on or related to the 2014 referendum and its associated campaigns with a timeframe of May 2011 – September 2014. This timeframe was considered following from the SNP winning a majority in the Scottish Parliament elections of that year which facilitated the process of holding a referendum up until shortly after polling day on the 18th September 2014, allowing for comprehensive cover of the range of debates that were occurring during this period. Materials viewed and recorded during these visits included policy documents, speech transcripts, campaign materials and communications, personal diaries and reflections, newspaper articles, blogs etc. These materials were complimented by the consideration of both academic and

historical texts as well as online resources such as campaign and organising group websites, several of which are now inactive and require use of Internet Archive's Wayback Machine to view.

Unfortunately, due to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, the possibilities of completing the research project as a Q-method study became increasingly unlikely due to the complications of lockdown restrictions as well as difficulties in converting the study to an online format. This resulted in a need to reassess and redesign the research project in such a way that would have allowed for a timely completion which ultimately led to the identification of the genealogy as a suitable alternative. In shifting the methodological focus from Q-methodology to Genealogy, it is important to note that the process of data collection and concourse sampling in Q-method studies compliments a genealogical approach in the sense that through the viewing and reviewing of materials connected to the topic, the researcher immerses themselves in the discourse. This alongside my own position and interactions during the 2014 referendum allows for a further degree of immersion with regards to the study of the discourse as required and encouraged in genealogical analysis. The shift in methodological focus and retention of the available and appropriate materials demonstrates the commensurate relationship between the theory and method as applied in this research. In this sense, we can also point to the further application and utility of the retroductive cycle in terms of revisiting both the materials and application of discourse theory in terms of the revisions to the scope and aims of the thesis.

The nature of genealogical investigation requires a degree of flexibility in terms of its operation. As noted above, there is no set formula or criteria for conducting genealogical analysis as such, and the specific engagements highlighted in this thesis are to an extent

guided by the previous interactions and attempts at constructing a Q-method study as well as the available materials and time constraints brought about by both Covid-19 and the need to redesign the methodological approach. The first consideration was establishing an appropriate timeframe in which to conduct the genealogy, this being 1967-2014. The starting point represents what many consider to be (re)birth of modern Scottish nationalism with the election of the first SNP MP to Westminster. To trace the subsequent developments of Scottish nationalism and its associated myths, the genealogy focuses on four constitutive moments: these being the 1979 and 1997 referendums on devolution, Thatcherism, and the 2007-2009 National Conversation consultation. The analysis then shifts to a detailed engagement of application and expressions of these myths during the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. However, given that this research adopts a diachronic approach, none of these events or periods under examination should be taken as emergence of discourse or myths *ex nihilo*. The selection of this range and events is informed by both consultations with written histories and academic texts that frequently revisit these periods as well as my own experiences and knowledge of Scottish political history, specifically with regards to the events or moments highlighted as constituting moments of dislocation of interest to the analysis of the development of myths in Scottish nationalism. To this extent, the identification of the timeframe under investigation can be understood through an application of intellectual function, these events and moments are ones that I have found to be both influential, interesting, and relevant such that they merit further investigation.

The nature of genealogical investigation relies heavily on historical materials including, but not limited to policy documents, speeches, and written histories. Materials viewed during archival visits related to the 2014 referendum provided ample resources for the analysis, however, due to the time constraints imposed by the redesign of the research and continued

lockdown restrictions, further archival research that specifically addressed 1967-2011 was not possible and so consideration of further materials were reliant on publicly available sources. As such the research turned to and utilises a range of publicly articulated discourses, focusing on statements and interventions made within the public space/arena. To this end, the research focuses on several high-profile public interventions that include several speeches, interviews, policy documents and political cartoons, which are further supplemented with reference to academic writings on both the general history and myths in question. It is important to reiterate here the role and status of materials included in the corpus, particularly with regards to the academic texts and histories included in the analysis. These accounts provide elaborate discussions of the source and context of the respective myths, while at the same time, these commentaries are themselves contributors to the discourses surrounding the respective myths and thus are integral elements of the analysis with regards to the continued use and interpretation of the myths in question. As such, several of the academic texts and engagements are considered in the analysis as extensions of the myths and in terms of contact and development of their discourses in terms of how they have structured and informed interpretation of the world. The grammars and conceptual contributions of the logics and intellectual function are then brought to bear on these moments illuminated through the process of genealogy.

As a final point, it should be reiterated that despite the prominence of theoretical and qualitative analysis in this work, this does not preclude the possibility or viability of developing quantitative or mixed-methods research on the topic, rather as stated above, the focus on qualitative engagements serves as one of several options, but it is the option that has been judged best suited for the needs and aims of the current research project. In so doing, the thesis makes a further contribution to discourse theoretical approach literature by offering a

revised conception and approach to nationalism studies within the field, as well as the development of the re-activated analytical tool of intellectual function for application in discursive inspired research projects. In addition, the identification and selection of genealogy allowed for the development of the research in a different and interesting direction, offering insights that would not have been possible had the research followed a Q-methodology approach.

To provide a brief indication of the following chapters: Chapter 4 engages in a short history of Scottish politics from 1967 to the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012 that formally transferred the necessary powers to hold the 2014 referendum. The purpose of this is to orientate the reader with some specific details of contemporary Scottish history as well as initial immersion into the discourses of Scottish nationalism. Chapter 5 revisits several key events and interventions during these periods, utilising publicly articulated discourses, the genealogical analysis presented here seeks to highlight the crystallisation of 4 myths, and through applications of logics and intellectual function demonstrate how they have become integral to Scottish nationalist discourses and practices. Chapter 6 then turns its attention to the 2014 referendum, utilising the logics and intellectual function, the chapter engages with various materials, highlighting the ways in which the above myths were utilised in nationalist discourses as well as how they influenced and guided practices of articulation.

Chapter 4 – A Short History of Scottish Constitutional Politics: 1967-2012

As discussed in the previous chapter, genealogy is useful for framing and understanding the different possibilities and alternatives that could have been followed. It should be noted here that discussions of Scotland's constitutional and politically history can be understood through what Mitchell (2014) has described as 'the Scottish Question', which includes themes and issues of national identity, Scotland's constitutional status, structures of government and governance etc.[57] As discussed above, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an initial immersion and orientation of the reader into the discourses and context of Scottish Constitutional politics. Conducting genealogy does not mean working within a microcosm and there are moments in the past that have and continue to have a profound influence on the present conjuncture. Similarly, we are not interested in a comprehensive retelling of events in Scottish history as such contributions have already been made in far greater detail and attention than is possible here.[58] The purpose of this chapter then is to highlight several points of intervention and interest to the developments of Scottish politics towards the climate of 2014, in doing so, the research seeks to crack the outer shell of the enigmas surrounding certain myths of Scotland and Scottish nationalism that would go on to play a prominent role in the expressions of Scottish nationalism both generally and in the context of the 2014 referendum.

4.1 The '79

Movements and calls for greater Scottish autonomy within the UK existed as far back as the late 1800s in tandem with the Irish Home Rule movement, with calls for a similar settlement.

[57] See Mitchell (2014) pp. 3-4.
[58] See Christopher Harvie (2004) Scotland and Nationalism & Tom Devine (2012) The Scottish Nation.

While none of these were successful (even at bringing the topic onto the political agenda), it is an important point to make that 'the campaign and appetite for Scottish Home Rule was not a contemporary development,' (Cairney & McGarvey, 2013: 23). For many, the revival and resurgence of Scottish 'nationalism' and reinvigoration of calls for greater autonomy began in the late 1960s with the election of Winnie Ewing as the SNP MP for Hamilton in the 1967 by-election. Following this and further nationalist successes in both Scotland and Wales across subsequent general elections, devolution became an ever more pressing feature in the UK political agenda. This prompted the then Labour Government to establish the Kilbrandon Commission in 1969 to investigate and report on the constitutional question. The commission published its report in late 1973 and advocated for a Scottish Assembly, however the conclusions in the report were far from unanimous. There was disagreement both in terms of the definitions of devolution and the limits in terms of the range of powers any proposed assembly should hold. By the time of the report's publication, Labour had been replaced by the Conservatives in government and the issue of home rule faded from the agenda.

The issue of devolution returned to the political agenda with renewed vigour and impetus following the hung parliament produced by the February 1974 general election, a second election in October which saw Labour elected with a narrow majority. In addition, both the SNP and Plaid Cymru returned 11 and 3 seats respectively and as a result were able to apply pressure on the Labour government to follow through on the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Commission. Harvie & Jones wryly remark that Labour's capitulation to devolution could be seen as 'a wimpish surrender to *force majeure*, a low-cost solution to a horribly expensive problem,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 110). Support for devolution from Labour, Liberals and Conservatives was lukewarm at best and in many cases outright hostile;

with a White Paper[59] titled '*Our Changing Democracy'*, published in 1975 met with indifference across all parties. Labour first introduced the Scotland Bill to Parliament in 1976 but its passage through the Commons was mired in conflict and controversy. By 1977, Labour had lost their governing majority, leaving the bill at the mercy of Labour backbenchers and opposition who were free to tinker with and water-down its contents. By the time the bill reached the committee stage, it contained some 350 amendments and an attempt by the Labour government push the bill through was narrowly defeated, forcing the government to temporarily withdraw the legislation, (Harvie, 2004: 184-5).

The Bill was reintroduced in late 1977 and during the debates and exchanges, Tam Dalyell MP for West Lothian introduced what is now commonly referred to as the 'West Lothian Question.[60] Dalyell consistently questioned whether, under devolution, he should be able to vote on issues pertaining to West Bromwich and not West Lothian, similarly would the Prime Minister be able to vote on issues affecting Carlisle but not Cardiff? The danger for Dalyell was that MPs from Scotland would exercise an important, and probably often decisive, effect on English politics while English MPs would have no say in the same matters in Scotland, (Hansard, 1977). The issue could not be answered with any certainty at the time and has remained an ever-present feature of the constitutional debate. Furthermore, to avoid intensifying already serious splits on the issue within the party, the Labour government was forced to concede a consultative, as opposed to decisive, referendum on the issue. This allowed for a significant amendment introduced by George Cunningham, the Labour MP for

[59] White paper in the UK is the term for policy documents produced by the Government that sets out proposals for future legislation they intend to introduce in a parliamentary term.

[60] The term 'West Lothian Question' was first used by Enoch Powell in response to the repeated posing of the question since Tam Dalyell was MP for West Lothian and had laid out the premise of the argument. A full transcript of the debate referenced here can be found via Hansard – copied below – with Dalyell's contribution beginning at Column 121-127.
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1977-11-14/debates/5b5223e8-2a89-4bbd-a64e-7ee2ba1a8493/ScotlandBill

London Islington, and a Scot himself, that would require that 40% of the whole eligible electorate vote in favour of the proposals; else the Act would be repealed. Almost ironically, this amendment was passed on Burns Night (25th January) 1978, and the amendment has subsequently been described as 'one of the most significant backbench interventions in British politics since 1945,' (Devine, 1999: 587).

The greatly amended Scotland Act received Royal Assent on the 31st July 1978 with the referendum scheduled for March 1st 1979, with the result being 51.6% voting in favour of establishing a Scottish Assembly and 48.4% against. Tom Devine described the result as inconclusive, ambivalent, and confusing, with the slim margin of victory for the Yes vote (2.8%) coupled with the fact that the yes vote constituted less than a third of the eligible electorate (32.9% - well below the 40% required by the Cunningham amendment) being far from a ringing endorsement of the devolution proposals. Furthermore, a turnout of 63.8% 'suggested that the referendum did little to inspire much enthusiasm on the issue,' (Devine, 1999: 588). In the aftermath, the SNP launched a 'Scotland said Yes' campaign to pressurise the government to proceed with devolution regardless, however, following the failure of the '79 referendum, Margaret Thatcher tabled a motion of no confidence in the Labour government which passed by a single vote, triggering a general election just two months after the devolution referendum, which the Conservatives subsequently won with a comfortable majority. With the election of Thatcher and a majority Conservative government, 'the campaign for Home Rule which had dominated much of Scottish politics in the 1960s and 1970s collapsed in acrimony, bitterness and disillusion,' (Devine, 1999: 588-9).

4.2 Thatcherism: 1979-1990

As Hassan has noted, 'the seismic economic and social changes which Scotland witnessed in the late 1970s and 1980s have become shortened to one word – Thatcherism,' (Hassan, 2014a: 129). That Thatcher came to be credited by some as the 'onlie begetter' of devolution and '*the* person who made Scots think that it was their differences and not similarities with England that determined their nation is a telling outcome,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 122).[61] Thatcher's personal and political agenda represented a comprehensive challenge to Scottish society and despite the failure of the '79 referendum a substantial proportion of the Scottish electorate had still voted in favour of the proposals and it became clear from the outset of Thatcher's premiership, 'that there was considerable potential for deep conflicts along several frontiers,' (Devine, 2017: 171). However, the popular impression that Scotland was universally opposed to Thatcher and Thatcherism from the beginning is misleading. While the Tories did not 'win' the 1979 general election in Scotland, their vote share increased by 6.7% resulting in 22 seats won. In addition, the SNP lost 9 of their 11 seats, 7 of which to the Conservatives. There was a sense of relative peace on all fronts in the early years of Thatcher's administration; rises in unemployment and the first evidence of de-industrialisation had occurred before Thatcher set foot in Downing Street and there was 'a common feeling that potentially drastic action may need to be taken in order ease the harsher effects of economic change and the effects of Trade Union militancy,' (Devine, 2017: 171).

Early Thatcherism was dominated by the issue of smokestack industries, where a combination of Thatcher's monetary experiments alongside events in the Middle East and the Falklands War, 'saw British manufacturing cut by almost a fifth, sweeping away numerous attempts to

[61] Emphasis in Original. Then SDP MP and future leader of the Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy went as far as to describe Thatcher as the '*greatest of all Scottish Nationalists.*'

augment and broaden Scotland's industrial base,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 129). Within Thatcher's first term, a fifth of Scotland's workforce was unemployed, with many high-profile closures such as Singer Sewing factory in Clydebank; Monsanto Chemicals in Ayrshire; Massey Ferguson in Kilmarnock and the Peugeot Talbot car plant at Linwood to name a few. The shift of economic balance to the private sector was initially warmly welcomed and applauded by Scottish business, however, this enthusiasm was short-lived. A series of bids for the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) from foreign based banks alarmed Scottish financial institutions and services that control of RBS may move outwith Scotland. These bids were ultimately referred to the Monopolies commission which would declare that they be rejected on the grounds of public interest. In effect, this was a declaration that 'the Scottish public interest was a significant factor and that it had erected a resounding hands-off notice on Scottish financial companies,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 130). There was also fierce resistance with regards to job losses and factory closures. For example, in 1981, the announcement from British electronics manufacturer Plessey of their intention to close their plant in Bathgate prompted a sit-in protest by the mainly female workforce, eventually prompting Plessey to sell to a rival which kept the plant open, (Bambery, 2018: 257-8).[62] The impact of such closures is also referenced and lamented in the 1987 song *Letter From America* by the folk duo The Proclaimers, whose lyrics emphasised the loss of communities as much as the industries: 'Bathgate no more, Linwood no more, Methil no more, Irvine no more, Lochaber no more,' (Finlay, 2008: 163). The reality was that increasingly, Scottish businesses and businesspeople began to 'think of themselves as Scottish, the subtext being that to be Scottish was to be upright and honest, whereas to be English or even British was to be underhanded and dishonest,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 131).

[62] See Bambery (2018) pp. 256-260 for a fuller discussion of the movements and resistance to plant closures and job losses in the early Thatcher administration.

The 1987 General Election was a crucial turning point in Scottish politics and placed the apparent 'democratic deficit' firmly on to the political agenda. Despite winning a third term in office, the Conservatives lost 11 of their 21 seats (6 to Labour; 3 to the SNP and 2 to the Liberals), with both Labour and the SNP challenging Thatcher's mandate to govern in Scotland, based on the inability of the Conservatives to sufficiently staff the Scotland Office. Thatcher's response was to prevent the Scottish select committee from sitting, although the reality was that the Conservatives lacked the Scottish backbench MPs to serve. While Thatcher believed she was denying Labour a Scottish platform to voice opposition to her policies, 'the move served to seriously damage and undermine the democratic accountability of the Scottish Office, which was now implementing policies that had been decisively rejected by Scottish voters,' (Stewart, 2009: 204). Despite this, 'such was the self-belief of leading members of Thatcher's government, that the solution to the Scottish problem seemed obvious: upping the dosage,' (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 40). This line of thinking was evident through Chancellor Nigel Lawson, who argued that Scots were sheltered from market forces and 'exhibited a culture of dependence rather than enterprise; whilst English Tory backbenchers also took the opportunity to criticise the scale of public expenditure in Scotland,' (Devine, 1999: 605). What was becoming increasingly clear for many was that Thatcher's assault on the post-war consensus was having the unintended consequence of 'unifying Scottish civil society both in its opposition to her politics and policies, whilst also building a growing consensus for constitutional reform,' (Stewart, 2009: 211).

While Thatcher had won a resounding victory over the Trade Unions during the 1984-5 Miner's strike and continued to enjoy confidence and support in the South of England, the increasing problem of governing Scotland began to be seen to be rooted 'not in Thatcherism itself, but the nature of the British constitution,' (Devine, 2017: 178). An already volatile

situation reached fever-pitch following the introduction of the 'Poll-Tax'. The Poll Tax had originally been devised to address local income tax rates, which the Tories had always resented since they were paid for the most part by the better-off (i.e., Tory voters), (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 132). The groundwork for the policy was laid by MP Michael Forsyth[63] and Douglas Mason of the Adam Smith Institute as a means of supplementing, then outright replacing the existing rates based on the value of property to a flat tax rate per head of the adult population. The policy's inherent inegalitarian nature and general unfairness was evident in the fact that it took no account of ability to pay, nor the fact that the duke in the castle paid the same as the pensioner in a tenement flat, (Harvie & Jones, 2000; Stewart, 2009; Devine, 2017). Despite Labour's initial firm resistance, Labour councils began the process of establishing measures for registering and collecting payments. Furthermore, a special Scottish Labour conference in Glasgow refused to back the policy of non-payment, marking the end of official opposition to the policy, which resulted in the tag of the Feeble Fifty being applied to Labour's Scottish contingent of MPs. Aside from campaigns of non-payment, actions of resistance included mass demonstrations and even occupation of Sheriff offices in Edinburgh, Dundee, and Galashiels, (Bambery, 2018: 272-3).[64] More than any other single policy, the Poll Tax drove home the message to many Scots that they were being ruled by an alien government. The fact that the tax came into effect in Scotland a year before it was due to in England[65], for many looked vengeful at worst, and at best, quasi-colonial treatment of Scotland as a laboratory for radical experiments in fiscal policy, (Devine, 1999; Kidd & Petrie, 2016).

[63] A future Secretary of State for Scotland 1990-92

[64] For further details and accounts of Scottish opposition to the Poll Tax see Stewart (2009) pp. 176-182 & Bambery (2018) pp. 270-274

[65] At the insistence of Scottish Conservatives.

Thatcher's assault on state institutions, the education system, local government, the public sector more generally and the Kirk, 'all institutions which carried much of Scottish identity was easily perceived as attacks on Scotland itself,' (McCrone, 2001: 122). Thatcher's politics and policies resulted in the weakening of institutional ties that both politically and affectionately bound Scotland to the Union. Her time in office saw the alienation of large parts of Scottish civil society, 'resulting in the growth of the perception that Thatcher and the Conservatives were uncaring and unsympathetic to Scottish interests,' (Stewart, 2009: 221). Subsequently a new battle cry emerged in Scottish politics: 'if Scotland had had a democratically elected parliament, Scotland would never have been burdened with the Poll Tax, (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 135). While the Poll Tax would be a contributing factor to Thatcher's eventual downfall, it was not the Scottish resistance that saw to this. The violent protests in England alongside internal Conservative strife over Europe would eventually bring the Iron Lady down in November 1990. And so, while Thatcher had been no champion of devolution, her actions and legacy laid the foundations on which a consensus for change was to be built.

4.3 The '97

Despite Thatcher's ousting, the Conservatives went on to win the 1992 election to secure a fourth term in government. Despite this, in Scotland parties advocating for devolution or outright Independence won 75% of the vote which resulted in 85% of Scottish seats at Westminster. The general impression and consensus that was emerging was that the argument for devolution had been won and now all that was required to initiate the devolution project was a change of government at Westminster, (Devine, 1999; Keating 2001). A Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) had been established in the early 1980s and following the publication of *The Claim of Right* in 1988 which put forward the 'intellectual case' for

establishing a Scottish Assembly, the CSA altered its name to the Campaign for a Scottish Parliament (CSP) in the early 90s, with the 'change in terminology from Assembly to Parliament indicating the hardening demand for a legislature with substantial and entrenched powers,' (Hearn, 2000: 59). In response to the Claim of Right, the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) was formed, whose purpose was to 'mobilise the Scottish political class and wider civil society around an agreed project for Home Rule that could be implemented in the event of the election of a favourable majority at Westminster,' (Keating, 2001: 255). The Tories declined to attend the SCC owing to their opposition to devolution, while the SNP also refused to attend owing to their suspicions of Labour. Labour's new leader, John Smith had been a devolution minister in the previous Labour government and was enthusiastic towards the SCC, 'making it plain that establishing a Scottish Parliament was a matter of unfinished business for Labour,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 163).

The proposals that emerged from the SCC, were not dissimilar to those introduced previously in 1987, however, a significant amendment that Labour had previously resisted, was that the proposed new parliament should be elected through a more proportional model. Though its precise form was undecided, this change in stance was to play an important role in the years to come, (Mitchell *et al*, 1998: 168). The apparent march towards devolution suffered a blow with the sudden death of Smith in 1994, and while Smith was a fervent advocate of devolution, the same could not be said of his successor Tony Blair, whose personal view on devolution was less enthusiastic. In June 1996, Labour policy was emphatically rubber stamped when Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson announced that a Labour government would be 'committed to holding a referendum on devolution asking two questions: did Scots want a parliament and should it have tax-varying powers,' (Mitchell *et al* 1998: 169). The two-pronged question was the result of two incidents. Firstly, Blair insisted

that Labour manifesto pledges on devolution must be capable of moving through the Commons with limited resistance and be immune to any dismantling efforts by future Conservative governments. One possible amendment to any potential bill that Labour 'could not guarantee defeating would be the inclusion of a referendum and so was forced to concede that a referendum would need to be held regardless,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 173). Secondly, Labour had given their support to an SCC proposal that the new Scottish parliament should have the powers to vary the basic rate of income tax by as much as 3 pence to the pound. Fearful of the potential electoral backlash of the 'tax and spend' image that had been a potent weapon against the party in the previous decade, a two-question referendum policy went some way to dissuading these fears and blunting Tory attacks, (Mitchell *et al* 1998: 169). Labour's change of policy towards a referendum caused issues both within the party and amongst its SCC partners, especially the Liberal Democrats. Despite this, activists became resigned to the two-question referendum strategy which 'in hindsight conceded to the tactical wisdom of the referendum and in a sense clinched the issue, whether this was Blair's objective or not.' (Hearn, 2000: 70-1) In addition, having been highly critical of the SCC, the SNP would be forced to decide between campaigning for the only scheme on offer or accepting the status quo, thus, 'while causing great annoyance among their peers, Labour had successfully wrong-footed two of their strongest opponents,' (Mitchell *et al*, 1998: 169-170).

To counter rising nationalist sentiments and demand for constitutional change, Prime Minister John Major had promised that following the 1992 election he would take stock of the constitutional situation, which was 'undramatic and amounted to the Scottish grand committee having the ability to question non-Scottish ministers,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 140). In subsequent years, the Conservatives' attempts to resist the growing calls for devolution were spearheaded by Michael Forsyth who was installed as Scottish Secretary in

1995. To the 'astonishment of the nation Forsyth transformed from Thatcher attack dog to Scottish patriot, and while he remained firmly and resolutely opposed to devolution, all other expressions of Scottishness were to be enthusiastically embraced,' (Devine, 2017: 198). The love-bombing[66] campaign included, a lavish reception for the cast of *Braveheart* in Stirling, with Forsyth decked out in full highland dress and the spectacular act of gesture politics when Forsyth convinced Major to return the Stone of Scone[67] to Scotland on loan on the understanding that it would return to Westminster for the next coronation, (Harvie & Jones, 2000; Devine, 2017). For Keating (2001), this amounted to a traditional Conservative strategy of 'killing home rule with kindnesses, with harsh rhetoric toned down, and drastic cuts in Scottish spending shelved,' (Keating, 2001: 258). However, the Conservative strategy was not one dimensional, with the issue of tax seen as a key weakness in the new devolution plans and one that Forsyth and the Tories were keen to exploit. Forsyth relentlessly attacked the so called 'tartan-tax', claiming that Labour planned to use any new legislative body to heavily tax Scottish voters and played on the 'tax and spend' reputation of previous Labour governments and manifestos to create unease and dissent over the issue. However, 'Labour's surprise referendum policy wrong footed the Tories on the tax issue although it did not remove it completely from election debates,' (Mitchell *et al*, 1998: 169).

The 1997 general election saw Labour claim an unprecedented majority, but perhaps even more significantly, the Conservatives were annihilated in Scotland, losing all their seats to the Labour landslide. Following the election, Donald Dewar was appointed Secretary of State for Scotland and was a central figure to the successful and rapid passage of the Scotland (and

[66] A term and theme that was to be revisited during the 2014 Independence Referendum as a way of describing certain actions by pro-Union politicians and campaigners.

[67] The Stone, also referred to as the Stone of Destiny in Scotland or the Coronation Stone in England, was used in the ceremonies of crowning Kings of Scotland up until its removal by Edward I during the First War of Scottish Independence in 1296 as a war prize. It now remains in Scotland aside from its return to Westminster for the Coronation of new monarch, the last being King Charles III in May 2023.

Wales) Referendum Bills 1997. By July 1997, the Labour government had published a White Paper, *Scotland's Parliament*, which for the most part followed Labour's election manifesto pledges with some minor changes. Further details included the composition of the elected members of the parliament as well as the electoral system and the controversial financial and tax arrangements, (Mitchell *et al*, 1998: 171-2). Secretary for Defence George Robertson held a visceral hatred of the SNP and was resistant to them joining the campaign collectively, however, Dewar was more open and keener to promote unity within the pro-devolution camp which would naturally require the SNP's involvement in some capacity, (Mitchell, et al, 1998; Harvie & Jones, 2000). Dewar himself was an interesting mix of loyal unionist and cultural nationalist, 'whose command of Scottish history and culture was formidable and greatly admired by his peers and opponents,' (Devine, 2017: 201). He was equally capable of dissuading the fears of both Labour and the SNP of the realities of devolution and thus his personal touch played a significant role in establishing the unlikely cross-party unity of the official pro-devolution campaign amongst Labour, Liberal Democrats and SNP partners, (Mitchell *et al*, 1998; Harvie & Jones, 2000).

The Scottish Devolution Referendum was held on the 11th September 1997, with 74.3% voting in favour of establishing a Scottish Parliament and 63.5% voting in favour of granting the new Parliament tax-varying powers. The results of the referendum were a resounding victory and endorsement of devolution that indicated the 'Settled Will' of the Scottish people where 'the Scottish people did not simply agree to the establishment of a new parliament; they thumped the table and demanded it,' (Harvie & Jones, 2000: 186). Mitchell *et al* (1998) summarise that while supporters of devolution appeared more united in 1979, the context of 1997 was wholly different. In addition to increased anti-Tory sentiment, the Honeymoon period of Labour's landslide victory was a far cry from the debacles that preceded the '79

referendum. Michael Keating, further notes that the pre-devolution unity on display in Scottish politics was more a result of 'a common enemy that parties and groups opposed rather than being in wholly in favour of devolution per se,' (Keating, 2001: 97). Peter Lynch makes a similar summary, arguing that the referendum result was not merely the product of Labour's victory in the 1997 general election, it was also the 'result of a long and varied period of social movement mobilisation by proponents of constitutional change across parties and the political spectrum,' (Lynch, 2019: 87). Twenty years after the painful failure of the 1979 referendum and the hardships of Thatcherism, Scotland had attained Home Rule, but the subsequent years would prove to be just as tumultuous.

4.4 Devolution 1999-2012: The Doomsday Scenario?

The first elections to the newly established Scottish Parliament were held on the 6th May 1999. Labour continued to ride the success from the 1997 UK general election and were the largest party of the new parliament, winning 56 out of 129 seats, the SNP won 35 seats, with the Conservatives and Lib Dems following on 18 and 17 seats respectively. Labour would go on to form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, with Donald Dewar duly elected as Scotland's first 'First Minister'. The early years of devolution were 'characterised by an atmosphere of high expectation, followed by a strong feeling of anti-climax and disappointment,' (Hassan, 2014b: 123). Part of the argument for establishing a Scottish parliament was that it would be different, Scottish devolution's *other* was often based on caricature, 'with a tendency to exaggerate the differences between Holyrood and Westminster, while ignoring the often-striking similarities in both style and practice,' (Mitchell, 2014: 253-4).[68] While much of the apparent outpouring of regret and disappointment were caricatures

[68] Emphasis added.

themselves, the historical context and wider institutional settings of devolution were rarely considered. The gradual embedding and settling of a new institution into a deep public and institutional networks and bodies clashed with the hopes of pre-devolution, and 'the resultant conventional parliament, while clearly an improvement, also felt as the loss and diminution in the possibilities for change,' (Hassan, 2014b: 124-5). Despite Labour's commanding position in both Scotland and London, the party's passion for devolution remained largely rhetorical and much of the early drive within the coalition came from the Liberal Democrats, 'who pushed for the replacement of upfront university tuition fees with a graduate endowment scheme, free personal care for the elderly and the abolition of the final vestiges of feudal tenure,' (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 45).

Further feeding these feelings were a series of scandals and controversies. Chief among these were spiralling costs of the new parliament building, which would not be completed until 2004, alongside several expenses' scandals and matters were not helped by Dewar's inability to control his cabinet, with widespread infighting and almost daily leaks to both the press and opposition, (Devine, 2017: 214). In October 1999, when speaking to a gay rights conference, Communities Minister Wendy Alexander announced that the Scottish Executive intended to scrap Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 that prohibited the "promotion" of homosexuality in schools.[69] There was a severe backlash from Scottish religious institutions, with the Catholic Cardinal Thomas Winning forging an alliance with millionaire and SNP supporter Brain Souter to form an anti-repeal campaign 'Keep the Clause', which included Souter personally funding a private postal referendum. For liberal intellectuals who had campaigned for the parliament, this episode was the most painful. Dewar and Alexander had

[69] This piece of legislation is alternatively referred to as Clause 2A in Scotland owing to the specific wording of the of the clause.

hoped to demonstrate to colleagues at Westminster that the Scottish Parliament could take the lead in ending discrimination against sexual minorities, 'but Scotland remained a country with many socially conservative attitudes and the pace of public opinion had not necessarily kept up with political consciousness,' (Macwhirter, 2013: 218).[70] Macwhirter goes on to summarise that the issues were primarily the result of the weaknesses of Scotland's new political leadership and democracy, Dewar's cabinet was deeply divided on various matters and the press were openly hostile in many cases and 'voters lacked confidence in the new generation of politicians serving in this new parliament,' (Macwhirter, 2013: 220). The move to repeal Section 28 was eventually passed on 21st June 2000 by a vote of 99 in favour to 17 against, with 2 abstentions, before the Act received Royal Assent on the 24th July 2000.

On the 11th October 2000 when First Minister Donald Dewar suddenly passed away, robbing the Scottish Parliament of leadership and perhaps more significantly a politician who could speak to Scotland beyond the Labour party, (Hassan, 2020). It was perhaps inevitable that the media would give the impression that Dewar had fathered the Scottish Parliament virtually alone[71], and while time has allowed for a more balanced and nuanced perspectives, 'Dewar's mark on Scottish devolution and his personal character and popularity in Scotland was undeniable,' (Devine, 2017: 202-204). The leadership void was filled by Henry McLeish, whose stint as First Minister ended after less than 12 months following a scandal involving the sub-letting of his parliamentary offices whilst still a Westminster MP. McLeish's successor, Jack McConnell provided a steady pair of hands, however, given McConnell's previous record, many expected his administrations to be more ambitious. Instead, McConnell became the embodiment of a conservative devolution, 'avoiding policies that would have

[70] A situation and position that has sadly not changed in the twenty years since.
[71] Dewar himself claimed that the Scottish Parliament did not have a father, but a mother in Margaret Thatcher

created difficulties between Holyrood and London, best illustrated by the similarity in spending plans between Holyrood and Westminster during this period,' (Mitchell, 2014: 259). McConnell renewed the coalition agreement with the Liberal Democrats following the 2003 election, and while this administration was similarly unimaginative, 'it could tout a major success in the form of the 2006 Smoking Ban in public places,' (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 46).[72]

While Labour complacently treated devolution as a promised delivered, it took the SNP longer to adjust to the new realities of political life in Scotland, (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 46). Dewar's death removed the chances for Labour to provide a positive, convincing and popular story of devolution and the Scotland it was meant to bring about, and this, alongside the failures of leadership and imagination around the devolution project provided the necessary environment in which the SNP would begin to 'thrive and ultimately capture the terrain on which reshape the devolution narrative and bring independence to the forefront of Scottish politics.' (Hassan, 2020) For most SNP politicians, Holyrood was the preferred destination, in contrast, devolution exposed the London-centric sight of Scottish politicians in Britain-wide parties and insofar as Scottish electoral politics was about 'who could best stand up for Scottish interests against those of Westminster, and the SNP leadership's fondness for Holyrood worked to their advantage in terms of their reputation with voters,' (Johns & Mitchell, 2016: 72). The fortunes of the SNP improved following Alex Salmond's return as leader of the party in 2005, with Nicola Sturgeon as deputy.[73] While previous leader John Swinney had greatly improved the internal mechanisations of the SNP, the return of Salmond

[72] The Smoking Ban also faced some considerable resistance, but also much like the Section 2A event, the Bill was passed with relative ease in the Parliament and little else said following. See Macwhirter (2013) pp. 226-228 for further discussion on this.

[73] Salmond had previously been party leader from 1990-2000 but stepped down when he decided to take up a seat at Westminster and following a series of high-profile falling outs with party members.

saw a change in style and appeal.[74] During this period the SNP began to speak of the potential of Scotland as a self-governing, independent nation as opposed to their 'previous stance of giurning[75] about what was wrong with Scotland, improving on their image and message which resulted in a near complete transformation from the previous decade,' (Hassan, 2011: 369).

This prudence would pay off in the 2007 Scottish parliament elections[76], when the SNP would claim victory in the Scottish Parliament elections, winning 47 seats; one seat more than Labour achieved with 46. After coalition talks with the Liberal Democrats broke down over the SNP manifesto commitment to an independence referendum and the refusal of both Labour and the Conservatives to engage in such discussions, the SNP pushed forward as a minority administration. During this period, the SNP adopted 'a highly technocratic approach, becoming more like New Labour than Scottish Labour had been,' (Mitchell, 2014: 271). This was partly the result of the constraints of minority government, but also stemmed from a need to stay on good working terms with Westminster, which would be essential for plans to hold a referendum on independence. The SNP progressed with pragmatism, concession, and expediency, with policies that would have 'automatically led to major confrontations quietly dropped or side-lined,' (Devine, 2017: 230-1). In their place, more popular policies were pursued, such as the abolition of bridge tolls on the Erskine and Forth Road Bridges and scrapping NHS prescription charges. These were difficult for opposition parties to oppose and the agreement of a funding concordat with Scotland's local councils to freeze council tax on an ongoing basis 'was a major success and demonstrated the extent to which ministerial

[74] For more detailed accounts of this specific period for the SNP see Mitchell *et al* (2012); Johns & Mitchell (2016) & Devine (2017)

[75] Scots spelling. Meaning to pull an exaggerated and disgusting face.

[76] Somewhat ironically, these elections occurred just two days after the 300th Anniversary of the Acts of Union that established the UK.

powers could be extended,' (Pittock, 2013: 208). The SNP also made the symbolic gesture of renaming the Scottish Executive as the Scottish Government 'as it was thought that Government was a more familiar term and implied a more important and significant body,' (Mitchell, 2014: 270). Despite the insistence of opposition parties over the perils of a nationalist government, and despite the severe limitations and constraints of minority administration alongside the fallout of the Global Financial Crisis, the SNP had proven competent in office, especially compared to the scandal ridden early years of the parliament, this basic governing competence appeared somewhat impressive, (Mitchell, 2014; Kidd & Petrie, 2016).

If the 2007 election and the experience of a nationalist government had provided a shock to the devolution consensus, it was broken completely in subsequent years. Firstly, the Conservatives returned to government in coalition with the Liberal Democrats following the 2010 UK general election. Secondly, in the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, the SNP secured an overall majority, winning 69 (an increase of 23) out of 129 seats, a feat thought (and designed to be) impossible for any party achieve under the proportional electoral system. The so called 'Doomsday Scenario' now reared its head in the form of the SNP being the dominant party in Scotland opposing the Conservatives in London; and with it, the constitutional question came roaring back to the forefront of Scottish politics. There was no inevitability to the SNP becoming the largest party in the Scottish parliament and support for independence had always been well short of a majority. However, the SNP came to be perceived as 'more than a party supporting independence, and they were now a credible party of government with a range of everyday policies that were unrelated to the constitutional question,' (Mitchell, 2014: 274). Majority government allowed the SNP to safely legislate on issues such as minimum pricing of alcohol, the unification of the police into a single national

force, ‘but the utmost priority was now legislating for an independence referendum within the parliamentary term,’ (Pittock, 2013: 217).

Negotiations on the terms of such a referendum began in earnest in early 2012. Controversary ensued over virtually all aspects of the referendum from its legality to the question wording with compromises from both sides were required. Salmond was keen on the addition of a second question or ‘third option’ on the ballot regarding the loosely defined ‘devo-max’, though this was unacceptable to Prime Minister David Cameron. In January 2012, Cameron offered to temporarily transfer powers to Holyrood to hold a referendum provided it was held within eighteen months and consisted of a single question for or against independence; the advantage of these conditions being that ‘decisively winning the referendum would put the lid on the nationalist clamour,’ (Bambery, 2018: 317). Cameron did however make significant concessions, namely that the Scottish Government could determine the date, the exact wording of the question (under supervision of the Electoral Commission) and the composition of the electorate, (Devine, 2017: 235). On October 15th 2012, Cameron, alongside Salmond, Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and Scottish Secretary Michael Moore, signed the Edinburgh Agreement enabling the transfer of powers to the Scottish Parliament to hold the referendum.[77] Under advisement from the Electoral Commission, the agreed question eventually read ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ The Scottish Government hinted that the vote would be held in late 2014, after the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow, the Ryder Cup in Gleneagles and the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, later confirming 18th September 2014 as polling day in March 2013. The final major development was the composition of the electorate, with the franchise extended to all

[77] An event that was taken advantage of by Salmond, by having photographs of the signing held with an electoral map of Scotland following the 2011 election in plain view between respective signatories.

residents of Scotland, regardless of origin and the voting age was lowered to 16 years old, (Pittock, 2013; Devine, 2017). The first political shots in the battle for Scotland had been firing since early 2012, now however, 'the broad rules of the campaign were in place and agreed on both sides. The campaign could begin in earnest,' (Devine, 2017: 235).

As noted in the previous chapter, genealogical analysis requires patience, attention to and knowledge of detail as well as being reliant on the collection and use of various materials. The above discussions and outline of Scottish political history have served to orientate the reader within the context of crucial developments in contemporary Scottish politics and the development of Scottish nationalism, providing an initial degree of immersion and knowledge on the topic at hand. The analysis has identified the period of 1967 to 2012 as being of particular interest and has further highlighted several key moments and events specifically the 1979 and 1997 referendums on devolution, and the experiences of Thatcherism and SNP government. The short history presented here has unearthed a series of elements upon which the logics and intellectual function can be brought to bear in evaluating and assessing the development of the myths of Scottish nationalism. This chapter has foregrounded the contextual element of nationalism as required by our definition set out in chapter 2. The following chapter will utilise the above concepts as a means of elucidating the agency of Scottish nationalism with regards to the discursive construction of these myths.

Chapter 5 – 4 Myths of Scottish Nationalism

5.1 The Stories we tell Ourselves

The previous chapter initiated the genealogical investigation by outlining some of the key developments and moments in contemporary Scottish Constitutional politics that have led to the present conjecture. As noted in previous chapters, the purpose of this initial exploration is to orientate ourselves with some of the finer details of Scottish political history as well as serving as an initial immersion into the discourses as required by a genealogical investigation. In doing so, the previous chapter has also served to foreground context as a key element in our approach to nationalism and our attempts here to grapple with its specificity and contingent nature as is preferred in our theoretical and conceptual understanding of nationalism. From this starting point, the attention of the genealogy now shifts to a more focused and detailed engagement with several key moments and interventions that occurred during the periods highlighted in the previous chapter. In doing so, the analysis moves to examine the emergence, evolution, and crystallisation of several prominent myths of Scottish nationalism during the period highlighted in the previous chapter, before moving to engage with their subsequent adoptions and expressions during the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum in the final chapter. Thus, the genealogical analysis presented in this chapter serves to identify the fault lines in the constitution these myths of modern Scottish nationalism and to illustrate both the context and specificity of these processes.

In this way, genealogy serves as an empirical tool for establishing historical context and conceptual elements, with the logics and intellectual function representing conceptual content of explanation and evaluation. By bringing genealogy, logics and intellectual function into dialogue, the myths explored here can be considered to operationalise the abstract ideas of the

logics and intellectual function in terms of their constitution, fleshing out the agency behind their interlinkages whilst remaining attentive to their contextual specificity. As a brief reminder, and as explored in Chapter 3, myths here are understood as specific articulatory constructions that attempt to suture and cover the trauma experienced from profound moments of crises, be these economic, social, or political. They are specific ways of reading dislocatory events, and while they do not reflect reality, they do bear some resemblance, tapping into common culture and history. It is important to stress that the labelling of these myths is not definitive as they are, like the logics and intellectual function, in part constructions of the researcher that serve as heuristic devices with which to frame and conceptualise the contexts of discursive practices within Scottish nationalism. Furthermore, the application of intellectual function in this instance allows for the genealogical analysis to both highlight and evaluate the specific articulations and expressions of these logics, their purposes and ends.

It would be prudent to offer some brief comments with regards to selection of myths and status of materials that will be employed in the analysis, specifically in reference to academic studies and literatures. Several of the authors have written extensively on a variety of prevalent myths in contemporary Scottish politics, albeit in differing contexts. For example, both Hearn (2000) and McCrone (2001) refer to the myth of egalitarianism as the Scottish myth in their respective studies, whilst others such as Gerry Hassan (2014a & 2014b) and Stephen Maxwell (2013) have covered myths ranging from cultural pessimism to Scotland's radical nature to the myth of Civic Scotland. It is these respective myths named above that form the focal point of the analysis to come. These myths are privileged in the analysis owing to their prevalence in Scottish public and political life as well as within academic research. As Hassan comments on the myth of Scottish cultural pessimism, 'most Scots have heard of it

and encountered it, and even know it in their own hearts,' (Hassan, 2014a: 39). In this sense, the academic texts that are referred to in this chapter, including those referenced above serve a dual purpose. Firstly, they are taken comprehensive and detailed discussions of the sources and contexts of these myths as well as providing commentary on their prevalence within Scottish political and social life. Secondly, by providing such commentary, this itself forms part of the analysis with the texts being considered as extensions of the respective myths that indicate broad acceptance of their contexts and narratives, thus through intellectual function they are considered as specific readings (or translations) of the respective myths within contemporary and contextual settings not as isolated interpretations or engagements.

A further element to consider here is how these respective myths assumed the roles as markers of difference and distinction from both an external and internal other, in other words how the operated through a political logic. Conducting a genealogical investigation allows us guard against treating Scottishness or Scottish national identity as being the same through time and space and privileges how national identity is something that takes place within and is constructed through contextualised discursive practices. Furthermore, any understanding of Scottish difference depends on the interests and perspectives of those making these claims of difference, whatever these may be, and subsequently forms a distinctive aspect of Scottish culture and politics, (Rosie & Bond, 2007: 40). To put this another way, it is not the case that Scots had a sudden change in their values and attitudes during the past 50 years, 'rather the political and social prisms through which theses values were expressed were altered and articulated in different ways in response the conditions of the respective periods of upheaval, which allowed for their re-interpretation and renewed expression,' (McCrone, 2006: 19). To this end, the research focuses on publicly articulated interventions in the form of speeches, policy documents and political cartoons. To reiterate the point raised in Chapter 3, the

respective events and materials presented in this chapter are not taken as the genesis or discourse ex nihilo of these myths, rather they are a means of elaborating on their crystallisation and solidification in public imagination through the interplay of social, fantasmatic, and political logics, with the genealogical nature of the investigation facilitating a process of critique through the logics and intellectual function in terms of specific contextual articulations and constitutive moments of political subjectivity and agency of Scottish nationalism.

The following sections will address 4 myths of Scottish nationalism. Taking each respective myth in turn, the following sections will offering some brief background before moving to engage with specific moments, that through an application of the Logics and intellectual function, will demonstrate the crystallisation of these myths into the nationalist imaginary. The chapter will then conclude with some discussion on the discursive conceptualisation of Scottish nationalism that follows from these engagements.

5.2 The Myth of Scottish Cultural Pessimism – 'Too wee, Too poor'

It has been claimed that Scottish culture is embodied and encompassed by a profound sense of loss, melancholy and pessimism; 'a lack of confidence, commonly expressed along the lines of, as Scots, we are too small, too poor, too divided, too Scottish to take charge of our own destiny,' (Hassan, 2014a: 39).[78] These sentiments are often traced to post-1707, where a powerful strain of cultural pessimism developed among Scottish intellectuals, 'characterised by Walter Scott as dividing Scotland between the heart (the past, the romance, the nation) and the head (the present and future, reason, and the British State),' (McCrone, 2017: 424-5).

[78] Anyone who knows me can see this pessimistic outlook in practice, particularly when it comes to football!

Alongside Nairn's comments in previous chapters regarding Scotland's missing nationalism, he further argued that the post-Union relationship between civil society and State in Scotland resulted in a strange sub-national culture, cultural because it could not be political, but not straightforwardly nationalist either. It was therefore 'sub-nationalist; venting its national content in various crooked ways – neurotically, rather than directly,' (Nairn, 1981: 155-6). The literary traditions of the Kailyard are often highlighted as the prime example of this crooked expression, which themselves became a key carrier of Scottish identity in the 19th and early 20th centuries and contributed to the development of the concept of '*Caledonian Antisyzygy*.'

Caledonian Antisyzygy was initially conceived as a reflection of the contrasts which Scots show at every turn, in their 'political and ecclesiastical history, polemical restlessness, conflicted personality, and adaptability, which is another way of saying that Scots make allowances for new conditions and practical judgement, which is an admission that two sides of the matter must be considered,' (Smith, 1919: 4). Stephen Smith argues that this use of the term is 'an essential psychological condition or world view, its hallmark being a love of contradictions, and a delight in maintaining two opposing ideas as equally true,' (Smith, 1984: 189). Reinforcing this account is an anxiety surrounding 'turbulent cultural interruption, but it is far from clear whether Scots are constitutionally unstable or open-minded to the point of incoherence,' (Carruthers, 2009: 2). Diagnoses of Caledonian Antisyzygy rose from the perception that Scottish history was fractured, with no obvious continuation between nationhood and the Scottish language; thus, the problem confronted with this concept, was that 'the domination of English as the language of Britain and Empire, curtailed the options for Scottish self-expression. As a result, distinctiveness and expression of Scottish identity receded,' (Carruthers, 2018: 351). Scottish culture was then said to be self-destructive, self-

pitying and dwells on various disasters and setbacks throughout Scottish history from the serious and the not so serious.[79]

McCrone argues that the idea of Caledonian Antisyzygy would probably have come to nothing were it not that it seemed 'appropriate to the cultural and political conditions of Scotland at different moments favourable for its adoption as a dominant trope,' (McCrone, 2017: 425). For example, through poet Hugh MacDiarmid, the concept was expanded into an almost 'mythical explanation for the ordering of reality of Scottish literature, politics and beyond,' (Smith, 1984: 189). In this sense, Caledonian Antisyzygy is an example of a myth made from affliction. As Nairn argues, the cultural reality of split personality is a propensity to alternate between 'dour matter-of-fact realism and unrestrained fantasy, and the knowledge of Scottish history compels us to accept this as real and necessary,' (Nairn, 1981: 150n17). We can observe this to some extent in MacDiarmid's use of the concept when he wrote *"I'll*

[79] The not so serious effects of Scottish cultural pessimism is amusingly brought to bear by comedian and actor Jonathan Watson during a live performance of the Scottish football comedy sketch show Only an Excuse in 1993. The segment begins with the two actors discussing what Scottish football is all about. This naturally touches on aspects of Scottishness which leads to one of the actors impersonating novelist William McIlvaney and delivering the following monologue:

> "When you're talking personality. You're talking person, with a bit of nality. Someone whom the Gods, or Ian Archer have deemed special. A unique being with charisma and talent. Unless that personality, is a Scottish personality. For in this footballing nation of ours, the word personality has come to be the recognised shorthand for 100 per cent pure mental. Then there is the question of nationality. Being Scottish is the only thing wrong with being a Scotsman. For to be Scottish is to be possessed by the demons of self-destruction. Scottishness being a towering triumph to the power of positive thinking. A total conviction in your lack of self-belief. A conviction crucial to the progressive stagnation of our game, whose absence might have altered the course of our history. With self-belief, in 1885, it might have been Arbroath 36 Bon Accord 37. In 1967, it would have been Berwick Rangers 1 Glasgow Rangers 5. At Wembley in 1961, it could have been England 9 Scotland 4. But, as Scots, we have no option be to treat victory and defeat the same. Because for every Bannockburn there is a Culloden. A Flodden. A Glencoe. A Hampden. A Wembley. A Costa Rica. A Peru. An Iran. And an Argentina!"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pFbz3cL02vQ The segment referenced above begins at 13.00 in the video and lasts until 17.15 (Last Accessed: 20/09/21)

hae nae hauf way hoose, but aye be whaur extremes meet"[80], where he could just have easily been referring to the 'internal conflicts that can take over people's lives as much the conflicted understanding of what it means to be Scottish,' (Vaczi *et al*, 2020: 947). Novelist Willie McIlvanney would later make a similar assessment that Scots were trapped in a weird 'psychic shuttle that runs from bleak self-doubt to wild declarations of arrogance and back again,' (McIlvanney, 1991; McCrone, 2017).

Nairn's arguments suggests that many Scots can reject nationalist claims seeking Scottish independence, while at the same time maintaining identification with a distinct Scottish nation, 'epitomising the separation of head and heart, which itself has underpinned the Scottish constitutional debate as much as Scottish national identity,' (Vaczi *et al*, 2020: 948). For example, Stephen Maxwell bemoaned that Scottish working-class identity bears little resemblance to the heroic imagery of Red Clydeside, rather it is politically dour and defensive, pickled with Tartan sentimentality bordering on caricature. And due to the 'schizophrenia of the Scottish imagination, the working-class figure of the maudlin nationalist of the night before is often the tame Unionist of the morning after,' (Maxwell, 2013: 96). As such, Scots are often presented, and present themselves as being shaped by doubt, conflict, argument and diminishing confidence, which has contributed to pathologising Scottish identity, which has often been reinforced by those who want Scottish society to remain as it is, as well as those forces outwith Scotland, namely the British establishment, (Hassan, 2014a: 40).

[80] "I'll have no halfway house, but always be where extremes meet." English translation of the Scots used in the text.

From this initial discussion, it is possible to identify two logics at play: one social and one fantasmatic. Taking the social first, we can call this a logic of *head over heart*, which encourages social and individual practices that privileges reason over passions in decision making and outlook. Whereas we can refer to the fantasmatic logic as one of the *conflicted self*, which is horrific in nature, in that it belays a characteristic of Scots that must be overcome for Scots to find their true expression and develop beyond their stunted and frustrated character. The interplay of these logics contributes to an inherent conflict inherent that allows for the concurrent holding of both radical and conservative interpretations of Scottish social and political life, but crucially, the holding of these interpretations is not necessarily contradictory. Rather involvement and performance of the cultural myth of Scottish pessimism allows the holder to access the necessary cultural, social, and political capital with which to defend a given position without falling into hypocrisy or contradiction. The myth of Scottish pessimism then speaks to the ability of Scots to articulate a response to specific events, even when the actions and positions appear contradictory. This subsequently has profound effects on both the interpretation and application of argument and beliefs that any individual may hold.

'I'm Feart!'

Through intellectual function, we can approach the political articulation of this myth and its associated logics into the national imaginary as a specific attempt to suture the dislocation and shock of the unsuccessful 1979 devolution referendum. As McCrone argues, reaction to the failure of the 1979 referendum had less to do with political meddling (i.e., The West Lothian Question or the Cunningham amendment discussed in the previous chapter) and more with assumed psycho-cultural traits, (McCrone, 2017: 22). One such reaction that exemplifies this, takes the form of a political cartoon and provides a unique insight into the articulation and

subsequent solidification of the myth of Scottish Pessimism into a nationalist imaginary. The cartoon, by Jim Turnbull (shown below in Figure 1), appeared in the Glasgow Herald Newspaper shortly following the 1979 referendum result.

Image 1



Cartoon drawn by cartoonist Jim Turnbull which appeared in the Glasgow Herald Newspaper (n/d) shortly following the 1979 referendum. Image sourced from: https://www.lambiek.net/artists/t/turnbull_jim.htm

The apathetic ball and chain that holds the Scottish lion down can be considered as a reference to the general feeling of apathy and disillusionment that existed at the time. As discussed in the previous chapter, the passage of the Scotland Bill alongside an increasingly

unpopular Labour government, led to a general disillusionment with the government and its direction. At a time when the UK seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis, people were more concerned with jobs and standards of living than constitutional reforms, a feeling which was exacerbated by the 1978-79 Winter of Discontent, giving rise to the sentiment that the Labour government was hardly in a position of strength to convince Scots of the merits of devolution, (Devine, 1999: 589). Here we can point to an evocation of the social logic of head over heart. The idea that despite the apparent appetite for a Scottish parliament, reality prompted a rethink in the sense that 'if nationalist rhetoric focused on the evils of excessive centralisation and government interference, was another layer of bureaucracy in the form of devolution really the solution?' (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 38). We can see this clearly through Lynch (2019) who refers to accounts of activists at the time who begrudged that 'by the time of the referendum, the popularity of the government had slumped, there had been bad weather, bad politics, bad industrial relations, an atmosphere that all changes were for the worst,' (Lynch, 2019: 65). Lynch further recounts how Dennis Canavan (then Labour MP) felt the impact of the economic situation among Labour supporters in his own constituency during the referendum campaign, stating that: 'The country is in absolute chaos, and you are expecting us to go out and vote in a referendum, what has a referendum got to do with this? A lot of people, even traditional Labour supporters would see the referendum as a way to give the government a bloody nose,' (Lynch, 2019: 65-66).

A further detail of the cartoon reveals that the lion is sporting an injury, bandaged, and highlighted as having been received in Argentina. The suggestion made here is that the disappointment of Scotland's performance in the 1978 FIFA World Cup, had a further and profound impact on a fragile Scottish self-confidence. Scotland had gone into the World Cup

with genuine belief that they could win the tournament[81], being the only British team to qualify and being able to call on the talents of players such as Kenny Dalgleish, Graeme Souness and Archie Gemmill among others, one could possibly be forgiven for indulging in some hubris. The reality was sobering. Forward Willie Johnston failed a drugs test and was sent home in disgrace; Scotland were then humbled 3-1 in their opening game against Peru before labouring to an uninspired 1-1 draw with Iran. Going into the final match, Scotland needed to beat the Netherlands (1974 and eventual 1978 finalists) by 3 clear goals to progress, and despite Archie Gemmill producing one of the greatest goals ever seen at a World Cup, Scotland could 'only' manage a 3-2 victory and were eliminated at the group stage. The experience saw Scottish supporters and commentators alike shuttle-run from euphoric optimism to a crushing pessimistic dejection, and no stops in-between, and the overriding feeling of failure has stayed with Scottish sport since.

A connection between the 1978 World Cup and the outcome of the '79 referendum was drawn by Christopher Harvie, who noted that political events might have been very different had Scotland performed well at the World Cup, with the 'we were rubbish hangover certainly contributed to the outcome,' (Harvie, 2004: 188). The implication drawn here, and further illustrated in Turnbull's cartoon, is that, when faced with a decision of such magnitude, the normally brave and proud Scottish lion casts its mind back to the confidence and good feeling in the build-up to the tournament, only to then quickly remember the pain and disappointment that followed. As a result, the lion is crippled by the demons of self-doubt, racing from the extremes of overwhelming confidence to timid uncertainty. This can be considered a clear evocation of the fantasmatic logic of the conflicted self. If we consider the manner of the

[81] Immortalised in Andy Cameron's world cup song *Ally's Tartan Army.* A link to a live performance of the song on BBC's Top of the Pops programme has been copied below:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xc2wmvYFco0

World cup exit alongside the general apathy discussed above, then we can see through the visualisation of Turnbull's cartoon, how an articulation of both the social and fantasmatic elements served to generate an atmosphere that 'injected Scottish society and culture with a poignant melancholy and pessimism about future prospects,' (Hassan, 2014a: 39). These elements combined to reinforce the social logic of head over heart, of falling back on matter-of-fact realism which would be subsequently amplified through the horrific fantasmatic narrative of the conflicted self. The passion and desire for change was met with the 'reality' of apathy and disappointment which served to reinforce the narrative of indecisiveness.

If the respective events above served to consolidate the social and fantasmatic logics of Scottish cultural pessimism, then their political articulation into a myth of Scottish nationalism was aided and appealed to via a political logic of *independence*. The political logic of independence here is not a referent to full sovereignty of the nation-state, rather it is posed at a level of national recognition of difference and distinction. Furthermore, through Voloshinov's concept of multi-accentuality, we can conceptualise how various and competing conceptions of this difference may exist (and co-exist), and through intellectual function we can envisage how the political logic of independence articulated the myth of Scottish pessimism and its associated logics into the privileged expression and representation of nationhood within a wider forum, becoming the dominant accent given the context in which it operated. Following successive 'shocks', nationalist discourse required a way of explaining its failures and if we consider the apathy produced by the Winter of Discontent, the dejection of the World Cup exit, the difficulties of Scotland Bill's passage and eventual referendum result, then through the intellectual function we can posit how this ideal of Scottish cultural pessimism presented itself as a viable object of articulation. By drawing connections between the failure of the referendum and the specific Scottish cultural traits and logics of pessimism,

the setback could be repackaged and reframed into a reasoning and way of interpreting the loss.

Nationalists and advocates for devolution required a uniting narrative, something with which to console themselves and displace responsibility, thus, through intellectual function, we can frame the responses to the failure of the 1979 referendum, such as Turnbull's cartoon, as an attempt to articulate the social and fantasmatic logics associated with the myth of pessimism, repackaging and re-interpreting them as key factors in the failure of the 1979 referendum. In this sense the political logic of independence stressed a logic of equivalence as a means of uniting proponents of devolution in their common cause alongside establishing the need to overcome such negative cultural traits. The suggestion here being that for Scotland to take decisive action with confidence befitting its reputation, then it must cast off the shackles of pessimism. In this sense, while attempting to establish a chain of equivalence between supporters of devolution in preparation for the next battle, the operation of this political logic of independence concurrently, and through a logic of difference, contributed to the constitution of an 'internal' other, something that must be defeated and overcome to advance the common goal of devolution. We could further illustrate this by referring to Cairns Craig's assessment of nostalgia in contemporary settings in that 'nostalgia emerged not as a retreat to the past from the present but a means by which the past can be used to redirect the energies of the self towards the future, making it future-orientated,' (Craig, 2018: 160).

In sum, utilising intellectual function we can posit that the political articulation of Scottish cultural pessimism into a myth of contemporary Scottish nationalism, served two purposes. On the one hand it served as a particular reading of the loss of the 1979 referendum that allowed proponents of devolution to explain their failures. On the other hand, it constituted

the practice of constructing equivalences among those who demanded and called for greater autonomy, whilst at the same time through a logic of difference, constituted an internal other that must be overcome if these demands were to be realised through a political logic of independence and its appeals to and evocation of the myths associated social and fantasmatic logics.

5.3 The Myth of Egalitarian Scotland – 'We're a' Jock Tamson's Bairns'

The idea of a strong egalitarian ethos in Scottish society is so widespread that 'many texts on Scottish culture and politics feel the need to address this myth at their outset,' (Hearn, 2000: 139). For Rae Morton, this egalitarian ethos penetrates deep into Scottish history and are 'inextricably linked with the institutions and traditions that have historically symbolised the Scottish nation,' (Morton, 2011: 84). The egalitarian myth finds its clearest expression through both the Kirk and the Scottish education system.[82] As Jones argues, the democracy of the Kirk, embodied by local sessions, synods, and a General Assembly, contributed strongly to the idea of an egalitarian state. In addition, the tradition that Scottish education offered every pupil, regardless class or wealth, the potential to attain the highest academic standard, permeated political debate and underpins many of Scotland's institutions, (Jones, 1992: 4). This is further emphasised by the fact that 'while patterns of social mobility are not all that different from the rest of the UK, it appears that the Kirk and the education system, as pervasive social institutions have played a key role in the history of social mobility in Scotland,' (Hearn, 2000: 142).[83] For example, the Kirk influenced Scottish society through 'control of poor relief, rudimentary education, and social activities in every parish throughout

[82] The theology behind the presbyterian Kirk is Calvinism and we shall use both terms interchangeably throughout the chapter to refer to values and belief system encouraged by the Kirk.
[83] See also McCrone (2001) pp.78-103 for detailed discussion of this 'Scottish' myth.

Scotland and while the state would eventually take over these roles, they were built on the existing structures inherited from the Kirk,' (Mitchell, 2014: 19).

Two main themes can be discerned from the influence of the Kirk: the first is that of an institution with proto-democratic structures; secondly, the psychological influence and impact of Calvinist theology[84], which, given the prominence of the Kirk in Scottish society, it is little surprise that Scots absorbed the ideology, norms and values associated with it, (Hearn, 2000; Morton, 2011). The image of social identity embodied by the Kirk was one of community and commitments were made to the community regardless of it being secular or religious. While social hierarchy and differences of economic and social power were not questioned, 'material rewards were seen as harmful if the duties and obligations to the community that wealth brings were not fulfilled,' (McCrone, 2001: 99). This egalitarian vision of society is often presented and enunciated through the saying '*We're a' Jock Tamson's bairns'*. While the phrase's origins are unclear, it has often been used to refer to 'all God's children.'[85] This vision of Scottish institutions and society helped to establish a conception of civic duty which emphasised 'communal values and social responsibility, providing a civic doctrine which underpinned social relations even after the Kirk's decline,' (McCrone, 2001: 102).

Scottish education inherited these values and norms further developed them in a different context. One of the most common expressions has been through the promotion of the fabled *'lad 'o pairts'*. The *'lad 'o pairts'* was a stock character of the Kailyard where 'a boy of exceptional skill and talent, usually of modest origin and means, is 'discovered by the local

[84] We will return to some these themes and provide further details in the discussion of further myths below.
[85] The phrase itself has various meanings attributed to it, but usually relates to ideas of common humanity or shared values and commitments. There is one account that attributes the first use of the phrase to Presbyterian Minister John Thomson who served Duddingston Kirk in Edinburgh, who would refer to his congregation as 'ma bairns.' (My children) A plaque now exists at the Kirk which reads: "Under the Seat Beside the Water Makes A Home For A' Jock Tamson's Bairns."

Kirk minister or School teacher and then promoted and financed so that he may go to university and pursue a professional career,' (Hearn, 2000: 141). Several distinctive egalitarian features of Scottish (University) education supported such tropes, including low-age entry levels, open entry until 1892, low fees and wide availability of bursaries. Further indications included the fact that in 1860, almost a quarter of Scotland's university student body came from the working-class, (Anderson, 1985; Morton, 2011). Scotland was also unusual in providing opportunities to rural areas, and it was this as much as the fable that attracted attention as by the early 20th century and post-war period, children of skilled industrial workers were sharing in the tradition,' (Anderson, 1985: 100). The post-war Welfare State consensus opened many of these opportunity structures for newer generations and expanding their access to the working classes. Thus, 'idealised egalitarianism and the cultural validation of education continued to endure in a way that over-arched specific historical institutional mechanisms,' (Hearn, 2000: 141). For McCrone, this embodied an 'instance of competitive equal opportunity which did not relate to equality of educational achievement or outcome, rather it related to a formal opportunity afforded to able students to proceed through the educational structure,' (McCrone, 2001: 97).

In this sense, the role of the egalitarian myth has been to 'translate national distinctiveness into institutional characteristics, reinforced by their apparent success in improving access to cultural capital,' (McCrone, 2017: 240). Despite the prevalence of this myth, several academic and writers are quick to question its legitimacy based on examples of extreme social inequality and an ever-widening educational attainment gap.[86] However, the coexistence of egalitarian beliefs and socially created inequality does not necessarily produce a contradiction. 'The conservative may use it justify a more meritocratic than egalitarian

[86] See Hearn (2000); McCrone (2001) & Hassan (2014a) for specific criticisms of egalitarian ethos and myth.

social/political order; while the radical may seek to rectify the anomaly in political and economic ways,' (McCrone, 2001: 93). This allows the egalitarian myth to be articulated to the interests and ideals of various sections of society and demonstrates the multi-accentual nature of the myth and discourses that seek to utilise its narratives. For example, Stephen Maxwell argues that the idea that Scottish society is egalitarian is central to Scottish democracy. In its 'strong nationalist version, class division is an alien importation from England; in the weaker version it describes the wider opportunity for social mobility,' (Maxwell, 2013: 17). The stronger strain resembles what McCrone describes as the 'activist' interpretation, which looks upon man-made inequalities and calls for their active resolution. The weaker interpretation argues that structural inequalities hold little bearing, since if all are created equal, nothing need be done to correct the situation, (McCrone, 2001: 91).

The egalitarian myth continues to be kept alive not simply because people believe it, but because there are 'institutional mechanisms which provide sufficient affirmation of its validity,' (McCrone, 2001: 96). Through the influence of the Kirk and Scottish educational structures, the partial reality behind the myth of egalitarianism consists of a 'genuine structure of opportunity for the rural middle class and some of the skilled working class, to enter the educated professions,' (Hearn, 2000: 141). McCrone provides a concise summary of the role and influence of this 'Scottish' myth as one that is representative of a set of social values and ethos, a celebration of sacred beliefs about what it is to be Scottish; serving to 'underpin a social and cultural order which places a premium on collective, cooperative and egalitarian commitments as well as being an ideological device for distinguishing Scottish society from its English counterpart,' (McCrone, 2001: 102-3). As such, the myth of egalitarianism acts as a 'belief system that encompasses several identity markers, explaining and fuelling Scottish

society more generally. It is a means for Scots to understand their social environment without necessarily reflecting a particular Scottish social order,' (Morton, 2011: 95).

Through the outline provided above, we can highlight the operation of certain social and fantasmatic logics that underpin this myth. We can refer to the social logic as one of *responsibility*, where it is the collective responsibility to ensure everyone regardless of their origin should be given the opportunity and access to the institutions and materials that will allow them to contribute to the good of the community. Thus, this logic encourages practices and values where opportunity benefits not only the individual, but that providing opportunity is a duty to the community over the narrow-minded interests of the individual which leads only to selfishness and callousness. The fantasmatic logic at play here, like the myth itself is one of *egalitarianism*. This fantasmatic logic stresses a beatific vision of Scottish society, where a set of structures and values that are to be cherished and defended in terms how they mark out a distinctly Scottish way of structuring society. As has been alluded to above, the interplay of these two logics has proven highly pervasive in Scottish culture and mindset that it is commonly itself referred to as *the* Scottish myth and one that requires our attention. Crucially, the adherence to this social logic and investment in the fantasmatic element is evidence of the multi-accentual nature of the myth, allowing for and maintaining its vitality through the application and contestation of often conflicting interpretations and practice. It is also worth highlighting here a connection with the myth of Scottish pessimism presented in the previous section, particularly with regards to the social logic of heart and head. While the heart may call for greater equality, the more maligned rule of the head leads to the more conservative outlook. While there are similarities here this does mean that we are discussing one and the same myth, rather we are highlighting elements that assist in the vitality and re-affirmations of the practices and fantasies contained in each respective myth. As noted,

elements do not act in isolation and their fixity is only partial, allowing for the interplay of elements of myths when they come into contact at various instances.

'The Sermon on the Mound'

As explored in the previous chapter, following the 1987 general election, Scottish public opinion, media, and commentary was 'increasingly painting the Thatcher government as alien and foreign, in terms of the lack of a democratic mandate and in its values, intent, and ideology,' (Hassan, 2014a: 139). Against this backdrop, Thatcher visited Scotland in May 1988. Firstly, she made an appearance as the guest of honour at the 1988 Scottish Cup Final. Prior to the match, she was booed and jeered as she took her seat with the added act of thousands of fans waving red cards in her direction.[87] A week later, she was due to give a televised address to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. This address would come to popularly known as the 'Sermon on the Mound'[88] and was a 'blatant attempt to appeal to Scots via this distinctive Scottish institution,' (Mitchell, 2014: 194). The popular title is derived from the biblical Sermon on the Mount, with the 'mound' referring to the hill on which the General Assembly building of the Church of Scotland stands. The religious theme did not end there with Thatcher's speech containing concerted religious overtones, drawing on her own personal Christianity and its applications to her politics. One of the key points in Thatcher's address related to wealth creation where she stated:

[87] In addition, the traditional receiving line was moved indoors in expectation of negative crowd reactions. Several Celtic and Dundee United players and staff refused to meet or acknowledge Thatcher during this reception.

[88] A full video recording of Thatcher's speech can be found via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J21NXB6rIw0 (Last Accessed: 28/09/21); in addition, the full transcript of the address can be found via: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107246

> "But it is not the creation of wealth that is wrong but love of money for its own sake. The spiritual dimension comes in deciding what one does with the wealth. How could we respond to the many calls for help, or invest for the future, or support the wonderful artists and craftsmen whose work also glorifies God, unless we had first worked hard and used our talents to create the necessary wealth?"
>
> "What is certain, however, is that any set of social and economic arrangements which is not founded on the acceptance of individual responsibility will do nothing but harm." (Thatcher, 1988)

Thatcher had made similar comments during an interview for Woman's Own magazine[89] following the Conservatives' victory at the 1987 General Election, where she implied that money was 'the great driving engine, the driving force of life.' She would then follow this statement with the now infamous 'no such thing as society' remark, claiming that the poor and unemployed were 'casting their problems on society and who is society? There are individual men and woman and there are families, and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first,' (Thatcher, 1987). For many in the Scottish media, the themes of the Sermon were further evidence that Thatcher had 'no interest in society and that her speech to the General Assembly has simply been an endorsement of greed,' (Finlay, 2008: 164). In addition, Thatcher also appeared to be denying community, and more specifically, the very community that 'had played such a vital role in the administration of Scottish public life and its various social and philosophical expressions,' (Craig, 2018: 7). This denial of society and collective responsibility can be clearly juxtaposed to the social logic of responsibility implied by the myth of Scottish egalitarianism and more specifically the position and understanding the Kirk had in relation to these points. Thus, by applying intellectual function, we can conceive appeals to this social logic through a political

[89] A full transcript of this interview can be found via: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689

logic of independence as a means of establishing a chain of equivalence between those groups that sought to stress and protect the values of social responsibility and community instilled by the Kirk and wider Scottish civil society. In addition, through this process and intellectual function, Thatcher, Thatcherism, and the Conservative Party more generally, were presented as an existential threat to these values through a logic of difference.

A further aspect of Thatcher's speech that drew attention came when she stated that 'We Parliamentarians can legislate for the rule of law. You, the Church, can teach the life of faith,' (Thatcher, 1988). The aim of this statement was seemingly to emphasise a separation of responsibilities, which was taken to imply that 'the Kirk should not interfere in politics, but instead tend to the matters of faith and crucially, support the law,' (Childs, 2006: 99). This was interpreted as a direct attack of the independence of the Kirk and when Thatcher had concluded her speech, the Moderator of the General Assembly, Dr James Whyte, proceeded to hand over several Kirk reports, one of which was titled *Just Sharing: A Christian Approach to the Distribution of Wealth, Income and Benefits*, when read out by Whyte drew laughter and applause. These reports were 'unambiguously critical of Thatcher's government and policies in Scotland and through these acts, the Kirk became an arch-critic of the Tories,' (Mitchell, 2014: 194). Craig notes that Thatcher could never quite understand why Scots were so hostile to her ideas, since they were, in her view, derived from Adam Smith. Thatcher herself commented that it was 'the Scots themselves who invented Thatcherism and that Tory values were in tune with everything that was finest in the Scottish character,' (Craig, 2018: 6). While Thatcher had chosen to emphasise wealth creation, the Kirk's reports and response had emphasised the widespread poverty caused by her policies. These differences in outlooks are something that Thatcher should have been more sensitive to considering her methodist

upbringing and the Presbyterian roots of Scottish Conservatism and Unionism should have made her more sensitive to the independent status of the Kirk, (Finlay, 2008; Stewart, 2009).

The fact that the Kirk had 'cold shouldered the Iron Lady was taken as proof that Thatcher's policies were alien to traditional Scottish society,' (Finlay, 2008: 164). Interestingly Thatcher's Secretary of State for Scotland Malcolm Rifkind, had prior to Thatcher's visit to Scotland, given a speech to the Aberdeen Chamber of Commerce, 'recognising that the Union was a multi-national state and was about the enjoyment of a healthy pluralism which did not require uniformity or Anglicisation of Scotland,' (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 40-1). The irony in the reaction against Thatcher on the basis of egalitarian values was that for all the electoral importance of Scottish working-class alienation from the Conservative government, 'the most striking protests often came from vested interests. This could happen precisely because Scotland possessed a sort of state and ruling elites who resented the erosion of power and influence,' (Paterson, 1994: 169). For example, we can recall the uproar from Scottish business and financial sectors to the possibility of the Bank of Scotland being bought out by foreign investors and headquarters moved outwith Scotland outlined in the previous chapter. This can be explained in part by the fact that pre-Thatcher, British government policy had been 'internalised as representative of traditional Scottish egalitarian values, with various policy areas and initiatives being adopted as 'Scottish' in contradistinction to the policies that Thatcher pursued,' (Pittock, 2013: 69). Utilising intellectual function, we can argue that the strength of these connections and rejection of Thatcher and her policies could then be said to result from the threat Thatcher posed to their vested interests and autonomy which was subsequently expressed through the political logic of independence, articulated, and interpreted as a direct threat and attack on the distinctive social and fantasmatic logics associated with Scottish egalitarianism.

The Sermon on the Mound thus became a constitutive moment in Scottish nationalist thought, situated in a symbolically laden place, whose outcome has effectively summarised a major strain of Scottish sentiment regarding social democracy, political autonomy, and distaste for neo-conservatism, (Hearn, 2003). Thatcher's intervention was poorly pitched to the extent that her quotation of St. Paul's letter to the Thessalonians that *"If a man will not work, he shall not eat"*, 'missed the original context, which had been to chastise parasitic preachers living off the worst off,' (Mitchell, 2014: 194). Thatcher's endorsement of unfettered individualism was articulated as a political choice, and one that was incompatible with the values of Scottish society as contained within the myth of egalitarianism. Through intellectual function, we can assess the Kirk's act of rebuttal as an articulation and expression of the social logic of responsibility, while likewise evoking the need to defend the fantasmatic logic of egalitarianism. The political articulation and action of the Kirk, in the form of the reports and symbolic opposition by both the Kirk itself and wider civil society of these logics through a political logic of independence resulted in Thatcher, and the Conservatives being seen to be attacking the institutions and values that shaped Scottish society. Utilising intellectual function we can argue that these acts were a direct response and reaction to the context of both Scottish society and Thatcher's speech, serving to solidify a growing inclination amongst Scots that her policies and politics were alien and to be resisted, and the political logic of independence established this equivalence through support for devolution as being the only means with which to protect these distinctly Scottish values and societal institutions.

This is not to say that the basis of Scottish identity was now formed and guided by a firmly Calvinist ethos, rather, Thatcher's intervention allowed for a renewed expression of Scottish difference and distinctiveness. The increasing secularisation of Scottish society from the 1960s onwards weakened the strength of the Kirk as 'an institutional foundation of Scottish

difference supported within the Union; thus, making it possible for this continuing sense of difference to find an alternative political expression,' (Craig, 2018: 279). For example, it is a testament to the strength and potency of the political articulation of the egalitarian myth, that less than a year following the sermon, The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly drafted Claim of Right (1988) was signed in the very same location as Thatcher's speech, by 58 of Scotland's 72 MPs, 7 of 8 MEPs, and 59 out of 65 Scottish regional, district and island councils, and several political parties, churches and trade unions. Thatcher's provocations and the Kirk's very public rebuttal then can be considered examples of contextualised agency with regards to the political articulation of both the fantasmatic logic of egalitarianism as well as the social logic of social responsibility as key values and markers of Scottish identity as first and foremost anti-Thatcherite and secondly, anti-Tory more generally. In so doing this 'brought into focus a more compelling rationale for a Scottish parliament – namely the protection of Scottish society from the excesses of a government that lacked popular support,' (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 38). While the ideals of egalitarianism had existed in the minds of Scots for some time, the political articulation, of the social and fantasmatic elements of these ideals produced a specific myth of egalitarianism in Scottish nationalist imaginary. This enshrined a sense of Scottish difference built upon an inherent set of egalitarian values and behaviours that differentiated Scots from the 'external' other which 'if Scottishness was defined in contradistinction to some 'other', that other came to be personified by Mrs Thatcher and Westminster more generally,' (Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014: 90). Through an application of intellectual function, the articulation of these logics through the political logic of independence, facilitated the incorporation of the egalitarian myth and its associated social and fantasmatic elements, by binding together of groups who sought to defend these values through devolution.

5.4 The Myth of Radical Scotland – Scotland's Potential to be Radical

Gerry Hassan has argued that one of the defining features of Scotland in the 20th century was the apparent appeal of socialism and social democracy, 'a Scotland that emphasised socialist and left-wing credentials as well as the capacity and potential for a radical political future,' (Hassan, 2014a: 101).[90] Keating & Bleiman argue that tradition of Scottish democracy is contained in a set of beliefs that Scottish society is inherently democratic and egalitarian in nature, 'which owed its development to the organisation of the Presbyterian Kirk and Scottish education system,' (Keating & Bleiman, 1979: 28). The growth of an egalitarian ethos has been covered in-depth above, but the development of a '*radical*' democratic tradition in Scotland 'owed much to the Kirk, which had introduced elected ministers and more democratic assemblies, and while this had been more theocratic than democratic, the impact on Scottish society of this democratic assertion was considerable,' (Keating & Bleiman, 1979: 29). Cohen argues that Presbyterian structures were built on representative elections from the grassroots and underlying these 'putative democratic structures of Scottish society was an expression across Scottish literature, lore, religion and law, that anyone could be held to account,' (Cohen, 1996: 808). Maxwell makes a similar assessment in that Presbyterian policy, however amended and qualified, 'never lost contact with the principles of popular election and participation, providing a practical education in democratic politics as well as a potent constitutional model,' (Maxwell, 2013: 25). Moreover, the Presbyterian emphasis on civic duty, communal values and social responsibilities would translate and live on in secular form, influencing the trade union movement, which reflected a strain of dour and puritanical

[90] Traditions and heritage of radical traditions are drawn as far back as the Covenanters in the 1600s; The Radical Insurrection of 1820 to Red Clydeside. This section will focus more on more 'recent' beginnings and its connection to the egalitarian myth, but it is worth noting that more attention is being paid to events such as 1820 in more recent scholarship.

egalitarianism, giving the movement an alternative set of traditions and perspectives than its English counterpart, (Hearn, 2000; McCrone, 2001).

The consequence of Calvinism's permeation in the Scottish Trade Union movement is evident in its subsequent development through to the period that has come to be known as *'Red Clydeside*.' The term Red Clydeside has become the shorthand for a period in Scottish history that saw the emergence and relative success of radical leftist political movements in areas along the River Clyde from Glasgow down the water as far as Greenock.[91] This period saw the rise of figures such as James Maxton, John MacLean, and Mary Barbour to name a few. Maxton and MacLean were both prominent anti-war campaigners, with both organising and participating in strikes as part of the Clyde Worker's Committee.[92] Mary Barbour was one of several prominent members of the Glasgow Woman's Housing Association which organised the Glasgow Rent Strike in 1915 and she would go to be elected to Glasgow Town Council. Red Clydeside is perhaps best remembered through the Battle of George Square in 1919, where following protests and actions for a 40-hour week, a massive rally took place in George Square in Glasgow where a red flag was raised. The demonstration resulted in a riot and deployment of British Army troops in fear of a Bolshevik style revolution.[93] Maggie Craig argues that Red Clydeside can be viewed as a period of class and economic struggle, though

[91] On a personal note, my own home, the Vale of Leven, with Alexandria at its centre, was one of the first district council areas in Britain to elect Communist/Radical Socialist councillors, who would eventually become a majority on the council for a short period in the late 1920s and early 1930s. During this time, the Vale and many other areas across Scotland were often referred to as Little Moscow and two streets in Alexandria; Hardie Street (named for Keir Hardie) and Engels Street (named for Friedrich Engels) remain as a reminder of the area's more radical political history.

[92] Maxton would go on to serve as an MP from 1922 to his death in 1946. He was involved in the first Labour govt. under fellow Scot Ramsay McDonald before splitting to found the Independent Labour Party. MacLean is best remembered in his role as a teacher running evening classes for workers and for his *Speech from the Dock* where he defended himself from charges of sedition. The speech itself has become mythologised in the broader Scottish leftist and national movements.

[93] See the following article in the Tribune from Maggie Craig, which is itself an excerpt from her 2018 book referenced here, for an excellent overview of this event.
https://www.tribunemag.co.uk/2019/01/the-battle-of-george-square

there is an irony that Clydeside's innate radical bent has roots in Glasgow's long history as a city of merchants and traders. Entrepreneurs had to be forward-looking, always seeking opportunities and willing to embrace change,' (Craig, M., 2018: 73).

Despite the power and influence of the images of Red Clydeside and the heritage of Calvinist theology, Hassan argues that the less proscribed and more radical ideals of equality from the left and socialists were not realised. While Scots have traditionally shown disdain towards the flaunting of wealth, this did not translate into a political programme or will to redistribute wealth and power,' (Hassan, 2014a: 33). In this sense, 'social democracy is paradoxically everywhere in Scottish politics, and yet it is hard to pin down – left deliberately undefined by those who claim to adhere to its principles and practices,' (Hassan & Barrow, 2019: 318). For Mitchell the self-perception of a radical leftist polity in nationalist circles is a function of oppositional political culture, where Scotland is often defined in terms of what it opposes rather than what it aspires to in the form of serious and concrete policy prescriptions or programmes, (Mitchell, 2014: 281). For example, and taking the discussion of Thatcher above into account, Thatcherism highlighted a political tension that had always existed but had been concealed by the rhetoric of consensual administration. Therefore, it allowed those she excluded from places of influence to 'protest against politicisation, while at the same time, the excluded were asserting an opposing political view, namely that of social democracy and corporatism,' (Paterson, 1994: 169). Much like how egalitarianism became synonymous with Scottishness, to stand in opposition to Thatcherism was to be radical in the application and defence of social democracy and democratic principles. In this way, the myth of Scottish radicalism has often been expressed in several forms, broadly typified as 'including a greater support for state intervention, a more corporate style of governance and the rejection of more individualistic attitudes,' (Allmendinger, 2001: 43).

Stephen Maxwell argued that the most dominant left-wing myth is of a Scotland that lives 'precariously on the verge of political and social reaction, drawing heavily from Calvinism and supported by strains of Marxist theory which saw bourgeois nationalism as necessarily reactionary,' (Maxwell, 2013: 16). The conclusion drawn from this were that 'the only force which contains the Scot's Calvinist genius for social reaction is England's benign and progressive influence, with the main obstacle to political reaction in Scotland being the united British Labour movement,' (Maxwell, 2013: 16). Thus, the Scottish working-class was thought to possess an instinct for 'radical, if not revolutionary socialism that was lacking in its Sassenach[94] counterpart,' (Maxwell, 2013: 17). In line with this view is what Hassan refers to as the limited styles, means and iconography of leftist politics: protests, demonstrations, marches through streets, shouting of slogans and signing petitions, all rituals that take on a quasi-religious outlook, (Hassan, 2014a: 110). For Hassan, this reflects a repetition of mantra over strategy and understanding, with the consequence being a mindset that feels secure in its outlooks and values and takes comfort in terms of how allies and opponents are defined by what the left is in opposition to. Thus, Scottish radical/leftist politics is often understood through 'negative characteristics, but this does not make explicit what the positive case would be, which is deliberate since implicit in such stances is to pose as the unstated undefined alternative that can be collectively envisaged and agreed upon,' (Hassan, 2014a: 111-12). Despite the more radical views Scots may hold of themselves, their role seems not to act as a call to radical action, but to console in light of the 'bleakness of its own vision of Calvinist Scotland; and as the prospect and perspective of change widens for Scotland, the Scottish left perversely hugs closer to itself its bittersweet images of defeat,' (Maxwell, 2013: 17). We can therefore summarise the myth of Radical Scotland as one that concerns Scotland's inherent instinct for radical vision and action as well as the means through which it pursues these.

[94] Scots word for an English person or English more generally.

This conception of a radical polity with an instinct and appetite for radical action speaks to several elements that have been discussed above, not least strong resonances with the myth of egalitarianism. However, the outline provided above calls our attention to a set of logics unique to the radical myth. The first we can call the social logic of *challenge*, which implies that, to be radical is to challenge the status quo, to be willing to favour and engage in action that calls this into question; to be part of a challenge. For example, by utilising intellectual function, we can conceptualise an attempt to articulate the myth of egalitarianism with the social logic of challenge. To challenge Thatcherism was not simply a means of holding power to account, it was an action that sought to protect elements of Scottish distinctiveness in terms of its Calvinist roots and emphasis on community, and thus was considered a radical act. This leads us to consider a fantasmatic logic of *radicalism*, which does not refer to actual radical and/or progressive policy and action, but the potential that such radicalism brings. The fantasmatic narrative here posits that once released from the confines of Westminster, Scotland will be free and more importantly able to pursue and fulfil its radical tendencies without restriction. This employs a beatific vision, one that stresses if only Scotland could overcome its obstacles, it would be better placed to pursue and fulfil its potential. As noted above, the radical myth resonates and bears some similarity with the egalitarian myth discussed in the previous section, which is not surprising given the political climate and developments discussed in the previous chapter that saw various groups come together in opposition to the economic and political developments of Thatcher's Britain, (Hearn, 2000: 152). While there is undoubtedly connections and similarities, especially when considering their origins and development; the key distinction being made here is that the egalitarian myth speaks to the necessary and desired values that are and should be held by Scots. The myth of radical Scotland is focused on the necessary and desired practice of these values. To hold egalitarian values requires radical action, and to be radical necessitates an egalitarian ethos. In

this sense the myths of Radical Scotland and Egalitarian Scotland represent two mutually dependent and supporting myths that further solidify and re-articulate narratives of the Scottish nation. By applying intellectual function, we can conceptualise these precise articulations and expressions of these myths and their respective logics, as contextually specific practices of articulating the nation in response to the perceived threats of Thatcherism and through the political logic of independence, guided these towards the solution of devolution.

'There shall be a Scottish Parliament!'

In 1995, the SCC published its recommendations for what Scottish Devolution should look like in the report, *Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right.* In sum this document wove a narrative of *new politics*, in which devolution was strongly associated with the ideas and notions of democratic renewal and the ability to develop and pursue more appropriate *Scotland specific* policies, (Mitchell, 2000; St. Denny, 2019).[95] For many, this new model of democratic governance 'would *release* the Scotland's instinct for social justice and *stimulate* their capacity for social *innovation*,' (Maxwell, 2007: 217).[96] These sentiments are clearly outlined in the following passage from the SCC's report which claimed that:

> "We have emerged with the powerful hope that the coming of a Scottish parliament will usher in a way of politics that is radically different from the rituals of Westminster: more participative, more creative, less confrontational. Part and parcel of that, we would expect, is a culture of openness which will enable the people of Scotland to see how decisions are being taken in their name and why. The parliament we propose is much more than a mere institutional adjustment. It is a means, not an end." (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995)

[95] Emphasis added.
[96] Emphasis added.

An implicit assumption that followed from these sentiments amongst proponents of devolution was:

> "that these new institutions would create novel procedures which would break Scotland free of old-style, elitist and confrontational styles of politics, which would either release an underlying consensus that had been frustrated by Westminster or would allow for the creation of a new consensual culture. Either way, the relationship between political institutions, procedures and political culture was assumed to be positive and direct." (Mitchell, 2000: 605).

The claim of a link between devolved Scottish democracy based on an open and participative model, and the means to greater achievements in social justice and cohesion 'were the strongest vision of a social democratic devolution that strongly appealed to the myth of Scottish radicalism,' (Maxwell, 2007: 218). In terms of the social logic of challenge, we can clearly point to the belief that the new institutions of devolution would challenge the 'old-style' of Westminster politics. In addition, it evokes a particular fantasmatic narrative of radicalism in the sense that devolution would unleash a new consensual socio-political culture and all the potentials that came with it. The promise of this new politics was concerned with difference as opposed to newness which would address and resolve the Scottish democratic deficit across several dimensions. Politically, it would better represent Scottish interests; institutionally, it would provide a new terrain on which these interests could be expressed; providing 'the capacity and authority to carefully consider Scottish issues in a dedicated democratic forum, which would presumably lead to the development of more suitable policy programmes with which to address specific Scottish needs,' (St. Denny, 2019: 75). Utilising intellectual function we can observe how, through the political logic of independence, the social logic of challenge and fantasmatic logic of radicalism were articulated together through pre-devolutionary rhetoric and sentiments, producing a conception that to be in favour of

devolution was to be radical, to challenge the status quo of the constitutional arrangement while at the same time evoking a fantasmatic narrative of potential and capacity for radical action that Scottish identity espoused and required.

Several of these themes would be reiterated after devolution had been won in the 1997 referendum and in the build-up to the re-establishment of Scotland's new parliament in 1999. In a 1998 press-release, soon-to-be First Minister Donald Dewar stated that:

> "We have a proud tradition in Scotland of working to tackle social division. We have developed innovative responses to social problems, many of which are now being promoted within the UK as models of good practice. We have a body of people […] who are committed to creating a fairer society in Scotland. And in the not-too-distant future we will have a Scottish Parliament which will give us the opportunity to develop Scottish solutions to Scottish needs, and to bring the arm of government closer to the people. Devolution matters. It will let us take the decisions that matter here in Scotland. It is an end in itself; but it is a means to other ends, and none more important than the creation of a socially cohesive Scotland." (Donald Dewar quoted in Maxwell, 2007: 217-218)

The claim of a proud tradition in tackling social division is a clear appeal to the social logic of challenge, to question why social divisions have existed and to move to rectify these. Likewise, we can consider the sentiment that the Scottish Parliament would provide the institutional space to develop Scottish solutions to Scottish issues as an invocation of the fantasmatic narrative of radicalism, where all that was required was a parliament and the radical potential of Scots would be realised. It should be noted here how this specific articulation of the respective logics resonates with the myth of egalitarianism. In stressing the fights against social division and the greater end of devolution achieving social cohesion could be considered a recognition of the social logic of social responsibility. Thus, inherent in

the assumptions of devolution, was that radical action entailed social responsibility in the sense that it challenged the status quo of social conditions and seeking and fighting for devolution was a radical challenge to social injustice. In addition, the calls for practices of new politics and its promises were subsequently articulated in support of devolution, which itself espoused the radical fantasmatic narrative that this new devolutionary Scotland was to be the land of the 'Presbyterian common weal, whose rhetoric and legacy of millenarian emancipation pervaded Scottish society. It was the place where the democratic intellect would create an educated populace with the capacity to challenge elites and if necessary, seize popular control,' (Paterson, 2015: 30).

These radical social and fantasmatic elements provided the basis of Dewar's opening address during the official opening of the Scottish Parliament on 1st July 1999[97] which has been referred to as 'an exceptional speech, suffused with a potent cultural nationalism and a keen sense of the disparate elements which had helped forge Scottish identity,' (Kidd & Petrie, 2016: 45). Prior to Dewar's speech, singer Sheena Wellington sang Burn's 'A man's a man for A' that,' which 'was not done to be taken as a statement of fact, that social inequalities did not matter, it was an expression of aspiration, of belief, of what it meant to be Scottish,' (McCrone, 2017: 222). This theme would be continued in Dewar's opening words:

> "This [mace] is a symbol of the great democratic traditions from which we draw our inspiration and our strength. At its head are inscribed the opening words of our founding statute. 'There shall be a Scottish Parliament.' Through long years, those were words first of a hope, then a belief, then a promise. Now they are a reality." (Dewar, 1999)

[97] A video of the full BBC coverage of the Official Opening of the Scottish Parliament on 1st July 1999 can be found via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thbplCQG04A
In addition, a full transcript of Dewar's speech is available via: https://www.ukpol.co.uk/donald-dewar-1999-speech-at-opening-of-the-scottish-parliament/

The strategy of devolution itself could be interpreted as a 'wise inclusionary strategy that was considered an antidote for separatism and resentment, with the underlying assumption that a separate independent political will existed in Scotland,' (Peleg, 2007: 125-6). While it may seem odd to claim that the advent of devolution was a dislocation or moment of crisis, consider the fact that devolution was a radical break from the constitutional order, and the moment in which the possibility of new politics became very real. The dislocation of devolution opened the social and political space significantly, particularly in terms of what was now possible and acceptable in Scottish politics. In this sense devolution saw the emergence of new terrains and points of intervention on which any kind of new politics could be built. From here we can apply intellectual function to conceptualise how the political logic of independence drew from the myth of Scottish pessimism in response to these emerging possibilities within nationalist discourses. There was a fear that nostalgia and retreat to the local was endemic to Scottish culture, something that haunted the architects of devolution. For example, Dewar had 'cautioned that a devolved structure for Scottish radio and television might lead to the production of Kailyard broadcasting,' (Craig, 2018: 160). However, the radical promise and potential of devolution as laid out in Dewar's speech can be interpreted as a foil to this fear. Through pursuing devolution, Scotland was taking a stand and moving away from this dour, insular, and backward-looking trait of Scottish culture. Despite this re-emergent pessimism present in the radical myth, Maxwell argued that 'perhaps the political and social legacy of Presbyterianism, made more mellow and humane by further secularisation, would prove to be one of the most valuable assets Scottish radicalism could carry into independence,' (Maxwell, 2013: 26). In other words, the radical promise of devolution was articulated as a means of overcoming both the internal 'other' of the myth of Scottish cultural pessimism, while at the same time, it sought to move away from the

Westminster-style politics that proved such a threat to the egalitarian values on which radical actions were built and aimed towards.

Dewar would further reiterate the theme of promise and potential with a simple statement during his speech:

> "A Scottish Parliament. Not an end: A means to greater ends. And those too, are part of our mace. Woven into its symbolic thistles are four words: Wisdom. Justice. Compassion. Integrity." (Dewar, 1999)

What the debates that came out of the SCC and Dewar's speech indicate, are an assertion that a distinctive Scottish political will was deeply concerned with the ideals of social justice and responsibility as enshrined in the myth of egalitarianism and so support for devolution was a radical step against, and departure from old style politics. A part of that belief contained within the 're-convening' of the Scottish Parliament, was that now, with all barriers and restrictions removed, the radical nature and characteristics of Scots could not be held back. Nothing now could stop the onwards march to fulfilling the radical potential of Scottish politics. Maxwell had previously warned against such sentiment in Scottish nationalism, arguing that while the myth of Scottish radicalism had proven valuable to attacking a failed status quo, it also served to 'justify an uncritical acceptance of nationalism's claim to be a de-centralising, anti-bureaucratic force, in so doing, condoning the facile assumption that independence will automatically release a flood of reforming energy to wash away Scotland's social and political ills,' (Maxwell, 2013: 18). The frustrations of the early devolution period discussed in the previous chapter illustrate this to a certain extent, however, the suggestion was that the (re)establishment of the Scottish parliament was seen to articulate the possibility that the Scots' Calvinist genius was now unshackled and all that was required for Scotland to

realise its 'radical' potential was to follow these impulses. Through intellectual function, we can consider the political articulation of devolution as the means to greater ends, reinforced and solidified both the ideals and practice of radicalism through novel institutional spaces. Utilising intellectual function then reveals how the campaigns for devolution articulated 'radical' Scotland against Tory England; with the left-wing radicalism and support for devolution articulated and associated with more 'radical ideas about the constitution and asserting a putative Scottish tradition of popular sovereignty against the centralising power of Westminster,' (Paterson, 2015: 28). With devolution, these ideas and principles of radical practice and action became sedimented into the wider nationalist tradition in the name of popular sovereignty, protecting Scottish distinctiveness and combatting the conflicted and pessimistic nature of Scottish politics.

5.5 The Myth of Civic Scotland – 'A better politics'

As discussed in Chapter 1, the autonomy and influence of Scottish civil society have long been used to explain how a unique sense of Scottish identity survived and thrived post-Union and that a lack of devolution in formal terms reflected the *de facto* autonomy of Scottish civil institutions. They were subtle and complex; schools, universities, media, churches, and daily practices that developed slowly and informally. In this sense, 'nationalists of all hues were successful in creating a world of dense Scottishness that nurtured a feeling allegiance in those brought up, or who had lived in Scotland for an appreciable length of time,' (Paterson, 1994: 181). Crucially, this 'self-management' implied a class which administered and regulated rather than ruled the sense of political governance or direction,' (Nairn, 1997: 205). During the 1980s this civil society would start to be referred to as Civic Scotland, a term that became synonymous with civil society, despite their different meanings. 'Civic Scotland was the voice of civil society, one that amplified specific perspectives, most prominently the pro-

devolution campaigns of the late 1980s and into the 1990s,' (Hassan, 2018: 37). In addition, the myth of Civic Scotland cannot be used without being defined and understood in terms of 'whom they are speaking for or claiming to speak for; and those without a voice. The assumption of the rhetoric behind Civic Scotland being that Scotland and its society is a place of the self-evident good, educated, enlightened, and that active and visible citizens speak for the greater good of wider society,' (Hassan, 2014b: 62).

Hassan argues that the emergence of the idea of Civic Scotland was the result of two trends. Firstly, was the decline of socialist and radical traditions discussed above, opening the political space which others sought to fill. Secondly, Thatcher's attack on the post-war consensus and the institutions and groups responsible for its running, gave these groups a vehicle with which to voice their opposition and describe their social ideology, drawing others into alliance against Thatcher, (Hassan, 2014a: 96). As a result, Civic Scotland was characterised by a specific sub-set of wider civil society, professional, respectable opinion stressing anti-Thatcherite credentials. It saw Thatcherism's attack on the managed and negotiated order of domestic life in Scotland as an attack on its own interests; but at the same time, 'this stratum of society did not directly align with Labour or more radically leftist currents and so sought refuge in the idea of Civic Scotland,' (Hassan, 2018: 38). The SCC was referred to as the expression of civil society or Civic Scotland during the Thatcher period, whereby the managers and administrators of Scottish society sought a means to air their grievances, as well as express a preference for corporatism and emphasise that Scottish society had a more social democratic ethos, (Finlay 2004; Hassan, 2014b). Finlay argues that a key element in the demand for devolution was the fact that the SCC was cross-party and included figures and organisations from wider society. Crudely put, 'the SCC argued that Scots rejected Thatcherism because of a strong civic identity, which in turn required a

parliament to best represent the interest of the Scottish people and society,' (Finlay, 2008: 164). For Hassan, it should have been impossible for this conception of Civic Scotland to speak for wider civil society; 'but the fact that it did is an indication of just how divisive Thatcherism was, and how centre-left politics became intertwined with the campaign for devolution,' (Hassan, 2014b: 62).

The Civic Scotland that emerged in the 1980s/90s 'was key to the growing belief that Scotland was different, that its politics were inherently more progressive and to the centre-left than the rest of the UK, and from this sprang the desire for a 'new politics,' (Hassan, 2014a: 96). This aspiration entailed constructing an ideology of Civic Scotland, one that is nearly always unstated; inclusive, social democratic and civic nationalist. Importantly however, 'for the society of the managed and negotiated order, this constructed ideology promoted institutional identities and self-interest – a closed set of conversations which self-presented themselves as being open and welcoming,' (Hassan, 2014b: 62). In this sense, Civic Scotland was not a conservation society, but a self-preservation society of elites and insiders, of adaptors and survivors who swayed with Labour both pre- and post-devolution and would go on to do the same with the SNP post-2007. (Hassan, 2012a) According to O'Hagan, 'civic memory keeps alive our politics, for it feeds it with dreams from the past and bending for home,' (O'Hagan, 2011). Hassan utilises this concept to reflect on how the struggle of the devolution movement burnt a civic memory into parts of Scotland, and this 'civic memory is contained within how Scotland is performed and played out, its assumptions, parameters and how it is discussed and portrayed in public discourse and media,' (Hassan, 2014b: 62-3) The idea of Civic Scotland as civic memory bears some resemblance to what might otherwise be called the public sphere, which can be considered a conceptual resource with which to overcome political and social problems. 'It designates a theatre in modern societies in which

political participation is enacted through the medium of talk, a space in which citizens deliberate common affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena of discursive interaction,' (Fraser, 1992: 110). In this way, the myth of Civic Scotland is one that has been employed to present Scottish society 'through the language of inclusiveness and participation, while at the same time operating institutionally as a set of gatekeepers and markers of what can be said and by whom in certain settings,' (Hassan, 2014b: 141).

This presentation of Civic Scotland has had a profound influence on socio-political environment, practices, and cultures of space in contemporary Scotland. Hassan uses the term 'unspace' to define and refer to spaces whose characteristics and culture have an institutional ethos; risk-averse and status-orientated, erecting significant barriers to certain groups and peoples. It promotes a narrow bandwidth of acceptable discussion, as well as perceived authority, with pressure to only operate within the parameters of institutional mandates.' (Hassan, 2014b: 65-6) The opposite, which Hassan describes as 'fuzzy' or 'messy' unofficial space is 'shaped by diversity, diversity in terms of attendance and participation with few barriers to access; the conversation is open and challenging, a space where unfinished or still developing thoughts are encouraged; the overall 'feel' of such a space is completely different in that it is more relaxed and tolerant, allowing for fun, play, humour and irreverence.' (Hassan, 2014b: 66) As with the other myths discussed above, there is an apparent duality and contradiction in these imaginings of Civic Scotland, which is not necessarily fatal or hypocritical. On the one hand:

> "in its attempt to speak for sections of society far beyond its reach, what the myth of Civic Scotland has disguised is that its account of Scottish politics and society is a largely generational one – one of a partly professionalised, privileged opinion that had

> been socialised in pre-Thatcherite norms and sought to maintain them through the upheavals of Thatcher and devolution." (Hassan, 2018: 38)

On the other, there is a version of Civic Scotland that invokes and emphasises the language of participative democracy and the ideals of popular sovereignty. One that is open and characterised by moves away from traditional forms of power and authority, self-organising and self-generating, reflected by both a generational and gender shift which has been aided by social media, (Hassan, 2013; 2014b; 2014c).

These differing representations present some discernible social and fantasmatic logics at the heart of the myth of Civic Scotland. We can call the social logic one of *active participation*, where no one, regardless of creed, race or competence should be restricted from sharing their views and ideas. Neither should they be reprimanded for sharing incomplete or partial ideas, these should be actively encouraged when it comes to participation in the political process. This logic resonates with the social logic of *social responsibility* related to the myth of egalitarianism, though the key difference here is direct participation in a political setting, whereas the social logic of opportunity speaks more to access to social institutions and services. Taken together these social logics reinforce and revitalise the other. On the other hand, the fantasmatic logic is one of *democratic praxis.* This logic does not speak to democracy or democratic practices per se, but its specific attempts to translate good democratic theory and ethos into good practice. This fantasmatic element then speaks to a 'Scottish' way of democratic conducting politics, one which is inherently a better practice that differentiates both Scotland and its practice of democracy from other variants. It is beatific in the sense that it is something to be aspired to and protected at all costs, even if the reality of the situation does not reflect this ambition. More generally, the myth revolves around both the space and range of acceptable debate, and the practices that encompass Scottish political life.

If the Civic Scotland of pre-devolution era was one that provided a 'physical' space for dissidents of Thatcherism to mobilise, then the Civic Scotland of post-devolution was one that spoke to the structures of that space in terms of what was desirable and amenable to those already operating within it. The apparent contradictory nature of these logics does not prevent their interaction or reinforcement, rather, this is evidence of the myth's as well as the logics' multi-accentual nature which allows for an acceptance and utilisation of the others discourses and characteristics to reinforce their respective narratives. In the case of Scottish nationalism centred on the goal of independence, advocates of the unspace or fuzzy space iterations of Civic Scotland can utilise the ideals and conceptions of the other in a state of co-existence while staving off tensions that may arise from contradictions and hypocrisy. In this way, the institutions and practices of Civic Scotland can be understood and seen as the natural everyday practice of parts of Scottish civil society, but what can be 'considered contentious is the ideal and more 'mythical' element which is used to present a partial view of Scotland and of a certain section of society in a manner that disguises self-interest, power and influence,' (Hassan, 2014b: 141).

'The National Conversation'

The establishment of the Scottish Parliament had many significant effects on Scottish public life, not least that the realities of devolution introduced a new political environment: 'injecting Scottish public life with new levels and degrees of accountability and scrutiny alongside a more pluralist politics not previously possible,' (Hassan & Barrow, 2019: 13). With regards to the political logic of independence, the rise of the SNP to position of government in 2007 allowed for the re-articulation of the notions of popular sovereignty contained within the logic of independence from enshrinement and protection of Scottish difference and distinctions within the UK to a more 'recognisable' nationalist agenda of full sovereignty. The structural

realities of devolution facilitated the development of the necessary institutional and social spaces in which this could occur, for example, on entering government, the SNP now had access to institutional mechanisms and exposure through more consistent media coverage that amplified their reach. Thus, from this position they were able to rearticulate the political logic of independence as well as the respective myths discussed above towards the goal of Scottish independence. We can conceptualise this through one of the SNP's key 2007 manifesto pledges, which was to produce a White Paper on constitutional change as a precursor to pursuing a referendum on Scottish independence, (Harvey & Lynch, 2012). The SNP published *Choosing Scotland's Future* (2007), launching a public consultation that would be referred to as the *'National Conversation'*. This consultation represented an 'opportunity for the SNP to engage the public through the apparatus of government on the issue of independence, something that the SNP had never been able or had access to initiate prior,' (Harvey, 2013: 9). The National Conversation afforded the SNP the opportunity to (re)set the political agenda, which was key in their overarching strategy of normalising the constitutional debate. In addition, it provided 'a platform with which to explain their vision of independence, and perhaps even more importantly, engaged the Civil Service in the debate,' (Harvey, 2013: 10). Through an application of intellectual function, we can argue that through conducting the national conversation, the SNP were able to alter the accent of popular sovereignty, allowing for the re-articulation of the political logic of independence as one constituting full sovereignty as opposed to recognition and maintenance of Scottish identity within the UK. In addition, the shift opened the discursive space and possibility of incorporating the previous discussed myths alongside the myth of Civic Scotland, consolidating these as privileged elements in nationalist discourse.

The opening sections of the White Paper set out the remit of the consultation, arguing that it revolved around three options in the constitutional debate; 1) Devolution with minor developments (*status quo*); 2) redesigning and extending the powers of the Scottish Parliament short of full independence; 3) full independence, (Scottish Government, 2007: vii-viii). The consultation process was pursued over three phases. Phase one was limited to an interactive website, with blog posts and articles written by ministers and secretaries of the Scottish Government, with some public speeches from Salmond to keep the consultation in the public eye. The Second phase was marked by more public forums such as Q&A sessions with ministers and meetings with various Scottish institutions alongside the publication of a series of reports and documents by the Scottish Government. The final phase of the consultation began in 2009 and revolved around the publication of a second White Paper, *Your Scotland, Your Voice*, which was intended to include a campaign for and eventual referendum on independence. However, due to parliamentary arithmetic and lack of support, this phase became dedicated to the idea and possibility of holding a referendum in the first place rather than campaigning during one.[98] The consultation process itself had not been planned in any detail, 'with the intention being to allow it to remain fluid and reactive to political circumstances and developments, with it only becoming more focused in its later phases,' (Harvey & Lynch, 2012: 95). The Scottish Government went to great lengths to demonstrate that the conversation would not be 'a one-way street, and that all views, even those to which the SNP were opposed, would be welcomed, and encouraged during the consultation process,' (Harvey, 2011: 3-4).

[98] See Harvey & Lynch (2012) pp. 94-100 for a more detailed description and outline of the National Conversation and consultation process.

The National Conversation launched on the 14th August 2007 with the publication of the White Paper followed by a speech by First Minister Alex Salmond in which he made the following statement:

> "I ask every Scot to pause and reflect, not just on what kind of country we are, but on the kind of country we could be, the kind of country we should be. I am committed to a new chapter in Scottish politics, one in which the story and the script is written by the people and not just by the politicians." (Alex Salmond quoted in Crawford, 2010 p. 89)

Public engagement was essential, not simply as a means of promoting the goal of independence, but as a means of 'placing and maintaining the constitutional issue on the public and political agenda, thus engaging political classes as well as the public in the discussions surrounding independence,' (Harvey, 2013: 10). The process of widening the constitutional debate to civil society was organised and facilitated by the Scottish Government through their engagements with a variety of pressure groups, charities, voluntary organisations, and religious groups. Aside from Scottish Government events, groups such as The Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO), the Council for Ethnic Minority Voluntary Organisations (CEMVO) and Young Scot, 'organised and promoted their own events that were linked to the National Conversation and included town-hall style Q&A events and roundtables,' (Harvey & Lynch, 2012: 107). Through the National Conversation, the Scottish Government made it plain that it 'wished to include as many people as possible in their national conversation, thereby ensuring that the discursive construction of the nation was the most inclusive iteration possible,' (Leith, 2011: 292). There is a clear invocation in both Salmond's speech and the attempted facilitation of the groups above of the social logic of active participation. In addition, there is a clear appeal to the fantasmatic element in the sense that this participation and style is both a good and desirable form of democratic politics.

Through intellectual function, by employing the political logic of independence, connections could be established between the myths of radical and egalitarian Scotland, thus altering these respective myths focus. With the political logic of independence now stressing full sovereignty, appeals to these logics were not explicitly about their protection, rather appeals were made in the sense that the social and fantasmatic logics of Civic Scotland is what allows Scotland's the radical and egalitarian tendencies to flourish. Active participation is a social responsibility in the sense the people of Scotland have a right and duty to 'write the script' of their future. In addition, the fulfilment of this participation spoke to the radical potential of Scottish politics and society.

The National Conversation resulted in a second White Paper published in 2009 titled, *Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation*. This document applauded the events, processes, and engagements with the National Conversation as 'a unique program of engagement with the Scottish public which has involved civic organisations, young Scots, black and minority ethnic communities and individuals from all parts of the country,' (Scottish Government, 2009: 5). There is a clear appeal here to the fantasmatic logic of democratic praxis, that the National Conversation was an example of the good working of Scottish democracy and that it upheld traditional and desirable Scottish values and practices. The report goes on to state that:

> "democracy in Scotland is underpinned by key principles such as power sharing and participation which marks out distinction of Scottish governance from the rest of the UK. The Scottish Government provides genuine access for the people which makes the Parliament responsive and maintains accountability." (Scottish Government, 2009: 125)

We can observe some clear appeals to the social logic of active participation, whereby privileging ideals such as genuine and open access to political processes, nationalist discourse was able to incorporate this practice as a key and desirable feature of Scottish politics. For example, prior to devolution and in the keeping with the rhetoric of the SCC,

> "much had been made of the role of civic society and the need for a more open political system, supporting the idea of a civic forum, which would facilitate and recognise the plurality of voices, taking an active role in ensuring effective involvement of groups traditionally excluded from the decision-making process alongside other recommendations for other institutions and processes for encouraging greater citizen participation." (Mitchell, 2000: 611)

In this sense, the process of the National Conversation produced a legacy of 'public engagement, leading to a multi-lateral debate with civic society in a variety of spaces and mediums, a public actively engaged and interested in discussing and pursuing their preferred ends,' (Harvey, 2013: 15-16). This resembles Gramsci's conception of associational spaces discussed in chapter 2, in which individual consciouses come to interact, promoting awareness of the relationships, dynamics and dimensions of public life and conversation, and as Hassan argues, 'this relationality has had significant consequences for public life, politics and democratic practices and culture in Scotland,' (Hassan, 2014b). The fact that the SNP were keen to promote and praise this legacy is evidence of an appeal to the fantasmatic element of praxis, where the type engagements seen where held as the pinnacle of democracy in Scotland.

The appeals to and desire to involve the wider public, whether by design or circumstance, can also be considered to have been to have fed off and utilised the radical imaginary discussed above. Specifically, the idea that this practice of politics while a desirable feature of Scottish

politics was also a radical departure and opportunity. Pre-devolution, there was a belief that 'good society was a given and all that was required was for it to be provided a platform. Put another way, it was the belief in the power of good and of good people being able to do good,' (Hassan, 2014b: 61). The discourse surrounding the National Conversation spoke the language of an open, inclusive Civic Scotland, continuing the ideals that had been prevalent in organisations such as the SCC during the campaigns for devolution. The National Conversation was the platform that would allow for the realisation of Scots radical tendencies, and through the political logic of independence, this was only guaranteed through full sovereignty for the Scottish nation. It is important to note here that despite the emphasis of on public engagement and participation, 'the SNP followed a largely conservative and orthodox consultation process, much of which was delivered in-house within the Scottish Government and was not really driven by concerns for deliberative democracy or popular participation,' (Harvey & Lynch, 2012: 93). For example, pressure group engagement was limited and very localised, lacking involvement from large organisations such as Confederation of British Industry (Scotland); Institute of Directors; several local authorities and political parties (most prominently Labour, Lib Dems, and Tories); Scottish Trade Union Congress and Universities Scotland etc, who had all involved to some degree with the parallel Calman Commission, (Harvey & Lynch, 2012). As Hassan argues, while it was always impossible for Civic Scotland to speak for wider society, it is 'an indication of how divisive Thatcher was and how centre-left politics came to be connected to the cause of devolution that this idea took hold,' (Hassan, 2014b: 62). Therefore, the appeals to and evocation of the fantasmatic narratives of Civic Scotland, allowed for nationalist discourse to articulate these in such a way that they have become informed and intertwined with the myths of radical and egalitarian Scotland, reinforcing these myths as privileged aspects of Scottish nationalist discourse while at the same time, providing them with new impetus and re-accentuated towards full independence.

5.6 Four Myths of Scottish Nationalism

Both this chapter and the one preceding, have sought to provide a more detailed investigation of developments and notable moments in Scottish political history that have acted as catalysts and points of intervention in the development of modern Scottish nationalism. Chapter 4 specifically set the task of foregrounding the wider political and historical context, whilst the present chapter has sought to identify and interrogate significant moments or events that were pivotal to the emergence of four prevalent myths within Scottish nationalism and nationalist discourses. These being, the Myth of Scottish Cultural Pessimism; the Myth of Egalitarianism; the Myth of Radical Scotland; and the Myth of Civic Scotland, which are visually presented below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: 4 Myths of Scottish Nationalism

Each myth that we have identified and named here in this chapter foregrounds distinct questions or concerns regarding the discursive construction of the nation. Furthermore, as we have demonstrated above, these myths are not mutually exclusive, nor do they act in isolation, they orbit the core of nation and tap into the contextual environment, utilising each other's narratives to further develop and reinforce perceptions and representations of the nation within a given context and for an expressed purpose. Through the genealogical analysis presented above, these myths are presented as the products of articulatory practices, each seeking to ascribe the nation with a specific meaning, where 'insofar as truth in politics emerges from the conflict of rival myths and theories, no one contribution can ever lay claim to being the final,' (Paterson, 1994: 6). Through the application of the logics and intellectual function, we have further assessed how the crystallisation of these myths into the Scottish nationalist imaginary can be understood through the application and interplay of a range of logics associated with each respective myth. These are presented below in table 1.

Table 1: 4 Myths of Scottish Nationalism and corresponding logics

	Social Logic	**Fantasmatic Logic**
Myth of Cultural Pessimism	*Head over Heart*	*Conflicted Self*
Myth of Egalitarianism	*Social Responsibility*	*Egalitarianism*
Myth of Radical Scotland	*Challenge*	*Radicalism*
Myth of Civic Scotland	*Active Participation*	*Democratic Praxis*

The application of the intellectual function here allows us to interrogate the practices and appeals associated with each respective myth through the operation of a political logic of independence; establishing equivalences between those groups that in the first instance fought of greater autonomy before this was re-articulated towards full independence, as well as marking out the boundaries of difference. In addition, the application of intellectual function here directs us to consider how these articulations were designated as both appropriate and viable for nationalist discourses. This required close contact and appreciation of the prevailing political and social environment as well as intricate knowledge of cultural elements that allowed for their effective articulation into a counter hegemonic movement built on the collective opposition established through the logic of difference, as well as the 'unified' demands that saw the establishment of a chain of equivalence across various groups. Taken individually and as stand-alone elements of Scottish culture, the respective myths above paint a particular tale of the values, norms and behaviours that encompass Scottishness or what it means to be Scottish.

This is not to suggest that these are the only logics or themes we could discern from these myths' elaboration and development over the period considered here. Indeed, these respective logics do not predetermine our critical engagements or any explanations that we draw. Rather they are the means for critical explanation, 'directing out attention to the aspects of Scottish nationalism that makes critical engagement and explanation possible, which in turn enables the generation of accounts that are always concrete and singular,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 161). In addition, the naming and application of these myths and their respective logics are necessarily a product of retroduction as well as intellectual function, with my decisions taken with regards to these names being informed by my experiences and contact with the materials as well as the constant process of returning to the material. In this sense, finite constructs that

are contestable and revisable when considering changing conditions and theoretical developments. In this way the retroductive and contingent nature of the logics explored above represent a specific accentuated view of the topic at hand. To put this another way, no matter how robust the application of logics and intellectual function construction, their subject dependence and quasi-transcendental status serves to remind us of their historical character. And while these 'ontological categories can be considered axiomatic and universal, exhibiting real effects, they are crucially nothing more than the horizon of our theoretical world view,' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 154). In this way, the myths of Scottish nationalism as they have been presented here through logics and intellectual function, represent the spatial dimension, foregrounding the issues and importance of agency within these sites of discursive struggle. The genealogical approach adopted here has sought to inject a further temporal dimension to the analysis, placing these practices and moments of agency within their appropriate historical contexts.

What remains for us is to present a discussion, evaluation, and critique of the ways in which these myths and their respective logics were articulated and practiced during the 2014 referendum campaign. Utilising the insights of both a discursive conception of nationalism and applying intellectual function will allow for the development of new insights into the tactics, activities, and expressions of nationalism during this period, which, having outlined, we will be able to critically evaluate their effectiveness. It is recognised that this application and direction produces a specific form of knowledge and understanding under the pretences that it will inevitably interact with other accounts, some similar, some opposed, but it is in this way and taken together that the interaction of various accounts of Scottish nationalism produced by respective literatures that we develop and improve our understanding of the phenomenon that so grips us.

Chapter 6: 'The Pure, the Dead and the Brilliant' – Myths of Scottish nationalism, Intellectual Function and 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

6.1 The Discursive Construction of Independence

> "That summer, Scotland was alive. The discovery of the self was like the discovery of a whole country. That people believed their own artistry and activism might just be compelling enough to rival conventions, institutions and leaders of the established state was, in itself, a remarkable feat of imagination. Scotland, in 2014, was changed forever." (Barr, 2016: 5)

It would not be out of place to suggest that the sentiment expressed above reflects much of the feeling surrounding the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, certainly on the pro-independence side at least. 'The National Conversation'; 'An explosion of political activity'; Scotland's Festival of Democracy'; 'A Thousand Flowers in Bloom.' All of these terms were used at one point to describe the events and atmosphere across Scotland in the build-up to polling day. The title of the chapter itself is taken from the title of a play written by Alan Bisset and first performed during the 2014 Edinburgh Festival, which is itself an adaptation of the Scottish slang 'pure dead brilliant' which people commonly associated with meaning something that is excellent or the best. The referendum and the campaign that preceded it was a seismic and transformative moment in Scottish political and public life, amplified by the rapid rise of the issue and prospect of independence post-2007 to the forefront of the British political stage, and for a fleeting moment, capturing the attention of the world. At the heart of the discussions and engagement with nationalism in the context of the 2014 referendum is the sentiment expressed by Andrew Barr that 'any account written about this time which places the acts of politicians of either side above the movement of the people will miss the far more interesting truth of what unfolded in Scotland during the summer of 2014,' (Barr, 2016: 7). To put this slightly differently, the discussion of the referendum campaign, groups, and events

provided below constitutes a move to ‘relate specific organisation and activism to its social bases, stressing the political and structural realities that influenced their function and effect,’ (Jessop, 1984: 146). The discussions below seek to relate the organisation and activism of the referendum to the structural and political realities of the moment, privileging the roles of context and agency, and through the application of the logics and intellectual function, critically engage with questions of how and why the 4 myths of Scottish nationalism as outlined in the previous chapter were articulated and elaborated on by the respective discourses and actions of the groups under consideration.

The contributions and discussions of the previous chapters have established the theoretical and conceptual means with which to carry out this task, in so doing producing the possibility for novel and nuanced accounts and explanation of these relations and their consequences. The genealogical analysis of the previous chapter marked out 4 myths of contemporary Scottish nationalism, and through the application of the re-activated concept of intellectual function, we have demonstrated how appeals to various social and fantasmatic logics were made through the political logic of independence constituted a specific articulatory practice, crystallising these myths and their respective logics into a sedimented, albeit contingent regime of norms and practices within contemporary Scottish nationalism. Furthermore, intellectual function allows us to approach and critically evaluate these specific articulations in terms of their attentiveness to the social-cultural context and their appropriateness to building a counter hegemonic project based on the goals of the ‘nationalist’ project at the time, those being devolution prior to 1999 and full independence following the SNP’s 2007 election victory. What remains is for the research to engage and evaluate how these myths and their respective logics were utilised within the context of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum further critically. In this sense, critique is applied in the Foucauldian sense where

we do not seek to ‘expose unpassable borders or describe closed systems, rather, our purpose here is to make changeable singularities visible,’ (Lemke, 2019: 383). In other words, through genealogy, this chapter seeks to answer how and why particular discourses and practices of nationalism during the referendum campaign occurred in the ways they did, and through the application of a Logics approach and the intellectual function, thus producing novel interpretations and evaluations of these changeable singularities.

The following sections will explore several groups and events that are of interest. The discussions will be framed around three groups which played a prominent role in the strategies and activities or the pro-independence campaign. The first section will consider the ‘official’ pro-independence campaign body Yes Scotland before the discussion moves on to discuss two further campaign bodies not directly connected or associated with the official campaign, National Collective and the Radical Independence Campaign. Following this, the chapter will conclude with some general discussion of the atmosphere, and further select events rounding off the discussion and analysis. These respective groups and the events and strategies they employed are by no means exhaustive, ‘the nature and variety of the campaign coupled with the stories of ordinary people who chose to take part during the referendum campaign are of tremendous historical value, but to try to collate them all would be an impossible task,’ (Barr, 2016: 7). Utilising intellectual function, the selection of these groups is rooted in their prominence during the campaigns and my familiarity with their activities, however, the hope here is that insights can be gained into the wider atmosphere and ethos surrounding the campaign for a Yes vote. More significantly for this research, this discussion and investigation seeks to highlight the novel means of expressing and performing nationalist politics and nationalism more generally. One that was born out of its specific context, and relatively successful in its mobilisation of issues if not its end goal.

6.2 Yes Scotland and the 'Official' campaign for Independence

For Lynch (2015) there is a challenge in simple characterisations of the Yes campaign since it involved so much in terms of both orthodox and unorthodox political activism and elements that were, alien to the conduct of traditional UK party and electoral politics. We shall focus less on the actualities of the structure of Yes Scotland here, and more on the discourse of its organisation. In his speech at the official launch of Yes Scotland, Alex Salmond declared that 'in order for the campaign to win the case for Independence, it would need to galvanise the whole community of the realm of Scotland, which could only be achieved by building the campaign brick by brick, community by community, matching and marrying the sentiment of the people with the wonders of modern technology,' (Thiec, 2015: 1). Chief strategist of Yes Scotland, Stephen Noon, re-emphasised this sentiment, arguing that:

> "the core concept behind our social campaign was the idea 'conversion through conversation', with volunteers and supporters being the primary advocates for Yes, they would hold conversations with people in their social networks, breaking issues down into manageable chunks and nudging people up the support scale from unconvinced/undecided to Yes." (Noon, 2014)

From these two accounts, we can determine that there was a recognition from senior figures of both the SNP and Yes Scotland, that any attempt to build a referendum campaign structure could not be built on the traditional party dominated model of electioneering, and a more nuanced approach would be required. In other words, there was an acceptance and understanding (at the rhetorical level at least), that the Yes campaign would need to be a decentralised movement, making use of the variety of accents and verbal interactions that the campaign would bring.

Through an application of intellectual function, we can highlight appeals to and utilisation of two myths from this initial outline. In the first instance, the emphasis on a brick-by-brick strategy draws from the myth of pessimism. In Noon and Salmond's statements there is a seeming acceptance of the prevailing social logic of head over heart and the appeals to the passions and idea of an independent Scotland would not be enough to convince people to 'support the cause.' Therefore, to encourage the head to support independence, the actions of the Yes campaign needed to be attentive and responsive to the doubts and questions people would undoubtedly have. This recognition that heart will not win out over head, and that support for independence must be carefully developed can be further framed as a recognition of and attempt to defeat the horrific fantasy of the conflicted self. Only through reassurance, close contact, and knowledge of the options open in terms of what independence entailed could the conflicted self be overcome and subsequently tailor for the logic of the head to match with the passions and beliefs of an independent Scotland. In addition, encouraging the role of communities and volunteers as the primary advocates of a Yes vote reflected an attentiveness and appeal to the myth of Civic Scotland. Recognition that the campaign would need to rely on wider participation indicates an articulation of the social logic of active participation in the sense that the campaign would be and crucially needed to be an open forum, where anyone and everyone would not only be afforded the opportunity to contribute, but that this was to be actively encouraged. Furthermore, 'dismissing' the traditional party-based model of electioneering in favour of an open and nuanced civic forum constitutes an appeal to the fantasmatic logic of democratic praxis in the sense that this strategy and style of campaign was not only appropriate for the task at hand, but an example of good politics and conduct that was inherent to the Scottish way of doing things. Through the political logic of independence, chains of equivalence were established along these lines, incorporating

advocates of independence in their common goal, while at the same time delineating the internal 'other' that must be overcome through a logic of difference.

Despite the insistence of an open and inclusive campaign model, the SNP's involvement was something of a 'fundamental paradox, as the largest party at Holyrood and within Yes Scotland, the SNP were key providers of funding as well as activists and participation,' (Adamson & Lynch, 2014a: 42). Several actions were taken to mitigate these realities as much as possible. For example, the advisory board and staff of Yes Scotland was not controlled by the SNP, it was a loose coalition, co-managed by independents, Greens, Socialists, and nationalists of various hues. The organisation was consciously aimed to be broad-based, cross-party, and non-party community campaign that would seek to recruit supporters and funding on that basis, (Adamson & Lynch, 2014a; Mitchell, 2016a). In this sense, 'Yes Scotland was the arm's-length campaign whose role was to create a Yes brand, foster local and sectoral groups and present a non-SNP message to the media and public,' (Gallagher *et al*, 2016: 59). In contrast, Fotheringham argues that 'in practice Yes Scotland was very much the vehicle for the SNP's pitch for independence, often to the exclusion of other groups, who were refused use of the official Yes Scotland offices in Glasgow because they did not chime with the needs and message of the official campaign, (Fotheringham, 2021: 314).

Through a further application of intellectual function, we can posit that these attempts to mitigate the influence of the SNP maintained the appeals to the myths of Civic Scotland and Cultural Pessimism as discussed above. Like Labour came to be closely associated with devolution in 1990s, 'the fact the SNP were in government and had introduced the legislation for an independence referendum and negotiated its terms with Westminster meant that Yes

Scotland was bound to bear its mark,' (Thiec, 2015: 3). Former Labour and SNP MP Jim Sillars similarly reflected that a key weakness of the Yes campaign was the near constant refrain that 'independence was not solely about Alex Salmond, the SNP, or the 2013 White Paper *Scotland's Future*.' This was hammered home during a televised debate by Better Together head Alistair Darling, when asked if Salmond would have a mandate to implement the White Paper in the event of a Yes vote, 'spotted the opportunity to firmly pin the referendum to the White Paper by answering that that would be the case. Something Salmond did not contest or deny,' (Sillars, 2015: 18). Therefore, the strategy of distancing the SNP as a central figure and the appeals to Civic and Pessimistic Scotland that this entailed can be understood through the intellectual function not simply as a viable discursive strategy, but a necessary one influenced by knowledge and appreciation of the structural contexts.

The official Yes campaign was something of a hybrid, it had elements of a traditional electioneering, but it was also a loose social movement that implemented central strategies and functions whilst retaining an autonomous element.

> "The strength in local and grassroots events organised by local Yes groups resulted in organic growth where activity on the ground tended to generate more engagement with and from supporters and a snowball effect ensued, laying the ground for the unprecedented levels of political activism and engagement before, during and after the official campaign period." (Lynch, 2015: 8)

Anecdotally at least, most of the campaign groups that 'sprung into existence wanted basics such as support, advice, and materials, but not full incorporation into the umbrella of Yes Scotland,' (Barr, 2016: 14). Indeed, complete, or even partial co-ordination would have been all but impossible, and yet, such co-ordination was never strictly 'necessary or desirable, given that sheer number of activists gave groups unique roles, with enough dedicated

campaigners to effectively carry out and deliver its own specialised message,' (Barr, 2016: 14). Yes Scotland Chief Executive Blair Jenkins made a similar assessment, claiming that the Yes campaign was 'no longer able to have an accurate handle on what's happening because like a proper grassroots campaign it's self-generating, it's autonomous, people are just getting on with it,' (Small, 2014). What is also noteworthy, was the Yes campaign's use of social media in this regard, utilising sites such as Facebook and Twitter to advertise and promote the events, activities and campaigns organised by local chapters. This reflected a strong DIY ethos, where local groups organising, social media campaigning and producing various literature and the wide expanses of activities outside of traditional electioneering that sought to build support throughout the duration of the long campaign, (Lynch, 2015).

The emphasis on the DIY aspect of the Yes campaign was influenced by the 'danger' of having the SNP too closely associated with its operation. However, a further crucial dimension in this was the media landscape and atmosphere. For example, despite rules and regulations designed to ensure objectivity and impartiality, mainstream TV coverage of the first year of campaigning (Sept 2012- Sept 2013) had not been fair or balanced, with evidence suggesting that this was likely to have negatively impacted the Yes campaign, (Robertson, 2014). In addition, the print media was overwhelmingly opposed to independence. Only 1 of 35 newspapers circulating in Scotland adopted a pro-indy position (The Sunday Herald), with the remainder favouring neutrality or outright opposition, resulting in coverage being heavily skewed in favour of the Union, (Mitchel, 2016a: 88-90). While it has been recognised that the influence of press media has declined, it still plays a significant role in agenda setting followed by broadcast media, for example, the Yes campaign was often portrayed as being on the defensive or losing ground over key issues, thus many terms of the debate were dictated

by Better Together and its constituent parts, (Lynch, 2015: 5).[99] We could relate this contextual situation to Ralph Miliband's discussion of the exclusion of avant-garde or dissenting voices from means of communications in previous chapters, where the Yes campaign's relative exclusion or lack of mainstream platform could be framed as the result of fear of 'a great danger to the dominant system that more and more people should come to think of a new social order as possible and desirable and that the masses should also seek to give expression to this belief,' (Miliband, 2009: 189).

Through intellectual function, we can posit that the adoption and appeals to the social and fantasmatic logics of the myth of Civic Scotland were measured responses on the ground to this structural reality. In privileging the social logic of active participation, the DIY ethos promoted by Yes Scotland encouraged the development of several forms of associational free spaces, through which the Yes campaign could be seen as affording the opportunity for active participation across society, further contributing to application of a nationalist political logic of independence where people could come together and contribute, each in their own way, to the creation of the shared experience and positive vision that the case for Scottish Independence could be built upon. The contingent nature of the Yes campaign's structure and organisation in turn established the conditions of the possibility that could articulate contingent identities and values that would be necessary for winning consent for the Scottish Independence project in the wider public. In this sense, the wider Yes campaign succeeded in engaging people in a debate about the kind of society they wanted Scotland to be, in large parts, thanks to the activism and involvement of extra-parliamentary groups campaigning on the ground alongside traditional political party activists for a Yes vote,' (Thiec, 2015: 7).

[99] For a more comprehensive and detailed discussion and analysis of the role of the media during the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, see Blain *et al* (2016).

6.3 Troublemakers – National Collective[100]

As discussed above, the emphasis on a decentralised campaign and encouragement of a DIY ethos encouraged the establishments of local chapters of Yes Scotland, but it also resulted in the formation and emergence of several non-partisan and non-aligned groups that would campaign for independence in their own ways and at times contradictory to the official positions of Yes Scotland. One such group that falls into this category is National Collective (NC), who merit closer investigation and attention owing to their prominence during the campaign, but also because of their unique approach to nation-building and campaigning itself which blurred the lines between political and cultural engagement, (Engström, 2018). As the founders reflect, National Collective started in a spare room, we set out with the aim of imagining a better Scotland and inspiring others to campaign through art, written and spoken word, events, local groups and social media. What started as a modest group of people meeting in Edinburgh quickly grew into a broader idea which people across Scotland could put their names to; an idea that put creativity, not economics at the heart of the case for self-government, (National Collective, n.d.; Barr, 2016: 11-12). Co-founder Andrew Barr further reflected that 'National Collective provided a space for people to explore the meaning of independence outwith traditional politics…Sometimes naïve, amateur and unpolished, it was all part of the organic quality of the Yes campaign,' (Barr, 2016: 6).

[100] On a point of order, during the write-up and revision of this chapter the National Collective Website, through which several pieces and excerpts have been referenced here became inaccessible. However, links that have been provided in the bibliography for these sources may still be accessed through Internet Archive's Wayback Machine by copying and pasting the original URL into the search engine of this tool. The Link to Internet Archive's homepage is provided below:
https://archive.org/web/

At the forefront of the purpose and project of NC was doing politics differently. For example, when wrapping up the project following the referendum, the organisers provided a short history of the organisation, where in their opening words they stated that:

> "There is a history linking radical politics with art in Scotland. In that sense, National Collective was simply the latest iteration of an old Scottish tradition of taking a creative approach to political discourse." (National Collective, 2015)

From the beginning of the campaign, the organisers rallied against a predominant and strong belief that arts and culture should be kept separate from rationality and serious business of politics, which they argued had resulted in a politics of individualism, apathy, alienation and sorely lacking in imagination. The onset of the referendum campaigns had started to challenge and uproot these conceptions and National Collective sought to provide something new in their place, it offered a form of political participation in politics that was thoroughly imaginative, but also accessible to all, (Barr, 2016: 6-7; National Collective, 2015). From these self-reflections, we can draw some clear appeals and connections with the myths of Civic and Pessimistic Scotland. Similarly, to the appeals discussed above with regards to Yes Scotland, there is a clear appeal to the social logic of active participation, as well as the fantasmatic narrative that such participation is a fulfilment of good democratic praxis. No one would be discouraged from participating and the ways in which people wished to express themselves in this space was potentially limitless, although NC's status as an arts collective placed an emphasis on artistic expressions this did not necessarily exclude other forms of participation, at least not in theory. By holding up imagination and creativity as key tenets, NC's calls for active participation drew on and espoused the fantasmatic ideal of good democratic praxis in opposition to the dour and unimaginative orthodox political conduct. At the same time, in characterising orthodox politics as apathetic and lacking in imagination, we

can argue that NC was drawing on aspects of the myth of Cultural Pessimism. Through intellectual function, we can argue that the apathy orthodox had reinforced the social logic of head over heart, and so NC's rally against this and offer of a new kind of political participation can be understood as having taken cues from this conception. In so doing, NC was participating in the construction of the conflicted self as an internal 'other' that must be overcome, where in this case the conflicted self was the result of an apathy and disenchantment that through the space offered by NC, could be soundly defeated. Through the lens of intellectual function we can posit that the application of a nationalist political logic in this instance operated in such a way as to build chains of equivalence between like-minded 'free-spirits' and supporters of independence, thus bringing together people from various backgrounds in their collective disenchantment with politics as is, bring them into contact with each other and encouraging their interactions, inviting them to find expression for their respective demands of the independence project.

As referenced in their statement above, the organisers of NC emphasised the radical nature and aspects of NC's campaigning and work. This radical dimension is given a clearer expression in their referendum 'manifesto', titled *Making the Space for a Human Conversation.*

> "In National Collective, we support independence because of the opportunity that comes with the ultimate creative act – creating a new nation…A collective of radical thought and story-telling narrators are able to make new from old, reshape now and imagine tomorrow. Abstraction, the artist's perpetual companion, is celebrated and opens the minds of friends, family and neighbours." (National Collective, 2013a)

Appeals to the social logic of challenge are further evident in a leaflet produced by NC and handed out during the 2013 March for Independence which stated, 'We're a generation who

have no fear over wrestling powers from the Westminster political machine,' (National Collective, 2013b). There are two dimensions to this appeal to challenge. The first is a challenge to orthodox politics and the constitutional status quo, whereby NC draw from the heritage of the devolution and home rule campaigns, and that the campaign for independence is simply an extension of these fights. Within the discourse of NC, art is key action or practice that epitomises such challenges. Through art people can re-imagine and provide expression to their ideas, whether that be through song, stories art etc. In addition, the performance of art is utilised as a means of challenging the traditional ways of doing politics. Art was a means of expression beyond mainstream political practice and as such could be used to challenge preconceptions and highlight possibilities and alternatives. For example, NC ended their manifesto declaration with the following passage.

> "A new manifesto of ambition can be written, drawn, or sculpted. Unlike the political dossier of promises to be broken, the creative seeks possibilities, for questions not answers. At National Collective we ask everyone to write a manifesto built not on style but on the substance of making." (National Collective, 2013a)

This in turn feeds a clear appeal to the fantasmatic logic of radicalism where much of the claims and discourse of NC reference the opportunities of independence, where Scotland's radical artistic potential could be fully recognised and unleashed. Through intellectual function we can argue that the operation of the political logic of independence here constructs equivalences based on common interests and ethos in the arts and what art can achieve in terms of an independent Scotland. In this sense, 'NC was an entry point for political engagement and activism, one of several entry points available, but one that appealed to and suitable for artistically minded people,' (Engström, 2018: 110). In terms of a construction of difference, Engström makes an interesting comparison in that NC could be understood as a

contemporary version of Nairn's intelligentsia in that it was eager to engage those who have previously been apathetic to gain support for their view of Scotland. While they may have been advocating democratic structures not previously in place in Scotland, 'their approach was not solely concerned with imagining new possibilities but also preserving the pieces of Scottish society that are perceived as unaffected or now under threat by Westminster,' (Engström, 2018: 112). Through intellectual function, we can understand how the political articulation of these myths continues the theme of marking out Scotland's difference and distinction from Westminster, why this is worth protecting, and why independence is the means to achieve this, articulated through an accent of NC defined and informed by artistic expression.

While the social accent of NC is one of artistic expression, their interest was never to restrict its appeal to a narrow field. It wasn't about fine art, art history, nor was it about hanging paintings in the galleries. 'It was more akin to the mood of the pub and café, makeshift, folky, and idealist, it was about having fun at a distance from traditional politics and encouraging creativity in everyone,' (Barr, 2016: 13-4). In this sense NC engaged in various activities and initiatives throughout the campaign, for example, Barr recalls NC's use of a wish-tree, where people were invited to write their hopes and dreams for an independent Scotland on tags and attach them to the tree. 'Those hand-written wishes found on those simple tags were a thousand times more interesting, truthful and revealing of Scotland than anything in the output of the mainstream press,' (Barr, 2016: 48). NC was also noted for its Twitter campaign #YesBecause which encouraged people to share their reasons for supporting independence. One of the most prominent events organised by NC was the month-long travelling grassroots festival that took place across the whole of Scotland during July-August 2014 named

'Yestival – The Summer of Independence.'[101] The rolling festival travelled across the whole of Scotland and involved a wide variety of activities from pop-up stalls in the streets to music, poetry and film screenings.

Prior to the beginning the tour, Barr reflected that 'tomorrow the movement spoken about for months becomes a living, lyrical, energised force in the streets and halls of the country. Tomorrow that drive for confidence, hope, ambition, and the revitalisation of the imagination enters the communities of the land in a way never before seen in Scotland,' (Barr, 2014a). Throughout the tour, several organisers and contributors wrote diary entries reflecting on the experiences, for example, one entry reminisced about meeting a pair of holidaying German bikers in Ullapool. They were surprised to learn that 'our vision and desire for a Yes vote is based on logical and progressive political arguments and not at all based on a romantic view of the past,' (McFadyen, 2014). A similar theme was noted in Montrose where Barr reflected on how the poet Morgan Downie, opened the night by stating:

> "I don't believe in nationalisms, I believe in people. I believe in the will of the people." Drawing threads between the knowing of the self and the knowing of the community, and how that enlivens and empowers people. "I would like to see a greater spectrum of education in Scotland. I'd like children to be able to go outside and know the names of the trees and the birds." (Barr, 2014b)

Another diary entry notes the sentiment expressed by a participant that 'it won't be any one event or campaign that gets us a Yes – it'll be the individual conversations we have with one another over the next – how long have we got now – eight weeks and a day?!' (Farley, 2014a). At the end of the tour, one organiser reflected that 'Trying's what we do best at

[101] A website containing audio and diary entries documenting the run of Yestival is available via: http://nationalcollective.com/yestival/ (Last Accessed: 31/01/23)

Yestival. We set out with ideas, sure, and something that in certain lights could be mistaken for a plan, but everything we do depends on people in the places we go – to turn up, to take part, to spread the word, to join in the choruses…We can't quite believe we've done it. And now, is it back to reality? This is reality now. Things are exciting, we're realising what our potential is, and the air is electrified with possibilities,' (Farley, 2014b).

Through intellectual function, we can posit that the ways in which these appeals were made, through the language, art and expression of those who participated in Yestival were the result of close contact with the passions and culture of the arts and its different incantations across Scotland. This allowed participants to give expression in their own 'accents' while at the same time reinforcing and re-imagining predominant elements in nationalist discourses. For example, in the reflections above, there are strong resonances with the fantasmatic logic of egalitarianism. The emphasis on communities and how community enlivens people can be considered a clear appeal to a central theme of Scottish egalitarianism where community is at the heart of social values. This is further reinforced by the call of greater access to the spectrum of education, not just education itself. In addition, the comments above suggest that the practice of conversations and participation good and desirable democratic praxis, espousing both social and fantasmatic logics of the myth of civic Scotland. Utilising intellectual function, we can observe the specific practice of articulation with the social logic of responsibility with the myth of egalitarianism. In this sense, one contributor to the diaries of Yestival noted how we should be thanking the artists – the writers, the poets, the musicians, the singers, and the storytellers – 'for articulating, expressing and confidently thinking about who we are and who we could be in the future. The artist is constantly refining and defining and articulating the situation for the politician, and, in their view, they are the people that we absolutely must listen to,' (McFadyen, 2014). The actions and activities of

artists then is framed and articulated as a social responsibility in the sense that they inform, define, and make the situation known, not just to politicians, but the wider community as well. If we apply the concept of intellectual function to the activities and discourses of NC when can surmise that appeals to various logics of the myths of Scottish nationalism were made through the political logic of independence through a diverse set of voices and expressions that drew these people together under the common goal of independence as well as a means of protecting and enshrining desirable Scottish traits and values through the lens of artistic expression.

6.4 'Britain is for the Rich; Scotland can be ours!': The Radical Independence Campaign

Neil Davidson comments that in the initial stages of the referendum campaign, the intention was to make the prospect of independence as palatable as possible to the unconvinced by proposing that the fewest possible changes to the established order of things. However, what became clear during the campaign, 'was that most Scots intending to vote Yes *wanted* their country to be different from the contemporary UK,' (Davidson, 2014a: 13)[102]. One of the key actors that pushed for a more *radical* agenda was the Radical Independence Campaign (RIC). The RIC initially began as conference, held in Glasgow on the 24th November 2012. Prior to the conference, the organisers took to the pages of the Scottish Left Review and described the coming conference as 'a coalition of socialists, feminists, trade unionists, Greens, peace movement, poverty campaigners, anti-racists groups, community activists, civil liberty campaigners and more who believe independence offers Scotland its best hope of a progressive future,' (Scottish Left Review, 2012). The event itself attracted up to 900 attendees and included a variety of activities and events, including workshops, plenary

[102] Emphasis in Original.

sessions, and featured an array of figures and personalities from across political and civil society, including several senior members of Yes Scotland.

The conference resulted in the Radical Independence Declaration, which was drafted by conference organiser and director of the Jimmy Reid Foundation Robin McAlpine and delivered by musician and Yes Scotland Advisory Board member Pat Kane, (Gillen, 2014: 142). A key passage from the declaration stated that 'this [RIC] is not a campaign for independence but a campaign for a better Scotland which we believe can only begin with independence. We are tired of complaining about Britain. It is time to talk about what Scotland can be.' (Kane, 2012) The declaration goes on to list several ideals of what Scotland could become with independence; 'Scotland could [can] be: A participative democracy; A Society of equality; A just economy; A Great Welfare State; A good neighbour; A moral nation,' (Kane, 2012). The declaration was subsequently renewed at the 2013 RIC conference and delivered by actor David Hayman, where it was re-affirmed that:

> "We must abandon 30 years of the politics of exploitation…We must replace it with the politics of sharing, where we all gain from the riches of our land and the fruits of our labour…Together we can raise up our heads and work for a Scotland yet to come but visible already. A Scotland of the Common Weal, of shared wealth and shared wellbeing." (Radical Independence Campaign, 2013a)

From the RIC declaration we can mark out several appeals to the myths of Scottish nationalism, most explicitly the myths of radical and egalitarian Scotland. The sections of the RIC declaration noted above make appeals to both the social logic of challenge and fantasmatic logic of radicalism within the wider myth of Radical Scotland. On the one hand, the declaration is a clear articulation of the social logic of challenge in the sense of the politics, policies and direction of Scotland and Britain more generally in the preceding

decades. This is reinforced through the list of ideals of what Scotland could become, which speaks to the fantasmatic ideal of Scotland on the edge of reaction, that all that is required to unleash and achieve these ideals, is to win independence and the rest will take care of itself. In addition, ideals such as equality, just economy, welfare and neighbourly conduct can be considered clear appeals and articulations of the myth of egalitarianism. On the one hand it appeals to the social logic of responsibility in the sense that to improve the lot and share in collective benefits, these are the things that radical and challenging action must prioritise. In addition, there are strong resonances with key tenants of the fantasmatic logic of egalitarianism, equality, community, and opportunity in the calls for equality, just economy and good relations within communities.

The RIC would continue to utilise these themes in their most prominent flyer campaign issued in February 2014. The flyer shown below in Image 1 and was stark and striking both in terms of its visuals and message.

Image 2: Front and Back design of the RIC flyer launched and distributed in February 2014[103]

Images Sourced from the RIC website available to view via:

http://radical.scot/flyers-and-graphics/ [Last Accessed: 30/08/23]

Firstly, the blunt title of the flyer. 'Britain is for the Rich. Scotland can be Ours' clearly identifies Britain as the other and through a list of features highlighted in white, the poster associates Britain with 'falling wages, worst child poverty, fourth most unequal society, wealth gaps etc.' The final message is no less striking and forceful, 'Scotland doesn't have to be like this. Vote Yes,' which can be interpreted as a challenge to the orthodoxy of Britain and the status quo. Therefore, the message and purpose of such a statement is to argue that to support a Yes vote is to challenge this conventional wisdom, to question why this is the case

[103] Additional information and sources for the claims made in the flyer can be found via: http://radical.scot/britain-for-the-rich/

and that there are possible alternatives. These can be considered a clear appeal and acknowledgement of the social logic of challenge in this instance, which is further reinforced by the idea that Scotland has the potential to break from this reality through independence, which again can be considered a clear appeal to the fantasmatic logic of Scotland on the edge of radical action, if only certain conditions, in this case, independence, are met. An early flyer produced by RIC and distributed in Dundee in 2013 (shown below in Image 2) shares a similar tone and but also provides some further nuances to these appeals.

Image 3: RIC Campaign Leaflet distributed in Dundee 2013



INDEPENDENCE

It's not about Salmond and the SNP
– It's about our future!

Most people in Scotland want a **fairer** and more **democratic** society – **greater equality** and **proper social security** for those who need it. We want the **welfare state**. We want **good-quality free education** in well- funded schools, colleges and universities. We want **decent genuinely-affordable housing**. We want investment in our local economies that will bring **local jobs**.

But the UK remains the 4th most unequal country in the developed world. Alistair Darling, head of the NO Campaign has said that Labour will cut "tougher and deeper" than Thatcher. No matter who is in power in Westminster, a fairer society will not be on the agenda and the worst of the cuts are still to come.

A NO vote in 2014 is a vote for austerity and inequality

Under devolution, the Scottish Government has been able to make things not quite so bad this side of the border (we have free prescriptions, more social housing, no university fees); but we can't escape the destructive cuts to public services, the bedroom tax, the benefits caps. We are not free to choose a fairer tax system that can fund economic investment and jobs. **If we are serious in wanting a better society, we need to be free to make it happen.**

A YES vote in 2014 is the first step towards a fairer Scotland

We take inspiration from other small nations and from other fairer societies. We know there is a better way. Another Scotland IS possible.

If you are not already on the electoral register, you can register online at www.electoralcommission.org.uk/voter-registration, download a form from the City Council website, or pick up a form from the council office at 18 City Square or from one of our stalls

Image taken with permission during visit to the Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling [04/09/2019]

Here the RIC highlights values such as ‘fairer and democratic society, equality and social security, quality education etc.’ These appeals exhibit a clear resonance with the fantasmatic logic of egalitarianism, with an emphasis on welfare and supporting policies that promote jobs and education indicating a clear commitment to community in contrast to the ‘rich’ and greed orientated interests that RIC associates with Britain. In addition, the claims that ‘A NO vote is for austerity and inequality’, and a ‘YES vote is the first step towards a fairer Scotland’ indicates an appeal to the social logic of responsibility within the myth of egalitarianism. Utilising intellectual function, we can observe that through the political logic of independence, appeals to the radical and egalitarian myths sought to establish an antagonistic frontier, where Westminster was characterised as exclusive, greedy, and corrupt, at odds with ‘Scottish’ egalitarian values of community, social responsibility, and equality. In this way, the operation of the political logic in terms of its articulation with the myths of radicalism and egalitarianism served to establish a chain of equivalence by incorporating ‘those who believed that not only could independence deliver socialism, but also provided the means for a fresh start and that there were alternatives not only to Westminster but also the SNP’s vision of what independence would be,’ (Gillen, 2014: 143). Therefore, we can evaluate those messages and rhetoric exemplified in the flyers above, served the purpose and aims of groups like RIC, to cultivate a common front against the neoliberal consensus of Westminster and their desire to enshrine and pursue a distinctive set of egalitarian values. This can be summarised in the post-referendum reflections of prominent RIC member Neil Davidson when he asserted that ‘Yes campaigners saw establishing a Scottish State, not as an eternal goal to be pursued in all circumstances, but as one which offered better opportunities for equality and social justice in our current condition of neoliberal austerity – in other words as a way of conducting the class struggle, not denying its existence,’ (Davidson, 2014b: 3).

A further application of intellectual function here can illuminate the reasoning and rationale behind the adoption and appeals to these respective myths and logics. The RIC was headed by mostly younger activists who threw themselves into the student movements of 2010 and had participated in anti-war and anti-austerity activism, leading them to question the deeper forces surrounding the British State. And while not opposed to Yes Scotland, the RIC roundly rejected the more conservative and cautious approach favoured by the SNP, (Sangha & Jamieson, 2014; Boyd, 2015). Thus, the messages and reflections discussed above constitute an attempt to translate their experiences into the language of support for Scottish independence. The challenge then for the RIC and Yes campaign more generally was how to engage and mobilise communities on this basis; the scale of which is best summarised by the fact that the turnout for the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections was just over 50%, meaning that approximately two million Scots who could vote, did not. This 'missing Scotland would therefore be a vital target group for both sides of the campaign, whereas in all other elections they were largely ignored,' (Sullivan, 2014: 13). Crucially as Sullivan argues, these people were not apathetic as when asked, people addressed issues 'through frames and language provided by parties and mass media, but also in a very personal way. They could identify problems in their communities and knew that if circumstances changed, then they could make these areas better places to live,' (Sullivan, 2014: 19). For example, Foley *et al* (2022) discuss various examples of when 'forgotten' residents and communities became politically active, but in the case of the 2014 independence referendum, 'there was going to be an outcome, and it was one that they could realistically have influence over,' (p. 89).

In setting out their radical case for Scottish independence, Foley & Ramand (2014) argued that 'the most likely Yes voters were those least likely to register to vote, and this should guide an effective approach to grass-roots campaigning, built on the geography of Scotland's

social classes. Independence will be won in tower blocks, housing estates and small towns, not gated communities and rural mansions,' (pp. 87-8). Keeping to this ethos, RIC was responsible for one of the biggest canvassing and voter registration drives in modern political memory. In the wake of the 'Britain is for the Rich, Scotland can be ours' flyer campaign, and for the remainder of 2014, the RIC organised several mass canvassing events across Scotland, targeting specific communities that had traditionally been shunned and marginalised by both Westminster and Holyrood,' (Boyd, 2015: 32). Two prominent activists of RIC recalled that:

> "the poorest, densely populated communities must bear the most votes and the most ready support for decisive political and social change we canvassed these areas the hardest…We recognised early that those voters who would buck the trend would be those who didn't talk to pollsters and distrusted politicians, these people told us that the only people who ever ask us what we think is you [RIC]." (Sangha & Jamieson, 2014)

Foley *et al* claim that it would be wrong to solely credit RIC with these types of activities and while RIC gave the wider Yes movement an initial push to the left, initiative and creativity emerged independently and often in the most unlikely places and ways,' (Foley *et al*, 2022: 88).[104] Aside from mass canvassing and voter recruitment drives, local RIC chapters, alongside local Yes groups 'organised social events, fundraisers, music and comedy nights etc. and these local groups were the real basis of RIC, national forums could bring people together and deal with issues that were often the recourse of motions passed more locally,' (Sangha & Jamieson, 2014).

[104] We have alluded to some of these activities when discussing Yes Scotland and National Collective above and we will return to discuss some select initiatives and activities below.

Applying intellectual function here allows us to evaluate how the intimate connection and attention of RIC members and activists to what the campaign considered *'communities of deprivation'*[105], helped to inform and influence the ways in which the RIC articulated and made appeals to the myths of radicalism and egalitarianism as discussed above with respect to their campaign flyers. The connections and contributions of these communities provided the impetus for re-accentuating the themes and abstract discussions of the wider Yes movement into a form conceivable and familiar to the people they met and engaged during such activities. In addition, applying intellectual function in this way also helps us to highlight further appeals to the myths of Civic and Pessimistic Scotland in RIC discourses and practices. In their attempts to engage and include these communities of deprivation, the strategy of RIC utilised both the social and fantasmatic logic of Civic Scotland. In terms of the social logic, the mass canvassing and social events can be considered as clear articulation and adherence to the logic of active participation, that everyone, regardless of background and position should be given the opportunity to contribute their ideas without restriction. Coupled with the notions of challenge and radicalism discussed above, this tapped into the fantasmatic logic of good and desirable democratic praxis, where the open forums and conduct of the RIC conferences and events were held up as exemplars of the alternative politics so many craved. In this sense, activist Cat Boyd claimed that 'it was not a wave of nationalism that powered momentum towards a Yes vote: this was a debate about social justice, economic democracy and an opportunity for radical change,' (Boyd, 2014).

In terms of appeals to and articulation of the myth of Scottish pessimism, through the lens of intellectual function, the strategies and conduct of RIC constituted a recognition of the dangers and hurdles posed by the fantasmatic logic of the conflicted self. The dangers of

[105] See Foley & Ramand, (2017) p. 86.

which were laid out in the wider understanding of ‘missing Scotland’, people moved to apathy and disenchantment despite their best interests and desire for change. This was raised by NC co-founder Andrew Barr in his own reflections of canvassing where ‘it became clear people had often lived their whole lives believing anything outside the status quo was a pipe dream, naïve, or worse. It seemed that Scotland’s destitution was taught and accepted as simple fact,’ (Barr, 2016: 27). As such, through intellectual function, we can interpret RIC messages and activities as a means of promoting support for independence amongst these communities not through identification with the Yes movement as ‘a revolt against political, economic and social alienation; a revolt against Westminster seeming contempt for human decency,’ (Boyd, 2015: 33). In so doing, the strategies and activities of RIC recognised the utility and appeals to the social logic of head over heart, directing their energies towards uniting around a common disdain for Westminster and more broadly the centralisation of power in London, which given mass alienation and distrust of career politicians, ‘was tactically astute and ensured a sense of unity across the wider movement,’ (Foley & Ramand, 2017: 87). To translate this into the language of discourse, the political logic of independence here served to establish chains of equivalence across groups in their common goals and opposition to Westminster and neo-liberal economics, where the unifying theme for the ‘radical’ elements was democracy more generally. That an independent Scotland could and would be more democratic than its current position within the UK and so the reasoned logic of this alternative would win over the doubts and pessimism of the conflicted self, allowing for the pursuit of Scotland’s radical tendencies which would in turn protect and enshrine the egalitarian and democratic values and appetites of these communities and Scotland more generally.

6.5. Scotland's Festival of Democracy

Beyond the official campaign and more prominent non-aligned groups such as NC and RIC, there were countless other expressions, initiatives, and activities, often autonomous and spontaneous in their performances and articulations of Scotland during its much acclaimed 'festival of democracy.' Foley *et al* (2022) argue, that to understand the nature of the Yes campaign as it developed, and especially in the last six months, it is important to reflect and compare the experiences of the referendums in 1979 and 1997 to 2014. For example, Lynch (2019) points to the variety of campaign methods and activities that were employed in 2014 compared to the '79 and '97 where 'the social media dimension was huge, but other forms of engagement were also significant and included art, music, political carnivals, cartoons, poetry etc. with these operating alongside growing political networks and new organisations such as NC; RIC and Women for Independence,' (Lynch, 2019: 116). For playwright David Greig, in the context of the referendum, 'the parameters of politics suddenly turned out to be much more malleable than we thought. The pound, the monarchy, Trident – nothing is given any more, not even the idea of Scotland itself. Put simply, the independence debate allows us to explore every aspect of our national life and ask ourselves the question – does it have to be like this?' (Greig, 2013). The following sections will explore a range of these activities and initiatives that sprung to life in Scotland during the referendum campaigns. While it is impossible to cover and discuss every individual act and performance, engaging with a small sample will help us to further apply intellectual function to the operation and articulations of Scottish nationalism during this transformative time.

On the 5th August 2014, a televised debate was held in the Athenaeum of the Royal Conservatoire of Scotland in Glasgow between First Minister Alex Salmond and leader of Better Together Alistair Darling. Journalist David Torrance noted in his diary of the

referendum campaign that the atmosphere was electric, before going on to comment that the 'audience was a bit feral, repeatedly booing both participants and yelling 'answer the question, causing the moderator to intervene and ask for calm, but it was great fun,' (Torrance, 2014: 99-100). Contrast this with the assessment of Bissell & Overend, who lamented that the 'nation watched two rather similar men in background, age, and views, shouting at and interrupting each other, with little respect for the bigger issues', before summarising that 'the staged debate failed to connect to the creativity, innovation, and enthusiasm that defined the referendum elsewhere,' (Bissell & Overend, 2015: 243). This tended to reflect how much media coverage of events and the referendum itself was viewed through 'the narrow lens of politics as political theatre which failed to acknowledge the richer, more nuanced, and sophisticated forms that politics and political activism were taking place outside of Holyrood and Westminster,' (Mitchell, 2016b: 7-8). Indeed, one of the most prominent and consistent framings was that the conduct and events surrounding the referendum were a celebration of democracy. This feeling is perhaps best summarised in a speech delivered by Alex Salmond a week prior to polling day where he lauded that:

> "In creating, what is becoming, a celebration of democracy, it is Scotland's people, Scotland's communities - not the politicians – who are re-invigorating and transforming the entire political process. The participation, the enthusiasm, the meetings, the discussions, the debate has been really remarkable. It has been a process of national empowerment. As a country we have re-discovered national self-confidence. As a nation, we are finding our voice." (Salmond, 2014)[106]

Since the referendum, there have been attempts to 'pour cold water' over the idea that what happened during the summer of 2014 was a 'festival of democracy', however as Devine

[106] A video recording of Salmond's speech can be found via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dnMXOgt-8gA [Last Accessed: 31/08/23]

highlights, several accounts from pro-Union figures at the time were convinced that something 'unusual' had happened during the summer of 2014, (Devine, 2017: 244). Firstly, Alex Massie, claimed that 'neither side could agree on much other than the fact that the campaign had been a steroid injection for democracy,' (Massie, 2014). Similarly, Hugo Rifkind[107] commented that 'people shouldn't be fooled by ugliness you've seen on the front pages. Rarely can there have been a political battle with such high stakes that has been conducted as peacefully,' (Rifkind, 2014). Similar views were shared by onlookers from outside Scotland, for example, Irish journalist Fintan O'Toole noted that:

> "Scotland at the moment is what a democracy is supposed to be: a buzzing hive of argument and involvement, most of it civil, respectful and deeply intelligent. This energy has been unleashed not by atavistic tribal passions but by a simple realisation: for once, the people have some power." (O'Toole, 2014b)

Similar comments were made by those in the Yes camp as well, with novelist and playwright Peter Arnott noted that:

> "the Yes campaign in all its participatory variety has revealed and unleashed a new and painfully hopeful democratic culture in this country on a scale and of a quality of thought and debate that I never would have expected. I'm sure my No voting friends don't really want all that to disappear and be forgotten." (Arnott, 2022: 58)

From these, we can mark out here some clear appeals to the myth of Civic Scotland in the first instance. The admiration and promotion of the good conduct and enthusiasm taken to the debates can be seen as clear articulation of the fantasmatic logic of democratic praxis, that the style and conduct of debate were uniquely Scottish and that they exhibited good democratic

[107] Son of former Secretary of State for Scotland under Thatcher, Malcolm Rifkind.

ethos and practice that should be the basis of all politics. In addition, the application of the political logic of independence framed these practices and atmosphere as an improvement to the traditional and dour Westminster or more generally parliamentary style politics. The acclaim of this renewed democratic culture also spoke to and articulated the social logic of active participation, which praised and highlighted the levels of activism and participation as being transformative thus further strengthening and feeding the fantasmatic narrative. We can also point here to an articulation of the myth of Radical Scotland in terms of both the social and fantasmatic elements through an articulation and contact with the myth of Civic Scotland. As noted, the feeling and conduct of the campaign and events were juxtaposed to traditional and dry politics, therefore in pursuing active participation and praising their democratic praxis, these actions and atmosphere constituted a challenge to orthodoxy thus appealing to and participating in the social logic of challenge. This in turn feeds the fantasmatic logic of radicalism in the sense that the potential of this new politics could and would help Scotland realise and fulfil its radical potential. In promoting and framing the independence debates and campaigns more generally in this positive light, the political logic of independence allowed for the constitution of a chain of equivalence that bound together supporters of independence based on a shared aim and goal of a positive transformation of Scottish politics.

On further point and a more general note and in terms of the mood and atmosphere of the broader Yes and No campaigns, the message and conduct of the broader Yes campaign 'stood in stark contrast to the negativity of Better Together, it was consistently upbeat and optimistic, with the wider movement verging on something of a quasi-evangelical mission of liberation,' (Devine, 2017: 242). For example, author Irvine Welsh argued that:

> "Scotland's post-devolution generation is a different breed to their predecessors; they've been building a new state in their imagination, from the basis of a limited but

> tangible parliament in Edinburgh. They see the possibilities in full statehood and came from nowhere to deal a body blow to Britain's tired and out-of-touch elites." (Welsh, 2014)

Lesley Riddoch would similarly argue that 'Westminster is wedded to elitism and has made no effort to democratise itself, and that the social democratic leaning of Scottish voters is almost as old as women's right to vote,' (Riddoch, 2014). Riddoch further stresses this point by arguing that Scotland's traditions of education, law and religion have shaped,

> "a Scottish way of doing things, and it is the encroachment on this uncodified but distinctive outlook by England's increasingly market-obsessed, winner-takes-all society that's been the main driver of Scottish Independence – a culture of uninhibited greed created by Thatcher and fuelled by New Labour's failure to reform and regulate." (Riddoch, 2014)

Founder of the online magazine *Bella Caledonia,* Mike Small makes a similar assessment in that Bella Caledonia was always an eclectic collection of multiple perspectives and tones. At times it felt in danger of coming apart at the seams but was 'held together by the idea of becoming, the idea of self-determination being explored from all angles, even if that wasn't spelt out clearly or widely understood,' (Small, 2022: 14).

Through an application of intellectual function, we can posit that the attempts to build the case for independence on positivity and good democratic praxis was informed by the negative structural realities discussed in the previous sections above, and therefore utilised and articulated elements of the myths of pessimistic and egalitarian Scotland alongside the civic and radical elements to this end. On the one hand, the emphasis on positivity can be seen as a direct articulation and reference to the social and fantasmatic elements of Scottish cultural

pessimism. If the fantasmatic logic of the conflicted self is pessimistic in outlook, then the remedy was positivity, to drive away self-doubt and have Scots embrace the potentials of independence as opposed to dwelling on the negatives pumped out by 'Project Fear'. This appeal is reinforced by an acknowledgement that passion alone would not break the social logic of head over heart and so the political articulation of positivity in both action and argument can be interpreted through intellectual function as a reasoned strategy and response to internal 'other' of Scottish culture. This allowed for an elaboration of Scottish difference across multiple accents as we have seen above, allowing people to identify with and explore a variety of issues and topics and relate them back to the central ideal of independence. This subsequently resulted in a surreal quality of the Yes campaign, where on the one hand, an official stance offering not an entirely coherent combination of Scandinavian ideals, small-nation business-friendly economics, while on the other, 'a more grassroots movement offering a thoroughgoing critique of capitalism and casting the movement as a fightback for the working class. For all these, the prospect of an independent Scotland served as a blank canvass on which to project visions of a better world,' (Hearn, 2014: 509-10).

We can also apply intellectual function here as a means of evaluating the connections and appeals to the myth of egalitarianism. For example, a local chapter of the Yes campaign in Edinburgh produced the flyer shown below in image 4, with the central message emphasising 'fairness, equality and democracy.' This constitutes a clear appeal to the fantasmatic logic of egalitarianism, with its emphasis prosperity for all and values of health and education. In addition, the flyer, among other campaign materials and messages stresses that independence is a guarantee to enshrine and protect the egalitarian, radical and democratic values and traditions that mark Scotland as different to Westminster. The messages contained within the flyer above also resonate with the 2013 Scottish Government White Paper Scotland's Future,

where in response to the question of why Scotland needs independence, the white paper claimed that ‘democracy, prosperity and fairness are the principles that are at the heart of the case for independence,’ (Scottish Government, 2013: 40). This alongside highlighting both younger generations and communities more generally as the key beneficiaries of a Yes vote suggests acknowledgement and articulation of the social logic of social responsibility, that independence is the responsibility of the community to itself. This in turn reinforces an appeal to the social logic of head over heart within the myth of Scottish pessimism, stressing that self-confidence and hope can help deliver the values and attributes necessary for Scotland to thrive. In so doing, the articulation of the political logic of independence is both translated and accentuated to speak and tap into the force of positivity, with which, Scottish independence could both overcome the dangers of the conflicted self, while at the same time, protecting and maintaining Scottish values and distinctions against perceived increased interferences from Westminster style politics and policies.

Image 4: Flyer designed by Stewart Bremner and produced by Yes Edinburgh North & Leith group

Image taken with permission during visit to Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling [11/09/2019]

6.6 All of Scotland's a stage!

One of the more amusing and frankly surreal events of the referendum campaign occurred the week before polling day on the 11th September. UK Labour leader Ed Miliband led a contingent of 104 Labour MPs and MEPs from across the UK to Glasgow in what was supposed to be a demonstration of solidarity, but was overshadowed by the appearance by a man riding a rickshaw who proceeded to follow the procession from Glasgow Central Station to the foot of the Royal Concert Hall whilst playing the 'Imperial March' from Star Wars.[108]

[108] Video of the incident taken by the rickshaw driver available via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DiMXuEmqAHA (Last Accessed: 18/01/23)

At various points the rider made several comments including, "Say hello to your imperial masters. These lovely people have travelled all the way from England to tell us they are better to rule us than anybody else." And so 'the event went on for ten excruciating and hilarious minutes as the political fetish momentarily came face to face with political chutzpah,' (Law, 2015: 7).[109] Others reflected that this comedic demonisation of the visiting Labour contingent 'demonstrated attitudes towards enactments of power, dominance and bias from Westminster, and what should have been a grand gesture from the Labour party was undercut and subverted by a moment of street performance,' (Bissell & Overend, 2015: 245). Actions such as these were small and simple, but they were commonplace. They were 'provoked by the political debates and by the desire to find ways of communicating their opinions and views, all of which were hotly debated across various platforms,' (Bissell & Overend, 2015: 245). Law (2015) raises a similar point in arguing that 'expressions of self-representation meant that political discourse was forced to shift from the logic of political self-marketing as the neutral, technical preserve of small circles of networked state managers and media interlocutors,' (p.3).

Through an application of intellectual function, we can pose that the 'performance' of the Glasgow Rickshaw rider tapped into several elements of the myths of Scottish nationalism. Firstly, we can point to an articulation and expression of the myth of Civic Scotland, specifically in terms of the social logic of active participation, that anyone can and should be encouraged to participate in their own way and style. In addition, through intellectual function we can conceive of performances such as this as an expression of the social logic of challenge within the myth of radical Scotland. For example, a paternalistic account, that had permeated through New Labour since the days of the devolution debate, that somehow, in some way, a

[109] Or as some in Glasgow might say 'gallus'

particular section of society knew best. Such acts of the rickshaw seemingly challenged this conception in this sense that fundamental questions about the nation, state and society which were taken for granted were now exposed to wider discussion and debate, where representative politics ensured that isolated individuals were typically unable to constitute a politically movement unless they delegated the right to representation, something that the wider public discourse of the Scottish independence referendum was beginning to break, (Law, 2015: 3; Bourdieu, 1991). This further reinforces the fantasmatic logic of good democratic praxis in the sense that wider and more varied participation of people within the political debates and system is a good and desirable quality of Scottish politics, which in turn can be viewed as a response to the horrific fantasmatic logic of the conflicted self within Scottish pessimism. Thus, through intellectual function, the political logic of independence here can be understood as being accentuated towards individual expression and confidence, which taps into the general feeling of optimism and positivity discussed above, and in so doing, constituted chains of equivalence across groups and individuals who sought independence as a means of pursuing better politics and democratic culture than that of Westminster, whilst simultaneously establishing difference between these ambitions and Westminster style managerialism and the internalised conflicted self who would frustrate these goals.

Some further performances we can raise here include the role of music which played a significant role during the referendum in terms of expression of ideas. One of the most prominent and defining songs that came out of the referendum was Gerry Cinnamon's *Hope Over Fear*.[110] The song itself became a staple of Cinnamon's live performances and would go

[110] The lyrics to Hope Over Fear can be found via: https://www.google.com/search?q=hope+over+fear+lyrics&rlz=1C1VDKB_en-

on to become something of an unofficial anthem of the Yes campaign. In an interview in 2015, Cinnamon made several reflections and remarks regarding his song and its status. Despite becoming a defining song of the Yes Campaign, Cinnamon insists the song is not about blind nationalism, rather, 'it is about asking people if they are really happy right now and looking at the changes we can make,' before going on to say that he saw 'independence as a way to pull the veil from over the nonsense and show the hypocrisies and the fact that it's all of us getting shafted,' (The National 2015). From these comments we can clearly discern an appeal to the myth of radical Scotland in terms of the social logic of challenge. Take for example the lyrics, 'Are the words of a few worth a bob coz they wear shirts and ties?' or 'Are you happy that nuclear weapons are dumped on the Clyde?' While the lyrics make a direct reference to this ideal of challenge, we can also view the act and performance of the song itself as a challenge in this sense that it defied the conventional way of doing politics, specifically the reference to 'shirt and tied' politicians which resonates with the idea of political fetish discussed above. In addition, elements of the song also speak and appeal to the fantasmatic logic of radical promise or potential, where independence could be a kick-starter for change for the better. The idea that he believed independence could be a kick-starter for change is evident in the line 'In Manchester, Nottingham, Sheffield they already know, that we're fighting for them and it's only the start of the show.' A further dimension worth noting is that the song was also motivated by the fact Cinnamon was thoroughly 'sick of being told when to be Scottish. We have been taught to hate ourselves, I'm sick of all the stuff you get, like at New Year when you have Jackie Bird, and at a Ceilidh, saying its Hogmanay, now you're allowed to be Scottish,' (The National, 2015). We can consider this statement and

---

GBGB959GB959&oq=hope+over+fear+lyrics&aqs=chrome..69i57j0i390l2j69i60l2.3521j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

In addition, several live (rather shaky and patchy) recordings of live performances of the song can be found on YouTube.

sentiment an acknowledgement of the fantasmatic logic of the conflicted self within the myth of pessimistic Scotland, which through the song, Cinnamon argues should be resisted and overcome.

When reflecting on the role of song in sport, Hassan comments that what underpins the singing of certain songs is a shift in the idea of 'what people think Scotland means and reclaiming and remaking of public space and culture and how that relates to being a nation. It informs a lived experience of what Scotland is and defines people and place in a distinctive way,' (Hassan, 2022b). Benedict Anderson considered music a key element in terms of how we imagine nations and national identity, 'not just in terms of nation anthems, but sounds more generally, the instruments, rhythms and movements and how these symbolise and evoke nations. Insofar as the independence debate was about national identity, music was important,' (Street, 2014). Likewise, McFadyen (2018) argues that musical events can be conceived as relational aesthetic experiences through which ideas of the nation were performed, but also, in many ways the nation was created, re-worked or redefined. Through intellectual function, song and music more generally can then be considered specified social accents with which to express and articulate ideas of the nation. We can therefore envisage how performances such as Cinnamon's were translations of the myth of Civic Scotland, one that espoused the social logic of open and unrestricted participation while at the same time appealing to the fantasmatic narrative of good and desirable democratic practice. At the same time, they provide individuals with 'the means of expressing these ideas in a language or accent that is both tangible and music's semantic power can expand the awareness of possibilities, focusing awareness of the present,' (McFadyen, 2018). Through the lens of intellectual function, a social accent of music could grasp and articulate, through the political logic of independence the respective myths of Scottish nationalism and their associated

logics, giving them form and meaning in relation to the lived experience of both performer and listener, with Gerry Cinnamon's performance simply reflecting one of many that attempted to do just this during the 2014 referendum.

Aside from everyday performances during the referendum, there were also several more 'explicitly theatrical events and performances that were responding to and generating creative engagement with the independence debate,' (Bissell & Overend, 2015: 245). The 2014 Edinburgh Fringe Festival was a prime time and location for such performances. On the 19th February, at the 2014 Brit Awards, David Bowie won Best British Male artist, and while not present at the ceremony, former Oasis star Noel Gallagher and supermodel Kate Moss accepted the award and deliver some words on his behalf. The final words of the speech simply read: "And Scotland, stay with us." In response to Bowie's intervention, a group of Scottish artists headed by playwright David Greig, created a show for that summer's Edinburgh Festival, which would set up camp in Bowie's (metaphorical) Manhattan rooftop apartment for all manner of discussions and performances on a range of issues and debates that the referendum campaign was covering. The creators explain that:

> "Our idea was to explore Scottish culture and politics and politics from surprising angles, to interest the audience in independence but not try to convert them, to create a show that felt like one of those good nights you get in the pub after a grassroots Indy event: a session where people are fizzing with ideas and gossip, intimate enough that everyone gets a shot at talking but open enough that folk feel free to discuss concerns as well as hopes and dreams…lubricated enough that there's a seasoning of songs, stores and poems as well." (All Back to Bowie's, 2014a)

The show ran from the 1st – 24th August, with everyday covering a new theme and topic, ranging from the nature of the Yes campaign, the role and place of gender, the relationships

between Scotland and the rest of the UK to various 'myths' of Scottishness. The shows included panel debates, music, and poetry in addition to segments where the audience were invited to write their responses to a prompt of the day, with responses written on anything that happened to be in hand![111] For example, one show was titled 'Exploring Tory Scotland' and one audience response to the prompt Tory Scotland is…? is worth highlighting here. The response read "Tory Scotland is something that represents privilege and elitism, beyond my own and most people's experience in working class Scotland," (All Back to Bowie's, 2014b). Another show was centred around the ideas of community, with several responses highlighting that "Community is people living and working together. In times of need we support and help each other." With others echoing these sentiments, stating the "Community is the foundation of our character and culture" and "Community is an opportunity to control our future," (All Back to Bowie's, 2014c). We can mark out several appeals to and evocations of the myths of Scottish nationalism in these responses and the very nature of the intended shows as described above suggests a clear appeal and acknowledgement of the myth of Civic Scotland in terms of both the social logic of active participation where audiences were encouraged to share and elaborate their views, regardless of how developed or articulate. In addition, the appeal to the atmosphere of the pub, convivial and fizzing discussion where people could openly discuss hopes and fears can be considered a clear appeal to the fantasmatic logic of democratic praxis in the sense that this conduct was an example of suitably good and Scottish practice of democracy that should be upheld and encouraged. The selection of audience responses highlighted above demonstrate a clear evocation of the myth of egalitarian Scotland. The emphasis on community in select audience responses

[111] On a personal note, it is to my great regret that I never got the chance to attend one of these shows or any 2014 Edinburgh Festival show for that matter. But what made this specific show noteworthy is that it demonstrates both the utility and value in seeking and evaluating the self-contextualization of subjects in response to the various social and political stimuli to which they were being exposed to at the time of the referendum. Whether that is displayed in humour or serious reflection, these accounts are invaluable.

demonstrates a clear acknowledgement and appeal to the social logic of community, where community is at the heart of political and social action, and the community should be privileged above all. This also speaks to the fantasmatic logic of egalitarianism in the sense that community is imbued with certain values such as equality and opportunity, something that is juxtaposed to the 'other' of Tory Scotland and by extension Westminster, which lacks these essential qualities.

It would be impossible to highlight the themes and responses of every show, just as it would be impossible to cover every instance of theatrical performance. However, by highlighting All Back to Bowie's we can posit more generally that 'what these performances demonstrated, was the desire to open a space for dialogue and debate. Indeed, one could argue that the referendum became a catalyst for a large-scale relational aesthetic to emerge,' (Bissell & Overend, 2015: 247). Shows such as All Back to Bowie's, among others, demonstrated the responsiveness and attentiveness of theatre to political and social context, 'with the communal nature of many of these events resembling artistically constructed relational spaces which aimed to give everyone the opportunity and chance to contribute,' (Bissell & Overend, 2015: 247). There is a clear and strong resonance with this understanding to Gramsci's associational free spaces that allow for collective experience sharing and contribution from members of a given social group. Aside from reinforcing appeals to the social and fantasmatic logics of myth of Civic Scotland here, we can utilise intellectual function to highlight how the above further highlights an appeal to the radical social logic of challenge. Through intellectual function, the various performances and theatres can be understood as a challenge to the dominant or orthdox style of politics. In addition, the content as these shows sought to challenge conventional thinking which in turn suggests an acknowledgement of the social logic of head over heart contained within the myth of Scottish pessimism. The metaphorical

theatre was often constituted through the live discussion that emerged in the moment, 'utilising performance as a relational framework to examine and critique the topics and arguments as well as consider their implications,' (Bissell & Overend, 2015: 247). A similar sentiment is expressed by Jen Harvie who argues that 'artistic performance is never only abstract ideas, but always material practice enacted in – and constituted by and constituting – networks of social relations,' (Harvie, 2005: 5). In the same way, intellectual performance and function is never abstract, but always material and embedded and conditioned, constituted and constituting within the social relations of associational space. As such through intellectual function, we can conceive the various 'theatrical' performances during the referendum as a specified social accent, where through mediums and variety of theatre and performance, individuals found expression and sought to apply meaning and understanding of the nation. Operating through the political logic of independence, these performances sought to draw out and establish chains of equivalence between those elements that united people in their support for an independent Scotland, while at the same time, marking out their differences and distinctions between supporters and the internal and external others.

6.7 Scotland's Summer of Living Dangerously and the status of Scottish Nationalism

In applying the Logics approach and intellectual function to the study of Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, the research here has sought to highlight the contextual specificity of Scottish nationalism, its differential articulations and practices, and its constituting logics that were operant during this period. In so doing, the research has provided a critical evaluation of myth-making as a specific articulatory practice within the nationalist repertoire. It has not been the aim here to pass judgement in terms of how successful these articulations in achieving independence, rather, the critical dimension relates to how and why articulations and appeals to specific elements were made in relation to

both their individual group context, as well as the wider socio-political climate. The engagement with specific national myths and their respective logics has demonstrated that these elements possessed a remarkable vitality and dynamism within Scottish nationalism and the pro-independence more specifically in the case here. The research has highlighted how Scottish nationalism more generally has been subject to fundamental changes, both in terms of content and approach in response to economic, social, and political conditions that they faced during these periods.

In his book *Caledonian Dreaming*, published during the referendum campaign, Gerry Hassan argued that 'change does not come from institutions or enlightened authority, nor does it come from myths or ideology, or ideas floated in a vacuum isolated from wider societal forces. Instead, it would require a crucial combination of three factors: Values, Vessels, and Voices,' (Hassan, 2014a: 166). Briefly, Hassan defines Values as that which 'characterises public life, what we do, how we interpret it, our actions, behaviours and wider outcomes of society, while the notion of voice addresses the language and underlying philosophies of how people speak and interact and challenging the increasing disembodied language of experts and professional classes,' (Hassan, 2014a: 167-170). Finally, Vessels refers to 'a sense of collective agency which people feel they have created, in which they have a sense of confidence and ownership and can see themselves and their views represented and articulated in day-to-day practices. It is about the spaces where people can find their genuine voice, where they can sense their values are being nurtured and nourished,' (Hassan, 2014a: 172). Through the application of intellectual function, we can point out some clear resonances between Hassan's three factors for change and the articulations and expressions of Scottish nationalism during the referendum campaign through a political logic of independence. Hassan's characterisation of Values can be understood through the emergence and

development of the 4 myths of Scottish nationalism and their respective logics identified during the genealogical analysis. That is to say that these myths represent a collective packaging of values and logics that constituted Scottish nationalism and informed both the conduct and content of many of the debates during the referendum campaign. Hassan's characterisation of vessels resonates with Gramsci's conception of associational free spaces, where organic intellectuals and individuals would be to share in their collective experiences and contribute to the construction of a hegemonic project. In addition, the idea of a 'genuine voice' can be compared to Voloshinov's conception of multi-accentual discourse, with the genuine voice of the individual reflecting their position within a given social group and their wider environment, and through this voice and interactions with and between social groups and individuals, produce specific meanings and identities to the elements and logics of the myths of Scottish nationalism that they engaged with. Furthermore, the application of intellectual function highlights how the selection and articulation of these values were both carefully considered and expressed in the respective voices of each vessel, which were themselves attuned and sensitive the immediate conditions of their social bases.

Both NC and RIC were for Hassan, examples of Third Scotland, which reflected a 'generational and gendered shift, populated by lots of hopeful, energised twenty-somethings, almost entirely pro-independence, not on traditional nationalist grounds; rather, it is a politics that puts social change first and independence second, although it sees a direct link between the two,' (Hassan, 2014c: 65). Hassan has further argued that the groups and organisations associated with third Scotland, 'gave voice to a Scotland that did not see itself as signed up to the old establishment (Labour) or the emerging new one (SNP). And while 2014 may now seem a long time ago now, the expressions of third Scotland demonstrated profound shifts. Crucially in terms of 'how political and cultural production was being practiced and created

which themselves found an audience and very public constituency,' (Hassan, 2022a: 180). For Ben Jackson, this reflected a particular common ground between proponents of independence in that there is a certain reluctance to declare that the case for independence is founded on nationalism. Rather, 'it rests on a positive and inclusive decision to create a more egalitarian Scotland that will surely emerge once it is severed from the decrepit hulk that is the British state,' (Jackson, 2014a: 16). Through intellectual function we can posit that Scottish nationalism provided space for the expression and embrace of these articulations, subject positions, and rhetoric, where the contradictory messages where targeted at different groups. For traditional labour voters in Scotland's working-class heartlands, 'the message was firmly social democratic: independence (and the SNP more broadly) were the only hope for a return to old Labour values; whereas to business leaders the prospect was presented as one of low-taxes and deregulation,' (Foley & Ramand, 2017: 87-8). This is what Hall claims Gramsci meant by organic (historically effective) ideology, it 'articulates into a configuration different subjects, identities, projects and aspirations. In this sense it does not reflect, rather it constructs a unity out of difference,' (Hall, 1988: 166).

This is precisely the role that Scottish nationalism has played, not just in the context of the 2014 referendum, but across its modern development. With the political logic of independence providing the necessary frame with which to establish chains of equivalence amongst the various pro-independence groups and organisations, while at the same time delineating the Scottish nation in terms of its difference and distinction to both internal and external others. What the investigation of Scottish nationalism more generally has demonstrated is the significance of agency to the operation of nationalism. While an elitist dimension did exist, the 2014 referendum, when viewed as a dislocatory moment, created the conditions of possibility for a genuine bottom-up articulation, expression, and construction of

the Scottish nation and what this entailed. The possibility and operation of bottom-up nationalism is something that has been largely overlooked and obscured through orthodox approaches to nationalism, but through a discursive approach and conception of nationalism that privileges agency and context, alongside the development of intellectual function as a supplementary analytical tool, we have been able to push the boundaries of nationalism research and provide critical evaluation and novel knowledge of the constructions of the nation during Scotland's summer of living dangerously.

Conclusion

Nationalism remains one of the foremost political forces in contemporary society, evident from 'the political rhetoric, media debates, public symbols and ceremonies to popular culture, sport, music and arts, so much so that nation-ness continues to occupy a prominent position in our daily lives,' (Day & Thompson, 2004: xi). Classical debates on nationalism have tended to focus on the search for origins and essences, however, these debates have become theoretically parochial and conceptually sterile in both their understanding and application of the term and phenomenon in contemporary politics. The challenge then for nationalism studies more broadly, has been to push beyond these boundaries, where what is represented as original, essential, and shared within the nation and national identity, has always been 'constructed across and through difference, because cultural distinctions of background, class, ethnicity, race and sexuality are the very things that constitute national identity,' (Hall, 2017: 139-140). In recent years, several approaches to nationalism have been developed through a range of disciplines, which have challenged economic-determinist and reductionist readings of nationalism, and in so doing, emphasised human agency in the motivations and intentions of nationalist politics. Nationalism and national movements more generally can then be analysed as 'an array of variegated, strategic responses to broader contextual developments, involving cultural and doctrinal conflicts that require political deliberation to resolve,' (Benner, 2018: 6-7). Scottish nationalism, both as a general phenomenon and specifically in the context of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum has offered a particularly fruitful case for further developing an approach to studying and evaluating nationalism on these grounds.

The opening chapter sought to reassess the concept of nationalism by exploring its explanatory origins and how the concept and terms has been utilised and applied to Scottish

nationalism more generally as well as its application in the context of the 2014 referendum. The predominant approaches of modernism, ethno-symbolism and Marxism were considered alongside the more recent developments of social constructivism and probed for essentialisms and elements that prove problematic and in so doing, two elements were found to be lacking in these accounts. The first concerned the role of agency in nationalism, where a lack of appreciation for how individuals engage with and practice nationalism as well as how nationalism itself structures and informs social relations and practices significantly hindered the scope and depth of any potential studies of the 2014 referendum. In addition, and relatedly, a second issue of context was raised, where the above approaches tend to marginalise the influence that context holds over nationalism. In the case of the Scottish nationalism, where independence has become the defining topic of modern Scottish politics, understanding how and why independence rose from the fringes to the mainstream and what understandings of underlying socio-political forces can be drawn, as well as the changing ideas of what Scotland is and what it entails are questions that orthodox approaches to studying nationalism were found to be ill-equipped to solve.

Chapter 2 engaged in a process of commensuration which began by outlining a discourse-theoretical approach to nationalism that provided the foundations on which to build an approach and conceptualisation of nationalism that was attuned and sensitive to the issues of agency and context. Through the concepts of articulation and radical contingency, discursive approaches conceptualise nationalism as a discourse that is structured around the nodal point nation, thus producing a specific way of understanding, and interpreting the social reality and guiding action. This minimal definition of nationalism is however limited in its application and not well suited to grasp the specificity of nationalism in terms of its contexts and agency and so requires the development of further grammars and analytical tools to evaluate

nationalism in a robust and conclusive manner. To this end, the research has moved to reactivate the concept of intellectual function. By returning to Gramsci's concept of organic intellectuals and writings on language and reading this alongside Voloshinov's concept of social multi-accentuality, then under the assumptions of articulation and contingency, intellectuals are facilitators of the articulation of experience. They must be attuned but also immersed and participant in various social groups, allowing them to translate the various social accents that every social group uses to internalise and make sense of the world around them, with each accent providing and articulating new meaning to both the nation, and the elements that constitute it. These insights were then made commensurable to discourse theory in their application to the concept of intellectual function in Laclau, thus producing a novel analytical tool within the wider repertoire of discourse theory for use in empirical research. In doing so, the research presented here contributes to both nationalism studies and discourse theoretical inspired research. On the one hand, it develops the discursive conceptualisation of nationalism produced by De Cleen & Stavrakakis (2017), as a discourse that constructs the nation towards specified ends, whose agency are contingent on their context. In addition, the research contributes to wider discursive literature through the development of a novel analytical tool, one that is attuned and capable of engaging with the specific and differential manifestations and expressions of nationalism and national movements in their given contexts. In this way, the reactivated intellectual function becomes another metaphorical tool in the toolbox of discourse theory's concepts and grammars, (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007).

To operationalise both this discursive conception of nationalism and intellectual function, the research adopted a Logics approach as set out by Glynos & Howarth (2007) which consists of 5 steps. Problematisation, Retroduction, Logics, Articulation and Critique. Problematisation refers to the puzzle(s) confronted by this thesis, which concerned the explanatory deficits of

predominant approaches to nationalism in their application to the 2014 referendum. Stemming from this, questions raised in terms of the specific constructions and expressions of Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014 referendum, and what the relationships between individual practices associated with this nationalism and context to these constructions were at the heart of this research. The process of retroduction has been ongoing throughout the completion of this thesis, with revisions in terms of definitions, the nature of intellectual function, and the elements of nationalism best suited to their application. Through readings and engagements with analyses of nationalism the research highlighted the importance and significance of myth and myth-making to nationalist discursive repertoires in the Scottish context, hinging on the centrality of differentiating and distinguishing Scotland from England and the mobilisation of these differences in pursuit of specified goals of Scottish nationalism. Given the theoretical and qualitative nature of the research, the selection of both material and technique were vital to addressing the context and specificity of practices surrounding Scottish nationalism.

To compliment the Logics approach, the research utilised Foucault's genealogical method as a means of identifying the fault lines of Scottish nationalism through the emergence and development of a series of myths across Scottish political history from the 1960s until 2014. Through highlighting several events in this period, and through engagement with contemporary materials, the research demonstrated and evaluated how specific myths became articulated and sedimented into the Scottish nationalist imaginary. The analysis considered 4 myths and several social and fantasmatic logics associated with each respective myth and through an application of intellectual function, the research demonstrated the articulatory practices and processes through which these myths and logics were constituted within Scottish nationalism in response to certain contexts through a political logic of independence.

In addition, the application of intellectual function facilitated a critique of how and why these myths were identified as both suitable and necessary constitutive elements for pursuing the ends of Scottish nationalism, these being devolution and subsequently full independence. In addition, the research has demonstrated how several elements encompassed others, whilst other would drop-away as less significant in a kind of boiling down process that occurred over the course of trying to articulate all these elements into a coherent discursive regime.

Having established the contingent development of Scottish nationalism up until the point of the 2014 referendum, the research shifted gears to critically engage with the specific and differential expressions of that nationalism during the 2014 referendum campaign. To this end the research highlighted three campaign groups of note, the official Yes Scotland, National Collective and the Radical Independence Campaign, and through applying intellectual function to the activities and discourses employed by these groups, critical assessments have been made not in terms of whether or not these respective groups articulations and interactions with the myths of Scottish nationalism and their corresponding logics were successful in their end goals, but with regards to how and why certain practices and messages were adopted in response to these interactions as well as the local and wider socio-political context of the referendum campaigns. These discussions were further supplemented with consideration and discussion of some of these contexts and more individual acts and performances. With these articulations in place and through the application of intellectual function, the research has constructed a narrative about the ways in which Scottish nationalism evolved, both in terms of its discourse and practices that were utilised during the referendum campaign, which logics came to the fore in which instance and how these were informed by the social accents, logics, and context of their expression. The initial problematisation, the question of nationalism, thus yields a critical explanation of the

multiplicity of agency and context in the constitution and expression of Scottish nationalism during the 2014 referendum, complimented by a series of orbiting logics and their interactions with specific groups. In so doing, the research has further elaborated on the conditions of possibility for a genuine bottom-up expression and construction of nationalism as a discourse, something that orthodox accounts of nationalism are ill-suited to engage with and made possible through a revised discursive definition of nationalism and the application of the analytical tool of intellectual function.

The research presented here is not without limitations or what we might otherwise call unexplored possibilities and some of these should be acknowledged briefly. For example, some further attention to the gender dimension and engagement with Women for Independence in a similar manner to NC and RIC would have helped to enhance the scope of the analysis, however, due to time constraints brought on by Covid-19 and availability of materials, it was not possible to include this in the thesis. Furthermore, the theoretical and qualitative nature of the thesis is a consequence of several factors, not least the Covid-19 pandemic which severely impacted the completion of the initial research strategy through Q methodology. However, the reassessment and redesign of the research as presented in this thesis is evidence of the working of the retroductive cycle within the Logics approach. In addition, intellectual function can be utilised and tuned to the role of the researcher. The exact application of the tools, and techniques adopted in this thesis represent an attempt on my part to translate experience, whose utility ultimately is decided by the familiarity of the researcher to the topic at hand and as such constitutes one way such a research project can be carried out, but by no means precludes alternatives. Indeed, the choice of qualitative methods does not preclude or exclude the possibility of alternative techniques and research methods both qualitative and quantitative. The adoption of these will depend on the context and research

goals of the specific project, but some particularly interesting and fruitful methods include the varieties of text and content analysis as well as Q methodology, all of which offer insights into aspects and elements of nationalism that can reinforce and supplement the understandings and knowledge produced through this thesis.

The focus on the 2014 referendum itself raises some questions regarding the applicability of the approach and its conception of nationalism. As highlighted above, it has not been the intention or the desired outcome of this thesis to produce a general or universal theory of nationalism, likewise, it has not been the purpose or intent to engage in 'hype' of nationalism and nationalist movements. The discursive conception of nationalism elaborated in this thesis alongside the reactivated analytical tool of intellectual function has sought to provide the necessary conceptual means to serve as a robust foundation upon which to discuss questions of political strategy and direction of future iterations that Scottish nationalism and nationalism more generally may or may not take and how exactly we should approach this task when it comes to empirical research. In other words, what we have sought here is 'to illuminate a piece of the canvas in the sense that the glimmer of the lighthouse is more important to the sailor than the brightness of the sun,' (Özkirimli, 2003: 354).

As matters turned out, the independence referendum has proven as much a beginning as an end, another stage in the constitutional re-imagining of Scotland, (Blain, 2016: 228). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to be able to offer an informed judgement on future trends and developments, but for some commentators the future of Scottish politics can be said to be one where Scottish autonomy and a qualified independence will be central, 'where the language of difference and distinctiveness remains, and where the issue of how to implement and understand centre-left ideas and values will be a cornerstone of any foreseeable near future,'

(Hassan, 2016: 43). Nationalism remains one of the most powerful and gripping phenomena in contemporary politics and society, and its prevalence is matched only by the variety of manifestations that we observe. The central thrust of this thesis has been to problematise the dominant conceptions and understandings of nationalism, and through this develop the conceptual and analytical tools necessary to critically engage with specific contexts, agency, and expressions of nationalism as we experience them. This is a necessary step for both nationalism studies more generally and discourse theoretical research, as developing and establishing robust and effective methods and tools for engagement with these complex and intricate political moments is essential for any critical engagement. To this end, this thesis has elaborated and developed a discursive conception of nationalism and further supplemented this with a renewed analytical tool in the intellectual function, providing the means with which approach and engage with the specificity of the agency and context of nationalism, in the hope that this analysis has expanded our knowledge of both nationalism as a general phenomenon and of Scottish nationalism as one of its many and varied manifestations.

Bibliography

Adamson, K. & Lynch, P. (2014a) The Scottish National Party and the 2014 Independence Referendum in Adamson, K. & Lynch, P. eds. (2014) Scottish Political Parties and the 2014 Independence Referendum, Welsh Academic Press, Cardiff

Adamson, K. & Lynch, P. (2014b) Conclusion: Scottish Political Parties and the 2014 Independence Referendum in Adamson, K. & Lynch, P. eds. (2014) Scottish Political Parties and the 2014 Independence Referendum, Welsh Academic Press, Cardiff

Agnew, J. (2018) Too Many Scotlands? Place, the SNP, and the future of nationalist mobilization, Scottish Geographical Journal, Vol. 134 Iss. 1-2 pp. 5-23

Allmendinger, P. (2001) The Head and the Heart. National Identity and Urban Planning in a Devolved Scotland, International Planning Studies, 6:1, pp. 33-54

All Back to Bowie's (2014a) Ground Control, n.d. Available via: https://www.allbacktobowies.com/ground-control/ [Last Accessed: 12/09/23]

All Back to Bowie's (2014b) Audience Responses to Prompt 'Tory Scotland is…?, Saturday 9th August 2014, Viewed at the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, [29/08/19] Acc.13585/TD3595(7)

All Back to Bowie's (2014c) Audience Responses to Prompt 'Community is…?', Friday 15th August 2014, Viewed at the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, [29/08/19] Acc.13585/TD3595(13)

Anastasiou, M. (2019) Of Nation and People: The Discursive Logic of Nationalist Populism, Javnost – The Public, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 330-345

Anastasiou, M. (2020) The spatiotemporality of nationalist populism and the production of political subjectivities, Subjectivity, Vol.13 Iss. 3, pp. 217-234

Anderson, B. (2003) Responses in Culler, J. & Cheah, P. eds (2003) Grounds of Comparison: Around the work of Benedict Anderson, Routledge, London & New York

Anderson, B. (2016) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London

Anderson, P. (2017) The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, Verso, London

Anderson, R. D. (1985) 'In search of the "lad of parts": The mythical history of Scottish education, History Workshop Journal, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 82-104

Antonsich, M. & Skey, M. (2017) Affective Nationalism: Issues of power, agency and method, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 41, Iss. 6, pp. 843-845

Arditi, B. (2007) Post-hegemony: Politics outside the usual post-Marxist paradigm, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 13 Iss. 3, pp. 205-226

Arnott, P. (2022) Dinner with No Voters: Or "What I wanted to say before the Pudding hit the fan" in Small, M. ed. (2022) Bella Caledonia: An Anthology of Writing from 2007-2021, Leamington Books, Edinburgh, also available online via: https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2014/07/17/dinner-with-no-voters-or-what-i-wanted-to-say-before-the-pudding-hit-the-fan/ [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

Avineri, S. (1991) Marxism and Nationalism, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, pp. 637-657

Balibar, E. & Wallerstein, I. (1991) Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, Verso, London

Bambery, C. (2018) A People's History of Scotland 2nd Edition, Verso, London

Barr, A. R. (2014a) Yestival Diary – Prologue, National Collective 29th June 2014, Available via: http://nationalcollective.com/yestival/2014/06/29/prologue/ [Last Accessed through Wayback Machine: 29/08/23]

Barr, A. R. (2014b) Yestival Diary – Montrose, National Collective 30th July 2014, Available via: http://nationalcollective.com/yestival/2014/07/30/diary-montrose/ [Last Accessed through Wayback Machine: 29/08/23]

Barr, A. R. (2016) The Summer of Independence: Stories from a Nation in the Making, Word Power Books, Edinburgh

Bauer, O. (2000) The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy edt. Nimni, E. trans. O'Donnell, J., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London

Bauer, O. (2012) The Nation in Balakrishnan, G. edt. (2012) Mapping the Nation, Verso, London

Benner, E. (2008) Nationalism within Reason, Australian Journal of Politics & History, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 28-40

Benner, E. (2018) Really Existing Nationalisms: A Post-Communist View from Marx and Engels, Verso, London

Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism, Sage Publications, London

Billig, M. (2017) Banal Nationalism and the Imagining of Politics in Skey, M. & Antonsich, M. eds. (2017) Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism, Palgrave Macmillan, London

Billings, D. B. (1990) Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 96, No.1, pp.1-31

Bissell, L. & Overend, D. (2015) Early Days: Reflections on the Performance of a Referendum, Contemporary Theatre Review, Vol. 25 No.2, pp.242-250

Blain, N. (2016) Afterword: Reimagining Scotland in a New Political Landscape in in Blain, N. & Hutchinson, D. with Hassan, G. eds (2016) Scotland's Referendum and the Media: National and International Perspectives, Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh

Blain, N. & Hutchinson, D. with Hassan, G. eds. (2016) Scotland's Referendum and the Media: National and International Perspectives, Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh

Bottici, C. & Challand, B. (2006) Rethinking Political Myth: The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(3), pp. 315-336

Bourdieu, P. (1991) Language and Symbolic Power, Polity Press, Cambridge

Boyd, C. (2014) If you think Yes voters were backing nationalism, then you weren't paying attention, Red Pepper, 19th September 2014, Available via: https://www.redpepper.org.uk/if-you-think-yes-voters/ [Last Accessed: 06/02/23]

Boyd, C. (2015) Radical Scotland is here to stay, Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture, Iss. 59, pp. 32-36

Breeze, M., Gorringe, H., Jamieson, L. & Rosie, M. (2015) 'Everybody's Scottish at the End of the Day': Nationalism and Social Justice amongst Young Yes Voters, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 24 Iss. 4, pp. 419-431

Breuilly, J. (1993) Nationalism and the State 2nd Edition, Manchester University Press, Manchester

Breuilly, J. (2005) 'Dating the nation: how old is an old nation?' in A. Ichijo & G. Uzelac eds. (2005) When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism Routledge, London

Breuilly, J. (2012) Approaches to Nationalism in Balakrishnan, G. edt. (2012) Mapping the Nation, Verso, London

Brubaker, R. (1998) Myths and misconceptions in the study of nationalism in Hall, J. A. edt (1998) The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Brubaker, R. (2020) Populism and Nationalism, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 26 Iss. 1, pp. 44-66

Butler, J., Laclau, E. & Žižek, S. (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, Verso, London

Cairney, P. & McGarvey, N. (2013) Scottish Politics 2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Calhoun, C. (1997) Nationalism, Open University Press, Milton Keynes

Calhoun, C. (2017) The Rhetoric of Nationalism in Skey, M. & Antonsich, M. eds. (2017) Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism, Palgrave Macmillan, London

Carpentier, N. (2017) The Discursive-Material Knot: Cyprus in Conflict and Community Media Participation, Peter Lang, New York

Carpentier, N. & De Cleen, B. (2007) Bringing Discourse Theory into Media Studies, Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 6 Iss. 2, pp. 267-295

Carruthers, G. (2009) Scottish Literature, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Carruthers, G. (2018) Postscript: The Strange Death of Literary Unionism in Carruthers, G. & Kidd, C. eds. (2018) Literature and Union: Scottish Texts, British Contexts, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Childs, P. (2006) Texts: Contemporary and Cultural Texts and Critical Approaches, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Cohen, A. P. (1996) Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of Some Rites, Rights and Wrongs, American Ethnologist, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp.802-815

Conversi, D. (2007) Mapping the field: Theories of Nationalism and the ethno-symbolic approach in Leoussi, A. S. & Grosby, S. eds (2007) Nationalism and ethno-symbolism: History, culture and ethnicity in the formation of nations, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Craig, C. (1996) Out of History: Narrative Paradigms in Scottish and British Culture in McCrone, D. (2017) The New Sociology of Scotland, Sage Publications, London

Craig, C. (2018) The Wealth of the Nation: Scotland, Culture and Independence, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Craig, M. (2018) When the Clyde ran Red: A Social History of Red Clydeside, Birlinn Limited, Edinburgh

Crawford, B. (2010) Ten Years of Devolution, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 63 No. 1, pp. 89-97

Crehan, K. (2016) Gramsci's Common Sense: Inequality and its Narratives, Duke University Press, Durham, London

Crowther, J., Martin, I. & Shaw, M. eds. (2003) Renewing Democracy in Scotland, National Institute of Adult Continuing Education, Available via: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jim-Crowther/publication/234715338_Renewing_Democracy_in_Scotland_An_Educational_Source_Book/links/55c8828808aeb97567472f49/Renewing-Democracy-in-Scotland-An-Educational-Source-Book.pdf [Last Accessed: 20/06/22]

Custodi, J. (2021) Nationalism and Populism on the left: The case of Podemos, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 27 Iss. 3, pp. 705-720

Custodi, J. (2023) How should we analyse the patriotism of the populist left: A response to Josep Lobera and Juan Roch, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 29 Iss. 1, pp. 113-116

Custodi, J. & Padoan, E. (2023) The nation of the people: An analysis of Podemos and Five Star Movement's discourse on the nation, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 29 Iss. 2, pp. 414-431

Dardanelli, P. & Mitchell, J. (2014) An Independent Scotland? The Scottish National Party's bid for Independence and its Prospects, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49 No. 3, pp. 88-105

Day, G. & Thompson, A. (2004) Theorizing Nationalism, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke

Davidson, N. (1999) In Perspective: Tom Nairn, International Socialism Journal, No. 82, Available via: https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj2/1999/isj2-082/davidson.htm [Last Accessed: 16/05/23]

Davidson, N. (2000) The Origins of Scottish Nationhood, Pluto Press, London

Davidson, N. (2014a) A Scottish Watershed, New Left Review, No.89, pp. 5-26

Davidson, N. (2014b) Scotland: The Social Movement for Independence and the Crisis of the British State, Revolutionary Socialism in the 21st Century (rs21), 23rd November 2014, Available via: https://www.rs21.org.uk/2014/11/23/scotland-the-social-movement-for-independence-and-the-crisis-of-the-british-state/ [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

De Cleen, B. (2015) "Flemish Friends, Let us Separate!": The Discursive Struggle for Flemish Nationalist Civil Society in the Media, Javnost – The Public, Vol. 22 Iss. 1, pp. 37-54

De Cleen, B. (2016) The Party of the People versus the Cultural Elite: Populism and Nationalism in Flemish radical right rhetoric about artists, JOMEC Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 70-91

De Cleen, B. (2017) Populism and Nationalism in Kaltwasser, C. V., Taggart, P. Espejo, P. O. & Ostiguy, P. eds (2017) The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, Oxford

De Cleen, B. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017) Distinctions and Articulations: A Discourse Theoretical framework for the study of Populism and Nationalism, Javnost – The Public, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 301-319

De Cleen, B. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2020) How should we analyze the connections between Populism and Nationalism: A response to Rogers Brubaker, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 26 Iss. 2, pp. 314-322

De Cleen, B., Moffitt, B., Panayotu, P. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2020) The Potentials and Difficulties of Transnational Populism: The case of the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25), Political Studies, Vol. 68 Iss. 1, pp. 146-166

De Cleen, B. & Glynos, J. (2021) Beyond Populism Studies, Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 20 Iss. 1, pp. 178-195

De Cleen, B., Goyvaerts, J. Carpentier, N. Glynos, J. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2021) Moving Discourse Theory Forward: A five-track proposal for future research, Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 20 Iss. 1, pp. 22-46

Derrida, J. (1997) Of Grammatology quoted in Martilla, T. (2016) Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis: From Political Difference to Empirical Research, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Derrida, J. (2016) Of Grammatology Fortieth Anniversary Edition, trans. Spivak, G. C., John Hopkins University Press

Devine, T. M. (1999) The Scottish Nation 1700-2000, Penguin Press, London

Devine, T. M. (2012) The Scottish Nation: A Modern History, Penguin Books, London

Devine, T. M. (2017) Independence or Union: Scotland's Past or Scotland's Present, Penguin Books, London

Dewar, D, (1999) Speech at the Opening of the Scottish Parliament, 1st July 1999, Transcript available via: https://www.ukpol.co.uk/donald-dewar-1999-speech-at-opening-of-the-scottish-parliament/ [Last Accessed: 22/08/23]

Duchesne, S. (2018) Who's afraid of Banal Nationalism? Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 24 Iss. 4, pp. 841-856

Engström, R. (2018) The (dis)continuation of Scottish Nationalism? A discursive comparison of the Scottish National Party and National Collective, Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 97-115

Farley, E. C. (2014a) Yestival Diary – Lerwick, National Collective 25th July 2014, Available via: http://nationalcollective.com/yestival/2014/07/25/diary-lerwick/ [Last Accessed through Wayback Machine: 29/08/23]

Farley, E. C. (2014b) Yestival Diary – Stirling, National Collective, 4th August 2014, Available via: http://nationalcollective.com/yestival/2014/08/04/diary-stirling/ [Last Accessed through Wayback Machine: 29/08/23]

Finlay, R. J. (1997) Heroes, Myths and Anniversaries in Modern Scotland, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 18 Iss. 1, pp. 108-125

Finlay, R. J. (2004) Modern Scotland 1914-2000, Profile Books, London

Finlay, R. J. (2008) Thatcherism and the Union in Devine, T.M. ed. (2008) Scotland and the Union: 1707-2007, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Finlayson, A. (1998) Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism, Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 3 Iss. 1, pp. 99-118

Finn, D. (2023) Two Centuries of the National Question, Jacobin, 15th February 2023, Available via: https://jacobin.com/2023/02/two-centuries-of-the-national-question [Last Accessed: 09/08/23]

Flitcroft, R. (2021) Populism in the UK: A Critical Analysis of the Discursive Logics of the UK Independence Party, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Essex, Available via: https://repository.essex.ac.uk/31837/ [Last Accessed: 31/07/23]

Foley, J. & Ramand, P. (2014) Yes: The Radical Case for Scottish Independence, Pluto Press, London

Foley J. & Ramand, P. (2017) In fear of populisms: Referendums and Neoliberal Democracy, Socialist Register 2018, Vol. 54 Rethinking Democracy pp. 74-98

Foley, J. & Wray, B. with Davidson, N. (2022) Scotland After Britain: Two Souls of Scottish Independence, Verso, London

Fontana, B. (2015) Intellectuals and Masses: Agency and Knowledge in Gramsci in McNally, M. ed. (2015) Antonio Gramsci, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Fotheringham, B. (2021) A History of the Independence Movement in Fotheringham, B., Sherry, D. & Bryce, C. eds. (2021) Breaking Up the British State: Scotland, Independence & Socialism, Bookmarks Publications, London

Foucault, M. (1977) Nietzsche, Genealogy and History in Foucault, M. (1977) Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Interviews and Essays, edt. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard & Sherry Simon, Cornell University Press, New York

Foucault, M. (1982) On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress in Rainbow, P.
edt. (1984) The Foucault Reader, Pantheon Books, New York

Foucault, M. (1991a) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, Penguin Books, London

Foucault, M. (1991b) Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori, trans. Goldstein, R. J. & Cascaito, J., Semiotext(e), New York

Fox, J. E. (2017) The edges of the nation: a research agenda for uncovering the taken-for-granted foundations of everyday nationhood, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 23, No.1, pp. 26-47

Fraser, N. (1992) Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy in Calhoun, C. (ed.) (1992) Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Freeden, M. (1998) Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? Political Studies, Vol. 46 Iss. 4, pp. 748-765

Freeden, M. (2021) Discourse, Concepts, Ideologies: Pausing for thought, Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 20 Iss.1, pp. 47-61

Gallagher, C., Scothorne, R. & Westwell, A. (2016) Roch Winds: A Treacherous Guide to the State of Scotland, Luath Press, Edinburgh

Gallie, W. B. (1955) Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 56, pp. 167-98

Gellner, E. (1964) Thought and Change, Weidenfield and Nicholson, London

Gellner, E. (1973) Scale and Nation, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 3 pp. 1-17

Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford

Gillen, P. (2014) The Radical Parties and Independence: Another World is Possible? in Adamson, K. & Lynch, P. eds. (2014) Scottish Political Parties and the 2014 Independence Referendum, Welsh Academic Press, Cardiff

Gillet, R. (2018) Foucault's Genealogy in Downing, L. edt. (2018) After Foucault: Culture, Theory, and Criticism in the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Gluckstein, D. & Fotheringham, B. (2021) Scotland, the National Question and Marxism in Fotheringham, B., Sherry, D. & Bryce, C. eds. (2021) Breaking Up the British State: Scotland, Independence & Socialism, Bookmarks Publications, London

Glynos, J. & Howarth, D. (2007) Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory, Routledge, London

Glynos, J. & Howarth, D. (2008) Structure, Agency and Power in Political Analysis: Beyond Contextualised Self-Interpretations, Political Studies Review, Vol. 6, pp. 155-169

Glynos, J. & Howarth, D. (2019) The Retroductive Cycle: The Research Process in Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis in Marttila, T. ed. (2019) Discourse, Culture and Organization: Inquiries into Relational Structures of Power, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Glynos, J., Howarth, D., Flitcroft, R., Love, C., Roussos, K. & Vazquez, J. (2021) Logics, Discourse Theory and Methods: Advances, Challenges and Ways Forward, Journal of Language and Politics, Vol. 20 Iss. 1, pp. 62-78

Goetze, C. (2016) Bringing Claude Levi-Strauss and Pierre Bourdieu Together for a Post-structuralist Methodology to Analyse Myths in Bleisemann de Guevara, B. ed. (2016) Myth and Narrative in International Politics: Interpretive Approaches to the Study of IR, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Gottweis, H. (2003) Theoretical Strategies of Poststructuralist Policy Analysis: Towards an Analytics of Government in Hajer, M. & Wagenaar, H. editors (2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks edt and trans. by Hoare, Q. & Smith, G. N., Lawrence and Wishart, London

Gramsci, A. (1985) Selections from Cultural Writings edts Forgacs, D. & Nowell-Smith, G. trans. Boelhower, W., Lawrence & Wishart, London

Gramsci, A. (2000) The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, edt. Forgacs, D., Lawrence and Wishart, London

Gramsci, A. (2011a) Prison Notebooks Volume 1, edt. Buttigieg, J. A. trans. Buttigieg, J. A. & Callari, A., Columbia University Press, New York

Gramsci, A. (2011b) Prison Notebooks Volume 2, edt. and trans. Buttigieg, J. A., Columbia University Press, New York

Gramsci, A. (2011c) Prison Notebooks Volume 3, edt. and trans. Buttigieg, J. A., Columbia University Press, New York

Gramsci, A. (2014) Selections from Political Writings 1910-1920 edt. Hoare, Q. trans. Mathews, J., Aakar Books, Dehli

Greenfield, L. (1996) Nationalism and Modernity, Social Research, Vol. 63 No. 1, pp. 3-40

Greig, D. (2013) Why the debate on Scottish Independence might be more interesting than you think?, Bella Caledonia, 4th August 2013, Available via: https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2013/08/04/why-the-debate-on-scottish-independence-might-be-more-interesting-than-you-think [Last Accessed: 25/01/23]

Griggs, S. & Howarth, D. (2013) The Politics of Airport Expansion in the United Kingdom: Hegemony, policy and the rhetoric of sustainable aviation, Manchester University Press, Manchester

Griggs, S. & Howarth, D. (2019) Discourse, policy and the environment: hegemony, statements and the analysis of U.K. airport expansion, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, Vol. 21 Iss. 5, pp. 464-478

Griggs, S., Howarth, D. & Feandeiro, A. (2020) The logics and limits of "collaborative governance in Nantes: Myth, ideology, and the politics of new urban regimes, Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 42 Iss. 1, pp. 91-108

Guibernau, M. (2004) Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: A critical assessment, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 10 No. 1-2, pp. 125-141

The Guardian (2014) Andy Murray has no regrets over support for Scottish Independence, 23rd September 2014, Available via: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/sep/23/andy-murray-scottish-independence-tweet-no-regrets [Last Accessed: 13/02/23]

Gutting, G. (2005) Foucault: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Haesly, R. (2005) Identifying Scotland and Wales: Types of Scottish and Welsh National Identities, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 243-263

Hall, S. (1983) The Great Moving Right Show in Hall, S. & Jacques, M. editors (1983) The Politics of Thatcherism, Lawrence & Wishart, Marxism Today, London

Hall, S. (1986) Variants of Liberalism in Donald, J. & Hall, S. (1986) Politics & Ideology, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, Philadelphia

Hall, S. (1993) "For Allon White: Metaphors of Transformations quoted in Hart, G. (2013) Gramsci, Geography, and the Languages of Populism

Hall, S. (1996) Introduction: Who Needs Identity? In Hall, S. & du Gray, P. (1996) Questions of Cultural Identity, Sage Publications, London

Hall, S. (1988) The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left, Verso, London

Hall, S. (2017) The Fateful Triangle: Race, Ethnicity, Nation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, London

Hall, S. (2019) Essential Essays Volume 1: Foundations of Cultural Studies ed. Morely, D., Duke University Press, Durham: North Carolina

Hall, S. (2021a) Selected Writings on Race and Difference, eds. Gilroy, P & Gilmore, R. W., Duke University Press, Durham: North Carolina

Hall, S. (2021b) Selected Writings on Marxism, ed. McLennan, G., Duke University Press, Durham: North Carolina

Hall, S. & Jacques, M. editors (1983) The Politics of Thatcherism, Lawrence & Wishart, Marxism Today, London

Hansard, House of Commons Debate, Vol. 939, Columns 121-127, Monday 14th November 1977 Available via: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1977-11-14/debates/5b5223e8-2a89-4bbd-a64e-7ee2ba1a8493/ScotlandBill [Accessed: 11/08/21]

Hart, G. (2013) Gramsci, Geography, and the Languages of Populism in Ekers, M., Hart, G., Kipfer, S. & Loftus, A. eds. (2013) Gramsci: Space, Nature, Politics. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester

Harvie, C. (2004) Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics 1707 to the Present 4th edition, Routledge, London

Harvie, C. (2016) No Gods and Precious Few Heroes: Scotland 1900-2015 4th Edition, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Harvie, C. & Jones P. (2000) The Road to Home Rule: Images of Scotland's Cause, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Harvie, J. (2005) Staging the UK, Manchester University Press, Manchester

Harvey, M. (2011) Changing the Constitution: How Nationalist Parties in Regional Government are Bringing Change to the UK Constitution, Federal Governance, Vol. 8 Iss. 1, pp. 2-16

Harvey, M. (2013) Consulting the Nation: Public Engagement on the Constitution in Scotland Wales, Working Paper presented as part of Political Studies Association Conference, 25th-27th March 2013, Cardiff, Available via: https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/60_34.pdf [Last Accessed: 09/08/23]

Harvey, M. & Lynch, P. (2012) Inside the National Conversation: The SNP Government and the Politics of Independence 2007-2010, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 80, pp. 91-116

Hassan, G. (2011) Anatomy of a Scottish Revolution: The Potential of Postnationalist Scotland and the Future of the United Kingdom, Political Quarterly, Vol. 82 No. 3, pp. 365-378

Hassan (2012a) The Self-Preservation Society of Civic Scotland, Gerry Hassan: Writing, Research, Policy and Ideas, 21st January 2012 Available via: https://gerryhassan.com/uncategorized/the-self-preservation-society-of-civic-scotland/ [Accessed: 21/07/22]

Hassan, G. (2012b) What are Modern Scotland's Three Defining Stories? Gerry Hassan: Writing, Research, Policy and Ideas, 4th December 2012 Available via: https://gerryhassan.com/blog/what-are-modern-scotlands-three-defining-stories-2/ [Accessed: 29/06/2022]

Hassan, G. (2013) The Emergence of 'the Third Scotland', Gerry Hassan: Writing, Research, Policy and Ideas, 12th September 2013 Available via: https://gerryhassan.com/blog/the-emergence-of-the-third-scotland/ [Accessed: 28/07/2022]

Hassan, G. (2014a) Caledonian Dreaming: The Quest for a Different Scotland, Luath Press, Edinbugh

Hassan, G. (2014b) Independence of the Scottish Mind: Elite Narratives, Public Spaces and the Making of a Modern Nation, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Hassan, G. (2014c) State of Independence: The rise of 'third Scotland', Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture, Iss. 57, pp. 61-72

Hassan, G. (2016) Scotland's Changing 'Community of the Communicators': The Political Commentariat and the Independence Referendum in Blain, N. & Hutchinson, D. with Hassan, G. eds (2016) Scotland's Referendum and the Media: National and International Perspectives, Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh

Hassan, G. (2018) Civil Society, The rise and fall of Civic Scotland and Contextualising Media, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 27 Iss. 1, pp. 36-44

Hassan, G. (2020) Donald Dewar and the Lost Story of Devolution, Bella Caledonia, 8th October 2020 Available via: https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2020/10/08/donald-dewar-and-the-losy-story-of-devolution/ [Accessed: 02/11/21]

Hassan, G. (2022a) Scotland Rising: The Case for Independence, Pluto Press, London

Hassan, G. (2022b) Singing for Scotland at Hampden, Murrayfield and Beyond, Bella Caledonia, 9th February 2022, Available via: https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2022/02/09/singing-for-scotland-at-hampden-murrayfield-and-beyond/ [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

Hassan, G. & Shaw, E. (2012) The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Hassan, G. & Barrow, S. (2019) Scotland the Brave? Assessing the Past Twenty Years and Mapping the Future in Hassan, G. & Barrow, S. eds (2019) Scotland the Brave? Twenty Years of Change and the Politics of the Future, Luath Press, Edinburgh

Hawkins, B. (2015) Fantasies of subjugation: a discourse theoretical account of British policy on the European Union, Critical Policy Studies, 9(2), pp. 139-157

Hearn, J. (2000) Claiming Scotland: National identity and liberal culture, Polygon, Edinburgh

Hearn, J. (2003) Big City: Civic Symbolism and Scottish Nationalism, Scottish Affairs, 42(1), pp. 57-82

Hearn, J. (2007) National Identity: banal, personal and embedded, Nations and Nationalism, No. 13, Vol. 4, pp. 657-674

Hearn J. (2014) Nationalism and normality: a comment on the Scottish Independence Referendum, Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 505-512

Hearn, J. & Antonsich, M. (2018) Theoretical and methodological considerations for the study of banal and everyday nationalism, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 24 Iss. 3, pp594-605

Henderson, A., Johns, R., Larner, J. M., & Carman, C. (2022) The Referendum that Changed a Nation: Scottish Voting Behaviour 2014-2019, Springer Nature, Cham, Switzerland

Hild, E. (2016) Renegotiating Scottish Nationalism after the 2014 Independence Referendum, Études écossaises, No. 18, pp. 151-166

Hobsbawm, E. (1977) Some Reflections on 'The Break-Up of Britain', New Left Review, 105(1), pp.3-23

Hobsbawm, E. (1983) Introduction: Inventing Traditions in Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds) (1983) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Hook, D. (2005) Genealogy, discourse, 'effective history': Foucault and the work of critique, Qualitative Research in Psychology, Vol. 2 Iss. 1, pp. 3-31

Howarth, D. (2000) Discourse, Open University Press, Buckingham

Howarth, D. (2002) An Archaeology of Political Discourse? Evaluating Michel Foucault's Explanation and Critique of Ideology, Political Studies, Vol. 50 pp. 117-135

Howarth, D. (2005) Applying Discourse Theory: The method of articulation in Howarth, D. & Torfing, J. eds (2005) Discourse Theory and European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, Palgrave, London

Howarth, D. (2013) Poststructuralism and After: Structure, Subjectivity and Power, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Howarth, D. (2015) Gramsci, Hegemony and Post-Marxism in McNally, M. ed. (2015) Antonio Gramsci, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Howarth, D. (2018) Marx, discourse theory and political analysis: negotiating an ambiguous legacy, Critical Discourse Studies, Vol. 15 Iss. 4, pp. 377-389

Howarth, D. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) Introducing discourse theory and political analysis in Howarth, D., Stavrakakis, Y. & Norval, A. J. eds. (2000) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, Manchester University Press, Manchester

Howarth, D. & Griggs, S. (2006) Metaphor, Catachresis and Equivalence: The Rhetoric of Freedom to Fly in the Struggle over Aviation Policy in the United Kingdom, Policy and Society, Vol. 25 Iss. 2, pp. 23-46

Howarth, D., Glynos, J. & Griggs, S. (2016) Discourse, Explanation and Critique, Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 10 Iss. 1, pp. 99-104

Hutchinson, J. (2004) Myth against myth: the nation as ethnic overlay, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 10 Iss. 1-2, pp. 109-123

Hutchinson, J. (2005) Nations as Zones of Conflict, Sage Publications, London

Ichijo, A. (2002) The Scope of Theories of Nationalism: Comments on the Scottish and Japanese Experiences, Geopolitics, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 53-74

Ichijo, A. (2004) Scottish Nationalism and the idea of Europe: Concepts of Europe and the Nation, Routledge, Abingdon

Ichijo, A. (2012) Entrenchment of Unionist Nationalism: Devolution and the Discourse of National Identity in Scotland, National Identities, Vol. 14 Iss. 1, pp. 23-37

Ichijo, A. (2013) Nationalism and Multiple Modernities: Europe and Beyond, Palgrave Macmillan, London

Ives, P. (2004) Language and Hegemony in Gramsci, Pluto Press, London

Ives, P. (2005) Language, Agency and Hegemony: A Gramscian response to Post-Marxism, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 455-468

Jackson, B. (2014a) The Political Thought of Scottish Nationalism, Political Quarterly, Vol. 85 No. 1, pp. 50-56

Jackson, B. (2014b) The Break-Up of Britain? The Left and Scottish Nationalism, Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy, Vol. 22 No. 1/2, pp. 15-23

Jackson, B. (2020) The Case for Scottish Independence: A History of Nationalist Political Thought in Modern Scotland, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Jessop, B. (1984) The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods, Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd, Oxford

Jessop, B. (2005) Gramsci as a Spatial Theorist, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 421-437

Johns, R. & Mitchell, J. (2016) Takeover: Explaining the Extraordinary rise of the SNP, Biteback Publishing, London

Jones, P. (1992) Introduction in Linklater, M. & Denniston, R. eds (1992) Anatomy of Scotland: How Scotland Works, Edinburgh, New York, Chambers

Kane, P. (2012) Radical Independence Conference 2012 Declaration, Bella Caledonia 26th November 2012, Available via: https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2012/11/26/radical-independence-conference-2012-declaration/ [Last Accessed: 30/01/23]

Katsambekis, G. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017) Revisiting the Nationalism/Populism Nexus: Lessons from the Greek Case, Javnost – The Public, Vol. 24 Iss. 4, pp. 391-408

Kearton, A. Imagining the Mongrel Nation: Political Uses of History in Recent Scottish Nationalist Movement, National Identities, Vol 7 Iss. 1, pp. 23-50

Keating, M. (2001) Nations against the State: The new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland 2nd edition, Palgrave, Houndmills, Basingstoke

Keating, M. (2010) The Government of Scotland: Public Policy Making After Devolution 2nd Edition, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Keating, M. (2017) Debating Scotland: Issues of Independence and Union in the 2014 Referendum, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Keating, M. & Bleiman, D. (1979) Labour and Scottish Nationalism, Macmillan, London

Kemp, A. (1993) The Hollow Drum: Scotland Since the War quoted in Lynch, P. (2019) Aye or Nae: The Referendum Experience in Scotland 1979-2014, Welsh Academic Press, Cardiff

Kerr, W. (2019) The descent of nations: social evolutionary theory, modernism and ethno-symbolism, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 104-123

Kidd, C. (2008) Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland 1500-2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Kidd, C. & Petrie, M. (2016) The Independence Referendum in Historical and Political Context in McHarg, A., Mullen, T., Page, A. & Walker, N. eds. (2016) The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Kipfer, S. (2013) City, Country, Hegemony: Antonio Gramsci's Spatial Historicism in Ekers, M., Hart, G., Kipfer, S. & Loftus, A. eds. (2013) Gramsci: Space, Nature, Politics. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester

Laclau, E. (1979) Politics & Ideology in Marxist Theory, Verso, London

Laclau, E. (1990) New Reflections on the Revolutions of our Time, Verso, London

Laclau, E. (1994) Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics in Howarth, D. editor (2015) Ernesto Laclau: Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York

Laclau, E. (1996) Emancipation(s), Verso, London

Laclau, E. (2000) Constructing Universality in Butler, J., Laclau, E. & Žižek, S. (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, Verso, London

Laclau, E, (2003) On imagined communities in Cheah, P. & Culler, J. D. edts (2003) Grounds of Comparison: Around the work of Benedict Anderson, Routledge, Abingdon

Laclau, E. (2005a) On Populist Reason, Verso, London

Laclau, E. (2005b) Populism: What's in a Name? in Howarth, D. editor (2015) Ernesto Laclau: Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York

Laclau, E. (2014) The Rhetorical Foundations of Society, Verso, London

Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, London

Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1987) Post-Marxism without Apologies, New Left Review, 166 (11-12), pp. 79-106

Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2014) Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 2nd Edition, Verso, London, New York

Law, A. (2001) Near and far: Banal national identity and the press in Scotland, Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 23, pp. 299-317

Law, A., (2015) Mediating the Scottish independence debate, Media education journal, Vol. 56, pp.3-7

Law, A. (2017) Scottish Exceptionalism? Normative Codes of Scottish Nationalism in the British and EU crises, Cambio. Rivista sulle trasformazioni Sociali, No. 7 Iss. 13, pp. 51-66

Legget, W. (2013) Restoring society to post-structuralist politics: Mouffe, Gramsci and radical democracy, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 39 Iss. 3, pp. 299-315

Leith, M. S. (2011) Governance and Identity in a Devolved Scotland, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 63 No. 2, pp. 286-301

Leith, M. S. (2012) The view from above: Scottish National Identity as an elite concept, National Identities, Vol. 14 Iss. 1, pp. 39-51

Leith, M. S. & Soule, D. P. J. (2011) Political Discourse and National Identity in Scotland, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Leith, M. S. & Sim, D. (2020) Scotland: The New State of an Old Nation, Manchester University Press, Manchester

Leith, M. S. & Radowicz, J. A., (2022) The Importance of Old and New Symbolism in Modern Scottish National Identity, Intercultural Relations, Vol. 6 No.2 (12), pp.68-85

Lemke, T. (2019) Foucault's Analysis of Modern Governmentality: A Critique of Political Reason, trans. Erik Butler, Verso, London

Lumsden, K. (2018) Why Themes don't Emerge from the Data, The Qualitative Researcher, 2nd December 2018, Available via: https://qualitativetraining.com/2018/12/02/why-themes-dont-emerge-from-the-data/ [Last Accessed: 20/03/24]

Luxemburg, R. (1976) ed. Davis, H., The National Question, Monthly Review Press, New York

Lynch, P. (2016) Bottom-up versus Top-down Campaigning at the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014, French Journal of British Studies, 20 (XX-2)

Lynch, P. (2019) Aye or Nae: The Referendum Experience in Scotland 1979-2014, Welsh Academic Press, Cardiff

MacIntyre, A. (1971) Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy, Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd., London

Macwhirter, I. (2013) Road to Referendum, Cargo Publishing, Glasgow

Macwhirter, I. (2014) Disunited Kingdom: How Westminster Won a Referendum But Lost Scotland, Cargo Publishing, Glasgow

Marttila, T. (2015) Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis: A suggestion for a research program, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 16(3), Article 1

Marttila, T. (2016) Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis: From Political Difference to Empirical Research, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

Marx, K. (2019) The Political Writings, Verso, London

Marx, K. & Engels, F. (2002) The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Books, London

Massie, A. (2014) The surprise winners from the referendum? Scotland. Politics. Big ideas are back at last, The Spectator, 6th September 2014, Available via: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-surprise-winners-from-the-referendum-scotland-politics-big-ideas-are-back-at-last/ [Last Accessed: 14/02/23]

Maxwell, S. (2007) The Voluntary Sector and Social Democracy in Devolved Scotland in Keating, M. ed. (2007) Scottish Social Democracy: Progressive Ideas for Public Policy, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels

Maxwell, S. (2013) The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism: Essays and Articles, Luath Press, Edinburgh

McCrone, D. (2001) Understanding Scotland: The sociology of a nation 2nd edition, Routledge, London

McCrone, D. (2006) The Same, But Different: Why Scotland? Scottish Affairs, Vol. 55 Iss. 1, pp. 11-22

McCrone, D. (2013) Getting Scotland: Re-reading Eric Hobsbawm, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 83 Iss. 1, pp. 1-9

McCrone, D. (2017) The New Sociology of Scotland, Sage Publications, London

McEnaney, J. (2019) Scottish Education since Devolution in Hassan, G. & Barrow, S. eds. (2019) Scotland the Brave? Twenty Years of Change and the Politics of the Future, Luath Press, Edinburgh

McFadyen, M. (2014) Yestival Diary – Ullapool, National Collective 21st July 2014, Available via: http://nationalcollective.com/yestival/2014/07/21/diary-ullapool/ [Last Accessed through Wayback Machine: 29/08/23]

McFadyen, M. (2018) Referendum Reflections: Traditional music and the performance of politics in the campaign for Scottish independence in West, G. & McKerrell, S. eds. (2018) Understanding Scotland Musically: Folk, Tradition and Policy, Routledge, Abingdon

McIlvanney, W. (1991) Surviving the Shipwreck quoted in McCrone, D. (2017) The New Sociology of Scotland, Sage Publications, London
McMillan, J. (2014) Yes Campaign not Anti-English, The Scotsman 18th July 2014, Available via: https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/columnists/joyce-mcmillan-yes-campaign-not-anti-english-1531330 [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

McTernan, J. (2014) Democracy is a referendum winner, The Scotsman, 22nd August 2014, Available via: https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/columnists/john-mcternan-democracy-referendum-winner-1528416 [Last Accessed: 09/08/23]

Miliband, R. (2009) The State and Capitalist Society, Merlin Press, Pontypool

Mitchell, J. (1990) The myth of dependency in Hassan, G. & Shaw, E. (2012) The Strange Death of Labour Scotland, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Mitchell, J. (2000) 'New Parliament, New Politics in Scotland', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 53, pp. 605-21

Mitchell, J. (2014) The Scottish Question, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Mitchell, J. (2016a) The Referendum Campaign in McHarg, A., Mullen, T., Page, A. & Walker, N. eds. (2016) The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Mitchell, J. (2016b) The Unexpected Campaign in Blain, N. & Hutchinson, D. with Hassan, G. eds (2016) Scotland's Referendum and the Media: National and International Perspectives, Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh

Mitchell, J., Denver, D., Pattie, C. & Bochel, H. (1998) The 1997 Devolution Referendum in Scotland, Parliamentary Affairs, 51(2), pp. 166-182

Mitchell, J., Bennie, L. & Johns, R. (2012) The Scottish National Party: Transition to Power, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Mondon, A. & Winter, A. (2020) Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right became Mainstream, Verso, London

Morton, G. (1999) Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland 1830-1860, Tuckwell Press, East Linton

Morton, G. (2008) Scotland is Britain: The Union and Unionist-Nationalism 1807-1907, Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, pp. 127-141

Morton, R. (2011) Class in a 'Classless' Society: The Paradox of Scottish Egalitarianism, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 75 Iss. 1, pp. 83-99

Mullen, T. (2014) The Scottish Independence Referendum 2014, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 41 No. 4, pp. 627-640

Munck, R. (1986) The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism, Zed Books, London

Munck, R. (2010) Marxism and Nationalism in the era of Globalization, Capital & Class, Vol. 34 Iss. 1, pp. 45-53

Nairn, T. (1968) Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism, New Left Review, No. 49 pp. 3-18

Nairn, T. (1975) Old and New Nationalism in Brown G. edt. (1975), The Red Paper on Scotland, EUSPB, Edinburgh

Nairn, T. (1981) The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, Verso, London

Nairn, T. (1997) Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited, Verso, London

Nairn, T. (2013) Forward: A Nations Blueprint? In Maxwell, S. (2013) The Case for Left-Wing Nationalism: Essays and Articles, Luath Press, Edinburgh

The National (2015) Non-stop activity the spice of life for Gerry Cinnamon – Interview, The National 18th July 2015, Available via: https://www.thenational.scot/news/14852901.non-stop-activity-the-spice-of-life-for-gerry-cinnamon/ [Last Accessed: 31/08/23]

National Collective (2013a) Manifesto: Imagine a Better Scotland, National Collective, 7th July 2013, Available via: http://www.nationalcollective.com/2013/07/07/manifesto-imagine-a-better-scotland/ [Last Accessed: 06/02/23]

National Collective (2013b) National Collective Leaflet distributed during the March for Independence September 2013, Viewed at the Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling [04/09/19], SPA/GA/SN/REF/2014/CL/YES/2013/53

National Collective (2015) Friday 1st May 2015, National Collective, 1st May 2015, Available via: http://www.nationalcollective.com/2015/05/01/friday-may-1st-2015/ [Last Accessed: 31/01/23]

National Collective (n.d.) About Us, National Collective, Available via: http://www.nationalcollective.com/about-us/ [Last Accessed: 31/01/23]

Nimni, E. (1985) Great Historical Failure: Marxist Theories of Nationalism, Capital & Class, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp.58-83.

Nimni, E. (1989) Marx, Engels and the National Question, Science and Society, Vol. 53 No. 3, pp. 297-326
Nimni, E. (1991) Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis, Pluto Press, London

Noon, S. (2014) Building a Groundswell for Yes, National Collective, April 8th 2014, Available via: http://www.nationalcollective.com/2014/04/08/building-a-groundswell-for-yes/ [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

Norval, A. J. (1996) Thinking Identities: Against a Theory of Ethnicity in Wilmsen, E. N. & McAllister, P. eds. (1996) The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power, University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Norval, A. J. (2000) The things we do with words – Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 313-346

Norval, A. J. (2013) Poststructuralist Conceptions of Ideology in Freeden, M. & Stears, M. eds (2013) The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford University Press, Oxford

O'Hagan, A. (2011) Civic Memory: Making Scotlands of the Mind quoted in Hassan, G. (2014b) Independence of the Scottish Mind: Elite Narratives, Public Spaces and the Making of a Modern Nation, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

O'Leary, B. (2001) Instrumentalist Theories of Nationalism in Leoussi, A. S. ed. (2001) Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, London

O'Toole, F. (2014a) The Art of Growing Up: A Foreward in Hassan, G. (2014a) Caledonian Dreaming: The Quest for a Different Scotland, Luath Press, Edinbugh

O'Toole, F. (2014b) Scotland's vote is not about Braveheart or kilts or tribal nationalism. It's about Democracy, The Guardian, 12th September 2014, Available via: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/12/scotland-vote-braveheart-nationalism-democracy-independence [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

Özkirimli, U. (2003) The nation as an artichoke? A critique of ethno-symbolist interpretations of nationalism, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 339-355

Özkirimli, U. (2010) Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction 2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke

Parekh. B. (1994) Discourses on national identity, Political Studies, Vol. 42 No. 3, pp. 492-504

Paterson, L. (1994) The Autonomy of Modern Scotland, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Paterson, L. (2015) Utopian Pragmatism: Scotland's Choice, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 24 Iss. 1, pp. 22-46

Peleg, I. (2007) Democratizing the Hegemonic State: Political Transformation in the Age of Identity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Pike, J. (2015) Project Fear: How and Unlikely Alliance left a Kingdom United but a Country Divided, Biteback Publishing, London

Pittock, M. (2008) The Road to Independence? Scotland since the Sixties, Reaktion Books, London

Pittock, M. (2013) The Road to Independence? Scotland in the Balance, Reaktion Books, London

Radical Independence Campaign (2013a) Declaration of Radical Independence: Full Text delivered by David Hayman, Radical Independence Conference 2013, Viewed at Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling [04/09/19], SPA/GA/SN/REF/2014/CL/YES/2013/66

Radical Independence Campaign (2013b) 'Independence', Campaign Flyer, Radical Independence Campaign, Viewed and image taken with permission at the Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling, [04/09/19], SPA/GA/SN/REF/2014/CL/YES/2013/12

Radical Independence Campaign (2014) 'Britain is For the Rich. Scotland can be Ours', Campaign Flyer, Radical Independence Campaign, Available via: http://radical.scot/flyers-and-graphics/ [Last Accessed: 30/08/23]

Remling, E. (2018) Logics, assumptions and genre chains: a framework for poststructuralist policy analysis, Critical Discourse Studies, 15(1), pp. 1-18

Riddoch, L. (2014) Let's Concentrate on Real Debate, The Scotsman 10th August 2014, Available via: https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/columnists/lesley-riddoch-lets-concentrate-real-debate-1529383 [Last Accessed: 17/01/2023]

Rifkind, H. (2014) Scottish Independence: Why the No campaign needs more passion, The Times, 4th September 2014

Robertson, J. (2014) Fairness in the First Year? BBC and ITV Coverage of the Scottish Independence Campaign from September 2012 to September 2013, viewed at the Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling [11/09/2019], SPA/GA/SN/REF/2014/PUB/2014/9

Rosie, M. & Bond, R. (2007) Social Democratic Scotland in Keating, M. ed. (2007) Scottish Social Democracy: Progressive Ideas for Public Policy, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels

Ryan, B. & Worth, O. (2010) On the contemporary relevance of 'left nationalism', Capital & Class, Vol. 34 Iss. 1, pp. 54-59

Sanders, D. (1995) Behavioural Analysis in Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. eds. (1995) Theory and Method in Political Science, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke

Sangha, S. & Jamieson, D. (2014) Independence referendum is transforming Scotland's political landscape, Revolutionary Socialism in the 21st Century (rs21), 11th September 2014, Available via: https://www.rs21.org.uk/2014/09/11/independence-referendum-is-transforming-scotlands-political-landscape/ [Last Accessed: 30/08/23]

Salmond, A. (2014) Speech to International Conference of Journalists, 11th September 2014, A recording of speech is available via: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dnMXOgt-8gA [Last Accessed: 31/08/23]

Scottish Constitutional Convention (1995) Scotland's Parliament: Scotland's Right, Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Edinburgh

Scottish Government (2007) Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation. Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World, August 2007, Scottish Government, Edinburgh, Available via: https://www.berria.eus/dokumentuak/dokumentua337.pdf [Last Accessed: 23/08/23]

Scottish Government (2009) Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation, November 2009, Scottish Government, Edinburgh, Available via: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_11_09_referendum.pdf [Last Accessed: 23/08/23]

Scottish Government (2013) Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, Scottish Government, Government White Paper

Scottish Left Review (2012) Independence Special, Iss. 73 Nov/Dec, Scottish Left Review, Glasgow

Sillars, J. (2015) In Place of Failure: Making it Yes next Time…Soon, Vagabond Voices, Glasgow

Skey, M. & Antonsich, M. eds. (2017) Everyday Nationhood: Theorising Culture, Identity and Belonging after Banal Nationalism, Palgrave Macmillan, London

Small, M. (2014) The Yes Campaign is Out of Control, Bella Caledonia 3rd March 2014, Available via: https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2014/03/03/the-yes-campaign-is-out-of-control/ [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

Small, M. (2022) 2007-2021: An Introduction by Mike Small in Small, M. ed. (2022) Bella Caledonia: An Anthology of Writing from 2007-2021, Leamington Books, Edinburgh

Smith, A. D. (1995) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Polity Press, Cambridge

Smith, A. D. (1998) Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism, Routledge, London

Smith, A. D. (2009) Ethno-symbolism and nationalism: A cultural approach, Routledge, London

Smith, G. (1919) Scottish Literature: Character and Influence, Macmillan, London

Smith, S. P. (1984) Hugh MacDiarmid and the Lenin/Douglas Line, The Bucknell Review, Vol. 29 Is. 1, pp. 185-199

Soule, D.P.J., Leith, M.S. & Steven, M. (2012) Scottish Devolution and National Identity, National Identities, Vol. 14 Iss. 1, pp. 1-10

Stavrakakis, Y. (2007) The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory and Politics, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

Stavrakakis, Y. & Katsambekis, G. (2014) Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery: the Case of Syriza, Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 19 Iss. 2, pp. 119-142

St. Denny, E. (2019) The Scottish Parliament and ‘New Politics’ at Twenty in Hassan, G. (ed.) (2019) The Story of the Scottish Parliament: The First Two Decades Explained, Edinburgh University Press

Stewart, D. (2009) The Path to Devolution and Change: A Political History of Scotland under Margaret Thatcher, Tauris Academic Studies, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London

Street, J. (2014) Marginal Notes: Music and the Scottish Independence Referendum, Eastminster: A Global Politics and Policy Blog, 29th September 2014 Available via: http://www.ueapolitics.org/2014/09/29/music-scottish-independence-referendum/ [Last Accessed: 12/09/23]

Sućeska, A. (2018) A Gramscian reading of language in Bakhtin and Voloshinov, Language Sciences, Vol. 70, pp. 179-192

Sullivan, W. (2014) The Missing Scotland: Why over a million Scots choose not to vote and what it means for our democracy, Luath Press, Edinburgh

Sunnercrantz, L. (2017) Hegemony and the Intellectual Function: Medialised Public Discourse on Privatisation in Sweden 1988-1993, PhD Thesis, Department of Sociology, Lund University, Media-Tryck, Lund

Sutherland, C. (2005) Nation-building through Discourse Theory, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 11 Iss. 2, pp. 185-202

Sutherland, C. (2012) Nationalism in the Twenty-first Century: Challenges and Responses, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke

Tamboukou, M. (1999) Writing Genealogies: an exploration of Foucault's strategies for doing research, Discourse: studies in the cultural politics of education, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 201-217

Tarrow, S. (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Contentious Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Thatcher, M. (1987) Interview for Woman's Own Magazine, 23rd September 1987, transcript available via: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 [Last Accessed: 22/08/23]

Thatcher, M. (1988) Speech to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 21st May 1988, transcript available via: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107246 [Last Accessed: 22/08/23]

Thiec, A. (2015) 'Yes Scotland': More than a Party Political Campaign, a National Movement Fostering a New Active Citizenship, French Journal of British Studies, 20 (XX-2)

Torfing, J. (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford

Torfing, J. (2005) Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges in Howarth, D. & Torfing, J. eds (2005) Discourse Theory and European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, Palgrave, London

Torrance, D. (2014) 100 Days of Hope and Fear: How Scotland's Independence Referendum was Lost and Won, Luath Press, Edinburgh

Torrance, D. (2017) Scotland's Progressive Dilemma, Political Quarterly, Vol. 88 No. 1, pp. 52-59

Torrance, D. (2018) 'Standing up for Scotland': The Scottish Unionist Party and 'Nationalist Unionism', 1912-1968, Scottish Affairs, Vol. 27 Iss. 2, pp. 169-188

Tudor, H. (1972) Political Myth, Praeger Publishers, New York

Vaczi, M., Bairner, A. & Whigham, S. (2020) Where extremes meet: Sports, nationalism, and secessionism in Catalonia and Scotland, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 26, Iss. 4, pp. 943-959

Van Exel, J. & de Graaf, G. (2005) Q methodology: a sneak preview [online] Available via: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gjalt_Graaf/publication/228574836_Q_Methodology_A_Sneak_Preview/links/02bfe50f946fc9978b000000.pdf [Last Accessed: 16/04/2024]

Vazquez Garcia, C. J. (2021) Rethinking Foucault's Care of the Self: Critique and (Political) Subjectivity, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Essex, Available via: https://repository.essex.ac.uk/31779/ [Last Accessed: 09/08/23]

Venizelos, G. (2021) Populism or Nationalism? The 'Paradoxical' Non-Emergence of Populism in Cyprus, Political Studies, doi: 10.1177/0032321721989157

Visker, R. (1995) Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique, trans. Chris Turner, Verso, London

Voloshinov, V. (1973) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. by Matejka, L. & Titunik, I. R., Harvard University Press, Harvard, Cambridge

Voloshinov, V. (2012) Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, trans. Titunik, I. R., Verso, London

Vulović, M. & Palonen, E. (2023) Nationalism, populism or peopleism? Clarifying the distinction through a two-dimensional lens, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 29 Iss. 2, pp. 546-561

Welsh, I. (2014) This Glorious Failure could yet be Scotland's Finest Hour, The Guardian, 20th September 2014, Available via: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/20/irvine-welsh-scottish-independence-glorious-failure [Last Accessed: 17/01/23]

Whigham, S. (2019) Nationalism, party political discourse and Scottish independence: comparing discursive visions of Scotland's constitutional status, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 1212-1237

Whigham, S. (2023) Bannockburn, Braveheart or Baccara? Ethnosymbolism, nationalism, and sport in contemporary Scotland, National Identities, Vol. 25 Iss. 4, pp. 357-374 Available via: https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2022.2147493

Wood, M. (2016) We do it all the time: Empson's Intentions, London Review of Books, Vol. 38 No. 3

Yes Edinburgh North & Leith (2014) 'Vote Yes Flyer', Designed by Stewart Bremner, Viewed and image taken with permission during visit to Scottish Political Archive, University of Stirling [11/09/2019], No catalogue number present.

Zienkowski, J. (2012) Overcoming the post-structuralist methodological deficit – metapragmatic markers and interpretive logics in a critique of the Bologna process, Pragmatics 22(3), pp. 501-534

Zienkowski, J. (2016) Articulations of Self and Politics in Activist Discourse: A Discourse Analysis of Critical Subjectivities in Minority Debates, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke