Siga, Lucas and Mihm, Maximilian (2021) Information aggregation in competitive markets. Theoretical Economics, 16 (1). pp. 161-196. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3559
Siga, Lucas and Mihm, Maximilian (2021) Information aggregation in competitive markets. Theoretical Economics, 16 (1). pp. 161-196. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3559
Siga, Lucas and Mihm, Maximilian (2021) Information aggregation in competitive markets. Theoretical Economics, 16 (1). pp. 161-196. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3559
Abstract
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property—that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Auctions; betweenness; competitive markets; information aggregation; rational expectations equilibrium |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jul 2024 15:09 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Jul 2024 15:09 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/38842 |
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