Ali, S Nageeb and Mihm, Maximilian and Siga, Lucas (2025) The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking. Econometrica, 93 (1). pp. 41-70. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22474
Ali, S Nageeb and Mihm, Maximilian and Siga, Lucas (2025) The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking. Econometrica, 93 (1). pp. 41-70. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22474
Ali, S Nageeb and Mihm, Maximilian and Siga, Lucas (2025) The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking. Econometrica, 93 (1). pp. 41-70. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA22474
Abstract
This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero-sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of “adverse correlation” that is necessary and sufficient for zero-sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Voting; populism; distributive politics; polarization; fragility; adverse selection |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Oct 2024 16:43 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Feb 2025 19:44 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/39385 |
Available files
Filename: Econometrica - 2025 - Ali - The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0