

The Effect of National Origins on the Voting Behaviour of Hispanics in the United States

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Summary

This thesis has taken a look at the way in which Hispanics have previously been measured in political science, a process that has typically taken on a large amount of aggregation of all but three major Hispanic American groups for clarity and other purposes, with the intention of proving that smaller groups did have specific voting intentions that were hidden by this aggregation of multiple groups into one. It will look at the way in which this has been done in the past, the backgrounds of each of these groups and what may cause groups to vote in particular ways during American Presidential and State Legislative elections to identify if there are significant differences between different Hispanic origins and the way in which they decide to vote for a political party at different levels. By using census data from large metropolitan areas with large Hispanic populations, and merging this data with election results as well as local economic data to determine their voting intentions. What we find is that at both presidential and state legislative levels, the origin of Hispanic Americans is a crucial factor in determining their vote at election time for some groups, including some which were previously aggregated into a large other category. We find that this category may no longer be suitable when dealing with Hispanic groups, and suggest new routes of investigation that can be taken following on from our findings.

An Introduction to The Effects of National Origins on the Voting Behaviour of Hispanics in the United States

Hispanic voting behaviour in the United States has been of interest of political scientists in more recent years, in part because of the growing population within the past decade or so. (Ennis and Albert, 2011). Part of this is due to the belief that such a large population would become a powerful voting bloc in the future of American politics, particularly in states which had the largest of these populations, being states such as California, Texas, and Florida. Much of the previous discussion on the topic had been more closely linked to the ways in which Hispanics would be more likely to vote for the Democratic party, and popular media discourse has tended to follow this line of thinking, with media articles during the 2020 election asking why Hispanics weren't as invested in the Democratic party as many popular outlets were expecting at the time (Sevastopulo, 2020). As such, this has raised the question how Hispanic populations actually vote outside of the well-researched and known groups, particularly the Cuban American population that is so well known to researchers as a group that tends to lean towards the Republican party (Pew Research Centre, 2020). Part of the reason for this question to arise was that there was even some surprise outside of the popular media, with some political scientists also asking the question of why some Hispanics seemed to be more right wing than had been previously expected back in the 2016 election (Galbraith & Callister, 2020). All of these expectations had been previously based off of the idea that most Hispanics were likely to be Democrat, and that for the most part, only Cuban Americans tended to be right wing amongst Hispanic populations. This was based mostly off of the idea of a grand, pan-ethnic Hispanic identity that transcended national origins in favour of a more ethnic unity, similar to the experience of African Americans (Jones-Correa & Leal, 1996).

We found in initial research into the literature on the subject that there would need to be several things we wanted to look at before actually coming to a consensus on what we

expected to find. We took the belief that there was unlikely to be pan-ethnic Hispanic identity, for why would the Cuban Americans alone be separated from this identity if one such identity did exist? We felt that, because of previous aggregations by other studies, that some other groups may not fall into this particular category, and so there may be other, smaller groups of Hispanic origins within the United States that may not be falling into the broadly seen category of being pro-Democrat. To this end, we felt we needed to look into several parts to be able to identify accurately the gaps in the literature and be able to identify several possibilities where we could see changes. This included the general backgrounds of the Hispanic groups we wanted to look at, as well as the historical grounds for the aggregation of groups, how we have previously seen groups as voting, and previous findings on Hispanic voting behaviour. We feel that going through what others had previously found, as well as understanding many of the groups we wanted to look into would provide us with some insights into how these groups would react if we were going to disaggregate them apart.

Hispanic Backgrounds

One of the largest and most important Hispanic groups that has been looked at often by political scientists is that of Cuban Americans. Previous research has always found Cubans to be much more right-wing than other Hispanic groups, and is one of our main arguments against the idea of a pan-ethnic Hispanic identity. As Cuban-Americans have either fled from, or have a family member who likely fled from the Pro-Castro communist regime in Cuba, particularly during the 1960s, it has always been unlikely that the Cuban American population would be pro-Democrat, due to some policies that have been taken by or advocated by Democrat leaning politicians. The thaw initiated by President Obama during his time in office would also prove a barrier to Cuban Americans, most of which prefer a hard line on foreign policy in relation to the Caribbean island nation (Lacinski, 2015). Whilst both parties were anti-Castro, the Republican party has often been a lot more vocal in their

campaigning to older Cubans on the issue, whilst the Democratic party focuses on other issues (Subervi-Velez, 1992)

There has also been lots of previous research on the Mexican and Puerto Rican origin groups. The reasons for this are usually that these are typically the three largest groups in the United States, and are usually those groups that tend to be disaggregated. Typically, they have found that these groups tend to lean towards the Democratic party (de la Garza et al, 1992), and we found no reason to be pushing for differences on this front. Whilst we are open to the possibility of there being differences found within these groups, our expectations for them are that these, along with the Cuban origin group, will be along lines that have already been found, due to the nature of the aggregation usually leaving these groups as individual data points. It is the smaller origin groups that we have wanted to focus on, which has proved difficult due to the lack of research on some of these groups before recent events have occurred.

Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Guatemalan origins in particular were of interest to us, as three groups that were often grouped together because of their close geographic locations being tied to having similar interests. Most of this however has been because of the gang violence found within central America in recent years (Perez, 2013), and we felt that this effect was perhaps being lost in being aggregated with many separate groups. We also felt that, as right wing candidates typically pursue political platforms based off of law and order, that we would be able to argue that at least one of these origins would break from the expected norm and perhaps be more Republican minded than is currently thought. The best way to be able to see was of course, through disaggregating these groups and being able to examine them individually as well as part of a whole Hispanic bloc.

Importance of Identity and Aggregation

There were two issues of concern that we found when looking at the previous literature for this thesis. The first was that there was a disturbing amount of aggregation that had previously been done with these origin groups, to the point that there was little information to be had on anything other than the biggest three groups by population. This was particularly clear in a review on Hispanic politics, but which focused only on these three largest groups because of the difficulty of being able to get hold of the smaller groups (Uhalner & Garcia, 1998). In addition, typical work on Hispanics usually tended to focus on only one of these groups, rather than trying to work on any wider understanding of the Hispanic vote as a whole (de la Garza & Yetim, 2003; Grenier, 2006; Sanchez 1994). As such, it was difficult to see where any sort of disaggregation had previously been done, as the majority of studies tended to get their survey data from aggregated surveys already, and this was part of the reason why we decided not to use previous survey data, where we would not be able to control the aggregation of the data that had previously been collected.

In addition, part of this aggregation of data had come from the debate around whether or not there was such a thing as a pan-ethnic Hispanic identity, an argument that occurred during the literature in the 1990s. After reviewing both sides of this argument in the literature (Padilla, 1992; Jones-Correa & Leal, 1996), we felt that there was very little to be said for this argument on our side, as we felt that a pan-ethnic identity would be better argued for by having the evidence from all Hispanic groups. Indeed, it would seem that the existence of some disagreement even from just the Cuban-Americans casts doubt on such an identity at all.

Collections and Usage of Data

Our data comes mostly from the American Community Survey, an offset of the United States Census. We decided on using this part of the census rather than the main part for several

important reasons, one of which was based upon its relative accessibility and better use of estimates for certain parts of the data that we wanted to use. In particular, the American Community Survey collected better data on the identification of Hispanic Identity than the main census, which has had a troubled history with collecting Hispanic data, such as when Mexican was introduced as a race in 1920 to help judge quotas, and then removed 10 years later. After the instatement of Title 13 in 1954, the Census would only again ask the Hispanic question in 1970. However, the census still only collects data every ten years, whilst the American Community survey collects data from a sample of households every year, giving us more up to date information that is reliably updated rather than data from ten years ago. This makes it a more reliable information source for us to use than the main census information. The collection of this data was helped in part by the mapped data that came along with using this particular source, allowing us to see these individual locations of responses on the map organised into areas that reflected separate neighbourhoods, allowing us to be able to correlate some locations with electoral results from other sources very easily and without too much further work needed to deduce locations and areas from one place to the next.

Our data was then mapped into local areas that the US Census Bureau uses, known as Public Use Microdata Areas. The decision to use these over the more commonly used Census Tract was a difficult one, but one that was made off the back of practicality. The Public Use Microdata Areas tended to be formed in such a way as to provide specific neighbourhood information based on a variety of factors, placing like for like areas together and creating more uniform data selections for these neighbourhoods. This allowed us to be able to place well-off neighbourhoods and less well-off areas separately from each other, which would help us when using our more economic based variables that we would be using in our research, They also work very well with some of our electoral areas, particularly at the presidential level, where many areas fall nicely into electoral wards and divisions that can be easily

placed into these areas as the results were collected. The same could not be said of census tracts, which tended to cross electoral lines at odd points. These would have been difficult to estimate how many votes from a particular census tract would go into one area, and how many into another. The decision to go with public use microdata areas is one that was made for both terms of organisation and being able to help with our individual data sorting.

Voting data where possible for both papers was gathered through the local election services. This tended to be through State Secretary of States, and their equivalents. This did present some challenges with regard to uniformity, and there was a challenge created particularly with spoiled ballots, where some states counted these and others did not. In the interest of preserving the fidelity of the information when counting votes, it was decided that the official total vote count would be used if possible, with the “other” votes category comprising all votes that were not cast either for the Democrats or for the Republicans. This meant that we could keep some uniformity of reporting across states and counties which may have different reporting regulations, allowing us to keep voting data across states uniform with others.

There was some difficulty in some states that meant that we had to abandon plans to be able to research in those states due to our research constraints. This included the major metropolitan areas in New York City and Los Angeles. The reasons for dropping these were due to the logistical challenges that would have been insurmountable for this thesis. New York City’s voting results were inconsistent, with multiple precincts being reported in more than one election with no distinction in which votes were for which races, and we were unable to make contact with their elections board. For Los Angeles, there were simply too many precincts which needed to be placed within our Public Use Microdata Areas, with thousands of these entries also having an exponential amount of data for each one, which would have been impractical in the circumstances in which this thesis was produced.

We also had to deal with the effect that using large metropolitan areas had on our results. As these areas tend to be highly Democratic in terms of their makeup, we had to come up with a solution that helped use to be able to use these areas and be successful in how we were able to interpret our own results. The resulting way was then to move these areas into groups using a municode system. Using this, we were then able to do regressions with random effects in these groups, giving us more reliable results and negating some of the influence from using predominantly Democratic areas.

In terms of our variables that were used, we decided to collect information from the American Community Survey on various economic and social variables that we believed would help us explain the variances in behaviour, and allow us to show that Hispanic origins were indeed significant in explaining how voting occurred in Hispanic American populations. Two of these economic variables were those of the Median Household Income, as well as the Average House Value in an area. Whilst average house value would give us an initial indication of how affluent an area was, the more unconventional of these two variables in the Median Household Income, which we selected over the mean. The reasoning for this is that it is entirely possible for some of our areas to have both poor areas and more affluent areas in the same measurement. As such, using the median measure allowed us to mediate out the extremes of both positions, giving a more accurate reading of what would be experienced within that area, and downplaying the effect of one or two extreme incomes at either end of the scale. In addition to this, we also used a variable to measure the amount of the population in an area that was covered by some means of health insurance. For using this variable, we took from the census bureau the entire measurement of health care coverage, not taking into account where this coverage came from, either private, public, or company provided. In this scenario, we were able to then see if having health care coverage at all would make a difference to how you vote.

We also used a variable to measure the percentage of the population in the area being on food stamps or similar programme. This socio-economic measure was used to help us be able to further control for poverty in areas by taking into account what the liveable income was in that area, and how many people were not being caught by our median income measure. By using the food stamp measure, we were able to have a better picture of how worse-off families and individuals were voting. This is the same rationale of our unemployment variable, for which we used the more liberal definition by not including those who were under 16 or in full time education.

We additionally also included the variable education operationalised as a percentage of people with a bachelor's degree or higher. This was included as a standard socio-economic measure that is typical in measuring education levels, and has been found to be significant in previous studies. We felt that including this was the right thing to do, and we find it to be important to our understanding of our results later on. We also realise that the findings that we have from these studies are limited to a short period of time, but we believe that this snapshot can lead to further research opportunities.

Our Questions

From our research of literature, we were able to confirm that there was generally a lack of disaggregation in results that we felt our research fell into nicely, and that disaggregating our data would place us in a unique situation where we would have something novel that hadn't been previously tried before our study, and would form the main focus of our work here. The majority of this would fall into one overarching question: that of whether the Origin of Hispanic American makes a difference to their voting behaviour, and this is looked at on two fronts: one identifying differences in presidential elections, and the other looking at the possibilities that it also affects their voting at the state legislative level. The reason for

splitting these two is that as they are at different levels as well as looking at different governmental sectors, that different policies and local concerns may change the results between them. In addition to this, the fact that there could be multiple state elections in one area for different seats would make it difficult to tie this in to a particular presidential vote, as we would be unable to say which seat was likely more Republican or Democrat. Thus, we split up our main questioning over two slightly different, but related studies. We find throughout these studies that during the period of the study, there is divergence between groups at both levels, which leads us to believe that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Hispanic Origin does have an effect on the voting of Hispanic populations, and that this effect is consistent in certain origin groups across different levels of elections.

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The Effect of National Origins on Hispanic Voting Behaviour in Presidential Elections

There has been much previous interest in the understanding of how Hispanics vote at the presidential level within both the media and wider academic circles. We look at whether or not the heritage of Hispanics measured by their self-identified group has an effect on the level of votes for the Democratic party in metropolitan areas. What we find is that some groups that were previously hidden in aggregation have statistically significant results linked to their self-identified ancestry, and that this found even when all major Hispanic populations are taken into account.

The prevailing perception of Hispanic voting patterns, as predominantly Democratic with the exception of the Cuban demographic, is widely disseminated through media outlets, both domestic and international. This narrative is evident in publications such as the Financial Times (Sevastopulo, 2020) and CNN (Morales, 2020). The unexpected outcomes of the 2016 election prompted initial academic inquiries into the reasons behind Hispanic support for President Trump (Galbraith & Callister, 2020). This line of questioning suggests a departure from the conventional understanding that only Cubans typically vote Republican, and that some Hispanics may have other inclinations that have not yet been defined.

The surprise elicited by these findings can be attributed to previous research methodologies that relied on large-scale aggregation of Hispanic populations. This approach was necessitated by the relative scarcity of detailed demographic data, particularly information pertaining to the specific countries of origin of Hispanic individuals or their families.

Consequently, this traditional aggregation has long been considered the most viable solution to a problem which has been consistent during the research into this topic.

Despite advancements such as the National Survey of Latinos, there has been limited progress in utilizing the newly available data. This is partly due to the fact that the survey itself continues to employ aggregation methods similar to its predecessors. This consistency

in methodology facilitates comparability with previous iterations of the survey. A shift in data presentation could potentially hinder comparisons between current and past survey results.

Maintaining consistent findings across two distinct “other” categories would be challenging if the composition of these groups were to change.

As such, this paper seeks to explore the assumption that Hispanics have a preference towards voting for the Democratic party during elections by looking at high-density urban areas in which Hispanics form a good proportion of the population present in the area, which we defined as being at least 15% of the population of an urban area. Through this, we then explore the link between the area’s voting, and the individual origins of Hispanics in that area, alongside a selection of other possible variables that would affect the vote of the population in the examined area. We examine the question of whether or not national origin matters for Hispanic voters within the US, and whether this may be due to historical circumstances in their countries of Hispanic origin, the political history of those nations, or other more local factors that may influence some groups more than others.

What we find is that during this specific election, whilst most Hispanic groups lean towards being independent in their overall leanings, some such as Cubans, Mexicans, and Nicaraguans are more inclined to have stronger political leanings. The propensity for Hispanics to have stronger political feelings also tends to be stronger based upon the political leanings of other Hispanics in the local area. Whilst we find that there are some origins for which their particular country of origin is important to their vote, this is not the case for the majority of these groups. Whilst acknowledging that we have issues with understanding if this is due to an ecological inference problem, which stems from us having to be careful with our data limitations from picking mostly high-density urban areas with a specific level of Hispanic population density. We find is that, for the majority of our Hispanic groups, we find no reason to think that there is a pro-Democratic preference stemming from their being

Hispanic. Moreso, this is from other factors, some of which will have to do with their surroundings and personal circumstances more than racial or ethnic factors.

The Argument For Disaggregation

The rationale for disaggregating this data is twofold. Firstly, the increased availability of detailed data, such as that provided by the Census Bureau's American Community Survey, allows for a more nuanced understanding of Hispanic populations. This data is not entirely accurate due to its estimated nature, but it offers a higher degree of precision than previous methods of aggregation, due to the detail that is currently present within it and the more local precision of the data involved within it. This detail enables us to challenge the media narrative about Hispanic voting patterns by allowing us to explain differences between Hispanic groups rather than the aggregated responses that exists in the literature to this point.

In addition to this, the disaggregated data allows us to examine whether Hispanics vote as a unified bloc or if their voting intentions vary. Historically, the dominant presence of Mexican-Americans has influenced perceptions of Hispanic political leanings due to their large population share. However, with the availability of this disaggregated population data, there is less need to view Hispanic political thought and ideological measurement through a Mexican-American lens. While Mexican-Americans remain the largest group of Hispanic Americans and warrant continued focus, there is now an ability to explore the political leanings of smaller Hispanic groups that can now be identified.

The use of more disaggregated data can mitigate the surprise expressed in academic papers regarding the 2016 Presidential elections, particularly those questioning why Hispanics might not vote Democrat. These assumptions came from data limitations at the time of research.

With improved measurement of smaller populations, we can predict with greater accuracy their political leanings, and comprehend the reasons behind their voting choices. The ability to explore these disaggregation will help explain the media's surprise at the election result.

Previous Aggregation

The practice of aggregating data is largely a consequence of the challenges associated with data collection, particularly with older databases and surveys where disaggregation is not feasible due to the age of the data. This is especially true for major surveys, where results are often aggregated for simplicity and ease of use. In some instances, the level of aggregation is so extensive that the aggregate categories are larger than the individual categories they encompass. While this approach may simplify data analysis, it inevitably obscures valuable information from smaller Hispanic groups due to the high degree of aggregation. This is especially true when there are multiple groups that are presented in aggregated areas. Where this occurs, there is naturally a loss of information deriving from this aggregation, though there are reasons for doing this such as the low population levels of those groups.

This aggregation is prevalent in most research on Hispanics, serving as a convenient method for simplifying complex data into digestible pieces (Dutwin et al, 2005; Mora, 2014). Much of this pre-aggregated data forms the basis for subsequent research, leaving researchers with little choice but to adopt this level of aggregation to make their work viable going forward. As a result, this aggregation, and sometimes aggregation of aggregation, leads to diminishing returns of using the information due to the loss over time of more nuanced information.

Significant differences exist among the three major groups traditionally used to study Hispanic political opinions and policy impacts. Given the lack of pan-ethnic unity among the

Hispanic population in the United States, these differences are likely substantial enough to render these groups inadequate as a means of understanding the entire population. Despite extensive research on these groups—Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican—many studies and external research tend to focus on these three origin groups at the expense of others. This includes studies that group all other groups together as Non-Mexican (Dutwin et al, 2005), or those that only focus on the “big three,” leaving us to speculate about the other groups (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). The focus on the three largest groups leaves us with unanswered questions, and a tradition of aggregation within this area. This research has tended to find that Cubans lean heavily towards the Republicans, whilst Mexicans and ‘other’ lean Democrat (Pew Research Center, 2020). Some studies have also found that Puerto Ricans are more independent than other Hispanic groups (Sánchez, 1994).

Recent studies have revealed clear differences in views even within a single origin group, underscoring the need for a more nuanced understanding of Hispanic voting behaviour. For instance, some Mexican Americans identify as conservative on social issues but lean liberal on economic matters (Greene & Kim, 2019). The further disaggregation of this data will allow us to better understand these diverse political viewpoints and thought processes within the Hispanic community. These differences within a single large group are likely to be replicated, causing blanket statements as seen earlier around the political leanings of Hispanics to be spurious.

This shows that the aggregation of this data has led to a tradition of aggregating all smaller population Hispanic identities in favour of providing clear information on the major population groups over focusing on individual identities of the groups in question. In doing so, there has been a loss of data linking those groups, as these are mixed together and put out in a way that creates uncertainty over how each group votes, leading to a reliance on the use of the term Hispanic to describe the entirety of the population over smaller group labels.

Imposed Identity

Understanding Hispanic identities is important for the basis of this research, and as such it is crucial to consider whether individuals within these groups identify themselves as Hispanic at all. There is disagreement within the literature as to whether or not this is the case, as some research suggests that due to social and cultural similarities, these groups may indeed identify as a multi-national ethnicity (Padilla, 1992). Conversely, others argue that the notion of a Hispanic identity is imposed by government agencies seeking to simplify data collection and target specific groups (Giménez, 1992). While some Hispanics may choose to identify in such a pan-ethnic way, the majority of evidence indicates that these terms are used more for convenience than as accurate representations of how these groups perceive themselves (Jones-Correa & Leal, 1996).

Furthermore, very few prefer the term 'Hispanic', opting instead for terms more closely linked to their national identity (de la Garza et al, 1992). This reveals why these groups have been aggregated in the past: the assumption that cultural proximity implies similarity in other areas, such as politics. This catch-all phrase was introduced by government officials for their convenience and was never embraced by the Hispanic people themselves (Jones-Correa & Leal, 1996). In doing so, this has been picked up by studies which use this data so that there is a clear link between the collection of the data and the analysis of such data.

The imposition of this label in the 1970s primarily for data collection purposes is undeniable and has had various repercussions (Pomeroy, 2000), though the term has now become a more generalised word for people who trace their ancestry to Spain, usually through the Spanish colonisation. This imposed identity has influenced research methodologies, leading to a scarcity of non-aggregated data and perpetuating the misconception that this is a historical

group with consistent behaviours. In reality, this label was introduced primarily for data collection and simplification purposes. That this has happened means that there is a disconnect between the actual usage of the term, and whether the term itself actually has meaning outside of statistical circles other than a description of race, something that is not correct in official documentation.

Whilst this label has been incredibly helpful in the past in leading to collection of data and the dissemination of data via these labels, it is good to note that this may not be the case within the population at large. If this is the case, then it is likely this will be reflected in groups having different understandings and leanings when it comes to political parties rather than voting as a homogeneous bloc. Should this bloc of voters exist within the population, it may be a sign that such a label has started to become accepted within the Hispanic populations at large.

Existing Research

Given the observed differences in political perspectives among Mexican-Americans (Greene & Kim, 2019), it is plausible to suggest that other Hispanic groups may also interpret political constructs differently from the accepted norm. Even in studies with significant aggregation, differences in political opinion are evident among Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban groups, each favouring different parties to varying degrees (Uhlener & Garcia, 1998). It is unlikely that these differences do not extend to other groups simply because they are smaller.

Factors such as religious identification and geographical location also shape the political opinions of Hispanic Americans, further challenging the notion of a unified Hispanic voting bloc (Kosmin & Keysar, 1995). If these factors significantly influence voting intentions, then the common conception of a united Hispanic voting bloc appears unsupported.

The existing research suggests that there are significant differences within Hispanic groups that warrant further investigation. With the aggregation methods of the past and improved current information, there is a gap in our understanding that can and should be filled. Do smaller groups follow the lead of larger Hispanic groups, thereby contributing to a semblance of a Hispanic identity beyond data collection purposes? Or is there no evidence of a Hispanic voting bloc, with these terms merely serving as convenient labels for grouping small data points into one easily identifiable category?

Given the existing literature on Hispanic voting behaviour, it is anticipated that this study will not reveal signs of a unified Hispanic identity through voting. If such an identity were to emerge, it would indicate a shift in the Hispanic population towards acceptance of a pan-ethnic identity not previously observed in the literature. Therefore, it would be surprising if any evidence supporting this pan-ethnic identity through voting were to appear within this study. Consequently, examining multiple groups of Hispanics could provide valuable insights into these questions that have previously been obscured by the usage of aggregation.

Examining these small groups can reveal the existence of smaller differences between these groups that may alter the final result within aggregated data, and show that many of these groups have separate political leanings than there were previously seen. As such, it is entirely plausible that these groups are separate within these areas due to the histories and differences between their own countries and cultures.

This then brings the question of why I use the term. The reason for this is that, whilst there are connotations that are taken from the usage of the word Hispanic, it is still the official term used by the Census Bureau in their questions about Hispanic identity. Further, to move into using the term Latino then brings about other questions about male-centric ideas, and would then lead to a separate debate about the role of gender which is beyond the scope

of this particular study. Using the term Hispanic therefore keeps us more in line with official documents and data.

There is a long history of immigration experiences affecting the political choice of individuals. Within the context of older studies, there is usually a link between these places that links these immigrant individuals with political parties tend to be more left wing. These are typically true where the immigrants are of a minority race of some disposition, and evidence of this can be found in the UK (Messina, 1989), and this has been corroborated through later studies as well (Saggar, 2000). This lean towards the left wing has been the basis of many arguments around immigration, and may go some way to explaining more right wing parties preferences for generally higher levels of border control in many countries, including that of the United States' Republican party. Seeing this reflected in the UK, though mostly of immigrants of Black and South Asian descent, allows us to apply these theoretical arguments to those Hispanics who have or whose ancestors immigrated¹ from other countries to the United States, thinking about their experiences from the country from which they have emigrated, and applying those experiences to their political. It is known that there is a link between party identification being associated positively with time spent in the US, and negatively with age (Wong, 2000), as well as Mexican Americans being more similar to their Anglo counterparts than they are with Mexicans who remain in their home country (de la Garza & Yetim, 2003). There is also the association of the Democrats with the working class sees more immigrants as a whole identify more closely with them (Cain et al, 1991). But we know already that there are other factors, for these things alone would not explain the

¹ It should be noted that, from 2021, 68% of Hispanics in the US are natural born citizens (Pew Research Centre, 2023). This section primarily seeks to note the idea that the cultural identity of those born in the US is affected to some degree by the country from which their ancestors originally resided within.

exceptions, such as Cubans, who do not fall into this pattern. There must therefore be some other factors at play that may explain these differences between different groups.

One such mechanism by which we may be able to explain differences between groups is their group's history with certain specific ideologies that would predicate them being either supportive or opposed to ideas that seem more aligned to those ideologies. We can express this in that those groups that have had left-wing dictatorships may be more opposed to the Democratic party, and the best example of this mechanism is that of Cubans, who are clearly in favour of the Republican party as seen previously. These anti-communist views would then manifest themselves within the support for Republicans. Similarly, this may well be seen in the case of Nicaragua, where a civil war with the communists may influence immigrants who fled from the conflict into having a similar viewpoint, due to the "indiscriminate and extensive Sandinista repression of a section of the rural population" (Langlois, 1997). This may also work the other way, in particular in the case of Chile, where there was right-wing dictatorship. The common belief of US involvement and Nixon's open dislike of the deposed president may contribute to anti-Republican feeling amongst the Chilean diaspora in the US, causing support for the Democrats to rise within this particular subgroup. This mechanism shows promise, given that there are several groups that could be seen as outliers, as well as providing a clear mechanism for the exemption of the Cubans in other literature.

Another mechanism we can look at in order to judge these differences may be that of foreign policy positions. This could be either the resentment of previous military intervention, or a disapproval of reproachment between the US and their home country. Again, a good example of this effect would be the Cuban population, who strongly disapproved of the Obama Administration's attempts to normalise relations with the Cuban government. (Lacinski, 2015). We also see a possible example of this in Honduras, where a Democratic government in the US refused to act on the 2009 coup, which may lead some to believe in the

lack of belief and support of the Democratic system. The aspersions on the Democrat administration of a possible role in the coup may also factor into these decisions. As such, we can see the potential for a mechanism in which these experiences factor into the party opinions of immigrant Hispanic populations, where these experiences differ by group, causing differences in voting behaviour for these groups from each other.

A third mechanism we can expect to be seeing is a strong preference for law and order in groups where there has historically been a history of violence and unrest. These types of policies are more typically seen in the political right, and therefore we can expect to see people from these nations express a slight preference for the Republican party, as a party that typically evokes ideas of law and order. Indeed, in 2016, Trump ran on a platform of strengthening the police, and fighting criminal gangs. One group in which we might be able to see this link is that of Salvadoreans, coming from a nation in which gang violence is prevalent in many areas of life (Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner, 2011). These gangs include those that President Trump campaigned on in 2016, and so this may also have brought more awareness to the issue to Salvadoreans who are in the US now, and is also known as a serious problem, with homicides per 100,000 in the country being above 60 in El Salvador, compared to 5 as a global average (Ambrosius, 2021). This problem also tends to be shared across parts of central America, and so we may see related increases in the Republican vote for other groups, including Guatemala and Honduras (Perez, 2013). However, this mechanism does have a second significant factor, that is that much of the gang violence was caused when the US government under Reagan deported gang members back to their countries of origin. This could cause an opposite effect to occur, where the origin groups instead back Democrats, due to the tough lines on deportation being a policy reason for them to back the Democrats over the Republicans (Ambrosius, 2021). It is also possible that we see this in the case of Colombia, where there is a history of governments changing laws quickly to pursue order,

whilst at the same time not using this as a method of justice, but one of control (Iturralde, 2015; Schultz-Kraft, 2018). Whilst there is no certainty around the direction of the effect caused, it is still a possibility that the effect of gangs and gang violence in the countries of origin will cause an effect on the voting intentions of these groups. It is more likely that right wing parties like the Republicans are more likely to feel the benefit of this, especially as we see that right wing parties are not punished as often for an uptick in gang violence (Visconti, 2019). As such, we can see this mechanism being likely to create more Republican support in groups which come from places with increased levels of violence and unrest.

Our next mechanism is that of economic and the economic history of places that groups are migrating from. Under this mechanism, people that have immigrated from a country with a history of economic uncertainty and crisis are more likely to vote for more populist economic policies. Given the two candidates in the 2020 election, this would likely be reflected in an increase in votes for the Republican candidate, Donald Trump. Countries that are likely to fall under this category and therefore influence their populations include Brazil, which had a long inflationary crises for over a decade during the 80s and 90s (Wibbels and Roberts, 2010). This mechanism is based off of evidence from the Eurozone, in which it was found populist parties did better particularly after the Eurozone crisis where nations were unable to respond individually to their economic circumstances (Guiso et al, 2024). As such, when these economic crises arise, it is likely to create an increase in the vote for those parties or individuals who are populist in their offering to the general electorate as they are offering problems outside of the institutional status quo. This will also be likely to be seen as a possible influence to Venezuelan voters, who have had a substantial increase in migration caused by the most recent economic crisis in the country (Pirovino & Papyrakis, 2023). This, combined with the campaign positions of the Donald Trump campaign, are likely to create these ideas in which they believe Donald Trump to be against this economic status quo that,

in the view of these groups, creates economic crisis, and therefore improve the vote share of the Republican candidate.

Slightly related to the last two mechanism we have our immigration policy mechanism, that the candidate and party positions on immigration are likely to have an effect on how groups vote for these parties and candidates. It is most likely that this mechanism favours parties that have more favourable immigration policies to a particular group, particularly for those groups have a wider range of classes moving from one country to the US. Typically in the case of Mexican immigrants in particular, this has been low skill, low wage immigration moving northwards, drawn by the higher wages available for the same work in the US (Gutierrez, 2019). As such, there is then an incentive for this group to allow for more lenient immigration, given that a lower threshold for immigration would allow more immigration in general, and the loosening of restrictions on potential family members. However, there is also evidence that a larger amount of native born Hispanics leads to greater inclination for looser immigration policy, including amongst Anglo-Americans (Rocha et al, 2011). If this is the case, then it may be less of a case that immigration policy is looser because of personal ties, but instead that looser immigration policy comes from subsequent generations in the families of immigrants being more inclined to give the same chances to others. As such, it seems likely that, especially within larger group populations, that these groups are likely to support parties with looser immigration restrictions, which in the US would equate to the Democratic party. This would be seen alternatively as a decrease in the Democratic vote share when there are greater levels of non-citizen populations.

Selection of Collection Areas

This study distinguishes itself from previous research by utilizing Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) instead of the more commonly used Census tract information. The rationale

behind this approach is that PUMAs allow for a more granular examination of neighbourhoods where circumstances differ, thereby revealing variations in Hispanic voting patterns. This system enables differentiation between different levels of Hispanic populations in areas of the same city, such as different populations in the west and north of Nashville, as well as in wealthier and poorer neighbourhoods of the cities under study. This will facilitate the separation of these areas to investigate if relative incomes of areas influence voting patterns.

The selection of PUMAs was based on several factors, including size and ease of use. However, a key consideration was minimizing instances where streets were in different voting areas but within the same census tract. While this still occurs with PUMAs, they tend to be smaller and most often involve large areas of land with very low populations and development, such as parks that do not actually hold areas of habitation within them, and as such is deemed acceptable for border areas.

The PUMAs were selected from a list of the 50 most populous cities in the United States with a Hispanic population equal to or greater than 15% of the total population. This ensures a significant number of Hispanic individuals living within the city. Notable exceptions to this sample include New York City and Los Angeles, which were excluded due to uncertainties regarding their electoral records and matching these with the provided PUMA areas.² We acknowledge that this criteria means that there are mostly urban areas represented within this study. Our reasoning for this is that the large majority of Hispanic people live within these

² Cities that were included in this analysis are as follows: Philadelphia, Washington DC, Boston, Charlotte, Nashville, Tampa, Miami, Raleigh, Omaha, Colorado Springs, Albuquerque, Las Vegas, Denver, Indianapolis, El Paso, Arlington, Fort Worth, Houston, Milwaukee, Portland, San Francisco, & San Antonio. Whilst LA, New York, and Chicago also met the criteria, these were removed because of high levels of uncertainty in areas. LA was divided into so many areas at the precinct level that we could not claim a high degree of accuracy when matching to PUMA data, whilst New York and Chicago presented uncertain presentations in their voting data that made vote carrying across precincts and pumas impossible, as we would have needed to count large numbers of votes twice.

urban areas, or just outside them. Whilst there are some groups of Hispanics living in more rural communities, when taking as a whole area, they did not meet our criteria for making up these numbers. Given that selecting these rural areas would create a Republican bias, and urban areas a likely Democrat bias, we decided to go for these urban areas based on the idea that we would hopefully be able to balance this out through the increase of population density within these areas, and the usage of control variables to moderate this bias where possible.

The main issue that this does create with our sampling is that all of the areas that are selected need to have high level concentrations of population in order for us to achieve numbers that we are able to then make a series of judgements on. Because of this, we have had to focus this research on urban centres with high levels of Hispanic population. From previous literature, we know that these areas typically have a pro-Democratic bias which there will be little way to fix due to the nature of how the study will be functioning (CITE). As such, we do not claim that the samples we produce here will be representative of the entirety of a Hispanic population. Rather, the samples that we have here are designed to give us an understanding as to whether or not there is any effect happening at all within major Hispanic origin groups. Whilst we have attempted to control for these effects by introducing a fixed effects check upon these areas, which confirm that many of these areas are indeed pro-Democratic areas, we still find information that we believe is useful in the determination of the political leanings of these groups whilst attempting to account for the pro-Democratic bias that we are seeing our data selection. We therefore also acknowledge that the use of these urban areas will limit our data's usefulness in more rural and agricultural settings, but maintain that using these areas would require us to lower the proportion of the population which were Hispanic in those areas, which would have made the data less useful overall. Whilst this means that we have little to no data in those states which are heavily agricultural

such as those in the south and mid-west, we believe that this is the most viable option for gaining useful data that can be kept to areas of high Hispanic populations overall.

Data Timeframes

The data on Hispanic populations for this study is sourced from the American Community Survey (ACS), a more comprehensive version of the US Census that asks more specific questions. The ACS provides more detailed information on specific national origins than the Census, enabling a more precise breakdown of national origins rather than broad categories such as ‘white Hispanic’. The estimates are based on 2018 data, which were the most up-to-date and complete at the time this study commenced. The 2018 data was chosen due to delays in uploading more recent data caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The 2020 Presidential election was selected for this study to align with the ACS data timeframe. Using data from an earlier election would have compromised the accuracy of the ACS population figures and potentially obscured true patterns of results. Where possible, election data was retrieved from state secretary of state databases or county-level equivalents to ensure accuracy. However, some locations, such as New York City, were excluded from the final analysis due to difficulties in aligning data with specific areas and unclear precinct locations.

Control Variables

It is crucial for us to consider the other factors that may affect voting behaviour during this time period. In particular, we have considered a large variety of variables that are in some cases known to cause some effect on voter’s final electoral choice. In doing so, we

should gain a clearer picture of how Hispanic groups vote when these things are taken into account.

Firstly, we have created control variables for the percentage of the local population that is either born abroad, and those that are not US citizens. These variables, presented as a percentage of the total population, helps us to look at the possible effects of two things in relation to the area we are looking in. The first of these is that, through the effects of immigration, do these communities vote more for one party based on the size of these variables. In addition, do these communities vote based on these sizes in terms of immigration policy. If these numbers make voters generally more anti-immigration, we would expect to see this as a reflected Republican increase, based on the policy decisions of Donald Trump.

Secondly, we have the education control variable, displayed as the percentage of people who have achieved a bachelor's degree or higher with an area. As previous studies have shown that there is an effect between education and voting (Van Green, 2019), it is good practice for us to consider this variable in voting. We expect this variable to demonstrate a considerable increase in the Democratic vote in areas where it is high, due to the socialisation effects of education, and the general trend which has been seen in educated people to vote for left leaning parties.

Thirdly, we have our economic variables. Given the various ways in which studies display economic wealth, poverty, and other factors, we have decided to take all of these into account when choosing variables for this purpose. The factors we have chosen to measure economics in the area are that of Median Household Income, Household Ownership, Unemployment, Health Insurance Coverage, and Households on Food Stamps or similar.

The reason we have chosen these is that each one allows us to look at a separate measure of how different economic factors may affect how groups vote during the process. It allows us to look at those who maybe don't fully fit into one category or another. By looking at multiple factors of economics, it allows us to see if there is further nuance between how people vote if they have it. For example, will people vote the same as an unemployed person if they also happen to be in an area where the median income is high? These multiple factors allow us to see if there are differences which may need to be explained or investigated further.

Our model of analysis relies on the numbers of Hispanics present within each area. By taking areas where these numbers are high, we can make more reliable inferences into how voting patterns in these Hispanic populations are working, though we will not be totally accurate. We have chosen to do this by looking at a regression analysis between origin groups and the level of votes for the Democratic party. We have also introduced random effects by coding for each area separately. By doing this, we hope to spread out the individual effect of each area, though this is not perfect, we feel it gives us the greatest possibility of minimising the effect of more ecological factors that we have not been able to control for within our model. Alongside these, we have also attempted to control for factors that would indicate, rich and poor areas, as well as how many immigrants in general tend to move to the area. We also have a foreign born percentage variable to help control for both immigration concerns and for giving an indication on the level of first generation immigrants within an area.

We know from our sampling that we were unlikely to get a fully representative sample of the entire Hispanic population. We do see key indicators within our data that can give us confidence with the data that we have is sufficient to draw results from. A key indicator we can use for the reliability of this data is that of the Cuban vote. It would be spurious were it to

show support for the Democratic party, and so it is a good sign of the reliability of the data we have to hand that it shows the expected pro-Republican effect that is consistent with results in previous studies. As such, we can have reasonable confidence in the selection of our data, despite the pro-Democrat leaning of many of the cities we have chosen. That there is a pro-Democrat lean in the larger urban areas we have chosen is also a good sign, given previous research showing the pro-Democrat leaning of such areas. We have also used a combination of random effect and fixed effect regression measurements in determining these results.

We have performed a regression analysis on this data, using a model which allows for us to take into account the political leanings of the areas we have taking in by using a Municode system. This allows us to at least measure the effect of the areas themselves as well as the effects of our independent variables that are included in our analysis. We then analyse the Democratic vote share with each Hispanic group being included in two separate analyses, one where they are the only group being analysed, and one where every group has been included. In doing so, we are allowing ourselves to see both the effects that individual groups have, and the overall effect of Hispanics in an area have on the vote share of Democrats in the area being looked at. We acknowledge that there is an ecological inference problem that can be seen through our data, due to the limitations of our data choice. This is something that we have had to accept due to our data preference and research method. Therefore, we would advise caution in our results, which we also discuss within our findings. It should therefore be noted that our results are applicable only to the electoral year, and for the specific issues in which we look at within our study.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
MEX	0.0970 (0.0646)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.096* (0.055)
PUE	-	-0.283 (0.237)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.712*** (0.258)
CUB	-	-	-0.754*** (0.105)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.813*** (0.125)
SALV	-	-	-	1.710*** (0.439)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.496*** (0.529)
NIC	-	-	-	-	-2.364*** (0.825)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-2.122* (1.113)
PAN	-	-	-	-	-	2.638 (6.856)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.350 7.378
DOM	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.518 (0.663)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.532 0.782
SPA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.148 (0.548)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.388 (0.386)
GUA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.439 (0.774)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.442 (0.839)
HON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.294 (0.687)	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.784 (0.894)
ARG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.262 (1.724)	-	-	-	-	-	-3.337 (2.307)
CHI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.360 (5.374)	-	-	-	-	8.267 (8.057)
COL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.274 (0.657)	-	-	-	-2.184** (1.050)
ECU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-2.515 (3.578)	-	-	5.837 (4.390)
VEN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.031 (0.492)	-	-0.591 (0.681)
PER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.430* (2.418)	10.104*** 3.597
Foreign Born	0.0159 (0.168)	-0.00755 (0.168)	0.617*** (0.174)	0.0588 (0.165)	0.0991 (0.170)	-0.0284 (0.173)	0.596*** (0.172)	0.008 (0.171)	0.008 (0.176)	0.021 (0.175)	-0.019 (0.169)	-0.032 (0.174)	-0.043 (0.179)	0.325 (0.175)	-0.010 (0.168)	-0.141 (0.185)	0.624*** (0.194)
Noncitizens	-0.689* (0.368)	-0.688* (0.368)	-1.223*** (0.337)	-1.122*** (0.367)	-0.698* (0.361)	-0.660* (0.374)	-1.459*** (0.334)	-0.727* (0.371)	-0.734* (0.393)	-0.775** (0.388)	-0.735** (0.367)	-0.699* (0.368)	-0.658* (0.372)	-0.721** (0.367)	-0.686* (0.373)	-0.610* (0.369)	-1.532*** (0.403)
Bachelor Degrees	0.628*** (0.136)	0.617*** (0.136)	0.694*** (0.122)	0.742*** (0.133)	0.609*** (0.134)	0.619*** (0.138)	0.793*** (0.119)	0.629*** (0.137)	0.640*** (0.137)	0.639*** (0.136)	0.600*** (0.138)	0.624*** (0.136)	0.607*** (0.138)	0.644*** (0.137)	0.617*** (0.137)	0.620*** (0.135)	0.759*** (0.120)
Median Income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Home Ownership	-0.312*** (0.103)	-0.276*** (0.102)	-0.191** (0.0924)	-0.221** (0.0988)	-0.281*** (0.101)	-0.296*** (0.103)	-0.159* (0.0897)	-0.267** (0.104)	-0.248** (0.102)	-0.251** (0.103)	-0.276*** (0.102)	-0.266*** (0.102)	-0.312*** (0.103)	-0.250** (0.103)	-0.295*** (0.103)	-0.276*** (0.102)	-0.306*** (0.089)
Health Care	-0.739*** (0.273)	-0.943*** (0.240)	-0.683*** (0.218)	-1.122*** (0.233)	-0.900*** (0.239)	-0.921*** (0.238)	-0P.573** (0.244)	-1.034*** (0.243)	-1.064*** (0.241)	-1.037*** (0.242)	-1.015*** (0.239)	-1.031*** (0.240)	-0.906*** (0.239)	-1.030*** (0.241)	-0.934*** (0.242)	-1.054*** (0.239)	0.150 (0.231)
Food Stamps	0.565*** (0.162)	0.609*** (0.166)	1.033*** (0.159)	0.626*** (0.156)	0.679*** (0.164)	0.596*** (0.168)	1.232*** (0.166)	0.542*** (0.161)	0.531*** (0.161)	0.531*** (0.160)	0.610*** (0.167)	0.578*** (0.166)	0.608*** (0.168)	0.535*** (0.160)	0.578*** (0.164)	0.635*** (0.167)	1.586*** (0.177)
Unemployed	2.865*** (0.570)	2.752*** (0.570)	1.429*** (0.544)	2.639*** (0.545)	2.482*** (0.568)	2.794*** (0.575)	1.127** (0.527)	2.809*** (0.567)	2.790*** (0.566)	2.792*** (0.565)	2.632*** (0.581)	2.768*** (0.568)	2.789*** (0.578)	2.819*** (0.566)	2.813*** (0.573)	2.677*** (0.567)	0.353 (0.535)
Constant	1.098*** (0.257)	1.285*** (0.226)	0.992*** (0.207)	1.424*** (0.220)	1.239*** (0.225)	1.265*** (0.225)	0.856*** (0.230)	1.365*** (0.0228)	1.392*** (0.228)	1.370*** (0.228)	1.356*** (0.226)	1.362*** (0.227)	1.257*** (0.226)	1.354*** (0.228)	1.280*** (0.229)	1.382*** (0.226)	0.403*** (0.225)

Table 11 Full Table of Presidential Elections

We also find that several factors outside of the main Hispanic ones we are looking at turn out to be significant for all origin group backgrounds. These factors are the levels of bachelor degrees, and unemployment rates in the areas that were studied. These factors have a positive relationship with the level of the Democrat vote in the area examined. These two factors have previous research backing up this relationship, and so the discovery of this is unsurprising. However, what we also find is that the level of healthcare coverage, measured as a percentage of people in an area that have health insurance, has a consistent strong negative effect on the Democratic vote. This could be for a number of varying reasons, but some of these could simply be that the areas with more health care coverage tended to be more Republican, or that these individual areas had other outside factors, such as being richer on average.

Whilst we have no significance in the results for Mexican and Puerto Rican origins when measured on their own, when we take into account all Hispanic origins, we find that both become significant in opposite directions, with Puerto Ricans showing a significant negative factor towards the Democratic party. As these effects are seen only with the joint effect of all other Hispanics, it is possible that this is coming from Puerto Ricans living in areas which already have a large number of Republican voters. Whilst we can't say for certain that this ecological inference is not taking place, it is still an interesting finding to note, specifically as on their own Puerto Ricans do not show any significant feeling towards either party. This reaction could be linked in part to the foreign policy positions, as Puerto Rico is in a unique situation where they do not have full US rights when on the Island, but do have them off of it. This would be surprising due to the usually Democratic party calls for statehood for Puerto Rico, but remains an explanation for the effect that we are seeing present in this group.

This situation is the same as the Mexican group, in which we find a lack of significance on their own, but some significance when looking at all groups. The direction of this is not as surprising, given that it has already been documented that Mexicans do tend to vote for the Democratic party and we are happy that these connect to this well-known finding. As we expected this as one of our tests, we are satisfied that this shows that our results can show some validity, given that our findings with Mexican and Cuban populations mirror those findings in the majority of previous studies that have looked at these two major groups in significant detail.

Panamanians having a pro-Democratic party direction is a surprise due to the way in which we expected this to be reflected within our analytical mechanisms. We would have expected them to be leaning more Republican due to the history of the country, and given the ousting of a dictator by a Republican party administration. This result may be due to a misinterpretation of this situation. It is possible that he is seen as a right wing figure in Panama, and this may have driven participation of the Panamanian diaspora towards the more left wing Democrat party, or perhaps a sign of the individual displeasure of Panamanians towards the policies of the Republican candidate in the election. The strong anti-immigration push by Republicans during the election cycle may also have had an effect on this position. A similar effect, where the choice of candidates may have been the driving factor, may be seen in our findings towards Salvadorean populated areas of these cities, where they also lean pro-Democrat.

Throughout South America, we tend to see a strong lean towards the Democratic party. From Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela we see a pattern of pro-Democratic leaning of varying levels of significance. From the Argentinean and Chilean perspectives, this may come from a history of political upheaval and right leaning dictators which likely has had some effect on the ways in which these groups come from. In Colombia, we find a pro-

Democrat leaning which is very small, almost a tiny lean towards the Democrats. This may come as part of the effects of the data selection, but may also represent a split between Colombians in richer and poorer sections of these urbanised areas. We see that the level of health care coverage, used here as a financial proxy, has a much stronger effect in moving Colombians towards the Republicans than the Colombian lean to the Democratic party.

A surprising one for us is that we find that Venezuelans are not leaning in any particular way when it comes to parties, despite them coming from a regime that is left wing and authoritarian in nature. Because of these, we expected that Venezuelans would begin to follow a path similar to that of the Cuban diaspora in that they would become anti-left wing in the belief that this may lead to something that was similar to what happened back in Venezuela. But this data shows that this may not be the case, especially given that even given the non-significance, the directional result showed a positive outcome for the Democratic party. Given that there is a massive variation between the random and fixed effects results however, we determine that the close pro-Democrat Venezuelan result was more due to the results of our sampling rather than a true pro-Democrat Venezuelan diaspora within the US. Further, the drop in positive relation to the Democratic party in our random effects shows that this relationship may not exist in a form that would reliably swing any result, even if significance in the relationship was found at some future point. Whilst this may change in the near future, for now it would seem that being Venezuelan alone does not help to predict your voting behaviour, and that there are other, greater factors at play within this group.

There are some groups who have not been included in this final analysis, due to the levels of these groups we were able to find. After collecting data, we have not proceeded with independent analysis of groups which in at least one area do not number at least 1,000 persons. We decided this in order to reduce the possibility of spurious results, especially in groups where populations regularly did not reach triple figures. It is unlikely that anywhere

where these groups did not cross this threshold one are present in sufficient numbers to be able to reliably make any inference about their behaviour given our method of data collection. The groups that have been removed from the analysis because of this are those of Uruguay, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Paraguay.

In conclusion, what we have seen is that, for most Hispanic origin groups, their individual family origins do not tend to influence the way in which they vote during American elections. We do see that this matters for some groups however, such as the Cubans and Salvadoreans, which shows that for some, there are factors at home or that come from their origin in some way as to have a lasting, significant effect on the way that they choose to vote at the ballot box. Some of these are shown to have been found in existing literature, such as the link between the Cubans and the Republican party, and we can show that this still exists within our research too. In addition, we believe that we have learnt a lot here about the nature of origin on the Hispanic electorate, based on the fact that it seems to be less significant than expected for many, whilst still overall being favourable to the Democrats.

It is crucial for us to say that this is based on one analysis of one election, and has not yet been conducted over multiple elections over time. We believe that this may be seen again in further elections, and that there may be a change over time if we were also to look at previous ones. In addition, we must also state our limitations, as we have been unable to control for the ecological inference problems we have due to the nature of the study. By looking into certain areas, we have of course not been able to separate the votes of the Hispanic population from the rest of the population in an area, and it may be that these are affecting the votes to some degree. In addition, we cannot conclusively say that the origin of

a Hispanic group actively causes them to vote Democrat, only that it appears that in most cases, it does not.³

Conclusion

What we have found in this initial analysis is that there is little substance to the media claim that Hispanics are Mexican. We do however find some evidence to support previous studies that Mexicans tend to be more pro-Democrat than other groups of Hispanics, and find ample evidence of the well-documented pro-Republican Cuban effect. We also find there to be some evidence for some groups having political leanings, seen within our study most strongly for both Puerto Ricans and Nicaraguan-Americans.

We have found that whilst in some places, such as with Cuban-American and Mexican-American groups that we broadly align with previous research in these areas, we have noted some areas of divergence, in particular that of Nicaraguan-Americans where our research has suggested a Republican lean within the origin group as a whole.

Whilst we were limited in the way we collected our data, we believe that, given that some of our key findings are supported by previous literature, that we can say that, in metropolitan areas, that national origins do make a difference in how some groups of Hispanics tend to vote in those areas. We do however acknowledge that part of this may be due to an environmental affect, such as it being a richer area which we are looking at possibly driving pro-Republican sentiment. We find that when measured as an overall Hispanic population, that certain groups do prefer opposing parties, and that this carries over to these groups when looked at in isolation. We also acknowledge that these results are a limited snapshot of one

³ It could be possible that some Hispanic groups may have other reasons outside of political ones for voting in some situations. One possibility for this is the discord between Colombia and Venezuela, where geopolitical tension may cross over into the political sphere within these communities. (Pearce, 2013). As such, there is still the possibility of intergroup relationships between Hispanic origin groups playing a role in their voting decisions.

particular election, and may be of limited use in understanding other elections, both previous to the one studied and future ones. It is our hope however that this study can help to build a groundwork for future study.

The next natural step is to begin to look further in to these results. Is it possible that these results and patterns are repeated at lower levels of elections, such as during state government elections as well, or is it only at the presidential level where we see this increase? We think that looking at this to see if the pattern here replicates is an important step in seeing whether or not these groups replicate their behaviour uniformly, and possibly ruling out the idea of a major candidate influence during the presidential election.

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The Effect of National Origins on Hispanic Voting Behaviour in State Elections

Further to our previous paper, we have started here by looking at the levels in which Hispanic Origins have a preference for the Democratic Party at the state level, and the effect of having Democratic Candidates running unopposed by Republican nominees. By using our data from the US Census Bureau and State level election results in metropolitan areas, allowing us to look at multiple elections in these areas. What we find is that there is a difference in how people of Hispanic origins vote at these different levels of elections.

Split ticket voting is an idea that has been thoroughly explored in previous research in voting differences between Presidential and state electoral results. Within this literature, we are yet to see the impact of Hispanic split ticket voting, and whether this affects their links to either of the two main parties that exist. This has been found previously to be based on factors such as giving a form of political insurance against a party or candidate (Burden and

Helmke, 2009), where a group may want to maintain some influence with both sides. The current thinking behind split ticket voting tends to focus a lot on the broad results in a county or municipality, and less on how race is seen to be split ticketing. Whilst there is some movement in this, the focus tends to be on racial attitudes towards other races (Levan & Greene, 2023).

This paper looks to try and find if there is any difference between Hispanic origins in how they vote for a president, and how they vote for someone at the state legislative level, an election often less prioritised and more about state issues. By doing this, we start to eliminate the possibilities that a preference found within an origin group happens to be because of a single candidate, or whether it is because of a true preference within that origin group for a particular party or party platform. There has been, over time, a nationalisation of party policy that has led to most state parties simply adopting the national party agenda and losing focus on state issues to become an extension of the national campaign (Hopkins, Schickler, & Azizi, 2022).

From this, and using our comparative dataset across various municipalities, we can look and see if there is a split ticket effect occurring amongst voters of Hispanic origin, or if the effects that we are seeing across elections are the result of a party preference within the origin group as a whole. Seeing the difference here would give us some confirmation of there being change and flux within groups, as well as helping to differentiate between the priorities of these origins during this election.

Split Ticket Voting

An important reason for looking more locally at these sorts of elections is seen during elections where there are already clear differences in political outcomes. One of these was seen in 2004 in Montana, where, whilst Bush won the presidential election, the Democratic

gubernatorial candidate won (Johnston et al, 2016). This already shows that there is a difference between the way that voters vote for different levels of government, though this is between the president and state level executive branch. This is most obvious in places such as Montana and Maine, because we can see how the differences between the districts can result in different results at different electoral levels. Though not a split ticket vote, we can also see differences between how people vote differently for separate offices, by looking at West Virginia, which voted for Trump I 2016, but strongly returned Joe Manchin for the Senate in 2018. However, most of the current literature tends to focus on the difference between two more comparable offices, such as the presidency, and a more state equivalent (Mulligan,2011; Burden & Helmke, 2009). As such, there is little looking at if people prefer their state representatives based on other factors than those for which they make their decisions for the presidency. Given however that there is already such evidence that people will vote differently for the executive level positions, it seems like a logical step to see that they could vote for different parties within representative positions locally than they do for the president of the United States.

That there is party influence at the state level is already clear, such as in studies which have looked at the uniqueness of Nebraska, where there is (officially) nonpartisan politics have shown a disconnect between non-partisanship and the preferences of state voters (Wright & Schaffner, 2002). However, what is the effect of parties on the voters themselves, and does being aligned with one affect your chances. What we do know is that certain parties ignore certain voters when campaigning, with Hispanics having less attention given to them by state representatives that are aligned with the Republican party (Gell-Redman et al, 2018) as outside of certain areas, they believe there are better uses for their campaign funds. If people do not feel represented well by their representatives, what are the chances that they would continue to vote for them, regardless of the party that they claim to represent during

elections? If this effect is seen throughout the United States, it is likely that the Republicans are shooting themselves in the foot by failing to mobilise and persuade such a powerful group of voters. Part of this is due to the idea that Hispanics do tend to lean towards the Democratic party.

There is also the issue that there is less turnout during state legislative elections. Sometimes this can be due to them occurring in so-called off years, during years between the presidential elections and midterms. As has been said, “State legislative elections are probably relatively low interest and salience for most voters” (Caldeira & Patterson, 1982). Given this, it is probably best to be looking at these sorts of elections during times where there are, to paraphrase, more important elections happening. The main one of these is the presidential election, though this brings its own issues with it that the national candidates dominate the campaigning and agendas of state candidates who may try to look at more state issues to try and gain an advantage. One of these things that has helped bring an advantage is the phenomenon of the straight-party ballot, which simply allows the voter to cast their vote in all races for a party candidate. This is seen to be more commonplace amongst historically Democrat areas, as well as utilised most by minorities such as African-Americans and Hispanics whilst ignored in high house value areas (Kimball et al, 2002). This may help to explain in the event that there is little to no difference in the voting between the presidential and state legislative results. However, if these are different, then it would also show that voters do take these things into account and do not just straight vote for a single party in all things, showing that there is some differentiation made in the minds of voters between state politicians and issues, as well as at the national level. If this is seen, it would become questionable as to how effective straight ticket voting is in the grander scheme of state elections outside of merely stopping votes from being wasted.

This would conflict with the growing polarisation within US politics, in which both parties are both moving away from each other. Logic would dictate that this would mean that party identification would probably become stronger, as well as meaning that just straight voting for one party would become more commonplace. This is seen both at the congressional level, but also at the state level in both upper and lower houses of state legislatures (Hinchliffe & Lee, 2021). That we see this means that there should be an link between presidential vote and vote at the state representative levels. If there is not, it would point to there being greater issues at play in the state area than are being discussed by national campaigns and politicians. It can be seen that when parties are more polarised nationally, that these issues likely have greater salience and therefore have more impact upon state elections than high stakes state issues that will be lost in the noise of the national election landscape (Zingher & Richman, 2019). That this is the case increases the fact that the importance of state issues may not be as important during times of high political polarisation, as the 2020 election was. It is therefore possible that we will see a state election that will correspond well with the presidential elections that happened at the same time as these state ones, as voters didn't so much vote for a party, but rather voted against the other.

What is also evident is that Hispanics have their own way of being influenced in their voting preferences. Should these preferences in political and social factors be slightly different from that such as non-Hispanic whites and African-Americans, then it's possible we have been missing some clear signs in Hispanic voting patterns that would otherwise have been hidden by the inclusion of other groups within these research designs. We know that Hispanics have their own political preferences, as seen by origins voting differently at the presidential level. We also know that they have their own social preferences as well (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003). This could lead to an unexpected result if these preferences are dramatically different from those that we have already seen in groups such as African-

Americans. During these, with the increased polarisation, we could see an exacerbation of those differences that we already know, such as more Cuban voting for Democrats. It is also equally possible that these preferences are different at the state level than the preferences Hispanic groups have for presidential candidates. If this is the case, then what we could see is Hispanic groups leaning towards other parties or no party at all based on their more localised preferences being different from those they have for the presidency or even for Congressional elections.

Gubernatorial Focus

What we see in previous literature is usually a focus on the gubernatorial election for state elections, due to these being easy to compare to the presidential vote. This is usually due to both of these forming the executive branch of their levels of government, and so being easier to compare to each other than what I am trying to achieve, which is comparing more national preferences to preferences over state issues and priorities. This is particularly important around issues such as immigration, which we know that Hispanic voters do not particularly think about when it comes to national issues (Galbraith & Callister, 2020). That this is not much in play during state elections, as there is little a state representative can do to curb these things, do they take other issues into account, or do they carry their preferences over with them through a straight ticket voting system (in a state where this system is allowed)?

What the previous literature shows is that there are ways in which national preferences tend to spill over into state politics, and so state issues are not always the focus of party political campaigns. Indeed, it seems that when things are extremely polarised, that parties try to avoid state politics and focus on the national issues, creating something akin to a national vote but simply moved to the state level instead of nationally. That this happens

means it is possible to see an almost replication of national votes when we come to the state election landscape, and a close mirroring of those election results to be seen at the state level, even if it is only at the level of state representative, an office that has tended to be overlooked in most studies in favour of studying gubernatorial elections due to its similarities with the office of the president.

Strategic Voting

We also find in the literature some support for the idea of strategic voting. This is when, where faced with the situation that a voter's preferred party cannot win, they will instead vote for the candidate most likely to defeat their least preferred party (Blaise & Degan, 2019). In cases where we find there is little to no competition against a Democratic party candidate, we could see places where the amount of votes for minor parties may grow as a strategic or protest vote against the Democratic party rather than a strong preference for the minor party, regardless of the political stance the party takes. Due to this, what we could possibly see is that in areas without a substantial Republican presence where the party refuses or declines to place a candidate, we should see a sharp rise in the vote share for third parties, as some voters may decide to vote for any party that isn't the Democrats.

What we will be looking for is for if the preferences of Hispanic groups stay the same from one election to the next. If there is a difference found between these levels, it would point to Hispanic voters taking different factors into account from one election to the next, and the possibility that there is not as much effect from the national election as has previously been thought. Should they continue to hold the same preferences, it would show that the effect of national politics spreads away from national elections, and that all of American politics is becoming polarised as to the point that state issues are not as important as national

politics to the average voters. If this is the case, there may need to be research into why there has been a loss of focus on state issues in state politics.

Hypothesis

The main reason for this study is to see if Hispanic groups continue to follow voting trends identified in the previous paper when the focus of the election is moved from the presidential contest to state legislators. Previous literature has pointed to the possibility that, due to the change in how parties are organised both nationally and locally, that we should see some change in the levels of support, but that support for the parties overall should remain if it previously existed, mostly due to there being a difference in how engaged a voter is with state politics over just being a national voter. These can be due to unexpected differences in the way that these Hispanic groups decide their preferences, and that some state parties can differ from their national party operations depending on state circumstances, as well as the amount of resources poured into various campaigns.

For this reason, the first hypothesis is one that gives us a baseline for this. Given that we know that party politics has become polarised, and that this polarisation has effects on how the state party machinery works, it is therefore logical to assume that these do have an effect on how Hispanics are persuaded to vote. Therefore, it is likely to see Hispanic groups vote in a similar way they do during the presidential election, using the same party labels to identify the party of choice rather than focusing on state issues, with the political party machinery pushing the same messaging at both the national and the state level. So our first hypothesis is in place to allow us to use it as a baseline for our results, using an expected result found in previous research for us to use as a test for our own research design. As such, we feel our first hypothesis is that in all areas, Democratic Vote share will decrease for all groups the more local elections get. We are testing this by comparing our results here to the

results of our previous paper, and feel that that national feel of Democratic campaigns will be detrimental to them at the state level. If this is correct, we should see decreases in the Democratic vote share even in pro-Democratic groups, such as the Mexican Americans, due to the lack of focus on state issues that they would be voting on.

A problem that was often encountered, as detailed later, was the lack of opposition in some races from the major parties. This is to be understood as races where only one major party stood for election. In these occasions, it is likely to see a large skew towards those parties who stand in all elections that have been measured within an area as opposed to those parties that have not done so, and so lose vote share in these areas. As this may be the case, it is sensible to measure some of these ones separately to the majority of results where there is active competition between the two major parties. But, these situations are interesting in themselves. So we will say our second hypothesis is that: There will be a significant increase in third party votes when a major party is absent from any Hispanic group. We believe that this will be seen no matter which third party happens to be standing in the area, though we have found these to be both the Green and Libertarian parties. The reasoning behind this is that Republican voters, when presented between a choice of Democrat, other party, or none, are more likely to choose to protest against a Democrat by voting alternatively or not voting at all rather than voting for the Democratic Party candidate. This may be particularly true amongst those voters who are more Republican in nature and more concerned about extreme left wing politics, such as Colombian and Venezuelan voters, who may be more concerned at left wing policies and ideas than other groups. This may also be the case for Nicaraguans as well.

These hypotheses should allow us to see what happens when these votes are translated from the overall presidential vote into more state votes. We should be able to spot what happens both when Hispanic groups are presented with both parties with similar platforms to

their national stages, but competing at a more state level. If there are differences between these two levels, we should also be able to see what these are, and whether or not these differences are significant from their previously seen voting behaviours. We should also be able to see if the state issues are actually making a difference, though if there is any change in the voting patterns. If there are changes, then what we will see is a pattern in which those groups that favour the Republicans or Democrats during the presidential election may not necessarily vote for them with either the same level of conviction, or indeed vote for them at all during state elections. If this is the case, it brings up the extremely interesting question of why this is happening.

If politics was becoming extremely polarised, we would expect to see the presidential results to be replicated across all electoral levels, rather than staying limited to national politics. If this is shown to be the opposite, and indeed these voting patterns change once we start looking at state level election results, what causes this change from one level to the other? Is it that there are state issues that can trump even national politics in terms of importance and salience to state voters, despite parties campaigning on similar platforms to their national parties at the time? Perhaps such a difference, if it does exist, would be pointing to there being a more personal relationship between the state voters and those representatives who have more state duties compared to more national based politicians and party machines?

These hypotheses provide a baseline through which we can begin to put together a picture that is clearer when it comes to state legislative elections, and building a picture of what Hispanic origins are thinking when they go to the polls in state elections as opposed to when they vote for the president, especially when these elections are happening concurrently with each other. Whatever we end up seeing here, we are going to see if there is a clear difference between the preferences of Hispanic origins between what they are looking for in a president, and who they look to for representation in their state areas. If these are different,

then clearly they take different factors into account when looking into these two important areas of Democratic representation.

Research Plan

For this research, we have continued with a similar research plan. A big part of state elections however was the choosing of which state election we should focus on in order to create comparable differences between our results. To do so required us to choose a state election that was held at the same time so as to recreate the same national political atmosphere for the election. This broadly leaves us with states that had state legislative elections during that year. As state representatives are more tied to their state areas, this gives us the best link to state area and state issues that is distanced enough from the national political picture, and which has a large consistency of occurrence across the country. It would be difficult to only do mayoral elections if the year chosen happened to not be that area's year.

As these state representatives are usually elected every couple of years in the same cycle as the Congressional House, these people are a good mix between state issues and national party campaigning. This is because parties will put at least a decent level of campaigning into state representatives, whilst still focusing on more state issues rather than a broad national picture. (Brox & Shaw, 2006). Because of this, it allows us to be able to gain a view on what Hispanics think about issues in their state region rather than focusing on the national policies of the parties, some of which may be different from what representatives are saying.

This is of course not a perfect way of understanding this. There will always be some bleeding over of policy concerns from the national political arena to the state and state level politics we are looking at. However, at the point after state representative elections, these

electoral offices are infrequently elected, and not always decided on at the same time as other state offices. Because of this, it would have given us a variance of years which would, in turn, change the results from each year due to whatever issues are being brought up in that particular year, and so this would make them less reliable in terms of measuring year to year differences. Because of this, I will be taking election results from only one year, that of 2020, to try to contain the effect of different issues changing results from year to year. Whilst there will still be the effect of the presidential election to consider, there will only be one effect from it, rather than effecting it in several different ways.

This presented its own problem in that in some areas, there was sometimes only one candidate. This creates problems with the skewing of an area towards one party where there is only one representative for some areas. To fix this, we have continued with Public Use Microdata Areas, as these areas did often cross state representative areas. By doing this, it gives us the chance to moderate some areas where there was only one representative in one race, but not in another. This doesn't entirely solve the problem, but this can also be moderated by looking at the average difference for parties from their presidential vote. In areas with a single candidate, this skew is likely to be high, and so using the Public Use Microdata Areas to add distance between these should help us to moderate the more extreme changes in vote share due to the lack of candidates in one race. By using the Public Use Microdata Areas to select these boundaries, we increase our chances of getting multiple state election boundaries and therefore less chance of simply one candidate being in all of these areas. This joining helps us to avoid as many single candidate areas as is possible without making unreasonable assumptions about what constitutes a state area, as broadly these are still in line with electoral and census mapping.

There is of course the question of why use state representative elections if some of the races have not a candidate from both major parties. The reason for this has been that, the majority

of the time, the lines of Public Use Microdata Areas are crossed by two or three separate representative districts. As a result, there is a lower chance of having an area with no Republican representative at all due to there being multiple elections in which there could be at least one candidate from both parties with a microdata area, allowing us more opportunities. However it is not an ideal situation simply due to the number of areas with a single candidate. There can be many reasons for this, but one of these is simply that one party did not think it was worth the money and effort to put forward a candidate, usually due to the state circumstances. It should be noted that when only one candidate ran, it was usually a Democratic candidate rather than a lone Republican.

There is also the question of why I decided to go with just state representatives rather than going as local as I can, for example with mayoral elections. Whilst it is true that as politics in the United States has become more polarised, that state elections have become more influenced by party politics (Warshaw, 2019), I do not think that the more localised elections are all that helpful in this particular scenario. Once we get to true localities such as mayoral candidates, things become so localised that, even with the polarised effect of the current political situation in the US, that state personalities can easily dominate the political landscape in cities. As such, I feel that it is easier to move away from the strong personality of state leaders by moving to state representatives. State representatives are a good midpoint between the presidency, congress, and the absolute locality that is mayoral elections. That these elections are also regular in all states also gives us the ability to easily compare separate states with each other, rather than having to look at the specific makeup of individual small localities to form a good view.

That the cities I looked at tended to be large in order to fit in the requirement for levels of Hispanic population also became something that would have been a hinderance to looking at smaller state political campaigns. This is because we would only have been able to

look at larger cities, where the only effect is that of the political parties due to their sheer size, and thus would have been skewed towards whichever party put in more resources. Due to the nature of immigration trending towards larger metropolitan areas, these areas would also likely begin to skew towards the Democrat side (Gainsborough, 2005). Due to the way that this happens,, and the selection criteria needing a certain percentage of Hispanic population within the city, the simple fact is that smaller townships and areas simply wouldn't qualify to be measured, and so we would end up with a set of areas which are much more likely to vote for a particular party.

Thus the reasoning behind choosing these areas based on Hispanic population is that we can't measure that population if it is not there in reasonable numbers. The reasoning behind the use of state representatives is that these areas typically cover both more urban and suburban environments within a city. As such, there is a more balanced selection of the electorate than we would get if used simple city locals for this vote. The use of state representatives also helps narrow down the personality part of the election. Whilst it is of course important to consider individual candidates, we want to see how they vote based on the party that the candidate runs for, rather than for the candidate individually. Using the state representatives instead of a more state office means that the party label that is attached to that candidate is much more important to the voter than if they were voting more locally, where there is a greater chance of them personally knowing the candidate outside of the electoral environment. This allows us to look at the way in which Hispanic groups are voting for parties locally whilst trying to minimise the effects of other things. We can't take these elections entirely out of the national landscape, but we can do our best to control for other state factors. This is done by the spreading out over the Public Use Microdata Areas of multiple state representative districts that allows us to minimise the effects of any strong personal connections, and also should show us that a particular area is strongly supportive of

one party of the other, which will be seen across the area as a whole rather than just strong in one state district.

All this allows us to see the ways in which separate Hispanic origins vote for their state representatives, and how these are different to those in which they voted during the presidential elections as previously seen? Do their presidential preferences count towards how they vote locally, or are they more prone to using split ticket politics, and prefer to evaluate national and state issues differently as opposed to counting it all as one party which is good, and the other having failed, being kicked out of office?

Data Selection

Our demographic and statistical data has been taken from the US Census Bureau, using the American Community Survey data that we have previously used to maintain the consistency of information between one study and the other. We also found that this would help with being able to provide decent estimates in numerous areas that the main census data would not be able to otherwise provide us with, and this was much more helpful with mapping to our public use micro data areas that we have been using to track down local areas. In addition to this, we have added for this paper the results in state level elections, and split these amongst the Public Use Microdata areas that we have, including in cases where there are multiple elections in the same area. These occurred when the PUMA overlapped two or more state legislative districts, and were helpful when helping us to minimise the effects of elections where was only one major party candidate standing for election.

To minimise these areas, we have created two sets of tables. One for where we see the effects overall across all state elections, and a secondary set where we have dropped all results where the Democrats had more than 95% of the votes. This rules out many of the cases where there were either unopposed candidates, or candidates whom only faced third

party or independent opponents. We also continued to use the same exclusionary policy for city areas that we have previously used, and have therefore only been using metropolitan areas where the Hispanic population is estimated to be at least 15% across the city as a whole.

We would like to say that we are aware of the ecological inference problem, which we have attempted to mitigate where possible. However, the usage of the high-density urban areas, which have a known voter preference for the Democratic party, was necessary due to needing to need appropriate Hispanic population levels to be able to gain reliable results. As such, our data may not be as useful to those looking for information in rural areas, or about areas with less-dense Hispanic populations.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
MEX	0.341*** (0.123)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.364*** (0.109)
PUE	-	-0.054 (0.384)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.215 (0.511)
CUB	-	-	-0.196 (0.201)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.635** (0.249)
SALV	-	-	-	2.101*** (0.720)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.598 (1.049)
NIC	-	-	-	-	-1.219 (1.394)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-6.457*** (2.209)
PAN	-	-	-	-	-	0.000 (0.000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-12.994 (14.636)
DOM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.557 (1.100)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.451 (1.551)
SPA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.631 (1.121)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.433* (0.765)
GUA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.699 (1.218)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.742 (1.664)
HON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.053 (1.098)	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.098* (1.774)
ARG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.258 (2.956)	-	-	-	-	-	-
CHI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.239** (8.837)	-	-	-	-	18.403*** (4.577)
COL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.093*** (1.061)	-	-	-	15.948 (15.984)
ECU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-7.675 (5.879)	-	-	1.178 (2.083)
VEN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.084 (0.822)	-	-14.935* (8.709)
PER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.987** (4.127)	9.645 (7.135)
Foreign Born	0.339 (0.304)	0.258 (0.308)	0.173 (0.340)	0.293 (0.302)	0.186 (0.305)	0.101 (0.307)	0.280 (0.312)	0.278 (0.311)	0.208 (0.318)	0.244 (0.316)	0.546 (0.300)	0.040 (0.304)	-0.115 (0.310)	0.278 (0.310)	0.010 (0.298)	-0.272 (0.320)	0.672* (0.385)
Noncitizens	-0.440 (0.609)	-0.357 (0.618)	-0.153 (0.651)	-0.761 (0.622)	-0.177 (0.626)	-0.167 (0.624)	-0.402 (0.625)	-0.409 (0.625)	-0.226 (0.659)	-0.347 (0.653)	-0.045 (0.637)	-0.192 (0.619)	-0.100 (0.615)	-0.277 (0.620)	-0.159 (0.641)	0.162 (0.634)	-0.449 (0.800)
Bachelor Degrees	0.524 ** (0.222)	0.518 ** (0.226)	0.409 * (0.236)	0.634*** (0.225)	0.451** (0.231)	0.523** (0.231)	0.510** (0.226)	0.508** (0.226)	0.507** (0.227)	0.514** (0.227)	0.427* (0.427)	0.452** (0.228)	0.464** (0.226)	0.509** (0.228)	0.394* (0.235)	0.383* (0.232)	0.601** (0.237)
Median Income	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Home Ownership	-0.133 (0.175)	-0.238 (0.174)	-0.116 (0.179)	-0.013 (0.171)	-0.080 (0.176)	-0.358 (0.175)	-0.030 (0.175)	-0.411 (0.177)	-0.025 (0.174)	-0.029 (0.175)	-0.115 (0.178)	-0.067 (0.174)	-0.090 (0.172)	-0.036 (0.175)	-0.143 (0.178)	-0.147 (0.176)	-0.227 (0.177)
Health Care	-0.558 (0.478)	- (0.427)	-0.671 (0.429)	- (0.417)	-0.941** (0.433)	- (0.423)	- (0.426)	- (0.429)	- (0.426)	- (0.428)	-0.813* (0.422)	- (0.420)	- (0.418)	- (0.424)	-0.885** (0.427)	-0.880** (0.417)	1.284*** (0.458)
Food Stamps	0.342 (0.259)	0.385 (0.269)	0.533 * (0.306)	0.510 * (0.261)	0.460* (0.280)	0.481* (0.275)	0.407 (0.266)	0.374 (0.262)	0.354 (0.265)	0.378 (0.263)	0.369 (0.287)	0.561** (0.277)	0.632** (0.276)	0.369 (0.265)	0.464* (0.280)	0.613** (0.286)	1.131*** (0.351)
Unemployed	1.634* (0.918)	1.470 (0.938)	0.758 (1.045)	1.428 (0.914)	1.162 (0.968)	1.236 (0.949)	1.482 (0.932)	1.503 (0.933)	1.511 (0.933)	1.462 (0.935)	1.266 (1.002)	1.160 (0.944)	0.946 (0.943)	1.477 (0.942)	1.042 (0.977)	0.846 (0.972)	-0.984 (1.061)
Constant	0.983 ** (0.446)	1.582*** (0.401)	1.193 (0.407)	1.537*** (0.393)	1.377*** (0.406)	1.472*** (0.397)	1.580*** (0.400)	1.608*** (0.402)	1.583*** (0.400)	1.565*** (0.401)	1.315*** (0.398)	1.490*** (0.394)	1.565*** (0.393)	1.464*** (0.399)	1.399*** (0.403)	1.378*** (0.393)	-0.481 (0.447)

Table 22 - All State Elections

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
<i>MEX</i>	0.404*** (0.120)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.423*** (0.114)
<i>PUE</i>	-	0.506 (0.715)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.055 (0.720)
<i>CUB</i>	-	-	-0.322 (0.204)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.569*** (0.225)
<i>SALV</i>	-	-	-	2.229** (0.884)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.692 (1.093)
<i>NIC</i>	-	-	-	-	-1.007 (1.353)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-5.156** (2.041)
<i>PAN</i>	-	-	-	-	-	2.586 (10.876)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-17.606 (13.612)
<i>DOM</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.411 (1.691)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-2.416 (2.835)
<i>SPA</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.901 (1.032)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.976 (0.697)
<i>GUA</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.500 (1.220)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.577 (1.519)
<i>HON</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.348 (1.074)	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.919** (1.642)
<i>ARG</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4.381 (2.853)	-	-	-	-	-	-18.115*** (4.044)
<i>CHI</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.094 (8.606)	-	-	-	-	11.273 (14.894)
<i>COL</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.657 (1.098)	-	-	-	1.638 (2.235)
<i>ECU</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-8.076 (5.635)	-	-	-11.087 (7.948)
<i>VEN</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.506 (0.815)	-	1.063 (1.235)
<i>PER</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.221* (4.045)	9.973 (6.462)
<i>Foreign Born</i>	0.315 (0.294)	0.235 (0.302)	0.192 (0.326)	0.207 (0.296)	0.135 (0.293)	0.109 (0.296)	0.232 (0.304)	0.273 (0.305)	0.196 (0.315)	0.205 (0.312)	0.008 (0.280)	0.015 (0.295)	-0.144 (0.308)	0.289 (0.304)	-0.083 (0.815)	-0.219 (0.315)	0.770** (0.357)
<i>Noncitizens</i>	-0.339 (0.609)	-0.326 (0.627)	-0.226 (0.663)	-0.587 (0.628)	-0.144 (0.633)	-0.180 (0.633)	-0.307 (0.629)	-0.402 (0.635)	-0.210 (0.672)	-0.239 (0.661)	0.038 (0.644)	-0.182 (0.628)	0.017 (0.639)	-0.267 (0.625)	-0.068 (0.657)	0.069 (0.640)	-0.551 (0.764)
<i>Bachelor Degrees</i>	0.462** (0.230)	0.471* (0.242)	0.203 (0.248)	0.477** (0.235)	0.324 (0.244)	0.367 (0.243)	0.434* (0.241)	0.415* (0.239)	0.431* (0.238)	0.433* (0.238)	0.278 (0.250)	0.339 (0.241)	0.265 (0.244)	0.438* (0.238)	0.183 (0.248)	0.252 (0.244)	0.419* (0.241)
<i>Median Income</i>	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Home Ownership</i>	-0.218 (0.181)	-0.088 (0.184)	-0.268 (0.187)	-0.125 (0.180)	-0.184 (0.185)	-0.157 (0.184)	-0.104 (0.184)	-0.135 (0.187)	-0.102 (0.183)	-0.108 (0.184)	-0.260 (0.185)	-0.171 (0.183)	-0.241 (0.184)	-0.101 (0.183)	-0.312* (0.186)	-0.253 (0.184)	-0.286 (0.179)
<i>Health Care</i>	-0.110 (0.494)	-0.930** (0.451)	-0.159 (0.445)	-0.738* (0.445)	-0.574 (0.457)	-0.694 (0.447)	-0.890** (0.450)	-0.945** (0.452)	-0.898** (0.450)	-0.903** (0.452)	-0.317 (0.440)	-0.731 (0.444)	-0.571 (0.443)	-0.798* (0.446)	-0.361 (0.450)	-0.561 (0.441)	1.565*** (0.480)
<i>Food Stamps</i>	0.043 (0.265)	0.096 (0.272)	0.232 (0.329)	0.218 (0.273)	0.137 (0.295)	0.093 (0.291)	0.099 (0.273)	0.096 (0.272)	0.087 (0.274)	0.105 (0.273)	-0.124 (0.304)	0.231 (0.295)	0.193 (0.300)	0.064 (0.274)	0.037 (0.298)	0.230 (0.302)	0.520 (0.347)
<i>Unemployed</i>	1.124 (0.980)	0.947 (1.009)	-0.505 (1.143)	0.784 (0.995)	0.463 (1.050)	0.651 (1.030)	0.957 (1.018)	0.979 (1.008)	0.971 (1.010)	0.960 (1.011)	0.703 (1.075)	0.484 (1.023)	0.262 (1.040)	0.970 (1.011)	0.204 (1.053)	0.157 (1.042)	-1.386 (1.085)
<i>Constant</i>	0.725 (0.448)	1.451*** (0.409)	1.018** (0.411)	1.295*** (0.404)	1.251*** (0.416)	1.335*** (0.407)	1.432*** (0.409)	1.478*** (0.411)	1.438*** (0.409)	1.443*** (0.410)	1.132*** (0.404)	1.368*** (0.404)	1.300*** (0.404)	1.351*** (0.407)	1.214*** (0.413)	1.305*** (0.403)	-0.547 (0.460)

Table 2 – Elections where Democratic Vote is <90%

Our findings are going to split into two areas. The first of these will explain what we have found at state level elections in full. The second set will discuss what we find when we drop certain election results from our findings. These dropped results reflect areas in which the Democrats took more than 90% of the vote in that specific state elections, which was usually the result of either an unopposed candidate, or one where there was opposition from just third parties rather than a Republican alternative to the Democratic candidate.

We do see some interesting differences between both tables. The main one of these is that, after dropping our uncontested Democratic elections, we see that the Cuban American population softens a little towards the Democratic party when all origins are taken into account. One possible cause for this reaction is that it is possible that more statewide issues take the limelight in this set of elections, and a possibility that Cuban Americans may be more issue based at the state level. Another possible explanation may be found in another couple of areas, such as the possibility of some Cuban-heritage candidates in Florida, or perhaps when there is no Republican candidate, Cuban Americans still turn out to vote for “anyone but” the Democratic candidate. Determining the cause of this small shift would require some further study. However, we do see the expected effect here of Cuban Americans voting primarily against the Democrats, something that is now reflected in both national and state level elections.

Our results for the Mexican American are as expected, with there being a strong link between Mexican Americans and voting for the Democratic party. This follows previous findings in other studies, but confirms that this is an effect that we can see replicated at different electoral levels. Interestingly, it is a much stronger link here to the pro-Democratic vote than was found at the presidential level. This could indicate the possibility that either Biden was not a strong candidate for the Mexican American community, or the possibility of a policy issue

that drove Mexican Americans away from the presidential platform, but close to the state party.

One interesting factor we see is the supposedly large effect that is alluded to in our results for Argentinean Americans, as well for the Ecuadorian Americans in Table 1. However, I do not believe that this is definitive proof of their voting intentions at the state level due to the low levels of population that we have for them. I had included them within this study because there are some districts in which they have greater than 1,000 population, the level of which I felt was a minimum to be included for the purposes of the study. But outside of a few specific instances, the population levels are very low, and so I would be cautious about determining this as a strong result. A further reason I would be cautious about these two particular results are the large numbers that have been recorded, which are very different from the numbers we would be expecting to be seeing. These two factors together suggest that the lower numbers of these groups may be having an inflationary effect on the results for them. As such, we would disregard the results for these groups, despite the high levels of significance that we found for them.

We also find that there is some relation between Honduran Americans and Nicaraguan Americans, but in opposite directions. Whilst this may be surprising due to the close proximity of these two nations geographically, this does reflect the difference in political cultures and histories between the two origins in particular. These differences make themselves clearly known at the state level, and I believe form a strong argument once again for the disaggregation of these groups from the current traditional aggregation methods. If we looked at the traditional ways only of doing this, we would not see this difference between two groups that many laypersons would clump together as being highly similar and homogenous as a group, given their many similarities. What we have found by separating these two groups is that, in both cases that we have looked at here, that there is a sizeable and

significant difference between the two that is inevitably lost during the aggregation process, and remains significant even whether or not we include the highly pro-Democratic contests that were included within the data gathering section of this study.

We also find some interesting results not tied to certain origin groups, but instead tied to economic circumstances that have both greater and lesser effects to those that we found during our presidential study. We find for example that the percentage of people in an area with at least a bachelor's degree had a much less significant impact on whether or not they voted for the Democratic party, with some origin groups finding a lack of significance in this usually strongly linked area when examined individually. This points us towards there being many more factors at play in the state elections than may have been first realised. Whilst this is still a significant factor when all Hispanic origin groups are examined at once, it is of much less significance than in presidential elections, pointing to the growing importance of other factors compared to the presidential election stage. This could be mostly economic in nature, as in some areas having a higher level of education may no longer be a distinct advantage in gaining work depending on your location, but could also be more to hometown factors such as having grown up with more of an attachment to a more local candidate. This would be an interesting field of study to find the reasons behind this decreased significance at the state level. However, our assumption in our hypothesis that all groups would vote less for the Democrats is incorrect, as some groups are more Democratic inclined at the state level, such as Mexican Americans.

In addition, we also see a difference in the importance of a couple of economic factors that did not show any significance during the national presidential election, but seem to hold more sway at the state level. The main one of these is the median income level, which whilst having a miniscule effect, still has a negative value towards the Democratic party that was not previously significant. This would help us see a reflection in the relative importance that

voters place on their state officials when it comes to their personal finances, and perhaps an insight into their thinking. It may be that when it comes to their personal financial position, there is more scrutiny on their state officials who control more local, and perhaps more publicised, financial decisions than the federal government does. Whether this is truly the case is hard to tell from this data, but it is interesting that this measure is significant at the state level, despite the miniscule difference that it makes in the Democratic vote.

For our hypothesis on some origin groups voting for other parties, we did not include a table for these results due to high levels of co-linearity. In the end, we were unable to have sufficient observations where there were no Republican candidates in order to show a link between third parties and Hispanic groups. Therefore we have to say that there is no effect present within our data. This is however a cause of the small dataset that we have when we only attempt to measure with areas where there is no Republican present. We believe that there is still an interesting thing to be found here, but our data selection has not allowed this to be seen at the present time.

Conclusion

To begin my conclusionary remarks, we have found that the difference in voting behaviour between Hispanic origin groups that had previously been seen at the presidential level does indeed continue further into state politics, this has not been in the expected way of being less Democratic party inclined for all groups. Whilst this means that our initial hypothesis has been proven incorrect, the implication for this is that there is now the possibility that such a disparity between individual Hispanic groups does continue further into more local politics, and may explain some differences in voting at local levels where there are high numbers of Hispanics, particularly in areas of mixed origin Hispanic populations. Whilst our data during this study has been limited by the observational nature of the data we have collected, we

believe that this is still a useful insight into the way that Hispanic voting behaviour has coalesced in some origin groups into something that can determine how they decide to vote, all the way down to the state level. We have seen this particularly for Cuban Americans, whom we have seen vote against the Democratic party at the state level, mirroring their behaviour at the presidential elections. We believe that this is an interesting finding in itself, given that we have also found that issues and other factors are given different weight at this level. We believe that there are still significant findings within this paper that deserve to be looked into further, especially as this study has been time limited to a particular election. We believe therefore that this study can use as a helpful benchmark for further, more long term studies into the topic.

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Conclusion

Throughout these studies we have been looking to prove several things. We have been able to show that there is a relationship between the origins of Hispanics in the United States, and the way in which they vote. We have specifically found that previous aggregation in presidential results may have hidden more nuanced aspects about Hispanic voting that had previously have been lost, particularly in relation to the way in which some of the smaller national origins have been voting against the Democratic party, such as the Nicaraguan Americans and Salvadorian Americans during the presidential election in 2020, as well as finding the same pattern in Nicaraguan Americans during state level elections. These results have pointed to the fact that these populations, as well as multiple other groups do have separate motivations that are attached to their style of voting that does not necessarily correspond to the previously held ideas in previous studies. That this is the fault of necessary aggregation may be a factor, but with it now being possible to look beyond this, looking into these groups individually is something that can and should be addressed in full.

That we have been able to find this continuous pattern across different election levels for different offices shows that the effects that we have found are continuous across groups as well as across different levels of priority for voters. We should note that this is only for one electoral period, and there is some danger in us looking beyond our results due to the danger of making inferences beyond the scope of our own study. However, our own results have already shown that factors that have affected how people voted in the presidential elections were not necessarily what were driving votes for those same voters during their state legislative elections. Whilst there is of course the possibility that these different levels of elections themselves have been the cause of this change in priorities, we also saw that broadly groups that had a preference for or against the Democrats tended to hold on to these prejudicial positions at both levels, meaning that there is something deeper than just policy

positions even at the state level, where more local issues should be taking a more front row seat in how these races are decided. That local issues did not seem to stop the carryover from the presidential election to the state legislative elections seems to indicate that there is a major underlying factor at play that may be influencing the results beyond what this study was able to look at in its short time period that it looked at.

What we have found in our study does also reflect some previous work, which has given us confidence that our results are valid. This includes the consistent finding of Cuban Americans trending against the Democratic party, something that has often been found in previous studies, and that our results conclude still continue today at both the Presidential and State level. We also find some support for the Democrat Democrats from Mexican-Americans, again reflecting the findings of previous studies. With these results showing us to be in line with research, we believe that these results are both verifiable as well as broadly accurate in their findings. This is also driven by the finding of education being a key variable for pro-Democratic areas in the presidential election, something also found by previous studies.

Where we have found great interest is within more economic factors, such as the median household income. This proved to be non-significant at the presidential level, and, whilst significant in state elections for some Hispanic origin groups, having only a small effect where it was significant. This may imply that either median income may not be as useful a measure as has been thought, or that perhaps broader economic concerns tend to dominate around the time of the election. Perhaps the fact that it was insignificant in all models during our presidential election analysis hints at the possibility that the money in a Hispanic family's pocket may not necessarily be something that families see the president as responsible for.

This is something that could be looked into, to determine one key income variable that is the best one to use for future research, or if these measures can be better used for some areas over others.

We did have limitations to our study here, and we feel that we should be forthright with the limitations that we faced during this project. We felt that going in with the time and funding constraints that we had, that using this observational data was the best way to look at what we wanted to see with sufficient detail. We still feel that this observational data has great value, as shown by our statistically significant results in both presidential and state elections.

However, we will admit to wanting to have a wider berth of results in order to look at more comparative data over a longer time period had all the observational data we wanted had been available. We believe that being able to look at this over a significantly longer period would help in showing greater detail into the results that we ourselves have found here. We are also aware of the danger of making further inferences beyond this study due to the ecological inference problems that have resulted from the choices made. We do believe that we have mitigated these as best as we can, but we would advise caution in taking these results forward, despite our own confidence in them.

We believe that this paper has considerable reasoning to be able to push for further study of Hispanic groups, and hope to be able to use it to push survey design into being able to handle these smaller groups of Hispanic individuals. Whilst some groups were still too small for our study to be able to reasonably measure them, we believe that this hold a big host of data that has been previously hidden from researchers in aggregation, and that our findings from this small observational study should be used as a basis for more research into individual Hispanic groups over a longer time period, as our own study has been time limited, and only covers a single election. That some pattern shave been found during this one election, we believe there is sufficient basis for this to be looked into in more depth.

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