**Appendix for "How United Nations peace operations can help overcome perils to post-conflict elections"**

**Table of Contents**

1. **Sample Construction**

In the article, post-conflict is defined as within ten years since the conflict ended. However, to be included in the sample, the post-conflict period must last at least for three years. Thus, post-conflict periods that lasted only two years are not included in the sample. Table A shows the list of all countries in our sample that are used in the main models. To check the robustness of our findings, we estimate models with alternative thresholds. To be included in the sample for the robustness check, the post-conflict period must last at least five years. We refer to this sample as the sample version 2. Section 6-(b) of this Appendix presents results obtained from models that were estimated using the sample version 2.

Table A: List of all countries used in the sample in the article. (Note: We used only election years within the years below.)

| Country | Years |
|---|---|
| Haiti | 1992-2001, 2005-2012 |
| Dominican Republic | 1966-1975 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1991-2000 |
| Mexico | 1997-2006 |
| Guatemala | 1950-1953, 1955-1962, 1996-2005 |
| El Salvador | 1973-1978, 1992-2001 |
| Nicaragua | 1974-1976, 1991-2000 |
| Costa Rica | 1949-1958 |
| Panama | 1990-1999 |
| Venezuela | 1963-1972, 1983-1991, 1993-2002 |
| Peru | 1966-1975, 2000-2006 |
| Bolivia | 1947-1951, 1953-1962, 1968-1977 |
| Paraguay | 1948-1953, 1955-1964, 1990-1999 |
| Argentina | 1956-1962, 1964-1973, 1978-1987 |
| United Kingdom | 1992-1997, 1999-2008 |
| France | 1963-1972 |
| Spain | 1968-1977, 1988-1990, 1992-2001 |
| Macedonia | 2002-2011 |
| Croatia | 1996-2005 |
| Serbia | 1993-1997, 2000-2009 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 1996-2005 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Greece | 1950-1959 |
| Moldova | 1993-2002 |
| Rumania | 1990-1999 |
| Russia | 1951-1960 |
| Georgia | 1994-2003, 2005-2007, 2009-2012 |
| Azerbaijan | 1999-2004, 2009-2011 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2000-2009 |
| Gambia | 1982-1991 |
| Mali | 1991-1993, 1995-2004 |
| Senegal | 2004-2010 |
| Niger | 1998-2006, 2009-2012 |
| Ivory Coast | 2005-2010 |
| Guinea | 2002-2011 |
| Burkina Faso | 1988-1997 |
| Liberia | 1981-1988, 1991-1999, 2004-2012 |
| Sierra Leone | 2002-2011 |
| Ghana | 1967-1976, 1984-1993 |
| Togo | 1987-1996 |
| Cameroon | 1962-1971, 1985-1994 |
| Nigeria | 1971-1980, 2005-2008 |
| Gabon | 1965-1974 |
| Central African Republic | 2003-2005 |
| Congo | 1994-1996, 2003-2012 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 1968-1976, 1979-1988, 2002-2005 |
| Kenya | 1983-1992 |
| Burundi | 1966-1975, 2009-2012 |
| Rwanda | 2003-2008 |
| Djibouti | 1995-1998, 2000-2009 |
| Ethiopia | 1961-1963 |
| Angola | 2010-2012 |
| Mozambique | 1993-2002 |
| Zimbabwe | 1969-1972, 1980-1989 |
| South Africa | 1989-1998 |
| Lesotho | 1999-2008 |
| Madagascar | 1972-1981 |

| Comoros | 1990-1996, 1998-2007 |
|---|---|
| Morocco | 1972-1974, 1990-1999 |
| Algeria | 1985-1990 |
| Tunisia | 1981-1990 |
| Sudan | 1973-1975, 1977-1982 |
| Iran | 1947-1956, 1969-1978, 2002-2004 |
| Iraq | 1945-1957, 1997-2003 |
| Egypt | 1982-1991, 1999-2008 |
| Syria | 1967-1976, 1983-1992 |
| Lebanon | 1959-1968, 1977-1981, 1991-2000 |
| Yemen (North) | 1949-1958, 1971-1978, 1983-1992, 1995-2004 |
| Tajikistan | 2001-2009 |
| Uzbekistan | 2001-2003, 2005-2012 |
| China | 1951-1955, 1960-1969, 2009-2012 |
| India | 1952-1955, 1972-1978 |
| Pakistan | 1978-1987, 1991-1993, 1997-2003 |
| Bangladesh | 1992-2001, 2007-2012 |
| Sri Lanka | 1972-1981, 2010-2012 |
| Nepal | 1963-1972, 2007-2012 |
| Thailand | 1952-1961, 1983-1992 |
| Cambodia | 1999-2008 |
| Laos | 1974-1983, 1991-2000 |
| South Vietnam | 1965-1974 |
| Malaysia | 1967-1973, 1976-1980, 1982-1991 |
| Philippines | 1955-1964 |
| Indonesia | 1954-1957, 1962-1964, 1970-1974, 1993-1996, 2006-2012 |
| Papua New Guinea | 1997-2012 |

## 1. Conflict Recurrence

Figure A: Relationship between the time since the last civil war and conflict recurrence.



The Y axis shows the percentage of cases where civil war recurred the next year. It was calculated by dividing the cases where conflict recurred in the next year by the total number of cases that survived until the specified time since the civil war.

## 2. Institutionalized Uncertainty Index Supplement

### 3-(a) Constructing Institutionalized Uncertainty

We use all countries' available information on elections to estimate the latent quality of elections to avoid creating bias by using only post-conflict countries. Further, if the information on particular variable(s) of the six dimensions is missing in the NELDA dataset for a particular election year and country, we avoid discarding such particular observations. Thus, each six dimensions takes the value one if the attribute discussed in the main text was observed actively in the election year and country. If the information is missing, the variable takes the value 0. Since we use IRT, this choice of coding allows us to take into account the non-random missingness of data. Even if the missingness of data comes from unobserved latent election attributes, the IRT model would take into account such latent quality since given the information on whether each six dimensions was actively observed or not, the IRT model infers unobservable election quality.

Thus, the total number of observations used for the IRT model is 2277. We specify the prior three model parameters: $\theta$, discrimination parameter, and item difficulty

parameter. For the prior distribution of the model parameters, we use N(0,1) for $\theta$, N(0,4) for item difficulty, and N(0,4) for item discrimination. The model is implemented by using MCMCpack. 55,000 iterations were obtained with 5,000 as burn-in. This process yields the institutionalized uncertainty index. We use the posterior mean as the institutionalized uncertainty index. Note that we only have information on the institutionalized uncertainty index during an election year since a non-election year, there is no information on election-specific information. Therefore, ultimately, in estimating models, our observations are kept to only election year.

### 3-(b) Validation for Institutionalized Uncertainty Index

Figure B: Correlation matrix chart



The first row shows a correlation between institutionalized uncertainty index and polyarchy, political corruption, vote buying, free campaign media, and multiparty, respectively. *Political corruption* is an interval variable capturing the average values of the public sector corruption index, executive corruption index, legislative corruption, and judicial corruption. A higher value of this variable indicates higher political corruption. *Vote buying* is an interval variable capturing the levels of vote buying. The higher value indicates the lower vote buying. The *Free campaign media* variable is an interval variable capturing levels at which parties or candidates received free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media. The higher value indicates the higher levels of free access

to media. *Multiparty* variable is an interval variable capturing levels of competition. The higher value indicates the higher contest and competition. All these variables are from the V-Dem dataset.

### 3-(c) Comparing Institutionalized Uncertainty Index with Alternatives (part1)

This section compares three indicators –our index, V-Dem Election free and Fair, and Polity2 score, with the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index (Norris and Grömping, 2019). Because the PEI data started in 2012, and our sample ends in 2012, we only have nine overlapping observations. All three indicators are normalized to make comparisons.

Figure C: Plotting three indicators against PEI.



Figure D: Plotting institutionalized uncertainty index against PEI.



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
Figure E: Plotting Polity2 score against PEI



Figure F: Plotting V-Dem free and fair against PEI



## 3-(d) Comparing Institutionalized Uncertainty Index with Alternatives (part2)

In this section, we compare the *Institutionalized Uncertainty Index* with two Alternatives: (1) V-Dem Election Free and Fair and (2) Polity2 Score. First, we start with a simple comparison using Boxplot for each year. To have the same scale for the y-axis, we conducted normalization for three variables. Figure G-I shows that compared to our index, two alternative measurements' data points are becoming less spread around the mean. We compared the heterogeneity of each variable using the Coefficient of Variation (CV). CV enables us to compare the dispersion of different variables since it captures each

variable's dispersion without depending on each variable's measurement unit. Each variable's CV in a given year (t) is calculated based on the following equation:

$$CV(X_t) = \left. \sqrt{\frac{1}{n_t - 1}\sum_{i=1}^{n_t}(x_{it} - \bar{x}_t)^2} \middle/ \left(\frac{1}{n_t}\sum_{i=1}^{n_t} x_{it}\right) \right.$$

The denominator indicates each year's mean value of the variable while the Numerator indicates each year's standard deviation. Further, to capture the difference between each CV, which we call "Heterogeneity difference" in Figure J, we subtracted CV(V-Dem Election Free and Fair) from CV(Institutionalized Uncertainty Index) and we did the same for CV(Polity2 Score). Figure J shows such heterogeneity difference. The vertical lines show the year when UNPKOs dealing with civil wars existed in some countries in our sample. Figure J shows that since the Cold War when UNPKOs started to be active, our index captures more heterogeneity across countries. We further magnified Figure J for years since 2000, when the Brahimi report was released, and peacebuilding-mandated tasks became common (Figure K). Using this sample (year > 1999), Table B presents the results obtained from simple OLS where the year was used as the independent variable and heterogeneity difference was used as the dependent variable. Figure K and Table B show that our index better captures heterogeneity across civil war-affected countries over time compared to alternatives. This is important since countries experienced civil wars have different trajectories regarding election quality.

Figure G: Boxplot for Institutionalized Uncertainty Index.

Figure H: Boxplot for V-Dem Election Free and Fair.



Figure I: Boxplot for Polity2 Score.



Figure J. Heterogeneity difference between Institutionalized Uncertainty Index and Alternatives.

**Heterogeneity difference between Institutionalized Uncertainty Index and Alternatives**

Figure K: Heterogeneity difference between Institutionalized Uncertainty Index and Alternatives since 2000.



**Heterogeneity difference between Institutionalized Uncertainty Index and Alternatives (2000-2012)**

Table B: OLS for Heterogeneity difference (2000-2012).

|  | Heterogeneity Difference between Institutionalized Uncertainty Index and V-Dem Election Free and Fair | | Heterogeneity Difference between Institutionalized Uncertainty Index and Polity2 Score | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | 0.016** | (0.004) | 0.015** | (0.005) |
| Constant | -31.722** | (7.439) | -29.902** | (9.522) |
| Observations | 13 | | 13 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.624 | | 0.474 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.590 | | 0.426 | |

## 3-(e) Predicting democratization

If our index successfully captures institutionalized uncertainty, then, we should also expect that there is a positive relationship between our index and democratization. To show how our index for election quality is related to democratization, we employ an analysis using the polity2 score as a dependent variable. We use the institutionalized uncertainty index as the main independent variable. Thus, the sample is a post-conflict election year. As including the lagged dependent variable might cause bias in interpreting the result, instead, we use one year lagged polyarchy as a control variable. We also control for log of GDP per capita, election history, democratic transfer of power, divided party control, log of time since the last civil war, log of time since the last election. To account for time-invariant unobservable variables, we use country-fixed effects.

Table C: Fixed effects regression for democratization.

|  | DV: Polity2 score | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Institutionalized uncertainty index | 3.982** | (0.966) |
| Polyarchy$_{t-1}$ | 7.812** | (1.558) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 1.818* | (0.818) |
| Election history | 0.122 | (0.084) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 2.087* | (0.816) |
| Divided party control | 0.268 | (0.606) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | -0.280 | (0.332) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.670* | (0.328) |
| Constant | -20.658** | (6.230) |
| Sample size | 287 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.471 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.240 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.
†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

## 3-(f) Predicting Time Since the Last Election

Table D: Fixed effects regressions of time since the last election.

|  | Time since the last election | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Institutionalized uncertainty index | -1.926** | (0.735) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Election free and fair | 0.117 | (0.293) |
| Polity2 score | 0.039 | (0.058) |
| Observations | 282 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.033 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.365 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.

†$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

## 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix

## 4-(b) Descriptive Statistics

Table E: Descriptive statistics.

| Variables | Min | Max | Mean | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNPKO | 0 | 1 | 0.239 | 0.427 |
| UNPKO & UNPM | 0 | 1 | 0.268 | 0.444 |
| Institutionalized uncertainty | 0.003 | 0.995 | 0.473 | 0.282 |
| Election free and fair | -2.988 | 2.188 | -0.447 | 1.285 |
| Election history | 1 | 29 | 8.546 | 5.218 |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.026 | 0.913 | 0.361 | 0.213 |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0 | 1 | 0.268 | 0.444 |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 5.595 | 10.538 | 8.139 | 0.880 |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0 | 8.666 | 3.567 | 1.669 |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0 | 2.398 | 1.640 | 0.552 |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0 | 3.178 | 1.116 | 0.660 |
| P5 trade max (ln) | 0.504 | 12.748 | 6.108 | 2.045 |
| Cold war | 0 | 1 | 0.425 | 0.495 |

## 4-(c) Correlation matrix for control variables

Figure L: Correlation matrix.

Variable order: Polyarchy, Democratic transfer of power, UNPKO & UNPM, Election history, Divided party control, GDP p.c. (ln), P5 trade max (ln), Military personnel (ln), Cold war, Time since the last civil war (ln), Time since the last election (ln).

## 4. Discussion on Control Variables Used in the Main Text

Due to limited space, we provide discussions and interpretations on control variables from the estimated models in the main text. First, we discuss the results for country characteristics. Tables 1 in the main text show that the lagged polyarchy score has a positive and statistically significant effect on electoral quality across all models. This adds credibility that our results are not driven by our specific measurement strategy. Regarding the democratic transfer of power, in all models, there is no statistically significant relationship with the quality of elections. Even when power is transferred, systematic manipulations could remain (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Schedler, 2013), making the transition toward democracy a reversible process (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1993). The divided party control variable has a positive and statistically significant association with institutionalized uncertainty in all models. This result is in line with the expectation that lower-stakes elections are associated with lower electoral quality.

In terms of economic development, there is no statistically significant relationship between GDP p.c. and institutionalized uncertainty. The election history variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on institutionalized uncertainty.

For example, in the case of Guatemala, elections were regularly held even during fighting. The electoral practices over time gradually improved the quality of elections. The first post-conflict elections were held in 1999, in which competitive politics took place without a noteworthy protest from military factions or business associations (Lehoucq, 2002).

## 5. Robustness Checks

### 6-(a) Estimating Models with V-Dem Election Free and Fair as Dependent Variable

Table F: Fixed effects regression of election free and fair.

| | DV: Election free and fair | | | |
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNPKO | 1.116** | (0.308) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.968** | (0.289) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 1.586** | (0.351) | 1.628** | (0.352) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.028 | (0.171) | -0.018 | (0.172) |
| Divided party control | 0.274* | (0.131) | 0.272* | (0.131) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.490* | (0.200) | 0.484* | (0.201) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.077 | (0.119) | 0.090 | (0.120) |
| Election history | 0.011 | (0.025) | 0.014 | (0.025) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.054 | (0.075) | 0.041 | (0.075) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.044 | (0.071) | 0.050 | (0.071) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.122 | (0.076) | -0.127 | (0.076) |
| Cold war | 0.009 | (0.185) | -0.007 | (0.185) |
| Constant | -5.217** | (1.435) | -5.197** | (1.445) |
| Sample size | 284 | | 284 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.356 | | 0.350 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.056 | | 0.047 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses. †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

### 6-(b) Estimating Models with Sample Version 2

Table G: Fixed effects regressions of institutionalized uncertainty (sample version 2).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNPKO | 0.207* | (0.104) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.198* | (0.096) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.360** | (0.124) | 0.365** | (0.124) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.066 | (0.059) | -0.065 | (0.059) |
| Divided party control | 0.061 | (0.046) | 0.061 | (0.046) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.058 | (0.074) | 0.060 | (0.074) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.005 | (0.042) | 0.007 | (0.042) |
| Election history | 0.029** | (0.010) | 0.029** | (0.010) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | -0.018 | (0.025) | -0.020 | (0.025) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.035 | (0.023) | -0.035 | (0.023) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.040 | (0.026) | -0.041 | (0.026) |
| Cold war | 0.063 | (0.062) | 0.165 | (0.176) |
| Constant | -0.170 | (0.542) | -0.195 | (1.544) |
| Sample size | 269 | | 269 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.322 | | 0.323 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.002 | | 0.003 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.

†$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

Table H: Fixed effects regressions of election free and fair (sample version 2).

| | *DV: Election free and fair* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (3) | | Model (4) | |
| UNPKO | 1.300** | (0.297) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 1.109** | (0.278) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 1.065** | (0.357) | 1.129** | (0.358) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.008 | (0.168) | 0.022 | (0.169) |
| Divided party control | 0.271* | (0.132) | 0.269* | (0.133) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.495* | (0.213) | 0.487* | (0.215) |
| Military personnel (ln) | -0.039 | (0.122) | -0.019 | (0.075) |
| Election history | 0.037 | (0.029) | 0.040 | (0.029) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.027 | (0.072) | 0.009 | (0.072) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.011 | (0.067) | 0.018 | (0.067) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.033 | (0.075) | -0.041 | (0.075) |
| Cold war | 0.175 | (0.178) | 0.151 | (0.179) |
| Constant | -5.500** | (1.553) | -5.474** | (1.571) |
| Sample size | 264 | | 264 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.441 | | 0.432 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.170 | | 0.156 | |

## 6-(c) Estimating Models Without the Upper Limit of Post-Conflict Period

Table I: Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (without upper limit for sample).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO | 0.288** | (0.077) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.184** | (0.067) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.358** | (0.072) | 0.369** | (0.072) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.041 | (0.036) | -0.035 | (0.037) |
| Divided party control | 0.066* | (0.026) | 0.062* | (0.026) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.041 | (0.039) | 0.034 | (0.039) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.018 | (0.022) | 0.022 | (0.022) |
| Election history | 0.008 | (0.005) | 0.009† | (0.005) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.007 | (0.016) | 0.005 | (0.016) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.017 | (0.015) | -0.014 | (0.015) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.025 | (0.017) | -0.026 | (0.017) |
| Cold war | -0.012 | (0.036) | -0.014 | (0.036) |
| Constant | -0.031 | (0.271) | 0.018 | (0.272) |
| Sample size | 600 | | 600 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.225 | | 0.215 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.077 | | 0.065 | |

†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table J: Fixed effects regression of election free and fair (without upper limit for sample).

| | DV: Election free and fair | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO | 0.680** | (0.233) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.615** | (0.202) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 2.201** | (0.218) | 2.212** | (0.217) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.092 | (0.112) | 0.101 | (0.111) |
| Divided party control | 0.285** | (0.079) | 0.277** | (0.079) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.529 | (0.117) | 0.528 | (0.117) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.128† | (0.066) | 0.132* | (0.065) |
| Election history | -0.011 | (0.015) | -0.011 | (0.015) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.012 | (0.048) | 0.014 | (0.048) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.001 | (0.045) | 0.003 | (0.045) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.080 | (0.051) | -0.083† | (0.050) |
| Cold war | -0.104 | (0.108) | -0.108 | (0.108) |
| Constant | -5.757** | (0.822) | -5.748** | (0.820) |
| Sample size | 587 | | 587 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.428 | | 0.429 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.316 | | 0.317 | |

†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

## 6-(d) Estimating Models with Year Fixed Effects

Table K: Two-way fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty.

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO | 0.261* | (0.130) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.222† | (0.118) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.409** | (0.139) | 0.414** | (0.139) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.087 | (0.073) | -0.084 | (0.073) |
| Divided party control | 0.071 | (0.055) | 0.070 | (0.055) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.005 | (0.086) | -0.006 | (0.086) |
| Military personnel (ln) | -0.024 | (0.050) | -0.021 | (0.050) |
| Election history | 0.010 | (0.014) | 0.012 | (0.014) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.018 | (0.031) | 0.015 | (0.031) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.052 | (0.023) | -0.050 | (0.029) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.037 | (0.043) | -0.036 | (0.043) |
| Cold war | -0.211 | (0.510) | -0.181 | (0.509) |
| Constant | 0.721 | (0.691) | 0.697 | (0.694) |
| Sample size | 289 | | 289 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.528 | | 0.526 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.015 | | -0.019 | |

## 6-(e) Estimating Models with Additional Controls (Incompatibility and Conflict Duration)

Table L: Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (controlling for incompatibility and conflict duration).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO | 0.292* | (0.117) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.265* | (0.108) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.328** | (0.116) | 0.335** | (0.116) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.067 | (0.057) | -0.065 | (0.057) |
| Divided party control | 0.096* | (0.044) | 0.096* | (0.043) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.009 | (0.066) | 0.010 | (0.067) |
| Military personnel (ln) | -0.030 | (0.025) | 0.029 | (0.040) |
| Election history | 0.028** | (0.008) | 0.028** | (0.008) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.001 | (0.025) | -0.001 | (0.025) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.043† | (0.023) | -0.042† | (0.023) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | 0.027 | (0.040) | -0.031 | (0.025) |
| Cold war | 0.111† | (0.061) | 0.108† | (0.061) |
| Governmental incompatibility | -0.024 | (0.068) | -0.022 | (0.068) |
| Conflict duration (ln) | -0.013 | (0.028) | -0.010 | (0.028) |
| Constant | 0.033 | (0.486) | 0.020 | (0.487) |
| Sample size | 289 | | 289 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.316 | | 0.316 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.005 | | -0.006 | |

## 6. Endogeneity and Identification Problems

## 7-(a) Estimating Models with Instrumental Variables

As instrumental variables, we use the economic and geopolitical interests of P5. We use three instrumental variables: log of the mean value of trade between P5 and the target

state, the mean value of P5 ideal point difference[1], and colonial ties[2]. As the colonial ties variable is a time-invariant variable, we use random effects regression. The instrumental variable approach involves several assumptions, and we discuss the relevance assumption and exclusion assumption. Extant studies show that P5 members' interests influence UN interventions (Oudraat, 1996; Srojek and Tir, 2015). Importantly, our measurement of the economic and geopolitical interests of P5 captures to what extent all P5 members have greater interests in the target state, indicating the levels of potential cooperation through the UN Security Council. Thus, the economic and geo-political interests of the P5 influence the deployment of UNPKOs (*relevance* assumption). However, this does not necessarily mean that all P5 members have the willingness to improve the *election quality* of the target state. The economic and geopolitical interests of the P5 affect the quality of the election of the host country only through the deployment of UNPKOs (*exclusion* restriction). The election quality may improve as a result of the actual deployment of UNPKOs in the target state.

Table M-a: Random effects regressions of institutionalized uncertainty with instrumental variables (UNPKO).

|  | First Stage (1) | | Second Stage (1) | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ideal point difference mean | -0.863† | (0.052) | | |
| P5 Trade mean (ln) | -0.015 | (0.022) | | |
| Colonial history | -0.111† | (0.061) | | |
| UNPKO | | | 0.752* | (0.380) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | -0.043 | (0.110) | 0.571** | (0.118) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.085† | (0.050) | -0.110 | (0.068) |
| Divided party control | 0.017 | (0.043) | 0.039 | (0.048) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.048 | (0.040) | 0.040 | (0.043) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.005 | (0.021) | 0.015 | (0.020) |
| Election history | 0.010† | (0.006) | 0.004 | (0.007) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.001 | (0.027) | 0.000 | (0.030) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.075** | (0.025) | -0.068† | (0.038) |

---

[1] We first calculated the absolute ideal point distance between each P5 member and the target state in a given year using United Nations General Assembly Voting Data (Bailey et al., 2017). Then, we took the mean value of the dyad score.

[2] Having colonial ties in the past could influence the interests of states.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cold war | -0.207** | (0.051) | 0.125 | (0.085) |
| Constant | 0.784** | (0.301) | -0.287 | (0.345) |
| Sample size | 281 | | 281 | |
| $R^2$ | | | 0.260 | |

Table M-b: Random effects regressions of institutionalized uncertainty with instrumental variables (UNPKO & UNPM).

| | First Stage | | Second Stage | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (2) | | (2) | |
| Ideal point difference mean | -0.132* | (0.053) | | |
| P5 Trade mean (ln) | -0.037† | (0.022) | | |
| Colonial history | -0.126* | (0.062) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.573* | (0.242) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.008 | (0.113) | 0.548** | (0.108) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.072 | (0.051) | -0.089 | (0.056) |
| Divided party control | 0.045 | (0.044) | 0.026 | (0.044) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.068† | (0.040) | 0.051 | (0.040) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.010 | (0.021) | 0.018 | (0.018) |
| Election history | 0.010† | (0.006) | 0.006 | (0.005) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.011 | (0.028) | -0.005 | (0.027) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.085** | (0.025) | -0.059† | (0.031) |
| Cold war | -0.263** | (0.052) | 0.113 | (0.070) |
| Constant | 1.128** | (0.305) | -0.370 | (0.325) |
| Sample size | 281 | | 281 | |
| $R^2$ | | | 0.260 | |

## 7-(b) Interactive Fixed Effects Counterfactual Treatment (IFEct) model

Figure M: Testing Pre-Trend (IFEct)

**Testing Pre-Trend (IFEct)**

Equivalence test p-value: 0.000

## 7. Alternative Measurement for Independent Variable

## 8-(a) Considering Mission Size

To investigate whether the size of UN peacekeeping missions matters, in this part of the analysis, we use the log-transformed number of UNPKO personnel as the independent variable. The measurement is obtained from Kathman's data on personnel commitments to UNPKOs from 1990 to 2011 (Kathman, 2013). Due to the sample year range of this personnel data, the number of observations was reduced to 160. We use the mean value of the total number of UNPKO personnel in a given year as the independent variable. As an alternative measurement, we also use the maximum value of the total number of UNPKO personnel in a given year. Since the distribution of these variables is positively skewed, we use the log-transformed version of this variable. Importantly, these variables capture the immediate effect of UNPKO deployment on election quality while the independent variables we used in the main text capture the long-term effects. This is because the number of UNPKO personnel becomes zero after the departure of the PKO. Because of the availability of information, in this analysis, the sample covers the years between 1990 and 2011. Therefore, we drop the *Cold War* variable from the model.

Table N: Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (UNPKO size).

|  | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
|  | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNPKO size (mean) (ln) | 0.013 | (0.016) | | |
| UNPKO size (max) (ln) | | | 0.011 | (0.016) |

| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.246 | (0.194) | 0.243 | (0.194) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.055 | (0.105) | 0.054 | (0.105) |
| Divided party control | 0.053 | (0.081) | 0.054 | (0.081) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.004 | (0.132) | 0.003 | (0.132) |
| Military personnel (ln) | -0.062 | (0.071) | -0.061 | (0.071) |
| Election history | 0.013 | (0.023) | 0.013 | (0.023) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.030 | (0.049) | 0.028 | (0.049) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.062† | (0.036) | -0.062† | (0.036) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.091† | (0.050) | -0.090† | (0.050) |
| Constant | 1.011 | (0.901) | 1.011 | (0.902) |
| Sample size | 160 | | 160 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| Year fixed effects | No | | No | |
| R² | 0.129 | | 0.127 | |
| Adjusted R² | -0.539 | | -0.542 | |

†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

## 8-(b) Considering Mission Mandates

To investigate whether mission mandates matter, we use the *peacebuilding mandate* and *election mandate* as independent variables. We include these two variables separately in the model. The peacebuilding mandate variable takes the value 1 if UNPKOs that included peacebuilding tasks were deployed in the country in the past, and 0 otherwise. The election mandate variable takes the value 1 if UNPKOs that included election monitor, election security, and election assistance tasks were deployed in the country in the past, and 0 otherwise. Information on UNPKO tasks was taken from Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) dataset (Lloyd, 2021).

Table O: Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (mandate).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| Election mandate | 0.115 | (0.125) | | |
| Peacebuilding mandate | | | -0.059 | (0.093) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.368** | (0.116) | 0.389** | (0.115) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.073 | (0.059) | -0.055 | (0.058) |
| Divided party control | 0.086† | (0.044) | 0.091* | (0.044) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.005 | (0.065) | -0.008 | (0.065) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.032 | (0.040) | 0.036 | (0.040) |
| Election history | 0.028** | (0.007) | 0.029** | (0.007) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.005 | (0.024) | 0.002 | (0.024) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.034 | (0.023) | -0.031 | (0.024) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.041 | (0.026) | -0.040 | (0.026) |
| Constant | 0.179 | (0.473) | 0.258 | (0.473) |
| Sample size | 288 | | 288 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| Year fixed effects | No | | No | |
| $R^2$ | 0.289 | | 0.285 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.034 | | -0.036 | |

†$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

Table P: Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (election mandate) with instrumental variable.

| | DV: Election mandate | | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | First stage | | Second stage | |
| Election mandate | | | 0.111 | (0.385) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.145* | (0.062) | 0.369** | (0.124) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.125** | (0.031) | -0.073 | (0.074) |
| Divided party control | 0.035 | (0.024) | 0.086† | (0.046) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.008 | (0.037) | 0.005 | (0.067) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.006 | (0.037) | 0.032 | (0.040) |
| Election history | 0.008* | (0.004) | 0.028** | (0.009) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | -0.012 | (0.013) | 0.005 | (0.026) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.005 | (0.013) | -0.034 | (0.024) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.033* | (0.015) | -0.042 | (0.026) |
| Proportion of other missions with election mandate | 0.600** | (0.125) | | |
| Constant | 0.416 | (0.264) | 0.180 | (0.495) |
| Sample size | 288 | | 288 | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country fixed effects | | Yes | | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | | No | | No |
| $R^2$ | | 0.259 | | 0.287 |

†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table Q: Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (peacebuilding mandate) with instrumental variable.

| | DV: Peacebuilding mandate | | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| Peacebuilding mandate | | | 0.122 | (0.240) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.123 | (0.081) | 0.370** | (0.118) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.093* | (0.040) | -0.070 | (0.061) |
| Divided party control | 0.032 | (0.031) | 0.087† | (0.045) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.018 | (0.048) | 0.013 | (0.070) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.036 | (0.028) | 0.028 | (0.041) |
| Election history | 0.004 | (0.005) | 0.028** | (0.007) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | -0.008 | (0.017) | 0.005 | (0.025) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.024 | (0.016) | -0.037 | (0.025) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | 0.002 | (0.019) | -0.047† | (0.028) |
| Proportion of other missions with peacebuilding mandate | 0.134** | (0.022) | | |
| Constant | -0.017 | (0.344) | 0.157 | (0.493) |
| Sample size | 288 | | 288 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| Year fixed effects | No | | No | |
| $R^2$ | 0.293 | | 0.272 | |

†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

## 8. Testing Mechanisms

In this supplemental section, first, we discuss the operationalization of each variable. First, to capture violence, we use *Political violence* measurement from V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020). Since our sample is post-conflict and our intention is to capture a lower level of political violence than battle-related deaths, we use this variable. V-Dem Dataset defines political violence as "the use of physical force to achieve political

objectives by non-state actors". A higher value of this variable indicates higher levels of political violence. Second, to capture civic norms and democratic attitudes paths, we use the *Civil society participation index* from the V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020). As discussed in the main text, a vibrant civil society is essential for democratic institutions (Huang, 2016). Democratic norms of inclusiveness, participatory dialogue, and tolerance are fostered by civil society through bridging social capital mechanisms (Putnam, 1993; 2000). Finally, we operationalize the rule of law using the V-Dem Dataset (Coppedge et al., 2020).

Table R: Fixed effects regression of political violence.

| | DV: Political violence | | | |
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNPKO | -1.261** | (0.347) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | -1.261** | (0.347) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | -0.995* | (0.447) | -0.995** | (0.447) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.166 | (0.214) | -0.166 | (0.214) |
| Divided party control | -0.564** | (0.158) | -0.564** | (0.158) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.567* | (0.235) | -0.567* | (0.235) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.120 | (0.134) | 0.120 | (0.134) |
| Election history | -0.022 | (0.028) | -0.022 | (0.028) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | -0.058 | (0.091) | -0.058 | (0.091) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.100 | (0.086) | -0.100 | (0.086) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | 0.122 | (0.085) | 0.112 | (0.085) |
| Cold war | -0.178 | (0.217) | -0.178 | (0.217) |
| Constant | -5.454** | (1.627) | -5.465** | (1.628) |
| Sample size | 214 | | 214 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.373 | | 0.373 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.079 | | 0.079 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.  †$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

Table S: Fixed effects regression of civil society participation.

| | DV: Civil society participation | | |
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNPKO | 0.281** | (0.051) | |

| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.248** | (0.048) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.347** | (0.058) | 0.356** | (0.059) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.016 | (0.028) | 0.019 | (0.029) |
| Divided party control | 0.049* | (0.022) | 0.048* | (0.022) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.115** | (0.033) | 0.114** | (0.033) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.048* | (0.020) | 0.051* | (0.020) |
| Election history | -0.010* | (0.004) | -0.009* | (0.004) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.008 | (0.012) | 0.005 | (0.012) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.003 | (0.012) | 0.005 | (0.012) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | 0.001 | (0.013) | 0.000 | (0.013) |
| Cold war | -0.088** | (0.031) | -0.092** | (0.031) |
| Constant | -0.726** | (0.238) | -0.726** | (0.240) |
| Sample size | 289 | | 289 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.558 | | 0.551 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.357 | | 0.346 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses. †$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

Table T: Fixed effects regression of rule of law.

| | DV: Rule of law | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO | 0.191** | (0.045) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.170** | (0.042) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.409** | (0.051) | 0.415** | (0.051) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.038 | (0.025) | 0.039 | (0.025) |
| Divided party control | 0.044* | (0.019) | 0.044* | (0.019) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.119** | (0.029) | 0.019** | (0.011) |
| Military personnel (ln) | -0.017 | (0.011) | 0.006 | (0.017) |
| Election history | -0.007† | (0.004) | -0.007† | (0.007) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | -0.010 | (0.011) | -0.012 | (0.011) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | 0.003 | (0.010) | 0.004 | (0.010) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.017 | (0.011) | -0.018 | (0.011) |
| Cold war | 0.067* | (0.027) | 0.064* | (0.027) |
| Constant | -0.686** | (0.210) | -0.678** | (0.211) |
| Sample size | 289 | | 289 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |

|  |  |  |
|---|---|---|
| R² | 0.429 | 0.424 |
| Adjusted R² | 0.170 | 0.163 |

Standard errors shown in parentheses. †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table U: Fixed effects regression of political violence (PKO size).

|  | DV: Political violence | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO size mean (ln) | -0.083* | (0.040) | | |
| UNPKO size max (ln) | | | -0.080* | (0.039) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | -1.935** | (0.511) | -1.938** | (0.512) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.223 | (0.284) | -0.225 | (0.284) |
| Divided party control | -0.311 | (0.224) | -0.310 | (0.225) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | -0.703* | (0.344) | -0.697* | (0.345) |
| Military personnel (ln) | -0.178 | (0.177) | -0.178 | (0.177) |
| Election history | 0.065 | (0.060) | 0.064 | (0.060) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.025 | (0.129) | 0.030 | (0.129) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.024 | (0.094) | -0.023 | (0.094) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.125 | (0.133) | -0.129 | (0.134) |
| Constant | 7.919** | (2.334) | 7.907** | (2.338) |
| Sample size | 125 | | 125 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| R² | 0.350 | | 0.347 | |
| Adjusted R² | -0.169 | | -0.173 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses. †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Table V: Fixed effects regression of civil society participation (mission size).

|  | DV: Civil society participation | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO size mean (ln) | 0.001 | (0.005) | | |
| UNPKO size max (ln) | | | 0.001 | (0.004) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.055 | (0.053) | 0.055 | (0.053) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.042 | (0.029) | 0.042 | (0.029) |
| Divided party control | 0.008 | (0.022) | 0.009 | (0.022) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.031 | (0.036) | 0.031 | (0.036) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.048* | (0.020) | 0.033† | (0.020) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Election history | 0.033† | (0.019) | -0.004 | (0.006) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.017 | (0.013) | 0.017 | (0.013) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.006 | (0.010) | -0.006 | (0.010) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | 0.001 | (0.014) | 0.001 | (0.014) |
| Constant | 0.201 | (0.248) | 0.201 | (0.248) |
| Sample size | 160 | | 160 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.131 | | 0.131 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.535 | | -0.536 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses. †$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

Table W: Fixed effects regression of rule of law (mission size).

| | DV: Rule of law | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO size mean (ln) | -0.004 | (0.006) | | |
| UNPKO size max (ln) | | | -0.005 | (0.006) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.127† | (0.070) | 0.126† | (0.070) |
| Democratic transfer of power | 0.082* | (0.038) | 0.081* | (0.038) |
| Divided party control | 0.014 | (0.029) | 0.014 | (0.029) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.091† | (0.048) | 0.092† | (0.048) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.026 | (0.026) | 0.026 | (0.026) |
| Election history | -0.012 | (0.008) | -0.012 | (0.008) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.007 | (0.018) | 0.007 | (0.018) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.003 | (0.013) | -0.003 | (0.013) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.009 | (0.018) | -0.009 | (0.018) |
| Constant | -0.352 | (0.327) | -0.353 | (0.327) |
| Sample size | 160 | | 160 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.155 | | 0.156 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.492 | | -0.491 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses. †$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

## 9. Robustness check for Hypothesis 2

Table X. Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (controlling for

incompatibility and conflict duration[3]).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | |
|---|---|---|
| UNPKO | 0.735** | (0.244) |
| Election history | 0.031** | (0.008) |
| UNPKO*Election history | -0.022* | (0.011) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.044† | (0.023) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.321** | (0.115) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.050 | (0.057) |
| Divided party control | 0.025 | (0.066) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.025 | (0.066) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.030 | (0.025) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.000 | (0.024) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.033 | (0.025) |
| Cold war | 0.126* | (0.061) |
| Governmental incompatibility | -0.023 | (0.068) |
| Conflict duration (ln) | -0.002 | (0.029) |
| Constant | -0.166 | (0.491) |
| Sample size | 289 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.331 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.011 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.

†p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

## 10. Extension for Hypothesis 2

In the main analysis, to measure the experience of elections, we used a variable election history. In this section, we conduct an extension analysis for further investigating hypothesis 2. We interact *Time since the last election (ln)* with *UNPKO*. A country without sufficient election history may not conduct elections regularly. In the theoretical argument, we argued that long periods without elections could influence the institutional capacity to hold elections as well as attitudes toward political participation and electoral competition. Thus, we directly test this mechanism to further investigate Hypothesis 2.

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[3] The conflict duration is correlated with election history. The correlation coefficient is 0.2282 with p-value < 0.000.

Table Y. Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (interaction).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | |
|---|---|---|
| UNPKO | 0.129 | (0.114) |
| Election history | 0.029** | (0.008) |
| UNPKO*Time since the last election (ln) | 0.139* | (0.056) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.069** | (0.025) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.337** | (0.114) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.058 | (0.055) |
| Divided party control | 0.977* | (0.042) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.027 | (0.065) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.027 | (0.038) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.008 | (0.024) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.034 | (0.024) |
| Cold war | 0.132* | (0.061) |
| Constant | -0.124 | (0.457) |
| Sample size | 289 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.336 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.029 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.

†$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

## 11. Robustness checks

Table Z: Fixed effects regressions of institutionalized uncertainty (dropping UK, France, and Spain).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO | 0.266* | (0.104) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.247* | (0.097) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.328** | (0.125) | 0.336** | (0.124) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.071 | (0.060) | -0.069 | (0.060) |
| Divided party control | 0.094* | (0.045) | 0.094 | (0.045) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.017 | (0.067) | 0.018 | (0.067) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.022 | (0.040) | 0.024 | (0.040) |
| Election history | 0.028** | (0.008) | 0.028** | (0.008) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.003 | (0.026) | 0.0004 | (0.026) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.041† | (0.024) | -0.040 | (0.024) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.032 | (0.025) | -0.033 | (0.025) |
| Cold war | 0.108† | (0.063) | 0.106 | (0.062) |
| Constant | -0.033 | (0.475) | -0.045 | (0.477) |
| Sample size | 276 | | 276 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.314 | | 0.314 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.004 | | -0.004 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.

†$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

Table Zb: Fixed effects regressions of institutionalized uncertainty (using Division of power control variable).

| | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model (1) | | Model (2) | |
| UNPKO | 0.279* | (0.106) | | |
| UNPKO & UNPM | | | 0.259* | (0.099) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.328** | (0.123) | 0.336** | (0.122) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.069 | (0.057) | -0.067 | (0.057) |
| Division of power index | 0.078 | (0.108) | 0.074 | (0.108) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.022 | (0.066) | 0.023 | (0.066) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.020 | (0.039) | 0.022 | (0.039) |
| Election history | 0.028** | (0.008) | 0.028** | (0.008) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | -0.000 | (0.025) | -0.003 | (0.024) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.043† | (0.023) | -0.042† | (0.023) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.032 | (0.025) | -0.033 | (0.025) |
| Cold war | 0.116† | (0.064) | 0.113 | (0.064) |
| Constant | 0.004 | (0.474) | -0.009 | (0.475) |
| Sample size | 289 | | 289 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.299 | | 0.299 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | -0.019 | | -0.019 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.

†$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

## 12. Unpacking UN missions

Table 1-a. Fixed effects regression of institutionalized uncertainty (unpacking independent variable).

|  | DV: Institutionalized uncertainty index | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| UNPKO only | 0.184† | (0.110) |
| UNPKO & UNPM | 0.634** | (0.224) |
| UNPM only | 0.126 | (0.263) |
| Polyarchy (t-1) | 0.333** | (0.115) |
| Democratic transfer of power | -0.059 | (0.056) |
| Division of power index | 0.095* | (0.043) |
| GDP p.c. (ln) | 0.028 | (0.065) |
| Military personnel (ln) | 0.034 | (0.039) |
| Election history | 0.031** | (0.008) |
| Time since the last civil war (ln) | 0.0009 | (0.024) |
| Time since the last election (ln) | -0.040 | (0.023) |
| P5 trade max (ln) | -0.040 | (0.025) |
| Cold war | 0.120† | (0.061) |
| Constant | -0.140 | (0.473) |
| Sample size | 289 | |
| Country fixed effects | Yes | |
| $R^2$ | 0.328 | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.012 | |

Standard errors shown in parentheses.

†$p<0.1$, *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$

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