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Chapter 2

The 'image of thought' and the State-form in Jung's 'The undiscovered self' and Deleuze and Guattari's 'Treatise on nomadology'

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Introduction

This chapter focuses on a number of conceptual affinities that appear within the work of Swiss depth psychologist C. G. Jung (1875–1961) and the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and his co-writer Félix Guattari (1930–1992). I draw extensively from one of Jung's final essays, 'The undiscovered self (present and future)' (1957), which was first published after both world wars and just after the period of the Red Scare in the United States. Jung's essay is noteworthy for its critical exigencies on the role of the State¹ in modern times. Jung analyses the ways in which the State organises and orientates thought in a certain one-sided manner. He considers the negative logical and ethical effects of this organisation on the individual, religion, and science. When in conformity with the State, these three systems reinforce the way in which the State organises and orientates an image of thought whose effects serve to exclude alternative forms of organisation.

In 'The undiscovered self' Jung presents arguments that attest to the psychological causes and consequences of the organisation of thought when it is universalised by the State. Likewise, Deleuze tends to focus on the organisation and distribution of relations within thought systems of which the State is one variation (others include the organism, language, psychoanalysis, art, science, and religion). In the first half of the chapter, I examine concepts that Jung presents in his essay. Jung introduces positive concepts such as 'individual' and the 'whole man' and negative ones such as the 'mass man', 'statistical man' and the 'State'. Jung's positive concepts can be read as gesturing to an alternative form of relations which share some affinities with Deleuze and

Guattari's affirmative characterisation of 'relations of exteriority' (the 'form of exteriority'). These characterisations feature alongside their critique of the 'State-form' from '1227: Treatise on nomadology: – the war machine', which comprises the twelfth plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1980/1987), a work they co-authored in 1980.

In the second half of the chapter, I consider Jung's analysis of the ways in which thought is orientated by the abstract idea of the State in modernity. I then relate this to Deleuze's critique of the image of thought which formed a crucial part of his *Difference and Repetition* (1968). I draw attention to the notion of the 'private thinker' that was first illuminated by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* and to which he returned in the 'Treatise on nomadology'. In this section I will argue that Jung's intentions in his essay exhibit many features which one can find in common with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the 'private thinker', a 'thinker' capable of resisting a hegemonic and one-sided image of thought. This argument involves an engagement with Jung's conceptualisation of estranging encounters with the extramundane from 'The undiscovered self'. I argue that these encounters make possible a re-orientation of a one-sided image of thought. In the latter sections of this chapter, I consider these encounters in relation to Deleuze's emphasis on the role of 'the encounter', which he believed could stimulate thought in new ways. Deleuze often referred to artistic encounters as capable of generating new ways of thinking and relating. Jung appears to be no less positive when in the concluding part of his essay he calls upon the potentials in modern art, which, along with analytical psychology, might open thought beyond its containment in a claustrophobic and one-sided image.

The abstract idea of the State and the State-form

Jung used the term 'wholeness' frequently in his works. Often the term is accompanied by another, 'totality', referring to the total personality. He refers to the psyche as 'the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious' (1921: §797). The goal of wholeness is a distant one, Jung tells us, and by individuation he means 'the complete actualisation of the whole human being' (1934: §352). Elsewhere, Jung reminds us that individuation is 'the process by which a person

becomes a psychological “in-dividual”, that is, a separate, indivisible unity or “whole” (1939: §490). In ‘The undiscovered self’ Jung reflects on the ‘fate of the individual human being’ (1957: §497) in an age of ‘mass-mindedness’ (ibid.: §§500, 511). At the end of the essay he asks his readers to recognise an ethical imperative: that they recognise the individual as ‘that infinitesimal unit on whom a world depends’ (ibid.: §588). What has taken place such that Jung would be moved to advocate for the necessity of such an ‘individual’?

In his essay, Jung identifies a number of targets which he holds as being responsible for the emergence of what he refers to as the modern ‘mass man’ (ibid.: §§510, 511, 537, 538, 567). The targets include the ‘abstract idea of the State’ (ibid.: §499), ‘State-religion’² (ibid.: §522) and a State-science whose methodology is predominately ‘statistical’ (ibid.: §§494, 495, 497, 499, 503, 507, 522, 523, 529; cf. ‘statistical man’, §537).³ The problematic logical implications of the abstract form of the State are closely bound up with a process of ‘statistical levelling down’ whose form Jung classifies as the ‘rationalistic *Weltanschauung*’ of the West (ibid.: §522; cf. §§523, 549, 553). The logical implications of ‘levelling down’ involve processes of exclusion which take as their object the ‘irregular’ (ibid.: §§494, 495). According to Jung, the ‘individual’ is an exemplar of the ‘irregular’ and consequently a casualty of the exclusionary effects which levelling down entails. He laments that ‘it is not the universal and the regular that characterise the individual, but rather the unique. He is not to be understood as a recurrent unit but as something unique and singular’ (ibid.: §495). In this passage, Jung equates the terms ‘universal’, ‘regular’, and ‘recurrent’. These terms serve the general function of the ‘rationalistic *Weltanschauung*’, excluding the ‘irregular’, ‘unique’, and ‘singular’. The form of the *Weltanschauung* and of the ‘abstract idea of the State’ is the same. Under this form, the organisation of relations proceeds in accordance with certain assumptions and pre-suppositions; the assumption that man is a comparative unit results in ‘an abstract picture of man as an *average* unit from which all individual features have been removed’ (ibid. par: 495; emphasis added). Taken together, these processes of exclusion have an ‘alienating effect’ (ibid.: §577) on the psyche of modern man.

In 1980 Deleuze and Guattari were also preoccupied with themes similar to those that had engaged Jung some twenty years before. In

A Thousand Plateaus they generated a number of concepts that echo Jung's use of the concept 'mass' and the effects of 'levelling down', which he associated with the form of the 'rationalist *Weltanschauung*'. Chief among these concepts Deleuze and Guattari refer to the 'majority' and the 'majoritarian', which they present as 'the analytic fact of Nobody' (1980/1987: 105). By the term majoritarian they do not mean a greater relative quantity than something else, for example a minority.⁴ Rather, 'majority implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it' (ibid.). Deleuze and Guattari claim that '[m]ajority assumes a state of power and domination' (ibid.), and as an example of its representative man they refer to 'white, male, adult, "rational," etc., in short, the average European, the subject of enunciation' (ibid.: 292).⁵ 'Majoritarian' man and 'mass man' refer to a 'Nobody': 'Majority is an abstract standard that can be said to include no one and thus speak in the name of nobody' (Conley 2005: 165). As we have seen, Jung takes account of something similar to the Nobody of this constant, standard and homogeneous majoritarian measure when he uses the term 'unit' to underscore the 'psychological effect of the statistical world-picture' (1957: §499).⁶ As a 'recurrent', 'statistical', 'comparative', and 'average unit' (ibid.: §495), Jung's mass man is the product of a 'levelling down and a process of blurring that distorts the picture of reality into a conceptual average' (ibid.).

Both Jung and Deleuze–Guattari consider the formation of the mass and the majoritarian to have an intimate relationship with the State. Here a note of caution is required. When Jung refers to the 'abstract idea of the State' (1957: §499), he implies that he is not actively seeking to distinguish between specific States, historical or otherwise. In the essay Jung tends to single out totalitarian regimes because of their capacities for accelerating the production of mass-mindedness. He uses the term 'dictator States' (1957: §§510, 511, 514, 515, 517, 571, 580) when referring to totalitarian regimes and, as one might expect given the historical context of his essay (1957), there are references to Communism (ibid.: §§504, 515, 516, 523, 541, 544, 559, 568),⁷ Russia, Stalin, China (ibid.: §517), and socialism (ibid.: §§511, 517).⁸ But to conclude from this that Jung privileges some normative conception of the democratic State over other variations would be incorrect.⁹ The State has a certain abstract form, and this form finds itself embodied

in the rationalistic *Weltanschauung*. In their 'Treatise on nomadology', Deleuze and Guattari refer to the State-form directly:

The State-form, as a form of interiority, has a tendency to reproduce itself, remaining identical to itself across its variations and easily recognizable within the limits of its poles, always seeking public recognition (there is no masked State). [...] Only thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is universal by right, of elevating the State to the level of *de jure* universality [...]. If it is advantageous for thought to prop itself up with the State, it is no less advantageous for the State to extend itself in thought, and to be sanctioned by it as the unique, universal form. [...] The State gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of universality.

(1980/1987: 360, 375, 376)

It is important to note that Deleuze and Guattari refer to the State-form as a form of interiority. In the 'Treatise', the system they are preoccupied with is the State or more broadly the political, but the form of interiority is not exclusive to the political. One can locate the form of interiority in other registers such as philosophical systems or other systems of thought. In the passage above, the authors indicate that the form of interiority can reproduce itself across variations. In 'The undiscovered self' the variations affected by the State-form include religion and science. In addition, Jung writes that for the mass man, 'the policy of the State is the supreme principle of thought and action. Indeed, this was the purpose for which he was enlightened, and accordingly the mass man grants the individual a right to exist *only in so far as he is a function of the State*' (1957: §510; emphasis added). Hence the State-form extends itself in thought accounting for the universality of presuppositions such as the recurrent and regular. When we try to distil the *form* of levelling down which Jung identifies with the rationalistic *Weltanschauung*, we should bear in mind Deleuze and Guattari's suggestion that the function of the State-form is 'capture'. Paul Patton summarises their account, reiterating that the 'essential function of the state is capture' but also that 'the underlying abstract form of the state is an interiority of some kind' (2000: 99). 'If it can help it', Deleuze and Guattari comment, 'the State does not dissociate

itself from a process of capture of flows of all kinds, populations, commodities, money or capital, etc.’ (1980/1987: 385–86). Levelling down captures relations by reducing them to the form of the same and interiorises them within a whole¹⁰ or a milieu of interiority.

When religion ‘compromises with the State’, Jung says that he prefers ‘to call it not “religion” but a “creed”’. A creed gives expression to a definite collective belief, whereas the word *religion* expresses a subjective relationship to certain metaphysical, extramundane factors’ (ibid.: 507; emphasis in original).¹¹ Jung’s criticism of religion as creed is echoed in Deleuze and Guattari’s treatment of ‘absolute religion’ from the ‘Treatise’. They claim that ‘[t]he absolute of religion is essentially a horizon that encompasses, and, if the absolute itself appears at a particular place, it does so in order to establish a solid and stable center for the global. [...] Religion is in this sense a piece in the State apparatus’ (1980/1987: 382). When science compromises with the State, its form becomes statistical with its attendant implications such as levelling down. In the ‘Treatise’, Deleuze and Guattari label science ‘Royal’ or ‘State-science’ when it compromises with the State:

Royal science is inseparable from a “hylomorphic” model implying both a form that organizes matter and a matter prepared for the form; it has often been shown that this schema derives less from technology or life than from a society divided into governors and governed, and later, intellectuals and manual laborers. What characterizes it is that all matter is assigned to content, while all form passes into expression.

(1980/1987: 369)

If we read Jung’s concerns about the extent to which thought, religion, and science compromise with the abstract idea of the State from a Deleuzian-Guattarian perspective, then the form of this compromise revolves around the form of interiority. This in turn concerns *relations* of interiority. In the previous passage, Deleuze and Guattari classify these relations as belonging to a schema that is hylomorphic, which involves the assumption of a ‘transcendent, formal ordering of matter which generates two orders of being (form and content) that can only be related analogically’ (Adkins 2015: 107). These two orders are ontologically discontinuous, and Deleuze and Guattari seek to account for

an ontological continuum on which relations of interiority form one abstract pole (or tendency) but which includes relations of exteriority as another tendency. In the 'Treatise', the authors account for the difference between these two kinds of relations in the form of a reasonably straightforward metaphor. Referring to the difference between two board games, chess and Go, they write:

Chess is a game of State, or of the court: the emperor of China played it. Chess pieces are coded; they have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations derive. They have qualities; a knight remains a knight, a pawn a pawn, a bishop a bishop. Each is like a subject of the statement endowed with a relative power, and these relative powers combine in a subject of enunciation, that is, the chess player or the game's form of interiority. Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, collective, or third-person function: "It" makes a move. "It" could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant. Go pieces are elements of a nonsubjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic properties, only situational ones. Thus the relations are very different in the two cases. [...] On the other hand, a Go piece has only a milieu of exteriority, or extrinsic relations with nebulae or constellations, according to which it fulfils functions of insertion or situation, such as bordering, encircling, shattering. [...] Finally, the space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival. The "smooth" space of Go, as against the "striated" space of chess.

(1980/1987: 352–53)

In this illustration, space is used to establish a context in which one can begin to approach the distinctions between relations of interiority (and its milieu) and relations of exteriority. We should recall that these

distinctions are not intended as discontinuities but rather as tendencies on a continuum. Why is chess a game of State? Its space is already cut up (striated) and its pieces are coded according to their allowable moves and their shape. Although there are a vast number of permitted moves, the game is fundamentally static. Movement through striated space is highly controlled and the pieces have formalised identities that have been hierarchically organised in advance. Internal relations determine the function of the chessboard and pieces, and its milieu of interiority. Striated space is another term for a homogenous space of quantitative multiplicity in which relations are subordinate to a global dimensionality. As an abstract machine of capture, the State-form creates striated spaces which are homogenous and measurable and which constitute a milieu of interiority by drawing boundaries. These require common measures, which in turn enable a distribution of similarities and differences.

Jung does not employ spatial distinctions to articulate the differences between the rationalistic *Weltanschauung* and the role that the irregular might serve to resist its form. Instead he generates other concepts or uses existing ones in a very novel way. As we have seen, he sets up a distinction between the individual and the mass man. Likewise, he draws the reader's attention to the notion of the 'whole man' (1957: §§523, 553, 561). These are concepts of resistance or 'war-machines'¹² (to adopt another concept from Deleuze and Guattari's 'Treatise'). Jung characterises the whole man as an irrational datum, 'the *concrete* man as opposed to the unreal ideal or "normal" man' (ibid.: §498; emphasis in original). What are the capabilities of the whole man? What can he/she do? This is an ethical question in the Spinozistic sense of ethics as an expansion of what a body can do. The whole man is capable of relating in ways that are not captured or excluded by the State-form. Adkins comments that '[i]t is precisely for this reason that the war machine is always trying to ward off the state. [...] The state converts the war machine's exteriority to a self-same interiority' (2015: 113). These modes of relating are experimental, that is, their effects cannot be fully determined in advance; but this does not mean that no influence is exerted on others or the world.

In the 'Treatise', Deleuze and Guattari introduce a number of concepts which are used for thinking through the implications of ways

of relating which are exterior to, or outside, those of the State-form. Most of the time they refer to the nomad, nomadic, and nomadicism,¹³ situating these in relation to different contexts (e.g. space, language, art, thought, and so on). Elsewhere in *A Thousand Plateaus* they refer to processes such as 'becoming-revolutionary' (1980/1987: 292) and 'becoming-minoritarian' (ibid.: 106–7). They declare that '[t]here is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never a becoming' (ibid.: 107), meaning that in becoming-minoritarian one does not aim at acquiring a new majority and a new constant. Rather, the figure of a minoritarian consciousness, Deleuze and Guattari assert:

continually oversteps the representative threshold of the majoritarian standard, by excess or default. In erecting the figure of a universal minoritarian consciousness, one addresses powers (*puissances*) of becoming that belong to a different realm from that of Power (*Pouvoir*) and Domination. Continuous variation constitutes the becoming-minoritarian of everybody, as opposed to the majoritarian Fact of Nobody.

(1980/1987: 106)

Are we entitled to equate this universal figure of minoritarian consciousness with the figure of the whole man and the individual presented in 'The undiscovered self'? As a continuous variation, the becoming peculiar to minoritarian consciousness is a kind of metamorphosis, a potential to deviate from the standard or unit that defines the mass and the majority. Resistance to the abstract idea of the State is developed in the minoritarian consciousness of the whole man who is capable of experimenting with relations engendering heterogeneous connections which are open to the outside. Finally, we might recall some of Jung's earliest sentiments from his final lecture to the *Zofingiaverein* from 1899:¹⁴ '[t]o be sure, the normal man is not a quantity acknowledged by public statute, but rather is the product of tacit convention, a thing that exists everywhere and nowhere' (1899: §246). The image of the whole man that Jung presents us with over fifty years later in 'The undiscovered self' calls to this image of the normal man which, as a man of nowhere, is an analytic fact of Nobody and whose everywhere is majoritarian, in contrast to the becoming-minoritarian of everybody.

Jung's critique of the 'image of thought' and its 'orientation' in 'The undiscovered self'

In the previous section, I identified a number of conceptual affinities between Jung's essay 'The undiscovered self' and Deleuze/Guattari's 'Treatise on nomadology' from *A Thousand Plateaus*. We saw that these writers were equally concerned with the logical and ethical implications of the exclusory effects that they considered certain forms of relations could engender in thought and society. In what follows I want to return to Jung's essay and examine the ways in which he accounts for the genesis of the habits of thought peculiar to the mass man and what he tells us about resisting these habits. Likewise, I will return to the work of Deleuze and of Deleuze and Guattari in order to assist this examination. In this section, my focus is primarily on the system of thought rather than the State-form. What remains common to both systems is the form of interiority.

In his essay, Jung offers the following erudite synopsis of the genesis of the alienating effects of exclusion on the psyche of modern man:

His consciousness therefore *orientates* itself chiefly by observing and investigating the world around him, and it is to the latter's peculiarities that he must adapt his psychic and technical resources. This task is so exacting, and its fulfilment so profitable, that he forgets himself in the process, losing sight of his instinctual nature and *putting his own conception of himself in place of his real being*. In this way he slips imperceptibly into a purely *conceptual world* where the products of his conscious activity progressively take the place of reality.

(Jung 1957: §557; emphasis added)

Jung refers to a certain orientation of thought towards the conceptual which gradually engenders an image of thought that becomes exacting, that is, fixed. Man puts his own image or conception of himself in the place of other images; in other words, man takes 'one image as the source and ground of all other images, without accounting for how this image of all imaging is possible' (Colebrook 2010: 184–85). This is exactly what Jung laments when in 1937 he accounts for the death of God as a process whereby God's image dissolves into the common

man. The common man (like the mass man) 'suffers from a hubris of consciousness that borders on the pathological'. Jung avers that '[t]his psychic condition in the individual corresponds by and large to the hypertrophy and totalitarian pretensions of the idealised State' (1938/1940: §141). The death of God (first heralded by Friedrich Nietzsche [1844–1900]) was the death of an image of God that had become too closely grounded in our own common image. '[W]ith Nietzsche', Jung says "“God is dead.” Yet it would be truer to say, “He has put off *our image*, and where shall we find him again?”" (ibid.: 144; emphasis added). What is lost in this process is an understanding of the genesis of 'our image' and how it came to be so dominant and all-pervasive.

One of the less explicit preoccupations of Jung's essay concerns a mass projection with a one-sided orientation and image of thought. This collective projection is facilitated by the State apparatus when it is universalised in the discourse of creeds and the methodologies of statistical science. The collective identification with this image is marked by Jung as 'the triumph of the Goddess of Reason' and he says that it testifies to 'a general neuroticizing of modern man' (1957: §553). Elsewhere in the essay, Jung argues that the 'supremacy' and 'worship of the word' (*logos*) 'was necessary at a certain phase of man's development' (ibid.: §554). This sentiment is also echoed in the following: '[o]nly when conditions have altered so drastically that there is an unendurable rift between the outer situation and our ideas, now become antiquated, does the general problem of our *Weltanschauung* or philosophy of life, arise' (1957: §549). In these passages one can discern an emphasis on a necessary or inevitable diremption of modern man, which results in collective neurosis. In her critical study of the recent ascendancy of the image of the organism in 'contemporary modern vitalisms',¹⁵ Claire Colebrook (a Deleuzian scholar) claims that 'it is the diremption of modern man – and all the false problems, neuroses, alienations and illusions that he brings in train – that allows this non-organic, abstract, ideal, spiritual or properly machinic and differential life to be intuited' (2010: 177). This follows in the train of 'necessary illusions [...] leading the way to an intuition of life as essentially productive of its own misrecognition' (ibid.). A collective projection and identification with a one-sided image may be a consequence of 'the organism's tendency to territorialise or re-territorialise all relations around the image of its own illusory unity' (ibid.: 143).

Jung's comment that alienated modern man 'slips imperceptibly into a purely conceptual world' (1957: §557) gestures to his awareness of the counter-efficient, neurotic effects of this process of universalisation, capture, and territorialisation. I include these points to show that scrutiny of collective projection is a critical act, one that is only possible 'after trauma – after the self has experienced what is other than itself as an alien infraction' (Colebrook 2010: 176). On a collective level this testifies to those moments of 'extreme isolation, impoverishment and detachment from "life" that man recognises as a power to create distorting, truncated, illogical and sterile images' (ibid.: 180).

Orientation to an image of thought is another way of expressing a certain way of *relating* to an image. I postulate that in 'The undiscovered self' Jung is proposing an ethical re-orientation of the way we relate to each other and the world via a new image. This image is closely aligned with the way he presents the positive concept of the individual and the whole man in the essay. As we shall see, the whole man acts as a kind of conceptual persona for Jung in his essay. I borrow 'conceptual personae' from the last work by Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (1991/1994). They write that 'philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts' and that 'concepts need conceptual personae that play a part in their definition' (ibid.: 2). The concept is a 'presence that is intrinsic to thought, a condition of possibility of thought itself, a living category, a transcendental lived reality' (ibid.: 3). 'Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their creator's signature' (ibid.: 5).

Jung's presentation of the concepts 'whole man' and 'individual' in the essay can be regarded as transformative concepts. Although the term 'individual' is very common and often carries with it certain implicit presuppositions, Jung's critical use of the term in the essay is novel and challenging. In those passages from 'The undiscovered self' where Jung criticises mass and collective opinion (e.g. 1957: §§503, 535, 554), he comes close to Deleuze's criticism of the image of thought (which forms the basis of Deleuze's third chapter of *Difference and Repetition*). In this criticism Deleuze takes Descartes' famous 'I think therefore I am' to task for presupposing too much, namely 'what it means to be and to think [...] and that no one can deny that to doubt is to think, and

to think is to be. [...] *Everybody knows, no one can deny*, is the form of representation and the discourse of the representative' (1968/1994: 130; emphasis in original). According to Deleuze, the *doxa* of common-sense and good-sense forms the implicit presupposition of philosophy as *cogitatio natura universalis*, and he suggests that we 'may call this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image' (ibid.: 131). What is it that can challenge this image of thought? I suggest that Jung's deployment of the individual and the whole man might have something in common with the way in which Deleuze and Guattari present the 'Idiot' as a conceptual persona capable of resisting this image (1991/1994: 62). In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze comments:

At the risk of playing the idiot, do so in the Russian manner: that of an underground man who recognises himself no more in the subjective presuppositions of a natural capacity for thought than in the objective presuppositions of a culture of the times, and lacks the compass with which to make a circle. Such a one is the Untimely, neither temporal nor eternal.

(1968/1994: 130)

We ask if Jung's notion of the individual and whole man might also have affinities with the underground man, one with the 'necessary modesty':

not managing to know what everybody knows, and modestly denying what everybody is supposed to recognise. Someone who neither allows himself to be represented nor wishes to represent anything. Not an individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought, but an individual full of ill will who does not manage to think, either naturally or conceptually.

(1968/1994: 130)

When Jung criticises the rationalist *Weltanschauung* and proposes an alternative to 'the triumph of the Goddess of Reason' (1957: §553), it is reason itself that is subjected to critique, given the way it has become orientated by the established values of the abstract idea of the State. We have seen how these values serve to exclude, how they become lodged in an image of thought which sustains collective opinion in a one-sided

manner: '[t]he image of thought is the only figure in which *doxa* is universalised by being elevated to the rational level' (Deleuze 1968/1994: 134). If we read Jung's essay with these comments in mind, then he can be regarded as an 'untimely', 'private thinker',¹⁶ a voice among other 'isolated and passionate cries' which are isolated on account of the fact that 'they deny what everybody knows [...]. And passionate, since they deny that which, it is said, nobody can deny' (ibid.: 130). In the words of Bruce Baugh: 'The private thinker is unreasonable because Reason is nothing but the guarantor of the ideas of "everyone", and the private thinker is incapable of going along with the crowd, even at the cost of being misunderstood and despised' (2015: 315).

Becoming estranged

Returning to the passage from 'The undiscovered self' that I drew from earlier (1957: §557), it is noteworthy that Jung refers to the real being of man and his instinctual foundations as having become uprooted. Such terms might imply a kind of original¹⁷ image or a natural way of relating before the fall of modernity.¹⁸ But such an assessment would be too simplistic. Elsewhere in the essay Jung calls on a positive power of 'estrangement' (1957: §§507, 557) that can be contrasted with the alienating and exclusionary effects propagated by the prevailing image of thought. During encounters with the 'extramundane' (ibid.: pars, 507, 508, 509, 511, 514, 543),¹⁹ an estranging *distancing* from the image of thought occurs. At times Jung refers to this estrangement as involving an 'immediate inner experience' (1957: §592) or an 'immediate relation with God' (ibid.: §§563, 564).²⁰ In becoming estranged from a prevailing normative image, potentials for imaging (which were formerly excluded by this image, or captured by it and reduced to the form of the same) are freed. This may be characterised as a positive process of disembodiment in the sense that a normative image of thought (for example, what Jung calls the statistical man or the mass man) is an image from which one is becoming estranged. Nonetheless, a normative image of the self is a rather vague characterisation. Colebrook offers some articulation in the following context:

The normative image of the artwork is tied closely to the normative image of the self, and both are premised on a norm of organic

life: the proper self is a well-formed whole in which there is not an imposed or centered form so much as a dynamic interaction of constantly re-engaged parts, all contributing to the ongoing coherence of a well-bounded unity.

(2010: 69)

Colebrook is decidedly critical of this image of the bounded 'whole', a whole which is often assumed to be maintained and regulated via a fixed inventory of transcendental conditions or sensory-motor habits. Other Deleuzian scholars such as Rosi Braidotti do not refer to a normative image directly, but critically consider normative features of the modern liberal subject such as the common-sense notion that only stable identities reposing on firms grounds of rational and moral universalism can ensure ethical probity, moral and political agency, and basic human decency (2012: 170). A normative image of the liberal individual with a universalistic or individual core (moral intentionality/rational consciousness) is not presupposed by Jung as a necessary condition for ethics; in its place a non-unitary, relational vision of the subject as whole is accorded priority. To this extent, Jung has something in common with post-structuralist philosophies in that he promotes the 'dissolution of the hard-core self of liberal individualism' (Braidotti 2012: 186) and tacitly advocates an 'ethics of depersonalisation', achieving a 'post-identity or non-unitary vision of the self' which requires 'the dis-identification from established references' (ibid.). Estrangement from an organic image of the whole is disembodying in the sense that the organisation of its internal relations is freed from subordination to a pre-given whole. Relations that were not considered proper to the milieu in which the organic image had been situated are opened up onto an outside.²¹ Being orientated by an image of thought that is too closely grounded in the conditioned (or too much like an organic whole) presupposes a certain distribution of relations that can have negative logical and ethical implications. These implications can be registered at different levels: at the level of the abstract idea of the State (Jung's preoccupation in 'The undiscovered self'), at the level of thought (Deleuze's preoccupation in *Difference and Repetition*), and at the level of life (or the organism, which is one register among others that preoccupy Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*).²²

The reciprocity between this image and the State engenders a one-sidedness which can reach epidemic (mass) proportions. The organisation and distribution of relations is channelled through thought and through institutions such as religion and science. In disorganising this image, the relation *to* the image of thought alters significantly:

It would not, therefore, be a question of evaluating images, theories or art works on the basis of their proximity to the lived; it would not be a question of judging images according to their attainability or similarity to what is recognised or recognisable. What needs to be rethought is not the nature and content of images [...] but the *relation to images*.

(Colebrook 2010: 115–16; emphasis in original)

What is important in this passage is the emphasis on non-organic images or those which are estranged to the point of bearing no relation with the recognised of common opinion. Considered in this way, Jung's reflection on the process of estrangement can be read as a commentary on ways of re-organising relations which are opened up during encounters with the extramundane, as he calls it. The individual or whole man can engage potentials in new ways that were formerly prohibited.

One of the reasons for the numerous references to art and artists (untimely and private thinkers) in the work of Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari²³ relates to their interest in the estranging and transformative effects that ideas and artistic works can evoke in the encounter. They attempt to ally these effects with concepts, accounting for a philosophical process of concept creation. In relation to this it might be worth recalling the following point on which Deleuze insisted:

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed.

(1968/1994: 139; emphasis original)

Art and extramundane encounters

Jung tends to territorialise estranging encounters with the extramundane on to the more traditional language of theology, but we need to recall that he takes theology to task when 'it compromises with the State' and 'compromises with mundane reality' (1957: §507). Furthermore, at the end of 'The undiscovered self', Jung suggests the possibility of an alliance between his analytical psychology and what he calls modern art. He recognises that this art-form has 'turned away from the old object-relationship toward the dark chaos' (ibid.: §584) and that it has opened up relations in such a way that they are no longer dependent on recognition. Jung claims that modern art is an 'excellent example: though seeming to deal with aesthetic problems, it is really performing a work of psychological education on the public by breaking down and destroying their previous aesthetic views of what is beautiful in form and meaningful in content' (ibid.). In other words, it breaks down an image of thought. Nevertheless, Jung remains ambivalent about this 'education', adding that 'art, so far as we can judge it, has not yet discovered in this darkness what it is that could hold all men together and give expression to their psychic wholeness' (ibid.). In spite of this, he concludes that 'since reflection seems to be needed for this purpose, it may be that such discoveries are reserved for other fields of endeavour' (ibid.). Potential alliances between different fields of endeavour are something that Jung is open to.²⁴

Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy has been characterised as one that actively forms (machinic) alliances with non-philosophies, such as art, cinema, and science. In these alliances philosophy does not claim any right to judge or assume any position of superiority (Deleuze 1968/1994: xvi; Lambert 2003: 18–19). This strategy is employed by Deleuze and by Deleuze and Guattari in their philosophy at large. Extramundane encounters in their work are most often drawn from aesthetic examples and from the world of ideas, past and present. It is arguably for this reason that Jung's work found its way directly into the hands of Deleuze and encouraged him to write his 1961 essay 'From Sacher-Masoch to masochism', in which 'we find Deleuze entranced by Jung's labyrinthine 1912 book *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*' (Kerslake 2004: 135).²⁵ In his work, Jung established alliances with what we might call non-psychologies; for

instance, in his collaboration with Wolfgang Pauli (1900–1958) an alliance was formed with quantum physics. Jung's more orthodox sources of alliance included mythology, religion, and certain branches of philosophy. Indeed, alliance formation appears to be at the heart of his empiricism.²⁶ In combination, these varied sources form a 'machinic assemblage'; in other words, analytical psychology does not and cannot work all by itself: it needs 'other machines that fit into its apparatus or assemblage and provide it with contents in order to work, in order to produce concepts' (Lambert 2012: 19).

Is it noteworthy that Jung includes comment on modern art in the closing passages of 'The undiscovered self' as if art, with analytical psychology, had a role to play in an alliance of resistance against the alienating orientation of the image of thought? There are a number of reasons why it might be. Firstly, it has already been established that Jung finds something of value in the power of modern art to destabilise object-recognition. From a Deleuzian perspective, this can be read as gesturing to ways of relating to images which do not presuppose a certain exclusionary distribution and organisation of relations. Secondly, Jung's inclusion of modern art in his essay also points to another domain in which the extramundane can be encountered. An encounter with God, an encounter with the unconscious, and encounters with modern art reinforce a theme that runs throughout Jung's essay, i.e. the destabilisation of the distinction between the inner and the outer.²⁷ Roderick Main makes a related point:

Although the collective unconscious is not structured socially, its field of influence inescapably includes society; and although the individuating person's obligations are not imposed directly from the outer, social order, they emerge inwardly partly as a response to and in a form that encompasses the outer, social and indeed environmental order.

(2004: 142)

Jung tends to classify extramundane encounters as examples of immediate inner experience (1957: §592). What is the status of inner when it is thought of in terms of relations? The inner is not a private and personal location. It is not the 'possession of a subjective interiority or thought' (Adkins 2015: 117). Rather, the form of the inner is an

exteriority. In the context of 'The undiscovered self', which deals with the negative effects of an orientation to an image of thought whose form is embodied in the abstract idea of the State, the outer corresponds to a form of interiority with respect to the organisation of its relations. Employing some of Main's terms above, the outer order cannot be the cause of obligations because the form by which it organises relations is diametrically at odds with the form of exteriority that obligates the whole man and the private thinker. Modern art, which problematises the inner/outer binary in terms of exteriority/interiority relations and which in Jung's view performs a 'work of psychological education on the public' (1957: §584), is capable of presenting images which break with the organic form of representation and recognition that characterises object-recognition and the orientation of the 'conceptual world' (ibid.: §557). It can encompass the outer, social, and environmental because in breaking with old images, new ways and modes of relating may be revealed which open experimental pathways with 'this world' or worlds that had formerly been obscured or excluded. To engage with this world, according to Deleuze, necessitates a belief, but one that is 'no longer addressed to a different or transformed world':

Man is in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction of which man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears. [...] Restoring our belief in the world – this is the power of modern cinema (when it stops being bad). [...] What is certain is that believing is no longer believing in another world, or in a transformed world. It is only, it is simply believing in the body.
(1989: 172)²⁸

For Deleuze, an inward response to the outer orientation of the mass man would involve a belief in this world. In his 'Concerning the archetypes, with special reference to the anima concept' (1936/1954), Jung wrote that the anima (soul or psyche) was inseparable from the world: 'Its nature [the psyche] shows itself not merely in the personal sphere, or in the instinctual or social, but in phenomena of world-wide distribution. So if we want to understand the psyche, we have to include the whole world' (ibid.: §114).²⁹ Elsewhere Jung claimed that

‘[i]ndividuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself’ (1947/1954: §432).³⁰ What opens this world up are estranging encounters and, as we have seen, Jung has referred to these as ‘extramundane’, including art as a venue for their engagement. For Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari these encounters can take place across numerous different registers and their philosophy is in part a study of estranging images, a practice they sometimes refer to as noology. In the ‘Treatise’ they offer this definition:

Noology, which is distinct from ideology, is precisely the study of images of thought, and their historicity. [...] noology is confronted by counterthoughts, which are violent in their acts and discontinuous in their appearance, and whose existence is mobile in history. These are acts of a “private thinker”, as opposed to the public professor: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, or even Shestov. Wherever they dwell, it is the steppe or the desert. They destroy images.

(1980/1987: 376)

‘The undiscovered self’ with its innovative use of concepts such as the mass man might be read as a study of images. In this way Jung can be called a private thinker and his essay embodies an inward response that encompasses this world. In the ‘Treatise’, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the private thinker as experiencing a certain kind of solitude. They qualify their use of the term private thinker, stating that this ‘is not a satisfactory expression, because it exaggerates interiority, when it is a question of *outside thought*. [...] And this form of exteriority of thought is not at all symmetrical to the form of interiority’ (1980/1987: 376, 377).³¹ They give further reasons for this qualification. Firstly, ‘to place thought in an immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside, in short to make thought a war machine, is a strange undertaking’. Secondly, they say that ‘[a]lthough it is true that this counterthought attests to an absolute solitude, it is an extremely populous solitude like the desert itself, a solitude already intertwined with a people to come, one that invokes and awaits that people, existing only through it, though it is not yet here’ (ibid.: 376–77). Thinking of the inner that Jung refers to so often in ‘The undiscovered self’ as a populous solitude might serve to de-emphasise an epistemological and ontological discontinuity that can become entrenched in the inner/

outer distinction. Jung's use of the concept of mass as well as his novel use of the terms 'individual' and 'whole man' can be read as opening up an outside thought by exposing the conditions and genesis of what organises relations in an exclusory fashion (the abstract idea of the State) and at the same time advocating for an engagement with the extramundane across different registers. Like Deleuze and Guattari's 'Treatise', Jung's essay has an untimely quality.

Concluding remarks

The potential influence of Jung's essay, its public or educational role cannot be determined in advance. It is not the work of a public professor or what Deleuze and Guattari also call a 'State-thinker' or 'man of the State' (1980/1987: 25, 268, 269, 356, 378, 482) because it does not compromise with the 'State-form' (ibid.: 376). Indeed, Jung's essay critically exposes the logical and ethical implications of relations when thought, the church, and science compromise with the State-form. The outcomes of the essay are experimental and the work is in solidarity with 'a new earth and people that do not yet exist', an 'oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical and irretrievably minor race', as Deleuze and Guattari put it (1991/1994: 108–9).³² The *uses* that concepts are put to by Jung in the essay should not be read as harbouring any pretensions to the erection of a new normativity, majority, or mass of the future.³³ Rather, their use gestures to the potential creation of pockets of resistance, whose form is experimental. Wholeness in this context is an ethical experimental practice or performance with relations that 'liberate life and thought from already constituted relations and extended quantities but not by appealing to some pure life before all differentiation' (Colebrook 2010: 151). Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical method is often guided by the question: 'what would thinking be if it were detached from the organised body of self-constituting man and placed in relation to other differentials? [...] becoming-imperceptible, or the thought of *not* being, not maintaining oneself, experimenting not with annihilation and return to anti-self-consciousness' but with 'approximation to zero' (ibid.: 151, 152).

In 'The undiscovered self', Jung raises awareness of the period of extreme isolation that man is undergoing. From a Deleuzian

perspective, this is not to be understood as isolation from a natural way of relating; rather, it testifies to a *power* to create images and experimental ways of relating to them. To become *critically* and *creatively* aware of this power involves estranging encounters and for Deleuze and Guattari these can be used to generate concepts which resist the hegemonic effects that the prevailing one-sided image tends to exert on relations.

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Notes

- 1 Throughout this chapter the word ‘State’ is given an initial capital, as in the English translations of both Jung’s ‘The undiscovered self’ (1957) and Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Treatise on nomadology’ in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980/1987: 409–92).
- 2 Or more generally religion governed by ‘creeds’ (Jung 1957: §507; see below).
- 3 Roderick Main (following Peter Homans) claims that ‘Jung’s understanding of modern society was “identical to that of the theory of mass society” – a theory which, along with Marxism, is “the most prevalent and widely known theory of modernity”. The modern form of this theory originated in the work of Max Scheler, José Ortega, and Karl Mannheim’ (2004: 136; Homans 1995: 178, 174).
- 4 The statistical number of minorities may in actuality be greater than that of the majority: ‘A minority can be numerous, or even infinite; so can a majority. What distinguishes them is that in the case of a majority the relation internal to the number constitutes a set that may be finite or infinite, but is always denumerable, whereas the minority is defined as a nondenumerable set, however many elements it may have’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 469–70). Deleuze and Guattari also claim that ‘the use of the number as a numeral, as a statistical element, is proper to the numbered number of the State, not to the numbering number’ (1980/1987: 390). One might also compare this to Jung’s critical comments on ‘large numbers’ from his essay (1957: §§503, 524, 535, 538, 539). It is clear from the essay that Jung tends to associate the ‘mass’ with large numbers.

- 5 We might compare this with Jung's acknowledgement that 'the European has also to answer for all the crimes he has committed against the coloured races during the process of colonization. In this respect the white man carries a very heavy burden indeed. It shows a picture of the common human shadow that could hardly be painted in blacker colours' (1957: §571; cf. Deleuze and Guattari's critical comments on the 'Face' of Christ as 'white' and what they call the 'white wall/black hole system' [1980/1987: 167–88]).
- 6 Jung's concerns about 'statistical' science are evident from his earliest lectures, the *Zofingia Lectures* (1896–1899). 'To be sure, the normal man is not a quantity acknowledged by public statute, but rather is the product of tacit convention, a thing that exists everywhere and *nowhere* [...] Just as a Paris cellar now harbours a *standard meter* by which all other instruments of measurement are calibrated, so, in an undetectable place inside the heads of scientific-minded men, there exists the standard of the normal man that is used to calibrate all scientific-philosophical traits' (1983: §246; emphasis added; cf.: §287. See Bishop 1995: 42).
- 7 Jung differentiates between historical variations, e.g. 'primitive communism' (1957: §503) and Marxism (ibid.: §§522, 523, 549, 568).
- 8 Cf. Main 2004: 117–21, 135–38.
- 9 Deleuze and Guattari assert that the State is an 'abstract machine of over-coding' (1980/1987: 230), with a specific form and a function before any concrete historical incarnation.
- 10 A recurring theme throughout all of Deleuze's thought, including with Guattari, concerns relations of the 'whole' (*tout*). Deleuze's persistent criticisms of a 'logical', 'organic unity'/'organic totality' and internal relations are situated across many different registers throughout his works (history, literature, art, cinema, politics, biology), and the notion of the 'whole' frequently appears with them. Many Deleuzians are critical of the term 'holism' (e.g. DeLanda 2009: 37) because they tend to equate this with organicism (e.g. Colebrook 2010: 141–45) and with the relations of interiority that Deleuze tends to identify with organic unity/totality (e.g. Deleuze 1966/2000: 113–16, 161, 163; 1983/1986: 95–96, 322–23, 326–27; cf. 'closed' and 'open' whole/s [1983/1986: 9–11, 16–20; Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994: 105]).
- 11 Under these circumstances of 'compromise', Jung asserts that '[t]he State takes the place of God' and that if '[t]he policy of the State is exalted to a creed, the leader or party boss becomes a demigod beyond good and evil' (1957: §511).
- 12 It should be noted that the object of the 'war machine' is not war in the conventional sense but the conditions of creative mutation and change (see Patton 2000: 109–10; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1980/1987: 229–30).

- 13 Also nomad science, nomad space, nomad war-machine, nomad art, nomad thought (see Deleuze and Guattari 1980/1987: 359–423).
- 14 Jung delivered these lectures as a student in the years 1896–1899 between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-three. In May 1895 he became a member of the *Zofingiaverein*, a Swiss Student Fraternity, and was elected Chairperson of the Basle section during the winter term of 1897/98.
- 15 E.g. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s model of living systems, Andy Clark’s anti-Cartesian positing of an extended mind, and the Gaia hypothesis. These are targeted in Colebrook’s study.
- 16 In the ‘Treatise’, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the ‘private thinker’ in a manner reminiscent of their treatment of the conceptual persona of the ‘Idiot’ (1980/1987: 376). Their selection and presentation of certain ‘private thinkers’ and modern artists as case studies dispenses with any excavation of their personal past in a manner reminiscent of Jung’s distinction between ‘visionary art’ and ‘psychological art’ (1930/1950: §139).
- 17 For example, he refers to building a ‘bridge to the original man’ as a solution to the alienating effects of the rationalist *Weltanschauung* (1957: §549).
- 18 As Colebrook notes: ‘perhaps the most dominant form of this narrative, and one that has a great deal of force at present, is the lapse into Cartesianism: current diagnoses of the state of play in philosophy, neuroscience, and everyday thinking lament the ways in which, following Descartes’ error we mistake the mind for a distinct substance, and then imagine knowledge as some mode of picturing or information processing’ (2010: 130).
- 19 In the *Zofingia Lectures* Jung uses the term ‘supermundane’ in a similar way (1983: §287). Jane Bennett surveys the narratives of ‘loss’ that inform many disenchantment ‘tales’ (2001: 56–90). Bennett refers to a ‘Deleuzian [*sic*] kind of enchantment, where wonders persist in a rhizomatic world without intrinsic purpose or divinity, or the “subjective necessity” (again Kant’s phrase) of assuming telos or God’ (ibid.: 34).
- 20 These notions of ‘immediate’ experience appear in Jung’s earliest lectures (1896–1899) where he refers to the idea of a *unio mystica* (1983: §§225, 257, 259, 265, 272, 289, 290). He contrasts this with the ‘ominous taint of Kantian subjectivism’ (ibid.: §251; cf. Paul Bishop, 1995: 42) that he identifies in the theology of Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1899). By ‘Kantian subjectivism’ I think Jung had in mind Kant’s philosophical commitment to a ‘rational faith’ (*Vernunftglaube*), which Kant espoused in part as response to the pantheism controversy, opposing with some vehemence Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s (1743–1819) *salto mortale* (a leap of faith).

- 21 Disembodiment is often thought of as something negative because of its association with Cartesianism and attendant disenchantment narratives. However, Colebrook comments that Deleuze and Guattari's thought is sometimes preoccupied by a 'perverse Cartesianism... that does not react against Descartes because he dehumanised life by rendering man into a ghostly disembodied subject, but because *res cogitans* was too much like a living body' (2010: 144).
- 22 E.g. '[N]ot all Life is confined to the organic strata: rather, the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being anorganic. There are also nonhuman Becomings of human beings that overspill the anthropomorphic strata in all directions' (1980/1987: 503).
- 23 E.g. *Proust and Signs* (1966/2000); *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (1981/2003); *Cinema I* (1983/1986) and *Cinema II* (1985/1989), and in collaboration with Guattari, e.g. *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* (1986).
- 24 For example, in 1945 Jung writes: 'Science *qua* science has no boundaries, and there is no speciality whatever that can boast of complete self-sufficiency. Any speciality is bound to spill over its borders and to encroach on adjoining territory if it is to lay serious claim to the status of a science' (1945: §212)
- 25 Kerslake writes that 'Deleuze's central thesis is that masochism must be conceived as a *perverse realisation of the fantasy of incest* – on condition that incest is taken in its "more profound" significance as a symbol of rebirth, as Jung claims' (2004: 135).
Positive references to Jung's work appear in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* where Deleuze rhetorically asks: Was not one of the most important points of Jung's theory already to be found here: the force of 'questioning' in the unconscious, the conception of the unconscious as an unconscious of 'problems' and 'tasks'? Drawing out the consequences of this led Jung to the discovery of a process of differentiation more profound than the resulting oppositions (see *The Ego and the Unconscious*)' (1994: 317, n. 17). This remark forms the basis of Kerslake's detailed study of the relationship between Bergson, Kant, Jung and Deleuze (2007).
- 26 Sean McGrath alludes to this when he claims that the 'empirical component to analytical psychology' is 'abductive, not inductive': 'The explanatory account itself is not deduced from the empirical facts: its sources are varied: the history of mythology, religion, and philosophy, as well as Jung's own not infrequent flights of *a priori* speculation. Abduction "leads away" (*ab-ducere*) from the empirical facts to be explained and constructs, on the basis of logical, imaginative, and intuitive moves, a speculative account of how those facts could be possible' (2014: 30).

- 27 Jung appears to de-emphasise the ‘outer world’ (e.g. 1957: §§507, 549), the ‘external’ (ibid.: §§508, 511, 529, 561, 563), and the ‘worldly’ (ibid.: §§514, 543, 563, 567) in the essay and valorise the ‘inner’ (ibid.: §§511, 516, 519, 521, 529, 533, 537, 542, 561). A potential consequence of this emphasis on the ‘inner’ is to locate ‘psychological reality and the nature of the self more within the private sector’ (Homans 1995: 142–43), the process of individuation being ‘entirely psychical not social’ with an endpoint that ‘is a pure and intensely privatised self, liberated from all obligation imposed from without by the social order’ (ibid.: 143).
- 28 Cf.: ‘[I]t may be that living in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered or our plane of immanence today’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994:75).
- 29 Cf. Bishop 2009: 154.
- 30 Cf. Main 2004: 140. On this sentence Bishop comments that ‘in the definition of ‘individuation’... given in that work, Jung makes the famous remark *Individuation schließt die Welt nicht aus, sondern ein*, inaccurately but wonderfully translated by R.F.C. Hull as “individuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself”’ (2008: 161). Bishop’s translation is: ‘individuation does not exclude, but includes, the world’.
- 31 See Michel Foucault’s analysis of Maurice Blanchot and the form of exteriority of thought: ‘La pensée du dehors’, *Critique*, no. 229 (June 1966): 523–48.
- 32 Jung appears to call on such a people when he declares that the ‘spiritual transformation of mankind... may not set in for hundreds of years’ (1957: §583).
- 33 Nevertheless, Jung also states that he would like to see the ‘effect on *all* individuals’ (1957: §583). Would this be to erect another ‘majority’ or ‘consensus’ of the future?

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