Policy over Votes: Why Extreme Governments Respond to their Supporters

Responsive government means changes in policy reflect changes in citizen preferences. But which citizens? This study examines this question through the lens of policymakers’ incentives to respond to their supporters, the preferences of which are at odds with those of the mean voter about one-third of the time. The article argues that policymaker incentives depend on the government’s position in policy space. Relative to centrist governments, both vote- and policy-seeking motivations push extreme governments to deliver for their supporters over the electorate at large. Analyses of public opinion surveys and policy outputs across fifteen countries over forty years provide support for this expectation. The viability of a supporter-targeted strategy, however, is not sustainable: findings show extreme governments lose votes when they respond to their supporters. The implication is that policy, and not votes, drives behavior for non-centrist governments. Study findings advance our understanding of how government extremism matters for opinion-policy linkages.