

**Evolution of Indonesia's National Security Strategy (NSS) from
1988 to 2024**

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Abstract

Indonesia's strategic location between the Asia-Australia and Indo-Pacific oceans underscores its critical role in regional security. Understanding its NSS requires examining how defence and security intersect with economic and political factors, shaping both national and regional stability. Over the past three decades, Indonesia has faced diverse challenges, including conventional, unconventional, internal, and external threats. This study analyses Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024, examining its evolution in the absence of a security council and formal governmental guidance. It explores the adaptation of the NSS through sociological theories encompassing military, political, and economic dimensions.

This study examines the transformation of Indonesia's NSS from an authoritarian regime that prioritized security and stability over developmentalism to a democratic framework following political reforms. During the reform era, democratisation was prioritised through decentralisation followed with economic nationalism and elite influence with focus on resilience and self-sufficiency. Institutionally, Indonesia's NSS evolved from the military's dual-function doctrine to a dual-tier oversight system under civil supremacy, reshaping civil-military relations (CMR). However, elite influence continued to shape security complexities. Indonesia's perception of risks and threat has changed also; from protecting the state's ideology by authoritarian regime, to building public trust while improving civil competency in fighting extremists. The post-reformation era elite power hindered security initiatives and weakened oversight and security measures. Meanwhile, civilian's role in NSS expanded significantly—from limited participation to active engagement in governance reforms. This shift fostered

public trust, increased civil influence on security policies, and promoted human rights and equality.

This thesis investigates four key aspects of Indonesia's NSS: the evolution of its priorities over time, modifications in security institutions, shifting perspectives on risks and threats, and the growing involvement of civilians. Findings reveal that Indonesia's NSS struggles to balance security demands, social ideals, public engagement, and a dynamically changing political environment.

List of Acronyms

ABRI	Indonesian National Armed Forces
ALKI	Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUKUS	Australia, the United Kingdom, the United State
BAKORTANAS	National Stability Coordination Agency
BASARNAS	National Search and Rescue Agency
BAKAMLA	Maritime Security Agency
BIN	State Intelligence Agency
BNPT	National Counterterrorism Agency
BCN	Indonesian Broadcasting Commission
BAIS	Indonesian Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency
BPK	Audit Board of Indonesia
BNN	National Narcotics Agency
BAHARKAM	Public Security Agency
BSSN	National Cyber and Encryption Agency
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CMAB	Civil Military Advisory Board
CMR	Civil Military Relations
DPD	National Defence Council
DDay	Deliberation Day
DPN	National Defence Council
DI/TII	Darul Islam / Indonesian Islamic Army

DWP	Defence White Paper
DPR	People's Representative Council
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FPI	Islamic Defenders Front
GBHN	Guidelines of State Policy
G30S/PKI	September 30 th Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party
GOLKAR	Party of Functional Groups
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (an Islamist group seeking a caliphate)
ICW	Indonesian Corruption Watch
IPW	Indonesian Police Watch
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
JAKUMHANEG	General Policy of National Defence
JAGARAHANNEG	People's Defence Awareness
JAGHANNEG	National Defence Readiness
KAMTIBNAS	National Security and Public Order
KOMKAMTIB	Command for Security and Order
KUHP	Criminal Code
KAMNAS	National Security
KOPKAMTIBNAS	Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
KKN	Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism
KOMPOLNAS	National Police Commission
KOMNAS HAM	National Commission on Human Rights
KAPPI	Action Command to Crush the Indonesia-Netherlands Agreement
KPK	Corruption Eradication Commission

LEMHANNAS	National Resilience Institute
LPSK	Witness and Victim Protection Agency
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MPR	People's Consultative Assembly
MP3Ei	Masterplan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development
NKRI	Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy
NSCC	National Security Coordination Council
NTAS	National Threat Assessment System
OJK	Financial Services Authority
ORBA	New Order (Orde Baru) under Suharto's regime
PSDKP	Maritime and Fisheries Monitoring Taskforce
PANGKOPKAMTIB	Commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
POLRI	Indonesian National Police
PETRUS	Mysterious Shootings
POLMAS	Community Policing
PANGAMARBAR	Commander of Western Indonesia Regional Defence
PANGAMARTENG	Commander of Central Indonesia Regional Defence
PANGAMARTIM	Commander of Eastern Indonesia Regional Defence
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
PDI	Indonesian Democratic Party
PPP	United Development Party

PERPPU	Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
REPELITA	Five-Year Development Plan
RPJMN	National Medium-Term Development Plan
RPJP	National Long-Term Development Plan
SISHANKAMRATA	Universal People's Defence and Security System
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (former President of Indonesia)
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SATPOL PP	Civil Service Police Unit
TCA	Thematic Content Analysis
TNI	Indonesian National Armed Forces
UUD	Constitution
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WANTANAS	National Security Council
WANHANKAMNAS	National Defence and Security Council

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Declaration

This thesis is a product of my research and critical thinking efforts without any outside influence or conflict of interest. It has been solely authored and presented by me without any prior submission for academic recognition at this or any other institution. The sources cited in this thesis are duly acknowledged to maintain accuracy and integrity in the research presented here. I claim ownership of the content provided and affirm that it is a true representation of my academic endeavours and contribution.

1.0 Introduction

Indonesia plays a pivotal role in the Southeast Asia region and has undergone significant shifts in its NSS over the past three decades.

Although, unlike many countries with formal NSS documents, Indonesia lacks an explicit and coherent NSS framework. A central argument of the study is that Indonesia does not have a formal, codified NSS research framework. Instead, its security priorities are dispersed across various government policies, strategic papers, and presidential decrees. This absence of a formal NSS poses challenges to strategic soundness, policy continuity, and governance, making it difficult for both domestic and international actors to fully understand Indonesia's security intentions and objectives. This lack of formalization has led to inconsistencies in policy implementation and a lack of coordination among security institutions, hindering the establishment of a long-term security vision.

This absence of a formal NSS defies unconventional state-centric frameworks and necessitates a sociological exploration of how security narratives are constructed in a non-Western context. Both Stampnitzky (2013) and Lisle (2016) contribute significantly to sociological approaches to security by examining how security and threat perceptions are shaped through discourse, expert knowledge, and social and political processes. Societal narratives, cultural influences, and public perceptions play a significant role in shaping NSS, contrasting the traditional focus on state-centric defence mechanisms and strategic policies. In case of Indonesia's NSS is shaped by complex historical, social, economic and political contexts, particularly its transition from authoritarian rule to more democratic state and modern post reform era, which influences how security is articulated and understood. Henceforth Indonesia's NSS

presents a unique case within sociology, which is distinct from traditional security studies.



1.1 Map of Indonesia (*Badan Informasi Geospasial (BIG)*)

The above 'Map of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia' (Fig. 1.1) showcases the islands and waters surrounding Indonesia comprehensively. The map illustrates Indonesia's prominent islands like Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan (*Borneo*), Sulawesi, and Papua are surrounded by water. This significant maritime boundary is an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These demarcations play a role in defining Indonesia's authority over its marine territories. The map displays the boundaries of provinces and important cities that play a role in administrative and regional governance purposes in Indonesia. This map serves educational and strategic needs by providing a comprehensive overview of the country's geography and territorial divisions.

Towards fully grasp Indonesia's approach to security it is essential to consider a broad understanding of security that goes beyond Western viewpoints. Indonesia's unique geographic positioning, straddling the continents of Asia and Australia and surrounded by the Indian and Pacific Oceans, establishes it as a key player in regional and global affairs. As an archipelagic nation comprising approximately 17,508 islands (Badan Informasi Geospasial, 2023). Its strategic location along critical international shipping routes underscores its role in contributing to global maritime security, participating in international efforts, and fostering cooperation arrangements at sea (Febrica, 2014). The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD) (report, 2018) reflects this perspective, predicting global trends and emphasizing Indonesia's vital location along the critical trade sea routes of Malacca and Lombok. These routes present both opportunities for economic development and challenges related to maritime security and geopolitical stability. Pekkanen et al. (2014, p. 9), praise this era as the "*century of Asia*," emphasising the region as a hub for current and rising influential countries. They argue that Asia's economic dynamism and technological advancements position it as a central player in global affairs. This assertion underscores Asia's growing influence and Indonesia's critical role within the region. Bellamy (2003) underscores the intrinsic link between security and economic progress, a vision established by the founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although, Sukma (2011) addresses issues such as infrastructure development and external security concerns regarding border control and maritime crime power competition have reshaped the landscape of East Asia. These focus on creating a secure environment conducive to economic growth is particularly relevant to Indonesia's strategic position and its role in ASEAN.

Moreover, Indonesia is home to a diverse population of around 1,340 officially recognized ethnic groups (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2010). Indonesia's population is approximately 280.4 million (*Badan Pusat Statistik*, 2023), making it the fourth most populous country in the world after China, India, and the United States. It is the largest Muslim-majority country and the third most populous democracy globally. In other view, The U.S. International Trade Commission (2021) highlights Indonesia's rich natural resources as the world's largest nickel producer, accounting for 30% of global nickel production in 2020, a crucial mineral for modern industries like battery manufacturing. Indonesia's economy significantly benefits from its abundant natural resources, particularly in mining and agriculture (Resosudarmo et al., 2012; Widodo, 2013). This geographical with rich of resourced and demographic diversity shapes its domestic policies as well as positions Indonesia as an important player in the region. However, reliance to natural resources has led to significant environmental consequences, such as deforestation and pollution, as well as social issues, including disputes over land ownership and the marginalization of indigenous populations (Gaveau et al., 2014; Lucas & Warren, 2013). To address these challenges, McCarthy & Zen (2016) advocate for balancing economic development with environmental conservation and equitable treatment of all societal groups. Among the challenges the nation confronts on both domestic and international fronts, it changed its approach to protect its interests and ensure national security. These factors present unique obstacles in developing a cohesive security approach (Bali, 2019; Djiwandono, 2017; Murdiyarso et al., 2011). Building on the development of Indonesia's NSS, as suggested by Laksmana (2011), this study presents a comprehensive analysis that integrates economic and strategic dimensions to address the country's security challenges. Through articulating the non-existent NSS application and efficiency, this

thesis highlights the necessity to go beyond a narrow perspective on security and appreciate the difficult balance Indonesia confronts between internal and foreign challenges.

Notwithstanding Indonesia's foreign policy is deeply rooted in its historical and ideological stance of being "*free and active*", a principle first articulated during the 1948 Foreign Policy Statement. This doctrine, cited in Shekhar (2018, p. 79), emphasizes non-alignment and proactive engagement in international affairs, allowing Indonesia to maintain strategic flexibility while promoting peace and cooperation. The *free and active* stance shapes its approach to foreign relations, balancing interactions with major global powers and regional neighbours without compromising its sovereignty or autonomy.

In other hand, the concept of *National Resilience (Ketahanan Nasional)*, a legacy of Indonesia's geopolitical and strategic thinking, serves as a foundational framework guiding its policies. As articulated by Laksmana (2011, p. 45), *National Resilience* emphasizes a holistic approach to national security, integrating geostrategic, economic, societal, and political dimensions to ensure a balanced and sustainable development trajectory. This framework reflects Indonesia's broader geopolitical strategy, which involves managing resources effectively, fostering socio-political cohesion, and navigating its role in the dynamic international order.

In term of strategic documents, Indonesia's strategy for security, highlighted in the Defence White Paper (DWP), demonstrates the nation's endeavours to adjust to changing circumstances over time. The DWP was initially released in 1995, has since undergone revisions in 2008, and has been scrutinised for its limited evaluation of threats in the last publishment and failure to tackle a variety of emerging security

issues in 2015, as noted by critics (Lowry, 2016; Arvia & Fitriani, 2021; Permatasari, 2015; ASP, 2016). A rounded NSS should not only focus on military aspects, however, also aspects such as economic development, political environment and social measures to address various threats and issues effectively.

Ultimately, this study examines Indonesia's NSS from a non-Western perspective, while incorporating distinctive conventional theories rooted in Western political histories. It investigates the broad construction and articulation of Indonesia's NSS, analysing how security is defined and understood in the absence of a formal strategy document and a dedicated security council. Through exploring the core of Indonesia's strategic philosophies, this research situates the country's NSS within a stronger sociological framework, examining its security dynamics at national, regional, and global levels. Hereafter, the following sections will begin by exploring discussions on Indonesia's security strategies and the critical role of national security in maintaining stability at both regional and global levels. This will be followed by a contextual overview that sets the stage for addressing the core research problem. Followed by the theoretical foundations of national security and CMR, providing a conceptual framework for understanding Indonesia's approach. The study's contributions will then be highlighted, emphasizing its relevance within the broader security discourse. Finally, the research landscape will be outlined, with a brief overview of each chapter, explaining the epistemological endeavour of this study.

1.1 Exploring How Changes and Global Trends Influence Indonesia's Approach to National Security (1988–2024)

The adaptation of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024 presents an interesting example of how a country's approach to security adjusts to significant shifts in both internal governance and global security settings. Critically the point of interest of Indonesia's NSS which has traditionally revolved around protecting sovereignty against external exposures and dealing with internal challenges (Singh, 2002; Mietzner, 2006).

Indonesia's external security concerns have been shaped by shifts in regional power dynamics, particularly in response to major global actors such as the United States, China, and Japan, whose influence has grown significantly in Southeast Asia. The rise of China's assertiveness in the South China Sea, for instance, has posed strategic dilemmas for Indonesia, compelling it to balance economic cooperation with Beijing while reinforcing its territorial integrity, especially around the *Natuna* Islands (Laksmana, 2019; Storey, 2021). The country has faced increasing security risks linked to the militarization of the Indo-Pacific (White, 2018). Where the growing presence of foreign naval forces and defence pacts like *AUKUS* - Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, (announced on September 15, 2021), raise concerns about regional stability (Kuik, 2022). Hence, Indonesia must response with more agile that aligns with *free and active* foreign policy doctrine to face the external pressures while ensuring strategic autonomy (Sukma, 2011). Although, Indonesia had to navigate through a global power structure without strong regional security frameworks and the resources that are commonly found in more developed nations (Weatherbee, 2014). This highlights the need for a security plan that prioritises survival and protects national interests in global power conflicts (Huxley, 2016; Anwar, 2020; Hadiz &

Robison, 2013; Chandra, 2014). Indonesia's NSS is reflected in its efforts to maintain strategic independence, leverage diplomatic engagements, and enhance its defence capabilities to safeguard national sovereignty amidst intensifying geopolitical rivalries.

Looking back, the evolution of Indonesia's NSS has been shaped by the historical changes of global post-Cold War. As mentioned by Gaddis (1992) the Cold War's conclusion to the shift of geopolitical landscape of international relations and security. Correspondingly Indonesia underwent a transformation from an authoritarian to a democratic government in the late 1990s leading to a period of reflective evaluation. This process was documented by Bourchier (1994) and Aspinall (2005), during the shift to democracy in the 1998, resulting in adjustments to security focusses and strategies centred on enhancing institutional reforms to better align and coordinate security efforts of Indonesia. Equally, the impact of the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis demonstrated how economic instability could directly affect national security by fostering domestic unrest and weakening state institutions (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Rosser, 2016). These economic and political transformations underscored how Indonesia recalibrate its NSS to address priorities and strategies institutionally, in respond to both traditional and non-traditional security threats in an increasingly complex global landscape.

Moreover, Indonesia has had to contend with non-traditional security threats exacerbated by globalization, including transnational terrorism, cyber warfare, climate change, and global economic fluctuations. The rise of digital threats, including cyber espionage targeting government infrastructure, has underscored the need for cybersecurity reforms to protect national interests (Honna, 2019; Lim & Ho, 2020). Likewise, Indonesia's archipelagic nature makes it vulnerable to environmental

security challenges such as rising sea levels, deforestation, and illegal fishing by foreign actors, which have prompted stronger maritime enforcement policies (Djalal, 2010; Murdiyarso et al., 2011, 2004; Goh, 2007/2008). These evolving challenges have compelled Indonesia to integrate a multifaceted institutional approach into its NSS, balancing traditional defence strategies with innovative solutions to safeguard its sovereignty and security in the face of an ever-changing global environment.

Internally, over this time frame, Indonesia moved from a totalitarian government towards a more democratic setup – a change largely shaped by the military aspects of its initial move towards democracy (Rieffel, 2004; Kingsbury, 2005). During the last decade of *ORBA* era in Indonesia (1988-1998), that favoured developmentalist and centralisation policies, significantly altered the priority and institutional design of the NSS. It examines into how Indonesia's NSS structures have evolved due to the influence of an active military and the complexities of incorporating civilian supervision (Crouch, 2020; Honna, 2018). The historical deficiency of clearness in strategic matters has posed obstacles to sustainable progress, over time. Therefore, it is crucial to study these arrangements to grasp the effectiveness of Indonesia's security strategy (Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2013). Harsono (2021) highlights how these state-driven security measures, while framed within a democratic transition. This period was characterised by a system that appeared to be democratic, however operated in a way that prioritised the state's development objectives over values; this approach had far-reaching effects on its security institutions acting to achieve it, and how risks and threat were perceived and on the involvement of civil society in security issues.

The transition to democracy after 1998 introduced significant reforms, including decentralization initiatives aimed at restructuring Indonesia's security governance.

Key changes involved the separation of defence and security institutions, along with a more balanced distribution of power both horizontally and vertically, to enhance accountability and governance efficiency. The role of civilians in homeland security was re-evaluated, marking a shift toward a more inclusive security framework that emphasized civil capacity-building (Turner, 2003; Mietzner, 2006; Honna, 2019). Turner (2003) highlights how decentralization processes in post-authoritarian states often involve redefining the role of security institutions, promoting greater civilian oversight, and integrating local governance structures into NSS. Public trust in government institutions plays a significant role in shaping security policies, as heightened transparency and accountability are often demanded in democratic governance (Norris, 2011; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). Hence, public confidence and ability to confront challenges define the understanding of the threats and risks. This aligns with Indonesia's efforts to balance state control with participatory governance in the security sector.

With shifts in the country's sociology-political and economic environment over time, the focus has adapted to meet shifting domestic requirements and external influences (Sukma, 2003). In last decade key aspect of this transformation was the more of economic nationalism, where the state sought to protect domestic industries and assert greater control over strategic resources in response to global economic pressures and competition (Benhabib, 2002; Norris, 2011; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). This approach shaped national security policies and influenced Indonesia's stance in global power dynamics, as policymakers navigated geopolitical tensions while maintaining economic sovereignty (Warburton, 2016; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). Additionally, during this period, security institutions struggled for power and influence, particularly as oligarchic elites leveraged security frameworks to protect their

economic and political interests (Winters, 2011; Fukuoka, 2013). This dynamic created an environment where threats and risks were often perceived through the lens of elite interests, rather than purely national concerns. However, within its borders, Indonesia faced persistent security challenges including separatism, terrorism, natural disasters, border breaches, piracy, cyber warfare, espionage, and drug trafficking (Aspinall, 2009; Honna, 2019). The economic disparities and the increasing influence of businesses in the political landscape have added to these difficulties.

Among these, marine security emerged as a major strategic focus, as Indonesia sought to safeguard territorial waters, vital trade routes, and resource-rich maritime zones from external encroachments, piracy, and illegal exploitation (Gindarsah, 2016; Sebastian & Lisdiyono, 2015). This shift in priorities reflected the growing recognition of maritime security as a key pillar of national defence, influenced by both economic and geopolitical imperatives (Sukma, 2011). Consequently, Indonesia's NSS evolved to integrate maritime security as a crucial component, balancing elite-driven interests with broader national security duties.

Nevertheless, in democratic societies, maintaining a balance between national security imperatives and the protection of civil liberties remains a critical challenge (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). In Indonesia, public opinion has influenced key security decisions, particularly regarding military oversight, counterterrorism measures, and responses to civil unrest (Weatherbee, 2014; Kingsbury, 2018). Although, in Security Sector Reform (SSR) practically emphasizing the need for transparent, accountable, and inclusive security governance in democratic societies (Sukma, 2003; Mietzner, 2006; Honna, 2019). This approach

offers perceptions into the evolving role of civilian oversight, governance mechanisms, and institutional trust in shaping NSS.

Indonesia's NSS has evolved over three political eras, shaped by shifting domestic political landscapes and evolving global security dynamics. Externally, Indonesia's NSS has been influenced by geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific and economic pressures with emerging security threats such as cyber warfare and environmental challenges. Internally, the interplay between military influence, oligarchic interests, public trust and opinion in state institutions has shaped policy decisions, often reflecting competing priorities. While Indonesia has made progress toward institutional reform and strategic adaptability, ongoing challenges persist in balancing national security requirements with democratic principles, CMR, and economic sovereignty. Understanding these complex dynamics provides analytical understandings into Indonesia's evolving security architecture and its broader implications for democratic consolidation and regional stability.

1.2 From Globalisation to Local Dynamics: Addressing the Research Problems in Indonesia's NSS

The increasing interconnectedness of the world in the era of globalisation has highlighted that security challenges in one region can have far-reaching global repercussions, making it crucial for academic assessments to adapt to these interconnected dynamics. Held and McGrew (2007) stress that understanding globalisation requires focusing on the transnational dimensions of security while addressing local contexts. For Indonesia, a nation situated in a strategically significant region, security concerns have evolved beyond traditional territorial threats, extending into regional conflicts, economic liabilities, and environmental challenges that are

heavily influenced by globalisation (Ritzer, 2007). Hence, the growing interdependence of states brings to the forefront new forms of security risks.

Whilst cyber threats, cross-border terrorism, and climate change-induced natural disasters have become increasingly pervasive, Indonesia must address new exposures emerging in the changing global order (Baldwin, 1997; Choucri, 2012). According to Murdiyarso et al. (2011), Indonesia's engagement with international diplomatic and security initiatives depends on accurate information exchange and collaboration across various sectors, including military and government bodies. This dynamic allows Indonesia to participate more effectively in international security discussions and improve its diplomatic stature on the global stage.

However, Indonesia's limited openness in strategic matters has hindered the country's security development due to inadequate institutional mechanisms and defence capabilities (Singh, 2002; Laksmana, 2011). The lack of transparency has led to challenges in Indonesia's ability to effectively address both internal and external threats, thereby impeding the overall progress of the NSS (Sebastian, 2006). While critics argue that documents such as the DWP serve as propaganda, Indonesia's aspirations as outlined in these documents have sparked regional concerns (Kurniawan, 2004). Although the focus should shift towards enhancing governance practices that prioritise military and diplomatic transparency, ensuring that peace and stability are maintained while fostering greater international collaboration on security matters (Sukma, 2003; Rizal, 2012). These perspectives are essential for ensuring that Indonesia's domestic security needs align with its foreign policy priorities and help secure regional stability (Djiwandono, 2017). Strengthening institutional coordination and adopting a more transparent security approach would improve Indonesia's

strategic credibility and facilitate deeper cooperation with regional and global security actors (Acharya, 2015). Indonesia's security development is affected by governance transparency, institutional mechanisms, and strategic credibility, all of which are crucial for effectively addressing threats, aligning domestic security priorities with foreign policy, and fostering regional stability through enhanced military and diplomatic cooperation.

The insights assist in understanding how Indonesia's security approach has evolved within a global context by considering international standards and regional security developments, as advocated by Buzan et al., (1998). Briefs from security assessment helps to assess how Indonesia's NSS responds to both new challenges by incorporating different approaches and resources to handle intricate security landscapes (Heineken, 2015; Sukma, 2012). Merging these views effectively to understand the security elements in influencing national security decisions, to enter a structure for examining the development of Indonesia's NSS. These background discussions intend to streamline the formulation and suggestions of research problems, as follows:

1. What are the key elements that have shaped Indonesia's NSS priorities from 1988 to 2024? And what are the driving forces behind it?
2. How have alterations in Indonesia's NSS framework influenced its efficiency and adaptability from 1988 to 2024? And what are the aspects that influence these changes?
3. What considerations have shaped the understanding of risk and threat in Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024? How this shift reflects on responding to threats prioritisation?

4. What has led to the growth of civil capabilities in Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024? What were the consequences to the security community and resilience?

The study focuses on the period from 1988 to 2024, which departed with the new paradigms introduced by the MOD during the Suharto era and influencing security strategies in the decades that followed. The period, starting from 1988 when Suharto began his last decade in power, is particularly relevant due to the influence of General Leonardus Benjamin (L.B) Moerdani, who served as the MOD and Security from 1988 to 1993. While Moerdani was a key architect of the dual-function (*dwifungsi*) doctrine, by 1988, he had begun advocating for reducing direct military involvement in politics (Crouch, 2010; Pour, 2007). His strategic shifts and security paradigms, introduced under his leadership, offer a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's NSS during a critical era of political and security evolution (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, 1988; Pour, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2009). This period marked by significant changes in Indonesia's political and security landscape. Furthermore, this period corresponded with the end of the Suharto era, a shift that brought democratic reforms and significant political transitions, which reshaped Indonesia's security landscape. As Suharto's authoritarian rule ended in 1998, Indonesia's NSS adapted to the new political climate, embracing a more transparent and democratic approach to governance, while balancing internal reforms and external diplomacy. These developments are crucial for understanding how Indonesia's NSS has evolved in response to both domestic shifts and regional security dynamics (Kingsbury, 2005). These shifts highlight the interplay between political leadership, its priorities, institutional reforms and strategic re-alignment, which continue to shape Indonesia's security governance and its adaptability to contemporary challenges.

All-inclusive, highlights that Indonesia's NSS is shaped by several interrelated features. One significant element is the shifting priorities driven by emerging non-traditional threats and evolving security interests. Analysing how these priorities change over time in response to political uncertainty, economic constraints, and regional disputes provides valuable insights into the adaptability of Indonesia's security strategy (Bali, 2019; Sarjito, 2023). Indonesia's security priorities are evolving due to external disadvantages and domestic political changes, particularly during the post-Suharto era, as the country navigates the balance between democratization and national security imperatives, resulting in a complex security environment. This period saw an increased emphasis on human rights and democratic governance, which reshaped how security is conceptualized and addressed, particularly in balancing internal stability with the principles of a democratic society (Held & McGrew, 2007; Rieffel, 2004). The shift towards democratisation, as well as decentralisation efforts, has influenced Indonesia's evolving security priorities, such as the expansion of civil society participation and the increased role of regional governments (Turner, 2003; Crouch, 2020; Honna, 2018). At the same time, Indonesia's security priorities have been shaped by economic constraints and regional dynamics. The aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the country's growing need to protect its economic interests have led to a strong focus on economic nationalism and safeguarding critical resources from foreign influence (Bali, 2019). Concurrently, regional disputes, notably in the South China Sea, have intensified Indonesia's focus on maritime security, alongside efforts to modernize its military and bolster its regional diplomatic engagements (Kurniawan, 2004; Widodo, 2013). The evolution of Indonesia's NSS demonstrates the complex interchange between internal political change, economic factors, and regional security challenges, necessitating ongoing strategic

reflectiveness to respond to a dynamic global and domestic environment (Singh, 2002; Weatherbee, 2014). These shifting priorities highlight Indonesia's adaptive approach to security, moving from traditional military concerns to addressing a broader spectrum of risks that include economic resilience, environmental protection, and safeguarding democratic principles amidst ongoing political and social transformations.

Another key aspect involves evaluating the effectiveness of security measures and institutional structures in dynamic conditions. Indonesia's security approach's success relies on its security institutions adapting to emerging threats and risks, managing them effectively, and understanding the evolution of military and police forces is crucial for its national security architecture. Djwandono (2017) stresses the importance of strengthening these institutions to respond to the evolving security challenges, particularly considering globalization and regional instability. Additionally, scholars studying SSR in Indonesia, like McCarthy & Zen (2016) and Setiawan & Saputra (2019), argue that reforming security institutions to reduce inefficiencies, corruption, and over-centralization is crucial for improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of Indonesia's security sector. This underscores the need for ongoing institutional reforms to enhance Indonesia's capacity to manage contemporary security challenges effectively.

A further consideration is Indonesia's approach to risk assessment and its influence on security policies. Understanding how threats—whether economic, military, or societal—are evaluated and prioritized is vital for effective security planning. Scholars like Murdiyarso et al. (2011), Widodo (2013), and Buzan et al. (1998) emphasize the importance of analysing the internal and external security environment to gauge the types of threats and risks Indonesia faces, from natural disasters to geopolitical

tensions. The role of risk management in Indonesia's NSS involves continuously assessing political, economic, and societal considerations. As Sidel (2006) notes, non-military challenges, including corruption, weak governance, and the manipulation of democratic processes, significantly undermine Indonesia's stability and hinder progress in other domains. These non-traditional threats emphasize issues beyond military capacity to incorporate good governance, accountability, and socio-political reforms.

Lastly, the role of civil capabilities is crucial in reinforcing national security efforts. Integrating civilian initiatives with military and governmental strategies is key to developing a comprehensive security framework (Sidel, 2006; Wahyudi, 2022). The ultimate emphasis lies on the civic role in the NSS, focusing on how civil society engages within a democratic governance framework (Mietzner, 2012; Aspinall, 2014). Indonesia's security strategy showcases the interplay between upholding national security and safeguarding civil rights – a crucial equilibrium for democratic nations (Hadiz, 2010; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014). Ensuring a well-functioning NSS requires continuous dialogue between state institutions and civil society, fostering mutual trust and legitimacy in security governance. Ultimately, a dynamic and inclusive approach to national security, rooted in CMR, is essential for fostering long-term stability and resilience in Indonesia. By combining these insights, this research creates a framework for understanding the interactions between democratization and national security. Hence, it brings fresh perspectives to academic conversations and provides practical suggestions for developing security policies (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Weatherbee, 2014; Kingsbury, 2018).

This study highlights the evolving nature of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024, shaped by both global and local dynamics. As globalization increases interconnectedness, Indonesia's security concerns, such as regional conflicts and emerging threats. Its underscores academic assessments to answer research puzzle that explore Indonesia's unique socio-political context. The period examined is pivotal, with significant transformations in political, social, and security landscapes, particularly influenced by key figures like General L.B Moerdani. By focusing on the period from 1988 onwards, the study offers a comprehensive analysis of the NSS, providing valuable insights for shaping Indonesia's future security policies. The research addresses the factors that have shaped Indonesia's NSS priorities, adaptations in its security structure, and the evolving understanding of risk and threat, as well as the role of civil capabilities in strengthening national security. The next section builds on this discussion by establishing the theoretical framework necessary for analysing national security within Indonesia's context.

1.2.1 Exploring the General Structures of Theoretical Perspectives on National Security

Academic discussions on security usually focus on defining what exactly constitute national security. The concept of security is crucial by understanding what needs to be protected and safeguarded as keys in shaping a nation's NSS. Resolving these questions significantly impacts the effectiveness of the NSS (Taylor, 2020). This process influences the country's priorities and decisions regarding its framework and action plans (Brown, 2019; Williams, 2021). It plays a role in shaping a country's relationships with other nations and its own internal policies (Smith, 2021). Creating a NSS is a key task for governments that are influenced by various factors within and

beyond their borders (Jones, 2019). The stability of each country plays a role in maintaining peace worldwide, since the overall order among nations relies on how stable each nation is domestically and internationally (Neocleous, 2006). National security covers a range of areas such as protecting the nation's borders and interests on a global scale.

The origins of the national security concept can be traced back to the United States where it was first established. Broadened by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to encompass both foreign matters with an emphasis on safeguarding the wellbeing and livelihood of the people as the ultimate objective of national security (Roosevelt, 1941). A deeper insight into this subject was cemented in 1947 by President Harry S. Truman's National Security Act. It led to the creation of bodies such as the National Security Council and the Department of Defence tasked with aligning U.S. national security plans (Schelling, 1966). National security encompasses a government's interests and obligations towards its citizens and other countries (Mabee, 2003; Buzan, 1991; Laffey & Barkawi, 2002). In another view, based on Wolfer's (1952) insights inspired by Walter Lippmann's ideas, society finds a sense of security by the safeguarding of its fundamental beliefs, even if it creates conflict as outcomes. States are tasked with safeguarding these beliefs using approaches to address both internal and external threats (Zainab, 2014). This evolution of national security demonstrates its dynamic nature, adapting to both historical contexts and contemporary challenges in maintaining state stability and societal well-being.

Understanding security in geopolitics requires a multidimensional approach that considers historical, cultural, and linguistic contexts alongside evolving threats. Laffey & Barkawi (2002) highlight the importance of understanding the background history,

culture, and language of affected regions in geopolitics. Croft (2013) further elaborates on the impact of traditions in shaping and promoting national security goals, underlining the evolving nature of geopolitics and the need for a broader perspective on security. Buzan & Hansen (2015) argue that conventional risks to a country's security are no longer exclusively managed by governments. Incidents involving safeguarding the state extend to protecting its people, ethnic communities, and environmental concerns spanning even global levels. Lake (2008) points out that the government continues to play a significant role in international relations, often influencing national security through engagements with countries. These perspectives collectively emphasize that national security today is shaped by both traditional state mechanisms and broader transnational influences.

In today's world, national security concerns have evolved to encompass areas like cybersecurity, food security, maritime security, environmental security, energy security, and adapting to new threats and risks. This broad perspective highlights the importance of addressing as a multidimensional construct that goes beyond military defence to include security from various angles such as political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental viewpoints (Mingst & Arreguin Toft, 2017; Baldwin, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998, Buzan, 1991). The scholarly discourse on NSS involves discussions on viewpoints of the involvement of sociologists in shaping policies through public interaction and governmental cooperation and crafting security strategies that influence public sentiment or discourage enemies (Levi, 2020; Caudle, 2009). It highlights the significance of cognitive mechanisms and differentiates between risk and insecurity (Beck, 2002). This strategy requires involvement from the public in collaboration with the government based on principles of openness and responsibility.

The discussion surrounding Indonesia's NSS explores its urgencies change throughout history. Illustration is the emphasis focus placed by Suharto's *ORBA* administration on upholding stability and suppressing separatist movements (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003). In contrary the reform period ushered in a set of national security priorities focusing on regional autonomy and CMR within the environment of broader democratisation efforts (Rasyid, 2003; Sukma, 2004, 2013). Scholars such as Bellamy (2006) and Fealy (2008) delve into the significance of society in national security by emphasising how democratisation has resulted in increased civilian supervision and involvement in security affairs. Buehler (2010) discusses decentralisation policies and highlights the importance of governments in crafting and executing security strategies to strengthen the civil capacity in the NSS. Moreover, Mietzner (2006) explores how adjustments in the military and police sectors following the Suharto era have changed their functions in national security, thus influencing overall institutional efficiency. The significance of reorganising institutions becomes evident when dealing with threats from within and outside (Crouch, 2018; McBeth, 2009). In assents threats are essential in formulating a NSS because they directly shape the priorities, resources, and overall direction of a country's security approach. Through identifying and analysing both traditional and non-traditional threats—such as military aggression, cyberattacks, terrorism, economic challenges, or regional instability—nations can assess their weaknesses and allocate resources effectively to address them.

In the circumstance of national security, threats are understood as potential dangers or risks that could harm national interests, sovereignty, or public safety. However, in the case of shifting threats, particularly during the post-Suharto era, have influenced the evolution of its security strategy as the country navigates the balance between democratization and national security imperatives (Bali, 2019; Widodo, 2013). The

changing political environment, internal security issues, and regional disputes have prompted Indonesia to reevaluate its defence strategies, prioritize military modernization, and enhance civilian participation in security governance (Crouch, 2020; Turner, 2003). Other views factors that shape how threats and risks are understood in Indonesia's NSS including changes in geopolitical landscapes conflicts in the region. Emmerson (2005) reminded the regional developments such as China's scaling and disputes in the South China Sea affect Indonesia's views on threats. In a similar vein, Acharya (2009) underscores how Indonesia's security approaches to the impact of global terrorism events after 9/11. Effective threat assessment is therefore crucial for creating adaptive and responsive security policies that align with both domestic and global security challenges, ensuring a robust and sustainable national security framework (McCarthy & Zen, 2016; Setiawan, 2018). Additionally, to ensure conceptual clarity, key terms such as 'threats,' 'security,' and 'national resilience' are precisely defined within the context of Indonesia's strategic culture.

However, the understanding of threats and risks in Indonesia's NSS has developed in response to the changing dynamics between military influences on societal, political and economic over time. For Indonesia's NSS, threats are interpreted in traditional military terms and as non-traditional risks, including terrorism, separatism, cyber threats, economic instability, and environmental challenges (Buzan et al., 1998; Emmers, 2013). As Indonesia's NSS has broadened its scope from military threats to encompass economic issues, environmental challenges, and societal considerations, it demonstrates an increasing impact of civilian viewpoints on security evaluations (Jenkins & Moskos, 1981; Buzan et al., 1998). According to Heineken (2015), a social aspect is essential in comprehending and tackling present-day security issues. Concurred the military's attention has transitioned from threats to upholding internal

security and safeguarding human rights (Ferriera, 2012). Military sociology offers a grasp of these changes by blending insights from politics, history, economics, and psychology (Kniskern & Segal, 2015; Ferriera, 2012). Hence the enhancement of capabilities within Indonesia's NSS has been prompted by the necessity for a holistic security approach to threats responds involving the military, civilian institutions, and society.

The evolving landscape of NSS features multifaceted nature, influenced by historical legacies, geopolitical shifts, and emerging threats. Theoretical perspectives on NSS highlight the importance of balancing traditional military concerns with broader societal, political, economic, and environmental factors. In the case of Indonesia, the transition from Suharto's centralized security approach to a more decentralized and democratic model reflects the changing priorities in its NSS. The inclusion of civilian oversight, institutional restructuring, and the broadening of security definitions of threats indicate a shift towards a more comprehensive security framework. The next discussion delves into CMR in NSS and in Indonesia as case study, examining how the evolving role of the military and civilian institutions has shaped security governance.

1.2.2 Examining the Sociological Aspects of CMR and Indonesia's NSS

Deliberating specifies a theoretical lens for this exploration, the study introduces a general hypothesis on military and civil relations, examining the balance of power, civilian control, and the evolving role of the military in democratic governance. This approach enhances the analytical depth and theoretical rigor of the research by situating the analysis within established frameworks of CMR particularly in transitional democracies such as Indonesia.

The evolution of military sociology underscores the military's profound influence on societal structures, governance, and civilian life. The theoretical exploration of military sociology such as Ferriera's (2012) influenced by early perspectives like Herbert Spencer's hierarchical society and Weber's (1946) authority concept, emphasizes the military's role in enforcing rules and maintaining societal stability. Jenkins and Moskos (1981) and Heineken (2015) argue that the military's authority is crucial for instilling skilfulness and promoting values such as respect, duty, and accountability which are essential for operational effectiveness and institutional credibility. Within the context of Indonesia's NSS, these theoretical insights are particularly relevant, as they illuminate the military's dual function: safeguarding national security while also shaping societal structures.

Sociological of CMR interests viewing the distribution of power and authority between civilian political leaders and military institutions (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Feaver (1999) and Finer (2002) emphasize the importance of civilian control over the military in democratic governance, preventing authoritarian reversals. They argue that the balance of power between civilian authorities and military institutions is crucial for maintaining subordination to nominated leaders. Civilian control is essential in CMR theory, emphasizing the supremacy of elected political leaders over military commanders in policy-making and national security decisions (Feaver, 1996). Feaver (2003) argues that civilian control is maintained through institutional mechanisms, legal frameworks, and political norms that ensure the military's loyalty and obedience to civilian authorities. This is particularly relevant in transitioning democracies, where historical patterns of military intervention in politics necessitate robust mechanisms for civilian oversight (Croissant et. al., 2010). Understanding CMR and the mechanisms

that enforce civilian control is crucial for safeguarding democratic institutions in the context of national security.

Evaluation Indonesia NSS, the military's role has evolved from a dominant political actor under Suharto's New Order to a more professionalized force under democratic rule (Mietzner, 2009). However, the military continues to exert influence in strategic policy areas, such as internal security and territorial management, reflecting its historical role in maintaining state integrity (Mietzner, 2011). This like Lasswell's (1941, p. 455) concept of the "garrison state" refers to a scenario where the military plays a crucial role in civilian governance, especially during external threats. Other analysis by Karl Marx's (1978) suggests this caused of transition from imperialism to industrial capitalism highlights the military's role in upholding the interests of the ruling class amid socioeconomic changes. This ongoing influence necessitates a nuanced analysis of how the military navigates its identity and function within a democratizing political system (Kammen & Chandra, 2010). While democratic reforms have formally reduced the military's political role, its continued presence in strategic policy areas underscores the complexity of CMR relations in Indonesia.

Civilian control has evolved significantly since the reform era, reflecting broader shifts in political power and governance structures in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2006). Following the fall of the *ORBA* regime, Indonesia undertook significant reforms to reduce military influence in politics, including the abolition of the military's dual function (*dwifungsi*) doctrine, which had legitimized its role in both defence and political affairs (Crouch, 2007). This restructuring aimed to establish clearer boundaries between military and civilian spheres, thereby strengthening democratic governance (Aspinall, 2010). While significant progress has been made, challenges remain in fully institutionalizing civilian

control over the military, as political dynamics continue to influence security policy and decision-making (Crouch, 2020). The process of establishment democratic oversight of security institutions continues to be vital for ensuring that Indonesia's NSS aligns with democratic principles and the needs of the nation.

The military's adaptation to new roles is crucial in emerging democracies to maintain democratic principles while safeguarding national security interests, as seen in the history of the Indonesian military. The balance of power between civilian leaders and military institutions is dynamic and context-dependent, influenced by historical legacies, political cultures, and institutional configurations (Huntington, 1957). In emerging democracies, this balance is often contested, as military elites may resist relinquishing power acquired under previous authoritarian regimes (Alagappa, 2001). According to Croissant and Kuehn (2011), effective civilian control requires and constitutional provisions as well as the political will and capacity of civilian leaders to assert authority over security policy. In Indonesia, the balance of power between civilian and military elites has fluctuated across different presidencies, reflecting changes in political leadership, party dynamics, and security challenges (Mietzner, 2013). During the early Reform Era, presidents like Habibie and Gus Dur sought to curtail military power, while later administrations under Megawati and SBY adopted more cautious approaches, balancing military interests with political stability (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010). These shifting dynamics underscore the importance of examining CMR relations through a historical-institutional lens. The evolving role of the military in democratic governance involves a transition from direct political involvement to a more professionalized focus on national defence and security (Bruneau & Matei, 2008). In post-authoritarian contexts, this transition is often gradual and contested, as military institutions adapt to new political environments and redefine their roles in line with

democratic norms (Stepan, 1988). The process of professionalization requires the military to optimise its understanding of loyalty, moving away from political allegiance toward a focus on constitutional and national security duties.

Although the change in recent years as civilian influence has increased, questioning the traditional military control. This transformation is based on the blending of civilian responsibilities, which has prompted a reassessment of security priorities (Caforio & Nuciari, 2006). The inclusion of viewpoints in security strategies mirrors wider shifts in society and has instigated a re-evaluation of national security goals to reconcile established military priorities with new civilian demands (Caforio & Nuciari, 2018; Ferriera, 2012). This shift in emphasis underscores a move from purely military centric tactics, towards embracing a range of societal issues. The importance of society in Indonesia's NSS has grown, notably due to the changing dynamics between civilian and military sectors over time, as highlighted by Kniskern & Segal (2015). They discuss how military sociology observes shifts in structures and societal norms about security matters. Caforio & Nuciari (1994) investigated the merging of military and civilian functions to better understand how societal developments influence the objectives and implementation of national security approaches. The increasing participation of organisations and the public in influencing security strategies underscores the crucial role of civilians in national security initiatives (Kniskern & Segal, 2015; Heinecken, 2015). This shift highlights the evolving nature of Indonesia's NSS, where civilian engagement and military adaptation work in tandem to address contemporary security challenges more effectively.

Through employing a general hypothesis on CMR, the study enhances its analytical depth and theoretical rigor. This approach allows for a comprehensive examination of

the interaction between civilian authorities and military institutions, shedding light on the complexities of democratic consolidation in Indonesia (Diamond, 1999). Furthermore, it contributes to the broader literature on CMR in transitional democracies by offering empirical insights into the Indonesian experience (Croissant et al., 2013). This supports the study's broader significance in understanding how CMR relations shape NSS within evolving democratic frameworks.

This theoretical framework provides a robust foundation for analysing the balance of power, civilian control, and the evolving role of the military in Indonesia's democratic governance. By situating the analysis within established CMR theories, the study enhances its theoretical diligence and contributes to a deeper understanding of the challenges and dynamics of emerging democratic contexts. The development of Indonesia's NSS shows how the interaction between military sectors influences national security priorities and shapes policies, institutional arrangement related to risk assessment and respond together with civil duties. This research seeks to explore these factors to understand how effective Indonesia's NSS is, with analysis of its evolution and suggesting ways to improve the nation's security structure and recommendations for future study. The upcoming section will further examine how the contribution of knowledge from this thesis enhances theoretical perspectives, deepens understanding of key issues, and informs policy recommendations for strengthening Indonesia's NSS.

1.3 Advancing the Understanding of Indonesia's NSS and Contribution

Indonesia's NSS evolution reflects the nation's unique historical context, geopolitical positioning, and internal dynamics of political, economic, and social factors. Despite its significance, the Indonesia's NSS has been absence and has often been

underexplored in academic discourse, particularly within sociological perspectives. In Indonesia, the domain of national security concerns includes academics who maintain strong connections with influential figures and rely on governmental patronage to influence university curricula (Hadiwinata, 2008). These academic restrictions might curtail their capacity to actively participate with, and impact, global scholarly and policy dialogues in Indonesia's circles today. This parallels Kristensen's (2019) assertion that non-Western nations, like Indonesia, aim for acknowledgement. Therefore, the deficiency of academic works about national security specifically on Indonesia serves as a reminder of the significance of grounding research on tangible real-world data (Laffey, 2003). This highlights the critical need for fostering independent academic discourse that can contribute to both national and global security debates while addressing Indonesia's unique security challenges.

One of the key contributions of this research is its examination of Indonesia's NSS, which operates without a clear legal framework or a dedicated security council. This study aims to bridge this gap by advancing the understanding and articulating of Indonesia's NSS through an in-depth examination of its priorities, institutional structures, interpretation of threats and risks, and the evolving role of civil capacities from 1988 to 2024, by employing a thematic content analysis enriched with hermeneutic methods. This approach allows for a comprehensive examination of Indonesia's NSS, capturing its complexities and demonstrates the effectiveness of integrating qualitative methodologies such as interviews, interpretative discourse analysis, and narrative analysis in national security research. Through investigating these dimensions, this research contributes to the academic field and offers practical insights for policy development and strategic planning in Indonesia.

This study advances the theoretical understanding of NSS by sociological perspectives contesting traditional security studies. National security is conventionally examined through political and strategic lenses, often prioritizing military capabilities and central with state objectives of threats. However, this research argues that a comprehensive understanding of NSS necessitates an exploration of sociological dimensions such as political culture, economic dynamic, societal and military influences as specially in case of Indonesia.

This research contributes to the broader discourse on security governance by highlights the significance of strong CMR within the NSS, shaping its structure, decision-making processes, and overall effectiveness in addressing national security challenges. Furthermore, it advances theoretical discussions on the role of civil capacities, political legitimacy, and public trust in security governance, reinforcing arguments within political sociology regarding the significance of social cohesion in state security frameworks (Norris, 2011; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). By evaluating the impact of community assembly, civil power, and societal resilience, the research provides a sociological perspective on the dynamic relationship between state authority and civil society, particularly within Indonesia's democratization process (Benhabib, 2002). This contribution is particularly relevant in the context of Indonesia's democratic transition, where public trust and political legitimacy are crucial for effective security governance and institutional stability (Turner, 2003). Additionally, this analysis aligns with perspectives on political economy and governance, emphasizing the entanglement of security policymaking with elite interests and institutional authority (Higley & Burton, 2006; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). What are more pertained theories of political sociology by critically examining the influence of political oligarchy on national security priorities (Winters, 2011). After

substantiating the background relating to the phenomena under analysis, the research enhances and confirms the theories by placing Indonesia's security policies within the larger framework of theoretical viewpoints.

Beyond its theoretical and academic contributions, this research offers practical implications for policy development and strategic planning in Indonesia. Through tracing the evolution of Indonesia's NSS and identifying key drivers of change, the study presents evidence-based recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness and adaptability of national security policies. The research recommends several key policy actions, including formalizing NSS research to ensure greater clarity, coordination, and policy continuity across administrations. It underscores the importance of integrating societal perspectives and civilian participation into security strategies, advocating for a more inclusive, transparent and holistic approach to national security (Soeprapto, 2020; Wahyudi, 2022). In doing so, this research informs policymaking, reinforcing the need for governance structures that balance state authority with civil engagement to ensure long-term security and stability.

Finally, this study contributes to akin security studies by positioning Indonesia's NSS within the broader context of Southeast Asian security dynamics. It explores how Indonesia's forms its NSS compare with other countries in the region facing similar political transitions and security challenges. This comparative perspective enhances the understanding of regional security dynamics and offers valuable insights for strategic cooperation and security integration within ASEAN. By advancing the understanding of Indonesia's NSS and contributing to theoretical, methodological, and practical discourses, this research makes a substantial impact to the field of sociology and contrasting security studies. It enriches academic knowledge and informs policy

development and strategic planning, promoting a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to national security in Indonesia and elsewhere.

1.4 Mapping the Research Landscape

The introduction assesses primary background into analysis of the evolution of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024. This focuses on the historical context, as well as the geopolitical and sociological influences that have moulded these approaches over time and created the research problem. It begins by exploring the concept of national security perspectives and civil military relations and how societal, economic, political, and environment impacts on security policymaking. The chapter briefly discusses the research goals, queries, and assumptions while giving a summary of the thesis structure.

In Chapter 2, literature is elaborated for the research theoretical framework from the sociological perspective to study national security especially for the case of Indonesia. The literature explores theory lenses to understand Indonesia's security strategy over different periods from 1988 to 2024, including the *ORBA* era and the reform era with its subsequent post-reform period.

During the *ORBA* era, taking reference of Robison (1986), emphasised developmentalism which is focused on growth and government authority to maintain stability greatly impacted national security. The reform era introduced decentralisation efforts aimed at promoting control and enhancing military professionalism, according to Aspinall & Fealy (2003). In the era following, reforms in the economy influenced the focus of the NSS on safeguarding interests against international impacts, as mentioned by Warburton (2016).

The structure of institutions played a role in shaping the NSS approach. State control over security policy due to centralisation was a prevalent feature, as noted by Crouch (1979). Nonetheless the decentralisation during the reform era led to enhancements in governance and effectiveness of NSS operations, according to Malley (1999). There were also shifts in how risks were perceived. During times of rule in the past, according to King (2014), the focus was on maintaining internal stability. In contrast, during reform periods based on Mietzner's (2011) study, public trust and civic participation increased awareness of various risks. The reform era saw a resurgence in the role of society after being suppressed during the *ORBA* era (Uhlin, 1997). However, current oligarchic influences pose a threat to its progress, according to Aspinall (2005). This review across sociology, economic policy, and political perspectives lays a brief for examining the intricate social political transformations and security concerns in Indonesia.

In Chapter 3 of the thesis an integrated method is employed to evaluate Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024. Qualitative, constructive and interpretative research methods are utilised to comprehend the nature of national security. Longitudinal analysis is applied to examine security trends and developments over the span of three decades in the national security sector (Neuman, 2014). In the context of NSS, research methods like semi-structured interviews and thematic content analysis are used to understand individual experiences and subjective reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Flick, 2018). It is important to consider primary and secondary sources, as well as expert insights, to uncover meaningful patterns in the data (Patton, 2015).

The research adheres to the protocols of the University of Essex regarding obtaining consent and safeguarding participant confidentiality (Silverman, 2020). The examination of data employs both inductive and abductive methods along with a conceptual framework to delve into the research inquiry (Peirce, 1931-1958; Brymans, 2016). The analysis process is shaped by thematic content analysis principles that are in harmony with the constructivist perspective by focusing on interpreting data within its contextual framework (Guest et al., 2012). This method aims to conduct an evaluation of the development of Indonesia's NSS focusing on key areas such as priority setting, institutional frameworks, risk assessment, and enhancing civilian capabilities.

Chapter 4 delves into the NSS of Indonesia during the period of *ORBA* spanning from 1988 to 1998. Under the governance of Suharto during that timeframe, national security issues were closely intertwined with the country's developmental approach, driven by economic initiatives and political centralisation. The chapter initiates by exploring how the *ORBA* administration justified its security measures through the ideology of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution, within the Development Plans and Outlines of State Policy (People's Consultative Assembly, 1969). These records highlighted the government's focus on expansion in line with the rapid development and state participation advocated by proponents of developmentalism, such as Rostow (1960), Hirschman (1970), and Chang (2002). Nonetheless, this strategy bolstered entities that consolidated power and wealth in the hands of a select elite group exacerbating social inequality, as noted by Acemoglu & Robinson (2012).

The chapter also delves into how military and political leaders centralised security decision-making during the *ORBA*'s era, diminishing the role of institutions and

curtailing democratic oversight, as discussed by Fukuyama (2011). The authority's frequent silent criticism rather than engagement, which affected how risks and threats were viewed and managed (Linz, 2000). Additionally, Dahl's (1971) work mentioned the lack of democratic involvement in an authoritarian rule, similar to the era of *ORBA* where Suharto's appearance of democracy restricted political involvement and quashed dissent, limiting civilian involvement in safeguarding the nation. During the *ORBA* era in Indonesia's history, the NSS was influenced by a combination of economic, political, and social elements. This resulted in its decline as it struggled to adjust to a populace that had grown weary of authoritarian governance.

Chapter 5 delves into the NSS of Indonesia during the period of reform from 1998 to 2014: a time marked by decentralisation efforts and changes in civil military relations under four presidencies. This section explores how decentralisation, as outlined by Rondinelli (1981) and Smoke (2003), resulted in a shift of power from the government to local authorities impacting regional security and governance significantly by abolishing the military's dual function (*Dwifungsi*). It also discusses how the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia underwent administrative restructuring during this period. The National Police's roles and the delineation of duties for the military and police were clarified by legislation to enhance security sector professionalisation and civilian oversight mechanisms (UU. No 3, 2002; UU. No 2, 2002). Their importance was emphasised in maintaining confidence, as discussed by Putnam (1993) and Mishler & Rose (2001). Indonesia's shift to democracy was complexly tied to citizen engagement and security strategies using the concept of competence, as discussed by Dahl (1989) and by Almond & Verba (1963). Additionally, government trust plays a pivotal role in shaping effective security policies, especially given the influence of press

freedom and social media, on risk assessment and threat perception. This sheds light on the interconnection among civic influence, public confidence, and national security.

Chapter 6 of the thesis delves into Indonesia's NSS during President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) tenure from 2014 to 2024. It discusses the impact of nationalism and oligarchic politics, as well as how public sentiment influenced security goals during that period. The chapter analyses how Widodo's economic nationalist policies, aimed at boosting infrastructure and reducing dependence on entities, helped strengthen government control of resources to safeguard national sovereignty, based on studies by Helleiner (2002) and Hadiwinata (2019). This chapter also explores the influence of elites on national security policy through the lens of oligarchic politics. It discusses how they played a role to control infrastructure and natural resources (Winters, 2011; Tapsell, 2017). Moreover, the impact of discourse and media activity is highlighted as it pushed the state to navigate between security concerns and democratic principles (Habermas, 1989). Additionally, it explores the repercussions of securitisation on government intervention and civil liberties, along with the responses from society (Buzan et al., 1998). Throughout President Widodo's time in office this chapter delves into the connections between government policies and societal trends.

In conclusion, this thesis presents the result of the evolution of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024 and its intricate interplay of social dynamics and economic factors alongside political influences. Based on the research by Winters (2011) and Hadiz & Robison (2004), it is evident that security measures are influenced by both external dynamics which require continuous adaptability, and the integration of various theoretical perspectives. This chapter suggests examining political and technological advancements to address challenges in NSS to enhance its effectiveness for social

security and stability with economic growth (Wisnu, 2013; Benhabib, 2002; Muslikhin et al., 2021). The chapter ends by expanding the conversation on creating NSS that integrate social sciences and further the body of knowledge and cutting-edge policies while safeguarding Indonesia's national concerns in a constantly changing global landscape. Next, the thesis acknowledges the theoretical perspectives and scholarly research that have impacted the study and serves as a guide in the literature for exploration of the topics discussed.

2.0 Literature Review

This research positions itself within the discipline of sociology due to the limitations of International Relations (IR) literature in addressing the complex, multi-dimensional evolution of Indonesia's NSS. While traditional IR theories emphasis on state-centric and military-focused studies of national security with roots in the United States and the United Kingdom, it fails to capture the nuanced interactions between civilian, military, political, and economic factors shaping Indonesia's security landscape. According to Hough (2021), national security cannot be defined purely by traditional military measures rather integrate social stability, political processes, and economic conditions, which together shape the resilience of a state against both internal and external threats. Krause & Williams (2018) argue it is essential to foster cooperation between civil society and security forces, especially in the case of Indonesia given the changing dynamics of security governance. In the context of Indonesia's NSS, this approach requires a balanced addition of thus factors with conventional military strategies to address the complex and interconnected security challenges which the country faces. This disciplinary shift allows a more comprehensive analysis of how national security priorities, institutional structures, risk interpretations, and civil roles are formulated and transformed in Indonesia.

This thesis is unique because it applies sociological theories to the study of national security, using Indonesia as an emerging democracy as a case study to place it within the larger security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asian regions. With an emphasis on historical legacies, ASEAN's role, and non-traditional security concerns, the analysis draws on Wilson's (2022) exploration of Southeast Asia's changing security dynamics to offer a crucial regional perspective. By incorporating insights from

Marx (1978) on class dominant, Lasswell (1941, pp. 455–468) on “garrison state”, Weber (1946) on bureaucracy, and contemporary sociological scholars, to name a few; Heineken (2015) and Kniskern & Segal (2015) highlighted military institutions that adapt to societal expectations, demonstrating the importance of public trust and the integration of civilian perspectives in security strategies. This research reframes national security as a multifaceted concept influenced by power dynamics, economic environment, social structures, rather than merely external, internal threats and military capabilities. Hence, this chapter explores the theoretical framework underpinning this study, to bridge the gaps in existing vast theories of military, political, and economic sociology, providing a cohesive conceptual framework to explain Indonesia’s NSS evolution from 1988 to 2024.

The evolution of Indonesia’s NSS offers valuable insights into the intersection of democracy, governance, and security matters. Miller & Smith (2020) discuss Indonesia’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy, highlighting the influence of democratization, economic shifts, and political diversity on national security priorities. The process was influenced by internal and external forces, as Sartori’s (1987) argument that democratic governance strengthens international standing, Diamond (2008) and Carothers (1999) highlighting the Cold War’s influence, and Pierson’s (2000) path dependency theory explains how institutional decisions during political transitions have long-term consequences. Additionally, academics have proposed that an inclusive approach broadens the understanding of risks and threats and emphasises the critical role that civil society plays in determining national security goals, guaranteeing that policies consider the many interests and concerns of the populace. Crenshaw and Dixon (2019) advocate for inclusivity and intersectionality in security plans, while Young (2020) emphasizes the importance of engaging multiple

perspectives in policymaking for public trust and legitimacy. Fukuyama (2020) emphasizes transparency and citizen involvement in governance for enhancing national security in a democratic context. The transition to democracy in Indonesia has significantly shaped its national security specifically on the threat's narrative and civil inclusion, although challenges remain in ensuring that democratic ideals are fully realized amidst entrenched power structures.

The case of Indonesia brings a perspective to these theories by showing how a nation with a rich political past and varied social character deals with the difficulties of moving from authoritarian rule to democratic governance without well-defined NSS and a form of security council. Sociology is important for its ability to connect collective experiences with greater social, political, and economic developments to increase the understanding of how national security is shaped and discussed within the global community (Giddens, 1984; Bourdieu, 1990). A concise introduction to national security has been acknowledged, together with the social dimension of CMR, to solve the research challenge at the outset of the previous chapter. The study utilizes sociological theories to analyse Indonesia's NSS evolution, providing a comprehensive understanding of social phenomena and addressing the research problem by capturing the complex landscape of the country's national security environment.

2.1 Positioning the Research within Sociology

Using a sociological perspective, this paper investigates the unofficial relationships that exist in Indonesia's NSS between the military, local governments, and private entities. By emphasising the power dynamics, economic ties, and social structures that influence NSS, it fills in gaps in the IR research and advances the broader national

security discussion. Comparing the sociological approach in NSS that focusses on CMR with traditional NSS, sociological politics with political science, and sociological economy with economic science is displayed in the following table.

Perspective	Sociology NSS vs Traditional NSS		Politik Sociology vs Politik Science		Economic Sociology vs Economic Science	
	CMR	IR, Strategic Study	Politik Sociology	Politik Science	Economic Sociology	Economic Science
Core Focus	Focuses on the role of society, social structures, and the interaction between civilian and military institutions in national security.	Primarily focused on military readiness, defence policy, and the state's institutional capacity.	Studies political behaviour, power dynamics, social influence, and class structures within political systems.	Analyses governance, institutions, and political theory with an emphasis on formal structures and state functions.	Focuses on societal impacts of economic actions, the role of social forces in economic development, and inequality.	Analyses resource allocation, market dynamics, and economic policies with an emphasis on efficiency and optimality.
Key Concepts	Social integration, civil supremacy, the militarization of society, democratic governance, civilian oversight of the military, social control, military influence on policy.	Military preparedness, defence strategy, security infrastructure, intelligence operations, state sovereignty, national defence.	Social structures, collective action, political inequality, public policy, political ideologies, class conflict.	Power distribution, electoral systems, state theories, party systems, legislative structures, democracy.	Social inequalities, economic development, social mobility, labour market dynamics, economic resilience.	Economic efficiency, market equilibrium, fiscal policies, economic growth, monetary systems, international trade.
Methodology	Qualitative methods, ethnographic studies, interviews, discourse analysis, historical comparison, institutional analysis.	Quantitative analysis, modelling, policy simulations, security assessments, risk management frameworks.	Qualitative analysis, historical institutionalism, Marxist theory, comparative political studies.	Quantitative methods, institutional analysis, game theory, policy analysis, comparative political studies.	Qualitative and quantitative methods, critical theory, historical materialism, institutional economics.	Mathematical modelling, econometrics, statistical analysis, market theory, optimization techniques.
Theoretical Framework	Constructivism, Social Constructivism, Democratic Peace Theory, CMR Relations, Political Sociology.	Realism, Neorealism, Defensive and Offensive Defence Theories, Deterrence Theory.	Marxism, Critical Theory, Post-structuralism, Political Economy.	Institutionalism, Rational Choice Theory, Pluralism, Elite Theory.	Political Economy, Social Conflict Theory, Institutional Economics.	Neoclassical Economics, Keynesian Economics, Marxist Economics, Behavioural Economics.
Key Actors	Civilian policymakers, military elites, social activists, public opinion, international CMR organizations.	Government leaders, military officials, defence contractors, intelligence agencies.	Politicians, political parties, social movements, interest groups.	Politicians, political institutions, voters, bureaucrats, political elites.	Workers, capitalists, government bodies, international economic organizations.	Firms, consumers, financial institutions, government regulators, international economic bodies.
Policy Implications	Emphasizes the importance of civilian oversight and public participation in military affairs, social integration of the military, balancing national security with social welfare.	National defence policies, military readiness programs, international alliances, strategic defence planning.	Focus on social justice, redistribution of political power, addressing inequality, reforming political institutions.	Governance reforms, democracy promotion, institutional design, electoral systems, civil rights.	Promotes policies that address inequality, improve economic resilience, and ensure that the economy serves all social groups.	Focus on economic efficiency, reducing unemployment, maintaining inflation control, promoting free markets, and globalization.
Strengths	Focuses on the social context of national security, improves civilian-military relations,	Provides a structured approach to state security, focuses on	Focuses on inequality and power dynamics, offers deep insights into	Provides a formal, scientific approach to understanding politics, enhances	Addresses social impacts of economic policies, focuses on inclusive	Focus on optimizing resource allocation, understanding market dynamics, efficient production,

Perspective	Sociology NSS vs Traditional NSS		Politik Sociology vs Politik Science		Economic Sociology vs Economic Science	
	CMR	IR, Strategic Study	Politik Sociology	Politik Science	Economic Sociology	Economic Science
	promotes democracy and human security.	defending sovereignty and national integrity.	social change and transformation.	institutional design and governance.	growth and equitable economic development.	and international competitiveness.
Weaknesses	Limited practical application in state security policy, sometimes overlooks hard security threats like terrorism and war.	Can neglect social and human factors in security, overly focuses on military solutions.	Can be overly theoretical, struggles with practical application in policy, may be ideologically driven.	Can be detached from real-world political issues, overly reliant on models that may not reflect human behaviour.	Can ignore market failures, environmental concerns, and social inequalities in the pursuit of economic growth.	Overly focused on market efficiency, may overlook distributional impacts and the human aspect of economics.
References	Janowitz, M. (1960). The Professional Soldier. Free Press. Feaver, P. D. (2003). Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and CMR Relations. Harvard University Press	Posen, B. R. (1993). The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Norton & Company	Weber, M. (1946). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford University Press. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International Publishers.	Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press.	Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press. Polanyi, K. (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Beacon Press.	Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press.

Table 2.1 Table on Sociological vs. Traditional Approaches in NSS: own constructions.

A thorough examination of how the sociological perspective gives an alternative viewpoint on politics, economy, and national security that places more emphasis on the social and human aspects of these domains is given in Table 2.1. Traditional NSS is rooted in realist and state-centric approaches, which emphasize state sovereignty, military preparedness, and strategic deterrence as the primary tools for maintaining national security (Waltz, 1979). This perspective prioritizes the state's ability to safeguard sovereignty and respond to external threats through military readiness, intelligence-gathering, and force projection (Mearsheimer, 2001). Through focusing primarily on hard power and geopolitical threats, traditional NSS sometimes fails to integrate broader social and political dynamics, such as economic instability, governance issues, and public distrust in security institutions (Booth, 2007). Posen

(1993) highlights how traditional NSS fails to incorporate social dimensions of security, particularly in ethnic conflicts and localized security issues, where military strategies might be insufficient in addressing root causes of instability. While this approach has been effective in addressing conventional security challenges, it often overlooks societal factors, such as human rights, civilian control, and the role of civil society in security governance.

The sociological perspective in NSS, particularly in CMR, introduces a human security approach, emphasizing the well-being of civilians, social integration, and the relationship between the military and society. Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) worked on sociological lens emphasizes the crucial role of civilian oversight, military professionalism, democratic accountability, and public trust in shaping security policies within a democratic society. Feaver (2003) further explores CMR and the dynamics of military professionalism and oversight, addressing how civilian leaders influence military policies and priorities. This approach expands the definition of security beyond mere territorial defence to include political stability, social cohesion, and economic well-being (Kaldor, 2013). By integrating CMR into NSS analysis, sociology provides a more inclusive and adaptive framework that acknowledges the social context of security governance (Burk, 2002; Bruneau & Matei, 2008). This broader perspective underscores the necessity of integrating societal needs and democratic values into NSS, ensuring that security policies are both effective and responsive to the evolving dynamics of CMR.

In the context of Indonesia's NSS, understanding CMR is particularly significant due to the country's historical experience with totalitarian rule, where military influence has been deeply intertwined with political decision-making. Clausewitz (1976) argues that

war is an extension of politics, emphasizing the intrinsic connection between military actions and state objectives. This perspective is crucial in CMR, which examines the interplay between military institutions, society, and political authority. Marxist (1978) theory suggests the military serves as an instrument of class domination, reflecting the ruling elite's interests and societal power dynamics. This aligns with Mills' (1956) concept of the power elite, where military, political, and corporate sectors operate as a unified structure, reinforcing elite dominance. Reflecting these theoretical perspectives is crucial for analysing Indonesia's NSS, as they highlight the intricate interplay between military power, political authority, and societal structures in shaping national security.

Political science primarily focuses on institutional design, governance mechanisms, and formal political structures, emphasizing state functions, electoral systems, and policy-making processes (Dahl, 1971; North, 1990). It often employs institutionalism to analyse how political institutions shape governance and policy, while rational choice theory models political behaviour based on self-interest and strategic decision-making (Buchanan, 1986). However, this approach tends to overlook informal power dynamics, social movements, and ideological influences that shape political life beyond formal institutions (Gramsci, 1971). In contrast, political sociology explores how social structures, collective identities, and power relations influence political systems, offering a more nuanced perspective on governance that integrates both formal and informal mechanisms of power. Weber (1946) provides a foundational understanding of authority, bureaucracy, and social structures, offering insights into how political power is distributed and exercised within social systems. In the realm of political analysis, sociological politics examines social structures, power inequalities, and social movements in shaping political processes (Tilly, 1990; Mann, 1986). For

instance, understanding how political elites leverage state institutions, including the military and police, to maintain power (Weber, 1976; Mann, 1984, 1986; Tilly, 1990). Political sociology explores how class structures, cultural identities, and historical power relations shape political behaviour and policymaking (Skocpol, 1979; Offe, 1985). This perspective is particularly valuable in understanding political change, as it highlights how grassroots movements, civil protests, and marginalized groups can challenge state authority and influence democratic transitions (Diamond, 2008). These contrasting views underline the key difference between sociological and political science approaches—while political science focuses on formal governance mechanisms and policy analysis, sociological politics examines the broader social structures that shape political behaviour, including class, ethnicity, gender, and culture.

Analysing the ideological and structural challenges within Indonesia's NSS requires a political sociology perspective, which examines how democratization, power structures, and societal diversity shape security governance. Huntington (1996, pp. 192–195) "clash of civilisations" theory emphasises the connection between cultural variety and democratisation. Democracies have the potential to lessen violence, nonetheless they can also exacerbate tensions in heterogeneous communities, which may call for military action (Collier, 2009). According to liberal peace theory, the chance of conflict is decreased by robust institutions and the rule of law (Paris, 2004). This highlights the need for a nuanced approach in Indonesia's NSS, where balancing democratic governance, cultural pluralism, and security imperatives remains a critical challenge.

Economic science and economic sociology are distinct fields that approach economic phenomena from different perspectives. Economics science focuses on resource allocation, decision-making, and market behaviour, using formal mathematical models and assumptions of rationality and self-interest to predict outcomes (Friedman, 1953). It employs quantitative methods to analyse individual and market behaviour, treating institutions as constraints on economic actions (Arrow, 1951). In contrast, economic sociology explores how social structures, cultural norms, and networks shape economic behaviour, emphasizing that economic actions are embedded in social relationships (Granovetter, 1985). It uses qualitative methods, such as case studies and ethnography, and views institutions as active forces that influence economic life and outcomes, rather than simply as external constraints (Polanyi, 1944). While economics prioritizes individual choice and efficiency, economic sociology emphasizes the social, cultural, and historical context of economic actions in shaping markets (North, 1990; Polanyi, 1944; Durkheim, 1893; Weber, 2001). The sociological economy approach critiques traditional economic theories by integrating social factors such as inequality, labour relations, and economic power structures (Polanyi, 1944; Sen, 1999). This perspective is essential for understanding how economic policies impact different social groups, how globalization affects national industries, and how informal economies contribute to economic resilience (Bourdieu, 1986; Beckert, 2009). These perspectives explain shifts in Indonesia's NSS and provide a broader attention of security policy within its socio-economic transformations.

Through integrating sociological perspectives into NSS, political scrutiny, and economic analyses, academics and policymakers can develop a broader and more nuanced conceptions of national security, governance, and economic development. These perspectives challenge traditional state-centric and market-driven approaches,

advocating for inclusive, people-centered policies that address modern security challenges, political transformations, and economic inequalities (Sassen, 2001; Fligstein, 2001). Lutz & Lux (2002) support a holistic approach to security-development, prioritising social and economic advancement over military tactics. Cohen (2012) offers insights into social policymaking by examining how social and geopolitical issues interact in NSS. These perspectives emphasize that security, politics, and economics are not isolated domains—rather, they are deeply intertwined with social structures, historical inequalities, and governance frameworks.

This research emphasis sociological approach ensures that security, politics, and economics are analysed through the lens such as social inclusion, public trust, and institutional accountability, making policies more responsive to the realities of society and governance in the 21st century. This interdisciplinary approach moves beyond rigid, traditional frameworks, promoting holistic and socially responsible policymaking that acknowledges the complexity of modern global challenges.

2.2 Integrating Theoretical Perspectives into the Conceptual Framework

Designed to ensure a comprehensive analysis, the study employs a backwards approach to match theoretical concepts with empirical realities in Indonesia's NSS. Furthermore, aims to fill in the gaps in current theories, it incorporates viewpoints from military, political, and economic sociology, indicating out components that are absent from traditional methods and developing a more complex analysis. The following table presents the theoretical hypotheses in a structured and analytical format, making it easier to scrutinises characters of the historical shifts, power dynamics, and policy changes in Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024.

Thesis Problem	Hypothesis (H#)	Theoretical Abstracts	Relevant Frameworks
1. How have national security priorities evolved?	H1	During ORBA (1966–1998), NSS was framed around developmentalism, where economic growth and infrastructure were prioritized as national security strategies.	Developmentalism (Evans, 1995); Economic Nationalism (Polanyi, 1944)
	H2	The shift from centralized authoritarianism to decentralization post-1998 fragmented national security priorities, reducing state control over regional security issues.	Decentralization Theory (Rondinelli, 1984); Institutionalism (North, 1990)
	H3	Decentralization led to regional economic disparities, shaping security vulnerabilities, particularly between resource-rich and resource-poor provinces.	Political Economy (Harvey, 2005); Security & Development Nexus (Lutz & Lux, 2002)
	H4	The devolution of power to regional governments weakened national security coordination, increasing the influence of local political elites in defining security priorities.	State Theory (Skocpol, 1979); Governance Studies (Fukuyama, 2013)
	H5	Despite decentralization, remnants of developmentalism persist in NSS through the securitization of economic policies, particularly in strategic industries.	Security Securitization (Buzan et al., 1998); Economic Policy & Nationalism (Rodrik, 2011)
2. How has Indonesia's institutional structure shaped NSS?	H6	Under ORBA's centralized authoritarian rule, national security was militarized, and the military functioned as both a security and economic actor.	Military Sociology (Janowitz, 1960); Power Elite (Mills, 1956)
	H7	Military-led governance under Suharto reinforced military supremacy in NSS policymaking, limiting civilian oversight.	CMR Relations (Huntington, 1957); Military Professionalism (Stepan, 1988)
	H8	The transition from authoritarianism to democracy post-1998 reduced direct military control over NSS although did not fully eliminate military influence.	Democratic Transition (Diamond, 2008); Security Sector Reform (Huxley, 2001)
	H9	The weakening of centralized military authority post-Reformasi allowed non-military security institutions (e.g., National Police, intelligence agencies) to play greater roles.	Institutional Theory (March & Olsen, 1984); Governance & Security Studies (Bruneau & Matei, 2008)
	H10	Despite democratic reforms, the TNI's territorial command and marine security structure remains central to NSS, demonstrating persistent centralized military governance.	CMR Concordance Theory (Schiff, 1995); Military Autonomy (Feaver, 2003)
3. How are threats and risks interpreted in Indonesia's NSS?	H11	During ORBA, national security was framed around ideology securitization, where political stability and regime survival were prioritized through military control and suppression of dissent.	Authoritarian Stability (Linz, 2000); Political Order (Huntington, 1968); State Security & Ideology (Alagappa, 1995); Repressive Developmentalism (Slater, 2010)
	H12	Public trust in security institutions shapes the interpretation of threats and risks in NSS, influencing the legitimacy of state-led security initiatives and crisis management strategies.	Public Trust & Security Institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001); Risk Society (Beck, 1992)
	H13	The effectiveness of government security policies depends on civil capacity, as increased civic engagement and transparency enhance public confidence in threat assessments and policy responses.	Civil Capacity & Governance (Putnam, 1993); Institutional Legitimacy (Lipset, 1959)
	H14	The securitization of risks in Indonesia's NSS is shaped by public perceptions of government competence, where trust in institutions determines the societal acceptance of security measures.	Securitization Theory (Buzan et al., 1998); Governance & Public Perception (Habermas, 1989)
	H15	The persistence of political oligarchy has shaped Indonesia's NSS, favouring elite economic and political interests over public security needs.	Oligarchy & Power (Winters, 2011); Elite Theory (Michels, 2001)
	H16	The shift from the DWP to more exclusive of National Defence General Policy reflects elite-driven security policymaking.	Political Elites & Security Policy (Dahl, 1971); Institutional Change (Pierson, 2000)

Thesis Problem	Hypothesis (H#)	Theoretical Abstracts	Relevant Frameworks
	H17	Oligarchic influence over NSS has resulted in policies reinforcing elite economic control, particularly in infrastructure development and defence capabilities.	Security-Political Nexus (Offe, 1985); Power & Governance (Foucault, 1991)
4. What is the civil role in shaping Indonesia's NSS?	H18	During ORBA, pseudo-democracy limited genuine civilian participation in security governance, as the military dominated NSS under the guise of national stability.	Authoritarianism & CMR Relations (Stepan, 1988); Pseudo-Democracy (Carothers, 1999)
	H19	Although Indonesia transitioned to democracy post-Reformasi, power remains concentrated within political elites, limiting true civilian oversight over NSS.	Democratic Deficit (Levitsky & Way, 2010)
	H20	The transition from authoritarianism to democracy led to increased public scrutiny of security institutions, where civil capacity and trust in governance influenced the effectiveness of security reforms.	Public Trust & Institutional Legitimacy (Lipset, 1959); Civil Engagement & Security Governance (Putnam, 1993)
	H21	Public trust in security institutions fluctuated during the reform period, with greater transparency and civil involvement improving legitimacy however elite influence policies still restricting full democratic oversight.	Governance & Public Perception (Habermas, 1989); Civil Society (Carothers, 1999)
	H22	The effectiveness of security reforms depends on the balance between public trust and elite-driven security, shaping long-term stability.	CMR Relations (Feaver, 1999); Risk Society (Beck, 1992)
	H23	Nevertheless, increased transparency and civil engagement in security policymaking have improved public perception and trust in government security strategies.	Public Sphere & Governance (Habermas, 1989); Civil Society (Carothers, 1999)
	H24	Post-Reformasi, public opinion has played a growing role in shaping NSS, as democratic freedoms allow civil society to engage security debates and challenge state narratives.	Public Sphere & Security Policy (Habermas, 1989); Media & Public Opinion in Security (Entman, 2003)
	H25	Despite democratization, elements of ORBA-era elite control persist, where security policies are often framed to align with political interests rather than broad civil participation.	Political Elites & Security Policy (Dahl, 1971); Hegemony & Public Discourse (Gramsci, 1971)

Table 2.2 Theoretical Hypothesis Framework: Own Constructions.

Table 2.2 presents a structured analysis of Indonesia's NSS by addressing four key research questions: (1) the evolution of national security priorities, (2) the institutional structure shaping NSS, (3) the interpretation of threats and risks, and (4) the role of civil society in NSS development. Each hypothesis is supported by relevant of theoretically abstracts, incorporating perspectives from sociological security studies, political and economy.

This thesis is focused on understanding the factors influencing Indonesia's NSS priorities as the first query. Developmentalism in economic sociology, decentralisation

in military sociology, economic nationalism in economic sociology, are emphasised as viewpoints in this context. The threads through out can be seen during the ORBA period (1988–1998), national security was framed within the ideology of developmentalism (Evans, 1995), where economic growth and large-scale infrastructure projects were considered fundamental to maintaining national stability. Security was tightly linked to economic policies, and the government prioritized state-led development to sustain regime legitimacy. However, the post-1998 decentralization (Rondinelli, 1981), process disrupted this centralized security structure, leading to fragmented priorities and a weakening of state control also national security coordination (Skocpol, 1979; Fukuyama, 2013), over regional security. This shift also created disparities between resource-rich and resource-poor provinces, shaping regional security vulnerabilities and allowing local political elites to exert greater influence over security policies. Despite the decentralization reforms, elements of developmentalist securitization (Buzan et al., 1998) persist. Particularly in strategic economic sectors where state intervention is justified under national security concerns leading to an economic Nationalism (Polanyi, 1944) as the priority in post reform era. The ORBA-era developmentalist-security nexus remains influential despite democratization, where security priorities are still intertwined with economic policies.

The second examine application delves into how the institutional framework shapes Indonesia's NSS. The institutional structure has shifted from being centralised to being decentralised and a result of post-reform oligarchy influence, with a focus on military, political, and economic sociological viewpoints. Indonesia's institutional security framework has undergone a transformation, moving from military supremacy to a more complex CMR structure that analysed through Military Sociology (Janowitz, 1960) and power elite theory (Mills, 1956). Under ORBA, the military played a dual role as both

a security force as well as social includes politic and economic actors, with negligible civilian oversight. Military-led governance ensured that the armed forces retained control over national security policymaking, reinforcing their dominance within the state apparatus. However, the democratic transition post-1998 reduced direct military influence in security governance (Diamond, 2008; Huxley, 2001), paving the way for a more diversified security sector (March & Olsen, 1984). The weakening of centralized military authority has enabled institutions such as the Indonesian National Police (INP) and intelligence agencies to assume greater security roles. Although, CMR concordance theory (Schiff, 1995) shows the persistence of TNI's territorial command structure and marine security demonstrates that elements of centralized military governance remain intact despite broader democratic reforms. In other hand this shift has also disrupted national coordination while simultaneously fostering elite-driven governance. As a result, security policymaking has become increasingly shaped by oligarchic interests, with institutional approaches arranging the protection of the ruling elite. The threads of Indonesia's institutional security transformation reveal a shift from military dominance under ORBA to a fragmented CMR structure shaped by democratic reforms and expanding roles of other security actors. Hitherto, underlying threads of centralized authority persist through the TNI's territorial command and elite-driven governance, highlighting the continuity of power within a changing security landscape.

The third research subject examines the calculation of risks and threats in Indonesia's NSS. The interpretation of threats and risks in NSS in the ORBA regimes, where ideology was securitized to maintain political stability, suppress opposition, and justify military control. This centralised interpretation is under scrutiny of military sociological perspectives. The inclusion of authoritarian stability (Linz, 2000) and political order

(Huntington, 1968) contextualizes how security was used as a tool for political repression. Repressive developmentalism (Slater, 2010) highlights how economic growth was linked to state control, reinforcing the securitization of political ideology. Consequently, in the post-Reform era, democratization has heightened expectations for transparency and accountability in security governance. Public trust and civil capacity as well as oligarchy influences stress military and political sociology, play a crucial role in shaping the interpretation of threats and risks in Indonesia's NSS. When public trust in security institutions is strong, state-led initiatives gain legitimacy, fostering cooperation and policy effectiveness (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Putnam, 1993). Conversely, weak trust can lead to scepticism and resistance, particularly if policies are perceived as serving elite interests. The securitization of risks depends on public perceptions of government competence, making institutional legitimacy essential for effective NSS (Buzan et al., 1998; Habermas, 1989). Meanwhile, oligarchy & power (Winters, 2011) and elite theory (Michels, 2001) reveal how security policymaking often favours elite interests and political interests over broader public security needs. In the instance of the shifting from the DWP to internal guidance of National Defence General Policy illustrates the growing dominance of elite-driven security strategies, where national security is increasingly shaped by power structures rather than broader democratic oversight (Dahl, 1971; Pierson, 2000). Hence, the interplay between military influence, elite power and economic security, highlights the complexity of Indonesia's evolving NSS on threat and risks interpretation, where democratic reforms coexist with persistent centralized and elite-driven structures. The threads of Indonesia's threat and risk interpretation in its NSS trace a shift from ideological securitization under ORBA—framed by authoritarian stability and repressive developmentalism—to a post-Reform landscape shaped by democratic expectations,

public trust, and civil capacity. However, enduring strands of elite-driven control and centralized power persist, revealing how military influence and oligarchic interests continue to shape security policymaking despite democratization.

The final study inquest delves into the role of society in Indonesia's NSS. The narrative underscoring pseudo democracy follows public trust and capacity, correspondingly public opinion in military and political sociology. The threads here is despite Indonesia's democratic transition, civil society's role in NSS remains constrained by elite control. Under *ORBA*, civilian oversight was largely symbolic, as the military controlled security governance under the guise of national stability (Carothers, 1999; Stepan, 1988). While post-reform governance has promoted increased transparency and public engagement in security policymaking, true civilian oversight remains limited due to the legacy of pseudo-democratic nature (Carothers, 1999) and Democratic Deficit (Levitsky & Way, 2010) of Indonesia's political system. Democratization introduced greater public scrutiny, where civil capacity and trust in institutions influenced the effectiveness of security reforms (Lipset, 1959; Putnam, 1993). While transparency improved legitimacy, elite-driven policies continued to restrict full democratic oversight (Levitsky & Way, 2010). The balance between public trust explains in "risk society" (Beck, 1992, pp. 98–112) and elite-driven security priorities has influenced the effectiveness of security reforms, with civil engagement (Habermas, 1989), playing a role in shaping long-term stability. In the post-Reform era, public opinion has played a growing role in shaping NSS, with civil society challenging state narratives and advocating for more inclusive security policies (Habermas, 1989; Entman, 2003). However, remnants of *ORBA*-era elite dominance persist, where security policies are often framed to align with political interests rather than broad civil participation (Dahl, 1971; Gramsci, 1971). This ongoing tension highlights the

complexities of Indonesia's security governance, where democratic ideals and civilian participation continue to be shaped by entrenched elite influence and historical legacies.

In summaries the evolution of Indonesia's NSS can be understood through four key predispositions: the shift from centralized military governance to a fragmented security structure post-reform, the transition from state-led developmentalism to economic nationalism and neoliberal adjustments, the movement from exclusive military dominance in NSS to a more complex CMR governance model, and the persistence of elite-driven security policymaking under a constrained democratic framework. These threads show how Indonesia's security environment in the contemporary age is shaped by ongoing conflicts between democratic governance and structural power, economic security, and institutional and elite control, notwithstanding institutional change. The following section explains theoretical justification that applied in analysing Indonesia's NSS from authoritarian regime to reform era and post-reform era.

2.3. Examining the Authoritarian Regime's Strategy During the Transition to Democracy

2.3.1 Understanding the Priority and its Driving Force of NSS Through the Mean of Developmentalism Perspective

Developmentalism is a government-led economic strategy promoting industrialization and focusing on economic growth in developing countries, as a key goal for societal progress. The state's role in guiding markets and directing economic policy, as seen in the concept by Evans (1995, pp. 3–20, 227–231) of "embedded autonomy". While critics argue that developmentalism can concentrate power among elites, leading to

inefficiency and inequality (Chang, 2002). The dependency theory highlights the global economic dependencies that developmentalism often propagates (Cardoso & Faletto's, 1979). This approach significance Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), aimed to promote local industries and decrease reliance on foreign products (Prebisch & Singer, 1998). Nevertheless, developmentalism theory suggests that economic growth plays a crucial role in maintaining a nation's stability and addressing broader social and political issues (Rostow, 1960; Hirschman, 1970; Chang, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Sen, 2000). In the context of national security, developmentalism has been instrumental in justifying state intervention in economic affairs to maintain political stability and social order. Relatedly Indonesia's industrialisation strategy faced challenges due to inefficiencies and corrupt practices, which affected its success and led to disparities.

During *ORBA* rule in Indonesia, developmentalism was closely tied to the NSS influencing the government's priorities and decisions. Crouch (1978), Elson (2001), and Liddle (1996) highlight how the *Security for Prosperity* initiative was embedded in national policy and key political addresses, underscoring its central role in Indonesia's governance during that period. McVey (1996, 1999) and King (1982) research on Indonesia's development during the *ORBA* reign highlights the integration of developmentalism and NSS, linking economic progress with stability. Studies by Chalmers (1997) and Robison (1986) highlight the relationship between security initiatives, development efforts, and governance practices; they stress the importance of striking a balance between strong governance and liberties, as well as how developmentalism shapes Indonesia's security objectives. This combination of tactics and national security highlights a larger pattern in which governments use economic means to protect social order and political stability.

Developmentalism, while focusing on economic advancements and national harmonisation goals resulted in progress, it neglected the need for broad governance improvements, leading to centralised authority control, socio-economic gaps, and corruption within the system. When economic growth is twisted and controlled by privileged groups, it deepens societal fractures and weakens national solidarity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Sen & Hill, 2000). This highlights the drawback of developmental strategies that overlook fundamental social and political disparities. Robison (1986) and Higgott & Robison (1985) reveal that the *ORBA* regime's focus on dominance and integration of economic and security measures worsened governance issues, leading to its downfall, and highlighting the dangers of focusing on success at the expense of inclusive and long-lasting governance.

Moreover, Indonesia's alignment with economic and security structures enabled Suharto to use global alliances for internal development and stability. Developmentalism theory emphasizes the importance of attracting investments and fostering economic advancement, however reliance on foreign investments can expose economies to vulnerabilities and hinder sustained growth (Kay, 1989; So, 1990). Prebisch's (1950) research challenges the long-term benefits of foreign investments for economic advancement. Furtado (1973) suggests that foreign financial aid perpetuates disparities by serving developed nations' interests rather than addressing the fundamental needs of developing countries. Development-focused strategies often require strategic international policy choices aligned with national economic and security objectives (Leifer, 1983; Vatikiotis, 1993). For instance, incidence of the exact involvement of Indonesia's Communist Party in the G30S/PKI coup remains a subject of debate (Anderson & McVey, 1971; Roosa, 2006). Although following the coup, Suharto prioritized national security and reinforced ties with

Western allies (Crouch, 1978). This shift solidified his regime domestically and positioned Indonesia within the global economic and security framework, further shaping its developmental trajectory.

Nevertheless, developmentalist strategy focuses on government-driven economic strategies geared towards attaining industrialisation and self-reliance, while expecting external aids. Indonesia's developmental approach during the *ORBA* era was closely linked to NSS, prioritizing state-driven advancement and stability, often overshadowing democratic practices and inclusiveness. The intricacies and conflicts associated with developmentalism as a guiding principle are essential for understanding Indonesia's NSS evolution and its focal points during that era.

2.3.2 Analysing Centralised Authority; from Military Strategy to Governance in Building Control

The centralised governance style, prevalent during *ORBA* periods, played a key role in significantly creating the NSS structure over time. Recognising the paradigms of centralisation and authoritarianism is essential for grasping how power is concentrated within a small group of individuals and contributes to shaping a security policy largely influenced by the state's control over political and economic resources (Slater, 2010). View of Lasswell (1941, pp. 455–468) "garrison state" concept suggests that civilian institutions become subordinate to military control during security threats pertinent to how Indonesia rational military power. Ideally, Huntington's (1957) theory of CMR emphasises civilian control over the military. Albeit the centralization of power has long been a mechanism for building control over both political and economic structures, particularly in authoritarian regimes (Mann, 1984). Weber's (1946) notion of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, was evident as the military acted as the

primary force in ensuring stability during the economic developmentalism phase as well. To an extent the involvement of personnel in business networks, as noted by Heryanto (2003) and Singh (2001), led to unlawful activities and solidified the economic supremacy of the ruling class by extending centralised power from politics to economic exploitation in Indonesia. This analysis sheds light on how Indonesia's economic policies were linked to security measures during the Suharto era.

Indonesia's military has historically been a key player in governance and security, during *ORBA*, when the doctrine of "*dwifungsi*" (dual function) granted significant authority, enabling the military to control both defence and domestic affairs. This dual function positioned the military as both a defence force at the same time a political institution and economic player that deeply involved in governance (Janowitz, 1960). The regime's reliance on the military to suppress political dissent and maintain social order aligns with Foucault's (1975) concept of disciplinary power, where the military exerted control through surveillance and intervention in civil society. The doctrines of dual function in Indonesia during the *ORBA* era established a hierarchical framework that prioritised military control over democratic values, resulting in a system with reduced civilian supervision (Kingsbury, 2003; Liddle, 1996; Crouch, 1978, 1996; Emmerson, 1983). As such, the house of representative council, which included military figures and government ministries, this integration was meant to ensure the military's loyalty to the state and prevent leaders from manipulating them, although reflected the centralised and militaristic governmental system of the time (Singh, 2016; MacDougall, 1992; Nisa, 2017). Nevertheless, the emphasis on decision-making power among individuals can lead to a gap between long-term planning and day-to-day operations inside an organisation or institution (Crouch, 1978). Centralised control

may reduce the efficiency of security entities by limiting their functions to supporting choices rather than promoting comprehensive policy implementation.

Moreover, centralized governance often limits political diversity and restricts public involvement in decision-making (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), and Linz (2000) emphasize the concentration of power in military-led governments and its impact on democratic governance and political pluralism. Authoritarian regimes consolidate power by suppressing democratic practices, reducing citizen participation, and weakening accountability, ultimately hindering societal and political progress (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1971). Indonesia's institutional framework during the *ORBA* period was established to uphold military supremacy and executive power, while ignoring oversight and accountability. This structure reinforced authoritarian rule and shaped long-term governance patterns, influencing CMR and democratic transitions in the post-*ORBA* era.

Additionally, during Indonesia's *ORBA* era, the people were impacted by the concentration of power in the state apparatus. Mill (2015) highlights the dangers of association of control by personal freedom, where governmental autonomy may limit individual liberties. This consolidation of power allowed state institutions to operate beyond legal boundaries, strengthened military dominance combining policing role, and restricted civil liberties by oppressing dissent (King, 1982; Aspinall, 2005). Ideally, Rawl (2005) emphasises the importance of a fair government valuing fairness and equality under a shared understanding of justice. Tilly (2007) and Fukuyama (2011) highlight how centralised power frameworks can erode civil supremacy. Suharto's administration used power to impose ideological uniformity and suppress dissent, affecting the efficiency and inclusivity of Indonesia's NSS. This concentration of power influenced national security concerns and solidified the military's involvement in

governing affairs. The approach of the *ORBA* regime towards governance and its influence on the NSS was manipulated by its encounters with political unrest and its aim to manage a diverse population spread across different geographical areas.

2.3.3 Shaping Centralised Power on Framing Threats and Manipulating Risk Interpretation

The military's dominant role in the state led to a centralized security structure, enabling it to address both external and internal threats. Although some argue that centralised power perceives threats and prioritizes maintaining state stability over fostering democratic participation and accountability under law (Anderson, 1983; Crouch, 1979; Aspinall, 2005; Vatikiotis, 1993). Locke (2016) and Montesquieu (2022) underline the risk brought about by political disparities in resources within centralised institutions, which can lead to a hegemonic regime that undermines democratic values. Evans' (1995) concept of embedded autonomy can be related to centralisation, as it often involves consolidating decision-making power within the state, allowing it to maintain autonomy from external pressures while ensuring effective policy implementation. This is consistent with Weber's (1946, p. 78) definition of "legal-rational authority" and reinforces the state's monopoly on lawful violence. Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) argue that militarisation has resulted in concentration on internal security issues, such as opposition and separatist movements, as threats to government stability. Security has been given precedence over democratic participation due to the state's concentration of power, which has shaped both governance and the larger political environment.

The *ORBA* regime used the state's philosophy of *Pancasila* to frame opposition groups, particularly those deemed as rebels, as threats to national unity and stability.

This ideological framing allowed the regime to justify repressive measures, centralise control, and suppress dissent (Bourchier, 2015; Vatikiotis, 1993; Cribb & Brown, 1995). By portraying dissent as a threat to national security, Suharto's government was able to sustain an authoritarian grip on power while controlling the public narrative (Kingsbury, 2018; Lane, 2008). The centralisation of power under *ORBA* is a classic example of how regimes use national security to maintain political dominance (Fealy & Bourchier, 1999; Kingsbury & Aveling, 2002). When political elites frame criticism as a security risk, it limits diversity and enhances state control projecting centralised power and state control over opposition (Tilly, 2007; Mann, 1984). Huxley (1993) asserts such political strategies helped maintain uniformity by delegitimising varied perspectives, especially through the suppression of media and information. The *ORBA* regime's control of information, particularly through censorship and labelling dissident media as rebellious, describe as an authoritarian approach in maintaining security that minimises transparency and disregards the principles of justice, institutional checks and balances (McVey, 1996; Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003; Hadiz, 2003; King, 1982; Bertrand, 2004). Impost of these practical perspectives helps to grasp how Indonesia's NSS during the *ORBA* period was influenced by and reinforced the centralisation of military power and its effects on institutional framework, risks, and threat interpretation enacted by the rule of government.

2.3.4 Civil Capabilities Under the Control of Authoritarian Regime through Illusory Democracy (Pseudo Democracy)

The civil position during *ORBA* was under the pretence of democratic legitimacy, the state upheld an authoritarian governance style while stifling political plurality and maintaining the impression of stability. Political sociologists argue that *ORBA* operated

under a pseudo-democracy, with tightly controlled elections and restricted political processes. Participation was limited to state-sanctioned entities, co-opting civil society into a corporatist model that curtailed genuine public engagement (Robison, 1996; Liddle, 1999). Diamond (1999) highlights how pseudo-democracies centralize control and marginalize opposition, exemplified by Suharto's use of Pancasila ideology to suppress dissent and frame it as a threat to national security. This manipulation of democratic procedures misled the public, facilitated by military interference and media regulation (Aspinall, 2005; Crouch, 1979; Sen & Hill, 2000). In this regard, ORBA's state control over political processes stifled dissent and strengthened the military's hold on the political and security landscape of the country.

The persistence of pseudo-democratic structures in Indonesia shaped the course of its NSS, influencing governance and policy formulation. Hidayat (2018) and Tilly & Tarrow (2015) examine the impact of Indonesia's pseudo-democracy on its NSS, drawing on Schedler's (2006) insights into how authoritarian regimes manipulate democratic processes, limiting media freedom and citizen participation. While Indonesia was not a totalitarian state, it exhibited totalitarian tendencies through media control and dissent suppression, a distinction made by Wolin (2017), who notes that totalitarianism promotes apathy over public involvement. In other view, social frameworks inevitably created a ruling class, mirroring Indonesia's elite dominance that hindered true civic participation (Michels, 2001; Sandel, 1996). Additionally, the fragmentation of the party system further consolidated power, stifling genuine democratic engagement (Mounk, 2018; Mouffe, 2000; Sunstein, 2017; Urbinati, 2014). Macpherson (1979) critiques the feasibility of participatory democracy without a representation system, highlighting the limitations faced by Indonesia's democratic institutions during the *ORBA* era. Consequently, Indonesia's pseudo-democratic

model shaped its domestic governance and reinforced a security framework that prioritized regime stability over democratic consolidation.

The analysis of pseudo-democracy in Indonesia's NSS during the *ORBA* period highlights the superficial adherence to democratic processes, often undermined by the state's reliance on militarisation and repression of dissent. These semi-democratic systems often exhibit authoritarian traits, such as media regulation and limited political diversity, that weaken the democratic structure, marked by election interference and declining democratic values. Hidayat (2018) and Tilly & Tarrow (2015) highlight the social reform movement because of authoritarian control, advocating for transparency, accountability, and democratisation, underlining its power in mobilizing collective action against limiting civil liberties. Examining these dynamics sheds light on the challenges faced by Indonesia's NSS in managing security and civic engagement during *ORBA* regime.

2.4 Reconstructing NSS Through Government Reforms

2.4.1 Understanding Priority from Decentralised and Professional Military

Decentralisation, which emerged during the reform era, sought to address the power vacuum left by the previous authoritarian regime. Decentralisation underscores regional autonomy's role in enhancing national stability and community welfare with post-1998 SSR leading to military territorial restructuring and improved security practices (Faguet, 2014; Ratnawati, 2010; Guan, 2006; Crouch, 2018; Carnegie, 2010). Rondinelli et al. (1984) emphasize the need for re-evaluating CMR as decentralisation necessitates new dynamics between military and civilian sectors. Croissant & Kuehn (2011) insight into CMR, help explaining Indonesia's unique

challenges, particularly the military's enduring influence on political and security decision-making in the post-authoritarian context. The "New Paradigm" conference in 1998 underscored this transition by promoting civilian institutions (Mietzner, 2006, p.167). This shift reflects the principles of decentralisation theory, transferring power to local administrations and aiming for democratisation and citizen involvement in national security (Rondinelli, 1981; Turner, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Equally, this empowerment enables local governments to effectively address unique security needs and promote national unity (Hofman & Kaiser, 2004; Wollenberg, 2004). Eventually, decentralisation reshaped Indonesia's security governance by fostering regional autonomy while simultaneously introducing new complexities in maintaining national cohesion and civilian oversight.

Decentralisation is a crucial aspect of converging the priorities of Indonesia's NSS during the reform era. It enables military forces to adapt effectively to regional security encounters by aligning operations with local governance, fostering collaboration between civil authorities and the military (Huxley, 2001). However, decentralisation faces challenges such as power conflicts and the need for clearer legal structures, potentially serving military attentions by keeping civilian governance focus (Turner, 2003; Hadiz, 2004; Rüland, 2003; Mietzner, 2009). Indonesia's security framework transformation has fostered a civilian-led governance model, reducing military control over political affairs (Soeprapto, 2020; Harsono, 2021). These changes have led to a democratic system with decreased military influence in politics and business emphasising military oversight to maintain focus on core duties (Haller, 2006; Crouch, 2018; Muir, 2008). Although, some believe the Indonesian military now operates behind the scenes rather than directly controlling civilian governments (Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2011; Crouch, 2018). The effort to reduce military governance was

aimed at creating a more transparent and accountable system, despite lingering beliefs in military political involvement (Kingsbury, 2003). Therefore, theorists (Huther & Shah, 2000) and scholars in Indonesia in particular (Schütte, 2017) emphasise the necessity of robust monitoring in decentralised governance, promoting procedures that guarantee accountability and transparency within the nation's NSS framework. Modestly addressing corruption has enhanced military professionalism and police effectiveness, optimistically impacting security management and community cohesion (ICG, 2001; Muir, 2008). Thus, while decentralisation has strengthened civilian governance and limited military dominance, its long-term success depends on maintaining institutional checks and preventing the resurgence of military influence in political affairs.

As a structural reform, decentralisation has reshaped governance by redistributing power from central authorities to local administrations, influencing both political and security dynamics. Decentralisation in Indonesia highlights its role in addressing regional security concerns and promoting democratisation, aimed to empowering local governance structures, and allowing marginalised voices to shape security policies (Stepan, 1988; Ginsburg, 2022). Thus, transferring power to lower government levels enhances service delivery and citizen engagement (Conyers 1986; Manor, 1999; Faguet, 2014). Furthermore, decentralisation eradicates regional inequalities and improves governance (Rondinelli, 1981; Smoke, 2003; Wibowo, 2008). Though, it can disrupt elite control and carry the risk of local elites co-opting these structures, undermining democratic processes (Gramsci, 1971). However, the effects of decentralisation, emphasising its function in reorganising the government while posing questions about accountability and effectiveness (Caspersen, 2017; Goetz & Jenkins, 2005). Hence, varying capacities of local governments can lead to challenges such as

increased corruption and regional disparities (Wollenberg, 2004; Hadiwinata, 2010; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). Nevertheless, while decentralisation strengthens democratic governance and security responsiveness, its success depends on institutional safeguards that mitigate corruption and ensure equitable development across regions. Thus, theoretical viewpoints concerning decentralisation offer perspectives into the structure and decision-making process of the NSS, emphasizing the importance of thoughtful execution to harmonize local and national security interests while addressing potential obstacles.

2.4.2 Analysing Institutional Reformation to Decentralisation Measures; Autonomy, Corporation, and Accountability

Decentralisation has significantly reshaped the institutional structure of Indonesia's NSS during the Reform Era, reflecting broader changes in CMR and local governance.

Decentralisation, a principle promoting democratic governance, has revolutionized security in developing countries by transitioning from military control to a system that is more democratically based and efficient (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010; Farguet, 2014). Huxley (2001) evaluate SSR in Southeast Asia demonstrate that decreasing military involvement in politics is a complex and continuous task. Post-Suharto attempts to depoliticize the military were made, although the success of these reforms remains debated. As Indonesia transitioned towards democracy, civilian involvement in security management contested military supremacy norms (Fukuyama, 1992). Military sociologists highlight how the military has changed from being a powerful political force to a more impartial, professional organisation that protects democracy and upholds civilian authority while enabling greater local involvement in security issues (Janowitz, 1960; Huntington, 1957; Mann,

1984; Tilly, 2007; Stepan, 1988). Schiff's (1995) suggests that effective CMR depend on the alignment of military, political, and societal actors, a dynamic seen in Indonesia's reform period. Aspinall (2014) highlights how local influential figures adapt to Indonesia's evolving political landscape, emphasizing the need for effective decentralisation. In other hand, Feaver (2003, p.3) addressing the "CMR problematique"—the tension between civilian control and military expertise in defence matters. While Weber's (1946) discussion of authority and bureaucracy, illustrating how the hierarchical nature of military institutions is increasingly confronted by civilian demands for accountability. Military ethics and accountability are crucial in liberal democracies, while SSR and oversight mechanisms are essential in post-authoritarian contexts (Burk, 2002; Bruneau & Matei, 2008). Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony suggests that even when the formal power of the military is reduced, its influence can persist through informal networks and cultural dominance. Kier (1997) highlights internal military culture's resistance to reform, which is crucial in analysing military behaviour in Indonesia. Indonesia's SSR aim to increase civilian control, although the military's influence remains embedded in social structures, highlighting the encounters of achieving a fully democratic security governance framework, as the military's entrenched role in governance and national security remains a significant issue.

In the era of reform, the shift towards decentralisation introduced dynamics in the institutional setup. Governance bodies improved their adaptation to necessities, hence changing the implementation and efficacy of national security measures (Rondinelli et al., 1984). Howlett et al., (2009) analysing how policies evolve and adapt within specific socio-political contexts especially relevant for examining NSS, governance reforms, and decentralisation policies. Decentralisation can empower civil authority to manage security concerns, balancing domestic priorities with external risks while

facilitating international engagement (Falleti, 2010; Snyder, 2001; Keen, 2020). Decentralisation plays a crucial role in enhancing governance, enabling the government to effectively address various domestic and international issues.

In Indonesia, decentralisation necessitated re-evaluation of resource allocation and organizational structures, enabling local authorities to handle security matters effectively. Martin & Rasch (2013) emphasize the importance of decentralisation policies in managing security issues at local and national levels. In the framework of decentralisation, where responsibilities are transferred from central to subnational entities, Wollenberg (2004), Mudacumura et al. (2006), Rondinelli et al. (1989), Breton (2002), Breton & Wintrobe, 1998, and Nelson (2007) have all made contributions to the field of security policy making. They have emphasised the importance of collaboration between local governments, communities, businesses, and community empowerment, and they have argued for institutional reforms and resource redistribution to improve outcomes in Indonesia. Caspersen (2017) highlights the need to address challenges posed by separatist movements and demographic imbalances, making sharing power a crucial aspect of national security risk management. This shift underscores the need for continuous policy adjustments to balance autonomy with national security urgencies, ensuring effective governance at all levels.

Decentralisation has significantly reshaped Indonesia's security governance, influencing institutional roles and public accountability. This shift towards decentralisation aims to improve the nation's capacity to manage various security issues (Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010; Faguet, 2014). For example, the government severed INP ties with military forces to put public safety first in response to public calls for less militarisation although it's additionally presidential attempts to

control the INP (Mukhtar, 2011; Crouch, 2018). The armed forces redefined their roles, while the INP expanded its responsibilities within the security framework, leading to distinct functions for each entity (Mietzner, 2013). On other hand the autonomy of military commanders under the Ministry of Defence and their accountability to the president, involving coordination among various bodies with concern about transparency and public oversight, emphasising the need for effective decentralisation (Crouch, 2018). Moreover, decentralisation in Indonesia's security system enhances diversity and responsiveness through networks of self-governing organizations, while it can result in inefficiencies and coordination challenges (Treisman, 2007; Rondinelli et al., 1984). Farguet (2014) and Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra (2010) highlight the improvement of security strategies and inter-agency cooperation, nevertheless difficult remain in collaboration among organizations and creating a comprehensive security plan. Balancing independence with collaborative governance is crucial for maintaining coherence and avoiding fragmentation (Smith, 1985). Effective governance relies on institutional independence to safeguard civil liberties and ensure governmental accountability (Huther & Shah, 2000; Smoke, 2003). While decentralization enhances adaptability and responsiveness, it also introduces complexities in coordination, transparency, and accountability (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). Decentralisation demands careful management to ensure that security governance remains cohesive and transparent across all levels of authority.

Additionally, other concerns about the growing power of agencies such as the *Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN)* or the State Intelligence Agency of Indonesia underscore potential risks to transparency and accountability (Haseman, 2005; Kingsbury, 2008). Similarly, the State Audit Agency (*BPK*) plays a pivotal role in maintaining transparency in public fund management (Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2011; Muir, 2008). However,

the lack of rigorous legislative scrutiny of *BPK*'s findings creates accountability gaps, enabling corruption to persist (Crouch, 2018; Schütte, 2017; Hadiz, 2004; Aspinall & van Klinken, 2011). In response, according to the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute (UNAFEI) (n.d.), the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (*KPK*) in 2003 aimed to combat corruption and enhance institutional accountability. The establishment of oversight committees is essential to safeguard democratic governance, as institutional autonomy empowers organizations to make independent decisions while protecting civil rights (Falleti, 2010; Schütte, 2017; Snyder, 2001). While decentralisation provides greater institutional independence, it also necessitates robust oversight to prevent corruption and ensure accountability in governance.

Ultimately during the reform era in Indonesia, decentralisation was given priority to enhance governance and accountability by promoting citizen participation and empowering marginalized regions. The achievement and influence of decentralisation in Indonesia's NSS throughout the reform period are influenced by contextual aspects such as political norms and historical background elements. The success of Indonesia's decentralised security governance depends on balancing autonomy with accountability, ensuring that power devolution strengthens rather than undermines democratic oversight.

2.4.3 Interpreting Risks and Threat Through the Lens of Public Trust and Civil Competency

The study underscores the significance of trust in institutions, the need for a comprehensive understanding of security risks and threats during democratic transitions, and the significance of reliability and integrity in various cultural contexts. Thus, was influenced by public trustworthiness, civic engagement, and the role of civil

society (Norris, 2011). During the reform era, there was an increase in societal engagement, fuelled by the ideals of public trust and competence (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). Trust is essential for effective governance and democratisation efforts, and it plays a crucial role in cultivating widespread confidence in society (Benhabib, 2002). NSS is greatly impacted by the importance of civic capacities and trust in society in bolstering security measures. Individuals are empowered to handle security issues, and trust in institutions promotes unity and effective governance (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Hardin, 2002). The concept of public confidence theory highlights the importance of trust in government organizations, and how it influences the effectiveness of policies and public collaboration (Putnam, 1993; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Additionally, Giddens (1990) on modernity and its influence on trust, offers a structure for comprehending how advancements in communication tools, like social media, shape public views towards institutions. In Indonesia, the rise of platforms can both bolster and weaken public trust in the NSS.

Towards minimise uncertainty and encourage collaboration during reform, the Indonesian NSS places a strong emphasis on identifying risks and threats, appreciating the contribution of civil society to security measures, and cultivating trust. Fukuyama (1995, 2001) emphasize the significance of civic involvement and trust in establishing enduring democracies and effective governance. Tyler (2006) emphasises the importance of trust in bodies for legitimacy, Fung (2003) emphasises the importance of discourse and public deliberation for improving governance practices and labour conditions, and Sztompka (1999) examines the impact of trust on risk management and community success. Trust is crucial for upholding legitimacy, as citizens are more willing to adhere to laws when institutions are just. De Graaf & Wiertz (2019) stress the influence of trust on norms, social capital, and government

involvement, while Norris (2011) calls attention to citizens' mistrust of political institutions due to their high standards, accountability, and transparency. The cultural and ethical dimensions of public trust are examined by Uslaner (2002), who also emphasises how it affects institutional effectiveness and political behaviour. Sofwan (2014) and Harris (2012) emphasize the importance of maintaining public trust in the government, as well as effective handling of security issues and emergencies, in achieving Indonesia's NSS success. Levi & Stoker's (2000) research on trust emphasizes its impact on both perception and actual performance. The effectiveness of governance emphasizes the significance of citizens' trust in government institutions for their functioning and ensuring compliance with laws and policies (Luhmann, 1979). Strong reliance in Indonesian institutions fosters collaboration, and trust is crucial for the NSS's effective risk and threat analysis.

Additionally, the level of trust in institutions influenced by cognitive elements directly impacts the efficacy of security measures and policies. Inglehart (1997) and Pollitt & Boukaert (2011) emphasise how changes in culture and reforms in management play a crucial role in shaping trust towards institutions. Berger (2011) and Kahneman (2017) discuss the significance of trust in various contexts, such as religion and governance, while shedding light on how cognitive biases impact decision-making and levels of trust. Crenshaw (1995) suggests that individuals may be drawn to organizations when they sense neglect from governmental authorities, while Gurr (1970) points out that perceptions of injustice can lead to insurgencies. Thus underscore the importance of reliable institutions in deterring radicalization and safeguarding national security. Although Clausewitz (1976) recognised that threats in contemporary conflicts are influenced by intricate social, political, and economic factors, Kaldor (2013) emphasises how warfare is changing, becoming more

ambiguous, and how both state and non-state actors have a substantial impact on security threats. Hence, the perceptions and reactions to risks and threats are influenced by several factors in Indonesia's NSS, with security threat management being greatly impacted by trust difficulties caused by public expectations to some extent media representation.

Public confidence in the NSS was closely linked to the government's ability to adapt responsibility in its national security practices. The evolving nature of conflicts, often centred around identity politics and non-governmental actors, required the NSS to adjust by adopting broader human security perspectives and engaging with community organizations. Nevertheless, the assessment of risks and threats within Indonesia's NSS during the reform era is closely linked to the notion of trust. Trust theories emphasize the importance of accountable governance and active public participation in dealing with security issues efficiently.

2.4.4 Exploring the role of CMR in NSS with the Balance of Public Confidence and Civil Competency

Public trust and civil capability are crucial in understanding the civil role in NSS during reform in Indonesia. Kahn (2013) argues that trust stabilises CMR, fostering cooperation and legitimacy in military actions, while Maoz (2006) asserts that strong public trust ensures that military operations align with democratic principles. Maintaining balance and trust in CMR within democratic systems is crucial (Minnich, 2001; Hahn, 1999; Gutmann, 1999), with community involvement and local knowledge playing a key role in conflict resolution and the development of Indonesia's civil defence strategy (Bebbington, 2008; Suryadinata, 2007). Public trust is essential for effective governance as it fosters confidence in institutions (Tyler, 2006; Hardin, 2002;

Fukuyama, 1995). Moreover, civil capability, which includes the ability of civilian institutions to provide oversight and accountability, is essential for maintaining order and fostering public compliance, thereby enhancing transparency and engagement within the NSS (Levi, 1997). Effective civilian oversight and professional inclusion are critical for maintaining a healthy relationship between civilian authority and military operations, thereby ensuring security institutions are accountable to the community. The concepts of trust and capabilities underline the importance of civilian oversight and proficient integration within security organizations (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Norris, 2011). Additionally, Security vulnerabilities within reform contexts are particularly concerning regarding financial practices and infrastructural inadequacies (Sahrasad, 2014). Achieving efficient civilian control poses challenges in CMR (Feaver, 2003; Bruneau & Matei, 2008; Cottey et al., 2002). Improving governance, adopting effective legislative supervision, and encouraging civilian engagement are critical for tackling Indonesia's national security challenges while guaranteeing a balanced and democratic CMR.

Indonesia's NSS during reform era, civil capabilities enhance security organizations' credibility, influence risk perception, and promote individual involvement in security management. Hence, the civil competency theory emphasizes the importance of education and civic participation in developing an informed populace capable of influencing decision-making and holding public officials accountable (Gutmann, 1999; Hahn, 1999; Minnich, 2001; Dewey, 2004; Allen, 2016). Education and active civic participation are vital for strengthening democratic governance and national security (Tyler, 2006; Hardin, 2002; Fukuyama, 1996; Dahl, 1989; Westheimer, 2007). Civil capabilities emphasize the role of education and civic engagement in ensuring individuals are informed and involved in governance processes (Gutmann, 1999;

Almond & Verba, 1963). Cohen & Arato (1992) suggests that civil society acts as a crucial intermediary between the government and citizens, fostering democratic values. By fostering an engaged and knowledgeable society, civil capabilities contribute to a more resilient security framework, where public trust and cooperation play a pivotal role in addressing emerging threats and maintaining national stability.

Strengthening civilian oversight in national security is essential for maintaining a well-adjusted CMR and reinforcing democratic accountability. Haller (2006) emphasizes the importance of effective government officials in reducing military reliance on administrative duties, however Muir (2008) highlights the Indonesian Department of Defence's lack of civilian supervision in military operations since 1999. Ensuring that civilian leaders are dedicated to national interests rather than merely serving their political parties is crucial for building public trust and enhancing national security (Feaver, 2003; Tyler, 2006). Moreover, Peters (2016) suggests that robust civilian institutions can enhance military governance effectiveness, emphasizing the necessity to empower local authorities to tackle diverse security concerns and promote democratic governance. In addition to bolstering democratic governance, an effective civilian oversight system makes guarantee that national security policies are open, responsible, and sensitive to public concerns. Nevertheless, building confidence requires commitment to democratic principles and active citizen engagement in NSS.

2.5 Shaping NSS in the Post-Reform Era

2.5.1 Understanding NSS's Priority on Economic Nationalism with Political Oligarchy Influences

After reform, Indonesia's NSS placed a high priority on economic nationalism to safeguard its industries and resources from outside influences, highlighting stability as an essential element of national security. Economic nationalism in a nation's NSS is influenced by Polanyi (1944) which suggests that markets were tied to social relationships. Weber (2001) and Fligstein (2001) emphasize how state authority shapes economic actions and market control, while Winters (2011) highlights oligarchic elites' influence on policy to maintain control over strategic industries and national security priorities. Weber's (1976) view of state authority, Mann's (1984, p. 189; 1986, pp. 170-175) theory of "infrastructural power," and Tilly's (1990) focus on state control over resources, emphasize the convergence of elite interests and state power to manage markets and resources, ensuring economic and national security. Lind (1996) and Heilbroner & Milberg (2012, p.107) propose a concept of "liberal nationalism" which aims to harmonize personal freedoms with governmental actions to progress national goals. In other words, economic nationalism is a concept that emphasizes the link between strategies and the interests of a nation by safeguarding local industries and resources to protect national economic welfare (Helleiner, 2002). This review of literature investigates theories surrounding economic nationalism and how these notions shape the objectives of Indonesia's NSS in the post-reform era.

The focus on economic nationalism in Indonesia's post-reform era is viewed as a reaction to the issues related to democratization and the necessity of upholding national sovereignty against global economic pressures. Heryanto (1988) study on

Indonesia with a larger framework of economic nationalism that is consistent with post-colonial global tendencies in which governments attempt to control their economy in the face of global capitalism. Rodrik (2011) argues that stability and national security are related, highlighting the role of economic nationalism in broad NSS. According to List (1841), developed nations gain from open trade, whilst developing nations employ tariffs and government assistance. According to scholars, there is pressure between a nation's autonomy and the external economic impact on individual state interests from globalisation (Gilpin, 1987; Lin, 2012; Rodrik, 2011). Weatherbee (2016, p.34) describes Indonesia's security strategy as a form of "hedging," wherein the country maintains strategic relationships with multiple global powers to balance its foreign policy and national interests. Moreover, Shimizu (2011) recommends striking a balance between domestic issues and conformity with the economic system. For instance, Jokowi's administration prioritised infrastructure development and self-sufficiency, which was consistent with nationalist economic policies meant to reduce dependency on foreign funding and authority (Hadiwinata, 2019). Warburton (2016) and Syailendra (2017) highlight the role that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play in strategic infrastructure projects and indicates a return to prioritising the state in national affairs. Likewise, Weiss & Thurbon (2020) delve into the idea of statecraft – a strategy employed by governments to drive technological advancement and enhance competitiveness on the global stage. Additionally, Wendler (2015) emphasizes the importance of nationalism in driving industrial growth and ensuring stability over time by investing in intellectual pursuits and education. Indonesia's NSS in the contemporary era adopted a stance of utilising economic nationalism to protect against the disruptive influences of global economic dynamics by focusing on strategies that support local industries and safeguard national resources.

In Indonesia's post-reform era, economic nationalism was entwined with preserving Indonesian cultural values and making sure that economic advancement complemented the nation's unique identity. The cultural aspect of nationalism holds significant importance in Indonesia's varied community landscape, where economic strategies need to consider the various ethnic and cultural factions in harmony (Campbell et al., (2006). Hence, Blyth (2002) discusses how government interventions in the economy can have unintended outcomes such as social unrest and inequality issues. Additionally, Keynes (2017) highlights the importance of coordinated government intervention to revive and steady economies during times of economic turmoil. Therefore, it is essential to strike a balance between inclusive policies and economic nationalism to promote national cohesion, sustainable economic growth, and the avoidance of social divisions.

Economic nationalism is given priority in Indonesia's NSS, highlighting how elite power shapes policies that protect domestic businesses while reinforcing oligarchic control over key economic sectors. As the public becomes more aware of oligarchy, there is a growing understanding of how economic power influences political decision-making, fuelling dissatisfaction with national stability (Törnquist, 2019). This discontent is further exacerbated by the entrenchment of elite influence in electoral processes, which, according to Slater (2018), serves to safeguard their interests, often through coercive measures. The commercialization of political support and the deeply rooted patronage system undermine electoral fairness, sustaining a system driven by financial power rather than democratic principles (Mietzner, 2020; Honna, 2018; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). Consequently, these dynamic fosters public disillusionment, increasing voter scepticism and strengthening support for populist movements as an alternative to the entrenched elite dominance.

Indonesia's NSS prioritizes economic nationalism to defend national interests, balance market forces and state involvement, and protect industries from global economic pressures. Jokowi's administration emphasizes self-sufficiency, state-owned establishments, and infrastructure development. Oligarchic structures influence economic policies, raising questions about policies implementation, democratic accountability and equitable development. Indonesia's NSS serves as an example of the complex relationship between economic nationalism, governance, and national security, highlighting the challenges in balancing national interests and inclusive prosperity.

2.5.2 Exploring the Impact of Oligarchic Influence in NSS Policies and Maritime Forces

Political oligarchy has played a pivotal role in shaping Indonesia's NSS, as the concentration of power in the hands of elite groups significantly influences policy outcomes. Political oligarchy plays a crucial part in Indonesia's NSS, as elites continue to control key sectors and post-reform, offering insights on social behaviours (Winters 2011; Hadiz & Robison 2004). Following Indonesia's reform era, oligarchic frameworks became entrenched, with power increasingly concentrated among elite groups, undermining democratic values (Winters, 2013). Moore (1966) asserts that a strong middle class is crucial for democracy, nevertheless Indonesia's post-Suharto oligarchy reveals the persistent dominance of economic elites. This concentration of power often undermines accountability and weakens the state's capacity to enact inclusive and responsive policies (Mann, 1984; Tilly, 1990). Economic elites influence policy design to protect their interests, often overshadowing the public good (Gehlbach & Moser, 2008). Consequently, the persistence of oligarchic power structures continues to pose

significant challenges to the development of a truly democratic and inclusive national security framework in Indonesia.

The research also reveals how military and oligarchic interests influence Indonesia's power dynamics, with security measures benefiting elites and diverting resources from addressing broader societal concerns. Slater (2010) examines how Indonesia's authoritarian Leviathan persisted until 1998, surviving the end of the Cold War. Honna (2018) discusses the military's role in politics, while Mietzner (2020) argues that financial interests shape Indonesia's electoral landscape. Schumpeter (2003) notes that oligarchic dominance can lead to inefficiencies and reduced motivation, while Pareto (2017) highlights the role of market positioning in maintaining elite dominance. The "iron law of oligarchy" by Michels (2001) suggests that organizations striving for democracy often end up being controlled by a small group of leaders, resulting in elite domination within the NSS. Dahl (1961) identifies several elite groups, including wealthy subleaders, who leverage alliances with citizens and officials to gain political influence. This analysis highlights how economic power can translate into political dominance, affecting the broader democratic landscape. Despite democratization progress, Indonesia's political and business elites maintain control over crucial sectors, often undermining transparency and fairness in the security apparatus (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Mietzner, 2020). This ongoing concentration of power among elites, despite democratic reforms, continues to shape the trajectory of Indonesia's NSS, often prioritizing the interests of the few over the broader public good.

Additionally, critics claim that seeing the draft of Indonesia's National Security Bill reintroduces the dual function concept, which formerly provided military dominance

over security and governance, possibly compromising democratic control and accountability. The Bill has been postponed multiple times since it was first proposed. Initially introduced in 2015, the bill faced significant delays due to political challenges, which centralized power in elites, is seen as a move to limit external scrutiny, allowing powerful groups to control national security narratives while reducing public oversight (Larosa, 2019). This shift reflects the persistent influence of oligarchic interests in shaping national security policy (Diprose et al., 2019; Sebastian & Iisgindarsah, 2012). Moreover, obscure legislation and decision-making processes can lead to policies difficult for public or independent evaluation, increasing the risk of unchecked authority (Walzer, 2011). Other concern, even though the 2015's DWP aimed to clarify strategies and address security threats (Utami et al., 2019), however the shift towards exclusivity of The National Defence General Policy (*Jakumhaneg*) raises concerns about prioritizing strategic alignment at the expense of transparency and consistency with international norms (Ubayanto et al., 2020). Thus, reflecting ongoing tension between robust national security measures and sufficient oversight, transparency, and accountability that critical for safeguarding democratic integrity in Indonesia's evolving political landscape. Moreover, examining Indonesia's NSS and the management of the *ALKI* or *Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes* through political oligarchy theory reveals a troubling concentration of power among the political and economic elites. Recent studies highlight the importance of cooperation across government agencies, security forces, and regulatory bodies to effectively protect Indonesia's maritime territory and interests, particularly in safeguarding the *ALKI* (Susilo et al., 2018; Fauzan et al., 2019). However, the pervasive influence of oligarchs complicates such efforts, as elite interests often dictate policy priorities, hindering collaborative initiatives

and limiting the effectiveness of security operations in serious areas like Indonesia's maritime sovereignty.

Political oligarchies shape Indonesia's NSS policies and institutional structure by emphasizing stability as a core national security concern, which frequently undermines democratic and public values. Elite groups retain control of critical sectors, restricting the state's ability to implement inclusive, transparent, and accountable policies. This is clear from the military's participation and control of vital marine regions such as ALKI, where oligarchic interests impede collective security and efficient policy execution.

2.5.3 Interpreting Risks and Threat under Oligarchic Influence and Executive Power

Indonesia's post-reform period, oligarchic interests have had a considerable influence on risk identification and threat management inside the NSS, impeding progress towards modern-era management. Michels (2001) believes when the power centralized among a small group hinders democratic discourse, prevents diverse risk and threat perspectives, and undermines the NSS's effectiveness in addressing public security needs. The world is experiencing a shift in risks and threats due to advancements and environmental changes, aligning with Beck's (1992) theory of risk evolution. Wealth concentration among the elite has shaped the NSS's perspective shifting the focus from viewing economic inequality as a security concern to protecting the interests of the affluent class (Piketty, 2014). Mills (1956) examines the interwoven interests of political, military, and corporate leaders who significantly influence national policy, and this convergence of power among a small group of elites shapes the decisions that govern society. Other view patronage in politics has led to security strategies protecting elite partnerships' interests, posing challenges to achieving full

democratisation (Fukuyama, 1992). Walzer (2011) suggests the significance of gradually distributing authority and progress, rather than consolidating power within a single entity, to counteract the negative impact of oligarchic influence on justice and political involvement. The influence of oligarchic interests in Indonesia's post-reform period continues to hinder the effective identification and management of risks and threats within the NSS.

A healthy balance between military and civilian roles in national security is essential for the preservation of democratic principles. Critics point out that as elite interests continue to shape important security choices, striking a balance between military autonomy and civilian authority is essential for the development of democracy (Mietzner, 2020; Huntington, 1991; Feaver, 1999). Increased civilian supervision of the military because of Indonesia's democratisation encouraged accountability and openness in security-related issues. Maintaining a proper equilibrium between military and civilian roles in national security is crucial, as an expanding military influence in security decisions risks compromising democratic governance principles (Varkkey, 2017; Koerniawan, 2018). This dynamic poses a significant threat to democratic values, particularly civilian oversight and accountability, as the military's involvement in governance may undermine democratic checks and balances and further entrench elite control over state institutions (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). Ultimately, ensuring a clear distinction between military and civilian roles is vital to safeguard democratic governance and prevent the consolidation of power within the hands of a few.

In occasion scrutiny, the NSS often perceives dissent or social uprisings as threats to national security, justifying suppressive approaches that foster inefficiency and

corruption. Corruption driven by elite influence undermines institutional credibility and jeopardizes national security by eroding public trust and diminishing the effectiveness of security measures (Mietzner, 2020). Numerous experts have debated the impact of governmental reactions to opposing groups, highlighting a broader trend of using state authority to silence dissent (Mietzner, 2020; Power, 2018; Bouchier, 2019). Separately, cultural and hereditary divisions play a role in shaping power dynamics, and challenges to the existing order, such as demands for social equality or political change, are viewed as major security concerns (Mosca, 1961). While regulations designed to combat terrorism are undeniably essential for national security. For instance, temporary laws, such as *Perppu*, are enacted during emergencies to manage communities in crises, underscoring the need for a well-rounded strategy to mitigate risks and inform executive decisions (Mispansyah et al., 2023; Freedman, 2013; Gowing, 2009). Although that such laws can be manipulated by the ruling elite to consolidate power without parliamentary approval, ultimately undermining the fairness and effectiveness of security measures.

Risk identification and threat management were impacted by post-reform Indonesian oligarchic interests, particularly the NSS. Because more military involvement undermines democratic governance, it is crucial to strike a balance between military and civilian duties in national security. It also considers how elite-driven corruption erodes institutional credibility and promotes inefficiency, consequently undermining the effectiveness of the NSS. The use of emergency legislation by the ruling class to consolidate power is criticised in the assessment.

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2.5.4 Engaging Civil Society through Public Sentiment in the Digital Age while Navigating NSS's Policy

The relationship between public opinion and national security policy is deeply intertwined, reflecting the evolving dynamics of governance, media influence, and democratic participation. Public sentiment is vital in shaping the priority of government policies, legislation, and frameworks, as well as promoting civic engagement (Mill, 2015; Dewey, 2004; Habermas, 1989). Public opinion plays a role in influencing the NSS, as seen in the alignment of security policies with societal values like the maintenance of civil liberties and discouragement of state violence practices (Goffman, 2016). Public opinion plays a significant role in shaping national security policies, particularly post-reform, when increased media freedom and press independence allow the public to engage more critically with government initiatives (Habermas, 1989; Dahl, 1989; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Additionally, the media's growing influence has amplified public oversight, enabling citizens to scrutinize government actions, especially regarding national security, and highlighting the

delicate balance between government authority and public participation, especially on issues like human rights and freedoms (Tapsell, 2017). Moreover, social media plays a significant role in engaging the Indonesian public, with civil society groups, youth movements, and community-led projects advocating for measures that highlight human rights and democratic principles (Hui, 2020; Madania, 2020). Zaller (1992) and Arendt (1998) highlight the significant influence of mass media on public opinion, particularly in community policing, and emphasize the importance of public debate and participation in maintaining democratic legitimacy, while cautioning against bureaucratic decision-making that can distance the public from political processes. Even if public opinion is becoming more and more important today due to information and technological breakthroughs, oligarchic dynamics have made engagement more difficult (Berenschot, 2018). The growth of the media after reform allowed for more in-depth discussions of new security concerns and create public opinion.

Furthermore, the public's views are influenced by media reports and personal beliefs in deciding how security threats are understood and handled by authorities. Biases, social relationships, and censorship can influence people's understanding of what is real (Lippmann, 2017). Sunstein (2017) highlight how emotions impact political results and opinions. Rogers' (2003) theory of the dissemination of innovations helps understand how information and discussions about security issues spread among the public and shape their views and behaviours. Moreover, the concept of securitisation theory is used to examine how portraying issues as security risks resulted in heightened government involvement and limitations on personal freedoms (Buzan et al., 1998). This interplay of media influence, emotional responses, information diffusion, and securitization underscores the dynamic relationship between public

perception and security policymaking, shaping both societal reactions and governmental decisions.

In Indonesia, the NSS has faced obstacles in dealing with a diverse population where public opinion encompasses a broad spectrum of perspectives and encounters. During the post-reform era, there were notable shifts in politics and the public's emotional reactions, especially concerning security matters, like terrorism, separatism, and communal unrest impacting the direction and objectives of the NSS. Ultimately, the evolving interaction between public opinion, media influence, and national security policy highlights the complexities of democratic governance.

2.6 Gap in the Literature and Contribution

This literature review identifies critical gaps in existing scholarship, particularly in understanding the informal networks that link the military, local governments, and unrevealing establishments in Indonesia. These networks play a vital role in shaping the country's NSS without legitimate guidance and security council and operate beyond formal institutional settings, influencing security decision-making, economic policies, and governance structures in ways that remain underexplored. Existing studies on Indonesia's NSS have primarily focused on formal institutions, legal frameworks, and state-centric security policies (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013; Sukma, 2003). By addressing these gaps, this research provides fresh insights into how power is distributed and maintained within Indonesia's security landscape, offering a more nuanced perspective on CMR, as well as political and economic sociologies.

The literature on military sociology and CMR in Indonesia provides a strong foundation for understanding the military's role in elite power structures and democratic

governance. Scholars like Marx (1978) and Mills (1956) have demonstrated the military's role in elite domination, while Stepan (1988) and Huntington (1957) have studied civilian oversight. Lasswell's (1941) work explains the militarization of civilian life in response to external threats. However, despite these contributions, several critical areas remain insufficiently explored. The lack of focus on the informal networks that connect the military, local governments, and industrialist enterprises is one of the most obvious gaps. These networks are vital in determining security governance, especially in a decentralised political system like Indonesia (Huxley, 2001). Although research on military business ventures highlights their economic activities (Mietzner, 2009; McLeod, 2000), it often neglects how these ventures interact with local political and business elites to maintain influence on security approaches.

Whilst research on CMR and decentralization acknowledges the role of the military in governance, it often frames these dynamics within rigid institutional boundaries (Mietzner, 2009; Crouch, 2010). Decentralization studies have not fully examined the role of local government officials in facilitating military-business partnerships (Hoon, 2012; Choi, 2011). Decentralization presents major challenge in Indonesia's security governance and its impact has not been sufficiently examined. Most studies focus on central government policies and institutional reforms though offer limited discussion on how regional and local governance structures influence NSS implementation (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003; Hadiz, 2010). Nonetheless, existing research does not adequately address how decentralization has reshaped security institutions, particularly in regions affected by separatist movements or terrorism threats (Rasyid, 2003; Soeprapto, 2020). Moreover, while corruption in Indonesia's security sector—especially within the police force—has been acknowledged (Buttle et al., 2016), its broader implications for counterterrorism, border security, and organized crime remain

insufficiently explored. Given Indonesia's extensive decentralization since the early 2000s, understanding how security policies are enforced at the regional level is critical.

Another underexplored dimension of Indonesia's security landscape is the interconnection between oligarchic networks and security institutions. Economic elites, often tied to political parties and private enterprises, maintain influence by leveraging military and police forces to secure business interests, particularly in resource extraction industries (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). These elites use coercive and legal mechanisms, including private security forces and paramilitary groups, to suppress opposition and reinforce their control (Wilson, 2015). Oligarchs also shape national security policies through their affiliations with political parties and military-business alliances (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). Despite post-Suharto reforms aimed at separating security governance from economic interests, the informal military-business nexus remains dominant, particularly in regional power structures where local elites control both economic resources and security enforcement mechanisms (Hoon, 2012; Choi, 2011). Rather than functioning as neutral state actors, Indonesia's security institutions often act as political and economic brokers, balancing the interests of oligarchs, local governments, and national elites (Hadiz & Robison, 2013). This research builds upon theories of CMR (Huntington, 1957; Finer, 1962), patrimonialism and clientelism (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003), and economic nationalism (Hameiri, 2015) to illustrate how these networks function as alternative power structures that influence both security and economic policies. This study challenges traditional governance frameworks and emphasises the need for more research by examining the ongoing intertwining of economic power and security institutions in Indonesia and the continued impact of elite networks on security policies despite democratisation.

Few studies have examined how these dynamics affect risk interpretation, legislative frameworks, and security sector accountability, despite political sociology's recognition that the relationship between political elites, military institutions, and economic interests has substantial implications for national security priorities. While there has been extensive research on the military's role during the Suharto era and the early reform period, there is a lack of comprehensive analysis regarding how historical legacies continue to influence contemporary CMR (Crouch, 1979; Kingsbury, 2005). Indonesia's transition to democracy has been widely examined (Carnegie, 2010; Anwar, 2021), while existing studies rarely address how past institutional structures continue to shape public perceptions of the military's role in national security. Even though oligarchic influences on Indonesian politics have been explored (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Rizal, 2012), their impact on security governance remains underexamined.

Economic sociology provides a valuable framework for understanding how markets interact with security governance. Scholars such as Polanyi (1944), Durkheim (1893), and Weber (2001) emphasize that economic structures are deeply embedded within political and social contexts. However, while studies recognize the importance of Indonesia's informal economy, they do not sufficiently address how these economic structures impact NSS, particularly concerning instability, corruption, and economic security (Granovetter, 1985; Evans, 1995). Likewise, studies on economic nationalism tend to focus on state policies, industrial strategies, and oligarchic influences although fail to account for the informal networks that underpin these power structures such as how private sector actors—often linked to political parties—leverage security institutions to protect their economic interests (Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Winters, 2011). Congruently, while global security challenges increasingly influence economic

policies, the literature lacks an in-depth analysis of how maritime security and trade route securitization shape Indonesia's national security priorities (Negara, 2019; Power, 2018). Given Indonesia's strategic position in global trade, these economic dimensions are critical for a more comprehensive understanding of its NSS.

By addressing these overlooked dimensions, this research contributes to a more holistic understanding of Indonesia's security landscape, revealing the persistent entanglement between economic power, political elites, and security institutions. It contests CMR and security governance by demonstrating how informal networks shape national security priorities, institutional structure, risks and threats perception and civil function beyond formal state mechanisms. Ultimately, this study underscores the need for a more nuanced approach in analysing Indonesia's NSS, one that accounts for the enduring influence of historical legacies, decentralization, and elite-driven security arrangements in shaping contemporary governance.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter firmly situates the research within the field of sociology, filling in the gaps in current theories and emphasising how political, military, and economic factors intertwine to shape Indonesia's NSS in the absence of a formal legal charter and designed councils. By employing a conceptual framework constructed from empirical findings, the study provides a fresh perspective on national security, challenging traditional IR approaches and contributing to the broader discourse on security studies (Fukuyama, 2013; Bruneau & Matei, 2008). Traditional state-centric theories, such as realism and neorealism (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001), fail to fully capture the complexities of Indonesia's security governance, which is deeply intertwined with political economy and institutional structures (Rodrik, 2011; Polanyi, 1944). This

chapter, therefore, challenges existing theoretical frameworks and offers a nuanced understanding of Indonesia's NSS, urging a rethinking of security governance in the contemporary global context.

The chapter highlights the importance of approaches that transcend mere military considerations, such as addressing interrelated security issues, utilising theoretical frameworks such as democratisation processes and economic dynamics, and analysing challenges within national security. The idea of national security has been advanced by Hough (2021), Kaldor (2013), Miller and Smith (2020), Kniskern, and Segal (2015), who have emphasised the importance of a complete strategy that goes beyond military might and stresses the interdependence of social and political forces. To manage interconnected trials across social dynamics, economic factors, and conventional military strategies, Krause and Williams (2018) and Crenshaw (2019) weight the significance of a comprehensive security approach that considers the intersectionality of social identities when creating security plans. Indonesia's unique security landscape is shaped by political transformations, economic ambitions, and social dynamics, necessitating a comprehensive approach to manage interconnected issues.

Furthermore, the evolution of CMR has been crucial in redefining security governance in the post-Reformasi era. While democratization has enabled greater transparency and civil engagement, it has not fully dismantled the entrenched power of security elites (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Public trust in security institutions remains a determining factor in the legitimacy of NSS, with shifting perceptions influencing the effectiveness of security governance (Habermas, 1989; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Eventually, this chapter has highlighted how Indonesia's NSS is not solely dictated by military imperatives however also influenced by public trust (Putnam, 1993; Rothstein & Stolle,

2008), institutional legitimacy (Lipset, 1959), and elite power structures (Winters, 2011). The intricate relationship between public trust, and CMR highlights the complexity of Indonesia's changing NSS and the necessity for a more integrated approach to security governance in the years after Reform.

Political sociology emphasises the increasingly important role of civil society in shaping Indonesia's NSS, a role that was historically marginalised during the authoritarian era although has gained significant prominence in recent years. According to Levitsky & Roberts (2021) and Ginsburg (2022), the rise of public trust and the growing reliance on expertise have been key drivers behind this shift, as civil society becomes more engaged in discussions of national security. In other hand, during Indonesia's reform era, as Miller & Smith (2020) argue, the rise of societal participation in governance led to a significant shift in how security risks were interpreted. While Kaldor (2013) and Fukuyama (2020) argue that even though oligarchic influences persist, civilian participation in national security dialogues is reshaping how security policies are framed and enacted. This shift has been accompanied by an evolving dynamic between the state, military, and civilians, illustrating the changing nature of CMR and social politic in Indonesia.

The analysis of economic sociology demonstrated how national security priorities in Indonesia are shaped by historical legacies, decentralization, economic nationalism, and elite-driven governance. The chapter has also shown how economic priorities, particularly state intervention in strategic industries, have been justified under the guise of national security, reinforcing economic nationalism as a key driver of NSS policy (Weiss & Thurbon, 2020). Rodrik (2011) and Turner (2003) highlight that economic strategies often intertwine with security concerns, where the political and economic spheres converge to secure national stability. Piketty (2014) further

emphasises that the strategic use of economic policies can ensure social order, especially in periods of political and social change. However, the interplay between economic nationalism (Helleiner, 2002; List, 1841), political oligarchy (Hadiz & Robison, 2013), and decentralized governance (Rondinelli, 1984) presents a nuanced understanding of Indonesia's security landscape, emphasizing the role of informal networks and elite control in shaping policy decisions. This analysis underscores the complex relationship between economic, political, and security factors in Indonesia, highlighting the role of elite influence and decentralization in shaping the country's evolving NSS

Chapters 4 to 6 of the thesis explores Indonesia's NSS from the authoritarian regime to the reform and post-reform era, using various theoretical frameworks in empirical analysis. It examines Indonesia's political transitions, which influence the selection of theories that accurately reflect changes priorities within Indonesia's NSS, the nature of its security community, the interpretation of risks and threats, and the role of civil society throughout three decades. The study uses data to combine theory and real-life events, revealing how Indonesia's NSS has evolved over time. The back-and-forth process between data and theories, to results, ensures that the analysis accurately captures the historical context and enhances the understanding of Indonesia's national security trends over time. This method allows adjustment of theoretical frameworks to be improved and validated through real-world sources. The next chapter explains the research methods for this thesis.

3.0 Methodology

This chapter presents the research approach for analyzing Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024. The study adopts a qualitative research design, combining thematic content analysis (TCA) with a hermeneutic approach to examine historical records, official reports, interviews, academic literature, and other pertinent materials. This structured process ensures that data collection informs thematic categorization, which subsequently shapes theoretical development. The research is guided by four key questions; *first what factors have influenced the prioritization of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024? Second how have institutional transformations within the NSS impacted its effectiveness and adaptability? Third what shaped the perception of risks and threats, and how did these interpretations influence response strategies? Last what contributed to the expansion of civil involvement in NSS, and what were the security implications?*

To address these inquiries, data is systematically coded and analysed within a thematic framework to identify patterns that explain shifts in security prioritization, institutional development, risk assessment, and civil role in Indonesia NSS. The study employs both inductive and abductive reasoning, allowing empirical findings to refine theoretical perspectives on national security-making in democratizing states. Through integrating structural sociological theories, this methodology provides a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's NSS evolution over three decades.

National security goes beyond surface-level events – it involves delving into backgrounds and societal structures while considering political strategies. Thus, are shaped by historical events and global interactions which are challenging to address with a single approach due to the diverse nature of each aspect involved. Ensuring

national security comprehends a blend of factors such as socio, economic, politics, and military. To grasp the entirety of this web of factors at play, requires diverse methodologies that each add a unique perspective to the wider picture. That is why it is important to take a faceted approach that combines several methods such as semi structure interviews, document analysis, and TCA, to gain a comprehensive understanding of the issue at hand.

Henceforth, the focal point of ensuring a comprehensive and relevant analysis of NSS, I purposefully selected participants based on their roles, expertise, and involvement in security policymaking. This approach follows Rai & Thapa (2015), who emphasize that participant selection should align with research objectives to maximize the relevance and robustness of data. Later, in constructive manner the theory frameworks were created in an organised way based on the data gathered from my research efforts. Drawing from the observations and developments discovery through fieldwork and data analysis, I developed these theories systematically. The theoretical standpoint remained consistent with the findings as new data emerges to keep the literature review current. Themes and patterns were utilised to provide context and address research challenges as they surface in the data analysis. Thus, from a dynamic and thorough perspective, this study provides a detailed and retrospective view of its evolution.

Towards showcase the merits of my research strategy effectively, I am applying Mark Saunder's (2019) research onion as a framework that directs my methodology. This method, illustrated in Figure 3-1, dissects the research process into layers, each focusing on a particular facet of my study. By employing this structure, I intend to deliver a coherent approach tailored for social science research. I find that it assists

me in blending different research ideas and offers a solid foundation for assessing and enhancing my academic work. This was highlighted by Hayman & Steenkamp (2020).




Diagram 3. 1 Research Methodology

Diagram 3.1 Research Methodology: own construction

The core layer of the research philosophy that guides my course of study is depicted in diagram 3.1. I adopt an interpretive paradigm to highlight the subjective aspect of reality and to stress the significance of comprehending individual experiences. This method enables me to delve into viewpoints and unveil significances and trends within Indonesia's NSS between 1988 and 2024.

In the second layer of my research plans, are the strategies I employ; inductive and abductive reasoning methods to guide the design and framework of my study by enabling me to examine potential risks in detail and critically evaluate security measures such as anti-terrorism tactics. This method helps my research to be

structured and methodical as it answers inquiries efficiently while promoting thorough data analysis and the discovery of fresh perspectives. Moving to the third layer involves applying a qualitative approach influenced by constructivist and interpretive viewpoints. This includes merging interviews and secondary sources, as well as thematic analysis of content to delve into subjective experiences and the social construction of reality within the context of NSS.

My study approach includes focusing on the timeline aspect spanning from 1988 to 2024, to the subjects of analysis of Indonesia's NSS. This type of analysis allows me to merge historical knowledge with data over time to identify patterns and shifts in the security landscape. The next aspect involves the methods used for data collection; I opt for structured interviews. This approach blends semi-structured formats to engage directly with participants and gather insights into their perspectives, while capturing both expected responses and unexpected revelations. When selecting individuals for this tier of the study group's sample pool, I carefully consider their expertise, background, or characteristics to ensure a comprehensive examination that aligns with the qualitative research principles rooted in constructivist and interpretive frameworks.

The seventh tier emphasises the significance of data analysis techniques to effectively identify and understand recurring patterns and themes. Through theme content analysis, which is a method compatible with constructivist and interpretive approaches, I am able to delve into the meanings and context of specific interpretations derived from participants' responses. According to the recommendations of Hussain et al., (2013), this involves merging sources of information and contrasting outcomes with theories or existing evidence to enhance the reliability and credibility of the study.

When it comes to obtaining consent from informed individuals and ensuring confidentiality while protecting the rights of participants – particularly when dealing with sensitive information – ethical considerations are given priority. The University adheres to protocols governing research to ensure the wellbeing of those involved.

Nevertheless, in my research into Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024, I aim to maintain coherence and complementarity by highlighting experiences and diverse viewpoints. I employ a constructivist and interpretative framework along with methods such as intentional sampling, semi-structured interviews, and thematic content analysis. The research methodology supports alongside theoretical framework to response the study's main research examinations which include the prioritization of NSS, evolution of institutional structures, risk assessment, and the enhancement of civil capacity. This approach demonstrates a commitment to rigorously understanding the intricacies of NSS.

3.1 Unravelling Social Constructs and Changing Security Dynamics; A Deep Dive into Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024

In my research methodology process, I chose to utilise an interpretative approach to analyse Indonesia's NSS across the years of transition and change. This decision stems from my understanding of various research paradigms, including ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methods, as discussed in the works of Rehman & Alharthi (2016), Bogna et al., (2020), and Fazlıoğulları (2012). Ontology, they argue, addresses the nature of reality, asking what exists within the realm of national security and how it is defined. Epistemology, on the other hand, explores the nature and scope of knowledge, helping me to understand how security knowledge is constructed within Indonesia's NSS over time.

The methodology provides guidance on the research procedures and the approach to data collection, while methods focus on the specific techniques used to gather and analyse data. By incorporating constructivism and interpretivism into my study, I emphasise the subjective nature of reality, where national security policies are not just abstract concepts however are shaped by the experiences and interpretations of individuals and groups. This approach is particularly relevant for understanding how Indonesia's NSS has evolved, as it allows me to explore the complex, socially constructed realities of security and how they have been influenced by historical, political, and cultural factors.

According to Lee (2012), constructivism emphasises the construction of meaning and knowledge by proposing a relativist ontology (multiple realities). This approach is in line with my research goal to delve into the viewpoints and meanings embedded within Indonesia's NSS. I found that constructivism and interpretivism offer powerful lenses for understanding how individuals and groups create meaning within their specific contexts. As I explored these frameworks, I was drawn to how constructivism, as noted by Bogna et al., (2020), is constructed through social interactions, while interpretivism, as Cupchik (2001) explains, focuses on understanding the subjective meanings people attach to their experiences. This perspective has enabled me to see how Indonesia's NSS is not just a set of policies and a product of the interpretations, identities, and values of those involved, shaped by the country's cultural and historical context. Constructivism, as Adler (1997) explains, helps to understand how security policies in Indonesia are shaped by social factors like identities, historical experiences, and cultural norms. Hence, I chose to use constructivism and interpretivism as theoretical frameworks to help dive deeply into the complexities of Indonesia's NSS evolution.

Interpretivism is described by Schwand (1998) and Van Der Walt (2020) as aiming to understand real-life encounters and the generation of meaning processes using techniques like ethnography and detailed interviews to capture the intricate subjective aspects of social occurrences. This approach focuses on exploring how selected individuals in society form and interpret meanings, making it well-suited for analysing the intricacies of state actors' behaviours and their changes over time. This perspective was essential for exploring the shifts in priorities, institutional frameworks, and risk assessments in Indonesia's security landscape over time. Interpretivism, as Sztompka (1999) suggests, guided me to focus on how people within Indonesia's security system interpret and respond to these changes, enabling me to better grasp the subjective of security policymaking. Wendt's (1999) work helped me appreciate that security strategies are reactions to objective threats and influenced by shared beliefs as well as collective understandings, which was crucial for exploring how Indonesia's identity plays into its security decisions. Hopf (2002) further informed my thinking by demonstrating how a state's identity shapes its security behaviour, offering insight into how Indonesia's national identity influences its approach to security, especially in relation to its neighbours and broader regional dynamics.

Throughout applying these frameworks, I was able to use methodologies like content analysis, purposeful sampling, and semi-structured interviews, which allowed me to explore how social structures shape Indonesia's NSS and uncover new trends over time. As well, Patton (2015) emphasised the value of qualitative methods in understanding the rich, complex data collected through these approaches. This helped me develop a more nuanced understanding of Indonesia's evolving security concerns, ensuring that my findings were informed by existing theories and were grounded in the real-world experiences of my participants.

Nevertheless, constructivism and interpretivism provide a perspective on analysing the NSS by emphasising the subjective and socially shaped elements of national security issues. They aid in untangling the interaction between individual and shared interpretations to comprehend how the NSS evolves, and its wider significance.

3.2 Inductive and Abductive Reasoning in the Evolution of Indonesia's NSS (1988–2024); An Approach Based on Constructivism and Interpretation

I intentionally approached the early stages of the research with an open mind, making a conscious effort to avoid becoming overly influenced by existing literature. This was important, because I wanted to prevent any preconceived ideas or biases from shaping the direction of the study. As Patton (2015) points out, avoiding bias is essential to maintaining the authenticity of the research process. By staying flexible, I could let the data speak for itself and guide the analysis in a way that was true to the participants' experiences. Drawing on abductive reasoning, I aligned with the constructivist and interpretive principles that shaped my approach, allowing me to develop theories organically based on the data I gathered, as Reichertz (2007) emphasises.

My approach was about discovering new insights directly from the experiences of those involved, rather than trying to fit the data into pre-existing frameworks. As Bryman (2012) notes, this type of analysis prioritises creating new theories from the ground upwards. It felt important to stay rooted in the real-world complexities of Indonesia's NSS, which, as Glaser & Strauss (1967) highlight, is what inductive reasoning allows. Although this method required patience, it helped me remain grounded in the data, minimising any potential biases. As Thomas (2006) suggests, inductive reasoning helps uncover the deeper layers of complex phenomena, like NSS.

Additionally, the use of abductive reasoning, as outlined by Timmermans & Tavory (2012), helped balance established theories with new insights, allowing me to interpret the data flexibly and with a rational perspective. This combination of approaches made my research thorough and more reflective of the nuanced realities of Indonesia's evolving NSS. This method permits a flexible strategy facilitating the refinement and adjustment of theories with the accumulation of fresh perspectives. Embracing a blend of reasoning techniques recommended by academics such as Gioia et al., (2012), enriches my capacity to construct a theoretical structure that encapsulates the intricacies of Indonesia's NSS.

This method differs from the approach where a hypothesis is fully developed and then tested with collected data, as mentioned by Yom (2015), explaining deductive reasoning. I prioritised inductive and abductive reasoning to develop theories grounded in the data collected. Timmermans & Tavory (2012) highlight the value of inductive reasoning in generating theories directly from empirical observations, while abductive reasoning allows for flexibility, refining theories based on the data. This approach ensured my findings remained responsive to the complexities of Indonesia's NSS, evolving through continuous reflection and adaptation to the context.

The focus on transparency mentioned by Woo et al., (2017), helps keep the research rooted in evidence and prevents biases from influencing the outcomes. Through real-time observations and semi-formal interviews, alongside archived data collection methods, Regner (2003) developed an understanding of strategy formation without depending on existing theoretical models. This hands-on approach led to the discovery of perspectives and interrelations that could have been missed with a strictly deductive

method. In my research context it is essential to blend abductive reasoning with inductive to comprehend the evolution of Indonesia's NSS.

I have found that national security is a field that is constantly changing in response to new threats, evolving policies, and shifting strategies. Through the use of inductive reasoning, I have been able to identify patterns and trends based on the data and experiences gathered throughout my research. As Charmaz (2006) highlights, this method allows the researcher to recognise recurring behaviours and themes, which are key to understanding how past events influence present security concerns.

In addition, I have found abductive reasoning, as described by Timmermans & Tavory (2012), useful in formulating flexible strategies to address emerging challenges. This approach has enabled me to develop hypotheses and interpretations in situations where information is incomplete or evolving. I may recognise trends in Indonesia's national security environment and critically examine strategies that were hypothetically described theoretical analysis in literature review, chapter 2, on how Indonesia NSS adapts to unexpected and narrative threats by combining inductive and abductive reasoning. This process has been crucial in helping me to understand the complexities of Indonesia's evolving security needs and respond to the unpredictable nature of global security dynamics.

In essence, the incorporation of inductive and abductive research frameworks in this study offers a strong basis for examining Indonesia's NSS. These frameworks facilitate an investigation of the personal and socially influenced elements of national security and provide more detailed insight for the thesis. Through combining these methods, the thesis presents a flexible analysis that is well-suited for navigating the intricate nature of NSS.

3.3 Exploring Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024, in a Qualitative Manner

The primary focus during my research on Indonesia's NSS between 1988 and 2024 was to gather testimonies from notable politicians, police officials, military commanders, and security personnel. Through a blend of qualitative research techniques, this approach provided insights into the fundamental principles underpinning Indonesia's NSS. I employed a qualitative approach that integrated interviews, archival records, and various primary and secondary sources to gain a comprehensive understanding of its complexities. Archival analysis was conducted to cross-validate interview findings with historical documents, legislative records, and DWP. As Creswell (2013) notes, qualitative methods are particularly valuable for exploring in-depth, contextual knowledge, especially when studying complex subjects like national security. This approach allowed me to capture the historical evolution of Indonesia's NSS and the socio-political and cultural factors that shape it.

I have examined official reports, legislative documents, military white papers, and strategic policies to contextualize interviews within historical and legal frameworks beforehand. Denzin & Lincoln (2018) emphasise that qualitative research, particularly in fieldwork settings, enables a deeper understanding of phenomena by examining multiple sources of data in their natural context. Silverman (2015) further underscores the importance of considering both the context and individual perspectives in shaping security strategies. By gathering insights from key stakeholders and analysing diverse sources, I uncovered the underlying factors influencing Indonesia's NSS, including political, military, and social dynamics. This allowed me to provide a nuanced, multi-dimensional view of Indonesia's national security landscape, revealing both formal structures and the lived experiences of those involved.

I intentionally focused on exploring the complex contextual nuances rather than relying on statistical methods, as my goal was to uncover the intricate realities of Indonesian national security. This approach aligned with Schwandt's (1998) emphasis on using a constructivist and interpretive framework to understand the underlying perspectives and interpretations of those involved in the security landscape. As Creswell (2013) suggests, qualitative research is particularly effective for gaining deep insights into social realities, even when statistical validation is not possible. By adopting this method, I was able to derive valuable insights from individual cases and from broader issues within Indonesia's NSS. Denzin & Lincoln (2000) support this view, noting that qualitative research challenges the concept of an objective reality, and instead, prioritises understanding the world through the lived experiences of real people. Cupchik (2001) further emphasises the importance of examining events within a broader context to uncover the patterns and deeper meanings that shape social realities.

Despite some criticisms of qualitative research for potentially overlooking theoretical interpretation, I followed the guidelines suggested by Mays & Pope (1995) to ensure a rigorous research design that acknowledges the importance of theory in guiding the analysis. Cypress (2017) highlights the importance of maintaining validity and reliability at every stage of the study, from planning to evaluation, which I ensured through careful attention to detail and methodological rigor.

Reflexivity also played a crucial role in my research. Gasson (2004) explains that being self-aware and critically assessing personal biases is essential for minimising the potential influence of these biases on the research outcomes. I made it a priority to reflect on how my own experiences and preconceptions might shape my interpretation

of the data. In line with Lowe's (1995) advice, I employed a "guide" during data selection and initial analysis, which helped me identify and manage variables effectively, ensuring a more objective and balanced approach to the study. This thorough and reflective process was key to maintaining the credibility and integrity of my findings while exploring the complexities of Indonesia's NSS.

I focused on the personal experiences and insights of individuals directly involved in the security field. By conducting interviews and analysing texts, I was able to capture the real-life stories that reveal the social interactions and behaviours influencing security decisions, as Kvale (1996) suggests. This approach allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the policies, strategies, and risks faced by these individuals, highlighting their personal narratives and experiences, as emphasised by Creswell (2013). Through these stories, I could uncover the rationale behind the choices made in security policy, providing a richer perspective on the decision-making process.

Denzin & Lincoln (2000) suggest that qualitative research is vital for uncovering the deeper meanings and processes behind social issues. In the context of my research, this means that qualitative methods will help explore the underlying factors shaping Indonesia's NSS and how they evolve in response to social and political changes. Similarly, Patton (2015) emphasizes that qualitative research is essential for studying complex and changing situations. For my research, this approach is key to understanding how Indonesia's security policies adapt over time and how decision-makers perceive and respond to new risks and threats. Moreover, the personal narratives gathered alongside my research were crucial in capturing the perspectives of those directly involved in shaping security policy. As Schwandt (1998) emphasizes, incorporating stakeholder viewpoints is essential for developing a sustainable and

comprehensive NSS. This approach enhances my understanding of strategic challenges and contributes to policies that are more attuned to practical needs and on-the-ground realities.

Finally, the research findings on Indonesia's NSS placesignificant emphasis on methodological rigor throughout the analysis process.. Complete adopting a flexible approach, the study examines the subjective and socially constructed dimensions of national security in Indonesia. This perspective provides deeper insight into the evolution of Indonesia's NSS over time and strengthens the study's theoretical foundation while linking the findings to the lived experiences of those shaping the nation's security landscape.

3.4 Strategic Observations from Purposeful Sample and Stakeholder View Regarding Indonesia's NSS (1988–2024)

My research focused on studying the shifts within Indonesia's NSS between 1988 and 2024, with profound attention on maintaining confidentiality and transparency throughout the process. Towards achieve this purpose effectively and accurately, I involved stakeholders who play vital roles in shaping and influencing decisions concerning national security issues. By selecting participants through deliberate sampling methods, I managed to identify a sample that truly reflected the overall population and minimised the chances of any sampling errors. This approach, known as "non-random sampling" or "non-probability sampling", is particularly valuable for interpretive research, according to Hussain et al., (2013). It allows me to select participants based on their significance to the study, rather than relying on random selection.

I intentionally selected participants who possessed the necessary expertise and insights to contribute meaningfully to understanding the complexities of Indonesia's national security landscape. Rai & Thapa (2015) stress the importance of selecting individuals whose knowledge and experiences align with the research objectives, as this ensures that the data collected is both relevant and robust. By carefully considering the participants' professional backgrounds, roles, and their direct involvement in national security matters, I was able to focus on those who could provide a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the NSS. This methodical approach ensured that the individuals chosen were well-equipped to offer valuable perspectives and allowed me to explore the intricate dynamics at play within Indonesia's security framework, ultimately enhancing the reliability and depth of my research findings. The selection process aimed to gather insights from key stakeholders involved in national security policymaking, strategy formation, and operational implementation. Participants included:

- Military and law enforcement officials – towards specify firsthand perspectives on security priorities, institutional coordination, and threat perception.
- Government policymakers and legislators – concerning offer insights into legislative and policy frameworks guiding security governance.
- Academics and strategic analysts – aimed at providing theoretical and critical perspectives on security trends such as decentralization, and CMR.
- Private sector and civil society representatives – regarding analyse the role of public-private partnerships and civilian engagement in security governance.

Through choosing participants based on their roles and backgrounds, I was able to gather a diverse range of perspectives, as Bryman (2016) argues that purposeful

sampling is essential for capturing the multifaceted nature of social phenomena. This diversity ensured that all aspects of the NSS –social, military, political and economic – were explored in depth. To minimize selection bias, the study incorporated a diverse range of participants from different security sectors and institutions, including military officials, policymakers, law enforcement officers, academics, and civil society representatives. This approach ensured a broad spectrum of perspectives, strengthening the study's validity and depth. Participants were identified and approached through researcher professional networks, referrals, and official correspondence, ensuring their engagement was entirely voluntary and based on informed consent. These methods facilitated access to individuals with relevant expertise while maintaining the ethical integrity of the research process. I gathered a group of participants who are experts in the field of security, with careful consideration given to their respective roles and responsibilities within the domain. I also carefully selected participants with direct knowledge and access to sensitive information, aligning with Cohen et al., (2018) emphasising the importance of selecting individuals embedded in the context of the study, particularly for complex topics like national security. Their expertise and insider access were crucial for gaining a nuanced understanding of Indonesia's security apparatus. Following this selection process, I contacted them through phone call, emails, and join seminars. After explaining my intention, we made agreed for appointment to meet for interview or share the questioner through emails or phone for their respond. Further, questionnaires were distributed to the participants and later who provided written feedback. Some interviews were conducted individually directly face to face and with voice recorded. Other series of interviews were conducted within the groups cluster of participants.

Toward ensures a stance of independence in my study approach regarding defence and security matters of Indonesia, I chose to volunteer independently without affiliating with any official institutions in this field. The participants involved in my research were not given compensation; both they and I personally covered all related expenses to confirm their involvement was solely driven by their expertise and personal values rather than external incentives. Moreover, I took deliberate steps to warrant participants felt secure in sharing their experiences and insights by providing a safe, non- threatening environment. As Holloway & Wheeler (2010) suggest, creating a secure space fosters openness, which in turn enhances the trustworthiness and credibility of the research findings. This approach was essential in ensuring the data collected was genuine and reflective of participants' true perspectives

Maintaining confidentiality and anonymity was a priority throughout the research. Each of participants were assigned pseudonyms for identification purposes, and all data was handled with strict security measures to protect their identities and sensitive information. These ethical safeguards were essential in fostering trust and openness, allowing participants to share insights without concerns about potential repercussions. Furthermore, I ensured the ethical handling of sensitive information by guaranteeing participant anonymity, which Flick (2014) highlights as critical in high- risk research topics like national security. Thru safeguarding privacy, I was able to mitigate concerns about safety and exposure, encouraging participants to share their experiences without fear of retaliation. Finally, this approach improved the reliability of my findings, as Patton (2015) notes that when participants feel assured of confidentiality, they are more likely to provide honest and in-depth responses. Ultimately, this careful selection process and emphasis on ethical standards provided a solid foundation for analysing Indonesia's NSS and contributed to the robustness of my research outcomes.

I purposefully employed a targeted sampling approach in my study as a choice that aligned with my goal of providing a comprehensive and insightful understanding of Indonesia's NSS. By focusing on stakeholders and influential leaders, I managed to gather extensive and detailed information that authentically mirrors the diverse perspectives and involvement of individuals shaping the NSS landscape. This method enhanced the importance and precision of the outcomes and helped as an advisory for developing effective and thorough NSS for Indonesia.

Number	Positions	Dates	Place	Group Cluster
1	Police grand commissioner Adjunct	31/5 & 13/6- '22,	Polda Metro Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
2	First admiral Mod	31/5 & 20/6- '22	MOD Office, Jakarta	Government policymaker (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
3	Major general (ret) army	4/6 & 21/6 – '22	UnHan, Sentul	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
4	Vice admiral (ret) navy	5/6 & 8/6 – '22	MOD Office, Jakarta	Government policymaker (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
5	Rear admiral (ret) navy	23/6 & 20/7 – '22	Lemhannas, Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
6	Colonel air forces	29/5 & 17/6 – '22	UnHan, Sentul	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
7	Public notary	03/6 & 11/6 – '22	Private Ofiice, Jakarta	Private Sector and Civil Society Representatives
8	Colonel air forces	23/5 & 07/7 – '22	Halim, Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
9	Colonel air forces	07/6 & 25/7 – '22	Halim, Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
10	Police grand commissioner adjunct	01/8 & 31/8 – '22	R&D Police, Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
11	People assembly at provincial	13/8 & 15/8 – '22	Meranti, Sumatra	Government Policymakers and Legislators
12	Air marshal (ret) air force	12/8 & 16/8 – '22	Lemhannas, Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
13	Police grand commissioner adjunct	16/8 & 19/8 – '22	Police Academy, Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Police Officials</i>)
14	Scholar of university of Padjajaran	18/8 & 19/8 – '22	Private Ofiice, Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts
15	PresDir state own ammunition factory (ret)	01/8 & 21/8 – '22	Private Office, Jakarta	Private Sector and Civil Society Representatives
16	Brigadier general police (ret)	02/8 & 08/8 – '22	Coast Guard (BAKAMLA), Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
17	Vice admiral (ret) navy	15/8/'22	Coast Guard (BAKAMLA), Sukabumi	Military & Law Enforcement Official
18	Dean university of Pattimura	13/8 & 23/8 – '22	Maluku, Ambon, Sulawesi	Academics and Strategic Analysts
19	Scholar university of Jaya Raya	10/8 & 22/8 – '22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts
20	2nd admiral (ret) navy, Dean Defence university	21/8 & 05/9 – '22	UnHan, Sentul	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
21	Master student Defence university	22/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)

22	Master student Defence university	25/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
23	Master student Defence university	23/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
24	Master student Defence university	23/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
25	Master student Defence university	23/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
26	Master student Defence university	24/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
27	Master student Defence university	24/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
28	Master student Defence university	25/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
29	Master student Defence university	24/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
30	Master student Defence university	24/8/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>)
31	Member of Parliament	08/9 & 22/9 – '22	Jakarta	Government Policymakers and Legislators
32	Researcher to Member of Parliament	08/9 & 25/9 – '22	Jakarta	Government Policymakers and Legislators
33	Vice air marshal (chief of SAR)	22/9/'22	SAR office, Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
34	Member of Parliament	23/9/'22	Jakarta	Government Policymakers and Legislators
35	Professor Defence university	22/9/'22	UnHan, Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts
36	First admiral navy's inspectorate	28/9/'22	Navy HQ, Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
37	Rear admiral (ret) navy	12/10 & 31/10 – '22	Navy HQ, Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
38	Major general (ret) territorial command	2/11 & 10/11 – '22	Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
39	Lecturer at military academy, army colonel	07/11/'22	Jakarta	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)
40	Major general (ret) territorial commander	02/11 & 25/11 – '22	Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
41	Consular / Diplomat (ret)	21/11 & 2/12 – '22	Jakarta	Government Policymakers and Legislators
42	Police Commissioner (Inter Pol)	11/2/'23	Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
43	Inspector general (ret) police	7/8/22-6/9/'22	Jakarta	Military & Law Enforcement Official
44	Diplomat	4/1/'22	Jakarta	Government Policymakers and Legislators
45	Major general (ret) deputy chancellor Defence university	08/12/'22	Sentul	Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>)

Table 3.2 List of Participants: own construction

The individuals being interviewed is detailed in Table 3.2. This includes information about how the data was gathered during the interview, such as the individual's job title and location, as well as the date of the interview session. They are further quoted in

the text of the analysis, for example: “An army colonel explained that... (personal communication, July 11th, 2022, Jakarta)”.

3.5 Gathering Data Via Semi Conversations and Documented Strategic Observations in Indonesia's NSS

I carefully selected interviewees who held diverse perspectives and experiences related to the subject matter. This approach aligned with Smith's (2010) emphasis on purposive sampling, which was crucial to ensure that I gathered relevant insights from key stakeholders involved in the formulation and execution of national security policies. Aim to focusing on the most

pertinent research areas, I could delve deeper into the complex and multifaceted description of NSS. Additionally, I followed Maxwell's (2013) advice on developing a structured yet flexible interview process, which allowed me to adapt my questions in response to the participants' insights while maintaining rigor in data collection. Moreover, I found that Carmichael & Cunningham's (2017) emphasis on carefully selecting participants and staying focused on the research goals was crucial. This combination of carefully selected participants and a focused interview strategy ensured that the findings of my study were both accurate and credible, offering a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's evolving NSS.

I have conducted with 45 stakeholders using open-ended yet structured questions to balance flexibility and comparability across responses. Seidman (2006) highlights the importance of post-interview tasks, like detailed notetaking and asking thoughtful, purposeful questions, so I made it a priority to follow this advice. During my interviews, I used semi-structured conversations, which helped me dig deeper into the

participants' perspectives while maintaining a focused interaction, as suggested by Rubin & Rubin (2012). Following Anna (2013), I relied on formal interviews to capture the participants' personal stories and viewpoints, which allowed me to explore critical themes within the NSS. Hence, the interviewing allows for nuanced, in-depth discussions on national security matters. Similarly, ensured direct engagement with policymakers and security officials, capturing policy rationale and decision-making processes. This approach helped me draw connections between individual experiences and broader policy decisions, giving me a comprehensive understanding of how national security strategies are shaped and adapted over time in Indonesia.

Ethnographic fieldwork is a vital component of my research, drawing on Saldana's (2013) approach to immerse deeply in the lived experiences of participants. This method is invaluable in understanding the stories and social behaviours that shape national security policies, particularly within an interpretivist framework, as outlined by Geertz (1973). In conducting interviews, I focused on listening attentively and recording participants' narratives, rather than challenging them directly, which follows the principles of Spradley (1979) for active listening and respectful inquiry. By prioritising the voice of participants, and their real-life experiences, this approach allowed me to gather data that authentically represents their perspectives, offering deeper insights into how societal norms and individual experiences influence the shaping of Indonesia's NSS.

The trustworthiness of my research is reinforced by my hands-on approach and methodical strategy for gathering and analysing data, aligning with Lincoln & Guba's (1985) emphasis on rigorous and reflective research practices. I employed coding techniques inspired by Carmichael & Cunningham (2017) and Saldana (2016),

ensuring my conclusions stem solely from the collected data, free from external influences, as advised by Miles et al., (2014). For me, coding goes beyond merely organising information – it is about deeply understanding and deriving meaning from the complex details that emerge during interviews and observations, as Corbin & Strauss (2008) suggest. This thoughtful approach guarantees each piece of data contributes to a more nuanced and accurate portrayal of Indonesia's NSS.

In designing my research framework, I sought to prioritise efficiency in both managerial and methodological aspects to address the expansive scope of my study. This approach is aligned with the guidelines suggested by Spencer et al., (2003), who emphasise the integration of government evaluation techniques such as interviews, focus groups, and document analysis. These tools allowed me to engage with key stakeholders and collect diverse data that would inform a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's NSS. The framework is focused on theoretical advancements and aimed for practical, tangible outcomes, ensuring the research was applicable and would have a meaningful impact on policymaking. By adhering to these methods, as suggested by Yin (2018), I was able to maintain rigorous standards while providing concrete insights into how Indonesia's NSS could be enhanced and better assessed, thus contributing to more informed evidence-based policy decisions in the country. This structured approach facilitated the application of theoretical concepts in real-world settings, supporting the alignment of research findings with actionable outcomes in the realm of national security policy.

In exploring Indonesia's NSS, I found that qualitative research methods were invaluable in gaining a deeper understanding of the complex social, political, and institutional factors that shape security policies. As Denzin & Lincoln (2011) point out,

qualitative methods provide rich, nuanced insights into the experiences of individuals and communities, which allowed me to explore how various stakeholders – including government officials, military leaders, and local populations – play a role in the creation and implementation of security strategies. Merriam (2009) stresses that these methods are especially useful for uncovering the contextual factors, such as cultural and political influences, that impact decision-making in the NSS.

I recognised that engaging with stakeholders was crucial to ensuring access to valuable data and fostering collaboration with those directly involved in, or affected by, security policies, which Patton (2015) highlights in the context of purposeful sampling. Through my research, I recognised how Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) are correct in suggesting that qualitative techniques like ethnography provide a deep understanding of the lived experiences of communities impacted by security measures, revealing hidden factors that quantitative methods might miss. Focusing on these perspectives, I was able to contribute to crafting policies that are more culturally sensitive and ethically informed – helping shape an NSS that addresses the security needs of Indonesia and embraces the diversity and complexities of its society, as Stake (1995) advocates. Towards systematically analyse these insights, I employed coding methods to classify, interpret, and structure the data, allowing patterns to emerge that illuminate the interplay between security policies, institutional frameworks, and societal responses. Below is a table outlining the data coding process:

Periods	Question	Answer	Category	Code	Subcode 1	Subcode 2	Critics
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
ORBA	Q1: From your knowledge and experience, what were the main priorities for national security under the Soeharto government between 1990 and 1998?	Soeharto's government between 1990 and 1998 prioritized internal security stability to support national stability and accelerate development , especially in the economic sector . This security priority can be seen from policies such as the dual function of the Armed Forces, the Military Operations Area and so on. These policies have both positive and negative impacts on the life of the state including the increased stability and security of the Indonesian state , the people's needs for food, clothing, and housing are quite well met and national programs such as the Five-Year Development Plan (REPELITA) are running well, on the other hand the development is only centered in the capital city so that there is a large gap between urban and rural communities, there are many human rights violations, and there is a restriction on freedom of the press and opinion.	RQ-1 Priority	development	Internal Stability security,	Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita)	human right violation

Table 3.3 Sample of coding: own construction

The structured coding system in Table 3.3 is essential for effectively analysing Indonesia's NSS, as it helps organise responses and identify key themes across different time periods. According to Patton (2015), explains that organizing responses through thematic analysis is vital for recognizing patterns in the data and gaining deeper insights. This process allows me to uncover significant themes and trends, which is essential for understanding the evolving Indonesia's NSS.

The first column outlines the time periods under study and pairs them with specific research questions that address key inquiries for each era. The second column details the types of questions asked to participants, designed to elicit detailed responses, while the third column highlights crucial terms within these answers, shaping the interpretation of participants' views. Responses are then categorised according to research themes, ensuring alignment with the study's objectives and uncovering patterns within the NSS. As themes emerge, they are further expanded upon in the seventh column with subcategories that explore more specific concepts, enriching the analysis. Finally, the eighth column provides critical evaluation of the themes and

subcategories, allowing for deeper exploration of the implications and perspectives drawn from the data, which aids in reflecting on the broader outcomes of the research.

The next process, likewise, aimed at further strengthen the alignment between the data sources and the research objectives, the table below provides a detailed mapping of each participant group to the specific research questions they contribute to. This approach ensures that the insights gathered from each group are directly linked to the key areas of inquiry, offering a clearer understanding of how each participant's perspective informs the study. The first classification focuses on the period of Indonesia's NSS between 1988 and 1998. The analysis employs targeted queries to capture the research objectives. The following table outlines the set of questions designed to guide the research inquiries, which are further developed in Chapter 4, the empirical section.

Classification 1	Questions 2	Context 3	Participant Categories (Frequencies) 4
To address the subject of priority	(Q1): <i>From your knowledge and experience, what were the main priorities for national security under the Suharto government between 1988 and 1998?</i> Regarding the execution	Developmentalism, social order, foreign investment	Military & Law Enforcement Official (2). Academics and Strategic Analysts <i>(Also classified under Police Officials)</i> (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (1).
	(Q2): <i>From your experience, how is the development, implementation of security policies?</i>	Plan and policy execution, Values and IR Corruption and inequality, Economic issues	Military & Law Enforcement Official (2). Private Sector and Civil Society Representatives (1)
Considering the reason behind it	(Q2.A) - <i>And what do you think is the driving force behind the priority of National security under the Suharto government?</i>	Pluralism, National unity, Economic growth International relations & global influence	Military & Law Enforcement Official (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts <i>(Also classified under Military Officials)</i> (3). Academics and Strategic analysts (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts <i>(Also classified under Police Officials)</i> (1). Government Policymakers and Legislators (1)
Regarding the structure of the institution	(Q5): <i>How did the priorities, drivers and interpretations of national security threats under the Suharto regime impact? 1.National Security Strategy? 2.Collaboration/integration/fragmentation of various national security institutions?</i>	Structural weaknesses, Centralized and authoritative control, Militarized approach and strategic security issues ABRI Dual Function Policy	Military & Law Enforcement Official (4). Academics and Strategic Analysts <i>(Also classified under Police Officials)</i> (2). Academics and Strategic Analysts (2).

		Limited interagency collaboration and coordination	Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (2).
	(Q6): <i>What do you think about the image of national security policy making during the ORBA era? Is it fragmented or is there collaboration between agencies?</i>	Absolute, top-down policy Policy is integrated Clashes between the government and citizens. Policy formalisation, without support its implementation	Government policymaker (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Military & Law Enforcement Official (4). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (3). Government Policymakers and Legislators (1).
To approach several perspectives on threats	(Q3): <i>What is meant and classified into the definition of organized crime, terrorism, subversion, radical fighters, traditional conflicts, from the perspective of National Security under the Suharto regime?</i>	horizontal Conflict, dynamics of the conflict and separatism. subversion is an act against a legitimate government in Indonesia	Government policymaker (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (2). Military & Law Enforcement Official (1).
	(Q4): <i>To what extent is the understanding of organized crime, terrorism, subversion, traditional conflicts so that they can influence the formation of national security under the Suharto government?</i>	intelligence-led strategy approach, ideology of Pancasila as a means of suppression	Military & Law Enforcement Official (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (2). Academics and Strategic Analysts (1).
Comprehending the civic function and authority at that period	(Q7): <i>How did the transition from Authoritarianism to Democratisation influence the following, 1. National security strategy and priorities, 2. Interpretation of national security risks and threats, 3. Institutional and structural design of national security institution</i>	Civil Supremacy in Pseudo Democracy Democracy under the control of the authorities, the role of the executive being strong and dominant The legislature was a rubber stamp	Military & Law Enforcement Official (1). Government Policymakers and Legislators (2). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Military & Law Enforcement Official (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Civil Society Representative) (1).
Additional information	(Q8): <i>Please describe any significant events, policy and other key points that happened during this era to support your opinion.</i>	Civil and Human Right Issue	Government Policymakers and Legislators (2). Military & Law Enforcement Official (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Civil Society Representative) (1).

Table 3.4 Matrix Questioner's ORBA: own construction

Table 3.4 illustrates the investigation into four key research areas concerning Indonesia's NSS. The questions (Q) outlined in the second column are thoughtfully designed to capture diverse narratives related to the research topic. They are grouped and categorized into four main thematic domains, as highlighted in column one: defining security priorities, examining the structure governing security decision-making, interpreting risks and threats, and exploring civilian engagement in shaping national security policies. Based on the opinions shared by the participants categories

in column four, the analysis focuses on developing a unified theme, emphasized in column three, as the practical outcome of the research queries. However, since this method is semi-structured, it also incorporates varying viewpoints on the research queries and topics, allowing for the construction of diverse perspectives.

Moreover, using carefully crafted questions in a semi-formal structure, the second period of empirical analysis, presented later in Chapter 5, explores Indonesia's NSS from 1998 to 2014. This process focuses on answering the research questions, which are further elaborated in the exploration. Below is the table to address practicality on data gathering and construction of findings.

Classification 1	Questions 2	Context 3	Participant Categories (Frequencies) 4
To touch on the topic of priority	<i>S2. (Q2): What are the main priorities for National security under the post-Suharto era and under dispensation or exclusion by democracy?</i>	Dissolving Dual Function ABRI Regional Autonomy	Military & Law Enforcement Official (3). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Civil Society Representative) (1).
	<i>S1. (Q7.1): How is the transition from the new order era to reformation era in the following areas? National security strategies and priorities</i>	Habibi – East Timur Referendum Gus Dur – SSR Megawati – law & institutional reform SBY – external threats management	Government Policymakers and Legislators (4). Academics and Strategic Analysts (3).
Concerning the organisation of the institution	<i>S1. (Q7.3): How is the transition from the new order era to reformation era in the following areas? Institutional and structural patterns of national security institutions.</i>	National Armed Forces (TNI), the National Police (POLRI), and civilian oversight mechanisms Ambiguity of Military Law and Police Law Autonomous Institutions	Government policymaker (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (2). Government Policymakers and Legislators (3). Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Police Officials) (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (1). Military & Law Enforcement Official (1). Private Sector and Civil Society Representatives (1).
To gain insights from different viewpoints on threat topics	<i>S1. (Q7.2): How is the transition from the new order era to reformation era in the following areas? Interpretation of national security risks and threats.</i>	Wantanas (Defence Council) Lemhannas (National Resilience) Press freedom & social media	Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Government policymaker (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Military & Law Enforcement Official (3).
	<i>S2. (Q1): Did democratisation influence the Interpretation of National Security Risks and threats.</i>	Anti-terrorism laws DWP	Military & Law Enforcement Official (1).

			Government Policymakers and Legislators (1).
	S2. (Q5): To what extent do interpretations of organised crime, terrorism, subversion, and traditional conflict affect the understanding of national security threats under democracy in Indonesia?	Radical Ideology Criminal Acts of Terrorism Bilateral cooperation	Military & Law Enforcement Official (1). Government Policymakers and Legislators (1).
Understanding the civic role and power during that time	S2. (Q4): <i>What do you think is the picture of the relationship between civilians in the government and the TNI and the Police?</i>	Varying trust to TNI and INP Civil & military ties shortage of competency Reserve's security Component civilian oversight & security vulnerabilities.	Academics and Strategic Analysts (Also classified under Military Officials) (2). Government Policymakers and Legislators (2). Military & Law Enforcement Official (3). Government policymaker (Also classified under Military Officials) (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (1).

Table 3.5 Matrix Questioner's Reform: own construction

Table 3.5 displays the first column, which classifies the topics related to the research questions into categories. The first row prioritizes issues, followed by a detailed exploration of the institutional framework. Next, the articulation of awareness regarding risks and threats is addressed, and finally, the understanding of the civil role is examined. The second column outlines the structured questions (Q) used by the interviewer to gather specific details from the interviewees, categorized in column four and reorder according to the key research inquiries. Further, responses are systematically organized to explore unique viewpoints on the research topic, as indicated in column three. This approach may involve a mix of sectional or varied inquiries to examine different aspects related to the study subject. The thoughts expressed by participants in column four, are then categorized based on their beliefs, leading to the development of a unified theme.

In the final period of analysis, covering Indonesia's NSS from 2014 to 2024, the empirical practical analysis builds on partially structured design queries and academic data to enhance the understanding of current and relevant developments concerning Indonesia's NSS in the post-reform era, as presented in Chapter 6. Below is the table

of contents that guides the data collection process, which enables the answers to the research problem.

Classification 1	Questions 2	Context 3	Participant Categories (Frequencies) 4
To touch on the topic of priority	<i>S3. (4): Please describe any significant events, policy and other key points that happened during this era to support your opinion.</i>	State control over economy to save national interest Elite alliances dominating national policy	Military & Law Enforcement Official (2). Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>) (2). Private Sector and Civil Society Representatives (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Civil Society Representative</i>) (2). Academics and Strategic Analysts (1). Government Policymakers and Legislators (1).
Focusing on the security institutional structure	<i>S2. (Q3): Are there any links between democratisation in Indonesia, and changes in the organisation and design of national security institutions.</i>	National Security Bill's potential impacts CMR relations Centralised institutional design of maritime security	Government Policymakers and Legislators (1). Military & Law Enforcement Official (3). Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>) (4). Academics and Strategic Analysts (3).
To gain insights from different viewpoints on threat and risks interpretation	S3. (Q1): How does institutional interests (for example, of the armed forces, the policing bodies, the ministries, and other state institutions) determine the interpretation of national security risks and threats	Corruption and unequal treatment under the law The politicisation of legal system Power among elite groups	Government Policymakers and Legislators (2). Government policymaker (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>) (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>) (1).
	S3. (Q3): How do civilians interpret and manage security risks or threats?	The 2018 Terrorism Law Militarising domestic security	Government Policymakers and Legislators (4). Military & Law Enforcement Official (1).
Understanding the civic role in security's paradigm	S3. (Q2): Does the civil society influence the interpretation of national security risks?	Social media influence public perceptions Participatory Democracy CMR relations	Military & Law Enforcement Official (3). Academics and Strategic Analysts (2). Government Policymakers and Legislators (1). Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Military Officials</i>) (2). Academics and Strategic Analysts (<i>Also classified under Police Officials</i>) (1).

Table 3.6 Matrix Questioner's Post Reform: own construction

In Table 3.6, the first column represents the intended result classification obtained from the interviews. The second column contains a set of queries designed to guide the conversations and collect data on the subject. The third column provides the context derived from key details, such as the prevalence of similar concepts or unique

perspectives. The final column identifies the data sources, specifying the qualified representatives whose perspectives are considered valuable, categorized by participant type.

Nevertheless, the theoretical frameworks used in this research are crucial for guiding the direction of the analysis. Additionally, the findings of this thesis enrich the existing framework by presenting new examples of hypotheses, as emphasized in the previous chapter. To illustrate the connection between theory and data, Table 3.7 below presents the results gathered from real-world research, which involved purposeful interviews with participants selected in a non-random manner. This table serves as the foundation for developing a research approach, guided by the theoretical framework, to explore key themes and address the research questions.

No	Research Focus 1	Longitudinal Periodic 2					
		1988-1998 A		1998-2014 B		2014-2022 C	
		Theories 3	Summaries from Context 4	Theories 5	Summaries from Context 6	Theories 7	Summaries from Context 8
1	Priority & Determination	Developmentalism	Developmentalism - social order - foreign investment - Planning and policy execution - Ethical considerations - Corruption and inequality - Economic issues - Pluralism - National unity, Economic growth - International relations & global influence.	Decentralisation	Dissolving Dual Function ABRI, Regional Autonomy, Habib - East Timur Referendum, Gus Dur - SSR, Megawati - law & institutional reform, SBY - external threats management	Economic Nationalism Politic Oligarchy	State control over economy to save national interest, Elite alliances dominating national policy
2	Structure Design Institution	Centralisation	Structural weaknesses, Centralised and authoritative control, Militarised approach and strategic tools to security issues, ABRI Dual Function Policy, in defence, security, and non-defence (social, political and economic), Absolute, top-down policy Limited inter-agency collaboration and coordination, Security policy are not disintegrated Although, clashes between the government and citizens, Policy formalisation, without	Decentralisation	TNI separation with INP and civilian oversight mechanisms, Ambiguity of Military Law and Police Law, Autonomous Institutions	Politics Oligarchy	National Security Bill's potential impacts, CMR relations, Centralised institutional design of maritime security

			security offices to support its implementation				
3	Threat & Risks Interpretation	Centralisation	Horizontal Conflict - dynamics of the conflict and separatism - subversion is an act against a legitimate government in Indonesia - intelligence-led strategy approach - ideology of Pancasila as a means of suppression.	Public Trust - Public Competency	<i>Wantanas & Lemhannas</i> (competency building bodies) Press freedom & social media, Anti-terrorism laws, DWP, Radical Ideology, Criminal Acts of Terrorism, Bilateral cooperation	Politics Oligarchy	Corruption and unequal treatment under the law - The politicisation of legal system - Power among elite groups - The 2018 Terrorism Law
4	Civil Role	Pseudo Democracy	Civil Supremacy in Pseudo Democracy, Democracy under the control of the authorities, the role of the executive being strong and dominant, the legislature was a rubber stamp, Civil and Human Right Issue	Public Trust - Public Competency	Varying trust to TNI and INP, Civil & military ties - shortage of competency - Reserve's security Component - civilian oversight & security vulnerabilities.	Public Opinion	Militarising domestic security, social media influence public perceptions, Participatory Democracy, CMR relations

Table 3.7 Research Findings Framework: own construction

Table 3.7 illustrates the development of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024 by outlining research inquiries that later elaborate in chapter 7. The findings of this research offer a comprehensive examination of the development of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024, structured across three periods: 1988-1998, 1998-2014, and 2014-2024 shown in the longitudinal table which also containing summaries of relevant theories. These theories are important for the research focus as they are based on the themes found in the data collection and help in summarising the research to answer specific questions. The research focusses on four key areas: prioritisation, institutional structure design, interpretation of threats and risks, and civilian involvement in the national security process, shows in column 1. The table shows the successful outcomes of this research and brief of the result illuminates in following passages.

In the first period (1988-1998), the prioritisation of Indonesia's NSS was heavily influenced by developmentalism, with a focus on maintaining social order,

encouraging foreign investment, and driving economic growth. However, this period also saw significant challenges such as corruption, inequality, and economic issues. As the country moved into the second period (1998-2014), there was a shift toward decentralisation. This transition, particularly under the presidencies of Habibie, Gus Dur, Megawati, and SBY, led to increased regional autonomy and reforms in the military and national institutions. This period also witnessed the rise of economic nationalism and the increasing role of political oligarchies, where elite alliances began to significantly influence national policy decisions. By the final period (2014-2024), decentralisation continued to be a dominant theme, with an emphasis on civilian involvement and military reforms.

The institutional structure of Indonesia's NSS evolved over the three periods, moving from a centralised, militarised approach in the early years to more decentralised and civilian-focused mechanisms in the later years. During the 1988-1998 period, the centralisation of power and the dual function of the Indonesian military (ABRI) led to a top-down policy structure with limited inter-agency collaboration. This created a system where security policies were often not well integrated, leading to clashes between the government and citizens. In the subsequent periods (1998-2024), decentralisation efforts were implemented, such as the separation of the Indonesian National Police (INP) from the military (TNI) and the introduction of civilian oversight mechanisms. However, challenges persisted, particularly around the ambiguity of military and police laws and the autonomy of different security institutions.

The interpretation of threats and risks in Indonesia's NSS also shifted significantly over the periods. In the early years (1988-1998), threats were interpreted through a centralised, intelligence-led strategy focused on preventing separatism, subversion,

and horizontal conflicts. The ideology of Pancasila was used as a tool for suppressing dissent. As the country progressed into the second and third periods, there was an increasing focus on public trust and competency in managing national security. Issues such as terrorism, radical ideologies, and criminal acts became more prominent, with political oligarchies and corruption also emerging as significant risks undermining the effectiveness of security policies.

Finally, the role of civilians in shaping Indonesia's NSS has evolved over time. In the early period, the country operated under a pseudo-democracy, where civil supremacy was constrained, and the executive held considerable power. Civil and human rights issues were often sidelined. As Indonesia moved into the later periods, there was a gradual shift towards greater civilian involvement in national security. However, trust in the TNI and INP remained varied, and the role of civilian oversight continued to face challenges. Public opinion, influenced by social media and the militarisation of domestic security, played an increasingly significant role in shaping perceptions of national security. Finally, the findings in chapter 7, highlight the complex and evolving Indonesia's NSS, shaped by a range of political, military, and civilian influences over the past several decades. The research underscores the importance of decentralisation, civilian oversight, and the changing interpretation of threats and risks in shaping the future direction of Indonesia's NSS.

3.6 Exploring Strategic Patterns and Insights through Thematic Content Analysis (TCA)

Data in this study was meticulously coded and categorized to uncover patterns in security governance, with focus on CMR, security decision-making and its effectiveness. Towards achieve this, I adopted a qualitative methodology, specifically Thematic Content Analysis (TCA), as outlined by Braun & Clarke (2006). This systematic approach facilitates the identification and analysis of patterns within qualitative data, offering a clear framework for exploring the complexities of Indonesia's NSS. The flexibility and rigor of TCA, as discussed by Vaismoradi et al., (2013), make it an ideal method for studying phenomena that are context-specific and multifaceted, such as those found in national security governance.

Towards further structure the analysis, I incorporated Boyatzis's (1998) techniques for developing consistent coding systems. This ensured that the coding process remained aligned with the research inquiries and the specific objectives of the study. Through using this approach, I was able to systematically examine and explore key themes within Indonesia's NSS, including shifting priorities, institutional, the changing interpretations of security threats and the role of CMR. Ultimately, this methodology provides a robust framework for gaining deeper insights into the complex dynamics of Indonesia's national security, shedding light on how these elements have evolved over time.

The research process begins with semi-structured interviews and conversations designed to elicit nuanced responses relevant to the research questions. These are followed by systematically identifying, categorising, and organising themes, as guided

by Guest et al., (2012). This approach allows for a comprehensive and contextually sensitive analysis of the diverse factors shaping Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024.

Other scholars such as Flicks (2013), Humble & Moselius (2022), Sandelowski & Leeman (2012), Graneheim & Lundman (2004), and Peterson (2017) emphasised that qualitative research heavily relies on thorough data analysis to draw meaningful conclusions from the raw information. Various qualitative methodologies such as content analysis and narrative analysis are employed in my research endeavours to explore perspectives and uncover valuable insights. Understanding these methods is essential for interpretations within written texts and establishing a foundation for the research – based on the data – to understand the meanings of text beneath the surface and anchoring the study firmly in the context of the data.

Aim to ensures the accuracy and reliability of the study's conclusions, content analysis is employed as a systematic method for identifying and addressing inaccuracies or inconsistencies within the data, as highlighted by Sparker (2005). This approach facilitates the verification of data and enhances the depth of analysis by breaking down complex experiences into smaller, more manageable components. By examining these parts, the analysis reveals patterns and underlying meanings that might otherwise remain obscured. Bogna et al., (2020) emphasise that this strategy is particularly effective in validating insights gathered from interviews and group discussions, as it ensures interpretations are grounded in evidence while capturing the nuanced dynamics of participants' experiences. In the context of analysing Indonesia's NSS, this technique is instrumental in refining the data collected, enabling a robust and meaningful exploration of the factors shaping the strategy.

Anderson (2007) highlights that TCA is a valuable tool in qualitative research methods, such as interviews and narrative studies, as it involves categorising and identifying patterns within data to extract insights that align with research objectives. Armboost (2017) further emphasises that coding serves as a powerful technique for simplifying complex text structures, enabling researchers to effectively make sense of intricate data. In this study, organising all collected data systematically and identifying key themes ensures the analysis addresses multiple research questions concurrently. Once the major themes are identified, these are cross-referenced with the research questions outlined at the start of the study, ensuring coherence and alignment with the original objectives (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Adjustments are made throughout the process to ensure the findings remain relevant and accurately to address the research goals. This approach provides a structured framework to analyse Indonesia's NSS, enabling meaningful insights into the institutional and socio-political dynamics shaping its evolution from 1988 to 2024.

Thematic analysis offers a robust approach to content analysis, allowing me to explore the meaning of text within its context, as emphasised by Loff & Yardley (2004). Mill (2015) underscores the critical role of context in data analysis, highlighting how it shapes participants' perceptions and significantly influences the quality of the study. Similarly, Vaismoradi et al., (2013) describe how research results can evolve along a spectrum from description to interpretation, enriching analytical depth. By integrating these perspectives, I can effectively identify and assess patterns within the data, enabling a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's NSS. Employing content analysis in this research is instrumental in uncovering key themes, trends, and underlying assumptions, as well as critically evaluating ideas. Guided by Braun & Clarke (2006), this approach enhances the study's framework, offering a valuable lens

to examine the intricate and ever-changing security challenges from 1988 to 2024 that define Indonesia's NSS.

DIAGRAM OF ANALYSIS PROCESS




Diagram 3.2 Analysis Process, Source: own construction.

Diagram 3.2 outlines an organised approach to analysing the evolution of Indonesia's NSS through structured coding and thematic analysis process. This method plays a role in studying the NSS throughout different historical eras and allows me to explore key research questions.

This research begins by categorising Indonesia's NSS into three dimensions: "Means or Components," "Ways or Concept," and "Ends or Objectives," as illustrated in Diagram 3.2. These classifications are essential for structuring the analysis, as they represent distinct yet interconnected facets of the NSS, each requiring focused investigation to achieve comprehensive understanding of its evolution. By breaking

down the NSS into these dimensions, the study systematically addresses the complexity of national security policies, ensuring a detailed examination of resources (Means), strategic approaches (Ways), and intended goals (Ends). Braun & Clarke (2006) provide the framework for thematic content analysis, which is applied here to identify patterns and relationships across these dimensions. Saldaña (2013) further supports this process with coding techniques that allow for iterative and layered analysis, ensuring the study effectively responds to its research questions regarding the evolution of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024. For instance, the "Means or Components" group encompasses subcategories like Government, Organisation, Individual, Technology, Rules, and Framework. Understanding these segments of Indonesia's NSS is essential for grasping the factors and instruments that have influenced its direction and the scope of its impact. As Miles et al., (2014) suggest, an effective analysis of any complex system, such as the NSS, requires a detailed understanding of its components and how they interact within the broader context.

Within the "Ends or Objectives" dimension of the NSS, the strategy encompasses a broad range of goals that span social dynamics, political reforms, technological advancements, environmental concerns, and legal frameworks. These objectives are interconnected, reflecting the evolving nature of national security in Indonesia, where issues such as political stability, technological progress, environmental sustainability, and legal development play critical roles. Analysing these objectives allows for a more nuanced understanding of how the NSS adapts to contemporary challenges and anticipates future ones, thereby shaping the nation's security priorities and strategic responses.

The process of coding plays a pivotal role in my thematic analysis, as it allows me to assign specific codes and subcategories to the data, helping me identify and explore recurring themes and sub-themes. As Saldana (2016) notes, personalising this process is essential for uncovering the deeper layers within the data and gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying patterns. This is crucial for my study of Indonesia's NSS, as I aim to trace the evolution of various aspects of the strategy across three distinct periods: the authoritarian era (1988–1998); the reform era (1998–2014); and the post-reform era (2014–2024). Throughout this journey, I focus on key aspects such as national security priorities, the design and structure of institutions, risk evaluation, threat perception, and the involvement of civil society in shaping the NSS. Drawing on the work of Gioia et al., (2012), I maintain a consistent thematic thread across these timeframes, ensuring that my analysis captures both the continuity and transformation of Indonesia's NSS. This approach helps me align the components, providing a deeper and more nuanced perspective on how the NSS has evolved over those years.

Having a well-organised approach is crucial for working through the research questions in this study. By carefully sorting and analysing the NSS data sets, I aim to uncover how the strategy has adapted to the ever-changing societal, political, and economic landscapes of Indonesia. Using TCA is particularly helpful in this process, as it allows me to explore both the surface-level details and the deeper, overarching themes that have shaped the development of the NSS over time. Braun & Clarke (2006) emphasise how TCA helps identify these patterns, which is what I need to understand the evolution of Indonesia's NSS. By applying these methods, my thesis aims to deepen scholarly understanding of Indonesia's NSS and provides valuable insights that can inform future studies and policy development. As Yegidis et al.,

(2018) suggest, the findings of research can guide the direction of future work and policy creation, making the analysis, as an academic exercise, something that can influence real-world decisions and strategies.

3.7 Navigating Challenges in Analysing Indonesia's NSS

Participants for this study were recruited through a purposive sampling method, targeting individuals with relevant expertise and experience in NSS. The process began with identifying key stakeholders, including government officials, military personnel, security experts, academics, and representatives from civil society. I approached potential participants with a clear explanation of the study's objectives, emphasizing the importance of their input in shaping a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's security governance. Invitations were sent via email or formal letters, with follow-up phone calls to confirm their participation and address any queries. Towards ensure the credibility and diversity of perspectives, participants were selected from distinctive sectors, ensuring a range of viewpoints, from policy makers to academic experts, analysts and practitioners. I sought to engage individuals who could provide insights on official security policies as well on the practical realities of security governance and the CMR in Indonesia.

Although my fieldwork study on Indonesia's NSS, conducted in Jakarta, faced several unique challenges, particularly given the sensitive nature of security as a research topic. One, as an academic from an international university working in this context, I recognized how societal norms and expectations shaped my interactions with participants particularly in the form of scepticism regarding nationalism—whether I was perceived as part of the collective "us" or as an outsider, a "they". Additionally, Acker (1992) and Ely et al., (1997) highlight how gender dynamics, especially in male-

dominated environments like the military, can influence the transparency of responses and the depth of interaction. In this case, usually the prevalence of male dominance within the military setting sometimes made it difficult to establish the level of trust needed for open and candid discussions. This dynamic may have inadvertently impacted the richness and complexity of the data to collect, presenting a barrier to fully understanding the nuances of the NSS. Recognising and navigating these gendered power structures was vital to ensure a more comprehensive understanding of the security landscape in Indonesia. While in some degree, I also encounter cultural and gender-related dynamics that affected participant interactions, as well as access and trust issues that complicated data collection.

However, drawing on two decades of experience as a practitioner working closely with military and law enforcement institutions, I have cultivated strong relationships with cultural familiarity, customs and tradition as proportionately a deep understanding of the military, law enforcement and government environments and personnel. This background provided me with a unique perspective, allowing me to navigate and grasp the complex nuances of the NSS. Although, as Denzin & Lincoln (2011) note, close ties can introduce potential biases, shaping interpretations and interactions with participants in ways that may not always be fully objective. Nevertheless, as a researcher with previous work experience in the defence and security sectors, I was aware of the potential biases resulting from my existing connections in the field. I sought out other perspectives and interacted with different participant groups to lessen them and either to confirm or contradicting the points to give sense of affirmation and assertion. This made my research objective and balanced, presenting a well-rounded perspective by contrasting official narratives with scholarly critiques.. Through operating this strategy, I was able to avoid depending entirely on the opinions of my

network. This approach, in line with Hammersley & Atkinson's (2007) focus on researcher reflexivity, helped me address potential biases and enrich my understanding of the NSS, allowing me to capture a broader range of experiences and insights. I was careful to consider a variety of viewpoints and critically assess how these personal influences could shape my understanding of the Indonesia NSS, ensuring a comprehensive and objective study.

Similarly, I recognised that as a researcher who are local to the context, might face the risk of having their perspectives influenced by their proximity to the subject matter. As Miller & Dingwall (1997) point out, closeness could lead to unintentional bias, perhaps favouring official accounts. To address this, I made efforts to remain vigilant throughout the research process. Reflecting on Maxwell's (2013) advice, I continuously examined how my own experiences and background, particularly my ties to the military and law enforcement, might affect my analysis. I also applied one critical approach to enhance the accuracy and reliability of my findings by engaging in self-reflection, considering my preconceptions and preferences, which helped me maintain objectivity throughout the research process. As Lincoln & Guba (1985) advise, soliciting feedback from colleagues and peers was another vital step to ensure the thoroughness of my research methods. Their guidance on maintaining rigor through constant reflection and external validation played a significant role in the integrity of my analysis. Furthermore, the methodological choices I made, such as incorporating formal interviews and purposeful non-random sampling, came with advantages and challenges that I had to navigate. Patton (2015) emphasises how formal interviews can offer a deep dive into diverse viewpoints, and I found this to be true. The interviews allowed me to gain thorough, nuanced insights, however the richness of the data also introduced variability in responses, making it difficult at times to standardize

interpretations.. Similarly, purposeful non-random sampling, enable me to focus on specific groups that I believed would provide valuable insights. However, as Yegidis et al., (2018) highlight, this approach carries the risk of selection partiality, making me conscious of the extent to which my conclusions could be generalized.. Recognizing these challenges, I took deliberate steps to balance the depth of insights with the need for broader applicability. This involved carefully structuring my interview questions to maintain consistency while allowing space for diverse perspectives to emerge. Additionally, I cross-validated findings by comparing participant narratives with secondary sources, ensuring that my interpretations remained grounded in a well-rounded understanding of the research context. While these methodological choices were instrumental in addressing my research questions, I remained mindful of their inherent limitations—some being too broad, others too specific—and worked to mitigate these issues to uphold the robustness and reliability of my findings.

Moreover, accessing data from military and government personnel proved to be a significant challenge due to the sensitive nature of their operations, with key information often out of reach because of security and confidentiality concerns. Similarly conducting research within military and policy institutions posed challenges due to hierarchical structures and institutional gatekeeping. I encountered ethical challenges when it came to accessing classified security information, although some of sources willing to handout exclusive presentation, confidential document analysis during their duty. Generally, to navigate this, I focused on utilizing publicly available data and expert-validated insights, ensuring the integrity of my research while maintaining compliance with ethical standards. This approach helped mitigate biases and ensured that my findings were both comprehensive and ethically sound.

The qualitative techniques I employed, such as TCA analysis, allowed me to uncover nuanced perspectives on Indonesia's NSS. TCA played a crucial role in uncovering and understanding the key themes in my data analysis process. However, the coding process itself was not simple, and avoiding premature interpretations was a complex task that required meticulous attention. Braun & Clarke (2006) emphasise how essential it is to maintain coherence and credibility during this process, and I was aware of this in my own work. While TCA allowed me to explore patterns in the data, I faced theoretical uncertainties that stemmed from employing abductive reasoning, which led me to generate insights based on patterns, and then work backwards to explain them. Tavory & Timmermans (2014) caution that this approach can limit the ability to generalise findings beyond the specific context of the research. This was an important consideration for me, as it reminded me to be mindful of the scope of my conclusions and the potential constraints of my study's specific context when interpreting the results. Furthermore, as Creswell & Poth (2016) highlight, technological challenges occasionally arose during both the data collection and analysis stages of the study. Methodological restrictions and practical difficulties, such as time consuming in empirical analysis process and technological hurdles with Nvivo being not practically reliance to capture complete and details participants giving their perspectives, thus added to the complexity of my research.

Throughout my research, I encountered several real-world obstacles that presented significant challenges, particularly in terms of time constraints, the geographical distance between the research location and the university, and issues with participant availability. These logistical difficulties were compounded by financial limitations, which required me to carefully manage my resources. These encounters necessitated meticulous planning and strategic resource management to ensure the study's

outcomes were as reliable and effective as possible. Despite obstacles, I was dedicated to upholding the quality and integrity of my study, negotiating limitations without sacrificing the breadth of my analysis. I made use of rigorous methodological approaches and reflective practices to guarantee the validity and comprehensiveness of my research.

4.0 Indonesia's NSS under "New Order" (ORBA era) 1988-1998

The period known as the "New Order," or Order Baru (ORBA) in Indonesian, and for this thesis, is analysed from 1988 to 1998, and was marked by an intricate blend of social, economic, and political, shaping its governance structure which is extensively explored in this chapter. This segment meticulously investigates the shift from rule to democratic principles by scrutinising key elements such as the focus on national security, power centralisation in security frameworks, and the risks and dangers management and the involvement of civilian participation, with thorough scrutiny.




DIAGRAM 4.1 ORBA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Diagram 4.1 Orba's NSS: own construction.

The argument in this chapter is highlighting the significance of ideology of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution in showcasing the constitutionality of Indonesia's governance system. Illustrates by the 4.1 diagram the direction of ORBA's NSS. ORBA

exercised control over the Armed Forces (known as *ABRI*) and various other aspects of the country including politics, economy, and social dynamics. The Military– Industrial Complex was driven by interests of the regime. *ORBA* is marked by capitalism and power elites similar to other nations with a strong military presence. The NSS was integrated into policy structures like *Repelita* and *GBHN* that were regularly issued starting from 1969 (People’s Consultative Assembly, 1969) incorporating the concept of national strategy for the priority and structures. These documents guided the nation’s approach to security and development issues.

Suharto’s *ORBA* in Indonesia introduced Law No 20 of 1982 as part of its security measures with the establishment of the "Total Peoples Defence and Security System," known as *SISHANKAMRATA*. This policy sanctioned participation in civilian matters through the dual function or *dwifungsi* (in Indonesian) doctrine and merged civilian and military responsibilities in safeguarding national defence. This law concentrated power in the President’s hands as the military leader and reinforced the military’s influence, over Indonesian politics (Sebastian, 2006; Kingsbury, 2018).

This chapter breaks down the examination of the research question into four sections. Starting with understanding the importance of security during the *ORBA* era and how developmentalism program of the government played a key role in driving national security by prioritising economic growth. This approach has its pros and cons – including its reliance on borrowing from abroad and embracing globalisation. The impact is learnt under the lens of developmentalism philosophy, to understand the political gaps, with the challenges of balancing economic growth with ethical considerations and international diplomacy. Indonesia’s NSS was influenced by an approach that emphasises economic progress through government strong

involvement. Following Rostow's (1960) development stages as a framework for this state led tactic aimed at rapid economic advancement mirrors Hirschman's (1970), on the importance of balancing market and non-market aspects. Chang (2002) critics of economics and the developmental agenda sparked innovative methods that questioned the norms established by wealthy nations. However, it also resulted in the concentration of power and wealth in a group through extractive institutions exacerbating inequality according to Acemoglu & Robinson (2012). Inefficiencies and corruption hindered the government's efforts to promote diversification through policies, like Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) as noted by Singer (1998) and Prebisch (2016). Sen (2000) argues that this approach favoured the elite's interests ultimately contributing to the downfall of the government. Therefore, Suharto's developmental policies increased both inequality and authoritarianism while aiming to boost Indonesia's economy.

During this era in Indonesia, centralised security decision making and implementation was focused on elite military and political institutions as described by Fukuyama (2011). The theory of structure highlights the concentration of political power in a single authority which can boost administrative efficiency and brings up issues regarding accountability and erosion of democratic values. The control by political elites was apparent in Indonesia's security decision making process during that period. Centralisation has had impacts on democracy and institutions by weakening democratic processes and reducing the involvement of civilian agencies in decision making processes and national security matters.

Furthermore, the analysis of risks and threats in the narrative of *ORBA's* NSS in Indonesia illustrates how the concentration of power within the executive and military

elite influenced the assessment, interpretation, and handling of national security risks. The centralised authority tended to interpret and address these threats by suppression over negotiation or resolution. According to Linz (2000) and Lipset (1959) the concept of centralisation emphasises that centralised and authoritarian regimes tend to limit diversity and decrease public involvement in decision making processes which results in a narrow focus, on national security driven by elites.

Throughout history the Indonesian government-maintained rule under the guise of democracy. The concept of pseudo democracy theory highlighted by Dahl (1971) and Mounk (2018) refers to systems in which democratic procedures appear to surface and fail to reflect the desires of the population. In scenarios where governmental influence lurks beneath the appearance and opposition is stifled by the military's involvement in civilian affairs the essence of politics and civil liberties suffers a decline. At the end of the era, eventual pushback from movements and protests challenged the administration's pseudo democratic practices, leading to a shift towards a government that embodies true democracy.

4.1 Identifying NSS's prime focus, in Indonesia During the ORBA Era

4.1.1 Exploring Indonesia's Goal of Economic Growth Through Security in ORBA's Era

During the ORBA era, Indonesia's NSS gave economic developmentalism top priority, closely corresponding with Polanyi's (1944) idea of the "embedded economy," which emphasises the relationship between markets and social and political contexts. According to Chang (2002), this strategy frequently resulted in the consolidation of power among the political elite, which fostered corruption and inefficiencies. Although Block (2008) believes the purpose of state interventions in the economy was to foster

development and to uphold sovereignty, which was a crucial objective for Indonesia in the ORBA era. McVey (1996, 1999) and King's (1982) perspectives on Indonesia's development and stability during President Suharto's reign emphasise the historical and philosophical link between economic progress and stability. They highlight the blending of developmentalism with NSS, sacrificing liberties for strong governance, and the relationship between development efforts and security initiatives, as emphasised by Chalmers (1997). The state sought to establish its dominance over the political and economic spheres in order to preserve stability and security within the country.

A former rear admiral noted (personal communication, 31st October 2022, Jakarta) that during Suharto's era the "Development Order," also known as *Orde Pembangunan* in Indonesian, coined development as synonymous with stability. It focused on drawing in investments by establishing a climate with modest wages instead of giving priority to anti-corruption measures and robust legal structures. This strategy mirrored the beliefs of developmentalism that argue economic progress is crucial for attaining domestic stability and fostering a conducive atmosphere for international investments to foster economic advancement. The police commissioner mentioned (personal communication, 11th February 2023, Jakarta) that Suharto focused more on maintaining stability rather than implementing extensive reforms in governance since he believed that political and social order were crucial for economic progress. Critics observed by scholars such as Putro (2020) and Putri et al., (2022) stressed the significance of a national environment for the improvement of economic prosperity should, along with advancements in industry and education, benefit society.

Developmentalism emphasises the importance of utilising local resources to support emerging industries and government involvement in economic progress (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). Indonesia's industrialisation strategy, Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), faced challenges due to inefficiencies and corrupt practices, leading to disparities during the ORBA era. ISI was implemented to promote local industries and reduce reliance on foreign products, aligning with Prebisch and Singer's (1998) idea of trade agreements for developing nations. ISI was part of a larger economic development blueprint aimed at building a stronger and more adaptable economy.

Suharto's initiative known as the "Security for Prosperity " sought to establish a sense of stability to foster progress; however, this approach often resulted in centralised authority and limited advancements in political and social reforms in favour of prioritising economic results over democratic ideals and responsibility. The specific example provided in the "Security for Prosperity" blueprint by a police grand commissioner adjunct (personal communication, 31st August 2022, Jakarta) illustrates how Suharto's agenda connected security with economic endeavours by fostering a safe environment beneficial to the growth of agriculture and livestock, crucial sectors within Indonesia's economy. This approach highlights the emphasis of developmentalism, on utilising security measures to boost growth even at the expense of governance norms and legal structures.

Suharto's "Security for Prosperity" initiative was a feature of his leadership during the ORBA era. He frequently discussed the importance of this program in his national addresses and talks with military and business groups (Crouch, 1978; Elson, 2001; Liddle, 1996). The idea was emphasised through different speeches and official

documents released during Suharto's leadership period — particularly within the framework of the Five-Year Development Plans (*Repelita*). Although there was not a document called "Security for Prosperity " these papers and speeches together outlined and put into action the approach of connecting national security to economic wellbeing, under Suharto's *ORBA* rule.

The document known as "Broad Outlines of State Policy" (*GBHN*) played a role in shaping Indonesia's policies during the *ORBA* period, under President Suharto. The *GBHN* acted as the blueprint for guiding the country's growth and governance. It laid out the long-term vision set by the People's Consultative Assembly (*MPR*) updated every five years. This framework aimed to steer the nation towards progress as outlined in the *Repelita*. Additionally, a senior police commissioner (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) pointed out that following the *GBHN* guidelines set by Suharto's administration included initiatives to boost progress and social changes while enhancing security measures to tackle the economic hurdles left from the previous administration. Moreover, a former Territorial Commander (personal communication, 11th November 2022, Jakarta) detailed the government's approach by highlighting efforts in securing foreign investments and implementing the *Repelita* to ensure fair distribution of development projects:

“The ORBA government successfully obtained significant foreign aid to support these initiatives, which played a crucial role in the Repelita. The injection of international funds played a vital role in financing diverse development initiatives and alleviating the negative impacts of inflation and debt. These endeavours demonstrated a calculated strategy to utilise global assistance to promote domestic development and ensure stability.”

The emphasis on attracting investments and strategies for fostering economic advancement is considered to work hand in hand effectively. Nevertheless, this strategy is in line with theories of developmentalism although critics cite the reliance on financial aid for economic progress and suggest that it exposes economies to vulnerabilities and impedes sustained advancement over time, hence the country's inability to achieve self-sustained growth (Kay, 1989; So, 1990). Initially, the principles of developmentalism promote a focus on growth by highlighting the significance of nurturing local industries and decreasing dependence on overseas investments.

The developmental approach in Indonesia's security system often prioritised security strategies over democratic governance and legal accountability according to a professor from Jaya Bay University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta). Similarly, Bardhan's (2010) study of development strategies in China and India reveals how centralised authoritarian governments prioritise progress over democratic practices. This tactic mirrored the authoritarian governance style prevalent in East Asian nations, emphasising centralised control and governance complexities (Higgott & Robison, 1985).

There is a debate among scholars regarding the development strategies implemented by the *ORBA* government in Indonesia. Some argue that initiatives such as "Father of Development" and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia promoted norms and agricultural modernisation while fostering economic advancement along with social and political harmony (Nugroho, 2018; Putri et al., 2022). Conversely, Rahmawati (2022) suggests that initially the goals of promoting economic growth ensuring fair development and maintaining national stability were achieved. Although at the end of *Repelita* the development plan faltered due to corruption, illegal practices, and

inadequate institutional structures that ultimately led to economic turmoil, simultaneously causing the disappearance of state funds and a peak in foreign debt, finally the downfall of the ORBA regime (Rahmawati, 2022; Purwanto, 2019; Fareza, 2016; Nugroho, 2014). This indicates that focusing on growth at the expense of inclusive and sustainable governance could be detrimental as per the developmental approach.

The complex connection among security protocols political steadiness and financial progress during Suharto's tenure showcases the impacts of ruling by the elite class and corrupt practices. It also underlines the link between economic strategy and security measures for maintaining national stability. A previous head director at a government owned military's industry (personal communication, 21st August 2022, Jakarta) underscores Suharto's emphasis on security to secure economic stability pointing out the administration's concentration on resources and defence structures:

“During the ORBA administration, certain economic drivers received assistance, but this support was primarily directed towards well-known business figures such as Ciputra, Bob Hasan, Prayogo Pangestu, and Lim Sioe Liong (Sudomo Salim). These individuals established large-scale enterprises, capitalising on their strong connections to the regime and maintaining their wealth and influence long after the ORBA period. The sustained success of these wealthy entrepreneurs, achieved in the later years of ORBA's rule, is frequently linked to undisclosed illegal holdings in nations such as Singapore and widespread corruption within various government agencies.”

At the time of the ORBA under Suharto, Indonesia's economy was dominated by crony capitalism, where the state aligned with military and oligarchic interests, particularly

large landowners and corporate elites. Moore's (1966) analysis is highly relevant to understanding Indonesia's political transitions and the role of elites. This method questions the lack of effectiveness and the domination of government efforts by a select few individuals like Suharto and his family members in official endeavours. This situation shows how developmental strategies can worsen disparities and problems in governance when manipulated by powerful elites.

In summary, the developmental strategy adopted in Indonesia's NSS during the *ORBA* period brought about economic progress and national stability, however frequently neglected the need for holistic governance improvements resulting in centralised authority, social and economic inequalities, and rampant corruption. Robison (1986) suggests that the focus on dominance and the integration of economic and security measures by the *ORBA* regime worsened governance issues. The regime's downfall was a result of this strategy that highlighted the dangers of focusing on success at the expense of inclusive and long-lasting governance (Higgott & Robison, 1985).

4.1.2 Developmentalism as Catalyst, to Understand Driving Force in Prioritization of ORBA's National Security

The application of the developmentalism concept of philosophy to elucidate Indonesia's NSS during the *ORBA* period, demonstrates an interaction between economic advancement and the nation's security goals (Rostow, 1960; Hirschman, 1970; Chang, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Sen, 2000). This highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach when viewed within the framework of leadership by elites, and reliance on entities. This section provides an examination of Indonesia's primary security concerns through the perspective of developmentalism and contributes to the conversation on governance, development, and security.

Under *ORBA*, the government in Indonesia focused on ensuring stability to enhance national security measures. A former Territorial Commander (personal communication, 11th November 2022, Jakarta) underscored the importance of maintaining a well-managed state budget to tackle inflation and foreign debt challenges in the country during the 1980's. This viewpoint resonates with the principle of developmentalism that emphasises on how economic stability plays a key role in bolstering national security. The government's commitment to maintaining discipline and effectively managing the economy is geared towards establishing a steady foundation that fosters growth and attracts investment opportunities — a reflection of the belief in the importance of economic policies in ensuring and improving national stability.

A former air marshal (personal communication, 16th August 2022, Jakarta) emphasised how the *ORBA* administration depended on loans from organisations like the World Bank and IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) - an international aid of economic assistance to Indonesia - to address escalating food costs and encourage economic progress. It shows their approach of connecting with economic structures to advance the country's growth. The collaboration with institutions brought in vital financial support and positioned Indonesia as an up-and-coming economic force often likened to an "Asian tiger." Nevertheless, this strategy also made Indonesia susceptible to risks linked with financial downturns and interdependencies—emphasising a crucial element of developmentalism — the drive for economic advancement through external channels could make the country vulnerable to international economic shifts and geopolitical influences.

The challenges of finding a balance between progress and ethical values while navigating international connections are clearly highlighted in the examination

conducted by an army colonel who is also a lecturer in military academy (personal communication, 11th November 2022, Jakarta). The United States restriction placed upon Indonesia because of human rights abuses during the East Timor conflict showcases the complexities within the framework of development focused policies. In the pursuit of advancement, it is crucial to uphold both global standards and ethical principles simultaneously. The trade restriction influenced Indonesia's global reputation and directly affected its national security and economic strategies. Highlighting the complex interplay between international relations in a globalised world and the balancing act of human rights concerns, alongside economic development policies.

Researchers have emphasised the significance of thorough strategic plans to combat hyperinflation and achieve economic stability. This involves seeking support from organisations such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund and securing funding for development projects (Cahyo, 2005; Fareza, 2016). Nonetheless these efforts resulted in outcomes such, as economic inequality and unethical practices (Nafis, 2008; Nugroho, 2018). The transition from focusing on matters to adopting external strategies led to a rise, in foreign indebtedness and economic turbulence.

Developmentalism theory proposes that the growth of the economy plays a role in maintaining the stability of a nation and serves as a crucial platform for tackling broader social and political dilemmas (Rostow, 1960; Hirschman, 1970). A dean of Pattimura university (personal communication, 23rd August 2022, Maluku) points out obstacles to achieving national unity in Indonesia such as identity-based politics, primordialism, and ethnic divisions. These socio-political aspects hinder a fair distribution of

development resources which leads to certain groups holding power dominance. The analysis resonates with the concept of developmentalism that stresses when economic progress is skewed and controlled by privileged factions and intensifies societal rifts and weakens national solidarity. This underscores a significant drawback of developmental strategies that overlook fundamental social and political disparities (*Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Sen & Hill, 2000*). Unequal progress amplifies differences in beliefs and values leading to social conflicts that jeopardise national cohesion. An admiral who holds a senior position at the MOD (personal communication, 20th June 2022, Jakarta) agrees with the idea that national security plays a crucial role in advancing national diversity and unity. This viewpoint emphasises the importance of having a safe and steady environment to effectively manage differences and promote societal progress. The success of this strategy relies on combining security measures with initiatives aimed at ensuring fair development and addressing social inequalities.

The deputy police commissioner (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) stressed the importance of ensuring security to support progress in society for better national prospects and to draw in international investments effectively. This perspective echoes the belief in development that economic growth is crucial for enhancing national development and stability. Consequently, national security strategies are crafted to foster a setting for economic endeavours by ensuring stability and minimising risks for investors. Furthermore, a parliament member (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta) spotlighted Indonesia's emphasis on Southeast Asia especially within ASEAN to tackle geopolitical and geo economic hurdles. Suharto's confidence in the importance of progress and his perspective on western nations as possible allies illustrate a strategy of development orientation that

focused on forming economic partnerships and collaborating regionally to enhance national security and growth. The alignment of Indonesia with economic and security structures allowed Suharto to utilise global alliances for internal development and stability efforts. This suggests that development focused strategies frequently require strategic international policy choices that coincide with national economic objectives and security objectives (Leifer, 1983; Vatikiotis, 1998). Although critics on foreign financial assistance sometimes sustain inequalities by predominantly serving to the interests of industrialised nations instead of addressing the essential requirements of developing countries (Furtado, 1973).

It is worth it to mention the extent of the involvement of the Indonesian Communist Party (known as *PKI*) in the coup event known as the *G30S/PKI* which happened on, 30th of September 1965 and remains a topic of debate among scholars who hold varying viewpoints regarding the account of a communist uprising during *ORBA* (Anderson & McVey, 1971; Roosa, 2006). General Suharto took charge of the military's response, which resulted in the dissolution of the *PKI* who claimed the responsibility of the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and Suharto's ascent to authority. Subsequently Suharto severed ties with China, which is a strong communist nation, and prioritised national security in the aftermath, thereby strengthening bonds with Western allies (Crouch, 1978). Similarly, Pradana (2016) argues that Indonesia's adoption of a "neighbour policy" through ASEAN reveals how developmentalism shapes its foreign relations in an extent seeking aid from Western nations tied Indonesia's economic progress to its alignment with the West. Although Prebisch (1950) challenges the long-term benefits of relying on foreign investments for economic advancement. Developmentalism highlights the integration of security and

foreign policy to establish an environment conducive to national progress through economic advancement as exemplified by this strategic approach.

The developmental approach discussed by Rostow (1960) and by Hirschman (1970) and Chang (2002) sheds light on Indonesia's *ORBA* era complexities involving economic growth interwoven with the stability and governance effects on the nation's NSS. Although focusing on economic advancements and national harmonisation goals during that period resulted in progress to some extent, although neglected the need for broad governance improvements fostering a trend towards centralised authority control widening socio economic gaps and fostering corruption within the system. This study offers insights from a perspective on the importance of combining economic progress with inclusive leadership and accountability governance to promote sustainable and fair development.

4.2 The Institutional Framework of Indonesia's NSS under the *ORBA*

4.2.1 From Military Strategy to Governance; How Centralized Authority Affects Indonesia's NSS

Under Suharto's authority in Indonesia, the military wielded significant political influence, shaping the NSS through its Dual Function doctrine and shaped the NSS, relying on it to suppress political dissent and maintain social order. This aligns with Foucault's (1975) concept of disciplinary power, where the military exerts control through surveillance and intervention in civil society. Weber (1919) explores the concept of the state as an entity that holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a defined territory. The military also played a crucial role in ensuring stability during the economic developmentalism phase. Janowitz's (1960) theory of

CMR highlights the military's dual role as both a defence force and political institution. According to Crouch (1978) and Emmerson (1983), the doctrines created a strict hierarchical framework focus on engagement in every aspect of governance, resulting in a scenario where civilian supervision was diminished and the military's priorities frequently took precedence over democratic values. This concentrated governance structure bolstered the military's authority in national security strategies.

The rationale behind centralising power was rooted in the *ABRI's* dual role doctrine which focused on safeguarding and the wellbeing of the nation in accordance with *Pancasila* and the 1945 constitution, outlined by a retired major general and former territorial commander (personal communication, 10th November 2022, Jakarta):

“The ABRI dual function concept is the soul, determination, and spirit of ABRI's service, to carry out the Indonesian nation's battle in state defence and national welfare to achieve national goals based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.”

This perspective positioned the military's role in governing as crucial for reaching objectives. However, this concentration frequently resulted in a governance structure where military concerns were prioritised over democratic values and civilian supervision. The account of a police grand commissioner (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) sheds light on the significant involvement of the Indonesian military in matters of national security and governance:

“The Indonesian military is responsible for national security, with the Armed Forces of Indonesia (ABRI) dual functions to participate in politics, economy, governance, and diplomacy.”

Moreover, confirmed by a colonel air forces (personal communication, 07th July 2022, Jakarta):

“ABRI dominates national security policymaking, making other agencies invisible.”

During the New Order era under President Suharto, ABRI held significant power, often surpassing the Ministry of Defence, which was seen as weak and passive. Influential military leaders, like General Benny Moerdani, had strong authority, while Defence Ministers were often older and less energetic. Suharto maintained control by handpicking military commanders who were loyal to him. Additionally, the position of National Defence and Security was combined with the role of the Armed Forces Commander, and General LB Moerdani served as both the Minister of Defence and Security from 1988 to 1993, further consolidating military power. This interpretation is supported by a professor at the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta), who noted the dominance of the military over the Ministry of Defence, and by a former Territorial Commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta), who agreed on the dual role of the Armed Forces Commander in holding the position of National Defence and Security during the period of 1988 to 1993. Eventually these shows the military’s strong influence in politics and governance due to power has sidelined civilian participation in key decision-making processes related to national security policies. In this scenario the limited involvement of agencies highlights the dangers of having power concentrated in the hands of a few without diverse views and oversight mechanisms.

Moreover, the function of the Army’s territorial command in local administration is exemplified by a Dean of the University of Defence (personal communication, 05th

September 2022, Sentul), highlighting the significant impact of the military on local governance practices. By serving as a watchdog for the government in communities, the territorial command has strengthened the power structure expanding military supervision into the framework of local governance. The leadership structure of the *ORBA* follows a system that emphasises centralised power theory and tends to favour military control over democratic values by incorporating military viewpoints into civilian management practices — a strategy that underscores the centralised focus on security and governance (Crouch, 1978; Kingsbury, 2003).

Scholars have pointed out the significance of the *ABRI* dual function (*dwifungsi*) doctrine in incorporating the military into Indonesia's scene (Suryawan & Sumarjiana, 2020; Gamini, 2021). This doctrine highlights the role of the military in upholding security and order while also influencing governmental decisions. MacDougal (1992) and Nisa (2017) in a study on Indonesia's context, argue that this integration was intended to ensure the military's allegiance to the state and prevent its manipulation by leaders. Nevertheless, this setup also resulted in a system of governance in which the military leadership exerted influence over political procedures detrimentally affecting the overall democratic governance and institutional oversight.

Security institutions like the National Defence and Security Council or "*Wanhanakamnas*," known as "*Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional*" in Indonesian, according to an expert from the university of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 21st August 2022, Jakarta) played a crucial role within the security framework of the *ORBA* era in Indonesia. Its main responsibilities included gathering information and carrying out security research through collaboration among ministries. However, it faced limitations in terms of authority and capability when it came to

implementing policies (Suryadinata, 1996). This underscores the focus on decision making power being concentrated in a group of individuals which can result in a disconnect between long-term planning and day to day operations within an organisation or institution (Crouch, 1978). This also demonstrates how centralised control may hinder the efficiency of security entities by confining their functions to backing decisions rather than facilitating holistic policy enactment.

Dahoklory & Ririhena (2020) Singh (2016) and Oktaviana & Pramadya (2019) delved into the formation of *Wanhan Kamnas* during the *ORBA* era, which was a significant body for national defence and security. This institution held sway in the *ORBA* era under President Suharto offering counsel to the government on defence and security strategies and influencing strategic and security decisions. Comprising military figures and government ministries, the council mirrored the centralised and militaristic governance structure of that period (Singh, 2016). The President took the lead with backing from the Military Secretariat General to highlight the significance of a military and legal framework for enforcing laws and maintaining security effectively (Oktaviana & Pramadya, 2019). Nevertheless, deficiencies in governance resulted in the establishment of bodies, like state supporting agencies and specialised task teams indicating the constraints of concentrated authority (Dahoklory & Ririhena, 2020).

Another security body known as *Bakortanas*, which serves as the agency responsible for coordinating national stability in Indonesia, was highlighted by a senior police commissioner's adjunct (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta), as pivotal in overseeing collaborative efforts, among various agencies under the command of the Armed Forces:

“ABRI implemented collaborative activities such as garrison patrols and the National Stability Coordination Agency (Bakortanas) to restore security and order and filled many government positions.”

Bakortanas exemplifies an approach with military leaders holding control over security matters and policy alignment within the system. Suharto’s government utilised mechanisms to silence political rivals and establish unofficial bodies like *Bakortanas* (Aby, 2016). The national security model of the New Order era displayed inefficiencies in bureaucracy as *Bakortanas* strengthened the dominance of authority by confining security policy alignment solely to military leaders, while excluding wider civilian involvement and supervision (Singh, 2016). For instance, the combining of police and military roles within the Armed Forces showcases the focus of security control being on the hands of the military organisation more extensively. An expert at *Lemhannas* (personal communication, 16th August 2022, Jakarta) explained that this merging under one division in which the department of defence and security was intended to form an approach towards addressing holistic security challenges. Additionally, the *ABRI* dual function strategy emphasised by a former Territorial Commander (personal communication, 11th November 2022, Jakarta), broadened the military’s duties beyond conventional defence tasks to include involvement in political, economic, and social areas. This approach required the military to influence the states direction empowering it to formulate and implement security measures. The dual role policy place *ABRI* as a stabilising force and a significant player in governing affairs – highlighting a centralised power dynamic with authority centred around a military elite group. The military’s firm control over security and political decisions frequently led to civilian checks being overlooked and democratic values being undermined, whilst blurring the distinctions between civilian security responsibilities (Crouch, 1978; Kingsbury, 2018).

In summary, the concentrated power system during the *ORBA* era in Indonesia, guided by the *ABRI* dual function doctrine, had an impact on the country's security and governance. While its objective was to uphold stability, it often disregarded democratic values and civilian supervision (King, 1982; Anderson, 1983; Crouch, 1979; Liddle, 1996). The extensive military influence in local administration, exemplified by bodies such as *Wanhanakamnas* and *Bakortanas*, sheds light on the structural challenges stemming from centralised authority (Robison 1986; Emerson 1983). As a result of this centralisation approach, emerged a system of governance marked by hurdles and minimal public involvement. This shows the struggle in Indonesia's historical backdrop of navigating between security concerns and democratic principles.

4.2.2 Security Measures and Organizational Interactions, in Building Control of ORBA

Under the leadership of Suharto's regime in Indonesia, different security measures were established to centralise authority and increase participation in various aspects like politics, society, and economy. The strategy, known as the dual function, emphasised security and public order over democratic processes and resulted in using military and police authority to enforce government control (Crouch, 1996; Liddle, 1996). This consolidation of power allowed state institutions to operate beyond legal boundaries and strengthened military dominance combining policing role and restricted civil liberties by oppressing dissent (Kings, 1982; Aspinall 2005). Additionally, the authoritarian regime fostered an economic alliance that blended financial and security concerns while extending its power beyond traditional legislative checks (Robison, 1986).

The concept of the "dual function of *ABRI* " as pointed out by a former secretary general of the MOD (personal communication, 08th June 2022, Jakarta) enabled the

military to expand its reach into political as well as social and economic domains while strengthening its authority and sidelining civilian administration. It prioritised upholding security and stability, placing more importance on these aspects than on democratic procedures. The concept of National Security and Public Order (known as *kamtibnas*) covers Indonesia's efforts to prevent disturbances and uphold law and order nationwide as discussed by scholars (Liddle, 1996; Aby, 2016). It encompasses strategies aimed at preserving order and ensuring societal stability through law enforcement and security measures. The theory of power highlighted by Fukuyama (2011) and Tilly (2007) underscores the importance of consolidating authority among a select group for maintaining stability and influence over prioritising inclusivity and democratic transparency. The dual role of ABRI as both an organisation and socio-political entity serves as a prime example of leveraging political power for national security purposes.

The utilisation of unofficial organisations which underscores how centralised power systems establish entities aimed at upholding governmental control through secretive and forceful methods. An adjunct grand commissioner of Police (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta) outlines the *ORBA*'s intelligence-focused approach in addressing terrorism by utilising bodies, like *Kopkamtibnas* and *Bakortanas* that operate outside of conventional legal boundaries:

“During the New Order era, the state prioritised an intelligence-led strategy approach in dealing with terrorism, with extra-judicial bodies such as the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtibnas) and the National Stability Coordination Agency (Bakortanas) to deal with and take action against terrorist movements.”

These organisations functioned by *ORBA* regime to eliminate threats such as terrorism using intelligence operations and measures outside the legal system. They emphasise how surveillance enables political dominance and stifles opposition. This approach indicates a concentration of authority wherein state security is upheld by monitoring and regulation that occasionally ignores the democratic norms.

A former navy rear admiral (personal communication, 31st October 2022, Jakarta) highlighted Indonesia's *ORBA* era during which the military took charge of maintaining order and police security. The Indonesian National Police operates with a centralised power structure that allows military influence to permeate aspects of national security within the *ABRI* framework. The blending of military and police roles has resulted in a handed approach to public order and a decrease in the effectiveness of civilian law enforcement. Moreover, a retired major general turned professor (personal communication, 21st June 2022, Jakarta) sheds light on the security protocols enforced by *ABRI* and INP along with the military's involvement in community outreach initiatives that extend beyond their defence duties. Under the leadership of the centralised command known as the supreme command for the restoration of security and order (known as *Pangkopkamtibnas*) for upholding security and order by the military's concentrated authority to establish their dominance and curtailed independent civilian institutional.

A professor at the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) discusses the challenges posed by power taking resources and roles intended for civilian institutions by levelling *Polri* to the "fourth brother" in a military oriented setting. Elaborated by Rikan (2014) and Gamini (2021) how *ABRI* in maintaining national stability and countering communist threats with the theological

concepts of "brotherhood" or "*catur darma*" and "three brotherhood" or "*eka darma*" are highlighted for their role in enhancing collaborative synergy, although domination under army and police as a last resort. The merger of INP and *TNI* raises concerns and highlights the centralised authority under a command structure.

A former diplomat at the United Nations (UN) (personal communication, 04th January 2023, Jakarta) brought up the controversial mystery shooting known as "*Petrus*" as a military mission in Indonesia that involved unlawful killings to eliminate suspected threats and reduce crime rates. Confirmed by Professor at University of Padjajaran (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) said:

"Petrus (the mysterious shooter) appeared in the late 80's under Mr. Benny Moerdani because thugs were on the loose. Disrupt the business world and society. No one feels responsible for this mysterious shooter. In the end, Mr. Benny was finally responsible for the Petrus issue, but under Mr. Harto's permission."

Through tactics to maintain authority while disregarding democratic and legal norms, this approach portrays a centralised power justifying government approved violence for the sake of stability. Despite the mission achieving its objectives, a professor at the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) mentioned that it lacked transparency and accountability. Additionally, a member of the community council (personal communication, 15th August 2022, Jakarta) told how criminal activities and unruly individuals were organised in a way that was supported by government authority and helped control societal behaviour by assisting law enforcement in maintaining peace and tackling rebellion. For instance, social organisations such as Youth of *Pancasila* and Komando Aksi Pengganyangan

Perjanjian Indonesia Belanda, (*KAPPI*) which translates to the Action Command to Crush the Indonesia-Netherlands Agreement, were developed to assist the government in combating activities and dissent. Within the framework of governance model, the government embraced illicit elements to strengthen its control in silencing opposition through violent means. Eddyono's (2021) study of the *Petrus* shootings, with more than four thousand casualties, sheds light on the impact of centralised power structures. Suharto's focus on tattooed offenders in the name of terrorism instilled fear and suspicion within society and eroded trust in the legal system. This atmosphere of doubt and anxiety among the people highlights the repercussions that come with concentrated power.

Furthermore, a police grand commissioner adjunct (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta) explained the concept of "corporate crime" in the *ORBA* era when major companies collaborated with military leaders to carry out unfair monopolistic practices that negatively impacted economic participants. This close connection between security concerns allowed the elite to dominate economic affairs resulting in exploitation and widespread corruption:

"In the context of the Indonesian business environment in ORBA, the term "corporate crime" refers to the criminal acts that are carried out by huge corporations and conglomerates that have established a monopoly over the Indonesian economy. The dominance of large firms has several negative repercussions on various economic stakeholders, including pricing schemes, the degradation of labour rights, the depletion of natural resources, the polluting of the environment, and unfair competition."

Furthermore, a former regional commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta) characterises crime as a means of opposing the government of the *ORBA* and engaging in illicit behaviour:

“...organised crime seeks to show resistance to the ORBA government and is a form of illegal activity.”

This viewpoint implies that the government's participation in economic endeavours served to retain power and as a response to perceived challenges to its rule. Organised crime was viewed as a type of opposition to the ruling regime and an unlawful practice. Although this blurred the boundaries between governance and criminal behaviour, while tackling illicit activities, was also a means of maintaining control by the government.

Researchers delved into how the military influenced the economy by emphasising the emergence of an industrial complex that wielded substantial economic influence (Nugroho, 2018; Legowo, 2013; Damayanti, 2020; Robison, 1996). The involvement of personnel in business networks as noted by Heryanto (2003) and Singh (2001) led to unlawful activities and solidified the economic supremacy of the ruling class by extending centralised power from politics to economic exploitation.

The NSS of the *ORBA* regime in Indonesia was marked by the centralisation of power and had a significant impact on governance and civil military relationships in the country. The military elite held authority through policies like the "dual functions of *ABRI*", which emphasises the used extrajudicial measures to prioritise stability over democratic principles and civilian control (Aspinall 2005). The merging of military and

police roles, along with security systems, highlighted how centralised power shaped Indonesia's social, political, and economic environment.

4.3 The Strategy of the *ORBA* Regarding National Security Risks and Threats

4.3.1 Framing Threats Through Centralised Power Under the ORBA Regime in Indonesia

Within the *ORBA*'s governance system, the central authority significantly influenced the approach and addressed security challenges. The administration considered organised crime, terrorism, subversion, and longstanding conflicts as prime threats to the country's stability. Rivkin & Ryan (2015) analyse the influence of Suharto's leadership on Indonesia's security strategies with a focus on how the military perceived threat and dealt with opposition. Experts viewed these threats from a perspective of centralised power that favoured maintaining state stability over promoting democratic involvement and legal responsibility (Anderson, 1983; Crouch, 1979; Aspinall, 2005; Vatikiotis, 1998). The focus on curtailing perceived risks – ranging from ideological movements to ethnic and local disputes – highlights how the concentration of power among the executive and military elite influenced Indonesia's NSS. This method allowed thorough – however, unauthorised – security actions and strengthened the government's control by portraying any disagreement or unrest as a direct threat to the country's unity.

A former general of the MOD (personal communication, 08th June 2022, Jakarta) pinpointed organised crime, terrorism, subversion, and traditional confrontations as dangers to the nation. This classification demonstrates an approach centred around authority where threats are viewed through a perspective that prioritises state stability

and regulation. The portrayal of these concerns as national security risks highlights the concentration of influence within the levels of government and the military leadership who identified and addressed these dangers in manners that imposed their control.

Towards effectively tackle national security challenges, it is crucial to take an approach that examines the interconnected nature of various threats and how economic, political, and social elements play a role in causing instability at a national level. A senior air marshal who is now in an academic circle (personal communication, 17th August 2022, Jakarta) elaborates the dangers posed by groups on both ends of the political spectrum, such as the Islamic movement known as *DI/TII "Darul Islam" (DI)* movement and its armed wing, the *"Tentara Islam Indonesia" (TII)*, which translates to the "Islamic Army of Indonesia, and the communist movement:

"As an extreme right is the DI/TII, an Islamic movement led by Kartosuwiryo, through the Indonesian militias group named "Iskam" aims to form the Islamic State of Indonesia and extreme left is the communist movement with a very wide coverage area; Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan."

Certain groups seen as posing risks to the stability of the government provoked a security reaction. Authority figure's view threats through an ideological lens and typically employ security measures to counter any ideological resistance. This underscores the dominance of authority of centralised power within the government that quashes movements that challenge its beliefs while projecting an image of stability and control. A retired Army Major General, who now teaches at the University of Defence shared insights (personal communication, 21st June 2022, Jakarta), in a discussion:

“...Horizontal Conflict is a conflict between a group of people with other community groups, usually triggered by racial issues, and Traditional conflicts are conflicts between certain ethnic groups, tribes, and groups. Examples include the Dayak community and the Madurese in Kalimantan.”

More examples addressed by a colonel air forces (personal communication, 07th July 2022, Jakarta):

“...Examples of the dynamics of the conflict and separatism in Papua, and the formation of the Free Aceh Movement.”

Both interviewees talked about tensions in areas and pointed out how separatist movements can hinder national unity and stability by causing conflicts within the country's regions. They stressed the importance of having a strong central government to address these issues efficiently because disagreements among regions can jeopardise harmony and result in stricter security measures.

Furthermore, scholars have pointed out how the Suharto administration utilised both methods and additional legal tactics to combat organised crime, terrorism, subversion, and traditional warfare (Aby, 2016; Cahyo, 2005; Jatmiko & Haruni, 2022). These actions were viewed as essential for maintaining control on society and abolishing dissent. This strategy demonstrates a concentration of power in which the government leverages structures and unofficial groups to assert its dominance and suppress perceived threats. To an extent, often prioritising state control over responsibility and democratic participation.

Indonesia's NSS, when examined through the perspective of power, as discussed by Fukuyama (2011) and Tilly (2007), demonstrates how the dominance of the executive

and military impacts the understanding and handling of threats. Imposing control in this manner often leads to extrajudicial measures being taken by the state. The organisational security of Indonesia's NSS during the *ORBA* era illustrates how concentrating power within the executive and military circles shaped perceptions of threats and responses. This concept adds to theories by delving into how concentrated authority affects government control and security strategies and how it deals with the dilemma of maintaining national security while being accountable. In a democratic governance it is necessity of open and inclusive governance systems to handle various security challenges efficiently – calling for fair and open methods towards safeguarding national security.

4.3.2 Interpreting the Risks and Ideological Manipulation by Framing Disruption as a Threat in ORBA's Security Strategy

The Indonesian government of *ORBA* employed an approach by using *Pancasila's* state philosophy to stifle dissenters by branding them as challenges to unity and stability (Bourchier, 2015; Vatikiotis, 1993; Budiman, 1990; Cribb & Brown, 1995). Their tactic illustrates how a central authority can stay in power by linking dissent with security risks and justifying measures that curtailed diversity and fostered fear and repression (Kingsbury, 2018; Lane, 2008; Fealy & Bourchier, 1999; Kingsbury & Aveling, 2002) and placing importance on state stability over democratic engagement and adherence to the law.

Suharto's government skilfully utilised *Pancasila* – the philosophy – to discredit political dissent by framing it as a danger to the country's cohesion and peace. Mentioned by a retired rear admiral (personal communication, 31st October 2022,

Jakarta), Suharto weaponised Pancasila to suppress any opposition or popular movements that questioned his power by labelling them as adversaries of Pancasila:

“Suharto used Pancasila as a means of suppression, branding all people or mass movements and organisations that opposed him, as opposed to Pancasila, and suppressing his political opponents with political exile or civil death. ABRI to side with one group, not side with the interests of the people. Everything is made persona non grata, and people are shunned from association, isolated, banned from abroad, and suppressed in the political and economic fields. In the Suharto era, all who interfered with the course of development and national stability were labelled organised crime, terrorism, and radical fighters.”

The strategy included isolating individuals from the community and restricting their involvement in politics and the economy by categorising them as security threats. This exemplifies a consolidation of power where authorities and armed forces justify measures by silencing diverse perspectives and dissenting opinions.

When the government labels dissent as terrorist acts it can use this to excuse taking drastic actions without legal oversight. This suppresses diverse opinions and creates an atmosphere of fear and control within society. A retired navy admiral (personal communication, 20th July 2022, Jakarta) discussed organised crime as coordinated behaviour rooted in specific beliefs. This perspective is in line with the centralised power strategy where the government classifies opposition and illegal activities using ideological terms to make it easier to suppress them effectively. By portraying organised crime and political disagreement as driven by ideologies that pose threats, the centralised power system justifies implementing security measures to manage and neutralise these factions. This strategy mirrors the governance framework under

centralised power (Fukuyama, 2011; Tilly, 2007; Mann, 1984) where the government's perception of threat is utilised to uphold ideological consistency and quash dissent.

Pancasila as the nation's ideology was manipulated as a tool for enforcing conformity which reflected the regimes overarching strategy of governance where adherence to specific ideologies was crucial for maintaining stability and authority. The New Order government used ideological frameworks such as the integralism state and developmentalism to justify their political actions by focusing on concepts like *ABR*'s dual function and the monopoly on interpreting Pancasila ideologies along with promoting anticommunism and blaming democracy as a scapegoat for their political legitimacy purposes (Legowo, 2013). These frameworks helped in consolidating power and enabled the government to identify potential threats and validate their repressive measures effectively.

The government's ranging identification of potential dangers enabled it to enforce stringent regulations to uphold authority by focusing on groups seen as questioning its legitimacy. A former Territorial Commander (personal communication, 21st June 2022, Jakarta) describes extremist fighters as people or factions with rigid beliefs who strictly follow fundamental religious doctrines. Radicalism stemming from religious fervour that deviates from established beliefs and principles, hence empowers authorities to validate measures against these factions. However, this form of governance enforces adherence to ideological norms and perceives any divergence as a threat to national security. Through this approach the state can regulate ideological manifestations effectively.

A professor at the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) discusses events that showcase how the state views threats in

Indonesia. This includes the Bali bombings, and bombings in Jakarta hotels, as well as clashes between different ethnic groups such as Dayak and Madura tribes and violent disagreements involving religious leaders in the East Java region. These occurrences shed light on how centralised authority perceives an array of security challenges. From terrorism to conflicts among ethnicities as reasons to implement strong security measures. Although sometimes overlooking the root social and political challenges.

The labelling of dissent as subversive is used to quash any form of resistance and strengthen the government's control by silencing differing opinions and political movements. Scholars emphasise the *ORBA* government utilised "openness politics" to instil a sense of fear among the public where any opposition to the government is seen as a danger (Legowo, 2013; Aby, 2016). Oktaviani & Pramadya (2019) examined how religious beliefs influence the perception of fighters as threats to security and emphasised the significance of ideology in shaping the government's view on security risks. Cahyo (2005) delved deeper into how the *ORBA* viewed the *PKI*, a communist party, as one of most influential in the mid-20th century apart from the Soviet Union and China, and other opposing opinions as risks to Indonesia's stability. Moreover, the restriction of writings and categorising unconventional media as rebellious, showcases how concentrated authority regulates information and hinders varied perspectives to uphold dominance, presenting various types of opposition as a threat to security (Refié, 2019). This strategy highlights how centralised authority figures use ideological structures to retain power presenting deviations as dangers to rationalise the implementation of governmental security tactics.

The Indonesian NSS in the *ORBA* era was known for its centralised structure and the significant impact of executive and military authorities. Scholars have demonstrated how the authoritarian regime shaped the way threats were perceived and handled often overlooking checks and balances and institutional efficiency (King, 1982; McVey, 1996; Rivkin & Ryan, 2015; Bertrand, 2004). The government employed tags to quell dissent and resistance (Aspinall, 2005). When the officials portrayed criticism as a security concern, it helped them curb variety and uphold their power (Huxleys, 1993). McVeys (1996) highlights how resistance and differing viewpoints were suppressed through controlling information and imposing censorship measures. It is suggested by Hadiz (2003) and Bouchier & Hadiz (2003) that a centralised authority may encounter challenges in maintaining security effectively while also fostering transparency and equity principles. The focus of the hypothesis lies in outlining the tactics utilised by the government to reinforce control and address dissenting voices. The thesis delves into how power influences government authority and ideological alignment while emphasising the significance of governance frameworks that maintain an equilibrium, between state security and democratic principles.

4.4 Civil Capabilities Under the Control of a Government System During *ORBA* Regime

4.4.1 Maintaining Influence via Pseudo Democracy System in Controlling Media and Manipulating Elections

The Indonesian *ORBA* regime exemplified pseudo-democracy, restricting civil society while maintaining an illusion of democratic procedures (Aspinall, 2005). The military's interference in elections and power centralisation played key roles in this facade (Crouch, 1979). Through media control and suppression of dissent, Suharto's

government created a system of authoritarian control (Sen & Hill, 2000). Scholars note that Suharto's rule featured controlled political participation, co-opting civil society within a corporatist framework (Robison, 1996; Liddle, 1999). Suharto's use of Pancasila doctrine framed dissent as a threat, reflecting Tilly's (2007) concept of state control under authoritarianism. Dahl (1971) emphasises genuine democratic processes, which were absent in ORBA's governance.

As per a high-ranking military officer (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta) who discusses how the *ORBA* government operated as a fake democracy by controlling and manipulating democratic institutions to stay in power. The consolidation of parties into the Indonesian Democratic Party (known as *PDI*), United Development Party (*PPP*), and the establishment of the Labour Party or "*Golongan Karya* (referred to as *Golkar*)" in Bahasa, Indonesia, demonstrate how the regime utilised these platforms to project an image of democratic procedures. The manipulation of parties was aimed at ensuring the government could influence election results by limiting real political competition and dissent among the people involved in the process. The military's involvement in screening candidates for positions further solidified this control mechanism and exemplified how a pseudo democratic setup allows the government to create a facade of democracy while quashing genuine diversity and civic engagement in politics. Elections were marked by tactics and strict control where the results were pre-established to uphold the governing authority's grasp on power. This hampered political engagement and democratic principles resulting in a system that merely masquerades as democratic.

The concept of pseudo democracy refers to systems that give the illusion of democracy. They operate under authoritarian control structures. A former diplomat at

the UN (personal communication, 04th January 2023, Jakarta) described the parliament as a mere formality simply endorsing government decisions without genuine discussion or dissent:

“At that time the legislature was a rubber stamp in the sense of the word, it was only for signatures, everything was regulated by the government, at that time everything was top down, everything that the president wanted has to be realised.”

The depiction underscores the undermining of institutions in systems that claim to be democratic, however concentrate decision-making authority in one branch while the legislature merely serves as a symbolic figurehead. This authoritarian governance masks the nature of the regime by having legislative bodies endorse actions without probing them deeply. The authorities employ control tactics to uphold a system that lacks democracy.

The authoritarian leadership of the ORBA was highlighted by an air marshal, now in academic circles (personal communication, 17th August 2022, Jakarta) who pointed out that while the authoritarian nature of ORBA effectively responded to challenges it also faced issues of corruption due to the absence of proper supervision. This point underscores a flaw in systems that seemingly democratic without true checks and balances – although effectively handle security issues by central control. However, it is prone to misuse of authority and dishonesty due to the lack of oversight mechanisms. The centralisation of power in the branch alongside the guise of democratic principles sets the stage for authoritarian actions without consequences resulting in widespread corruption and a decline in individual freedoms.

According to a former commander of *BAKAMLA* (personal communication, 15th August Sukabumi), during the *ORBA* era there was significant emphasis on authority and centralisation that impacted legislative bodies such as the People's Consultative Assembly and House of Representatives negatively in terms of effectively governing the government affairs. The depiction focuses on the weakening of structures in systems that claim to be democratic, although concentrate decision making authority in one branch while the legislature merely serves as a symbolic presence. This authoritarian governance hides the reality of the regime by having legislative bodies endorse actions than scrutinise them. Control tactics are employed by the government to uphold an undemocratic system.

This approach highlights the facade of democracy within the regime as legislative entities serve mainly to legitimise decisions rather than offer authentic political representation or supervision (Hidayat, 2018). Additionally, the regime leveraging paternalistic cultural norms roles to underscore the leader's authority while diminishing the roles of civilians, and utilised bodies for executive approval by having numerous lawmakers directly appointed by the president (Damayanti, 2012). Utilising paternalism as a rationale, portraying the executive as a guardian figure while restricting political diversity and responsibility.

Additionally, a staff expert for the parliament's member (personal communication, 25th September Jakarta) highlighted that the government under *ORBA* enforced regulations over media and press activities due to perceiving unbridled freedom of the press as a possible challenge to its power and control:

"The ORBA government also imposed severe media and press control through security precedents. Unchecked media freedom might turn the media into a

deadly opposition force, the ORBA government realised. The ORBA government's security posture was polarising. The security approach, according to many activists, prompted the ORBA government to suppress the people and commit human rights violations. Additionally, the journalistic was prohibited and Suharto's press was not free and has made false security because people feel terrified and have trouble expressing themselves."

The way the government handles the media shows a type of pseudo democracy in action – using tactics that restrict freedom to keep up the appearance of democratic governance intact. Moreover, according to a postgraduate from the Defence university (personal communication, 24th August 2022, Jakarta), during Suharto's era there were efforts to regulate the media and extensive control of military due to national security concern. This highlights the government's approach of consolidating power to address threats and shape public sentiment. This strategy exemplifies the democratic characteristics of the government system by involving civil entities such as the media, in advancing the state's security objectives while strengthening centralised control through restrictions that curb autonomous oversight and civil involvement in matters of national security.

Confirmed by Hadi & Kasuma (2012) and Pratikno (1998) exploring how the ORBA utilised propaganda and media manipulation to uphold its control system effectively, the government endorsed messages in newspapers and on television to establish an environment where the media served as a channel for state propaganda rather than a platform for independent public discussions. This control on the media played a role in sustaining Suharto's autocratic rule by giving the government the power to shape public perception and avoid the spread of opposition. The employment of media for

state propaganda demonstrates how pseudo democratic governments utilise civil institutions to strengthen their control while projecting an illusion of democratic leadership.

This analysis delves into Indonesia's NSS from the perspective of pseudo democracy in line with Schedler (2006). It explores the interplay among government authority control and restrictions on media freedom and citizen engagement while underscoring the challenges of pseudo democracy in fostering open and responsible governance practices. Through a study of how media control operated during the rule of the *ORBA* government, it has revealed the methods used to uphold power and silence opposing voices while presenting a false image of democratic leadership. This section delves into how a semblance of democracy affected government control and individual liberties alongside media influence and underscores the importance of civil bodies in fostering genuine democratic participation.

4.4.2 How Militarisation and Civil Resistance Contributed to the Decline of ORBA Pseudo Democracy

This thesis delves into the ways in which the *ORBA* government manipulated procedures to take over civil organisations within Indonesia's NSS. It emphasises how fundamental civil liberties and real political engagement were often disregarded to uphold dominance within a quasi-democratic system. The participation of *ABRI* in non-military affairs indicates a shift towards a militarised form of governance in which military strategies and reasoning are used to address civilian concerns and frequently leading to the restriction of civil rights and silencing of opposing political views. An expert staff member of Parliament (personal communication, 25th September 2022, Jakarta) provides further insight:

“Military power is sometimes abused, and the military deploys its authority to address civilian issues as well as military ones. Individuals who picked up guns in the ORBA’s era were considered as a danger to state security, so ABRI was leveraged during the Suharto’s dictatorship to manage security disturbances induced by dissatisfaction with the Suharto regime.”

As mentioned by a colonel in the air force (personal communication, 25th July 2022, Jakarta), that during the ORBA era, military authority was frequently misused; ABRI instead of focusing solely on defence duties, as intended by its mandate, were frequently involved in tackling civilian matters and using force to suppress any subversive activities.

“ABRI was granted the authority to move and behave in a coercive way to deter subversive efforts. ABRI also had the authority to arrest individuals or groups of individuals who were found to be violating government programmes.”

This situation shows a facade where the military is utilised to uphold state authority and quell disagreement while still appearing to follow democratic principles. ABRI was allowed to detain people for not complying with initiatives, which demonstrates how centralised power systems use forces to handle civil unrest and establish limits of freedom. This scenario highlights how pseudo functions, by using military force to keep peace and stifle resistance activities, which hinders real civic involvement and political activism.

Moreover, a postgraduate student from the Defence university (personal communication, 23rd August 2022, Jakarta) pointed out that this approach to enforcing policies can give people a feeling of safety, ultimately endangering civil liberties. This

insight underscores an aspect of pseudo democracy; establishing a regulated setting that upholds the appearance of stability while sacrificing civil rights. This setup weakens society's influence on policy making and political engagement.

The convergence of turmoil and mounting public demands influenced a pivotal moment that brought about notable shifts in politics and ultimately resulted in Suharto's resignation from office. A member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta) delves into the sequence of events that culminated in Suharto stepping down from power while highlighting the impact of the 1997 currency crisis, widespread social unrest, and student demonstrations that posed challenges to the established *ORBA* government. The increase in dissatisfaction and the widespread protests showcase the instability found in systems that are seemingly democratic although lack democratic values and practices. The limitation of rights and opposition voices can provoke a strong response from society in terms of social and political consequences. The pushback from protests and global disapproval – especially from the United States – underscores the difficulties that pseudo democratic governments encounter when citizens unite against authoritarian actions. Suharto stepping down due to the student protests highlights how pseudo democratic systems struggle with handling governance issues because centralised power and stifling of opposing voices can spark widespread civil opposition and calls for political change.

The shift to a system posed notable obstacles such as overcoming deeply rooted authoritarian behaviours and setting-up fresh democratic standards and bodies. Hidayat (2018) and Tilly & Tarrow (2015) have delved into Indonesia's reform movement driven by a lack of trust in the government and a desire for democracy promotion. They posit that civil society plays a role in challenging pseudo democratic

practices and advancing genuine democracy. The combination of the 1997 crisis and widespread demonstrations spurred various social groups and civil society actors to confront Suharto's flawed democratic system, demonstrating how collective efforts can shape political landscapes. This progress suggests that grassroots movements can transform democratic leadership into political structures that are accountable and inclusive while also being flexible in times of political change and civil establishment.

In this section of the analysis focusing on Indonesia's NSS during the *ORBA* era highlighted the significance of pseudo democracy. It points out that while democratic processes and institutions were maintained on the surface, the state enforced control through militarisation and stifling dissent (Diamond, 2002). The centralisation of power within the executive and military elite enabled a governance system that emphasised control, rather than democratic responsibility. The militarised form of governance involved using strategies in civilian matters which sometimes led to the restriction of civil rights. This demonstrates how the government-imposed control through methods, according to Schedler (2006). The regime under Suharto distorted the ideology of Pancasila to discredit political dissent as a danger to unity and validate forces on opposition. The government's imposition classification of opposition as terrorist actions and its manipulation of information, along with silencing opposing voices, demonstrates how concentrated authority interprets various security issues to validate widespread security tactics. This approach erodes freedoms and fosters a deceptive sense of safety. The thesis highlights the importance of movements and civil society in combating pseudo democracy and reshaping politics by overcoming authoritarianism and establishing democratic values and structures.

4.5 Conclusion

The *ORBA* era in Indonesia from 1988 to 1998 was a focus on centralising power, prominence of the military, and placing stability above democratic values. This section explores Indonesia's NSS in depth, highlighting how the developmental approach impacted security priorities and the concentration of power in military and political circles, through centralised decision making and how authoritarian rule influenced perceptions of risks and threats.

During the era of Suharto's rule in Indonesia, as depicted by scholars like Robison (1986) and Higgott & Robison (1985), with the developmental approach focused on achieving economic progress and stability to ensure national security was robustly established on solid footing. This strategy was based on Rostow's (1960) framework of economic growth stages, in line with the research inquiries to understand the priority of Indonesia's NSS on advancing the economy towards modernisation. According to Chang (2002) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2012), although these methods may bring economic advantages, they also contribute to the reinforcement of social and economic inequalities along with the rise of corruption and the accumulation of wealth and authority among a privileged few individuals over time. The section illustrates that the push for advancement under state regulation often come without holistic governance able to reform, leading to the establishment of a system marked by exploitative institutions and a widening economic disparity.

The concentration of power in security decision-making within the *ORBA* regime worsened these issues, according to Fukuyama (2011) and Tilly (2007). By giving authority to the military and political elite while sidelining civilian organisations and reducing public involvement in governance processes resulted in more harm than

good to democratic accountability, as pointed out by Liddle (1996) and Crouch (1979). The government's dependence on a power system resulted in weakening of the necessary checks and balances for proper governance. The organisations mentioned by Emmerson (1983) and Robison (1986), like *Wankamnas* and *Bakortanas*, symbolise the underlying problems of control. It showcased how decision-making authority was held predominantly by the elite while civilian supervision was marginalised.

During that time frame, the assessment of risks and dangers was largely shaped by the dominance of authority within the government and military upper echelon, as highlighted by Linz (2000) and Lipset (1959) in their research on autocratic regimes. The government's strategies for safeguarding national security primarily revolved around repression rather than dialogue, categorising political dissidents and differing opinions as severe menaces to the nation. The restricted and exclusive strategy resulted in the enforcement of actions that violated civil rights and suppressed diverse political views (Aspinall, 2005; Hadiz, 2003). The government's use of ideological labels to brand dissenting voices as criminal or terrorist activities enabled the authorities to justify their oppressive actions while retaining control (Huxley, 1993; Bouchier & Hadiz, 2003).

The involvement of people in this type of quasi democratic system was greatly limited (Dahl, 1971; Schedler, 2006). The *ORBA* emphasis on control and repression of civil liberties led to a situation where democratic procedures seemed shallow, and real political engagement was restricted. The government's attempts to uphold authority were met with resistance from movements and protests that ultimately questioned the facade of democracy in place – an evolution noted by scholars like Mounk (2018) and

Bertrand (2004) who studied similar shifts from authoritarianism to democracy in various settings.

The examination of Indonesia's NSS during the *ORBA* period emphasises the difficulty of managing both state security and democratic principles simultaneously. The regime's emphasis on development policies and concentration of authority, while stifling opposition, highlighted the shortcomings of a stance in ensuring national security. The downfall of the *ORBA* regime, mentioned by King (1982) and McVey (1996), serves as a reminder of the dangers associated with prioritising stability and economic progress over transparency and comprehensive governance. This section emphasises the importance of responsible leadership frameworks that blend economic progress with democratic values to guarantee national security without compromising civil rights and by adopting a fair and just strategy towards growth as well as leadership.

5.0 Indonesia's NSS during the Reform period (Four Presidencies)1998 to 2014

The period of change from 1998 to 2014 is discussed with in-depth analysis in this chapter on Indonesia's NSS. Conducted using studies that delve into decentralisation as well as theories related to public trust and civic competence, the decentralisation theory assesses how the transfer of power from authorities to local governments impacts regional security and governance dynamics (Rondinelli, 1981; Smoke, 2003). The theory of public trust underscores the significance of having faith in governmental institutions for developing effective security strategies and fostering citizen cooperation (Putnam, 1993; Mishler & Rose, 2001). The theory of competence highlights the importance of citizen participation and its impact on security policies within a democratic setting (Dahl, 1989; Almond & Verba, 1963). Through combining these theories with data findings, the chapter offers a thorough examination of Indonesia's developing NSS and the obstacles it encounters to answer the research questions.




DIAGRAM 5.1 REFORM I
Source: own construction

Diagram 5.1 depicts the reform of Indonesia's NSS and maps how Indonesia has made changes to its constitutional *UUD 45*, with strong emphasis upholding the values of Pancasila. The country's development approach is shaped by three blueprints: the National Long Term Development Plan (known as *RPJP*), the National Medium Term Development Plan (known as *RPJM*), and the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development (known as *MP3EI*). The *RPJP* is geared towards encouraging long-term economic development and improving infrastructure while tackling poverty issues, as outlined in the *RPJM* the five-year strategy (Presidential Regulation No 5 of 2010). The *MP3EI* focuses on developing economic zones and attracting investments (Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs in 2011). Decentralisation policies entail transferring authority and budget

control from Parliament to the Provincial Peoples Assembly, as well as oversight responsibilities to monitor the executive office. The latest trend towards a system has resulted in a balanced distribution of power among different organisations such as government departments and non-governmental agencies, like the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. An impartial committee has started an assessment procedure to uphold responsibility and openness.

Between 1998 and 2014 in Indonesia's NSS, there were transformations brought about by various legislations. Under Law No 3 of 2002 the focus shifted towards having a military and highlighted the shared duty of citizens in protecting the nation by discarding outdated doctrines mentioned in Laws No 20 of 1982 and No 1 of 1988 (UU No. 3/2002, National Defence Law, 2002). Additionally, Law No 2 of 2002 redefined the role of the INP (Indonesia's National Police) placing emphasis on ensuring security rather than military functions (Law No 2 of 2002, on the Indonesian National Police). Law No 32 of 2004 granted government the authority to meet regional security requirements in alignment with the NSS objective of maintaining national unity (Law No 32 of 2004 on Regional Government). Finally, the proposed National Security Law intends to create a structured framework for unifying defence mechanisms public order and national resilience to align Indonesia's security strategy with democratic ideals and principles of human rights, although was not issued until after this thesis has finished.

The study focuses on the idea of decentralisation as discussed by Rondinelli (1981) and Smoke (2003), highlighting the importance of security strategies in times of transition and emphasising the removal of the Military's Dual Function role as priority. The Indonesian *ABRI* have embraced an approach and decentralised administrative

framework along with consistent policies during presidential transitions across four successive leaders. Moreover, it discusses the evolution of national security institutions and frameworks during the reform process such as the separation of *TNI* and *INP*, from the previous *ABRI*. Discussed within the chapter are the dynamics between leadership and defence security agencies which sheds light on the importance of public confidence (Harris, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 2001) as well as the effectiveness of civilian supremacy (Bebbington, 2008; Suryadinata, 2007). The narrative emphasises civil military relationships along with the roles of civilians and vulnerabilities in security.

5.1 Reforming Indonesia's NSS by Prioritising Decentralisation and Military Professionalisation

5.1.1 Prioritising National Security in Decentralised Indonesia: The Impact of Military Reform and Governance

The focus of Indonesia's NSS has changed due to decentralisation and military reform efforts that have reshaped governance and security practices during a period of reform. The evolution of Indonesia's NSS post the discontinuation of the Indonesian *ABRI*'s dual function represents a move towards democratic governance and enhancing military professionalism. This shift aligns with decentralisation theory principles by transferring power from bodies to local administrations (Rondinelli, 1981; Turner, 2003). The transformation of Indonesia's security framework through decentralisation has led to a shift towards a governance model led by civilians (Soeprapto, 2020; Harsono, 2021). This shift played a role in diminishing the extensive control of the military over political matters (Rondinelli, 1981; McCullough & Johnson, 1989). Decentralisation was not solely driven by calls for democratisation rather aimed

at dispersal of authority from the military to facilitate wider citizen involvement in national security issues (Smoke, 2003; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).

The removal of *ABRI*'s role was crucial in reshaping the military's involvement in politics and governance, as highlighted by a senior police commissioner (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta) and a former territorial commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta), in their respective statements. The goal of dividing *ABRI* into *TNI* and *INP* was to ensure that the military does not wield power and to promote a democratic and decentralised system of governance effectively. This restructuring of *ABRI* into *TNI* and *INP* signifies an institutional change with the purpose of reinforcing democratic principles.

Within Indonesia's reform agenda lies a focus on reshaping the military and police sectors to foster a competent security framework under civilian oversight. This change was established during a conference in 1998 known as the "New Paradigm", emphasising indirect influence and collaboration with civilian institutions as guiding principles (Mietzner, 2006). Scholars have highlighted the changes in Indonesia led to a democratic government system by reducing military involvement in politics and business (Haller, 2006; Crouch, 2018; Muir, 2008). For instance, the significance of oversight of the military to ensure they focus on their core military duties rather than getting involved in governance or commercial activities (Haller, 2006; Crouch, 2018). It has been observed that a key aspect of these reforms is addressing corruption within the military to promote transparency and accountability (Muir, 2008). This enhances the professionalism of the armed forces and improves police effectiveness. These changes within the military and police have positively affected security management by reducing crime rates and enhancing community cohesion (ICG, 2001; Muir, 2008).

The effort involved in reducing the military's impact on governance was aimed at establishing a system that is more open and responsible to the public eye.

The division and decentralisation of *TNI* and *INP* in Indonesia's security sector have had an impact by moving towards indirect influence and collaborating with non *TNI* entities. A graduate student at a Defence university (personal communication, 23rd August 2022, Jakarta) suggests that this marks a push for democratisation through political regulations that have specifically delineated the roles of *TNI* and *INP*. The implementation of these reforms plays a vital role in improving the public perception of both organisations and ensuring effective community involvement. Reorganising the *TNI* and establishing a boundary between *TNI* and *INP* are crucial measures in promoting democratic security governance and minimising the risk of concentrated misuse of authority.

The reforms are made complex by the enduring belief in the military's political involvement. This method enables the military to uphold authority without controlling the government's operations, and the appearance of civilian control is preserved to some extent (Kingsbury, 2003). Scholars point out that the Indonesian military has shifted to a role behind the scenes rather than taking control of civilian led governments (Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2011; Crouch, 2018). Additionally, decentralisation has encountered problems such as power conflicts and ambiguity, highlighting the need for defined legal structures and effective collaboration between different levels of government (Turner, 2003; Hadiz, 2004). These obstacles may be viewed as serving the military's objectives in keeping the civilian government somewhat reliant and chaotic, hence maintaining its influence on the political process (Rüland, 2003; Mietzner, 2009).

The concept of decentralisation plays a role in Indonesia's NSS by highlighting the importance of regional autonomy in fostering national stability and community well-being. With decentralisation transferring authority from central to governments, to address distinct security and welfare requirements (Faguet, 2014), allows local authorities to effectively plan and oversee their operations, as emphasised by a former territorial commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta):

“The *TNI*'s role in building the nation and state is seen in the granting of regional autonomy authority, which gives region's discretionary power to organise regional government. Empowerment from all parts of national and state life contributes to welfare and security balance. The *TNI* provides community service, and the Police Institution cares for national pluralism by serving fairly and wisely, based on applicable laws and regulations, maintaining internal security through police functions, security and public order, law enforcement, protection, and service to the public. These roles should help Indonesian diversity unified.”

Many experts agreed that, following the occurrence of Indonesia's Security Sector Reform (SSR) in 1998, the restructuring of the military's territorial layout and the reorganisation of Regional Military Commands were implemented to improve security management practices (Ratnawati, 2010; Guan, 2006; Crouch, 2018; Carnegie, 2010). This empowerment improves the efficiency of security forces and helps strike a balance between taking care of people, ensuring safety in the community, and keeping the country stable. Allowing regional authority in decentralisation strategies gives local governments the system to better addressing their community's unique

security and welfare issues effectively, also promoting national unity (Hofman & Kaiser, 2004).

The *TNI*s' participation in community service helps uphold a balance by allowing the military to positively impact societal progress without crossing into political territory. Hence, respecting clear role boundaries between different sectors of governance and development initiatives. Through collaboration with stakeholders and non-*TNI* entities, as well as prioritising local interests in their efforts of reform, have promoted a cooperative security approach that embodies inclusive governance principles and boosts the reputation of both organisations (Smoke 2003). The introduction of the Regional Autonomy Law No 32, 2004 resulted in a balanced distribution of authority and resources across different regions (UU No 32/2004). The movement for autonomy in Indonesia reflects the values of local empowerment and community engagement by granting local authorities the responsibility to address their security issues (Wollenberg, 2004). However, the persistence of challenges such as power conflicts and jurisdictional disputes, remains a concern according to Acharya (2015). Decentralisation of this, showcases the advantages of giving authorities control over their operations to better meet local demands and minimise the risk of centralised misuse of power despite lingering conflicts regarding authority and jurisdiction.

Concisely, the conversation regarding the importance of reform in Indonesia's security, centres around the decentralisation concept and the removal of the dual function of the *ABRI*. The decentralisation concept promotes independence to ensure national stability and community well-being (Faguet, 2014; Smoke, 2003). This approach enables local authorities to effectively manage their affairs, while military engagement aids in supporting governance and development efforts without encroaching on

political matters. The goal is to transfer authority from the government to local bodies by giving prominence to civilian-led governance and enhancing military professionalism. The split of *ABRI* into *TNI* and *INP* is essential to uphold neutrality and prevent it from being used for political purposes (Hofman & Kaiser, 2004). This division has led to security management and a decrease in crime rates while enhancing community stability. This thesis offers an insight into how decentralisation has transformed Indonesia's national security landscape by fostering a governance structure that is more democratic and accountable. It has set the groundwork for a holistic and flexible approach to national security despite facing ongoing obstacles.

5.1.2 Evolution and Impact of Indonesia's NSS Priority Across Four Presidential Administrations

This section examines the post-ORBA period of Indonesia's NSS with the influence of decentralisation on security protocols by looking at the development of the country's NSS. Using decentralisation theory as a guide to understand the changes during four presidential terms, highlighting what is the driving force of the priority of Indonesia's security strategies (Faguet, 2014; Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). After the *ORBA* fell in 1998 in Indonesia, President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, known as B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), took the lead in making changes in the country's political and military arenas by concentrating on decentralising defence policies with the aim of diluting the military's centralised control and promoting a more democratic and accountable national security structure (Harsono, 2021; Soeprapto, 2020). These reforms marked the start of a shift towards regional autonomy and civilian supervision despite facing numerous obstacles along the way (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003). The subsequent administrations of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) (1999-2001), Megawati

Sukarnoputri (Megawati) (2001-2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2014) further steered through these challenges each leaving their mark on shaping Indonesia's security strategies moving forward (Mietzner, 2009; Kingsbury, 2005). During Gus Dur's time as president of Indonesia, he focused on decreasing the military's involvement in politics and enhancing independence of local autonomy. Megawati's administration prioritised balancing economic stability with counterterrorism initiatives, which influenced security priority (Feith, 2007). SBY's term agenda was advancing progress and incorporating extensive security tactics into national policies signifying a wider attention towards modernised security management led by civilians (Emmerson, 2005).

After the *ORBA* regime ended in 1998 in Indonesia, followed by President Habibie's initiatives towards reforms, noted by an active Member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta), highlighted the restructuring military and civilians to reform Indonesia's defence policy was initially by President Habibie. Emphasis on decentralising defence policy to remove the standing centralised control by the military and separated civilian responsibilities to establish a more democratic and transparent defence strategy framework. Shift occurred during the reform era political and military restructuring, which is examined using decentralisation theory (Faguet, 2014). This theory elucidates how the splitting of *ABRI*, into *TNI* and *INP* led to the creation of institutions and roles geared towards enhancing stability and democratisation within the Indonesian government structure.

President Habibie's reforms demonstrate how the system adapted to shifts after the downfall of the *ORBA* regime, according to a professor at the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta):

“Without consulting the *TNI*, Habibie made a wise decision to liberate Timor-Leste by renegotiating the country's foreign debt, where Habibie mistakenly converted USD cash into Yen or Euros at first. Decentralisation of national security policy has taken place, and elections and government reconstruction continue to be a challenge.”

President Habibie's tenure is noted for his focus on governance and efforts towards decentralisation despite not being widely popular among the people. His reforms in defence and foreign policy aimed at diminishing influence and fostering a more open and democratic system of governance.

Scholars have recognised that President Habibie's reforms played a role in decentralising power and supporting regional autonomy. This shift broke away from the centralised government structure (Ratnawati, 2010; Guan, 2006; Crouch, 2018; Carnegie, 2010). Academic focus on the situation in Timor-Leste was influenced by militias and violence during a referendum that eventually led to United Nations oversight. This highlighted the difficulties of implementing policies of decentralisation (Crouch, 2018). The *Baligate* scandal exposed instances of corruption and misuse of funds during Habibie's time in office (Hadiz, 2000). It emphasised the challenges faced in governance during periods of transition, and efforts towards decentralisation.

After Habibie's presidency, President Gus Dur encountered obstacles from the military and influential politicians in his efforts to decentralise power. According to a professor at the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta), Gus Dur's term saw shifts in politics and economics:

“Although Gus Dur is blind (physically), during Gus Dur's period, the economy stabilised with the rupiah strengthening. However, Gus Dur's technique of humanising the *TNI* did not match good governance. Political parties were not prepared to appoint ministers, and the recruiting process was chaotic. Parties organise, socialise, and communicate with one another. Since its cadre party and people are habituated to crises, *Golkar* survives even after disbanding.”

Despite attempts to make the *TNI* more civilised, considering previous human rights violation, and political parties were caught off-guard when selecting ministers caused disorder in the recruitment process.

Additionally, an active member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta) thought that the SSR in Indonesia displayed potential during this period. This transformation had its origins in Gus Dur's significant leadership:

“Indonesia's SSR was founded under Abdurrahman Wahid's two-year rule. The *TNI* rejected and disobeyed parliament's request for Wahid's resignation over *Bulogate* and *Bruneigate*. Law No 34 of 2004 had inconsistencies when parliament's political elite 'approved' active *TNI* members to engage in direct election contestation or when *TNI* Headquarters inventoried *TNI* firms as a condition for corporate takeovers.” “President Gus Dur continued the defence policy that had not yet attained its core. The fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia moved maritime (then marine and fisheries) from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, continuing the military and civilian restructuring. His short tenure made the policy unsustainable.”

The introduction of the Regional Government's Law (UU No 34 of 2004) meant to distinguish between military and civilian responsibilities, although encountered discrepancies when the political leaders in parliament supported active *TNI* members to participate in direct electoral competition, or when audit tasking was done by *TNI* Headquarters for *TNI* businesses as a requirement for business acquisitions. Moreover, political parties faced challenges with disorganisation and lack of readiness in selecting ministers which resulted in a disorderly recruitment procedure.

Scholars such as Muir (2008) and Ratnawati (2010) highlighted the efforts made by Gus Dur to decentralise Indonesia's defence policy through the creation of the Department of Defence in 1999 which merged the Departments of Defence with Security. President Gus Dur's actions, such as naming a Defence Minister and dividing *TNI* and INP, were crucial steps in enhancing civilian control and decentralisation (Muir, 2008; Ratnawati, 2010). However, his controversial call for aid to dissolve the Parliament and involvement in financial scandals like "*Bulog Gate*" and "*Brunei Gate*" led to his impeachment (Crouch, 2018; Carnegie, 2010). The opposition from the political leaders against decentralisation initiatives, underscores the conflicting nature of shifting towards civilian-controlled governance systems. According to decentralisation theory illustrated by Faguet (2014) and Smoke (2003), the focus is on improving governance and accountability through decentralisation. However, it frequently faces pushback from established powers and bureaucratic inertia. These theoretical perspectives shed light on the challenges encountered during Gus Dur's reform efforts and their wider impact on Indonesia's NSS.

President Megawati worked on further developing the decentralisation policies already in place in Indonesia's NSS. Under Megawati's leadership there were changes made

in laws and institutions that centred around strategically managing Indonesia's territories. The focus was on reducing central control and promoting regional self-governance. She encountered obstacles during her tenure including a ruling by the International Court of Justice that granted Malaysia control over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan. A member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta) highlighted the loss was an impact due to implementing various policies on Indonesia's approach to safeguard its remote small islands.

Implementing decentralisation policies in Indonesia, as seen during Megawati's administration, highlights the challenges in a country with geographically dispersed regions. The process of decentralisation poses challenges such as conflicting jurisdictions among authorities, leading to coordination issues and bureaucratic inefficiencies which can impede the efficacy of reforms (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). Megawati's revisions to legislation as Law on State Defence (UU No 3 of 2002) according to the scholars was to enhance professionalism within the *TNI* and diminish its involvement in business affairs while also improving civilian oversight and advocating for human rights standards (Muir, 2008; Crouch, 2018). This legislation marked a milestone in decentralising military influence and aligning Indonesia's defence strategies with democratic values. Additionally, Megawati passed several changes in the legal system, like modifying the *UUD 1945* constitution and establishing the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* or *KPK* in Indonesian). Other reforms included creating a corruption court and updating laws related to regional governments (Ratnawati, 2010; Carnegie, 2010; Acharya, 2015). These actions resonated with the ideas of decentralisation theory which stress the importance of empowering communities and running things efficiently at an administrative level (Bardhan & Mookerjee, 2006; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra,

2010). The actions taken dispersed authority widely and made sure responsibility was in place, hence Indonesia's NSS in line with democratic norms.

The shift under SBY's leadership and the ongoing reforms highlight the challenges of enacting policies effectively. SBY's tenure was centred on improving the *TNI* and addressing external national defence concerns. As stated by a professor at *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta), SBY's methodical approach towards governance and defence reform was noteworthy. A member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta), points out that SBY's administration emphasised redirecting national defence priorities towards external threats while giving importance to civil authority and global collaboration. This strategic shift aims to bolster Indonesia's standing internationally, while ensuring stability and sovereignty within its borders.

Moreover, encouraging cooperation with other countries can build a stronger and more flexible security system. For example, Kingsbury (2008) mentioned how setting up a fresh anti-terrorism team post the 2004 election fostered stronger connections with the United States and Australia for Indonesia. SBY highlighted the importance of addressing risks and combating terrorism within a decentralised defence structure as a strategic response to evolving security concerns. This concept of decentralisation focuses on prioritising defence against external threats while also emphasising civilian authority and promoting collaboration with other countries (Riker, 1964; Oates, 1999; Treisman, 2007; Falletti, 2010; Snyder, 2001; Rai, 2014; Keen, 2020). The theory emphasises how dispersing power can improve countries to make sure people are answerable for their actions and reduce disputes in society. However, the difficulties

involved are in keeping a country and making sure different levels of government work well together.

Indonesia has given importance to national security policy during the decentralisation process across four presidencies by balancing political and military changes, including regional autonomy and civil military relationships while implementing comprehensive security strategies. During President Habibie's term in office, a focus on decentralising defence policy was observed with the goal of clarifying the roles of the civilian sectors in line with Rondinelli's et al., (1989) call for local autonomy to strengthen democratic governance. President Gus Dur continued the efforts in promoting decentralisation despite facing opposition, confirmed to Manor's (1999) idea emphasised the importance of decentralisation in enhancing democratic governance. President Megawati pushed forward autonomy and adjusted defence strategies according to democratic values in line with perspectives of Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) on tailoring national policies for local requirements. President SBY concentrated on restructuring and handling external defence challenges while ensuring internal peace – a reflection of Keen's (2020) observation on the delicate balance of partnerships required by decentralisation for national unity.

5.2 Understanding Institutional Reforms in Indonesia's NSS Through Decentralisation Theory

5.2.1 The Progress of Indonesia's NSS Development Through Decentralisation Measures and Democratic Oversight

Indonesia's NSS underwent significant changes due to decentralisation, reflecting changes in CMR relations and local governance in reform agenda. This shift allowed

for increased local participation in security matters, aligning with political sociology perspectives that emphasise the importance of decentralisation in fostering accountability and responsiveness to regional security needs (Mann, 1984; Tilly, 2007). This shift was influenced by Janowitz's (1977) exploration of the military's relationship with society, Huntington's (1957) analysis of CMR dynamics, and Clausewitz's (1976) recognition of the broader societal implications of military conflict. The government seeks to improve professionalism and transparency in the security sector by engaging stakeholders and giving more authority to local officials. Although it is important to find ground between democratic supervision and practical challenges when making institutional changes in Indonesia's NSS initiative.

As per an admiral working in the MOD (personal communication, 20th June 2022, Jakarta) the revamp of Indonesia's NSS started by revising the 1945 Constitution to redefine the responsibilities of the *TNI* and *INP*. This adjustment aimed to tackle concerns while upholding peaceful public order (known as *Kamtibmas*). He highlights how crucial decentralisation is in developing and executing Indonesia's NSS. He argues that engaging the Parliament in defining security goals leads to a well-rounded approach by considering input from various governmental and non-governmental bodies. This partnership demonstrates that decentralisation was expected to enhance the responsiveness and effectiveness of Indonesia's security systems by promoting collaboration among government departments (Smoke 2015). This era signifies a shift from past norms where the military held sway over internal security affairs. The method used to shift power within Indonesia's security system emphasises altering structures and ensuring security institutions align with democratic values (Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010; Farguet, 2014).

In addition, the government's strategy on security underwent a notable change in the late 1990s due to significant anti-military feelings. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, civilian oversight of the security apparatus went beyond political standard (ICG, 2001). In reaction to the public's demands for reduced militarisation and the president's efforts to regulate the INP, the government cut connections with the forces to prioritise upholding public safety and enforcing laws (Mukhtar, 2011; Crouch, 2018). As the Armed Forces dissolved their duties followed by a broader scope for the INP, led to a distinctive function within the security structure.

Moreover, decentralisation has altered the dynamic between the *TNI*, the INP, and civilian oversight mechanisms by separating *ABRI* into *TNI* and INP as part of an institutional reorganisation to promote democratic security governance. According to a former rear admiral (personal communication, 20th July 2022, Jakarta) insights on the new institutional framework where the military commander is under the MOD for operational matters, while each Chief of Staff focuses on personnel and strength development. *TNI* oversees the use of force while INP manages homeland security reporting directly to the President. The division of duties highlighted here emphasises the method of handling security measures in which various departments have specific duties and hierarchies. Similarly, Mietzer (2013) talks about the changes in Indonesia's security systems after the Suharto era reforms that involved reorganising the military and police functions separately to improve democratic supervision and civilian control.

A former Member of Parliament (personal communication, 23rd September 2022, Jakarta) stressed the importance of the dual oversight system in Indonesia's security setup by highlighting that the *TNI* falls under the MOD while the INP directly reports to the President. He disagrees that this setup leads to a situation where the President is

responsible for internal security through the police force instead of it falling under the Ministry of Home Affairs, as it ideally should.

In a conversation about the political power, by Aspinall (2014), the focus was on how local influential figures in Indonesia – including traditional leaders and business personalities – adapt to the changing political scene in the country. While some of these figure's work towards progress and democratic practices in their communities, others misuse their authority to promote corruption and favouritism shaping the governance landscape at a level in various manners.

In addition, a member of the Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta) shares how they addressed the call from the public for a dedicated National Police force that operates independently from the Armed Forces. The significance of Presidential Instruction No 02 of 1999 and the National Police Law (Act No 02 of 2000) played a role in ensuring this autonomy for the INP. This allowed the INP to concentrate on maintaining law and order, providing safety and security, and serving communities without any interference from the military. The Deputy Police Commissioner (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) emphasised the role of the INP in maintaining national security and highlighted their ability to seek support from the military in addressing organised crime issues.

A collaborative framework showcased here allows security agencies such as *TNI* and INP to work together effectively and fulfil their roles within a security system (Rochmawati, 2020). Nonetheless, Crouch (2018) raises issues regarding the autonomy of the commander in chief in the forces under the MOD's supervision and direct accountability to the President for military strategies and operations. The framework involves bodies such as the Coordinating Ministry of Political Affairs and

Security Affairs and the Indonesian Military and Police. It also includes an "Ad Hoc" group and a dedicated council (Surwandono & Ramadhani, 2016; Muir, 2008). This setup ignites worries regarding uncertainties and insufficient public oversight. It emphasises the necessity for decentralisation (Crouch, 2018). The *TNI* Law (Law No 3 of 2002) and INP Law (Law No 2 of 2002) have made the relationship between the police and military more complex, which has led to violations of rights because of keeping operational authority and making impromptu decisions (Haller, 2006; Crouch, 2018; Muir, 2008; ICG, 2001). Concerns have been raised about the decentralisation and institutional changes because of issues like overlapping authority, lack of oversight, unclear roles in security services, and possible human rights violations caused by sudden decisions. Decentralisation has impacted the development of security strategies and the issue of cooperation among various agencies (Faguet, 2014; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010).

Furthermore, a professor at *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) has highlighted concerns regarding the delayed preparations for the National Security Bill and the effects of disbanding *TNI* on advancements. Likewise, a senior air marshal who is now in an academic circle (personal communication, 17th June 2022, Jakarta) has pointed out:

“The National Security Law, which has been under consideration for over 10 years, has not been confirmed by order, and the Criminal Procedure Code interprets and regulates all threats.”

The National Security Law has been in deliberation for more than a decade without being put into effect yet, while the Criminal Procedure Code (known as *KUHP*) is

responsible for interpreting and supervising all risks – a clear indication of a deficiency in the legal system for managing national security comprehensively.

Decentralisation within Indonesia's NSS strives to establish a security framework by engaging various government and stakeholder tiers. Nonetheless, it may result in setbacks and inefficiencies in policymaking due to conflicting priorities (Rondinelli, 1981). There is growing attention towards the National Security Act (*Kamnas*) initiative as it represents the government's efforts to safeguard the nation's autonomy by formulating a national security blueprint (ICG, 2001). Worries about issues with privilege caused a delay in the act's implementation from 2004 to 2006, even though it was part of the National Legislation Programme (Muir, 2008). DKN refers to *Dewan Keamanan Nasional* or the National Security Council which was set up because of these efforts (Eko, 2015). Scholars have emphasised the importance of collaboration and alignment between different government agencies when addressing national security issues (Sugara, 2021; Akbar et al., 2021; Hadi, 2017; Kuncoro, 2013; Sahaya & Ali, 2011). They suggest that this coordination should be reflected in the government's plans, such as the National Long Term Development Plan (*RPJP*) and the National Medium Term Development Plan (*RPJMN*). This highlights the importance of implementing security measures for authorities to work together effectively in ensuring national security without compromising civil liberties despite potential conflicts of interest.

In summary, the institutional changes within Indonesia's NSS have strived to establish a democratic and accountable security framework, with enhanced effectiveness. These adjustments have been guided by the principle of decentralisation. They have engaged various stakeholders while empowering local authorities (Conyers et al.,

1986; Faguet, et al., 2014; Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). The revisions made to the 1945 Constitution have redefined the responsibilities and duties of both the military and police forces, emphasising addressing matters while upholding public order. The division between the military and police roles has improved democratic oversight and control over them in a positive way, although there are worries about how much power the commander in chief holds and the lack of supervision by citizens in general. Also, some difficulties have surfaced due to decentralisation including cooperation issues among organisations and creating a comprehensive security plan (Smoke, 2015; Rondinelli, 1981, Rondinelli et al., 1984). Some challenges also arise from delays in passing the National Security Law, and gaps in the system which make decentralisation more complex. Despite these difficulties, the government's goal is to work and collaborate across different government agencies to uphold national security while also protecting civil liberties.

5.2.2 Navigating Autonomy, Coordination, and Accountability in a Complex Security Landscape

Looking at Indonesia's NSS from the perspective of decentralisation theory reveals a network of independent bodies at the regional level and centralised oversight. While decentralisation has led to the creation of security entities operating independently, challenges persist in terms of coordination, transparency, and accountability across these entities.

A former Research & Development Director of *Bakamla* (personal communication, 08th August Jakarta) provides insights into the structure of security forces. Within the TNI umbrella are the Air Force, Navy, and Army units whereas the INP is primarily tasked with handling state and public security matters. Other security organisations in

Indonesia such as the Civil Service Police Unit (*Satpol PP*), National Search and Rescue Agency (*Basarnas*), and Marine and Fisheries Resources Surveillance Unit (*PSDKP*) operate independently and report to various government departments. This decentralised structure highlights the diversity of Indonesia's security system. Decentralisation within networks of self-governing organisations and departmental subdivisions enables individualised responsiveness. However, this approach can lead to inefficiencies and challenges with coordination (Treisman, 2007; Rondinelli et al., 1984).

In addition to the organisations mentioned earlier in the list of institutions discussed by a member of the people's assembly at provincial (personal communication, 15th August Meranti), there is a particular focus on the establishment of several national security agencies such as the Indonesian National Intelligence Agency (*BIN*) and Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (*Bakamla*). This development signifies a transformation in Indonesia's security environment towards greater diversification and decentralisation of security responsibilities aimed at bolstering the nation's capability in effectively addressing diverse security issues (Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010; Faguet, 2014).

Scholars have expressed concern about the increased power given to BIN and its effects on transparency and accountability (Haseman, 2005; Kingsbury, 2008). Additionally noted by Muir (2008), the lack of intelligence reform within BIN and its supervision by leaders with ministerial authority could jeopardise human rights and civil liberties. Decentralised systems play a role in balancing power distribution to prevent potential misuse, by ensuring that no individual organisation like *BIN* operates without being held accountable for their actions. This is especially important when

there is a lack of oversight in place (Falleti, 2010; Snyder, 2001; Treisman, 2007; Rondinelli et al., 1984). This situation highlights the importance of oversight measures in a decentralised security system to prevent potential misuse of authority.

According to a former Chief Director of a state-owned military's industry (personal communication, 21st August 2022, Jakarta), the country's security functions decentralisation is emphasised by the independence given to important institutions, like the central Bank of Indonesia, the Corruption Eradication Commission (*KPK*), and the Financial Services Authority (*OJK*).

“Such that numerous institutional strengths are autonomous (Bank Indonesia, *KPK*, *OJK*, etc.)”

In essence, these bodies can function efficiently and independently as part of an effort to enhance transparency, responsibility, and effectiveness in the financial and governmental systems of the country. It is crucial to establish oversight committees, as emphasised by Schütte (2017), to ensure proper governance and answerability. Moreover, scholars stress the importance of ensuring justiciability in organisations to safeguard civil and political rights from government infringements (ProPatria, 2006). Justiciability or institutional autonomy refers to the ability of institutions to enforce decisions and ensure compliance independently without being influenced by factors such as government entities while safeguarding civil and political rights effectively (Falleti, 2010). As a case in point, the State Audit Agency (*BPK*) as a self-governing body overseeing integrity in governmental activities, serves as a guardian to guarantee the proper and transparent utilisation of public funds (Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2011; Muir, 2008). Nevertheless, the insufficient depth of inquiries by lawmakers into irregularities investigated by the *BPK*, signifies a notable gap in accountability. The

lack of oversight indicates that even though there are decentralised and self-governing oversight structures in place, they are not fully effective due to a lack of follow-up from the legislative side. This situation can lead to corruption and the improper use of funds (Crouch, 2018; Schütte, 2017; Hadiz, 2004; Aspinall & van Klinken, 2011).

Ultimately, the NSS of Indonesia showcases an intricate framework that consists of various autonomous bodies and local organisations. The rise in agencies like the *BIN*, as well as independent bodies such as the central Bank of Indonesia and the *KPK*, indicates a shift towards more-decentralised control that can enhance governance, although also requires strong monitoring to prevent misuse of power (Rondinelli et al., 1989). It highlights the importance of enforceability and independence of institutions to safeguard civil liberties and political rights while also ensuring governmental responsibility (Huther & Shah, 2000; Smoke, 2003). A point emphasised by Smith (1985), the balance between independence and collaborative governance. This decentralisation boosts the adaptability, at the lower-level governance and brings about difficulties in terms of coordination, transparency, and accountability (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). The hurdles of decentralisation involve guaranteeing supervision and answerability, the institution's efficiency relying on proper legislative structures, and oversight systems.

5.3 Interpreting Risks and Threats in the Intersection of Public Trust and Civil Competency to National Security in Reformation Indonesia

5.3.1 *Exploring Risks and Threats in Indonesia's NSS through the Lens of Public Confidence*

Indonesia's NSS was shaped significantly by the confidence of the public and involvement of citizens, along with the impact of press freedom and social media dynamics. Scholars like Putnam (1993) argue that public trust and engaged citizenry play a vital role in enhancing the functionality of security bodies such as the National Resilience Council (*Wantanas*) and the National Resilience Institute (*Lemhannas*). Additionally, Tyler (2006) argues that institutional credibility holds a pivotal importance in gaining public support for security measures. Giddens (1990) offers a perspective on how modern communication tools influence trust. This emphasises the difficulty of handling false information while maintaining transparency. Norris (2011) argues that upholding trust among the public is crucial for democratic leadership particularly in a setting where media freedom and citizen involvement are key factors. Striking the balance between these aspects is important for creating a strong and trustworthy NSS that boosts public trust.

Analysing Indonesia's NSS considering trust and civic competency offers a holistic view of risks and threat interpretations, influence on security protocols, and the effectiveness of associated institutions like the *Wantanas* and the *Lemhannas*. These institutions are crucial for their role in training national leaders, assessing strategic resilience, and fostering national principles, as emphasised by a former diplomat (personal communication, 02nd December 2022, Jakarta). The 2006 Presidential Regulation sought to enhance *Lemhannas* by reorganising its structure and functions

to boost effectiveness and strengthen its role in national resilience across defence security, and political, economic, and socio-cultural domains (Presidential Regulation No 67 of 2006). According to Rothstein & Uslaner (2005), empowering citizens with the information and resources to address security concerns, strengthens the nation's security infrastructure significantly. Agencies such as *Wantanas* and *Lemhannas* need to carry out their responsibilities and elevate the country's worth and civilian skills to guarantee a resilient nation that fosters public trust and security.

This is elaborated in detail by an expert of *Lemhannas* (personal communication, 16th August 2022, Jakarta):

“As secretariat general, the *Wantanas* monitor demanding administration and how many personnel handle their approved jobs. While *Lemhannas*, the National Resilience Institute, currently teaches, analyses, and consolidates national values and measures resilience, maybe at the sub-district or district level.”

The importance of trust in security institutions is highlighted by various theories which suggest that the legitimacy and efficiency of these institutions greatly depend on the level of trust they receive from the public (Putnam, 1993). Building and maintaining trust is key for the effective enforcement of security measures and policies as it encourages citizen cooperation and adherence to rules, which is crucial for national security. Theories regarding civil abilities emphasise the importance of developing and improving citizens' skills to engage with and support national security initiatives for the country's overall resilience (Fukuyama et al., 2011). These competencies empower citizens to participate in shaping the security landscape, hence bolstering national security strategies starting from local communities. The true test is ensuring these

improvements make a difference in strengthening the nation's resilience and earning the trust of the public.

Some have mentioned that *Wantanas* manages and implements strategies related to resilience, while *Lemhannas* focuses on evaluating and improving national cadre and leadership education to meet both national and international strategic needs efficiently and effectively (Surwandono & Ramadhani, 2016). Soeprapto (2020) emphasises the importance of education and leadership development in enhancing Indonesia's national resilience by fostering civic skills and upholding national ideals to equip leaders to address intricate security challenges effectively. The potential overlap between these two entities may result in inefficiencies and confusion rather than leveraging each-other's strengths as they might end up duplicating efforts instead of complementing each-other's capabilities.

In another paradigm, it is important to consider security issues with regards to public trust and civic abilities in a democratic society like Indonesia, that values freedom and security as interdependent elements of governance, according to a senior admiral working in the MOD (personal communication, 20th June 2022, Jakarta). He highlights that although democracy fosters freedom of expression and the growth of groups, it also carries certain risks where lack of oversight could enable the formation of groups involved in criminal activities such as terrorism or subversion. This emphasises the importance of preserving rights while implementing strong oversight to safeguard against possible security risks.

A senior police commissioner (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta) mentioned that the freedom of speech within Indonesia's democratic system can lead to the rapid spread of threats that are hard to contain and therefore pose a major

security concern. This viewpoint underscores the necessity for systems to supervise and regulate the swift propagation of potentially dangerous content. The perspective of a police commissioner (personal communication, 11th February 2023, Jakarta) contributes to the reform objectives focused on enabling the media to report without constraints:

“One reform goal was to give the press freedom to report on everything. This flexibility allows news coverage without ethics or conventions. Uncensored news. All ages can use. Everyone can now say whatever they want without ethics or manners, swear at each other, "strip" each other, expose each other's disgrace, and even expose this country's disgrace to the world.”

The current situation has resulted in a lack of regulation in news coverage which can lead to issues and the disclosure of sensitive information. This unrestricted flow of information sometimes leads to public discussion of national matters that might pose a risk to national security. Therefore, it is essential to uphold freedoms and maintain vigilant oversight to thwart such dangers and combat organised crime, as well as terrorism, while addressing conventional conflicts.

In another view, Indonesia's press freedom framework is seen to provide a positive setting for the mass media although with weaknesses (Sahrasad, 2014). Muir (2008) argues that the press must uphold objectivity and avoid being influenced by interests in society, to maintain its effectiveness in overseeing governmental powers across branches without getting involved in political matters that could compromise its integrity in reflecting public concerns. While press freedom offers a platform for the mass media to function effectively and serve the public interest by keeping a check on the authority of the executive and legislative branches of government.

Furthermore, the emergence of networking platforms as a potent tool in politics underscores the challenges in upholding national security in today's digital era by prompting questions about public confidence and civic capabilities. However, this affects societal harmony according to a former territorial commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta). He points out that social media has evolved into an avenue for shaping public perspectives and influencing policy decisions due to its extensive reach and affordability. It has the ability to influence political interactions as well as economic patterns and how the public perceives things – hence holding significant implications for the security of a nation. The concept of an "echo chamber," as elucidated by the interviewee demonstrates how social media algorithms strengthen existing beliefs by screening information to build a uniform environment. This phenomenon can intensify any divides in society which may result in polarisation and disputes. When false information and rumours propagate within these confined spaces of agreement, they can seriously undermine trust and unity – presenting a risk to national security.

In the age of technology and information sharing online, combating false information and societal divides hinges on trust from the public. Establishing trust in security institutions and helping individuals acquire skills can reduce risks while educating the population, enabling governments to address security challenges while preserving democratic principles. As an example, the commendable work of an elite counter-terrorism unit within the INP, known as special Detachment 88, can bolster faith in INP authorities (Muir, 2008). Public trust plays a crucial role in garnering cooperation and backing from the public for security initiatives, thereby reinforcing national resilience.

This analysis emphasises the importance of recognising skills and public confidence in effectively managing security measures within Indonesia's NSS. Norris (2011) in particular, stresses the significance of trust in democratic governance and how civic skills affect the performance of institutions. Thus, reflecting the analysis of security institutions such as the *Wantanas* and the National *Lemhannas*. Cohen & Arato (1992) shed light on the role of civil society in democratic participation – a crucial factor in evaluating how public trust and civic capabilities influence security measures. Connecting involvement to public trust is vital, according to Putnam (1993) who emphasises the importance of striking balance between democratic freedoms and security, considering the increasing impact of social media platforms on society. Luhmann's (1979) theoretical model delves into the influence of trust on the efficacy of institutions, while work by Sztompka (1999) examines how trust influences interactions within society. These viewpoints collectively underscore the challenges of upholding governance and security in a swiftly changing democratic environment.

5.3.2 Navigating Threats while Enhancing Civil Skills and Trust

The reformation period in Indonesia was marked by democratisation and increased political involvement. However, there was a shift towards belief that the initial focus on political participation and civil liberties were triumphs of democracy, as noted by Inglehart (1997). The process of democratisation can bring about challenges such as the emergence of radical groups, according to his observations. According to Crenshaw (1995) and Gurr (1970), the emergence of radical groups as an alternative when political and social institutions fail to address grievances adequately, and the risk this poses to national security, are substantial. Extremism frequently arises from socio-political grievances and thrives on ideological influences, weak governance, and

economic disparities (Sukabdi, 2019). The complexity of these threats is challenging military focused risk assessments as highlighted by Kaldor (2013). The level of trust in the NSS is influenced by the government's ability to understand and effectively respond to these diverse threats that are deeply rooted in socio political and economic factors.

In Indonesia's context, as discussed by a retired rear admiral (personal communication, 31st October 2022, Jakarta), the unintended outcomes of democratisation were emphasised to fuel the rise of radical Islamic organisations:

"After-reformation marked by the opening of the faucet of democratisation has become fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic groups. The phenomenon of radicalism among Muslims is often based on religious understanding, even though the originator of radicalism can be born from various things, whether economic, political, social, and so on. In the political constellation in Indonesia, the problem of Islamic radicalism has been getting bigger because its supporters are also increasing. However, sometimes these movements have different views and goals, so they do not have a uniform pattern. There are those who simply fight for the implementation of Islamic law without having to establish an "Islamic state", but there are also those who fight for the establishment of an "Islamic state of Indonesia", depending on the point of view of the adherents. With this matter, national security under democracy is very dangerous for the current national stability".

This scenario highlights an element of national security – the importance of maintaining trust between the public and governmental bodies while empowering civil society to address and confront evolving challenges effectively. This variance calls for

customised strategies that consider the beliefs and goals of different factions. The process of democratisation has opened an environment for these factions to advance their goals, elevating them to significant positions in the political arena.

According to Kahneman (2017), cognitive biases play a role in shaping the perception of threats within national security contexts. For example, it can sway individuals' views on fairness and efficiency by pointing out that trust issues can hinder the acceptance and successful implementation of crafted laws. In the context of Indonesia's NSS, these biases could potentially result in an emphasis on more recent occurrences and an oversimplification of the underlying factors contributing to radicalism. In order to effectively tackle extreme beliefs, the NSS should acknowledge these prejudices and adopt a more nuanced approach that addresses both urgent risks and underlying concerns.

Academics emphasise the worsening influence of the increasing population of extremists, whose connections to criminal and terrorist groups showcase the diverse aspects of the threat environment. Mukhtar (2011) and Haller (2006) shed light on the nature of the threat environment, shaped by religious, economic, political, and social elements and the significance of confidence in government and security establishments in tackling these issues. Sukabdi (2020) highlights that extremism often stems from ideological fervour and structural vulnerabilities like socio-economic inequality, political instability, and weak governance. These factors can lead radical movements to adopt violence as a legitimate means, disrupting societal harmony and challenging the state's security and order. Komara (2015) sheds light on the balance between democracy and military influence that affects public confidence in governmental bodies. Sukma's (2012) study on Indonesia's stance on security norms,

and Karim's (2016) discussion about the necessity of a bilateral strategy for democratisation, are key points to consider.

The collaboration between countries plays a role in strengthening local measures against extremism and terrorism while fostering a more secure and democratic environment. Seniwati (2014) mentioned the actions taken by presidents to enhance security through stricter anti-terrorism laws and heightened surveillance measures. Transparency and democratic principles are key in upholding trust in security measures and encouraging collaboration in counterterrorism initiatives. Conversely, democratic or militaristic approaches can erode trust and hinder public engagement.

The case of the Bali Bombings in 2002, brought about a change in how Indonesia discussed terrorism, according to an active Member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta). The swift reaction to this event resulted in the introduction of Government Regulation as a substitute for Law No 1 of 2002, followed by Law No 15 of 2003 on Combating Terrorism Crimes that aimed to define activities as acts with the intention of instilling widespread fear or causing large scale harm through violent actions or threats thereof (Republic of Indonesia, 2002, 2003). The immediate response bypassed parliamentary talks and emphasised the importance of quick government intervention during emergencies. Having an open system of governance is vital for effectively putting anti-terrorism regulations into practice. However, the success of systems greatly depends upon the trust of the public; when democratic procedures are sidestepped or ignored altogether this trust can diminish significantly over time. Public confidence plays a role in giving credibility to national security actions by making sure they are seen as just and gaining the required public support and collaboration.

Additionally, addressing security concerns effectively through publishing national strategies is crucial in building public trust. For example, the 2003 DWP explaining the government focus on restructuring and isolating the *TNI* from political interference to enhance credibility through autonomous action while limiting political intervention (Muir, 2008; Crouch, 2018). Reform initiatives like the 'blue book' and development paper, aimed to enhance abilities and foster a more cohesive society (ICG, 2001). The DWP and military doctrines released in 2008 demonstrate a dedication to adjusting military tactics and stance to contemporary challenges (Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2011). This highlights the importance of a rounded strategy that integrates public confidence and civic proficiency in national security goals.

Finally, during Indonesia's reformation era the emergence of Islamic extremists had an effect of a loss of trust in governmental bodies and has been attributed to a decline in civic capabilities. The process of democratisation inadvertently opened doors for these groups to push their objectives forward, raising concerns about security (Inglehart, 1997). Aimed to tackle these dangers effectively and safeguard national security concerns comprehensively, it is crucial to consider biases and promote trust through transparent governance practices (Kahneman, 2017). An idea proposed by Benhabib (2002) is that an active involvement of the public and the reinforcement of civil society are vital components to uphold stability and combat threats, to further enhance resilience and address emerging challenges satisfactorily.

5.4 The Role of CMR in Indonesia's National Security

5.4.1 Improving National Security by Building Civil Competency and Public Trust in Indonesia

In understanding the civil role in NSS, military sociology emphasises the trust between the public and military fosters cooperation and legitimises military actions (Kahn, 2013), while strong public trust aligns military operations with democratic values (Maoz, 2006). In political sociology, Levi (1997) highlights that civil capability enhances oversight and accountability, vital for democratic governance. Peters (2016) asserts that empowered civilian institutions improve military effectiveness, ensuring that security measures reflect public will and address diverse needs. These perspectives illustrate the interplay between civil capability, public trust, and effective governance in the reformed Indonesia's NSS.

Civil competency theory underscores the importance of education and civic involvement in preparing individuals to engage proactively in governance, guaranteeing that national security strategies resonate with the public's concerns. Scholars have emphasised the role of these skills in upholding democratic governance principles (Gutmann, 1999; Almond & Verba, 1963; Nussbaum, 2003). The theory of trust further stresses the significance of trust in government institutions as it promotes adherence to laws and regulations, and encourages widespread public support and cooperation (Tyler, 2006; Hardin, 2002; Fukuyama, 1996).

The contrast in opinion towards the *TNI* and the INP in Indonesia underscores the importance of aligning security forces with public interests. A Dean at the Defence

University (personal communication, 05th September 2022, Sentul) pointed out a difference in how the public views the *TNI* and the INP:

“Civilians don't trust INP because its actions represent the government's interests but trust the *TNI* because it acts on their behalf.”

Furthermore, echoing this sentiment, a member of the provincial people's assembly (personal communication, 15th August Meranti) highlighted:

“The *TNI*'s various efforts in embracing the people in carrying out their duties have improved the image of the *TNI* itself. This contrast with the police agency, which, since the beginning of the reform era, has been separated into a separate (autonomous) institution with all the authority that is classy in the hope that law enforcement and civil security are free from interference from the authorities and carried out as the adage that "equality before the law". This has decreased its image due to the chaos of high-ranking officials who carried out corruption scandals and other criminal acts.”

The positive rapport that the *TNI* maintains with the community, contrasts the situation with the INPs, highlighting the need to align security forces with public concerns and establish strong oversight measures. Building trust is crucial for boosting national security by prioritising education and independent oversight as key strategies in this endeavour. Many scholars highlight the significance of education and independent oversight in instilling confidence in government (Gutmann, 1999; Almond & Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1989).

Therefore, the International Crisis Group suggests that public education plays a role in garnering support for police reform and relevant laws (ICG, 2001). Muir's (2008)

perspective emphasises the necessity of autonomous organisations supported by non-governmental entities and media to address community issues and citizen complaints. This approach ensures that the intelligence sector remains transparent and answerable. In their works, Dahl (1989), Almond & Verba (1963), and Westheimer (2007) highlight the significance of fostering connections between civilian and military entities, as well as encouraging public involvement in security establishments. They stress the importance of harmonising sectors to uphold democratic principles and promote efficient national security endeavours. Balancing civil military relations and cooperative governance plays a role in tackling challenges and preserving public confidence.

A retired rear admiral (personal, communication, 20th July 2022, Jakarta) stated that the balance of power between military forces in Indonesia is a delicate one; both the *TNI* and the *INP* are seen as strong protectors of the nation. This observation highlights how important it is for CMR to be cooperative to ensure security. Likewise, a senior police officer who serves in the International Police (personal communication, 11th February 2023, Jakarta) emphasised the importance of collaboration among civilians, military, and law enforcement in society. He mentioned:

"In a society it is important for civilians as well as the military and police forces to collaborate, and mutual respect is key to empower the nations unity and strength. When citizens have authority over the government and security forces, it is essential that they do not develop a sense of superiority while serving the nation."

This viewpoint emphasises the importance of cooperation in ensuring governance and security measures are in place. In addition to this point of view, a former member of Parliament (personal communication, 23rd September 2023, Jakarta) emphasised the

importance of unity among the police force *TNI* and the general population highlighting their role in protecting citizens and strengthening the national security framework. The government should involve communities in conflict-resolution efforts through civic education and bolster organisations to provide lasting solutions to address underlying issues.

CMR pertain to maintaining a balance between civilian oversight within a democratic system, discussed by Minnich (2001), Hahn (1999), and Gutmann (1999), highlighting the importance of maintaining a relationship between the civilian and military sectors within democratic systems. They stress the impact of education in nurturing skills and knowledge on citizenship, as well as promoting involvement in civic matters. Community involvement and local insights play a role in resolving conflicts and are vital elements in shaping Indonesia's civil defence strategy development (Bebbington, 2008; Suryadinata, 2007).

A key aspect of governance involves the military's support in civilian-led security strategy while upholding democratic principles and public welfare to enhance public confidence (Tyler, 2006; Hardin, 2002; Fukuyama, 1996). Active community participation and social engagement are fundamental in establishing strong security measures and promoting political stability in Indonesia. For example, Sudarsono (2008) studied Indonesia's defence strategy that relies heavily on the Reserve and Supporting Components (*Komponen Cadangan dan Komponen Pendukung*) which play a role in bolstering national security by engaging a wider segment of society in defence activities. His study supports the notion that an educated and involved public, play a role in ensuring national security is effective. However, scholars show concern on weaknesses in the Indonesian parliament's institutions, such as shortage of

personnel and lack of comprehension defence technical knowledge, and small involvement in national security discussions (Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2011; Acharya, 2015). These shortcomings pose challenges to supervision and law-making in the field of national defence that weaken the overall efficacy of Indonesia's security structure.

In summary, including civil competence theory in understanding security frameworks, emphasises the significance of education, community involvement, and local knowledge in promoting effective governance and security. As emphasised by scholars, engaged citizens play a vital role in holding national security institutions accountable and ensuring that security strategies are in line with public interests (Gutmann, 1999; Hahn, 1999; Tyler, 2006). The difference in public perception between the TNI and the INP highlights the importance of making changes and ensuring supervision to match security forces with societal expectations and beliefs in a better way. Scholars focus on trust from the civil skills along with the discoveries of how crucial it is to tackle gaps within institutions and boost involvement of parliament in safeguarding the nation (Sudarsono, 2008; Sebastian & Lisgindarsah, 2011; Acharya, 2015). In the end, strong national security relies on maintaining a balance between civil and military forces through collaborative governance and engaging the public actively (Bebbington, 2008; Suryadinata, 2007). Enhancing these elements excel Indonesia's security structure and guarantee the preservation of democratic principles and better serves its people.

5.4.2 Balancing Public Confidence and CMR in Indonesia's NSS

The concept of trust and civic abilities underscores the importance of civilian supervision and collaboration with security organisations by emphasising the changing

relationship between civilian leadership and military activities. Public trust emphasises the importance to have confidence in institutions for effective governance (Tyler, 2006; Hardin, 2002; Fukuyama, 1996). Civil abilities highlight the importance of education and civic involvement in making sure that individuals are informed and engaged to governing processes (Gutmann, 1999; Almond & Verba, 1963). Effective civilian supervision and professional inclusion are vital for upholding a relationship between civilian rule and military activities, while ensuring that security institutions function openly and are answerable to the community.

This thesis analyses Indonesia's NSS through trust and civil capabilities and highlights how civilian involvement and supervision play a crucial role in determining the relationship between civilian leadership and military activities, as expressed by a colonel from the air force (personal communication, 25th July 2022, Jakarta):

"Civilian government officials are increasingly aware of their role in military dominance."

This increasing awareness indicates a move towards increased supervision and control over military operations to improve the democratic management of security organisations. Moreover, according to a former Secretary General of the MOD (personal communication, 8th June 2022, Jakarta):

"Government agency placement should be proportional and professional"

This viewpoint emphasises the importance of incorporating both civilians and military personnel in defence and security roles based on merit and balance to build trust and competence within these organisations effectively. Maintaining a merit-based system

in security institutions guarantees that roles are assigned based on expertise rather than political factors, enriching efficiency and building trust within these institutions.

Additionally, a former Commander of the *BAKAMLA* (personal communication, 15th August 2022, Sukabumi) sheds light on the relationship between the Indonesian military and the local civilian community. He elaborates:

“The military’s interaction with civilians is intricate; the commander in chief manages operations while the minister formulates policies, and the president oversees the police’s policymaking and implementation.”

The importance of defined roles and responsibilities in maintaining a strong and unified NSS is highlighted by the complex relationship between different entities involved in it. Ensuring civilian oversight and trustworthy civilian governance is essential for a secure national defence strategy. Scholars pointed out the challenges in achieving efficient civilian control and supervision in CMR (Feaver, 2003; Bruneau & Matei, 2008; Cottey et al., 2002). They emphasise the significance of enhancing governance capabilities and credibility, as well as implementing robust legislative oversight while maintaining a balanced approach to national security matters. Haller (2006) indicates that the effectiveness and trustworthiness of government officials have led to less reliance on the military for administrative duties, which distance from the historical perception of the military being a manifestation of the people. However, the power dynamics related to civilian defence ministers remain ambiguous. Muir (2008) underscores the Department of Defence’s involvement in military activities since 1999 without sufficient civilian supervision. He emphasises the importance of reconciling national security operations with freedom of speech and implementing robust legal

frameworks to ensure that security forces operate within legal boundaries and are under civilian jurisdiction.

In addition to that point of view regarding national security risks, using the concept of trust and civil capabilities indicates a strong link between the quality of governance and the effectiveness of security measures (Bruneau & Matei, 2008). The remarks made by a professor from *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) highlight gaps in civilian readiness for emergencies:

“The civilians are unprepared, the Indonesians are indifferent, the leadership fails, they are party oriented only, transactional, and unorganised, and the civilian minister of defence commanded the security- focused institutions regulations and administrations. This situation has led to a lack of accountability and transparency in the government, which has further eroded public trust. It is imperative for Indonesia to address these issues and strengthen its democratic institutions to ensure long-term stability and progress.”

The citizens in Indonesia lack preparedness, while leaders prioritise party agendas over organised and strategic security efforts. Moreover, concern lays in the defence minister overseeing the rules and management of security-oriented organisations. This lack of readiness and attention has resulted in notable challenges regarding accountability and transparency within the government, further diminishing public confidence. The decline in public confidence towards governmental and security bodies could greatly influence the efficiency of NSS. It plays a vital role in civic capabilities potentially causing a breakdown in collaboration between the public and security entities impeding effective risk reduction efforts.

Making sure that civilian leaders have the tools and are dedicated to the nation rather than just their political party's interests is essential for building trust among the public and strengthening national security (Feaver, 2003; Tyle, 2006). Political leaders compromise democracy by fostering corruption increasing income inequality and diminishing confidence in institutions. The security vulnerabilities within reform contexts are expanded, specifically concerning financial practices and inadequacies in infrastructure (Sahrasad, 2014). The concept of trust and expertise in the sector underlines the significance of civilian supervision and skilled assimilation within security organisations (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008; Norris, 2011). Rebuilding confidence requires showcasing dedication to principles and engaging citizens in NSS.

In summary, the success of Indonesia's NSS is significantly impacted by concepts of trust among the civil skills that influence CMR interactions. Experts underscore the significance of trust in enabling effective governance and fostering public compliance with security protocols (Tyler, 2006; Hardin, 2002; Fukuyama, 1996). Civil competencies emphasise the role of education and active civic involvement in promoting informed and engaged citizen participation (Gutmann, 1999; Almond & Verba, 1963). In addition, the importance of balancing military duties to avoid one side dominating, and to guarantee democratic supervision effectively establishing trust and accountability through good governance, is essential when merging these viewpoints to that point of view (Feaver, 2003; Bruneau & Matei, 2008). In Indonesia's journey through changes and reforms, it is crucial to instil merit-based systems for national priorities and well-defined responsibilities to strengthen the nation's security and resilience.

5.5 Conclusion

The final section of this chapter brings together the interactions within Indonesia's NSS from 1998 to 2014. This era saw changes in the nation's security structure under the leadership of Habibie, Gus Dur, Megawati, and SBY projected by decentralisation theory put forth by Rondinelli (1981) and Smoke (2003). The changes were motivated by the need to dismiss the military's doctrine "dual function" and to move towards a democratic system of governance. During President Habibie's term in office, the NSS reforms began with the distinction between military and civilian functions to set a foundation for a more democratic NSS. This progress was continued by President Gus Dur despite facing opposition as he pushed forward with the decentralisation process emphasising autonomy. President Megawati then strengthened these initiatives by aligning defence policies with principles of democracy. Finally, SBY's administration focused on reforms and addressing external defence threats, in efforts to boost Indonesia's global position and ensure domestic harmony.

The structure and organisation of the military forces (*ABRI*) went through decentralisation into *TNI* and *POLRI*. This played a key role in removing political influences from, and by, the military and enhancing security operations (Hofman & Kaiser, 2004). This split strengthened the military's neutrality and promoted civilian control, although faced obstacles such as slow legal developments and the necessity for more robust monitoring systems.

The chapter delves into how national security organisations have evolved over time and emphasises their increased capabilities and independence within the system. Although decentralisation has led to challenges in coordinating security agencies, it also highlights the difficulties involved in forming a unified security strategy. The

examination underscores the significance of trust and civilian competencies in this scenario which are crucial for upholding a sustainable democracy and efficient governance (Harris, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 2001).

Social media gained prominence, and press freedom expanded significantly, and a new set of challenges arose regarding security during this time. This called for an equilibrium between protecting democratic freedoms and implementing effective surveillance measures. The rise of Islamic factions due to declining civil capabilities and diminished public confidence, highlights the unforeseen security risks that came with the democratisation movement (Inglehart, 1997).

The chapter underscores the role of maintaining strong CMR relations promoting public trust and aligning security policies with the broader societal needs and interests for the continued success of Indonesia's NSS (Feaver, 2003; Bruneau & Matei, 2008). In Indonesia's journey through political reforms, emphasis on merit-based systems prioritising national concerns and defining roles clearly are crucial for fostering a stable and robust nation.

6.0 Indonesia's NSS during the Post-Reform Era, 2014 to 2024

This chapter explores Indonesia's NSS from 2014 to 2024 under President Jokowi's two tenures. It delves into the impacts on priorities for security planning and policies as well as the influence on national security structures. It follows with threat perception and the public position using theoretical frameworks related to economic patriotism and political oligarchy within a broader context of public opinion. The idea of economic nationalism stresses the importance of government control over resources to safeguard security and independence (Helleiner, 2002; Hadiwinata, 2019). This was the appearance in Widodo's policy on building infrastructure and reducing reliance on resources. Moreover, the section delves into how influential economic elites sway decisions related to security to serve their own interests, particularly in industries like infrastructure and natural resources (Winters, 2011; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). Moreover, the chapter delves into the consequences of securitisation by exploring how labelling certain issues as security threats has resulted in heightened state intervention and constraints on civil liberties. The response of society to these challenges is also examined in depth (Buzan et al., 1998). Finally, the impact of opinion and civil society on the NSS is analysed by considering theories of public discourse and media influence. It is noted how increased scrutiny and activism have forced the state to navigate the balance between security measures and democratic values (Habermas, 1989; Tapsell, 2017). By incorporating these principles into the discussion regarding Indonesia's national security landscape during Widodo's tenure as president, adds valuable perspectives to the academic conversation.




DIAGRAM 6.1 REFORM II
Source : own construction

Diagram 6.1 Post Reform Indonesia's NSS Framework: own construction

Diagram 6.1 displays Indonesia's complex political and security setup that illustrates how governmental bodies interact with military and civil organisations. The diagram focuses on strategic themes, such as Nationalist Political Economy, Global Maritime Axis, Administrative Reform, and Minimum Essential Force, which shape the country's overall goals centred around promoting national unity and advancing economic and maritime priorities while revamping bureaucratic processes. In Indonesia, core beliefs such as the *Pancasila* Ideology, The Unitary State (*NKRI*), Unity in Diversity (*Bhineka Tunggal Ika*), and the 1945-Constitution are portrayed as the foundation of the nation's values of unity amidst diversity and adherence to principles. Important players such as the People, Political Party, and Autonomous Commission, which consist of entities like journalists and NGOs alongside human rights commissions and civil society organisations, are highlighted for their crucial position in the governance procedures.

Although political parties hold significant influence over both the president and parliament, the diagram shows how power moves between groups – the president and parliament working alongside various ministries and regional governments – and points out that active military and police leaders also play civilian roles in a mix of military and civilian leadership. This mirrors the intricate power structure in the Indonesian government and is the same as the previous decade government procedures, such as the Long-Term Plan (*RPJP*), Middle Plan Term (*RPJMN*), and Presidential Decree (*PERPPU*). These are tools that the president employs to enact policies on priorities and manage the nation effectively to address both national and regional threats promptly. The base of the diagram illustrates the political system using terms such as Non-Liberal, Political Identity, Populism, and Securitisation. This indicates a shift towards consolidating power and the impact of measures on national security and democratic governance in Indonesia's NSS. It provides an insight into how ideology, governance structures, political dynamics, and the merging of civilian and military functions shape the NSS.

In the span of a decade from 2014 to 2024, Indonesia's NSS went through changes owing to a series of legislative adjustments that revamped the defence law enforcement sectors and democratic structures of the nation. A noteworthy event during this period was the inception of the National Cyber and Encryption Agency (*BSSN*) in 2017, as per Presidential Regulation No 53 of 2017. This organisation was assigned to protect Indonesia's cyber independence which highlights the growing significance of cybersecurity in the country's security plan (Widodo, 2018). To an extent, the government highlighted the significance of upholding press freedom and civil liberties, while addressing the challenges posed by misinformation and hate speech on media platforms (Anwar, 2021).

Adjustments made to the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (Law No 19 of 2016) aimed to combat cybercrimes without compromising freedom of speech (Putri, 2019). Legislation No 23 of 2019 was brought forward during Indonesia's transition to democracy to establish reserve forces for times of national crises. It highlighted the significance of taking an approach to safeguarding national interests and acknowledged the interconnectedness of various threats necessitating a unified response (Jones, 2022). The law also reinforced the role of the National Resilience Council (Wantanas) and the National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas), crucial for strategic planning and policy formulation (Wicaksono, 2020).

Additionally, legislative acts supported Indonesia's active participation in ASEAN's security and United Nation's peacekeeping, as part of Indonesia's broader strategy to enhance its international standing and contribute to regional stability, reflecting its position as a key player in Southeast Asia (Sulaiman, 2020). Although initiating discussions further about potential militarisation and viewed as an intention to enhance the country's defence capacities within a democratic framework (Rizal, 2023), these changes were geared towards updating Indonesia's security systems and promoting structures while staying true to democratic principles amidst evolving global security challenges.

Analysing the prioritisation of security strategies during Indonesia's transition period involves looking through the lens of economic nationalism as a critical theoretical perspective. Helleiner (2002) emphasises the concept of safeguarding national economic interests and significantly shapes national security policies by giving importance to economic self-reliance and protecting domestic industries, especially in times of political and economic uncertainties. Furthermore, in exploring the influence

of politics on national security institutions, Barker (2013) provides important perspectives on this matter. Their research delves into how centralised power among a select elite group can influence policy choices to serve their own agendas. This theory of oligarchy shows who is affecting the creation and enforcement of the National Security Bill, diverse constitutions, and presidential directives. Huntington (1991) offers a basis for studying the impact of oligarchic control on military and security establishments by illustrating how political leaders shape these establishments to meet their strategic goals. Beck's (1992) theory on risk society is relevant when dealing with issues like terrorism and disaster management. It stresses the necessity for societies to adjust to evolving risks and dangers such as terrorism and natural calamities. Finally, Dahl (1998) presents an examination of how civil authority and defence security services interact based on democratic governance. He emphasises the importance of public opinion and community participation in shaping national security policies to adhere to democratic values. This analysis delves into Indonesia's security strategies during its period of transition by considering economic nationalism, as well as factors such as oligarchic influence and CMR relations, also public sentiment within the framework of democratic principles.

6.1 Between Economic Nationalism with Political Oligarchy in Deciding National Security Priority

6.1.1 Exploring the Fusion of Economic Nationalism in Indonesia's NSS

Indonesia's post-reform NSS's economic nationalism can be understood through Polanyi's (1944) "embedded economy" theory, which emphasises the state's strategic regulation of key sectors like energy and infrastructure to protect national interests and sovereignty. This aligns with Weber's (2001) view of state authority shaping economic

actions, where bureaucracy prioritises national security through economic control. States also create and manage markets to ensure resilience and national stability in the face of global challenges (Fligstein, 2001). In political sociology, Winters (2011) highlights how oligarchic elites influence policy to maintain control over strategic industries, shaping national security priorities. Weber's (1976) view of state authority, Mann's (1984, 1986) theory of "infrastructural power," and Tilly's (1990) focus on state control over resources, reinforce how elite interests and state power converge to manage markets and resources, ensuring economic and national security.

Analysing Indonesia's NSS can be understood by looking at nationalism principles that emphasise the importance of government involvement in the economy to protect and advance national interests. Helleiner (2002) discusses how economic nationalism highlights the role of the state in managing matters to ensure self-reliance and shield local industries from foreign danger. This theoretical framework holds significance in grasping the national priority, highlighted by prominent figures in Indonesia's security sector such as a colonel from the air force, (personal communication, 25th July 2022, Jakarta) who stresses the importance of boosting the competitiveness of domestic industries. These priorities are implemented through measures that are focused on reducing regulations and bureaucracy, and expediting national projects such as land allocation, streamlining permits, and advancing infrastructure. These initiatives aim to enhance Indonesia's security by promoting economic resilience and self-sufficiency through a strategic connection between economic policies and security strategies. The concept of nationalism emphasises the importance of a robust and independent economy in safeguarding national security (List, 1841; Helleiner, 2002). Therefore, the emphasis on these initiatives in NSS demonstrates a comprehensive strategic approach that combines economic vitality with national security goals to equip

Indonesia to navigate various economic and geopolitical hurdles effectively (Sukma, 2010; Shimizu, 2011).

Scholars highlight the connection between policies and national security within Indonesia, known as *Nawacita* initiative, by focusing on areas such as defence and security, education, public welfare, infrastructure, and national empowerment (Syailendra, 2017; Warburton, 2016; Ladiqi & Salleh, 2018). Research by Warburton (2016) and Syailendra (2017) emphasises the role that state owned enterprises (SOEs) play in strategic infrastructure projects and indicates a return to prioritising the state in national affairs. The Indonesian government is reemphasising state driven development to retain control over assets through SOEs aiming to enhance national security by securing economic independence and stability while reducing reliance on foreign entities.

Economic nationalism places importance on safeguarding a country's wellbeing and assets by implementing policies that involve interventionist measures as demonstrated by Indonesia's decision to prohibit the export of essential commodities, like palm cooking oil. The aim of this strategy is to uphold the resilience of resources and ensure security by addressing the challenges associated with limited resources – an idea emphasised by an expert from the university of Defence, a retired major general (personal communication, 21st June 2022, Jakarta):

“The policy of the central government to issue export ban decisions on certain commodities related to natural resources is an effort to protect the interests of maintaining the stability of resource resilience, as part of efforts to maintain national security from the threat of "scare resources”.

This act reflects on economic nationalism and refers to government intervention aimed at safeguarding security and sovereignty by regulating the flow of resources to stabilise local supply chains and lessen external vulnerabilities (Helleiner, 2002; Rodrik, 1997). However, the implementation of strategies comes with its own set of difficulties and criticisms. According to a notary's observations (personal communication, 11th June 2022, Jakarta), policies based on economic nationalism may incite social unrest and unfairly favour specific societal factions while marginalising others, resulting in scarcities of essential items such as sugar and cooking oil that negatively impact various segments of the population.

The government has often implemented policies that appear populist or nationalist – such as restricting palm oil exports or prioritising domestic industries – ostensibly in opposition to the interests of global capital. Block's (1987) theory explains the intricate relationship between Indonesia's political class and its oligarchic elite, where the state maintains autonomy while aligning with capitalist interests to manage internal crises and ensure stability. During which, still sustaining the interests of powerful domestic oligarchs. However, Blyth (2002) opines economic nationalism could result in turmoil and unequal advantages for various societal factions when policies that seem to favour certain interests excessively limit the freedom and welfare of others. This critique emphasises the challenges of reconciling national security goals with societal repercussions seen in Indonesia's NSS.

The government's dedication to nationalism is evident in certain legal actions like bolstered export and import regulations, and limitations on foreign investments. An instance worth noting is the acquisition of the Grasberg gold and copper mine from Freeport McMoRan in 2017, as mentioned by Wicaksana (2019). This move was seen

as an attempt to strengthen control over resources and support the nationalist economic outlook. This decision is in line with the viewpoint of Weiss & Thurbon (2020) which focuses on statecraft: governments employ strategic tactics to attain self-sufficiency and bolster their authority over resources at a national level.

Indonesia's NSS, in addition to focusing on economic policies, also intertwines with external geopolitical involvement for a comprehensive approach aimed at safeguarding and promoting national interests amidst local and global dynamics, as highlighted by the Navy's First Admiral (personal communication, 28th September 2022, Jakarta). The emphasis lies on the correlation between democratisation efforts and national security enhancements, where Indonesia looks towards aligning its security structures with democratic standards to bolster internal stability and uphold international democratic principles for a more robust national security architecture. Moreover, the strategic juggling is emphasised in the situation of Indonesia's reaction to the increasing rivalry between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, asserted by a postgraduate student from the Defence university (personal communication, 23rd August 2022, Jakarta). Weatherbee (2016) characterises Indonesia's security approach as a "hedging" strategy that maintains ties with both powers. Pramono et al., (2021) and Negara (2019) add there were reports about Indonesia's involvement in China's "One Belt One Road" project that supports infrastructure developments at the same time as works alongside its defence collaboration with the United States of America. This two-pronged strategy highlights Indonesia's focus on nationalism by expanding its network of strategic allies to boost its economic growth and security without relying heavily on any specific dominant force globally. Insights by Brenner (1999) help explain how this decentralisation process intersects with global economic forces. While local governments in Indonesia gained

greater autonomy, they also had to navigate the pressures of economic globalisation and national priorities, such as Jokowi's push for economic nationalism.

Through actions like restricting exports and taking ownership of vital sectors like the Grasberg mine, the government prioritises independence in the economy and control over resources in line with the ideas of economic patriotism (Helleiner, 2002; Rodrik, 1997). However, this strategy has drawn criticism for its repercussions on social unrest and economic disparities (Blyth, 2002). The employment of government-owned companies for advancing projects, strengthens a state-focused economic framework with the goal of attaining stability and independence (Syailendra, 2017; Warburton, 2016). Moreover, Indonesia's geopolitical tactics that involve maintaining ties with global players such as the United States and China portrays its endeavour to bolster national security through varied economic and strategic alliances (Sukma, 2010). This integrated strategy guarantees that Indonesia's economic and security strategies are tailored to tackle both global and internal challenges.

6.1.2 Analysing the Impact of Political Oligarchy on Indonesia's NSS from Critical Perspectives

Political oligarchy serves as a framework to grasp the underlying priorities outlined in Indonesia's NSS. According to Winters (2011) oligarchy is described as a system in which the richest individuals in society wield influence over public assets while often undermining democratic structures in the process. This perspective can be seen in Indonesia through disturbances that uncover the power dynamics at play, as highlighted in an interview with an expert from the University of Defence, who once was a territorial commander (personal communication, 21st June 2022, Jakarta). He comments on the arrests related to hoarding cooking oil, shedding light on the role

played by prominent business figures, and indicating their control over crucial economic resources.

The increasing recognition among the population of the term 'oligarchy' reflects an understanding of how economic strength can impact political power and worsen public dissatisfaction and concerns about national stability. This awareness influences how the public view and engage with the landscape, in line with Törnquist (2019) who suggests that discontent with oligarchic control can result in higher levels of voter scepticism, and involvement in demonstrations or backing for populist movements.

Based on perspectives discussed by a Professor from *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) the exchange of votes for Rp.50k (fifty-thousand rupiah) exemplifies how money-influence is transformed into political sway through the process known as "money politics." Hadiz & Robison (2013) suggest this practice reinforces dominance by fostering financial ties between candidates and voters – ensuring that political control stays in the hands of the wealthy elite capable of funding expensive election campaigns. President Jokowi's governance strategy emphasises forming alliances and building networks of power, rather than seeking widespread agreement in the legislative arena. According to Muhtadi (2019), Jokowi's leadership showcases how influential political and economic elites sway policies by leveraging their resources and control over political parties, to impact both economic stability and security agendas.

The connection between parties and wealthy elite groups is highlighted by a former UN Diplomat (personal communication, 04th January 2023, Jakarta) observing how reliance on rich elites can make political parties vulnerable to oligarchic control, instead of serving as true democratic channels for public expression. The concerns

raised by Mietzner (2020) and Honna (2018) about the dominance of money-driven politics in Indonesia, shed light on practices such as buying votes and distributing favours that uphold the system in place. During the 2014 election period, as noted by a graduate student at the Defence University (personal communication, 24th August 2022, Jakarta), the utilisation of the paramilitary force known as *Pam Swakarsa*, illustrates how the electoral process has become increasingly militarised and reinforces the dominance of oligarchs in political power dynamics. This is explained by Slater (2018), how the merging of influence with electoral affairs safeguards elite interests and may resort to coercive methods when deemed essential.

In Indonesia's NSS, the influence of an oligarchy highlights the impact of concentrated economic power on political and security matters. The affluent individuals hold sway over assets and decision-making within an oligarchical system that undermines democratic principles of broad representation and answerability (Winters, 2011). The commercialisation of backing, and the entrenched patronage system, further diminishes the fairness of elections and perpetuates a politics reliant on financial support (Hadiz & Robison, 2013). President Jokowi's leadership approach reflects an influence from wealthy individuals in shaping national policies and maintaining close ties to affluent business figures at the highest echelons of power in the country.

This analysis suggests that key decisions within the NSS, such as political outcomes and security matters, could be influenced by a small and powerful minority who hold significant sway. Scholars Muhtadi (2019), Mietzner (2020), Honna (2018), and Slater (2018), highlight how military involvement and electoral dynamics serve to uphold dominance over the NSS, often at the expense of democratic principles and eroding public confidence. Political parties rely heavily on elites for financial support, which

undermines democratic institutions by prioritising the interests of the rich over genuine representation of the peoples' will. Indonesia faces challenges in implementing democratic security measures due to the influence of oligarchs. The ongoing struggle between control and democratic goals underscores the importance of Indonesia dismantling and overthrowing the oligarchy for its national security.

6.2 Navigating the Impact of Oligarchic Forces on NSS and Maritime Governance

6.2.1 Assess Indonesia's NSS Amid Oligarchic Influence and Power Dynamics Without a National Security Bill

Examining Indonesia's NSS from the perspective of political oligarchy theory, sheds light on the dynamics of power distribution and the potential influence of oligarchs on national security policies. Theories by Tilly (1990) and Mann (1984) highlight the power imbalance in state control over resources, where elites often dominate, leading to a concentration of power and a dominance structure that undermines accountability and the enforcement of policies. These actions often involve manipulating institutions to safeguard their own interests, leading to increased power centralisation and a decline in democratic governance structures. According to Winters (2011), the concept of "oligarchy as wealth defence" characterises oligarchy as the centralisation of power among a small group of affluent individuals who leverage their wealth to shape political decisions in Indonesia. This theory holds importance when assessing the National Security Bill in this chapter, as it provides a structure for examining how influential figures could centralise authority within the executive member of government and influence the formation and implementation of security measures.

An expert staff Parliament Member (personal communication, 25th September 2022, Jakarta) expresses worries that the National Security Bill might give much power to the executive branch and potentially lead to a concentration of authority that could threaten democratic values. The staff member raised the issue of communication and public engagement regarding the bill and highlights the importance of transparency and involvement in addressing concerns about centralised power in oligarchic governance structures. This situation corresponds with the concept of oligarchy theory in which those in power manipulate government institutions to strengthen their control (Barker, 2013).

The worries voiced by a Rear Admiral (personal communication, 31st October 2022, Jakarta) concerning the impacts of the National Security Law – especially regarding the military's responsibilities and its collaboration with authorities – highlight the intricate equilibrium between upholding state security and protecting civil governance integrity. The legislation aims to tackle types of state security risks encompassing geographical features, as well as demographic and socio-cultural complexities. The Admiral stresses the need for a boundary between law enforcement and military power to avoid military control overshadowing civilian governance or interfering too much in civil matters. The challenge is made complex by the establishment's refusal to comply with laws that go against the objectives of influential individuals or groups, as mentioned by Police Grand Commissioner Adjutant (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta). This opposition reflects the political and institutional factors that frequently influence and occasionally impede the formulation of national security policies.

In the realm of political oligarchy theory, perspective analysis considers these disputes as battles for influence among ranking individuals aiming to safeguard their own interests (Michels, 2001). In Indonesia's setting, this resistance emerges when there is pushback against governmental decisions that are seen as jeopardising the entrenched power or independence of pivotal bodies such as the Indonesian INP and the *TNI*. Scholars analyse the dominance of power in Indonesia who exploit governmental structures to maintain their authority while potentially undermining democratic principles for their own interests (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robisons, 2013). Henceforth, the opposition from established institutions towards the implementation of the National Security Law can be viewed as a reflection of the power struggles among groups who oppose reforms that jeopardise their authority over governmental systems and assets. Additionally, Yogo (2016) points out that the division and specialisation of duties between the *TNI* and INP may unintentionally result in coordination and accountability gaps. This jeopardises efficient governance and CMR interactions, as highlighted by Honna (2018). The absence of a cohesive strategy for regulating national security could potentially result in centralised power within the government or military sector.

The structure setup by Indonesia's NSS poses difficulties in managing the balance of power between the police forces, while ensuring proper oversight mechanisms are in place. A Dean of the University of Defence (personal communication, 05th September 2022, Sentul) sheds light on the challenges involved in defining and achieving security goals. This brings to light a web of power struggles among institutions vying for influence over the NSS. He notes that even though the MOD is recognised as the entity responsible for national security matters, its effectiveness has been challenged by opposition from INP which is reluctant to share authority or give up control to avoid

conflicts of interest. This resistance within institutions reflects the power struggles typical in oligarchic systems where different elite groups compete for influence over national security decisions. This internal competition results in a lack of cohesive governance and hampers the creation of a unified strategy, mirroring the bureaucratic divisions evident in Indonesia's political environment (Mietzner, 2020).

Critics of the National Security Bill process have highlighted the tensions between military and police functions in Indonesia, allegedly because the reintroduction of the dual function concept has created challenges in terms of authority and oversight which could potentially weaken democratic control (Diprose et al., 2019; Sebastian & Iisgindarsah, 2012). Therefore, the implementation of the national security law has encountered deadlock due to conflicts over the jurisdiction and powers of defence and security entities while endeavouring to establish an encompassing framework for safeguarding the nation.

Furthermore, the development of Indonesia's NSS analysis from the shift of the DWP to the *Jakumhaneg*, demonstrates how influential elite interests are in shaping institutional frameworks. According to a Deputy Chancellor of the University of Defence (personal communication, 08th December 2022, Sentul), the DWP used to offer insights into Indonesia's defence capacities, although has been discontinued because of concerns about the outdated nature of military resources. The move towards reduced transparency reflects the desires of a group aiming to shape the narrative on national security by reducing outside oversight (Larosa, 2019). A former Commander of BAKAMLA (personal communication, 15th August 2022, Sukabumi) criticised the DWP as a collection of items without clear strategic objectives. This criticism ultimately led to its replacement by the *Jakumhaneg* framework:

“Our “DWP” is like a shopping list. Not determining our goals. Therefore, the Minister of Defence published the National Defence General Policy JAKUMHAN. The input from below should have been coordinated. There are top-down and bottom-up approaches. Unfortunately, we are Bottom-Up and never move up.... (mockingly).... That is the situation we're in.”

This policy aims to steer approaches within different government departments. However, it seems to follow a hierarchical style commonly seen in oligarchic leadership structures where a small group makes decisions without involving wider consultation processes as much as it typically should (Barker, 2013; Walzer, 2011). Nevertheless, the *Jakumhaneg* continues to play a role in decision-making and executing tasks effectively, especially in situations where the legislation is not accessible.

However, the technical problem arises in the delay of publishing *Jakumhaneg* and its development managed mainly by the MOD of the National Defence Council (*DPD*), as pointed out by a Deputy Chancellor of the Defence University (personal communication, 08th December 2022, Sentul). This highlights the concentration of security policy making processes:

“The MOD which issued the product, *Jakumhanag*, the derivative National Defence General Policy is called *Jaghanneg* National Defence Policy, another derivative is called *Jagarahanneg*, another is called Doctrine. This *Jakumhaneg* was actually signed to serve as consideration for other ministries or institutions in making their operational policies, if at the MOD itself it was used as reference material for developing existing projects or programs, but the *Jakumhaneg* that we currently have for 2020-2024 is late in published, it was only signed by the

President on January 8 2021 it means that what is made does not refer to *Jakumhaneg* which is completely different. *Jakumhaneg* should have been a product of the National Defence Council, or *Dewan Pertahanan Nasional (DPN)*” or “*Wantanas*” because it is not functional, there are no people, therefore, the MOD do the work, and because the *DPN* is chaired by the President.”

This method bypassed democratic systems and was put in place to maintain oversight and control by concentrating power even more in the hands of select individuals within the MOD.

Academics point out that the 2015 DWP was designed to tackle threats and enhance societal progress via well-defined defence strategies (Utami et al., 2019). Larosa (2019) emphasises the importance of incorporating international inclusion, as well as domestic security aspects, into Indonesia’s NSS by harmonising a strategic plan. Following that decision by the MOD to introduce the *Jakumhaneg* replacing the DWP, this shift towards *Jakumhaneg* has raised questions about the emphasis on strategic alignment compared to transparency and international consistency (Ubayanto et al., 2020). This shift corresponds with the concepts of oligarchy in which power is centralised among a select group of influential individuals who may limit outside perspectives and criticism.

Examining Indonesia’s NSS from the perspective of political oligarchy theory, highlights the complexities of power dynamics and the concentration of control in the country’s governance structure (Barker, 2013; Walzer, 2011; Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). The theoretical model provides an understanding of how the interests of the elite influence and, at times, distort the NSS. The concerns within governmental bodies indicate the broader impacts of these power dynamics, where attempts to

centralise, authority may weaken democratic principles and transparency. Finally, the evolution underscores the dangers of oligarchic influences within Indonesia's NSS, underscoring the importance of remaining vigilant and implementing reforms to establish a security policy framework that is more inclusive and transparent, accountability-wise.

6.2.2 Elite Control in Indonesia's Archipelagic Sea Lanes

Indonesia's NSS institutional structure in the post-reform era is focused on the archipelagic sea lines (ALKI), which are sea routes in Indonesia's waters that balance international navigation rights with national sovereignty. However, the management of these routes shows how power can be concentrated in the hands of a few elite individuals and how this can impact democratic supervision and the effectiveness of security policies. The way Indonesia's NSS is structured and how they handle their ALKI, highlights the ideas of consolidating power and controlling elites when viewed through the perspective of political oligarchy theory (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Mietzer, 2020). This emphasises the difficulties in establishing governance in a system controlled by oligarchic interests.

According to a professor from the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta), Indonesia's ALKI system is overseen by three commands; West Commander (*PANGAMABAR* for *ALKI I*), Middle Commander (*PANGAMARTENG* for *ALKI II*), and East Commander (*PANGAMARTIM* for *ALKI III*). The strategic segmentation aims to tackle issues like foreign fishermen and ships from nearby nations such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. Enhancing the capabilities of the State Intelligence Agency emphasises a control and intelligence strategy for handling these security challenges. This concentration of power may

sideline input from other institutions and public oversight which could result in reduced accountability and transparency in maritime security operations, further discussed as threats in Indonesia's NSS.

Scholars offer a perspective on the *ALKI* Patrols structure and goals under the leadership of INP and the Director of Water Police known as *Baharkam*, compared to the *ALKI* command system (Listiyono et al., 2021; Rahman et al., 2021). They emphasise its responsibility in maintaining peace and protecting interests through safeguarding foreign vessels' security and preserving Indonesia's unity. This systematic method of managing maritime border security entails actions to implement marine laws and uphold national values. However, this approach may neglect the importance of wider institutional collaboration and involving the public in security decision making processes, as highlighted by Sumadinata et al., (2022). To establish marine border control measures, it is essential to conduct inclusive events that engage a diverse array of stakeholders to develop a holistic national security strategy that considers various viewpoints and ensures security measures are aligned with the needs and concerns of the general population.

The concept of political oligarchy within the NSS, highlights the struggles in organisational structure with agencies such as the Maritime Security Agency (*BAKAMLA*). These challenges impact Indonesia's security efforts and have implications for governance and societal unity in pursuing maritime goals in Indonesia. A former air marshal, now an expert at *Lemhannas* (personal communication, 16th August 2022, Jakarta) has pointed out issues in maritime security by stressing the need for improved task division and collaboration among agencies, like *BAKAMLA*:

“Critical to security, in particular maritime security. Such as BAKAMLA (Maritime Security Agency) has a role but the division of tasks for cooperation and harmonisation is not optimal. Many of our EEZs have been afflicted. All the logistical routes and the initial prosperity steps that should have been issued by Jokowi were correct. He wants to be Sea Power of Asia, but the program doesn't go there.”

Indonesia's aim to strengthen its presence in the sector in Asia is facing obstacles due to challenges in executing effective maritime security initiatives and addressing power distribution concerns and vested interests that play a role in this scenario. Major authorities in the maritime sector should simplify work divisions. However, Oligarchic influences frequently trigger conflicts over the power dynamics (Winters, 2011). The efficiency of *BAKAMLA* is affected by teamwork and coordination among different organisations which restricts its ability to protect Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Indonesia encounters difficulties stemming from political and institutional variations affected by influential oligarchic entities that impede cooperation and widen the divide between strategic goals and actual execution plans (Winters, 2011; Robison & Hadiz, 2004).

In regional and global concerns, scholars emphasise the importance of following the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in setting up EEZs both regionally and globally for safeguarding national sovereignty and handling border disputes effectively (Setiawan & Ajita, 2022; Sumadinata et al., 2022). These structures play a role in defining maritime entitlements and addressing issues with neighbouring nations. Exemplified by Chaer et al., (2021) who introduced a framework

for trilateral collaboration among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines aimed at addressing piracy and kidnapping issues in the Sulu Sea.

The establishment and reorganisation of security and defence agencies like *BAKAMLA* show advancements in Indonesia's endeavours to strengthen its security measures. A professor from the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) noted that these advancements indicate enhancements in capabilities to tackle maritime security issues. Ensuring efficient integration and collaboration among these agencies is crucial for achieving solid security results. A former Commander of *BAKAMLA* (personal communication, 15th August 2022, Sukabumi) sheds light on the real-world obstacles and complex political dynamics involved in upholding security:

"One time, I was called by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs. He said to me "Commander, don't be like that, right now we are managing good relations with China". I replied, "I think it depends on the State, sir, now this is my obligation, the law is done now." I asked back, "What government policy?" ... "it's at the commander's discretion". After that incident, the TNI Commander in Chief called me... and So I agree and so I changed the pattern. There is already a policy. But there is one element that is not yet government policy, such as the Rule of Engagement and the special Rule of engagement. It could be normative, but it can also be special, the situation is different. For example, for Chinese ships, don't catch them but just chase them away. Well... building good relations is not my business but the affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It's the Commander's business to enforce the law here. There should be someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the fleet.

It's called Expert Staff. Those who support things other than military technicalities."

He has experienced the struggle between following orders and taking political factors into account when dealing with influential neighbouring nations such as China. An event where the Vice Admiral received guidance from the Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs (*Menkopolhukam*) to modify his enforcement tactics to preserve diplomatic ties, demonstrates the impact of political power dynamics. This sway frequently causes top-level policymakers to favour diplomatic factors over the steadfast implementation of national security measures. Reliance on the judgment of commanders of strict rules of engagement can make the institutional structure more complex and introduce possible variations and weaknesses in security missions.

Recent research highlights the importance of multiple parties in safeguarding Indonesia's maritime interests (Susilo et al., 2018; Faunzan et al., 2019). This involves cooperation among different government departments, security forces, and regulatory bodies. The intricate system of institutions relies on a variety of rules agreements and beliefs which underscores the need for a shared understanding of security goals and challenges. However, in a politically dominated system where power is concentrated among a few, coordination between these entities may face obstacles due to conflicting priorities and power dynamics (Winters, 2011). Inconsistencies in how security is handled may result in scattered efforts and decreased effectiveness, since each organisation might focus on its individual interests rather than shared national security objectives.

In summary, the management of the *ALKI* in Indonesia sheds light on the issues surrounding the upholding of national security in a politically oligarchic framework.

While *ALKI* plays a role in Indonesia's maritime security plan, it is important in striking harmony between global navigation rights and national independence. Although the concentration of power within privileged establishments diminishes democratic accountability and transparency, oligarchy's impact on power consolidation within military and intelligence agencies limits institutional involvement and public accountability (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). The complexity of this influence is exacerbated by conflicting interests among various actors engaged in maritime security efforts (Susilo et al., 2018; Fauzan et al., 2019). These divergent interests lead to disjointed initiatives and a decrease in the effectiveness of safeguarding measures for Indonesia's waters. This analysis emphasises the necessity for improved and transparent governing structures to guarantee the efficacy and responsibility of Indonesia's maritime security approach.

6.3 Oligarchic Influence and Executive Power Interpreting Risks and Threat in Indonesia's NSS

6.3.1 The Role of Presidential Decrees in Indonesia's National Security Framework

In Indonesia's post-reform era, the NSS is shaped by oligarchic interests that prioritise elite security over the public good, resulting in a selective framing of threats (Winters, 2011). This approach undermines the state's capacity to address genuine security challenges, as resources are often diverted to maintain elite control. Additionally, Michels's (2001) "iron law of oligarchy" illustrates how power becomes concentrated among a small group, stifling democratic discourse and limiting diverse perspectives on security needs.

The rise of elite groups in Indonesia poses a risk to the effectiveness of national security measures by fuelling corruption and sparking social tensions rooted in power dynamics and unequal social status among citizens. A specific case that sheds light on the imbalance in treatment, involves a former leader of a regional police station facing obstacles from a powerful business entity – a stark example of the divide between law enforcers and common individuals that weakens the principle of equal legal rights. This incident was brought to wider attention by a former member of Parliament (personal communication, 23rd September 2023, Jakarta):

“I heard that the former Head of Province’s Police Station (*Kapolda*) just complained that he wasn't served because what was being opposed by a conglomerate. I saw on YouTube. He said, “I reported to the institution where I grew up there until I got two stars. After I retired, I was treated injustice, how about other common people”. We should be the same before the law. In that case, the attitude of our law enforcers should be justice, don't get involved in politics... They said "this is the political opponent of the regime, so we will work on it"... (expressing example) ... don't be like that, according to their respective portions. Prosecutors should not be bribed easily; judges also are like that. We really should be a clean country from Corruption Coelutions Nepotism (known as *KKN*), both from the INP, the *KPK*, the prosecutors, we enforce the law without discrimination.”

This highlights the problem within society where politicians use laws and systems to safeguard their interests: a common trait of oligarchic rule (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). Additionally, a former secretary general of the MOD (personal communication, 08th June 2022, Jakarta) revealed how widespread corruption in the

government is, and even involves, members of the Parliament. The corruption driven by influence undermines the credibility of institutions and jeopardises national security by eroding trust among the people and diminishing the efficiency of security measures. In this scenario, elite interests frequently overshadow the good, resulting in a disjointed and inefficient governance approach (Mietzner, 2020; Winters, 2011).

Academic studies suggest that corruption is deeply ingrained in Indonesia's system and impacts sectors such as law enforcement agencies and the judicial system (Buttle et al., 2016). The recent modifications to the Anti-Corruption Commission Act in Indonesia reflect a concerning trend of diminishing powers of the *KPK*, exposing the impact of political oligarchy on the country's governance and security. Researchers have raised concerns about the performance of the *KPK* in fighting corruption amid criticism that recent legal revisions have weakened the Commission's power significantly (Megah et al., 2022; Mietzner, 2020; Akbar, 2021). Wibowo et al., (2021) and Akbar (2021) suggest that these alterations in legislation signify a plan by the authorities to reduce the impact of anti-corruption endeavours and empower oligarchic influences, while compromising independent monitoring mechanisms. Under President Jokowi's tenure in Indonesia's government, the system saw a rise in the influence of figures which altered the scope of the authority of the *KPK* and undermined efforts to combat corruption, while casting doubt on the trustworthiness of governing bodies among the public – emphasising the risks associated with seemingly centralised power structures. According to Winters (2011) and Hadiz & Robison (2013), the establishment of oligarchic dominance in Indonesia results in a governance climate that favours the interests of the elite class over others, which weakens institutions and grows dissatisfaction among society – posing a risk to the stability and security of the country in the long-term.

The political elite in Indonesia play a role in shaping national security policies by centralising executive authority and impacting decision making procedures in particular ways. There are worries regarding the risk of authoritarian governance stemming from the President's broad power to enact Presidential Decrees (*Perpres*), as well as Government Regulations in Lie of Law (*Perppu*), especially in times of urgency. The accumulation of authority in the branch may result in choices that heavily depend on the personal discretion of the President – a point raised by a retired air marshal, now an expert at *Lemhannas* (personal communication, 16th August 2022, Jakarta). He underlined the importance of the "black swan" theory and pointed out that these rules could be escalated to become Central Government Regulations during crucial situations, which in turn consolidates more power within the executive branch. The clear impact of the elite in this situation is noticeable, since choices concerning national security often rely heavily on informal input and personal judgment rather than being firmly based in a structured legal system. Winters (2011), as well as Hadiz & Robison (2013), highlight the concentration of authority among the elite endangering democratic scrutiny and jeopardising national security by fostering a system where those in power could make arbitrary decisions that serve their own interests.

Scholars share this worry when the President holds both roles of advancing party agendas and is evaluating the legality of laws (Akbar, 2021). It could weaken democratic oversight and pave the way for power abuse. Moreover, Mispansyah et al., (2023) dive into the scenario by discussing how laws, such as *Perppu* as a temporary law, come into play during emergencies to manage community bodies in times of crisis. As per Freedman (2013) and Gowing (2009), these occurrences are quite unpredictable, underscore the significance of adopting a well-rounded strategy to minimise the potential of risks, and unambiguous executive choices.

A case study highlighted President Jokowi's administration decision to disband the Islamic Defenders Front (*FPI*) and *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (*HTI*) for security concerns, sheds light on the intricate relationship between political oligarchy and governance in Indonesia. An active Member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta) expressed disapproval of the government's strategy and highlighted the lack of significant responses from most Indonesian Muslims regarding the actions taken against *FPI* and *HTI* groups. The disbandment of *HTI* was especially contentious because it was carried out through a *Perppu*, an emergency Government Regulation, even although there were existing laws that outlined procedures for shutting down organisations that contradicted Pancasila, Indonesia's ideology. She viewed that this move avoided scrutiny by the court system, ignited worries about the misuse of authority by the government, and the weakening of legal principles that are meant to uphold fairness in a society that values human rights.

Numerous experts have debated how the political landscape in Indonesia is being influenced by the government's reactions to these groups – a trend that highlights a broader strategy of using state authority to address opposition voices (Mietzner, 2020; Power, 2018; Bouchier, 2019). For instance, in 2016 during the "212 movement", there were demonstrations orchestrated by Prabowo Subianto and his followers from Islamist factions, like *FPI* and the Indonesian Ulama Council, against then-Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) who was a political competitor (Fealy, 2016; Mietzner, 2017). The aftermath led to the arrest of Rizieq Shihab from *FPI* and the prohibition of the *HTI* organisation – an action that many experts see as a way for those in power to silence opposing voices (Power, 2018; Pepinsky, 2019). To further exemplify this scenario in motion, Törnsquest (2019) and Mietzner (2020) discuss how the

government under Jokowi strategically used identity politics by choosing Ma'ruf Amin as his running-mate in the elections of 2019.

Towards summarise, the ongoing existence of an oligarchy in Indonesia greatly affects national security and governance by showing how the interests of the elite can weaken democratic values and institutional credibility. The centralisation of power in the hands of the elites can be seen through President Jokowi's reliance on Presidential Decrees and Government Regulations, instead of following established laws. This raises concerns about hasty decision-making and possible legal framework deterioration. The concept highlighted by Winters (2011), as well as Hadiz & Robison (2013), demonstrates how political oligarchy negatively impacts governance by concentrating power in a privileged few that erodes public confidence and worsens corruption: endangering national stability and security in the process.

6.3.2 The Impact of Oligarchs on Security Legislation to Counterterrorism and Natural Disaster Response in Indonesia

Political elites commonly leverage security legislation to strengthen their control and sideline dissent while maintaining power within structures (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). An instance of this behaviour can be seen in the enactment of the 2018 Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia which aims to enhance security through community involvement and safeguarding infrastructure against terrorism threats. The law is designed to tackle security issues by involving the community and enhancing protective measures. However, it could also be seen to consolidate control by the elite in the name of national security. According to a former member of Parliament (personal communication, 23rd September 2023, Jakarta), the law calls for a holistic approach encompassing security measures and terrorism studies to tackle risks and

pinpoint accurate areas at risk. However, legislation might be wielded to strengthen political dominance and quash opposition. Some experts contend that while these regulations are crucial in combating terrorism threats, they could also be exploited by the ruling class to uphold their power and diminish the justness and efficiency of security measures at that level (Mietzer, 2020; Power, 2018).

The key to the execution of anti-terrorism tactics as laid out in the 2018 Law on Combatting Terrorist Crimes, is the efficient cooperation among governmental bodies and agencies. Notably though, is the need for collaboration with companies and non-governmental organisations, as well as international anti-terrorism entities (Juprino et al., 2022). However, the application of these laws has been criticised for violating human rights. Reports suggest that government officials' excess of power has resulted in arrests and escalated surveillance (Sugiantu & Rofi'i, 2018; Suatmiati & Kastro, 2020). Even although fighting terrorism effectively needs collaboration from all sides, the interference of influences can disturb this teamwork, resulting in inefficiencies and a focus on elite priorities, rather than the welfare of the public. These examples showcase the dangers of a system in which the power of the elite hinders the achievement of wider societal goals (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). The problems highlight that those in power might use laws to tighten their grip, while hiding behind the pretext of national security concerns. This trend shows how political elites tend to twist laws in their favour at the cost of fairness and good governance.

The inclusion of the TNI in counterterrorism efforts under the Terrorism Law signals a significant change in the country's security approach and ignites important questions about the impact of political elites on governance dynamics, according to an expert Parliament Member (personal communication, 25th September 2022, Jakarta). The law

grants TNI responsibilities in civil law enforcement activities that surpass its traditional military duties and encroaches into domains typically overseen by civilian bodies. This new direction suggests a growing pattern of military participation in local matters – an observation supported by Sebastian & Iisgindarsah (2012) who note a rise in military involvement in unconventional tasks due to perceived threats to state stability or the interests of the ruling class. This change could potentially diminish the role of organisations and empower the elite by assigning security responsibilities, primarily to the military – a move that could be seen as an effort to centralise power under the pretext of bolstering national security.

The National Counterterrorism Agency (*BNPT*) is crucial in this scenario as it oversees terrorism studies and policy formation efforts effectively and efficiently, according to the expert staff of Parliament Member (personal communication, 25th September 2022, Jakarta). The decision-making authority and management of information by *BNPT* exemplify a framework that emphasises cohesive actions while prompting discussions on transparency and responsibility concerns. The partnership between the *BNPT* and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and local authorities showcases a rounded approach to combating terrorism by leveraging social media to advocate for religious moderation and deradicalisation (Nugraha et al., 2022; Christawan et al., 2023). The collaboration among organisations like the State Intelligence Agency (*BIN*), the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (*BCN*), and the Indonesian Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (*BAIS*) in combating terrorism and cyber threats, introduces complexities and potential challenges, as noted by Hatta et al., (2018).

A former UN Diplomat (personal communication, 04th January 2023, Jakarta) criticises this division and proposes that merging these agencies could improve effectiveness and minimise duplication:

“When I’m on assignment in the United States, there is no *BNPT*, *BNN* is part of the police, why don’t we make it tougher so we don’t have multi-layers and it will also waste funds, if it’s for an emergency, that’s OK, but if the situation gets better, improve the structure. The original becomes better, containing people who are strong, professional, and have measurable abilities to overcome the problem.”

The division observed, indicates a lack of cohesive leadership and contributes to the existence of various sources of power within the state that may hinder the establishment of a central authority figure. The broader responsibilities undertaken by the *TNI* now encompass disaster relief efforts and humanitarian aid initiatives, as discussed by a former territorial commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta), and further acknowledged by Varkkey (2017) and Koerniawan (2018), highlight complexities in balancing military and civilian duties. The expanded range of involvement seeks to tackle different national security issues, however, comes with the drawback of blurring the lines between military and civilian roles. This could strengthen oligarchy power and pose a threat to democratic values such as civilian supervision and answerability (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robinson, 2013).

Ultimately, the 2018 Law on Combatting Terrorism in Indonesia showcases how political elites can utilise security laws to strengthen their control while claiming to prioritise security needs. The focus on involving communities in counterterrorism efforts and safeguarding infrastructure in the law, to bolster counterterrorism

measures, also acts as a tool for centralising power among the elite under the pretext of national security concerns. The incorporation of the *TNI* in counterterrorism efforts and the concentration of authority in the *BNPT* highlight the growth of military and bureaucratic influence, which could sideline civilian organisations and strengthen oligarchic power structures. The conflicting forces at play, in a system where the dominance of the elite can compromise the effectiveness and justice of national security measures, underscore the importance of adopting a well-rounded strategy that protects both security and democratic values. This concept is supported by Winters (2011) and Hadiz & Robison (2013). Concerns about divided agency responsibilities and the dangers of militarising duties, emphasise the wider impact of this legislation on governance and democratic values.

6.4 Balancing Public Opinion and Shaping Policy in Indonesia's NSS

6.4.1 Navigating Public Opinion, Media Influence, and Governance in the Digital Age

Public opinion significantly influences the CMR in Indonesia's NSS post-reform era. Huntington (1991) highlights the shift towards democratisation, requiring a rebalancing of military and civil authority. Feaver (1999) argues that public opinion reflects growing demands for transparency and accountability in security matters. Citizens push for reforms that diminish the military's power and promote civil supremacy. This has led to a new dynamic where civil institutions have greater input, while elite interests continue to influence key national security decisions (Mietzner, 2020). Public opinion is a powerful force in ensuring the military's compliance with democratic norms, while highlighting the tension between civil empowerment and elite-driven security policies.

Studying how civil society contributes to Indonesia's NSS by applying public opinion theory, offers perspectives on how societal beliefs influence security strategies and

risk assessment practices. Theories on opinion, like those introduced by Habermas (1989), highlight the significant role of public discussion in shaping governmental policies. In Indonesia's context, the increasing impact of media and the freedom of the press has heightened public examination of government decisions concerning national security measures (Tapsell, 2017). The connection between society and national security is emphasised in this methodology, with specific focus on media and social platform's role in shaping it. The dual role of society in influencing national security is noted by a police grand commissioner Adjunct from the R&D Division (personal communication, 31st August 2022, Jakarta):

“The role of civil society is very important in influencing national security and risk responses. This influence can be positive or negative. Positive When the community participates in providing positive input in anticipating the emergence of risks and threats to national security. Negative character arises when the community is part of the emergence of national security risks and threats.”

Positive involvement from the community is crucial in foreseeing and lessening risks and dangers effectively. In contrast, it is harmful when certain groups worsen vulnerabilities or directly contribute to security threats. This duality underscores the significance of how engagement and perception influence national security results.

Advancements in science and technology plays a role in shaping public interactions with security policies – they both enable and complicate engagement with the public on these matters, according to a professor from *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta). Although digital tools empower people to join conversations and decision-making processes to some extent, this potential is far from fully realised, and a large part of the population tends to be passive participants.

He compared it to "foam in the ocean " easily swayed by popular sentiments rather than actively influencing policy directions themselves. This comparison emphasises how public opinions in the era are often reactive rather than based on well-informed or critical perspectives when it comes to matters of national security. The idea of being overly defensive or fanatical without considering perspectives, highlighted by the professor, shows how public opinions can get deeply rooted and divided. This division can lead to discussions among the public and hinder their ability to effectively participate in creating logical and fair security plans. This scenario is explored in the context of public sphere theory which focuses on how technology either supports or hinders the development of public discussion on security matters (Habermas, 1989).

Both Hui (2020) and Mietzner (2020) highlight how digital advancements boost democratic engagement through increased public involvement and mobilisation, while posing security threats to nations. The quick spread of information and divergent viewpoints can disrupt public conversation and make it harder to implement effective security strategies. The growing availability of resources enables members of the community to engage in discussions on a national level with greater involvement. However, it also makes them vulnerable to potential manipulation and false information. Although, the Indonesian Press Council's firm stand against hoaxes and false news emphasises the effects of misinformation on national security and public confidence (Madania, 2020). The situation echoes Rogers' (2003) concept of the dissemination of innovations in which the circulation of details affects public perspectives and actions related to security concerns.

Social media plays a role in shaping national security by influencing public opinion and supporting security measures, while bolstering community strength and resilience in

both positive and negative ways. Social media significantly influences perceptions of national security in Indonesia by combining traditional and digital platforms such as TV and the internet, as highlighted by Christawan et al., (2023). Research by Hui (2020) and Madania (2020) underscores the role of social media in engaging the Indonesian public, since almost half the population actively participates on these channels.

The example of moving Indonesia's capital demonstrates how challenging it can be to involve society in national security strategy and broader policymaking efforts effectively. It highlights the impact of participation, or lack thereof, on national policy choices and perceptions of government effectiveness. A former UN Diplomat (personal communication, 04th January 2023, Jakarta) stresses the importance of engaging communities in initiatives, suggesting that effective communication tools play a vital role in gaining public approval and comprehension. This emphasises the significance of inclusive governance that actively engages citizens in decision-making processes (Habermas, 1989).

However, the limited engagement of the community in Indonesia's national security and policy choices, suggests a divide between governmental measures and public involvement that could erode both trust and support for these efforts. A Professor at *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) criticises the decision-making process regarding the capital city by pointing out the lack of significant civilian contribution to policy creation. He suggests incorporating a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to guarantee that policies align with the requirements of society. The passing of the capital city regulation without

extensive input from the public, demonstrates a gap between government choices and citizen engagement.

When policies are crafted without taking sentiment into account, they might find it challenging to secure widespread approval from the people in general. Recent research regarding the relocation of Indonesia's capital has failed to explore the potential national security and defence ramifications (Sumantri, 2022). A deficiency in engaging in discussions with the public could lead to the development of policies that are not finely aligned with the security requirements of the populace at large, thereby impacting their efficacy and how they are perceived by society.

Conversely, a Colonel who serves as a senior lecturer at the Military Academy (personal communication, 07th November 2022, Jakarta) also demonstrates a practical, although debatable, approach to interacting with the public:

“For the strategy of moving the capital city, not all people know that not all people are aware. Because they are still limited in knowledge, they are still limited in interest. Most importantly, not all people have to know. Because if everyone had to know and everyone had to give their opinion it wouldn't happen. That's a leader's policy. I want this. Because he had calculated. If you ask for the opinion of 1-2 people, it will not be a policy. Until now, that's also the case because it may have a specific purpose. If the poll would not take place. Specific Goals will not be achieved. What's his specific purpose later will probably know.”

He claims that not everyone must be notified or participate in the decision-making process for strategic moves such as moving the capital city. This perspective implies that leadership choices should be guided by goals, rather than seeking input from the

public – an approach that emphasises specific objectives over public involvement. According to Arendt (1998), distancing the public from decision-making processes diminishes the openness and responsibility that is crucial for political legitimacy and active citizenship. The need to consider both civilian viewpoints by involving the community in security management, embodies the idea of civil military relationships, as proposed by Huntington (1957).

The study on the involvement of society in Indonesia's NSS delved into how public opinion theory, such as Huntington (1957), Arendt (1998), and Habermas (1989), and how social media impacts public views on national security issues (Tapsell, 2017; Rogers, 2003). Citing Indonesia's capital city relocation as a case study, highlights the difficulties and intricacies of integrating society into security policies and decision-making processes. It underscores the significance of participatory governance that involves citizens in decision-making processes, while noting the potential impacts of policies that overlook public responses (Dewey, 2004). Lastly, it advocates for a rounded strategy that integrates public feedback into the planning of civil military relations in security, to guarantee both efficiency and inclusivity.

6.4.2 Shaping Indonesia's NSS Through Engaging Civil Society in Community Policing and Public Participation

The inclusion of community policing (*Polmas*) in Indonesia's NSS highlights the importance of involving society in upholding public order and dealing with security issues efficiently. Indonesia's active approach to policing stresses the collaboration between police and the community to manage security challenges and ensure public order is maintained. Law enforcement officials work closely with residents to identify potential risks, tackle problems, and implement solutions that are tailored to the

specific knowledge and circumstances of each community (Prakoso, 2020). According to public opinion theory, as explained by Habermas (1989), the significance of the sphere in politics is where individuals analyse political power critically and engage in decision-making procedures. This can be seen in how *Polmas* works to promote a bond between authorities and the public that boosts overall safety in the community.

The Police Grand Commissioner's Adjunct (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) explained *Polmas* as an effort where law enforcement works together with the community to recognise and tackle security and public order concerns such as Kamtibmas. *Polmas* showcases how involving the public can result in quicker security protocols by nurturing a cooperative bond between authorities and residents. Furthermore, a retired air marshal, now an expert at *Lemhannas* (personal communication, 16th August 2022, Jakarta) underlines the importance of taking an approach to security that involves the police and other bodies, like the National Police Commission (*Kompolnas*), the National Human Rights Commission (*HAM*), and the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (*LPSK*). This coordinated strategy showcases an effort among various organisations handling different aspects of national security which indicates that garnering public support and legitimacy is enhanced when security measures are all encompassing, transparent, and mindful of human rights. Dahl (1989) asserts that considering citizen preferences in policymaking is essential for democracy to work effectively, thus leads to a trustworthy and efficient NSS.

Baker (2012) scrutinises how special interests impact community policing efforts related to Indonesians and private security contracts which might undermine public involvement by transforming it into a tool benefiting specific groups instead of a true community endeavour. Public perception is vital in this context because if the public

views community policing as favouritism towards the elite, it could lead to a decline in trust and collaboration. According to Page & Shapiro (1983), public opinion has an impact on policy decisions. Meanwhile, Zaller (1992) emphasises the influence of elites in shaping these perceptions, which may influence how the public perceives the effectiveness and fairness of community policing efforts. Adding to this perspective is Sukma (2012) who discusses the involvement of rights-focused NGOs, such as *KontraS* and *Impartial*, in advocating for reforms within the military court system to show how diverse public opinions and contributions from civil society are crucial for a well-rounded and democratic approach towards national security issues. The concept of securitisation theory by Buzan et al., (1998) offers a way to comprehend how portraying matters as security concerns can result in heightened government involvement and limitations on civil freedoms. This theory is significant for analysing how public sentiment influences the promotion of rights and democratic principles in the NSS.

On the other hand, civil society organisations (CSOs) partaking in Indonesia's NSS initiatives play a vital significance of involving the public in moulding security strategies. A former Research and Development Director of *BAKAMLA* (personal communication, 08th August 2022, Jakarta) highlights how groups like Indonesian Police Watch (IPW) and Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) contribute to promoting openness and responsibility within security bodies. Their involvement in the NSS displays how the influence of sentiment nurtured by CSOs can push for policy changes and guarantee that security measures align with the wider public welfare. The impact of sentiment on policy development is notably emphasised by Page & Shapiro (1983) to learn particularly when CSOs convey society's unified voice during decision-making processes.

A former territorial commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta) demonstrates the significance of communication with various groups such as local community leaders and media professionals in the field of security management projects. This inclusive method that engages a variety of civil society members in national security endeavours boosts the efficiency of security plans and fosters transparency in government operations and supports community policing efforts aligned with democratic principles. Zaller (1992) delves into the concept of opinion and proposes that involving a variety of societal groups in discussions about security, can shape public perceptions and align security measures with the values and interests of the general population. For instance, Praja et al., (2021) emphasise the importance of youth organisations in security strategies by highlighting their ability to empower young individuals in creating innovative and impactful security measures. However, the effectiveness of participation in national security, largely depends on the capabilities of civil authorities. Sebastian & Isgindarsahs (2012) point out that the MOD has gaps in institutional capacity building, poses challenges for democratic civilian oversight underscoring the difficulties in ensuring that civic engagement leads to substantial influence and answerability within security establishments.

Finally, incorporating community policing into Indonesia's NSS highlights how important public involvement is in shaping security policies that are responsive to all stakeholders' needs and concerns. Initiatives such as *Polmas* emphasise the engagement of civil society and the development of partnerships between the police and the community to show how public input plays a crucial role in upholding trustworthiness, openness, and responsibility within security structures. According to the ideas put forth by Habermas (1989) and Zaller (1992), it is crucial to have a public sphere and involve a variety of stakeholders to ensure security policies uphold

democratic principles and adequately address the needs of all people in society. This method improves the credibility and efficiency of security strategies. At the same time, protecting individual freedoms by integrating these policies into a structure that values human rights and represents the opinions of the community at large. The effectiveness of Indonesia's NSS hinges upon incorporating input from societal groups to guarantee security efforts are both protective and in line with democratic and fair principles.

6.5 Conclusion

The evaluation of Indonesia's NSS spanning from 2014 to 2024 showcases a mix of economic nationalism, influential political dynamics by oligarchy, and societal perceptions from public opinion, and highlights the diverse aspects of security management under President Jokowi's leadership. This era has seen progress in laws and institutions designed to bolster national security in response to shifting local and global complexities.

Economic nationalism plays a role in Indonesia's NSS under Jokowi's leadership as it aims to boost national sovereignty by focusing on self-reliance and reducing dependence on foreign entities. According to Helleiner (2002), this strategy requires state control of resources to protect the country's interests. The government's emphasis on building infrastructure and managing resources strategically, such as the nationalisation of vital industries like the Grasberg mine, is in line with this principle, as highlighted by Rodrik (1997) and Syailendra (2017). Nevertheless, there has been some debate surrounding these measures. Opponents claim that they could worsen disparities and financial uncertainties (Blyth, 2002). The use of government-controlled companies for initiatives also demonstrates a focus on a state-driven economic

approach to ensure stability and independence, underscoring the delicate balance between safeguarding national security and promoting economic wellbeing.

The impact of oligarchy on Indonesia's NSS has been significant. The dominance of power within groups has shaped national security decisions to match their own agendas, often disregarding transparency and democratic values (Winters, 2011; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). This influence of oligarchy is clear in the shift from the DWP to the *Jakumhaneg*, showcasing a move towards increased centralisation and reduced transparency in crafting security policies (Hadiz & Robison, 2013).

The control of groups has influenced a security approach that appears to prioritise safeguarding the nation – although, frequently upholds current power dynamics and restricts wider democratic participation in Indonesia's security landscape. Transformations are key legislative changes, such as the creation of the National Cyber and Encryption Agency (*BSSN*) and the enactment of the National Security Law (Law No 23 of 2019). The *BSSN* highlights the increasing significance of cybersecurity (Widodo, 2018), and the National Security Law establishes a legal structure for a complete strategy on national security (Jones, 2022). These changes are accompanied by the prioritisation of media freedom and individual rights (Anwar, 2021; Putri, 2019) demonstrating attempts to strike a balance between security and democratic principles despite presenting obstacles and possible constraints.

The concentration of authority and the impact of formations present noteworthy obstacles to Indonesia's NSS. The domination of elite interests has the potential to weaken democratic leadership and openness, which can affect the efficiency and equity of security measures (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). The inclusion of community policing and engagement programs such as *Polmas* signifies a stride

towards establishing more comprehensive and receptive security strategies. The continuous challenge lies in striking a delicate balance between security and democratic values (Huntington, 1957; Habermas, 1989).

In Indonesia's NSS, public views and societal groups are playing a growing role due to public discussions and media sway gaining traction. This shift is underscored by the theories on opinion by Habermas (1989), as well as media influence theories by Tapsell (2017), which emphasise how civil society can question and mould security measures. The rise of tools and social platforms has boosted public involvement and brought challenges such as misinformation and divided viewpoints, as pointed out by Rogers (2003). Dewey (2004) stresses the importance of education in fostering democratic values and creating an engaged citizenry, which indirectly supports the idea of transparent and inclusive governance. Moving the capital city serves as an example of how challenging it can be to involve public opinion in security policies.

In summary, the NSS of Indonesia over the period 2014 to 2024 showcases the interactions among government policies and elite power, as well as the involvement of civil society. The perspectives of economic nationalism and oligarchic politics alongside public sentiment into security governance, emphasises advancements and hurdles faced by the country. The effectiveness and democracy of Indonesia's NSS greatly hinges upon mitigating conflicts and ensuring that decisions are inclusive, transparent, aligning with national interests, while upholding democratic principles.

7.0 Conclusion

This thesis makes a significant theoretical contribution by offering a structured framework for analyzing Indonesia's NSS, despite the country lacking a formal NSS or a dedicated National Security Council. Unlike many other states that explicitly define their NSS through official doctrines, Indonesia's security policies have been shaped through a combination of presidential decrees, sectoral policies, and ad-hoc security arrangements. This study attempts to develop a new way of looking at Indonesia's NSS through a sociological point of view, focusing on the social, political and economic factors that influence security agendas. This enables to look at how national security despite a function of formal political and governmental processes the same time a function of social structure, economic pressure, and political dynamics. It gives a more comprehensive view of how security policies in Indonesia are developed, discussed, and enforced, and sheds light on the general societal factors that influence national security decision-making even when there is no formal security framework.

Indonesia's security strategy has evolved in response to shifting political, economic, and social dynamics, reflecting the complexities of security governance in a developing democracy. An extensive assessment of Indonesia's NSS throughout history enhances this thesis's grasp of how social dynamics interact with political frameworks and economic structures to shape its priorities and implement NSS policies, both institutionally and effectively (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Aspinall, 2014; Mietzner, 2009; Sukma & Prasetyono, 2003; Weatherbee, 2008). Through underscoring the integration of modern threats in addressing Indonesia's security challenges over time, this research aims to deepen the understanding of the dynamic nature of the country's security landscape and the CMR in democratic systems

(Acharya, 2004; Cottey et al., 2002; Alagappa, 2001; Croissant et al., 2010). External factors that influence security include the security policies of ASEAN and other global regulations (Sukma, 2003). These mutual influences explain why it is important to have a comprehensive and adaptive approach towards understanding Indonesia's national security, without neglecting the balance between domestic and regional as well as global security dynamics.

This thesis concludes by addressing the core research questions that guided this study. First, it examines the factors that shaped Indonesia's national security priorities from 1988 to 2024 and the reasons behind their evolution. Second, it explores how changes in Indonesia's security strategy institutions influenced their effectiveness and adaptability, as well as the key drivers of these transformations. Third, it analyses the factors that shaped Indonesia's perception of risks during this period and how these perceptions influenced threat responds. Finally, it investigates the development of civil capabilities within Indonesia's security strategy and their role in strengthening national resilience.

The research highlights that strengthening Indonesia's NSS requires prioritizing national sovereignty, economic development, and social stability. A comprehensive framework is needed to address both domestic and international security challenges. Economic nationalism, as discussed by Helleiner (2002), plays a key role in this effort by protecting local industries and reducing reliance on foreign investments. This approach enhances economic stability and national security by keeping critical sectors under domestic control, limiting external influence. In other hand, reducing political oligarchy's dominance is crucial, as these elites often prioritize personal interests over national security and may introduce foreign influence (Robison & Hadiz, 2004;

Winters, 2011; Fukuoka, 2012). Although, strengthening public engagement and inclusivity can counterbalance their power, ensuring security policies serve national rather than elite interests, as argued by Norris (2011). Transparency and accountability are key to preventing security governance from being shaped by political or personal motives.

The study also finds that Indonesia's NSS must navigate decentralization while addressing elite influence on security policies in the security institutions. Turner (2003) emphasizes the importance of legal frameworks in defining the roles and responsibilities of security institutions, ensuring a structured and cohesive strategy. Effective legislation should support decentralization by allowing local governments to address their security needs while maintaining coordination with the central government. Norris (2011) further argues that institutional integrity depends on policies prioritizing security over political interests. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) highlight that promoting transparency and accountability strengthens governance and fosters a cohesive NSS. Clear laws and coordination mechanisms are necessary to prevent fragmentation and ensure a unified national security approach.

Furthermore, engaging communities and local administrations in security planning offers valuable insights into regional security challenges, necessitating an inclusive and open risk assessment approach for NSS development. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) emphasize the importance of public participation in governance to build trust and credibility. For greater security readiness, Indonesia must address concerns of cybersecurity, corruption, and socioeconomic disparity; hence, it is essential to conduct regular strategic risk assessments that incorporate intelligence, inclusivity, data analytics, and scenario planning.

Finally, ensuring public involvement in security governance fosters a more responsive and democratic national security framework. Regular consultations, research initiatives, and community dialogues help align the NSS with the needs of the people rather than political elites. Engaging civil society organizations (CSOs) in security decision-making strengthens policy credibility and aligns strategies with broader societal concerns, as highlighted by Benhabib (2002). Public participation is essential to preserving democratic values and preventing power centralization.

Conclusively, this research makes important contributions primarily at the theoretical level, the study expands previous frameworks of security studies, moving away from traditional security analysis to a sociological approach. Next in empirical terms, it adds to the existing literature by providing new data collected through interviews with security actors in Indonesia, which offer new insights into the real-life experiences of policymakers, military officials and civil society members. Accomplishes in the policy domain, the research suggests the recommendations for enhancing Indonesia's NSS, including the creation of an NSS and a National Security Council, and enhancing CMR. The preceding section will summarize the theoretical contributions, empirical results, policy suggestions, and possible directions for future enquiries.

7.1 Theoretical Contributions of the Study

Traditionally, the study of NSS has been dominated by security studies with theories of realism and idealism (Walt, 1991; Morgenthau, 1948). These approaches emphasize the role of state power, sovereignty, and military capabilities in ensuring national security, focusing primarily on external threats and the state's ability to defend itself against foreign aggression (Waltz, 1979). Realism assumes that states operate

in an anarchic international system where security is achieved through power accumulation, military strength, and deterrence (Mearsheimer, 2001). Idealism, on the other hand, emphasizes international cooperation, institutions, and diplomacy as key mechanisms for achieving security (Keohane & Nye, 1977). While these perspectives provide valuable insights into NSS in conventional, state-centric security contexts, they do not fully explain the dynamics of security in transitional democracies like Indonesia, where internal social, political and economic factors play crucial role in shaping security strategies.

Pointing thus gap, this thesis applies a sociological lens to NSS, incorporating perspectives from CMR, political sociology, and economic sociology. CMR refer to the interaction between military institutions and civilian authorities in shaping national security policy (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1977). Political sociology examines how political power, elite structures, and governance systems influence security decisions (Tilly, 1992; Skocpol, 1979). Economic sociology explores how economic policies, industrial strategies, and market structures impact national security (Polanyi, 1944; Helleiner, 2002). Through integrating these three sociological perspectives, this thesis demonstrates that Indonesia's NSS is determined by external military threats and deeply intertwined with domestic political and economic transformations.

The first inquires of this study is to determine the evolution of the Indonesia's NSS priorities from 1988-2024, through an appropriate theoretical lens that facilitates a comprehensive exploration of the factors shaping these shifts. During the *ORBA* era (1988–1998), security policy was primarily shaped by developmentalism, where economic growth was perceived as essential to maintaining stability (Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Elson, 2001). This aligns with economic sociology theories that emphasize the

role of industrialization and foreign investment in maintaining social order (Stiglitz, 2002). Following the fall of *ORBA*, national security priorities shifted towards democratic governance and decentralization, reflecting an emphasis on redistributing power and transforming CMR (Rüland, 2003; Mietzner, 2009). Security policies focused on regional autonomy, CMR, and the reduction of military influence in politics (Crouch, 2018). In recent years, under President *Jokowi*, national security has been increasingly shaped by economic nationalism, emphasizing state control over key economic sectors to safeguard national interests (Warburton, 2016; Winters, 2011). This shift aligns with economic sociology theories that highlight the role of state intervention in economic security (Helleiner, 2002; Rodrik, 1997). This trajectory illustrates how security policy has been shaped by economic, political, and military transformations rather than purely external military threats. Indonesia's national security priorities have evolved through distinct phases.

The study also traces the evolution of Indonesia's security institutions. Under *ORBA*, national security was heavily centralized, with the military (*ABRI*) controlling political, social, and economic affairs (Crouch, 1978; Emmerson, 1983). This reflects CMR theories on authoritarian military dominance (Huntington, 1957). During the reform era, Indonesia undertook significant institutional reforms, including the separation of the police (*INP*) from the military (*TNI*) and the establishment of civilian oversight mechanisms (Sebastian & Iisgindarsah, 2012). This period also saw the creation of independent security institutions, aligning with political sociology theories on democratization and state restructuring (Tilly, 2007; Fukuyama, 2011). However, in recent years, security governance has been shaped by elite control and institutional competition, where powerful business and political groups influence security policymaking (Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Mietzner, 2020). This reflects political sociology

theories on oligarchic dominance in post-authoritarian states (Winters, 2011). This study contributes to CMR and political sociology by demonstrating how institutional power shifts have affected the effectiveness and responsiveness of security governance in Indonesia.

The interpretation of threats and risks in Indonesia's NSS has correspondingly evolved. During the centralized *ORBA* period, security threats were framed in terms of subversion, separatism, and ideological dissent, aligning with CMR theories on military-led governance (Finer, 2002; Janowitz, 1977). In the reform era, democratization led to a broader interpretation of security, emphasizing public engagement, counterterrorism, and human security (Tyler, 2006; Norris, 2011). However, in recent years, oligarchic influence has increasingly shaped the security agenda, prioritizing elite interests over broader national concerns (Winters, 2011; Mietzner, 2020). These shifts reflect the evolving nature of political sociology in Indonesia, where security priorities are shaped by the democratization of threat perceptions and the contestation between democratic governance and oligarchic consolidation.

Finally, the role of civil society in NSS governance has evolved alongside the transformation of CMR and broader political sociological shifts. Under *ORBA* regime, security governance was characterized by pseudo-democracy, with limited public participation in security decision-making (Schedler, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010). The reform era saw an emphasis on public trust and civil capabilities, as governance reforms aimed to increase civilian oversight of security institutions (Almond & Verba, 1963; Fukuyama, 1996). A greater participation through NGOs and media transparency seen in the reform period. In the current era, public opinion has become

a critical factor in shaping national security policies, with social media and civil discourse influencing decision-making (Zaller, 1992; Tapsell, 2017). The increasing influence of public discourse on security matters demonstrates the connection of political sociology and CMR governance in contemporary NSS.

The following table presents a detailed overview the theoretical evolution of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024. Highlighting theoretical developments to the empirical evidence drawn from different political eras, providing a clear framework for understanding the dynamic factors influencing Indonesia's NSS.

Research Question	Theoretical Contribution	Key Concepts	Empirical Hypothesis	Reference
What factors have influenced the prioritization of Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024?	Developmentalism in Economic Sociology (economic security under dictatorships) → Decentralization in CMR and Politic Sociology (CMR reforms & regional autonomy) → Economic Nationalism in Economic Sociology (state-driven economic security).	The prioritization of NSS shifted from an economic growth-focused security model under authoritarianism to decentralized governance and, later, economic nationalism driven by state intervention.	Authoritarian Era (1988-1998): Economic growth was prioritized to ensure political stability and social order. Reform Era (1998–2014): Democratization shifted security priorities toward decentralization, regional autonomy, and institutional reform. Current Era (2014–2024): Economic nationalism emerged as the main security priority, reinforcing state control over strategic industries and resources.	Polanyi (1944), Helleiner (2002), Huntington (1957), Robison & Hadiz (2004), Mietzner (2009)
How have changes in Indonesia's security framework impacted its effectiveness and flexibility from 1988 to 2024?	Centralized in CMR (military dominance under ORBA) → Decentralized in CMR, Economic Sociology and Political Sociology (military dominance (institutional separation of TNI and INP, regional autonomy) → Oligarchic Influence in Political Sociology and CMR (political elites reshaping security institutions).	Indonesia's NSS institutional structure evolved from military dominance under ORBA (centralized) to a decentralized system with separate TNI and INP and regional autonomy. Recently, political oligarchs have reshaped security institutions, increasing elite influence.	Authoritarian Era (1988–1998): The military (ABRI) controlled political, economic, and security institutions, consolidating power under a centralized state apparatus. Reform Era (1998–2014): Democratization led to the separation of TNI and INP, introducing civilian oversight and regional autonomy, though inconsistencies in implementation weakened security coordination. Current Era (2014–2024): Political oligarchs increasingly influenced security governance, leading to institutional fragmentation and weakened transparency.	Huntington (1957), Tilly (2007), Winters (2011), Hadiz & Robison (2013), Mietzner (2020)
What influences have impacted the perception of risks and threats in	Centralized Threats in CMR (military-defined subversion & separatism)	Risk interpretation in Indonesia shifted from centralized threats, focusing on military-defined subversion and	Authoritarian Era (1988–1998): The regime justified repressive measures by framing political dissent, separatism, and	Janowitz (1977), Norris (2011), Fukuyama (2011),

Research Question	Theoretical Contribution	Key Concepts	Empirical Hypothesis	Reference
Indonesia's NSS from 1988 to 2024?	<p>→ Public Trust & Civil Capability in Political Sociology and CMR (counterterrorism, democratic security sector reform)</p> <p>→ Oligarchic Influence in Political Sociology and CMR (security policies shaped by elite economic and political interests).</p>	separatism, to prioritizing public trust and civil capability through counterterrorism and democratic security reforms. Recently, oligarchic influence has shaped security policies driven by elite economic and political interests.	<p>ideological subversion as security threats.</p> <p>Reform Era (1998–2014): Democratic reforms shifted the focus toward counterterrorism, media transparency, and building public trust in security institutions.</p> <p>Current Era (2014–2024): Political and economic elites manipulated security narratives to serve their interests, prioritizing regime stability over genuine national security concerns.</p>	Winters (2011), Mietzner (2020)
What factors have contributed to the development of civil capacities within Indonesia's NSS between 1988 and 2024?	<p>Pseudo-Democracy in Political Sociology and CMR (state-controlled political participation)</p> <p>→ Public Trust & Civil Capabilities in Political Sociology and CMR (increased civilian oversight, NGOs, media engagement)</p> <p>→ Public Opinion in Political Sociology and CMR (social media, digital governance shaping security policy).</p>	Civil participation in Indonesia evolved from a pseudo-democracy with state-controlled political involvement to a period of increased civilian oversight, with greater NGO and media engagement. Recently, public opinion, influenced by social media and digital governance, has played a significant role in shaping security policy.	<p>Authoritarian Era (1988–1998): Civil participation was restricted, with the military controlling political discourse and suppressing opposition.</p> <p>Reform Era (1998–2014): Civil society organizations (CSOs), media, and NGOs played a larger role in shaping security discourse, though challenges remained in building trust in security institutions.</p> <p>Current Era (2014–2024): Public opinion, fuelled by social media and digital activism, has become an influential factor in shaping national security policies, though misinformation and elite control over digital spaces present new challenges.</p>	Almond & Verba (1963), Schedler (2006), Levitsky & Way (2010), Tapsell (2017), Zaller (1992)

Table 7.1 Theoretical contribution: own construction

Table 7.1 outlines the theoretical contributions of this study by examining Indonesia's NSS across various historical periods. The analysis is organized around four key research questions, with corresponding theoretical frameworks, key concepts, empirical hypotheses, and supporting references. By employing sociological perspectives, this thesis expands the theoretical discourse on NSS beyond traditional state-centric models. It highlights that national security is not exclusively defined by military power, however, is also influenced by political structures, economic strategies, and CMR. This approach offers a more comprehensive framework for analyzing security strategies in developing democracies, especially those without an official NSS. The following contribution shows from empirical analysis that supports

theoretical elucidation and provides a broader narrative grounded in real-world contexts.

7.2 Evolving Priorities: The Transformation of Indonesia's NSS from Developmentalism to Decentralisation, to Economic Nationalism

The evolution of the priority of Indonesia's NSS prominence during the *ORBA* era, while the military's centralised role, coupled with a developmentalist economic agenda, maintained a superficial stability (Crouch, 1978; Elson, 2001). In the post-reform era, decentralisation shifted power structures, although military influence and elite capture persisted, complicating efforts to democratise security governance (Rondinelli, 1981; Muir, 2008; Ratnawati, 2010). Conclusively, in the Jokowi era, economic nationalism and political oligarchy have shaped security policies in ways that prioritise elite interests over general welfare (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). This thesis contributes to the broader discourse by identifying what still needs to change – namely, the reform of elite-dominated governance structures – and arguably what cannot be changed, such as the central role of economic stability and decentralisation in managing national security in a diverse and dynamic state, like Indonesia. The research underscores that, while economic wellbeing and decentralisation are vital to the NSS, unresolved issues of military influence and oligarchic power continue to distort security priorities in ways that favour narrow interests over broader democratic goals.

Between 1988 - 1998: Developmentalism and Authoritarian Stability

The framework of Military Sociology helps in understanding how the military's role under Suharto's regime reflected broader authoritarian patterns, particularly the

centralisation of military power to maintain control over economic and political domains. Janowitz (1977) – a key figure in military sociology – offers insights into the concept of “military as a state apparatus,” which is evident in Suharto’s centralised control of both security and economic policies during the *ORBA* era. Janowitz’s view aligns with how the Indonesian military under Suharto functioned as a stabilising force to ensure national unity, while supporting economic developmentalism.

Crouch (1978) and Elson (2001) argue that Suharto’s government leveraged economic growth through *Repelita* (Five-Year Development Plans) and *GBHN* (Broad Outlines of State Policy), linking prosperity directly to security. Stiglitz (2002) and a police grand commissioner adjunct (personal communication, 31st August 2022, Jakarta) further explains this approach as “Security for Prosperity,” highlighting how economic progress became a proxy for a secure nation, while other aspects of governance, such as democratic participation and human rights, were sidelined.

Suharto’s “Security for Prosperity” approach, and reliance on *Repelita* and the *GBHN*, resonates with Polanyi’s (1944) concept of the “embeddedness” of the economy in social and political institutions, where economic growth and stability were intertwined with national security. Giving the example of the government’s emphasis on keeping wages low and avoiding risks, while working to lower external debt and manage the state budget, was intended to create an appealing environment for international investors (a former territorial commander, personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta). While this growth provided temporary stability, it ultimately masked deeper social and economic inequalities, as noted by Cahyo (2005).

Indonesia’s NSS prioritises security strategies over democratic governance and legal accountability, according to a Professor from *Jaya Bay University* (personal

communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta). Despite this, challenges like identity-based politics, primordialism, and ethnic divisions hinder the achievement of national unity in the country (a Dean of *Pattimura* university, personal communication, 23rd August 2022, Maluku). These socio-political factors led to certain groups holding power dominance. An admiral from the MOD (personal communication, 20th June 2022, Jakarta) agrees that national security is crucial for advancing national diversity and unity. This study provides insights on the importance of combining economic prosperity with inclusive leadership and accountable governance to ensure sustainable and equitable development.

Moreover, Mann's (1984) theory of "despotic power" is reflected in Suharto's regime, where the state maintained centralised power, particularly in the security sector, to suppress dissent and maintain economic control. And Moore's (1966) analysis is highly relevant to understanding Indonesia's political transitions and the role of elites. Both researchers provide frameworks to understand the authoritarian dynamics at play. However, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis exposed the limitations of this approach, leading to Suharto's downfall.

This research builds upon this understanding by uncovering the nuanced role that centralised control played in shaping the NSS during the *ORBA* era, specifically, while previous studies have discussed the prioritisation of economic growth. The findings of this thesis reveal how centralisation within the security apparatus curtailed regional autonomy, leading to inefficiencies in responding to localised security threats. Additionally, the lack of political reform during this period entrenched authoritarian rule, which contributed to the regime's eventual collapse. What needs to change from this period is the over-reliance on economic growth as the sole pillar of security, while what

cannot be changed is the recognition that economic wellbeing remains a critical component of national stability.

Between 1998 - 2014: Reform, Decentralisation and the Dismantling of Military Influence

The post-Suharto era marked a significant shift in CMR relations by the dismantling of the military's *dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine, which had allowed the military to hold political power. This aligns with Janowitz's (1969) theory of the "civilianisation" of the military, where the armed forces relinquish political control and focus on defence. This marked the division of the military into the *TNI* and *INP*, and reflected a profound shift in Military Sociology, as it aimed to depoliticise the military and enhance civilian control (Muir, 2008; Crouch, 2018). Conversations with both a police commissioner adjunct (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta) and a former regional command leader (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta) underscore the importance of these transformations by highlighting their contribution to ensuring impartiality within the military and strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms.

Political sociology, through the works of Tilly (2007) and Giddens (1985), offers insights into the decentralisation process. Tilly's theory on "state formation and decentralisation" can be applied to understand how Indonesia's decentralisation (through UU No 32/2004) aimed to distribute power from the central government to regional authorities, theoretically creating a more participatory and democratic governance structure. Rondinelli (1981) and Smoke (2003) explain that decentralisation was intended to create more responsive governance, in line with theories of political restructuring in post-authoritarian states. This transformation, highlighted by a former territorial commander (personal communication, 25th

November 2022, Jakarta), emphasises the importance of independence, and improvements in governance by giving more power to local authorities and promoting civilian-led administration practices. However, as Sebastian & Lisginarsah (2011) point out, military influence persisted informally, complicating the formal decentralisation process. The economic sociology perspectives of Brenner's (1999) concept of "state rescaling" applies to Indonesia's regional autonomy, where local elites capitalised on decentralisation to consolidate their power, leading to fragmented governance and uneven security implementation, as noted by Ratnawati (2010). Furthermore, throughout the four presidencies during this time, the priority remained on bolstering autonomy and diminishing military influence through initiatives aimed at integrating the military further into civilian governance structures.

Local elite actors in Indonesia's decentralisation process have often undermined the intended democratisation of security governance. A professor at the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) pointed out that President B.J. Habibie's decision to liberate Timor-Leste without TNI consultation signified a major shift in national security policy. However, challenges remained in elections and governance. During President Gus Dur's term, this professor noted that his approach to "humanising" the TNI did not support good governance, leading to chaotic political party recruitment. An active member of Parliament (personal communication, 22nd September 2022, Jakarta) highlighted that the SSR, initiated under Gus Dur, faced hurdles including TNI's defiance of parliamentary authority and inconsistencies in Law No 34 of 2004. A former territorial commander (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta) emphasised that the granting of regional autonomy allowed local elites to exert power, further complicating democratic reforms in security governance.

The research highlights previously underexplored dynamics within the decentralisation process. While the literature acknowledges the formal reduction of military power, the findings of this thesis delve into the continued informal influence that military leaders exerted in post-Suharto administrations (Rüland, 2003; Mietzner, 2009). The discussion on decentralisation by scholars led to disparities in security management across regions, with some local governments benefiting from increased autonomy while others faced inefficiencies due to a lack of coordination (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). Additionally, this research reveals the critical role of local elite actors, who, in some cases, leveraged decentralisation to solidify their power, undermining the intended democratisation of security governance. Nevertheless, this thesis offers an insight into how decentralisation has transformed Indonesia's national security landscape by fostering a governance structure that is more democratic and accountable. It has set the groundwork for a holistic and flexible approach to national security despite facing ongoing obstacles. What needs to change is a more coherent coordination between local and central authorities, and what cannot be changed is the necessity of decentralisation in a large, diverse country like Indonesia.

Between 2014 - 2024: Economic Nationalism and Political Oligarchy

The Jokowi era has shown the rise of Economic Nationalism, where economic resilience is closely tied to national security. Syailendra (2017) and Warburton (2016) document how Jokowi's administration was a revival of nationalism in economy, prioritised at boosting the performance of local industries and ensuring that resource sustainability remained a crucial aspect of national security through policies. A colonel from the air force (personal communication, 25th July 2022, Jakarta) emphasises that

these priorities are being implemented through measures aimed at reducing regulations and bureaucracy, while expediting national projects such as land allocation, permit streamlining, and infrastructure development. Moreover, such interventionist measures are demonstrated by Indonesia's decision to prohibit the export of essential commodities like palm cooking oil (a retired major general, personal communication, 21st June 2022, Jakarta). This reflects Helleiner's (2002) and Rodrik's (1997) interventionist theories of economic sociology, which argue that state intervention in the economy is essential for maintaining national security. Jokowi's approach aligns with these theories by positioning economic resilience as a critical component of Indonesia's NSS. In a personal communication (11th June 2022) a notary in Jakarta highlighted the potential for economic nationalism to lead to social unrest, marginalising certain factions, and causing scarcities of essential items like sugar and cooking oil. This, according to Blyth (2002), can result in unequal advantages and societal turmoil.

Concurrently, Political Sociology reveals the deepening role of political oligarchy in shaping Indonesia's security policies. Oligarchs have manipulated the political system to protect their economic interests, as explained by Winters (2011) and Hadiz & Robison (2013), blurring the lines between public policy and private interests. The thesis expands on this by examining how oligarchic control has influenced policymaking and impacted the institutional structure of the NSS. An example is provided by a former territorial commander (personal communication, 21st June 2022, Jakarta) about the recent custody of individuals stockpiling cooking oil, sheds light on the influence wielded by prominent business figures in the industry and underscores their dominance over vital economic assets. Another example of "money politics" involves the exchange of votes for favours and the increased presence of the military

during elections, which contributes to maintaining the dominance of the elite in affairs (a Professor of *Padjajaran* University, personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) (Muhtadi, 2019; Slater, 2018). The political oligarchy in Indonesia's NSS illustrates the impact of economic power on political and security interests. Power centralisation disrupted the country's priority to favour the class and weakens democratic structures.

This research extends these discussions by offering a deeper examination of how oligarchic influences have shaped national security policies, although also impacted the priority of Indonesia's NSS. While existing studies address the influence of oligarchs on policymaking, this research explores how elite dominance affects the implementation of security policies on the ground, particularly in areas such as land allocation, permit streamlining, infrastructure development, and essential commodities. This adds a critical layer to the discussion on how political and economic oligarchy intertwine with national security in contemporary Indonesia. What needs to change is the entrenchment of oligarchic power in policymaking, whilst what cannot be changed is the essential role of a stable economy in ensuring national security.

7.3 Evolving Institutions of Indonesia's NSS: From Centralised Authoritarianism to Decentralised Democracy and Elite Control

The evolution of institutional design of Indonesia's NSS reflects a complex interplay of historical legacies, institutional modification, and ongoing challenges posed by political oligarchies. While significant strides have been made towards democratisation and decentralisation, the persistence of centralised power dynamics underscores the need for ongoing reform. This analysis distinguishes between what existing literature reveals, and the insights provided by this research, emphasising the importance of

transparency, public engagement, and accountability in shaping the future of Indonesia's NSS. The necessity for a balanced and accountable security framework remains paramount, and identifying static elements that hinder reform is crucial for navigating the complexities of Indonesia's security governance landscape.

Between 1988 – 1998: Centralised Power and Military Dominance

Under the *ORBA* government in Indonesia, the NSS functioned within a centralised decision-making framework that prioritised elite interests, undermining democratic accountability. This alignment with centralised institutional theory is evident, as hierarchical structures restrict public involvement and oversight (Linz, 2000; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). The concentration of authority within the military, particularly influenced by the *ABRI* and its Dual Function doctrine, created an opaque governance system devoid of transparency and public participation (Crouch, 1978; Emmerson, 1983; Aspinall, 2005). The empirical exploration highlights the dual role of the *ABRI* as both protectors of national security and influential players in politics and social affairs. A former territorial commander emphasised this perspective (personal communication, 10th November 2022, Jakarta), reinforcing the idea alongside a senior police officer (personal communication, 9th August 2022, Jakarta) and a colonel in the air force (personal communication, 25th July 2022, Jakarta). Together, these insights illustrate the significant political and social influence wielded by the *ABRI* in Indonesian society.

This concentration has created a system where civilian oversight is limited, and military interests often take precedence over democratic values (Emmerson, 1983; Crouch, 1978). The hierarchical design of Indonesia's security system has prioritised security over democratic participation, resulting in civilian agencies having a limited role in

policy formulation. This perspective was shared by a senior police officer (personal communication, 9th August 2022, Jakarta). Additionally, a former navy rear admiral noted that the strong influence of the territorial command on local governance exemplifies the military's authority in regional affairs (personal communication, 5th September 2022, Sentul). Together, these insights highlight how the military's dominance undermines civilian involvement in governance. Military Sociology helps illuminate how the military's pervasive influence manifested through strong territorial commands in local governance, which prioritised order and control over democratic principles (Fukuyama, 2011; Tilly, 2007). The incorporation of the Dual Function doctrine further entrenched military allegiance while obstructing civilian oversight (MacDougall, 1992; Nisa, 2017). As Suryawan & Sumarajana (2020) note, this governance model favoured military priorities over democratic processes, resulting in limited civilian agency involvement in policy formulation.

The institutional design under Suharto's rule exemplified centralised authority, where decision-making powers resided predominantly within elite circles, as demonstrated by institutions like the *Wanhanakamnas*. While *Wanhanakamnas* has played a role in security matters, and collaboration between ministries, conveyed by a professor of University of *Padjadjaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022; Jakarta), the effectiveness is limited in policy implementation and highlights the broader constraints of centralised authority, as discussed by Dahoklory & Ririhena (2020), Singh (2016), and Oktaviana & Pramadya (2019). Suharto's rule was characterised using intelligence-driven tactics through organisations like *Komkamtib* and *Bakortanas*, which operated outside legal boundaries. This critical observation was elaborated upon by a senior police officer (personal communication, 31st June 2022, Jakarta) and a former territorial commander (personal communication, 21st June 2022). Together,

their insights highlight the controversial and extra-legal methods employed by the regime to maintain control and suppress dissent. This demonstrated a concentration of power achieved through monitoring and regulation methods (Robison, 1986).

However, during the ORBA era in Indonesia, the concept of "corporate crime" emerged as major companies collaborated with military leaders to establish monopolistic practices, significantly impacting economic participants. A police grand commissioner adjunct explained that this close relationship allowed elites to dominate economic affairs, resulting in exploitation and widespread corruption. He noted that large corporations engaged in criminal acts that harmed various stakeholders through unfair competition, degradation of labour rights, and environmental pollution (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta). A former regional commander added that organised crime served as a form of resistance against the ORBA government (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta). This dynamic reflects how the government's economic involvement was a strategy to maintain power amid perceived challenges. Researchers, including Nugroho (2018), Legowo (2013), Damayanti (2020), and Robison (1996), highlighted the military's influence in creating an industrial complex that solidified the ruling class's economic supremacy. While Heryanto (2003) and Singh (2001) noted that military personnels' participation in business networks led to unlawful activities extending centralised power from politics to economic exploitation.

This research adds depth to the understanding of how military interests overshadowed democratic principles, leading to governance characterised by bureaucratic inefficiencies and public disengagement. It identifies that while the literature recognises the concentration of authority, it has not adequately explored the

implications of this structure on local governance and civil society's limited role. Changes observed during this era include the military's dominance establishing a legacy of centralised control that requires re-evaluation in terms of contemporary security governance. Furthermore, a shift towards incorporating civilian oversight and enhancing public participation in decision-making processes is essential to restore democratic values in national security. However, the foundational role of the military in Indonesian politics, rooted in Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution, remains entrenched, complicating efforts to transform the NSS.

Between 1998 – 2014: Decentralisation and Democratic Aspirations

The period following the 1998 reforms marked a significant shift in Indonesia's NSS, transitioning towards decentralisation and aligning with theories of security governance that advocate for enhanced public participation in decision-making processes (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010; Faguet, 2014). The reform journey commenced with revisions to the 1945 Constitution that redefined the functions of the TNI, as mentioned by a Navy First Admiral (personal communication, 20th June 2022, Jakarta). He explained that the goal of this adjustment was to create balance between safeguarding against external threats and maintaining internal stability. This aimed to balance external defence and internal security responsibilities (*Kamtibmas*) (Smoke, 2015; Mukhtar, 2011; Crouch, 2018).

Empirical opinion by a former rear admiral (personal communication, 20th July 2022, Jakarta), the same as a former member of Parliament (personal communication, 23rd September 2022, Jakarta), and the literature, suggests that this shift facilitated the establishment of security entities and a dual supervision system, enabling the *INP* to operate independently of military influence (Mukhtar, 2011; Crouch, 2018). Key

reforms, such as Presidential Instruction No 2 of 1999 and the National Police Law (UU No 2 of 2002), played pivotal roles in asserting the INP's autonomy, as mentioned by a senior police officer (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta). Additionally, a provincial people's assembly member (personal communication, 15th August 2022, Merati) mentioned the creation of specific bodies such as *BIN* and *Bakamla*, although concerns regarding the clarity of responsibilities and inter-agency cooperation persisted (Mietzner, 2012; Crouch, 2018). Scholars like Skocpol (1985) emphasise the significance of institutional arrangements in shaping state power, illustrating how these reforms facilitated the emergence of the INP as a more independent entity. Tilly's (1985) concepts of state capacity and political violence further contextualise the INP's evolving role, highlighting the complexities of state authority in the face of historical military dominance.

As civilian oversight of the security system evolved from procedural to substantial reforms, the involvement of the Parliament (*DPR*) in establishing security goals represented a notable advancement in governance practices (Rodríguez-Pose & Ezcurra, 2010). Bardhan & Mookherjee (2006) argue that decentralisation fosters accountability by incorporating local communities in decision-making. Nevertheless, critics like Smoke (2003) and Aspinall (2014) raise concerns about corruption and coordination challenges, highlighting the difficulties of balancing autonomy with efficient governance.

Efforts to enhance transparency and accountability in Indonesia involved distributing authority across various government levels and organisations, as noted by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003), Treisman (2007), Faguet, (2014), and Bardhan & Mookherjee (2006). Decentralisation extended beyond security organisations to include financial

and governance entities, like Bank Indonesia and the *KPK*, with the aim of improving transparency and integrity. However, the effectiveness of these institutions largely depended on legislative support and oversight, as remarked by a Chief Director of a State-Owned Industry (personal communication, 21st August 2022, Jakarta). Schütte (2017) highlighted the necessity of autonomous monitoring committees to ensure good governance and accountability, while ProPatria (2006) emphasised the importance of enforcing decisions and safeguarding rights. Additionally, Crouch (2018) and Hadiz (2004) point out that the State Audit Agency's effectiveness hinges on lawmakers' willingness to act on its findings and maintain accountability. The institutional changes within Indonesia's NSS during the reform era sought to create a more democratic and accountable security framework, resulting in a complex system of autonomous agencies and regional organisations.

This research elucidates how the reforms aimed at enhancing accountability, also struggled with clarity in roles and inter-agency cooperation (Mietzner, 2012; Crouch, 2018). It further highlights the paradox of decentralisation, where local autonomy can lead to corruption and coordination challenges, a concern echoed by critics (Smoke, 2003; Aspinall, 2014). This research builds upon existing literature by adding a nuanced understanding of how decentralisation has both empowered regional actors and introduced new challenges, such as fragmented governance and oversight issues. The rise of autonomous agencies and regional organisations signifies a shift towards a more democratic governance framework, necessitating increased legislative support for oversight institutions for transparency and accountability. However, the deeply ingrained military influence, although reduced, remains a factor that cannot be fully eliminated from Indonesia's security apparatus. Despite progress, entrenched political

elites continue to leverage state institutions to maintain their power, echoing elements of the previous centralised structure.

Between 2014 -2024: Oligarchic Influence and Fragmented Governance

From 2014 onwards, the evolution of Indonesia's NSS has been heavily influenced by political elites, and Indonesia's national security institutions have become increasingly pronounced, highlighting the role of oligarchy theory in understanding power dynamics within the NSS. Winters (2011) defines a political oligarchy as a concentration of power among a wealthy few who exploit state structures to protect their interests. This framework elucidates concerns surrounding the National Security Bill, which is currently at a standstill, and has been perceived as potentially consolidating authority at the expense of democratic values (Diprose et al., 2019; Sebastian & Iisgindarsah, 2012). An expert staff member in Parliament (personal communication, 25th September 2022, Jakarta), and a former Rear Admiral (personal communication, 31st October 2022, Jakarta), both expressed similar worries about the implications of the National Security Law.

Additionally, a Police Grand Commissioner Adjutant (personal communication, 13th June 2022, Jakarta) highlighted how powerful individuals or groups often reject laws that conflict with their interests, further complicating the issue. Hadiz & Robison (2013) emphasise that Indonesia's political oligarchy is driven by elites who manipulate state institutions to maintain their power, often undermining democratic governance. This dynamic is reflected in the current institutional structure, where competing institutions vie for control over national security policies and operations, as noted by a Dean of the University of Defence (personal communication, 5th September 2022, Sentul).

Mietzner (2020) further highlights that this fragmented governance characterises Indonesia's security and political landscape, contributing to instability and inefficiency.

The shift from the DWP to the *Jakumhaneg* in Indonesia's NSS highlights how elite interests shape institutional frameworks. According to a Deputy Chancellor of the University of Defence (personal communication, 8th December 2022, Sentul), the DWP was discontinued due to concerns over outdated military resources. This moves towards reduced transparency, as noted by Larosa (2019), reflects a desire to control the national security narrative by limiting outside oversight. A former Commander of *BAKAMLA* (personal communication, 15th August 2022, Sukabumi) criticised the DWP for lacking clear strategic objectives, leading to its replacement with *Jakumhaneg*. The hierarchical decision-making approach in *Jakumhaneg*, common in oligarchic leadership, concentrates power within the Ministry of Defence (MOD), bypassing democratic processes. The delayed publication of *Jakumhaneg* further underscores the centralised control, as noted by the same Deputy Chancellor. Academics like Utami et al., (2019) and Larosa (2019) emphasised the importance of international and domestic alignment in Indonesia's NSS, while Ubayanto et al., (2020) highlighted concerns over transparency and the oligarchic concentration of power in security policymaking.

The management of Indonesia's *ALKI* reflects the influence of elite actors balancing international navigation rights with national sovereignty while maintaining control (Mietzner, 2020; Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Winters, 2011). A professor from the University of *Padjajaran* (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) commented that Indonesia's *ALKI* system is centrally administered with a focus on enhancing the State Intelligence Agency's capabilities. However, fragmentation and

inefficiencies in power concentration, as noted by an expert at *Lemhannas* (personal communication, 16th August 2022, Jakarta), hinder the effective execution of Indonesia's National Security Strategy (NSS). A former Commander of *BAKAMLA* (personal communication, 15th August 2022, Sukabumi) highlighted practical and political challenges in maritime security, where discretionary decisions by commanders, rather than standardised rules, create vulnerabilities. Academic studies (Listiyono et al., 2021; Rahman et al., 2021; Sumadinata et al., 2022; Setiawan & Ajita, 2022; Chaer et al., 2021) further explore internal and international collaboration based on maritime law for sea security.

Nonetheless, the NSS of Indonesia has experienced changes in its institutional framework over time and has evolved through changes in governance and security structures, marked by a shift from centralised control under ABRI's Dual Function to a decentralised two-tier system. Although, political oligarchy and competing interests, especially between the *TNI* and *INP*, have led to fragmentation, hindering effective policy execution. Moskos (1970) and Skocpol (1985) emphasise that military culture and internal divisions weaken state capacity and governance. Elite influence and power concentration further complicate maritime security and national intelligence management. The transition from the DWP to *Jakumhaneg* indicates a move towards centralisation and reduced transparency, raising concerns about public trust and the concentration of power. Hence, a comprehensive review of national security policies is necessary to prevent a concentration of power and restore public trust in governance structures. Despite these observations, the underlying power dynamics within the state apparatus, particularly the military's role, remain a constant factor that complicates efforts for reform and transparency.

7.4 Evolving Threat Perceptions in Indonesia's NSS: From Centralised Control to Democratic Challenges and Elite Influence

The evolution of risks and threat interpretations within Indonesia's NSS redirects a complex interaction of political ideologies, governance structures, and socio-political factors. While existing literature provides a foundation for understanding these dynamics, this research enriches the discussion by emphasising the importance of adapting security frameworks to account for emerging threats, the role of public trust, and the implications of political oligarchy. The findings call for a re-evaluation of security strategies that prioritise democratic values, accountability, and citizen empowerment in shaping national security policies. The identified changes, necessary reforms, and immutable aspects of the political landscape offer a comprehensive perspective on the challenges and opportunities facing Indonesia's NSS in the coming years.

Between 1988 – 1998: Militaristic Threat Perceptions

During President Suharto's ORBA government (1988-1998), Indonesia's NSS was characterised by a militaristic approach to threat analysis. The emphasis on maintaining state stability and ideological uniformity significantly shaped security policies. Scholars such as Anderson (1983), Crouch (1979), and Aspinall (2005) indicate that Suharto's leadership predominantly perceived threats in the contexts of preserving authority and suppressing dissent. Organised crime, terrorism, regional conflicts, and subversion were classified as paramount threats to national stability, overshadowing the need for democratic governance.

The Indonesian government identified organised crime, terrorism, regional conflicts, and subversion activities as critical threats to national stability, prioritising state security over democratic governance. From field discussion, a former MOD Secretary General (personal communication, 8th June 2022, Jakarta), a former air marshal (17th June 2022), a former territorial commander (21st June 2022), and a colonel of the air force (7th July 2022) explained that these threats justified the implementation of extensive security measures, reflecting the government's focus on maintaining security as a top priority.

The literature underscores how authoritarian tactics justified extensive security measures, often bypassing legal frameworks (Anderson, 1983; Fukuyama, 2011; Tilly, 2007). Suharto's concentration of authority enabled the identification of threats that warranted repressive measures, both legally sanctioned and extrajudicial (Aby, 2016; Cahyo, 2005; Jatmiko & Haruni, 2022). Furthermore, manipulating the state ideology of Pancasila allowed the regime to equate dissent with challenges to national cohesion (Budiman, 1990; Cribb & Brown, 1995; Bouchier, 2015; Vatikiotis, 1993).

Empirical perspectives from a former Rear Admiral (personal communication, 31st October 2022, Jakarta), a former Territorial Commander (21st June 2022), and another former Rear Admiral (20th July 2022) revealed that the state categorised opposition and criminal activities under broad ideological labels to justify their suppression. This ideological manipulation helped strengthen Suharto's authority by equating dissent with security risks, thereby legitimising repressive actions. The NSS of the *ORBA* prioritised control and ideological uniformity, often compromising democratic values and institutional credibility in the process.

This thesis extends existing literature by elucidating how the state categorised opposition and criminal activities under broad ideological labels, facilitating repression. The NSS during the *ORBA* era prioritised control and ideological conformity at the expense of democratic values, revealing a governance system that suppressed dissent and eroded institutional credibility. The transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government marked a shift in the legitimacy of state power, requiring a re-evaluation of security policies. The focus on human rights and public participation emerged as essential components in shaping the NSS, post-Suharto. There is a need to institutionalise mechanisms that prioritise accountability and transparency within security organisations moving from repressive measures to a framework that empowers citizens and safeguards civil liberties. The historical context of the *ORBA* era, which established deep-rooted patterns of militarisation and repression, cannot be erased. This legacy continues to influence contemporary security practices and perceptions.

Between 1998 - 2014: Transition to Democracy and Inclusive Governance

The transition to the reform era (1998-2014) marked a significant shift in how threats were perceived. With the democratisation process underway, the focus shifted towards inclusive governance structures and participatory systems. Buzan & Hansen (2015) emphasise the necessity of balancing democratic freedoms with effective threat management, reflecting the changing conceptual framework of security governance.

During this period, the value of public trust and the capacity of security institutions came to the fore. Moskos (1970) demonstrates how military structures and perceptions shape state authority and security policies, which in Indonesia's case, evolved to utilise public trust and civil competency, particularly amidst the influence of oligarchy on the

securitisation process. Scholars like Putnam (1993) and Tyler (2006) highlight the importance of civic involvement in ensuring the efficiency of security organisations, such as the *Wantanas* and the *Lemhannas*. Critics, however, pointed to inefficiencies and overlaps within these institutions (Surwandono & Ramadhani, 2016).

The emergence of modern communication technologies during this period added new dimensions to risk and threat interpretations. Giddens (1990) and Norris (2011) explore how social media influenced public trust and information dissemination, leading to increased civic engagement and the proliferation of misinformation.

The dual-edged nature of press freedom and social media presents both challenges and opportunities. While these platforms democratise information and empower civic participation, they also facilitate misinformation, creating new security risks. A retired diplomat (personal communication, 2nd December 2022) notes that *Lemhanas* plays a crucial role in enhancing national resilience however must navigate a complex information environment shaped by modern communication tools. Rothstein & Uslaner (2005) argue that a well-informed citizenry is essential for a resilient national security framework.

The Reformation era marked a significant shift in interpreting risks and threats, particularly following the democratisation after the New Order regime. This period led to increased political participation and the emergence of radical ideologies and groups, as noted by Inglehart (1997). A former rear admiral (personal communication, 31st October 2022, Jakarta) points out that the democratisation process fostered the growth of radical Islamic groups, aligning with Crenshaw (1995) and Gurr (1970), who argue that when institutions fail to address grievances, radical groups may emerge, posing risks to national security. Although Sukabdi (2019, 2020) differentiates

radicalism from extremism, arguing that radicalism is reformist and open to dialogue, while extremism is driven by socio-political grievances and weak governance. Hence, requires a balanced approach involving counterterrorism, community engagement, and socio-economic reforms to effectively address immediate threats and root causes.

This thesis contributes to the discourse by emphasising the necessity of recognising security through socio-political lenses (Kaldor, 2013) and advocating for skill development as vital for empowering citizens and enhancing national security. The NSS has adapted to address these evolving challenges, recognising that socio-political factors can fuel radicalisation. The NSS also confronts challenges related to media influence on public perceptions of security threats. Sahrasad (2014) and Muir (2008) highlight the media's role in public discourse while cautioning against potential oligarchic influences. The rise of social media complicates this landscape; a former territorial commander (ret) major general (personal communication, 25th November 2022, Jakarta) notes its significant impact on socio-political dynamics and public opinion, creating challenges for maintaining public trust.

This research extends the literature by demonstrating how the democratisation process and advancements in media transformed threat perceptions, highlighting the complexity introduced by misinformation and civic engagement. The emphasis on socio-political factors reflects a nuanced understanding of national security, suggesting a need for frameworks that accommodate these evolving dynamics. The establishment of democratic institutions and a more engaged civil society marked a significant shift in the NSS. New channels for public input in security policy emerged, and a broader definition of security began to take root. Ongoing efforts to improve the

functionality and collaboration among security institutions are essential. Enhanced training and the integration of community feedback mechanisms could foster more effective security responses. The persistent presence of misinformation and the complexities of modern communication, which can distort public perception of security issues, remain a challenging reality.

Between 2014 - 2024: The Impact of Political Oligarchy

In the past decade, the national security landscape was profoundly influenced by the entrenchment of political oligarchy, characterised by rising corruption and social inequality that undermined the effectiveness of national security policies. The manipulation of legal and institutional frameworks by political elites became a major concern. For instance, the unequal treatment of a former provincial police head, who was in a dispute with a conglomerate, illustrates how elites exploit the legal system for personal gain, which erodes public trust in law enforcement, mentioned by a former member of Parliament (personal communication, 23rd September 2023, Jakarta).

Literature reveals that elite factions manipulate legal and institutional frameworks to safeguard their interests (Winters, 2011; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). The prevailing concerns about corruption, social inequality, and inequitable legal practices have diminished the effectiveness of security strategies (Buttle et al., 2016; Megah et al., 2022; Mietzner, 2020; Akbar, 2021; Wibowo et al., 2021). The weakening of the KPK in Indonesia illustrates a troubling trend where legislative changes have diminished the KPK's authority, as noted by Megah et al., (2022) and Mietzner (2021). They argue that this reflects a broader strategy aimed at bolstering oligarchic interests, undermining effective anti-corruption measures, and ultimately posing significant risks to national security by prioritising elite interests over public accountability. The analysis

suggests that the concentration of power often treats opposition as a security threat, undermining democratic principles and human rights. Weber (1922) and Skocpol (1985) illustrate how state authority and the interplay of political power can shape threat perceptions, highlighting the significance of oligarchic interests in the security landscape.

Concerns arise from the concentration of power within the executive branch through Presidential Decrees (*Perpres*) and Government Regulations in Lieu of Law (*Perppu*). Scholars such as Akbar (2021) and Mispansyah et al., (2023) argue this centralisation can lead to decisions motivated by personal interests rather than legal principles, undermining democracy. The dissolution of groups like the FPI under President Jokowi illustrates this concern (Mietzner, 2020; Power, 2018). The 2018 Law on Combating Terrorism exemplifies a dual approach, prioritising community involvement while consolidating elite authority. Critics argue that such laws may entrench elite power and silence dissent (Power, 2018; Mietzner, 2020).

The expansion of the TNI into domestic counterterrorism operations, highlighted by Sebastian & Iisgindarsah (2012), risks overshadowing civilian institutions under the guise of national security. Critics, including a former diplomat from the United Nations (personal communication, 04th January 2023, Jakarta), highlight that the fragmentation of counterterrorism agencies undermines effective governance. The involvement of multiple agencies, such as the *BNPT*, State Intelligence Agency (*BIN*), and Indonesian Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (*BAIS*), results in a complex and potentially redundant system.

This thesis adds to existing literature by demonstrating how the intersection of political oligarchy and state power has led to a deterioration of democratic ideals in Indonesia's

NSS. The research highlights the risks posed by elite interests, emphasising the need for reforms that ensure transparency and accountability in governance. Additionally, the analysis underscores the implications of fragmented security organisations on effective governance, challenging existing frameworks that advocate for centralisation without addressing the complexities of power dynamics. There has been an increasing awareness of the impact of political oligarchy on governance and security policies. Civil society organisations have become more vocal, pushing for transparency and accountability in the NSS. To effectively counter the influence of political oligarchs, it is crucial to promote systemic reforms that empower democratic institutions, enhance public participation, and address issues of corruption and inequality. The entrenched nature of oligarchic power and its influence on governance cannot be easily dismantled as it is deeply rooted in Indonesia's political culture and history.

7.5 Evolving Civil Role in Indonesia's NSS: From Authoritarianism to Reform and Contemporary Democracy

Under ORBA, civil society was marginalised, leading to a security framework characterised by authoritarian control and limited accountability. The transition to the reform era saw a gradual increase in civil engagement, marked by the rise of NGOs and a push for greater transparency and accountability. In the contemporary era, public opinion and media have become instrumental in shaping the NSS, although challenges remain regarding misinformation and the need for comprehensive public dialogue. The research indicates that while substantial advancements in civil engagement have occurred, several issues need addressing, including the ongoing struggle for trust in security institutions and the necessity for genuine collaboration between civil society and state actors. This analysis highlights the dynamic interplay

between civil society and national security throughout Indonesia's modern history, emphasising the continuous need for reforms and adaptations to strengthen democracy and enhance national security governance.

Between 1988 – 1998: The Authoritarian Grip on Civil Society

During the *ORBA* regime, Indonesia's NSS severely restricted the role of civil society, characterised by stringent government controls over freedoms and media. This suppression stifled public engagement and dissent, aligning with the theoretical framework of Military Sociology, which examines the relationship between military institutions and civil society (Janowitz, 1977; Finer, 2002). The concept of pseudo-democracy, articulated by Schedler (2006), Diamond (2002), and Levitsky & Way (2010), serves as a lens to analyse how authoritarian grip shaped security mechanisms, leading to a governance structure that minimised civil society's influence on security affairs. This resulted in a security framework characterised by government control and limited accountability.

Under Suharto's leadership, power was concentrated within a small elite, suppressing genuine political competition and media freedoms. This concentration of power is consistent with the insights of Political Sociology, which explores how political institutions and power dynamics influence social structures (Weber, 1968; Mills, 1956). Damayanti (2012) and Hidayat (2018) highlight how the manipulation of political parties enabled the regime to influence election outcomes and extend executive control into legislative bodies. This often served merely as "rubber stamps" for government actions, supported by a comment from a former Diplomat at the UN (personal communication, 04th January 2023, Jakarta). Military involvement in vetting candidates further solidified this control, while strict media regulations transformed

outlets into propaganda tools rather than independent entities. A staff expert for a parliament member (personal communication, 25th September Jakarta) stated that the government enforced regulations over media and press activities due to perceived challenges to its power and control, due to unbridled press freedom. Hadi & Kasuma (2012) and Pratikno (1998) document the regime's reliance on propaganda and media manipulation to sustain its authoritarian rule.

The militarisation of governance under Suharto's regime reflected a broader trend of employing military methods to address civilian issues. Personal communications with a member of Parliament's expert staff (25th September 2022, Jakarta) and an air force colonel (25th July 2022, Jakarta), summarises the perspectives on the military's role extended beyond security, to managing civilian dissent and enforcing government programs. This militarisation, combined with the regime's pseudo-democratic façade, created an environment where civil liberties were severely restricted.

The culmination of these authoritarian practices led to the 1997 economic crisis and subsequent social turmoil, culminating in Suharto's resignation in 1998. This transition catalysed the establishment of a democratic framework, marked by reforms aimed at dismantling authoritarian practices and fostering civic engagement. The post-Suharto era witnessed a focus on reforming structures to enhance accountability and promote individual rights, as noted by Hidayat (2018). The shift from a superficial democratic system to a more participatory one, reflects significant changes in the operational dynamics of civil society. The role of civil society, including student movements and public demonstrations, was crucial in driving this political transition (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). The collective action of these groups highlighted the inherent instability of

pseudo-democratic systems and the significant impact of civil resistance on political reform.

Research reveals the authoritarian mechanisms of the ORBA regime that stifled civil participation, creating a controlled security environment. This study extends the discussion by critically examining the tactical use of military and media to suppress dissent and highlighting the specific impacts of these tactics on civil society engagement within the NSS. The transition from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic framework opened avenues for civil engagement in governance and security, strengthening democratic institutions to ensure genuine political participation and curtailing the remnants of authoritarian control. The historical legacy of authoritarianism continues to influence political behaviour and CMR relations, creating challenges in fully realising democratic governance.

Between 1998 – 2014: Shifts in Civil Society Engagement

The transition to the Reform Era marked a pivotal shift in the role of civil society within Indonesia's NSS. Following Suharto's resignation, there was a notable increase in civil society engagement, with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) playing a crucial role in promoting transparency and accountability in governance processes. This research explores how heightened engagement contributed to a more collaborative approach to CMR relations, drawing on Clausewitz's (1976) emphasis on the social aspects of warfare, and Huntington's (1957) ideas regarding authoritarian transitions. Scholars such as Tyler (2006), Hardin (2002), and Fukuyama (1996) emphasise the importance of trust in institutions' a crucial factor for effective governance and security measures.

Despite the progress, challenges persisted in establishing trust within security institutions. The reputation of the Indonesian INP suffered due to high-profile corruption scandals, while the Indonesian *TNI* garnered public trust due to perceptions of alignment with community interests (ICG, 2001; Muir, 2008). The civil competency theory, posited by Gutmann (1999), Almond & Verba (1963), and Nussbaum (2003), underscores the need for education and active public involvement in ensuring accountability in security institutions. The intricate relationship between military and civilian sectors in Indonesia, as described by various officials, reflects the necessity for clear roles and responsibilities. The personal views of a former MOD secretary general (ret) vice admiral (8th June 2022, Jakarta) and a former commander of *BAKAMLA* (15th August 2022, Sukabumi) underscore the need for balanced integration of civilians and military personnel in defence roles.

This thesis identifies maintaining a harmonious CMR, where civilian authority prevails, and an equilibrium between the *TNI* and INP protects public interests. Authorities must engage communities and NGOs in conflict resolution by promoting education and empowering these groups to address underlying issues. Insights from Minnick (2001), Hahn (1999), and Gutmann (1999) further highlight the significance of stable CMR in governance. The inclusion of Reserve and Supporting Components in Indonesia's defence strategy, as noted by Sudarsono (2008), illustrates efforts to foster broader participation.

However, critiques from Sebastien & Lisagindarsah (2011) and Acharya (2015) highlight significant deficiencies in training and understanding of defence requirements among security personnel. The thesis explores the evolving dynamics between civil governance and military operations, employing theories of trust and competency to

illuminate these relationships. Moreover, a professor from *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) has criticised Indonesia's lack of preparedness for emergencies, and lack of accountability and transparency in the government. The situation has led to a breakdown in collaboration between the public and security entities, affecting effective risk-reduction efforts. The professor argues that the government needs to address these issues and strengthen its democratic institutions to ensure long-term stability and progress. The decline in public confidence could significantly impact the efficiency of the NSS and potentially hinder effective risk-reduction efforts.

Existing studies document the reform process and increase civil society engagement in governance post-Suharto, highlighting the challenges faced in building trust and competency within security institutions. This research deepens the discussion by focusing on the complexities of CMR during the reform period, advocating for community engagement as a means of strengthening democratic governance. The rise of NGOs and increased civil society involvement in governance processes marked a significant shift from the prior era. There is a pressing need for ongoing reforms to enhance public trust in security institutions, particularly the INP, through transparency and accountability measures. The lingering effects of the authoritarian legacy, such as ingrained corruption within institutions, continue to pose challenges for democratic reforms and civil engagement.

Between 2014 – 2024: Emerging Dynamics and Challenges

From 2014 to 2024, the evolution of Indonesia's NSS has been significantly influenced by public opinion and media. Drawing on Dewey (2004), this research emphasises the role of education in fostering democratic participation. Technological advancements

have enhanced civil society's engagement, as noted by Habermas (1989), with the diffusion of innovation underscoring the necessity of addressing misinformation that can shape public behaviour (Rogers, 2003).

The growing influence of media has led to increased scrutiny of governmental actions, including security measures (Tapsell, 2017; Mietzer, 2021; Christawan et al., 2023; Hui, 2020; Madania, 2020). A professor from Padjajaran University (personal communication, 19th Aug. 2022, Jakarta) argues that while digital tools can partially enable people to participate in conversations and decision-making processes, most of the population is passive, compared to "foam in the ocean" easily influenced by popular sentiments. This research underscores how civil society can enhance national security by engaging communities to prevent potential threats. However, it also highlights the challenges of misinformation, likening the public's susceptibility to a foam on the ocean – easily influenced and often polarised. Robust communication with diverse stakeholders, including grassroots communities and media, becomes essential in this context.

Debates among experts regarding security strategies reveal the pitfalls of inadequate public dialogue, which can result in policies that are misaligned with community needs. The relocation of Indonesia's capital exemplifies concerns about government transparency and public understanding of policy implementation (Sumantri, 2022). And again, the relocation of Indonesia's capital city provides a pertinent example of the challenges in integrating civil society into national security and broader policymaking. The critique by a professor at *Padjajaran* University (personal communication, 19th August 2022, Jakarta) about the lack of extensive public involvement in this decision, illustrates a disconnect between government actions and

public participation. The role of public opinion in shaping security policies is not without contention. A senior lecturer at the Military Academy (personal communication, 07th November 2022, Jakarta) presents a pragmatic perspective, suggesting that not all citizens need to be involved in decision-making processes. This lack of comprehensive public consultation reflects a top-down approach that prioritises government objectives over citizen engagement, echoing Arendt's (1998) critique of leaders who bypass democratic processes.

The inclusion of competency and trust from the public emphasises the need for reforms to enhance civil society's role within Indonesia's NSS. Page & Shapiro (1983) note the significance of public opinion in shaping policies, particularly through CSOs, that articulate community voices in decision-making processes. This study contributes to existing knowledge by highlighting how CSOs can influence policy changes and ensure adherence to democratic principles.

A personal communication with a Police Grand Commissioner's Adjunct (19th August 2022, Jakarta) exemplifies *Polmas* as a community-oriented approach where law enforcement collaborates with residents to address security concerns effectively. Followed with a retired air marshal as an expert in *Lemhannas* (16th August 2022, Jakarta) emphasises that a holistic security strategy involves multiple entities, including the National Police Commission (*Kompolnas*) and the National Human Rights Commission (*Komnas HAM*), to ensure public support and uphold human rights.

Moreover, a former Research and Development Director of *BAKAMLA*, a retired Brigadier General of Police (8th August 2022, Jakarta) highlights the contributions of CSOs such as Indonesian Police Watch (*IPW*) and Indonesian Corruption Watch

(ICW) in enhancing transparency and accountability in security bodies. Additionally, a former territorial commander (25th November 2022, Jakarta) stresses the significance of engaging various community groups and media in security management, promoting inclusivity and transparency. Zaller (1992) supports this by stating that including diverse societal groups in discussions can shape public perceptions and align security measures with community values. Praja et al., (2021) further underscore the role of youth organisations in empowering young people to contribute to security strategies. However, the effectiveness of public participation in national security is contingent upon the capabilities of civil authorities. Example critiques by Sebastian & Iisgindarsah (2012) highlight the challenges of democratic civilian oversight due to gaps in institutional capacity building within the MOD, preventing civic engagement from gaining significant influence.

Available literature underscores the growing role of public opinion and media in shaping security discourse and policy. This study enhances the discussion by demonstrating the critical need for robust civil engagement in national security, emphasising the impact of community policing and multi-organisation collaboration on enhancing security effectiveness. The significant influence of media and public opinion on shaping government policies and security discourse has transformed civil society's role. Enhanced mechanisms for public dialogue and education initiatives are necessary to ensure that policies align with community needs and mitigate misinformation. The complexities of misinformation and the historical trust deficits within security institutions, present ongoing challenges that require continual effort to address.

7.6 Policy Recommendations

This research recommends the establishment of a NSS, and an institutional framework designed to provide Indonesia with a clear, long-term security vision while ensuring effective democratic governance of CMR relations. By integrating strategic priorities, establishing an institutionalized mechanism for security and threat interpretation, and reinforcing civil supremacy, Indonesia can create a modern, responsive, and accountable national security structure. A formalized NSS, coupled with a National Security Coordination Council (NSCC), an independent threat assessment mechanism, and a CMR Advisory Board (CMAB), would enhance Indonesia's ability to proactively address emerging security challenges. Moreover, strengthening CMR and ensuring civilian leadership in security policy would further strengthen democratic governance and build greater public trust in Indonesia's national security institutions.

Establishing a NSS Framework

A NSS should serve as a legally binding document that provides a comprehensive, coherent, and long-term vision for Indonesia's national security, ensuring policy continuity and inter-agency coordination. A codified NSS will enhance strategic coherence by outlining the state's security priorities, threat assessments, and policy responses while ensuring accountability in national security governance (Sebastian & Laksamana, 2016). The development of this strategy will solidify Indonesia's security agenda the same time provide a reference for policymakers to respond effectively to emerging threats.

The NSS must align with Indonesia's economic, political, and defence interests, striking a balance between military security, internal stability, and economic resilience.

Research on ASEAN security frameworks has highlighted the crucial role of economic security in sustaining national stability (Caballero-Anthony, 2010). Given Indonesia's strategic position in the global economy, ensuring that the NSS accounts for economic vulnerabilities and trade security will be critical in maintaining national stability.

Towards remain relevant, the NSS should be reviewed periodically, preferably every five years, allowing it to adapt to evolving threats and geopolitical shifts. The practice of conducting regular strategic reviews has been widely implemented in security policies of countries such as Australia and Japan, enabling them to maintain policy flexibility and effectiveness (Ball, 1993). Through adopting this periodic review mechanism, Indonesia able to ensure that its NSS remains dynamic and responsive to both internal and external security developments.

Additionally, the development and implementation of the NSS should be overseen by an inter-ministerial working group to promote inter-agency collaboration and avoid bureaucratic silos. Studies on security governance in Southeast Asia suggest that fragmented ministerial structures often lead to inefficiencies in policy execution, reinforcing the need for an integrated approach (Rüland, 2011). Establishing such a working group would facilitate a more coordinated approach to national security governance, ensuring alignment across government agencies.

Institutional Framework for National Security Decision-Making

Indonesia must establish a NSCC under the President, responsible for policy integration and strategic oversight. National security councils have proven effective in democratic systems, ensuring coherent policy direction and inter-agency coordination

(Bruneau & Matei, 2008). A properly structured NSCC will provide a centralized mechanism for national security decision-making, reducing policy fragmentation.

Towards prevent political interference, the NSCC should operate independently and be composed of representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs, National Intelligence Agency (*BIN*), National Police (*Polri*), and key civilian agencies. This multisectoral representation will facilitate balanced decision-making and enhance the effectiveness of national security governance (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013). Beside ensuring that diverse security institutions collaborate, Indonesia would be proficient to create a more effective and resilient security policy framework.

The coordinating minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam) should serve as the primary executive coordinator of national security policy, ensuring seamless inter-agency cooperation and policy implementation. Furthermore, a permanent secretariat for the NSCC should be established to maintain operational continuity, support strategic planning, and coordinate crisis responses. Institutionalized structures such as these have been shown to improve policy execution and prevent ad hoc responses, a challenge often encountered in Indonesia's current decentralized approach (Rüland, 2011). A dedicated secretariat will ensure that the NSCC functions efficiently and can respond swiftly to security challenges.

Enhancing Threat Interpretation and Risk Assessment

A standardized approach to threat interpretation and risk assessment is essential for proactive national security governance. Indonesia should establish a National Threat Assessment System (NTAS) to identify and classify security threats, including

terrorism, cyber threats, transnational crime, economic security risks, and climate-related security challenges. Similar systems have been successfully implemented in the United States and the European Union, improving early warning capabilities and coordinated responses to security threats (Buzan, 1991). Implementing such a system in Indonesia would enhance national preparedness and improve intelligence-sharing across agencies.

Intelligence-sharing mechanisms between the military, police, intelligence agencies, and civilian institutions should be strengthened to facilitate real-time information exchange. Improved intelligence-sharing has been identified as a key factor in successful counterterrorism and crime prevention efforts in other countries (Honna, 2013). Strengthening intelligence-sharing networks would enhance Indonesia's ability to respond quickly to emerging security threats.

Additionally, Indonesia should develop an integrated risk mapping approach using artificial intelligence and big data analytics for predictive threat assessment. Emerging technologies have increasingly been employed in NSS to enhance strategic foresight and pre-empt emerging security risks (Goldman, 2010). By integrating advanced technological tools, Indonesia can significantly improve its ability to anticipate security threats and take pre-emptive action.

Regarding improves transparency and accountability; Indonesia should publish an annual National Security Report detailing emerging threats and state responses. Such reporting mechanisms have been successfully adopted in other democratic countries, increasing public trust in national security policies (Sebastian & Gindarsah, 2013). This would provide guidance for policymakers, inform the public, and contribute to democratic oversight of security governance.

Strengthening CMR and Civil Supremacy in Security Policy

Ensuring civilian authority over national security governance is crucial for democratic consolidation. To strengthen civilian oversight, Indonesia should establish a CMAB within the NSS framework. This body would provide civilian oversight and strategic recommendations, helping to ensure that military policies remain aligned with democratic principles (Crouch, 2010). Civilian oversight is particularly important in transitional democracies like Indonesia, where historical military dominance in policymaking has left lasting institutional challenges.

Furthermore, there must be a clear separation of roles between the military (*TNI*) and law enforcement (*Polri*) to prevent institutional overlap and conflicts of jurisdiction. Indonesia's historical challenges with military involvement in internal security highlight the importance of defining explicit institutional boundaries (Honna, 2003). Crosswise clarifying the division of responsibilities, Indonesia can prevent conflicts between security institutions and improve coordination.

Public participation in security discourse should be institutionalized through dialogues with academia, think tanks, and civil society organizations. Broader societal engagement in security policy discussions fosters public trust and ensures that security governance reflects democratic values (Sukma, 2003). Encouraging public dialogue on security matters will enhance legitimacy and inclusivity in national security policymaking.

7.7 Future Research

Looking ahead, future research could explore the intersection of sociology and legal studies, particularly through a comparative analysis of Indonesia's NSS and those of more advanced nations. Such a study would examine how different sociopolitical contexts, legal frameworks, and institutional structures influence the formulation and implementation of national security policies (Buzan, 2004; Croft, 2006). This comparative approach would deepen the understanding of Indonesia's unique challenges and opportunities equally offer broader insights into the sociological dimensions of security governance. By juxtaposing Indonesia's experience with that of advanced nations, future research could reveal critical lessons on balancing security, democracy, and human rights (Galtung, 1996; Neocleous, 2008). This would significantly enhance scholarship in the sociology of security, providing valuable contributions to both theoretical and practical discussions on global security governance (Duffield, 2007; Lutz & Lutz, 2008). Ultimately, such research could further reinforce the thesis's significance, demonstrating the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to understanding and addressing contemporary security challenges in diverse global contexts.

Given the political dynamics unfolding during this research, future studies should adopt a sociological perspective to explore the implications of recent democratic developments in Indonesia, particularly in relation to the 2024 presidential and gubernatorial elections.. These elections have raised concerns regarding the transparency of Indonesia's political processes and their impact the NSS. The constitutional amendments allowing President *Jokowi's* son, *Gibran Rakabumi-Raka*, to run for vice president provoke questions about fairness, legality, and the growing

influence of political elites, which have sociological implications for social trust and the erosion of democratic values (Constitution Net, 2024; The Diplomat, 2023; Today Online, 2023). Future research could assess how these changes affect public trust in democratic institutions, national security, and the sociopolitical fabric of Indonesian society, particularly regarding fears of a shift toward authoritarianism (The University of Sydney, 2024).

Moreover, the 2024 gubernatorial elections, where *Jokowi's* son *Kaesang Pangarep* appears to benefit from strategically timed opportunities, further highlight the concentration of power within political elites and its sociological implications for democratic governance (The Diplomat, 2023; Today Online, 2023). Critics argue these developments prioritize familial and elite interests, which could undermine Indonesia's democratic processes and reverse the progress made since the fall of the ORBA regime, suggesting a regression in social structures and political accountability (The University of Sydney, 2024). Investigating how such political strategies influence the NSS and the overall societal trust in security frameworks is crucial to understanding the broader sociological impacts on Indonesia's future democratic stability.

Additionally, exploring the intersection of technology and national security from a sociological perspective could provide valuable insights into how technological resources influence security strategies and public trust (Muslikhin et al., 2021; Meliala, 2001). Future studies should examine the sociological implications of technological advancements on security communication, focusing on how these innovations enhance transparency, foster greater public participation, and shape societal perceptions of security. Understanding the role of technology in strengthening public trust and involvement in security efforts will be crucial for analyzing the evolving

relationship between state institutions and society or CMR in the context of national security.

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