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The Syntax of Conditional Sentences in Syrian Arabic:

A Study Based on the Dialect of Deir Ezour

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A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD by research in Linguistics

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October 2011.

1290 0097 3



Essex U.N.D. 2011

DEDICATION

To my students.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am heartily grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Mike Jones, whose supervision, encouragement, guidance and support enabled me to develop a better understanding of my present research. Without his continuous academic help, I would not have been able to complete this work. I can only say Dr. Jones, thank you very much for guiding my primary experience in research.

I also would like to express my special thanks to all my informants who have given me much of their time and help by responding to my questions, phone calls and emails. Without their corporation I could not have gotten such relevant data.

I am also greatly indebted to the teaching staff in the Department of Language and Linguistics at the University of Essex; they are always ready to advise and help. Particularly I would like to thank Prof. Louisa Sadler who has always been there guiding and encouraging. This is also a great opportunity for me to express my respect to Dr. Doug Arnold for his help and support. Louisa and Doug have made their personal libraries available for me each time I asked for a book or an article.

I am also pleased to thank Dr. Enam Al-Wer for her personal support and assistance through the different stages of writing my thesis. Enam has always been a source of inspiration and support. Her invaluable advice and suggestions on the transliteration of my data and on some aspects of my research were very useful.

I owe my deepest gratitude to my mother who had taught me how to be patient in the hardest times. Her unconditional emotional support made the times of stress more manageable. I also owe a great debt to my wife Hāla Jalabi and two sons Ibrahim and Maher for their support and patience. They have endured my leaving them for long hours while studying late in my office.

ABSTRACT

This work is a descriptive and analytical account of the syntax of conditional constructions in the dialect of Deir Ezour, an Arabic dialect spoken in the northeastern part of Syria.

In chapter 1, the general syntactic features of Deir Ezour Dialect (DED), including inflection, word formation, pronouns, verbs, modality, etc., are outlined. In chapter 2, I review various perspectives on the different types of conditionals, and identify some of the main studies that have considered conditional structures.

In chapter 3, DED conditional sentences are divided into two main types, realis and irrealis; each type is further divided into different subtypes. I focus on the ways in which the choice of a conditional particle expresses different conditional relations and on the difference (and overlap) between conditional constructions and other superficially similar constructions (e.g. 'when-clauses').

In chapter 4, I investigate the internal properties of the P and Q clauses particularly with respect to the tense of the verb and the use of auxiliaries. Tense forms used in DED conditionals are examined and discussed in the light of Declerck's (1991) Tense Theory.

Chapter 5 investigates the factors which determine the order of the P and Q clauses. Cases where the P-clause occurs after the Q-clause are discussed in relation to Peled's (1992) claim that final P-clauses can function as Q-clause modifiers.

Finally in chapter 6, I discuss a range of sentence-types which do not have the canonical (if P, Q) patterns; these are called paratactic conditionals (PCs). PCs are divided into two main types, Imperative-Like Conditionals (ILCs) and Imperative-Like Ultimatums (ILUs). The differences between ILUs and ILCs, their structural patterns, and cases where they can have a subject other than the second person are also covered.

List of Transliteration Symbols Used.

The following symbols (adapted from the Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics (2006)) are used in transliterating the data of this study.

List of Transliteration Symbols Used.			
Symbol used	Phonetic transcription	Examples	
'	/ʔ/	' <i>ab</i>	father
		<i>ra'īs</i>	president
		<i>barī'</i>	innocent
‘	/ʕ/	‘ <i>aqid</i>	contract
		<i>ba‘aṭ</i>	he sent
		<i>bā‘</i>	he sold
a	/æ/	<i>sa‘ādah</i>	happiness
		<i>qalam</i>	pen
ā	/ɑ:/	‘ <i>ānseh</i>	female teacher
		<i>garām</i>	love
		<i>ḥālāt</i>	cases
b	/b/	<i>beīt</i>	house
		<i>bāb</i>	door
		<i>ḥiber</i>	ink
č	/tʃ/	č <i>ān</i>	hewas
		<i>ḥačī</i>	speech
d	/d/	<i>dam</i>	blood
		<i>ḥadīd</i>	iron
		<i>sa‘īd</i>	happy
đ	/ðˤ/	đ <i>id</i>	against
		<i>ḥāđir</i>	present
		<i>ḥađ</i>	luck
ḍ	/ð/	ḍ <i>ahab</i>	gold
		<i>eḍa</i>	if

ei	/ei/	<i>beit</i>	house
		<i>zeit</i>	oil
		<i>leil</i>	night
aw	/aw/	<i>yawm</i>	day
		<i>lawn</i>	colour
		<i>lawm</i>	blame
f	/f/	<i>fuqur</i>	poverty
		<i>safar</i>	travel
		<i>'is'āf</i>	ambulance
ġ	/ɣ/	<i>ġurfah</i>	room
		<i>miġsalah</i>	sink
		<i>ṣamiġ</i>	glue
h	/h/	<i>hātif</i>	telephone
		<i>muhandis</i>	engineer
ḥ	/h/	<i>ḥukūmah</i>	government
		<i>muḥāfid</i>	mayor
i	/i/	<i>kasir</i>	breakage
		<i>xubiz</i>	bread
ī	/i:/	<i>mudīr</i>	manager
		<i>jadīd</i>	new
j	/dʒ/	<i>jabal</i>	mountain
		<i>fajer</i>	dawn
		<i>'āj</i>	ivory
k	/k/	<i>ktāb</i>	book
		<i>miktabah</i>	library
		<i>mafak</i>	screw driver
l	/l/	<i>laḥim</i>	meat
		<i>miliḥ</i>	salt
		<i>'asal</i>	honey
m	/m/	<i>mudmin</i>	addict
		<i>'alam</i>	pain
n	/n/	<i>naḥil</i>	bees
		<i>'inab</i>	grapes
		<i>lsein</i>	tongue

q	/q/	<i>qahwah</i> <i>ma'aqad</i> <i>fariq</i>	coffee complicated team
r	/r/	<i>rās</i> <i>marḥaba</i> <i>nār</i>	head hello fire
s	/s/	<i>si'ir</i> <i>fistān</i> <i>ḥabis</i>	price dress jail
š	/ʃ/	<i>šamis</i> <i>maši</i> <i>rmūš</i>	sun walking eyelashes
ş	/sˤ/	<i>şaf</i> <i>maşāari</i> <i>raqiř</i>	class money dancing
t	/t/	<i>tanzilāt</i> <i>mustařfah</i> <i>fāt</i>	sales hospital he entered
ṭ	/θ/	<i>ṭāni</i> <i>muṭallat</i> <i>ḥādīt</i>	second triangle accident
ṭ	/tˤ/	<i>ṭabī'i</i> <i>maṭar</i> <i>miřit</i>	natural rain comb
u	/u/	<i>luḡah</i> <i>kutub</i>	language books
ū	/u:/	<i>safarū</i> <i>fudūli</i>	They travelled curious
w	/w/	<i>waqit</i> <i>mwaddaf</i>	time clerk
x	/x/	<i>xamīs</i> <i>muxbir</i> <i>bāyex</i>	Thursday secret agent silly
y	/j/	<i>yānařīb</i> <i>kambyotar</i>	lottery computer

z	/z/	<i>za'lān</i>	upset
		<i>ḥazīn</i>	sad
		<i>mumtāz</i>	excellent
o	/ʊ/	<i>kambyotar</i>	computer
e	/e/	<i>eḍa</i>	if

-Note that geminated sounds are indicated by doubling the symbol of the sound concerned. For example, *sbāḥ* (swim!) is the imperative verb form of *sibiḥ* (lit. he swam), while *sabbāḥ* (swimmer) refers to the person who is skilled in swimming.

-There is no difference in the pronunciation of ض /d^s/ and ظ /ð^s/ in DED where ظ /ð^s/ is used instead of ض /d^s/ all the times.

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List of Abbreviations Used.

Acc	Accusative	Neg	Negative
Activepart	Active Participle	NP	Noun Phrase
Adj	Adjective	OM	PCs starting with <i>One More...</i>
Aux	Auxiliary	PCs	Paratactic Conditionals
CA	Classical Arabic	PFV	Perfective Verb
CFC	Counterfactual Conditional	PI	Pseudo Imperative
comp or C	Complementiser	PP	Prepositional Phrase
comp	Conditional particle	PPS	Present Perspective System
DA	Dialectal Arabic	prep	Preposition
DE	Deir Ezourt	Progmark	Progressive Marker
DED	Deir Ezour Dialect	Prop	Propositional Part
def	Definite Article	QW	Question Word
ET	Established Time	R	Reality/Reference Space
existop	Existential Operator	RCs	Realis Conditionals
F	Feminine	S	Mental Space
FPS	Future Perspective System	SB _M	Space Builder
FS	Full Situation	sg	Singular
Gen	Genitive	SPs	Strategic Principles
HC	Hypothetical Conditional	STO	Situation Time Of Orientation
ILCs	Imperative-Like Conditionals	t ₀	Temporal Zero Point
ILUs	Imperative-Like Ultimatums	temp	Temporal Particle
imp	Imperative	TO	Time Of Orientation
INFL or I	Inflection	T-relations	Tense Relations
intro	Introducer	TS	Time of the Situation
IRCs	Irrealis Conditionals	verb.part	Verbal Particle
Juss	Jussive	Viz	Namely
M	Masculine	WA	Written Arabic
M	Mental Space	Wishpart	Wish Particle
Mod	Modal	W-relations	World Relations
MRA	Modern Written Arabic	1	First person
MSA	Modern Standard Arabic	2	Second person
MST	Mental Space Theory	3	Third person

List of Symbols Used .

*	Ungrammatical Sentence
??	Pragmatically Odd sentence
=	Equal
$\sim Q/H$	Q is not satisfied
$\sim P\text{-clause?}R$	The negation of P is undetermined in R
/	Satisfaction Relation
!	Determined Situation
?	Undetermined Relation
\neg	Negation
\sim	Negation

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Chapter One

General Characteristics of the Deir Ezour Dialect

1.0. Introduction.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to discuss some of the general features characterizing the dialect under discussion (Deir Ezour Dialect (DED)) and set the scene for the subsequent chapters. The chapter starts by giving a brief idea about the place where this dialect is spoken. Then it discusses some notes on the data used, the main objectives behind this study and gives a brief account of the Arabic language. The second part of this chapter deals with DED word formation, pronouns, agreement, sentence structure, and negation. Finally it discusses how modality is expressed in DED. This chapter aims at giving a general overview of DED and at preparing the reader for discussing DED conditional sentences.

1.1. Deir Ezour (DE).

In this section I introduce Deir Ezour¹ (DE), the place where the dialect under discussion is spoken and give a brief account of the dialect spoken in this city. DE is a governate in The Syrian Arab Republic. Geographically DE lies in the northeastern part of Syria and is therefore bordering Iraq. This is illustrated in the following map.

¹ Also written Dayr az Zawr, Deir Ezzor, Dier Ezzour, Dayr az Zawr, Dier Ezzor, etc.

Map (1). Administrative divisions in Syria.²

This map shows the administrative divisions of all the Syrian provinces where DE is in the northeastern part; it also shows the neighbouring countries surrounding Syria (particularly Iraq) which borders DE. DE has a population of about 1,000,000 inhabitants and an area of 33,060 km.² It is situated on the banks of the Euphrates River (*nahr al.furāt*), a fact that makes this province a productive farming area.

² Source: End Time Ministry Website. <http://www.ltradio.org/charts/>. See *References* for detail.

There are three major villages in DE, namely *Maiādīn*, *Albu Kamāl*, and *Albṣeirah*. The dialects spoken in these villages are not identical to the ones spoken in DE; DE represents the capital city and hence the only urban area in the province. However, there are many similarities in vocabulary, grammar, phonology, syntactic features, etc among the dialects spoken in DE and its villages. Differences, however, become more apparent as we move further from DE, but there is always a chain of mutual intelligibility between the DED and the dialects of the surrounding villages, probably as a result of geographical adjacency.

As we move to a further province, say Damascus³ or Ḥims, differences become very clear. In other words, the further we travel from DE the larger the dialectal differences become. For example, a DE speaker can easily communicate with a speaker from *Arraqqah* (the closest province to DE). On the other hand, there is some difficulty for a him/her to converse with a speaker from a coastal province like *Ṭarṭūs* or *Alādiyyah* in the western part of Syria. Given the fact that it takes less than two hours by car to travel from DE to the Iraqi border, and around half an hour to be in Iraq if you travel from *Albu Kamāl*, one of the main villages in DE, one can, due to geographical closeness, anticipate a certain degree of similarity between dialects spoken in DE and those spoken in the surrounding areas whether in the same country (Syria) or other bordering countries like Iraq. This indicates that straight lines defining the administrative or even political boundaries do not usually follow dialectal or linguistic boundaries as 'geographically adjacent dialects can be mutually intelligible' (Chambers and Trudgill, 1980: 5). Nevertheless, we cannot generalize the findings resulting from the analysis of DE data (or any of its adjacent villages) to other provinces which are geographically remote like Aleppo (or *Ḥalab*), Damascus, nor to any of

³ For a comprehensive study of the dialect of Damascus see Cowell (1964).

the neighbouring countries like Lebanon or Jordan, etc. This is also confirmed by Chambers and Trudgill (1980: 5) who state that 'the greater the geographical separation, the greater the difficulties of comprehension'.

DED seems to belong more to the Iraqi dialects rather than the Syrian ones. According to Blanc (1964), Jastrow (1978) and Palva's (2009) classification of Arabic dialects, DED can fall within the *qeltu* dialects, as is the case with the Iraqi dialects.

1.2. Notes on the Data Analysed.

The term conditional construction will be interpreted very broadly in this thesis. To a first approximation, conditional constructions consist of two clauses, P and Q, where the value of Q is in some sense dependent on that of P.

Though DED is a living dialect spoken by around one million people,⁴ it is an undocumented dialect. That is to say, there isn't a written corpus representative of this particular dialect. Therefore, since 'a participant observer who writes down a spoken example will always have extra knowledge about its pragmatic setting' (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 21-22), I acted as the main source of data, and as a participant observer in this study. In other words, I acted as my own informant; being a native speaker familiar with this particular dialect, I would be more competent in giving more solid linguistic judgments on the sentence structures of this dialect depending on my own intuition. I have also checked judgments with other DED native speakers where appropriate; they were asked to identify some conditional sentences conforming to DED grammatical rules. Their judgments are based on their DED underlying linguistic competence.

⁴ The Syrian Ministry of Tourism website (www.syriatourism.org). See references for detail.

Furthermore, as it is not always possible to collect data representing all types of DED conditional sentences, I acted as the main source of data of this dialect. The same thing applies to the various types of conditionals in English; Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 22) point out that though Declerck and Reed 2001 constructed an exhaustive corpus of conditional sentences, their corpus lacked some rare uses of conditional structures where 'meta-metaphorical conditionals never turned up'. Acting as my own informant will help provide all types of DED conditionals needed for discussion.

The word *Arabic* is used in this study as a cover term to refer to examples acceptable in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), Written Arabic (WA), and Classical Arabic (CA). I will use the abbreviation (DED) at the end of examples representative of *Deir Ezour Dialect*. Further, round brackets () are used to mark materials not present explicitly in the example concerned but introduced to make the translation more understandable. Square brackets [] are used to give contexts for some of the examples. I have also added the glosses for some of the quoted examples particularly when the gloss is relevant.

1.3. Objectives.

This study provides a primarily descriptive account of the conditional constructions in DED using literature based on other languages (primarily English).

My study of conditional constructions in DED has several objectives. First, it can provide a further contribution to the study of Arabic dialects; to my knowledge, conditional constructions have not been studied in detail in any variety of Arabic; Ingham (1991: 42)⁵, for instance, points

⁵ Ingham's (1997) article has already been published in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (1991). See references for detail.

out that 'to date' [1991] he had 'not seen anything devoted to the study of these structures [conditional sentences] in a colloquial dialect, although most teaching manuals devote a section to this'. This study is an answer to Ingham's (1997) statement.

The second objective relates to my aspiration of providing a comprehensive account for such structures which most researchers assume to be difficult: (a) 'it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give a precise definition of conditional meaning or conditional interpretation' (Declerck & Reed, 2001: 8), (b) 'until recently, most studies on conditionals were conducted by logicians and philosophers rather than linguists; thus it is not surprising that no adequate linguistic theory of conditionals exists' (Akatsuka, 1985: 625), and (c) 'the meaning of the English word *condition* is semantically more complex than that of IF' (Wiezicka, 1997: 54). This study can be an attempt to overcome the difficulties of conditional constructions by providing a detailed discussion of conditional constructions in a colloquial variety of Arabic, DED (my own variety).

Since DE is quite a large area, much of what shall be said about this dialect extends to other dialects spoken in the areas neighbouring DE and probably in other Arabic dialects.

The choice of DED as the basis for this study should not be taken to imply that there is something special or distinctive about conditional constructions in this dialect. Rather, the aim of this thesis is to present a detailed investigation of these constructions in a particular dialect (my own) which may be taken as representative of colloquial spoken Arabic, and to provide a model which can be extended to the study of other dialects. That is to say, this study is not about a particular aspect of DED grammar, it is rather an investigation of conditional constructions in Arabic; therefore, it provides a model of conditional constructions in dialectal Arabic.

Given the fact that DED is not a written variety, unlike Classical and Modern Standard Arabic, this study can help document some aspects of this dialect, particularly conditional structures, and this will then help involve these structures in linguistic discussions. We aim at making this dissertation a starting point for exploring more about this particular dialect.

1.4. Varieties of Arabic.

Arabic divides into three main types: Classical Arabic (CA), Modern Standard Arabic (MSA or MS), and Dialectal Arabic (DA). CA is related to the language of the classical literature and the Holy Qur'an, Islam's holy book; the revelation of the Qur'an in Arabic gave the language a great religious significance, and helped preserve its grammar and style; 'as the chosen language for the *Qur'ân*, it [CA] became the object of centuries of religious study and exegesis, theological analysis, grammatical analysis and speculation' (Ryding, 2005: 3). Nevertheless, CA is regarded as a dead language, very much like Latin. MSA is less complicated than CA and is therefore more appropriate for educational use; the structure of CA 'is similar to Modern Standard Arabic but the style and much of the vocabularies are archaic' (Wightwick & Gafar, 1990: xiii). What keeps CA alive, however, is the fact that it is the language of prayers, religious rituals, and religious sessions and sermons prevalent in many of the Arabic-speaking countries.

MSA is usually acquired simultaneously with one's dialect as a result of exposure to TV and some formal settings. It is generally based on CA and is used in formal communication, television and radio news, prose, etc. It is considered the modernized form of CA, with updated vocabularies and prescriptive grammatical rules. In other words, MSA is a relaxed form of CA and is considered the universal language of the Arab world through which Arabs can converse or

communicate. Badawi, Carter, and Gully (2004) distinguish between CA and MSA by showing that CA refers to the most eloquent type of Arabic language and its heritage, while MSA refers to the Arabic modern area. MSA is understood in its written form by most, if not all, Arabic speakers all over the Arab World. According to the standards of MSA, many of the Quranic vocabularies used in CA are out-dated. MSA allows Arabs to communicate with the largest number of Arabic speakers all over the Arab world, and can therefore be a better alternative to CA.

There is a consensus among dialectologists that a certain dialect should not be regarded as minor or inferior regardless of the number of people speaking it. Chambers and Trudgill (1980: 3), for instance, disapprove of considering dialects 'a substandard, low status, often rustic form of language' or a kind of deviation from the norm; they point out that such considerations are 'often erroneous', stating that 'it does not make any kind of sense to suppose that any one dialect is in any way linguistically superior to any other'. In a later work, Trudgill (2004: 2) confirms the same point indicating that 'dialects are not peculiar or old fashioned or rustic ways of speaking'. Furthermore, Crystal (1980: 110) gives dialects a status closer to that of a language; for him, 'dialects are subdivisions of languages'. Similarly, the dialect under discussion is dealt with in the same way, as a subdivision of language representing a variety of Arabic language.

In spite of the diversity characterising Arabic dialects, there seems to be some common syntactic properties among them; for example, all Arabic dialects lack overt Case inflection, and all have a dominant SVO verb order, Versteegh (2001). In the following sections, we will consider some of the general properties characterising DED.

1.5. General Characteristics of DED.

There is a tendency in DED to use a fewer number of suffixes when expressing agreement. For example, one suffix is used for both the plural and the dual, unlike the case in CA and MSA; Case markers are dropped in DED because they are not necessary for expressing the speaker's message. Furthermore, plural adjectives are used for modifying both plural and dual nouns, though CA and MSA use separate suffixes for dual and plural adjectives. The aim of the following sections is to facilitate the understanding of the data used in the subsequent chapters and to give a general account of DED.

1.5.1. Inflection.

There is no Case inflection in DED. Unlike CA or MSA in which Case indicators are morphologically realizable, Case in DED is a covert phenomenon: (1.b) below is the DED counterpart of the MSA (1.a).

1.

- a. *'aqada* *l.mudir.u* *jtimā'.an* *ma'a* *l.muwaddafina*
 hold_{+past.3.m.sg} def.director_{Nom} meeting_{Acc} prep def.employees
 The director held a meeting with the employees. (Ryding 2005: 168).

- b. *'aqad* *l.mudir* *jtimā'* *ma'a* *l.muwaddafin*
 hold_{+past.3.m.sg} def.director meeting prep def.employees
 The director held a meeting with the employees. (DED).

Case marking in (1.a) takes place as vowels represented in inflectional morphemes suffixed to the nouns concerned. On the other hand, there is no Case marking on the nouns of the DED example in (1.b). This supports Versteegh's (2001) observation that the lack of Case is a feature of most

Arabic dialects; Case indicators in Arabic dialects are not present morphologically. That is to say, Case in DED is an abstract phenomenon which cannot be morphologically realized.

1.5.2. Number.

Only nouns in DED have a separate dual form. Pronouns, adjectives, and verbs only have a singular/plural distinction. This section deals with two main points; first it gives a brief account of Number in DED. Second, it discusses the rules characterizing Number agreement in DED.

Nouns in Arabic are marked for three Number contrasts: singular, plural and dual. The former is the default form and the other two are derived by suffixes attached to the singular noun. Unlike English, 'Arabic has a separate Number category for two of anything' (Ryding, 2005: 129). The suffixes indicating the dual in CA change in accordance with the syntactic role and the gender of the noun concerned. The following table shows how the dual suffixes in CA change in accordance with the syntactic role and the gender of the noun *rajul* (lit. 'man') (adapted from Abu-Chacra, 2007: 70).

Function	Masculine NP	Feminine NP
Subject	<i>jā'a rajul.ani</i> come _{+past.m} man _{.dual.(Nom)} Two men came. (CA)	<i>jā'at bint.ani</i> come _{+past.f} girl _{.dual.(Nom)} Two girls came. (CA)
Object	<i>zurtu rajul.ayni</i> visit _{+past.1.sg} man _{.dual.(Acc)} I visited two men. (CA)	<i>zurtu bint.ayni</i> visit _{+past.1.sg} girl _{.dual.(Acc)} I visited two girls. (CA)
Object of a preposition	<i>marartu bi.rajul.ayni</i> pass _{+past.1.sg} prep.man _{.dual.(Gen)} I passed by two men. (CA)	<i>marartu bi.bint.ayni</i> pass _{+past.1.sg} prep.girl _{.dual.(Gen)} I passed by two girls. (CA)

Table (1): CA change of dual suffixes according to the syntactic function of the dual noun.

As can be seen above, the suffix *-ani* is used as a dual marker for both masculine and feminine nouns when they function as subjects. On the other hand, *-ayni* is used as a dual marker for nouns functioning as objects or object of prepositions.

The formation of dual nouns in DED can be similar to the one in CA or MSA: there are two dual markers *-ein* for masculine nouns, and *-tein* for feminine ones. However, these two dual markers are used regardless of the syntactic function of the noun concerned. That is to say, the dual form of a masculine noun in DED is the same whether this noun functions as subject, object, etc. This can be shown in the following examples.

2.

DED Dual Formation		
Function	Masculine NP	Feminine NP
Subject	<i>'aja</i> <i>aṭ.ṭālb.ein</i> come _{+past.m} def.student _{dual.m} The two students came. (DED).	<i>'ajat</i> <i>aṭ.ṭālib.tein</i> come _{+past.f} def.student _{dual.f} The two students came. (DED).
Object	<i>zirtu</i> <i>aṭ.ṭālb.ein</i> visit _{+past.1.sg} def.student _{dual.m} I visited the two students. (DED).	<i>zurtu</i> <i>aṭ.ṭālib.tein</i> visit _{+past.1.sg} def.student _{dual.f} I visited the two students. (DED).
Object of a preposition	<i>marreitu</i> <i>bṭ.ṭālb.ein</i> pass _{+past.1.sg} prep.def.student _{dual.m} I passed by the two students. (DED).	<i>marreitu</i> <i>bṭ.ṭālib.tein</i> pass _{+past.1.sg} prep.def.student _{dual.f} I passed by the two students. (DED).

As shown above, *-ein* is used to derive masculine dual nouns, and *-tein* is used to derive feminine ones. Thus, unlike English, which uses *two* or *both* to indicate dual nouns, DED has separate dual suffix to mark dual nouns.

Three main ways are used to form the plural of NP's in DED; the first two depend on the gender of the NP concerned: a feminine NP like *syārah* (car) forms its plural by adding the suffix –

āt to the stem as in *syārāt* (cars), while a masculine noun forms its plural by adding the suffix *-in* to the masculine singular noun as in *muslimin* (Muslims), the plural form of *muslim* (Muslim). However there are many exceptions to this way such as *ktāb* (book) whose plural is *kutub* (books), not **ktābin*. The third way depends on vowel change and/or inserting one or two consonants in the noun concerned. For example, the plural forms of *ḥṣān* (horse) and *yawm* (day) are *ḥuṣun* (horses) and *'ayām* (days), respectively.

Unlike CA, DED uses one form of plural whether an NP functions as a subject or as an object:

3.

- | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| a. <i>l.mitdāhrin</i> | <i>ṭabbaṣū</i> | <i>syārt.uh</i> |
| def.protestors | destroy _{+past.3.pl} | car.his |

The protesters destroyed his car. (DED).

- | | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| b. <i>aš.ṣurṭah</i> | <i>dakkat</i> | <i>l.mitdāhrin</i> |
| def.police | arrest _{+past.3.f.sg} | def.protestors |

The police arrested the protesters. (DED).

The general rule of Number agreement in DED can be summarized along the following lines:

4.

- Singular nouns require singular modifiers.
- Dual and plural nouns require plural modifiers.

A singular noun can be described only by a singular modifier:

5.

- | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| a. <i>qābalat</i> | <i>ṣadīqeh</i> | <i>qadīmeḥ</i> |
| meet _{+past.3.f.sg} | friend _(sg.f) | old _(sg.f) |

She met an old friend. (DED).

- | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| b. <i>*qābalat</i> | <i>ṣadīqeh</i> | <i>qadīmāt</i> |
| meet _{+past.3.f.sg} | friend _(sg.f) | old _(pl.f) |

*She met an old_(pl) friend. (DED).

Similarly, plural nouns require plural modifiers:

6.

a. *l.mudīr* *qābal* *l.‘ummāl* *an.našīṭīn*
 def.manager meet_{+past.3.m.sg} def.workers_(pl) def.active_(pl)
 The manager met the active workers. (DED).

b. **l.mudīr* *qābal* *l.‘ummāl* *an.našīṭ*
 def.manager meet_{+past.3.m.sg} def.workers def.active_(sg)
 *The manager met the active_(sg) workers. (DED).

The plural noun *l.‘ummāl* (the workers) in (a) can only be described by a plural modifier, hence the plural adjective *an.našīṭīn* (the active_(pl)). Using a singular modifier like *an.našīṭ* (the active_(sg)) instead of a plural one would render the structure ungrammatical as shown in (b) above.

Contrary to CA, DED dual nouns can be modified by plural modifiers. That is to say, dual modifiers are not used in DED where plural ones are used instead:

7.

a. *l.bintein* *aṭ.ṭawilāt* *yihcūn* *’ingilizi* *b.ṭalāqah*
 def.girls_{dual} def.tall_(pl.f.) speak_{+pres.3.pl} English prep.fluency
 The two tall girls speak English fluently. (DED).

b. *aṭ.ṭālbein* *as.sūriein* *ḥaṣalū* *‘ala* *minḥeh*
 def.students_{dual} def.Syrian_{pl} get_{+past.3.m.pl} prep scholarship
 The two Syrian_(pl) students_(du) got a scholarship. (DED).

The dual noun *l.bintein* (the two girls) in (a) is not modified by a dual adjective but by a plural one, *aṭ.ṭawilāt* (the tall_(pl)); the structure is still acceptable though there is no Number agreement between the dual noun *l.bintein* (the two girls) and its plural modifier *aṭ.ṭawilāt* (the tall_(pl)). That is

to say, dual adjectives are not used in DED and the plural ones are used instead. The same point applies to the example in (b) above.

1.5.3. Gender.

Both CA and DED have two gender distinctions, feminine and masculine. That is to say, DED does not use the neuter gender as is the case in English. Further, DED can be similar to CA in the fact that the feminine/masculine distinction is arbitrary unless the gender distinction is based on natural gender.

Generally speaking, DED nouns are masculine by default while the feminine nouns are formed with a gender suffix such as the masculine feminine suffix *-ah*. The gender suffix marking femininity in DED is *-ah* or *-eh* which is known in Arabic traditional grammar as the *at.tā' al.marbūṭah* (lit. 'the round *tā'*') Ryding (2005); it is a suffix used to change singular masculine nouns into feminine ones. The following examples show how the addition of *-ah* changes a noun gender from masculine into feminine in DED:

8.

Masculine	----- <i>-ah/-eh</i> ----->	Feminine
<i>mwaddaf</i> (clerk. _m)		<i>mwaddaf.ah</i> (clerk. _f)
<i>tālib</i> (student. _m)		<i>tālib.eh</i> (student. _f)
<i>tawīl</i> (tall. _m)		<i>tawīl.eh</i> (tall. _f)
<i>ġazāl</i> (deer. _m)		<i>ġazāl.ah</i> (deer. _f)

As can be seen above, the addition of the suffix *-ah* or *-eh* which marks a feminine gender changes the gender of the noun/adjective from masculine to feminine.

Further, nouns in DED agree in gender with the adjectives modifying them:

9.

- a. *l.mudīr* *qābal* *at.ṭālib* *aš.šātīr*
 def.principal meet_{+past.3.m.sg} def.student_(m) def.hardworking_(m)
 The principal met the hardworking student. (DED).

- b. *rīm* *libsat* *fistān* *ḡālī*
 Reem wear_{+past.3.f.sg} dress_m expensive_m
 Reem wore an expensive dress. (DED).

1.5.4. In/Definiteness.

While definiteness in DED is expressed by the prefix *al-*, *il-*, or *l-* (the), there is no morpheme representing the indefinite marker *-un/an* in DED. Indefiniteness, by contrast, is expressed by the absence of the definite article *al-*, *il-*, or *l-*. The following examples show how omitting the definite article *al-* makes the noun *tifāḥa* (apple) indefinite.

10.

- a. *rīm* *ʾaklat* *at.tifāḥah*
 Reem eat_{+past.3.f.sg} def.apple
 Reem ate the apple. (DED).

- b. *rīm* *ʾaklat* *tifāḥah*
 Reem eat_{+past.3.f.sg} apple
 Reem ate an apple. (DED).

In (a), the reference is to a specific apple, while in (b) to any apple. Though nunation and other Case markers are not used in DED, there are some residues of it which can be found in some words like *maṭalan/faradan* (for example), *ʾabadan* (never), etc.⁶

⁶ However, Kaye & Rosenhouse (1997: 299) state that 'residues of CA nunation are still used productively in some Bedouin dialects (mainly in the Arabian Peninsula)'. See also Ryding (2005: 161).

The definite article *al-* (the) assimilates to some of the consonants (the apicals) it precedes; therefore, its pronunciation depends on the consonant following it: When it assimilates to a consonant, the latter is doubled in pronunciation. For example the noun *sijarah* (a tree) becomes *as.sijarah* (the tree) when prefixed by *al-*. I.e., the first consonant is assimilated and doubled in pronunciation.

Nouns and adjectives in DED can indicate in/definiteness agreement through the presence or absence of the definite article *al-*. For example, a noun phrase whose head noun is definite can only have a definite modifier:

11.

- | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| a. <i>mḥammad</i> | <i>štara</i> | <i>as.syārah</i> | <i>aj.jadīdeh</i> |
| mohammad | buy _{+past.3.m.sg} | def.car | def.new |
| Mohammad bought the new car. (DED). | | | |

- | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| b. <i>mḥammad</i> | <i>štara</i> | <i>as.syārah</i> | <i>jadīdeh</i> |
| mohammad | buy _{+past.3.m.sg} | def.car | def.new |
| Mohammad bought the car new. (DED). | | | |

as.syārah aj.jadīdah (the new car) in (a) shows that in addition to Number and Gender agreement the noun *as.syārah* (the car) and its modifier *aj.jadīdah* (the new) agree in definiteness. On the other hand, modifying the definite noun *as.syārah* (the car) by the indefinite modifier *jadīdah* (new) as shown in (b) is not possible because the resultant structure is no longer an NP, but a circumstantial construction.⁷ A circumstantial clause shows the circumstance of the subject or object and can answer the Question *how* (How was the car? It was new).

The reverse is also true: a noun phrase whose head noun is indefinite can only have an indefinite modifier:

⁷ For more about circumstantial construction in CA and MSA see Ryding (2005: 112-113).

12.

- a. *nādiya* *tiḥči* *luḡah* *ʾajnabiyyeh*
 Nadia speaks_{+pres.3.f.sg} language foreign
 Nadia speaks a foreign language. (DED).

- b. * *nādiya* *tiḥči* *luḡah* *l.ʾajnabiyyeh*
 Nadia speaks_{+pres.3.f.sg} language def.foreign
 *Nadia speaks a language the foreign. (DED).


(a) shows that there is an indefiniteness agreement in the noun phrase *luḡah ʾajnabiyyeh* (foreign language) where the indefinite noun *luḡah* (language) is modified by an indefinite adj *ʾajnabiyyeh* (foreign). Modifying the indefinite noun *luḡah* (language) by a definite modifier is not possible and the resultant structure is ungrammatical as shown in (b) because it shows disagreement between an indefinite noun and its definite modifier.

1.6. Word Structure.

Like CA, derivation of words in DED is based on interlocking a consonantal root with some patterns of vowels, a process known in linguistic studies as 'introflexion'.⁸ Introflexion can result in a grammatical change. A verb, for instance, can be changed into a noun or adjective. Let us consider the following example where the verb *sibiḥ* (lit. 'he swam') is used as a root verb from which nouns, adjectives, etc., can be derived.

⁸ See Ryding (2005: 46-48) for introflexions in CA and MSA.

13.



DED change of Grammatical category through introflection.

As can be seen above, all the derived stems involve the consonantal root s-b-ḥ. These stems can have inflectional suffixes to indicate subject-verb agreement in verbs and derivational ones to indicate gender and number agreement in nouns.

1.6.1. DED Pronouns.

Unlike English, most of the DED pronouns have a separate masculine and feminine form. For example, while English use the form *you* to address a second person feminine or masculine subjects, DED has a separate form for each gender. In the following sections, I will give a general view about pronouns in DED, including subject, object and possessive pronouns.

While object pronouns (see next section) have to attach to other words to get their meanings, subject pronouns are independent morphemes which can stand alone in a sentence; they can be used to replace nouns or noun phrases in a sentence. Let us consider the following example.

14.

a. <i>humma</i>	<i>yil'ab.ūn</i>	<i>be.l.ḥadiqeh.</i>
they	play +pres.3.pl	prep.def.garden
They play in the garden. (DED).		

- b. *hiea* *tsāfer* *be.aṭ.ṭayārah*
 she travel_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.def.plane
 She travels by the plane. (DED).

humma (they) in (a) and *hiea* (she) in (b) are two subject pronouns replacing nouns or noun phrases.

Unlike CA, but like English, DED does not have separate pronouns indicating dual subjects; plural pronouns are used for both dual and plural subjects. The dual subject in (a) below is replaced by the plural pronoun *humma* (they) in (b). That is to say, *humma* (they) can be used for both dual and plural nouns.

15.

- a. *māher* *w* *fāṭmeh* *qarū* *ar.resālah*
 Maher conj Fatimeh read_{+past.3.pl} def.letter
 Maher and Fatima read the letter. (DED).
- b. *humma* *qarū* *ar.resālah*
 they read_{+past.3.pl} def.letter.
 They read the letter. (DED).

The following table shows the subject pronouns used in DED with their English counterparts.


DED Subject Pronouns		
DED	English	Person
<i>ʿana</i>	I	1.sg.
<i>niḥna</i>	We	1.pl.
<i>ʿenta</i>	You	2.m.sg
<i>ʿenti</i>	You	2.f.sg
<i>ʿentum</i>	You	2.f/m.pl
<i>huwwa</i>	He	3.m.sg
<i>hiea</i>	She	3.f.sg
<i>humma</i>	They	3.f/m.pl

Table (2): DED Subject Pronouns.

The above table shows that DED pronouns never have a separate dual form. An equivalent to the neutral pronoun 'it' is not used in DED because things, nouns, objects, etc. have gender. i.e., they are referred to as either feminine or masculine.

DE is a pro-drop dialect because subject pronouns can be incorporated in the inflections of the verbs. That is to say, the verb inflection helps distinguish subjects though they are not mentioned in the sentence. This can be seen in the following example where the agreement affixes attached on the verb determine which subject pronoun is dropped. The verb *sāfar* (lit. 'travelled') is used as an example.

16.



As can be seen above, agreement affixes distinguish the dropped subjects. For example the agreement affix *-it* in *sāfarit* (you 2.m.sg travelled) indicates that the dropped pronoun is the second person masculine singular pronoun *'enta* (you 2.m.sg).

DED Object pronouns cannot stand alone in the sentence because; that is to say, they are a set of bound words or clitics. This is also true of other Arabic dialects such as the Egyptian and the Syrian dialects, Versteegh (2001: 101). These pronouns get their meanings by attaching to either a

verb where they indicate a direct object as in (17.b), or to a preposition where they indicate an object of a preposition as in (18.b).

17.

a. <i>'aḥmad</i>	<i>ba'at</i>	<i>ar.risalah</i>
Ahmad	send _{+past.3.m.sg}	def.letter
Ahmad sent the letter. (DED).		

b. <i>'aḥmad</i>	<i>ba'at.ha</i>
Ahmad	send _{+past.3.m.sg} it
Ahmad sent it. (DED).	

ar.risalah (the letter) in (a) is replaced by its corresponding clitic object pronoun *-ha* (it) in (b). Similarly, when we have an object of a preposition, it can be replaced by a corresponding clitic object pronoun attached to the preposition:

18.

a. <i>hāla</i>	<i>ḥačat</i>	<i>ma'a</i>	<i>'aḥmad</i>
Hala	speak _{+past.3.f.sg}	prep	Ahmad
Hala spoke with Ahmad. (DED).			

b. <i>hāla</i>	<i>ḥačat</i>	<i>ma'a.h</i>
Hala	speak _{+past.3.f.sg}	prep.him
Hala spoke with him. (DED).		

Ahmad in (a) is replaced by the clitic pronoun *-h* (him) in (b). The following table shows the object clitic pronouns in DED with their subject non-clitic counterparts:

DED Object and Subject Pronouns					
DED object pronouns			DED Subject pronouns		
<i>-ni</i>	(me)	1.sg.	<i>'ana</i>	(I)	
<i>-na</i>	(us)	1.pl.	<i>nihna</i>	(we)	
<i>-(a)k</i>	(your)	2.m.sg	<i>'enta</i>	(you)	
<i>-či</i>	(your)	2.f.sg	<i>'enti</i>	(you)	
<i>-kum</i>	(your)	2.f/m.pl	<i>'entum</i>	(you)	
<i>-uh/ah</i>	(him)	3.sg	<i>huwwa</i>	(he)	
<i>-ha</i>	(her)	3.f.sg	<i>hiea</i>	(she)	
<i>-hum</i>	(them)	3.f/m.pl	<i>humma</i>	(they)	

Table (3). DED Object and Subject Pronouns.

Unlike CA, there is no distinct dual object pronoun in DED as the plural object pronoun *-kum* is used instead.⁹

Unlike possessives in English which are free morphemes, possessives in DED are bound ones; they attach to the nouns/prepositions they follow. DED Possessives are used to indicate ownership by being attached to the noun denoting the thing owned:

19.

- a. *rabi'i* *māt*
 friend.my die_{+past.3.m.sg}
 My friend died. (DED).

- b. *'ibin.kum* *najah*
 son.your_(2.pl) pass_{+past.3.m.sg}
 Your son passed (his exam). (DED).

-i (my) in (a) and *-kum* (your_{2.pl}) in (b) are two possessive pronouns used in DED. They help restrict or specify the meaning of the noun they attach to: in (a), for instance, *-i* (my) specify which friend I am talking about (*my friend*). The structure resulting from attaching one of these

⁹ See Ryding (2005) and Abu-Chacra (2007) for a list of object pronouns in CA.

pronouns to a noun is known in traditional Arabic grammar as *idāfa* (addition) construction¹⁰ where the added pronoun identifies the noun it precedes. For example, the added possessive pronoun *-kum* (your) in *'ibin.kum* (your son) specifies the noun *'ibin* (son).

Similarly, CA dual possessive pronouns are not used in DED. Plural possessive pronouns are used for both plural and dual possessors. The following table shows the distribution of DED possessive pronouns with a representative example.

DED Possessive Pronouns		
First person	<i>-i</i> (my)	<i>beit.i</i> (my. _{1.sg.} house)
	<i>-na</i> (our)	<i>beit.na</i> (our. _{1.pl.} house)
Second person	<i>-ak</i> (your)	<i>beit.ak</i> (your. _{2.m.sg.} house)
	<i>-či</i> (your)	<i>beit.či</i> (your. _{2.f.sg.} house)
	<i>-kum</i> (your)	<i>beit.kum</i> (your. _{2.f/m.pl/dual} house)
Third person	<i>-uh</i> (his)	<i>beit.uh</i> (his. _{3.m.sg.} house)
	<i>-ha</i> (her)	<i>beit.ha</i> (her. _{3.f.sg.} house)
	<i>-hum</i> (their)	<i>beit.hum</i> (their. _{3.f/m.pl/du} house)

Table (4): Distribution of DED Possessive Pronouns

Observe that the DED possessive pronouns represented in the above table have the same forms as the object pronouns.

1.7. Verbs in DED.

DED has two finite verb forms which are traditionally called the *perfective* and the *imperfective*. The former is used for completed events in the past, while the latter expresses durative events or situations in the present or future. Though *the perfective* and *the imperfective*

¹⁰ See Beeston (1970) and Ryding (2005) for a further discussion of *idāfa* (addition) construction in Arabic.

are used in our discussion of Arabic and DED examples, we use *past* and *pres(ent)* to represent them in our glosses. The two forms can interact with auxiliaries or modals to form different tenses.

DED is a pro-drop language; the verb inflection is sufficiently rich to allow a null subject. In their base forms, DED verbs indicate the third person masculine singular. The verb *sibiḥ*, for instance, means 'he swam'; other examples include *nām* (he slept), *ribiḥ* (he won), *ḡasal* (he washed), etc. Verbs in DED are usably triliteral, i.e. consisting of three consonants (also called radicals). Unlike English whose verb base forms (the unmarked form) are in the present, the unmarked verb in DED is in the perfective and the imperfective is a marked verb. The following table shows some illustrative examples.

20.

Perfective (base form) verb		
CA	DED	English
<i>nāma</i>	<i>nām</i>	(he slept)
<i>šareba</i>	<i>šerb</i>	(he drank)
<i>darasa</i>	<i>daras</i>	(he studied)
<i>ḡasala</i>	<i>ḡasal</i>	(he washed)

Perfective situations in Arabic are expressed in two ways: (a) the use of the past form of the verb and (b) the use of the imperfective form of the verb in combination with the Aux *čān* (lit. 'he was'). The latter expresses a meaning equivalent to that conveyed by the past progressive in English:

21.

- a. *māher* *katab* *risālah*
 Maher write_{+past.3.m.sg.} letter
 Maher wrote a letter. (DED).

- b. *māher* *čān* *yiktib* *risālah.*
 Maher be_{+past.3.m.sg} write_{+pres.3.m.sg} letter
 Maher was writing a letter. (DED).

The verb *katab* (wrote) in (a) refers to an action that happened and finished in the past whereas the combination of the *čān* (was) with *yiktib* (write) in (b) indicates an action which was in progress at some point in the past.

DED perfective verbs agree with their subjects in Number and Gender. Agreement inflections attach to the verb stem:

22.

- a. *sāfartu*

travel_{+past.1.sg}

I travelled. (DED).

- b. *mḥammad* *sāfār*

Mohammad travel_{+past.3.m.sg}

Mohammad travelled. (DED).

- c. *nādiya* *sāfarat*

Nadia travel_{+past.3.f.sg}

Nadia travelled. (DED).

As can be seen in the above examples, an agreement marker is attached onto the verb to indicate agreement with the subject.

Unlike CA which uses a separate agreement marker for verbs of dual subjects, DED does not. Instead, DED speakers use the same markers used for plural verbs. i.e., DED verbs lack a distinction between dual and plural verbs. The following table shows the distribution of DED subject-verb agreement markers.

Subject-verb Agreement Markers in DED Perfectives					
person number	First	Second		Third	
	M & F	M	F	M	F
sg	-tu	-t	-ti	Ø	-at
pl/dual	-na	-tum	-tum	-ū	-ū

Table (5): DED subject-verb agreement markers.

As the above table shows, DED speakers do not mark the verb with a separate agreement marker when the subject is a dual noun where the plural markers are used instead.

The imperfective in DED is a derived verb form; it is derived by manipulating the root consonants of the perfective by adding/omitting extra consonant(s)/vowel(s) before or after the root consonants. For example, the imperfective verb *tnām* (lit. 'she sleeps') is derived from the perfective form *nām* (lit. 'he slept') by adding the prefix *t-*.

Further, DED imperfectives agree with their preceding subjects; subject-verb agreement is maintained morphologically, each Person imposes certain morphological prefix (and/or suffix) on the verb concerned. For instance, to have the imperfective third person masculine form from *katab* (lit. 'he wrote'), we add the prefix *yi-* before the first radical, omit the first vowel *-a-*, and change the last vowel from *-a-* into *-i-*. The derived form is *yiktib* (lit. 'he writes'). The following table shows the distribution of subject-verb agreement markers in DED where the verb *najaḥ* (lit. 'succeeded') is used as an example.

23.

Imperfective Conjugations of DED Verbs			
		Singular	Plural and dual
First		'anjah	nintah
Second	m	tinjah	tinjahūn
	f	tinjahīn	
Third	m	yintah	yintahūn
	f	tinjah	

As shown above, verbs in DED do not have a distinct dual form, unlike verbs in CA.

1.8. DED Basic Sentence Structure.

Ryding (2005), Abu-Chacra (2007), Wickens (1980), Wright (1995), Fareh (1995) among others divide sentences in Arabic into two types: verbal sentences which contain a verb and verbless (copular/equational) ones which lack a lexical verb; i.e., the predicate is a noun phrase, adjective, preposition phrase etc.

Abdel-Hafiz (2005) points out that there are two different hypotheses dealing with Arabic sentences, the *Subject Hypothesis* and the *Topicalization Hypothesis*; the former claims that the noun introducing the sentence is the subject, and the latter claims that it is a topic. My discussion of DED sentences adopts the first hypothesis. That is to say, we will deal with the preverbal nominal as a subject regardless of the type of the sentence.

The verb in a simple sentence usually follows the subject. The latter is usually a noun, or a pronoun which can be dropped. The complement, however, occurs in the final position and can be an NP, AP, or PP, etc. That is to say, the normal constituents order of simple sentences is SV(C). Let's consider the following example.

24. *'aḥmad yiqra aj.jarīdeh*
 Ahmad read_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.newspaper
 Ahmad reads the newspaper. (DED).

'aḥmad can be replaced by a pronoun subject as in (a) below, and the complement of a verbal sentence can be a PP as in (b):

- 25.
- a. *huwwa yiqra aj.jarīdeh*
 he read_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.newspaper
 He reads the newspaper. (DED).
- b. *'aḥmad yudrus be.l.maktabah*
 Ahmad study_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep.def.library
 Ahmad studies in the library. (DED).

Equational sentences involve a covert copula and do not contain a verb at all; they usually consist of a subject followed by a predicate nominal which can be a noun as in (a), adjective as in (b), or a prepositional phrase as in (c).

- 26.
- a. *nādiya ṭālbeh.*
 Nadia student
 Nadia (is) a student. (DED).
- b. *nādiya ḥilwah*
 Nadia beautiful
 Nadia (is) beautiful. (DED).
- c. *li.wlād be.l.medrasah*
 def.children prep.def.school
 The children (are) in the school. (DED).

Verbless sentences are known as equational sentences because the subject and its predicate can be equal. For example, in a sentence like

27. *nādiya* *mudarseh*

Nadia teacher

Nadia (is) a teacher. (DED).

Nadia and *teacher* are equivalent because they refer to the same person.

In equational sentences the counterpart of verb *to be* is usually omitted unless the sentence is in the past. Following Bahloul (2008), Ryding (2005), Benmamoun (2000), Cowan (1958) among others for similar facts in Arabic, I will assume that the example in (a) below contains a covert copula which must be overt when time reference is past as shown in (b).

28.

a. *aj.jau* *ḥār*

def.weather hot

The weather (is) hot. (DED).

b. *aj.jau* *čān* *ḥār*

def.weather be_{+past.3.m.sg.} hot

The weather was hot. (DED).

(a) corresponds to an English sentence with a present copula, though the present copula is invisible in the DED example. On the other hand, the copula must be visible when the sentence indicates the past, as is the case in (b). Thus, a copula is covert in present nominal clauses, but should be overt in past ones.

An equational sentence consisting of a subject and predicate nominal requires that the former be definite as in (a) below, and the later indefinite as in (b):

29.

a. *l.'ab* *mudarris*

def.father teacher.

The father (is) a teacher. (DED).

- b. *li.stād* *mušrif*
 def.teacher supervisor
 The teacher (is) supervisor. (DED).

Nevertheless, defining the subject and predicate does not result in an equational sentence, but in an NP:

30. *li.stād* *l.mušrif*
 def.teacher def.supervisor
 (lit. The teacher the supervisor) = (The teacher who is the supervisor). (DED).

That is to say, there is no agreement in definiteness between the subject and its predicate in equational sentences.

Nevertheless, equational sentences show subject-predicate agreement in Gender as in (a-b), and in Number as in (c-d) below.

31.

- a. *li.binit* *fudūliyyeh*
 def.girl curious_(sg.f.adj)
 The girl is curious. (DED).
- b. *l.walad* *fudūli*
 def.boy curious_(sg.m.adj)
 The boy is curious. (DED).
- c. *l.banāt* *fudūliyāt*
 def.girls curious_(pl.f.adj)
 The girls are curious. (DED).
- d. *l.wlād* *fudūlin*
 def.boys curious_(pl.m.adj)
 The boys are curious. (DED).

(a-b) shows that the subjects agree with their predicates in Gender and Number: the feminine noun *l.binit* (the girl) in (a) agrees with its predicate, the feminine adjective *fudūliyyeh* (curious), in Gender and Number. Similarly, the masculine noun *l.walad* (the boy) in (b) agrees with its predicate, the masculine adjective *fudūli* (curious) in Gender and Number. The same thing applies to the examples in (c-d).

1.9. Negation in DED.

Unlike SA which uses five¹¹ different particles to express negation, DED uses three, *mā*, *mū*, and *lā*. The latter is used in negative imperatives as in *lā tiji* (Do not come!) and the first two are used to negate verbal and verbless sentences, respectively. This is shown in the following examples.

32.

a. <i>mā</i>	<i>katab</i>	<i>bāsim</i>	<i>ar.resālah</i>
Neg	write _{+past.3.m.sg}	Basim	def.letter
Basim did not write the letter. (DED).			

b. <i>mū</i>	<i>za'lānah</i>	<i>nādiya</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>ḥabīb.ha.</i>
Neg	angry	Nadia	prep	lover.her
Nadia is not angry with her lover. (DED).				

These two negative particles are not interchangeable. i.e. we cannot use *mā* to negate verbless sentences, nor can we use *mū* to negate verbal ones:

33.

a. * <i>mā</i>	<i>za'lānah</i>	<i>nādiya</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>ḥabīb.ha.</i>
Neg	angry	Nadia	prep	lover _{gen} .her.
Nadia is not angry with her lover. (DED).				

¹¹ The five particles expressing sentential negation in SA are 'the invariant particle *maa*, the particle *laa* and its tensed counterparts *lam* (PAST) and *lan* (FUT), and *laysa*' (Alsharif & Sadler, 2009: 5).

- b. **mū* *katab* *bāsim* *ar.resālah.*
 Neg write_{+past.3.m.sg} Basim def.letter
 Basim did not write the letter. (DED).

Thus, while *mā* is used with verbal sentences, *mū* is used with verbless ones.

It is the presence of an overt verb that determines the choice of *mā* or *mū*. Past equational sentences are negated by *mā* because of the presence of the overt copula. On the other hand, present equational sentences are negated by *mū* because the copula is covert:

34.

- a. *firās* *mā* *čān* *zangīl*
 Firas Neg be_{+3.m.sg} rich
 Firas was not rich. (DED).

- b. *firās* *mū* *zangīl*
 Firas Neg rich
 Firas (is) not rich. (DED).

Unlike CA which has separate particles to negate the present, the past and the future, DED uses one particle (*mā*) to negate any verb regardless of its time reference:

35.

- a. *aṭ.tullāb* *mā* *yitdāharūn* *ḏid* *l.ḥukūmah*
 def.students Neg demonstrate_{+pres.3.pl} against def.government
 The students do not demonstrate against the government. (DED).

- b. *aṭ.tullāb* *mā* *tdāharū* *ḏid* *l.ḥukūmah*
 def.students Neg demonstrate_{+past.3.pl} against def.government
 The students did not demonstrate against the government. (DED).

- c. *aṭ.tullāb* *mā* *rāḥ* *yitdāharūn* *ḏed* *l.ḥukūmah*
 def.students Neg will demonstrate_{+pres.3.pl} against def.government
 The students will not demonstrate against the government. (DED).

mā is used to negate verbs in the above examples regardless of their different time references.

1.10. DED Modality.

There are several particles in DED which function as modals (Mod). They cover different meanings related to intent, obligation, necessity, probability, etc. Unlike modals in English which are fully-fledged lexemes, modals in DED are either verbs or adjectives which can be variants of the verbs/adjective they are derived from. This is also true of other Arabic dialects like the Najdi dialect: Ingham (1994: 187) points out that 'when contrasted with the modal auxiliary verbs of English ..., the Najdi modals appear as a rag-bag of elements derived from verbs, adjectives and primitive particles and rather vaguely differentiated from certain other elements on the periphery of the group which look more like fully-fledged lexemes'. I will discuss the use of three DED verb-like modals, including *čān* (to be), *rāḥ* (will), *qām* and *qa'id* and some modal adjectives, *yimkin/mumkin* (possible), *lāzim* and *darūri* (necessary). We will gloss *čān* as *be*, *rāḥ* as *will*, *qām* and *qa'id* as *progmark* (progressive marker), and *yimkin/mumkin*, *lāzim* and *darūri* as *Mod* (modal)

1.10.1. Verb-like Modals.

1.10.1.1. *čān* (to be).

The fact that *čān* (lit. 'he was') inflects for tense and person indicates that it can function as an ordinary verb. Its presence in a nominal sentence indicates a non-present situation, whereas its absence indicates a present one. Further, its imperfective form *yakūn* (lit. 'he is') is rarely used. *čān* is a copula and can be used as an auxiliary; nevertheless, it seems to have some modal flavour

corresponding to *would* in English where it is used in this form (*čān*) with all persons. An example of this is the use of the pluperfect in conditionals; this will be discussed in details in chapter three.

When used as a copula expressing past situations, *čān* conjugates in accordance with the subject of the sentence:

36.

a. *l.walad čān bi.l.medrasah*
 def.boy be_{+past.3.m.sg} prep.def.school
 The boy (was) in the school. (DED).

b. *l.binit čānat bi.l.medrasah*
 def.girl be_{+past.3.f.sg} prep.def.school
 The girl (was) in the school. (DED).

The following table shows the different conjugated forms of *čān* in DED.

Conjugation of <i>čān</i> in DED	
<i>čān</i>	English Equivalent
<i>čintu</i> _{1.sg}	(I was)
<i>činna</i> _{1.pl}	(we were)
<i>činit</i> _{2.m.sg}	(you _{2.m.sg} were)
<i>činti</i> _{2.f.sg}	(you _{2.f.sg} were)
<i>čintum</i> _{2.dual/pl}	(you _{2.dual/pl} were)
<i>čān</i> _{3.m.sg}	(he was)
<i>čānat</i> _{3.f.sg}	(she was)
<i>čānū</i> _{3.dual/pl}	(they _{3.dual/pl} were)

Table (6): Conjugation of *čān* in DED

One of the Bedouin traits in DED is the affrication of the /k/ sound: the use of the /č/ sound rather than /k/ in *čān* and in many other words indicates that the /k/ sound is affricated in DED. The affrication of *k* is also found in other Arabic dialects such as some dialects of Bahrain and

Palestine: 'the affrication of *k* is not only a Bedouin trait but also well known from some rural sedentary dialects spoken, e.g., in Bahrain, Soukne and central Palestinian villages' (Palva, 2009: 25).

One of the main uses of *čān* is to express events which were in progress at some point in the past; a past progressive event is indicated in DED when a form of *čān* is followed by an imperfective verb:

37.

- | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| a. <i>čintu</i> | <i>'atfarraj</i> | <i>'ala</i> | <i>filim</i> |
| be _{+past.1.sg} | watch _{+pres.1.sg} | prep | movie |
- I was watching a movie. (DED).

- | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| b. <i>čānat</i> | <i>tišrab</i> | <i>qahwah</i> |
| be _{+past.3.f.sg} | drink _{+pres.3.f.sg} | coffee |
- She was drinking coffee. (DED).

The next auxiliary we will discuss is mainly used in expressing future events.

1.10.1.2. *rāḥ*

Like its Iraqi counterpart, DED uses the modal *rāḥ* (lit. 'he went') to express the future; Erwin (2004: 138) points out that *rāḥ* is used in Iraqi Arabic 'with imperfective indicative verb forms. It has the specific meaning of future action. The English equivalents are usually *going to* or *will* with a verb and occasionally a present tense form with future meaning'. Consider the following example (from Erwin 2004: 138):

- | | | |
|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| 38. <i>rāḥ</i> | <i>asawwīha</i> | <i>ṣ.ṣubuḥ</i> |
| will | do _{+pres.1.sg} | def.morning |
- I am going to do it in the morning. (Erwin, 2004: 138).

The same observation is noted by Blanc (1964: 117) and Palva (2009: 21).

In its use as a modal, the perfective verb form *rāḥ* is used to help express actions that will take place in the future:

39.

a. 'abū.i	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yištari</i>	<i>beit</i>	<i>jadīd</i>
father.my	will	buy _{+pres.3.m.sg}	house	new

My father will buy a new house. (DED).

b. 'imm.i	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tistaqīl</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>wadīfat.ha</i>
mother.my	will	resign _{+pres.3.f.sg}	prep	work.her

My mother will resign from her work. (DED).

c. 'as'ār	<i>l.'akīl</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tirtafi'</i>	<i>annawb</i>
prices	def.food	will	rise _{+pres.3.pl}	again

Food prices will go up again. (DED).

As the above examples show, *rāḥ* is used in DED to give the verb it precedes a future interpretation. *rāḥ* is indeclinable where we can use the same form with all persons. Thus, when functioning as a modal, *rāḥ* is equivalent to *will* or *is going to* in English; It can therefore be considered a variant of the CA future particles *sa/sawfa* (will).¹²

raḥ is an Aux verb. This means that it cannot be negated by *mū* (not), but by *mā*. For example,

40. <i>sāli</i>	<i>mā/*mū</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tiktib</i>	<i>al.wadīfeh</i>
Sally	Neg	will	write _{+pres.3.f.sg}	def.homework

Sally will not write the homework.

Furthermore, *rāḥ* (lit. 'he went') and its imperfective form *yirūḥ* (lit. 'he goes') can be used as main verbs which are fully conjugateable:

¹² See Ryding (2005), Wickens (1980), and Wright (1995) on how to express the future in CA.

41.

- a. *'imm.ī* *rāḥat* *'a.aš.šugul*
 mother.my go + past.3.f.sg prep.def.work.
 My mother went to work. (DED).

- b. *li.wlād* *yrūḥūn* *'a.l.madrasah* *kul* *yawm*
 def.boys go + pres.3.pl prep.def.school every day
 The boys go to school everyday. (DED).

Nevertheless, the imperfective forms of *rāḥ* can be used only as lexical verbs, but not as modals.

The present progressive in DED can be also expressed by using two modal elements, *qa'id* (an active participle form which literary translates as *the person who is sitting/sitter*) and *qām* (lit. rose/got up). These two modal elements are discussed in more detail in the next section.

1.10.1.3. *qām* and *qa'id*.

qām (lit. 'rose/got up') and the active participle (Activpart) *qa'id* are used as present progressive markers; once they precede an imperfective verb, the time indicated is the present progressive. A variant of *qa'id* is used in Muslim Baghdadi Arabic: Palva (2009: 28) states that Muslim Baghdadi speakers use '*gā'ed* with the imperfect as a present continuous marker'. Also Behnstedt (1997) indicates that *gā'id* is also used in the Syrian Desert.

qām and *qa'id* are used interchangeably in DED with no difference in meaning; we will gloss them as progressive markers (progmark). The resulting verb form, the imperfective verb form preceded by *qām/qa'id*, can be likened to the present progressive in English:

42.

- a. *li.wlād* *qām/qa'id* *yaklūn*
 def.boys progmark eat + pres.3.pl
 The boys are eating. (DED).

- b. *l.binit qām/qa'id turquṣ*
 def.girl progmark dance_{+pres.3.f.sg}

The girl is dancing. (DED).

Nevertheless, the past progressive cannot be expressed when *qām/qa'id* precede a perfective verb:

43. **li.wlād qām/qa'id 'akalū*
 def.boys progmark eat_{+past.3.pl}

*The boys are ate. (DED).

Like *rāḥ*, *qām* and *qa'id* are invariable as they have the same form with all persons when they are used as modals.

While *qām* can be used with a full range of inflections when used as lexical verb meaning *rose/got up*, *qa'id* cannot because it is an active participle form. The following examples show how *qām* is used as a fully conjugatable lexical verb:

44.

- a. *rīm qāmat 'an aṭ.ṭawleh*
 Reem rise_{+past.3.f.sg} prep def.table

Reem rose from the table. (DED).

- b. *lammā l.mudīr waṣṣal l.muwaddāfin qāmū*
 when def.manager arrive_{+past.3.m.sg} def.employees stand_{+past.3.pl}

When the manager arrived the employees stood up. (DED).

The Active participle form of *qām* is *qāyīm* which can have a specific meaning (standing in prayer during the hours of the night), or a general meaning of existing; an example of each is respectively given below.

45.

- a. *'abū.i* *čān* *qāyim* *l.leil* *mbāriḥ*
 Father.my be_{+past.3.m.sg} stand_{+Activepart} def.night yesterday
 My father was standing (in prayer) last night. (DED).

- b. *l.xilāf* *lissa* *qāyim* *bein.hum*
 def.conflict still exist_{+Activepart} between.them
 The conflict is still existing between them. (DED).

So far we have considered some modal elements which are either verbs or active participles. They are used for indicating past and past progressive such as *čān*, future such as *rāḥ*, and present progressive such as *qām* and *qa'id*. In the next section we will consider some modal adjectives which help express possibility, necessity, etc.

1.10.2. Modal Adjectives.

Modal adjectives concern the speaker's attitude about a situation in the sentence. DED has three modal adjectives: *yimkin/mumkin* (possible) is used to express possibility and *lāzim* and *darūri* (necessary) are used to express necessity.

These modal adjectives do not have identical counterparts in English. We will, where appropriate, use subordinate clauses such as *it is possible* when translating *yimkin* or *mumkin*, and *it is necessary* when translating *lāzim* and *darūri*. Further, these modal adjectives are indeclinable where we use the same forms with all persons. Let us consider the following examples:

46.

- a. *lāzim* *tšūf* *diktor*
 Mod see_{+pres.2.m.sg} doctor
 It is necessary that you see a doctor. (DED).

- b. *lāzim* *yšūf* *diktor*
 Mod see_{+pres.3.m.sg} doctor
 It is necessary that he sees a doctor. (DED).

47.

- a. *'ahmad* *yimkin* *sāfar* *l.xamīs* *l.mādi*
 Ahmad Mod travel_{+past.3.m.sg} def.Thursday def.previous
 It is possible that Ahmad travelled last Thursday. (DED).

- b. *nādiya* *yimkin* *sāfarat* *l.xamīs* *l.mādi*
 Nadia Mod travel_{+past.3.f.sg} def.Thursday def.previous
 It is possible that Nadia travelled last Thursday. (DED).

The above sets of examples show that the modal adjectives *lāzim* (necessary) and *yimkin* (possible) are indeclinable, i.e., they do not conjugate in accordance with the subject.

Negation of modal sentences involving *yimkin* and *lāzim* is performed in two ways: either by inserting the negative particle *mā* after the modal and before the main verb or by inserting the negative particle *mū* before the modal (at the beginning of the sentence):

48.

- a. [A doctor cautioning his patient against infection]

lāzim *mā* *tšāffhīn* *'iḥadah*
 Mod Neg shake.hand_{+pres.2.f.sg} anybody
 It is necessary that you do not shake hands with anybody. (DED).

- b. *mū* *lāzim* *tšāffhīn* *'iḥadah*
 Neg Mod shake.hand_{+pres.2.f.sg} anybody
 It is not necessary to shake hands with anybody. (DED).

These examples differ in terms of the scope of negation. It is the action of *shaking hands* that is negated in (a): the doctor asks the patient *not to shake her hands with anybody*. On the other hand,

the doctor in (b) is expressing his/her attitude about hand-shaking which he/she believes not necessary.

The first syllable (*yim-*) in *yimkin* is changed into *mum-* when preceded by the negative particle *mū* and the resulting form is *mumkin*¹³:

49.

a. 'ahmad	<i>yimkin</i>	<i>mā</i> /* <i>mū</i>	<i>yisāfer</i>	<i>kul</i>	<i>xamīs</i>
Ahmad.	Mod	Neg	travel _{+pres.3.m.sg}	every	Thursday.

It is possible that Ahmad does not travel every Thursdays. (DED).

b. * <i>mā</i> / <i>mū</i>	<i>mumkin</i>	'ahmad	<i>yisāfer</i>	<i>kul</i>	<i>xamīs</i>
Neg	Mod	Ahmad	travel _{+pres.3.m.sg}	every	Thursday.

It is not possible that Ahmad travels every Thursday. (DED).

The use of *mū* rather than *mā* to negate these modals confirms that they belong to the category of adjectives rather than verbs.

1.11. DED Active Participle.

There is a considerable literature, (Wild (1964), Johnston (1976), Ingham (1994) etc.), investigating the status of active participle (Activpart) in dialectal Arabic and whether the participle should be assigned a perfective or imperfective aspect. However, these issues are not our concern here. This section gives a brief idea about the active participle in DED and show how it is formed.

¹³ *yimkin* also changes to *mumkin* when used as an interrogative particle meaning *is it possible to?* For example,

<i>mumkin</i>	<i>ṭhadid.l.i</i>	<i>mau'īd</i>
Mod	appoint _{+pres.2.m.sg} prep.me	appointment

Is it possible to give me an appointment? (DED).

The Activpart in DED is usually a noun used to refer to the person who does the action. The following two examples show that the Activpart *xasrān* (loser) in (b) below is derived from the verb *xisir* (lit. lost) in (a):

50.

- a *fādi* *xisir* *l.mubārāh*
 Fadi lose_{+past.3.m.sg} def.match
 Fadi lost the match. (DED).
- b. *fādi* *l.xasrān* *l.mubārāh*
 Fadi def.loser_{Activpart} def.match
 Fadi is the loser of the match. (DED).

xasrān is an Activpart form derived from the verb *xisir* (lit. lost). The Activpart gives more information about the subject of the verb from which it is derived; it does whatever the verb, from which it is derived, can do. It takes an object if the verb from which it is derived is transitive: *l.mubārāh* (the match) in the above examples is the object of the verb *xisir* (lost) in (a) and of the Activpart *xasrān* (loser) in (b).

1.12. Summary.

In this introductory chapter we have outlined some of the main features characterizing the dialect under discussion. This chapter aimed at setting the scene for the subsequent chapters by familiarizing the reader with the main features of this dialect. In the first part of this chapter, we have discussed, among other issues, the geographical nature of Deir Ezour, given some notes on the data used and talked about the main objectives behind this study.

In the second part, we have considered word formation, showing how words are derived and how verbs are inflected. We have also shown that DED pronouns can either be free or bound

morphemes. Further, subject-verb/noun-modifier agreement has also been discussed. Our study of DED sentence structures has focused on the two main types of sentence, verbal and verbless sentences. We have also shown that the two DED negation particles *mā* and *mū* are used to negate verbal and verbless sentences, respectively.

DED has several modals. *čān* (lit. 'he was') and *rāḥ* (lit. 'he went') can function as auxiliaries whereas *yimkin* (possible) and *lāzim* (necessary) are modal adjectives. We have also dealt with the two verb-like modals, *qām* (lit. 'rose/got up') and the active participle modal form *qa'id* (lit. the person who is sitting).

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.0. Introduction.

This chapter provides an overview of conditional sentences in general. It aims at identifying some of the seminal works that dealt with conditional sentences and carrying on from where existing research has already reached. This chapter discusses two main points. First, it gives a general review of the existing theories of conditional sentences, showing how conditionals have been tackled by other disciplines. Second, it gives an overview of what studies on conditionals have argued and established in both English and Arabic. This chapter will then set out the main theoretical background necessary for introducing conditional sentences in DED and set the scene for the succeeding chapters.

2.1. Preliminary Terminology.

2.1.1. The P-clause and the Q-clause.

A variety of terms are used in the literature to refer to the two parts of a conditional sentence, (the conditional clause and the main clause). Arab grammarians such as Almasdi and Alṭarābulṣi (1985) and Alsāmōrā'i (2003) look at the conditional sentence as a compound structure consisting of two parts: the first is *aš-šarṭ* (the condition) and the second is *aj-jawāb* (lit. 'the reply/the answer'). In English several studies refer to the condition clause (the clause introduced by *if*) and the main clause as the *protasis* and the *apodosis* respectively. Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 738), for example, point out that the *protasis* and *apodosis* come from Greek, indicating that the prefix *pro* in *protasis* means *before* and that the term *protasis* therefore refers to the sentence 'prior to the apodosis'. This was also noted by Wickens (1984) who points out that the term

protasis refers to the clause setting the condition whereas the term *apodosis* is used to refer to the sentence setting the consequence of the condition.

Variant terms for the *protasis* and the *apodosis* are the *antecedent* and the *consequent*. These two terms are mainly used by logicians when discussing conditional sentences: Nute and Cross (1989: 1478) point out that 'the conditional or *if* part of a conditional sentence is called the antecedent and the main or *then* part its consequent even when *if* and *then* do not actually occur'. The same observation was noted by Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 738) who state that 'in logic the terms *antecedent* and *consequent* generally correspond to *protasis* and *apodosis* respectively'. Other logicians like Lewis (1973) represent the conditional clause and the main clause in the form *If P, (then) Q* where P stands for the *premise* or *proposition* and Q for the *consequent* or *conclusion*. Other terms are found in the literature; for example Dancygier (1998) uses the terms subordinate clause and main clause, Declerck & Reed (2001) use the terms P-clause and Q-clause and they also use *head clause* to mean the Q-clause and main clause.

To avoid confusion, we will commit ourselves to using the two terms the *P-clause* and *Q-clause* to respectively mean *the conditional clause* and *the main clause*.

2.1.2. Conditional Sentences Defined.

Defining *conditional sentences* might not be a simple task. For example, Declerck & Reed (2001: 8) think that 'it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give a precise definition of conditional meaning or conditional interpretation'; Likewise, Wiezbicka (1997: 54) points out that 'the meaning of the English word *condition* is semantically more complex than that of IF'. This section aims at giving an approbated definition of *conditional sentences* by reviewing some of the existing definitions in the literature.

One of the typical definitions of conditional sentences is provided by Dancygier (1998) who points out that conditional sentences in English are usually of the form *if A (then) B*¹⁴ where *A* represents the antecedent while *B* the consequent. Dancygier (1998: 1) points out that the form *if A (then) B* refers to 'sentences that are composed of *the main clause* (sometimes also called *q*, or the *apodosis*) and a *subordinate clause* (*p*, or the *protasis*). The subordinate clause is introduced by a conjunction, the least marked of English conditionals conjunctions being *if*. Bennett (2005: 3) provided another definition which is more or less similar to Dancygier: 'an item is a conditional if it is expressed by an English sentence consisting of *if* followed by an English sentence followed by *then* followed by an English sentence'. Bennett's and Dancygier's definitions do not seem to account for every conditional sentence we can have, simply because there are conditional structures that have no conditional particle (*conj*) at all, a fact which makes their definitions lacking.

A clearer definition is provided by Crystal (1980: 79) who defines a conditional sentence as 'a term used in grammatical description to refer to clauses whose semantic role is the expression of hypotheses or conditions. In English, these are introduced by *if*, *unless*, and a few other conjunctions'. However, Crystal's definition also seems lacking because it cannot include all the types of conditional sentences; we can, for example, have a conditional sentence which is not introduced by a conjunction at all. For example,

1. Give me the money or I'll shoot you.

The above example shows a kind of threat which can be interpreted as *If you don't give me the money, I'll shoot you*. Note that the P-clause and the Q-clause are joined by means of the conjunction *or*. We will discuss this kind of conditional sentence in more detail in chapter six

¹⁴ Some linguists alternatively use the form *if P (then) Q*; both forms are used in the literature and are exchangeable.

(Paratactic Conditionals). Paratactic conditionals rule out definitions relying on the presence of a conditional particle.

Other linguists (e.g. Afash (2005) and Hacking (1998) define conditional sentences in terms of the relation between the conditional clause and the main clause: Hacking (1998: 1) states that 'a conditional relationship between two events is one in which the realization of one event is dependent upon or conditioned by another'. Hacking's (1998) definition accords with Afash's (2005); Afash (2005: 77) views the conditional sentence through the existence of a relation between its two events where the fulfilment of the first event (the one in the P-clause) depends on that of the other, (the one in the main clause). Let's consider the following example,

2. *eda teqra ar.rewāyeh rāh tefham l.hubkah*
 comp read_{,pres.2.m.sg} def.novel will understand_{,pres.2.m.sg} def.plot
 If you read the novel, you will understand the plot. (DED).

There is a clear relation between the event in the P-clause and that in the Q-clause: the reading of the novel will result in understanding the plot. In other words, the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause is causational. Afash's (2005) and Hacking's (1998) definitions of conditionals pose another problem as not all conditional sentences reflect a (causal) relation between their two clauses. That is to say, we can have examples of conditional sentences where the fulfilment of the P-clause is independent of the Q-clause, a fact rendering Hacking's and Afash's definition deficient. Noncausal conditionals are also known in the literature as *arbitrary conditionals* because the link between the P-clause and the Q-clause is arbitrary. Consider the following example (from Weidenfeld, Oberauer & Hörmig, 2005: 1483)

3. If the church bells are ringing in Manchester, then the workmen in Manchester knock off work.

(Weidenfeld, Oberauer and Hörmig, 2005: 1483).

Though the above example is a well-formed conditional sentence, there is no real relation between the event of the P-clause and that of Q-clause where *knocking off work* is not the result of *ringing the church bells*.

The topic of conditional sentences is not appropriately considered in CA; the reason behind this, as claimed by Almasdi and Alṭarābulṣi (1985), is that conditionals as a grammatical topic is not clear in Arabic grammar: '*fa-'inanā la nakadu najedu 'inda an-nwhāti ta'rīfan mutakamilan le-aj-jumlate aš-šarṭiyyah, wa yu'za ḍālika 'ila ġumūḍi mafhūm "š-šarṭi 'indahum*. (lit. Philologists almost can not have a comprehensive definition of the conditional sentence; the reason for this is the vagueness they have about the concept of conditional sentences').

Conditional sentences in Arabic are referred to as *aj-jumal aš-šarṭiyyah* (the conditional sentences). Schulz, Krahel and Reuschel (2000: 362) state that *aj-jumal aš-šarṭiyyah* (the conditional sentences) are 'facts the existence or the execution of which is the precondition for the existence or execution of other facts'. Similar observations are noted by Cantarino (1975: 312) and Wickens (1980: 76) who respectively state that in a conditional sentence 'the validity of a given statement is conditioned by another statement presented along with it' and that a conditional sentence 'causes a particular statement or command to depend on the fulfilment of a given condition'. We note that these two observations depend on relating the P-clause to the Q-clause. This further shows that the idea of conditionality in both Arabic and English is essentially the same.

Some linguists were aware of the difficulty of defining conditional sentences; Kaufmann (2006: 6), for example, points out that 'the form *if A, B* is neither necessary nor sufficient for the expression of conditionality'. Alsāmōrā'i (2003) points out that a conditional sentence has a basic meaning (causational) and form (If P, then Q) and that conditionals not abiding to this form can still be regarded as conditionals. In other words, Alsāmōrā'i (2003) points out that a conditional

sentence might diverge from its typical form (If P, then Q) and is still indicates a meaning usually associated with conditional sentences. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six (Paratactic Conditionals).

Based on the above discussion, we find that a conditional sentence can have different types and structures. Therefore, we will interpret conditionals in a broad sense, covering different structures which semantically and syntactically indicate a conditional interpretation. This will include *-ever*-particle conditionals (chapter three), imperative-like and ultimatum-like conditionals (chapter six), etc. In this descriptive study I will use the term *conditional sentences* or *conditionals* as a cover term to refer to the different structures involving a conditional meaning.

Having discussed the definition of conditionals we now move to considering the main theories of conditional sentences.

2.2. Previous Studies on Conditionals.

More than one discipline has considered the issue of conditionals, e.g., logic, philosophy, psychology and linguistics. However, the majority of studies were done by philosophers or logicians; the first conference on conditionals which involved linguists was held in 1983; this can answer Akatsuka's (1985: 625) question of why we find that there is no adequate linguistic theory of conditional sentences. This section tries to shed some light on the previous studies of conditional sentences by considering some of the main theories that have dealt with conditional sentences.

2.2. 1. Conditional Sentences in Logic and Philosophy.

Conditional sentences are discussed by logicians and philosophers. Kaufmann (2006: 6) points out that 'philosophical logic is concerned with the truth conditions of sentences and their

logical behavior'. Logicians study the truth values of conditional sentences and their interpretation. A conditional sentence in logic is called the *material implication* or *material conditional* and is considered as an operator (symbolized by the left-arrow " \rightarrow " symbol) which connect the P-clause and the Q-clause; thus, If $P \rightarrow Q$.

Abbott (2004: 1) points out that 'there is a long tradition that associates natural language indicative conditionals with the material conditional of propositional logic'. Logicians developed a predicate calculus which posits the truth values (True and False) of propositions consisting of a proposition P and a consequent Q. That is to say, conditional sentences can be represented by a value which shows whether a conditional sentence is true or false: 'the proposition is true if both p and q are either true or false, and if p is false and q is true. The proposition is false if p is true and q is false' (Hacking, 1998: 2). Logicians introduce truth tables to represent the truth values of conditional constructions. For example, the following table (from Abbott (2006: 3)) shows how conditionals are represented by truth values,

P	Q	$P \supset Q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	F

Table (7): Representation of Conditional by truth tables.

Nevertheless, many linguists point out that the truth-value representation of conditionals does not always function in accordance with their intuition about the *if P, then Q* reasoning because it does not account for all the natural language conditionals; Hacking (1998: 2), for example, states that 'this formalization of the logical relationship between two propositions does not, however, necessarily hold for natural language'. A natural language conditional sentence

should involve some semantic connection between the P-clause and the Q-clause. For example, there is no clear relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause in the following example,

4. If you write about conditional sentences, Cairo is the capital of Egypt.

The same observation is noted by Comrie (1986: 80) who states that 'totally unrelated propositions can be combined if they have the appropriate truth values, [whereas] natural language almost invariably requires semantic coherence between the two clauses'. That is to say, truth-value conditionals are acceptable in logic regardless of the semantic link between the P-clause and the Q-clause. For a linguist, the above example is semantically odd, though it is a well-structured conditional sentence; it does not show any semantic relation between *writing about conditional sentences* and the fact that *Cairo is the capital of Egypt*. Sweetser (1990: 113) further points this out by indicating that 'the natural language use of conditionals is not identical with the conditionality defined by logical *if-then* (\supset)'.

Conditional sentences have also been studied by philosophers. Philosophers had long tackled the topic of conditional sentences where they 'have been skeptical about the intelligibility of concepts of natural necessity and possibility, about claims, potentialities, propensities and connections that seem to be statements about how things could or must be, and not just about how they are' (Stalnaker, 1990: 316). Further, Declerck & Reed (2001: 13) show that other philosophers such as Lewis (1973) classify conditionals into more than one type: 'in philosophical literature, conditionals are traditionally subdivided into indicative¹⁵ conditionals on the one hand, and subjunctive or counterfactual on the other hand'. The following examples respectively represent these two types:

¹⁵ Some linguists e.g. Kaufmann (2006) believe that the distinction between indicative conditionals and subjunctives or counterfactuals is not uncontroversial.

5.

- a. If the weather is nice, Sally will go on a hike.
- b. If the weather had been nice, Sally would have gone on a hike.

Though many philosophers focused on the distinction between indicative and counterfactual/subjunctive conditionals, no clear-cut distinction has been reached; Williamson (in press) points out that an indicative conditional 'presents its consequent as holding in the actual world on the supposition that its antecedent so holds, whereas a subjunctive conditional merely presents its consequent as holding in a world, typically counterfactual, in which its antecedent holds'. The following examples are illustrative.

6.

- a. If Sally neglects her studies, she gets low marks.
- b. If Sally had studied hard, she would have got high marks.

We are not going to pursue the philosophical representations of conditional sentences any further as it is not our main concern in this study. For more detail of how conditionals are discussed by philosophers see Levi (1977), Jackson (1979), and Nute (1980) among others. In the next section, I discuss a different approach to conditionals.

2.2. 2. The Possible Worlds Approach.

Several studies discuss conditional sentences within the possible-worlds approach. This section gives a general idea about how conditionals are represented and interpreted in this approach and considers some of the main studies that have used this approach.

The actual world for the advocates of the possible worlds approach is only one world among an infinite number of possible worlds, whereas the possible world exists in 'a conceptual space' (Bradley and Swartz, 1979: 3).

Ahti-Veikko (2006c: 345) gives credit to Peirce (1832) for his contribution to the now-known possible worlds semantics, stating that Peirce 'proposed a logical approach to modalities that came close to possible-worlds semantics. He also contributed to the development of the possible-worlds idea by investigating modalities through the creation of new logical methods'. The same observation is noted by Copeland (2001); Copeland (2001: 99) points out that the first reference to possible worlds was by Peirce (1932: 347). Peirce (1932: 347) argues that 'the quantified subject of a hypothetical proposition is a *possibility*, or *possible case*, or *possible state of things*... thus, arise various kinds of possibilities'.

Stalnaker (1981), Declerck & Reed (2001), and Schulz (in press) have discussed conditional sentences within the theory of possible worlds: Schulz (in press), for example, points out that the basic rule of how to interpret conditionals 'makes use of a set of possible worlds'. Stalnaker (1981: 46) argues that 'an analysis [of conditional sentences] in terms of possible worlds has the advantage of providing a ready made apparatus on which to build a formal semantical theory'. Stalnaker resorts to Kripke's (1963) semantic system of modal logic. I will discuss the following example to show how Stalnaker has employed Kripke's (1963) semantic system to analyze conditionals in terms of possible worlds.

7. If she paid the bill early, they would offer her a discount.

Following Kripke's (1963), we propose that we have a set (s) of possible worlds which have a possibility relation (R); *the early payment of the bill* and *the discount offer* are possible worlds if they are members of (s). If the P-clause and the Q-clause are possible worlds, then, the Q-clause is a possible world with respect to the P-clause. That is to say where *the early payment of the bill* is the actual world, *the discount offer* is a possible one. The possibility relation between the two

clauses is reflexive; the P-clause and the Q-clause are possible worlds with respect to themselves. That is to say, 'every world is possible with respect to itself' (Kripke, 1963: 46).

One of the most recent studies that analysed conditional sentences within the possible worlds approach is that of Declerck & Reed (2001: 495) who distinguish between *the possible world*, *the actual world*, and *the counterfactual world*. they state that *the possible world* refers to the 'way that things are or might be. The actual world is the way things actually are. A theoretical (nonfactual) world is an alternative way of conceptualizing things, such as the future world, the world of the imagination of the speaker, a counterfactual world, etc'. The following examples are illustrative.

8.

- a. Arabic is the main language in Syria.
- b. If English had been the main language in Syria, I would have found a good job there.

Both (a) and (b) are true: (a) is true in the actual world, and (b) is true in a counterfactual world.

Other linguists have interpreted conditional sentences by classifying them according to their type, structure, time reference, etc. This is discussed in detail in the following section.

2.2.3. Classificational Approaches to Conditionals.

In this section, I shed some light on the studies that focused on the classification of conditional sentences. This section can help in setting the scene for the succeeding discussion of conditional sentences in DED and the classification used to group the different types of DED conditionals.

Athanasiadou & Direven (1996: 611) provide a detailed description of English conditionals, classifying them into four types:

9.
 - a. course of events conditionals,
 - b. hypothetical conditionals,
 - c. logical *if*-clauses, and
 - d. conversational *if*-clauses.

The following set of examples respectively represents each type.

- a. If you do not practice your English, it will not improve.
- b. If I had enough time, I would clean the house
- c. If there's an elite in China, she wrote, it's the masses. Athanasiadou & Direven (1996: 611)
- d. The new teacher is very patient and hardworking, if you need my opinion.

The course of events conditional represented by (a) indicates a causal relation between the first event and the second one. The hypothetical conditional in (b) indicates a possible situation and its consequence where the reference can be to an imagined situation in the present. Athanasiadou & Direven (1996: 613) point out that in logical P-clauses, represented by the example in (c), we 'have a metalinguistic operation in which we are not even referring to two events but rather to one event and the logical identification of one of its participants is based on truth conditions'. In conversational P-clauses, the P-clause is independent of the Q-clause, yet the two clauses are linked by the conversation taking place between the speaker and hearer.

Athanasiadou & Direven (1996: 611) further group these four types into two main categories: (a-b) above are considered as event-based conditionals, while (c) and (d) are marginal ones. Athanasiadou & Direven's classification is focused on the meanings indicated by each type of conditional but it ignores other aspects such as the role of tense, mode and modality.

Sweetser (1990) provides another way of classifying conditionals; she classifies conditionals into three main domains: content, epistemic and speech-act domains. Athanasiadou & Direven (1996: 610) explains Sweetser's (1990) classification of conditionals as follows:

'the main object of Sweetser's analysis is to elucidate the functioning of conditionality in the content domain ('real worlds'), in the epistemic domain (knowledge of the truth of the hypothetical premise expressed in the protasis would be a sufficient condition for concluding the truth of the proposition expressed in the apodosis) and in the speech act domain (the performance of the speech-act represented in the apodosis is conditional on the fulfillment of the state described in the protasis)' (Athanasiadou & Direven, 1996: 610).

The first domain (content domain) is realized through relating the content of the P-clause and the Q-clause to one another; this is explained in the following examples.

10.

- a. If it snows, the children will feel cold.
- b. If you drop this glass, it will break.

(a) and (b) are content domain conditionals: snowing in (a) results in the fact that *the children will feel cold* and (b) shows that *dropping the glass* will result in its breakage. That is to say, the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause can be 'causal' i.e., *snowing* can bring about the state of affairs that *the children feel cold* and *dropping the glass* causes it to break. Thus, the P-clauses and the Q-clauses are related to the content of each other. A conditional sentence showing no link between its two clauses, (e.g. *If I have toothache, I shall study French*) is not acceptable 'because we cannot imagine a relationship between the contents of the protasis and apodosis' Sweetser (1990: 113). Similarly, there is no reason for *studying French* to be conditionally dependent on *having toothache*.

Epistemic domain conditionals (the second type) are best explained by Kay (1997: 2) as 'expressions of the reasoning process. If the state of affairs represented by the P clause turns out to be true, then we are licensed to believe what we are told in the Q clause'. For example,

11.

- a. If Sally gets the highest mark, she has been studying hard.
- b. If their dog is barking, someone is knocking at their door.

(a) reads as follows: the knowledge that the state of affairs *Sally gets the highest mark* is true is sufficient to conclude the proposition in the Q-clause *she has been studying hard*; Sweetser (1990: 116) explains this point by stating that 'if-then conjunction expresses the idea that knowledge of the truth of the hypothetical premise expressed in the protasis would be a sufficient condition for concluding the truth of the proposition expressed in the apodosis'. Thus, we can say that the knowledge that the proposition *their dog is barking* in (b) is true is enough for us to conclude that the state of affairs *someone is knocking at their door* is true too.

In her last domain, the speech-act¹⁶ domain, Sweetser (1990) argues that the P-clause in a speech-act conditional identifies the situation which made the speaker offer the speech-act in the Q-clause:

12.

- a. If you're hungry, I have a sandwich in my bag.
- b. If my behavior was inappropriate, I apologize.

(a) and (b) indicate that the 'performance of the speech act represented in the apodosis is conditional on the fulfillment of the state described in the protasis' (Sweetser, 1990: 118). Thus, (a) 'purports' to state an opinion only conditionally on the state of hunger; in other words, the accomplishment of the speech acts in the above examples takes place conditionally.

A related classification of conditionals is provided by Harder (1996: 443) who distinguishes between three types of conditionals: trigger conditionals, epistemic sequence conditionals and speech act conditionals: 'Among the problems to conditionals are the distinctions into content, epistemic and speech act conditionals'. Declerck & Reed (2001) however, argue that Harder's classification is similar to that of Sweetser (1990) but Harder uses different labels.

¹⁶ The term 'speech-act' does not indicate an act of speech, but rather refers to 'a communicative activity, defined with reference to the intentions of the speaker while speaking (the ILLOCUTIONARY force of his utterances) and the effects he achieves on his listener (the PERLOCUTIONARY effect of his utterances' (Crystal (1980: 328).

Kellerman's (1989) classification of conditionals is based on the degree of possibility a conditional sentence indicates; Kellerman points out that we can range the classification of conditionals along a continuum ranging from low hypotheticality at one end to high hypotheticality at the other. The same observation can be found in Comrie (1986: 88-89) who points out that 'a factual sentence would represent the lowest degree of hypotheticality, while a counterfactual clause would represent the highest degree'. According to this continuum real conditionals are the least hypothetical or have great likelihood because there is a good chance that they will be fulfilled, whereas the potential conditionals are less hypothetical as they have some chance to be fulfilled. Irreal conditionals are highly hypothetical because there is no chance for them to be fulfilled. Both classifications concentrate on the degree of possibility a conditional sentence indicates and on how likely an event will come out.

Most traditional grammarians e.g. Azar (1999), Murphy (1994), Carter & McCarthy (2006) seem to classify conditional sentences into three main types: conditionals that are (a) true in the present or future, (b) untrue (contrary to fact) in the present or future and (c) untrue (contrary to fact) in the past. These three types correspond respectively to possible, unlikely, and impossible actions or states, and can be respectively illustrated in the following set of examples.

13.

- a. If they practice well, they will win the match.
- b. If they practiced well, they could win the match.
- c. If they had practiced well, they could have won the match.

Carter & McCarthy (2006: 448) provide a similar ternary classification, yet they base their classification on the different verb forms and modals used. They point out that the 'differences in tense and modality are important to a possible or imagined situation. In the conditional clause, tense choices express different types of potential events'. In line with the classification of English

conditionals as consisting of three main types is that of Hacking (1998: 15-16) who also points out that English conditional 'grammaticalizes three semantic distinctions...real, potential, and counterfactual'. The following examples represent each type.

14.

- a. If drivers exceed the speed limit, the police will arrest them.
- b. If drivers exceeded the speed limit, the police would arrest them.
- c. If drivers had exceeded the speed limit, the police would have arrested them.

(a) expresses a real condition where exceeding the limit (the condition) has yet to be accomplished.

On the other hand, (b) which represents a potential conditional (second type) indicates that exceeding the limit is virtually realizable, 'but contains an additional nuance of doubt'; thus, we think of *arresting the drivers* as being less likely. The counterfactual (third type) example in (c) presupposes that in the relevant real-world context no drivers did in fact exceed the speed limit. There are many other classifications where each is based on a certain aspect of the conditional sentence. For more classifications see among others Schachter (1971), Thompson and Longacre (1985), Reilly (1986), Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman (1999), etc.

Based on the above discussion we find that there are two problems facing the classificational approaches to conditionals. The first is that not only do we find various types of conditional sentences but we also find a various number of typologies which can be confusing. The second problem is indicated by Declerck & Reed (2001: 4) who show that almost any type of conditional 'always belongs to several categories (types) at once'. In other words, there is some overlap between the various types of conditional sentences:

- 15. If she did not finish her work on time, she may lose her job.

Declerck & Reed (2001) indicate that an example like the one above can be regarded as an 'inferential' conditional, 'open' conditional, or 'syntactically unmarked' conditional.

2.2.4. Other Approaches to Conditionals.

Akatsuka (1985: 625-626) discusses the way how conditionals are identified in the brain, stating that 'conditionals are identifiable not by their syntactic forms, but by speaker attitudes... [and that] an understanding of what is registering in the speaker's consciousness at the time of the utterance is the key to identifying a conditional'. That is to say, one way of interpreting conditionals is through their mental representations registered in the mind of the speaker/hearer at the time of utterance.

In the remaining part of this chapter, we will consider some of the existing studies that have considered Arabic conditional sentences; these studies will be the background against which DED conditionals will be discussed in the succeeding chapters.

2.3. Conditional Sentences in Arabic.

This section gives an overview of conditional sentences in Arabic. It aims at identifying some of the main works that have dealt with Arabic conditionals. We will give a critical review to some of the studies carried out by some Arabic grammarians and will discuss some of the attempts made by Arabists such as Wickens (1980), Peled (1992), Schulz, Krahel and Reuschel (2000), etc.

Arabic grammarians e.g. Al-'anṣārī (1972), Almasdi and Alṭarābulī (1985), Al-Xoṣ (1993), Alsāmora'i (2003), Afach (2005) among others approach conditional sentences in two different ways: the first one (the majority of studies) discusses one part of the conditional structure at a time. For example, the conditional particles are discussed under the umbrella of particles in general and the verb forms following the conditional particles are discussed under the umbrella of verbs, etc. This way of approaching conditionals gives a vague and divided view of conditionals.

In the second approach, conditionals are discussed under the umbrella of the rhetoric styles and are dealt with as one of the rhetoric styles.¹⁷ Grammarians following this way discuss the *'uslūb aš-šarṭ* (The Conditional Style) at one go (particles, verb forms, meanings etc.); conditional sentences in this approach are considered as a type of rhetoric, rather than a rigorous linguistic structure.

Despite over a thousand years of history, little comprehensive research exists on conditional sentences in Arabic. Most of the existing studies merely outline this topic in the course of a coursebook or a reference. Many of the related issues were not discussed and there is a confusion in the terminology used. For example, Ibn Ya'īš (1886) refers to conditional sentences by using the generic term *aš-šarṭ* (lit. 'the condition') (Almasdi and Alṭarābulsi, 1985). Others like Alzamaxšari (1906) classify sentences in Arabic into four types where the *conditional sentences* are one of these types.¹⁸

Furthermore, Almasdi and Alṭarābulsi (1985: 17) state that: '*fa-'inanā lā nakadu najedu 'inda an-nuḥātī ta'rīfan mutakamilan le-aj-jumlate aš-šarṭiyyah, wa yu'za ḍālika 'ila ġumūḍi mafhūm aš-šarṭi 'indahum*. (lit. philologists almost can not have a comprehensive definition of the conditional sentence; the reason for this is the vagueness they have about the concept of conditional sentences). Others like Al'ānbāri (1957) use the term *aš-šarṭ wa aj-jazā'* (lit. 'the condition and the requital) to refer to conditional sentences; the two terms *aš-šarṭ* and *aj-jazā'* can therefore be respectively equated to the P-clause and the Q-clause.

In his grammar series *Qiṣṣatu Al-'i'rāb* (The Story of Philology), Al-Xoṣ (1993) divides conditional sentences into two main types in accordance with the type of the conditional particle

¹⁷ Other rhetoric styles include *'aslūb al-'istifhām* (The Interrogative Style), *'aslūb al-qasam* (The Swearing Style), *'aslūb al-madiḥ wa aḍ-ḍam* (The Praise and Condemnation Style), etc.

¹⁸ The other three are (a) the nominal sentence, (b) the verbal sentence, and the (c) adverbial sentence.

used: *'adwāt jāzimah* (jussive particles) and *'adwāt ġayr jāzimah* (non-jussive particles). A jussive particle is one that affects the verb following it by changing its mood from indicative to jussive.¹⁹ This shows that *'adwāt aš.šarṭ* (the conditional particles) play a vital role in the study of conditional sentence.

Unlike English, CA has 19 conditional particles which are used to indicate different interpretations and functions. Nevertheless not all these particles are used in DED, as we will see in the next chapter. The following table, adapted from Al-Xoş (1993: 88-105), shows the jussive and non-jussive conditional particles in CA.

Conditional Particles in CA.			
Jussive particles		Non-jussive particles	
<i>'in</i>	if	<i>eġa</i>	if
<i>eġmā</i>	if	<i>kullamā</i>	when(ever)
<i>man</i>	who(ever)	<i>lammā</i>	when(ever)
<i>'aina</i>	where(ever)	<i>lau</i>	if
<i>mahmā</i>	what(ever)	<i>laulā</i>	if/had it not been for
<i>mata</i>	when(ever)	<i>laumā</i>	if/had it not been for
<i>'ayāna</i>	what(ever)	<i>'mā</i>	if
<i>'annā</i>	when(ever)		
<i>haytūmā</i>	where(evr)		
<i>kayfamā</i>	no matter how		
<i>'ayu</i>	which(ever)		
<i>mā</i>	if		

Table (8) Jussive and Non-Jussive Particles in CA.

Further, Al-Xoş (1993) subdivides jussive and non-jussive particles into different types in accordance with their use and meaning; for example, the particle *man who(ever)* is used with conditionals involving human subjects, while *mahmā (what(ever))* with conditionals involving non-

¹⁹ The jussive and non-jussive classifications of conditional particles are based on the mood of the verb following the particles: jussive particles changes the mood of the verb into jussive.

human subjects, etc. Nevertheless, Al-Xoş's (1993) study does not provide a comprehensive account of conditionals because some of the main issues (the interpretation of conditionals, the clausal order of the P-clause and the Q-clause, the different verb forms used, etc.) are not dealt with. His study is centred on the conditional particles and giving examples of their use and meanings.

Al-'anşāri (2005)²⁰ discusses conditional sentences by disassembling the conditional structure. At one place he discusses the conditional particles, at another he discusses the P-clause and at a third one he discusses the Q-clause, etc. For instance, he discusses particles in general (including conditional particles) alphabetically; each conditional particle has its own entry and is given an encyclopedic account: not only does he give the conditional meaning an article indicates or how it is used in a conditional sentence, but also gives a comprehensive account of its non-conditional meanings, functions, the existing accounts found in previous studies, etc. Each meaning or function is supported by an illustrative example from classical or Qur'anic Arabic.

Though Al'anşāri's (2005) study gives a considerable description of conditional sentences, it lacks organization and unity. For example, conditional particles are discussed in different places of his book, where one can not see the link between them. Readers are lost in the extensive unrelated details provided. Alsāmora'i (2003) and several others grammarians follow suit in discussing conditional sentences. Most of these studies discuss the conditional structure in a fragmented fashion which results in giving a vague and non-integrated view of the conditional structure and the relations between its clauses.

Almasdi and Alṭarābuli_(1985) provide a significant study of conditional sentences, focusing on their structure and classification, giving the characteristics of each conditional particle

²⁰ Al-'anşāri (2005) is one of the landmarks of Arabic philologists; 'his linguistic arguments appear to establish him as a unique and sophisticated grammarian' (Gully, 1995: 73).

and its frequency of occurrence in the Qur'an. The latter is their only source of data from which all the examples they discuss are taken. Another study that restricts the data to a religious source is that of Bin-Ismā'īl (2006) who discusses conditional sentences in the books of Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Buxāri (the Authentic/correct (book) of Al-Buxāri) and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (the Authentic/correct (book) of Muslim),²¹ two books concerned with the sayings and prophetic traditions of Prophet Mohammed.

Conditional sentences have also attracted many Arabists such as Cantarino (1975), Wickens (1980), Peled (1992), Ingham (1997), and Schulz, Krahel and Reuschel (2000), etc. Peled (1992), for instance, provides a detailed study of conditional constructions in CA, giving a syntactic-semantic characterization of conditionals in CA, emphasizing the relationships holding between the P-clause and the Q-clause and the different verb forms permitted in each clause. However, he restricts his study to what he considers 'cardinal structures', namely conditional sentences introduced by the particles *'in*, *eḍa*, and *lau*.

Wickens (1980: 76) outlines the main points necessary for investigating conditional sentences in Arabic, indicating that there are three main points that need to be taken into consideration when studying Arabic conditionals: 'the particle used for 'if'; the aspect of the verb employed and the introduction of the *jawāb* [i.e. the Q-clause] by *fā'*'.²² These are the main points discussed in most Arabic grammar references and grammar coursebooks.

The variety of conditional particles in CA has led some linguists to consider the different functions they have. Schulz, Krahel and Reuschel (2000: 365), for instance, try to work out the difference between *eḍa* and *'in* which are both translated as *if*. They point out that *eḍa* (if)

²¹ Two books which contain the prophetic traditions of prophet Mohammed. Muslims view these two books as their most trusted collection of Prophet Mohammed's sayings.

²² *fā'* is a morpheme functioning as an introducer (intro) to the Q-clause; it corresponds to the use of *then* in the Q-clause in English.

'indicates the certain realization of the condition' whereas *'in* (if) 'only expresses a certain degree of probability'. Schulz, Krahel and Reuschel (2000) further suggest that while *if* can be the counterpart of *ʿada*, *in case* is the counterpart of *'in*. A similar attempt has been made by Cantarino (1975).

The Q-clause in Arabic conditionals can be prefixed by the morpheme *fā-*. This morpheme (*fā-*) functions as an introducer (intro) to the Q-clause, and can correspond to *then* in English; it is, 'not translatable, but corresponding to a breathing space of the English *well now!*', Wickens (1980: 77). Consider the following example (from the Qur'an 9: 6).

16.

'in *stajāra.ka* *'ahad.un* *min* *l.kufār.i* *fā. 'ajir.hu*
 conp seek.protection_{+pres.3.m.sg.}you anyone_{Acc} prep def.polytheists_{gen} intro.grant.protection_{+imp.2.m.sg.}him
 If anyone of the polytheists seeks your protection, then (well now) grant him protection. (Qur'an 9: 6).

Wickens (1980: 77) enumerates three of the cases where the Q-clause of a conditional sentence is introduced by *fā-*: (a) when the Q-clause begins with anything other than a verb, (b) when the Q-clause begins with a verb in the imperative and (c) when the perfective verb of the Q-clause 'is intended to have a really past and effective sense'. This means that the occurrence or absence of *fā-* in conditional sentences depends on the structure of the Q-clause. Other linguists, including Cantarino (1975), Peled (1985), Schulz, Krahel and Reuschel (2000), have tackled the same issue and considered other cases of introducing the Q-clause by *fā-*. Cantarino (1975: 362), for example, adds to the cases provided by Wickens (1980) that *fā-* introduces the Q-clause of a conditional when it 'is an elliptical nominal or verbal sentence'. Consider the following example.

17. *'in* *'ajizat* *as.syāsatu* *fā.l.ḥarbu*
 conp fail_{+past.3.f.sg.} def.politics intro.def.war
 Whenever politics fail, then the war [follows]. (Cantarino, 1975: 362).

We are not going to pursue the issue of introducing the Q-clause with *fā-* any further because the Q-clauses in DED conditionals are not introduced by *fā-* at all.

Based on the above discussion, we conclude that conditional sentences in Arabic have not been given sufficient attention; they are rather discussed under the Arabic rhetoric styles, or under the different parts they consist of. The majority of studies concentrate on three main points: the conditional particles used, the verb forms and on introducing the *jawāb* by *fā-*. Nevertheless, rarely do we find these points discussed in one chapter or one book; rather, they are discussed in a fragmented fashion. Our study of DED conditionals attempts to bridge this gap and provides an integrated study of DED conditionals.

2.4. Summary.

The purpose of this chapter is to give a general review of the existing studies on conditional sentences in Arabic and to familiarize the reader with the issues to be discussed in the following chapters. In this chapter we have presented a review of conditional sentences in previous studies, identified some of the seminal works that dealt with conditional sentences, and given a general review of some theories of conditionals. We have shown that several terms are employed to refer to the two parts of a conditional sentence such as the *protasis* and the *apodosis*, the *antecedent* and the *consequent*, *aš-šarṭ* (the condition) and the *aj.jawāb* (lit. 'the reply'), etc. Then we have reviewed some definitions of conditionals, showing that most of the the existing definitions do not really account for the different types of conditional sentences. We have therefore used the term *conditionals* or *conditional sentences* as a cover term which can refer to any conditional sentence signifying a conditional interpretation. This chapter has also shown how conditionals are considered in other disciplines such as logic and philosophy and within the *Possible Worlds Approach*.

Some of the main studies on Arabic conditionals have been considered in this chapter. We have identified the two approaches Arabic grammarians use in dealing with conditional sentences: the majority of studies have dealt with conditionals in a fragmented fashion, discussing one part of the conditional sentence at a time. This approach gives a vague and non-integrated view of conditionals. The second approach discusses conditionals under the umbrella of the rhetoric styles because it considers conditional constructions as a type of rhetoric, not as a linguistic construction. Our literature review of Arabic conditionals shows that little comprehensive research on this topic has been done in Arabic.

Chapter Three

Conditional Sentences in DED

3.0. Introduction.

This chapter gives a unified description of DED conditionals within the Theory of Mental Spaces as discussed in Fauconnier (1994) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005). The chapter aims to describe the processes of mental space building triggered by conditional thinking, and interpreting the different DED conditional structures. It is organized as follows: first I will outline the relevant ideas of the Theory of Mental Spaces (TMS), then I will classify DED conditionals into two main types, *realis* and *irrealis*. Both types are further classified into other subtypes. The emphasis will be on distinguishing conditional clauses from temporal ones, and on the use of the auxiliary *čān* (lit. 'he was') in *realis* and *irrealis* conditionals. I will also discuss some of the structural variations in *realis* and *irrealis* conditionals. Finally, I will examine the causal relations held between the two clauses of a conditional sentence.

3.1. Framework: Mental Spaces.

The Mental Space Theory (MST) will be used as a framework to investigate the semantic interpretation of DED conditionals. Our summary of the MST relies mainly on Fauconnier (1994), and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005).²³

Lakoff and Sweetser²⁴ (1994: xvii) define a mental space as 'a significant part of what is happening backstage, behind the scenes, in the cognitive background of everyday speaking and commonsense reasoning'. That is to say, the MST is a cognitive theory used to refer to real or imaginary worlds, a fact which makes it suitable for discussing and interpreting conditional

²³ The MST was first presented in 1978 at the Academia della Crusca, in Florence, and only in later years it has been applied to other areas of study, (Fauconnier, 1994).

²⁴ Fauconnier's (1994) book, *Mental spaces: aspects of meaning construction in natural language*, was forwarded by Lakoff and Sweetser.

constructions. Not only did we choose this particular theory because it can account for all types of DED conditionals, but also because it brings together the point of view of psychology and logic approaches. The basic idea in the MST is that when the speaker is engaged in any form of thought while talking or communicating, a mental space is set up: 'mental spaces – are constructed for any stretch of thought' Lakoff and Sweetser (1994: xxxvii). Thus, conditional particles or 'connectives' as Fauconnier calls them are considered space builders that can create mental spaces.

3.1.1. Space Builders and Base Spaces.

The process of space-building is not restricted to P-clauses in conditionals; other expressions and contexts can also set up mental spaces. For example, contexts involving pictures or photos as in (a), temporal expressions as in (b), imaginative situations as in (c), disjunctions/conjunctions as in (d), etc., all can create mental spaces:

1.

- a. In Len's painting, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes. (Fauconnier, 1994: 20).
- b. In 1921, Deir Ezour was occupied by France.
- c. In the story of Alaal-Din, a jinni lives in a magic lamp.
- d. Dalia can either cook her food or eat in the restaurant.

The prepositional Phrase *in Len's painting* in (a) functions as a space builder that sets up a mental space M in which the statement *the girl with blue eyes has green eyes* holds; the above examples have in common the building of a mental space wherein a statement holds. A space builder is a linguistic expression that can establish a mental space. Similarly, the use of *if* in a conditional sentence, triggers a mental space setting in the mind of the speaker or hearer: 'the job of *if* is to prompt the set-up of a mental space' (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 29). In other words, P-clauses according to MST are space builders. The following example shows that the use of *eda* (if) in DED can also trigger a mental space setting:

2. *eda sāli twaffir šwayyat mašāri rāḥ t'ammir beit jadīd*
 comp Sally save_{+pres.3.f.sg} some money will build_{+pres.3.f.sg} house new

If Sally saves some money, she will build a new house. (DED).

eda in the *eda*-clause *If Sally saves some money* sets up a space wherein *Sally saves some money*, and the speaker, within that space, predicts that *Sally will build a new house*. That is to say, conditional particles are space builders. Note that the P-clause and the Q-clause hold in a space which is different from the reality space, and that the Q-clause is an extension to the space created by *eda*. However, Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 18) argue that it is the whole P-clause that sets up the mental space for a given conditional sentence: 'a conditional construction involves setting up a mental space (in the case of *if*-conditionals, this is the job of the *if*-clause), and requesting the construal of something (in *if*-conditionals, the *then*-clause or the main clause) within that space'. This can be illustrated in the following example.

3. *eda sāli darsat rāḥ tinjah*
 comp Sally study_{+past.3.f.sg} will succeed_{+pres.3.f.sg}

If Sally studies, she will succeed. (DED).

eda sets up a conditional mental space (S) which is separated from the reality space (R). That is to say, *Sally studies* holds in (S) but not necessarily in (R). *Sally's success* holds in an extension of (S), but not necessarily in R. This means that the Q-clause extends what was set-up in the P-clause.

A base space refers to the present reality which is shared between the speaker and the hearer; it is also called the *reality space* (Fauconnier 1985) and the *reference space* (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005). Base/reality spaces are often abbreviated as (R). Let us consider the following example,

4. If Ahmad takes a taxi, he will arrive on time.

The P-clause in the above example sets up a space wherein *Ahmad takes a taxi* and *arrives on time*. It is not necessary for the space created by *if* to be similar to the reality space (R). (R) is

the space on which all other created spaces depend. Alternative spaces are different from, but linked to, base spaces.

3.1.2. Alternative Spaces.

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 31) argue that 'one of the most important reasons for setting up mental spaces is to imagine alternatives'. That is to say, when a conditional sentence is uttered, the speaker/hearer sets up two spaces, a reality space and a mental space. The former is the speaker's understood reality space on which other imagined spaces depend, and the latter is an alternative space in which the P-clause and the Q-clause hold. The following example is illustrative,

5. If Sally travels to Egypt, she will visit the Pyramids.

The above conditional sentence will involve two mental-space set-ups: in the first space, *Sally travels to Egypt and visits the Pyramids*. That is to say, both P and Q hold in the first mental space. In the second (alternative) space, on the other hand, Sally does not travel to Egypt and does not visit the Pyramids; both $\neg P$ and $\neg Q$ hold in the alternative space. The alternative space can refer to the reality or base space. Two mental spaces enter into an alternative relationship 'if they are incompatible and are both construed in context as subsequent causal and temporal development from the same base or reference space' (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 35). In other words, alternative and mental spaces are mutually exclusive and they therefore cannot coexist.

Dancygier and Sweetser point out that speakers or hearers create or set up the space directly mentioned first and its implicit alternative second. Consider the following example,

6. If Nadia wakes up late, she will miss the 8 o'clock bus.

Two mental spaces are created; the first space is the one in which *Nadia wakes up late*, as it is the directly mentioned one; the second alternative space where *Nadia wakes up on time* ($\neg P$ -clause) is set up afterwards.

Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 39) base the notion of alternative spaces on that of Geis and Zwicky (1971), stating that 'Geis and Zwicky (1971) are obviously correct in asserting that for many conditional utterances, there is a natural inferential pattern from an utterance *if P, Q* to an added conclusion that if not P, not Q'. That is to say, the hearer sets up two mental spaces; in the former, P and Q hold, and in the latter (the alternative) $\neg P$ and $\neg Q$ hold.

On the other hand, Dancygier and Sweetser argue that not all conditional sentences involve alternative spaces. For example, conditionals making offers and some types of speech act conditionals do not involve alternative mental space set-ups. The following examples are illustrative.

7.

a. [A graduate Administrator talks to a fresher]

If you have any question, my name is Angelina.

b. [A mother talks to her six-year-old girl]

If you want to play now, your toys are in the living room.

The new student in (a) is not setting two alternative spaces: (one in which he/she has a question and the Graduate Administrator's name is Angelina, and another in which he/she does not have any question and the Graduate Administrator's name is something else). In such type of conditional, the speaker/hearer is not involved in setting up two alternative spaces, 'rather the antecedent is used to specify the mental-space background against which the offer is made' (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 110).²⁵

Fauconnier (1994: 85-92) presents a number of rules and strategies which can be used in understanding the MST. The following sections explain these rules and strategies and provide illustrative examples showing how they apply.

²⁵ Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 110) base this observation on both Nikforidou's (1990) and Sweetser's (1990).

3.1.3. Rules and Strategies Used in MST.

A conditional construction can consist of a P-clause which can function as a space builder (SB_M) followed by a Q-clause (S) or a propositional part (*Prop*):

8. If Sally keeps training her staff, she will improve their performance.

$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{SB_M} \quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{Prop/S}$

Fauconnier further argues that P-clauses and Q-clauses can be satisfied or determined according to two relations, satisfaction and determination.

3.1.3.1. Satisfaction and Determination Rules.

The satisfaction relation is symbolized by a slant line (/). 'We say that $Q (= Q' (a, b, c, \dots))$ is satisfied in space H if the relation Q' holds of the counterpart of a, b, c, ..., in space H' (Fauconnier, 1994: 86). Further, Q can be either satisfied or unsatisfied:

9.

- a. Q/H Q is satisfied in space H.
- b. $\sim Q/H$ Q is not satisfied in space H.

The determination rules are independent of the satisfaction ones: 'we say that Q is *determined* in space H if it is either satisfied or not satisfied' (Fauconnier, 1994: 86). Consider the following example,

10. The manager believes that the staff will protest against his decision.

the staff will protest against his decision is determined with respect to the manager's beliefs, but is not established as satisfied or not satisfied.

Furthermore, a proposition can be determined or undetermined; Fauconnier (1994: 86) provides the following notations to represent determined propositions:

11.

- a. $Q!H$ Q is determined in H.
- b. $Q?H$ Q is undetermined in H.

MST involves the use of two strategic principles (SPs) which can help us better understand the relation between mental spaces:

12.

SP₁: Avoid contradiction within a space (e.g. avoid $\sim Q/H$ and Q/H).

SP₂: Structure space M and its parent space R as closely as possible with respect to background assumptions and implicit presuppositions. (Fauconnier, 1994: 86-87).

Fauconnier (1994) introduces the relation *inheritance* to indicate that a proposition is satisfied in both the reality space R and the mental space M. Let us consider the following example,

13. If Ahmad's kids are at home, they will disturb our meeting.

Considering the above example in a context where the speaker knows Ahmad, and assumes that he is married and has children etc., S (the Q-clause) is inherited i.e. it holds in both M and R.

Fauconnier (1994: 91) points out that we need to structure a mental space M to maximize similarity with the R space, a principle which he calls *space optimization*: 'when a daughter space M is set up within a parent space R, structure M implicitly so as to maximize similarity with R'. Based on this optimization principle, Fauconnier argues that elements in the daughter space M have an M' counterpart in R. Therefore, if the original elements (the ones in R) have certain relations or background assumptions, the same relations or assumptions should also hold for the counterpart elements in (M). For example,

14. If Sally likes philosophy, she will enjoy my classes.

The P-clause creates a mental space M which is very similar to the parent space R because SP₂ in (12) above is applied. That is to say, elements in R have counterparts in M because the background assumptions of R hold in M.

3.1.4. Imaginative Mental Spaces.

Fauconnier (1994: 11) points out that there are two dimensions related to imaginative mental spaces. These two dimensions help us interpret imaginative conditionals: 'the first is a

lexical dimension. [and the second] is grammatical'. The conditional particle (comp) *if* and modals like *could* and *might*, etc., represent the lexical dimension, while variation in tenses represents the grammatical one. An example of each dimension is given below:

15. [A librarian talks to a fresher]

If you had returned the book on time, they would not have charged you.

16.

a. If Mary won the race, she would be happy.

b. If Mary had won the race, she would have been happy.

In (15), the conditional particle *if* in the P-clause and the modal *would* in the Q-clause are two lexical elements that can help interpret imaginative conditionals; both are representative of the lexical domain; the P-clause is undetermined (P-clause?) with respect to the parent space (P-clause?R) and is not satisfied (\sim P-clause/R).

In (16), the variation of tense forms (simple past in (a) and past perfect in (b)) is representative of the grammatical domain. These tense forms help indicate the imaginative interpretation of conditionals: the use of the past tense form *won* and the modal *would* + *be* in (a) indicate that the P-clause can be unsatisfied (\sim P-clause) in respect to the parent space, and undetermined (P-clause?). Therefore, a hypothetical interpretation is expressed. On the other hand, the use of the past perfect in (b) shows that the P-clause is unsatisfied in the parent space (\sim P-clause/R), and hence a counterfactual interpretation is expressed. Thus, hypothetical conditionals are used when we have (P-clause?) and (\sim P-clause/R). On the other hand, counterfactual examples are used only when the P-clause is not satisfied in the parent space, (\sim P-clause/R).

In imaginative conditionals, we discuss cases where mental spaces are incompatible with their parent spaces. A counterfactual conditional represents 'a case of forced incompatibility between spaces; a space M_1 is incompatible with another space M_2 if some relation explicitly specified in M_1 is not satisfied for the corresponding elements in M_2 '

(Fauconnier, 1994: 109). In other words, in counterfactual conditionals the P-clause sets up a counterfactual space which is incompatible with the origin or parent space R. The Q-clause expresses some relation which is satisfied in the counterfactual space created for the P-clause. For example,

17. If Sally had won the lottery, she would have become rich.

The above example sets up two mental spaces which are incompatible with the parent space. The P-clause sets up a space wherein *Sally had won the lottery*, unlike the parent space. The Q-clause sets up a counterfactual space which is (a) incompatible with the parent space, and (b) expresses some relation (becoming rich) satisfied only in the counterfactual space. The two spaces are incompatible with each other, and therefore, a counterfactual interpretation is indicated.

Having discussed the relevant points in the MST, we turn into considering the semantic interpretation of DED conditionals. I will first present the conditional particles used in DED. Then, I will move into classifying conditionals into two main types, realis and irrealis.

3.2. Conditional Sentences in DED.

3.2.1. Conditional Particles.

Several conditional particles are used in DED. Some such as *eḡa* (if), *'in* (if) and Ø²⁶ are mainly used in realis conditionals; others such as the two particles *bas* (when) and *lammā* (when) can be used to express temporal relations.²⁷ The auxiliary *čān* (lit. 'he was') has developed into a conditionals particle and is used in realis conditionals.

Another type of particle is used to express generic conditionals; I will call this type the *-ever* particle conditional. The particles used in this type are composed of two morphemes the

²⁶ We will deal with conditionals introduced by Ø (zero particle) in chapter six, *Paratactic Conditionals*.

²⁷ We will have a good reason why *bas* and *lammā* are used in temporal, rather than conditional, clauses.

second of which is equivalent to *-ever* in *whenever*. There are four *-ever* particles, namely *weinmā* (wherever), *'eimtāmā* (whenever), *škūnmā* (whatever) and *minumā* (whoever). Finally, we will discuss how the conditional particle *lau* (if) is used in irrealis conditionals. The following table shows the distribution of conditional particles in DED.

Conditional Particles in DED		
Realis Particles	Irrealis Particles	Generic Particles
<i>eda</i>	<i>lau</i>	<i>weinmā</i> (wherever)
<i>'in</i>		<i>'eimtāmā</i> (whenever)
<i>bas/ lamma</i>		<i>škūnmā</i> (whatever)
<i>čān</i>		<i>minumā</i> (whoever)

Table (9): Distribution of Conditional Particles in DED.

3.2.2. Classification of DED Conditionals.

My classification adapts and builds on those presented in Schachter (1971), Thompson and Longacre (1985), Reilly (1986), Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman (1999), and Declerck and Reed (2001).

Conditional constructions in DED classify into two main categories, *realis* and *irrealis*. *Realis* conditionals (RCs) refer to situations or events in the real world and include future, present, past, and generic conditionals. *Irrealis* conditionals (IRCs), on the other hand, refer to imaginative situations and include hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals. In the following sections, *realis* and *irrealis* conditionals are discussed and analysed within the MST. However, a note on the difference between *realis* and *irrealis* is in order.

3.2.2.1. Realis/Irrealis Distinction.

Elliott (2000) argues for a grammatical category called *reality status* with the binary distinction of *realis* and *irrealis*.²⁸ She shows that linguists have used a variety of terminology which can be synonymous with the terms *realis* and *irrealis*; Feldman (1986), for instance, uses the terms *factive* and *non-factive* to mean *realis* and *irrealis* in his study of Awtuw, a language of Papua New Guinea. Similarly, Cornyn and Roop (1987) use the term *actual* and *potential* to refer to *realis* and *irrealis* respectively. Several studies argue that situations occurring in the real world are *realis* ones, while situations occurring in an unreal world are *irrealis*; de Haan (in press), for example, defines the term *realis* as 'the set of real events' and the term *irrealis* as 'the set of unreal events'. Elliott (2000: 66-67), furthermore, argues that a *realis* event indicates a perceived reality while an *irrealis* one refers to a hypothetical notion or a conceptual idea; she defines the two terms along the following lines:

18.

- a. 'A *realis* proposition prototypically asserts that an event or state is an actualized or certain fact of reality;
- b. an *irrealis* proposition prototypically implies an event belongs to the realm of the imagined or hypothetical, and as such it constitutes a potential or possible event but it is not an observable fact of reality'. (Elliott, 2000: 66-67).

Further, Roberts's (1990: 376) distinction between *realis* and *irrealis* is based on the notion of different worlds (real and unreal worlds): 'while there can be many possible worlds there can only be one real world. The real world is one in which events are actualized. Other non-real worlds are then related to the real world by modal concepts'. This leads us to conclude that *realis* events or situations refer to events which are thought of as *real* and can be

²⁸ Elliott (2000: 55) states that Sapir (1930) was one of the earliest linguists who used the term *irrealis* in his description of Southern Paiute; Sapir (1930: 168) notes that the *irrealis* modal suffix 'indicates that the activity expressed by the verb is unreal, i.e. either merely potential or contrary to fact'.

actualized, whereas *irrealis* events or situations refer to events/situations belonging to a world other than the real world, i.e., imaginable, hypothetical and unreal-world events.

3.2.2.2. DED Realis Conditionals.

DED RCs can be used to express future, present, past and generic conditionals. The propositions expressed are *realis*, i.e., they can occur in the real world. The following sections investigate the different types of DED RCs and show how they are interpreted. We will start with the first type of RC, future conditionals.

3.2.2.2.1. Future Conditionals.

In this type of RC, *eda* (if) is used to introduce future conditionals. The P-clause typically consists of *eda* followed by a proposition, while the Q-clause states a prediction with a future reference. This type of conditional expresses what we think we will do in a certain situation in the future. That is to say, the speaker guesses or expects what will happen in the future. The guessed proposition in the Q-clause is contingent as we are uncertain whether it will occur or not:

19.

- a. [A midwife encouraging a new mother to breastfeed].

eda trad'in raḥm.či rāḥ yinqabid' 'asra'
 comp breastfeed_{+pres.2.f.sg} uterus.your will involute_{+pres.3.m.sg} faster.
 If you breastfeed, your uterus will involute faster. (DED).

- b. *eda 'ali yiddayyan maṣāri min.ak rāḥ yiraji' hum 'a.l.waqit*
 comp Ali borrow_{+pres.3.m.sg} money prep.you will return_{+pres.3.m.sg} them prep.def.time
 If Ali borrows money from you, he will return it on time. (DED).

In (a), the midwife is engaged in setting up a mental space which is about a real situation in this world. Within this space, the new mother breastfeeds her baby, and has her uterus involuting faster. The midwife predicts a faster involution to the mother's uterus only in the space set up by the *eda*-clause (wherein the mother breastfeeds). That is to say, there is a

prediction that the mother's uterus will involute faster if she breastfeeds; the midwife talks about a possible attempt at breastfeeding. The alternative space the midwife sets up includes the negation of both the P-clause and the Q-clause. In other words, the midwife and the mother create an alternative space wherein the mother refuses to breastfeed and her uterus involutes slower. Similarly, the P-clause in (b) functions as a space-builder, setting up the mental space M wherein *Ali borrows money from somebody*; within M, the Q-clause proposition (*Ali returns the money on time*) holds; the Q-clause therefore extends what was set up in M. That is to say, both the P-clause and the Q-clause hold in M.

The Q-clause of the second type of RC is understood through inference.

3.2.2.2.2. Inferential Conditionals.

Another type of RC is inferential conditionals. In this type, the P-clause functions as a premise and the Q-clause as the inferred conclusion from that premise:


20.

a. *eḍa nādiya tursub b.kul l.fhūṣāt mā rāḥ tāxud šahādat.ha*
 comp Nadia fail_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.all def.exams Neg will get_{+pres.3.f.sg} degree.her
 If Nadia fails all her exams, she will not get her degree. (DED).

b. *eḍa laila samīneh lāzim titjannab ad.dasam*
 comp Laila overweight Mod avoid_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.fat
 If Laila is overweight, she must avoid fatty food. (DED)

(a) and (b) are inferential conditionals: we can infer their Q-clauses depending on their premise-like P-clauses. In (a), we deduce that Nadia will not get her degree because she fails all her exams. In (b), we infer that Laila must avoid fatty food because she is overweight. In (a) two mental spaces are set up: in the first one both propositions hold, and in the second (alternative) one both propositions do not. This can be represented as follows:

21.



A Mental Space representation for *If Nadia fails all her exams, she will not get her degree.*

The P-clause *If Nadia fails all her exams* builds a mental space M represented by the left rectangle. In this space *Nadia fails all her exams*. The proposition of the Q-clause *she will not get her degree* holds in this mental space. An alternative space is set up wherein $\sim P$ and $\sim Q$ hold as represented in the right rectangle.

Based on Declerck and Reed's (2001) discussion of inferential conditionals, inferential conditionals divide into two types, namely direct and indirect inferential conditionals. Indirect inferentials divide further into (a) closed P-clause, and (b) ad absurdum inferential conditionals. In the following sections, I show how DED conforms to these types.

3.2.2.2.1. Direct Inferential Conditionals.

Declerck and Reed (2001: 488) point out that 'whereas in direct inferential conditionals, P is the premise underlying an inference about the truth of Q, there are also inferentials where the inference goes from Q to P'. Starting with direct inferential conditionals, let us consider the following example:

22. [Sally's blood-test results showed that she is anaemic. Her husband says:]

eḍa 'indči²⁹ fuqur dam lāzim tāklīn laḥim 'aḥmar kul yawm
 conp prep poverty blood Mod eat_{+pres.2.f.sg} meat red every day

If you have anaemia, you must eat red meat everyday. (DED).

The example above indicates a direct inferential conditional because the P-clause proposition *the wife is anaemic* functions as a premise, while the Q-clause that *the wife must eat more red meat* as a conclusion. The conclusion drawn by the husband depends on the premise-like P-clause. That is to say, in this type of conditional, when the premise in the P-clause is true, the conclusion in the Q-clause is true too.

Drawn conclusions are not entirely based on the premises (the P-clauses), but can also rely on the contextual and pragmatic knowledge which the speaker and the listener share. For example,

23. [Athree-year old child is crying because of his toothache. Upon hearing him cry, his father says:].

eḍa snān.ak twejj'.ak lāzim titjannab l.karameileh
 conp teeth.your hurt_{+pres.3.f.pl.}you Mod avoid_{+pres.3.ms.sg} def.candies

If you have toothache, you must avoid (eating) candies. (DED).

The conclusion the father draws in the above example is based on his pragmatic knowledge that toothache in children is associated with eating too many candies.

Another characteristic of direct inferential conditionals, Declerck and Reed (2001) point out, is that the Q-clause should assert the conclusion drawn from the P-clause. In other words, conditionals with unassertive or 'nonassertoric' Q-clauses are not considered direct inferential conditionals; this mainly includes Q-clauses involving questions. Thus, the following is not an example of a direct inferential conditional because the Q-clause is not assertive.

²⁹ *'ind* (at) is not a verb, but rather is a locative adverb of place; it corresponds to the preposition (at) in English. See Ryding (2005: 173) for more information about *'ind* in MSA.

24. *eda 'id mīlād.ha as.sabit aj.jei šqad šār 'umur.ha*
 comp Day birth.her Saturday def.next how become_{+past.3.m.sg} age.her
 If her birthday is next Saturday, how old is she? (DED).

The above example does not represent a direct inferential conditional because the Q-clause does not express any inference in spite of the fact that the P-clause can function as a premise, and because the Q-clause is a question.

3.2.2.2.2. Indirect Inferential Conditionals.

This type of inferential conditional is called *indirect* because the hearer's inference about the truth of the P-clause is based on the proposition of the Q-clause. Indirect inferential conditionals divide into two types: *closed P-clause* and *ad absurdum* inferential conditionals.

These two types are respectively exemplified in the following set of examples:

25.

- a. [A detective's response to a criminal's claim of being innocent]

eda 'enta fi'lan barī' liš qatalit mart.ak
 comp you_{2.m.sg} really innocent why kill_{+past.2.m.sg} wife.your
 If you (are) really innocent, why did you kill your wife? (DED).

- b. [Ahmad phones his fiancé Reem and, trying to fool her, says that he is the president. Recognising his voice she says:].

eda 'enta ar.ra'īs 'ana as.sayydeh l.'ūlah
 comp you_{2.m.sg} def.president I def.lady def.first
 If you are the president, I am The First Lady. (DED).

Both of the above examples represent indirect inferentials. In (a), the truth value of the P-clause is based on the Q-clause. In other words, the detective's question *why did you kill your wife?* implies that the criminal is not innocent and that he, the detective, does not believe the criminal's claim of being innocent. Thus, the claim that *the criminal is innocent* is treated as being false because it does not conform with the proposition in the Q-clause. In other words, the detective expects the criminal to infer from the Q-clause that his, the criminal's, claim of being innocent is false.

The example in (b) represents an *ad absurdum* inferential conditional. In this type of conditional, the speaker's inference about the truth value of the P-clause is based on the proposition of the Q-clause which the speaker makes false deliberately; Reem deliberately claims that she is *The First Lady* so that the falsity of Ahmad's proposition that *he is the president* is made clearly false too.

The relation between the two clauses of indirect inferential conditionals is typically non-causal.

3.2.2.2.3. Non-causal Conditionals.

In this type of conditional, the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause is not causal and the fulfilment of the Q-clause does not depend on the P-clause, unlike the case in future conditionals. This type of conditional does not trigger alternative mental spaces. That is to say, the speaker does not intend to set up two mental spaces. Alternatively, the P-clause is used as a background to the base space upon which the Q-clause makes its offer or speech act. The following two examples are illustrative:

26.

- a. [In his first day of work, Nadir meets Sally who introduces herself to him].

<i>eḍa</i>	<i>ḥtājeit</i>	<i>ši</i>	<i>'ism.i</i>	<i>sāli</i>
comp	need _{+past.2.m.sg}	thing	name.my	Sally

If you need anything, my name is Sally. (DED).

- b. [A wife talking to her husband].


<i>eḍa</i>	<i>jo'ān</i>	<i>l.ma'karonah</i>	<i>bi.l.muṭbax</i>
comp	hungry	def.spaghetti	prep.def.kitchen

If you are hungry, the spaghetti is in the kitchen. (DED).

In (a) Sally does not intend to set up for Nadir two alternative spaces (one in which he needs something, and her name is Sally, and another in which he does not need anything and her name is not Sally). Rather, she uses the P-clause *If you need anything* as a background which would then justify introducing herself to him in the Q-clause. Similarly, the wife in (b) is not

setting up two alternative mental spaces for her husband (a mental space wherein he is hungry and the spaghetti is in the kitchen, and another wherein he is not hungry and the spaghetti is not in the kitchen). Rather, the P-clause functions as a background for the indirect offer of spaghetti in the Q-clause. The example in (b) can be represented as follows:

27.



A mental space representation for *If you are hungry, the spaghetti is in the kitchen.*

Declerck and Reed (2001: 320) point out that the P-clause in such type of conditional 'explains the relevance of uttering the Q-clause'. For example, because Nadir in (26.a) may need something, Sally finds it relevant to introduce herself to him. Similarly, because the wife in (26.b) thinks that the husband can be hungry, she finds it relevant to inform him that the spaghetti is in the kitchen. That is to say, the P-clauses in the above examples explain why uttering the Q-clauses is relevant. Note that English *if* in this type of conditional can be replaced by *in case*. (a) *In case you need anything, it is therefore pragmatically relevant to introduce myself to you*, and (b) *In case you are hungry, I find it relevant to tell you that the spaghetti is in the kitchen.*

3.2.2.2.4. Past Realis Conditionals.

Past realis conditionals describe what the speaker used to do in certain situations in the past, and show that these situations or habits have changed and that the speaker no longer practises them nowadays. In other words, this type of conditional construction describes real past habits that the speaker used to have in the past. Let us consider the following example.

28. [Ahmad tries to convince his letting agent to give him a discount. He says:]

eḍa jaddadna al. 'aqid čānat šāhibt al. beit ti'fī.na ḥasim
 conp renew_{+past.1.pl} def.contract be_{+past.3.f.sg} owner def.house give_{+pres.3.f.sg} us discount
 If we renewed the contract, the landlady used to give us a discount. (DED).

Ahmad's sentence conveys a past real conditional, and describes a specific situation in the past; It describes a past habit the landlady used to do, but which she no longer does. This interpretation is conveyed by the use of a perfective verb form in the P-clause together with a form of the Aux *čānat* (lit. 'she was') (conjugated in accordance with the number and person of the subject) and with an imperfective verb form in the Q-clause:

(P-clause: (*eḍa*) + V_{past} → Q-clause: Aux *čān* + $V_{\text{pres.}}$).

That is to say, the use of the Aux *čān* followed by a main verb in the imperfective can be equated to the use of *used to* followed by a main verb in English:

29.

a. [A father talks to his children about his school days when he was their age]

eḍa waṣṣaltu aš.šaf mit'axxir l. 'ānseh čānat tlūmn.i
 conp arrive_{+past.1.sg} def.class late teacher be_{+past.3.f.sg} upbraid_{+pres.3.f.sg} me
 If I arrived late to class, the teacher used to upbraid me. (DED).

b. [Two merchants talk about their past successful pargains]

eḍa 'fū.na si'ir 'arxaš činna ništari kammiyyāt čabīreh
 conp give_{+past.1.pl} us price cheaper be_{+past.1.pl} buy_{+pres.1.pl} amounts large
 If they offered us a cheaper price, we used to buy large amounts. (DED).

Both examples refer to past habits which the speakers used to do in the past. The verb forms in the Q-clauses consist of a form of the Aux *čān* followed by the imperfective form of the main

verb. The two examples show that the Aux *čān* in the Q-clause conjugates in accordance with the number and person of its subject: the two forms *čānat* in (a) and *činna* in (b) refer to a third person feminine singular, and to a first person plural respectively. The following table shows the different conjugated forms of the Aux *čān* when occurring in the Q-clause of past RCs:

30.

Conjugation of Aux <i>čān</i> in the Q-clauses	
Person	Conjugation of <i>čān</i>
<i>'ana</i> (I. _{1.sg})	<i>čintu</i> (lit. I was)
<i>niḥna</i> (we _{1st.pl})	<i>činna</i> (lit. we were)
<i>'enta</i> (you _{2.m.sg})	<i>činit</i> (lit. you were)
<i>'enti</i> (you _{2.f.sg})	<i>činti</i> (lit. you were)
<i>'entum</i> (you _{2.m.f.pl})	<i>čintum</i> (lit. you were)
<i>huwwa</i> (he _{3.m.sg})	<i>čān</i> (lit. he was)
<i>hiea</i> (she _{3.f.sg})	<i>čānat</i> (lit. she was)
<i>humma</i> (they _{3.m.f.pl})	<i>čānū</i> (lit. they were)

Conjugation of Aux *čān* in the Q-clause of past RCs.

Past realis conditionals are not restricted to expressing habitual past situations; they can also express past conditionals which do not involve habits. The following example is illustrative,

31. *eḍa dālia čānat b.ḥaflat l.bāriḥ yimkin tiji 'a.l.šugul mit'axrah*
 comp Dalia be_{+past.3.f.sg} prep.party def.yesterday Mod come_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.def.work late
 If Dalia was at yesterday's party, she may arrive late for work. (DED).

Two mental spaces are set up in the above example. In the first mental space, Dalia was at yesterday's party and arrived late for her work. In the second mental space, Dalia was not at yesterday's party and arrived to work on time.


We now turn to discussing another type of realis conditional, generic conditionals; this will also include the difference between temporal and conditional clauses, and the use of the *-ever* particles.

3.2.2.2.5. Generic Conditionals.

Generic conditionals can sometimes be called iterative conditionals. A conditional sentence is considered generic if it expresses generalizations about events or situations in the real world, situations whose fulfilments are certain and definite, and events that are repeatable. Generic conditionals show that the P-clause and the Q-clause express a dependence relation that can be universal because they can introduce general truths or facts which do not change through time. For example,

32. *eda* *nuxluṭ* *az.zeit* *be.l.mai* *yitūf*
 comp mix_{+pres.1.pl} def.oil prep.def.water float_{+pres.3.m.sg}
 When/If we mix oil with water, it floats. (DED).

The hearer is prompted to set up a mental space wherein *oil is mixed with water*, and *floats on it*. An alternative space is also set up wherein *oil is not mixed with water*, nor *does it float on it*. This can be represented as follows:



A mental space representation of *When/If we mix oil with water, it floats*.

The relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause in the above example is based on a fact that represents a physical law. The fact indicated in this type of conditional holds for all times, past, present and future. We do not have any doubt about the fulfilment of the events indicated in generic conditionals. The Q-clause is inherited because it is satisfied in both the reality space R and the mental space M.

Both *if* and *when* can be used in expressing generic situations in English. Nevertheless, there is a slight difference in the interpretation of the above example when *eda* (if) is replaced by *bas* (when): in the former, *floating of oil on water* is conditioned by mixing it with water, while in the latter, *floating of oil on water* is cotermporal with mixing it with water. Though the example expresses more or less the same meaning when *bas* (when) is used, this does not mean that we can always replace *eda* (if) by *bas* (when) in generic conditionals. Consider the following example,

34. ??*eda/bas* *tġib* *aš.šamis* *yiji* *il.leil*
 conp/temp set_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.sun come_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.night
 ?? If/When the sun sets the night comes. (DED).³⁰

Note that the use of *eda* (if) in the above example is rather odd because it suggests that the sun might not set. This leads us to discuss the temporal particle (temp) *bas* (when) and its variant *lammā* (when) in DED, and show how they differ from *eda* (if).

3.2.2.2.5.1. Temporal (when) versus Conditional (if).

This section discusses the use of *bas* and its variant *lammā* (when), and shows how they can be different from *eda* (if). In order is a review of the existing accounts showing the similarities/differences between *when* and *if* in English. These accounts will then constitute a conceptual framework which can help us distinguish temporal *bas/lammā* from conditional *eda* in DED.

Dancygier (1998: 63) points out that *when* can replace *if* in generic conditionals with more or less the same meaning: in generic conditionals, she argues, 'there is some degree of similarity between a sentence with *if* and an analogous one with *when*'. For example,

35. If/When I drink too much wine, I feel dizzy.

³⁰ The use of the double question marks (??) indicates that the sentence is semantically odd.

Using either *if* or *when* in the above example expresses similar meanings, as the speaker talks about an action that he/she frequently performs.

Descriptive grammarians seem to share the same observation: Swan (1980: 624), for example, states that 'in generalizations about things that happen repeatedly, both *when* and *if* are possible without much difference in meaning'. For example,

36.

- a. If/When she sleeps well, she feels better all day.
- b. If/When water boils, it vaporizes.

Similarly, Reilly (1986) points out that 'there is a semantic overlap for *when* and *if* where they refer to situations occurring, having occurred, or predicted to occur, in the real world'. This means that *when* and *if* are interchangeable in English when the P-clause expresses actions/situations referring to habitual occurrences in the real world. Consider the following example.

37.

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{If} \\ \text{When} \end{array} \right\} \text{ Jamie drinks cranberry juice, he gets a rash. } \text{ (Reilly: 1986. 313). }$$

Reilly (1986: 313) further points out that 'the more regular the co-occurrence relationship between the antecedent and consequent events, the more interchangeable the *when* and *if* structures'.

On the other hand, Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) provide two main points which can be used to differentiate *when*-clauses from *if*-clauses. The first concerns the speaker's stance toward the if/when-clause, and the second concerns both the 'contemporality' of the situation presented in the *when-clause*, and the verbal aspect indicated by the verb forms used. These two points are discussed below.

As for the first point, the speaker in a *when*-introduced clause assumes a positive epistemic stance toward the situation presented, while the speaker in an *if*-introduced clause

does not assume such a stance; 'it [*when*] obligatorily adopts a positive epistemic stance towards the situation described in the *when*-clause, while *if* takes a neutral stance' (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 48). The following two examples are illustrative:

38. [Speaker plans to leave gifts for a sleeping child].

- a. When she awakens she will think a magician has been there
- b. If she awakens she will think a magician has been there. (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 46).

In (a), the Q-clause is predicted unconditionally because *when* indicates a positive epistemic stance; it is rather predicted temporally. The speaker in (a) views the proposition in the *when*-clause positively and identifies with it, whereas he/she views it neutrally in (b), i.e., his/her stance towards the proposition is neutral. Further, the speaker in (a) is committed to the reality of the space set up by the *when*-clause, whereas in (b) he/she is not.

The second point distinguishing *when*-clauses from *if*-clauses relates to the verb form used in the *when*-clause: verb forms in *when*-clauses can have aspectual conflict, while this is not the case in *if*-clauses. Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 45) point out that *when* demands 'a punctual time' and 'certainty', and these demands will cause certain verb forms to be 'in aspectual conflict'. The following examples are illustrative:

39.

- a. ??When Faris does not stop eating, he will have a stomach-ache.
- b. When Faris eats too much, he will have a stomach-ache.

Since *when* expresses *certainty*, it sounds pragmatically odd to imagine certainty in (a) – that Faris certainly won't stop eating. The continuous activity of *not stopping* (eating) is in fact in 'aspectual conflict' with the demands of *when* which should establish *certainty* and *punctuality*. In other words, the *when*-clause in (a) contradicts the *certainty* and *punctuality* demands of *when*, and therefore involves aspectual conflict, whereas the *when*-clause in (b) *when Faris eats* is easily interpreted as indicating *certainty* and *punctuality*. Note that no such aspectual conflict is present in *if*-clauses when similar situations are considered:

40.

- a. If Faris does not stop eating, he will have a stomach-ache.
- b. If Faris eats too much, he will have a stomach-ache.

Furthermore, Ingham's (1997: 119) distinction between conditional *if* and temporal *when* is based on the certainty of the action concerned; he argues that 'we can define a time clause as one where the occurrence of the action is not in question, but where the time of occurrence is, at least in future events, not known. A conditional clause on the other hand is one where the occurrence of the action is itself in doubt'. In other words, while the occurrence of the action in conditional clauses is doubtful, the one in temporal clauses is certain. Declerck and Reed (2001: 31) share with Ingham (1997:119) the same observation where they also refer to the certainty of the action as a differentiating point: '*when* differs from *if* in that it implies factuality'. That is to say, sentences introduced by *when* are certain whereas those introduced by *if* are not. For example,

41.

- a. I'll deliver the goods if you pay me.
- b. I'll deliver the goods when you pay me. (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 31).

The speaker in (a) does not seem very sure that he/she will be paid when *if* is used, whereas the one in (b) takes it for granted that he/she will be paid, i.e. payment for him/her is a fact that will definitely take place; the same point is confirmed in Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 12) who point out that *when* 'seems to be marking claims for the factuality of the space it sets up, ... [while] *if* makes no such promises'.

A further difference between *if* and *when* is provided by Thompson and Longacre (1985: 179-80) who argue that the difference between subordinate time clauses and subordinate conditional clauses is that the former are paraphraseable with a relative clause while the latter do not appear in relative clauses. For example,

42.

- a. Sally recognized her old friend *when she saw him*.
- b. Sally recognized her old friend *the time at which she saw him*.

The above examples show that it is possible for the italicized *when*-clause in (a) to be paraphrased by the italicised relative clause in (b). On the other hand, conditional clauses are not paraphraseable by relative clauses:

43.

- a. If Sally sees her old friend, she will recognize him.
- b. ??Sally will recognize her old friend *on the condition which she will see him*.

Further, Thompson and Longacre (1985: 177-178) argue that subordinate time clauses are 'substitutable for by a single word' while subordinate conditional clauses are 'not substitutable for by a single word'. Their evidence is based on Zapotec, an Otomanguean language spoken in Mexico.

A further difference between *if* and *when* relates to the type of the condition they introduce: '*if* and *when* are not the same: in unreal conditionals, only *if*, not *when*, may be used' (Carter & McCarthy, 2006). For example,

44.

- a. If my son had graduated, he would have got a job in a good company.
- b. *When my son had graduated, he would have got a job in a good company.³¹

Semantic overlap between temporals and conditionals does not exist only in English. German, for instance, shows that the use of *wenn* (when) can be both conditional and temporal; Comrie (1986) argues that a sentence like

45. Wenn er kommt, gehe ich weg

If/When he comes, I leave. (Comrie, 1986: 82).

³¹ The use of the asterisk (*) indicates that the sentence is ungrammatical.

can be considered conditional in its interpretation. The same observation is indicated by Dreyer and Schmitt (2001: 160) who point out that 'it is not always easy to distinguish between temporal and conditional sentences with *wenn* in German'.

Based on the above accounts, we predict that the difference between *bas* (when) and *eda* (if) in DED conditionals is also not clear-cut. This issue is discussed in more detail in the following section.

3.2.2.2.5.2. *bas/lammā* versus *eda*.

bas and *lammā* are variants of each other, and can therefore be used interchangeably in several cases. However, only *lammā* is found in both DED and MSA. In MSA, *lammā* has two main uses, (a) a negative particle, and (b) a conditional particle. Wickens (1980: 76) point out that *lammā* is used as a conditional particle indicating time and is often translated as *when*. Similar observations have been made by some traditional Arabic grammarians (see among others AlXoş (1999: 6: 126) and Al'ansāri (2005). Al'ansāri (2005: 369) points out that *lammā* is a conditional particle '*bima'na hīna*', (lit. 'indicating the meaning of *when*'). The following example is from Al'ansāri (2005: 369):

46. *lammā* *jā'a.ni* *'akramtu.hu*
 temp come_{+past.3.m.sg} me honor_{+past.1.sg} him
 When he came to me, I honoured him. (Al'ansāri, 2005: 369).

bas is the dialectal variant of *lammā*, and is never used in MSA or CA; both *bas* and *lammā* are used in DED and both correspond to English *when*. This is clear in the following examples.

47.
 a. *bas/lammā* *tixlaş* *l.ħarib* *yi'imm* *as.salām*
 temp finish_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.war prevail_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.peace
 When the war ends, peace prevails. (DED).

b. <i>bas/lammā</i>	<i>yinzil</i>	<i>l.maṭar</i>	<i>tšir</i>	<i>aš.šwārī</i>	<i>wahil</i>
temp	fall _{+pres.3.m.sg}	def.rain	become _{+pres.3.m}	streets	mud

When the rain falls, the streets become muddy. (DED).

One of the most important differences between *bas* and *lammā* is that a *bas*-clause indicates the present or the future time regardless of its verb form, while this is not the case in *lamma*-clauses. In other words, a *bas*-clause can refer to the future even if a perfective verb form is used. Consider the following examples:

48. [A doctor handing a prescription to a patient]

a. <i>bas</i>	<i>ʾaxaḍit</i>	<i>hāḍa</i>	<i>ad.dawa</i>	<i>tušʿur</i>	<i>b.taḥassun</i>
temp	take _{+past.2.m.sg}	this	def.medicine	feel _{+pres.2.m.sg}	prep.improvement

When you take this medicine, you feel better. (DED).

b. <i>bas</i>	<i>tāxud</i>	<i>hāḍa</i>	<i>ad.dawa</i>	<i>tušʿur</i>	<i>b.taḥassun</i>
temp	take _{+pres.2.m.sg}	this	def.medicine	feel _{+pres.2.m.sg}	prep.improvement

When you take this medicine, you feel better. (DED).

The above two examples express a generic interpretation in spite of the fact that the *bas*-clauses have two different tense forms. That is to say, present or future reference in *bas*-clauses is indicated regardless of the tense form used. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, *Tense in DED Conditionals*.

On the other hand, in *lammā*-clauses a future interpretation is not indicated when the perfective is used, rather the use of the perfective in *lamma*-clauses can only refer to a completed past situation. For example,

49. <i>lammā</i>	<i>hāla</i>	<i>ʿirfat</i>	<i>ʾaxṭāʾha</i>	<i>ʿadrat</i>
temp	Hala	know _{+past.3.f.sg}	mistakes.her	apologize _{+past.3.f.sg}

When Hala knew her mistakes, she apologized. (DED).

In the next section, we will investigate the similarities/differences between *bas*-introduced conditionals and *eda*-introduced ones.

3.2.2.2.5.3. *bas*-Introduced Versus *eḍa*-Introduced Conditionals.

The difference between *if* and *when* is barely noticeable in English when generic situations are expressed. This is also true of some Arabic dialects: Ingham (1997: 117) points out that 'in one area of conditional sentences, the two types conditional and time clause, come very close together and are in some cases indistinguishable, or to put it another way, one would not know whether to translate the sentence into English with *if* or *when*'. Ingham (1997) shows that open punctual conditionals introduced by *ila* (if) can be interpreted with either *if* or *when* in English. The following example is from Ingham (1997: 121).³²

50.

ila galliṭaw i.ṭṭa'ām xaḍā.l.u lugma lugmiten u gām
 comp/temp bring +past.3.pl def.food take +past.3.m.sg prep.him mouthful two.mouthfuls conj stand +past.3.m.sg
 If/Whenever they brought the food, he would take one or two mouthfuls and leave. Ingham (1997: 121).

As shown above, the example can be translated with either *if* or *when* with no difference in meaning.

Similarly, *bas* and *eḍa* in DED are interchangeable when they introduce generic situations. Consider the following examples.

51.

a. *bas/eḍa tšagḡil ad.dafāyeh tšīr al.gurfah dāfyeh*
 temp/comp turn +pres.2.sg def.heater become +pres.3.f.sg def.room warm
 When/If you turn the heater on, the room becomes warm. (DED).

b. *bas/eḍa titla' aš.šamis yinšaf l.ḡasīl*
 temp/comp shine +pres.3.f.sg def.sun dry +pres.3.m.sg def.washing
 When/If the sun shines, the washing dries. (DED).

bas and *eḍa* in the above examples convey the same interpretation (a generic one), and can therefore be used interchangeably. In other words, *bas* and *eḍa* are interchangeable when they introduce generic situations or regular events occurring or predicted to occur in the real world

³² Glosses have been added for this example.

and the more regular the incidents or situations they introduce, the more interchangeable they are.

One of the main differences between *bas*-clauses and *eda*-clauses is that in the former the speaker presupposes that the situations described in the sentence have occurred or will undoubtedly occur, whereas there is no such assumption in the latter. Consider the following examples:

52.

a. [A woman turns the oven on, and places a chicken inside].

bas *tistawi* *ad.dijājah* *nākul.ha*
temp cook_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.hen eat_{+pres.1.pl.it}

When the chicken cooks, we will eat it. (DED).

b. [A wife talking to her husband over the phone].

eda *waṣṣaltu* *al.beit* *qabl.ak* *rāḥ* *'aḥaddir* *al.'aša*
comp arrive_{+past.1.sg} def.house befor.you will prepare_{+pres.1.sg} def.dinner

If I get home before you, I will prepare the dinner. (DED).

The woman in (a) presupposes that the chicken will cook. A reading of (a) with *eda* replacing *bas* is inappropriate because it would then suggest that the chicken may not cook, a suggestion which sounds odd given the context provided. On the other hand, the wife in (b) does not presuppose that she will arrive home before her husband does, rather she is unsure who is going to arrive first.

Another criterion differentiating *bas* from *eda* is the use of negation in the P-clause: it is always possible to negate the P-clause of an *eda*-clause while this is not the case in *bas*-clauses. Consider the following set of examples.

53.

a. [A doctor advising a teenager].

eda *mā baṭṭalit* *tāxuḍ* *ha.ad.dawa* *rāḥ* *tṣir* *mudmin* *'al.eh*
comp Neg stop_{+past.2.m.sg} take_{+pres.2.m.sg} this.def.medicine will becom_{+pres.2.m.sg} addicted prep.it

If you do not stop taking this medicine, you will become addicted to it. (DED).

b. [Two school teachers are discussing some class problems.]

eda mā baṭṭalat tgīr rāḥ 'aqūl.lil.ha tutruk al.ḥiṣṣah
 comp Neg stop_{+past.3.f.sg} chat_{+pres.3.f.sg} will say_{+pres.1.sg} prep.her leave_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.class

If she does not stop chatting, I will ask her to leave the class. (DED).

The above two examples are grammatically and pragmatically acceptable. However, replacing *eda* with *bas* will give pragmatically odd interpretations:

54.

a. [A doctor advising a teenager].

??*bas mā baṭṭalit tāxuḍ ha.ad.dawa rāḥ tṣīr mudmin 'al.eh*
 temp Neg stop_{+past.2.m.sg} take_{+past.2.m.sg} this.def.medicine will becom_{+pres.2.m.sg} addicted prep.it

??When you do not stop taking this medicine, you will become addicted to it. (DED).

b. [Two school teachers are discussing some class problems].

??*bas mā baṭṭalat tgīr rāḥ 'aqūl.lil.ha tutruk al.ḥiṣṣah*
 temp Neg stop_{+past.3.f.sg} chat_{+pres.3.f.sg} will ask_{+pres.1.sg} prep.her leave_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.class

??When she does not stop chatting, I will ask her to leave the class. (DED).

In the above *bas*-clauses there is a contrast between the meanings (certainty and punctuality) which *bas* involves and between the verb forms used: in (a) it is pragmatically odd to imagine a situation in which someone does not stop taking medicine continuously, or someone who regularly does not stop chatting as in (b). In other words, since the *bas*-clause expresses certainty, it sounds pragmatically odd to imagine certainty in these examples- that someone does not stop taking medicine and that someone does not stop chatting. The continuous activity of *not stopping* is in 'aspectual conflict' (cf. Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 45) discussed in 3.2.2.2.5.1. above) with the demands of *bas* which should establish *certainty* and *punctuality*.

A further difference between *eda* and *bas* concerns the use of modals in the Q-clause: there is no need for a modal in the Q-clause of *bas/lammā*-conditionals, whereas some modal element is typically required in the Q-clause of *eda*-conditionals. Consider the following examples.

55.

a. [Two friends meet].

eda zirit.ni lyawm rāh 'axabr.ak l.'axbār l.hilwah
 conp visit_{+past.2.m.sg} me def.today will tell_{+pres.1.sg} you def.news def.beautiful

If you visit me today, I will tell you the good news. (DED).

b. *bas/lammā fariq.ha yixsar l.mubārāh tballiš tibči*
 temp team.her lose_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.match start_{+pres.3.f.sg} cry_{+pres.3.f.sg}

When her team loses the match, she starts to cry. (DED).

As the above examples show, the modal *rāh* (will) is required in conditionals introduced by *eda*. On the other hand, there is no need for such a modal in the Q-clause of *bas/lammā*-introduced conditionals. Nevertheless, there are some cases where we can leave out the modal in *eda*-introduced conditionals, particularly in generic and non-causal conditionals. The following two examples are illustrative:

56.

a. *eda tsaxxin l.mai yigli*
 conp heat_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.water boil_{+pres.3.m.sg}

If you heat water, it boils. (DED).

b. *eda thib at.tasawwq hāda l.maḥal yi'mal tanzilāt*
 conp like_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.shopping this def.store make_{+pres.3.m.sg} discounts

If you like shopping, this store offers discounts. (DED).

As the above two examples show, there is no need for a modal in the Q-clause; both examples presuppose that the Q-clause propositions are true, and therefore we do not need the modal in this case. The example in (a) expresses a generic situation which is based on a physical law that is always true. The example in (b) shows that there is no direct relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause: the fact that somebody likes shopping is not the cause for a certain store to offer discounts. That is to say, the speaker is not predicting that the store *will* offer discounts.

The use of the perfective in *eda*-clauses can denote the present or the future while in the *lammā*-clauses it refers to the past. For example,

57.

- a. *eda* *'axadit* *'asberineh* *rāh* *tuš'ur* *b.taḥassun*
 conp take_{+past.2.m.sg} aspirin will feel_{+pres.2.m.sg} prep.improvement

If you take an aspirin, you will feel better. (DED).

- b. *lammā* *'axadit* *'asberineh* *ša'arit* *b.taḥassun*
 conp take_{+past.2.m.sg} aspirin feel_{+past.2.m.sg} prep.improvement

When you took an aspirin, you felt better. (DED).

The perfective in (a) indicates a future action, while in (b) a completed or past action. This is also true of some other Arabic dialects including Najdi and Riyāḍi dialects where 'a perfective is interpreted as having future time reference only in a conditional structure'

(Ingham, 1997: 118).³³

The use of the first person subject is another criterion used to distinguish *bas*-conditionals from conditionals introduced by *eda*: the use of the first person in *eda*-conditionals can result in pragmatically odd interpretations, whereas there is no such restriction in *bas*-conditionals. Note that the following examples are pragmatically odd:

58.

- a. ??*eda* *ṭaba'tu* *at.taqrir* *nṭeitu.h* *nusxah*
 conp print_{+past.1.sg} def.report give_{+past.1.sg} copy

?? If I printed the report, I gave him a copy. (DED).

- b. ??*eda* *šiftu* *nādiya* *lawwaḥtu.l.ha*
 conp see_{+past.1.sg} Nadia wave_{+past.1.sg} prep.her

?? If I saw Nadia, I waved to her. (DED).

The reason for this oddity can be due to the assumption that generally the speaker should know what happened to him/her in a particular situation. This shows that the use of the first person is not always possible in *eda* conditionals. Nevertheless, we can use the first person subject in

³³ Ingham's (1997) study is based on the dialect of ĀlDhafir tribe of North-Eastern Arabia; 'this is supplemented to some extent by materials from other Bedouin groups and from written sources. I also had the opportunity to observe the speech of Riyāḍ and Sudair region'. (Ingham, 1997:118).

English conditionals when the Q-clause indicates a present situation as in *I'm sorry if I offended anybody*.

On the other hand, there is no restriction on *bas*-conditionals in using first person subjects. Thus, replacing *eda* by *bas* in the above examples results in well-formed and pragmatically acceptable sentences:

59.

- a. *bas* *ṭabʿtu* *at.taqrīr* *nṭeitu.h* *nusxah*
 comp print_{+past.1.sg} def.report give_{+past.1.sg} him copy
 When I printed the report I gave him a copy. (DED).

- b. *bas* *šiftu* *nādiya* *lawwaḥtu.l.ha*
 comp see_{+past.1.sg} Nadia wave_{+past.1.sg} prep.her
 When I saw Nadia I waved to her. (DED).

The above examples are grammatically and pragmatically acceptable though we used the first person in both the P-clauses and the Q-clauses.

Unlike *bas*-conditionals whose two clauses involve a time relation, namely the *bas*-clause defines the reference time for the Q-clause, no relation of this sort is found in *eda*-conditionals. Consider the following examples.

60.

- a. [Salim asks the secretary about his job application]

eda *qaddamit* *ṭalab* *min ʿisboʿ rāḥ* *nitwāṣal* *maʿāk* *bukrah*
 comp apply_{+past.2.m.sg} application prep week will contact_{+pres.1.pl} prep.you tomorrow
 If you applied last week, we will contact you tomorrow. (DED).

- b. [Salim asks the secretary about his job application]

**bas* *qaddamit* *ṭalab* *min ʿisbūʿ rāḥ* *nitwāṣal* *maʿak* *bukrah*
 temp apply_{+past.2.m.sg} application prep week will contact_{+pres.1.pl} prep.you tomorrow
 *When you applied last week we will contact you tomorrow. (DED).

As the above examples show, it is possible in (a) to have a conditional sentence referring to two distinct times: the P-clause refers to the perfective and the Q-clause to the future. However, this possibility is not permitted in the *bas*-conditional as shown in (b).

Furthermore, *lammā/bas*-clauses cannot express an actual situation in the present, as the imperfective denotes either a habitual or future situation/event; the consequence of this is that we cannot say a sentence like

61. **bas/lammā* *this* *b.ta'ab* *'assa'* *'anī.ha* *stirāḥah*
 temp feel_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.tiredness now give_{+pres.1.sg.} her break
 *When she feels tired now, I will give her a break. (DED)

The use of the imperfective in the *bas/lamma*-clause cannot refer to a situation occurring at the moment of speech. The above sentence is ill-formed because the *bas/lammā*-clause defines the reference time of the Q-clause and this time cannot be *now*. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the imperfective in *eda*-clauses refers to an actual situation in the present:

62. *eda* *this* *b.ta'ab* *'assa' rāḥ* *'anī.ha* *stirāḥah*
 conp feel_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.tiredness now will give_{+pres.1.sg.} her break
 If she feels tired now, I will give her a break. (DED).

The above example is grammatical; the imperfective in the P-clause expresses an actual situation occurring at the moment of speech.

Having shown some of the differences/similarities between *eda*, *bas* and *lammā*, and how they can be used in expressing conditional/temporal meanings, we now turn to discuss the *-ever* particle conditionals whose main characteristic is the kind of the particles used.

3.2.2.2.6. *-ever*-Particles Conditionals.

Some of the question words (QWs) in DED are used as conditional particles when the morpheme *-mā*³⁴ is attached onto them. *-mā* (-ever) functions as a conditional marker, and can be an equivalent to the English *-ever* when attached onto a QW like *what* in *whatever*. This is also true of MSA; Ryding (2005: 674) points out that ‘-maa can be suffixed to an adverb or a noun to shift its meaning to *-ever* such as *whenever* or *wherever*. These expressions are considered conditionals in Arabic’. The following example is from Ryding (2005: 674).

63. *ʾayn-a-maa* *kun-ta,* *yu-mkin-uka* *ʾan* *ta-stamiʿ-a*
 wherever be_{+past.2.m.sg} can_{+pres.2.m.sg} comp listen_{+pres.2.m.sg}

Wherever you are, you can listen. (Ryding, 2005: 674).

P-clauses introduced by *-ever* particles have the form of free relative clauses where the speaker does not know the identity of the entity (thing, place, person, etc.) referred to. These free relative structures can have the semantic interpretation of conditional constructions.

In his descriptive study of Syrian Arabic, Cowell (1964: 337-38) refers to conditionals involving the *-ever* morpheme as ‘quasi-conditional’ clauses.³⁵ This indicates that *-mā* has the same function (conditional marker) in other Syrian dialects. Furthermore, Brustad (2000: 265) points out that ‘all four dialects³⁶ share a construction that is a kind of habitual conditional: the particle */-mā/* suffixed to an interrogative particle to give the meaning *-ever*’. In the Moroccan

³⁴ The use of *-mā* (-ever) as a conditional marker is not to be confused with *mā* as a negative particle: *-mā* as a conditional marker is a bound morpheme that gets its meaning only when it is attached to a QW, while the negative particle *mā* is a free morpheme used in negating verbal sentences:

1.

- a. *nādiya* *tišrab* *ḥalīb*
 Nadia drink_{+pres.3.f.sg} milk
 Nadia drinks milk. (DED).
- b. *nādiya* *mā* *tišrab* *ḥalīb*
 Nadia Neg drink_{+pres.3.f.sg} milk
 Nadia does not drink milk. (DED).

³⁵ Cowell’s (1964) study is based on the dialect of Damascus.

³⁶ The four dialects Brustad (2000) refers to are Moroccan, Egyptian, Syrian, and Kuwaiti.

dialect, for instance, the conditional marker *-mā* attaches to the QW *fin* (where) to give the particle *finmā* (wherever). *finmā* (wherever) can be used as a conditional particle. Consider the following example from Moroccan Arabic.

64. *fin-mā* *mšīna,* *'inti* *m'āna*
 wherever go_{+past.1.pl} you prep.us
 Wherever we went, you were with us. (Brustad, 2000: 265).

As can be seen in the above example, the conditional marker *-mā* (-ever) attaches onto the QW *fin* (where) to form the particle *finmā* (wherever) which can be used as a conditional particle.

Similarly, in English *-ever* is attached onto a QW and the resulting form is used as a conditional particle: Palmer (1974: 132-3) as quoted in Declerck and Reed (2001: 6) indicates that a conditional may have 'a meaning close to *whenever*- to link two habitual actions'. Further, in his (1986) typological study of conditionals, Comrie points out that the *-ever* morpheme is used in English to help express conditionality: the 'insertion of indefinite *-ever* into temporal clauses can lead to interpretations identical to those of conditionals'. Thus, a conditional introduced by a QW + *-ever* being attached onto it has an interpretation similar to a one introduced by *if*. For example,

65. Whenever/if he goes shopping, he buys some digestive biscuits.

Having shown some of the existing accounts for the use of *-ever* as a conditional marker in both Arabic and English, we will discuss the *-mā* (-ever) conditional particles in DED.

3.2.2.2.6.1. The *-mā* Conditional Particles in DED.

Four *-mā* (-ever) particles are used in DED: *weinmā* (wherever), *škūnmā* (whatever), *'eimtamā* (whenever) and *minumā* (whoever). Each particle is composed of a QW and the

conditional marker *-mā* (-ever). The following table shows these *-mā* particles and the QWs used in forming them.

The <i>-mā</i> Conditional Particles in DED	
Question Word	Insertion of <i>-mā</i>
<i>wein</i> (where)	<i>wein.mā</i> (wherever)
<i>škūn</i> (what)	<i>škūn.mā</i> (whatever)
<i>'eimta</i> (when)	<i>'eimta.mā</i> (whenever)
<i>minu</i> (who)	<i>minu.mā</i> (whoever)

Table (10): The *-mā* Conditional Particles in DED.

I will show how each particle is formed, discuss the meaning it gives to the sentence it introduces, and refer to the verb forms possible after each particle. Our starting point is the particle *škūnmā* (whatever).

3.2.2.2.6.1.1. *škūnmā* (whatever).

škūnmā (whatever) is composed of the QW *škūn* (what) and the conditional marker *-mā* (-ever). As a QW, *škūn* (what) is used to ask about things, actions, names etc., and can therefore be followed by either nouns or verbs:

66.

- a. *škūn* *tištaḡil*
 QW do_{+pres.2.m.sg}
 What do you do? (DED).

- b. *škūn* *as.sālfēh*
 QW def.matter
 What is the matter? (DED).

When *-mā* attaches to *škūn*, the resulting particle *škūnmā* has the meaning of English *whatever*. *škūnmā* can be used as a conditional particle introducing a realis conditional with generic interpretation:

67. [Two co-workers criticize their colleague Salwa who used to spread gossip].

- škūnmā* *tisma'* *txabber* *mudīr.ha*
 whatever hear_{+pres.3.f.sg} inform_{+pres.3.f.sg} manager.her

Whatever she hears, she tells to her manager. (DED).

The above example expresses a realis conditional which is pragmatically interpretable as *if she hears anything, she tells it to her manager*. Salwa's reporting of whatever she hears is a habit that she does on a routine basis. *škūnmā* conveys a meaning similar to *no matter what*, or *whatever*. The sentence has a generic interpretation; it expresses a situation that occurs on a regular basis: *whatever Salwa hears she tells to her manager*.

Replacing *škūnmā* (whatever) with *eda* results in an ungrammatical sentence:

68. **eda* *tisma'* *txabber* *mudir.ha*
 comp hear_{+pres.3.f.sg} inform_{+pres.3.f.sg} manager.her
 *If she hears, she tells to her manager. (DED).

The ungrammaticality in the resultant example comes from the fact that the transitive verb *tisma'* (hear) is not satisfied because it is not followed by a complement. The above example poses the question of why it is possible to use *tisma'* (hear) without a complement when the sentence is introduced by *škūnmā* (whatever), but not possible to do so when the sentence is introduced by *eda* (if). The answer to this question comes from the fact that the particle *škūnmā* (whatever) functions as the complement of the verb *tisma'* (hear), but it has moved to the beginning of the sentence. On the other hand, *eda* can not function as a complement to the verb *tisma'* (hear). This means that the above example can be grammatical if the verb *tisma'* is satisfied by a complement:

69. *eda* *tisma'* *'ai.ši* *txabber* *mudir.ha*
 comp hear_{+pres.3.f.sg} any.thing inform_{+pres.3.f.sg} manager.her
 If she hears anything, she tells to her manager. (DED).

škūnmā is also used to express future conditionals where the Q-clause involves a modal auxiliary indicating a future reference:

70. [A journalist talks over the phone].

škūnmā *yīšīr* *rāḥ* *'axabbr.ak*
 Whatever happen_{+pres.3.m.sg} will inform_{+pres.1.sg} you
 Whatever happens, I will inform you. (DED).

The example indicates a future realis conditional: *if anything new happens, the journalist will inform the magazine he works for*. *eda* can not replace *škūnmā* in the above example for the same reason discussed above.

Past situations in *škūnmā*-clauses are expressed by (a) using a perfective verb after *škūnmā*, and by (b) using a form of the Aux *čān* followed by an imperfective verb form in the Q-clause:

71.

- a. *škūnmā* *waffarat* *čānat* *ṭḥuṭ* *bi.ḥsāb.ha*
 whatever save_{+past.3.f.sg} be_{+past.3.f.sg} deposit_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.account.her
 Whatever she saved she used to deposit in her (bank) account. (DED).
- b. *škūnmā* *qtarḥat* *čānū* *y'ārdūn*
 whatever suggest_{+past.3.f.sg} be_{+past.3.pl} oppose_{+pres.3.pl}
 Whatever she suggested they used to oppose. (DED).

Both of the above examples express past realis conditionals denoting past habits/situations that used to take place in the past. The P-clause consists of the particle *škūnmā* (whatever) followed by a perfective verb, while the Q-clause is introduced by a form of the Aux *čān* (lit. 'he was') followed by an imperfective verb. The inflections of the Aux *čān* which are in concord with the understood subjects indicate that the Aux *čān* is not a frozen hypothetical marker as is the case in imaginative conditionals (as we will see later in this chapter).

DED -ever particle conditionals are not used for expressing conditionals with an irrealis interpretation; the irrealis interpretation, as we will see later in this chapter, is signalled by the particle *lau* (if) which cannot occur in -ever conditionals:

72. [Two friends are in a restaurant looking at the selection of meals available in the menu]

škūnmā tuṭlub lāzim tiṭjannab al.'akil ad.dasim
 conp order_{+pres.2.m.sg} Mod avoid_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.food def.fatty

Whatever you order, it is necessary that you avoid fatty food. (DED)

There is no way of looking at the P-clause in the above example as expressing irrealis counterfactual situation meaning *Whatever you had ordered*. Further, the irrealis interpretation of a DED conditional sentence requires that the Q-clause involve the uninflected occurrence of *čān* which cannot occur in the Q-clause of –ever-conditionals:

73. **škūnmā tuṭlub čān lāzim tiṭjannab al.'akil ad.dasim*
 conp order_{+pres.2.m.sg} be_{+past.3.m.sg} Mod avoid_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.food def.fatty

Whatever you order, it would have been necessary to avoid fatty food. (DED).

Nevertheless, English ever-particle conditionals can express conditionals with irrealis interpretation where a counterfactual pluperfect is used in the P-clause. The following examples are illustrative:

74. Whatever his staff had claimed, he would have argued against.

Like the QW used to form it, *škūnmā* (whatever) is used to refer to things or objects, but not to humans. This becomes clear when we compare *škūnmā* (whatever) with its counterpart *minumā* (whoever) which, by contrast, is used only with humans.

3.2.2.2.6.1.2. *minumā* (whoever).

minumā (whoever) is composed of the QW *minu* (who) and the *-mā* (-ever) morpheme. Together they form *minumā* (whoever) which is used as a conditional particle referring to humans. The following examples show how the QW *minu* (who) is used,

75.

a. *minu ribiḥ l.yānaṣīb*
 QW win_{+past.3.m.sg} def.lottery
 Who won the lottery? (DED).

- b. *minu* *bāq* *l.maṣāri*
 QW steal_{+past.3.m.sg} def.money
 Who stole the money? (DED).

minumā is used as a conditional particle introducing realis conditionals be they present, past or future conditionals. The following example expresses a present habitual conditional.

76. *minumā* *yiqra* *bi.ntidām* *titwassa'* *ma'rif.ūh*
 whoever read_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep.regularity increase_{+pres.3.f.sg} knowledge.his
 Whoever reads regularly his knowledge increases. (DED).

The above sentence can be paraphrased as *if anyone reads regularly, his knowledge increases*.

The *minumā*-clause indicates actions/situations referring to habitual occurrences in the real world. When introducing present habitual conditionals, the main verb in both clauses should be in the imperfective.

When *minumā*-conditionals introduce conditionals with future interpretations, the Q-clause has to involve a modal referring to the future:

77. [Maher and Fadi are two shop assistants; Maher asks Fadi why he places the feeding bottles next to the sterilizers. Fadi says:]

minumā *yīštari* *qannīnat rdā'ah* *rāḥ* *yīštari* *mu'aqmeh* *ma'a.ha*
 whoever buy_{+pres.3.m.sg} bottle feeding will buy_{+pres.3.m.sg} sterilizer prep.it
 Whoever buys a feeding bottle, he will buy a sterilizer with it. (DED).

The above example indicates a future conditional interpretation, and can be equated to a conditional sentence with *if*: *if any customer buys a feeding bottle, he/she will buy a sterilizer with it*.

Though the *minumā*-clause can take the form of a free relative (*Whoever buys a feeding bottle*), the sentence it introduces will still convey a conditional interpretation. In other words, the antecedent of the *minumā* (whoever) is always indefinite.

When used in past conditionals, *minumā* is followed by a perfective verb form, while its Q-clause is introduced by a form of the Aux *čān* followed by an imperfective verb:

(P-clause: *minumā* + perfective, Q-clause: *čān* + imperfective). For example,

78.[Ali asks Sally about Saddam Husein, the previous president of Iraq; Sally says:]

minumā ārad hukūmt.uh čān yiḥuṭṭ.uh bi.as.sijin
 whoever oppose_{+past.3.m.sg} government.his be_{+past.3.m.sg} put_{+pres.3.m.sg} him prep.def.preson
 Whoever opposed his government, he used to imprison him. (DED).

The above example can be paraphrased as *if anybody opposed Saddam Husein's government, he used to imprison him*. That is to say, the above example conveys a past realis conditional: it describes a past habit Saddam Husein used to have.

The last two *-mā* (-ever) particles are *weinmā* (wherever) and *'eimtāmā* (whenever). They do not differ in terms of use and structure from *minumā* and *škūnmā* discussed above; therefore, they will be discussed together in the following section to avoid repetition.

3.2.2.2.6.1.3. *weinmā* (wherever) and *'eimtāmā* (whenever).

Both particles are composed of a QW combined with the conditional marker *-mā* (-ever): *weinmā* (wherever) is composed of *wein* (where) and the conditional marker *-mā* (-ever), and *'eimtāmā* (whenever) is composed of *'eimta* (when) and the conditional marker *-mā* (-ever). The following examples show how *wein* (where) and *'eimta* (when) are used in questions:

79.

- a. *wein* *li.ktāb*
 QW def.book
 Where (is) the book? (DED).
- b. *wein* *rāḥ* *trūḥ* *bukrah*
 QW will go_{+pres.2.m.sg} tomorrow
 Where will you go tomorrow? (DED).

80.

- a. *'eimta* *tsāfir*
 QW travel_{+pres.2.m.sg}
 When do you travel? (DED).

- b. 'eimta sāfarit

QW travel_{+past.2.m.sg}

When did you travel? (DED).

- c. 'eimta rāh tsāfir

QW will travel_{+pres.2.m.sg}

When will you travel? (DED)

As the above sets of examples show, *wein* (where) is used to ask about places, while *'eimta* (when) about the time at which something occurs, occurred, or will occur.

When the conditional marker *-mā* attaches onto these QWs, they can be used as conditional particles. Both *weinmā* (wherever) and *'eimtāmā* (whenever) are used to express habitual, future or past realis conditionals. The following examples indicate habitual interpretations.

81.

- a. [Sally and Hala meet and start their common gossip]

weinmā rāma trūh tuḥ mikyāj
 wherever Rama go_{+pres.3.f.sg} put_{+pres.3.f.sg} make-up

Wherever Rama goes, she wears make-up. (DED).

- b. [Nadia and Monah meet and start talking about each other's diet]

'eimtāmā 'aleiqi 'akil ṭabī'i 'aštārī.h
 whenever find_{+pres.1.sg} food natural buy_{+pres.1.sg} it

Whenever I find natural food, I buy it. (DED).

Both examples introduce habitual conditionals: (a) expresses Rama's habit of wearing make-up wherever she goes, and (b) indicates Monah's habit of buying natural food whenever she finds it. Both examples can be paraphrased with conditional sentences of the form *if P, Q*.

82.

- a. If Rama goes anywhere, she wears make-up.
 b. If Nadia finds natural food anywhere, she buys it.

Further, *weinmā* (wherever) and *'eimtāmā* (whenever) can be used in future conditionals, where a modal is used in the Q-clause:

83. [A doctor talks to a diabetic patient]

- a. *weinmā* *trūḥ* *rāḥ* *yiwiṣfū.l.ak* *nafs* *ad.dawa*
 wherever go_{+pres.2.m.sg} will prescribe_{+pres.3.pl} prep.you same def. medicine
 Wherever you go, they will prescribe you the same medicine. (DED).

b. [A nurse talks to a patient in a private hospital]

- 'eimtāmā* *tikbis* *hāḍa* *az.zir* *rāḥ* *'āji* *mubāšaratan*
 whenever ring_{+pres.2.m.sg} this def.bell will come_{+pres.1.sg} immediately
 Whenever you press this button, I will come immediately. (DED).

Both examples express future plans or contingencies: in (a), the doctor expects that the patient will be prescribed the same medicine (insulin) wherever he goes. In (b), the nurse informs the patient that she will come to his help whenever he presses a certain button. Similarly, both examples can be equated to conditional sentences of the form *if P, Q*.

84.

- a. If you go to any other clinic, they will prescribe you the same medicine.
 b. If you press this button, I will come immediately.

When *weinmā* (wherever) and *'eimtāmā* (whenever) are used in past conditionals, the structure of the sentence changes: *weinmā* (wherever) and *'eimtāmā* (whenever) are followed by a perfective verb in the P-clause. The Q-clause begins with a form of the Aux *čān* followed by a verb in the imperfective:

85. [Ahmad was asked how friendly the people he met were.]

- a. *weinmā* *riḥtu* *čānū* *yraḥbūn* *bi.ni*
 wherever go_{+past.1.sg} be_{+past.3.pl} welcome_{+pres.3.m.pl} prep.me
 Wherever I went, they used to welcome me. (DED).
- b. [Salim complains to his friends about his wife's old habits.]
'eimtāmā *rji'tu* *'al.l.beit* *čānat* *tballiš* *naq.ha*
 whenever return_{+past.1.sg} prep.def.house be_{+past.3.f.sg} start_{+pres.3.f.sg} nagging.her
 Whenever I came back home, she used to start her nagging. (DED).

Both examples indicate past habitual conditionals. The relation holding between the P-clause and the Q-clause is a habit relation that was true in the past.

Based on the above discussion, we find that the *-mā* (-ever) particles share three main characteristics. First, all can be used to express present, future and past conditionals. Second, the fact that an *-ever* particle can not replace the question word from which it is composed indicates that they (the *-ever*-particles and the question words from which they are composed) are in complementary distribution and that they are mutually exclusive. Third, they all show the same verb forms used: in habitual conditional, for example, the P-clause and the Q-clause involve an imperfective verb form, while in past conditionals the Aux *čān* is used in the Q-clauses. The use of these particles with the verb forms used are summarized in the following table:

Verb Forms in <i>-ma</i> -Particles Conditionals			
<i>-ma</i> (-ever) Particles	Type of conditional	P-clause Verb Form	Q-clause Verb Form
<i>škūnmā</i> (whatever)	Habitual	imperfective	imperfective
<i>minumā</i> (whoever)	Future	Imperfective	<i>rāḥ</i> + imperfective
<i>weinmā</i> (wherever)			
<i>ʔeimtāmā</i> (whenever)	Past	perfective	<i>čān</i> + imperfective

Table (11): Verb Forms in *-mā*-Particles Conditionals

3.2.2.2.7. Realis Conditionals Introduced by *ʔin*, (ʔin-RCs).

The last particle used in realis conditionals (RCs) is *ʔin*. Its use in DED is different from the one in Classical or Modern Standard Arabic: in DED, it is used to introduce a specific type of RC, those that have rare occurrences. In CA or MSA, on the other hand, *ʔin* can be used to introduce both RCs and IRCs. I will give a brief account of *ʔin* in CA and MSA, and then turn to show how *ʔin* is used in expressing DED RCs.

There is a consensus among linguists that *ʔin* in CA or MSA occurs less frequently compared to other particles. Ryding (2005: 672), for example, shows that *ʔin* occurs less frequently in MSA when compared to other conditional particles like *edā*: 'the use of *ʔin* with

conditional clauses is less frequent in Modern Standard Arabic than in literary and Classical Arabic'. Consider the following example from Ryding (2005: 672),

86. *'in* *zur-tum-uu-nii* *'akram-tu-kum*
 comp visit_{+past.2.pl.} me honour_{+past.1.sg.} you
 If you visit me, I shall honour you. (Ryding, 2005: 672).³⁷

The same observation is reported in Peled (1992: 41) who points out that the occurrence of *'in* is 'rare' compared to other particles.

Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 291-292) argue that *'in* can express both RCs and IRCs.³⁸ They point out that both *'in* and *eda* are used to express RCs: 'The likely (or possible) condition is usually introduced by *'in* or *eda*'. They further argue that *'in* is used to express both realis and irrealis conditionals. The latter, they point out, are expressed by 'prefacing' the verb in the *'in*-clause with the Aux *kana*. The following example is from Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 292).

87. *'in* *kāna* *qad*³⁹ *qāma* *daxalū* *bait.a.hu*
 comp be_{+past.3.m.sg} verb.part stand_{+past.3.m.sg} enter_{+past.3.m.pl} house.Acc. his
 If he had departed, they entered his house. (Haywood and Nahmad, 1962: 292).

Based on the above accounts, we can conclude that *'in* is used in CA and MSA to express both RCs and IRCs; the distinction between the two is based on the structure, particularly the use of the Aux *kana*.

In the remaining part of this section, we discuss how *'in* is used in DED RCs. I will show that the use of *'in*-conditionals in DED expresses meanings different from the ones found in MSA or CA.

³⁷ Ryding (2005: 672) borrows this example from Abboud and McCarus (1983: 2: 182).

³⁸ Ryding (2005: 671) shares the same views where he argues that 'to express possible conditions, Arabic uses two conditional particles: *eda* or *'in*'.

³⁹ *qad* is a verbal particle (verb-part) used to convey information about the aspect of the verb it precedes (Ryding, 2005: 446).

In DED, *'in* is used to express two types of RCs. First, RCs expressing situations that rarely occur but are possible. The second type expresses RCs comparable with English 'Easter Bunny' sentences.

Situations or events in *'in*-conditionals are very unlikely to happen, and their fulfilment is doubtful; nevertheless, they are possible. In other words, *'in*-introduced conditionals describe events which though unlikely are never unrealis. They indicate events that do not often occur, or situations that the speaker thinks they rarely or scarcely occur. Consider the following two examples. The first concerns the journalist al-Zaidi who has thrown his shoe at the previous American president, an event that rarely happens. It is clear, in the second example, that the P-clause describes a realis rare situation because only a few attempts have been made to achieve unity among Arabic countries.

88.

- a. *'in* *lagah* *qundart.uh* *'ala* *ra'is* *tani* *lāzim* *ad.dawlah* *tutrud.uh*
 comp throw_{+past.3.m.sg} shoe.his prep president another Mod government sack_{3.f.sg} him
 If ever he throws his shoe at another president again, the government must sack him. (DED).

- b. *'in* *twahḥadat* *ad.dwal* *l.'arabiyyeh* *rāḥ* *yišaklūn* *quwwah* *čabīreh*
 comp unite_{+past.3.f.pl} def.countries def.arabic will represent_{+pres.3.pl} power big
 If ever the Arabic countries unite, they will represent a strong power. (DED).

Throwing a shoe at a president in (a) is seen as a possibility which has a very little or scant chance to occur. The same thing applies to the example in (b) where the speaker is extremely doubtful that the Arabic countries will unite at any time. As the translations of the above two examples show, the best equivalent corresponding to *'in* is the combination of *if* and *ever*, (*if ever*). Analogous meaning can be expressed by *should* in English:

89.

- a. Should he throw his shoes at another president again, the government must sack him.
 b. Should the Arabic countries unite, they will represent a strong power.

As noted above, *'in* is used with conditionals expressing rare, yet possible, situations. Thus, using it with conditionals expressing generic or general realis situations would result in pragmatically odd sentences. For example, the following sentences are ruled out because *'in* is used:

90. ?? *'in* *tal'at* *aš.šamis* *bukrah* *rāh* *nsāfir* *'a.aš.šām*
 comp rise_{+past.3.f.sg} def.sun tomorrow will travel_{+pres.1.pl} prep.def.Damascus
 ?? If ever the sun rises tomorrow, we will travel to Damascus. (DED).

The example above is ill-formed because *sun rising* is, beyond any doubt, not a rare or scarce event as the use of *'in* suggests.

Furthermore, the particle *'in* has an interesting use, where the P or Q clause describes a situation that is extremely unlikely to occur, if not impossible. Consider the following two examples. In (a), a father is desperately talking to his lazy son few days before the final exam; the example in (b) is a wife's response when she knew that her husband had misguidedly invested his money with a deceiving company.

91.

- a. *'in* *najaḥit* *bi.l.fahiš* *rāh* *'aquš* *'id.i*
 comp pass_{+past.2.m.sg} prep.def.exam will cut_{+pres.1.sg} hand.my
 If ever you pass the exam, I shall cut my hand off. (DED).
- b. *'in* *yitla'* *aj.jaḥaš* *'a.l.meiḍanah* *rāh* *yraj'ū.l.ak* *mašāriyy.ak*
 comp climb_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.donkey prep.def.minaret will reurn_{+pres.3.pl} prep.you money.your
 If ever the donkey climbs the minaret, you will get your money back. (DED).

In (a), the speaker apparently treats the Q-clause as false, and from its falsity we understand that the P-clause is highly unlikely to be fulfilled, and is false too. In (b), it is obviously false to have *a donkey climbing the minaret of a mosque*, and from the falsity of this proposition, we understand that the Q-clause's proposition (that *the husband gets his money back*) is false too.

An observable point in the above two examples is that the interpretation of (a) goes from the Q-clause to the P-clause, while the interpretation of (b) goes from the P-clause to the Q-clause. In other words, the absurd situation in this type of conditional can be expressed either

in the Q-clause as in (a), or in the P-clause as in (b). Both examples describe situations the speaker believes to be highly unlikely or extremely difficult to occur.⁴⁰

Comparable structures are also found in English where the speaker indicates the falsity of the P-clause by providing an obviously false Q-clause. Abbott (2006: 9) calls this type of conditional 'Easter bunny conditionals' which, she states, 'depend crucially on *modus tollens*, the consequent is intended to strike the addressee as obviously false, thus conveying the falsity of the antecedent'. Consider the following examples.

92.

- a. If that's a real diamond, then I'm the Easter bunny. (Abbott, 2006: 9).
- b. If that's a real diamond, I'll eat my hat. (Abbott, 2004: 11).
- c. If Hitler was a military genius, then I'm a monkey's uncle. (Young, 1989: 44).

In an earlier study, Abbott (2004: 11) argues that 'such sentences are very useful for lively denials of somebody else's (explicit or implicit) claims'. The speaker in (a) denies the claim that *the diamond is real*. A similar observation was noted by Young (1989: 44) who points out that the P-clause in this type of conditional is strongly negated through the Q-clause's falsity: 'the consequence is so obviously false that the sentence is in fact a strong negative assertion'. That is to say, the P-clauses in (a-c) above are negated: the diamond is not a real one, and Hitler was not a military genius.

A noticeable difference between the English 'Easter Bunny' conditionals and their DED counterparts discussed above is that in English it is the Q-clause that expresses the false or absurd situation, while there is no such restriction in DED.

⁴⁰ Other DED examples are very culture-specific: a clerk was told by someone that the government will increase everybody's salary by 50 %. Unbelieving what he was told, the clerk says:

'in	ṣaḥ	kalām.ak	rāḥ	'aḥliq	ṣawārbī
comp	correct _{+past.3.m.sg}	speech.your	will	shave _{+pres.1.m.sg}	moustaches.my

If ever what you say is right I shall shave my moustaches. (DED).

For many people in Dier Ezour, moustaches are a symbol of manhood. Other examples involve shaving the beard which symbolizes other similar beliefs.

The Aux *čān* plays a significant role in the structure and interpretation of DED conditionals. Not surprising is the fact that *čān* can even function as a conditional particle.

3.2.2.2.8. *čān*-Introduced Conditionals.

Several studies (Pesetsky 1989, Holmberg 1986, and Den Besten 1983) share the observation that inverted conditionals in English and in a number of other Germanic languages involve a movement from I to C; Pesetsky (1989: 6), for example, points out that 'C-Inv [conditional inversion] is a rule that moves the contents of INFL to C'. This type of conditional is known in English as *inverted conditionals*.

Some researchers point out that 'the inverted conditional antecedent is often more formal in English than its uninverted counterpart' (Iatridou and Embick, 1994: 190). Consider the following examples:

93.

- a. If John had eaten the calamari, he might be better now.
- b. Had John eaten the calamari, he might be better now. (Iatridou and Embick, 1994: 190).

Iatridou and Embick (1994: 190) argue that the example in (b) is more formal than the one in (a).

On the other hand, Declerck and Reed (2001: 221) state that 'although inversion [in conditionals] is typical of a formal style, it may also occur in less formal (e.g. quoted, or ostensibly quoted, spoken) English'. This means that inverted conditionals in English can be used in formal and spoken communication.

Similar constructions can be found in other Arabic dialects such as Moroccan Arabic; Brustand (2000: 263) argues that Moroccan speakers use a variant of *čān* (*kūn*) as a conditional particle. Consider the following example from Brustand (2000: 263):

94. *kūn žiti kunrā tfəyykna*⁴¹

kūn came-you *kunrā* had-fun-we

If you had come, we would have had fun. (Brustad, 2000: 263).

In Najdi Arabic, for instance, all the different variants of *kān* such as *inkan*, *inčan*, etc., represent hypothetical conditional particles (Ingham, 1994: 139).

Corresponding DED structures are signalled by *čān* where it introduces the P-clause. The DED Aux *čān* has developed into a conditional particle used in introducing conditional sentences. This can resemble English constructions like *should you need any help contact me*, where *should* replaces the conditional particle *if*. Let us posit that DED *čān*-introduced conditionals are equivalent of English inverted conditionals. Consider the following examples where (b) is the *čān*-introduced equivalent of (a).

95.

a. *eḍa čānat šarbānah qahwa mā rāḥ tnām b.suhūlah*
 comp be_{+past.3.f.sg} drink_{+ActivPart} coffee Neg will sleep_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.ease
 If she has drunk coffee, she would not sleep easily. (DED).

b. *čānha šarbānah qahwa mā rāḥ tnām b.suhūlah*
 be_{+3.f.sg} drink_{+ActivPart} coffee Neg will sleep_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.ease
 Should she drink coffee, she would not sleep easily. (DED).

(a) shows that *eḍa* occupies the complementiser position in the uninverted conditional, whereas (b) shows that we have an empty complementiser position where the Aux *čān* has moved to it. This implies that DED *čān*-introduced conditionals also involve a T to C movement, as is the case in English.

The *čān*-introduced conditional is not a paraphrase of its *non-čān*-introduced counterpart; the *čān*-introduced conditional does not express the same meaning or time reference of its *non-čān*-introduced counterpart, as the *čān*-introduced conditional will always refer to the present or the future. Let us consider the following example.

⁴¹ The glosses Brustad (2000: 263) provides for this example do not make sense to me, particularly the word *kunrā*.

96.

[A wife comes back home carrying several shopping bags; her husband says:]

- a. *eḏa* *čānat* *titsawwaq* *šarfāt* *kul* *mašāri.i*
 comp be_{+past.3.f.sg} shop_{+pres.3.f.sg} spend_{+past.3.f.sg} all money.my
 If she was shopping, she spent all my money. (DED).

- b. *čānha* *titsawwaq* *rāḥ* *tuṣruf* *kul* *mašari.i*
 be_{+past.3.f.sg} shop_{+pres.3.f.sg} will spend_{+pres.3.f.sg} all money.my
 Should she be shopping, she will spend all my money. (DED).

The past reference is excluded once *čān* introduces the sentence. That is to say, though *čān* is the past form of *yakūn* (be), it indicates a future time reference when used in *čān*-introduced conditional. That is to say, DED *čān*-introduced conditionals do not refer to the past- they only refer to the future; conditionals referring to the past have to be introduced by a conditional particle like *lau* or *eḏa*.

lau-introduced conditionals (see next section *DED Irrealis Conditionals*) cannot be changed into their *čān*-introduced counterpart. In other words, it is not possible to change the uninverted irrealis conditionals into their *čān*-introduced ones. For example, we cannot change the example in (a) below into its *čān*-introduced counterpart because this will result in an ungrammatical structure as shown in (b):

97.

- a. *lau* *čintu* *ʾaʾrif* *sāli* *bi.l.mustašfah* *čān* *zirtu.ha*
 comp be_{+past.1.sg} know_{+pres.1.sg} Sally prep.def.hospital be_{+past.3.m.sg} visit_{+past.1.sg} her
 If I had known Sally in the hospital, I would have visited her. (DED).

- b. **čintu* *ʾaʾrif* *sāli* *bi.l.mustašfah* *čān* *zirtu.ha*
 be_{+past.1.sg} know_{+pres.1.sg} Sally prep.def.hospital be_{+past.3.m.sg} visit_{+past.1.sg} her
 *I knew Sally in the hospital, I would have visited her. (DED).

However, this structure is possible in English: *Had I known Sally in the hospital, I would have visited her.*

The structure of DED *čān*-introduced conditionals can vary where *čān* can be followed by a clause or a copular clause. Consider the following examples where *čān* is followed by a clause.

98.

a. [Sami tells his sister Salwa that their father will buy him a bike for his birthday. Salwa replies:]

čān 'bū.i štarā l.sāmi biskaleit lāzim yištari wāḥid 'il.i zeid
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} father.my buy_{+past.3.m.sg} prep.Sami bike Mod buy_{+pres.3.m.sg} one prep.me as well
 Should my father buy Sami a bicycle, he must buy one for me as well. (DED).

b. [Ahmad's wife is going to deliver her baby next month. Ahmad says:]

čān mart.i jābat walad rāḥ 'asammī.eh 'ibrāhīm
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} wife.my beget_{+past.3.f.sg} boy will call_{+pres.1.m.sg} him Ibrahim.
 Should my wife give birth to a baby boy, I will call him Ibrahim. (DED).

In both examples, *čān* replaces the conditional particle *eḏa*, and is followed by a clause. That is to say, the above two examples are equivalent to a corresponding examples with *eḏa*:

99.

a. [Sami tells Salwa that their father will buy him a bike for his birthday. Salwa replys:]

eḏa 'bū.i štarā l.sāmi biskaleit lāzim yištari wāḥid 'il.i zeid
 conp father.my buy_{+past.3.m.sg} prep.Sami bike Mod buy_{+pres.3.m.sg} one prep.me as well
 If my father buys Sami a bicycle, he must buy one for me as well. (DED).

b. [Ahmad's wife is going to deliver her baby next month. Ahmad says:]

eḏa mart.i jābat walad rāḥ 'asammī.eh 'ibrāhīm
 conp wife.my beget_{+past.3.f.sg} boy will call_{+pres.1.m.sg} him Ibrahim.
 If my wife gives birth to a baby boy, I will call him Ibrahim. (DED).

To me, there is no clear difference between *čān*-introduced conditionals and their corresponding *eḏa*-introduced counterparts, as both convey the same message and both express future realis situations. Nevertheless, the use of *čān* to introduce conditional sentences does not mark formality, as the use of *čān* is a dialectal variant of the classical *kana* (lit. 'he was').

A noticeable point in this type of conditional is that *čān* does not inflect when the subject of the P-clause is overt. That is to say, it is used in its default invariable form, *čān*. On

the other hand, when the subject is absent, an accusative clitic attaches to the end of *čān* to mark the agreement with the dropped subject. Compare the following two examples:

100.

- a. *čān.uh štara l.sāmi biskaleit lāzim yištari wāhid 'il.i zeid*
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} buy_{+past.3.m.sg} prep.Sami bike Mod buy_{+pres.3.m.sg} one prep.me as well
 Should he buy Sami a bicycle, he must buy one for me as well. (DED)

- b. *čān.ha jābat walad rāḥ 'asammī.eh 'ibrāhīm*
 be_{+past.3.f.sg} beget_{+past.3.f.sg} boy will call_{+pres.1.m.sg}.him Ibrahim.
 Should she give birth to a baby boy, I will call him Ibrahim. (DED).

čān as a conditional particle is suffixed by the accusative clitics *-uh* in (a), and by *-ha* in (b); these clitics mark agreement with the covert subjects: *-uh* in (a) marks the third person singular subject, and *-ha* in (b) marks the third person feminine subject. The following table shows the different forms of *čān* with the accusative clitics attached onto it:

101.

Accusative Clitics attached to <i>čān</i>			
Person		Singular	Plural
1	Masculine and feminine	<i>čān.i</i>	<i>čān.na</i>
2	Masculine	<i>čān.nak</i>	<i>čān.kum</i>
	Feminine	<i>čān.či</i>	
3	Masculine	<i>čān.uh</i>	<i>čān.hum</i>
	Feminine	<i>čān.ha</i>	

This table shows that the plural forms for each person are the same regardless of the gender of the subject: the first person plural form *čānna*, for instance, is the same for both masculine and feminine plural subjects.

The main verb following *čān* in this type of conditional agrees with its subject whether the latter is covert or overt. The main verb is usually in the perfective form; however, the imperfective is also possible without any difference in meaning:

102.

- a. *čānuh štara/yištari l.sāmi biskaleit lāzim yištari wāḥid 'il.i zeid*
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} buy_{+past/pres.3.m.sg} prep.Sami bike Mod buy_{+pres.3.m.sg} one prep.me as well
 Should he buy Sami a bicycle, he must buy one for me as well. (DED).

- b. *čānha jabat/tjīb walad rāḥ 'asammī.eh 'ibrāhīm*
 be_{+past.3.f.sg} beget_{+past/pres.3.f.sg} boy will call_{+pres.1.m.sg} him Ibrahim.
 Should she give birth to a baby boy, I will call him Ibrahim. (DED).

Both examples convey the same message regardless of the tense form of the verb in the P-clause and both are interchangeable with a corresponding *eḏa*-introduced conditional sentence.

103.

- a. *eḏa štara/yištari l.sāmi biskaleit lāzim yištari wāḥid 'il.i zeid*
 comp buy_{+past/pres.3.m.sg} prep.Sami bike Mod buy_{+pres.3.m.sg} one prep.me as well
 If he buys Sami a bicycle, he must buy one for me as well. (DED).

- b. *eḏa jabat/tjīb walad rāḥ 'asammī.eh 'ibrāhīm*
 comp beget_{+past/pres.3.f.sg} boy will call_{+pres.1.m.sg} him Ibrahim.
 If she gives birth to a baby boy, I will call him Ibrahim. (DED).

Note that the possibility of having an accusative clitic attached to *kana* (lit. 'he was') is not possible in CA, unlike the case in DED. We cannot, for instance, replace *al.kitabu* in (a) below by its accusative clitic *-hu* in (b).

104.

- a. *kāna l.kitābu jadīdan* b. **kāna.uh jadīdan*
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} def.book new be_{+past.3.m.sg} it new
 The book was new. (Abu-Chacra, 2007: 196). *was.it new.

The structure of the Q-clause in *čān*-introduced conditionals can also be headed by (a) a modal element such as (*rāḥ*, *lāzim*, or *yimkin*) followed by a verb in the imperfective or by (b) an imperative verb. This is respectively shown in the following examples.

105.

- a. [Two friends are going to the cinema. One of them says].

čān at.taḏākir xilṣat yimkin nrūḥ 'ala sīnama tānyeh
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} def.tickets finish_{+past.3.f.pl} Mod go_{+pres.1.pl} prep cinema another
 Should the tickets run out, we may go to another cinema. (DED).

b. [A manger talks to his secretary].

čān hada daq qūli.l.uh 'ana bi.li.jtimā'
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} anybody phone_{+past.3.m.sg} tell_{+imp.2.f.sg} prep.him I prep.def.meeting
 Should anybody call, tell him I am in the meeting. (DED).

The second variation in *čān*-introduced conditionals is when the P-clause is a copular clause:

106. [A woman is being questioned by a detective]

The Detective:

- a. *čān.či muḍnibeh rāḥ 'asjin.či šahir*
 be_{+past.2.f.sg} guilty will imprison_{+pres.1.sg} you month
 Should you be guilty, I will imprison you for a month. (DED).
- b. *čān.či fi'lan barī'eh lāzim tiḡbiti.l.na barā'at.či*
 be_{+past.2.f.sg} really innocent Mod prove_{+pres.2.f.sg} prep.us innocence.your
 Should you really be innocent, you must prove your innocence. (DED).

As can be seen in the above examples, the P-clauses consist of a copular clause in which *čān* has raised to the complementiser position. The accusative clitic *-či* attached onto *čān* marks agreement with the implicit subjects; i.e., these clitics function as subjects.

So far, we have discussed the different types of RCs, and shown most of the DED conditional particles used. In the second part of this chapter, we discuss the other major type of conditional sentence, *irrealis* conditionals (IRCs).

3.2.2.3. DED Irrealis Conditionals (IRCs).

Irrealis conditionals are conditional constructions which are 'not presented as possibly matching the actual world. The possible world evoked by the P-clause may be either purely imaginary or counterfactual' (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 489). The following sections discuss the second major type of DED conditional, namely irrealis conditionals (IRCs). I divide DED IRCs into two types, hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals and show how these two types are interpreted and constructed; I will further discuss the strength of negation and the

structural variations in IRCs. However, I will first investigate the main points differentiating IRCs from RCs in English; these will give us a conceptual framework that will help us better understand their DED counterparts.

3.2.2.3.1. Realis vs. Irrealis Conditionals in English.

One of the main differences between realis and irrealis conditionals relates to the tense form of the P-clause: the tense form of the P-clause in RCs can be past or present, whereas the one in IRCs must be past.

107.

- a. If George forgets his homework, his teacher will give him a low mark.
- b. If George forgot his homework last week, his teacher will have given him a low mark.

Both of the above examples express a RC. The tense form of the P-clause in (a) is present, while the one of the p-clause in (b) is past. That is to say, the P-clause of a RC can have either a past or a present tense form. In IRCs, on the other hand, the tense form of the P-clause must be past. Further, the modal used in the Q-clause, usually *would*, must also be past:

108.

- a. If George *forgot* his homework, his teacher *would* give him a low mark.
- b. If George *had forgotten* his homework, his teacher *would* have given him a low mark.

(a) shows that the tense form of the verb *forgot* in the P-clause and the modal *would* in the Q-clause are past. Similarly, past time in (b) is indicated by the pluperfect in the P-clause, and by the conditional tense in the Q-clause; it is the past tense that indicates irrealis mood in English.

The second point differentiating RCs from IRCs is a semantic one; events/situations expressed in IRCs have a counterfactual interpretation, and can even express contradictions:

109.

- a. If she had eaten more than she actually did, she would have had stomach-ache.
- b. If her situation was worse than it actually is, she would need an operation.

Both of the above examples are grammatical though they express imaginative situations. That is to say, it is always possible to express hypothetical and counterfactual situations in IRCs. It

is not possible, on the other hand, to express hypotheticality and counterfactuality in RCs as the events/situations expressed must be possible in some sense, at least in the mind of the speaker. In other words, we cannot express imaginative situations in RCs; this justifies why the following examples are ungrammatical,

110.

- a. *If her situation is worse than it actually is, she will need an operation.
- b. *If she ate more than she actually did, she will have stomach-ache.

Another difference is the use of imperative forms in the Q-clause of RCs; while the Q-clause in a RC can be imperative as in (a) and (b) below, the Q-clause of an IRC cannot as in (c) and (d):

111.

- a. If you attend tomorrow's lecture, listen carefully.
- b. If you have a headache tomorrow morning, take an aspirin.
- c. *If you attended tomorrow's lecture, listen carefully.
- d. *If you had a headache tomorrow morning, take an aspirin.

Furthermore IRCs, unlike RCs, are compatible with certain constructions such as *I know that + ¬P-clause*. The following examples are illustrative:

112.

- a. I know that he did not get the job, but if he had got it, he would be happy.
- b. I know that he is not at home, but if he was, he would call.

By contrast, RCs are incompatible with the *I know that + ¬P-clause* construction whether the reference is to the past or the present:

113.

- a. *I know that he did not get the job, but if he did get it, he will be happy.
- b. *I know that he is not at home, but if he is, he will call.

With the above differences in mind, we now turn into considering IRCs in DED.

3.2.2.3.2. Irrealis conditionals in DED.

I divide DED IRCs into two types, hypothetical and counterfactual. The main particle used in these types is *lau* (if). *lau* is used to introduce IRCs be they hypothetical or counterfactual. In order is a brief account of how *lau* is used in the literature of Classical and/or Standard Arabic.

Several studies confirm the role of conditional particles in determining whether a conditional sentence is realis or irrealis. There is a consensus among linguists concerning the role of the particle *lau* in introducing irrealis conditionals. Wickens (1980: 76), for instance, argues that *lau* 'implies a hypothetical or impossible condition'. That is to say, once *lau* introduces a conditional sentence, it gives it an irrealis interpretation. Similarly, Ryding (2005: 675) points out that *lau* is used in MSA to express contrary-to-fact conditionals: 'the conditional particle used to introduce contrary-to-fact conditions is *lau* لو'. The same observation is confirmed by Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 290) who show that in written Arabic (WA) 'there are two types of condition, the *Likely* and the *Unlikely*. The Unlikely condition is introduced by the conjunction لو [*lau*]'. Consider the following example from Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 290):

114. *lau* *kuntu* *malik.an* *ḥakamtu* *bi.ʿadālat.in*
 conp be_{+past.1.sg} king_{+Acc} rule_{+past.1.sg} prep.justice_{gen}
 If I were a king (but I am not, and am not likely to be), I would rule with justice.

(Haywood and Nahmad, 1962: 290).

Arabic grammarians (see among others Alsāmora'i, 2003) call the conditional particle *lau* an *'imtinā'iyyah* (lit. 'preventing') particle because it denotes the non-realizeability of the proposition in the Q-clause. Further, Peled (1992: 41) discusses several traditional Arabic grammarians and concludes that *lau* is mainly used to express imaginative conditionals: 'in medieval Arabic grammatical writings, *lau* is essentially associated with past counterfactuality, *'imtinā'* [lit. 'prevention']'.

Similarly when discussing Arabic conditional particles, Testen (1998: 97) calls *lau* 'counterfactual *lau*' because it is mainly used to introduce imaginative conditionals. Further evidence that *lau* expresses IRCs comes from Fleisch (1968) as discussed in Peled (1992: 38); Fleisch uses the term *irréel* to refer to the non-realizability of the Q-clause when *lau* is used. Fleisch, Peled (1992: 38) points out, 'classifies all *lau* conditional sentences as *irréel*'.

More interestingly, Peled (1992: 37) points out that *lau* is not purely a conditional particle and that it is originally a wish particle (wishpart): 'the optative semantic component in *lau* plays a significant role in determining the structures and meanings of *lau*-sentences'.⁴² The following example (from Al'anṣārī 2005: 351) shows how *lau* indicates an optative interpretation in CA:

115. *lau* *ta'tī.ni* *fā.tuḥadīṭa.ni*
 wishpart come_{+pres.2.sg.}me intro.talk_{+pres.2.m.sg.}me
 Would that you come, then you talk to me. (Al'anṣārī, 2005: 351).

This shows that there is a close relationship between *lau*-conditionals and optatives introduced by *lau*, a fact which also holds for English: Traugott (1985: 293) states that the fact that 'imagined hypothetical worlds are often those that are wished for may motivate the selection of optatives'. Optative interpretations can be expressed in English by *if only*:

116. If only I knew how to drive a car.

The speaker does not know how to drive a car, and he/she would like to learn how to drive it.

The sentence expresses a wish in the present.

Having shown some of the existing accounts related to the use of *lau*, we turn into investigating how it is used in DED to express imaginative (hypothetical and counterfactual) conditionals.

⁴² Peled (1992) further reports other studies, particularly Brockelmann's (1966:646) which confirms the same observation.

3.2.2.3.3. Hypothetical versus Counterfactual Conditionals.

Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman (1999: 551) distinguish between hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals in accordance with the strength of negation in the P-clauses. They point out that the P-clause is not strongly negated in hypothetical conditionals, whereas it is strongly negated in counterfactual ones. I will draw on their observation to show that this distinction applies to DED IRCs.

By *strength of negation*, we mean the extent to which the speaker disbelieves the truth of the P-clause. Consider the following two examples, (a) is a hypothetical conditional (HC), and (b) a counterfactual conditional (CFC):

117.

- a. [Two men are conversing prior to announcing the election results].

<i>lau</i>	<i>yirbaḥ</i>	<i>l.'entixābāt</i>	<i>čān</i>	<i>gayyar</i>	<i>ad.distūr</i>
comp	win _{+pres.3.m.sg}	elections	be _{+past.3.m.sg}	change _{+past.3.m.sg}	def.charter

If he won the election, he would change the charter. (DED).

- b. [Having lost his race competition, a competitor says:]

<i>lau</i>	<i>čintu</i>	<i>rbiḥtu</i>	<i>h.as.sibāq</i>	<i>čān</i>	<i>nṭū.ni</i>	<i>minḥeh</i>	<i>riādyeyh</i>
comp	be _{+past.1.sg}	win _{+past.1.sg}	this.def.race	be _{+past.3.m.sg}	grant _{+past.3.pl.me}	scholarship	athletic

If I had won this race, they would have offered me an athletic scholarship. (DED).

The P-clause in (a) expresses a situation that is not strongly negated: it is still possible that the candidate may win the election. That is to say, the proposition made in the P-clause is not impossible and is therefore not strongly negated because the possibility that he/she may win the election is not excluded. On the other hand, the P-clause in (b) expresses a situation that is strongly negated: it is impossible for the competitor to win this race, as the competition is now over. That is to say, the P-clause proposition is impossible and is therefore strongly negated, because the possibility that the competitor wins the race is excluded.

3.2.2.3.4. *lau* Expressing Hypothetical Conditionals (*lau*-HCs).

The speaker in *lau*-conditionals does not think that the P-clause will or has been fulfilled, and therefore treats the proposition as being doubtful or undetermined:

118. [Sally invites Ahmad to her graduation party. Ahmad says:]

lau ʔaxalliṣ šuḡl.i bakkīr čān jīt ʔa.l.ḥaflat.či
 conp finish_{+pres.1.sg} work.my early be_{+past.3.m.sg} come_{+past.1.sg} prep.def.party.your

If I finished my job early, I would come to your party. (DED).

The above example sets up a hypothetical mental space wherein the P-clause is undetermined (P-clause?): Thus, two novel structures appear in the hypothetical mental space created: (a) P-clause?, and ¬P-clause. The P-clause proposition (*finishing the job earlier*) is undetermined (P-clause?) with respect to the parent space R. That is to say, the P-clause is undetermined in the parent space (P-clause?R). According to the MST, two dimensions are involved in the structure of the above example. The first is the lexical dimension: *lau* in the P-clause, and the frozen (invariable) *čān* in the Q-clause are two lexical elements that help us recognize the hypotheticality of the example above. The second is the grammatical dimension represented by the tense forms used: the main verb in the P-clause is the imperfective,⁴³ and the one in the Q-clause is the perfective. The example above indicates a situation that is unlikely to happen, yet still possible: it is unlikely that Ahmad will finish his work and therefore he may not go to his friend's party; the possibility that he may finish his work early is still there. In other words, the sentence does not exclude the possibility that Ahmad might finish his work earlier.

An important point is in order in the structure of *lau*-HCs: *čān* occurs in the Q-clause taking the third-person singular form no matter what the subject of the sentence is. This issue is discussed in more detail in the following section.

⁴³ The perfective is also possible with no difference in meaning. See chapter four, *Tense in DED Conditionals*.

3.2.2.3.4.1. The Use of *čān* in *lau*-HCs

In this section, I discuss the use of *čān* in *lau*-HCs. I will first give a brief background about the origin of *čān* in Arabic, and then show how it is used in DED *lau*-HCs.

čān is the dialectal form of the CA *kāna* (lit. 'he was').⁴⁴ *kāna* is the default verb of being in CA or MSA. Consider the following examples where (b) is the DED counterpart of the CA example in (a).

119.

- a. *kāna* *l.bustān.u* *kabīr.an*
 be_{+past.3.m.sg} def.garden_{.Nom} large_{.Acc}
 The garden was large. (Haywood & Nahmad, 1962: 105).
- b. *l.bistān* *čān* *čabīr*
 def.garden be_{+past.3.m.sg} large
 The garden was large. (DED).

The /k/ sound in *kāna* is affricated in DED where it is replaced by /č/, *čān*. Further, the nominative Case of *l.bustān.u* (the garden) and the accusative Case of *kabīr.an* (large) in (a) are dropped in their DED counterparts in (b).

kāna can also function as an Aux verb where it is used in conjunction with main verbs to express different tenses such as the past progressive: Ryding (2005: 446) argues that 'to convey the idea of continued or habitual action in the past, the verb *kaan-a* is used in the past tense in conjunction with the present tense of the main verb'. The example in (a) below is from Ryding (2005: 447) and the one in (b) is its DED counterpart.

120.

- a. *kaan-at* *ta.rtadii* *qamīš-an* *'azraq-an*
 be_{+past.3.f.sg} wear_{+pres.3.f.sg} shirt_{.Acc} blue_{.Acc}
 She was wearing a blue shirt. (Ryding, 2005: 447).

⁴⁴ Also transcribed as *kaana*, *kana* and *kāna*, etc.

- b. *čānat* *tilbas* *qamīš* *ʿazraq*
 be_{+past.3.f.sg} wear_{+pres.3.f.sg} shirt blue
 She was wearing a blue shirt. (DED).

Furthermore, Ryding (2005: 449) shows that *kāna* in MSA can be used in conjunction with the future tense of the main verb to indicate conditional tenses: 'to describe an action that would or could have taken place..., the past tense of *kaana* is used with the future tense of the main verb'. For example,

121.

- a. *maa* *kaan-at* *sa-ta-ʿrif-u* *l-qiraaʿat-a* *wa-l-kitaabat-a*.
 Neg be_{+past.3.f.sg} will.know_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.reading_{.Acc} conj.def.writing_{.Acc}
 She would not have known [how] to read and write ('reading and writing'). (Ryding, 2005: 449).
- b. *kun-tu* *sa-ʿa-staxdim-u* *shayʿ-an* *ʿaaxar-an*.
 be_{+past.1.sg} will.use_{+pres.1.sg} thing_{.Acc} else_{.Acc}
 I was going to use something else.⁴⁵ (Ryding, 2005: 449).

A similar use of *kāna* can also be found in some dialects of Arabic; in Damascene⁴⁶ Arabic, for instance, *kāna* is used in hypothetical conditional sentences: Cowell (1964: 334) points out that *kāna* indicates hypotheticality, referring to it as 'hypothetical *kān*'. However, the occurrence of *kāna* in Damascene conditionals is different from that of DED: while *kāna* occurs inflected in the the Q-clauses of Damascene conditionals, it occurs uninflected in the Q-clause of DED conditionals. The following example, (from Cowell 1964: 337), is illustrative:

122. *lau* *bi-ḥabbu* *baʿḍon ʾal-baʿḍ* *kānu* *tʿāmalu* *sawa* *mən* *zamān*
 comp intro.like_{+pres.3.pl} other def.another be_{+past.3.pl} deal_{+pres.3.pl} together prep time
 If they had liked one another, they would have gotten together long ago. (Cowell, 1964: 337).

As the above example shows, the use of *kāna* in the Q-clause occurs in its inflected form *kānu* (they were) because it is in concord with the dropped third person plural subject.

In his comparative study of four Arabic dialects (Moroccan, Egyptian, Syrian, and Kuwaiti), Brustad (2000: 260) argues that 'all four dialects contain reflexes of *kān* that mark

⁴⁵ Glosses are mine.

⁴⁶ 'Damascene' is the adjective from Damascus, the capital of Syria.

hypothetical distance, that is, a position taken by the speaker that the condition is less likely to happen'. Furthermore, Brustad (200: 261) reports Ingham's (1994:139) study, stating that 'Ingham remarks that /kān/, /in-kān/ / čān/ and /in- čān/ all represent hypothetical conditional particles in Najdi' Later Ingham (1997: 128) argues that irrealis interpretation of conditionals can be expressed by the combination of *lau* and *čān*, stating that 'where *lo* does mark an unreal or unfulfilled condition it will usually have *cān* as a marker on the main clause'. Consider the following examples.⁴⁷

123.

- a. *lo* *jay.ah* *muṭar* *čān* *kill.ah* *xadrah*
 comp come_{+past.3.m.sg} rain be_{+past.3.m.sg} all.it green

If rain had come to it (the land), it would all be green. (Ingham, 1991: 128).

- b. *lo* *kān-ni* *ḍammān* *kān* *gult* *li.k*
 comp be_{+past.1.sg} thirsty be_{+past.3.m.sg} tell_{+past.1.sg} prep.you

If I was thirsty, I would have told you. (Jonstone, 1964: 100).⁴⁸

The structure of *lau*-HCs involving *čān* can be expressed through the following examples:

124.

- a. [Sally is preparing for her exam. She says:]

- lau* *šribtu* *qahwa* *'akṭar* *čān* *darastu* *'ahsan*
 comp drink_{+past.1.sg} coffee more be_{+past.3.m.sg} study_{+past.1.sg} better

If I drank (some) more coffee, I would study better. (DED).

- b. [A factory manager talks to his staff.]

- lau* *l.'arbāḥ* *titdā'af* *čān* *rawātib.kum* *zādat*
 comp profits multiply_{+pres.3.f.pl} be_{+past.3.m.sg} salaries.your increase_{+past.3.f}

If the profits multiplied, your salaries would increase. (DED).

Considering the above examples, we find that two characteristics distinguish the structure of *lau*-HCs: first, the verb of the P-clause can either be in the perfective as in (a), or in the

⁴⁷ Glosses have been added for these two examples.

⁴⁸ Jonstone's (1964) study is based on the Dosiri Dialect as spoken in Kuwait. This example is also cited in Ingham (1991: 128).

imperfective as in (b) with no difference in meaning. Second *čān* occurs in the Q-clause invariably (uninflected). In other words, the structure of *lau*-HCs is: (*lau* + *im/perfective* in the P-clause) and (an uninflected *čān* + *perfective* in the Q-clause). Observe that in spite of the odd relationship between the verb forms (the tenses used) and the interpretations of this kind of conditionals, they are comparable to hypothetical conditionals in English; in English, the use of the past tense in the P-clause does not refer to the past, rather to the future. For example,

125. If Sally won the lottery, she would buy a new flat.

The uninflected occurrence of *čān* in the Q-clause suggests that we have an implicit subject corresponding to the English *it*. That is to say, we have an expletive/pleonastic subject in the Q-clauses of *lau*-HCs. This means that *lau*-HCs can be equated with structures involving expletive subjects. Thus, (124.a-b) can be equated with

126.

- a. If I drank some more coffee, it would be the case that I would study better.
- b. If the profits multiplied, it would be the case that your salaries would increase.

In the following section, we discuss how *lau* is used to introduce the second type of imaginative conditional, counterfactual conditionals (CFCs).

3.2.2.3.5. *lau* Expressing Counterfactual Conditionals (*lau*-CFCs).

Counterfactual conditionals (CFCs) express situations that are contrary to fact; the speaker perceives the propositions in the P-clause and the Q-clause as false. *lau*-CFCs express past and present counterfactual situations. The following example expresses present counterfactuals.

127. [When Ahmad and Hadi are watching the news, Ahmad says:]

- a. *lau čintu ra'īs čān šaja'tu l.ħuriyyeh as.syāsiyyeh*
 comp be_{+past.1.sg} president be_{+past.3.m.sg} encourage_{+past.1.sg} def.freedom def. political
 If I were a president, I would encourage political freedom. (DED).

Hadi:

- b. *lau činna b.sūria 'assa' čān šārakna bi.l.muḏāharāt*
 comp be_{+past.1.pl} prep.Syria now be_{+past.3.m.sg} participate_{+past.1.pl} prep.def.protests
 If we were in Syria now, we would participate in the protests. (DED).

(a) indicates that Ahmad is not a president. Similarly, (b) indicates that Ahmad and Hadi are not in Syria. That is to say, the speakers in both examples express a desire for things/situations (becoming a president and being in Syria) to be different from what they really are. Both examples indicate that the P-clause and the Q-clause do not hold in the present. Though the perfective is used in the above two examples, they refer to situations (encouraging political freedom in (a), and participating in the protests in (b)) in the present. That is to say, the past tense in DED present counterfactuals conditionals can be used to refer to the present time; this is also true of present counterfactuals in English:

128.

- a. If my grandfather were alive today, he would experience a very different world.
 b. If my grandfather were here now, he would be angry. (Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 1999: 551).

Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman (1999: 551) argue that in present counterfactual conditionals, 'the past tense refers to the present time'. Similarly, Iatridou (2000: 234) calls past tense used in present counterfactuals 'fake tense' because it can indicate a present interpretation.

DED counterfactual conditionals can also express past situations where the P-clause and the Q-clause did not hold at a certain time in the past. For example,

129.

- a. [Ahmad came home to find that his sister Sally had come back from France].
lau činti xabbartī.ni qabil čān jibtū.čī min l.maṭār
 comp be_{+past.s.f.sg} inform_{+past.2.f.sg} me before be_{+past.3.m.sg} collect_{+past.1.sg} you prep def.airport
 If you had informed me before, I would have collected you from the airport. (DED).

- b. [When the team she supports lost the final, Reema said:]

lau čānū li'bū 'aḥsan čān ribḥū
 comp be_{+past.3.pl} play_{+past.3.pl} better be_{+past.3.m.sg} win_{+past.3.pl}
 If they had played better, they would have won. (DED).

Both examples express impossible situations which did not hold in the past. In (a), Sally did not inform Ahmad about her arrival and therefore he did not collect her from the airport. Both the P-clause and the Q-clause are false and contrary to what had happened in real life. Ahmad actually imagined the situation of Sally informing him about her arrival and speculated about the consequences of that imagined situation. Similarly, (b) expresses an irrealis situation: the team had not played better and therefore had not won the final.

The counterfactual interpretation of (129.a-b) is realized lexically and grammatically: on the lexical level, the use of *lau* followed by a variable form of *čān* in the P-clause and the use of the invariable form in the Q-clause help us realize the counterfactual interpretation. On the grammatical level, the use of the pluperfect in the P-clause (formed by *čān* + im/perfective verb form) and the conditional tense in the Q-clause (formed by the invariable *čān* + a perfective verb) help us realize the counterfactual interpretation.

The P-clause in (129.a) sets up a counterfactual space which is incompatible with the origin or parent space R; the Q-clause expresses some relation which is satisfied in the counterfactual space created for the P-clause. Thus, the speaker or hearer sets up two mental spaces which are incompatible with the parent space: in the first mental space, the P-clause sets up a space wherein *Sally had informed Ahmad about her arrival*, unlike the parent space wherein Sally hadn't. In the second mental space, the Q-clause sets up a counterfactual space which (i) is incompatible with the parent space, and which (ii) expresses some relation (*Ahmad collects Sally from the airport*) satisfied only in the counterfactual space. Thus, the P-clause is not satisfied in the parent space R, ($\sim P/R$). This shows that in counterfactual conditionals the mental spaces created are incompatible with their parent spaces.

3.2.2.3.5.1. The Use of *čān* in *lau*-CFCs.

The structure of CFCs is different from that of HCs. The P-clause of a CFC consists of *lau* followed by a compound verb consisting of an inflected form of *čān* followed by the main verb which can be either perfective or imperfective. The Q-clause is typically introduced by an uninflected form of *čān* followed by a perfective verb form. Let us consider the following two examples.

130.

a. [A car accident happened]

lau čīnit tsūq b.ḥaḍar čān mā šār l.ḥādīt
 comp be_{+past.2.m.sg} drive_{+pres.2.m.sg} prep.care be_{+past.3.m.sg} Neg happen_{+past.3.m.sg} def.accident
 If you had driven carefully, the accident would not have happened. (DED).

b. [Two staff members arrive late to the meeting; their manager says:]

lau čintum 'axaḍtum taksi čān waṣṣaltum 'a.l.waqit
 comp be_{+past.2.pl} take_{+past.2.pl} taxi be_{+past.3.m.sg} arrive_{+past.2.pl} prep.def.time
 If you had taken a taxi, you would have arrived on time. (DED).

čān agrees with its subject in the P-clause: in the P-clause of *lau*-CFCs, *čān* always inflects like any other verb in Arabic. The inflected form of *čān* followed by the main verb in the P-clause correspond to the conditional pluperfect in English, and therefore expresses a counterfactual situation.

Observe that while *čān* inflects in the P-clause, it does not do so in the Q-clause. The uninflected occurrence of *čān* in the Q-clause suggests that we have an implicit subject corresponding to the English *it*; we have an expletive/pleonastic subject in the Q-clauses of *lau*-CFCs. Thus, (130.a-b) correspond to two conditionals with expletive subjects:

131.

- a. If you had driven carefully, it is the case that the accident would not have happened.
- b. If you had taken a taxi, it is the case that you would have arrived on time.

So far, we have discussed the typical structure of HCs and CFCs. In the following sections, we discuss other possible variations in the structure of these types of conditionals.

3.2.2.3.5.2. Variation in the Construction of IRCs.

In this section I discuss some of the other structural variations in the P-clauses of imaginative conditionals. I will discuss variations where the P-clause involves an active participle (Activpart) form and the copula *čān*.

Both types of imaginative conditionals use the Activpart in the P-clause. The only difference between the two is that while *čān* is absent in the P-clause of HCs, it is present in the P-clause of CFCs. This is respectively shown in the following examples.

132.

- a. *lau mart.i rabḥānah l.yānašib čān šarfatt.uh 'a.l.hdūm*
 comp wife.my win.Activepart def.lottery be_{+past.3.m.sg} spend_{+past.3.f.sg} it prep.def.clothes
 If my wife won the lottery, she would spend it on clothes. (DED).

- b. *lau mart.i čānat rabḥānah l.yānašib čān šarfatt.uh 'a.l.hdūm*
 comp wife.my be_{+past.3.f.sg} win.Activepart def.lottery be_{+past.3.m.sg} spend_{+past.3.f.sg} it prep.def.clothes
 If my wife had won the lottery, she would have spent it on clothes. (DED).

The P-clause in the hypothetical situation in (a) consists of a covert copula and the Activepart *rabḥānah* (winner), while the P-clause in the counterfactual situation in (b) consists of a visible form of *čān* followed by the Activepart *rabḥānah* (winner). Activepart forms are derived from their corresponding verbs; the Activepart *rabḥānah* (winner) is derived from the verb *ribiḥ* (lit. 'he won'). Like their corresponding verbs, Activepart forms agree with their subjects in person, number and, where appropriate, gender: *rabḥānah* (winner) is a third person feminine singular Activepart form; it agrees with its antecedent *mart.i* (my wife) in person, number and gender.

Furthermore, Activepart forms have a verbal force in the sense that they can, like the verb from which they are derived, have a subject and complement. For example, *mart.i* (my wife) in the above examples is the subject of the Activepart *rabḥānah* (winner) and *l.yānašib* (the lottery) is its complement.

Further, the fact that the Activepart is derived from its corresponding verb indicates that each conditional sentence containing an Activepart form can have a similar version with the corresponding verb from which its Activepart form is derived. Thus, the above two examples can also be expressed as follows:

133.

a. *lau mart.i ribḥat l.yānaṣīb čān šarfatt.uh 'a.l.hdūm*
 comp wife.my win._{+past.3.f.sg} def.lottery be._{+past.3.m.sg} spend._{+past.3.f.sg} it prep.defclothes
 If my wife won the lottery, she would spend it on clothes. (DED).

b. *lau mart.i čānat ribḥat l.yānaṣīb čān šarfatt.uh 'a.l.hdūm*
 comp wife.my be._{+past.3.f.sg} win._{+past.3.f.sg} def.lottery be._{+past.3.m.sg} spend._{+past.3.f.sg} it prep.defclothes
 If my wife had won the lottery, she would have spent it on clothes. (DED).

The Activepart forms in (132.a-b) are replaced by their corresponding verbs in (133.a-b). Of note also is the fact that the Q-clauses are headed by the invariable *čān* whether the P-clause contains a verb or an Activepart form.

The second variation in the structure of imaginative conditionals is when the P-clause is a copular one. Copular P-clauses can indicate a hypothetical or counterfactual interpretation. Let us first recall the point we discussed in chapter 1 about copular clauses in DED: the copular verb *čān* in DED is omitted unless the copular sentence is in the past. Similarly, P-clauses with visible copula express past counterfactual situations, while P-clauses with an invisible copula indicate hypothetical ones. Consider the following example with an invisible-copula P-clause:

134. [Sally's friends notice that she did not come to work today. One says:]

lau sāli mardānah čān xabbarat.na
 comp Sally sick be._{+past.3.m.sg} inform._{+past.3.f.sg} us
 If Sally (was) sick, she would inform us. (DED).

The above example shows that the P-clause consists of *lau* followed by a covert copula. The absence of the copula suggests that the sentence has a hypothetical interpretation: the possibility that Sally was sick is not determined. That is to say, \sim P-clause is not established.

On the other hand, P-clauses with a visible copula indicate a counterfactual interpretation. Consider the following counterfactual example which indicates a past time reference.

135. [Sally's friends find out that she was not sick.]

<i>lau</i>	<i>sāli</i>	<i>čānat</i>	<i>mardānah</i>	<i>čān</i>	<i>xabbarat.na</i>
comp	Sally	be _{+past.3.f.sg}	sick	be _{+past.3.m.sg}	inform _{+past.3.f.sg} us

If Sally had been sick, she would have informed us. (DED).

Sally's sickness is not established, or that \neg P-clause is already established. The presence of the past form of the copula *čānat* in the P-clause indicates a past counterfactual interpretation. This is also true in counterfactual conditionals indicating present time.

136. [Sami paid double the price for his late-booked flight ticket]. One of his friends say:]

<i>lau</i>	<i>čintu</i>	<i>b.makān.ak</i>	<i>čān</i>	<i>hajaztu</i>	<i>'abkar</i>
comp	be _{+past.1.sg}	prep.place.your	be _{+past.3.m.sg}	book _{+past.1.sg}	earlier

If I were you, I would book earlier. (DED).

Though the P-clause refers to the present, the sentence expresses a counterfactual situation: the possibility that *Sami's friend is Sami* is not established. That is to say, \sim P-clause is already established. Thus, irrealis P-clauses with absent copula usually indicate hypothetical interpretations, while visible-copula P-clauses indicate counterfactual interpretations whether they indicate past or present situations.

Bergmann (1964: 222) as quoted in Bar. (2003: 5) points out that 'there is not any compulsory circumstantial link between the two parts of the conditional sentence', a point which linguists are not happy with. This issue is discussed in more detail in the following section.

3.3. The Relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause.

The relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause is heavily addressed in the literature of conditionals. Linguists are not happy with truth-value representation of conditionals which indicates that a conditional sentence can be true regardless of the relation between its two clauses. This section sheds some light on this issue and on the two main relations holding between the two clauses of conditionals, sequentiality and causality.

The common linguistic view concerning the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause is that a typical conditional sentence shows a kind of semantic relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause. Nevertheless, logicians point out that the relation between the two clauses of a conditional sentence is not necessary. Both Comrie (1986) and Dancygier (1998) share the view that the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause is an important aspect in the interpretation of conditional sentences. Dancygier (1998), for instance, states that in a conditional sentence none of the propositions presented in the P-clause and the Q-clause is asserted. Rather, it is only the type of relation between the propositions that is communicated.

In logic, the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause is represented in a truth table, a table developed by logicians whereby conditionals are represented in terms of truth values (true and false). This is shown in the following table.

Truth Values of Conditionals in Logic		
P-clause	Q-clause	If P then Q
True	True	True
False	False	True
False	True	True
True	False	False

Table (12): Truth-Value representation of Conditionals

According to the truth table above, we have four cases: a conditional sentence is true in the first three cases, and is false in the fourth one. In the first two cases a conditional sentence is

considered a true one when both the P the Q clauses are true as in (a), or when both are false as in (b).

137. (true P-clause + true Q-clause = true conditional).

- a. *eda bukraḥ sabi'ṭa'is neisān as.sūriein rāḥ yiḥtaflūn bi.li.stiqāl*
 comp tomorrow seventeenth April def.syrians will celebrate_{+pres.3.pl} prep.def.independence
 If tomorrow is the seventeenth of April, the Syrians will celebrate the Independence (Day). (DED).

b. (false P-clause + false Q-clause = true conditional).

[Ahmad talks to his friends about the party he made last week. One of them says:]

- lau činit 'azamit.ni čān jītu*
 comp be_{+past.2.m.sg} invite_{+past.2.m.sg} me be_{+past.3.m.sg} come_{+past.1.sg}
 If you had invited me, I would have come. (DED).

The third case where a conditional is true when *the P-clause is false and the Q-clause is true* is best represented with *ḥata lau* (even if) conditionals. For example,

138. (false P-clause + true Q-clause = true conditional)

- a. [Investigations showed that a problem with the brakes caused the car accident.]

- ḥatta lau čānat tsūq b.buṭu' l.ḥādīt čān šār*
 even comp be_{+past.3.f.sg} drive_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.slowness def.accident be_{+past.3.m.sg} happen_{+past.3.m.sg}
 Even if she had driven slowly, the accident would have happened. (DED).

Finally, a conditional is false when the P-clause is true and the Q-clause is false. 'Easter Bunny' sentences (discussed in 3.2.2.2.7. *Realis Conditionals Introduced by 'in*) are a clear case in point for this type of conditional.

Truth-value tables do not account for all the natural language conditionals. Comrie (1986: 78-80) points out that though 'many conditional sentences in natural languages do indeed receive an interpretation congruent with this range of possibility allowed in logic..., this does not carry over to natural languages, where conditionals require a stronger link between protasis and apodosis'. That is to say, a typical conditional sentence in natural language has to express a kind of dependence or causal relation where the realization of the proposition in the Q-clause depends on the one in the P-clause. This means that truth tables do not hold for all natural language conditionals because conditional sentences in natural languages should involve

some pragmatic rationality between the P-clause and the Q-clause, a fact which is not necessary for logicians and their truth value tables. Thus, there should always be a kind of semantic coherence or link between the two clauses of a conditional sentence. Comrie (1986: 80) states that this link in most instances is causal where 'the content of the protasis must be interpretable as the cause of the content of the apodosis'. Consider the following examples.

139.

- a. If today is Sunday, the priest will be in church.
- b. If you go out without the umbrella, you'll get wet. (Comrie, 1986: 80).

The two main semantic relations holding in typical conditional sentences are sequentiality and causality. These two relations are discussed in more detail in the following section.

3.3.1. Sequentiality and Causality in Conditionals.

The aim of this section is to show that the relation between the two clauses of DED conditionals parallels that in English ones, and to show that causality and sequentiality are the two typical relations holding in DED conditionals. To achieve this aim, I discuss the existing accounts related to this topic in English, supporting my discussion with DED conditional sentences. The discussion presented below has profited from the insights presented in Comrie (1986) and Dancygier (1998).

Dancygier (1998) argues that a conditional sentence is not merely a juxtaposition of a P-clause with a Q-clause, rather the two clauses are typically iconically ordered; this iconic order is so 'pervasive that it was at some point postulated to be universal' (Dancygier, 1998: 81). A conditional sentence is interpreted as expressing an iconic order when its two clauses have sequential time relation.

As I have shown at the beginning of this study (in the literature review), Sweetser (1990) classifies conditionals under three main domains: epistemic domain, speech-act domain and content domain. In the latter she refers to *real world* events: a conditional in the content

domain, she points out, is interpreted as expressing a causal relation when its clauses express real world events or situations. This means that the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause can be 'causal' and that they, the P-clauses and the Q-clauses, are related to the content of each other. Further, Dancygier (1998: 80) emphasizes the importance of a causal relation in conditionals so much that 'there is practically no account of conditionals which fail to note that if-clauses tend to express causes'.

Sequentiality in conditionals means that the time of the situation in the P-clause precedes the time of the situation in the Q-clause. Dancygier (1998: 76-78) identifies (a) iconicity, (b) the degree of grammatical integration and (c) thematic coherence as the most important factors that can help interpret conditional structures as sequential. Furthermore, she points out that conditionals involving causal relations can be interpreted sequentially: 'sequentiality is related to causality, since these two aspects of interpretation of an utterance are often inseparable'.

Dancygier (1998) further points out that conditionals can be 'characterized as putting things one after another... [because] what is contingent on the validity of the condition has come after what constitutes the condition'. Thus, an example like

140. *eda tsallim waḍift.ak mit'axxir li.stād rāḥ yinaqqiṣ 'alāmt.ak*
 comp submit_{+pres.2.m.sg} assignment.your late def.teacher will reduce_{+pres.3.m.sg} mark.your
 If you submit your assignment late, the teacher will reduce your mark. (DED).

can be interpreted as *the late submission of the assignment* happens before *the teacher reduces the mark*. In other words, the time of submitting the assignment precedes that of reducing the mark. The above example can also be understood causally: the fact that *the addressee submits the assignment late* is the cause of *having his/her mark reduced by the teacher*. Thus, conditionals expressing a sequential interpretation can also indicate a causal one.

Van Der Auwera (1986: 200) points out that natural language conditionals involve a relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause; he calls this relation *Sufficiency Hypothesis*, meaning that the fulfilment of the P-clause proposition is a sufficient condition for the

fulfilment of the one in the Q-clause; this relation can invite a causal or sequential interpretation. Dancygier (1998: 82) supports this observation by showing that causality can be the default relation between the clauses of realis conditionals: 'when real world events are put in a sufficient conditionality relation, causality is the most natural interpretation to arise'. The following examples are illustrative:

141.

- a. *eḏa tuq'ud mit'axxir rāḥ tfūt.ak muḥāḏarat at.tis'ah*
 comp wake_{+pres.2.m.sg} late will miss_{+pres.2.f.sg} you lecture def.nine
 If you wake up late, you will miss the 9 o'clock lecture. (DED).

- b. *eḏa tša'ʿil ad.dau rāḥ nšūf 'aḥsan*
 comp turn.on_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.light will see_{+pres.1.pl} better
 If you turn on the lights, we will see better. (DED).

The relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause in (a) is causal: *waking up late* causes *the missing of the 9 o'clock lecture*. The P-clause proposition (*waking up late*) is a sufficient condition for the Q-clause proposition (*missing the 9 o'clock lecture*). Similarly, the example in (b) is iconically ordered and it can be interpreted causally: *turning the lights on* causes *us to see better*.

Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 69-76) point out that a typical causal relation 'involves agenthood and manipulation'. This poses the question of whether non-agentive sentences can involve a causal relation. The answer to this question is provided by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 75), as quoted in Dancygier (1998: 84); a causal relation can be interpreted when we have 'an emergence of an event from the state'. Consider the following set of examples:

142.

- a. *eḏa 'ibn.ak kaṣlān lāzim tḥuṭ.l.uh mudarris xuṣūṣi*
 comp son.your lazy Mod assign_{+pres.2.m.sg} prep.him tutor private
 If your son is lazy, you must assign him a private tutor. (DED)

- b. *eda yiḥasib.ni ġabi rāḥ 'aṭbit.l.uh l.'akis*
 comp think_{+pres.3.m.sg.} me stupid will prove_{+pres.1.sg.} prep.him def.opposite
 If he thinks I am stupid, I will prove the opposite to him. (DED).

The P-clauses of the above two examples express states rather than events, where the subjects are non-agentive. The P-clauses in these two examples represent states from which events can emerge and they therefore can express causal interpretations: *having a son who is lazy at school* is the reason behind *assigning a private teacher*, and *someone thinks that I am stupid* can be the cause for *proving the opposite situation to him/her*.

DED non-content domain conditionals (in the sense of Sweetser, 1990) do not reflect a causal relation. Consider the following two examples where (a) shows a causal relation between the two clauses, but (b) does not show any relation of this kind. Compare the following two examples.⁴⁹

143.

- a. *eda tāxuḍ qitār aṣ.ṣubuḥ rāḥ twaṣṣil b.sur'ah*
 comp take_{+pres.2.m.sg.} train def.morning will arrive_{+pres.2.m.sg.} prep.quickness
 If you take the morning train, you will arrive quickly. (DED).

- b. *eda 'indak htimām bi.aṣ.šī'ir nizār šā'ir*
 comp prep interest prep.def.poetry Nizar poet
 If you have an interest in poetry, Nizar is a poet. (DED).

The example in (a) is a content domain conditional where the relation between the P-clause and Q-clause is causal. On the other hand, the relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause in (b) is not. While *taking the morning train* can be the cause for *arriving quickly* in (a), *having an interest in poetry* is not the reason or the cause for *Nizar being a poet* in (b). That is to say, the example in (a) is understood causally while the one in (b) is not: in (a), the relation between the P-clause (*taking the morning train*) and the Q-clause (*arriving early*) is in the content domain (real world) which means that the event of *taking the morning train* is related to the event of

⁴⁹ The explanation of these examples is based on Dancygier (1998) who argues that non-content domain conditionals do not reflect a causal relation.

arriving quickly. In (b), the P-clause *having an interest in poetry* and the Q-clause *Nizar is a poet* are related on the level of discourse; that is to say, they are not causally interpreted.

Thus, we can conclude that natural language conditionals should involve some semantic link (usually a causal one) that connects the P-clause and the Q-clause. Therefore, sentences lacking this link are intuitively not acceptable. The following examples are illustrative:

144.

- a. ??*eḍa tabxat ma'karūnah lāzim ywaṣṣlū li.tifāqiat salām*
 comp cook_{+past.3.f.sg} spaghetti Mod reach_{+pres.3.pl} prep.treaty peace
 ??If she cooks spaghetti, they must reach a peace treaty. (DED).
- b. ??*eḍa snān.ak twejj'.ak aj.jeiš as.sūri rāḥ yistanfir*
 comp teeth.your hurt_{+pres.3.f.pl}.you def.army def.Syrian will mobilize_{+pres.3.m.sg}
 ?? If you have toothache, the Syrian Army will mobilize. (DED).

The above two examples lack a semantic link between their clauses: *reaching a peace treaty* cannot be caused by *making spaghetti*, nor does *having a toothache* can cause *a specific army to mobilize*.

Needless to say not all conditionals have an iconic order; in some conditionals the P-clause and the Q-clause have a common time reference. In other words, they happen at the same time; Wilson (1990), quoted in Dancygier (1998: 77), argues that there are cases of simultaneity in some conditionals where the P-clause and the Q-clause are concurrent. For example,

145. If the baby is asleep, Mary is typing. (Dancygier, 1998: 77).

Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that the P and Q clauses in typical DED conditionals express causal relations and that causally-related conditionals usually express sequential relations.

3.4. Summary.

In this chapter, we have provided a detailed description of DED conditionals. The Theory of Mental Spaces (Fauconnier, 1994) is used as a framework within which DED conditionals are interpreted. We have shown that DED conditionals divide into two main types, realis and irrealis. Realis conditionals include future, inferential, non-causal, past realis and generic conditionals, whereas irrealis conditionals include hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals. The role of conditional particles and their use in determining the meaning of the conditional sentences have been emphasized; each particle can give a different interpretation to the sentence it introduces. *eda* (if) and *ʔin* (if), for instance, are mainly used in realis conditionals whereas *lau* is used in irrealis conditionals. This chapter has also discussed the difference between temporal and conditional clauses and provided a number of criteria to differentiate between them. We have also found that the *-mā* (-ever) particles share three main features: (a) all can express present, future and past conditionals, (b) the ever-particles and the question words from which they are composed are mutually exclusive, and (c) they all show the same verb forms used.

Our study has demonstrated that the DED Aux *čān* (lit. 'he was') has developed into a conditional particle which can be used in introducing conditional sentences equivalent to inverted conditionals in English. We have also discussed the relation holding between the two clauses of a conditional sentence and argued that *causality* and *sequentiality* are the two relations holding in DED typical conditionals.

Chapter Four

Tense in DED Conditionals

4.0. Introduction.

This chapter addresses two main questions. First, is there a tense system at work in the DED conditional sentences? Second, what tense combinations are possible in the structure of each type of DED conditional? Investigating the tense system in DED conditionals can show us what determines the possible tense forms used in either the P-clause or the Q-clause and help us establish an organized taxonomy of the tense forms used in them.

My study of the tense forms and their possible combinations in DED conditionals makes use of Declerck's (1991) tense theory. This theory can accommodate all the DED conditional constructions and the tense forms used. This theory is further explained in Declerck (1997). I will first outline the relevant points of this theory. Then, I will discuss the use of tense forms in DED conditional constructions. However, before we explain Declerck's (1991) tense theory, we will review some of the existing accounts of tense forms used in English and Arabic conditionals.

4.1. The Use of Tense Forms in Conditional Sentences.

The use of tense forms in conditional constructions has been tackled by many linguists. For example, Hornstein (1990), as reported by Dancygier (1998: 3), provides an account for *well-formedness* which he calls 'the syntax of tense'. His analysis reduces the study of conditional structures to the study of their verb forms. Hornstein's account is basically based on Reichenbach's theory of tense, where he 'offers a formalism which is designed to filter out ill-formed tense configuration . . . [and] accounts for possible and impossible pairings of verb forms in p and q clauses independently of the semantic, pragmatic and contextual factors involved' (Dancygier, 1998: 3).

Dancygier (1998: 17) argues that the choice of verb forms in conditionals is the decisive factor in interpreting the conditional sentence: 'verb forms are in fact the best indicators of intended interpretations of conditionals'. She further classifies conditional structures into two major classes in accordance with the verb forms used: predictive conditionals and non-predictive ones; 'verb forms will be claimed to fall into two major classes: predictive ones, where the modal verb *will* is used to mark predictive meaning, and non-predictive ones, where other verbs are used' (Dancygier, 1998: 23). In predictive conditionals, Dancygier argues, the verb forms are characterized by two kinds of backshift, *if*-backshift and hypothetical backshift.

According to Quirk et al (1985), backshifting refers to the hypothetical use of the past tenses; and therefore, verbs in hypothetical conditionals are backshifted: the past verb forms are used to refer to either the present or the future, while the pluperfect verb forms are used to refer to the past. When the past verb form refers to the present, as is the case in (a) below, the P-clause expresses a proposition that is contrary to assumption. On the other hand, when the past verb form refers to the past as is the case in (b) below, the P-clause expresses a proposition that is contrary to fact (Quirk et al, 1985).

1.
 - a. If I were rich, I would buy a house.
 - b. If I had been rich, I would have bought a house.

This indicates that past tense in English conditionals can be used without past time reference. This use of past tenses is referred to in the literature as 'the past-as-unreal hypothesis' (Dahl, 1997: 97).

This shows that tenses can undergo a kind of transposition from one time of reference to another. Tynan and Lavin (1997: 118) argue that transposition of tense can occur both in English and Spanish. As for English, they distinguish between two types of present tense spheres: unmarked temporal sphere or unmarked use of the present tense and a marked temporal sphere or

modal use of the present tense: when the present tense is used to refer to other temporal spheres such as the future, the present tense is said to have a modal connotation and it therefore indicates a marked temporal sphere. On the other hand, the present tense is said to be unmarked when used to refer to the present temporal sphere: 'the simple present in English is unmarked when used to refer to the present temporal sphere, whereas it is modally used to refer to the future' (Tynan and Lavin, 1997: 118). This distinction made by Tynan and Lavin (1997: 118) seems to be analogous to the use of the Present Perspective System (PPS) and the Future Perspective System (FPS) in Declerck's theory of tense as we will see later in this chapter.

Tynan and Lavin (1997: 123) further discuss tense neutralization in the P-clause of English conditionals: 'the tense of the subordinate is in fact neutralized and is anaphorically determined by its main clause'. The following example is illustrative.

2. If Sally learnt Hebrew, she would talk to the tourists.

In (2), though the tense form in the P-clause is past, the reference is to the future. Tynan and Lavin (1997: 124) claim that the reference to the future takes place once *would* (or *could*) is used in the Q-clause. They resort to Spanish to support their claim where they find that the marked use of the past verbal form is activated in Spanish 'by the use of the subjunctive in the protasis'. Similarly, they show that 'the marked use of the past verbal form is activated in English by the use of *would* (alternatively *could* or *might*) in the apodosis'. That is to say, the past verbal form *learnt* in the above example is used to refer to a temporal sphere other than the past and that is why Tynan and Lavin call it *marked* use of the past. This means that the verbal tense in the P-clause is neutralized and is therefore marked when *would* is used in the Q-clause: if *would* (or any of its alternatives) does not occur in the main clause, the tense used in the P-clause is unmarked, rather it would indicate its own temporal reference:

3. If Mary saw what was happening, she didn't say anything to me. (Tynan and Lavin, 1997: 123).

Note that the past verb form used in the P-clause refers to the past, not to the future where *would* does not occur in the Q-clause.

Furthermore, Comrie (1986: 93-6) provides an analysis of tense in conditionals for more than one language (Russian, Latvian, English, etc.); he concludes that 'one frequent phenomenon crosslinguistically in conditionals with high hypotheticality is loss of tense distinction'. Comrie shares with Tynan and Lavin (1997) the observation about tense neutralization in conditionals.

Backshifting of tenses in conditionals is also discussed in Comrie (1986: 94) where he finds that 'one aspect of time reference that is common in Indo-European and European-area languages in conditionals with high hypotheticality is backshifting of tense, i.e. use of a morphologically past tense with present (or future) time reference and a pluperfect with past time reference'. This can be clarified in English in the following two examples.

4.

- a. If he read the novel, he would answer the questions.
- b. If he had read the novel, he would have answered the questions.

Dancygier (1998: 7-8) discusses the use of verb forms in conditional structures with regard to their temporal reference and epistemic stance; she reports Fillmore's (1990) study which 'treats conditionals as constructions in which the choice of a verb form in one clause is related to the choice made in the other in a way which is dictated by the overall interpretation of the construction in terms of time and *epistemic background*'. For example, a sentence like

5. If you study, you will pass the exam.

refers to a *neutral epistemic* stance toward a future event (passing the exam)- the verbal forms used are the present in the P-clause and the future in the Q-clause. Based on this observation,

Dancygier argues that the use of the past perfect in the P-clause can express a negative epistemic stance toward a past event.

Having discussed some of the previous studies that have dealt with the use of tense forms in English conditionals, we turn to discuss their counterparts in Arabic conditionals.

4.2. Tense in Arabic Conditionals.

The use of tense forms in Arabic conditionals has also been considered by some researchers; the majority of them agree on the fact that verb forms play little role in conditional sentences and that it is the conditional particle used that is responsible for determining the interpretation of the sentence.

In his study of conditional sentences in some Bedouin dialects, Ingham (1997: 137) provides several conditional sentences where the use of the perfective corresponds to the future, not to past time; he then concludes that the time reference in conditionals is not necessarily indicated by the tense forms used, stating that 'the time or condition clause is unmarked for time reference. The fact that it is in the perfective does not indicate past time particularly, and the time reference is shown by the verb in the main clause or by the context or ... by the time/condition particle itself'.

Similar observations have been made by Haywood & Nahmad (1962: 292) who argue that the verb form plays little or no role in conditional sentences, stating that 'there is no particular temporal significance in the verbs of conditional sentences, and often the context is the only guide'. They point out that there are four possible verb forms: (a) the perfective is used in both the P-clause and the Q-clause, (b) the Jussive (juss) is used in the P-clause, and the perfective in the Q-clause, (c) the perfective is used in the P-clause, and the Jussive in the Q-clause, and (d) the

Jussive is used in both the P-clause and the Q-clause. Respectively, the following examples (from Haywood & Nahmad (1962: 291-92)) represent these four possibilities.⁵⁰

6.

- a. 'in *dahaba* *zaidun* *dahabtu* *ma'a.hu*
 comp go_{+past.3.m.sg.} Zaid_{+Nom} go_{+past.1.sg.} prep.him

If Zaid goes, I shall go with him. (WA).

- b. 'in *yadhab* *zaidun* *dahabtu* *ma'a.hu*
 comp go_{+pres.3.m.sg.Juss} Zaid_{+Nom} go_{+past.1.sg.} prep.him

If Zaid goes, I shall go with him. (WA).

- c. 'in *dahaba* *zaidun* *'adhab* *ma'a.hu*
 comp go_{+past.3.m.sg.} Zaid_{+Nom} go_{+pres.1.sg.Juss} prep.him

If Zaid goes, I shall go with him. (WA).

- d. 'in *yadhab* *zaid.un* *'adhab* *ma'a.hu*
 comp go_{+pres.3.m.sg.Juss} Zaid_{+Nom} go_{+pres.1.sg.Juss} prep.him

If Zaid goes, I shall go with him. (WA).

(Haywood & Nahmad, 1962: 291-92).

Haywood & Nahmad show that the above examples can all be translated as present conditionals with future interpretation. One might thus wonder how we can express conditionals other than the likely-to-occur type represented in the above examples; Haywood & Nahmad (1962: 292) state that 'the sentence may be made definitely perfect or pluperfect, by prefacing either *كان* or *قد* to the verb'. *Kan* is the main verb of being in Arabic, and *qad* /*qad*/ is a verbal particle (verbpert) used to convey information about the aspect of the verb it precedes (Ryding, 2005: 446).

Peled (1992) discusses the use of verb forms in CA conditionals; he reports some medieval Arab grammarians such as Mubarrad and Ibn Ya'ish who have argued that the perfective verb forms in Arabic conditional sentences can be used to convey futurity; a similar observation is made by

⁵⁰ Haywood & Nahmad's (1962) study is based on Written Arabic (WA).

Ingham (1997: 118) who argues that 'a perfective is interpreted as having future time reference only in a Conditional Structure'. The following example (from Ingham 1997: 118) is illustrative.

7. *in allah jāb.u dibahñā.w*
 comp God bring_{+past.3.m.sg.} him kill_{+past.1.pl.} him
 If God brings him, we will kill him. (Ingham, 1991: 118).

Ingham shows that the time reference of the Q-clause *dibahñāw* (we will kill him) is future though the verbal form is perfective, arguing that Q-clauses with perfective verbal forms have a future time reference only when they are part of a conditional sentence. In other words, when the Q-clause *dibahñāw* (we will kill him) is considered in isolation (i.e. as an affirmative clause), it does not have the same time reference as its corresponding string has in the conditional sentence. I.e., it will only refer to the past, and will be translated as *we killed him*, not *we will kill him*. Nevertheless, Peled (1992: 12) regards the claim that *perfective verb forms indicate futurity* as 'a considerable over-simplification' of the use of tense forms in conditional sentences.

Wickens (1984: 76) points out that the choice of the conditional particle plays a significant role in Arabic conditionals, stating that 'the actual word used for *if* in Arabic has considerable bearing on the time and the probability of the statement'. That is to say, the conditional particle used determines the timing and the possibility of the conditional sentences where the 'time-factor is naturally somewhat irrelevant'. Furthermore, Wickens (1984: 77) argues that 'the Aspect of Arabic verbs in conditional sentences is normally always either *māḍī*⁵¹ or Jussive [and that] this has no real bearing on time'. He concludes that the choice of the verb forms (perfective or imperfective) 'depends on stylistic considerations, euphony, effect and so on' (Wickens, 1984: 77). That is to say, the use of the verb form does not really determine the interpretation of the

⁵¹ *māḍī* is the Arabic term for *perfective*.

conditional sentence where 'in the same sentence, *māḍī* may be paired with *māḍī*, jussive with jussive; or the *shart* may take one, and the *jawāb* the other'.⁵²

Bahloul (2008: 59) points out that the use of the perfective in conditional sentences can indicate a present or future time reference; the following example is from Bahloul (2008: 59).

8. *'in darasta najaḥṭa*
 comp study_{+past.2.m.sg} succeed_{+past.2.m.sg}
 If you study, you will succeed. Bahloul (2008: 59),

Based on the above example⁵³ and its translation, Bahloul (2008: 60) concludes that 'while English makes use of a present tense verbal form *study*, and a future tense verbal form *will succeed* in hypothetical contexts, Arabic only uses the Perfect verbal form to express both an actualized present hypothesis *'in darasta*, and a prediction *najaḥṭa* with a clear future time interpretation'. In other words, though the verb in the P-clause is perfective, the P-clause 'is only interpreted as in the English translation *if you study*' (Bahloul, 2008: 60). Similarly, though the Q-clause has a perfective verbal form, the reference is to a future event whose realization depends on the fulfillment of the proposition in the P-clause.

The fact that the perfective can be used with present or future time reference is further confirmed by Dahl (1985: 80) who points out that 'in Modern Standard Arabic, the category variously called *Perfect* or *Perfective* normally has only past time reference but may refer to the future in certain subordinate clauses'. Furthermore, Dahl (1985: 80) indicates that the use of the perfective with a future time reference is not particular to Arabic: 'there are, however, several exceptions to the tendency to restrict PFV [i.e. perfective verb] to past time reference, the most

⁵² *shart* (lit. condition) and *jawāb* (lit. answer) are two Arabic terms that refer to the *P-clause* and the *Q-clause*, respectively.

⁵³ Bahloul (2008) points out that this example is presented in Abboud and McCarus (1992: 178) as the prototypical example of a conditional sentence in MSA.

notable being the Slavic Perfective. Other examples are Japanese, Modern Greek and some Bantu languages, e.g. Zulu and Sotho'.

Other researchers have discussed the importance of the conditional particles in Arabic; Brustad (2000: 256) points out that 'formal Arabic rules for the conditional dictate that the mood of the conditional as *realis* or *irrealis* is signalled through the choice of the particle'. This means that the particle plays a major role in the interpretation of conditionals. Brustad (2000: 256) indicates that some dialects such as the Syrian dialects rely on the particle used to distinguish between the different types of conditional sentences: 'with the exception of Syrian, the dialects do not seem to rely upon the conditional particle to make an absolute distinction between possible and counterfactual sentences'.

Based on the above discussion, we conclude that there is a consensus among linguists that tense forms play little role in determining the time reference of conditional sentences in Arabic and that the conditional particles themselves play an important role in indicating time reference for Arabic conditionals.

Having considered some of the studies relevant to the use of tense forms in Arabic conditionals, I now turn to consider the use of tense forms in DED conditionals. However, I will first discuss some of the main points in Declerck's (1991) Theory of Tense within which the tense forms of DED conditionals are discussed.

4.3. Declerck's (1991) Tense Theory.

4.3.1. Temporal Zero Point t_0 .

Declerck (1991: 7) adopts Lyons's (1977: 68) definition of tense who states that tense 'grammaticalizes the relationship which holds between the time of the situation that is being described and the temporal zero-point of the deictic context'. In a later work, Declerck and Reed

(2001: 115) define tense in similar terms, indicating that tense is 'the grammatical expression of temporal location of the actualization of a (predicted) situation' Declerck (1991) uses the term *situation* as a cover term for events, states, actions, etc.

Following a work by Lyons (1977), Declerck uses the term *temporal zero point* (abbreviated as t_0) to refer to the time which is 'the ultimate origin of all the temporal relations expressed in the sentence'. That is to say, t_0 refers to the time which all the situations in the sentence are related to. The t_0 in English, Declerck (1991) argues, can refer either to the coding time or to the time of decodification. The former indicates the time of speaking while the latter the time of reception. Declerck then discusses the idea that the time of reception can sometimes be later than the time of speaking and provides ample evidence of situations where the speaker may choose the reception, but not the coding, time as the t_0 .

4.3.2. Preliminary Concepts.

Declerck (1991) introduces various concepts in his theory of tense. We will consider them through the discussion of the following example.

9. Fadia was in the university this morning.

The above example can refer to or imply more than one *time*: the first one is the time established by the time adverbial *this morning*. Declerck calls this time the 'Established Time' (ET). The second time Declerck (1991: 18) introduces is the *situation time of orientation* (STO); it refers to the 'time interval at which the situation is located' or 'the time with which the situation is represented as simultaneous'. The STO can be either (i) the whole of the ET where Fadia has been in the university through the whole of the timespan indicated by the time adverbial *this morning*, or (ii) it, the STO, can be a subpart of the of the ET where Fadia may have been in the university

for only sometime in the course of *this morning*. The use of the past form *was* in the above example shows that the STO is anterior to t_0 .

Another notion introduced by Declerck is the *Full Situation* (FS), and the *Time of the Situation* (TS). The former refers to the time that Fadia actually was in the university. The latter refers to 'that subinterval of the full situation (possibly the whole full situation) that is located in time by the sentence, i.e., that is represented as simultaneous with STO' (Declerck, 1991: 8). That is, the example in (9) can be true in either of the following cases: (i) if the time of the FS coincides with the STO, and (ii) if only a subpart of the FS coincides with the STO. This is clarified in more details when the FS is compared with the Predicted Situation which will be discussed in the following section.

4.3.3. Full Situation versus Predicted Situation.

Declerck and Reed (2001: 113-114) distinguish between the full situation and the predicted one. As its name suggests, the full situation 'is the complete situation as it actualizes in whatever possible world is being referred to'. The predicted situation, on the other hand 'is that part of the full situation (possibly all of it) about which a claim is made in the sentence'. For example,

10. Ahmad was in his office an hour ago.

The use of the past form *was* in the above example indicates that the predicted, not the full, situation is located in time because of the use of the tense form *was*. The sentence does not exclude the possibility that Ahmad is still in his office.

Note that by the time of the full/predicted situation we mean the time the full/predicted situation actualizes. Declerck and Reed (2001) distinguish between the time of the full situation and the time of the predicted situation. The time of the predicted situation refers to 'the time at

which the predicted situation is located, [or] the time at which the predicted situation is simultaneous'. For example,

11. Sally will submit her thesis next year.

The time of the predicted situation (the submission of the thesis) is located in the future. The verb form *will submit* is a tense form used to indicate the time of actualization of the submission of the thesis in the post-present.

Another related concept introduced in Declerck's theory of tense is the *Time of Orientation*.

4.3.4. Time of Orientation (TO).

The notion *Time of Orientation* (TO) is used for 'any time that functions as the origin of temporal relation' (Declerck, 1991: 18). This means that both t_0 and STO can be TOs: t_0 is a TO because the STO is anterior to t_0 , and the STO is also a TO because the situation can be simultaneous with TO.

Further Declerck and Reed (2001: 115) argue that there are three types of TO: t_0 TO, implicit TO, and TO of the time of the predicted situation. The first type is the t_0 time of orientation. For example,

12. Nadia passed her viva last year.

The t_0 in the above example is the TO represented by the verb *passed*. The time of the predicted situation is anteriorly related to the TO of the verb *passed*.

The second type is when the TO is implicit. This can be clarified in the following example.

13. Nadia had passed her viva.

The time of the predicted situation in the above example is anteriorly related to an implicit TO; the latter (the implicit TO to which the time of the predicted situation is related as anterior) is also anterior to the t_0 .

The last type of the TO is when the TO is the time of the predicted situation. This can be explained by considering the following example.

14. The Registry informed the student that the committee had read his thesis.

The past tense form *informed* relates the time of its predicted situation to t_0 . On the other hand, the past perfect tense form *had read* relates the time of its predicted situation as anterior to the time indicated by the past tense form *informed*. This shows that 'a time of orientation may be the time of a predicted situation' (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 115). Declerck and Reed call this TO a 'situation TO', and it is abbreviated as (STO).

Declerck (1991) divides *time* into spheres, and divides spheres into sectors.

4.3.5. The Two Time-Spheres and their Sectors.

Declerck (1991: 16) argues that, in English, time is divided into two spheres, the past time-sphere and the present time-sphere. The former lies completely before the t_0 and therefore it does not include it, while the latter is 'an indefinite timespan including t_0 '.

Declerck argues that the present/past time-spheres can be divided into three sectors: the anterior, the posterior, and the simultaneous sector. The anterior sector refers to the part of the time-sphere that reaches up to the t_0 . The posterior sector, on the other hand, refers to the part of time-sphere that starts at the time of orientation (TO) and extends to the future. The simultaneous sector refers to the part of the time-sphere that centres in the t_0 . The following example is from Declerck (1991: 19).

15. John said he was tired because he had worked hard and that he would go to sleep early.

(Declerck, 1991: 19).

The STO of the verb *said* divides the past time-sphere into three sectors: the STO indicated by *was tired* is located in the simultaneous sector, while the STO indicated by *had worked hard* is located in the anterior sector, and the STO indicated by *would go to sleep* is located in the posterior sector.

The present time-sphere by analogy can also be divided into three corresponding sectors: the sector anterior to t_0 which is called the pre-present sector; the second sector is simultaneous with t_0 which is also called the present sector. The third sector is posterior to t_0 and is called the posterior sector. Thus, the present time-sphere is also divided into three sectors: the pre-present sector, the present sector, and the posterior sector. Declerck (199: 19) distinguishes between the past time-sphere sectors and the present time-sphere ones: 'whereas the present time-sphere is automatically divided into three sectors, the past time-sphere sector is not subdivided into sectors as long as no situation has been located in it'. This can be summarized along the following lines:

16.

While the availability of the past time-sphere sectors depends on locating a situation, the availability of the present time-sphere sectors is automatic.

This indicates that the past time-sphere sectors can be considered as one single sector, while the present time-sphere is three sectors.

4.3.6. Absolute Sectors.

Declerck (1991: 19) points out that since the past time sphere is not divided into its three sectors unless a situation is located in it, it can therefore be dealt with as if it were a single sector that lies completely before the t_0 . Declerck introduces what he calls the *Absolute Sectors*: 'together with the three present time-sphere sectors, the past sector then constitutes the set of absolute sectors, i.e. the four sectors that are defined in direct relation to t_0 '. Thus, we have only four

absolute sectors: (a) the past sector, (b) the pre-present sector, (c) the simultaneous sector and (d) the post-present sector. The common characteristic of the four sectors (the absolute sectors) is that they all are defined with regard to their relation to t_0 .

4.3.7. Absolute Tenses versus Relative Tenses

Declerck's theory of tense joins the tradition that distinguishes eight English tenses (the preterit, the present, the present perfect, the future, the future perfect, the past perfect, the conditional and the conditional perfect). Declerck calls the first four tenses (the preterit, the present, the present perfect, and the future) *the absolute tenses*, and the latter four ones (the future perfect, the past perfect, the conditional and the conditional perfect) *the relative tenses*. The preterit is used to locate a situation in the past, while the present perfect locates it in the pre-present. The present tense on the other hand is used to locate a situation in the present, while the future tense is used to locate it in the post-present. This indicates that there is a kind of correspondence between the absolute sectors and the absolute tenses. This can be represented in the following table,

17.

Absolute Sectors	Absolute Tenses
The past	The preterit
The present	The present
Pre-present	The present perfect
The post-present	The future

As can be seen above, the past absolute sector corresponds to the preterit absolute tense, and so on.

The other four tenses (the future perfect, the past perfect, the conditional and the conditional perfect.) can only be used as relative tenses; and they are so called because 'they can only relate a situation to a TO which is already established in one of the sectors' (Declerck, 12991: 20).


4.3.8. Temporal Domain versus Intensional Domain.

Declerck's (1991) theory of tense distinguishes between *temporal domain* and *intensional domain*: the intensional domain refers to 'a domain of interpretation which has its own set of presupposition and truth conditions, in terms of which propositions can be evaluated and interpreted' (Richter, 1982: 96). The temporal domain, on the other hand, represents a time interval that is occupied by at least one situation or by several situations which are temporally related to each other by a tense form: the term *temporal domain* refers to 'a set of times of orientation which either consists of a single STO or comprises several STOs that are temporally related to each other by means of special tense forms' (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 116). The difference between the two domains can further be explained by the following example.

18. Fadia said that she had spent a sleepless night, that she felt sick and that she would leave early.

The temporal domain in the above example is represented by a set of times which are related to each other by different tense forms. Declerck and Reed (2001: 116) point out that the different tense forms are all related to a central or binding TO 'which is the only TO which is placed on the time line, since it is the only TO that is directly related to t_0 '. They use Venn-diagrams to represent how different tenses are related to each other. Thus, the above example can be represented as follows:

19.



A Venn-diagram representation for *Fadia said that she had spent a sleepless night, that she felt sick and that she would leave early.*

As can be seen above, the relation of simultaneity is represented by a vertical line as in *felt*, while anteriority and posteriority by slanting lines: if an STO is anterior to its TO, it is located to its left as in *had spent*, and if an STO is posterior to its central TO it is located to its right as in *would leave*.

As the above diagram shows the absolute tense form *said* in the first clause *Fadia said* locates its STO in the past sector, creating a past time-sphere domain. The time of the situation of the *said-clause* is the binding or the central TO of the domain created; therefore, the time of the situations in the other clauses is temporally subordinated to the central TO of the past time-sphere domain. Thus, in the above example the binding or the central TO is the past tense form *said*, and the time of the situations of all the clauses are temporally subordinated to it. The past perfect form *had spent* represents its STO as anterior to the binding TO of the *said-clause* and is therefore located to its left, while the past tense form *felt* represents its STO as simultaneous with the central

TO and is therefore represented by a vertical line. *would leave*, on the other hand, represents its STO as posterior to the central TO and is therefore located to its right.

4.3.9. Tense Relations versus World Relations.

Declerck and Reed (2001: 117-118) distinguish between tense relations (T-relations) and world relations (W-relations). They base their distinction on the idea that anteriority, posteriority and simultaneity are not necessarily represented by the tense forms used. Consider the following example.

20.

- a. The police arrived after the criminal had run away.
- b. The police arrived after the criminal ran away.

In (a) anteriority is expressed by using the relative tense form *had run away*, while in (b) anteriority is expressed by using *after* which clarifies which STO is the anterior one. It is also our pragmatic knowledge and our knowledge of how the world is structured that can also tell us whether the arrival of the police happened first or second. This indicates that temporal relations between STOs can be expressed either by T-relations or by W-relations.

4.3.9.1. T-Relations.

Declerck and Reed provide three ways through which an STO is T-related to a TO: T-simultaneity, T-anteriority, and T-posteriority. In the former 'the time of the situation is represented as T-simultaneous with the time of orientation'. For example,

21. Fadia said she was waiting for the bus.

In the above example, the past tense form *was waiting* represents its STO as T-simultaneous with the STO of *said*.

There are two possibilities to express T-anteriority in Declerck's Theory of Tense; they are represented in the following two examples.

22.

- a. The manager has interviewed the applicant.
- b. Sally and Fadia had been flatmates for years.

The time of the situation in the above examples precedes the TO. Nevertheless, in (a) the STO is located completely before TO, while in (b) the STO starts before the TO and reaches up to it.

Contrary to T-anteriority, T-posteriority has the time of its situation represented as *following* the TO. For example,

23. They will apply for the job tomorrow.

The STO of the above example is located completely after the TO.

4.3.9.2. W-Relations.

W-relations show how temporal relations can be expressed not by tense forms but by the context or pragmatic knowledge. For example,

24. [A witness was taken to the police station. When he came back home, his wife asked him what happened, he replied:]

- a. One police officer was questioning me and another was writing down my answers.
- b. When he had bought the book, he had not noticed the large wrinkle on the back.
- c. The teacher marked the exam papers and revealed the results to the students.

In (a), it is clear from the context that the STO of questioning and that of writing are W-simultaneous. In (b), both past perfect tense forms (*had bought* and *had not noticed*) locate their STOs as T-anterior to an unspecified TO. These two tense forms are simultaneous. However, the simultaneity relation is not expressed by the use of tense forms, but by the context. In other words, simultaneity holding between the two STOs is a W-relation not a T-relation. In (c), it is our pragmatic knowledge that tells us that marking the papers must be understood as W-anterior to

revealing the results to the students. Similarly, the anteriority of the two past tense forms (*marked* and *revealed*) is not expressed by a T-relation, rather by W-relation.

4.3.10. Direct and Indirect Binding


Declerck and Reed (2001: 119-120) distinguish between direct and indirect binding. We have a case of *direct binding* when the STO of the head clause binds the time of the situation of its subclause. The latter is then said to be temporally subordinated to the STO of the head clause. On the other hand, when the STO of the subclause is temporally subordinated to an STO of a clause other than the head clause, we will have a case of *indirect binding*. The following two examples represent direct and indirect binding respectively.

25.

- a. The police realized *that the suspect had often pretended that he was innocent*.
- b. The detective suspected *that the suspect had committed the crime because he had felt tense*.

(a) shows a relation of direct binding where all the subclauses are temporally subordinated to the superordinate clause: the STO of *was* is simultaneous with the STO of *had pretended*. Thus, both of the *that-clauses* are simultaneous with each other, while the first clause is represented as anterior to the matrix clause. This can be represented as follows:


26.



A Venn-diagram representation for *The police realized that the suspect had often pretended that he was innocent.*

On the other hand, in (25.b), both the *that*-clause and the *because*-clause represent their STOs as anterior to that of the matrix, where the temporal relation between the STOs of the *that*-clause and the *because*-clause is unexpressed. This can be represented as follows:

27.



A Venn-diagram representation for *The detective suspected that the suspect had committed the crime because he had felt tense.*

4.3.11. Sloppy Simultaneity.

Declerck (1991: 41) explains the difference between (strict) simultaneity and sloppy simultaneity: two situations are (strictly) simultaneous when they either coincide or overlap:

28.

- a. He felt unhappy when he said that.
- b. We will be in London when he arrives. (Declerck, 1991: 41).

The above two examples involve two situations which are simultaneous with each other. However, sentence simultaneity can also be sloppy:

29.

- a. When her husband came home, she murdered him.
- b. If she dyes her hair, she will look blonde.

The examples above express sloppy simultaneity where the actions in each sentence do not coincide or overlap with each others, rather they follow each other. The point is that the tense forms used in the subordinate clauses are the same ones which are typically used to express simultaneity. Declerck (1991: 41) points out that 'the tense forms expressing simultaneity can be used in cases where there is sloppy rather than strict simultaneity'. In other words, we have a case of a sloppy simultaneity when a tense form which is typically used to express simultaneity is used to refer to an STO which does not have a point of time common with the central TO. This can be further clarified in cases where the present participle is used:

30.

- a. Looking at the white sheets, she saw a big patch of blood.
- b. Opening the drawer, he took a sharp knife.

Each of the above sentences involves a non-finite form (present participle) which is used to express how two STOs follow each other. This said, we note that the verb forms used (present participles) are typically used to express simultaneity. Since the tense forms used to express simultaneity are also used to express sloppy simultaneity, this indicates that simultaneity is the unmarked relation (Declerck, 1991).

4.3.12. Shift of Temporal Perspective.

'We speak of a shift of temporal perspective when the tense system that is characteristic of a particular sector is used in referring to another sector' (Declerck, 1991: 66). In other words, we have a shift of temporal perspective when a TO from a particular sector is used to refer to a different sector. I.e., if we have a situation that is located in the past sector and it is represented as if it were a present situation:

31.

- a. I have seen him twice when I was in my office.
- b. The lecture starts at 9:00 am.

In (a), the past tense sector is used to relate a situation to the TO which has been established in the pre-present sector. That is, we have a shift of temporal perspective from the pre-present sector to the past sector. In (b), the shift of temporal perspective is from the post-present to the present: the present tense is used to refer to the future- we have a post-present situation which is represented as holding in the t_0 .

4.3.12.1. The Two Systems of the Post-present Domain.

Declerck (1991: 50) argues that two systems are used to refer to a situation in the post-present domain, the Present Perspective System (PPS), and the Future Perspective System (FPS).

4.3.12.1.1. Present Perspective System versus Future Perspective System.

Simply speaking, the PPS is used to express a T-relation in the post-present domain. 'It consists of relative tenses and is used to relate a situation to a post-present TO which behaves as if it were t_0 ' (Declerck, 1991: 50). This indicates that the PPS involves a shift of temporal perspective where the preterit and the present perfect can be used to indicate anteriority;

simultaneity and posteriority in the PPS, on the other hand, are expressed by the use of the present and the future tense respectively.

Unlike the PPS, the FPS consists of tenses that can establish post-present domain such as the future tense, the future perfective tense, and the present tense when underlying a shift of temporal perspective from the post-present to the present. This indicates that the FPS comprises absolute tenses (which can establish a domain) and relative tenses (which establish a relation within the domain).

Having outlined the main concepts in Declerck's (1991) tense theory, we will now consider the use of verb forms in DED conditionals.

4.4. The Use of Verb Forms in DED Conditionals.

4.4.1. The Use of Verb Forms in Future Conditionals.

This type of conditional expresses situations where the proposition in the P-clause may or may not actualize in the actual world; i.e., the actualization of this proposition is considered as a real possibility that may or may not be fulfilled:

32.

- a. *eḡa* *zārat.ni* *rāḥ* *tjīb.l.i* *hadiyyeh*
 comp visit_{+past.3.f.sg.}me will bring_{+pres.3.f.sg.}prep.me present
 If she visits me, she will bring me a present. (DED).

- b. *eḡa* *tištari* *hāḡa* *li.ktāb* *rāḥ* *'asta'ir.uh* *minn.ak*
 comp buy_{+pres.2.sg.} this def.book will borrow_{+pres.1.sg.}it prep.you
 If you buy this book, I shall borrow it from you. (DED).

The future interpretation of this type of conditional is conveyed by the use of a perfective or imperfective verb form in the P-clause, and the occurrence of the modal form *rāḥ* (lit. 'will') followed by an imperfective verb form in the Q-clause:

33.

DED Future Conditionals	
P-clause	Q-clause
comp + perfective/imperfective	<i>rāḥ</i> + imperfective

The verb form used in the P-clause can be either in the perfective or the imperfective with no difference in meaning:

34.

- a. *eḍa* *zārat.ni/tzūr.ni* *rāḥ* *tjīb.l.i* *hadiyyeh*
 comp visit_{+past/pres.3.f.sg.}me will bring_{+pres.3.f.sg.}prep.me present
 If she visits me, she will bring me a present. (DED).

- b. *eḍa* *tištari/štareit* *hāḍa* *li.ktāb* *rāḥ* *'asta'ir.uh* *minn.ak*
 comp buy_{+pres/past.2.sg.} this def.book will borrow_{+pres.1.sg.}it prep.you
 If you buy this book, I shall borrow it from you. (DED).

The P-clauses in the above two examples can either have perfective or imperfective verb forms to locate the P-situation as T-posterior to the t_0 . It is normal to use the imperfective to express the future as this is also available in English:

35. The Prime Minister meets the UN representative next week.

The question of how a structure using the perfective can express the future or the post present has a counterpart structure in English where the past is used to express the present or the future. Dahl (1997: 97) states that 'it is fairly commonplace observation that past tenses in languages like English are sometimes used without past time reference'. The following example is from Dahl (1997: 97).

36. If only you were here now. (Dahl, 1997: 97).

Nevertheless, expressing the post-present with the perfective is not possible in the Q-clause. In other words, though we can have either the perfective or the imperfective verb form in the P-clause, the Q-clause can only have an imperfective verb form after *rāḥ*.

37.

a. *eḍa* *zārat.ni/tzūr.ni* *rāḥ* *tjīb.l.i/*jābat.l.i* *hadiyyeh*
 comp visit_{+past/pres.3.f.sg.} me will bring_{+pres/past.3.f.sg.} prep me present

If she visits me, she will bring/*brought me a present. (DED).

b. *eḍa* *tištari/štareit* *hāḍa* *li.ktāb* *rāḥ* *ʾastaʿīr.uh/*staʿāreit.uh* *minn.ak*
 comp buy_{+pres/past.2.sg} this def.book will borrow_{+pres/past.1.sg.} it prep.you

If you buy this book, I shall borrow/*borrowed it from you. (DED).

As can be seen, the above examples are ruled out when we use a perfective verb form after *rāḥ* in future conditionals.

In the following section we discuss what effect the permissibility of the occurrence of either the perfective of the imperfective in the P-clause has on the time reference of future conditionals.

3.4.2. Shift of Temporal Perspective in Future Conditionals.

The use of the im/perfective in the P-clause of future conditionals represents a shift of temporal perspective, and therefore triggers a post-present interpretation:

38. [A doctor talks to his patient].

eḍa *ʾaxaḍti* *hāḍa* *aš.šarāb* *rāḥ* *tithassanīn*
 comp take_{+past.2.f.sg} this def. syrup will improve_{+pres.2.f.sg}

If you take this syrup, you will get better. (DED).

As can be seen above, the verb *ʾaxaḍti* (lit. 'you took') is in the past, yet the reference is to the post-present. In other words, the use of the perfective verb form *ʾaxaḍti* in the P-clause is represented as if it were a post-present verb form; therefore, we have a shift of temporal perspective. However, this is not the case in the English likely-to-occur conditionals where the past is not allowed in the P-clause of future conditionals:

39. If she visits/*visited me, she will bring me a present.

Thus, the use of the perfective in the P-clause of DED future conditionals is parallel to the use of the present in the P-clause of English future conditionals as both indicate a shift of temporal perspective and both have future interpretations. That is to say, both the im/perfective in DED and the present in English are used to express T-posteriority to the post-present time of the Q-situation. This raises the question of which system is used in DED future conditionals, the present perspective system (PPS) or the future perspective system (FPS).

4.4.3. The PPS and the FPS in DDE Future Conditionals.

Declerck and Reed (2001: 156) point out that English 'conditionals referring to the post-present normally have to use the Present Perspective System'.⁵⁴ They argue that the obligatory use of the PPS in P-clauses referring to the post-present is due to the fact that the STO of the P-clause will be located in the temporal domain of the Q-clause. In other words, the post-present-referring Q-clause creates a temporal domain which works as an intensional domain. This intensional domain coincides with the one created by the post-present-referring P-clause. For example,

40. *eḡa* *'axaḡit/tāxuḡ* *dūš* *rāḡ* *ṡis* *b.taḡassun*
 conj take_{+past/pres.2.m.sg} shower will feel_{+pres.2.m.sg} prep.improvement
 If you take a shower, you will feel better. (DED).

The STO of *'axaḡit* (lit. 'you took') is located in the STO of *ṡis* (lit. 'you feel') and is temporally subordinated to it. The temporal domain created by the STO of *'axaḡit* (lit. 'you took') coincides with the intensional one created by the STO of *ṡis* (lit. 'you feel').

Furthermore, the perfective/imperfective verb form used in the P-clause of the above example indicates that we have a marked (in the sense of Tynan and Lavin (1997) discussed above) temporal reference to the future. That is to say, the use of the perfective/imperfective verb

⁵⁴ Declerck and Reed (2001: 158-161) provide three exceptions where we can use the Future Perspective System in the P-clause of conditionals expressing post-present possibilities. These exceptions are not our concern here.

form in the P-clause have a modal connotation; i.e., they are modally used because they are used to refer to other (the future) temporal sphere. On the other hand, the use of the future tense in the Q-clause represented by the use of the modal *rāḥ* followed by the imperfective *this* (lit. 'you feel') indicates an unmarked temporal reference to the future.

Based on the above discussion, we can say that in the same way as the P-clause of a future conditional in English uses the PPS, the P-clause of a future conditional in DED uses the PPS. The P-clauses in both English and DED refer to a time that is posterior to the t_0 . Similarly, in the same way as the Q-clause of a future conditional in English uses the FPS, the Q-clause of a future conditional in DED uses the FPS where the Q-clauses in both English and DED refer to a time that is posterior to the t_0 :

41. *eḍa* *ṭalabtu* *min.uh* *maṣāri* *rāḥ* *ydayyinn.i*
 comp ask_{+past.1.sg} prep.him money will lend_{+pres.3.m.sg} me
 If I ask him for money, he will lend me (some). (DED).

The TO of the P and the Q clauses establishes a post-present temporal domain. This temporal domain functions as an intensional domain. The Q-clause's intensional domain coincides with that of the P-clause. The P-clause's STO is temporally subordinated to that of the Q-clause because the P-clause's STO is located in the Q-clause's temporal domain.

To sum up, DED future conditionals are constructed by the occurrence of a verb form (perfective or the imperfective) in the P-clause and the modal *rāḥ* (will) followed by a verb in the imperfective in the Q-clause. In DED future conditionals, the use of the im/perfective in the P-clause is analogous with the use of the present in the P-clause in English conditionals and the use of the modal *rāḥ* (will) followed by a verb in the imperfective form in DED is analogous with the use of *will* followed by a verb in the present in English. The P-clause uses the PPS, whereas the Q-

clause uses the FPS. Future conditionals in both DED and English have a shift of temporal domain where the present tense is used in the P-clause with a future reference.

4.5. The Use of Verb Forms in Generic Conditionals.

In this section, I will discuss the use of verb forms in both generic conditionals and conditionals expressing present habits. Since generic and present-habit conditionals have the same structure with regard to verb forms, the discussion below applies to both.

In its narrowest sense, 'a generic expression is one that ascribes a general property to all members of a class' (Langacker, 1997: 191). This leads us to agree with Ter Meulen's (1986: 123) observation that 'conditionals and generics are shown to share an important semantic property: persistence of expressed information'. The same idea is confirmed by Declerck and Reed (2001: 74) who point out that one of the characteristics of generic conditionals is 'the existence of past, present, and future instances of actualization', where they can express a cause and effect relation and eternal truths. For example,

42.

- | | | | | | |
|----|---|-----------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| a. | <i>eḍa</i> | <i>tṣaxxin/ṣaxxaniṭ</i> | <i>l.būz</i> | <i>yṣīr</i> | <i>mai</i> |
| | comp | heat _{+pres/past.2.m.sg} | def.ice | become _{+pres.3.m.sg} | water |
| | If you heat ice, it turns to water. (DED). | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| b. | <i>eḍa</i> | <i>nuxluṭ/xalaṭna</i> | <i>az.zeit</i> | <i>bi.l.mai</i> | <i>yṭūf</i> |
| | comp | mix _{+pres/past.1.pl} | def.oil | prep.def.water | float _{+pres.3.m.sg} |
| | If we mix oil with water, it floats. (DED). | | | | |

The P-clauses in both examples show that the perfective and the imperfective are possible with no difference in meaning. However, this is not the case in the Q-clauses where only the imperfective is possible with no modal preceding it. Thus unlike future conditionals, generic conditionals can use the PPS in both the P-clause and the Q-clause. The use of the PPS in both clauses clearly

indicates a shift of temporal perspective because the STO of both the P-clause and the Q-clause is located in the past, present, and future; the use of the perfective verb forms in the P-clause to refer to the past, present or future is also accountable for: it also indicates a shift of temporal perspective where the past version of the PPS is used.

Another support for the use of the perfective forms in the P-clause of a generic conditional comes from English which shows more or less the same structure with regard to the use of verb forms in hypothetical conditionals; consider the following example.

43. If she woke up at 8:45 am, she would arrive late.

The time reference in the P-situation is to the future in spite of the fact that the verb form used is the past. That is to say, in the same way as the P-clause of a hypothetical conditional in English uses the past version of the PPS to locate a situation in the future, the P-clause of a generic conditional in DED uses the PPS to refer to the past, present or future. Both the P-clause in English and the P-clause in DED locate their STO in a time other than what the verb forms indicate.

The fact that the perfective and imperfective in generic conditionals are used to refer to other time references indicates that they are used *modally* because they are used to refer to different temporal spheres. For example,

44. *eda* *tidğat/dağatit* *l.hawa* *yşir* *sā'il*
 comp compress_{+pres/past.2.m.sg} def.air become_{+pres.3.m.sg} liquid
 If you compress air, it becomes liquid. (DED).

The time reference in generic conditionals involves the past, present and the future because they refer to general timeless truths that do not change by time. This will be discussed in more details in the following section.

4.5.1. Time Reference in Generic Conditionals.

Both the P-situation and the Q-situation in a generic conditional are related to the t_0 . However, the TO of the Q-clause comprises both time-spheres (the past and the present) and their sectors where the Q-clause can refer to (i) a situation that happened before the TO and (ii) to an indefinite timespan which includes t_0 :

45. *eḏa aš.šamis tḡib yiji l.leil*
 comp def.sun set_{+pres.3.f.sg} come_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.night
 If the sun sets, the night comes. (DED).

The Q-situation locates in all sectors: the past, the pre-present, the present and the post-present.

Other verb forms like those equivalent to the pluperfect or conditional perfect are not used with generic conditionals. In other words, this kind of conditional is not usually used with tense forms equivalent to the English relative tenses (future perfect, past perfect, conditional and conditional perfect), nor with the particle *lau* which is used with imaginative conditionals:

- 46.
- a. **lau aš.šamis ḡābat yiji l.leil*
 comp def.sun set_{+past.3.f.sg} come_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.night
 *If the sun set, the night would come. (DED).
- b. **lau aš.šamis čānat tḡib čān 'aja l.leil*
 comp def.sun be_{+past.3.f.sg} set_{+pres.3.f.sg} be_{+past.3.m.sg} come_{+past.3.m.sg} def.night
 *If the sun had set, the night would have come. (DED).

Another point related to the use of verb forms in generic conditionals is whether the temporal relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause can be identified by T-relations or by W-relations.

4.5.2. T-Relations versus W-Relations in Generic Conditionals.

Our pragmatic knowledge, not tense or verb forms, tells us that the temporal relations are not expressed by tense alone. That is to say, the use of the verb forms is not the only means through which we can identify the temporal relation holding between the P-clause and the Q-clause. For example,

47. *eda* *tşaxxin/şaxxanıt* *l.mai* *yigli* *bi.ad.daraja* *miyyeh*
 conp heat_{+pres/past.2.m.sg} def.water boil_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep.def.temperature hundred
 If you heat water, it boils at 100°C. (DED).

It is clear from our pragmatic knowledge that the STO of *heating the water* is W-anterior to *boiling*; This indicates that anteriority is not expressed only by the use of tense forms; it can also be expressed by pragmatic knowledge which tells us that *boiling of water* happens after *heating* it (to a certain temperature). That is to say, the anteriority relation holding between the two STOs in the above example is a W-relation, not a T-relation.

4.5.3. The Use of the PPS in Generic Conditionals.

The PPS can be used in both the P-clause and the Q-clause in generic conditionals. However, the P-clause can alternate between the perfective and the imperfective with no difference in meaning:

48. *eda* *galeit/tigli* *l.mai* *yitbaxxar*
 conp boil_{+past/pres.2.sg} def.water vaporize_{+pres.3.m.sg}
 If you boil water, it vaporizes. (DED).

The verb forms (perfective or imperfective) used in the P-clause are modally used because they refer to other temporal spheres (past, present and future). When the imperfective is used, the PPS is employed and when the perfective is used the past version of the PPS is employed.

Unlike the Q-clause in future conditionals which needs to have the future marker *rāḥ* before the imperfective, the Q-clause in generic conditionals does not need to have any future marker. Thus, while the Q-clause in future conditionals uses the FPS, the Q-clause in generic conditionals uses the PPS. Nevertheless, neither future conditionals nor generic ones can have a perfective verb form in the Q-clause:

49. *eḍa* *ḡaleit/tigli* *l.mai* **tbaxxar*
 comp boil_{+past/pres.2.sg} def.water vaporize_{+past.3.m.sg}
 *If you boil water, it vaporized. (DED).

The use of the imperfective in the Q-clause of a generic conditional is modally used because it is used to refer to other (past, present and future) temporal spheres. That is to say, the imperfective in the Q-clause of a generic conditional is marked, unlike the future tense (*rāḥ* followed by the imperfective) in the Q-clause of a future conditional which is unmarked because it only refers to the post-present temporal sphere.

4.6. The Use of Verb Forms in Past-Habit Conditionals.

A conditional construction expresses a past habit when it refers to a habitual situation that took place in the past or in the pre-present. This type of conditional expresses past habits because it can refer to a number of past actualizations of the habit stated in the P-clause or the Q-clause. This means that all the verb forms used in this type of conditional occur in the past time-sphere and all lie completely before t_0 :

50. [During a job interview, the applicant was asked why he left his previous job. He answered:]
eḍa *ʕmiltu* *ḡaltah* *baṣiṭeh* *čānu* *yxabrūn* *l.mudīr*
 comp make_{+past.1.sg} mistake simple be_{+past.3.pl} inform_{+pres.3.pl} def.manager
 If I made a simple mistake, they used to inform the manager. (DED).

The above example shows that conditionals expressing past habits involve a perfective verb form in the P-clause and a form of *čān* followed by a verb in the imperfective. Thus, the form of a past habit conditional is

The P-clause

comp + perfective

The Q-clause

čān + imperfective

Unlike future and generic conditionals where the verb form of the P-clause can alternate between the perfective or the imperfective, the verb form in the P-clause of past habit conditionals is obligatory in the perfective where the reference is to a past habit; the use of the imperfective in the P-clause will result in ungrammatical examples:

51.

- a. *eḍa* *wājahat.ha* *muškileh* *čānat* *tistašīr* *jid.ha*
 comp face_{+past.3.f.sg.} her problem be_{+past.3.f.sg.} consult_{+pres.3.f.sg.} grandfather.her

If a problem faced her, she used to consult her grandfather. (DED).

- b. *eḍa* **twājih.ha* *muškileh* *čānat* *tistašīr*_{+pres.3.f.sg.} *jid.ha*
 comp face_{+pres.3.f.sg.} her problem be_{+past.3.f.sg.} consult grandfather.her

*If a problem faces her, she used to consult her grandfather. (DED).

In the following section, I discuss the use of the PPS in past habit conditionals.

4.6.1. The PPS in Past-Habit Conditionals.

The P-clause of a past habit conditional can only use the past counterpart of the PPS. Therefore, the use of the perfective in the P-clause is unmarked because it only refers to the past where the reference is to a situation (or a habit) that happened and finished in the past. Further, the use of the perfective in the P-clause does not indicate any shift of temporal perspective where the perfective only refers to the past time-sphere. For example,

52. *eḍa taṣal bi.ha čānat tsajjil l.mukālamah*
 comp phone_{+past.3.m.sg} prep.her be_{+past.3.f.sg} record_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.call
 If he phoned her, she used to record the call. (DED).

phoning happened and finished in the past. The P-clause does not refer to any time sphere other than the past.

Unlike the use of the perfective in the P-clause of future conditionals which can refer to the future, the use of the perfective in the P-clause of a past habit conditional cannot. Consider the following two examples where (a) is a future conditional, and (b) a past habit one.

53.
 a. *eḍa wājahat.ha muškileh rāḥ tistašir jid.ha*
 comp face_{+past.3.f.sg} her problem will consult_{+pres.3.f.sg} grandfather.her
 If a problem faces her, she will consult her grandfather. (DED).
 b. *eḍa wājahat.ha muškileh čānat tistašir jid.ha*
 comp face_{+past.3.f.sg} her problem aux consult_{+pres.3.f.sg} grandfather.her
 If a problem faced her, she used to consult her grandfather. (DED).

The above two examples differ in the structure of their Q-clauses: while the Q-clause in (a) is introduced by the future marker *rāḥ* (will), the one in (b) is introduced by a form of the auxiliary *čān*, *čānat* (lit. 'she was'). The perfective verb in the P-clause in (a) can refer to the future because of the occurrence of the future marker *rāḥ* (will) in the Q-clause, whereas the perfective verb in the P-clause of (b) cannot refer to the future because the Q-clause is not introduced by the future marker *rāḥ* (will). In other words, the occurrence of *rāḥ* in the Q-clause helps activate the future time reference of the P-clause's perfective verb in (a), whereas the occurrence of the Aux *čānat* in the Q-clause helps activate the past time reference of the P-clause's perfective verb in (b). This idea (discussed in 4.1. *The Use of Tense Forms in Conditional Sentences*) of activating the future or the past reference is analogous with Tynan and Lavin's (1997: 124), who argue that the future interpretation in English conditionals is activated once *would*, or *could* is used in the Q-clause.

This leads us to say that past habit conditionals use the past version of the PPS where the verb form in the P-clause does not undergo any shift of temporal domain.

In the next section, I discuss the binding relation in past habit conditionals and the question of which clause (the P-clause or the Q-clause) binds the other.

4.7. The Relation between the P-situation and the Q-situation.

Based on Declerck's (1997) theory of tense which indicates that a sentence can express a direct binding relation when the STO of the head clause binds the time of the situation of its subclause as in *The police realized that the suspect had often pretended that he was innocent*, we can analogously hypothesize that a conditional sentence can be a case of a direct binding when the Q-situation binds the time of the P-situation. Let us consider the following example.

54. [Two recruitment agents are discussing an applicant's job application].


eḡa štaḡal b.hai aš.širkeh čān yilbas badlah wa grāfah
 comp work_{+past.3.m.sg} prep.this def.company be_{+past.3.m.sg} wear_{+pres.3.m.sg} suit conj tie
 If he worked for this company, he used to wear a suit and a tie. (DED).

The above example shows that the STO of the P-situation is anterior to the STO of the Q-situation.

In other words, *working for this company* was anterior to *getting used to wearing a suit and a tie*.

This can be represented as follows.

55.



This means that the STO of the Q-situation does not bind the STO time of the P-situation. Therefore, the sentence does not express a direct binding relation. In contrast to our hypothesis, it is the STO of the Q-situation that is temporally subordinated to the STO of the P-situation. Thus, the absolute past tense *worked* in the P-clause locates its STO in the past sector and therefore creates a past time-sphere domain. The time of the situation of the *worked-clause* is the binding or the central TO of the domain created. On the other hand, the time of the situation in the Q-clause is 'temporally subordinated' to the central TO of the past time-sphere domain. Thus, the binding or the central TO is the past tense form *worked* and the time of the situation in the Q-clause is temporally subordinated to it. The Q-situation represents its STO as posterior to the central TO in the P-clause and is therefore located to its right.

Furthermore, the relation between the two STOs can express sloppy simultaneity where the P-situation follows the Q-situation. That is to say, one situation follows the other, i.e., *working for this company* happened before *getting used to wearing a suit and a tie*. However, this is not always the case where some cases can express strict simultaneity between the STO of the P-situation and that of the Q-situation:

56. *eḏa sāqat as.syārah čānat ttabbit ḥzām l.'amān*
 comp drive_{+past.3.f.sg} def.car be_{+past.3.f.sg} fasten_{+pres.3.f.sg} belt def.peace
 If she drove the car, she used to wear the peace-belt. (DED).

The STO of the P-situation and that of the Q-situation were simultaneous at some point in the past.

In the next section, we continue our discussion of verb forms in conditional constructions by discussing the use of tense forms in imaginative conditionals.

4.8. Tense in Imaginative Conditionals.

In this section, I discuss the use of verb forms in imaginative conditionals (hypothetical and counterfactual).

4.8.1. The Role of *lau* in Expressing Imaginative Conditionals.

In hypothetical conditionals, the P-clause introduces a proposition that is unlikely to happen, yet it is not impossible. Iatridou (2000: 234), as discussed in Declerck and Reed (2001: 93), describes such type of conditional as 'future less vivid conditionals'. The P-clause in hypothetical conditionals introduces a proposition that is closer to being false than true in the real world:

57.

a. <i>lau</i>	<i>štarat</i>	<i>aj.jarīdeh</i>	<i>čān</i>	<i>qarat</i>	<i>l.ʿaxbār</i>
comp	buy _{+past.3.f.sg}	def.newspaper	be _{+past.3.m.sg}	read _{+past.3.f.sg}	def.news

If she bought the newspaper, she would read the news. (DED).

b. <i>lau</i>	<i>ʾaxalliš</i>	<i>šugl.i</i>	<i>bakkīr</i>	<i>čān</i>	<i>jītu</i>	<i>ʿal.ḥafilt.ak</i>
comp	finish _{+pres.1.sg}	work.my	early	be _{+past.3.m.sg}	come _{+past.1.sg}	prep.party.your

If I finished my job early, I would come to your party. (DED).

The use of the particle *lau* indicates an imaginative interpretation. In other words, once *lau* introduces the sentence an imaginative interpretation is indicated.

I consider *lau* as the counter-particle of *eḏa*: while *eḏa* is used with likely-to-occur conditionals, *lau* is used with imaginative ones. The fact that only *lau* is used in imaginative conditionals (hypothetical and counterfactual) finds a good support in the literature on conditional structures in Arabic: Peled (1991: 40), for example, argues that '*lau*-sentences correspond to what is referred to in Reilly⁵⁵ (pp.312-13) as *imaginative conditionals* (in contrast to *simple*

⁵⁵ Reilly's (1986) discussion is based on Schachter (1971).

conditionals)'. Furthermore, Wickens (1984: 76) points out that *lau* is used to indicate both hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals, stating that *lau* 'implies a hypothetical or impossible condition'.

4.8.2. Verb Forms in Hypothetical Conditionals.

Verb forms play little role in determining hypothetical conditionals. The hypothetical interpretation in DED conditionals is conveyed by the use of the conditional particle *lau* followed by a perfective or imperfective verb form in the P-clause, and by the use of a frozen form of *čān* followed by a perfective verb form in the Q-clause. Whether the verb form used in the P-clause is in the perfective or the imperfective, there is no change in the meaning:

58.

- | | | | | | |
|---------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|
| a. <i>lau</i> | <i>štarat/tišdari</i> | <i>aj.jarīdeh</i> | <i>čān</i> | <i>qarat</i> | <i>l. 'axbār</i> |
| comp | buy _{+past/pres.3.f.sg} | def.newspaper | be _{+past.3.m.sg} | read _{+past.3.f.sg} | def.news |
- If she bought the newspaper, she would read the news. (DED).

- | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| b. <i>lau</i> | <i>'axalliš/xallaštu</i> | <i>šugl.i</i> | <i>bakkīr</i> | <i>čān</i> | <i>jītu</i> | <i>'al.ḥafilt.ak</i> |
| comp | finish _{+pres/past.1.sg} | work.my | early | be _{+past.3.m.sg} | come _{+past.1.sg} | prep.party.your |
- If I finished my job early, I would come to your party. (DED).

Thus, the P-clause of a hypothetical conditional can use either the perfective or the imperfective to locate the P-situation as T-posterior to the t_0 . However, though we can have either a perfective or imperfective verb form in the P-clause, the Q-clause can only have a perfective verb form after *čān*:

59.

- | | | | | | |
|---------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| a. <i>lau</i> | <i>štarat/tišdari</i> | <i>aj.jarīdeh</i> | <i>čān</i> | <i>qarat/*tiqra</i> | <i>l. 'axbār</i> |
| comp | buy _{+past/pres.3.f.sg} | def.newspaper | be _{+past.3.m.sg} | read _{+past/pres.3.f.sg} | def.news |
- If she bought the newspaper, she would read/*reads the news. (DED).

- b. *lau* ²*axalliṣ/xallaṣtu* *ṣuḡl.i* *bakkīr* *čān* *jītu/*'aji* *'al.ḥafilt.ak*
 comp finish_{+pres/past.1.sg} work.my early be_{+past.3.m.sg} come_{+past/pres.1.sg} prep.party.your
 If I finished my job early, I would come/*come to your party. (DED).

In the above hypothetical conditionals, the use of the verb form in the P-clause is not responsible for giving the hypothetical interpretation of the sentence because hypotheticality is expressed regardless of the verb form (be it perfective or imperfective). In other words, hypothetical conditionals are expressed by (i) the use of the particle *lau* which introduces the P-clause and functions as a hypothetical marker in combination with (ii) the verb form used in the Q-clause, viz., the invariable form *čān* followed by a perfective verb form.

The use of the perfective in DED hypothetical P-clauses to refer to another time (the future) is similar to the use of the past tense in English to refer to another time (the present or the future):

60.

- a. If I finished the report, I would give you a copy.
 b. If I were a rich man, I would buy a villa.

Though both *wrote* and *were* are in the past, they refer to the future and present, respectively. This means that they are marked because they can refer to other temporal sphere. The main difference between DED and English hypothetical conditionals is the fact that in English it is the verb forms that are responsible for the hypothetical interpretation, whereas in DED it is the particle *lau* (in combination with the verb forms) that gives the hypothetical interpretation:

61.

- a. *lau* *xallaṣtu/2axalliṣ* *at.taqrīr* *čān* *nṭeitū.k* *nusxah*
 comp finish_{+past/pres.1.sg} def.report be_{+past.3.m.sg} give_{+past.1.sg} you copy
 If I finished the report, I would give you a copy. (DED).

- b. *lau* *čintu/akūn* *zangīl* *čān* *štareitu* *veila*
 comp be_{+past/pres.1.sg} rich be_{+past.3.m.sg} buy_{+past.1.sg} villa
 If I were rich, I would buy a villa. (DED).

The P-clause of a hypothetical conditional can be W-anterior or W-simultaneous with some future TO. Let us consider the following examples.

62.

- a. [Hala tells Sally that she cannot accompany her to go shopping. Sally says:].

lau *gayyarti* *ra'i.či* *čān* *riḥna* *ma'a.ba'id*
 comp change_{+past.2.f.sg} opinion.your be_{+past.3.m.sg} go_{+past.1.pl} prep.others
 If you changed your mind, we would go (shopping) together. (DED).

- b. [Ali's friend asks him whether the police has found out who broke into his shop. Ali answered:].

lau *irfū* *l.harāmi* *čān* *xabbarū.ni*
 comp know_{+past.3.pl} def.theif be_{+past.3.m.sg} inform_{+past.3.pl}.me
 If they found out the thief, they would inform me. (DED).

Though the possibility of Hala changing her mind about going with Sally is interpreted as W-anterior to some future TO, the example in (a) can be interpreted as W-simultaneous. It also expresses sloppy simultaneity: Hala's decision to go shopping with Sally is followed by the actualization of the Q-situation. The same thing applies to the example in (b) where the possibility of finding out the thief is represented as World-anterior to some future TO; the example also expresses sloppy simultaneity as the two situations follow each other. The fact that the verb forms in the P-clauses can alternate between the perfective and the imperfective prevents us from claiming that anteriority can be indicated by the use of the perfective verb form. That is to say, anteriority in (a) or (b) is not expressed by the use of tense forms; it is rather expressed by W-relations.

4.8.3. The Use of the PPS/FPS in Hypothetical Conditionals.

The fact that the verb form in the P-clause of a HC can alternate between the perfective and the imperfective indicates that DED HCs use both the PPS and its past version. Unlike English where the P-clause of a HC uses the past counterpart of The PPS to express the future or the present. Compare the following two examples.

63.

- a. *lau* *ğayyarti/tğayyrīn* *ra'ī.čī* *čān* *riḥna* *ma'a.ba'id*
 comp change_{+past/pres.2.f.sg} opinion.your be_{+past.3.m.sg} go_{+past.1.pl} prep.others

If you changed your mind, we would go (shopping) together. (DED).

- b. If you studied/*study well, you would pass the exam.

As can be seen in the above two examples, it is possible in DED HCs to have either a perfective or imperfective verb form in the P-clause with no difference in meaning, while this is not possible in English. On the other hand, the verbal form in the Q-clause has a different structure:

64. *lau* *tištaḡil* *'idāfi* *čān* *waffarat* *šwayyat* *maṣāri*
 comp work_{+pres.3.f.sg} overtime be_{+past.3.m.sg} save_{+past.3.f.sg} some money

If she worked overtime, she would save some money. (DED).

As the above example show, the verb form in the Q-clause consists of a frozen form of *čān* followed by a verb in the perfective. Together, invariable *čān* and the perfective verb form, are analogous with the English conditional tense, i.e., *would + a verb in the base form* where both can be used to locate their Q-situation in the post-present.

The hypothetical interpretation is activated by the occurrence of (i) the particle *lau* which introduces the P-clause, and (ii) the use of *čān* + a perfective verb in the Q-clause. We can suggest then that the use of *čān* followed by a verb in the perfective (which are analogous with the conditional tense in English) represent the FPS.

The use of the im/perfective in the P-clause of DED HCs is analogous with the use of the past in the P-clause of English HCs. Similarly, the use of *čān* followed by a verb in the perfective form in the Q-clause of DED HCs is analogous with the use of *would* followed by a verb in the present in the Q-clause of English HCs.

This leads us to say that in the same way as the P-clause in English HCs uses the counterpart of the PPS, the P-clause in DED HCs uses the counterpart of the PPS as well, where both P-clauses in English and DED HCs refer to a time that is posterior to the t_0 . Thus, the Q-clause of a DED HCs uses the FPS (represented by *čān* followed by a verb in the perfective) where the reference is to a time that is posterior to the t_0 .

4.8.4. Verb Forms in Counterfactual Conditionals

A conditional structure is said to be counterfactual if its P-clause refers to a world that is contrary to fact. For example, a teacher is discussing a novel with her students. The teacher noticed that some of the students do not participate in the questions she asks. She says:

65. *lau čintum qareitum ar.rewāyeh čān šāraktum bi.l.munāqašah*
 comp be_{+past.2.pl} read_{+past.2.pl} def.novel be_{+past.3.m.sg} participate_{+past.2.pl} prep.def.discussion
 If you had read the novel, you would have participated in the discussion. (DED).

In the above example, the proposition introduced by the P-clause is true in a world that is contrary to the actual world; i.e., it is false in the actual world. Thus, a counterfactual conditional presents its P-clause as incompatible with and contrary to the real world; in Declerck and Reed's (2001: 636) terms, a counterfactual conditional indicates a 'maximal remoteness from reality'. Consider the following example.

66. [Sally had missed her flight because she forgot her passport at home. When her husband knew about it he said:].

lau činti tđakkarti jwāz.či čān mā fātat.či aṭ.ṭiārah
 comp be_{+past.2.f.sg} remember_{+past.2.f.sg} passport.your be_{+past.3.m.sg} Neg miss_{+past.3.f.sg} you def.plane
 If you had remembered your passport, you would not have missed the plane. (DED).

The P-situation *forgetting the passport* and the Q-situation *missing the plane* are located in the past domain.

The counterfactual interpretation of this type of conditional is conveyed by the use of (i) the particle *lau* which introduces the P-clause, (ii) a form of the Aux *čān* followed by a verb in the perfective in the P-clause, and by (iii) a frozen form of *čān* in the Q-clause followed by a perfective verb form. Thus, the form of a CFC is

The P-clause

comp + Aux *čān* (conjugated) + perfective

The Q-clause

čān (unconjugated) + perfective

That is to say, the verb forms used in the P-clause and the Q-clause can only be in the perfective. A noticeable point about this structure is that while *čān* is used in the P-clause as an auxiliary that conjugates (agrees) with its subject, *čān* in the Q-clause is used invariably. This leads us to conclude that the use of the Aux *čān* followed by the perfective in the P-clause resembles the use of past perfect in the P-clause of counterfactual conditional in English. Similarly, the use of the invariable *čān* followed by the perfective in the Q-clause resembles the use of the conditional perfect in the Q-clause of counterfactual conditionals in English.

4.8.5. Time Reference in Counterfactual Conditionals.

The time reference of the P-situation and the Q-situation can be located either in the past, pre-present or even the present. So far we have shown how the P-situation and the Q-situation are

located in the past. In other cases of counterfactual conditionals the P-situation can be located in the pre-present or in the present:

67.

a. [Salwa and Nadia missed the first part of the movie. Salwa says:].

lau činti waşşalti 'abkar čān ḥadarti l.filim min l.bidāyeh
 comp be_{+past.2.f.sg} arrive_{+past.2.f.sg} earlier be_{+past.3.m.sg} watch_{+past.2.f.sg} def.movie prep def.beginning
 If you had arrived earlier, you would have watched the movie from the beginning. (DED).

b. [Ahmad goes to a book-fair; two books attracted his attention, yet he could not afford them; he says:]

lau čānat l.'as'ār 'arxaş čān štareitu hai l.kutub
 comp be_{+past.3.f.sg} def.prices cheaper be_{+past.3.m.sg} buy_{+past.1.sg} these def.books
 If the prices were cheaper, I would have bought these books. (DED).

In the above two examples, the P-clauses refer to the pre-present, and the present respectively. We can have similar cases in English where the P-situation of a counterfactual conditional is located in the present:

68. If you had come tomorrow instead of today, you wouldn't have found me at home.

(Declerck and Reed, 2001: 178).

The above example shows that while the P-situation is located in the present, the Q-situation is in the post-present.

Counterfactual conditionals in which the speaker 'transposes' himself/herself into the world of the hearer can also express post-present reference. This type of conditional is called counteridentical conditionals.

4.9. Counteridentical Conditionals.

A very common type of counterfactual conditional is when the P-clause expresses a situation whereby the speaker imagines him/herself in the position or in the place of the person

being addressed. Declerck and Reed (2001: 100) adopt Goodman’s (1991) terminology by calling this type of conditional *counteridentical conditional*. The term comes from the fact that the P-clause ‘identifies two incompatible entities with each other, as in *if I were you, If Bill had been Kim*, etc’.

This type of counterfactual conditional has two variations in DED: (i) the first is when the P-clause involves the occurrence of the prepositional Phrase (PP) *b.makān* (in place) after the aux *čān* an (ii) the second is when *čān* is followed by either an NP or a (comparative) adjective. The Q-clause in both variations is the same: a frozen form of *čān* followed by a verb in the perfective. The structure can be summarized as follows:

69.

Structure of Counteridentical Conditionals	
The P-clause	The P-clause
comp + <i>čān</i> (conjugated) + PP <i>b.makan</i> (lit. in place)	<i>čān</i> (unconjugated) + perfective
comp + <i>čān</i> (conjugated) + NP/(comparative adjective)	

Consider the following example where two customers are not satisfied by the service of a restaurant. One tells the other:

70. *lau čintu b.makān l.mudīr čān ḥassantu l.xidmeh*
comp be_{+past.1.sg} prep.place def.manager be_{+past.3.m.sg} improve_{+past.1.sg} def.service
If I were in the place of the manager, I would improve the service. (DED).

The P-clause in the above example consists of the aux *čān* followed by the PP *b.makan* (lit. ‘in place’). Alternatively the same example can be said without the PP *b.makan* with no difference in meaning:

71. *lau čintu l.mudīr čān ḥassantu l.xidmeh*
comp be_{+past.1.sg} def.manager be_{+past.3.m.sg} improve_{+past.1.sg} def.service
If I were the manager, I would improve the service. (DED).

Both examples refer to a counterfactual situation which cannot take place; i.e., *the customer is not the manager*. The structure of the Q-clause remains the same in both variations: *čān* (unconjugated) + a perfective verb.

The second variation in the structure of the P-clause involves *čān* + a (comparative) adjective. Consider the following two examples. In (a), a 16 year old girl was not allowed to buy cigarettes because she is under the legal age. In (b) a man lost the chance of winning the lottery:

72.

- | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| a. <i>lau</i> | <i>čintu</i> | <i>'akbar</i> | <i>čān</i> | <i>štareitu</i> | <i>duxān</i> |
| comp | be _{+past.1.sg} | older | be _{+past.3.m.sg} | buy _{+past.1.sg} | tobacco |
| If I were older, I would buy tobacco. (DED). | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| b. <i>lau</i> | <i>čintu</i> | <i>maḥdūd</i> | <i>čān</i> | <i>rbiḥtu</i> | <i>l.yānašib</i> |
| comp | be _{+past.1.sg} | lucky | be _{+past.3.m.sg} | win _{+past.1.sg} | def.lottery |
| If I had been lucky, I would have won the lottery. (DED). | | | | | |

Both examples have a counterfactual interpretation: the propositions expressed in the P-clauses cannot be fulfilled.

An important aspect relevant to counterfactual conditionals is deictic reference, a point discussed in the following section.

4.9.1. Deictic Reference in Counterfactual Conditionals.

Declerck and Reed (2001: 100-1) distinguish between deictic references indicating to the *speaker* and deictic references referring to the *hearer* in counterfactual sentences:

73.

- a. If I were you, I'd kill myself.
- b. If I were you, I'd kill me.

(Declerck and Reed, 2001: 100).

Declerck and Reed (2001) point out that the deictic reference in (a) refers to the hearer, not the speaker, and that the sentence can be interpreted as 'what I would do in your place is kill myself'.

On the other hand, the deictic reference in (b) refers to the speaker, not the hearer, and that the sentence can be interpreted as ‘what I would do in your place is kill me’. In other words, while the message conveyed in (a) is about what the hearer should do to himself, the message in (b) is about what the hearer should do to the speaker (Declerck and Reed, 2001). In this section, I will discuss whether DED can express similar structures with similar interpretations. Consider the following example where Ahmad talks to Salwa after realizing that she is accepting bribes:

74. *lau* *čintu* *makān.či* *čān* *šanaqtu* *hāl.i*
 comp be_{+past.1.sg} place.your be_{+past.3.m.sg} hang_{+past.1.sg} self.my
 If I were you, I would hang myself. (DED).

The speaker imagines a world where he puts himself in Salwa’s shoes, yet the deictic centre of Ahmad’s imagined world is not Ahmad, but Salwa. The sentence can be interpreted as *what I would do in your place is hang myself*, or, *I advise you to hang yourself*. The deictic centre is the hearer, not the speaker. The sentence shows what Ahmad (the speaker) asks the hearer (Salwa) to do to herself. This shows that the first case is available in DED counteridentical conditionals.

As for the second case where the centre of the deictic reference is the speaker, I will consider the following example: Faris is a lame person; he applied for a job in a restaurant. Contrary to his expectation, he was accepted. When Faris saw his employer, he said:

75. **lau* *čintu* *makān.ak* *čān* *rafadtu.ni*
 comp be_{+past.1.sg} place.your be_{+past.3.m.sg} reject_{+past.1.sg}.me
 *If I were you, I would reject me. (DED).

As the above starred example shows, it is not possible to construct a sentence meaning *If I were you, I would reject me* in DED. The Q-clause is very odd: it is similar to saying *I saw me*, or *I hanged me* etc., where one expects *I saw myself*, or *I hanged myself*. The ungrammaticality arises from the fact that the subject and the object in the Q-clause are the same, a structure that is unacceptable in DED. Replacing *-i (me)* by *hāl.i* (lit. ‘myself’) in the above example can solve the

grammaticality issue of the sentence, yet the sentence will not convey the respective meaning given the context above:

76. *lau* *čintu* *makān.ak* *čān* *rafadtu* *ḥāl.i*
 conp be_{+past.1.sg} place.your be_{+past.3.m.sg} reject_{+past.1.sg} self.my
 If I were you, I would reject myself. (DED).

Thus, it is not possible in DED to construct an equivalent to *If I were you, I'd kill me* or *If I were you, I would reject me*, etc.

4.10. Summary.

In this chapter we have discussed the tense system in DED conditionals within Declerck's (1991) tense theory. The use of different tense forms in the different types of DED conditionals has been described. The relevant literature shows that (a) there is a consensus among researchers that verb forms play little role in the interpretation of conditional sentences in Arabic and (b) that conditional particles used are responsible for determining the interpretation of the conditional sentences they introduce. Our study however does not really conform to this view, as different conditionals require distinct verb forms. We have shown, for instance, that while DED future conditionals take the following form:

P-clause	Q-clause
conp + perfective/imperfective	<i>rāḥ</i> + imperfective

past realis ones, on the other hand, take a different form:

P-clause	Q-clause
conp + perfective	<i>čān</i> + imperfective

In other words, DED verb forms can play an important role in the interpretation of conditionals. It is the combination of both the conditional particles and the tense forms used which determine the interpretation of DED conditionals. Our study has revealed that there is a considerable degree of

similarity between DED and English with respect to the use of tense form, particularly the use of the perfective to indicate the future.

DED counterfactual conditionals have also been discussed in this chapter; our study has revealed that it is not possible to construct a counterfactual sentence like *If I were you, I would reject me* in DED due to the oddity of the Q-clause.

Chapter Five

Clausal Order in DED Conditionals

5.0. Introduction.

Most of the conditional constructions we have so far discussed consist mainly of a P-clause followed by a Q-clause. However, there are several cases where this order is reversed. This chapter mainly discusses this reversed order and shows why a speaker chooses one order rather than the other, i.e., what makes the speaker produce a sentence with either initial or final P-clause. Further, this chapter discusses some of the semantic differences the change in clausal order indicates. This chapter is organized as follows: first, I will review some of the existing accounts related to the clausal order of conditional structures in both English and Arabic. Then I show some of the cases in which P-clauses are finally-positioned in DED conditional constructions. Next, I argue along with Peled (1992) that final P-clauses can function as Q-clause modifiers. *For reasons of length* we will restrict our discussion to realis conditionals. In other words, the *Q, if P* order in irrealis conditionals is not discussed in this chapter.⁵⁶

5.1. Clausal Order in English Conditionals.

Four main points will be discussed in this section: (a) the widely-held view that initial P-clause conditionals are more prevalent than initial Q-clause ones, (b) Haiman's (1978) claim that P-clauses are topics and the response of some researchers to this claim, (c) the universality of the initial P-clause conditionals and (d) conditionals whose P-clauses are finally-positioned.

⁵⁶ The *Q, if P* order in irrealis conditionals is possible in English. For example, I would quit my job if I won the lottery.

5.1.1. Initially-Positioned P-clauses.

A cursory review of the literature on English conditionals shows that in the majority of examples P-clauses precede Q-clauses. Comrie (1986), for instance, points out that the P/Q order is the unmarked form of conditional structures; that is to say, the P/Q order is the typical order of conditionals. Further, Dancygier (1998: 145-146) reports some studies which confirm the same observation: in a discourse-oriented study by Linde (1976), for example, the data analysed show that conditionals in which the P-clause precedes the Q-clause represent 80 percent of the conditional sentences analysed: 'a figure like this strongly suggests that the speakers' choice of position for the *if-clause* cannot be unmotivated' (Linde, 1976: 280). Linde shows that the reason behind the preponderance of the *if P, Q* order is what she calls the 'temporal ordering principle' which states that the *P-clause* situation precedes that of the Q-clause clause.

Ford and Thompson (1986: 353) disapprove of Linde's (1976) observation about the precedence of initial P-clauses over Q-clauses because her 'database is limited and may be representative of only one discourse type'. Nevertheless, they share the widely-held observation that conditionals with initial P-clauses are more prevalent than the ones with final P-clauses. Their study involves both written and spoken corpora. In both of these corpora they have found that 'initial conditional clauses outnumber final conditional clauses by a ratio of about three to one' (Ford and Thompson, 1986: 354). In their study of discourse conditionals, Ford and Thompson (1986: 356-358) decide on four situations in which P-clauses are initially positioned and therefore serve as topics for the following material (the Q-clauses): (a) when a conditional 'repeats an earlier claim', (b) when 'the conditional offers a contrast to something which has gone before, (c) when the conditional 'provides exemplification' and (d) when the P-clause 'opens up new possibilities whose consequences are to be explored'. The following examples

(from Ford and Thompson (1986: 356-358)) respectively represent these four situations where the P-clauses are positioned initially.

1.

- a. From the very start of the project friends kidded me about being Nim's 'daddy'. After all, I had no children of my own. ... *If* indeed there was a sense in which I was regarded as Nim's father, it would really be as paterfamilias of an often unruly family, breadwinner, listener, comforter, and peacemaker.
- b. When in elementary algebra, you do problems about A, B, and C going up a mountain, you have no emotional interest in the gentlemen concerned. ... But *if* you thought that A was yourself, B your hated rival and C the schoolmaster who set the problem, your calculation would go askew.
- c. *If* you try to explain to someone, say, in the steel industry, that possibly prosperity in other countries might be advantageous to him, you will find it quite impossible to make him see the argument.
- d. The condition of a discharged battery may be tested by passing current through it . . . *If* the cell voltages vary more than 0.1 volt, replace the battery. *If* the cell voltages are all within 0.1 volt, test the total battery voltage.

Ford and Thompson (1986: 361) conclude that conditionals in English 'occur much more frequently in initial position than in final position'.

Some researchers provide other explanations for the preponderance of the P/Q order; for example, Lehman (1974), as discussed in Dancygier (1998: 146), points out that the 'p/q order effectively allows the interlocutors to gain common ground gradually, as the discourse progresses'. Lehman's (1974) views bear some similarity to those of Schiffrin's (1992); the latter points out that many scholars such as Firbas (1964) 'proposed that the organization of a sentence follows a given-to-new (or topic-comment) order in which the speaker begins with the information assumed to be given and progress toward the information assumed to be new' (Schiffrin, 1992: 179). Further, Schiffrin points out that one of the benefits of the given/new order is the ease of transmitting the information to the recipient: 'the given/new order eases the

transmission of information to a recipient' (Schiffrin, 1992: 171). Therefore the P/Q order is due to the givenness of the P-clause and the newness of the Q-clause.

Further, Schiffrin (1992) points out that the P/Q order prevails because it is doubly motivated, stating that 'if clauses occupying the initial position follow both of two major principles of discourse organization: they are topics and they are givens, so their initial position is doubly motivated'. That is to say, topicality and givenness are two reasons why P-clauses come first in the structure of a conditional sentence.

The term *topic* is meant to be construed in the sense of Haiman's (1978) study (which will be discussed in the following section). Haiman (1978) states that P-clauses function as topics and that is why they are initially positioned in the structure of conditionals. Some researchers have supported Haiman's (1978) views while others provide some counter-evidence to his claim. This is discussed in the following section in more detail.

5.1.2. Are P-clauses Topics?

Haiman (1978) points out that P-clauses function as topics because they represent shared information between the speaker and the hearer, and that is why they occur initially: 'conditionals, like topics, are givens which constitute the frame of reference with respect to which the main clause is either true (if a proposition), or felicitous (if not)' (Haiman, 1978: 564). Consider the following examples.

2.

- a. If Max comes, we will play poker.
- b. If Max had come, we'd have played poker.
- c. If ice is left in the sun, it melts.

(Haiman, 1978: 564).

The *P-clauses* in the above examples function as the topics to the sentences they introduce because they represent shared knowledge between the speaker and hearer, i.e., they are givens.

Haiman (1978) argues on morphological evidence from various languages (e.g. Hua and Tagalog)⁵⁷ that P-clauses are analogous to topics. Haiman's (1978: 583) understanding of P-clauses indicates the functional similarity between topics and P-clauses in Hua; this is clear in his definition of conditionals: 'A conditional clause is (perhaps only hypothetically) a part of the knowledge shared by the speaker and his listener. As such it constitutes the framework which has been selected for the following discourse'. His discussion is based on some shared morphological desinence between P-clauses and topics; he argues that *given that P* structure in Hua expresses a meaning equivalent to English *since P*, *when P*, or *because P*, therefore, P-clauses function as givens, i.e., as shared knowledge or old information between the speaker and the hearer. That is to say, they are topics. For example,

3. hi-su-mamo
 'if I do it'
 hu-mamo
 'given that I do it'

(Haiman, 1978: 581).

Haiman considers P-clauses as givens and that is why they occur initially in the sentence; he argues that P-clauses are similar to topics in that they are 'old information' and therefore givens too; the desinence *mamo* in the above example is shared between the P-clause *hi-su-mamo* (if I do it) and the topic *hu-mamo* (given that I do it). Thus, he concludes that P-clauses are topics. Furthermore, Haiman (1978: 572) indicates that 'conditional clauses are also very frequently left-dislocated constituents'. That is to say, the property of left-dislocation characteristic of topics is similar to positioning P-clauses sentence-initially;

Haiman's construal of the topicality in Hua is confirmed by Akatsuka (1986: 346) who states that '*if p* construction in Hua shares the verbal ending *mamo*. Haiman argues that since the two constructions [if-clauses and givens] share *mamo*, we are forced to identify both of

⁵⁷ Hua is a Papuan language of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea, while Tagalog is an Austronesian language spoken mainly in the Philippines.

them as conditionals in Hua'. Nevertheless, Akatsuka (1986) does not entirely agree with Haiman (1978), pointing out that conditionals are not givens (old information) because not all topics are givens. Akatsuka's (1986) observation is based on Kuno's (1972) two types of topics, thematic and contrastive topics; the following illustration is from Akatsuka (1986: 347).

4.

Thematic = 'Speaking of X' – X must be old information

Contrastive = 'As for X' – X can be new information.

The point is that Haiman (1978) considers both thematic and contrastive topics as old information or givens, whereas Akatsuka (1986) indicates that only thematic topics are givens where there is the possibility that contrastive topics may be new information and therefore not givens; this is clear in Akatsuka's (1986: 342) statement: 'Haiman (1978) explicitly rejected the distinction between the two categories [thematic and contrastive topics]'. This means that Akatsuka (1986) does not really reject Haiman's conditionals-are-topic conclusion, rather he is concerned with Haiman's generalization that all topics are givens: 'I have argued that conditionals are not givens. However, I am not disagreeing with Haiman's view that conditionals are topics. Not all topics are givens' (Akatsuka, 1986: 348).

Haiman's (1978) claim that P-clauses are topics has been criticized by many researchers; Dancygier (1998: 134), for example, argues that *if* in the P-clause marks a proposition as non-assertive, showing that the speaker does not accept the P-clause as true or as a shared information with the hearer; and therefore, 'conditional protases cannot be claimed to be 'given'. On the contrary, the function of protases is to present assumptions as for some reason unassertable'. She concludes that Haiman's *conditionals-are-topic* claim is invalid: 'protases ... do not fit standard criterion for topicality' (Dancygier, 1998: 135).

5.1.3. Universality of the Initial P-clause Conditionals.

Due to the fact that the P/Q order is more prevalent than the Q/P one, some researchers have concluded that the former is a universal order that is shared in all languages. Ford and

Thompson (1986: 354) argue that 'the preponderance of initial versus final conditional clauses appears to be a language universal'. Furthermore, they report a study by Marchese (1976) who examines a written corpus of Godie (a Kru language spoken in Ivory Coast) where 'text counts reveal an even more striking tendency for initial conditionals (100 per cent in 135 pages of transcribed speech' (Ford and Thompson, 1986: 354).

Comrie (1986: 86) suggests that the preponderance of the P-clause-Q-clause order in languages has to do with the cause-and-effect relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause: 'since cause precedes effect (at least in our conceptualization of the world), it could be that this is mirrored iconically in the order of the clauses'. That is to say, since cause precedes effect, the P-clause which usually expresses a cause precedes the Q-clause which expresses an effect.

Greenberg (1963: 84-5) considers initial-P-clause conditionals a universal of word order: 'in conditional statements, the conditional clause precedes the conclusion as the normal order in all languages'. Furthermore, Comrie (1986: 83) supports Greenberg's (1963) observation by stating that he has not find any counterexample to Greenberg's (1963) generalization: 'work leading up to the present paper has uncovered no counterexamples to this generalization.' One thus wonders whether the P/Q order is a universal one, i.e., whether it is adhered to by all natural languages. Though no research has been done to all natural languages regarding this issue, 'many grammars note explicitly that the usual order is that for the protasis to precede, and presumably the same will hold for many languages where the grammars are silent on this point' (Comrie, 1986: 83).⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Comrie (1986: 83-84) reports some languages in which the P-clause must precede the Q-clause 'in particular in languages with a rigid rule requiring the finite verb of the main clause to stand sentence-finally (e.g. Turkish)'. Further, he points out that 'in Mandarin, the protasis must precede the apodosis, irrespective of whether either protasis or apodosis is marked overtly'.

Nevertheless, situations where P-clauses occur in the final position do exist; the questions of why such constructions occur, or in which cases P-clauses occur in final position, are discussed in the following section.

5.1.4. Finally-Positioned P-clauses.

Declerck and Reed (2001: 367-369) discuss different kinds of finally-occurring P-clauses such as (a) Postscript-P conditionals and (b) conditional anacolutha. They categorize these types under 'syntactically marked' conditionals. In Postscript-P conditionals the P-clause is 'added as a kind of afterthought'. Declerck and Reed (2001: 369) cite the Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics (1996: 20-12) to express conditional anacolutha; anacoluthon refers to a 'sudden change of an originally planned sentence construction to an alternative, inconsistent one during sentence production due to unplanned speech. Anacoluthon is considered to be the result of self-correction during speech or also the blend of two different constructions'. Thus, some conditional structures take the form of anacoluthon. The following two examples represent these two kinds of P-clauses (the second example is from Declerck and Reed (2001: 369)).

5.

- a. I will call you at 11 tonight, if you stay awake.
- b. The only reason I'd do that would be if there were problems with the computer. (*This is a blending of 'The only reason I'd do that would be that there were problems...' and 'I would only do this if there were problems...'*)

Ford and Thompson (1986: 360) identify some cases which account for the final positioning of P-clauses: the argue that P-clauses with 'new, heavy, or compared NPs' tend to appear final in the conditional construction where 'this will sometimes necessitate post-posing a conditional clause'. For example,

6.

- a. Our confused and difficult world needs various things *if* it is to escape disaster, and one of the most necessary is that ...
- b. So it was in the French Revolution, when dread of foreign armies produced the reign of terror. The Soviet government would have been less fierce *if* it had met with less hostility in its first years. (Ford and Thompson, 1986: 360).

The NP (Our confused and difficult world) in (a) is 'a new, heavy and important referent' in the sentence and therefore the P-clause involving it tends to appear final in the sentence. In (b) the NP (the Soviet government) is compared with the NP (the French Revolution) mentioned in the previous sentence. Thus, the P-clause containing the NP (the Soviet government) tends to be finally positioned.

A further possible explanation for the final occurrence of P-clauses suggested by Ford and Thompson concentrates on the length of the P-clause; they point out that the length of the P-clause results in its being finally-positioned: 'Another factor which seems to warrant a conditional's tendency to migrate to final position is its length'. According to this observation, P-clauses which occur in the final position are longer than their Q-clauses; that is to say, their length precludes their occurrence in the initial position. For example,

7. Lana would not receive any apple *if* she pressed such incorrect sequence as: *please machine apple give* or *machine please give apple*. (Ford and Thompson, 1986: 361).

Based on the literature of the clausal order in conditionals, I note that there is a lack of assertiveness in the principles or reasons suggested for clausal order in conditionals, particularly the final occurrence of P-clauses: most, if not all, researchers providing accounts for the final positioning of P-clauses seem to be irresolute, or uncertain about why the P-clause can be finally-positioned. Ford and Thompson (1986: 360), for instance, state that 'while we are not in a position to offer an explanation for this fact [that P-clauses can be finally-positioned], it seems to have something to do with the incompatibility between the discourse

work of qualifying a noun or verb performed by these incorporated clauses and the topic for the following clause work performed by the conditional clause'. That is to say, there is an air of uncertainty about the conclusion they provide; the explanations they suggested are doubtful and far from being definite. They further state 'we do not claim to have offered an explanation for the choice of final over initial position, but we do hope to have suggested what some of the factors are which motivate this choice'.

Comrie's (1986: 84) explanations are not better with regard to their definiteness. For example, before explaining why we can have final P-clause conditionals, he states 'the suggestions below are necessarily speculative and it is not necessary that only one of them be the correct solution: possibly the interaction of all or some of these factors leads to the observed preferred clause order'. Further, Peled (1992: 139) exhibits the same doubtful conclusion by stating that there is no way in which the P-clause and the Q-clause can be ordered, an issue which he refers to as 'the non-permutability of the prot. [protasis] and the apod. [apodosis] in a CSn. [conditional sentences]'.

Having reviewed some of the existing accounts about the clausal order of conditional structures in English, I turn to review some of the literature on this topic in Arabic.

5.2. Clausal Order in Arabic Conditionals.

Few attempts have been made to explain the clausal order of conditional sentences in Arabic. Many researchers on Arabic seem to have overlooked this topic, others may simply touch it in passing without any considerable analysis: Ingham (1997: 137), for instance, points out that 'the preference is for the time or condition clause to precede the main clause...' without any further explanations. Similarly, Abu-Chacra (2007: 312) states, without telling us *when* or *how*, that 'the second part of the conditional sentence may precede the first part'. Further, Wickens (1980: 76) does not take into account cases where the P-clause occurs final. He points out that 'in Arabic the Protasis (*shart*) must practically always precede the Apodosis

(*jawāb*). Also, Holes (1995: 238) merely indicates that the P-clause 'may occur before or after the apodosis' without any further explanation.

Other researchers such as Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 296) discuss cases where P-clauses function as an afterthought. They point out that in conditionals involving an afterthought P-clause 'a statement is made as if it were a fact, then a condition is added'. The following example is from Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 296).⁵⁹

8. *qālū* *'inahum* *nibāl.un* *wa* *'in* *kānū* *kufār.an*
 say_{+past.3.m.pl} comp nobles_{Nom} conj comp be_{+past.3..pl} infidels_{Acc}

They said that they were noble, although they were infidels. (Haywood and Nahmad, 1962: 296).

Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 296) give no explanation as to where or when we can use afterthought conditionals, though they state that such kinds of conditionals 'are not at all unusual in Arabic'.

Ryding (2005: 672) gives little, if any, explanation to the possibility of having a Q/P order in Arabic conditionals, a possibility which he calls a postposed condition: 'most of the time, the *šarṭ* clause [i.e., the P-clause] comes first, before the *jawāb* [i.e., the Q-clause] or apodosis, but sometimes the order is reversed'. Ryding (2005: 672) however refers to the deletion of the *fā-* when the P-clause comes final in the sentence: 'the particle *fā-* is omitted'. *fā-* is a bound morpheme equivalent to English *then* when introducing a Q-clause. That is to say, it functions as an introducer (intro.) to the Q-clause. For example,

9.
eda ragibta *fi* *hajzi* *taḍkaratin* *fā. 'alai.ka* *'an* *tadfā'a* *musbaqan*
 comp want_{+past.2.m.sg} prep booking ticket intro.prep.you comp pay_{+pres.2.m.sg} beforehand
 If you want to reserve a ticket, (then) you must pay in advance. (Ryding, 2005: 672).

The Q-clause in the above example is introduced by *fā-* which can be equivalent to *then* in English. However, when the Q-clause introduces the sentence, *fā-* (then) is omitted:

⁵⁹ Haywood and Nahmad (1962: 296) only provide the Arabic text with its English translation for their examples.

10. 'alai.ka 'an tadfā'a musbaqan eḍa raḡibta fi ḥajzi tadkarat.in
 prep.you comp pay_{+pres.2.m.sg} beforehand conj want_{+past.2.m.sg} prep booking ticket_{Acc}
 You must pay in advance if you want to reserve a ticket. (MSA).

The above example shows that *fā-* is omitted when the P-clause is finally-positioned. English seems to show some similarity because *then* is omitted when the P-clause occurs after the Q-clause. Compare the following two examples.

11. If you want to reserve a ticket, then you must pay in advance.
 12. You must pay in advance, if you want to reserve a ticket.

It is not possible to keep *fā-* when the Q-clause precedes the P-clause in Arabic.

13. ??fā. 'alai.ka 'an tadfā'a musbaqan eḍa raḡibta fi ḥajzi tadkaratin
 intro.prep.you comp pay_{+pres.2.m.sg} beforehand conj want_{+past.2.m.sg} prep booking ticket
 ?? Then you must pay in advance if you want to reserve a ticket. (MSA).

Nevertheless, initial *then* is possible in English when the Q-clause is a consequence of something else; this is shown in the following conversation:

14. [A customer talking to a receptionist].
 a. I want to be sure that the room is booked.
 b. Then pay in advance.

Badawi, Carter and Gully (2004: 640) support the claim that the *P, then Q* order is more prevalent than the *Q, P one* by considering data from Modern Written Arabic (MWA): 'MWA maintains broadly the CA order of protasis-apod. [apodasis] in conditional sentences'. This again shows that the *P, then Q* order is the unmarked one in Arabic.

According to Peled (1992: 138), when a P-clause occurs in the final position, it does not function as a P-clause, it rather functions as a modifier of the Q-clause. He also argues that when the Q-clause occurs in the initial position it changes into a main clause. That is to say, a structure with the Q-clause followed by the P-clause does not constitute a conditional sentence, rather the Q-clause is a main clause modified by the P-clause. Nevertheless, the Q-clause functions as a main clause whether the clausal order is *P, then Q* or *Q, P*. Peled bases his claim on some of the medieval Arab grammarians such as Ibn Al'anbārī (1961) and Ibn Ya'īš (1886).

Peled (1992: 139) quotes Ibn Ya'īš (1886) who 'argues that in a sentence like *'anā dālimun 'in fā'altu* ('I am a sinner if I do'), *'anā dālimun* (I am a sinner) is not a *jawāb* (Q-clause) *'wa-innamā huwa kalāmun mustaqillun 'uqqiba bi-l-šarṭi*' ('rather, it is an independent sentence followed by a CC[conditional clause]')'.

Thus, Peled (1992: 138) argues that when a P-clause occurs in a non-initial position, its main function is as an adverbial modifying clause; and therefore a P-clause can 'function as a sentence adverbial, or as a modifier of another clause/phrase and as such it may occur either in medial or in sentence-final position'. My analysis of DED conditionals draws on Peled's basic claim that conditionals occurring in the final position can function as modifying adverbial clauses. Peled's analysis depends mainly on the difference in verbal mood and the use of the introducers like *fā* or *la* which are used in CA, but not in DED.

Having reviewed some of the previous studies related to the clausal order in English and Arabic, I will discuss this topic in DED in light of the literature reviewed above.

5.3. Clausal Order in DED Conditionals.

In the following sections, I discuss the different types of final-P conditionals in DED. Conditionals in which the P-clause occur within its Q-clause are not discussed in this study.

5.3.1. Types of DED Final P-clauses.

In this section, I show that final DED P-clauses can be categorized into four types: (a) relevance P-clauses, (b) lessening and enhancing P-clause, (c) averting P-clauses, (d) promotional P-clauses. These types are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

5.3.1.1. Relevance P-clauses.

Declerck and Reed (2001: 320) call such conditionals relevance-expressing conditionals because the P-clause 'explains the relevance of uttering the Q-clause'. The following example is from Declerck and Reed (2001: 320).

15. I am not a coward, if that is what you think. (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 230).

The P-clause *if that is what you think* expresses a situation under which the proposition *I am not a coward* can be relevant.

Scheffler (2008: 373) points out that ‘the *if*-clause in a relevance conditional does not state a condition under which the consequent is claimed to hold. Instead, the consequent seems to be put forward absolutely and the *if*-clause appears to express a situation under which it may be relevant’. Consider the following DED example.

16. [A mother talks to her son who has just come back home].

<i>bi</i>	<i>baṭāṭa</i>	<i>miqliyyeh</i>	<i>eda</i>	<i>jo‘ān</i>
existop ⁶⁰	potato	fried	comp	hungry

There are fried chips if you (are) hungry. (DED).

The P-clause *eda jo‘ān* (if you are hungry) explains why the mother utters the Q-clause *bi baṭāṭa miqliyyeh* (there are fried chips). Though the two clauses do not express a direct causal relation, they are still related to each other: there is a relation between being hungry and the availability of fried chips.

Relevance P-clauses tend to occur final in the sentence when they express such a relation with their Q-clauses. The P-clause *eda jo‘ān* (if you are hungry) does not express a condition under which the Q-clause proposition *there are some fried chips* will hold; instead, it expresses a situation under which *eda jo‘ān* (if you are hungry) can be relevant. For a further analysis of relevance P-clauses see for example Van der Auwera (1986), DeRose and Grandy (1999), and Siegel (2006) among others.

5.3.1.2. Lessening and Enhancing P-clauses.

Lessening and enhancing P-clauses can express meanings opposite to each other: while lessening P-clauses aim at minimizing or trimming down the proposition made in the Q-clause,

⁶⁰ *existop* stands for existential operator.

enhancing ones aim at magnifying or expanding it. The following two examples represent these two types respectively.

17.

a. [Salim had a serious car accident and is now in the hospital. His doctor says:]

yih̄tāj xamis ʿayyām ta yiṭlaʿ min l.mašfa eḏa rāḥ yiṭlaʿ
 need_{+pres.3.m.sg} five days prep leave_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep def.hospital comp will leave_{+pres.3.m.sg}
 He needs five days to leave the hospital, if he will leave (it). (DED).

b. [Sally asks her friend about the best football player he knows. He answers:]

bieleh ʿafḏal lāʿib bi.l.barāzil eḏa mū bi.l.ʿālam
 Pelé best player prep.def.Brazil comp Neg prep.def.world
 Pelé is the best player in Brazil, if not in the world. (DED).

In (a) the P-clause *if he will leave it* weakens the strength of the Q-clause proposition. In other words, the P-clause indicates that Salim will need to spend more than five days to recover and that the possibility of leaving the hospital in the near future is doubtful; the P-clause lessens the possibility of Salim's recovery. In (b), the P-clause *if not in the world* has a boosting effect because the expression *in the world* indicates a wider area when compared to *Brazil* mentioned in the Q-clause. That is to say, an enhancing effect is indicated when the P-clause involves an expression that can be considered superior to that in the Q-clause.

The closest English equivalent constructions to the lessening and enhancing P-clauses are commenting conditionals discussed by Declerck and Reed (2001: 340) who state that 'the P-clause expresses the speaker's comment on the contents of the Q-clause or on the conditions under which she is uttering the Q-clause'. A lessening, or 'downtoning' P-clause as Declerck and Reed (2001) call it, 'tones down, or casts doubt on, a claim made or implied in Q'.

Consider the following examples in English where the first set represents lessening conditionals and the second enhancing ones.

18.

- a. The lecture lasted about one hour, if not less.
- b. Nadia will pass the exam with a low score, if she passes at all.

19.

- a. Liverpool won three matches, if not more.
- b. We waited for only five minutes, if not less.

(18.a.b) are examples of lessening P-clauses because they weaken the strength of the Q-clauses' propositions: the P-clause in (18.a) indicates that the speaker doubts that the lecture lasted for an hour. Similarly, the P-clause in (18.b) casts doubt on the likelihood *that Nadia will pass her exam*.

On the other hand, enhancing conditionals tones up or casts more certainty on the proposition made by the Q-clause. (19.a.b) are examples of enhancing P-clauses. In (19.a), the P-clause *if not more* enhances the Q-clause proposition *Liverpool won three matches* by toning it up. The same thing applies to (19.b) where the P-clause further emphasizes that the waiting time was very short.

When the P-clause involves negation, it does not mean that it is a lessening P-clause, as enhancing conditional can be negative as well. For example,

20.

- a. [A wife complaining (to her husband) about the bad company their daughter keeps]

rāḥ *yifasdūn.ha* *eḍa* *mā* *fassaqū.ha*
 will spoil_{+pres.3.pl.}her conp Neg demoralize_{+past.3.pl.}her
 They will spoil her, if not demoralize her. (DED).

- b. [A father advising his teenage daughter who refuses to go to school.]

l.ʕilim *yixali.či* *mašhūrah* *ʔaktar* *eḍa* *mū* *qawiyyeh* *ʔktar*
 knowledge make_{+pres.3.f.sg.}you famous more conp Neg powerful more
 Knowledge makes you more reputable, if not more powerful. (DED).

Both of the above examples involve enhancing P-clauses. Observe that both P-clauses involve negation. In other words, not every lessening P-clause should involve negation.

On the other hand, enhancing P-clauses must always involve negation; enhancing interpretation is not possible if the P-clause does not involve negation:

21.

a. [A sales-assistant promoting a product]

hāda l.ʕītir ydal kul an.nahār eḏa mū li.l.nahār aṭ.tāni
 this def.perfume last_{+pres.3.m.sg} all def.day comp Neg prep.def.day def.second

This perfume lasts all day long, if not to the next day. (DED).

b. [The Finance Office asked Ali to pay his outstanding tuition fees].

aš.šahir aj.jei kafil.i rāḥ yidfāʕ l.qaṣiṭ l.ʾawwal eḏa mū l.mablaḡ kāmīl
 def.month def.next sponsor.my will pay_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.installment def.first comp Neg def.fee total

Next month my sponsor will pay the first instalment if not the total fee. (DED).

Another type of final P-clause shows that the speaker is open to change or is ready to amend what s/he has stated in the Q-clause. This kind of P-clauses is discussed in the following section.

5.3.1.3. Averting-P-clauses

This type of P-clause shows that the speaker is ready to amend or avert the proposition stated in the Q-clause as shown in (22.a) below. Averting-P-clauses can also be used to get permission or get the addressee's consent about the Q-clause proposition as in (22.b), or to admit the speaker's uncertainty about the truthfulness of the proposition stated in the Q-clause as in (22.c).

22.

a. [Hala speaks to her husband]

ʔuxt.i rāḥ tqaddi aj.jimʕah wa as.sabit maʕā.na eḏa mā tmāniʕ
 sister.my will spend_{+pres.3.f.sg} def.Friday conj def.Saturday prep.us comp Neg mind_{+pres.2.m.sg}

My sister will spend the weekend with us, if you do not mind. (DED).

b. [Fatima, a PhD student, meets her supervisor and asks him for an appointment:]

mumkin ṭhaddid.l.i mawʕid bukraḥ eḏa ʕindak waqit
 Mod appoint_{+pres.2.m.sg} prep.me appointment tomorrow comp prep time

Is it possible to give me an appointment tomorrow, if you have time? (DED).

c. [Salwa asks Hadi about the football match which she could not watch last night. He says:]

ʕingiltraḥ xisrat l.mubārāḥ eḏa mū ḡaltān
 England lose_{+past.3.f.sg} def.match comp Neg wrong

England lost the match, if I (am) not wrong. (DED).

In (22.a-c), the P-clauses tend to occur in the final position. The common characteristic of these examples is that the P-clause makes the proposition stated in the Q-clause more polite or more tentative: Hala's use of *eḏa mā tmāni*^c (*if you do not mind*) in (a) softens her request regarding her sister's visit. Similarly, the P-clause *eḏa 'indak waqit* (*if you have time*) in (b) renders Fatima's request for an appointment more polite and eliminates any risk of making her request sound like an order or any risk of making her supervisor feel that the appointment is an imposed obligation. The use of the P-clause *eḏa mū ḡaltān* (*if I am not wrong*) in (c) indicates Hadi's uncertainty about the result of the football match.

Another type of final P-clause is promotional conditionals which is mainly used to promote sales, services, etc.

5.3.1.4. Promotional Conditionals

As their name suggests, promotional conditionals are used to promote or convince the hearer to accept the proposition stated in the Q-clause which is usually presented as an offer. For example,

23.

- a. [A white-goods sale assistant is talking to a customer].

rāḥ tāxuḏ ṣiyānah majjāniyyeh eḏa štareit 'aḥad muntajāt.na
will take_{+pres.2.m.sg} maintenance free comp buy_{+past.2.m.sg} one products.our

You will get free maintenance if you buy any of our products. (DED).

- b. [A bank assistant tries to convince a customer of opening a bank account in the branch he works for]

rāḥ tiḥṣal 'ala 'alif leira eḏa fataḥit ḥsāb b.banig.na
will get_{+pres.2.m.sg} prep thousand lira comp open_{+past.2.m.sg} account prep.bank.our

You will get 1000 liras if you open an account in our bank. (DED).

It is obvious that this type of conditional is mainly, but not exclusively, used in marketing. It is a technique used by sellers to encourage customers to buy or accept their offers or products. Sellers introduce the good part (the Q-clause/the offer) first; by so doing, their offer is presented as if it were a good bargain for their proposed customers. The Q-clause in

promotional conditionals tones down the possible shock the P-clause may cause: telling the customer in (a) that he/she will get free maintenance for his/her washing machine or any other product (before telling him/her to buy it) will make him/her think of the benefits he/she will get first. Similarly, in (b) the bank assistant informs the customer about the benefits of opening a bank account first, then he/she introduces the condition later on in order to convince the customer of opening a bank account.

The following examples show how promotional P-clauses can also be used in non-marketing situations; (a) is said by a health visitor to a man who smokes heavily, while (b) by a detective while questioning a suspect.

24.

a. *nitkaffāl* *b.maṣārīf* *‘ilāj.ak* *eḍa* *tbaṭṭil* *at.tadxīn*
 sponsor_{+pres.1.pl} prep.expenses treatment.your comp stop_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.smoking
 We fund your treatment expenses, if you stop smoking. (DED).

b. *rāḥ* *‘asā‘d.ak* *eḍa* *tqūl* *l.ḥaqīqah*
 will help_{+pres.1.sg.you} comp tell_{+pres.2.m.sg.} def.truth
 I will help you, if you tell the truth. (DED).

The P-clause in (a) is an offer used by the health visitor to encourage the man to quit smoking.

Similarly, the P-clause in (b) is used by a detective to know the truth.

Promotional conditionals whose Q-clause involves a verb in the imperative can be reduced into an NP with no difference in meaning. Compare the following set of examples.

25.

a. *‘iḥṣal* *‘ala* *ṣiyānah* *majjāniyyeh* *eḍa* *štareit* *‘aḥad* *muntajāt.na*
 get_{+imp.2.m.sg} prep maintenance free comp buy_{+past.2.m.sg} any products.our
 Get free maintenance if you buy any of our products. (DED).

b. *ṣiyānah* *majjāniyyeh* *eḍa* *štareit* *‘aḥad* *muntajāt.na*
 maintenance free comp buy_{+past.2.m.sg} any products.our
 Free maintenance if you buy any of our products. (DED).

26.

- a. *'iḥṣal* *'ala* *'alif* *leira* *eḍa* *fataḥit* *ḥsāb* *b.banig.na*
 get_{+imp.2.m.sg} prep thousand lira comp open_{+past.2.m.sg} account prep.bank.our
 Get 1000 liras if you open an account in our bank. (DED).

- b. *'alif* *leira* *eḍa* *fataḥit* *ḥsāb* *b.banig.na*
 thousand lira comp open_{+past.2.m.sg} account prep.bank.our
 1000 liras if you open an account in our bank. (DED).

(25) and (26) show that we can reduce imperative Q-clauses into their relevant NPs with no difference in meanings. Nevertheless, this is not the case in promotional conditionals in which the Q-clause is declarative:

27.

- a. *nitkaffal* *b.maṣārīf* *'ilāj.ak* *eḍa* *tbaṭṭil* *at.tadxīn*
 sponsor_{+pre.1.pl} prep.expenses treatment.your comp stop_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.smoking
 We fund your treatment expenses if you stop smoking. (DED).
- b. **maṣārīf* *'ilāj.ak* *eḍa* *tbaṭṭil* *at.tadxīn*
 expenses treatment.your comp stop_{+pres.2.m.sg} def.smoking
 *Your treatment expenses if you stop smoking. (DED).

DED P-clauses also occur final in the sentence when no subject is expressed in the Q-clause. This is indicated in DED when the Q-clause is introduced by adjectives indicating warning like *xaṭīr* (serious) or satisfaction like *tamām* (great), etc. For example,

28.

- a. [When Sally's doctor examines her chest; he says:]
xaṭīr *eḍa* *mā* *baṭṭalti* *at.tadxīn*
 serious comp Neg stop_{+past.2.f.sg} def.smoking
 It will be serious, if you do not stop smoking. (DED).
- b. [Ahmad fills many scholarship applications. His father says:]
tamām *eḍa* *ḥaṣṣalit* *minḥab*
 perfect comp get_{+past.2.m.sg} scholarship
 It will be perfect, if you get a scholarship. (DED).

The Q-clauses in the above examples have no subjects, and therefore a dummy subject is used in their English translations. Both examples can correspond to conditional sentences of the

form *If P, Q*: (a) *If she does not stop smoking, her situation will be serious*, (b) *If you get a scholarship, it will be perfect*.

Having discussed the types of final P-clause in DED, I will now consider how P-clauses can function as post-modifiers.

5.4. P-clauses Functioning as Post-Modifiers.

Following a work on conditional structures in CA by Peled (1992), I hypothesise that final P-clauses in DED conditional structures can function as post-modifiers to their preceding Q-clauses. This study agrees with that of Peled (1992). I propose two criteria according to which the modifying function of final P-clauses is accounted for: the first is the loose relationship between the P-clause and the Q-clause and the second is the optionality of the P-clause.

Considering the following example we find that final P-clause conditionals indicate a loose kind of relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause:

29. [A recruitment agent informs Sally that two vacancies are available. When she asks him which vacancy she can apply for, he says:]

<i>tiqdarir</i> ⁶¹	<i>tqadmīn</i>	<i>'al.āf.tnein</i>	<i>eda</i>	<i>tridīn</i>
be.able.to _{+pres.2.f.sg}	apply _{+pres.2.f.sg}	prep.def.both	comp	want _{+pres.2.f.sg}

You can apply for both, if you want. (DED).

There is a loose relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause in the above example: the P-clause proposition *if you like* does not function as a cause or a condition for applying to the available vacancies. That is to say, there is no dependence relationship between the P-clause and the Q-clause. Rather, the P-clause functions as a modifier to the Q-clause.

We can find similar cases in English where finally-occurring P-clauses do not serve as a condition upon its fulfilment the Q-clause depends:

30. Can you fax me a copy of this report, if that is not a problem?

⁶¹ Unlike English, the DED verb *qider* (lit. was able to/could) is a fully conjugatable verb.

Again the P-clause and the Q-clause are not closely connected, i.e., the relation between them is loose: *not having a problem* is not a condition for *faxing a copy*. This lends further support to our proposition that finally-occurring P-clauses can function as post-modifiers to their Q-clauses.

The second criterion supporting the claim that final P-clauses can function as Q-clause modifiers is the optionality or omitability of final P-clauses; final P-clauses can, like modifiers, be left out without affecting the grammaticality or the meaning of the sentence:

31.

- a. *tiqdarīn* *tqadmīn* 'al *aṭ.ṭnein* *eḍa* *trīdīn*
 be.able.to +pres.2.f.sg apply +pres.2.f.sg prep def.both conj want +pres.2.f.sg
 You can apply for both, if you want. (DED).
- b. *tiqdarīn* *tqadmīn* 'al *aṭ.ṭnein*
 be.able.to +pres.2.f.sg apply +pres.2.f.sg prep def.both
 You can apply for both (DED).

As the above examples show, deleting the final P-clause does not affect the grammaticality of the sentence as the example in (b) is still grammatical even though the whole P-clause is omitted. Further, the essential meaning is still preserved without the occurrence of the P-clause. This indicates that the P-clause is optional and therefore it functions more or less as a Q-clause modifier.

Since modifiers can be shifted between the front and end of the sentence without essentially affecting the grammaticality or meaning of the modified clause, this means that final P-clauses can also be shifted to the front of the sentence without affecting the meaning and grammaticality of the sentence. This can be tested by preposing the final P-clause to the beginning of the sentence:

32. *eḍa* *trīdīn* *tiqdarīn* *tqadmīn* 'al *aṭ.ṭnein*
 conj want +pres.2.f.sg be.able.to +pres.2.f.sg apply +pres.2.f.sg prep def.both
 If you like, you can apply for both. (DED).

Though there might be a change of focus, the essential meaning of the sentence is the same. Like modifiers, final P-clauses can be shifted to the front of the sentence without affecting its meaning or grammaticality, a fact which lends a further support to our claim that final-P-clauses function as modifiers to their Q-clauses.

In the next section, I discuss the semantic significance indicated by the change in clausal order.

5.5. Semantic Difference versus Clausal Order.

This section sheds some light on the difference in meaning between the *if P, then Q* order conditionals and their *Q, if P* order counterparts.

Dancygier (1998: 146-8) points out that conditionals with different clausal orders 'tend to be interpreted differently, especially with respect to what is being asserted and what is being given as background'. Consider the following examples.

33. [A mother talks to her 5-year old child while shopping].

- a. *eḡa tuq'ud 'āqil 'aštārī.l.ak lu'bah*
 comp sit_{+pres.2.m.sg} polite buy_{+pres.1.sg.}prep.you toy

If you keep quiet, I will buy you a toy. (DED).

- b. *'aštārī.l.ak lu'bah eḡa tuq'ud 'āqil*
 buy_{+pres.1.sg.}prep.you toy comp sit_{+pres.2.m.sg} polite

I will buy you a toy, if you keep quiet. (DED).

(a) represents the unmarked order of a conditional sentence where Q follows P; the sentence asserts the causal relation between the P-clause and the Q-clause: *quietness* will be the condition for *buying the toy*. Note also that an intonational pause between the clauses is necessary; this pause will be represented by means of a comma [,]. On the other hand, in (b) the mother puts the emphasis on the Q-clause and adds the P-clause as a background or as an afterthought; the relation between the two clauses is not causal where the P-clause is added at the end of the sentence as an afterthought. Added afterthoughts help loosen the relation

between the two clauses. Observe that an intonational pause is therefore necessary to express the latter interpretation.

Dancygier (1998: 150) shows that if there is no pause before the final P-clause the sentence would trigger a causal interpretation: 'with the *if*-clause postposed and with continuing intonation any sentence seems to invite a causal interpretation of the relation between P and Q'. This justifies why the following example (from Dancygier, 1998: 149) is difficult to interpret and therefore not acceptable,

34. ?? The plane arrived early if she is in the lobby. (Dancygier, 1998: 149).

Dancygier points out that the above example is difficult to interpret because the speaker claims (if the sentence is read without a pause) that *the early arrival of the plane* results from *seeing somebody in the lobby*.

Conditional structures in DED behave in the same way as in English: a pauseless conditional construction can indicate a causal relation between the two clauses. That is to say, a sentence with a short pause between the two clauses weakens the causal relation between the two clauses:

35. [Shadia asks Hadi about the psychology lecture which she could not attend. He says:]

??ḡayyarū	aj.jadwal	eḡa	mū	ḡalṭān
change +pres.3.pl	def.timetable	comp	Neg.me	wrong

??They changed the timetable if I (am) not wrong. (DED).

Without a pause before the P-clause, the sentence would be difficult to contextualize because it would then mean that the timetable has been changed because of the proposition stated in the P-clause, viz. that the speaker believes that *he is not wrong*.

In the remaining part of this section, I discuss the different interpretations brought up by changing a conditional construction with a P, then Q order into a Q, P one:

36.

- a. [A waitress approaches two customers who have just sat down and started looking in the menu].

eda lissah mā qarrartum rāḥ 'arja' ba'id xamis daqāyiq
 comp yet Neg decide_{+past.2.pl} will come.back_{+pres.1.sg} prep five minutes
 If you have not decided yet I will come back in five minutes. (DED).

- b. *rāḥ 'arja' ba'id xamis daqāyiq eda lissah mā qarrartum*
 will come.back_{+pres.1.sg} prep five minutes comp yet Neg decide_{+past.2.pl}
 I will come back in five minutes, if you have not decided yet. (DED).

In (a), seeing that the two customers have not yet decided on what to order, the waitress decides to give them five minutes and comes back when they are ready to order. That is to say, the P-clause is presented as a background to the waitress' decision to come back after five minutes. According to Dancygier (1998: 150) P-clauses functioning as backgrounds for their Q-clauses in English are 'contextually bound' because they are acquired by the speaker (the waitress in our example) in an indirect manner, and therefore represent the background information for what comes next, the Q-clause (the waitress' decision to come back after five minutes). In (b), the waitress' decision to come back after five minutes is presented first and after a short pause the P-clause occurs. The proposition that the waitress will come back in five minutes is presented on the basis of the assumption that the customers have not decided what to order.

As we have mentioned above, Dancygier (1998: 150) points out that 'with the *if*-clause postposed and with continuing intonation any sentence seems to invite a causal interpretation of the relation between P and Q'. Thus, the pauseless reading of the same example would give us a different interpretation, viz., a causative one. The waitress presents the P-clause as the reason for the proposition in the Q-clause: the waitress will come back in five minutes because the customers have not yet decided on what to order. In other words, a pauseless reading of the above example indicates that the relation between the two clauses is causal.

5.6. Summary

In this chapter we have given a descriptive account for the clausal order in DED conditionals. Our discussion has focused on cases where Q-clauses occur before P-clauses. Previous studies have shown that the *if P, then Q* order is more prevalent than the *Q, if P* one. Two main issues have been discussed, Haiman's (1978) controversial claim that *P-clauses are topics* and the response of some researchers to it. We have also shown that the preponderance of initial P-clause conditionals appears to be a language universal

Our review of some of the existing studies has revealed that Arabic grammarians have overlooked the issue of clausal order in Arabic conditionals. I have also identified four cases where the *Q, if P* order is used: (a) relevance P-clauses, (b) lessening and enhancing P-clauses, (c) averting P-clauses and (d) promotional conditionals. Furthermore, we have provided ample evidence in support of the claim that final-P-clauses function as modifiers to their Q-clauses; this has included the loose relation between the Q-clause and its post-modifier (i.e., the P-clause) and the possibility of leaving out the P-clause without affecting the meaning of the sentence concerned. We have also considered different interpretations resulting from reversing the *if P, then Q* order.

Chapter Six

Paratactic Conditionals

6.0. Introduction

It is not always necessary to have a conditional particle to express conditionality; there are other conditional constructions *paratactic conditionals* (PCs) which, though particle-free, can still express conditionality. PCs divide into two main types, Imperative-Like Conditionals (ILCs), and Imperative-Like Ultimatums (ILUs). ILCs are constructions that superficially look like a co-ordination of two clauses the first of which is typically an imperative clause; however, the imperative used in ILCs can have a conditional interpretation usually associated with conditional P-clauses. For example,

1.
 - a. Ask him a question and you get no answer.
 - b. Buy from that shop and you'll regret it. (Davies 1986: 162).

Though (a) and (b) look like compound sentences, they have a conditional interpretation respectively corresponding to the following conditional sentences: *If you ask him a question, you get no answer*, and *If you buy from that shop, you will regret it*.

ILUs are distinguished by their reference to undesirable situations or ultimatums, hence the name. For example,

2.
 - a. Stop gambling or you will lose all your money.
 - b. Book an appointment before you come or you will wait for a long time.

Similarly, though (a) and (b) look like compound sentences, they have conditional interpretations respectively corresponding to the following conditional sentences: *If you do not stop gambling, you will lose all your money* and *If you do not book an appointment before you come, you will wait for a long time*. This chapter discusses constructions displaying meanings similar to those of conditionals though no conditional particle is used; it also deals with the different types of PCs and their structural variations and discusses how PCs can be similar to

typical conditionals. Before embarking on the different types of DED PCs, I will give a brief background to the semantic-pragmatic uses of imperatives. Then, I will give a general review of the existing accounts of PCs.

6.1. Imperative Clauses.

Typically, imperative sentences express directive illocutionary forces indicating that the speaker has an authority over the addressee; imperatives can express a command as in (a), make a request as in (b), or make a wish as in (c):

3.

- a. Leave the classroom now!
- b. Please lend me some money.
- c. Have a good day.

The command in (a) indicates that the speaker has an authority over the addressee, whereas the request in (b) indicates that the speaker lacks or seems as if he/she lacks that authority. The speakers in both examples want the actions to take place; *leaving the classroom* and *borrowing some money* are desirable situations from their (the speakers') point of view. On the other hand, hearers/addressees do not often want the action to take place. For example, in a context where (a) is said to a student whose teacher asks him/her to leave the class, the student is not happy with the teacher's command which he/she considers undesirable. There are however cases as in (c) above where the action can be desirable for the hearer, where the imperative expresses a wish.

However, imperative sentences can, when contexts are known, express far more situations than shown above. Lapeyre (1993: 56) argues that though a directive illocutionary force is the distinctive feature of imperative sentences, the latter can also express other

situations that do not conform with this force. For example, giving consent to an offer (a), expressing an unwilling or reluctant acceptance (b), or giving permission (c), etc.⁶²

4.

a. A: Could I help you carry this bag?

B: Yes please, help me if you like.

b. Ok, do invite them, but if I were you I wouldn't. (Lapeyre, 1993: 56).

c. Park your car in my garage.

Sperber and Wilson (1986: 250-1) argue that an imperative sentence presents a description of a desirable or undesirable state of affairs, suggesting that the different types of imperative sentences can be distinguished on the basis of their desirability/undesirability to the speaker or hearer:

5.

a. [Driver to traffic warden:]

Pretend you didn't see me.

b. He: Could you tell me the way to the station?

She: Turn right at the traffic lights and keep straight on.

(Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 250).

The imperative sentence in (a) expresses a request, while the one in (b) a piece of advice; Sperber and Wilson (1986: 250-1) point out that 'a requestive speech act is one that represents a certain state of affairs as desirable from the speaker's point of view, whereas an advisory speech act is one that represents a certain state of affairs as desirable from the hearer's point of view'. That is to say, an imperative sentence can express desirable or undesirable state of affairs.

⁶² For other uses of imperatives see Aarts (1989: 127) who shows that imperatives can also have the illocutionary force of exclamations, e.g., *Fancy Sally talking to me in this way*, questions e.g., *Tell me who broke the glass I left on the table*, or statements e.g., *Consider the problem I talked to you about*, etc.

Imperative sentences can also have a conditional interpretation which can also be either desirable or undesirable to the hearer. This is respectively shown in the following examples:

6.
 - a. [A customer refuses to pay the bill in a restaurant]
Pay the bill or I will call the police.
 - b. Pay the bill on time and I will give you a discount.

While the Q-constituent⁶³ in (a) expresses an undesirable situation, the one in (b) expresses a desirable one.

Both of the examples in (6) can be paraphrased by conditional sentences of the form *If P, then Q*:

7.
 - a. If you do not pay the bill, I will call the police.
 - b. If you pay the bill on time, I will give you a discount.

The conditional interpretations of PCs is construed pragmatically. Katz (1977: 237) points out that the interpretations of imperatives 'are matters for a pragmatic theory's account of how Grice's maxim *Be relevant* ... is applied in determining utterance meaning'. Interpreting an utterance with no regard to its pragmatics or to the context in which it is uttered is rejected because 'it fails to be relevant' (Katz, 1977: 237).

6.2. Previous Accounts on PCs.

Several linguists, Fraser (1971), Fretheim (1973), Thumm (2000), Davies (1986), Declerck and Reed (2001) among others, have discussed PCs. This chapter benefits from the ideas and points discussed in the last two.

⁶³ Following Declerck and Reed (2001), I will use the terms P-constituent and Q-constituent to refer to the P-clause and Q-clause of a PC, respectively.

Declerck & Reed (2001: 493) define a PC as the 'construction which is interpreted as a conditional but in which the P-clause is coordinated with the Q-clause (rather than being syntactically subordinated to it)'. Consider the following example.

8. Keep quiet or you will leave the class.

keep quiet represents the P-constituent and *you will leave the class* the Q-constituent. The sentence is pragmatically interchangeable with a conditional sentence of the form *If you do not keep quiet, you will leave the class*. Declerck & Reed (2001) also indicate that PCs with *or* can be interpreted by using the conjunction *otherwise*; thus, the above example can be equated to *Keep quiet otherwise you will leave the class*.

Conjoining two clauses can, under some circumstances which will be clear later in this chapter, express an interpretation similar to that associated with conditionals. The resulting structure is called paratactic conditionals, or 'if-less conditionals' as Van der Auwera (1986: 206) calls them. In this structure, the P-constituent is typically an imperative clause, but one which does not satisfactorily express command or order. In other words, the P-clause is a pseudo imperative (PI) clause:

- 9.
- a. Open the window and I'll kill you.
 - b. Open the window and I'll kiss you.

(Van der Auwera, 1986: 206).

Based on an observation made by Jespersen (1940: 475), Van der Auwera (1986: 209) concludes that 'general imperatives... capitalize on the conditional meaning', showing that the interpretation of a PC depends on the desirability of the proposition expressed in the Q-constituent: since killing is undesirable, the P-constituent in (a) involves an imperative *not to open the window*. The sentence can be paraphrased by a prototypical conditional structure of the form *if P, Q: if you open the window, I will kill you*. The opposite applies to (b) where

kissing is assumed to be desirable: the P-constituent involves an imperative *to open the window*; (b) can be paraphrased as *if you open the window, I will kiss you*.

Thumm (2000: 3) subsumes under PCs 'structures which traditional grammar calls *asyndetic juxtaposition*, i.e. constructions without any linking element between the clauses at all'. This indicates that PCs can further include sentences having no linking words at all, in addition to being particle-free. The following example, from Thumm (2000: 3), is illustrative.

10. You drive like hell, you'll get there on time. (Thumm, 2000: 3).

you drive like hell in the above example forms the P-constituent, and the clause *you'll get there on time* the Q-constituent. The conditional sentence corresponding to the above example is *If you drive like hell, you'll get there on time*.

Furthermore, Thumm (2000) focuses on the question of how to identify PCs from those explicitly marked with *if*. To answer this question, Thumm (2000: 5) shows that 'a pervasive system of framing and contextualization is at work which makes it possible to identify, process, understand, describe and analyze PCs'. He reinforces the role of contextualization cues in interpreting PCs, quoting Auer's (1992) observation that contextualization is responsible for giving an utterance its particular interpretation, stating that 'contextualization tries to answer the question by what means is an activity orchestrated in order to be hearable as such, or, by what means does the speaker signal to the recipient of an utterance the action performed by the utterance?' (Thumm, 2000: 8).

Dancygier (1998: 189) discusses some shared characteristics between PCs and typical conditionals, showing that the similarity of these structures [i.e., PCs] to prototypical conditionals 'rely on aspects of the construction's meaning which correspond to the features of prototypical conditionality'. She shows that PCs have some features in common with

conditional sentences such as 'non-assertiveness' and 'content-domain relation between the conjuncts'. For example,

11. Help me and get a free lunch.

The above example expresses conditionality (*If you help me, you will get a free lunch*) because the use of the imperative form expresses non-assertiveness in the same way expressed by the conditional particle *if*. Further PCs can, like typical conditionals, express a causal relation between the two conjuncts/clauses. This is indicated by Dancygier (1998: 189) as follows: 'there is non-assertiveness (or potentiality), here introduced by the meaning of the imperative form, rather than by *if*; there is a content-domain relation between the conjuncts; and the form of the construction is iconic of the sequence of events involved'. Based on Dancygier's above observation, I will assume that these characteristics are the main points distinguishing DED PCs from co-ordinated sentences. They are also the main points giving a PC its conditional interpretation.

Several other studies⁶⁴ point out the similarity between PCs and typical conditionals. Green (1975: 125), for instance, points out that imperatives used in PCs 'are likewise *if, then* statements' because both have the same interpretation. The following example is from Green (1975: 125):

12. Cry and I'll smack you again. (Green, 1975: 125).

The above example is not an invitation *to cry*, but rather a threat *not to cry*. The speaker threatens the addressee *not to cry* under the threat of smacking him/her again. The example can be equated to a conditional sentence of the form *If P, Q. If you cry, I will smack you again.*

⁶⁴ For a general discussion of PCs in a variety of languages such as Hua (a Papuan Language of the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea), the Cebuano (an Austronesian language spoken in the Philippines) and Vietnamese, see Haiman (1983).

Having discussed some of the existing studies about PCs, I will now turn into discussing these structures in DED.

6.3. Paratactic Conditionals in DED.

In the following sections, I discuss the two main types of PCs in DED, show their structural variation and how they express desirable and undesirable situations. Then, I will draw a comparison between ILCs and ILUs and discuss cases of PCs with subjects other than the second person. However, I will start by showing that imperatives used in PCs can denote two different meanings, a genuine imperative and a conditional one.

6.3.1. PCs versus Genuine Imperatives.

Imperative clauses used in PCs can denote a genuine imperative meaning or a conditional one. Consider the following two examples:

13.

a. [A father advising his young son *not to carry a weapon*.]

<i>šil</i>	<i>ʔai</i>	<i>slāḥ</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>aš.šurṭah</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tdukk.ak</i>
carry _{+imp.2.m.sg}	any	weapon	conj	def.police	will	arrest _{+pres.3.f.sg} .you

Carry any weapon and the police will arrest you. (DED).

b. [A mother talks to her daughter].

<i>jleiy</i>	<i>li.ṣḥūn</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>ʔaʿmal.lil.či</i>	<i>gattu</i>
wash _{+imp.2.f.sg}	def.dishes	conj	will	make _{+pres.1.sg} prep.you	gateau

Wash the dishes for me and I will make you a gâteau. (DED).

Though both examples can express a meaning similar to conditionals, there is a difference between the imperative clauses used: the imperative verb *carry* in (a) is not a genuine imperative as the speaker is not in fact instructing the addressee *to carry a weapon*; rather, the father tries to discourage his son from carrying weapons. On the other hand, the imperative verb *wash* in (b) is a genuine imperative as the speaker is in fact instructing the addressee *to wash the dishes*. This suggests that imperatives used in PCs do not always express order or

command. Further, though PCs can involve imperative clauses, the imperative verb does not satisfactorily indicate an instruction, a point which led to the use of terms like *pseudo-imperative* (PI). The fact that imperatives used in PCs can denote a meaning different from genuine imperative supports our claim that these structures are not types of imperatives, but another type of conditional structure, namely PCs.

A further difference showing that imperatives used in PCs can either denote a genuine imperative meaning or a conditional one is based on the use of stative verbs. Lakoff (1966) points out that while stative verbs can occur in PCs, they cannot occur in ordinary imperatives. For example,

14.

- a. ?? Sound suspicious.
- b. Sound suspicious and the police will arrest you.

Based on Lakoff's (1966) observation, we find that PCs can indicate a conditional interpretation which imperative clauses cannot indicate. For example,

15. *bayyin middayyin w rāḥ yiṣadqūn kul šī tqūl*
 sound_{+imp.2.m.sg} religious conj will believe_{+pres.3.pl} every thing say_{+pres.2.m.sg}
 Look religious and they will believe everything you say. (DED).

Though the P-constituent *Look religious* is an imperative clause, it can not stand alone as a dependent imperative clause ??*Look religious!*. It is not under the control of the hearer to *look religious* and therefore this clause cannot express a command associated with genuine imperatives. However, when it is combined with a Q-constituent like *they will believe everything you say*, the imperative clause *look religious* will denote a conditional interpretation. The resultant structure can be interpreted as *if you look religious, they will believe what you say*.

Based on the above, we can say that there is a difference between PCs where the P-constituent uses a stative verb and one where the verb used is a dynamic one. This is further illustrated in the following examples:

16.

- a. *nadfi* *šaqt.i* *w* *rāḥ* *'anṭī.či* *xamsin* *waraqah*
 clean_{+imp.2.f.sg} flat.my conj will give_{+pres.1.sg} you fifty lira
Clean my flat and I will give you fifty liras. (DED).
- b. *ḥis* *bi.t.ta'ab* *w* *l.mudīr* *rāḥ* *yit'ātaf* *ma'.ak*
 feel_{+imp.2.m.sg} prep.def.tiredness conj def.manager will sympathise_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep.you
Feel tired and the manager will sympathize with you. (DED).

Though both of the above examples can express conditional meanings, there is a difference between their P-constituents; while the P-constituent in (a) expresses a command, the one in (b) does not. The use of the imperative *clean* in (a) denotes that the speaker is really instructing the addressee *to clean the flat*, whereas the imperative *feel* in (b) does not denote an imperative of this sort because *causing someone to feel tired* is not in the control of the speaker; the P-constituent rather has a conditional meaning *if you feel tired*. This further supports our claim that these structures are not types of imperatives, but rather a type of conditional structure, namely PCs.

6.3.2. Imperative-Like Conditionals (ILCs) in DED.

Building on a work by Davies (1986), we show that DED PCs divide into ILCs and ILUs. The former divide further into three subtypes. In the first subtype, we will discuss (a) ILCs where only the P-constituent is an imperative clause, and (b) ILCs where both (the P and Q constituents) are imperative clauses. The second subtype deals with asyndetic ILCs and the third one deals with PCs whose P-constituent is a quantified NP.

6.3.2.1. ILCs with Imperative in the P (and Q) Constituent(s).

ILCs can have two main structural variations: (a) ILCs with imperative in the first conjunct, and (b) ILCs with imperative in both conjuncts. In (a), the P-constituent is an imperative clause while the Q-constituent a declarative one. Let us consider the following example,

17. [Sally and Hala are two sisters trying to finish the daily chores quickly. Sally says:]

sāḍīn.i *bi.l.tandif* *w* *rāḥ* *ʾasāʿid.čī* *bi.aṭ.ṭabix*
 help_{+imp.2.f.sg.}me prep.def.cleaning conj will help_{+pres.1.sg.}you prep.def.cooking
Help me with the cleaning and I will help you with the cooking. (DED).

The P-constituent in the above example is an imperative clause. Though the above sentence consists of two coordinate clauses, a conditional interpretation is indicated: *If you help me with the cleaning, I will help you with the cooking.*

ILCs with an imperative P-constituent can express desirable or undesirable situations. Consider the following two examples where (a) expresses a desirable situation while (b) an undesirable one.

18.

a. [A manager talks to his sales-assistant].

bīʿ *l.bidāʿah* *hāda l.ʿusbūʿ* *w* *rāḥ* *ʾanṭi.k* *ʿaşrah bi.l.miyveh* *ʿumūlah*
 sell_{+imp.2.m.sg.} def.goods this def.week conj will give_{+pres.1.sg.}you ten prep.def.hundred commission
Sell the goods this week and I will give you a 10 % commission. (DED).

b. [A kidnapper phones the victim's family and asks for a ransom.]

xabrū *aš.šurṭah* *w* *rāḥ* *ʾaqtil* *ʾibin.kum*
 call_{+imp.2.pl} def.police conj will kill_{+pres.1.sg.} son.your
Call the police and I will kill your son. (DED).

While the Q-constituent in (a) expresses a desirable situation (having a 10 % commission), the one in (b) expresses an undesirable one (*having one's child killed*). In other words, while (a) expresses a promise, (b) a warning or a threat. This shows that there is a kind of association

between expressing promises and desirable consequences on the one hand, and expressing threats or warnings and undesirable consequences on the other.

An ILC can also consist of two imperative clauses. Declerck and Reed (2001: 405) argue that such structures can result in a semantic oddity and that they 'have a low degree of acceptability'. They provide different cases all of which, they claim, are unable to denote a genuine conditional meaning, pointing out that these cases weaken the possibility of having a PC with an imperative clause in both conjuncts. The following are the examples they base their judgement on:

19.

- a. Open that door and {??die / you will die}!
- b. Do that for me and {? receive £5/ I will give you £5}.
- c. Say that once more and {??die / you will die}.
- d. Open this door and enter Paradise itself!
- e. Buy a lottery ticket now and win £250,000.

(Declerck and Reed, 2001: 405)

Declerck and Reed (2001: 405) point out that though both clauses in each of the above examples are imperative, they cannot express conditional meanings: the examples (19.a-c) 'have a lower degree of acceptability'.⁶⁵ Declerck and Reed (2001) show that (d) cannot be interpreted as *if you open this door you will enter paradise itself*, and that it rather means that *'the addressee is exhorted to open the door to Paradise and enter it'*. Though (e) sounds fully acceptable, Declerck and Reed (2001: 405) argue that 'it does not yield a genuine conditional meaning' because it is a kind of 'rhetorical trick' that is normally used in advertisements.

⁶⁵ Mike Jones, the supervisor of this study, holds a different opinion where he finds examples like '*Do that for me and receive £5*' to be fine in English; this shows that Declerck and Reed's claim (that *examples with imperative in both conjuncts have a low degree of acceptability*) is a little bit exaggerated (Mike Jones, in a personal communication). See references for detail.

Unlike Declerck and Reed (2001), I will show that PCs with imperative in both conjuncts are quite possible in DED. That is to say, ILCs in DED can be of the form *imperative clause + wa (and) + imperative clause*. I will show that this type of ILC can be used to express rewards, punishments, or advertisements, etc. For example,

20. [A manager is annoyed with Hazim whose reports contain errors and inaccurate calculations.]

ġlāt marrah tānyeh wa sallim.ni 'istiqālt.ak
 err + imp.2.m.sg time another conj hand + imp.2.m.sg me resignation.your
 Make another mistake and hand me your resignation. (DED).

The manager is not actually asking Hazim to *make another mistake*, rather is just warning him *not to make* similar mistakes again. The relation between *making another mistake* and *resignation* helps give the sentence an interpretation similar to the one associated with conditionals, namely *if you make another mistake, you will have to hand me your resignation*.

Promises, rewards and reprimands can also be expressed by using ILCs with imperative in both conjuncts:

21.

a. [A landlord talks to his doorkeeper.]

kannis l.madxal w xud xamis.mīt waraqah
 sweep + imp.2.m.sg def.entrance conj take + imp.2.m.sg five.hundred lira
 Sweep the entrance and get five hundred liras. (DED).

b. [Sally fails her exam more than one time. Dissatisfied with her failures, her father says:]

rsubi hāi as.sanah zeid wa dfeini ħāl.či bi.l.trāb
 fail + imp.2.f.sg this def.year again conj bury + imper.2.f.sg self.your pre.def.soil
 Fail this year again and bury yourself in the earth. (DED).⁶⁶

The above two examples express a promise and a reprimand respectively. In (a), the landlord's intended meaning is *if you clean the entrance, I will give you five hundred liras*. That is to say,

⁶⁶ The phrase *dfeini ħāl.či bi.l.trāb* (bury yourself in the earth) is used in DED in a derogatory sense. For example when you want to reprimand someone who fails his/her exams, betrays trust, etc.

the imperative here is used to express a promise or a reward (on the assumption that *getting five hundred liras* is a desirable situation). The same applies to (b) where the father is not asking his daughter to really *bury herself*; rather, the imperative is used as a way of reprimanding or rebuking her for failing her exams more than one time. The sentence can be equated to a conditional sentence of the form *if P, Q: if you fail again this year, it is better for you to bury yourself in earth*.

Using ILCs with imperative in both clauses is very common among DED retailers where they use such structures to promote marketing. The following two examples are illustrative.

22.

- a. *štari* *ma'jūn* *snān* *wa* *rbāḥ* *l.firčāyeh* *b.balāš*
 buy + imp.2.m.sg paste teeth conj win + imp.2.m.sg def.brush prep.free
 Buy the toothpaste and get the brush for free. (DED)
- b. *štari* 'arba' *sīdiyyāt* *w* *xūd* *l.xāmis* *b.balāš*
 buy + imp.2.m.sg four CDs conj take + imp.2.m.sg def.fifth prep.free
 Buy four CDs and take the fifth for free. (DED).

This type of PC is very common in advertisements and on shop windows. The aim is to raise sales, increase customers' consumption of products, and stimulate market demand. The shopkeeper in (a) tries to convince the customer to buy the toothpaste and a brush at the same time. The same thing applies to (b) where the shopkeeper tries to convince the customer to buy more than one CD at the same time by offering a free one.

Similar examples are found in everyday English such as *Buy one, and get one free*; however, such examples can also be used asyndetically (i.e.) with no conjunction between the two constituents (*Buy one, get one free*). PCs with no conjunctions are often referred to as asyndetic PCs.

6.3.2.2. Asyndetic PCs.

Asyndetic constructions are a type of PC where no coordinator is used to link the P and Q constituents. Gohl (2000: 84) defines asyndetic PCs as ‘structures that are not connected by a grammaticalized element’. Further, Fortuin (2011: 90) refers to asyndetic PCs as ‘conjunctionless constructions’, because no conjunction is used. They are also called ‘juxtapositional conditionals’ (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 407), obviously because they are constructed by juxtaposing two phrases/clauses next to each other. Let us consider the following example.

23. [‘I haven’t got anything to live on’.] –Of course, no work, no money’. Declerck and Reed (2005: 407).

The speaker in the above example produces two phrases *no work* and *no money* without using any conjunction. The two juxtaposed phrases respectively correspond to a P-clause and Q-clause in a typical conditional of the form *if P, then Q*, and can therefore be pragmatically interpreted as *if you do not work, you will not get any money*.

Though there is a lack of written literature on asyndetic PCs in English, signs and advertisements involving asyndetic PCs are publicly widespread.⁶⁷

Existing studies show that PCs in English can also be used in formal and informal settings; Gohl (2000: 83–84) points out that ‘especially in informal talk, a frequent device is the use of asyndetic linkage’. However, Bailey (1989) claims that examples of PCs can also be

⁶⁷ From my own observation, I find that asyndetic PCs are widely-used in shops, magazines, transportation, etc. For example, it is very common in some shops to come across signs saying *No proof of age no sale*, or *NO ID, NO SALE*. These two asyndetic PCs are usually written as a sign indicating that *if you are under the legal age, you are not allowed to buy alcohol or tobacco*. Similarly, and as a way of marketing, you could find some products with asyndetic PCs such as *Try me love me*. Further, a food company advertises its delivery services with an asyndetic PC like *You dial we arrive*. On the cover page of a magazine, you might find an asyndetic PC like *Give us a week we will give you a better body* as a way of advertising fitness products. Finally, asyndetic PCs can be found on notices to caution drivers from having alcoholic drinks. An example of that is *You booze you lose*.

found in written English: 'one sort of open conditional can be paratactic in spoken and, increasingly, in written usage' (Bailey, 1989: 278). For example,

24. You don't study, you fail. Bailey (1989: 278).

We can find some examples of PCs in some translations of the Bible, a point which supports the claim that PCs are not restricted to informal settings. The following examples are from The Holy Bible (the New international version).⁶⁸

25.

- a. 'Come, follow me', Jesus said, 'and I will make you fishers of men'. Matthew 4: 19.
- b. Keep my commands and you will live. Proverbs 4: 4.
- c. Accept what I say and the years of your life will be many. Proverbs 4: 10

DED asyndetic PCs use the existential operator *bi* (there is) to indicate a conditional meaning. Both the P and Q constituents can have the same structure where the negation particle *mā* precedes the existential operator (existop) *bi* (lit. 'there is') which is usually followed by an NP. The following two examples are illustrative:

26.

- | | | | | | |
|--------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| a. <i>mā</i> | <i>bi</i> | <i>maṣāri</i> | <i>mā</i> | <i>bi</i> | <i>zawāj</i> |
| Neg | existop | money | Neg | existop | marriage |

There is no money, there is no marriage. (DED).

- | | | | | | |
|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|
| b. <i>mā</i> | <i>bi</i> | <i>maṭar</i> | <i>mā</i> | <i>bi</i> | <i>maḥṣūl</i> |
| Neg | existop | rain | Neg | existop | crop |

There is no rain, there is no crop. (DED).

Each of the above examples consists of two existential clauses juxtaposed next to each other.

Both can be pragmatically paraphrased as conditional sentences: (a) *if there is no money, there will be no marriage* and (b) *If there is no rainfall, there will be no crops*. Implied is a causal relation between the two clauses: *the unavailability of money causes the non-occurrence of*

⁶⁸ The Holy Bible (the New international version) (1983). See references for detail.

marriage, under the assumption that marriage expenses cost a great deal of money. Similarly, *draught or lack of rainfall* causes *the state of having no crops*.

Furthermore, asyndetic PCs can also be expressed with structures involving either finite or imperative clauses:

27.

- a. [A father teaching his kid how to turn his computer on].

<i>kbeis</i>	<i>hāda</i>	<i>az.zir</i>	<i>l.kambyotar</i>	<i>yiš'il</i>
press + imp.2.m.sg	this	def.button	def.computer	turn.on + pres.3.m.sg

Press this button, the computer turns on.

- b. [Two officials are discussing business ethics]

<i>dfā'</i>	<i>rašwah</i>	<i>yitgādūn</i>	<i>'an</i>	<i>muxālafāt.ak</i>
pay + imp.2.m.sg	bribe	overlook + pres.3.pl	prep	infractions.your

Pay a bribe, they overlook your infractions. (DED).

Each of the above two examples consists of two clauses where the first is imperative and the second declarative. These examples can express a meaning pragmatically interchangeable with a conditional sentence of the form *if P, Q*. Thus, (a) can be equated to *if you press this button, the computer will turn on*, and (b) to *if you pay a bribe, they will overlook your infractions*.

An asyndetic conditional can, regardless of the desirability of its Q-constituent, have an ILC counterpart expressing similar meaning. This is shown in the following sets of examples.

28.

- a. [Sally has a headache; her mother gives her an aspirin].

<i>xuḍi</i>	<i>h.al.'asbirīneh</i>	<i>l.'alam</i>	<i>rāh</i>	<i>yixtafi</i>
take + imp.2.f.sg	this.def.aspirin	def.pain	will	disappear + pres.3.m.sg

Take this aspirin, the pain will disappear. (DED).

- b. *xuḍi*

<i>h.al.'asbirīneh</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>l.'alam</i>	<i>rāh</i>	<i>yixtafi</i>
this.def.aspirin	conj	def.pain	will	disappear + pres.3.m.sg

Take this aspirin and the pain will disappear. (DED).

c. [A father trying to convince his daughter not to have a tattoo].

<i>ʿmali</i>	<i>l.wašim</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yitgayyar</i>	<i>lawn</i>	<i>jilid.či</i>
make _{+imp.2.f.sg}	def.tatto	will	change _{+pres.3.m.sg}	colour	skin.your

Get the tattoo, you will experience skin discolouration. (DED).

d. <i>ʿmali</i>	<i>l.wašim</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yitgayyar</i>	<i>lawn</i>	<i>jilid.či</i>
make _{+imp.2.f.sg}	def.tatto	conj	will	change _{+pres.3.m.sg}	colour	skin.your

Get the tattoo and you will experience skin discolouration. (DED).

The asyndetic examples in (a) and (c) have ILC counterparts in (b) and (d), respectively. That is to say, asyndetic PCs can have corresponding ILC counterparts.

To the best of our knowledge, no empirical research has investigated asyndetic PCs in dialectal Arabic. Examples corresponding to PCs do exist in Classical and Standard Arabic; however, they are not discussed in Arabic as a type of conditional structure, but are discussed under cases where the imperative is responsible for the occurrence of verbs in the jussive mode. Let us consider the following examples.

29.

a. <i>ʾibʿat</i>	<i>la.na</i>	<i>malik.an</i>	<i>nuqātil</i>	<i>fī</i>	<i>sabīl.i</i>	<i>alāh</i>
send _{+imp.2.m.sg}	prep.us	king _{.Acc}	fight _{+pres.1.pl.Juss}	prep	way.gen	Allah

Appoint for us a king, we will fight in Allah's way. (Qur'an, 2: 246).⁶⁹

b. <i>ʾudrus</i>	<i>tanjaḥ</i>
study _{+imp.2.m.sg.Juss}	succeed _{+pres.2.m.sg.Juss}

You study, you succeed. (Alxoş, 1987: 133.part 1).

The imperative *ʾibʿat* (lit. 'send!') in (a), and *ʾudrus* (lit. 'study!') in (b) respectively cause the verbs *nuqātil* (fight) and *tanjaḥ* (succeed) to be in the jussive mode. The fact that PCs occur in Classical and Standard Arabic indicates that they are not restricted to informal settings. In other words, PCs are used in both formal or informal settings in Arabic.

⁶⁹ Taken from a certified translation of The Noble Qur'an; see references for detail.

6.3.2.3. Quantified PCs.

One of the variations in the structure of ILCs is when the P-constituent is a quantified NP. Culicover (1972) refers to a PC with a quantified NP as the ‘OM-sentence’ due to the use of the expression *One More* at the beginning of this type. For example,

30. One more can of beer and I’m leaving. (Culicover, 1972: 199).

Culicover (1972: 200) shows that an OM-sentence can have three different interpretations; the above example, for instance, can have the following three interpretations:

31.

- a. If you drink one more can of beer I’m leaving.
- b. After I drink one more can of beer I’m leaving
- c. In spite of the fact that there is one more can of beer here, I’m leaving.

(Culicover, 1972: 200).

We are interested only in the first interpretation which Culicover calls the ‘consequential reading’. He calls the second and third interpretations the sequential and incongruence readings respectively.

Only ILCs, but not ILUs, can be used with quantified expressions because an ILC ‘expresses *if [+P], then Q ...* [while] paratactic conditionals with *or* can only be interpreted as *if [-P], then Q*’ (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 407). For example,

32.

- a. Two more victories {and / *or} we are sure of winning the title.
- b. Another hour, {and / *or} we are free.

(Declerck and Reed, 2001: 407).

Note that it is not possible to have a quantified expression with PCs involving *or*, i.e., with ILUs. Furthermore, Declerck and Reed (2001) share with Fillmore (1986: 169) the same observation that a PC with a quantified NP ‘indicates the distance between the actual state of affairs and the actualization of the theoretical Q-situation’ (Declerck and Reed, 2001: 407). The quantified expressions *two more victories* in (a) indicates the number of victories needed for

the actualization of the proposition in the Q-constituent, i.e., for *winning the title*. Similarly, the quantified expression *another hour* in (b) indicates the time which should elapse before *we are free*.

Nevertheless, Declerck and Reed (2001) fail to account for the fact that ILUs can be used with quantified expressions when the quantifier is negative. The following examples are illustrative.

33.

- a. No more noise or you will have to leave the room.
- b. No more drilling or the roofs will fall off.

The above examples show that contrary to what Declerck and Reed (2001: 407) point out (that only ILCs, but not ILUs, can be used with quantified expressions), it is possible to have an ILU with a quantified P-constituent.

DED quantified PCs can also indicate a conditional interpretation. For example

34. *xuṭwah* *tānyeh* *w* *rāḥ* *'aqawṣ.ak*
 step second conj will shoot_{+pres.1.sg}.you.

One more step and I will shoot you. (DED).

The P-constituent is a quantified NP; the quantifier *tānieh* can, depending on context, mean *another*, *second* or *more*. The example can be pragmatically interpreted as *if you take one more step, I will shoot you*.

There is no restriction on the type of the Q-constituent of a quantified PC with regard to the desirability/undesirability of the situation expressed. That is to say, the Q-constituent in a quantified PC can express desirable and undesirable situations, unlike the case in ILUs where only undesirable situations are possible, as we will see later in this chapter. The following two examples are illustrative.

35.

- a. [A classroom teacher talks to a talkative pupil].

<i>kilmeh</i>	<i>tānyeh</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>tiṭlaʿ</i>	<i>barrah</i>
word	second	conj	go _{+pres.2.m.sg}	out

One more word and you go out. (DED).

b. [Two brothers playing question-and-answer game]

<i>jawāb</i>	<i>tāni</i>	<i>ṣaḥiḥ</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>tirbaḥ</i>	<i>aj.jaʿizah</i>
answer	second	right	conj	win _{+pres.2.m.sg}	def.prize

One more right answer and you win the prize. (DED).


On the assumption that *being asked to leave the class* is an undesirable situation, and *to win a prize* is a desirable one, the main difference between (a) and (b) is that the Q-constituent in (a) expresses an undesirable situation, while the one in (b) expresses a desirable situation. That is to say, we can express desirable and undesirable situations in quantified PCs.

6.3.3. Imperative-Like Ultimatums (ILUs).

The second main type of paratactic conditional is Imperative-Like Ultimatums (ILUs). In this type, the P and Q constituents are linked by *ʾaw* (or) or *willa* (otherwise). ILUs can only express undesirable situations such as warning the addressee that a serious penalty is possible if the P-constituent is not met. That is to say, ILUs express ultimatums, hence the name.

Both *willa* (otherwise) and *ʾaw* (or) are used in ILUs with no difference in meaning. However, *ʾaw* (or) intuitively seems to me more formal than *willa* (otherwise). The fact that only *ʾaw* (or), but not *willa* (otherwise), is used in Classical Arabic supports our judgement that *ʾaw* (or) is more formal than *willa* (otherwise). *willa* (otherwise) has developed out of the combination of three elements: the conjunction *wa* (and), the conditional particle *ʾin* (if), and the negation particle *lā* (not). This is shown in the following diagram.

36.



As shown above, the phrase *wa 'in lā* (lit. and if not) is reduced to *willa* when used in DED.

willa can therefore express a meaning equivalent to *and if not* or *otherwise*. For example,

37. [A shop assistant to a drunk customer].

<i>'utruk</i>	<i>l.maḥal</i>	<i>willa</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>'axabbir</i>	<i>aš.šurṭah</i>
leave _{+imp.2.m.sg}	def.shop	otherwise	will	phone _{+pres.1.sg}	def.police

Leave the shop *otherwise/and if not* I will call the police. (DED).

As is the case in ILCs, two main structures characterise ILUs; the first is ILUs with imperative in the first conjunct, and the second is ILUs with imperative in both conjuncts. Both structures are discussed in the following sections.

6.3.3.1. ILUs with Imperative in the First Conjunct.

In this section, I will discuss ILUs having the following form:

(Imperative *P-constituent* + *conj* + *finite Q-constituent*). Consider the following example.

38.

a. <i>qfeil</i>	<i>l.bāb</i>	<i>'aw</i>	<i>l.ḥarāmiyyeh</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yibūqūn</i>	<i>beit.ak</i>
lock _{+imp.2.m.sg}	def.door	conj	def.thieves	will	rob _{+pres.3.pl.}	house.your

Lock the door or the thieves will rob your house. (DED).

b. <i>rajji'</i>	<i>li.ktāb</i>	<i>li.l.maktabah</i>	<i>bukrah</i>	<i>'aw</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tidfa'</i>	<i>ḡarāmah</i>
return _{+imp.2.m.sg}	def.book	prep.def.library	tomorrow	conj	will	pay _{+pres.2.sg}	fine

Return the book to the library tomorrow or you will pay a fine. (DED).

Each of the above examples consists of an imperative *P-constituent* and a declarative *finite Q-constituent* introduced by *'aw* (or).

ILUs can only express undesirable situations or possible threats/dangers which will take place if the command expressed in the P-constituent is not carried out. In other words, ILUs are interpreted as (if [-P], then [+Q]). Consider the following examples.

39.

- a. [A child interrupted his father more than one time; the father says].

baṭṭil *tqāṭi'.ni* 'aw *rāḥ* 'a'āqib.ak
 stop_{+imp.2.m.sg} interrupt_{+pres.2.m.sg} me conj will punish_{+pres.1.sg} you
 Stop interrupting me or I will punish you. (DED).

- b. [A traffic police issuing a fine to a driver]

sūq *bḥaḍar* *willa* *rāḥ* *niḷgi* *ruxṣat* *swāqt.ak*
 drive_{+imp.2.m.sg} prep.care or will cancel_{+pres.1.pl} licence driving.your
 Drive carefully or we will cancel your driving licence. (DED).

Both of the Q-constituents in the above examples express undesirable situations on the assumption that *getting punished*, and *cancelling one's driving licence* are undesirable consequences. Both examples express a conditional interpretation of the form (if [-P], [+Q]): (a) *If you do not stop interrupting me, I will punish you*, and (b) *If you do not drive carefully, we will cancel your driving licence*.

I will show that there are two different types of undesirable situations, a point which has gone unnoticed in the studies that have discussed PCs. Consider the following examples.

40.

- a. [Knowing that a job vacancy is advertised, a mother advises her son to apply soon:]

qaddim 'al *hāḍa* *aš.šugul* *bakkīr* 'aw *rāḥ* *yirfudūn* *ṭalab.ak*
 apply_{+imp.2.m.sg} prep this def.job early conj will reject_{+pres.3.pl} application.your
 Apply for this job early or they will reject your application. (DED).

- b. [A robber talks to his victim]

nṭi.ni *maṣāriyy.ak* 'aw *rāḥ* 'aqawṣ.ak
 give_{+imp.2.m.sg} me money.your conj will shoot_{+pres.1.sg} you
 Give me your money or I will shoot you. (DED).

Both situations (*rejecting one's application*, and *getting shot*) are undesirable. However, the speakers of these examples have two different stances towards their addressees: while the speaker in (a) expresses a positive stance toward the addressee, the speaker in (b) expresses a negative one. In other words, though the mother in (a) indicates that *rejecting one's job application* is something undesirable, she is not actually hoping for her son to have his job application rejected; she is, on the contrary, keen on avoiding him such an undesirable situation by asking him to *apply early*. The mother's concern is the addressee's welfare and benefits. On the other hand, the speaker in (b) expresses feelings of hostility towards the addressee and is threatening *to shoot* him/her; the robber's concern is the money, not the addressee's welfare and his/her stance toward the addressee is negative.

Furthermore, the fulfilment of the P-constituent in ILUs with positive stance benefits the addressee, whereas the fulfilment of the one with negative stance benefits the speaker.

Compare the following examples.

41.

a. [Sami, a very old man, visits his friend who asks him to sit on a comfortable chair.]

'uq'ud 'a.l.kursi l.muriḥ 'aw dahr.ak rāḥ yweij'.ak
 sit_{+imp.2.m.sg} prep.def.chair def.comfortable conj back.your will ache_{+pres.3.m.sg} you
 Sit on this comfortable chair or you will have a backache. (DED).

b. [A businessman talks to a company representative.]

ḥawlū l.maṣāri li.ḥsāb.na 'aw rāḥ nilḡi l.'aqid
 transfer_{+imp.2.pl} def.money prep.account.our conj will cancel_{+pres.1.pl} def.contract
 Transfer the money to our account or we will cancel the contract. (DED).

Asking an old man *to sit on a comfortable chair* is for the welfare of the old man. On the contrary, immediate *money transfer to the account of the businessman* will benefit the latter. This leads us to conclude that when the speaker holds a positive stance toward the addressee, the fulfilment of the P-constituent will benefit the addressee. On the other hand, when the

speaker holds a negative stance towards the addressee, the fulfilment of the P-constituent will benefit the speaker himself/herself.

ILUs can express both generic and future conditionals; futurity is typically indicated by the use of the modal *rāḥ* (will) which introduces the Q-constituent. Generic ILUs, on the other hand, are modal-free. The following two examples are illustrative.

42.

a. [A football coach talking to the players]

<i>tmarranū</i>	<i>b.jad</i>	<i>'aw</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tixsarūn</i>	<i>l.mubārāḥ</i>
exercise _{+imp.2.pl}	prep.labour	conj	will	lose _{+pres.2.pl}	def.match

Exercise hard or you will lose the match. (DED)

b. <i>tmarranū</i>	<i>b.jad</i>	<i>'aw</i>	<i>xsarū</i>	<i>l.mubārāḥ</i>
exercise _{+imp.2.pl}	prep.labour	conj	lose _{+imp.2.pl}	def.match

Exercise hard or lose the match. (DED).

(a) expresses a realis conditional with a future reference where the modal *rāḥ* is used to predict the future. The sentence can be equated with a typical conditional with *if*: *If you do not exercise hard, you will lose the match* (If –P, Q). By leaving out the future marker *rāḥ* (will) in (b), the sentence indicates a generic conditional that can function as a general instruction; (b) can also be equated to a typical generic conditional with *if* or *when*: *If/when you do not exercise hard you lose the match* (If/when – P, Q).

What distinguishes the example in (b) above is that both of its conjuncts are imperative, a structure which will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

6.3.3.2. ILUs with Imperative in both Conjuncts.

In this section, I discuss the structures of ILUs whose two conjuncts are imperative clauses and show the interpretations these structures express. Let us consider the following two examples.

43. [Affected by the rise in products' prices, a staff member tells his manager]

zawwid *'ujūr.na* *'aw* *twaqqa'* *'idrāb*
 increase_{+imp.2.m.sg} wages.our conj expect_{+imp.2.m.sg} strike

Increase our wages or expect a strike. (DED).

The above example consists of two imperative clauses conjoined by *'aw* (or); it can be interpreted as (if [-P] then [+Q]), and can be equated to a conditional sentence of the form *if P, Q. If you do not increase our wages, we will make a strike.*

In order is the question of whether any two conjoined imperative clauses form a PC or what gives two conjoined clauses a conditional interpretation. In other words, why a PC is not considered a mere compound sentence as is the case in the following example.

44. *štari* *l.ktāb* *'aw* *sta'ir.uh* *min* *l.maktabah*
 buy_{+imp.2.m.sg} def.book conj borrow_{+imp.2.m.sg} it prep def.library

Buy the book or borrow it from the library. (DED).

Obviously, the above example is not a PC though it is composed of two imperative clauses conjoined by *'aw* (or). This poses the question of what distinguishes a PC from examples like the one above. Based on Dancygier's (1998: 189) observation, a PC has all the basic characteristics of a typical conditional: (a) contingency, (b) a causal relation between the two clauses and (c) sequentiality of events, I will argue that DED PCs conform to this observation and that they have an interpretation typically associated with conditional sentences. Let us consider the following example.

45. [A tax adviser warning against tax evasion]

dfa'ū *darāyib.kum* *'aw* *qaddū* *talat* *sanawāt* *bi.as.sijin*
 pay_{+imp.2.pl} taxes.your conj spend_{+imp.2.pl} three years pred.def.prison

Pay your taxes or spend three years in prison. (DED).

The above example can be equated to a conditional sentence of the form *If P, Q. If you do not pay your taxes, you will spend three years in prison.* The first conjunct *Pay your taxes* represents the P-clause proposition found in typical conditional sentences, and the second

conjunct *spend three years in prison* indicates the tax adviser's expectation if the command in the first conjunct is not adhered to; therefore, the two clauses express a contingent situation, a situation characteristic of prototypical conditionals. However, while this contingency or 'non-assertiveness' is conveyed by the use of the conditional particle *eda* (if) in prototypical conditionals, it is conveyed by the P-constituent in the ILUs.

Furthermore, the relation between the two conjuncts of the above ILU is causal where *not paying one's taxes* can cause *spending three years in prison*. This relation also indicates an iconic order where *not paying one's taxes* precedes the penalty of *spending three years in prison*. We can therefore conclude that contingency, causality and iconicity are the three features that can give PCs a conditional interpretation.

ILUs with imperative in both conjuncts can only express undesirable situations. The Q-constituent cannot express a desirable situation at all because this would result in a pragmatically odd sentence. Compare the following two examples.

46.

- a. *qtā'* *ad.duxxān* 'aw *zīd* *forṣat* *aj.jalṭah*
quit_{+imp.2.m.sg} def.smoking conj increase_{+imp.2.m.sg} chance def.stroke
Quit smoking or increase the chance of having a stroke. (DED).

- b. ??*qtā'* *ad.duxxān* 'aw *qallil* *forṣat* *aj.jalṭah*
quit_{+imp.2.m.sg} def.smoking conj decrease_{+imp.2.m.sg} chance def.stroke
??Quit smoking or decrease the chance of having a stroke. (DED).

The only difference between the above two examples is that while the Q-constituent in (a) expresses an undesirable situation (*increasing the chance of having a stroke*), the semantically odd one in (b) expresses a desirable situation (*decreasing the chance of having a stroke*). Only the example in (a) can be interpreted as *if [-p], [+q]*: (*If you do not quit smoking, you will increase the chance of having a stroke*); interpreting (b) as *if [-p], [+q]* will result in a pragmatically odd sentence.

47. ?? If you do not quit smoking, you will decrease the chance of having a stroke.

The above example is ruled out due to pragmatic oddity expressed by having a Q-constituent expressing a desirable situation.

Having discussed both types of PCs, we will now consider the main points differentiating them from one another.

6.4. ILUs versus ILCs.

Lawler (1975: 317) opens her study of PCs by stating that the difference between ILCs and ILUs involves 'a curious asymmetry'. Based on her observation, I will show how the following paradigm of ILCs and ILUs can be explained.

48.

a. *štari.l.i* *šundawīšeh* *w* *rāḥ* *'aqitl.ak*
 buy_{+imp.2.m.sg.} prep.me sandwich conj will kill_{+pres.1.sg.} you
 Buy me a sandwich and I'll kill you. (DED).

b. *štari.l.i* *šundawīšeh* *w* *rāḥ* *'abūs.ak*
 buy_{+imp.2.m.sg.} prep.me sandwich conj will kiss_{+pres.1.sg.} you
 Buy me a sandwich and I'll kiss you. (DED).

c. *štari.l.i* *šundawīšeh* *'aw* *rāḥ* *'aqitl.ak*
 buy_{+imp.2.m.sg.} prep.me sandwich conj will kill_{+pres.1.sg.} you
 Buy me a sandwich or I'll kill you. (DED).

d. ??*štari.l.i* *šundawīšeh* *'aw* *rāḥ* *'abūs.ak*
 buy_{+imp.2.m.sg.} prep.me sandwich conj will kiss_{+pres.1.sg.} you
 ?? Buy me a sandwich or I'll kiss you. (DED).

(a) and (c) express undesirable situations, while (b) a desirable one. The deviance of (d) shows that it cannot indicate an imperative *not to buy a sandwich* with the promise of *kissing* upon consent; the only possible interpretation (d) indicates is the same as (c) with the presupposition that the hearer does not want to be kissed. This shows that (c) and (d) do not express the same asymmetry we get in (a) and (b): while (a) indicates an ultimatum *not to buy a sandwich*, (b)

indicates an invitation *to buy a sandwich*. This is not the case in (c) and (d) where in spite of the fact that the Q-constituent in (c) is an ultimatum *to buy a sandwich*, (d) does not mean *do not buy a sandwich*.

One of the main differences between ILCs and ILUs is the type of situation (desirable or undesirable) the Q-constituent indicates, a point referred to by most of the studies that dealt with PCs. While the Q-constituent in ILCs can express either a desirable or undesirable situation, the one in ILUs can only express undesirable situations. Consider the following examples.

49.

- a. [Ahmad and Amer are browsing the internet.]

naṣṣib hāda l.barnāmaj w rāḥ ybūqūn bayānāt.ak
 install_{+imp.2.m.sg} this def.program conj will steal_{+pres.3.pl} data.your
Install this software and they will steal your data. (DED).

- b. *naṣṣib hāda l.barnāmaj w kambyotar.ak rāḥ yištaḡil 'asra'*
 install_{+imp.2.m.sg} this def.program conj computer.your will work_{+pres.3.m.sg} faster
Install this software and your computer will run faster. (DED).

The Q-constituent in (a) expresses an undesirable situation (stealing one's personal data), while the one in (b) expresses a desirable situation (faster performance of the computer). In other words, while (a) indicates a directive *not to install this software* with a threat of having one's data stolen, (b) indicates a directive *to install this software* with a promise of faster performance of the computer upon consent. That is, ILCs can express desirable and undesirable situations.

The ability of expressing both desirable and undesirable situations is permitted in ILCs only. That is to say, the Q-constituents in ILUs can express only undesirable situations. This justifies the oddity of the following example:

50. ??*naṣṣib hāda l.barnāmaj 'aw kambyotar.ak rāḥ yištaḡil 'asra'*
 install_{+imp.2.m.sg} this def.program conj computer.your will work_{+pres.3.m.sg} faster
 ?? **Install this software or your computer will run faster.** (DED).

The oddity in the example above results from presenting a desirable situation (fast running of one's computer) as a threat. It is pragmatically odd for ILUs to express desirable situations, as only undesirable situations are allowed.

Nevertheless, deciding whether a Q-constituent is expressing a desirable or undesirable situation can be context-dependent. In other words, the same Q-constituent can sometimes express a desirable or undesirable situation depending on the context in which a PC is uttered. Consider the following examples.

51.

- a. [A husband to his drug-addict wife.]

baṭli ta'āfi muxadirāt 'aw rāḥ 'aṭaliq.či
 stop_{+imp.2.f.sg} taking drugs conj will divorce_{+pres.1.m.sg} you
Stop taking drugs or I will divorce you. (DED).

- b. [A wife discovers her husband's infidelity. She files a case against him and asks for divorce. The husband says].

tḡbiti xiyānt.i li.l.maḥkamah w rāḥ 'aṭaliq.či
 prove_{+imp.2.f.sg} infidelity.my prep.def.court and will divorce_{+pres.1.m.sg} you
Prove my infidelity to the court and I will divorce you. (DED).

Note that though the Q-constituent (I will divorce you) in both examples is the same, it does not express undesirability in both examples: in a context where (a) is uttered by a husband suffering from his wife's addiction and feeling unable to put up with it, the Q-constituent expresses a threat or an undesirable situation (with the assumption that getting divorced is undesirable for wives). On the other hand, the same Q-constituent in (b) can express a desirable situation in a context where living with an adulterous husband is very undesirable for his wife, a case in which the wife prefers divorce (a desirable solution) to living with a disloyal husband.

Another difference between ILCs and ILUs relates to the meanings these structures imply. Davies (1986: 205) states that both ILCs and ILUs can imply a meaning different from the one their appearance indicates: 'like ILCs, ILUs have often been considered to be other than their appearance would suggest'. Consider the following two examples.

52.

- a. Learn these skills and you can manage your company better.
- b. Get out of my house or I will call the police.

Davies claims that examples like (a) and (b) are not ordinary conjunction/disjunction of imperative and declarative clauses; *and* in (a) does not function as a typical conjunction conjoining two clauses, nor does *or* in (b) function as a typical disjunctive offering alternatives or options; rather, there is a further meaning implied in these sentences, a conditional one.⁷⁰ Pawley and Synder (1983) further distinguish between two types of *or*, ultimatums *or* and alternative *or*. The former is similar to the one used in ILUs, while the latter is found in examples expressing alternatives such as *clean the kitchen or tidy your room*. Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1999: 473) argue that *and* is a multifunctional conjunction, stating that *and* is a 'marker of many meanings'. They further point out that one of the functions of *and* is 'the idea of as a result'.

Like their English counterparts, DED ILCs and ILUs express a meaning different from the one their appearance indicates where *wa* (and) and *'aw* (or) do not really function as prototypical conjunctions. Compare the following two examples:

53.

- | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|----------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| a. | <i>nādiya</i> | <i>sāfarat</i> | <i>'ala</i> | <i>maṣir</i> | <i>w</i> | <i>zārat</i> | <i>l. 'ahrāmāt</i> |
| | Nadia | travel _{+past.3.f.sg} | prep | Egypt | conj | visit _{+past.3.f.sg} | def.pyramids |
| | Nadia travelled to Egypt and visited the pyramids. (DED). | | | | | | |

⁷⁰ Lawler (1971), Stockwell, Schachter and Partee (1973), Culicover (1972) and Pawley and Synder (1983) share the same observations.

- b. [Two people are testing a smoke alarm]

<i>daxxin</i>	<i>sikārah</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>aj.jihāz</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yištaḡil</i>
smoke _{+imp.2.m.sg}	cigarette	conj	def.device	will	work _{+pres.3.m.sg}

Smoke a cigarette and the alarm will go off. (DED).

Though the conjunction *wa* (and) is used in (a) and (b), it has a different function in each example: in (a), *wa* (and) functions as a typical coordinating conjunction used to join two clauses. On the other hand, *wa* in (b) does not function as a coordinating conjunction, but rather is used to indicate a conditional interpretation; the pragmatic implication of (b) denotes a conditional interpretation. That is, (b) can be interpreted as *if you smoke a cigarette, the alarm will go off*. By uttering the first conjunct *smoke a cigarette*, a mental space is set up wherein the event occurs, and within that space *the alarm goes off*. This shows that *wa* (and) is a multifunctional conjunction.

Similarly, the use of *ʾaw* (or) in ILUs does not express alternation; rather it, like *wa* (and), helps express conditionality. Compare the use of *ʾaw* (or) in the following two examples.

54.

- a. [Sally has recently got her undergraduate degree].

<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tkamil</i>	<i>dirāst.ha</i>	<i>ʾaw</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tqaddim</i>	<i>ʿala</i>	<i>šugul</i>
will	continue _{+pres.3.f.sg}	study.her	conj	will	apply _{+pres.3.f.sg}	prep	job

She will continue her study or she will apply for a job. (DED).

- b. [A father talking to his children when he knew that Salwa got swine flu].

<i>xalikum</i>	<i>baʿīdīn</i>	<i>ʿan</i>	<i>salwa</i>	<i>ʾaw</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tinʿadūn</i>	<i>b.ʾinfelwanza</i>	<i>l.xanāzīr</i>
stay _{+imp.2.pl}	away	prep	Salwa	conj	will	infect _{+pres.2.pl}	prep.flu	def.pigs

Stay away from Salwa or you will get swine flu. (DED).

The disjunctive *ʾaw* (or) plays two different functions. In (a), it is typically used as a disjunctive expressing alternatives, while in (b) it is used to help express a conditional interpretation. That is to say, the pragmatic implication of (b) denotes a conditional interpretation. The use of the imperative clause *Stay away from Salwa* triggers a mental space set-up wherein *the children stay away from Salwa* and in the same space *they do not get swine*

flu. Alternatively, in a mental space where the children *do not stay away from Salwa*, *they get swine flu*. Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that one of the pragmatic characteristics of *wa* (and) and *'aw* (or) is the ability to denote conditional implication. Thus, DED PCs, like their English counterparts, indicate a meaning different from the one their appearance suggests.

Reflecting on the discussion presented so far, one can observe that by comparing DED PCs with their English counterparts a considerable number of similarities can be found; the use of DED *wa* and *'aw* seems similar to the use of their English *and* and *or* where both can be used to indicate a conditional meaning or to conjoin two clauses. It is therefore not a mere coincidence that we find the same differences between *wa* (and) and *'aw* (or) and their English counterparts taking into consideration that DED and English are totally unrelated. This suggests that expressing conditional meaning by employing paratactic structures can be a universal phenomenon. A further support to this claim comes from other languages such as French; we can find examples of PCs in French where conjunctions can also be used to denote a conditional meaning. Consider the following example (from Jayez and Dargnat (2009: 251).

55.

- a. Make any serious attempt to understand string theory and it'll ruin your scientific life.
- b. Fais la moindre tentative sérieuse pour comprendre la théorie des cordes et ça ruinera ta vie scientifique.

Jayez and Dargnat (2009: 251).

We can therefore conclude that expressing PCs by means of conjunctions can be a universal phenomenon.

Polarity reversal can be one of the points distinguishing ILCs from ILUs. When the P-constituent of an ILU involves a situation expressing a positive polarity, the intended meaning involves a reversal of the polarity of that situation. The reverse is true in P-constituents expressing negative polarity. Declerck and Reed (2001: 403) point out that 'if a paratactic

and/or-conditional expresses a threat, *the polarity of the two clauses is reversed*⁷¹ when *or* is used, but not when the conjunction is *and*'. Consider the following example:

56.

- a. Be quiet or leave the court.
- b. Ask her a question and she starts shouting.

Though the P-constituent *be quiet* in (a) apparently has a positive polarity, the intended meaning indicates a polarity-reversed interpretation, where (a) is interpreted as '*if [-P] [+Q]* (*if you do not be quiet, you will have to leave the court*). That is to say, the polarity of the positive P-constituent (*be quiet*) is reversed. On the other hand, when the conjunction used is *and* as is the case in (b) above, the interpretation of the P-constituent does not involve any reversal of polarity: (b) is interpreted as '*if [p], [q]* (*if you ask her a question she will start shouting*). This shows that the polarity reversal of P-constituents takes place only when the sentence concerned is an ILU, where *or*, not *and*, is used.

Considering the example in (56.a) again, we note that the polarity of only *one clause*, (the P-constituent), undergoes reversal. In other words, (a) is interpreted as '*if [-p] [+q]* (*if you do not be quiet, you will have to leave the court*). This makes us question the accuracy of Declerck and Reed's statement quoted above, namely that '*... the polarity of the two clauses is reversed when or is used*'. Had this observation been accurate, (a) would have been interpreted as '*??If you do not be quiet, you will have not to leave the court*. In other words, it is *only the* P-constituent of an ILU that gets its polarity reversed.

Like their English counterparts, DED ILUs have their polarity reversed when interpreted. Consider the following example.

⁷¹ We will show that this (italicised) part of Declerck and Reed's statement is inaccurate.

57. [(setting: exam-room). An invigilator talks to some students:]

skut.ū *'aw* *rāḥ* *'algi* *'imtiḥānāt.kum*
 keep.quiet_{+imp.2.pl} conj will cancel_{+pres.1.sg} exams.your

Keep quiet or I will cancel your exams. (DED).

The above example conveys a warning to the students; it is paraphraseable as *if [-P], [+Q]: if you do not keep quiet, I will cancel your exams*. This shows that the interpretation of this example involves a reversal of the P-constituent's polarity.

Regardless of their P-constituents' polarity, ILUs will always involve polarity reversal when interpreted. The following two examples are illustrative.

58.

a. [Two high school teachers are having a short conversation. One says:]

lā *tiḥči* *bi.as.syāsah* *bi.aṣ.ṣaf* *'aw* *ṭullāb.ak* *rāḥ* *yīškūn.ak*
 Neg talk_{+pres.2.m.sg} prep.def.politics prep.def.class conj students.your will report_{+pres.3.pl}.you

Do not talk about politics in the class or your students will report you. (DED).

b. [A manger arrives and finds two employees involved in a violent argument. She says:]

lā *tiṭjādalūn* *annawb* *'aw* *rāḥ* *'anhi* *'uqūd.kum*
 Neg argue_{+pres.2.pl} again conj will terminate_{+pres.1.sg} contracts.your

Do not argue again or I will terminate your contracts. (DED).

The above examples correspond to the following polarity-reversed conditional sentences:

59.

- a. If you talk about politics in the class, your students will report you.
- b. If you argue again, I will terminate your contracts.

DED ILCs do not undergo polarity reversal regardless of the desirability of the situation expressed in their Q-constituents. Let us consider the following two examples. (a) expresses a desirable situation, while (b) an undesirable one.

60.

a. [A detective questioning a criminal].

qūl *l.ḥaqīqah* *w* *rāḥ* *nxaffif* *'uqūbt.ak*
 say_{+imp.2.m.sg} def.truth conj will commute_{+pres.1.pl} penalty.your

Tell the truth and we will commute your penalty. (DED).

- b. *xawwin mart.ak w zawāj.ak rāh yintahi bi.aṭ.ṭalāq*
 distrust_{+imp.2.m.sg} wife.your conj marriage.your will end_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep.def.divorce
 Distrust your wife and your marriage will end in divorce. (DED).

The interpretations of the above ILCs do not involve polarity reversal, unlike the case in ILUs; both of the above examples are interpreted as *If P, Q*, and are pragmatically interchangeable with the following non-polarity-reversed conditional sentences.

61.

- b. If you tell the truth, we will commute your penalty.
- c. If you distrust your wife, your marriage will end in divorce.

A further difference between ILCs and ILUs concerns the question of whether each ILC is synonymous with its corresponding ILU. Fraser (1971: 160) and Davies (1986: 205-206) hold different views concerning this question: Fraser (1971: 160) points out that an ILC is synonymous with its ILU counterpart, and that both ILCs and ILUs are synonymous with one corresponding conditional sentence with *if*. For him, the following examples are all synonymous.

62.

- a. If you talk, I'll shoot Max.
- b. Talk and I'll shoot Max.
- c. Don't talk or I'll shoot Max.

(Fraser, 1971: 160).

Fraser (1971: 160) states that 'the [above] three sentences are synonymous, and in each case, the first part states the condition under which the second part will hold'. On the other hand, Davies (1986: 205-206) exposes the 'inaccuracy' of Fraser's claim by providing examples indicating a clear contrast between an ILC and its corresponding ILU counterpart:

63.

- a. Be polite *and* you'll get an invitation.
- b. Don't be polite *or* you'll get an invitation.

(Davies, 1986: 205-206).

Contrary to Fraser's claim, Davies argues that (a) and (b) above are not synonymous: while the example in (a) is used to advise the addressee *to be polite* where *being polite* will produce desirable results, the example in (b) 'can only be understood as a directive asking the addressee *not to be polite* with the implication that *getting an invitation* is something undesirable'.

Though both accounts sounds plausible, I agree with Fraser's claim (1971: 160) that an ILC is synonymous with its ILU counterpart, a claim applicable to most DED PCs. That is to say, a DED ILC is synonymous with its ILU counterpart. The following examples are illustrative.

64.

- a. *fďāḥ* *sirr.i* *w* *ṣadāqat.na* *rāḥ tintahi*
 reveal_{+imp.2.m.sg} secret.my and friendship.our will end_{+pres.3.f.sg}
Reveal my secret and our friendship will end. (DED).
- b. *lā* *tifďaḥ* *sirr.i* *'aw* *ṣadāqat.na* *rāḥ tintahi*
 Neg reveal_{+pres.2.m.sg} secret.my conj friendship.our will end_{+pres.3.f.sg}
Do not reveal my secret or our friendship will end. (DED).

Both of the above examples can convey the same message (revealing the secret will terminate friendship). Further, the P-constituent in both examples provides a condition-like statement on whose fulfilment the Q-constituent will hold. (b) can be a paraphrase for (a) and both can be equated to a conditional sentence of the form *if P, Q*.

65. If you reveal my secret, our friendship will end.

One common feature of the PCs presented so far is that most, if not all of them, use the second person as their subject. This raises the question of whether using a different subject (other than the second person) is possible in PCs.

6.5. PCs with Subjects other than the 2nd Person.

In this section I discuss whether DED PCs allow subjects other than the second person. Linguists hold different views regarding this issue in English. I will briefly review some of these views and then turn to show how far PCs in DED conform to them.

Mistakenly, Thumm (2000: 6) claims that examples with subjects other than the 2nd person are not available in the literature of PCs at all, and that his study has initiated the use of subjects other than the second person in PCs.⁷² He presents a study of PCs in English involving examples with subjects other than the 2nd person, stating that ‘contrary to the literature, according to which PCs (always) have the 2nd person singular ..., more than 1/4 of the PCs in my corpus have subjects other than the 2nd person singular’. However, the literature on PCs does really have PCs with subjects other than the 2nd person. Davies (1986: 194), for instance, provides some examples where it is possible to use the third person subject in PCs; the following example is from Davies (1986: 194):

66. He makes one mistake and he will be out. Davies (1986: 194).

The above example shows that we can use a third person subject in PCs and still have a conditional interpretation, *if he makes one mistake, he will be out*.

Nevertheless, understood subjects seem to behave differently: we can have an understood subject other than the second person in ILCs, while in ILUs only a second person understood subject is permitted (Davies, 1986: 208).

67.

- a. ?? Pass his exams or he'll be in trouble.
- b. Pass his exams and he'll have no problem.

(Davies, 1986: 208).

⁷² We will show that this claim is invalid.

As the above examples show, ILUs do not allow understood subjects to be other than the second person, while this is allowed in ILCs.

Using other subject forms such as *oneself* and *yourself* in PCs are also not uncontroversial. Keyser and Postal (1976) show that ILCs can allow forms like *oneself* as subjects. For them examples like the one below are acceptable:

68. Exercise oneself everyday and one's body becomes healthier.

On the other hand, PCs with *oneself* subjects are ruled out according to Silva and Zwicky (1975) on the basis of formality. Silva and Zwicky (1975) remark that ILCs which allow forms like *oneself* are excluded 'because of the conflict between the relatively colloquial ILC construction and the formality of the pronoun *one*' (Discussed in Davies, 1986: 164).

Further, *yourself*-forms are permitted in PCs. For example, Lawler (1977) judges PCs with second person subjects (including *yourself*-forms) as grammatical, while those with third person subjects as ungrammatical. This is clear in the following set of examples (from Lawler, 1977: 372).

69.

- a. Scratch yourself and I'll kill you.
- *b. Scratch himself and I'll kill him.
- c. Scratch yourself or I'll kill you.
- *d. Scratch himself or I'll kill him.

(Lawler, 1977: 372)

More interestingly, Davies (1986: 164) points out that ILCs can involve a subject of any person as long as it is retrievable from the context: 'ILCs may be understood to have a subject of any person, provided this is clearly recoverable from the context'. According to Davies (1986: 164), the following set of examples are all grammatical.

70.

- a. Find myself a place to live and I'll soon settle down.
- b. Get themselves organized and they'll soon start making a profit.

- c. Set up our own business and we'll have much more freedom.

(Davies 1986: 164-165).

Thus, we find that linguists have different opinions regarding the possibility of having a subject other than the 2nd person in PCs. One wonders whether DED PCs can also allow subjects other than the second person. Let us consider the following examples.

71.

- a. [Setting: (airport). Ali notices that a lady has left her luggage unattended. He says].

haḍiĉ l.marah lāzim tintabih 'ala čanāfi.ha 'aw l.'umāl rāḥ yišilūn.hum
 that def.woman Mod attend_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep luggage.her conj def.staff will
 remove_{+pres.3.pl.} them

That woman should attend to her luggage or the staff will remove them. (DED).

- b. [Sally is reading a job advertisement whose dead line is neighing.]

lāzim 'aqaddim ṭalab bakkīr 'aw rāḥ yirfuḍūn ṭalab.i
 Mod apply_{+pres.1.sg} application early conj will reject_{+pres.3.pl} application.my
 I should fill an application early or they will reject my application. (DED).

(a) and (b) show that it is possible to have a subject other than the second person in ILUs; the subject in the P-constituent in (a) is the third person and the one in (b) is the first person. Nevertheless, it is not possible to have an understood subject other than the second person in DED ILUs. Compare the following two examples.

72.

- a. *'intabih 'ala ḡrād.ak 'aw rāḥ tixsar.hum*
 watch_{+imp.2.m.sg} prep belongings.your conj will lose_{+pres.2.m.sg} them
 Watch your belongings or you will lose them. (DED).

- b. *??tintabih 'ala ḡrād.ha 'aw rāḥ tixsar.hum*
 watch_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep belongings.her conj will lose_{+pres.3.f.sg} them
 ??Watch her belongings or she will lose them. (DED).

(a) and (b) show that only a second person understood subject is permitted in DED ILUs.

Other understood subjects like the third person result in an ill-formed structure as shown in (b).

It is not possible to construct an ILC with a subject other than the second person, as such a structure cannot indicate conditionality:

73. *yudrus* *zein* *w* *rāḥ* *yinjaḥ* *bi.l.fāḥiṣ*
 study_{+pres.3.m.sg} well conj will pass_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep.def.exam
 He studies well and he will pass the exam. (DED).

Though the above example is a possible DED utterance, it does not denote a PC; rather, it is a compound sentence composed of two conjoined clauses.

Nevertheless, there are two common DED sayings⁷³ which can involve a conditional interpretation with subjects other than the second person in ILCs: the first is used when one meets with somebody who is skilfully and resourcefully trained in convincing and dealing with others. The second, on other hand, is used to describe a person people have great difficulty in convincing or dealing with him/her:

74.

- a. [Sally discovers that her manger has always given her a slick evasive answers whenever she asks for pay rise. She says:]

yāxd.ak *ʿa.l.mai* *w* *yrajʿ.ak* *ʿaṭṣān*
 take_{+pres.3.m.sg} you prep.def.water and return_{+pres.3.m.sg} you thirsty
 He takes you to the water and brings you back thirsty. (DED)

- b. [All Reem's attempts to convince Dani that he was wrong were in vain. Reem says:]

ʿaql.l.uh *teis* *yqul.l.i* *ḥilbī.h*
 tell_{+pres.1.sg} prep.him he-goat tell_{+pres.3.m.sg} prep.me milk_{+imp.2.f.sg} it
 I tell him it is a he-goat, he asks me to milk it. (DED).

The saying in (a) is used to indicate that Sally's manager is very sophisticated and intelligent. Sally's utterance draws on the contrast between *water* and *thirsty* on the assumption that if people go to a place where water is abundant, they will not come back thirsty. On the other hand, the saying in (b) is used to refer to Dani's close-mindedness or lack of intelligence: by using the *he-goat* analogy, Reem indicates that the fact that Dani's views are wrong is as clear

⁷³ These two sayings are culture-specific.

as the fact that a *he-goat* cannot be milked. The sentence can be pragmatically interchangeable with *if you tell Dani it is a he-goat, he will ask you to milk it* (i.e., he is stupid).

It is also grammatical to use a reflexive pronoun other than the second person in DED PCs. Consider the following two examples where (a) uses a first person reflexive, and (b) a third person one:

75.

a. <i>ʔatawwir</i>	<i>nafs.i</i>	<i>ʔaleiqi</i>	<i>šugul</i>	<i>zein</i>
improve _{+pres.1.sg}	self.my	find _{+pres.1.sg}	job	good
I improve myself, I find a good job. (DED).				

b. <i>ytawwir</i>	<i>nafs.uh</i>	<i>yleiqi</i>	<i>šugul</i>	<i>zein</i>
improve _{+pres.3.m.sg}	self.him	find _{+pres.3.m.sg}	job	good
He improves himself, he finds a good job. (DED).				

Both of the above PCs are well-formed DED structures. To a DED speaker, the above examples clearly imply a conditional interpretation, and respectively correspond to conditional sentences of the form *if P, Q*.

76.

- a. If I improve myself, I will find a good job.
- b. If he improves himself, he will find a good job.

In the remaining part of this section, I will investigate how *nobody* and *someone* can be used in English and DED PCs.

Rupp (2003: 14-15) shows a range of lexical subjects permitted in English imperative clauses; we will discuss two types of lexical subjects, namely 'quantifiers and indefinite third person DPs such as *nobody, someone ...*'. For example,

77.

- a. Nobody leave!
- b. Someone call the police!

I will show how *nobody*, *someone* and their DED equivalents can be used as subjects in ILCs.

The quantifier *nobody* can be used as a subject in an ILCs regardless of the desirability of the Q-constituent.

78.

- a. Nobody interrupt the speaker and *we will understand better*.
- b. Nobody listen to the speaker and *he will leave the lecture hall angry*.

Note that *nobody* is used in the above ILCs whether the Q-constituents refer to a desirable situation as in (a) or to an undesirable one as in (b).

On the other hand, using *nobody* as the subject of an ILU demands that the Q-constituent be undesirable:

79.

- a. Nobody leave now or *the police will accuse you of stealing*.
- b. *Nobody carry a lot of cash with them or *they will be safe*.

Similarly, the indefinite third person *someone* can be used as a subject in ILCs regardless of the desirability of the Q-constituents. This is represented in the following two examples where the Q-constituent in (a) expresses a desirable situation, while the one in (b) an undesirable situation:

80.

- a. Someone switch on the heater and *we will all feel better*.
- b. Someone turn on all the appliances and *they will pay a high electricity bill*.

On the other hand, when *someone* is used in ILUs, the Q-constituent can only indicate an undesirable situation. Consider the following two examples where (b) is ruled out because the Q-constituent indicates a desirable situation.

81.

- a. Someone turn on the fridge or *the food will go mouldy*.
- b. *Someone turn on the fridge or *you will prevent bacteria from spreading around your food*.

DED PCs involving *laḥḥad* (nobody) and *waḥid* (someone/one) are also possible. For example, *laḥḥad* (nobody) can be used as a subject in ILCs regardless of the desirability of the Q-constituent. Consider the following two examples where (a) expresses a desirable situation and (b) an undesirable one:

82.

a. [A teacher encouraging his students at the beginning of the term].

<i>laḥḥad</i>	<i>ydayyeʿ</i>	<i>l.waqit</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>l.kul</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yinjaḥūn</i>
nobody	waste _{+pres.3.m.sg}	def.time	conj	def.all	will	succeed _{+pres.3.pl}

Nobody waste time and all will succeed. (DED).

b. [A frozen-food supplier talks to some of his customers].

<i>laḥḥad</i>	<i>yīštari</i>	<i>bidāʿat.hum</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yixsarūn</i>	<i>maṣārī.hum</i>
nobody	buy _{+pres.3.m.sg}	products.their	conj	will	lose _{+pres.3.pl}	money.their

Nobody buy their products and they will lose their money. (DED).

On the other hand, using *laḥḥad* (nobody) as the subject of an ILU demands that the Q-constituent be undesirable. This justifies the oddity of the example in (b) below:

83.

a. <i>laḥḥad</i>	<i>yitfarraj</i>	<i>ʿala</i>	<i>hāda</i>	<i>l.film</i>	<i>ʾaw</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tšūfūn</i>	<i>kwābīs</i>
nobody	watch _{+pres.3.m.sg}	prep	this	def.movie	conj	will	see _{+pres.2.pl}	nightmares

Nobody watch this movie or you will have nightmares. (DED).

b. ?? <i>laḥḥad</i>	<i>yisūq</i>	<i>b.surʿah</i>	<i>ʾaw</i>	<i>aš.šurṭah</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>tkāfiʾ.kum</i>
nobody	drive _{+pres.3.m.sg}	prep.speed	conj	def.police	will	reward _{+pres.3.f.sg} you

??Nobody drive fast or the police will reward you. (DED).

Similarly, indefinite third person *waḥid* (someone) can be used as the subject of ILCs regardless of the desirability of the Q-constituent. The Q-constituent in (a) below expresses a desirable situation, while the one in (b) expresses an undesirable one:

84.

a. <i>waḥid</i>	<i>yittašil</i>	<i>bi.aṭ.ṭawāriʾ</i>	<i>w</i>	<i>rāḥ</i>	<i>yinqidū.na</i>	<i>mubāšratan</i>
someone	call _{+pres.3.m.sg}	prep.def.emergency	conj	will	rescue _{+pres.3.pl} us	immediately

Someone call the emergency and they will rescue us immediately. (DED).

- b. *waḥid yḡabbi ʾalʿāb.ha w rāḥ tballiš tibči*
 someone hide_{+pres.3.m.sg} toys.her conj will start_{+pres.3.f.sg} cry_{+pres.3.f.sg}
 Someone hide her toys and she will start crying. (DED).

On the other hand, when *someone* is used in ILUs, the Q-constituent can only indicate undesirable situations. In the following set of examples, (b) is odd because its Q-constituent indicates a desirable situation:

85. [Sally finds that her brothers' room so messy. She tells them:]

- a. *waḥid yirattib l.ḡurfah ʾaw ʾimm.i rāḥ tšayyieḥ ʿalei.na*
 someone tidy_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.room conj mother.my will shout_{+pres.3.f.sg} prep.us
 Someone tidy the room or my mother will shout at us. (DED).
- b. ??*waḥid yirattib l.ḡurfah ʾaw ʾimm.i rāḥ titšakar.na*
 someone tidy_{+pres.3.m.sg} def.room conj mother.my will thank_{+pres.3.f.sg}.us
 ??Someone tidy the room or my mother will thank us. (DED).

Based on the above discussion, we note that the ways PCs are expressed in English are so similar to those expressed in DED that we can expect that expressing PCs by means of conjunctions can be a universal phenomenon, taking into consideration that we are discussing two languages which are totally unrelated.

6.6. Summary.

In this chapter we have discussed the structure of paratactic conditional (PCs) which can be divided into two main types, Imperative-Like Conditionals (ILCs) and Imperative-Like Ultimatums (ILUs). The first part of the chapter has discussed the use of imperative clauses, their different uses, and their role in PCs. We have shown that imperative clauses do not express genuine imperative meanings when used in PCs.

ILCs are divided into four subtypes: (a) ILCs with imperative P-constituents, (b) ILCs where both P and Q constituents are imperative, (c) asyndetic ILCs and (d) ILCs with

quantified P-constituents. In the second part of this chapter, we have pointed out some similarities and differences between ILCs and ILUs.

Our review of the exiting studies on PCs in English has shown that PCs can be used in formal and informal settings. We have also shown that examples corresponding to PCs are also found in Classical and Standard Arabic; nevertheless, Arabic grammarians do not treat PCs as a type of conditional. Our study of the previous studies on Arabic PCs have also revealed that there is a lack of written literature about Arabic PCs.

Contrary to Davies's (1986) claim, we have argued that an ILC is synonymous with its ILU counterpart. Furthermore, our literature review of PCs in English has refuted Thumm's (2000) claim that PCs with subjects other than the second person do not exist in literature. We have also identified some cases where using the third person singular subject in DED ILCs is possible. Finally, our discussion of PCs in DED shows a considerable degree of similarity between DED and English with respect to the ways PCs are expressed, a point which indicates that expressing PCs can be a language universal

Chapter Seven

Conclusions and Recommendations

7.0. Introduction.

In this final chapter of the thesis, I restate the objectives of this study, summarize the major issues discussed, and discuss the findings of this study and their implications. I will finally provide some suggestions for further research.

7.1. Aims.

This descriptive study provides a model of conditional constructions in dialectal Arabic. It aims at providing a further contribution to the study of Arabic dialects in general and Syrian Arabic in particular. This study has resulted from my own personal aspiration of providing a comprehensive account for conditional sentences in dialectal Arabic. This study can be an answer to Ingham's (1991: 42) statement that 'to date [1991]' he had 'not seen anything devoted to the study of these structures in a colloquial dialect.'

Furthermore, taking into consideration the lack of empirical research on Arabic conditionals, this study is an attempt to bridge this gap and provide an integrated syntactic and semantic descriptive analysis of Arabic conditionals. Finally, it is hoped that the descriptive generalizations presented in this study will provide a useful basis for other researchers who work on Arabic conditionals.

7.2. Chapters Summary.

The introductory chapter has outlined the main syntactic features of DED. We have shown that DED employs fewer agreement suffixes than Classical or Modern Standard Arabic. For example, verbs do not inflect for the dual and plural verbs are used with both dual and plural subjects. We have stated that there is no morphological realization for Case in DED because Case is a covert phenomenon as is the case in many Arabic dialects. The study has also shown that definiteness is expressed by the prefix *al-*, *il-*, or *l-* (the), that the derivation of

words is based on interlocking a consonantal root with some patterns of vowels and that DED is a pro-drop variety with an SV(C) word order. Finally, the study gives a brief account for modals used in DED including *čān* (lit. 'was'), *rāḥ* (lit. 'went'), *qām* (lit. 'rose up'), *qa'id* (lit. 'sitting') and some modal adjectives such as *yimkin/mumkin* (possible), and *lāzim/dārūri* (necessary). The introductory chapter has aimed at giving a general overview of DED and at preparing the reader for the discussion of DED conditional sentences.

A review of conditional sentences in previous studies was presented in the second chapter. We have identified some seminal works that dealt with conditional sentences, giving a general review of what studies on conditionals have argued and established in both English and Arabic. We have considered the variety of terms used to refer to the P-clause and the Q-clause such as the protasis and the apodosis, the antecedent and the consequent, *aš-šaṛṭ* (lit. 'the condition') and the *aj.jawāb* (lit. 'the reply/the answer'), etc. Mention has also been made of the problem of defining *conditional sentences* where we find that most of the existing definitions do not really account for the different types observed. We have stated that the term conditionals in this study will be used to cover all the different structures which can bear a conditional interpretation.

Furthermore, we have briefly discussed how conditionals are considered by other disciplines such as logic and philosophy, and by other approaches such as the *possible world approach*. We have also shown that Arabic grammarians have approached conditional sentences in two ways: (a) the majority of studies have dealt with conditionals in a fragmented fashion, discussing one part of the conditional structure at a time; we have concluded that this way gives a vague and non-integrated view of conditionals. (b) the second way has discussed conditionals under the umbrella of the rhetoric styles, considering conditional constructions as a type of rhetoric; we have concluded that this way considers conditional sentences as a type of rhetoric, rather than a rigorous linguistic structure. Further, we have seen that little

comprehensive research has been done on conditional sentences in Arabic and that many of the related issues were not discussed. The purpose of the literature review chapter is to give the reader an idea about the existing studies on conditional sentences in Arabic and English and to prepare him/her for the issues discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter three gives a unified description of DED conditionals within the Mental Spaces Theory (MST) as discussed in Fauconnier (1994) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005). We have chosen the MST because it refers to real or imaginary worlds, a fact which makes it suitable for interpreting conditional sentences. The main idea in this theory is that when a conditional sentence is uttered a mental space representing this sentence is set up; within this space the P-clause and the Q-clause hold.

We have stated that DED conditionals divide into two main types, *realis* and *irrealis*. *Realis* conditionals include several subtypes such as future, inferential, non-causal, past *realis*, and generic conditionals, whereas *irrealis* conditionals include hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals. Each type is explained and exemplified with reference to the MST. We have established the importance of the conditional particles and their use in determining the meaning of the conditional sentences they introduce. Some particles such as *eda* (if) and *'in* (if) are mainly used in *realis* conditionals, and some others such as *lau* are used in imaginative conditionals. We have also shown that the two particles *lammā* and *bas* correspond to *when* in English. Further, a number of criteria are used to show the difference between temporal and conditional clauses.

Our study has revealed that the DED Aux *čān* (lit. 'he was') has developed into a conditional particle which can be used in introducing conditional sentences; this can resemble inverted conditionals in English, e.g., *should you need any help contact me*, where *should* replaces the conditional particle *if*. Further, we have argued that causality and sequentiality are the two main relations holding in DED typical conditionals.

Chapter four investigated the tense system in DED conditionals within Declerck's (1991) Tense Theory. In this chapter we have described the use of different tense forms in the different types of DED conditionals and provided an explanation based on Declerck's Tense Theory. The existing accounts related to the use of tense forms in Arabic conditionals have shown that there is a consensus among researchers that verb forms play little role in the interpretation of conditional sentences and that the conditional particles used are responsible for determining the interpretation. However, our study of the tense system in DED conditionals does not really conform to this view, as different conditionals require distinct verb forms. For example while DED future conditionals take the following form

P-clause	Q-clause
comp + perfective/imperfective	<i>rah</i> + imperfective

past realis conditionals take a different one:

The P-clause	The Q-clause
comp + perfective	<i>čān</i> + imperfective

That is to say, verb forms can play an important role in the interpretation of DED conditionals. This chapter has also dealt with DED counterfactual conditionals; our study of this type of conditional sentence has revealed that it is not possible to construct a sentence meaning *If I were you, I would reject me* in DED, as the resulting Q-clause is very odd.

In chapter five we have discussed the clausal order in DED conditionals. The focus was on cases where the P-clause occurs after the Q-clause. Different studies on conditionals have highlighted the widely-held view that the *if P, then Q* order is more prevalent than the *Q, If P* one. Related issues like Haiman's (1978) controversial claim that *P-clauses are topics* and the response of some researchers to this claim have also been investigated.

Our study of the existing research on Arabic conditionals has revealed that Arabic grammarians have overlooked the issue of *clausal order* in Arabic conditionals. Further, we

have discussed four cases where the *Q, If P* order is used; these include relevance P-clauses, lessening and enhancing P-clauses, averting-P-clauses and promotional conditionals. Guided by Dancygier's (1998) study, I have also considered the different interpretations brought up by changing a conditional construction with a P/Q order into a Q/P one.

Paratactic conditionals (PCs) are dealt with in chapter six. The discussion is centred on the structures of Imperative-Like Conditionals (ILCs) and Imperative-Like Ultimatums (ILUs), the two main types of PCs. Our study of these structures has shown that imperative clauses used in ILCs and ILUs do not express a genuine imperative meaning, but a conditional interpretation usually associated with conditional P-clauses. We have divided ILCs into four subtypes: (a) ILCs with imperative P-constituents, (b) ILCs where both P and Q constituents are imperative clauses, (c) asyndetic ILCs and (d) ILCs with quantified P-constituents.

Reviewing the literature of PCs in English has shown that PCs are used in formal and informal settings. Similarly, examples corresponding to PCs are also found in Classical and Standard Arabic; nevertheless, they are discussed in Arabic grammar under cases where the imperative is responsible for the occurrence of jussive verbs; i.e., they are not dealt with as conditional constructions. Previous studies indicated a lack of research on PCs in Arabic.

We have divided DED ILUs into two subtypes: (a) ILUs with imperative in the first conjunct and (b) ILUs with imperative in both conjuncts. The differences between ILCs and ILUs have also been identified; the most prominent of which is that ILUs unlike ILCs can only indicate undesirable situations. Further we have, contrary to Davies's (1986) claim, argued that a DED ILC is synonymous with its ILU counterpart. Our literature review of PCs in English has refuted Thumm's (2000) claim that examples with subjects other than the second person are not available in the literature of PCs at all.

Further, examining DED data have shown that it is possible to construct a PC with a subject other than the second person. However, we have indicated some exceptions where we

have, contrary to English, found that using the third person singular subject in DED ILCs does not yield a PC, but a compound sentence composed of two conjoined clauses. This chapter shows that the ways used in English to express PCs have clear analogues in DED.

7.3 Summary of Findings.

Though this study is meant to be descriptive in nature, it has revealed a number of findings. Reflecting on the discussion presented throughout the main chapters of the thesis, we note that DED conditionals have, like their English counterparts, realis/irrealis, hypothetical/counterfactual and ILCs/ILUs distinction. This is striking because English and DED are two languages that are completely unrelated. In other words, though DED and English express conditional structures in very different ways, they have grammatical strategies for making the same semantic distinctions. Both can use imperative clauses to express paratactic conditionals and both have a number of *-ever* particles that can be used in expressing conditional meanings, etc. That is to say, the way conditionality is expressed in DED has clear analogues with other languages particularly English. These similarities between DED and English in expressing conditionality may provide evidence to support an approach to meaning based on universal concepts.

Contrary to the literature which indicates that tense forms play little role in the interpretation of conditional structures, we have found that this does not completely apply to DED conditionals. Tense forms in combination with conditional particles play an important role in determining the type and interpretation of conditionals. For example, DED past realis conditionals can only be expressed when the main verb of the P-clause is perfective and the Q-clause involves a form of *čān* followed by the imperfective.

This study has shown that conditional particles play a very significant role in conditional sentences. We have also pointed out that each conditional particle can be used with

a particular type of conditional. For example *lau* can only be used with *irrealis* conditionals, unlike *'in* and *eda* which are used with *realis* conditionals.

One of the points this study highlights is the difference in the way English and Arabic researchers approach *conditional constructions*. Compared to English, the literature on Arabic conditionals provides a vague and fragmented perspective of conditional sentences. In addition to the lack of comprehensive analyses of conditionals, the literature on Arabic conditionals shows that conditionals are mainly discussed as a type of rhetoric, but not as a rigorous linguistic phenomenon.

Our discussion of DED paratactic conditionals has shown that the speaker in ILUs can have two different stances (positive or negative) towards his/her addressee. The following two examples are illustrative:

1.

a. [A mother talks to her son while he was going to bed.]

gatti *hāl.ak* *b.baṭṭāniyyeh* *tānyeh* 'aw *rāḥ* *tubrud*
cover_{+imp.2.m.sg} self.your prep.blanket second conj will feel.cold_{+pres.2.m.sg}

Cover yourself with another blanket or you will feel cold. (DED).

b. [A food supplier talks to a company representative.]

saddidū *l.maṣāri* *l.yawm* 'aw *rāḥ* *niḡi* *ṭalab.kum*
pay_{+imp.2.pl} def.money def.day conj will cancel_{+pres.1.pl} order.your

Pay the money today or we will cancel your order. (DED).

Both situations (*getting cold* and *canceling one's purchase order*) are undesirable. However, the fulfillment of the P-constituent in (a) benefits the addressee (the son), whereas the fulfillment of the one in (b) benefits the speaker (the food supplier). The speaker in (a) expresses a positive stance toward the son, whereas the speaker in (b) expresses a negative stance toward the company representative.

A final conclusion we can draw is that this study is a general syntactic investigation of conditional constructions in dialectal Arabic based on a Syrian dialect, DED; it can therefore be considered as a model of conditional constructions in dialectal Arabic.

7.4. Limitations and Scope for Further Research.

Our descriptive analysis of the DED conditionals has revealed several other issues which could be of interest and worth investigating more thoroughly. For example, the use of tense forms in PCs can be further investigated especially in PCs having a subject other than the second person. Similarly, the clausal order of imaginative conditionals merits further investigation. Further, conditionals in which P-clauses occur within their Q-clauses have not been dealt with in this study; thus, a study which investigates P-clauses occurring within their Q-clauses can help give a more integrated view of the clausal order of DED conditionals.

No attempt has been made in this thesis to give a thorough syntactic analysis of conditional sentences within a particular theoretical framework. Particular questions which deserve further research include the syntactic category of the conditional particles, the syntactic status of the invariable use of the Aux *čān* and the structural relation between the P and Q clauses in different types of conditional structures. We hope that the descriptive generalizations presented in this study will provide a useful basis for the discussion of these issues.

Reading throughout this study, one can observe that some conditional particles are more frequent than others. However, this study does not investigate the occurrence frequency of conditional particles. A study based on analyzing conditional sentences in a given corpus would be of great benefit. This can involve comparing the 19 conditional particles used in CA to their dialectal counterparts and showing the different syntactic and semantic properties they involve.

Another central and important issue for further investigation is to examine conditional constructions in other varieties of spoken Arabic and show how far they differ or agree. This

can provide a more comprehensive study of Arabic conditionals, a point which brings this study to a close.

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