Cabrales, Antonio and Feri, Francesco and Gottardi, Piero and Melendez, Miguel (2025) Strategic Information Transmission and Social Preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 237 (Septem). p. 107194. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107194
Cabrales, Antonio and Feri, Francesco and Gottardi, Piero and Melendez, Miguel (2025) Strategic Information Transmission and Social Preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 237 (Septem). p. 107194. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107194
Cabrales, Antonio and Feri, Francesco and Gottardi, Piero and Melendez, Miguel (2025) Strategic Information Transmission and Social Preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 237 (Septem). p. 107194. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107194
Abstract
This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders engage in deception also when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication we observe is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games, even though, as in previous work, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. A novel feature of our framework is that sometimes senders’ and receivers’ interests are in conflict and some other times they are aligned. We show that our findings can be attributed to distributional preferences of senders, which may be sufficiently high to induce them to lie, even when they face a cost of lying, to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than the sender.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Cheap talk; Conflicts of interest; Deception; Experiments; Social preferences |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 26 Nov 2025 10:18 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Nov 2025 10:18 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/41467 |
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