‘Human, all too human’: the anthropocentricisation of ecocide

Using the theoretical framework of co-optation, this article argues that the ecocide movement can be accommodated under the institutional framework of the International Criminal Court in a mutually beneficial manner. However, how ecocide is formulated before the Court is pivotal. There are risks of, on the one hand, anthropocentricising ecocide, and on the other of undermining the Court’s core tenets as a judicial body required to uphold fundamental human rights. A typology of the major approaches to ecocide shows there is significant conceptual divergence regarding the purpose of this crime. Some commentators have inserted overarching anthropocentric interests into the definition, whereas others insist on its ecocentric formulation. The analysis herein argues that excessive incorporation of anthropocentric interests risks causing assimilative co-optation of the ecocentric strand of the ecocide movement. That would nullify the independent value of ecocide as a protection for nature. Conversely, the ecocentric roots of ecocide can be accentuated by ensuring its applicability independent of showing harm to humans. In this way, the relationship between the Court and the ecocide movement can shift away from assimilation and towards a mutually advantageous relationship adhering to the framework of strategic co-optation.