

C. G. Jung, Analytical Psychology, and the “Structure of Feeling” in the Modern Period

Deborah Phung

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychoanalytic Studies

Department/School of Psychosocial and Psychoanalytic Studies

University of Essex

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Summary

This thesis proposes that Raymond Williams’ cultural materialist notion of the ‘structure of feeling’ can be interpreted as an unconscious historical process. It will be discussed, on the one hand, in relation to Jungian analytical psychology and, on the other hand, in the context of the emergence of a shift in nineteenth century European historical thought from a tradition and style of objective, documented, history, to the value of the historicist notion of *feeling into the past*. Williams’ idea that representations of the living sense of an historical period are conveyed, as an impression of the character and tone of that period, in its symbolic forms, and become *felt* in another, later, time and place, will be studied in relation to Jungian notions of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. The articulation of the ‘structure of feeling’ in the Modern period will be examined in Jung’s writings.

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PART ONE

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to examine two core concepts of Jungian analytical psychology, the unconscious, the collective unconscious in particular, and the archetypes. These are ideas that are introduced and widely presented by Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) as being fundamental to human, creativity. As vital elements of unconscious creativity Jung's ideas inform my proposal that the collective unconscious and the archetypes offer a plausible psychological perspective from which to explore the concept of a 'structure of feeling' which appears in the literary and cultural studies of Raymond Williams (1921-1988).

Williams formulated the term 'structure of feeling' to describe the ways in which the creation of a work of art or other cultural form communicates the lived experience of the time of its conception through the implicit articulation of socio-cultural influences. He proposes that the 'structures of feeling' of the present cultural environment of the artist or writer is represented in a work of art at the time of its production and then communicated, or re-presented, at a later time to be experienced by the reader/spectator/audience in their own present cultural environment in the future as an expression of the artist's lived experience of the past.

Williams was a leading cultural theorist of the twentieth century and a novelist. The 'structure of feeling' first arises in his writing in *Preface to Film* (1954) and continues to develop in his work, which he defined as 'cultural materialism' in *Marxism and Literature* (1977), until the late 1980s. Although the naming of his key concept implies a connection with a psychological or psychoanalytic line of thought it relates to a historicist method of cultural and literary analysis. This inquiry, therefore, stems from my ongoing sense of the complexity of a term which proposes that 'feeling', which is usually attributed to the individual, constitutes a

significant formative quality in the process of cultural development through which collective as well as individual responses to the arts and other cultural forms are expressed and experienced. Because the concept relates to notions of the creativity of the individual artist as well as the creative interpretative responses of the individual and collective reader(s), audience(s), spectator(s) or consumer(s), the ‘structure of feeling’ implies a psychological aspect that invites further investigation from the perspective of the creativity of the Jungian collective unconscious.

This brief introduction continues with a summary of the methodology used to examine the thesis, followed by a review of the literature which summarises the principal sources consulted in the shaping of the investigation. It concludes with an outline of the following individual chapters of the thesis.

Methodology

The thesis examines the concept of the ‘structure of feeling’ as a psychological and cultural process from the perspective of analytical psychology, historicism, cultural materialism and literary criticism. Jungian analytical psychology emphasises the potential for the creative processes of the collective unconscious when manifest as archetypal symbolic images of past experience to have a compensatory and transformative function on the individual and society. For Jung this relates to unconscious psychic processes that are based on the notion of a collective past that is natural, innately acquired, infinite, timeless and guided by universal principles.

Williams, on the other hand, views the past as contingent on the influence of particular dominant ideologies and events and their collective effect on the course of human interests and agency. From their opposing positions Jung and Williams both emphasise the importance of maintaining sensitivity towards the past in its own terms. Their empathetic approach to the narratives and events of the past whether they are mythical expressions of primeval or ancient times in Jung's work, or references to more recently detailed and recorded events in Williams's writings, illustrates that in spite of the inherent differences their respective works each represent a fundamental interest in the influence of the past on individuals and societies in the present and the future and a shared historicist perspective.

A historicist or cultural materialist approach studies the time of the production of a textual or cultural form which can be a literary text, painting, film, tv, or any recorded document, and how it compares with other contemporaneous forms and later interpretations of the same texts/forms. Consideration is given to representations of the conscious and potentially unconscious embodiment of ideas and attitudes that appear to have emerged in the creation of cultural forms, i.e., the prevailing political, religious and cultural ideas at the time of production, and the differences in expression and tone which represent them as 'other' to the moment in which they are being read. Historicist literary criticism emphasises that cultural forms are important resources for nurturing our ability to gain insight into the actual lived experience of the past, they augment details recorded in historical writings and illustrate the role of creativity in the making and analysis of culture. Rowland (2019) writes 'given that the past has irretrievably vanished, literature becomes a valued text in itself, as it survives as it was then' (Rowland, 2019, p. 118). Similarly, the cultural materialist position is that any text, document, or image which has outlived its past becomes valued for its intrinsic communication of the time of its production.

The writings of Freud and Jung, although typically thought of in the context of psychology or medical science, rather than literature or culture, exemplify the notion that the role of any recorded culture is valuable to our continuity with the past. Although the time of their formation, Freud from the late nineteenth century until the end of Jung's life in 1961, has 'irretrievably vanished' their collected works continue to create a significant contribution to representations of the lived experience of their times; in recorded case histories and essays articulating cultural criticism, and to the classical origins and wide-ranging history of the depth psychologies. In the present their ideas remain influential as post-Freudian and post-Jungian psychotherapeutic methods and in the formation of new ideas and methods that have become central to the analysis and interpretation of cultural forms.

Freud and, especially Jung, have contributed widely to 'culture-making' (Homans, 1979/1995). Homans writes that Freud and Jung aspired 'to transform and remake Western culture' with their psychologies but he notes a distinction between their thought stating that 'In Freud's thought, science is always manifest, culture-making latent' and in Jung's, culture-making is always manifest and science latent (Homans, 1995, p. xlv). This is because Jung challenges the dominance of modern scientific discourse. He considers it to be limited in outlook particularly when discussing unconscious processes. Consequently, he looks back to distant archaic times, to mythology, alchemy and religious thought, for creative methods to augment his psychology and in doing so he re-animates continuity with the past.

Raymond Williams's work also takes a historicist perspective but instead of focusing on individual psychology he examines the inter-relation between cultural forms and society. He uses the term cultural materialism to describe his position which examines a broad range of

cultural forms in relation to the historical situation in which they are produced to reveal their relation to the prevalent ideology. Rowland describes cultural materialism as a ‘nuanced development of Marxism’ that recognises the role of the text in the ‘complex construction’ of ‘cultural values’ (ibid., p. 8). Higgins (1999) suggests that cultural materialism, and the concept of the ‘structure of feeling’ in particular, are not just a development but a challenge to both ‘preserve’ and exceed Marxist literary criticism, and explain ‘major shifts’ in conventions, in drama for example, without ‘recourse to the clumsy Marxist metaphor of base and superstructure’ (Higgins, 1999, p. 42). Williams ‘rejected the classic base versus superstructure model of orthodox Marxism’, in which culture can ‘be explained by the vicissitudes and logic of the economy’, emphasising in his analysis ‘culture’s internal dynamics’ (Horak, Seidl, 2010, p.13). Cultural materialism is a historicist approach because it encourages readers to engage with the complexities of cultures of the past through a broad range of alternative contemporaneous texts or forms, in addition to the dominant and ‘selective tradition’ of works, so that those that may have been marginalised or silenced regain their voice (Williams, 1961, p. 70).

Williams (1961) takes the example of the form of the novel to describe the notion of a ‘selective tradition’ and notes the need to ‘distinguish three levels of culture’ to help illustrate it. First:

[...] the lived culture of a particular time and place, only fully accessible to those living in that time and place [...] the recorded culture, of every kind, from art to the most everyday facts: the culture of a period. There is also, as the factor connecting lived culture and period cultures, the culture of the selective tradition. (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 70).

He adds that in the first instance the ‘sense of the life within which the novels were written, and which we now approach through our selection’, is not able to be fully recovered by a later individual. The recorded culture is ‘absorbed into the selective tradition; and both are different

from the culture as lived' meaning the lived sense of a particular time will always evade us (ibid., p. 71). Yet, selection takes place 'within the period' when only certain things are selected for value and emphasis'. These will constitute a reflection of 'the organisation of the period as a whole' but the values and emphases represented may not necessarily be confirmed at a later date (ibid.).

The selective tradition thus creates, at one level, a general human culture; at another level, the historical record of a particular society; at a third level, most difficult to accept and assess, a rejection of considerable areas of what was once a living culture. (ibid., p. 72).

The process of selection and rejection described by Williams is indicative of the earlier references to the notion that the novel or text, including the arts and other cultural forms, have a function in the 'complex construction of cultural values' (Rowland, 2019, p.8) and 'culture's internal dynamics' (Horak, Seidl, 2010, p.13).

The historicist positions require the 'close reading' approach to literary criticism. This involves undertaking to empathise with the various levels of expression in a text. Rowland describes this as meaning 'Whatever the theoretical orientation', analysing literature means the reader needs 'to do more than a cursory and superficial reading of the work in question' (Rowland, 2019, p.33). It encourages a fully 'detailed' and 'balanced' 'critical examination of the text', and its 'effects' (Cuddon, 1977/1999, p. 142). Close reading suggests that to perform the most effective interpretation means to go 'deeper' into the text, 'looking for less overt, less obvious, even partially conscious or unknowing aspects' of it (Rowland, 2019, p. 33).

To conclude this summary of methodologies, Jung's writings invite a historicist interpretation to explore the various levels of his work and because his writings are characterised by a period

of marginalisation of which Shamdasani (2003) provides a detailed account. For example, Jung was seen not on his own merits but in relation to Freud. Shamdasani writes:

Historians have recontextualized the “origins of psychoanalysis” within late nineteenth-century developments in neurology, psychiatry, biology, psychotherapy, and related areas. Whilst a great deal of controversy remains concerning these issues, it is nevertheless clear that the larger share of the claims for Freud’s originality have not been sustained.

At the same time, Jung’s derivative position with regard to psychoanalysis has not been seriously challenged. The adequacy of the Freudocentric view of Jung, in which psychoanalysis features as the key determining context for the emergence of complex psychology, has been assumed as self-evident. This represents nothing less than the complete mislocation of Jung and complex psychology in the intellectual history of the twentieth century. (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 13).

In addition to Jung’s work being marginalised as derivative, when he chose to name his psychology ‘complex psychology’ the name was shown ‘startling disregard’ and rarely adopted even by ‘his followers’. The aim of complex psychology which Jung defined in 1954 as ‘the psychology of “complexities” i.e. of complex psychical systems in contradistinction from relatively elementary factors’, was to challenge the primacy of science over the humanities by proposing that his psychology aimed to assimilate the two areas of study (ibid., p. 14).

Shamdasani states:

Jung held that psychology constituted the fundamental scientific discipline, upon which other disciplines should henceforth be based.

In his view, it was the only discipline which could grasp the subjective factor that underlay other sciences. The establishment of complex psychology was to enable the reformulation of the humanities and revitalize contemporary religions. (ibid., p. 15)

Shamdasani critically asserts that ‘The history of Jungian psychology has in part consisted in a radical and unacknowledged diminution of Jung’s goal’ (ibid.). Although the name ‘complex psychology’ appears to remain neglected, it is apparent that contemporary readings of Jung are becoming more open to engaging with analytical psychology as a means of revitalizing the humanities and religions, and engaging with the humanities as a means of revitalizing analytical psychology, in acts of ‘culture-making’ (Homans, 1979/1995, p. xlv).

Williams’s concept of a ‘structure of feeling’, on the other hand, invites interpretation from the perspective of Jung’s notions of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. The idea that the symbolic, archetypal, residue of an innate, boundless and collective past which exists as a facet of the unconscious is able, when required, to emerge as culturally defined by the present to guide patterns of behaviour, or as a key to interpretation or transformation, stirs an adequate sense of correspondence with historicist thought, the significance of the past to analytical psychology, and the ‘structure of feeling’ to provoke this inquiry.

Williams’s materialist sense of the past is concerned with more recent times, with events taking place and recorded over generations rather than aeons. The ‘structure of feeling’ is a collective response to a transition or insight from the past to the present but it is not described as unconscious. It is, however, described as being ‘expressed; often not consciously’ and it is not formally ‘learned’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69), and so the ‘structure of feeling’ seems to share some similarity with the process of archetypal symbolism because it is also integral to the creative content and interpretation of the past in the present.

Contemporary post-Jungian writers are now broadening the scope of archetypal theory to include ‘not only the official decorous language of “archetypal symbolism” in Greek mythology or fairy tale or legend’ but also to assert that ‘anything at all can be archetypal’ if it arouses a deep psychic response (Samuels, 1989/2016, p. xix). This development is what Samuels describes as his attempt at ‘the democratization of analytical psychology’ (ibid.) and it gives greater access for the analysis of ideas like the ‘structure of feeling’ that may previously have been excluded because it does not fit strictly enough with the original criteria used by Jung.

The principal methodologies chosen as the framework for this thesis; historicism, analytical psychology, and close reading, aim to illustrate the significance for Jung and Williams, in spite of their differences, of maintaining a meaningful connection to the past not as a fixed state but as a formative internal energy with influence on the present.

Literature Review

As already noted in the introduction to this chapter the thesis explores Raymond Williams's concept of the 'structure of feeling' from a Jungian point of view. It is a notion that is central to Williams's background in literary criticism and historicism from which he developed a broadly Marxist materialist position towards cultural studies. The 'Structure' of 'feeling' as a term to describe the collective response of the lived experience of particular times in the past and its articulation in the creative expression of contemporary cultural forms is problematic because the concept raises questions of how something as abstract as feeling can be structured, and how then does the feeling become expressed as a collective response. Williams, when questioned about the development of the concept states that it is a 'deliberately contradictory phrase' that is 'a structure in the sense that you could perceive it operating in one work after another' but 'it was one of feeling much more than of thought – a pattern of impulses, restraints, tones' (Williams and *New Left Review* 1979/1981, p. 159).

For Williams the notion of 'structure' refers to the completed creative work and literary analysis is the most effective method for interpreting the expression of feeling. In his suggestion that feeling is represented as 'a pattern of impulses, restraints and tones' *much more than thought* he implies that the evidence of feeling emerges from a level of perception that is not necessarily that of expressive language. It is this reference to the potential for a structured conception of feeling in the arts that has led to this proposal that the psychological perspective of analytical psychology, especially Jung's notions of the collective unconscious and the archetypes, could enrich the interpretation of Williams's concept of the significance of the felt presence of the past in contemporary interpretations of cultural or symbolic forms.

Works that refer to Williams and Jung are unusual and, therefore, this thesis does not contrast or draw comparisons with other works. In publications that focus on Jungian psychology I have found that Hockley in *Frames of Mind* (2007), refers to Williams's cultural theory in chapters discussing 'A Jungian approach to television' (Hockley, 2007, pp. 66-69) and 'Narcissism and the alchemy of advertising' (ibid., pp. 79-81) and Rowland, in *Jungian Literary Criticism* (2019) refers to Williams's overall perspective that he eventually named 'cultural materialism', (Williams, 1977, p 5) in the chapter 'Jung for history and historicity' (Rowland, 2019, p.119). I have not yet come across any other texts that specifically explore Williams's 'structure of feeling' in the context of analytical psychology.

The research takes a historicist perspective from the beginning by concentrating at first on the primary sources of Jung's writing mainly taken from the Collected Works, published by Routledge, and Williams's published texts or writings included in edited collections where his original texts are not available. These texts together enable the gathering of a sense of the feelings that were emergent in writings of the early and mid-late twentieth century respectively. In addition to the primary sources, I consulted Jung's biography *Jung*, Bair (2004), Jung's autobiographical text written and compiled with Jaffé, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (1963) and a biography of Raymond Williams, *A Warrior's Tale*, Smith (2008).

The thesis begins with a brief introduction to the key concepts of both writers including an essay, 'Approaching the Unconscious' written by Jung for a late text *Man and his Symbols* (Jung and Franz-von, ed., 1964/1978) which is a collection of essays written by Jung and other eminent Jungian writers, and the essay 'Psychology and Literature' (1930) included in *the Spirit in Man, Art and Literature*, (Jung, 1966/2014, CW15) and 'Psychology and Literature' (1933)

as it appears in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (Jung, 1933/2001). Raymond Williams's text written with Michael Orrom, *Preface to Film* (1954) provides a summary of one of his earliest descriptions of the 'structure of feeling', and initial references to Williams's texts *The Long Revolution* (1961/2011), *Marxism and Literature* (1977) and *Politics and Letters* (1979/1981) are also made. Next, possible moments in the development of Williams's ideas, when he may have been influenced by the ideas of Jung are examined. These occur in the biographical writing of Smith (2008) noted above, and in a recently published collection of Williams's work, previously held in the Raymond Williams Archive at Swansea University, titled *Culture and Politics* (Williams, ed., O'Brien, 2022) which reveals a chapter omitted from Williams's first book, *Culture and Society* (1958).

The second part of the chapter goes on to examine Jung's early essay 'Structure of the Unconscious' (1916) which forms Appendix 2 of, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, (Jung, 1966//2016, CW7). This essay is of interest because of its significance as a very early formulation of Jung's notions of the collective unconscious and the archetypes both of which will be examined further and in more detail in later chapters. Two 'Prefaces' to the first two editions of 'On the Psychology of The Unconscious' (1917), written in 1917 and 1918 and published in the same volume, are also included to give a sense of the impact of analytical psychology at that particular time in the past. Other writings from Jung's collected works are referred to in this chapter to establish an introduction to his work including, essays from *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 'Instinct and the Unconscious' (1919), 'Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology' (1931) and 'On the Nature of the Psyche' (1947), (Jung, 1960/1969, CW8), discussions of Jung's definition of feeling recorded in the 'Tavistock Lectures' 1935 in *Analytical Psychology* (Jung, 1968/2014) and an initial reference to 'On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry' (Jung, 1922/2014 CW15) is made.

After the initial references have been made to lay the foundation for future discussion of the key concepts, the thesis gives a detailed account of aspects of historicism the assimilation of which, as a method of reading the past, may have influenced Jung's scholastic studies. Further to the summary of historicism as a methodology for the basis of the thesis, noted previously in this chapter, it is subsequently described in greater detail with reference to *Historicism* (Hamilton, 1996/2003), *The Pursuit of History* (Tosh, 1984/2015) and *Critical Theory* (Malpas S., and Wake P., 2006) and as distinct from a study of detailed historical fact in *The New Nature of History* (Marwick, 2001).

The early development of historicism is summarised, from the 18th century writings of Giambattista Vico, which is discussed in one essay in a collection of White's work, in terms of Vico's description of 'culture as a human creation' this appears in *The Fiction of Narrative* (White, H., ed, Doran, 1994/2010). In an attempt to examine primary sources where possible, the research continues by consulting edited collections of the writings of Johann Herder, who conceived of the idea of 'feeling into' the past, in the essay 'This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity' (1774), which is included in *Philosophical Writings* (Herder, trans/ed., Forster, M. N., 2002), and two collections of the 19th century essays of Wilhelm Dilthey, *W. Dilthey Selected Writings* (Dilthey, Rickman, H. P., ed., 1976/1979) and *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (Dilthey, trans./ed., Betanzos, R. J., 1923/1988).

The thesis proposes that Jung's writing takes an aesthetic, poetic, turn at times, particularly when he is focusing on unconscious symbolic and archetypal processes. This relates also to his claim that analytical psychology benefits from hermeneutic interpretation because he writes:

fantasy [...] remains the creative matrix of everything that has made progress possible for humanity. Fantasy has its roots in the conscious and the unconscious alike, in the individual as much as in the collective [...] it cannot be taken literally. *Concretely* understood, it is worthless. If it is understood *semiotically* as Freud understands it, it is interesting from the scientific point of view, but if it is understood *hermeneutically*, as an authentic symbol, it acts as a signpost, providing the clues we need in order to carry on our lives in harmony with ourselves [...] Its meaning resides in the fact that it is an attempt to elucidate, by a more or less apt analogy, something that is still in the process of formation [...] to attribute hermeneutic significance to it is consistent with its value and meaning.

(Jung, 1916/1966/2014, CW7, p. 291:490-492).

Jung's interpretative approach to unconscious processes such as the archetypes and myth shares a resemblance to the significance of hermeneutics to a historicist perspective in that both require an empathetic approach to narratives and images of the past. The aesthetic tendencies in his interpretative methods reflect the breadth of resources from which Jung forms his analogies. Hermeneutics are discussed with reference to Hamilton (1996/2003) and Dilthey's essay 'The Development of Hermeneutics' (1900) in (Dilthey, Rickman ed., 1976). Aesthetic historicism is introduced in *Visualizing the Past* (Maurer, 2013) and reference to Jung's creativity in *The Art of C. G. Jung* (Hoerni, U., Fischer, T., and Kaufmann, B., 2019).

Part Two of the thesis is made up of two chapters that examine the archetypes in further detail. In Chapter Four reference is made to Jung's essay 'Instinct and the Unconscious' (1919) in *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* (Jung, 1960/1969, CW8). Jung first uses the term 'archetype' in this essay in place of 'primordial image'. This chapter also examines another early essay, 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912) in *Symbols of Transformation* (Jung, 1956/2014,

CW5) that describes Jung's view that we all think in a 'directed' way which uses language to communicate our thoughts and connects us to reality, and also in an 'undirected' way that is characterised by the cessation of language, piles of images and an accumulation of feeling. This essay introduces the sense that, in analytical psychology, the function of the unconscious and especially the collective unconscious is valued as the origin and source of human creativity.

The main part of the chapter explores the development of the concept of the archetypes in essays that appear in the collected works. The main essays written by Jung and consulted here are; 'On the Psychology of the Unconscious' (1917/2014) in CW7, 'The Structure of the Psyche' (1927/1969) and 'On the Nature of the Psyche' (1947/1969) in CW8, 'Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious' (1934/1968), 'The Concept of the Collective Unconscious' (1936/1968), 'Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype' (1938/1968), and 'The Psychology of the Child Archetype' (1940/1968) in CW9i, 'The Self' (1948/1968) in CW9ii and 'Wotan' (1936/1970) in CW10. Another text that supported the purpose of this chapter in providing a further aspect to the understanding of the archetype is *Jung and Intuition* (Pilard, 2015). 'On the Nature of the Psyche' (1947/1969) and late essays 'Synchronicity an Acausal Connecting Principle' (1952/1969) and 'On Synchronicity' (1952/1969) all published in CW8, address the notion of the 'psychoid', time and 'meaningful coincidences', in relation to Chapter Four concludes with some thoughts on the significance of myth for analytical psychology from three different authors; *The Mythological Unconscious* (Adams, 2001), *Theorizing About Myth* (Segal, 1999) and *Jung in the Humanities* (Rowland, 2010)

To follow from Jung's development of the notion of the archetypes the focus shifts to later post-Jungian developments of Jung's ideas. Four examples are chosen to represent some different

ways of approaching the ideas of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. First, in *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (Samuels, 1985) Samuels, gives a summary of multiple approaches involved in the development of Jung's ideas in chapter two, 'Archetype and Complex'. Next, the core themes in Jung's concept of the archetypes are examined in a more recent publication *Archetype, Attachment, Analysis* (Knox, 2003/2012). Samuels and Knox are both clinical psychotherapists and Professor Samuels is also a leading academic of analytical psychology. The next example is taken from a scientific paper written by Peter Saunders and Patricia Skar (2001) and published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* titled 'Archetypes, Complexes and Self-organization' (2001). Also published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, the last example given here is the philosophical view of Colman (2018), in the essay, 'Are Archetypes Essential' (2018).

The introduction to various possible explanatory perspectives on analytical psychology, and the archetypes in particular, is represented here because the thesis goes on to examine a proposal made by Pietteri Pietikäinen, in an article published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 'Archetypes as Symbolic Forms' (1998), that suggests that Jung's notion of the archetypes could be expanded upon to enable it to become more accessible to cultural studies. This was a controversial article that provoked a number of critical responses from Jungian scholars which were published in the same journal and are discussed in the section two of Chapter five of the thesis.

After examining the proposal that archetypes are symbolic or cultural forms, and the question of the value of archetypal interpretations to cultural studies, the thesis returns to Raymond Williams's concept of the 'structure of feeling' to explore the question from the perspective of

cultural studies. The next part of the thesis presents a summary of the origins and development of Williams's role in British cultural studies and also goes on to give a more detailed account of the development of the 'structure of feeling'.

This part of the thesis looks at the early influence on Williams of the literary critics I. A. Richards and *Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgement* (1929), and F.R. Leavis's, *The Great Tradition* (1948) during his time as a student at Cambridge. The influence of Karl Marx and historical materialism is also noted with reference to *The German Ideology* (Marx, Engels, 1888/1969). The significance of Williams work to the origins of cultural studies and the establishment of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 1964 are introduced in references to the writing of Stuart Hall, the Director of the Centre from 1968-1979. Higgins (1999) account in, *Raymond Williams: Literature, Marxism and Cultural Materialism* (1999) of Williams's development of 'cultural materialism' is also explored here.

The detailed account of the development of the 'structure of feeling' is presented in chronological order from the early mention of the term in Williams's *Reading and Criticism* (1950) to a more thorough description in Williams and Orrom *Preface to Film* (1954) and its gradual expansion in Williams's *The Long Revolution* (1961), *Marxism and Literature* (1977) and his defence of the term during interviews with the editorial board of the *New Left Review* published in *Politics and Letters* (1979).

The points of convergence between Jung and Williams form the final discussion of the thesis and this takes place within the context of Williams's chapter 'The Creative Mind', in *The Long Revolution* (1961). This chapter describes the development of notions of the creative mind

from the times of the ancient Greeks to the ‘new psychology’, a term used by Williams in this text to refer to Freudian psychoanalysis and Jungian analytical psychology, and new writings on the science of perception. The chapter will conclude with an examination of Virginia Woolf’s *Mrs Dalloway* (1925) in the context of the ‘structure of feeling’ of the unconscious in the modern period.

Chapter Outline

The chapter outline follows the order of the literature review. Chapters One, Two and Three will form Part One of the thesis. The present chapter, Chapter One, 'Introduction' first gives a basic introduction to the key concepts that will form the main discussion of the thesis. It also provides a description of the methodologies used; historicism and the literary critical method of close reading and a literature review which notes the key texts selected and studied for the purpose of the investigation. The current outline of the following chapters of the thesis completes this chapter.

Chapter Two 'The Formative Psyche', continues to broaden the introduction to the basic concepts of Jung and Williams and presents an overview of the evident but tentative influence of the depth psychologies on Williams's work. For example, he referred to Freud, Herbert Read, Jung and Erich Fromm in *The Long Revolution* (1961) alone. The chapter examines Jung's early essay 'Structure of the Unconscious' (1916) as an example of his initial references to the collective unconscious and primordial images which would eventually be re-named as the archetypes. This essay is included as an appendix to *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, Collected Works Volume 7 (1966/2014). Also published in this text is an essay titled 'On the Psychology of the Unconscious' first published as 'The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes' (1917). Two editions were published in rapid succession in 1917 and 1918 and discussion of the Prefaces, each written by Jung, illustrates the popularity of notions of the 'problem of the human psyche' at that time in the past and gives an example of Jung's tendency to connect his clinical work with socio-cultural events.

Chapter Three ‘Historicism’ takes a more detailed look at historicism as a methodology and as a perspective from which Jung appears to take an empathetic view of the past. This appears in his broadly scholastic approach to the manifestations of the collective unconscious and his interpretative methods. A study of aesthetic historicism, by Maurer (2013), includes details of historicists such as Jakob Burckhardt. Jung cites Burckhardt as the influence for his early description of the archetypes as primordial images and this connection in turn evokes the sense that in Jung’s life, and work, he places high value on aesthetic expressions of the psyche, in paintings, carvings and mandalas, for example. This chapter concludes by examining the relation of hermeneutics to historicism and hermeneutics to Jung’s interpretative method.

Chapter Four and Chapter Five make up Part Two of the thesis. Chapter Four ‘The Archetypes and Myth’ and Chapter Five ‘Are the Archetypes Symbolic Forms?’ concentrate, in the former on the origin and development of Jung’s notion of the archetypes and the latter, explores post-Jungian perspectives on the archetypes and examines a paper written by Petteri Pietikäinen (1998) and published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* (1998) that proposes that a Jungian notion of the archetypes could be useful to a wider area of study.

Part Three, Chapter Six ‘Cultural Studies, Cultural Materialism and the ‘Structure of Feeling’ explores the development of Raymond Williams’s career, especially from the mid-twentieth century when cultural studies became established as a new area of study. It considers the influence of F. R. Leavis and Karl Marx on his work, and the development of cultural materialism. Finally, it examines the concept of the ‘structure of feeling’ in closer detail.

Chapter Seven ‘Critical Points of Convergence between C. G. Jung and Raymond Williams’ compares and contrasts the two approaches to the presence of the past in cultural forms, beginning with a summary of Williams’s writing on ‘The Creative Mind’ and concluding with a study of Virginia Woolf’s novel *Mrs Dalloway* (1925) as an example of the ‘structure of feeling’ of the unconscious.

Chapter Eight ‘Conclusion’, presents the conclusion to the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FORMATIVE PSYCHE

Introduction

This chapter will begin with some citations from Jung's works to introduce the essence of the key Jungian concepts, the collective unconscious and the archetypes, and the ways in which his works convey the impression that an unconscious collective past is a formative influence on our creativity, readings and interpretations, in the present. To follow, citations from Williams's works define the 'structure of feeling' as part of a developmental cultural process. The thesis aims to establish from the outset a footing from which Jung's key concepts and Williams's idea of the 'structure of feeling' will express the ways in which psychic and social experience shapes creativity and the making of culture.

Next, the chapter will give an overview of Williams's possible associations with Jung's thought. This intends to illustrate that his apparent ambivalence towards the depth psychologies and his cultural materialist position present a challenge to any definitive claim to the 'structure of feeling' having, consciously at any rate, emerged from the perspective of a depth psychology. In spite of the fundamental differences in academic perspectives between Williams and Jung, the aim is to investigate whether together their key ideas provide an effective interdisciplinary approach to the creation, function, and interpretation of cultural or symbolic forms.¹ Although both are writing from different viewpoints, through their shared empathy with the presence of the past in the creation and interpretation of symbolic forms, their methods recognise that humanity's roots in the past although deep need not remain fixed but can adapt flexibly to appeals from the unconscious as well as consciousness for individual and collective change.

¹ The term, 'Cultural forms', in this thesis, denotes written documents, literary or other, and all forms of artistic expression. They may also be referred to as the arts and artistic, creative or symbolic forms.

As a theoretical framework to support the inquiry historicism is summarised next. This is in advance of the more detailed discussion that follows in chapter two. Jung's writing, which illustrates a cultural as well as a psychological perspective of his own historical context, i.e., the early-mid twentieth century modern period. His cultural criticism, in addition to his clinical writings, present a valuable contribution to recorded histories and the 'structures of feeling' of the time. An overview of the origins of the Jungian structured psyche will follow. This aims to provide a sense of the development of the collective unconscious and the archetypes going forward to the detailed inquiry that follows in part two of the thesis. Jung's early publication, 'The Structure of the Unconscious' (1916) provides an illustrative example of his emerging thought.

The Formative Psyche: C. G. Jung

Jung writes in 'Psychology and Literature' (1930/1950):

A great work of art is like a dream; for all its apparent obviousness it does not explain itself and is always ambiguous. A dream never says "you ought" or "this is the truth." It presents an image in much the same way as nature allows a plant to grow, and it is up to us to draw conclusions. If a person has a nightmare, it means he is either too much given to fear or too exempt from it; if he dreams of a wise old man, it means he is either too much of a pedant or else in need of a teacher. In a subtle way both meanings come to the same thing, as we realize when we let a work of art act upon us as it acted upon the artist. To grasp its meaning, we must allow it to shape us as it shaped him. Then we also understand the nature of his primordial experience. He has plunged into the healing and redeeming depths of the collective psyche, where man is not lost in the isolation of consciousness and its errors and sufferings, but where all men are

caught in a common rhythm which allows the individual to communicate his feelings and strivings to mankind as a whole. (Jung, 1930/1950, CW15, pp. 104-105:161).

In this citation Jung recommends that the reader maintains an open-mindedness to the work of art because looking for a specific universal meaning like ‘truth’ to guide them may impede the content of the work from revealing ‘meanings’ and ‘feelings’ that could actively ‘shape’ or transform the individual. The artist, Jung writes, communicates ‘common rhythms’ from the collective unconscious but the shape they take in the reader will depend on the individual’s own particular psychological, historical and socio-cultural position.

To allow art to take meaning and shape them requires the individual to step away from the ‘creative process’ towards a cognitive effort of interpretation, even though ‘nothing is more injurious to immediate experience than cognition’ (Jung, 1922/1931, CW15, p. 78:121). Jung contemplates the importance of meaning:

Perhaps art has no “meaning,” at least not as we understand meaning. Perhaps it is like nature, which simply *is* and “means” nothing beyond that. Is “meaning” necessarily more than mere interpretation – an interpretation secreted into something by an intellect hungry for meaning? Art, it has been said is beauty, and “a thing of beauty is a joy for ever.” [...] But when I speak of the relation of psychology to art we are outside its sphere, and it is impossible for us not to speculate. We must interpret, we must find meanings in things, otherwise we would be quite unable to think about them [...] for the purpose of cognitive understanding we must detach ourselves from the creative process and look at it from the outside; only then does it become an image that expresses what we are bound to call “meaning.” What was a mere phenomenon before becomes something that in association

with other phenomena has meaning, that has a definite role to play, serves certain ends, and exerts meaningful effects. And when we have seen all this we get the feeling of having understood and explained something. (ibid. pp. 77-78:121).

Jung's reflection on the meaning of "meaning" concludes that a work of art when seen 'in association with other' factors can have a particular function, 'a role to play', as it is purposeful in that it 'serves certain ends', 'exerts meaningful effects' and promotes understanding. This suggests the presence of an underlying ontological/epistemological dichotomy in the interpretation of creative artistic, symbolic, cultural forms and an aesthetic and instructive function in the development of the individual and society.

The creativity of the unconscious is explored in *Man and His Symbols* (1964), a text that includes an essay written by Jung but published after his death. The text is important because, as stated in the Introduction written by John Freeman who interviewed Jung for BBC television, it is written for a specific purpose; that Jung and four distinguished Jungian scholars contribute writings that will enable his ideas to be read as more accessible to a wide public readership. It had been noted that 'Freud's work was well known' but 'Jung had never managed to break through to the general public and was always considered too difficult for popular reading' (Freeman, in Jung and von Franz, 1964/1978, pp. v-viii.).

In the essay, 'Approaching the Unconscious', Jung states, 'The discovery that the unconscious is no mere repository of the past, but is also full of germs of future psychic situations and ideas, led me to my own new approach to psychology' (Jung and von Franz, 1964/1978 p. 25). In this assertion, Jung distances himself from a widely held assumption that the personal

unconscious, according to Freudian psychoanalysis, has a predominantly repressive function but he continues, ‘in addition to memories from a long-distant conscious past, completely new thoughts and creative ideas can also present themselves from the unconscious - thoughts and ideas that have never been conscious before’, the latter ‘new thoughts and creative ideas’ denote the activity of the collective unconscious. These thoughts, he continues, ‘form a most important part of the subliminal psyche’ (ibid.). The ‘subliminal material’ may remain unconscious or appear momentarily in consciousness and ‘can consist of all urges, impulses, and intentions; all perceptions and intuitions; all rational or irrational thoughts, conclusions, inductions, deductions, and premises; and all varieties of feeling’ (ibid., p.24). The ‘material’ referred to by Jung is that which encompasses the instinctual, intuitive, cognitive and evaluative functions of the psyche and he considers these functions to be constitutive of the unconscious as well as consciousness. This thesis will discuss further, in chapter three, how unconscious processes contribute to the manifestation of ‘subliminal material’ in the symbolic and archetypal content of archetypal images, dreams and the arts.

Joseph Henderson (1903 - 2007) further describes the significance of the dynamic effect of the unconscious when he asserts, ‘the contents of the unconscious exert a formative influence on the psyche.’ He adds that although we may not pay conscious attention to unconscious contents, we are shaped by our unconscious response to them. This, he writes, includes how we respond to ‘the symbolic forms’ such as dreams, in which the unconscious contents express themselves’ (Henderson, in Jung and von Franz, 1964/1978, p. 98). The unconscious, then, is a dynamic creative force able to generate subliminal content and symbolic forms with the potential to influence and shape the present and future. The ability to shape present and future is achieved because collective archaic symbolic content when manifest in the present becomes defined by and illustrative of the individual’s unique circumstances and familiar cultural

referents (Jung, *ibid.*, pp. 56-57). In this way, transformative psychological and socio-cultural responses may become open to interpretation.

The references to the writings of Jung and Henderson represent the direction in which the thesis takes as an exploration of the ways in which the interpretation and creation of the arts and cultural forms are mutually formative acts in which the unconscious and conscious perform a 'culture-making' function (Homans, 1979/1995, p. xxix).

The Formative Psyche: Raymond Williams

An early description of the 'structure of feeling' was published in *Preface to Film* (1954) written with Michael Orrom. To recap, the 'structure of feeling' developed as a notion that proposes cultural forms created in past times represent the moment of their production or creation and in later interpretations can inform us of elements of the lived experience of their time. In this essay the writers describe the 'structure of feeling' from a materialist position, stating that it represents the relationship, between 'all the products of a community in a given period' (Williams and Orrom, 1954, in Higgins, 2001, p. 33). The writers also take a historical viewpoint, but a critical one where they state that 'In the study of a period, we may be able to reconstruct, with more or less accuracy, the material life, the general social organization, and, to a large extent, the dominant ideas' (*ibid.*) but periodisation presents a problem in that when studying a past period we tend to 'separate out particular aspects of life, and treat them as if they were self-contained,' yet this would not reflect how they were actually lived and 'experienced.' They suggest that this leads us to adoption a position where, 'We examine each element as a precipitate, but in the living experience of the time every element was in solution, an inseparable part of a complex whole' (*ibid.*).

Works of art, are the ‘precipitates’ which represent the primary creative response to the total socio-cultural experience but as such they are also the expression of elements of a complex whole and an embodiment of the ‘dominant structure of feeling’ and interpreted in relation to the whole social structure.² The ‘structure of feeling’ of a period, according to the writers, is in solution as the living sense or lived experience of the time. It is the element that endures in cultural forms and artistic representations when the works have been evaluated against all the separate parts, i.e., ‘material life’, ‘social organization’, institutions and ideologies, but where, ‘there yet remains some element for which there is no *external* counterpart’ (ibid., *emphasis added*). The latter development in their description of the ‘structure of feeling’ raises a critical question because Williams and Orrom hint at the presence of an *internal* element to the ‘structure of feeling’ of a period and, paradoxically, in what is to become known as a cultural materialist approach, their suggestion that the structure of feeling conveys the internal essence of the experience of the living sense of the past, invites a psychological inquiry into how this may be communicated. Williams, in a later text, concedes that new structures of feeling are communicated, ‘often not consciously’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69). He implies that the hidden element may be conveyed *unconsciously*, subliminally, instinctively or intuitively, into a feeling of the living expression of the past and re-cognised in interpretations of symbolic forms, when read, viewed or heard in the future, our present.

Williams and Orrom state that over time the socio-cultural change is represented in artistic forms as new structures of feeling which emerge in perceptible changes to familiar artistic conventions, in, for example, writing styles, fine arts and media productions. Conventions may be described as the aesthetic rules of communication, particular to different art forms. They

² In later writings, Williams includes a wider selection of media, such as newspapers, popular fiction, television, and documentation generally, as the symbolic forms of a period.

may be read as denoting meaning to the reader/spectator/audience in uncomplicated accessible language or images, or they may be interpreted as communicating in ways that appeal to unconscious, or subliminal interpretations, in subtle, implied, or symbolic content. According to the writers, changes to received conventions find acceptance in the ‘tacit consent’ of the audience and/or other artists when there are ‘changes in the structure of feeling which *demand expression*’ (ibid., pp. 33-34. *Emphasis added.*). ‘Tacit consent,’ also implies the acceptance of an unarticulated, or *internal*, level of communication. In a later development of his concept of the structure of feeling, Williams suggests that the ‘demand for expression’ is conveyed as, ‘all that is not fully articulated, all that comes through as disturbance, tension, blockage, emotional trouble’ (Williams, 1979/1981, p. 168). The need for expression is manifest in new, literary, artistic and/or cultural conventions and represents the emergence of a new structure of feeling.

The premise that ‘tacit’ forms of expression communicated in cultural forms provide a connection between past and present in emerging structures of feeling, and can be interpreted as the manifestation of an unconscious archetypal process that disrupts consciousness, is the main focus of the thesis and will be examined further in the following chapters.

In *The Long Revolution* (1961/2011) Williams expands more broadly on the concept of the structure of feeling and briefly on the idea that it is ‘often not conscious.’ He writes, the ‘structure of feeling’,

is as firm and definite as ‘structure’ suggests, yet it operates in the most delicate and least tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this structure of feeling is the culture of a period: it is the

particular living result of all the elements in the general organisation. And it is in this respect that the arts of a period, taking these to include characteristic approaches and tones in argument, are of major importance. For here, if anywhere, this characteristic is likely to be expressed; often not consciously, but by the fact that here, in the only examples we have of recorded communication that outlives its bearers, the actual living sense, the deep community that makes the communication possible, is naturally drawn upon [...] And what is particularly interesting is that it does not seem to be, in any formal sense, learned. One generation may train its successor, with reasonable success, in the social character or the general cultural pattern, but the new generation will have its own structure of feeling, which will not appear to have come 'from' anywhere. (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69).

Williams suggests that the 'least tangible parts of our activity', where the structure of feeling operates, are conveyed in the intrinsic expression of the arts. This is where the surviving elements of the artist's particular culture, in the expression of lives that have been lived, can be communicated through a deep enduring commonality and the sense of being shared without being learned.

In this citation Williams refers to a structured approach to the psyche that has the capacity for depth and for functioning consciously and 'not consciously.' His reference to the 'social character' relates to the work of Erich Fromm (1900-1980) and the 'cultural pattern' to the work of Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) and it is a continuation of its earlier mention in the same text. Fromm is known for being a psychoanalyst and critical theorist who was associated with the Frankfurt school, and Benedict, of whom a brief summary is given in the next section of this chapter, was an anthropologist who wrote *Patterns of Culture* (1934) and was influenced

by both Freud and Jung. In the chapter prior to the one in which the above citation appeared Williams had revealed some knowledge of the works of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Herbert Read (1893-1968) and Jung. This reveals that although critical of the ‘new psychology’ Williams shows some recognition of its value to his form of cultural theory (ibid., p. 31).

This preliminary attempt to clarify Williams’s meaning of the ‘structure of feeling’ would not be complete without including another, noted in the Introduction to the thesis but cited here in full, from a later text, *Politics and Letters* (1979/1981), which is a collection of interviews between Williams and members of the *New Left Review* editorial team. He is asked ‘How exactly did you come to develop the concept?’ Williams’s reply ends on a note that is significant because it seems that even for the author the definition of ‘feeling’ in this context is difficult to put into words. He states:

The point of the deliberately contradictory phrase, with which I have never been happy, is that it was a structure in the sense that you could perceive it operating in one work after another which weren’t otherwise connected – people weren’t learning it from each other; yet it was one of feeling much more than thought – a pattern of impulses, restraints, tones, for which the best evidence was often the actual conventions of literary or dramatic writing. To this day I find that I keep coming back to this notion from the actual experience of literary analysis rather than from any theoretical satisfaction with the concept itself.

(Williams, 1979/1981, p. 159).

Williams’s description of how he came to develop the concept suggests that it was still in development. For Williams ‘feeling’ is not perceived as emotion or affect because that would be unproblematic, or perhaps even expected, as a response to the question. He describes instead

‘A pattern of impulses, restraints and tones,’ that are felt rather than thought, with perhaps no recourse to language except when reading between the lines. It is not conscious and yet is somehow communicable. The complexity that Williams describes appears to resonate with notions of an unconscious instinctive archetypal process and this notion is the focus of the thesis. The next section of this chapter will explore the extent to which Williams may have been familiar with Jungian psychology.

Finding Jung in the context of Freud

Williams’s writing includes few direct references to the depth psychologies but he does engage with notions of the unconscious as an aspect of the mind. He may have acquired knowledge of Jung when he was a student at Cambridge University in the 1940s where he had two close friends, Wolf Mankowitz, who became a 1950s novelist and scriptwriter, and Clifford Collins who Mankowitz, during an interview in 1990 with Williams’s biographer, remembered as going to Cambridge ‘to read medicine’ before switching to English. Mankowitz recalls that Collins wanted to be a writer and was able to impress ‘acquaintances by somehow having an access to things which seemed to give him knowledge, about Jung’s theories, “in advance” of others’ (Smith, 2008, p. 241). Williams, Smith writes, ‘was closer to Collins’ (ibid.). It is possible that the friends discussed Jung’s ideas but I am not aware of any further details to confirm this.

Williams rarely refers directly to Jung’s ideas. His position prompts a recollection of Homans (1995) assertion that ‘paradoxically, the best way to write about Jung is to do so in the context of writing about Freud, the psychoanalytic movement, and the history of psychoanalysis in the widest possible sense’ (Homans, 1979/1995, pp. xi - xii). Freud’s work is cited more frequently

by Williams. He does on occasion refer to Jungian concepts, for example, the ‘archetypes’ (Williams, 1977, p. 119) and the ‘collective unconscious’ (ibid., p. 103) but does not attribute them to Jung. In *The Long Revolution* (1961/2011), however, Williams does cite Jung’s work directly from the essay ‘Psychology and Literature’ (1933), as published in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1933/2001). He refers to Jung’s contribution to the ‘new psychology’ in chapter one, titled ‘The Creative Mind,’ but briefly and after Freud and Herbert Read.

A recently edited collection of Williams’s work *Culture and Politics* (Williams and O’Brien, 2022), reveals that during the planning of the publication of *Culture and Society: 1780-1950* (1958) which was an early success for Williams, he was asked to shorten the length of the book by the publishers. Williams decided to omit two chapters one of which he later describes as a discussion of ‘the English Freudians and Herbert Read’ (Williams, 1979/1981, p. 99). This chapter was originally titled ‘Sir Herbert Read’ and held in the Raymond Williams Collection in the Richard Burton Archives, Swansea University and has now been published in *Culture and Politics* (2022) titled, ‘Herbert Read: Freud, Art and Industry’ (Williams and O’Brien, p. vii). Williams states he ‘was so hostile to Read’ that although he had to cut two chapters he was ‘less distressed’ at the time by cutting the Freudians and Read chapter. In the late seventies, however, he adds ‘I regret it now because it would have been relevant in the sixties, when the whole question of Freud became so important in discussions of art’ (ibid., p. 99-100).

O’Brien writes, that the Herbert Read chapter represents Williams’s broad thinking because ‘the theories adopted by those discussed rely on universal and essentializing propositions about art and society; specifically, there is a lack of emphasis on ‘making’ and the contingencies of history’ (O’Brien, ed., p. 7). This attitude towards culture, art and society that has been attributed to psychoanalytic theory is now challenged in contemporary depth psychological

approaches to cultural development, in Jung's work and post-Jungian thought great value is placed on the unconscious psyche as fundamentally creative and deeply involved in making culture. Homans writes that Jung asserts the need for psychoanalysis to 'embrace' its 'double destiny: culture-analyzing and culture-making' (Homans, 1995, p.xxix).

In the opening paragraph of the Herbert Read chapter Williams introduces the significance of evolving intertextuality in the formal study of culture. He begins by mentioning the importance of 'history', 'the study of literature and language' as it is led by the literary critics F. R. Leavis (1895-1978) and I. A. Richards (1893-1979), and 'political and social theory' but he regards them all as continuations of nineteenth century discussions. Williams states that 'In contrast with these kinds of discipline, where the continuity, if also the change, is marked, there are the highly important twentieth-century developments of psychology, anthropology, and sociology, which have, on occasion, been more difficult to assimilate to the established tradition' (ibid., p.35-36). Williams in the nineteen-fifties was not simply looking at the new psychologies in isolation, as 'universal and essentializing,' but as aspects of developing ideas to be incorporated critically into the study of culture.

New disciplines and new developments in the older more established disciplines have, Williams asserts, 'deeply affected attitudes' towards 'common life' and, therefore, 'culture' (ibid., p. 35). Williams writes,

We have reason to be grateful to those writers who have attempted this process of assimilation; and one of the most interesting of these writers is Herbert Read. Read's work has been of very great interest, and his theories of art and the artist, and of their social functions, are already of practical importance in our contemporary ideas of culture. The point of

particular importance to me is that in Read's work, one finds at once a continuation of the tradition [...] and, in the process of this continuation, the attempted assimilation of the new sciences. (ibid., p. 42).

In this chapter also Williams examines the new ways of thinking inspired by the work of the American anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) and Freud and their influence on Read. Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* (1934) is a text that Williams refers to again in *The Long Revolution* (1961/2011). Williams includes an account of Read's interpretation of Freud's work taken from Read's *Art and Society* (Read, 1936/1945, pp. 94- 95) and although the whole chapter had been edited out of the main text, Williams returns to his original discussion of Read's thoughts in shorter versions when discussing I.A. Richards's literary criticism in *Culture and Society: 1780-1950* (Williams, 1958/2017, p. 327) and when referring to the new psychologies in *The Long Revolution* (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 32).

Read 'came to reject Freud's theories' as he understood him to have 'suggested that artistic activity was little different to mental illness'. But his interest in Idealist philosophy unified Read with the theories of Jung' (Paraskos, 2002, in Read, 1963/2002 p. xix). In the late 1940s Read was an editor at Kegan Paul, who were soon to merge with Routledge and had reached an agreement with Jung to publish his Collected Works. He subsequently joined two London analysts, Michael Fordham and Gerhard Adler, on the editorial Board of Jung's Collected Works. Read became a personal acquaintance of Jung and visited him at his home in preparation of his article for the *Hudson Review* in 1951 (Sherry, 2018, pp. 130-131). The essay written by Read titled simply 'C. G. Jung' (1957) was later published in a collection of his essays *The Tenth Muse* (1957/2015) tells of a 'long talk' they had during Read's visit to Jung's home in Zurich (Read, 1957/2015, p. 214). They engaged in written correspondence, a lengthy letter from Jung to Read in September 1960 is included in *Selected Letters of C.G.*

Jung, 1909-1961 (Jung, Adler, Jaffé, 1984, pp. 191-196), where Jung thanks Read for the essay written in honour of Jung's 85th birthday and goes on to discuss modern art in light of Read's recently published *The Form of Things Unknown* (1960) (ibid., p.193).

Williams's references to Benedict and Read in his writings are significant here because despite being selected for discussion as 'Freudians' both writers also followed the ideas of Jung and it is possible that their works conveyed his influence to Williams. Sherry (2018) writes of Benedict's involvement with Margaret Mead (1901-1978) another well-known American anthropologist. Mead 'studied anthropology under Boas and Benedict,' and Benedict and Mead 'used type theory to understand their personal relationships and as a tool for understanding the dominant psychological orientation of the cultures they were studying' (Sherry, 2018, p. 71). Franz Boas (1858-1942) had attended the Clark University conference in 1909 'at which Freud and Jung spoke' and was 'well aware at how psychology could enrich anthropology' (ibid., p.70). Benedict and students of Boas developed 'the "Culture and Personality" school of anthropology' and she was also interested in determining the integrating factor that shaped culture and discussed "Psychological Types in the Southwest" (1928) and, Sherry writes, 'she used Nietzsche's Apollonian/Dionysian dichotomy in her book *Patterns of Culture*' (ibid., p71).

Shamdasani (2003) also refers to the impact of 'Jung's typology' on Benedict and Mead and, tellingly, he adds that 'One gets the impression that Benedict was attempting to distance herself from Jung, despite drawing some inspiration from his *Psychological Types*' (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 337). He writes of Mead:

She stated that: "In my own thinking I drew on the work of Jung,

especially his fourfold scheme for grouping human beings as psychological types, each related to the others in a complementary way” [...] Yet in her published work, Mead omitted to cite Jung’s work. (ibid.).

The acknowledgement of a sense that writers, in addition to Williams, tended to distance themselves from Jung or even overtly neglect to mention him in their work, presents a paradox in that Williams was developing a methodology that aimed to give a voice to marginalised thinkers. Shamdasani states that ‘such indirect and half-acknowledged conduits’ have had the ‘greatest impact upon modern anthropology and concepts of culture’ and resulted in Jung’s work taking new directions and undergoing ‘a sea change’ when assimilated into academic studies. This concurs with Homans position that a gradual assimilation of Jungian studies has required the development of a contextual approach, ‘that surpasses previous ones in its historical sweep’ and ‘its sociological depth’ because the depth psychologies ‘interpret,’ ‘analyse’ and ‘create’ culture (Homans, 1979/1995, p. xiii).

On one hand, Williams is ambivalent toward notions of depth psychology but on the other hand he counters this with oblique references that emerge as tacit reminders of the importance he ascribes to notions of the unconscious as a part cultural development. The connections between Williams and Jungian analytical psychology are tenuous as they lack detail. Williams appears to place more value on Freud’s theories which by the 1960s had begun to be assimilated into the arts and social science.

Introducing the Structure of the Unconscious (1916)

As already noted in the introduction to the thesis historicism, as a methodology, will be used to provide a frame of reference for this inquiry. Historicism is described as a ‘critical movement’ that developed in nineteenth century Europe and is associated with Romanticism (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 1).³ This chapter notes that Jung’s writing was being produced at the beginning of the twentieth century during the transition from Romanticism to modernity. Following a summary of historicism, Romanticism and hermeneutics as they relate to Jung’s writings the chapter continues with an account of Jung’s early essay, known initially as, ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’ (1916/2014) this presents his early ideas as a foundation for the chapters that come later in the thesis. This essay, after extensive revision, became ‘The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious’ (1928/2014) and forms the second part of volume seven of the Collected Works. Some of Jung’s texts have undergone multiple revisions which have been made during his life time or edited posthumously.

‘The Structure of the Unconscious’ (1916/2014), and ‘The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious’ (1928/2014), illustrate the early development of Jung’s concept of the collective psyche. The text is an introduction to the notion of the development of the individual, their relation to society, early references to the differentiation between the personal and collective unconscious, and the introduction to notions of the primordial image or archetypes. This introduction to the formation of Jung’s notion of the collective psyche is outlined at the beginning of the thesis to continue to provide the foundation and framework for the key

³ Romanticism as a philosophical and artistic movement broadly spans 18th and 19th century European culture. It has been described as a significant historical and cultural foundation for the formation of Jung’s ideas and those of dynamic psychiatry in general. (Ellenberger, [1970] pp.199-225). For an in-depth description of the influence of the history of ideas emerging in this period on Jung’s works, see Shamdasani (2003).

concepts in analytical psychology that I consider to have some correlation with Williams' 'structure of feeling', as outlined earlier.

This is followed by an illustration of Jung's thoughts, as a contemporary writer, writing on the particular historical moment in Western European culture as the influence of Romanticism gives way to the effects of modernity and Modernist perspectives, during the early decades of the twentieth century. His thoughts form a context for an analysis of multiple relationships between the rise of psychoanalysis, the emergence of analytical psychology, and the complex feelings that were emerging at a time when progress and growth as a result of the rapid advance of modernisation were, paradoxically, accompanied by the widespread destruction and conflict of World War. Feelings of anxiety, conflict, trauma and loss, inevitably took shape in the modern psyche and this is represented in the ascent of the psychoanalytic movement, analytical psychology and reflected in the Modernist movement in the arts. The connection between the rise in popularity of analytical psychology at the time, and the experience of such complex feelings, were recognised and expressed by Jung, in the 'Preface to the first Edition' (1917), and 'Preface to the Second Edition' (1918), of 'The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes' (1917/1920).⁴

The chapter concludes with a summary of the particular meaning and significance of the term *feeling* as used by Jung and Williams. Jung employed feeling, in his writings, as both a psychological function, and also as a psychological *process* that attributes value. Jung's

⁴By the time of its fifth edition, this essay became known as, 'On the Psychology of the Unconscious' (1943) and forms the first part of volume seven of the Collected Works of Jung.

The Collected Works published by Routledge, edited by Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham and Gerhard Adler, and translated by R. F. C. Hull, are the volumes referred to in this thesis, unless otherwise stated.

When reference is made to a text of the Collected Works, after the author, title and date, the page number is given, followed by the paragraph number. Dates of publication show first publication and publication referred to here.

meaning of feeling, *as an evaluative process* will be compared and contrasted to the unforeseen difficulty of attributing a clear and distinct description of feeling to explain Williams's notion of the structure of feeling of the past in the present.

Contextualizing Jung: Historicism, Romanticism and Hermeneutics

Historicism gained momentum in 'the first half of the nineteenth century', as 'a facet of Romanticism', spreading throughout 'the Western world' (Tosh, 1984/2015, p. 6). Romanticism, 'also pervaded the fields of philosophy, science and medicine' (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 202.). It emphasises 'the importance of historical context to the interpretation of texts of all kinds' (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 2). Historicism is a reaction to older traditional representations of histories, associated with the Enlightenment, that believe that 'natural laws govern human behaviour' and cultures are 'formulated' and 'evaluated' by their adherence to the 'ideal patterns' that emerge (ibid.).

Historicists counter this position by arguing that 'human nature is too various' for natural laws to be 'universally applicable' (ibid.). The advantage of the interpretation of *all kinds of texts* in their historical context will therefore add a broader frame of reference from which one may understand the varieties of experiences lived in the past. The influence of this vein of historicist thought is evident in twentieth century historical, literary and cultural studies, for example, where readings of psychoanalytic texts, socio-cultural events and literary and art forms represent intricate connections appearing in the lived experience of the early decades of the twentieth century.

Romanticism

To provide an alternative viewpoint, to the Enlightenment dependence on natural laws and ideal patterns, Hamilton writes, historicists had to:

[...] evolve a model for apprehending social and cultural diversity different from the scientific, law-governed paradigm of the Enlightenment. Romantic aesthetics, that sense of a human richness unmeasured by scientific calculation and best equated with a natural grandeur [...] offers itself for this purpose [...] Romanticism was, “ultimately a metaphysic in which individuality, plurality and pantheism are combined” (ibid.).

Romanticist notions of the significance of the individual and individuality, the value of multiple approaches to understanding the past in the present, whether through religion, myth, cosmology, natural science, or a vast knowledge of the history of ideas, in addition to an ambivalent attitude towards the presumed authority of scientific positivism, all accord with a position taken by Jung. In particular reference to the unconscious, Jung in ‘Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology’ (1931/1969) is critical of the derision with which metaphysical ideas were met in the wake of the dominance of ‘scientific materialism’ in the nineteenth century. He writes, ‘The whole invisible inner world seems to have become the visible outer world, and no value exists unless founded on a so-called fact’ (Jung, 1931/1969, CW8, p. 339:651).

According to Ellenberger, Romanticism as a ‘considered cultural reaction against the Enlightenment’ which, ‘proclaimed the values of reason and of society,’ also developed ‘the cult of the irrational and of the individual’. The emphasis on the irrational and an appreciation of mysticism, are among the aspects of Romanticism which inhabit Jung’s thinking (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 199). An emphasis on feeling is also a significant aspect of

Romanticism. Ellenberger writes that it produced an ‘ideal type of Man’, characterised by ‘an extreme sensitiveness enabling Man to “feel into” Nature and to “feel with” other men, a rich inner life, belief in the power of inspiration, intuition, and spontaneity, and the importance ascribed to emotional life’ (ibid., p. 202). Although this attitude to ‘inner life’ may have encouraged the development of psychoanalytic theories, some Romantics were criticised for over-sentimentality, leading to what has become known as a ‘romantic malady’ (ibid.). This, Ellenberger asserts, is ‘a longing for something indefinable and extraordinary, the hero, in continuous unrest, roaming around aimlessly’ (ibid.).

Feeling, is also recognised and described by Jung, ‘as sentiment’ (Jung and von Franz, 1964/1978, p. 49), but it is also a specific and significant aspect of the unconscious, in particular its involvement as an aspect of the constellation, activation and manifestation of the archetypes and archetypal image. For Jung, feeling, is rational, like thinking, and has an evaluative function (Ibid.). It is in this context that I examine it in relation to Williams’ structure of feeling later in this chapter.

In other examples of the influence of Romanticism recognised in Jung’s works, Ellenberger refers to the ‘feeling for “becoming”’, the notion that ‘all beings stemmed from seminal principles, which developed in individuals, societies, nations, languages and cultures.’ The lives of human beings, he writes, are ‘not just a long period of maturity following a shorter period of immaturity, but a spontaneous process of unfolding, a series of metamorphoses’ which, Ellenberger suggests, was to be what Jung later described as ‘individuation’ (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 200). References to Romantic interests in language, cultures, folklore and myths, the *Weltanschauung* of the nation, as well as the quality, ‘emotional and spiritual’,

of the ‘relationship between the sexes’, are also related, in particular, to Jung’s thought (ibid., p. 201). The influence of Romanticism on Jung’s idea of the unconscious is evident in the impact of Romanticism on the development of dynamic psychiatry (Ellenberger, 1970, Shamdasani, 2003).

Hermeneutics

As another aspect of historicism, hermeneutics is described by Hamilton, as a formal method of interpretation that sought to balance the feeling and aesthetic of Romanticism with the need for a ‘science of interpretation’ (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 3). Hamilton writes:

From Schleiermacher to Gadamer, [...], the hermeneutic tradition has struggled to recast this aesthetic heritage in order to show that history, properly understood, demonstrates that we can have a kind of knowledge complementing the natural sciences, and that all experience not falling under scientific jurisdiction need not be consigned to a non-cognitive aesthetic which lays no claim to being true. (ibid. p. 2).

Schleiermacher (1768-1834), is associated originally with the ‘science of interpreting scripture’, which led to hermeneutics being posited as a ‘science of interpretation’ (ibid., p.3). Hermeneutics is seen to complement the natural sciences and the aesthetic of Romanticism, and to represent the source of a ‘cognitive’, if not a positivist or scientific, contribution to the understanding of histories (ibid.). A hermeneutical approach to the past, is ‘to be understood on the model of interpreting a text’, and all texts, ‘literary or otherwise’, are understood in relation to other texts, which suggests that meanings are not static but can depend on when, or in what context, they are read. The ‘value’ of a text, ‘is relative to that accorded to adjacent

discourses of science, politics, history and so on' (ibid.). Hamilton's description is in accord with Williams's method of literary analysis and criticism.

Historicism and hermeneutics will be effective terms of reference from which to begin a study of the writings of Williams and Jung. Jung also, in his many references to multiple types of past and present histories, from ancient, universal, mythological motifs, to the personal case histories of his patients, the aim of Jung's interpretations of the archaic is that it appears in consciousness *in the present in order to offer valuable content for the future*. The value Jung places on his interpretation of a text - I include interpretations of abstract texts, such as images, dreams and myth - and the meanings it evokes, are culturally defined in the present, i.e., 'relative to[...]adjacent discourses' (Ibid.).

Jung writes of his hermeneutic approach to interpretation in, 'The Structure of the Unconscious' (1916/2014), in relation to the difference between his own conception of the symbolic content of 'creative fantasies', and that of 'Freud and Adler', for whom, fantasy is 'pre-supposed' to be 'nothing but a "symbolic" disguise for the basic drives and intentions' (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p. 290:490). Jung states that fantasy cannot be taken 'literally' because 'concretely understood' it is 'worthless' as the value of fantasy lies in its ability to unify the conscious and unconscious psyche. Freud, 'understands' the symbolic content of fantasy as signs, '*semiotically*', and this, 'is interesting from the scientific point of view' (ibid., p. 291:491). But, Jung writes, if a fantasy 'is understood *hermeneutically*, as an authentic symbol, it acts as a signpost, providing the clues we need in order to carry on our lives in harmony with ourselves' (ibid.).

Jung, continues:

The symbol is not a sign that disguises something generally known.

Its meaning resides in the fact that it is an attempt to elucidate, by a more or less apt analogy, something that is still entirely unknown or still in the process of formation. If we reduce this by analysis to something that is generally known, we destroy the true value of the symbol; but to attribute hermeneutic significance to it is consistent with its value and meaning (ibid., p. 291:492).

Jung is referring to his preference for the hermeneutic interpretation of a symbol because it is less reductive than that which he sees as Freud's more objective, scientific interpretation. Jung, in his attitude to interpretation is content for a plurality of meanings to emerge from the originally unknown origin and direction of the symbol. The symbol is a way of 'signposting' later, further meanings, it is neither literal, objective, nor pre-supposed, but in the context of Jung's description the symbol is relative to adjacent discourses, both personal and social. 'The essence of hermeneutics', according to Jung, 'consists in adding further analogies to the one already supplied by the symbol'. The analyst in a clinical situation would add objective analogies based, on their knowledge and experience, to the patient's subjective analogies (ibid., p. 291:493).

Jung's writings illustrate his tendency to provide multiple references to a variety of sources of knowledge that signpost the way to further possible meanings. His work indicates his awareness of his own contemporaneity and admits that his own position when writing is an historical one. This is reflected in his thinking that is highly influenced by ancient thought and mythical narratives as they appeared in the past, and also as they appear in the present as potential developments towards the future. In the 'Addendum' to 'Structure of the Unconscious' (1916/2014), Jung refers to his awareness of his ideas, being very new and 'inadequately formed', but casts himself as a 'pioneer' on a new venture and asks the reader to,

‘feel his way into what I am endeavouring to describe’ (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, pp. 295-296:503). This translation of Jung indicates the sense of ‘Romantic aesthetics’, in which the feeling for ‘human richness unmeasured by scientific calculation,’ is central to an empathetic engagement with his ideas (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 2).

Jung’s writing comprises a dual approach. On the one hand, Jung interprets and writes of his own lived experience of contemporary socio-cultural events, contextualises his thinking in terms of the influence of past scholars and the history of ideas, and appeals for an empathetic reading of his emerging theories which illustrates an historicist attitude and invites historicist readings, of his work in the present. On the other hand, but in parallel to the latter viewpoint, his writings on the core concepts; the unconscious the collective unconscious and the archetypes, refer to a domain characterised by the universal, mythical and timeless and are a-historical but he ascribes a poetic quality that, at the same time, invites the cultural and literary interpretations that twentieth century historicism has inspired. To interpret Jung’s works as symbolic forms of their time, in the context of Williams’ cultural materialist approach, encourages the interpretation of the past and the poetic together.

‘The Structure of the Unconscious’ (1916/2014)

The origin and publication of Jung’s lecture, ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’, (1916/2014), and the ways in which it has been shaped by subsequent revisions is detailed here as an example of the re-presentations of a work-in-progress. Revisions take place, inevitably, amid the implicit and explicit influences of changing social, political, psychological and cultural discourses. In relation to this essay, all those changes were taking place, in the broadest sense

within the whole of society, as a result of two world wars, and, more specifically, within the conflicts and developments in psychoanalytic thought.

‘The Structure of the Unconscious’ (1916/2014) was first published in 1916. Jung sets out his early ideas on how he imagines the different aspects of the collective psyche, how these function in relation to society, and that these comprise a structure. By 1953 the essay had undergone further translation and revisions, and appears in English as Appendix II to, Part II of the first edition of the Collected Works, volume seven, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (1953/2014). Meanwhile, the ‘Structure of the Unconscious’ became ‘The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious’ (1928//2014), in 1928 after ‘thorough revision’ (Jung, 1953/2014, CW7, p. 123.). The latter became Part II, of the first edition, of the Collected Works of Jung, volume seven.

In the first edition, the ‘Editorial Note’ states that ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’ marked a turning point in the history of analytical psychology,’ as it ‘revealed the foundations upon which the greater part of Professor Jung’s later work was built’ (Read, Fordham, Adler, 1953, p. v.). The editors comment further on the essay, writing that it is ‘remarkable for the number of revisions’ undertaken and for ‘reflecting a new development of thought based upon fruitful researches into the unconscious.’ In spite of revisions, the ‘original drafts’, are deemed to be ‘more significant’ as they are of ‘historical interest’ to the study of analytical psychology, because, the editors write:

They contain the first tentative formulations of Jung’s concept of archetypes and the collective unconscious, as well as his germinating theory of types. This theory was put forward,

partially at least, as an attempt to explain the conflicts within the psychoanalytic school, of which he had been so prominent a member and from which he had so recently seceded. (ibid.).

Although some content of ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’ is inevitably repeated in ‘The Relations Between Ego and the Unconscious’, the opportunity for the reader with an historical interest to make ‘comparisons’ was considered to ‘justify’ the decision to publish both. (Ibid.).

In the second edition of volume seven, published in 1966, (the edition referred to in this thesis), the editors comment on a further revision of ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’. This occurred at the time as a result of the discovery of Jung’s, ‘posthumous papers.’ It is included again in the second edition of *Collected Works*, volume seven, as Appendix II as a ‘re-edited’, ‘largely retranslated’ version of a German manuscript discovered in 1961. ‘The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious’ still forms Part II of volume seven and remains the unrevised 1928 version of the comprehensive revision of the 1916 essay.

In the preface to the second edition of the publication of ‘The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious’ (1935), Jung again claims that it is, ‘the expression of a long-standing endeavour to grasp [...] the transformation process of the unconscious psyche’ and its independent nature. This is a point of view that represents a departure from Freud’s position. Jung acknowledges also that the contents of this essay remain a work in progress, indicating a characteristic tendency in his writing to express his work as being in continuous development (Jung, 1928/2014, CW7, pp. 123-125).

The Collective Psyche

‘The Structure of the Unconscious’ last revised in 1966, is published with two differing versions of the ‘Summary’, they are both referred to here because the essay and summaries represent some of the earliest of the changing emphases in Jung’s ideas at the time. In the first version of the ‘Summary’, Jung describes the formulation of the collective psyche. He begins by noting that it is ‘necessary’ for the division of, ‘psychological contents into conscious and unconscious contents’ (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p. 300:511). The conscious and unconscious contents are then ‘subdivided’ into ‘personal and ‘collective’ content (ibid., p. 301:515). In Jung’s first version of the ‘Summary’ the notion of the collective psyche is structured to encompass the personal and collective *conscious* and *unconscious* contents but he does not describe the *collective unconscious* here. The latter concept is developed in the second version.

According to Jung, conscious contents are either ‘*personal*’, or, ‘*impersonal*’, which he also refers to as, ‘*collective*’. The ‘general validity’ of psychological contents is ‘not recognized’ in personal contents but is recognized in the impersonal/collective contents. Some unconscious content may be personal, if it was once conscious and is now repressed, and is referred to as the personal unconscious, but if it becomes conscious again its ‘general validity’ is not recognized. The impersonal/collective unconscious content has no previous relation to consciousness and therefore does have ‘general validity’ (ibid., p. 300:511). When Jung refers to the ‘general validity’ of the psychological contents of the collective or impersonal unconscious, he is implying that the collective psyche is involved in the apprehension and evaluation of *universal* laws, forms and ideas, and the personal conscious and unconscious apprehend and evaluate *particular* events.

Individuality and the Individual

Jung states that it is difficult to determine individual from collective psychic content but individuality is 'always and everywhere present' (ibid., p. 301:515). This is illustrated in his assertion that a relationship between, individual and collective, and also, conscious and unconscious contents is necessary for the effective development of individuality. In the first version of the 'Summary' of 'The Structure of the Unconscious', Jung describes individuality as a 'principle'. It is, he writes, a principle that selects and limits the personal contents of the psyche, it enables, and can even 'compel', 'differentiation from the collective psyche' because individuality is the, 'peculiar and unique', that emerges from a range of collective psychic contents (ibid., p. 301:514). Individuality, Jung writes, also 'manifests itself partly as an obstacle to collective functioning and partly as resistance to collective thinking and feeling'. In the first version of the 'Summary', then, Jung describes individuality as a dynamic, autonomous, developmental process, the importance of which is expressed, metaphorically, as the beating heart of the collective psyche. He concludes; 'Individuality corresponds to the systole, and collective psychology to the diastole, of the movement of libido' (ibid.).

In the second version of the 'Summary', Jung places greater emphasis on notions of individuality and the individual as they stand in relation to society. Individuality, he writes, is closely related to social environment. According to Jung, the development of the 'uniqueness of the individual' coincides with the development of individuality and it has an effect on the development of 'society' and 'social structure'. To neglect or 'suppress' this aspect of the individual would, he writes, be a 'moral defeat for society', if it were to occur at the expense

of the dominance of ‘collective ideals and organizations’ (ibid., p. 303:519).⁵ Although individuality requires, ‘personal relationships’ to develop, these alone are not enough, and individuality, ‘requires a *psychic* relationship to the collective unconscious’ and so reaffirms the centrality of balancing consciousness and the unconscious to individuality (ibid., p. 303). Jung maintains the importance of the development of individuality throughout his work and expands on it in detail in his concept of individuation.

In ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’, Jung defines his perception of individuality which he contrasts with another concept, the persona. The persona he writes, ‘is a function for adapting the individual to the real world. The persona thus occupies a place midway between the real world and individuality (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p. 298:507). In Jung’s major revision of, ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’, now known as, ‘The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious’ (1928//2014), he writes that the ‘persona’ is ‘two-dimensional’, a ‘mask’ that performs a ‘compromise between individual and society’ it presents as only an appearance of reality (Jung, 1928/2014, CW7, p. 158:246). Through its multiple masks and in its central role of social activity, the persona facilitates relationships and communication with society (Samuels, Shorter, Plaut, 1986, pp. 107-108). But, of greater significance to Jung is its position, ‘midway between the real world and individuality,’ because the persona occupies the boundary between inner and outer realities or, psychic and social realities. Jung writes, ‘The individual stands [...] between the conscious part of the collective psyche and the unconscious part.’ But unlike the outward looking persona, the individual, ‘is the reflecting surface in which the world of consciousness can perceive its own unconscious historical image’ (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7,

⁵ In *The Undiscovered Self* (Jung, [1957/2002]), where Jung develops this aspect of his thought, he describes how it is the individual that is the key to, ‘*understanding*’ mankind, not the ‘abstract picture of man’ presented as a scientific ‘statistical unit’ with ‘all individual features removed’. (Jung, [1957/2002], p.6).

p. 298:507). The ‘unconscious historical image’ is how Jung describes the imagined contents of the collective unconscious and is described in the next section of this chapter.

The individual is positioned as a ‘point of intersection or a dividing line, neither conscious nor unconscious, but a bit of both’, and individuality is referred to as, ‘the innermost core of ego-consciousness and of the unconscious’. ‘Beyond’ this lies only, ‘the collective unconscious’ (ibid., p. 298-299:507). The collective psyche is posited as structured, in this thesis, but a structure implies a complete entity. Jung, however, appears to refer to a *structuring process* where the individual and individuality remain at the interface between consciousness and the unconscious where they are always in formation and developing in conjunction with one another.

In his description of the individual as: both a multiplicity of personas and a unique individual; neither conscious nor unconscious but a ‘reflecting surface’ of both; inward as well as outward looking and backward as well as forward looking, Jung creates a sense that the individual in relation to society, cannot be understood completely unless viewed as being in constant relation to the ‘image’ of their unconscious. The unconscious image is not representable in pictorial form but, as discussed earlier in reference to Williams’ structure of feeling, its contents may emerge from subliminal spaces as symbolic material, or feeling, that disrupts consciousness.

The individual, as noted above, is positioned between polarities but the individual needs, ‘a psychic relationship,’ that will maintain balance between ‘the development of individuality’ and the ‘collective unconscious’ (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p. 303:519). I propose that the structure of feeling, when described by Williams as disruption or tacit consent for change, acts

unconsciously in the creation and interpretation of symbolic forms to *compensate* for an imbalance between the individual and the development of individuality, and the collective unconscious.

Jung defines ‘compensation’ as a function performing ‘inherent self-regulation,’ it is an ‘activity of the unconscious’ that balances ‘the one-sidedness of the general attitude, produced by the function of consciousness.’ Imbalance creates tension which can become ‘so acute’ that ‘unconscious contents break through in the form of dreams and spontaneous images.’ The spontaneous disruption of symbolic material from the collective unconscious may also become manifest in the style and content of the arts and cultural forms. Jung continues, ‘the unconscious compensation does not run counter to consciousness but is rather a balancing or supplementing of the conscious orientation’ (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p.419:694). *Tacit* consent to creative changes in artistic conventions suggests unconscious participation in the ‘balancing or supplementing of the conscious orientation.’ The relationship between compensation and the structure of feeling will be explored in later chapters.

The Collective Unconscious

The collective unconscious is not defined in full until the second version of the ‘Summary’ of ‘The Structure of the Unconscious’, where it is included as an additional section. The definition is cited here at length, although not in its entirety, because it provides a clear introduction to the collective unconscious as it relates to this thesis, mainly, that, Jung’s conception of the collective unconscious and its immeasurable influence on the collective psyche is portrayed as a vast, oceanic, hub of activity comprised of the potential for the realisation of unconscious historical images that carry the prospect of communicating feeling.

The collective unconscious is a fully unconscious aspect of the collective psyche. Jung writes:

[...] The collective unconscious is composed of:

- a. Subliminal perceptions, thoughts and feelings that were not repressed because of their incompatibility with personal values, but were subliminal from the start because of their low stimulus value or low libido investment.
- b. Subliminal vestiges of archaic function that exist *a priori* and can be brought back into function at any time through an accumulation of libido. These vestiges are not merely formal but have the dynamic nature of instincts. They represent the primitive and the animal in civilized man.⁶
- c. Subliminal combinations in symbolic form, not yet capable of becoming conscious.
3. An actual content of the collective unconscious always consists of an amalgamation of the elements enumerated in *a-c*, and its expression varies accordingly.
4. The collective unconscious always appears projected on a conscious [external] object.
5. The collective unconscious in individual A bears a greater resemblance to the collective unconscious in individual B than the conscious ideas in the minds of A and B do to one another.
6. The most important contents of the collective unconscious appear to be “primordial images,” that is, unconscious collective ideas (mythical thinking) and vital instincts [...]
(Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, pp. 303-4:520).

The collective unconscious is the locus of ancient psycho-social and biological instinctive responses that shape patterns, or images, that carry the potential for their eventual expression, in the present. *A priori* archaic forms and instincts, as well as collective perceptions, thoughts, feelings and symbolic forms, follow unconscious patterns that will gain expression when their potential is invested with sufficient quantities of psychic energy. Expression will then only take form symbolically when manifest as a ‘primordial image’, or, as it is also known, an

⁶ The descriptive language Jung applies, variably in his writings, and notably here, to describe his concept of the collective unconscious is out-dated, therefore, unless using a direct citation from the works of Jung, or other writers, the opposing words ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ will be replaced with the terms, archaic/primordial/ancient, and modern. ‘Libido’ will be used in the Jungian sense to express energy, or specifically, psychic energy, unless stated otherwise.

archetype. It will remain unconscious and unrepresentable unless powerful enough to be projected onto consciousness in symbolic form.

To recap, the individual, according to Jung, is a principle, positioned at the interface between the conscious collective psyche and the unconscious collective psyche, and reflects an unconscious historical image onto the conscious world. The collective unconscious extends further into the psyche than the personal unconscious as it reaches ‘beyond’ any imagined borders (ibid., pp. 298-299:507). Here, in the deepest domain of the unconscious, the collective unconscious contains an unconscious image, or images, of ‘time immemorial’ (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, pp. 298:507). Jung writes:

[...] that part of the unconscious which consists on the one hand of unconscious perceptions of external reality and, on the other, of all the residues of the phylogenetic perceptive and adaptive functions. A reconstruction of the unconscious view of the world would yield a picture showing how external reality has been perceived from time immemorial. The collective unconscious contains, or is, an historical mirror-image of the world. It too is a world, but a world of images. (ibid.).

Jung’s writing takes a characteristically poetic turn; he paints a picture of the collective unconscious as a metaphorical ‘historical mirror-image of the world’, but, central to his own hypothesis of the collective unconscious the contents associated with it cannot be experienced, literally, as visible. It is not accessible in pictorial representations, or in reflected images of the world since time immemorial. Its contents are the archaic imprints for instinctual patterns, they are unconscious, irrepresentable and unknowable. In 1946, Jung developed the concept of the ‘psychoid unconscious’ to describe, in terms of a mind/body connection, the inaccessibility of the unconscious where it meets the organic, physiological and instinctual (Samuels, Shorter,

Plaut, 1986, p. 122). The archaic imprints offer only the potential for the unconscious manifestation of archetypal material in images.

The Primordial Image or Archetype

The collective unconscious, then, resembles a repository for the preservation of unconscious archaic content, and a matrix for the formation of archetypes and archetypal images. The archetypal content appears in dreams, fantasies and psychopathologies of perception, such as hallucinations, and also carries the potential to emerge in consciousness in cultural forms where the symbolic representations of images of the past can be felt in connection with the present. In, 'The Structure of the Unconscious', Jung, illustrates his idea of the collective unconscious as a world of images in a description of a case history recorded by, Alphonse Maeder, (1882-1971) in *Archives de psychologie* IX (1910).

The patient's diagnosis is schizophrenia. He is described as a 'wretched, locksmith's apprentice', who is of below average intelligence and has been ill from an early age. His description of the world, as 'his picture book, the leaves of which he was turning over as he looked around him', is equivalent to that of the German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) *The World as Will and Idea* (1818/1866), 'but expressed in primitive picture language' (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, pp. 271-272:447). Jung explains that the patient's, 'vision is just as sublime as Schopenhauer's, the only difference being that with the patient it remained at an embryonic stage, whereas in Schopenhauer the same idea is transformed from a vision into an abstraction and expressed in a language that is universally valid'. The 'vision', in the patient, 'is an impersonal value, a merely natural growth' (Ibid., 272:448). Jung regards the

impersonal as being the same as the collective, whereas in Schopenhauer's earlier philosophical, interpretative task, it 'represents a personal value'.

Jung concludes that:

It would, however, be wrong to attribute to the philosopher, by exaggerating the value of his achievement, the additional merit of having actually created or invented the vision itself. It is a primordial idea that grows up quite as naturally in the philosopher and is simply a part of the common property of mankind, in which, in principle, everyone has a share. The golden apples drop from the same tree, whether they be gathered by a locksmith's apprentice or by a Schopenhauer. (ibid.).

This description of archetypes is central to this thesis because Jung is describing how its contents are the source of a *natural* process, common to all, in which unconscious instincts, imprints or impressions, are mobilised as images and symbols. The 'visions', 'primordial ideas', or images assimilate and constellate with a range of other psychic contents and if they generate sufficient psychic energy may become manifest as primordial images or, in consciousness, symbolic forms. A particular quality of the primordial image, when augmented with the power of psychic energy, is its 'feeling-value' or 'numinosity' (Jung, 1947/1969, CW8, p. 209:411). Manifestation of the archetypal image is related to other physical and psychic processes, for example, 'instinct' and, 'intuitive apprehension' (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8, p. 156-7:338-9), as well as feeling.

At this point the consideration of feeling represents a turn in the thesis towards the importance of *feeling into* analytical psychology, as a levelling or equalizing psychology. With Jung's

request to his readership in mind, i.e., that they feel their way into his developing thoughts as they appear in writing to enhance their understanding (Jung 1916/2014, CW7, pp. 296:503), I suggest that in the example of the value of the natural image of the world to the locksmith's apprentice, Jung argues for the accessibility of unconscious impressions, irrespective of either intellectual capacity or sophisticated means of expression. This is an aspect of analytical psychology that resonates with Raymond Williams' particular approach to cultural studies.

One of Williams' principal positions is as an advocate for the equal value of both popular and highbrow cultural forms. Milner (2002) writes that Williams' great achievement for cultural studies is, 'as a non-canonising, social scientific, study of all aspects of the production and reception of all texts, whether elite or popular' (Milner, 2002, p. 10.). Williams, like Jung, engages with a sense that accessibility to the equal validity of cultural forms need not be limited by intellect or other means of cultural elitism but, unlike Jung, Williams is concerned with the conscious social and material communication of particular values. Jung, in the example of the Locksmith's apprentice, given above, is primarily concerned with the unconscious natural processes of communicating universal values. When archetypes manifest in consciousness, however, Jung interprets them in the socio-cultural context in which they appear.

Feeling into the text, image or other cultural form is an historicist method for understanding history, as a human science, from an empathetic viewpoint. The Romantic poets, for example, are well-known to have had empathy with, and deep feeling and reverence for Nature, an empathy which Jung is described as sharing (Ellenberger, 1970, p.201) and which is reflected in the value he places on the collective unconscious. The concept of empathy or *Einfühlung*, as an historicist approach is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, 'Historicism'.

Feeling as an evaluative process

Jung refers to feeling as a conscious psychological process. He writes that, 'Feeling is primarily a process that takes place between the *ego* and a given content, a process, moreover, that imparts to the content a definite *value*' (Jung, 1921/1971, CW6, pp. 434:724). On the other hand, he instils a broader sense of feeling as an important evaluative process that occurs beyond ego-consciousness as an integral aspect of unconscious functioning. To recap, when they first described the 'structure of feeling' Williams and Orrom in *Preface to Film* (1954) suggest also that feeling has an implicitly evaluative function. Their assertion that the changes in artistic conventions occur from generation to generation, dependent on *tacit consent*, implies an unarticulated level of evaluation takes place by the audience.

It is important to emphasise that feeling, according to Jung, differs from 'affect' or 'emotion'. He clarifies his position at the time of the first of five 'Tavistock Lectures', delivered in 1935, where during the discussion that followed, most of the questions posed are requests for Jung to provide further clarification of his view on the differences between feeling, emotion and affect (Jung, 1968/2014, pp. 3-28). Jung's response is to differentiate between feeling and emotion by asserting that emotion is characterised by observable 'physiological innervation', and, therefore, a bodily reaction which is felt as such. He states that he considers 'emotion' to be 'affect', as it 'affects' or 'causes interference' to the individual (*ibid.*, p19). Feeling, on the other hand, shows no physiological innervation but he concedes that when it increases in intensity it has the potential to turn into an affect and only then will it show 'marked physical innervation' (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 434:725). He accepts that the word feeling is used by others to describe emotional and affective responses but insists that for his own purpose,

feelings are ‘mental’, not ‘physiological’, and he chooses to use ‘feeling’ to describe ‘the giving of values’ (Jung, 1968/2014 pp. 22-23).

‘Feeling’, Jung asserts, ‘informs you through its feeling-tones of the *values* of things [...] whether a thing is acceptable or agreeable or not [...] what a thing is *worth* to you [...] you cannot perceive and you cannot apperceive without having a certain feeling reaction’ (Jung, 1968/2014, p. 9). In an earlier work Jung defines apperception as a psychological process that, like feeling, may form a close relationship to thinking, or cognition. He defines apperception as:

[...] a psychic process by which a new content is articulated with similar, already existing contents in such a way that it becomes understood, apprehended, or “clear.” We distinguish *active* from *passive* apperception. The first is a process by which the subject, of his own accord and from his own motives, consciously apprehends a new content with attention and assimilates it to other contents already constellated; the second is a process by which a new content forces itself upon consciousness either from without (through the senses) or from within (from the unconscious) and, as it were, compels attention and enforces apprehension. In the first case the activity lies with the *ego*; in the second, with the self-enforcing new content. (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, pp. 412-413:683).

Feeling, as a corresponding process, can be defined as an ‘*apperception of value*,’ and, *active* and *passive* apperception can be distinguished by feeling (ibid., p. 436:729). This suggests that feeling is both, ‘assimilated to’ apperception in consciousness, and via the unconscious. This is illustrated by Jung’s suggestion that *passive feeling*, like passive apperception, is influenced by the unconscious in so far as it, ‘allows itself to be attracted or excited by a particular content,

which then forces the feelings of the subject to participate' (ibid.). The similarity between passive apperception and passive feeling is that both are susceptible to the force of unconscious processes that may 'compel attention and enforce apprehension' (ibid., pp. 412-413:683). '*Active feeling*', occurs when the individual consciously transfers value by making, 'an intentional valuation of the content in accordance with feeling and not in accordance with the intellect', and this corresponds to the description of active apperception. Active, or directed feeling, is rational, and passive feeling is irrational (ibid.). Feeling, according to Jung, is 'subjective', and he relates it primarily to the 'acceptance or rejection' of conscious or unconscious, psychic content, rather than the intellectual process of establishing 'conceptual relations' (ibid., p. 434:725). In his definitions of active and passive feeling and active and passive apperception, Jung conveys the sense that feeling is critically important to the evaluative process that takes place in the psyche.

Jung maintains that feeling is a rational function, although, he concedes that this point of view is controversial. Feeling, he writes, is an independent function but may be associated with another rational function, such as thinking or an irrational function, such as sensation, (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 435:726), or intuition (ibid., p. 436:729). The ability to explain the concept of feeling is, 'limited', because when an attempt is made to classify feelings according to that which 'the intellect can apprehend', the intellect may be found 'incompatible' with the 'nature' of some feelings and these remain resistant to classification. 'Passive feeling', therefore, may be described as 'irrational'. (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, pp. 436:728). This is because the unconscious, especially the collective unconscious may elude rational explanation. In this event, feeling may appear to be irrational when it is implied that it 'confers values without the participation' or 'against the intentions of the subject'. It may then be perceived to have become

associated with ‘intuition’ (ibid: 436:729), which he refers to as an ‘irrational function of perception’ (ibid: 453:770).

Williams, Jung and Feeling

From the perspective of Williams’s notion of the structure of feeling, the act of *choosing to feel into* the past to examine whether significant structures of feeling are evident in particular arts or literature is, therefore, a conscious method and it bears a resemblance to Jung’s idea of feeling as a rational function that can be associated with thinking, which is also a rational function. An empathetic reading involves a similar conscious rational attempt to empathise with a period but may also be associated with intuition as an irrational function. Jung also suggested that empathy is related to an active form of projection which is, however, unconscious (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 458:784). Jung’s description of feeling conferring ‘values without the participation’ of the subject, also suggests unconscious activity and could be represented in the creative process of the artist or the creative response, i.e., interpretation, of the reader/audience. In ‘On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry’ (1923), Jung writes of two types of literary works: one that is conscious and springs ‘wholly from the author’s intention to produce a particular result.’ The other appears to emanate from the unconscious and is work that ‘brings with it its own form’, anything the writer ‘wants to add is rejected’ and anything the writer ‘would like to reject is thrust back’ at them (Jung, 1922/2014, CW15, pp. 72-72:110).

Jung implies that feeling has the potential to emerge from the unconscious, and become an aspect of an archetypal or primordial image and, therefore: ‘It would’, he writes, ‘be an unpardonable sin of omission were one to overlook the *feeling-value* of the archetype’ (Jung,

1946/1969, CW8, p. 209:411). He writes, ‘As a numinous factor, the archetype determines the nature of the configurational process and the course it will follow, with seeming fore-knowledge, or as though it were already in possession of the goal to be circumscribed by the centring process’ (ibid.). Jung’s writing confirms the notion that the archetype is purposeful and for this reason I refer to the unconscious archetypal process.

Reber and Reber (1985/2001) state that among a variety of meanings of the word ‘process’ that are used in psychology, ‘all are derived from the Latin *processus*, meaning *a going forward* and the underlying connotation is always that of a series of steps or a progression towards some aim or some goal.’ In general terms a process is, ‘any change or modification in a thing in which directionality or focus can be discerned,’ and it may also refer to, ‘the manner in which some change is brought about’, for example, through a ‘set of operations that produces a particular result’ such as a ‘*learning process*’ (Reber & Reber, 1985/2001, p. 567.). The definition of ‘process’ is noted here as it is in accord with Jung’s descriptions of the transformative effect of the emergence of archetypes on the unconscious and/or conscious psyche and also suggests that despite being described as a ‘*structure of feeling*’, Williams’ concept also denotes a *process* of feeling. The thesis aims to critically assess the ways in which Jung’s understanding of ‘feeling’ and his archetypal hypothesis may enrich Williams’ notion of the ‘structure of feeling’ as a process of cultural development.

The ‘structure of feeling’, in Williams writing, is concerned with how we interpret a sense of the feeling of a particular time in history, through our reading, in the present. To illustrate this, Jung’s writing, in the section that follows, represents a particular ‘structure of feeling’ of the modern period and invites the reader to consider how writing in the early decades of the

twentieth century impacted Jung's thinking. He expresses the feeling of the effect of prolonged conflict and instability on contemporary European culture and on the consciousness of the people, and also writes to suggest that taking time to reflect inwardly, on the natural and historical aspects of the collective unconscious, may offer a renewed sense of connection to the present and future.

Feeling and Analytical Psychology in Historical and Cultural Context

The rise in popularity of psychoanalytic thought in the early twentieth century in Western cultures, began with the publication of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and has been generally represented as being shaped by the difficulty in achieving acceptance as a rational and scientific method. This is in keeping with the 'structure of feeling' of the time but from the viewpoint of today I find the notion that 'tension and articulation between literal and metaphorical understandings' in psychologies (Samuels, 1989/2016, p. xiii), offers a broader outlook from which to view Jung's writings. In the early twentieth century analytical psychology gained greater relevance when the rational outlook was disturbed by the trauma of World War and augmented by the shock of recent rapid modernisation. This was characterised in the expression of the arts, the Modernist movement, in particular, which represented a maelstrom of often contradictory feeling, sometimes illustrated in complex new and experimental methods, influenced by psychoanalytic ideas.

Jung writes in 1918, in his Preface to the Second Edition of 'On the Psychology of the Unconscious', of his pleasure at the widening public interest in his ideas, which is indicated by the short period of time between the publication of the first and second editions. He states, however, that:

This interest may be due in no small measure to the profound shock which our consciousness sustained through the World War. The spectacle of this catastrophe threw man back upon himself by making him feel his complete impotence; it turned his gaze inwards, and, with everything rocking about him, he must needs seek something that guarantees him a hold.

(Jung, 1918/2014, CW7, p. 5).

Jung describes the deep need in society for a sense of inner order and certainty when the reality of the outer world is that it has generated collective and individual suffering. This resulted in feelings of powerlessness in the face of a ‘catastrophe’ of seismic intensity, and a ‘profound’ sense of ‘shock’, all particularly disturbing because, paradoxically, the ‘catastrophe’ was created by the acts of humankind itself. Jung adds, however, that, ‘too many still look outwards, some believing in the illusion of victory and of victorious power, others in treaties and laws, and others again in the overthrow of the existing order’ (ibid.). In spite of the damaging effect of war on psyche and society, Jung finds too many people are still willing to put their trust in national, political and social institutions and organisations to enable recovery and provide an ordered existence, a sense of order which, he believes, will only be achieved if people can retrieve a feeling of being grounded in nature. This is to be found internally, by re-establishing contact with the collective unconscious.

Jung had already stated, in the ‘Preface to the First Edition’ (1917) of ‘On the Psychology of the Unconscious’, that the external world alone cannot solve the problems of humanity because the, ‘psychology of the individual is reflected in the psychology of the nation’ (ibid., p.4). In this case, the ‘attitude of the individual’ must change if a change in ‘the psychology of the

nation' is required. The 'Preface', was written in 1916, the year before its publication, and in the middle of the war which would continue for the next two years. Jung notes at this time that:

The great problems of humanity were never yet solved by general laws, but only through regeneration of the attitudes of individuals. If ever there was a time when self-reflection was the absolutely necessary and only right thing, it is now, in our present catastrophic epoch. Yet whoever reflects upon himself is bound to strike upon the frontiers of the unconscious, which contains what above all else he needs to know. (ibid. p.4).

Jung appears to refer to the individual's need to reflect upon himself in order to stimulate the activity of the collective unconscious, which he has described as the source of 'vital instincts' (Jung, [1916/2014], CW7, p.304;520), and will in later writings refer to as the source of archetypal symbols that carry the potential to become activated in the quest for transformation.

Jung, in the second 'Preface', is writing in October 1918, one month before the war ended, and at this time he reiterates that the individual holds the key to collective, or social, change, through knowledge gained through self-reflection. The wider public interest in his ideas, as illustrated in the rapid sales of the first edition, is *symptomatic* of the instinct to return to oneself. He asserts that:

Every individual needs revolution, inner division, overthrow of the existing order, and renewal, but not by forcing them upon his neighbours under the hypocritical cloak of Christian love or the sense of social responsibility or any of the other beautiful euphemisms for unconscious urges to personal power. Individual self-reflection, return of the individual to the ground of human nature, to his own deepest being with its individual and social destiny – here is the beginning of a cure for that blindness which

reigns at the present hour.

(ibid., p.5).

The need to ‘look inwards’, towards the unconscious aspects of the psyche, ‘the ground of human nature’, the ‘deepest being’ for ‘renewal’, appears to be a necessary remedial stage in addressing the symptoms of trauma and shock that were a cause for concern in early twentieth century society. (Ibid.) This, Jung implies, can occur when people, through self-reflection, can re-establish a connection with being grounded in the natural world and return to society with the sense of a renewed social attitude.

Jung attributes the ability for self-reflection to the particular endeavours of the artistic, creative mind. He acknowledges that ‘Peoples and times, like individuals, have their own characteristics and attitudes’, but that ‘attitudes’ tend to imply dominant trends and ‘bias’ which tend to lead to the ‘exclusion’ of alternative feelings and positions. If compelled to follow the dominant tendencies directed and lived experience by society, aspects of the psyche risk being denied the right to expression if ‘incompatible with the general attitude’ (Jung, 1922/2014, CW15, p. 83:131). Jung is writing fifty-seven years before Williams articulates a similar point of view.

Williams states that a structure of feeling is located in, ‘the endless comparison that must occur in the process of consciousness between the articulated’, i.e., the dominant tendencies, and ‘the lived’ whether or not they are compatible with the general attitude. (Williams, 1979, p. 168). The necessity to articulate such conflicts, either as they are felt between the inner psyche and its relation to general attitudes, as in Jung’s viewpoint, or in a process of conscious articulation

of the discomfort between dominant and personal attitudes, as in Williams's also became characteristic expressions of the modernist movement in the arts.

In his writing about creative writers in, 'On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry' (1922), Jung distinguishes between two kinds of artistic expression, on the one hand, he describes writing that is an expression of the writer 'as a person', communicating conscious awareness of realistic and representable aspects of life, and on the other hand, the writer as an instrument of the 'creative processes that move them' (Jung, 1922/2014, CW15 p. 74:112). When the latter artist, Jung writes, metaphorically, 'takes to the back streets and alleys because he cannot endure the broad highway he will be the first to discover the psychic elements that are waiting to play their part in the life of the collective' (ibid., p. 83:131). 'Here', Jung continues:

[...] the artist's relative lack of adaptation turns out to his advantage; it enables him to follow his own yearnings far from the beaten path, and to discover what it is that would meet the unconscious needs of his age. Thus, just as the one-sidedness of the individual's conscious attitude is corrected by reactions from the unconscious, so art represents a process of self-regulation in the life of nations and epochs.
(ibid., p. 83:131).

The artist's 'lack' takes them behind and beyond the breadth of their conscious experience toward the unconscious. Jung illustrates how the self-reflective artist, on turning inward toward the unconscious, can reassemble that which he apprehends, and enrich the symbolic form of their art. This will inform the production and interpretation of cultural and art forms and styles, and these will become creative articulations of the 'nation and epoch' in which they are created. Jung states that the artist may *intentionally* engage in self-reflection and 'follow his yearnings'

(ibid.), or that they may become an instrument of ‘the creative process that moves’ them’ (Jung, ibid., p. 74:112). The latter accords with the emergence of the archetypes of the collective unconscious, as in the case of Maeder’s patient, as the unconscious psyche acts naturally and autonomously to ‘enrich the symbolic form’ of the picture of the world, in everyday life.

In the two, brief ‘Prefaces’ to ‘On the Psychology of the Unconscious’, Jung summarises, and presents his evaluation of the time in history in which he is writing. The events in the external world have turned his attention, urgently, to the nature of the unconscious, which he finds needs to be seriously considered and engaged with for both the individual and society’s survival. He posits the unconscious as a ‘chaotic’ influence on the ‘ordered world of consciousness’ and places the responsibility on the individual to transform the attitudes of society. (Jung, 1917/2014, CW7, p. 4). Jung suggests that the ability to influence a change in this feeling of uncertainty can only be achieved by the individual who engages with the unconscious.

The collective psyche, according to Jung, is structured in such a way that the real nature of the individual is grounded, not in the personal unconscious but beyond it, in the collective unconscious, from where feeling is assimilated in the archetypal process. This is the depth to which the individual must turn, or be turned, in order to assimilate, unconsciously, the means for transformation and renewal of the conscious attitude so that feelings of order and certainty in society can be restored. Raymond Williams, writing from the viewpoint of literary and cultural analysis when he describes the ‘structure of feeling’, also imagines a structuring process, but one that is involved in the formation of cultural forms, where significant change in the feeling of an epoch may become evident, as a pre-emergent process of cultural transformation and renewal.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrated the origins of the key concepts of Jung and Williams and examined their ideas to show how feeling, as an evaluative process, is an important aspect of Jung's analytical psychology, notably the collective unconscious and the archetypes, and how facets of Jung's ideas are perceptible in Williams' concept of the structure of feeling. Feeling, according to Jung, acts creatively, to evaluate that which we perceive and apperceive in consciousness and in the unconscious, and emerges as an influential aspect of the archetypal process.

In Williams's work feeling also attributes value to the representation, interpretation and re-interpretation of the past in cultural forms through tacit agreement of the acceptance or non-acceptance of artistic conventions. Non-acceptance initiates the need for a process of change and renewal in the development of forms of artistic representation and communication. This can be enriched by taking an historicist view of the past and gaining insight into the ways in which the historicist view informs the process of past and present roles in culture-making. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

JUNG AND HISTORICISM

Introduction

The first part of this chapter develops the summary of historicism as a methodology in the introductory chapter and, having noted the influence of romanticism on its development in the previous chapter, offers an overview of historicism as an important development in historical thought in Europe emerging in the eighteenth century in the writings of the philosopher of history, Giambattista Vico (1668- 1744) and philosopher and historian, Johann Herder (1744-1803). It then explores the work of nineteenth century historians, Leopold Von Ranke (1795-1886) an academic historian who has been described as ‘the founding father of German academic historicism’ because his work illustrates the endeavour to ‘shape history into a scholarly discipline’ (Maurer, 2013, p. 10), and Jakob Burckhardt (1818-97) the cultural historian and known influence on Jung (Bair, 2004, p. 188), (Shamdasani, 2012, p. 57).

The early writers introduce notions of the poetic and the aesthetic into the current of developing historicist thought and this appears, in different ways, in the twentieth century writings of Jung and Williams. In Jung’s writings he weaves poetic language into scientific discourse when he interprets aspects of the collective unconscious in particular, for example, when illustrating notions of the archetypal image, symbol and myth. This has the effect of implicitly subverting the dominance of positivist ideologies and introduces other ways of expressing and thinking about traditional subjects such as history and science. Jung’s writing, for example, echoes a sense of the poetic arising out of Vico’s historical thought in the latter’s innovative method which introduces notions of imagination, creativity and self-creation, that broaden our understanding of life as experienced in the past by indicating that human agency is an active part of historical narratives and the production of cultural forms. The influence of the poetic and aesthetic on Williams is seen in the importance he places on the role of the development

and use of language, in all cultural forms, because tacit changes in language constitute the primary expressions of historical, social and cultural transformation symbolised in structures of feeling.

Maurer's work refers to the 'aesthetic design' of the nineteenth century historiography introduced by, for example, Ranke and Burkhardt, which placed emphasis on, 'factuality, objectivity, and scholarliness', but at the same time, Ranke's 'criteria for establishing history as an academic discipline are closely intertwined with aesthetic discourse' that included, for example, textual criticism' and 'hermeneutics' (Maurer, 2013, pp. 12-13). The historicist approach, saw the advent of a 'pictorial turn', as the 'power of images became also a crucial factor for investigating and interpreting the past' (ibid. pp. 4-5). Herder on the other hand, is concerned with the ways in which the feeling, experienced of living at a certain time in the past, can be *felt into* by the historian seeking to understand the period in question. Herder is an influence on Williams, in particular. The characteristics in the writings of Jung and Williams will be discussed in more detail throughout the development of this thesis.

The next part of this chapter will introduce the influence of the German philosopher and historian, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). His ideas promote the need for differentiation between the social or human sciences and natural science when studying the past. He is known for introducing the concept of *verstehen*, or understanding, 'through which life comes to know itself,' because 'When we "understand" something, we see it in its proper interrelationship of whole and part in the general swirl of mental life and experience' (Dilthey, Betanzos ed., 1923/1988, p. 23). This concept is associated with the hermeneutic approach to historical

thought and Dilthey was influenced by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), whose hermeneutics have been instrumental to the shaping of historicism.

Historicism: An Overview

History, Marwick (2001) writes, was only beginning to be recognised as a professional and academic discipline in Europe from the late nineteenth century, although he states that writers of history have been acknowledged as such from the time of the Ancient Greeks. He names Herodotus (c.484BC - c.425BC), as an early example from a time when the focus for historical writing was on 'political and military life' (Marwick, 2001, p. 53). According to Marwick, the first 'learned journal' to publish *historicist* thought was the 'Historische Zeitschrift' in 1859, followed by the first journal of The American Historical Association, 'The American Historical Review', in 1884. The first notable book written by C.V. Langlois and Charles Seignobos, titled *Introduction to the Study of History*, was published in London in 1898 (ibid., pp. 51-54).

Hamilton (1996/2003) writes, however, that historicism had much earlier origins and has been developing since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the philosophical and historical writings of, for example, Vico and Herder, who were critics of Enlightenment thought (Hamilton 1996/2003, pp. 30-36). Concurrently, in the early eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, notions of the unconscious, were articulated in the writings of philosophers such as, Friedrich W.J Schelling (1775-1854) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) and the writers Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and William Wordsworth (1770-1850). As scholars and creative writers they were beginning to address, 'a new concern with memory and the past', and employing a 'theoretical focus on the foundation of consciousness in earlier, more primitive and unconscious stages', while also recognising notions of 'internal mental divisions' including

‘dialogue between the conscious and unconscious self’ and acknowledging a growing interest in different mental states such as, ‘madness’, ‘sleep, dreams and trances.’ These emerging concerns were to be perceived from the viewpoint of both, ‘individual development’ and ‘cultural history as a whole’ (ffytche, 2012, p. 3). This is a viewpoint that, in contrast to the previous emphasis on the objective recording of factual events, is now recognised to represent the early formative ideas in the development of the new psychologies, as well as complementing the broader focus on history as the expression of a human science concerned with the collective and individual lived experience of the past,

While historicism, as an intertextual critical method for the study of the past was evolving alongside the new psychologies, by the end of the nineteenth century tensions were growing in the developing field of psychology as some proponents rejected the association with earlier academic disciplines. Shamdasani writes:

At the end of the nineteenth century, many figures in the West sought to establish a scientific psychology that would be independent of philosophy, theology, biology, anthropology, literature, medicine and neurology, whilst taking over their traditional subject matters. The very possibility of psychology rested upon the successful negotiation of these disciplinary crossings. (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 4).

This conflicted position resulted in the call for ‘a radical break with all prior forms of human understanding’ from some psychologists (ibid.). To view Jung’s ideas in this context illustrates how his ideas at the beginning of the twentieth century, were first seen at the end of the Romantic movement, and during the beginning of the Modern period. It demonstrates, on the one hand the feeling for the need for modernity to embrace a complete break with the past, explicit also in other cultural forms at the time, and, on the other hand, the need for a feeling of

being grounded in the continuity of a collective archaic historical past. Jung, while being attentive to the effects of the rapid changes taking place in the modern world, proposed that the individual should, through ‘self-reflection’, revisit being grounded in the past. He believed, ‘the return of the individual to the ground of human nature, to his own deepest being with its individual and social destiny’ would, as ‘an instinctive return to oneself,’ enable the development of the self in the light of modern times (Jung, 1917/2014, CW7, p. 5).

Jung chose to ‘negotiate the disciplinary crossings’ (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 4) by articulating his psychology in terms of classical mythology, theology, the arts and the philosophical frames of reference of earlier scholastic writings while maintaining his scientific discourse as a doctor of medicine. The context in which Jung writes is historicist because his writings are intertextual, they adopt the significance of the past in mythical narratives, scholarly and scientific ideas, and project their significance onto present and future concerns in hopes for transformation and renewal. The key Jungian concept examined in this thesis - the potential of the collective unconscious as the matrix of the archetypes - is presented by Jung to be the means of expression of innate experience of an archaic past that is able to connect the unconscious past in the manifestation of images and symbols with conscious activity in the present. Aesthetic historicism as a framework for his writing positions those of Jung’s ideas that meet with resistance for being unscientific, from a positivist point of view, into a position that values broader, more open-ended terms of interpretation and understanding.

When Jung describes the collective unconscious, it is not as an historicist concept because, ‘The key idea from which historicism *differentiates itself* is the notion that there are natural, divine or other fundamental laws that define eternally the essential truths of human existence’ Such

natural laws give rise to the idea that there is ‘an innate human nature given by God or biology’ that ‘presents a universal essence shared by us all’ (Malpas, 2006 p. 56. *Emphasis added.*). In the previous citation from his writings, Jung refers to the idea of the collective unconscious as ‘the ground of human nature’ (Jung, 1917/2014, CW7, p. 5). The explanation, therefore, of what historicism *is not*, according to Malpas, resembles how Jung describes what the collective unconscious *is* (Malpas, 2006, p. 56). But in analytical psychology it is the *potential* for meaning that is innate, universal and timeless. When the potential is manifest and emerges in consciousness as an image or symbolic form that represents the archaic source, for example, in a dream, it is then transformed into recognisable content that is open to interpretation as the past forging a relation to the present personal, cultural and historical context. The collective unconscious is the ground that connects the past with the present and future, or, in other words connects the universal with the particular.

Hamilton, states that historicism is characterised by a hermeneutical approach in which ‘the past is to be understood on the model of interpreting a text’ (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 3). In this context the method of interpreting symbols or archetypal images, disguised in archaic and/or mythological motifs, means the interpretation of symbols and archetypes when manifest in consciousness, is performed in a similar way to textual analysis. Jung writes that the unconscious archetype is changed when it becomes conscious because when it is ‘perceived’, it ‘takes its colour from the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear’ (Jung, 1954/1968, CW9i, pp. 5-6). Jung’s description of the archetype as culturally defined resonates with twenty first century historicist criticism of literature and culture which, ‘explores how the meaning of a text, idea or artefact is produced by way of its relation to the wider historical context in which it is created or experienced’ (Malpas, 2006, p. 55). The archetype, then, if read as a universal potential of the unconscious and autonomous emergence of the past, only

invites textual analysis when conscious because in consciousness it becomes a product of the lived experience of the culture in which it appears and may then be interpreted in an historicist context.

Vico and Herder

Vico: Self-Creativity

History, according to Vico and Herder, is less influenced by an emphasis on the ‘regularities’ of natural or scientific laws, as suggested by Enlightenment attitudes, but perceived instead as ‘something we are actively implicated in, like purposeful living, not external to, like the phenomena rationalised by scientific investigation’. It represents a series of ‘events and regularities’ similar to the experience of individuals (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 36). This attitude indicates an emerging emphasis on history as personal experience that can affect the ways in which individuals identify themselves as active participants in the living process of their lives rather than as merely experiencing life as determined by scientific and/or natural laws.

Vico, Hamilton writes, suggests that history can be understood ‘ontogenetically’, that is, ‘in its development through time.’ This implies that ‘a nation, society or normal object of historical study follows a pattern or “course” [...] analogous to that of the individual human life – childhood, maturity, decline and dissolution’ (ibid., p.30). Vico proposes that the evolution and interpretation of ‘cultural self-understanding’ may be divided into ‘three principal stages - the first peopled by Gods, the next by giants or heroes, and only the last by people themselves,’ but to consider the world from the latest ‘demythologized’ viewpoint would be to ‘neglect its explanatory origins and so fail to understand it’. Hamilton asserts that the key to Vico’s ideas is, ‘the discovery of the mythological or *poetic* sources of civilization’ (ibid.).

Hayden White, in, 'Northrop Frye's Place in Contemporary Cultural Studies' (1994/2010), acknowledges the well-known influence of Jung's archetypal theory on Frye and describes the influence on Frye of Vico's ideas on the poetics of cultural self-understanding. White asserts that 'Frye was nothing if not a philosopher of human freedom, of artistic creativity, and beyond that of a generally human power of species self-creation' (White, 2010, p. 266). This description is an introduction to the influence of Vico's renowned expression '*verum factum*', translated by White as 'the true is the made', meaning 'one can only truly know' that which one has made, or 'is capable of making' (ibid.). The relevance of Vico's idea to this thesis is revealed in White's perception of the connections Vico describes between culture, history and human development.

White writes:

[...] since culture is a distinctively human creation, human beings can aspire to a knowledge of culture of a kind and degree utterly different from that which they can have of the rest of nature. And since history is the record of this process of cultural creation, human beings can legitimately aspire to a knowledge both of history and of themselves as the agents of a specifically historical mode of existence that is both truer and more certain than any knowledge they can ever hope to have of nature. Historical knowledge, in short, is human self-knowledge and specifically knowledge of how human beings make themselves through knowing themselves and come to know themselves in the process of making themselves. (ibid.)

In contrast to Hamilton's viewpoint which suggests Vico is taking an ontological position to the development of history, White suggests that Vico's "'maker's knowledge'" is an 'epistemological' foundation for a 'poetic' reflection on 'human creativity' (ibid.). Vico, White writes, considers culture to be the result of human creativity, and history to be the representation of cultural creation. This was against Enlightenment reason because it was a point of view derived from notions of imagination and, in particular, 'the human capacity to think in images as well as in concepts, to coin metaphors and then use them as a basis for actions' (ibid., 267).

The notion that cultural self-understanding has a poetic aspect, without which a demythologized viewpoint would be felt as lacking in expression and meaning, resembles a Jungian point of view. The Jungian archetypes convey impressions of an unconscious collective past that can be interpreted as mythological in their echoing of the 'three principal stages', described by Vico as the ages of gods, heroes and men. Gods and heroes provide poetic connection with the past which can be interpreted in the content of archetypal and symbolic images that can convey the potential for a transformative effect on future cultural and self-understanding. The third stage in Vico's notion of the developmental ages of humanity, the age of men, suggests that time has erased the past ages of gods and heroes. Jung counters this by reproducing the earlier ages of myth aesthetically, in interpretation, as they function to restore for demythologised societies, their cultural connection to the past. Myth, as both a poetic and problematic aspect of Jung's thought, will be discussed further in later parts of this thesis.

Herder: Self-Development

Like Vico, ‘Herder models cultural variety on the stages of an individual life.’ Hamilton, in a citation from a 1968 translation of Herder’s philosophy of history published in 1784-91, writes:

The youth is not happier than the innocent, contented child;
nor is the peaceful old man unhappier than the energetic man
in his prime... And yet the striving never ceases. No one lives
in his own period only; he builds on what has gone before and
lays foundation for what comes after. (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 34).

Herder’s is expressing the idea that historical knowledge, as a record of the human creation of cultures of the past and present that carry a blueprint for the future, embodies a similar notion to Vico’s, ‘human self-knowledge,’ the ‘knowledge of how human beings make themselves through knowing themselves,’ and also how they ‘come to know themselves in the process of making themselves’ (White, 2010, p. 266). Herder likens ‘human progress’, not to ‘science’, but to ‘an “endeavour”, a growth always appropriate to the character or age of the individual (Hamilton, 1996/2003 p. 29). This is ‘measured by the human perception of “what has gone before” and “what comes after”, and so will exhibit variations according to cultural circumstance’ (ibid.).

The ‘striving’ for self-development expressed by Herder resonates with Jung’s concept of individuation. Jung asserts: ‘As the individual is not just a single, separate being, but by his very existence presupposes a collective relationship, it follows that the process of individuation must lead to more intense and broader collective relationships and not to isolation’ (Jung, CW6, 1921/2014, p. 448:758). Culture, as the result of human creativity and the basis for historical and self-knowledge is important to the development between the individual and the collective relationship. The transition of collective, socio-cultural, knowledge and values from past and

present to the future is maintained through the communication of cultural and symbolic forms such as language. In accord with Vico's theory of maker's knowledge, poetics and culture are knowledge we get from reflecting on human creativity and activity (White, 2010, p. 266). As such it precedes Jung's concept of individuation and the need for the individual to nurture a relationship to the collective.

Raymond Williams openly credits Vico and Herder as an influence on his own historicist version of cultural studies. Williams cites Vico, published in, *'The New Science (from 1725)'*, where, he states, although philosophers had spent their energy exploring 'the world of nature', as God's creation, only He could ultimately know it. This resulted in the philosophers neglecting to study the 'world of nations or civil world', which, as it is made by humanity is something they alone, 'could hope to know' (Williams, 1977, p. 16). For Williams, the 'new emphasis,' on the civil world in Vico's writings were, 'against the grain of time, the "natural sciences" are rejected but the "human sciences" given a startling new emphasis' (ibid., p. 17). This led to the 'shaping of societies and the shaping of human minds', which heralds the origin of the 'general social sense of "culture"' (ibid.). Herder, Williams writes, advanced Vico's position in his emphasis on the 'historical self-development of humanity' as 'a fundamental social process' that actively shapes 'cultures' (ibid.). 'Culture,' in this sense, became, on the one hand, a 'noun of "inner" process that reflects "intellectual life" and "the arts,"' and comprised a special influence on the arts and humanities and their relation to society, and, on the other hand, the word 'culture' denotes 'a noun of general process', influencing notions of, "whole ways of life", and became central to the "human sciences" and the "social sciences"' (ibid). Williams appears to share Herder's view that, human communication reveals humanity in language as 'a cultural manifestation bound to conventions of time and place' (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 33]. The recognition of the evolution of language is critical to the understanding

of past and present cultures. Williams claims that the use of language in past documents and the artistic practices convey continuity with the past but at the same time develop changes in tone, style and expression into new conventions and new ‘structures of feeling’ (Williams, 1961, pp. 68 -71).

Herder, Language and Einfühlung

Williams states that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the question of human language as a ‘constitutive human process’, became the bedrock of thought concerning the notion of culture (Williams, 1977, p. 20). For Williams, like Herder, this means language is perceived as being vital ‘to the act of human self-creation’, not as in previously held notions of language given by God, with which Herder’s perception of language should not be confused. For language to be ‘constitutive’ it must be perceived to be an ‘indissoluble’ element of human interaction (ibid., p. 29). Language, for Herder, is a cultural form created by humanity, as opposed to God or Nature, through which it undertakes to know itself.

Herder considered historical facts to be ‘more expressive’ than the reductive ‘general principles’ recorded in ‘Enlightenment history’ (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 29). His emphasis on expression is revealed in his value of the role of language, not just as a form of ‘designation’ but as a cultural form, where humanity is ‘revealed in language’. This aspect of Herder’s historicism is represented as ‘*Einfühlung*,’ or “‘feeling one’s way in”” according to Forster in *Herder: Philosophical Writings* (Herder, Forster ed., 2002, p. xvii). Forster’s interpretation of the meaning of *Einfühlung* is based on Herder’s essay, ‘This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity’ (1774). Marwick (2001) also cites Herder, (no reference is given)

who states: ‘First sympathise with the nation, go into the era, into the geography, into the entire history, *feel* yourself into it’ (Marwick, 2001, p. 62). In Forster’s translation, Herder states:

[...] it as though one were supposed to survey the world-sea of whole peoples, ages, and lands, comprehend it in *one view, one feeling, one word!* Tired semi-*phantom* that a word is! The whole living painting of mode of life, habits, needs, peculiarities of land and climate, would have to *be added* or to have *preceded*; one would have first to *sympathize* with the nation, in order to feel a *single one* of its *inclinations* or *actions all together*, one would have to *find* a single word, to *imagine* everything in its fullness – or one reads – *a word!* (Herder, Forster ed., 2002, pp. 291-2).

Herder illustrates that that despite his view that language is a cultural form created by people to fulfil the function of their own need for social communication, ‘the word’ alone is inadequate as a means of revealing ‘the *great detail* of peoples and times’ without the added force of ‘feeling into’ it (ibid., p. 292). He invokes the concept of the ‘soul’ to support his method and in doing so he confirms his departure from the study of history from the Enlightenment position of a logically reasoned chronicle of events.

In an earlier essay, ‘How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People’ (1765), Herder counters notions of ‘Logic,’ which ‘merely contains the order of verbal presentation,’ with his concept of the soul (ibid., p. 8). Logic, he writes, ‘contains comfortless, far-too-universal rules [...] a philosophical register, and then a scholastic method of ancient disputation,’ making it inaccessible to all. ‘Consequently, its truths cannot be made universal for the benefit of the people’ (ibid., p. 9). Herder asks, how can this become more useful? He writes:

Our Logic presupposes the greater part of psychology, unless one

wants to consider it as mutilated limbs of our soul and as a field full of corpses. For who will speak of the abilities of something whose forces I do not yet know? But our Logic must also be united with the marrow of the science of the soul [*Seelenlehre*] if it is to be useful. In short, I have attempted to plant its limbs back into the body, and I have seen how then everything lives, a spirit enters these bones, they are full of life (ibid., p. 9).

Herder, then, finds Logic as lifeless as the word, but when language is infused with soul it breathes the forces of life and spirit into the minds of the people, and it presents the mind with the quality of ‘the art of invention’ or discovery (ibid., p. 10). The notion of the soul adds a poetic and aesthetic aspect to his renditions of *feeling into* history.

He writes:

The whole nature of the soul, which *rules* through everything, which *models* all other inclinations and forces of the soul *in accordance with itself*, and in addition *colors* even the most indifferent actions – in order to share in feeling this, do not answer on the basis of the word but go into the age, into the clime, the whole history, feel yourself into everything – only now are you on the way towards understanding the word (ibid., p. 292).

Herder’s historical thinking, represents a logical reasoned approach to the self-development of language as ‘human communication’ made by and for humanity, yet also looks to notions of the soul, not as *other*, but as an integral part of the mind, for the adequate expression of feeling. Herder’s historicism expresses his philosophy of mind, for example, in that ‘the mind is a unity’

and ‘cognition’ or ‘*theoretical* work’ should not become detached from ‘volition or affects’ (Herder, Forster ed., 2002, p. xxiii).

Herder, then, introduces the idea of enhancing historical understanding through empathy with the otherness of lived experiences of the past. He criticises the tendency of modern historians to model ‘all centuries after the pattern of their own time’ (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 29) and, ‘famously proposes that the way to bridge radical difference when interpreting is through *Einfühlung*’ (Herder, Forster ed., (2002) p. xvii). Forster states that rather than the interpreter ostensibly performing an act of ‘self-projection onto texts’, Herder is suggesting, ‘an arduous process of historical-philological inquiry’. Herder wanted to avoid ‘assimilation of the thought in a text to one’s own’ and because of this the interpreter should regard *Einfühlung* as a ‘metaphor’, rather than a method (ibid.).

Empathy

Historicism, influenced by Herder, is conveyed in the Romantic interest of revisiting the ‘atmosphere and mentality’ of the past in order to empathise and give meaning to past lived experience (Tosh, 1984/2015, p. 7). Historical awareness in the context of the historicist notion of empathy is, Tosh writes, dependent on ‘three principles;’ ‘*difference*’ or ‘*otherness*’, ‘*context*’, and ‘*process*’. Tosh asserts that acknowledging the ‘otherness of the past’, is often articulated in terms of ‘periodizations’ which, he suggests, should be regarded with caution because this implies a ‘difference’ that is imposed on people living in past periods but for whom the periodisation of their lives would have no meaning. Historical awareness of ‘difference’ in the context of his ‘three principles’, also requires that present ways of thinking and behaving

are not imposed on earlier ones on the assumption that people in the past thought in the same way as people of the present (ibid., p. 8).

The second principle, 'context', is that the 'subject of enquiry' should not be 'wrenched' from its own setting (ibid., p. 10). Awareness of 'context' and 'otherness' in the reconstruction of the 'atmosphere and mentality' of the past is crucial to the development of empathy and understanding. The third principle, that history should be recognised as a 'process', refers to 'the relationship between events over time which endows them with more significance than if they were viewed in isolation' (ibid.). Tosh describes 'process' in terms of the kind of historical thinking, in addition to empathy, that is required for the understanding of the 'gulf' between 'then and now' and 'us and them' (ibid. p. 11).

Historicism, as explained by Tosh, describes a sense of historical *consciousness* as it evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Jung, awareness of the primordial past is the basis for the concept of the collective *unconscious*. Jung values the timelessness of the past and the *unconscious* effects of its 'otherness' on the present. For Jung, the primeval and archaic content of the collective unconscious is the context and source of the emergence of archetypal and mythological manifestations. It characterises an instinctive, intuitive and symbolic process that functions to bridge the many gulfs between, for example, present/past, self/other, modern/archaic.

Vico and Herder introduce an historical consciousness that emphasises individual experience and expression as important to the promotion of a feeling of connectedness with the past and the 'convergence...of historical, cultural and poetic interpretation' (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p.

36). This could explain why such ideas became popular with ‘intellectuals, novelists and poets’ (Marwick, 2001, p. 62). ‘Individual experience’, ‘expression’ ‘connectedness’ and the ‘convergence of historical, cultural and poetic interpretation,’ as effects that arise to counter the potentially demythologizing effect on human consciousness, are also expressed in descriptions of the need for connectedness to the past, articulated in cultural and poetic interpretations of the Jungian unconscious. Williams’ ‘structure of feeling’ embodies the importance of the convergence of histories, cultural and artistic practices, in active, conscious, interpretation of connection to the past, in the present.

Leopold Von Ranke: Representing History

Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), also made an influential contribution to the development of historicism in the nineteenth century. He is known for stating, in an early publication, that; ‘History has had assigned to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of the ages to come.’ This point of view, , encourages unrealistic expectations and he aims only to ‘*show how things actually were...*’ (Tosh, 1984/2015 p. 7. *Emphasis added*). Notions of examining experience from the inside, exploring difference and avoiding anachronistic interpretations of historical events continued to become more central to the representation of histories and, in addition, Ranke promoted the significance of detailed study and concentrated on the textual analysis of primary sources.

Tosh writes:

What was new about the historicists’ approach was their realization that the atmosphere and mentality of past ages had to be reconstructed too, if the formal record of events was to have any meaning. The main task of the historian

became to find out why people acted as they did by stepping into their shoes, by seeing the world through their eyes and as far as possible by judging it by their standards (ibid.).

Historicism continued to encourage a more empathetic relationship with the past as the pursuit of ‘meaning’ inherent in recorded facts and events became more important. Marwick describes Ranke’s approach as being both historicist and hermeneutic. He writes; ‘The Rankean approach is *hermeneutic* in its insistence on the supreme importance of primary sources...and it is *historicist* in the insistence that the past is different from the present’ and ‘that to understand any society, or institution, or topic, we have to understand its historical origins’ (Marwick, 2001, p. 66).

According to Maurer (2013) Ranke declares his commitment to the ‘naked truth’ of his detailed interpretations of original historical evidence. His aim was to ensure that his historical writing used only ‘authentic sources’ and its origins were derived from, ‘memories, diaries, letters, official correspondence and original accounts of the eye witnesses’ (Maurer, 2013, p. 11). Textual analysis, archives, footnotes, references and bibliographies were significant aspects of Ranke’s detailed interpretative approach. He criticised other historians for their rhetorical style, and inclusion of ‘fictitious illustrations, imaginary speeches and false documents’. His intention was to establish ‘objectivity’ in his study of textual sources while maintaining the importance of personal accounts of the past (ibid.). Ranke’s critical *reading into* the past, like Herder’s *feeling into* the past, appear in the Jungian approach to psychological interpretation which requires objectivity and empathy in the approach to the personal and collective past of individuals required for the creative and imaginative interpretation of the psyche. Historicism appears to have influenced an approach to reading and interpreting human experience, past and present, that is reflected in the development of the depth psychologies.

Ranke and Burckhardt: Aesthetic Historicism

Maurer describes Ranke's version of historicism as 'aesthetic historicism'. He 'integrates scholarly discourse and art into his conception of historicism' and, Ranke, she writes, stated that: 'History differs from other scholarly disciplines, because it is at the same time art' (ibid., p. 12). One role of aesthetics, Maurer asserts, is to 'represent and re-produce the scholarly findings', and while Ranke valued objective factual findings, 'source study follows the aesthetic interpretive practice of hermeneutics' (ibid.). Maurer suggests that a hermeneutical approach to the 'de-rhetorization' of history denotes the application of 'another set of poetic forms' to express 'authenticity' (ibid.).

Maurer's study of aesthetic historicism shows that images were an important aspect of the changing conception of recorded histories. Ranke, she writes, employed visual imagery in his writings, in a way that may be seen to further his 'de-rhetorization' (ibid.) of history and oppose the dominant notion of the past, which had rested on the re-telling of events in the manner of '*grand narrative*' (ibid. p. 19). Use of imagery and images shifted the emphasis from feeling and 'seeing the past' from the 'premises of high aesthetic culture' and historical narratives, to include popular visual cultural forms and this approach may be seen to have made history more accessible (ibid p. 20). The emphasis on the significance of dreams, visions and archetypal images and the use of imagery as a literary device in the writings of analytical psychology, and the multiple illustrations included to augment Jung's ideas in the publication of the *Collected Works*, heighten the poetic and aesthetic effect of Jung's predominantly scientific ideas and enable accessibility to a wide audience.

Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), following Ranke, also valued the role of the image and poetics in his approach to history and while Ranke's writings concentrated on political histories, Burckhardt's focus was on cultural and art history (ibid., pp. 74-75), the latter is known in Jungian circles as a cultural historian whose ideas were familiar to Jung. Burckhardt's notion of the 'primordial image' influenced the development of Jung's notion of the archetypal image (Read, Fordham, Adler & McGuire, in Jung, CW8, 1969, p. 133). Burckhardt left his home town of Basel in Switzerland, in 1839, to study in Berlin where he participated in Ranke's seminars. He was an avid collector of photographs and became well-known for using them in his lectures as aids for interpretation and representation (Maurer, 2013, p. 81). Hamilton writes that Burckhardt's cultural history 'closes the gap between history and aesthetics', as his purpose was for his historical writings to be 'appreciated' in the same way his readers would 'appreciate art' (Hamilton, 2003, p. 20).

Maurer's study focuses on the fact that *imagery* began to break down the rhetorical aspects of history *writing*, in Ranke and Burckhardt, while maintaining historical meaning. Maurer claims that 'Ranke's writings often set historical scenes into picturesque landscape and mountain panoramas.' Panoramic paintings were popular in Germany by the first decade of the nineteenth century. They were placed in rotunda-shaped architectural constructions that encircled an elevated platform from which the audience could experience the illusion of having a complete overview' (ibid. p. 19). By interpreting Ranke's writing of history as 'employing the aesthetics of the panorama as a poetic strategy of representation' and describing such artistic expressions as captivating experiences, Maurer implies that such representations of history evoke symbolic landscapes of the past that provide ways in which the reader/observer is encouraged to *feel into* a visual expression of the experience of a past moment in the present (ibid). Cinema would

significantly enhance this experience from its beginnings in America and France at the end of the nineteenth century, the 1890s, onwards (Cook, 1985, p. 3).

Burckhardt, in the context of the development of images, had ‘integrated the aesthetics of photography into the rhetorical-poetic design of his art historical writings’ (Maurer, 2013, p. 20). He also introduced visual representations of the past, but not the past as, ‘synthesised according to narrative-temporal paradigms’, but as ‘ordered visually and spatially’ (ibid., p.20). Maurer states that while Ranke believes that ‘aesthetic representation’ should meet the ‘scholarly purposes of academic historiography’, Burckhardt appears to find poetry to be ‘the true source of history’ and he represented this in the use of myths (ibid. p. 76). To explain further, Maurer writes:

Burckhardt bases his consideration of the representation of history on poetic principles. He considers myths as keys to decipher historical, cultural and political meaning. Ranke regarded myths as a seductive incitement to literary invention and false rhetoric; Burckhardt regarded them as central tools for historical representation, interpretation, and understanding. These aspects, such as autonomy, poetry and myth, emphasize the aesthetic configuration of Burckhardt’s writing, which constructs the basis for the constitutive role of the visual in his historicism. Burckhardt regards the image as a central stylish element in the representation of history... (ibid., p. 77).

Ranke’s ‘aesthetic historicism’, then, is moderated by limiting the extent to which he allows for the imaginative re-presentations of history. The visual aspect of Burckhardt’s historicist approach, on the other hand, is augmented by his emphasis on poetic principles, notably myth,

as a ‘key’ to unlocking symbolic meanings through interpretation and understanding and, at the same time, enhancing the ‘aesthetic configuration’ of his writing (ibid.). This aspect of Burckhardt’s thought, in which symbolic meanings and their ability to convey greater meaning than the word, or language, in itself, may be seen to represent an important point of convergence with analytical psychology that also emphasises the importance of images and myths as expressions of the collective unconscious.

Maurer considers Burckhardt’s writing to ‘conceptualise history as a great continuum of simultaneous historical processes’, which creates the effect of ‘a powerful totality beyond linguistic representation’ (ibid.). Although Maurer is referring to Burckhardt’s writing as a conscious articulation of history, she describes the way in which Jung may refer to the *collective unconscious* also as a site where the history of all humanity is conceptualised as continuous, powerful and beyond linguistic representation. Aesthetic historicism, represented in poetic language, myth and image, may therefore be seen as an expression of the orientation of the collective unconscious towards re-presentations of the image(s) of the primordial past. Critical historicism takes place when symbolic articulations are the subject of conscious interpretation.

The atmosphere of aesthetic historicism may have influenced Jung’s broad interest in symbols, the visual arts and the application of them to his psychology. A recent publication, *The Art of C.G. Jung* (2019), edited by Ulrich Hoerni, Thomas Fischer and Bettina Kaufmann, is a selection of Jung’s art and contributor’s essays. They focus on the perception of Jung as ‘an artist in his own right’, since the publication of *The Red Book* (2009) (Niehus, in Hoerni, Fischer and Kaufmann, 2019, p. 7). Jung was also an avid collector of art and artefacts. His interests and skills in calligraphy, drawing, mandalas and painting are known, yet his skills extended

also to ‘sculptures,’ and carving ‘reliefs in wood and sandstone’ (Hoerni, in Hoerni, Fischer and Kaufmann, 2019, p. 15).

Jung also explored the symbolic meanings of colour. He followed Goethe’s ideas in his *Theory of Colours* (1810), where Goethe asserts that ‘colours excite particular states of feeling’ (Hoch, in Hoerni, Fischer and Kaufmann, 2019, p. 33). Hoch gives further examples, citing a letter from Jung to the dancer Romola Nijinski in 1956, in which he describes the connection between colours in dreams, where ‘the unconscious manifests itself in colourful symbols’ (ibid., p. 36) and also notes that, historically, notions of the symbolic meanings of colour are found in writings on ‘alchemy’, including Jung’s writings on the subject (ibid., p. 43). The arts are, therefore, of significant importance to Jung but he does not view them in isolation from the environment in which they are created, experienced or interpreted. Modern art, for example, was of interest to him as human expression, of both the individual psyche and the archetypes, at that specific moment in history, rather than as an act of aesthetic criticism (Fischer and Kaufmann, in Hoerni, Fischer and Kaufmann, 2019, p. 22).

Jung and Burckhardt

Jung was not an uncritical follower of Burckhardt, he found some aspects of his work to be superficial (Bair, 2004, p. 188), and appeared to be disappointed by his open criticism of the Swiss historian, J.J. Bachofen (1815-1887) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) (ibid., p. 33). Jung found Burckhardt’s writing a useful source because despite his criticism, he did, however, introduce him to writers such as Bachofen, a cultural historian and sociologist (Ibid., p. 188), and, notably, an ‘anthropologist of primitive culture’ (ffytche, 2012, p. 159), whose writings

on myth ‘remained of life-long interest’ to Jung. (Bair, 2004, p. 33). Burckhardt has been a significant influence on Jung’s notion of the archetypal image. Burckhardt, in a letter, writes:

What you intend to find in Faust, you will have to find in an intuitive way. Faust is namely a genuine and legitimate myth, i.e., a great primordial image, in which everyone has to intuit *his* own being and destiny again in his own way... For the Oedipus saga there lay an Oedipus chord in every Greek that longed to be directly touched and to vibrate after its own fashion. And so it is with the German nation and Faust. (Shamdasani, 2012, p. 57).

Jung’s references to ‘primordial images’ in notions of the archetypes, implies that his perception of the past is also that it has an intuitive and expressive connection with the present in accord with Burckhardt, and also in accord with broader notions of historicism expressed since the thought of Vico and Herder. Shamdasani writes that when Jung was writing ‘*Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*’ (1911-1912) his attention was focused on the play of primordial images, across cultures and epochs,’ that ‘could emerge spontaneously, without prior learning’ (ibid). The emergence of the primordial image would be unique to the individual as it would become shaped, intuitively, by individual experience and expression and also, as already mentioned, by the cultural environment in which it becomes manifest.

Burckhardt suggests, a chord may be touched that would resonate intuitively with the individuals of a nation and be seen to appear in historical events from a later viewpoint. Burckhardt articulates this in terms of an achievement, following an intentional act ‘to find’ the chord in *individual consciousness* (ibid. p. 57). Although this echoes Herder’s notion of attempting to understand the history of a ‘nation’, ‘the era’, and ‘the geography,’ so as to ‘*feel yourself into*’ the past (Marwick, 2001, p. 62), the primordial image, for Jung, is an expression

of the instinctive autonomous and *unconscious* manifestation of an image from the *collective unconscious* that forms a connection with the past.

In 'Psychology and Literature' (1930), Jung writes that *Faust*, as a 'symbol', is 'the expression of something profoundly alive' in the soul of German people, he states: 'For it is not Goethe that creates *Faust*, but *Faust* that creates Goethe. Jung is suggesting that the archetypal content of the creative process unconsciously and autonomously shapes the writer's response to their work and articulates a symbol. It may then evoke a 'primordial image' of 'the figure of a healer or teacher of mankind or of a wizard' (Jung, 1930/2014, CW15, p. 103:159). The primordial image, he writes, is:

the archetype of the Wise Old Man, the helper and redeemer,
but also of the magician, deceiver, corrupter, and tempter.
This image has lain buried and dormant in the unconscious
since the dawn of history; it is awakened whenever the times
are out of joint and a great error deflects society from the right
path. For when people go astray they feel the need of a guide
or teacher, and even of a physician. (ibid.).

This description of the archetype, suggests that Jung perceives it both as a transformative influence on the individual as 'helper and redeemer' and also as the potential basis for the instinctive and intuitive response to social and historical change, 'whenever the times are out of joint' (ibid.), or demythologized. It is comparable with Burckhardt's poetic/aesthetic historicism that is described as engaging with myth to enable the interpretation of symbolic meanings. The archetype itself is not, Jung writes, 'good or evil' but its instinctive manifestation will be evaluated and 'determined' by 'the conscious attitude' (ibid., p. 104). The evaluation and interpretation of an archetypal manifestation in consciousness is made in

relation to the feeling it evokes. Further examination of the development of Jung's ideas explaining the concept of the archetypes is the subject of Part Two of this thesis.

Wilhelm Dilthey: Human Sciences and Hermeneutics

Human Sciences

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was a German scholar and his thought represents a significant contribution to late nineteenth century debates concerning the scientific status of history and psychology, as human sciences, and the value of the methodology of interpretation, especially hermeneutics, to our development of understanding. Dilthey reacted against the 'dominance of science over life,' His dissatisfaction stems from the perception that science dominated at the expense of culture, philosophy and human experience. He believed that 'art had ceased to represent something positive on its own account' and attempts to explain what science could not were rejected as 'irrationality' (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 59). Dilthey aimed to establish a 'theoretical basis for the historical understanding of life' (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 37). In his, '*Introduction to the Human Sciences*' (1883), Dilthey concentrated on the basis for the study of 'society and history' and proposed that this would only be achieved by finding ways to distinguish between '*Naturwissenschaft*', or 'natural science', and '*Geisteswissenschaft*'. The latter, Shamdasani writes, does not have an 'exact equivalent' in the English language but translates broadly as 'mental science, human science or systematic scholarship'. 'Natural science' refers generally to 'science' (ibid).

In an introduction to a selection of Dilthey's writings, Rickman (1976) gives a further explanation of these terms to clarify the sense of ambiguity surrounding Dilthey's intended approach to the human studies, which he based on 'understanding and hermeneutics' (Dilthey,

Rickman ed., 1976, p. 11). Dilthey, who had ‘some misgivings’, about his use of ‘*Geisteswissenschaften*’ had intended it as a translation of the ‘moral sciences’ as in ‘the human disciplines like history, sociology, jurisprudence, linguistics and literary criticism’ (ibid., p. 12). It is, however, in his ‘study of mind’ that ambiguity arises because, Rickman writes, ‘in contrast to the *Naturwissenschaften* which deal with matter,’ Dilthey ‘used *Geisteswissenschaften* - for the disciplines which deal with mind and its products.’ He chose this term because studies of the mind ‘are only accessible to understanding and require interpretation.’ But, as the body is ‘matter,’ then ‘*Geisteswissenschaft*, in the sense of the study of mind, can only be a part, though a crucial one,’ of the studies of humanity (ibid).

Dilthey’s interests extended to ‘the development of physiological psychology, man’s place in the evolutionary scale and the role of the physical environment, all of which involve use of scientific methods’ however, his main concern is with the whole person as a ‘psycho-social unit.’ But, his attempt to differentiate between mind and matter, and the decision to prioritise mind, reduces the study of man to only one aspect of his being (ibid. p. 12). Ambiguity arises, then, where Dilthey appears to give priority to the human sciences to the extent that it ‘supersedes’ and even ‘excludes’ other methodologies, such as the natural sciences (ibid p. 11).

Dilthey further differentiates between the two types of knowledge, he proposes that, the natural sciences deal with ‘sense-based facts’, while the human sciences deal with ‘inner experiences and historico-social reality,’ and a psychology of the individual was considered the fundamental human science (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 38). The ‘central position’ of human science was, until the late nineteenth century publication of Dilthey’s thought in 1883, ‘occupied only by the vague generalisations of experience of life, creations of poets, descriptions of character and destinies by men of the world and by indefinite truths which the

historian weaves into his narrative' (ibid.). For Dilthey, 'scientific knowledge and cultural knowledge' are fundamentally different and history and psychology, as human sciences, belong to the latter form of knowledge because 'Inner experience could not be compared to processes in nature' (ibid.). The critical difference between outer and inner, or matter and mind, is that they require different methods of interpretation. 'Whereas one *explains* nature, the other *understands* psychic life.' Dilthey places greater value on understanding, or *Verstehen*, the term given to describe his method of studying the human sciences (ibid.).

Jung, like Dilthey, appreciated that his own work incorporated the natural sciences, as they pertain to the study and practice of medicine, and the human sciences, illustrated in his deep interest in psychology, and in 1946 he maintained his own challenge to the attitude that gave priority to scientific explanation. In, 'On the Nature of the Psyche' (1946) he articulates this as an enduring and urgent concern:

Looked at from the standpoint of modern consciousness [...] the much needed broadening of the mind by science has only replaced medieval one-sidedness – namely, that age-old unconsciousness which once predominated and has gradually become defunctive – by a new one-sidedness, the over-valuation of “scientifically” attested views. These each and all relate to knowledge of the external object and in a chronically one-sided way, so that nowadays the backwardness of psychic development in general and of self-knowledge in particular has become one of the most pressing contemporary problems [...] Yet the psychic facts are as much in need of objective scrutiny and acknowledgement (Jung, 1946/1969, CW8, p. 220:426).

Jung takes an historical viewpoint, he compares the modern psyche with the medieval age of ‘unconsciousness’, or a level of consciousness that could be defined by ‘metaphysical potencies,’ and ‘superstition’ (ibid.). But, in parallel with Dilthey in the last century, he sees the inner/outer dichotomy as just as problematic in modern times because of the enduring ‘over-valuation’ of knowledge of the external object’ (ibid.). Jung sees this problem as being as illustrative of contemporary society in the mid-twentieth century as it had been in the early twentieth century, when he stated that there was a need to attend to the inner psychic life through ‘self-reflection’ and ‘renewal’ to achieve the ‘instinctive return to oneself’ a need that he believed to be indicated, not least of all, by the recent expansion in the public endeavour, at the time, to satisfy their ‘interest in the problem of the human psyche’ (Jung, 1917 and 1918, CW7, pp. 4-5).

The contemporary socio-historical situation in 1946, Jung writes, illustrates that; ‘As a result of the prevailing one-sidedness and in spite of the [...] demonstration of an unconscious that has become alienated from the conscious, there are still vast numbers of people who [...] apply their scientific scrupulosity only to external objects, never to their own psychic condition’ (Jung, 1946/1969, CW8 p. 220). Jung suggests that a lack of synthesis between scientific and psychological explanation and understanding means that an adequate method interpretation is required. The ‘art’ of hermeneutics, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is endorsed by Jung as a method of interpretation that, in a therapeutic relationship, engages with inner and outer development when symbolic manifestations signpost towards greater breadth and enrichment of interpretation.

When applied to creative fantasies or dreams, Jung writes, there will be no correct interpretation, but, 'validity is proved by their intense value for life.' Jung states that although a scientifically minded person may only accept that an interpretation should be 'right' there are also many people, 'for whom science is not a principle of intellectual ethics superior to their own minds, but rather a means of corroborating their inner experiences and giving them general validity' (Jung, 1916/2014, pp. 291-292:493-494). Jung is expressing the idea that psychology, as a human science, profits from a method of interpretation where the inner, symbolic, life of an individual/patient and the outer, objective, analysis of the therapist, are corroborated and validated to a point at which the 'value to life' is understood.

Dilthey's 'central aim' is to gain greater knowledge of humanity, or 'social-historical reality' (Dilthey, Rickman ed., 1976, p. 5). His methodology included being able to 'recapture the richness of experience which gives human life its distinctive qualities' (ibid., p. 7). This involved, in some accord with Ranke's approach, Dilthey's illustration of his own work with 'the use of autobiographies, literary works, letters and diaries as suitable material for research' (ibid.). For Dilthey, 'social-historical reality' is constituted by individuals because they 'think, feel and act and so produce languages, religions and institutions' (ibid). His approach to studying 'socio-historical' realities is in accord with Ranke, in terms of the importance he attributes to original sources, and Herder, with regard to the self-development of languages and their use in human communication. All are sources which give expression and meaning to social-historical reality.

Dilthey emphasises that human actions are of prime importance in the communication of meaning as they illustrate 'mental states', and he refers to all human actions, or indeed, 'the

whole range of human behaviour’, as ‘expressions’ (ibid. p. 8). In the historical context of Dilthey’s writing, the term ‘expression’ has a distinct meaning and is worth a brief explanation here. In the nineteenth century, from the point of view of Romanticism, ‘expression’ or ‘expressivity’ refers to authorship, and is perceived as ‘a work that is constituted in – and as – the author’s consciousness.’ In this context, expression represents ‘the ideas’ but also the ‘feelings, intentions and desires which emerge in the act of composition and result in a linguistic artefact’ which could be creative, for example, a ‘poem, play, novel,’ or an ‘essay or other literary work’ (Bennett, in Waugh, 2006 p. 49). In Jung’s writing, although the content is fundamentally science, his ideas are often distinctive because they are expressive. Raymond Williams, in his cultural analysis, often uses ‘expression,’ in the above sense, as a term to refer generally to cultural forms as the vehicle for structures of feeling.

The way in which we make sense of the mental state communicated by behaviour or expression is described as ‘understanding’, but understanding, to Dilthey, ‘differs significantly from other forms of knowing such as perceptual awareness’ (ibid. p. 9). Betanzos explains, in terms of Dilthey’s concept of *verstehen*:

Verstehen in Dilthey’s usage refers to understanding spiritual or mental reality, that is, understanding other people first, then indirectly ourselves, but also the great cultural manifestations of spirit in society and its institutions. It is the cement that makes the world of human affairs cohere [...] *Verstehen* is thus the mode of understanding all human, both on the individual or interpersonal levels and on the level of societal bodies. “Mutual *verstehen* assures us of the *community* which exists between individuals... The community of living individuals is the point of departure for all relationships of the particular and the universal in the human sciences” (Dilthey, Betanzos ed., 1988, p. 24).

The understanding of the realities of other people, ourselves and all 'great cultural manifestations of spirit' is to be achieved through interpreting their expressions of individual and collective spirit. Rickman states that Dilthey referred to 'acts of understanding' that are engaged in comprehending 'the meaning of a complex, permanent expression' as 'interpretation.' The methodology used is 'hermeneutics' (Dilthey, Rickman ed., 1976, pp. 9-10) and Dilthey was influenced by the hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834).

Hermeneutics

The concluding thoughts of Dilthey's 'The Development of Hermeneutics' (1900), ends with an outline of Schleiermacher's method, which introduces the idea of unconscious creativity to hermeneutics. (Ibid., pp. 256-260). Dilthey writes, 'The final goal of the hermeneutics procedure is to understand the author better than he understood himself.; a statement which is the necessary conclusion of the doctrine of unconscious creation.' (Dilthey, Rickman ed., 1976, pp. 259-60).

Dilthey places Schleiermacher's approach to hermeneutics in the context of the influence of 'Winkelmann's (1717-1768) interpretation of works of art,' Herder's '(1744-1803) empathy into the spirit of the ages and people' and also 'the philology oriented towards the new aesthetic of classical scholars.' Schleiermacher's own knowledge of German transcendental philosophy is another significant influence and all combine, Dilthey writes, to enable him to reach 'behind what is given in consciousness to the creative capacity which, working harmoniously and unconscious of itself, produces the whole form of the world in us' (Dilthey, Rickman ed., 1976 p. 256). These factors combine to create Schleiermacher's particular style of interpretation and that which Dilthey describes as 'the definitive founding of a scientific hermeneutics' (ibid.).

Schleiermacher's hermeneutics augments the adherence to a hermeneutic based on rules that had been practised for many centuries, by developing the analysis of understanding in relation to literary creation and historical records. This meant that he turned to the examination of, 'the comprehension of the purposive act itself.' But, Dilthey writes, Schleiermacher,

[...] could only analyse understanding which is a reshaping or reconstruction on the basis of its relationship to the process of literary creation. He recognized the imaginative consideration of the creative process through which a vital literary work originates as the basis for appreciating the process by which we understand the whole of a work from its written signs and from this the purpose and mentality of its author. (ibid.).

Schleiermacher initially based his analysis of understanding and interpretation on literary creation but, Dilthey writes, he required a 'new psychological-historical view' and a 'philological hermeneutic', to achieve a wider ranging 'general hermeneutic' (ibid., p. 257). He achieved this in collaboration with a group of 'friends', scholars including Johann C. F. Schiller, (1759-1805), Wilhelm von Humboldt, (1767-1835), Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), who had turned from 'poetic production to the understanding of the historical world.' They formed a 'powerful movement,' which also influenced Ranke (1795-1886) and Hegel (1770-1831), among others (Ibid.).

The psychological-historical view, 'assumes the existence of a unitary and creatively active capacity which, unconscious of its doing and shaping, receives the first stimulus for its work and then develops it' (ibid., pp. 256-257). This describes a psychological view similar to that described, later, by Jung in 'Structure of the Unconscious' (1916/2014) in relation to the hermeneutic interpretation of the content of fantasy, where he describes one function of the

symbol, which could be equivalent to an initial stimulus, is to ‘signpost’ the way towards a multiplicity of possible interpretations (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p. 291:491-493).

Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic method, Dilthey writes, addressed the ‘general difficulty of all interpretation’, which is:

The whole of a work must be understood from individual words and their combination but full understanding of an individual part pre-supposes understanding of the whole. This circle is repeated in the relation of an individual work to the mentality and development of its author, and it recurs again in the relation of such an individual work to its literary genre (Dilthey, Rickman ed., 1976, p. 259).

First, Dilthey describes the philological and grammatical views taken in the interpretation of literary and artistic forms which Jung appears to apply to the interpretation of words, and also symbols and images, that inform his patient’s dreams, fantasies and pathological states, such as hallucinations. The particular attention to the interpretation of the author’s development in the second stage is where the social cultural and historical aspects of the work, or patient, are taken into account and is also illustrated in Jung’s interpretative practice. The three stages of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic method, including the relation of stages one and two to the development of literary genre and conventions, occur also in Raymond Williams’ interpretations of literary, artistic and cultural forms.

Put succinctly Dilthey explains how Schleiermacher ‘solved the problem’ in his written introduction to Plato’s *Republic* where:

He started with a survey of the structure, comparable to a superficial reading, tentatively grasped the whole context, illuminated the difficulties and halted thoughtfully at all those

passages which afforded insight into the composition. Only then did interpretation proper begin (ibid.).

Dilthey, after documenting a broad history of the development of hermeneutics from classical times to the beginning of the twentieth century, describes the method by which all texts are now approached. The influence of Schleiermacher's method, results in greater understanding of an author and this adds a further 'explanatory context' (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 61).

The greater understanding arises out of the notion of 'unconscious creation' because this may be seen to historicise 'what the author knows, learning from it something in addition to the truth he or she tells' (ibid). This means that the author's work may be interpreted in the context of that which 'the author could not have said, something he or she lacked the historical distance from themselves to see' (ibid). Hamilton states that understanding the author successfully adds to their 'scientific effectiveness' and the 'added dimension is specifically historical, not just aesthetic' (ibid.). Schleiermacher's method relates to Dilthey's wider interest in the human sciences because it portrays 'historical understanding which does not reduce to science' but proposes a different type of science (ibid.). Hamilton describes the line of thought expressed by Dilthey as representing an 'historical turn' from the aesthetics and poetics of Romanticism to a new science of history, leading to a 'more rounded world-view' characterised by the incorporation of sociological, cultural and political areas of study and a 'revitalized humanities fit to compete with science' (ibid., pp. 61-62).

The suggestion that Dilthey arrived at this particular aspect of hermeneutic methodology through the study of history where Hamilton claims he found that multiple kinds of 'expressions and symbols' develop out of 'original creativity,' illustrates that a psychological turn, coincided

with the historical turn to his ideas (ibid., p. 62). Dilthey claimed that, ‘we understand ourselves in relation to our past.’ We create ‘intelligible events’ in our lives by ‘detecting the values, meanings and purposive patterns which connect our past to our present’ (ibid., p. 64). Dilthey considered this to be the way in which all history is understood and, Hamilton cites Dilthey where he states, ‘The reflection of a person about himself remains the standard and basis for understanding history’ (ibid. p. 65).

Although Dilthey’s ideas appear to compare with an historicist approach, according to Betanzos, in their translation and introduction to Dilthey’s *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (1923/1988), Dilthey rejected claims that his studies were historicist. Historicism is categorised, by Betanzos, alongside scepticism and relativism, and, he suggests that it represents a viewpoint that is contrary to Dilthey’s endeavour to gain ‘objectivity in his philosophy and validity in his science’ (Dilthey, Betanzos ed., 1988, pp. 30-31). The historicism of the nineteenth century, however, professed that the interpretation of history involved *more than* making an objective representation of the past, or simply recreating the past, because it could not be separated from the present (Brannigan, 1998, p. 29).

Dilthey, in the nineteenth century, may not have intended to contribute to historicist thought but his application of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic methodology may be seen, from the viewpoint of the present, to have validated methods of twenty-first century historicism, cultural and literary studies and, broadly, the humanities. Brannigan includes Dilthey in his list of ‘major philosophers of historicism’ who considered the past to be ‘expressive in the same way that a literary text is expressive’ (ibid., p. 30). ‘Historicists’, he writes, ‘understand the past as a narrative, and accordingly they narrativise the past’. This approach acknowledges that the

past ‘constitutes many possibilities for meaning’ (ibid). It also, therefore, presents considerable potential for interpretation.

Conclusion

Dilthey writes that Schleiermacher’s ‘theory of inner and outer form is fundamental.’ (Dilthey, Rickman ed., 1976, p. 259). Hermeneutics is a fertile method for achieving understanding in all human studies and is apparent in analytical psychology. Rickman explains:

The study of the human world involves not only the extensive interpretation of texts and verbal utterances but also the treatment of many other social phenomena *as if* they were texts to be interpreted. In other words, investigating the human studies is frequently more like finding the meaning of a poem than like researching in physics or chemistry (ibid., p. 10).

Rickman includes psychoanalytic theory because it studies human behaviours, or, according to Dilthey, ‘expressions,’ that were not previously thought meaningful, such as, ‘slips of the tongue ‘and other mistakes, ‘compulsions and hysterical symptoms’ as ways into understanding mental life’ (ibid., pp. 8-9). Rickman criticises Freud for being unable to ‘disentangle himself from a conception of knowledge modelled on the physical sciences,’ and suggests that psychoanalytical interpretations, because neither ‘verifiable’ nor ‘falsifiable,’ may benefit from the interpretative methods employed by ‘historians or literary critics’ (ibid., p. 9).

Contrary to Rickman’s comment, Freud does endeavour to disentangle himself from positivist knowledge in his well-known interpretations of the Oedipus myth and in his studies of the origin of religion and myth that he discloses in letters to Jung. On 1st September 1911, Freud

writes, ‘my work in these last few weeks has dealt with the same theme as yours, [...] the origin of religion’ (McGuire, 1974/1991, p. 236). In further correspondence, notably on the 30th November 1911, Freud confides to Jung that he is having ‘difficulties’ with his ‘work on totemism’ (ibid., p. 248). It appears that he is working on *Totem and Taboo* (1913). In the Preface of this publication Freud states that he is attempting for the first time to apply ‘psychoanalysis’ to ‘social psychology.’ He ‘confesses’ that Jung is one source of the ‘first stimulus for my own essays’ (Freud, 1913/1960, p. ix).

During this particular period of correspondence between the two men it becomes evident that Freud is reading Jung’s “‘Transformations and Symbols of the Libido’” (1912) and he refers to the ‘section on two modes of thought’ (McGuire, 1974/1991, pp. 244-245). Freud confides to Jung that he is finding his own work on the psychology of religion ‘troubling,’ on the 2nd November 1911, (ibid., pp. 241-242) and it is ‘going slowly’ on 12th November 1911, prompting him to express his exasperation asking, ‘Why in God’s name did I allow myself to follow you into this field?’ He asks Jung for suggestions but allows that, ‘probably my tunnels will be far more subterranean than your shafts and we shall pass each other by’ (ibid., pp. 244-245). In reply, Jung acknowledges that he and Freud have different modes of thinking. Jung answers Freud on 14th November 1911:

Our personal differences will make our work different. You dig up the precious stones, but I have the ‘degree of extension.’ As you know, I always have to proceed from the outside to the inside and from the whole to the part. I would find it too upsetting to let large tracts of human knowledge lie there neglected. And because of the differences in our working methods we shall undoubtedly meet from time to time in unexpected places (ibid., pp. 245-246).

Jung describes his own method in similar terms to Dilthey's summary of Schleiermacher, mentioned earlier. Jung suggests that first he would perform an *outer* survey of the 'structure' and 'context' of *the whole*, then through deeper consideration illuminate and reveal the *inner* complexities of *the parts*. He implies that interpretation begins by accessing and revealing further opportunities to extend human knowledge.

For Jung, knowledge and understanding are also perceived in relation to unconscious creativity. Dilthey's description of the act of interpretation as reaching 'behind what is given in consciousness to the creative capacity which, working harmoniously and unconscious of itself, produces the whole form of the world in us' (Dilthey, Rickman, ed., 1976, p. 256), resonates with Jung's description of the collective unconscious where he writes, 'The collective unconscious contains, or is, an historical mirror-image of the world. It too is a world, but a world of images' (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p. 298). For Jung, the inner complexities of psychological interpretations emanate from deep within the psyche, from the collective unconscious and the archetypes, and because of the intangible nature of those parts of analytical psychology and their relation to the past, he often assumes the language of poetics, rather than science, to communicate his extensive knowledge and enable the expression of the unconscious and its creativity.

The second part of the thesis will concentrate on the development of the core concept of the archetypes which convey a multiplicity of references to the collective past of humanity. In the next chapter, Chapter Four 'The Archetypes and Myth', it first presents an outline of the historical and scholastic influences on the development of Jung's work and then discusses Jung's essay, 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912/2014) which differentiates between critical direct

thinking and creative undirected thinking in the context of different levels of consciousness. Jung's position on the notion of historical continuity is explored with reference to post-Jungian thought on 'archetypal history' (Lu, 2011). Chapter three continues with a detailed account of Jung's definitions and descriptions of the development of his notion of the archetypes, and concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship of the archetypes to myth in analytical psychology.

PART TWO

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ARCHETYPES AND MYTH

Introduction

Part two of the thesis concentrates on Jungian and post-Jungian conceptions of the archetypes. Chapter Four begins by noting how past scholarly influences on the development of Jung's thought, especially his ideas regarding the archetypal image, present a paradox in that the depth of scholastic learning undertaken in a historicist approach to inform and interpret the images and mythological narratives, 'inverts' the notion that they appear spontaneously without prior learning (Shamdasani, 2012, p.57). This is followed by consideration of the paradox in the light of Jung's writing on 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (Jung, 1912/2014, CW5, pp.7-33). It then examines in detail the origins of Jung's idea of the archetype in its relation to instinct, intuition and feeling, this section concludes with a summary of Jung's notion of the archetypal image. The final section of this chapter explores the importance of mythology to the understanding of the collective unconscious and the archetypes.

Historical influences and the 'profound paradox'

'Instinct and the Unconscious' (1919/1969) is the published essay of a contribution to a symposium of the same title, presented in translation on behalf of Jung, at London University in July 1919 (Read, Fordham, Adler, eds., in Jung, 1960/1969, CW8, p. 129).⁷ In 'Instinct and the Unconscious' Jung addresses the development of the philosophical foundation for his own interpretation of the archetypes. Plato, Jung writes, placed a high value on the archetypes as 'metaphysical ideas, as "paradigms" or models, while real things are held as only the copies of these model ideas' (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8, p. 135:275). The 'idea of the archetype' was

⁷ The editors of this volume note that this essay contains the first instance of Jung's use of the term 'archetype'. Jung, they write, had previously discussed 'the same concept under the term "primordial image"' in 'CW5, par. 45, n. 45,' and CW7, 'par. 101,' (Ibid.p.133). The essays they refer to are 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912/1952) and 'The Personal and the Collective Unconscious' (1966/2014), respectively.

‘borrowed’ from the Medieval philosophy of St Augustine (ibid., pp. 135-136:275). Jung refers to early notions of the archetypes, found in scholasticism,’ as ‘natural images engraved on the human mind, helping it to form judgements,’ but states that by the age of later thinkers, such as, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Schopenhauer the notion became reduced by, ‘deterioration’ of its ‘metaphysical value,’ to ‘thought,’ and associated with ‘cognition’ and ‘reason’. Later scholastic and philosophical notions of the archetypes, Jung writes, became associated with the ‘psychological process’ which ‘disguises the instincts under the cloak of rational motivations and transforms the archetypes into rational concepts’ (ibid., p.136:276-277). But Jung maintains that the archetypes are unconscious ‘pre-existent forms [...] which can only become conscious secondarily,’ when giving symbolic form to ‘psychic contents’ (Jung, 1936/1968, CW9i, p. 43:90), until then, they are beyond reason.

Shamdasani (2012), provides a comprehensive summary of the historical influences on Jung’s thought in this context, he sketches a much wider frame of reference and influence than that of philosophy alone. He writes that Jung resigned from the Burghölzli Hospital in 1909 to concentrate more fully on research, this included ‘the study of mythology, folklore and religion’. Jung also turned his attention from ‘the psychology of the individual’ to include the study of aspects of ‘cultural history’ (Shamdasani, 2012, p. 49). Shamdasani notes the influence of, for example, ‘Friedrich Creuzer (1771-1858), a professor of philology and ancient history at Heidelberg’ (ibid., p. 50).

Creuzer believed that ‘all the religions and philosophical ideas of ancient times take two main forms, mythic and symbolic,’ and ‘image and metaphor are the first elements of symbolism,

which is the source of all expression' (ibid.). Jung wrote to Freud in 1909 expressing his conviction that:

...a complete understanding of the psyche (if possible at all) will only come through history or with its help... mythology appears to me now in a new and significant light. What we now find in the individual soul - in compressed, stunted or one-sidedly differentiated form - may be seen spread out broadly in the historical past. (ibid.).

This correspondence signifies the emergence of Jung's key concepts; the archetypes and the collective unconscious. But the above citation also illustrates how Jung tends to conflate history and mythology when his ideas, which are presented in the vein of the human sciences rather than from an empirical/positivist position, are distinctly expressive.

Jung aims to express a hypothesis that establishes an empathetic dialogue between consciousness and the past, as the unconscious *other*, while acknowledging its influence on the present and future. This is not history, because myth can only provide false or imaginary narratives of the past, rather than details of actual events (Hamilton, 1996/2003 p. 6). Jung at this time, however, began to direct his own interest, and that of his students, towards the images, symbols and mythic material, as the 'possible presence of phylogenetic material in the dreams, fantasies and delusions of psychotic patients' (ibid., p.51). The material gathered in this way became important for Jung as evidence for his hypotheses and, according to Shamdasani, 'The possibility in modern times of the spontaneous re-emergence of mythic motifs with no prior acquaintance was at the heart of Jung's vision' (ibid., p.53).

As noted in chapter two, Jung was also influenced by the well-known Swiss cultural historian, Jacob Burckhardt, who had alluded to the potential for the spontaneous re-emergence of mythic motifs, in the present. To recap briefly, Jung writes that Burckhardt ‘seems to have glimpsed’ the probability that ‘typical myths which serve to work out our racial and national complexes’ exist and re-appear. This is evident, Jung writes, as Burckhardt ‘once said that every Greek in classical times carried a piece of Oedipus in him, and every German a piece of Faust’ (Jung, 1912/2014, CW5, p. 32:45). The notion of the ‘primordial image,’ then, was adopted from Burckhardt by Jung and formed the basis for his concept of the archetypes.

The idea that the psychic content of individuals may comprise of collective mythical motifs and that when they are activated and emerge in consciousness, will become culturally determined in the present, depicts the dynamic force and potential of the collective unconscious. Following Jung’s assimilation of Burckhardt’s idea, ‘his attention was focussed on the play of primordial images, across cultures and epochs, and the manner in which these images articulated the progressions and regressions of the human libido’ (Shamdasani, 2012, p. 57). Jung was clearly greatly influenced by what he perceived to be the potential for the mythical content of the human psyche to be of great cultural and psychological significance. The importance of myth to analytical psychology will be discussed further in the final section of this chapter.

An enduring consequence of Jung’s prolific scholastic reading and the influence this had on his ideas is that which Shamdasani terms, ‘a profound paradox’ in his work.

At the heart of Jung’s vision of the spontaneous re-emergence of primordial images lay a profound paradox. The recognition of such

images required wide and deep classical humanistic scholarship...

At the same time, Jung's thesis inverted the very terms of classical humanism – such ideas, images, and conceptions could emerge spontaneously without prior learning, for their source was to be found within the soul of the individual. This threw open the question of the understanding of creativity and authorship. (ibid.).

Shamdasani goes on to discuss the 'primordial images,' 'ideas and conceptions,' that spontaneously re-emerge 'without prior learning,' in the context of Jung's reference to the similarities between the visions of Maeder's patient, the apprentice locksmith, and the philosopher, Schopenhauer, which are manifest in the image of the world as a picture book. The summary, from Jung's 'The Structure of the Unconscious' (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p. 271-273), has already been noted in chapter one of this thesis but is mentioned again here because the relationship between the primordial image/archetype to the 'question of the understanding of creativity and authorship,' is a core concept of the thesis.

The process of the spontaneous emergence and re-emergence of archetypal images, which implies an innate potential of the unconscious, is, therefore, interwoven with notions of 'creativity and authorship.' Shamdasani's description of a 'profound paradox' echoes Jung's early essay where he refers to the scholastic tendency to attempt to conceal such a paradox by disguising the 'instincts under the cloak of rational motivations,' and transforming the irrational, unconscious, 'archetypes into rational concepts' (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8, pp. 136:276-277). For Jung, however, it is vital that despite the 'wide and deep' scholasticism that may be associated with the interpretation of the emergence and re-emergence of archetypal images, in consciousness, the unconscious images are the shared possession of the whole of humanity. So, to attribute 'authorship' to Schopenhauer for being inspired by a primordial

image would, therefore, be an exaggeration of his creativity (Jung, 1916/2014, CW7, p.272) and a negation of the creativity of the locksmith's apprentice.

The primordial image, as the origin, and therefore, author, of the manifestation of an unconscious creative process, performs the function of stimulating and eliciting the purpose of itself. In Jung's later work on poetry and literature, he states, that 'The creative process, so far as we are able to follow it at all, consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image' (Jung, 1922/2014, CW15, p. 82:130). This, in light of the example of the locksmith's apprentice, however, occurs whether the result is to be a work of art or the manifestation of psychic conflict. The image emanates from the collective unconscious in symbolic form, to convey the potential for clarification or resolution of psychic tension, then interpretation takes place when the image appears in individual consciousness. Scholastic learning is critical to interpretation, not authorship, in Jung's work, but his method of interpretation depicts a creative use of classical and religious scholasticism. Interpretation and creativity are the result of different ways of thinking and Jung explores two kinds of thinking in his early work.

Jung: 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912/2014)

In 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912/2014), Jung defines time in two different ways. On the one hand, as historical, temporal, an objective reality in present consciousness, determined by world, societal and cultural events and, on the other hand, as the innate, unconscious footprint of the ancient past of the world, since time immemorial, and which is attributed to the collective unconscious. The latter position is not history, as it refers to infinite unconscious time, an unknown past that is an imaginative concept. Jung manages, however, to align the two versions of history and the past in analytical psychology. In, 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912/2014), to

recap on the previous chapter, Jung illustrates what Dilthey (1900) describes from the point of view of Schleiermacher's writings, as a process that extends beyond conscious rational thought to, 'the creative capacity which, working harmoniously and unconscious of itself, produces the whole form of the world in us' (Dilthey, Rickman, ed., 1976, p. 256). In Jung's writings this is represented as the modern world in constant dialogue with the primordial past.

Jung maintains that his method of analytical psychology represents a close connection between the psychological and the ancient past in the human psyche. In the introduction to 'Symbols of Transformation' (1912/2014),⁸ Jung emphasises that his own approach to psychology aims to examine the importance of history to the individual and society. He writes:

Psychological investigators have hitherto turned their attention mainly to the analysis of individual problems. But, as things are at present, it seems to me imperative that they should broaden the basis of this analysis by a comparative study of the historical material [...] For, just as psychological knowledge furthers our understanding of the historical material, so, conversely, the historical material can throw new light on individual psychological problems. These considerations have led me to direct my attention more to the historical side of the picture, in the hope of gaining fresh insight into the foundations of psychology.
(Jung, 1912/2014, CW5, p. 5-6;3).

Jung makes clear his intention to broaden the scope of his psychology and this signifies the shift towards extending the analysis of the individual to include the historical context of collective humanity as a whole. For Jung, the broader scope, is to include both objective

⁸ CW5, 'Symbols of Transformation', was extensively revised in 1952.
(Jung, CW5, editorial note, [1912/2014] p. v).

historical awareness and the unconscious past. He acknowledges that Freud and some of his followers have also examined and tried to understand ‘historical problems’ by applying their methods to individual psychology and the ‘activity of the unconscious psyche in modern man’ (ibid., p. 5:2). Jung’s intention to explore the role of ‘historical material’ in the illumination of ‘psychological problems’ (ibid. p. 5-6:3), leads him to propose a psychic function where the ancient past and the present unite but the archaic ‘historical material’ he refers to is the content of myth.

Jung refers to Freud’s articulation of the Oedipus myth to explain his emerging point of view:

[...] if we can succeed in discriminating between objective knowledge and emotional value-judgements, then the gulf that separates our age from antiquity is bridged over, and we realize with astonishment that Oedipus is still alive for us. The importance of this realization should not be under-estimated, for it teaches us that there is an identity of fundamental human conflicts which is independent of time and place. What aroused a feeling of horror in the Greeks still remains true, but it is true for us only if we give up the vain illusion that we are *different*, i.e., morally better, than the ancients. We have merely succeeded in forgetting that an indissoluble link binds us to the men of antiquity [...] By penetrating into the blocked subterranean passages of our own psyches we grasp the living meaning of classical civilization, and at the same time we establish a firm foothold outside our own culture from which alone it is possible to gain an objective understanding of its foundations. (ibid., p. 4-5:1).

Jung suggests that the past should be considered objectively and non-judgementally so that when unconscious mythological narratives and motifs from the ancient past re-emerge in us,

they will be recognised as relevant and purposive in the present. If we maintain our connection to the unconscious archaic world, we gain a firm footing from which we can open our minds to broader interpretations of our modern personal and cultural conditions. This passage illustrates Jung's attempt to establish an empathetic dialogue with the past as *other*, while also acknowledging its influence on present and future consciousness.

Jung's ability to maintain a sense of the archaic past as always present in the psyche, is explained and illustrated in the first essay of 'Symbols of Transformation', titled 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912/2014), where he differentiates between 'directed' and 'non-directed' thinking. First, he describes 'directed' thinking, this depends on language, as 'simply a system of signs or symbols' (Jung, 1912/2014, CW5, p. 12:13). The importance of language to directed-thinking is acknowledged as a system devised to communicate with others. Jung states: 'So long as we think directedly, we think *for* others and speak *to* others (ibid., p. 12:12). It is '*thinking in words*', 'directed *outwards*, to the outside world' (ibid. p. 11:11). Jung writes:

To that extent, directed or logical thinking is 'reality-thinking,' a thinking that is adapted to reality, by means of which we imitate the successiveness of objectively real things, so that the images inside our mind follow one another in the same strictly causal sequence as the events taking place outside it (ibid.)

Jung depicts directed, logical or reality-thinking as a temporal, linear process. Directed thinking is in a form that, as it is 'adapted to reality,' it functions to connect purposefully with the world (ibid.). The communication of 'directed-thinking', uses language and speech 'generated by intellect' and it 'generates intellect' (ibid., p. 13:14). It is, therefore, 'an instrument of culture' that has been developed over the centuries, through education, and has been 'forced' to change the nature of thinking 'from the subjective, individual sphere to the

objective, social sphere.’ This process has resulted in a ‘re-adjustment of the human mind to which we owe our modern empiricism and technics’ (ibid., p. 16:17). Jung echoes the viewpoint of Herder, noted in the last chapter, that ‘it is in the use of language that we become human,’ through communication, and ‘the humanity revealed in language is a cultural manifestation bound to conventions of time and place’ (Hamilton, 2003/1996, p. 33).

In the earlier citation from Jung’s writing in the introduction to ‘Symbols of Transformation’, he is not referring to directed thinking when he writes in reference to the Oedipus myth, that ‘there is an identity of fundamental human conflict which is *independent of time and place*’ (ibid., p. 4:1, *emphasis added*). Jung refers there to the presence of psychic conflict in the unconscious, where time is infinite and place is indefinite. This kind of thinking corresponds with thoughts that occur non-directedly. Jung writes that these are thoughts will then ‘float, sink or rise’ in an ‘automatic play of ideas’ (ibid., p. 17:18). ‘Non-directed’ thinking distracts us from reality and invites fantasy, or dreaming, and then, Jung writes, ‘thinking in verbal form ceases, image piles on image, feeling on feeling’ (ibid.). The content of non-directed thoughts consists of notions of the ‘the past’ and its countless ‘memory images’ (ibid., p. 18:19). The point that Jung is making is that ‘directed’ thinking is a conscious activity but when language, and the effort involved in using it, has ceased, ‘undirected’ thinking becomes spontaneous and ‘guided by unconscious motives’ (ibid., p. 18:20).

‘Non-directed’ thinking evokes, for Jung, ancient ways of creating meanings. Modernity, he suggests, has encouraged a materialistic way of seeing the world but he admires the ‘ancients’ their ‘fantastic’ mode of thinking, and the way in which it was ‘saturated with mythology’, prior to the Enlightenment (ibid., p. 20:23). On mythical thinking, he writes:

This activity of the early classical mind was in the highest degree artistic; the goal of its interest does not seem to have been how to understand the real-world as objectively and accurately as possible, but how to adapt it aesthetically to subjective fantasies and expectations... (ibid., p.21:24)

Jung presents this mode of thinking as an expressive, poetic, creative, ‘artistic’, response to making sense of the world in which unconscious symbolic images emerge in mythical form as a substitute for language. Meanings may still be ascribed to the unconscious images, however, because although they are ‘ancient’, the motifs were once based on reality, the meanings of which ‘re-echo’ and endure ‘side by side’ with our ‘newly acquired directed and adapted thinking’ (ibid., p.28:36). ‘Non-directed’ thinking may be seen to guide Jung’s own creative way of expressing the re-echoes of the past from the collective unconscious and the archetypes in his later works. The ideas expressed in Jung’s ‘Two Kinds of Thinking’ provide a way in which to reconcile the directed-thinking of scholasticism applied to interpretation of the primordial image, with the spontaneous unconscious, un-directed and unlearned, re-emergence of the same images in the present.

Lu and the idea of ‘archetypal history’

Lu (2011) writes that, for Jung, history ‘operates at two distinct levels,’ and he goes on to broaden the distinction between ‘objective history’ and ‘natural history’, described by Jung in, ‘Role of the Unconscious’ (1918) (Lu, 2011, p. 15). Jung considered ‘objective history’ to be ‘the “history” which we “make”’ (ibid.). It is, Lu states, more useful to refer to this version of history as ‘*conscious history*’, as it represents a rational dialogue with the past (ibid., p. 16). Conscious history, then, describes history as it would be expressed in directed thinking, adapted and ready to communicate to the world. Jung describes ‘natural history’, however, as a history

that is timeless and ‘transmitted’ with the ‘brain structure’ (ibid.) It produces creative fantasies which ‘have their roots in mythology’ and it arises out of the collective unconscious. Jung writes, ‘this structure tells its own story’, the story of humanity, ‘the un-ending myth of death and rebirth, and of the multitudinous figures who weave in and out of this mystery’ (Jung, 1918/1964, CW10, p. 10:12). Jung asserts that the collective unconscious discloses ‘its living presence only through the medium of creative fantasy’ and it knows humanity as it has always been, not as it is at the moment but, ‘as myth’ (ibid., p. 10:13).

Lu suggests that ‘natural history may be perceived as *‘archetypal history’*, as it is not entirely unconscious but will, at times, become ‘partially’ manifest ‘as conscious history’ (Lu, 2011, p. 16). Archetypal history, describes a history arising out of non-directed thinking, that emerges or re-emerges out of inner, unconscious, motives as creative fantasy. It represents a Romantic notion of history as it expresses a ‘deep feeling for nature’ and ‘myth’ as well as the unconscious (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 200). Lu states that, ‘archetypal history’ could, however, be perceived negatively, as ‘repetitive’, resistant to change, and denying ‘human agency’ and ‘context.’ If it were to ignore historical and political developments, ‘archetypal history’ could repeat ‘potentially harmful discourses’ (Lu, 2011, pp. 17-19). This is because archetypal content of the unconscious implies mythological narratives which tend to represent ‘imagined histories’, rather than historical realities (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 6).

On the other hand, Lu cites Jung who, in the ‘Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology’ (Jung, 1931/1969), ‘advocates fostering a “living sense of history” by recognising the reality of historical continuity’ (Lu, 2011, p. 14). The “continuity of history” is intrinsically bound to recognising the unconscious operating in history’ (ibid., p.15). Lu describes the awareness of

a connection to the past as a ‘grounding mechanism,’ a ‘reference point’ and a ‘firm foundation’ for self-development. Lu adds, ‘At the collective level, society is inherently linked to an ancient past, and knowledge of this connection is integral to deciphering the psychological effects the unconscious has had on cultural and intellectual progress’ (ibid.). Historical continuity as the living sense of the collective unconscious, defines the origin of the greater dimension to cultural and intellectual forms than are known at the time of their creation.

Jung’s references to ‘history’ or, more precisely, the past. in his writing appear to represent the two kinds of thinking he describes. He provides direct, rational thought in essays that provide cultural criticism and insight into early twentieth century ‘structures of feeling’ of modernity and modernism, and refers frequently to his reading of a vast history of scholastic studies. On the other hand, Jung also expresses himself in the manner of non-directed ways of thinking. When the direct language of scientific explanation and interpretation may not be felt to be adequate, he writes creatively, expressing the primordial past in his many references to mythology. If vulnerable to positivist scientific scrutiny, in his writing on the collective unconscious or the archetypes for example, Jung articulates his ideas in poetic expressions of imagery and metaphorical language giving the effect that, the concept of the archetypes could have partly written itself in acts of undirected creativity.

The Jungian Archetype

Jung writes, the ‘factor determining the mode of apprehension,’ commonly described today as understanding, is the ‘archetype or primordial image’ (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8 p. 136-:277). He continues, ‘Just as conscious apprehension gives our actions form and direction, so unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct’ (ibid., p.

137:277). This citation, from ‘Instinct and the Unconscious’ (1919/1969), summarises Jung’s core concept that the archetype is the initial determining factor in the process of *unconscious apprehension*. The next section of this chapter will examine the importance of instinct, intuition and feeling to the archetypal image.

Personal and Collective Unconscious

In ‘Instinct and the Unconscious’ (1919/1969) Jung differentiates between the ‘personal’ and the ‘collective’ unconscious. The personal unconscious is described as ‘a receptacle’ for ‘lost memories...contents...too weak to become conscious’, psychic contents that may emerge in dreams, and ‘the more or less intentional repressions of painful thoughts and feelings.’ However, of greatest importance to Jung’s psychology is that:

[...] we also find in the unconscious qualities that are not individually acquired but are inherited, e.g., instincts as impulses to carry out actions from necessity, without conscious motivation. In this “deeper” stratum we also find the *a priori*, inborn forms of “intuition”, namely the *archetypes* of perception and apprehension, which are the necessary *a priori* determinants of all psychic processes. Just as his instincts compel man to a specifically human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his ways of perception and apprehension into specifically human patterns. (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8, p. 133:270).

Jung illustrates, in this early work, that the archetypes are directly associated with the manifestation of instincts and are also innate ‘forms of intuition’. They function as unconscious dynamic psychic processes that determine ‘perception and apprehension’. Jung states that the archetypes generate the psychic energy required to ‘force’ the process of ‘perception and

apprehension' to follow certain patterns, some of which will emerge, as instinctive actions, in consciousness.

Of prime importance to Jung is that:

The instincts and the archetypes together form the “collective unconscious.” ...it is not made up of individual and more or less unique contents but of those which are universal and of regular occurrence. Instinct is an essentially collective, i.e., universal and regularly occurring phenomenon which has nothing to do with individuality. Archetypes have this quality in common with the instincts and are likewise collective phenomenon.

(ibid., p. 133-134:270).

The archetypes then, as ‘*a priori*’ intuitions, together with the instincts, constitute and mediate in the collective unconscious where they facilitate and shape universal meanings prior to their emergence in individual consciousness.

Instinct

Jung acknowledges the importance of ‘instinctive activity’ as an object of study to biology and philosophy, but he considers it to be of particular importance to psychology. He defines ‘instinctive actions’ as behaviours ‘of which neither the motive nor the aim is fully conscious and which is prompted only by obscure inner necessity’ (Jung, CW8 [1919/1969] p. 130:265).

He writes:

[...] instinctive action is characterized by an *unconsciousness* of the psychological motive behind it, in contrast to the strictly conscious processes which are distinguished by the conscious

continuity of their motives. Instinctive action appears to be a more or less abrupt psychic occurrence, a sort of interruption of the continuity of consciousness. On this account, it is felt as an inner necessity – which is, in fact, the definition of instinct given by Kant. (ibid.).

Jung connects ‘instinct’, in human beings, with actions and behaviour motivated by the unconscious but he adds, all ‘unconscious processes’ may not be classed as instinctive because instinctive actions require, ‘regularity of occurrence’ and ‘uniformity’ of stimulus. He explains that the fear of snakes is considered a general fear generating a typical response in, for example, monkeys, as well as humans, and is therefore instinctive, while fear of hens is not, so the latter could be classed as a phobia (ibid., p. 131:266).

Both of Jung’s given criteria for ‘instinctive action’, i.e., ‘uniformity’ and ‘regularity of occurrence’, are suggestive of an unconscious continuity at work behind the ‘continuity of consciousness’ that is interrupted by ‘instinctive action’. Although Jung connects instinct with activity, as in the biological ‘fight or flight’ response to a perceived threat, it is however, also described as a *feeling*, ‘felt’ as an ‘inner necessity’. Jung suggests, therefore, that ‘instinct’ functions on more than one level of consciousness. It is characterised by being determined by the unconscious but ‘felt’ as an ‘inner necessity’ which is not conscious, because ‘inner,’ before becoming manifest in consciousness as instinctive action.

In a later definition of the term ‘instinct’ Jung emphasises that it is characterised by an *impulsion* that may arise from an interior or ‘outer stimulus’ which acts as a ‘trigger’ to the ‘mechanism of instinct psychically’. He asserts that, ‘Every psychic phenomenon is instinctive

that does not arise from voluntary causation but from dynamic impulsion...In my view, all psychic processes whose energies are not under conscious control are instinctive'. However, he does allow that there may be occasions when psychic material 'under conscious control' may in 'abnormal circumstances, become instinctive processes when supplied with unconscious energy,' for example, when consciousness is restricted by repressed content (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 451:765).

In the earlier essay, 'Instinct and the Unconscious', Jung discusses whether instincts are learned or inherited. They may, he suggests, be considered to have developed from individual reactions that became general through frequent repetition, 'This explanation is plausible in so far as we can observe every day how certain laboriously learnt activities gradually become automatic through constant practice'. Jung illustrates how, in the natural or non-human world, 'the element of learning is sometimes totally absent' and gives, as an example, a brief summary of the yucca moth.

Let us take as an example the incredibly refined instinct of propagation in the yucca moth... The flowers of the yucca plant open for one night only. The moth takes the pollen from one of the flowers and kneads it into a little pellet. Then it visits a second flower, cuts open the pistil, lays its eggs between the ovules and then stuffs the pellet into the funnel-shaped opening of the pistil. Only once in its life does the moth carry out this complicated action. (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8 p. 132:268).

He asserts that such an example may not, therefore, be explained in terms of 'learning' or repetition. It is, however, suggestive of an instinctive impulsion to act and it illustrates Jung's assertion that 'unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct' (ibid., p. 137:277).

Jung writes:

If we call instinct “refined”, then the “intuition” which brings the instinct into play, must be something incredibly precise. Thus the yucca moth must carry with it an image, as it were, of the situation that “triggers off” its instinct. This image enables it to “recognize” the yucca flower and its structure. (ibid.).

Jung’s assertion that the archetype is an ‘*a priori*’ intuition provides an explanation for the apparent *meaningfulness* of the series of acts carried out by the yucca moth.

Jung considers his attempts to explain instincts in a rational way were hindered by the fact that human beings are necessarily prejudiced when attempting to rationalize their own behaviour. In a concise summary he emphasises that, ‘*Instincts are typical modes of action, and wherever we meet with uniform and regularly recurring modes of action and reaction we are dealing with instinct, no matter whether it is associated with a conscious motive or not.*’ (ibid., p. 135:272-273). Instincts, then, are universal and active on a conscious and/or unconscious level of apprehension or understanding.

Intuition

Jung differentiates between instinct and intuition, in ‘Instinct and the Unconscious’ (1919/1969):

Intuition is an unconscious process in that its result is the irruption into consciousness of an unconscious content, a sudden idea or “hunch”. It resembles a process of perception, but unlike the conscious activity of the senses and introspection the perception is unconscious. That is why we speak of intuition as an “instinctive”

act of comprehension. It is a process analogous to instinct, with the difference that whereas instinct is a purposive impulse to carry out some highly complicated action, intuition is the unconscious, purposive apprehension of a highly complicated situation. (ibid., p.132:269).

For Jung, both ‘intuition’ and ‘instinct’ originate in the unconscious. Instinct appears to be a more tangible concept, it has a biological, and therefore scientific, aspect, and is associated with a behavioural response, an impulse to act. But while instinct may be seen to erupt into consciousness as activity and manifests in consciousness as a purposeful impulse to behave or act in a certain way, intuition emerges as ‘purposive apprehension’. Intuition then may be perceived to be an emergent way of *understanding*.

Jung, in *Psychological Types* (1921/2014), describes intuition as ‘a basic psychological function’ (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 453:770 :

It is the function that mediates perceptions in an *unconscious way*. Everything, whether outer or inner objects or their relationships, can be the focus of this perception. The peculiarity of intuition is that it is neither sense perception, nor feeling, nor intellectual inference, although it may also appear in these forms. In intuition a content presents itself whole and complete, without our being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence. Intuition is a kind of instinctive apprehension, no matter of what contents. (ibid.)

According to Jung’s earlier essay, ‘intuition’ and ‘instinct’ are both determined by ‘unconscious apprehension through the archetype’ and appear to be very closely aligned in the unconscious. In the above citation he suggests that intuition is an instinctive and purposive

way of knowing or understanding, through mediating perceptions. In the full definition, which is partly cited above, Jung does not mention the ‘archetypes’ but refers to intuition as functioning to mediate that which ‘presents itself’ as ‘content’ which is ‘whole and complete, without our being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence’ (ibid.). This is suggestive, however, of content which Jung describes as the unconscious irruption of an archetypal image, and intuition as that which has the capacity to unconsciously bring the image or instinct ‘into play’ (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8, p. 136-137:277).

Pilard, Jung and Intuition (2015): Einfall, Anschauung and Einfühlung

Pilard’s, *Jung and Intuition* (2015), is a detailed study of numerous different conceptions and complexities of the term ‘intuition’ in Jung’s work (Pilard, 2015, p. xi), and how these are susceptible to becoming altered and even lost, in translation (ibid., pp. 3-21). Because Pilard is making reference to loss of meaning that have arisen in translations from German to English, it is sometimes necessary for lengthy citations from her work to maintain the clarity she provides. Pilard writes that although ‘intuition’ may be best known as an aspect of Jung’s work on psychological types, this is a conscious aspect of ‘intuition’, but for Jung, ‘intuition’ comes from the Jungian unconscious and pervades many aspects of his psychology (ibid., p. xiii). Different forms of intuition appear in Jung’s work and a summary of three forms, described by Pilard; *Einfall*, *Anschauung* and *Einfühlung*, will be addressed here in order to facilitate interpretation of Jung’s core concept in the context of this thesis.

Einfall

In translation ‘*Ein* means “in” and *fall* “fallen,”’ Pilard writes, and ‘*Einfall*’ also means “*plötzlich*,” “*sudden*.”’ Pilard, as an example of Jung’s use of *Einfall*, cites the lecture notes from Jung’s presentation at the first Tavistock Lecture in 1935, where he states:

‘The Germans call this an *Einfall*, which means a thing which falls into your head from nowhere. Sometimes it is like a revelation. Actually, intuition is a very natural function’ (Pilard, 2015, p. 12).

Jung adds that intuition is, ‘a perfectly normal thing, and it is necessary, too.’ Intuition is necessary because, Jung asserts:

[...] it makes up for what you cannot perceive, or think or feel because it lacks reality. You see, the past is not real any more and the future is not as real as we think. Therefore we must be very grateful to heaven that we have such a function which gives us a certain light on those things which are round corners. (Jung, 1935/2014, CW18, pp. 15-16:26).

Pilard notes that although Jung’s definition of *Einfall* is over-simplified, it is ‘central to the under-conscious state as it mechanically portrays in the simplest terms what happens there.’ It is represented in Jung’s studies of the occult (Pilard, 2015, pp. 12-13). The ‘under-conscious’ is an important aspect of Pilard’s writing on Jung and intuition.

Pilard describes the under-conscious as being a ‘structure’ where analogies between the personal and collective/mythic unconscious psychic content of a patient is analysed using an intuitive method in, for example, ‘active imagination’ (ibid., p. 13). The under-conscious, Pilard writes, is the ‘state in between the unconscious and consciousness that favours the appearance of intuition’ (ibid., p. xiii.). It is ‘where symbolical and literal are equivalent,’ a

border where ‘visions’, ‘the extraordinary’, ‘the mysterious’, and a ‘momentary state before a psychological change, such as in the “transcendent” function experienced during active imagination’, may occur (ibid., p. 57). The transcendent function and active imagination will be explained in a later section of the thesis which explores Jung’s application of myth to his work. Pilard writes, ‘Any intuitive faculty, be it pathological, supernatural, or normal, passes through this under-conscious structure, which redirects intuition either to the unconscious [...] through the *Anschauung*, or to consciousness to become a proper intuition instead, for instance, of an under-conscious vision’ (ibid.).

Anschauung

The *Anschauung* is a more complex form of intuition than *Einfall* and Pilard writes of how its relevance to a better understanding of the archetypes has been overlooked as a result of incorrect translation from German to English. While *Einfall* is in use in ‘common or scientific contexts’, *Anschauung* ‘has been used for centuries in scientific, philosophical, aesthetical, poetic, or literary contexts.’ Although now no longer in general use, Pilard considers Jung’s use of the term to be motivated by the connection with, *schau*, from *schauen*, “to see” (ibid.).

Pilard writes:

The unconscious impression of the archetype on the present consciousness of humanity is allowed by the *Anschauung*, on the one hand, or the instinct on the other, or both together. Thanks to their *Anschauung*, human beings “see” the (collective) myth in order to live it with their own personal images in a situation which is theirs and which is psychologically needed. Sometimes, human beings directly “enact” the myth. In this case, it is directly their instinct that reaches the archetype, which is also “a pattern of behaviour.” (ibid., p. 14).

This citation illustrates that, Pilard interprets *Anschauung* as a requirement that allows for the manifestation of the archetype in the individual's present personal and cultural environment, and instinct is required to enable the individual to act on it.

It is important, therefore, that *Anschauung* is understood, in German, to be 'equivalent' to intuition, that both *Anschauung* and intuition 'identify the archetype,' and that, 'archetype cannot be understood without intuition' (ibid., p. 152). English and French translations, Pilard writes, have been incorrect resulting in the 'inevitable loss,' of precision' (Ibid.). Pilard states:

[...] what Jung wanted to emphasise in his first use of the term was the intimate relationship between *Anschauung* and archetype. Archetype without *Anschauung* did not make sense. One could not fathom the nature of the archetype without linking the archetype to the function of intuition. (ibid., p. 153).

Pilard is referring to Jung's first use of the term, 'archetype', in 'Instinct and the Unconscious' (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8, p. 133:270), from a passage also cited earlier in this chapter. She cites both German and English versions to illustrate this point and also explains that *Anschauung* is 'insufficiently' translated into English as 'apprehension' because '*Anschauung* is not only a perception, a comprehension, or an apprehension, but an intuitive one' (Pilard, 2015 p. 153).

The passage ends with Jung stating:

Instinct is an essentially collective, i.e., universal and regularly occurring phenomenon which has nothing to do with individuality. Archetypes have this quality in common with the instincts and are likewise collective phenomena. (ibid., p. 134:270).

Pilard describes the translation of the German *Erscheinung*, into English, ‘phenomenon,’ as a significant example of the loss of ‘the inherent link between archetype and intuition.’ She writes, ‘Whereas “phenomenon”, such as “representation”, or *Bildung*, [...] led the mind towards conscious realities, the dynamic [...] term *Erscheinung* (“appearance”) described the nature and the dynamics of the archetype, its unconscious origin, and its relationship to consciousness through intuition’ (Pilard, 2015, p. 153).

Einfühlung

Einfühlung, Pilard writes, is not problematic because, like *Einfall* and *Anschauung*, there is a lack of an equivalent term in the English language, but because of its ‘general polysemous use and its polysemous use in Jung’s work itself’ (ibid., p. 14). Pilard asserts that the first translation of *Einfühlung* into English as ‘empathy’ appeared in 1909 in the work of the American Psychologist, Edward Titchener, a student of Wundt (1832-1920). Her view of the term is from the perspective of psychological studies and it is traced back to nineteenth century German aesthetics in general but does not connect it with Herder’s earlier eighteenth - nineteenth century contributions to historicism, although her translation is the same (ibid.).

Pilard distinguishes between three kinds of empathy. The first is unconscious and is associated by Jung with Lévy-Bruhl’s concept of *participation mystique*, where ‘in the almost undifferentiated “primitive” state of mind, objects and subjects are felt as identical’, in the second is viewed as ‘the key’ to ‘successful transference between analyst and patient’, the third, which is the position on empathy taken as the foundation for this thesis, is the wider meaning that denotes ‘the relationship between a person and the Other [...] a person to other persons, to the inner and outer world’ (ibid., p. 16). In translation, therefore, ‘Whereas *Einfall*, or “what

falls into”, describes only a movement, *Einfühlung* expresses “the act of *feeling* (oneself) into” (ibid.).

In summary, Pilard suggests that *Anschauung*, describes an under-conscious intermediary aspect of the archetypal process where the archetypes of intuition analogize personal and collective unconscious content, in a process of negotiation in conjunction with the instincts, the appearance of the image. *Einfall* is associated with the potential for intuition to become felt in the emergence of the image in consciousness, for example, as a presentiment and *Einfühlung* describes the act of finding, or the experience of feeling, an intuitive connection with the Other. It is important to observe that Jung differentiates between feeling and intuition but that both are fundamental aspects of the archetype.

Feeling

Feeling as an evaluative process in analytical psychology has been broached in chapter one but Jung also describes feeling, with ‘thinking [...], sensation and intuition’, as one of the four basic psychological functions, or ‘forms of psychic activity’. Thinking and feeling, he writes, are rational, and sensation and intuition are irrational (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, pp. 436-437:731). The ego is involved in the process of ‘feeling’ which indicates that feeling occurs in consciousness (ibid., p. 434:724).

To recap on chapter one, Jung writes:

‘Feeling...is an entirely *subjective* process... a kind of *judgement*, differing from intellectual judgement in that

its aim is not to establish conceptual relations but to set up a subjective criterion of acceptance or rejection. Valuation by feeling extends to *every* content of consciousness, of whatever kind it may be. (ibid., p. 434:725)

Feeling, as a rational, conscious process, is like thinking. Jung explains that it 'is a rational function because in the same way that thinking organises the contents of consciousness under concepts, feeling arranges them according to their value' (ibid., p. 435:727). Feeling can be 'abstract or concrete.' Jung writes, 'The more concrete it is, the more subjective and personal is the value conferred...but the more abstract it is, the more universal and objective the value will be' (ibid.). Feeling, for Jung, is involved in evaluation, expression, perception and understanding.

Jung, in a later essay, 'The Structure of the Psyche' (1927) asserts that feeling, is different to thinking, however, because of the process of evaluation involved. The process of evaluation is a part of the process of apperception. He writes:

Sense -perceptions tell us that something *is*. But they do not tell us *what* it is. This is told us not by the process of perception but by the process of *apperception*, and this has a highly complex structure. Not that sense-perception is anything simple; only, its complex nature is not so much psychic as physiological. The complexity of apperception, on the other hand, is psychic. We can detect in it the co-operation of a number of psychic processes. (Jung, 1927/1969, CW8, p. 140:288).

Jung differentiates between 'thinking and feeling' in the process of apperception, in an example of an unknown and 'peculiar' noise which is evidently caused by 'air' in the 'central

heating.’ The noise is ‘*recognised*’ as such and ‘recognition derives from [...] thinking’ (ibid., p. 141:290). The fact that the noise is considered to be ‘peculiar’ imbues it with a ‘*feeling-tone*’ which, in turn, ‘implies an *evaluation*’ (ibid., p. 141:289). ‘*Feeling-tones*’ are described as being ‘emotional reactions of a pleasant or unpleasant nature’ they may be accompanied by ‘memory-images’ which bring further ‘emotional phenomena’ and, therefore, may appear as good or bad in evaluations of the object of perception. Jung adds that, ‘In ordinary speech this process is called *feeling*’ (ibid., p. 141:291).

Jung refers to *feeling-values* in addition to feeling-tones. As noted in chapter one of this thesis, in a later essay, ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947/1969), Jung states, ‘It would be an unpardonable sin of omission were one to overlook the *feeling-value* of the archetype,’ he adds that, the *feeling-value* is ‘extremely important both theoretically and therapeutically’ (Jung, 1947/1969, CW8, p. 209:411). When considering ‘psychic contents,’ Jung writes, one allows for ‘value judgements’ as well as ‘intellectual judgements’ because this results in ‘a more complete picture of the content’ and also its ‘position’ in the ‘hierarchy of psychic contents in general’ (Jung, 1948/1968, CW9ii, p. 28:53).

He writes:

The feeling-value is a very important criterion which psychology cannot do without, because it determines in large measure the role which the content will play in the psychic economy. That is to say, the affective value gives the measure of the intensity of an idea, and the intensity in its turn expresses that idea’s energetic tension, its effective potential (ibid.).

Jung suggests that *feeling-value* is attributed to unconscious psychic content whereas *feeling-tone* in the earlier citation suggests the emergence of a conscious evaluation. But although Jung has suggested in some earlier works that feeling is a conscious function, feeling-tone and feeling-values are both, in this instance, attributed to the archetypes. Jung states that ‘the shadow...has a decidedly negative feeling-value, while the anima, like the animus, has a more positive one.’ He continues:

Whereas the shadow is accompanied by more or less definite and describable feeling-tones, the anima and animus exhibit feeling qualities that are harder to define. Mostly they are felt to be fascinating or numinous (ibid.).

The notion of the ‘numinous’ in Jung’s psychology represents the most significant feeling-value attributed to the archetypes.

The Numinous

In ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947/1969), Jung writes, ‘the archetypes have, when they appear, a distinctly numinous character which can only be described as, “spiritual”, if “magical” is too strong a word [...] There is a mystical aura about its numinosity, and it has a corresponding effect upon the emotions’ (Jung, 1947/1969, CW8, p. 205-206:405). Jung’s characterisation of the archetypes as potentially numinous and able to produce an affect confirms that they are associated with intensity of feeling, whether or not they emerge in consciousness.

Jung writes, ‘As a numinous factor, the archetype determines the nature of the configurational process and the course it will follow, with seeming foreknowledge, or as though it were already

in possession of the goal to be circumscribed by the centring process (ibid., p. 209:411). In this citation Jung relates the ‘numinous’, or the numinosity of the archetype, to its autonomous, dynamic and purposive function.

According to Murray Stein, the word ‘numinous’ was introduced by Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), in an attempt to describe the ‘Holy’ as ‘distinct from other theological and philosophical or ethical renditions, such as “the good” or “goodness” (Stein, 2006, p. 38). For Otto, the purpose of his term was to describe religious experiences. Jung adopted it to emphasise ‘the important religious dimension of the psyche and of aspects of psychotherapeutic and developmental processes’ (ibid., p. 44-45). Stein states that, for Jung, ‘the object of a numinous experience was a content of the unconscious psyche that needed to be made conscious.’ Jung, he asserts, was highly receptive to numinous experiences, which he illustrates as “inner experiences”, such as dreams and visions’, in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (1963), ‘Septem Sermones ad Mortuos’ (1916) and *The Red Book* (2009). The numinous, like intuition, as a precursor to feeling, has the purposive function in the archetypal process to carry the potential to transcend psychic boundaries from the unconscious, through the subliminal or under-conscious, to emerge in consciousness as feeling.

Synchronicity

Jung also notes, in ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947) that numinosity can be ‘associated with synchronistic or parapsychic effects.’ He defines synchronicity as ‘the not uncommonly observed “coincidence” of subjective and objective happenings, which just cannot be explained causally, at least in the present state of our knowledge’ (Jung, 1947/1969, CW8, n.118, p. 205).

Jung gives example of a ‘spontaneous meaningful coincidence’ in, ‘On Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle’ (1951), that he experienced during a clinical encounter. The patient was a young woman found, by Jung to be ‘psychologically inaccessible’ because she was highly rational and ‘always knew better about everything.’ As he hoped for something ‘unexpected and irrational’ to occur that would challenge her intellect she undertook to tell him about the dream she had the previous night in which ‘someone had given her a golden scarab’ a valuable piece of jewellery. While she was speaking Jung heard ‘tapping at the window’ behind him and realised that an insect was trying to get into the room. He opened the window and ‘a scarabaeid beetle flew in [...] whose gold-green colour most nearly resembles that of a golden scarab.’ Jung showed the patient the scarab and declared, ‘Here is your scarab.’ He writes, ‘This experience punctured the desired hole in her rationalism and broke the ice of her intellectual resistance.’ Her treatment progressed satisfactorily. Jung states that there are many such examples of meaningful coincidence and they are often categorised as ‘clairvoyance, telepathy, etc.’ He gives as another example ‘Swedenborg’s well-attested vision of the great fire of Stockholm’ (Jung, 1951, CW8, pp. 525-6:982-985).

Jung refers to the previous examples in his list defining synchronistic phenomena:

1. The coincidence of a psychic state in the observer with a simultaneous, objective, external event that corresponds to the psychic state or content (e.g., the scarab), where there is no evidence of a causal connection between the psychic state and the external event, and where, considering the psychic relativity of space and time, such a connection is not even conceivable.
2. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding (more or less simultaneous) external event taking place outside the observer’s field of perception, i.e, at a distance, and only

verifiable afterward (e.g., the Stockholm fire).

3. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding not yet existent future event that is distant in time and can likewise only be verified afterward.

(Jung, 1951, CW8, p. 526:984).

He calls the events in the second and third examples ‘synchronistic’ because the ‘coinciding events are not yet present in the observer’s field of perception’ they are ‘anticipated in time in so far as they can be verified afterward’ (ibid. p. 526:985).

In a later development of the above lecture paper, ‘Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle’ (1952), Jung interprets the ‘archetypal foundation’ of the example of the scarab. In the first instance he repeats that in the case of this patient treatment was very difficult and little progress had been made until her dream. He writes:

I should explain that the main reason for this was my patient’s animus, which was steeped in Cartesian philosophy and clung so rigidly to its own idea of reality that the efforts of three doctors [...] had not been able to weaken it. Evidently something quite irrational was needed which was beyond my powers to produce. The dream alone was enough to disturb ever so slightly the rationalistic attitude of my patient. But when the “scarab” came flying in through the window in actual fact, her natural being could burst through the armour of her animus possession and the process of transformation could at last begin to move.
(Jung, 1952/1969, p.439:845).

Jung makes a further point that augments the archetypal foundation of this event, he continues, ‘Any essential change of attitude signifies a psychic renewal which is usually accompanied by symbols of rebirth in the patient’s dreams and fantasies.’ In this case, he writes, ‘The scarab is

a classic example of a rebirth symbol' and he refers to an Egyptian myth to support his interpretation (ibid.).

The Psychoid

Main (2004) writes of Jung that

‘At around the same time as he was developing his theory of synchronicity, Jung also modified and expanded his conception of the collective unconscious and archetypes. In particular, he began to write of the *‘psychoid’* character of the collective unconscious and of the relativisation of space and time within the unconscious. These modifications, stated explicitly in the essay ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947/1954), were postulated by Jung largely in order to account for synchronistic phenomena. (Main, 2004, p. 25).

In ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947/1954) Jung refers to the archetypes as ‘decisive factors’ that ‘constitute the structure of the collective unconscious.’ The latter ‘cannot be directly perceived or “represented” [...] and on account of its “irrepresentable” nature’ he refers to it as ‘psychoid’ (Jung, 1947/1969, CW8, p. 436:841).

This inaccessible and irrepresentable part of the collective unconscious is important to Jung’s notion of synchronicity because ‘the psychoid’ refers to a ‘level’ of the psyche where the ‘psychological and physiological meet.’ Main writes, ‘The psychoid level is not equivalent or reducible to either one of these realms but, in an unknown way combines and transcends both.’ This suggests that the psychoid unconscious or archetype especially has to do with the relationship between a person’s psyche and body (Main, 2004, p. 25). Jung, at times, extends

this to suggest that ‘it should also refer to the relationship between a person’s psyche and the physical world beyond’ the person’s body. Main continues, ‘The feature that accounts for how the psychoid archetype might connect the psyche and the outer world is its ability to relativise space and time (ibid., p. 26). Synchronistic events can be ‘widely separated in space and time’ and this led Jung to propose that ‘space and time do not operate in the unconscious in the same way as they do in the world of conscious experience’ (ibid.).

The Archetypal Image

The archetypal image is of fundamental importance to Jungian psychology. Archetypes remain unconscious and as such they are not representable in themselves but appear in consciousness as archetypal instincts/patterns of behaviour, impressions, or images, for example, in dreams. Only when they appear in consciousness, do they become open to interpretation. The archetypes, Jung writes, in ‘Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious’ (1934/1968), are ‘archaic or [...] primordial types, that is, [...] universal images that have existed since the remotest of times’ (Jung, 1934/1968, CW9i, p. 5:5). The idea of unconscious, universal, ‘archaic’ or ‘primordial types’, suggests that universal psychic experiences are stored as prototypes, and/or patterns of behaviour, that provide infinite unconscious frames of reference for conscious interpretation.

Jung asserts: ‘The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived, and it takes its colour from the individual consciousness in which it happens to appear’ (ibid., p. 5:6). This means that the archetypes are universal when unconscious as they are aspects of the collective unconscious, but become culturally determined when archetypal content appears in an individual’s consciousness. As patterns of

behaviour, the ‘instincts’ are also considered to be important driving factors of the collective unconscious, and are active in the actualisation of the archetype. Jung writes, in ‘The Concept of the Collective Unconscious’ (1936/1968):

[...] instincts are impersonal, universally distributed, hereditary factors of a dynamic or motivating character, which very often fail [...] to reach consciousness [...] the instincts are not vague and indefinite by nature, but are specifically formed motive forces which, long before there is any consciousness, and in spite of any degree of consciousness later on, pursue their inherent goals. Consequently they form very close analogies to the archetypes, so close, in fact, that there is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, in other words, that they are *patterns of instinctual behaviour*.
(Jung, 1936/1968, CW9i p. 43-44:91).

In ‘The Concept of the Collective Unconscious,’ Jung does not comment on the role of intuition in the mediation or appearance of the archetype. He portrays the instincts as the sole ‘dynamic’, purposive, energy of the collective unconscious, where they represent the potential for the expression or manifestation of archetypal content. In the earlier essay, ‘Instinct and the Unconscious,’ (1919), Jung also described ‘the primordial image...as the *instinct’s perception of itself*, or as the self-portrait of the instinct’ (Jung, 1919/1969, CW8, p. 136:277).

The notion of an archetypal *image* and Jung’s tendency to describe archetypes as *forms* denotes something represented pictorially, a material content, an image or visual experience, and is often associated with the content of dreams which are perceived as visual experiences. Jung’s use of imagery in his writing is useful for describing the potential for the formation of the

archetype in the collective unconscious. For example, his description of it as analogous to a crystal in, 'Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype' (1938/1968):

A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience. Its form, however... might perhaps be compared to the axial system of a crystal, which...preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own...The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal... a possibility of representation which is given *a priori*. The representations themselves are not inherited, only the forms, and in that respect they correspond in every way to the instincts, which are also determined in form only (Jung, 1938/1968, p. 79:155).

Another, earlier, example of imagery to illustrate the form of the archetype is found in 'Wotan' (1936), where Jung writes:

Archetypes are like river-beds which dry up when the water deserts them, but which it can find again at any time. An archetype is like an old water-course along which the water of life has flowed for centuries, digging a deep channel for itself. The longer it has flowed in this channel the more likely it is that sooner or later the water will return to its old bed. (Jung, 1936/1970] CW10, p. 189:395).

Both descriptions are effective in enabling the communication of a difficult concept. However, these examples of the imagined representations of archetypes give them a visual substance that may be seen to be misleading as they contradict the unconscious, instinctive and intuitive nature of the archetype. As Jung confirms in 'On the Nature of the Psyche' (1947/1969):

The archetypal representations (images and ideas) mediated to us by the unconscious should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are very varied structures which all point back to one

essentially “irrepresentable” basic form.’

(Jung, 1947/1969, CW8 p. 213:417).

The notion of the ‘archetype as such’ is important to that which may be seen to be an over-emphasis on archetypes as images. The ‘archetype as such’ is entirely abstract, it may be described as an *a priori potential* for the development and formation of an archetypal image. Jung goes on to emphasise that; ‘The real nature of the archetype is not capable of being made conscious...it is transcendent’ (ibid., p. 213:417). An archetypal manifestation, he asserts, is entirely different from ‘that which caused the representation’ (ibid.).

The concept of the archetype may be seen to be more broadly comprehensible when perceived as an *impression*, because the emphasis on imagery, in Jung’s writing, and notions of ‘the archetypal image’ can be misleading. The notion of an archetypal impression offers greater clarity, given the significance of the ‘archetype as such’, because an ‘impression’ does not necessarily evoke an image. An archetypal impression allows for more ways of understanding the *felt* appearance of archetypal content, for example, when it is driven by instinct as a pattern of behaviour, or intuition, as a presentiment, or hunch.

Jung refers to the archetypes or ‘primordial images’ as impressions in ‘On the Psychology of the Unconscious,’ as noted in chapter two which was first published in 1917, but ‘thoroughly revised by Jung in 1943 (Jung, 1917/2014, CW7, p. 7-8). In this essay Jung writes; ‘The greatest and best thoughts of man shape themselves upon these primordial images as upon a blueprint’ (ibid., p. 69:109). The archetype is popularly described in this way, as if conscious, suggestive of a prototype, yet the ‘archetype as such’ is the repository for infinite mythological

and historical impressions of the past located in the collective unconscious. Jung writes, of the archetypes:

I have often been asked where the archetypes or primordial images come from. It seems to me that their origin can only be explained by assuming them to be deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity. One of the commonest and at the same time most impressive experiences is the apparent movement of the sun every day. We certainly cannot discover anything of the kind in the unconscious, so far as the known physical process is concerned. What we do find, on the other hand, is the myth of the sun-hero in all its countless variations. It is this myth, and not the physical process, that forms the sun archetype. The same can be said of the phases of the moon. The archetype is a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas. Hence it seems as though what is impressed upon the unconscious were exclusively the subjective fantasy-ideas aroused by the physical process. We may therefore assume that the archetypes are recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions (ibid.).

Jung describes the archetypes as unconscious traces of continuously evolving human experiences, often mythological in nature. The ‘recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions’ are unconscious, and Jung implies that we may, therefore, only ‘assume’ the nature of the archetypes. Perhaps this is because it is not possible to fully express in words a concept that exists on a pre-lingual level of apprehension, or because the instinctive and intuitive nature of the archetype is imbued with the potential to convey impressions as unconscious apprehensions, or through the under-conscious and the archetypes of intuition, with or without images.

This introduction to the Jungian archetypes as being closely bound with unconscious notions of ‘instinct’ and ‘intuition’ and, in consciousness, ‘feeling’, is intended to illustrate a way in which ‘feeling’ may be seen to constitute an important aspect of the structure of the psyche. Instinct, instinctive action and intuitive apprehension together, may be seen to contribute to an unconscious framework that provides the potential for feeling to emerge and evaluate psychic content in consciousness. This framework requires a cogent foundation also for the hypothesis that the ‘structure of feeling’ as it appears in Raymond Williams’ work, may be recognised in Jung’s theory of the archetypes.

The Archetypes and Myth

Catharsis and Myth

Jung’s articulation of the archetypes and myth, as a literary and historical expression in his psychology, is used to narrativize a living sense of the past, partially lost in the history of modern secularisation and in the age of ‘de-mythologisation’, described by Vico (Hamilton, 2003/1996, p.30). They are, therefore, viewed in terms of a restorative and transformative function of the unconscious. Historically, myth as a creative narrative form, has provided a useful function as it is felt to be ‘cathartic’ in its ‘modelling’ of events (ibid., p. 7). For Plato and Aristotle, in ancient Greece, myth would most likely be represented in storytelling or drama. Aristotle believed the genre of tragedy in particular, engaged the audience in identifying with extremes of emotion, such as ‘pity and fear’ which would result in a healthy and pleasurable experience which he called ‘*catharsis*’ (Nightingale (2006), in Waugh, ed., 2006, p. 44). A story or narrative, myth, poetry, play or film, that engages with depths of emotion in the audience, has a cathartic effect because it creates a connection to natural feelings, a human response to the representation of insights into ‘our own humanity’ with its ‘vulnerabilities’ and

‘limitations’ (ibid., p. 45). This implies a process of unconscious or conscious identification with aspects of the content of the art form.

In his discussion of the ‘poetics of history’, Hamilton relates how myth was problematic for ancient classical scholars because there was a desire to ‘separate history from fiction’ but it was, at the same time, acknowledged that myth may be the only available terms in which to tell an ultimate truth. He writes that for Plato, ‘myths aspire to be history, but in the absence of facts they must resort to fictions’ and, in this context, myths can support Plato’s philosophy, but as ‘imagined histories’ rather than truth (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 6). Jung’s interpretation of myths, or the archetypal characters they depict, as unconscious models for patterns of behaviour, encapsulates the poetics, or the ‘imaginative style of discourse’, inherent in Jung’s ‘archetypal perspective’ (Hillman, 1989, pp. 23-24).

Myth: History or ‘the human past’?

Historian Arthur Marwick (2001) emphasises a firm distinction between ‘history’ and ‘the human past’. He asserts that while accepting the importance of the past, the *human* past specifically, ‘it is impossible to apprehend *directly*’ in the same way we may encounter other areas of knowledge such as geographical features, demonstrable science such as chemistry, anatomy and physiology, for example. ‘What actually happened in the past’, he writes, ‘is almost infinite’ (Marwick, 2001, p. 25). It may only be reached by ‘memories, myths, and most important, through the relics and ‘sources’, archaeological, written, printed, painted...that it leaves’ (ibid., p. 24). Historians, on the other hand, provide *accounts* of the past which contribute to *knowledge* and are broadly referred to as ‘history’ (ibid., p. 29).

Marwick asserts that historians provide sound knowledge and do not ‘construct’ or ‘reconstruct’ the past (ibid., p. 2). Images of the past, created in artistic form, in for example, Burckhardt’s photographic images, film and literature, can, however, represent effective accounts of history. Marwick alerts the reader to be aware that mythical notions of past times may be constructed in ways that exploit the past, to ‘serve some current national, political, personal or religious purpose’. For example, in the manipulation of notions of ethnicity, to imply ‘ethnic superiority’ (ibid., p. 33). This has been noted by Lu (2011), in the context of the potential for ‘archetypal history’ to repeat ‘harmful discourses’ (Lu, 2011, p.17-19). and Rowland (2010), who states that myth may be seen to be ‘politically suspect’, as it may ‘politicize the understanding of history, becoming a source of stories that fix one identity by excluding another’ (Rowland, 2010, p. 81-82). Myth, then, can be an ambiguous form of expressing the past.

Three functions of myth

Adams (2001): existential transformation

Freud was first to incorporate mythology into psychoanalytic psychology, by applying aspects of the Oedipus and Narcissus myths, but this was greatly extended by Jung and post-Jungians, such as James Hillman, to become what is described as ‘archetypal psychology’. (Adams, 1997, p. 103). Adams describes this as an ‘archetypal psychology’ of ‘multiple mythological motifs’ (Adams, 2001, p. 5). He writes, ‘Jung regards “mythological motifs as structural elements of the psyche”. They are ‘spontaneous’, ‘autonomous manifestations’ and ‘the unconscious is intrinsically mythopoeic, or myth-making’ (ibid., p. 11). Jung writes that these, ““myth-forming structural” elements must be present in the unconscious psyche,’ and that the ‘products’ of these ‘are never,’ or only rarely, ‘myths with a definite form.’ They are,

‘mythological components’ or, “‘motifs”, “primordial images”, types,’ or ‘*archetypes*’ (Jung, 1940/1968, CW9i, p. 152-153:259-260).

In clinical practice, Jung developed a technique for the interpretation of mythological material, the technique is known as ‘interpretation by amplification,’ or ‘the amplificatory technique,’ and requires a comparison to be made between ‘*clinical material*’ and ‘the same or similar *mythological material*, in order to establish archetypal parallels.’ It illustrates the ‘*parallel process*’ taking place between the archetypal images in the mythological material and the clinical picture. The interpretation of the clinical material is then related to the patient (Adams, 2001, p.17). Adams writes of the ‘transformative function’ of this process it is, he writes, ‘existentially transformative’ (ibid., p. 32). It is used by Jungian analysts to facilitate existential transformation by ‘psycho-mythological amplification of the archetypal images that emerge from the collective unconscious in dreams and fantasies’ (ibid.).

Myth is not defined as history, or historical knowledge, in interpretation but as psychological. It is unconscious content of imagined narratives and archetypes that have been repeated in perpetuity to convey past patterns of behaviour. Adams, in agreement with Hillman (1975), writes that myth creates ‘a perspective’ and ‘a practical precedent’ (Adams, 2001, p. 33). It presents alternative perspectives based on precedents of what others have done in the same or similar situations and which can be accepted or rejected as possible solutions to the inner or outer life of an individual (ibid., p. 33). Myth and the archetypal figures or situations that appear in clinical interpretation are seen as transformative because they appear to purposefully unite unconscious and conscious content and in so doing they re-connect the past and the collective with individual consciousness.

Segal (1999): Revealing the Unconscious

The prime function of myth, for Jung, according to Segal (1999), is ‘to reveal the unconscious.’ Myth is created and ‘guided by the unconscious which intentionally reveals itself’ in consciousness. (Segal, 1999, p. 77). ‘The unconscious seeks to communicate its presence to consciousness as clearly as possible’, and to do this, Segal writes, ‘It simply speaks its own language’ which is translated by the analyst (ibid.). Interpretation of myth, for Jung, is dependent on the ability to translate the symbolic language of the unconscious and this explains the importance of the extent of scholastic knowledge required to form parallels between conscious and unconscious archetypes and motifs (ibid., p. 79).

Segal writes that it is important for Jung that myth does not only function to alert the individual to the existence or presence of the unconscious but ‘actually to enable humans to experience it’ or even ‘enter’ it (ibid., p. 77). His view concurs with Adams’ that myth has an existential function. Historically it has enabled people to ‘feel at home in the world’ by connecting ‘the inner to the impersonal outer world,’ often by personifying the outer world in cosmological myths that invoke human relationships to the sun and/or moon, for example (ibid., p. 78). Modern myths, however, are secular and tend to invert the archaic tendency, in attempts to reconnect modern humanity with the inner world, as represented, Segal suggests, in Jung’s writings on ‘synchronicity.’ Segal writes, ‘meaningfulness now lies entirely within humans rather than also within the world,’ because myth no longer ‘accounts for the world but the feeling of at-homeness in it, synchronicity offers an existential benefit compared with that offered by myth’ (ibid., p. 78). Jung, in ‘Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting principle’ (1952/1969) does, however, refer to an example of case history material where his patient related her dream about a golden scarab and he was able to find a parallel reference in myth

and state that ‘Meaningful coincidences [...] therefore seem to rest on an archetypal foundation’ (Jung, 1952/1969, CW8, p. 439-440:854-846).

Jung, Segal writes, also sees myth as having a social function because the content of myth, for example, archetypes as personifications, situations or behaviours, become potential models to emulate. Segal states, ‘There are theories of myth for whom the prime function is the inculcation of correct behaviour,’ and he cites the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski who writes, ‘The myth comes into play when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, warrant of antiquity, reality and sanctity’ (Segal, 1999, p. 79-80). The modelling of social and moral values is represented as an important function of myth in analytical psychology because the focus is on adjusting and maintaining a sense of balance between the unconscious and the conscious attitude or orientation to the world.

Rowland (2010): dialogue between ‘mythos’ and ‘logos’

Susan Rowland, in *C.G. Jung in the Humanities (2010)*, sees the core function of Jung’s writing of myth as a dialogue between two types of knowledge and cognition, ‘mythos’ and ‘logos,’ that date back to the early Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle. Logos refers to ‘abstract rational knowledge’ concerned with truth and reason. (Rowland, 2010, p. 21). Mythos is represented in ‘narratives of gods and heroes’ that illustrate, ‘Greek history, identity and culture’ as ‘expressions of psychic potential’, in their depiction of supernatural characteristics that are outside ‘human limitations’ (ibid.). Myth, as noted in the previous section, also has an important function, Rowland writes, as ‘a form of language that enables participation’ in the unconscious and is a potent ‘authentic *representation* of the interplay of consciousness and the unconscious, and an active *intervention* shaping such inner dialogue’ (ibid., p. 180). Logos and

truth, are not narrative forms of knowledge, but are dependent on mythos to provide a story to explain their ideas (ibid., p. 21). This has been stated by Hamilton, as Plato's justification of myth as 'a true story in the only terms available', or as 'imagined histories' (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 6).

Rowland states that Jung's writing is itself, 'a mixture of mythos and logos' (Rowland, 2010, p. 22). She writes, the 'simultaneous presence of mythos and logos' in his works, forms a 'vital', 'dialogical relationship' between them (ibid., p. 22). His thought is logos, 'when he produces concepts and theory', and mythos, when he is the 'creator of stories and images' and 'pays tribute to the inexpressible' (ibid.). This insight resonates with Jung's own assertion, cited earlier in the chapter from, 'Two Kinds of Thinking (1912/2014), where, he writes, 'directed thinking' uses language and speech, 'generates intellect' (Jung, 1912/2014, CW5, p. 13:14) and is an 'instrument of culture' (ibid., p. 16:17). The influence of logos, is implied in 'directed thinking,' and, in Jung's suggestion that, historically developments in education have forced change onto ways of thinking, 'from the subjective, individual, sphere' i.e., undirected-thinking, 'to the objective, social sphere' or directed-thinking, and 'resulted in an adjustment to the human mind' (ibid.). Mythos is implied in 'non-directed thinking', where images and feelings take over from language, and acts of unconscious creation 'express the universal and ever-renewed thoughts of mankind' (ibid., p. 32:42).

Jung's analytical psychology, Rowland writes, creates the sense of myth as being 'a special kind of narrative that both represents and shapes the psyche, and knits us into the collective' (ibid., p. 97). She suggests that, 'Jung gives us back mythos to soothe the loneliness of logos in comprehending humanity. The truth of logos is not enough; Jung insists upon the boundless

possibilities of mythos (ibid., p. 22). The infinite and ‘boundless possibilities’ of myth are inhabited by the equally endless potential of the archetypes. Jung writes, that as ‘condensed expressions’ of the unconscious and conscious ‘psychic situation as a whole,’ archetypes become ‘spontaneously constellated’ as archetypal images and when they are of ‘primordial’ or ‘archaic character’ they are ‘in striking accord with familiar mythological motifs’ (Jung, 1920/2014, CW6, p. 443:746). The archetypal material that appears in this way indicates its connection to the ‘collective unconscious’. It is always collective as ‘mythological motifs’ are common to a wide range of peoples and cover vast periods of time (ibid., p. 443:746-747). The boundlessness of mythos represents perpetual dialogues between, for example, unconscious/consciousness, collective/individual and past/present. Unconscious dialogues between the language of archetypal, mythological and psychic content, and their manifestation in consciousness, represents the creative, poetic, aspect of analytical psychology that is of particular significance to studies of the arts and culture where, ‘true *expression* of the psyche is privileged over conceptually based claims to *know* it’ (Rowland, 2010, p. 180).

Conclusion

This chapter began with a further account of the importance of scholasticism to Jung and goes on to show how it relates to the development of his work, especially in deciphering the significance of the archetypes and mythological motifs in the therapeutic process of amplification. The analyst studies parallels between images appearing to the patient that are disclosed in the clinical setting, and images that occur in mythological narratives, before interpreting their findings to the analysand. A further key concept in Jung’s work, outlined in ‘Two Kinds of Thinking’ (Jung, CW5 [1912/2014], pp7-33:4-46), helps to explain how analysis and interpretation may be better understood in light of Jung’s description of how the

mind has the capacity to engage in simultaneous thought processes; in conscious, rational, temporal, social, directed thought, and in unconscious, non-directed thinking. The latter is fluid, free-flowing and is associated with the timeless, multiplicity and boundlessness, of mythos – the source of the archetypes of intuition, primordial images and feeling. The chapter aims to have illustrated the depths of oceanic activity inherent in the Jungian unconscious. From inner unconscious, to the under-conscious and outer consciousness, the archetypes and mythical motifs function to maintain a mediatory dialogue with all aspects of the psyche to facilitate successful adaptation of conscious orientation in the external world.

Jung's use of myth, as a literary and historicist expression, builds narratives of the past and the present, both as unconscious and in consciousness. Myth symbolises a living sense of the past, which has been partially lost in secularisation and the resulting 'de-deification' (Segal, [1999] p.78)) and 'de-mythologisation' (Hamilton[1996/2003] p.30) but that endures beneath consciousness and therefore offers hope of spiritual transformation. Jung's recognition of the need for dialogue between the unconscious and consciousness and past and present, in an attitude of 'historical continuity,' is critical to the promotion of a sense of connectivity between present and past, expressed as 'groundedness' (Lu, [2011] p.15). Being grounded in history allows for conscious recognition and empathy with the human experience of the past, the present and with potential futures. It represents our being both rooted in the unconscious human past and moving towards perpetual renewal and transformation.

Jung's own works may be read as characteristic of two ways of thinking. He represents his ideas in the directed manner of logos and, at the same time, in the undirected, imaginative mode of mythos, as a dialogue taking place between unconscious symbolic forms as they emerge in

consciousness. It is this characteristic of Jung's work, and the notion of archetypes and archetypal images, that gives it a poetic perspective towards history and renders analytical psychology a valuable framework for the analysis of literature and culture.

In the next chapter, Chapter Five 'Are Archetypes Symbolic Forms?', the thesis explores the ways in which Jung's ideas are developed in *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (Samuels, 1985) and (Knox, 2003/2012). It will then examine the article published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, titled 'C.G. Jung and the Psychology of Symbolic Forms,' (Pietikainen, 1999), in which the author proposes that the Jungian archetypes could be beneficially re-imagined in the context of hermeneutical and cultural studies. The final section of chapter five reveals the critical discussion that was published in the same journal following publication of Pietikainen's article, and discusses this in light of further post-Jungian ideas.

CHAPTER FIVE

ARE ARCHETYPES ‘SYMBOLIC FORMS’?

Introduction.

Section One: Post-Jungian notions of the Archetypes

This chapter introduces post-Jungian interpretations of the archetypes. It begins by exploring a variety of different ways of approaching the concept as introduced by Samuels in *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (Samuels, 1985), a text that outlines developments in post-Jungian thought until the mid-1980s. The next section describes four models of the archetypes, proposed in *Archetype, Attachment, Analysis* (Knox, 2003/2012). The latter provides a frame of reference for understanding the archetypes in the cultural studies context of this thesis. To follow, two more examples of post-Jungian perspectives towards the archetypes are included, those of Saunders and Skar (2001) and Colman (2018), which illustrate the broad perspective in which the core concept is perceived. In the second section of the chapter, I discuss Petteri Pietikäinen's proposal that the archetypes could be re-imagined in the context of cultural studies published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* and titled 'Archetypes as symbolic forms' (1998). This is followed by the ensuing discussion resulting from critical responses to Pietikäinen's paper by eminent post-Jungians and published in a later edition of the same journal.

Andrew Samuels: Jung and the Post-Jungians (1985)

Scientific readings of Jung

In *Jung and the Post-Jungians* (1985), Andrew Samuels provides a summary and critique of the evolution of Jung's ideas and the emerging post-Jungian 'archetypal theory' at the time of publication. Samuels writes that towards the end of the twentieth century scientific credibility remained critical to many who were engaged in the study of Jung's ideas. He describes post-Jungian expansions in relation to biology. For example, Samuels writes that Fordham noted in

New Developments in Analytical Psychology (1957) that if archetypes are to be considered to be inherited, as ‘hereditary functions’ they must be genetic. By the 1980’s Stevens in, *Archetype: A Natural History of the Self* (1982) took a more specific position stating that archetypes may be located and transmitted ‘in DNA’ (Samuels, 1985, p. 37-38).

Other scientific disciplines, such as ethology, also an area of interest for Fordham and Stevens, is concerned with the study of ‘natural animal behaviour’ and ‘innate characteristics and patterns of adaptation...’ (ibid., p. 36-37). In the context of neurology, investigations were taking place that sought to locate archetypal structures in the brain. Samuels cites, for example, the work of Rossi, ‘The cerebral hemispheres in analytical psychology’ (1977) published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, who suggested that the archetypes may be located in the right cerebral hemisphere and Henry’s ‘Comment on ‘The cerebral hemispheres in analytical psychology’ by Rossi, E.,’ (1977) subsequently published in the same journal. Henry, a neurophysiologist, suggested that ‘the limbic system and the brain stem taken together may ‘be’ the site of the collective unconscious’ (ibid., p. 38-39).

Samuels notes that one of Jung’s later concepts, the ‘psychoid unconscious’ in, for example, Jung’s ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947), is informed by physics and is an attempt to explore the unconscious psyche in relation to matter, while also maintaining that the ‘psychoid unconscious’ is ‘irrepresentable’ and ‘unfathomable’ (Samuels, 1985, p. 30). Samuels suggests that contemporary theoretical physics, expressed in Professor David Bohm’s writing in *The Times* in February 1983, describes significant developments in Quantum Theory, that uphold the view that ‘action-at-a-distance’, which is a hypothesis that examines the ‘...supposed tendency of two very distinct sub-atomic particles to behave harmoniously, as though each

‘knew’ what the other was doing’, and which had been previously ‘rejected by Einstein’, may be seen to strengthen ‘Jung’s intuition’. This is important because it implies that if science could accept that the behaviour of one particle could influence another, ‘with no apparent force or signal linking them’, then the idea of unconscious processes as unknowable may become equally acceptable to science (Samuels, 1985, p. 29-30).

Archetype and instinct

Jung, Samuels writes, took the position that: ‘...Archetype and instinct perform similar functions and occupy similar positions in psychology and biology respectively’ (ibid., pp. 27-8). Samuels suggests that three possible lines of inquiry emerge from this viewpoint and they begin by taking either an ‘upward’ or ‘downward’ direction. He writes:

‘...the student of archetypes can follow the downward path and explore the worlds of ethology and biology in the hope of constructing a scientific picture of what it is to be human. Or the upward path may be followed, leading to the world of the spirit. Or a dual path can be taken which emphasises the bifurcated nature of the archetype. Jung developed all three paths but, in his later work, followed the ‘upward’ direction’ (Samuels, 1985, p. 28).

The position taken in this thesis concerning the archetypes, follows the ‘dual path’. It takes into account ‘the biological’ or material path, in so far as it relates to brain, instinct and feeling, and also a non-material path, where instinct, feeling and intuition function together, mediating in the unconscious to facilitate conscious interpretation.

The notion of ‘spirit’, however, is suggestive of a higher consciousness integral to articulations of idealism but my interpretation and use of the term ‘spirit’ observes Jung’s simple definition in ‘Spirit and Life’ (1926/1969). ‘Life’, Jung writes, is simply synonymous with ‘body’ a ‘living body’ [...] a ‘visible and tangible reality [...] a material system ready for life’ (Jung, 1926/1969, CW8, p. 321:604-605). ‘Spirit,’ He writes, is ‘perplexingly ambiguous’ but in its commonplace sense is, ‘synonymous with “mind”’ (ibid., p.320-1:602). ‘Spirit,’ is also described as ‘psychic factors’ (ibid., p. 320:604). The ‘psychic factor’ provides the body with ‘living being’ (ibid., p. 321:605). Reference to ‘spirit’ as a ‘higher’ consciousness, is countered by Jung who prefers to refer to ‘wider’ consciousness (ibid., p. 336:645).

Jung writes:

[...] what we might perhaps call “higher” consciousness is not always higher from the point of view of our conscious values and often contrasts violently with our accepted ideals. One should, strictly speaking, describe this hypothetical consciousness simply as a “wider” one, so as not to arouse the prejudice that it is necessarily higher in the intellectual or moral sense. (ibid.).

The dual path evokes the mind/body duality and suggests that the archetype, as a ‘psychic factor’ with the potential to provide the body with creative purpose and the impulse for ‘living being,’ applies to equally to everyone, without prejudice.

Archetype as blueprint and feedback system

Samuels asserts that ‘archetypal theory’ delivers ‘a crucial link in the dialogues between nature/nurture, inner /outer, scientific/metaphorical, personal/collective or societal’ (Samuels, 1985, p. 23). His description of the notion of the archetype as ‘blueprint’ and the following example of ‘archetype and experience’ as ‘a feedback system’ offers an example of the nature/nurture dichotomy, or an archetypal relationship between mind/body, and provides insight into the role of feeling in the evaluation of experience. He writes:

Certain fundamental experiences occur and are repeated over millions of years. Such experiences, together with their accompanying emotions and affects, form a structural psychic residue – a readiness to experience life along broad lines already laid down in the psyche. The relationship between archetype and experience is a feedback system; repeated experiences leave residual psychic structures which become archetypal structures. But these structures exert an influence on experience, tending to organise it according to the pre-existing pattern. (ibid., p.26).

In his proposal that ‘residual psychic structures’, ‘together with their accompanying emotions and affects’ give shape to emergent ‘archetypal structures’ that will order characteristic ways of behaving and making meanings, Samuels reaffirms Jung’s assertion that archetypes are ‘recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions...’ (Jung, 1953/2014, CW7, p .69:109). As outlined earlier, my interpretation of the archetype as an ‘impression’ is that it is a form of apprehension. This may be experienced as feeling as well as image. Samuels’ assertion that experiences and their concurrent ‘emotions and affects’ form ‘residual psychic structures’, or ‘archetypes’, that carry ‘emotions and affects’ with them and become repeated as archetypal structures evolve, confirms that there is potential for archetypes to be experienced as feeling as affect, as well as in a process of evaluation.

Giving as an example the mother and baby relationship, where the baby's experience becomes organised around 'patterns of 'self', 'mother', 'good', 'bad'', Samuels illustrates the reciprocity between individual experience, the environment, and the structuring of the archetypes (ibid., p. 26). According to Jung, the apprehension of experiences, whether they 'acquire a positive or negative quality', such as 'good', 'bad', is evaluated by feeling (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 434:724). In this context, feeling becomes a function in the context of the 'feedback system' described by Samuels.

The wider perspective

Samuels' description that 'the relationship between archetype and experience is a feedback system,' proposes a broader frame of reference for post-Jungian 'archetypal theory' than individual psychology alone. His assertion that 'the relationship between archetype and experience is a feedback system' in that 'repeated experiences leave residual psychic structures which become archetypal structures' which, in turn, 'exert an influence on experience, tending to organise it according to the pre-existing pattern,' suggests a valuable framework from which to explore cultural studies and the 'structure of feeling' (ibid., p.26). Samuels observes how the theory of archetypes shows parallels with 'structuralist approaches in psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology and anthropology' (ibid.,39).

He concludes his discussion of archetypal theories stating that, 'there is a general move in analytical psychology away from single, big, decorous, numinous expectations of archetypal imagery,' and he predicts the current view that supports the multidisciplinary and/or intertextual approach to Jungian studies. He writes:

The archetypal is a *perspective* defined in terms of its impact,

depth, consequence and grip. The archetypal is in the emotional experience of perception and not in a pre-existing list of symbols [...] Themes, patterns, behaviour, interlace with images in the imaginal, and these then mingle with emotion, instinct and body. Thus a continuous and seamless field of reference is created with no pre-existing or prescribed focus or locus of interest. That is elected by the individual, or by the context, or by the field of reference – or simply elects itself. (ibid., p. 53).

Samuels is envisaging a far broader perspective from which to view the effect of the archetypal.

Jean Knox, Archetype, Attachment, Analysis (2003/2012)

Like Samuels, Knox provides a detailed overview of the development of notions of the archetypes, and she builds on Jung's work and that of post-Jungian scholars and clinicians, to build her own models of the archetypes. She recognises that a particular difficulty is encountered in the study of Jung's work because the extent to which his many and varied academic interests influenced his work has resulted in a number of frames of reference within which it may be conceptualised. These range from the sciences, to clinicians and a number of academic disciplines.

In the academic world, for example, she states, 'philosophers have shown the most interest', naming Brooke, *Jung and Phenomenology* (1991), Pietikäinen, 'Archetypes as symbolic forms' *Journal of Analytical Psychology* (1998) and Bishop, *Jung in Contexts* (1999), (Knox, 2003/2012, p. 15). A more recent contribution, she writes, has been from George Hogenson, 'The Baldwin effect: a neglected influence on C.G Jung's evolutionary thinking' *Journal of*

Analytical Psychology, (2001), who engages with both science and philosophy. Hogenson, she writes, is an analytical psychologist and philosopher who has, ‘explored Jung’s evolutionary thinking in the light of his knowledge of the work of neo-Darwinians’ (ibid., p. 19). This is a viewpoint from which he ‘suggests that archetypes can be considered to be ‘the emergent properties of the dynamic developmental system of brain, environment and narrative’, rather than as pre-existing instructions hard-wired into the brain’ (ibid., p.19-20). In this brief summary, Knox illustrates that Hogenson provides an example of a post-Jungian position that does not dismiss science as a factor in the formation of archetypal structures but also emphasises the importance of social and cultural influences.

The overview continues with a summary of the ways in which Jung’s work has been investigated ‘in the light of his own psychology.’ Knox names Homans, *Jung in Context* (1979) and his assessment that ‘Jung had grandiosely and narcissistically fused the contents of his own consciousness with the mythological symbolism of the past...’ This, Homans suggests, occurred when he was writing *Symbols of Transformation* (1912/1952), where Jung, objectified his ‘alien feelings in the form of images’ and so necessarily ‘formulated’ notions of ‘the collective unconscious’, ‘the archetypes,’ and other key concepts (ibid., pp.20-21). In, ‘Jung and the concept of the Other,’ Papadopoulos, in Papadopoulos and Saayman, eds., *Jung in Modern Perspective* (1984), ‘sees Jung’s concept of the archetype as the culmination of his quest for a language and framework to describe the ‘Other’, and as an expression of his own personal search for meaning’ (ibid., p. 21). Knox also cites Douglas, ‘The historical context of analytical psychology,’ in Young-Eisendrath and Dawson, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Jung* (1997), who takes a similar view to Homans, ‘arguing that the main themes in analytical psychology reflect Jung’s own intrapsychic conflicts’ (ibid.).

Samuels (1985), is positioned as a ‘neutral investigator’ of Jung’s work, including his study of the archetypes. His conceptualisation of the ‘archetype as blueprint,’ Knox writes, suggests that he agrees that ‘accumulated human experience becomes stored as innate archetypal structures.’ She takes issue with this point of view as it is, ‘a Lamarckian model’ (ibid., pp. 21-22). Lamarck ‘believed that experiences acquired by one generation could be transmitted genetically to the next’ (Stevens, 2002/2015, p. 16). This is a view which, Knox claims, ‘must be discarded in a post-Darwinian world.’ She adds, however, that Samuels modifies this view further on in the same text (Knox, 2003/2012, pp. 21-22).

‘Core themes in Jung’s concept of archetypes’

In her examination of the different frames of reference in which Jung’s work has been studied, Knox resolves some of the ambiguity surrounding Jung’s idea by proposing four paradigms arising out of different scientific and philosophical influences and which consistently emerge in post-Jungian ‘archetypal theory.’ These are, she writes:

- biological entities in the form of information which is hard-wired in the genes, providing a set of instructions to the mind as well as to the body
- organizing mental frameworks of an abstract nature, a set of rules or instructions but with no symbolic or representational content, so that they are never directly experienced
- core meanings which do contain representational content and which therefore provide a central symbolic significance to our experience
- metaphysical entities which are eternal and are therefore independent of the body (ibid., p. 24).

The four core themes in Jung’s concept of the archetypes depict the importance of the tangible ‘body,’ in contrast with abstract notions, such as ‘organizing frameworks that are never directly experienced’ and the ‘central significance’ of the ‘symbolic,’ that are required for the understanding of archetypes and archetypal processes. Knox, states that the meaning of the

word ‘archetype’, ‘needs to be redefined, not as a cultural phenomenon as proposed by Pietikäinen (1998), but as a psychological feature arising out of the development of the human brain’ (ibid., p. 39). Psychology and the human brain are central to the definition of the archetype, but I consider cultural influences to be an equally significant factor in the interpretation of symbolic representations and core meanings. The ways in which meaning is structured and interpreted forms a critical aspect of cultural studies and it is important that the archetypes are recognised as both *psychic and cultural* formations.

It is characteristic of readings of Jungian analytical psychology that multiple viewpoints co-exist. The next part of the chapter will explore two more post-Jungian ideas, chosen for their theoretical difference to each other, to emphasise the broad perspective that prevails in the enduring attention to the Jungian archetype. The final part of the chapter will examine Pietikäinen’s ‘Archetypes as symbolic forms’ (1998).

Peter Saunders and Patricia Skar, ‘Archetypes, complexes and self-organization’ (2001)

Complexes

Saunders and Skar agree with Hogenson’s view and summarise it as, ‘[...] the archetypes do not exist some place [...] they are the emergent properties of the dynamic developmental system of brain and narrative’ (Saunders and Skar, 2001, p. 322). The authors take a scientific, neurophysiological standpoint but begin by explaining the relationship between the archetypes and the ‘complexes’ as expressed by Jung in his Foreword to Jolande Jacobi’s *Complex/Archetype/Symbol in the Psychology of C.G. Jung* (1956). They cite Jung, who describes, ‘the peculiar autonomy the complexes display as compared with the other contents of consciousness,’ because the latter, are controlled by ‘the will’ (ibid., p. 305). Jung continues,

they write, ‘complexes either force themselves on our consciousness by breaking through its inhibiting effect, or...they obstinately resist our conscious intention to reproduce them...They cut across the adapted performance of consciousness (ibid). Jung’s assertion that the complexes appear to be *autonomous*, suggests to Saunders and Skar that the psyche possesses the potential to develop self-organising functions.

Jung explains this further in the foreword to Jacobi’s text, and Saunders and Skar cite Jung again, where he states, ‘It was not difficult to see that while complexes owe their relative autonomy to their emotional nature, their expression is always dependent on a network of associations grouped round a centre charged with affect’ (Saunders and Skar, 2001, p. 305). The emotional centre of the complex, Jung writes, is ‘individually acquired’ and ‘personal’ in nature. Complexes may be categorised because they are not ‘infinitely variable’ but are ‘well-characterised’. They are popularly known as, ‘inferiority complex, power complex, father complex, mother complex, anxiety complex...’, and this, he suggests, is because ‘they rest on equally typical foundations, that is, on emotional aptitudes or *instincts*’ (ibid., pp. 305-306).

The formative aspects of the ‘emotional aptitudes’, or instincts, described above, are identified by Jung, as ‘the archetypes.’ The instincts and the archetypes, like the complexes, are also ‘relatively autonomous’ psychic processes and need to be examined not in isolation but in relation to each other. Saunders and Skar consider a number of Jung’s notions of the archetypes, stating that his ‘wide-ranging’ descriptions of them as, for example, ‘irrepresentable’, ‘transcendental’ and yet also related to psychic ‘*process*’, is confusing. They aim to focus on ‘a biological standpoint’ which ‘recognises the importance of the spiritual ‘pole’ of the archetype, in order to attempt to provide greater clarity (ibid pp. 306-307). From

an historical viewpoint they state that ‘In science, the word ‘archetype’ seems to be used only when no mechanical explanation can be found for the similarities to which it refers. Biologists stopped writing of archetypes after Darwin.’ However, because ‘physiological form is relatively stable’ and ‘complexes are dynamic’, Jung is necessarily more fluid in his use of the term ‘archetype’, sometimes using the concept of ‘form’ or ‘a potential form’. The authors cite Jung (1921/1971), where he defines the ‘primordial image’ as ‘a self-activating organism’, endowed with generative power’ (ibid., pp. 310-311).

Self-organization

The authors present a hypothesis that ‘the process that forms the complex...is self-organization within the brain/mind’. It denotes ‘a process that is typical of large complex systems of many kinds.’ ‘Self’, in this sense, is used to ‘indicate that there is no pre-existing template or external directing force [...] nothing directly to do with the concept of self in ‘psychology.’ The term ‘self-organization’, in this context, is validated by neurophysiologists, and ‘occurs within the brain and is important in its functioning.’ The authors assert that ‘therefore, the core of Jungian thought is consistent with current ideas about how the brain works and is as firmly rooted in biology as it needs to be’ (ibid., p. 311). But a significant cause of confusion in Jung’s notions of the archetypes, Saunders and Skar claim, is that Jung tended to conflate ‘form with the process which it brings into being’ (ibid).

The authors suggest that as a result of current knowledge in the field of neurophysiology it is possible to examine the archetypes in the context of ‘processes,’ and the ways in which they ‘are responsible for the complexes’, but because the process may not be identified with ‘the set of complexes it produces’, the two concepts, ‘process’ and ‘complex’, must be seen to be

separate concepts. To clarify the position of the archetype in their discussion, they write, ‘while we know that the right sorts of processes exist, we cannot associate a particular neurophysiological process with a given pattern of behaviour. It seems natural, therefore, to define the archetype in terms of the complexes, not the processes’ (ibid., pp. 311-312).

The archetypes, in this context, they write, ‘exist as biological entities without our having to postulate anything beyond the organizational capability that the brain is generally agreed to possess’ (ibid.). The authors suggest that we do not need to know *when* the archetypes originated but that, ‘They came into existence as the brain and consciousness evolved and as societies developed.’ We are to assume that the material basis of the brain, that is, the brain as matter, and the ‘laws of physics and chemistry’ have ‘always’ been there, but the archetypes ‘remained latent until there were brains sufficiently complex for them to become manifest’ (ibid., p. 312). Archetypes, then, are seen in relation to the processes that produce complexes and they are also recognised as having their own source of energy.

The authors offer a clear explanation of their point of view:

While archetypal forces do not form part of our *definition*, they remain as typical properties of archetypes...while the forces are indeed associated with the archetype, they arise out of the complexes. In the early, crucial stages, it may require only a relatively small bias to set in motion the self-organization that will produce one of the complexes associated with the given archetype, just as a very small vortex can lead to a tornado or hurricane. As the complex develops, the ideas and experiences that are incorporated into it make it very much stronger. A new idea or experience that is (in a metaphorical sense) aligned with the complex, will be drawn into it, generally being modified in the process. If it happens to be very

strongly aligned with the complex to begin with, it can be drawn in immediately and directly, and the individual in whose mind this occurs will feel this as a very strong force indeed, what we sometimes refer to as a 'numinous experience'. (ibid).

Saunders and Skar suggest that the archetypes are related to ideas and experience and therefore effect the complex from the outside, i.e. consciousness, as well as the unconscious, while the complex, in that it 'draws in' the archetypal 'forces' is an inner, or unconscious, process. Just as a 'very small vortex can lead to a tornado or hurricane' then the complexes are subject to various intensities of change in their self-organization. This may be seen to depend on the strength of affect the archetype conveys.

To illustrate the concept of self-regulation in greater detail the authors describe a phenomenon, discovered by a French physicist and named after him, called the Bénard convection. This involves the following:

A large shallow container is filled with water and then heated evenly from below [...] the water begins to move, as warmer water rises from the bottom and cooler, denser water sinks. Eventually, and spontaneously, this motion organises itself into a regular pattern of cells, looking something like a honeycomb. The pattern does not reflect either the way in which the water was heated or the shape of the container. It is an emergent property arising out of the dynamic. (ibid p. 313).

This example illustrates that from a scientific point of view, it is accepted that certain patterns occur spontaneously in response to certain stimuli, and also in non-animal forms, where instincts are not apparently involved in the process. The Bénard convection is a, 'classical

example of self-organization, the phenomenon in which order and pattern arise spontaneously and apparently out of nothing' (ibid:314).

Self-organization is recognized as 'typical behaviour' of 'complex systems' and should, therefore be expected of the brain. Self-organizing systems are 'robust' in two important ways; first, 'it is not necessary to specify the conditions precisely to obtain the usual form', and second, 'once produced the form will persist' even if disturbed. Thus, Saunders and Skar consider the self-organizing system to be similar to the archetype. They write that just as, 'The characteristic honeycomb pattern of Bénard convection does not exist, except as an abstraction, until it is realized' also, there 'is nothing that can be [...] identified as the archetype [...] only the system, its dynamic, and the surrounding environment. The pattern is an emergent phenomenon' (ibid., p. 314).

The authors do not agree with the notion that the archetypes exist *a priori* because, in the context of their argument, it is not currently known where, or how, the brain 'stores and retrieves information.' They do claim, however, that the brain comprises of a 'complex network of links' where there exists, 'a constant process of organization' and that this 'suggests that the brain is likely to produce the phenomena that are associated with complex, non-linear systems.' Self-organisation is an example of a 'complex, non-linear system' (ibid., p. 317).

Their examination of the archetypes leads them to assert that in this context it is possible to ask 'how archetypes arise and what properties' they may have. They propose that: 'The self-organization will be of instincts and experiences which are in some way associated, because they occur, or first occur at the same time, because they relate to similar things, or in some

other way' (ibid., p. 318). The authors state that in fact, under these conditions, dependent on structures of similarities and associations, (complexes), they 'would *expect* there will be archetypes' (ibid). If, the authors write, the archetypes were to be understood as separate entities, for example, genetic structures, then they would only be able to form complexes 'centred on those pre-existing archetypes' (ibid., p. 319).

If the archetype is seen as a 'property of the dynamic', however, and 'there are sufficiently strong influences from outside' then 'a different complex can form', and when the archetype is seen to be 'an emergent property of the complex', it is possible that there may also be the formation of new archetypes (ibid). They conclude:

we must always remember to differentiate between the archetypal image and the archetype itself [...] So, while we can easily see that there are a myriad of images that can relate to one archetype, there are relatively few typical life experiences and predispositions, in a developmental sense, that we all share. But if we do not assume that these predispositions to typical life experiences (the archetypes) are fixed forms somewhere within us, but rather, that they *emerge* from the self-organizing systems (complexes) that are formed as we move through life, then we must remain open to the possibility that new archetypes can be born into our constantly evolving experience of life. (ibid., p. 320).

Saunders and Skar suggest that the complexes and archetypes are engaged in a fluid, adaptable, rather than a 'fixed', process, which may be perceived as being receptive to formative and/or transformative change, as we 'experience life'.

Warren Colman, *'Are Archetypes Essential?'* (2018)

Essential 'ground of being'

Colman re-evaluates Jungian notions of the archetypes, in the wake of 'emergence' theories. He proposes to 'abandon' the archetypes as a theory while maintaining the fundamental 'spirit and quality' of Jung's original ideas. He concentrates on the Jungian notion of the 'numinous' instead because he considers that Jung, in his notion of the archetypes, was trying to '*explain*, revelatory, transformative experiences' (Colman, 2018, p. 336). He cites Jung, in *C.G Jung Letters, Volume 1.*, ed. Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffé, (1945/1973), who writes of the importance of 'the approach to' the numinous in therapy, as 'certain symbolic events characterized by a strong emotional tone.' Colman considers this to be 'an *experiential*, even phenomenological account, not a theoretical one' and suggests that there are differences between the two concepts by which he means, archetypes are an idea, but the 'the numinous' is an experience (ibid., p. 337).

Jung's notion of the archetypes, Colman writes, is 'problematic' because of its 'essentialism.' He refers to early writings in which Jung's ideas have been likened to Plato's. The latter's notion of ideal forms, and the notion that all things have a 'primary essence', corresponds with the suggestion that archetypes, as Jung writes in 'Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious' (1934/54), are 'pre-existing images' and 'eternal, transcendent forms' (ibid., p. 339). Colman, however, is not satisfied with the notion that the archetypes are not knowable as the archetype in itself but only as archetypal images, as he finds that this does not explain that the basis for archetypes exists at all.

Colman's objective is to examine how notions of the archetypes and the numinous, influence our 'ground of being.' He goes on to explain that he was influenced, in the 1960s, by constructivist notions that 'there is no definite or necessary form to human nature but that we are 'constructed' by our social and cultural circumstances' (ibid., p. 340). These ideas, he writes, resulted in a feeling of 'personal, moral and philosophical doubt' as 'old certainties' collapsed. He writes of the personal effect this had:

The idea of an archetypal world of primordial images offered a sense of psychological grounding in something that was fundamentally 'there', something for which my own emotional experience of the numinous seemed to offer a guarantee. That, after all, was something I knew indisputably to be true and if, as Jung argued, such numinous experiences were the manifestation of eternal archetypes, then this offered an experiential basis for a philosophical and spiritual ground of being (ibid).

Jungian psychology, then, provided Colman with a 'ground of being' that maintained an essentialist position. He does not mention the unconscious, or a need for a 'ground of being' based on a collective past, but Colman's recollection is suggestive of a yearning for the groundedness in historical continuity, that a connection to 'archetypal history' would convey in accord with Lu's ideas, noted in the previous chapter (Lu, 2011). He explains that while he accepts and credits a 'Marxist-inspired view that the ideological and cultural world is shaped by social and material forces...this always seemed completely unable to account for...the nature of consciousness' (ibid). Archetypal theory, he writes, offered a way to perceive 'human nature' as 'organised', as 'psychologically grounded', however, Jung's essentialist view of the archetypes in 'Concerning the archetypes, with special reference to the anima concept' (1936/54) described in terms of 'transcendence' and of 'no exactly determinable form

but...indefinite structure...’, become problematic for Colman as such meanings defy full comprehension (ibid., pp. 339-340).

Emergence

Colman continues, describing how his previously essentialist position has been influenced by the more recent notions, published in this century, that the archetypes are ‘not essential and pre-given *a priori*’, they are ‘...emergent properties of dynamic interactive systems of brain, body, environment, and/or symbolic narratives’. Colman refers to the work of Hogenson (2001) and Saunders and Skar (2001), already noted, as examples. He summarises the focus of his own version of ‘emergence theory’, in the context of the archetypes, as being, ‘on the relation between symbols and affect’ (ibid., p. 341). He proposes that:

the symbolic systems that Jung drew on as evidence for the existence of archetypes are emergent from human action in the world. Humans are group animals who co-operate in their engagement with the physical environment and in so doing create tools to act on the world as well as tools to think the world, namely symbols (ibid.).

Colman views symbolic forms to be constitutive, and influenced by numinous affect. They emerge in the individual psyche but are dependent on social, cultural and environmental patterns to be able to ‘think the world’.

His perception of the essentialist theory of the archetypes has evolved in combination with the constructivist notion of the influence of society on the cultural world but it retains the overall significance of psyche, symbol, consciousness and affect, in constituting and interpreting

meaning. He acknowledges that this has changed the way in which he now locates our ‘ground of being’. He writes:

I would say that it lies in our affective engagement with a physical and social environment that is mediated by the symbolic systems of culture...Where my view has changed is that I now see that the symbolic images which express such visceral states do not simply *represent* what is already there but *constitute* and transform those states in the process of giving them form [...] This is why all archetypal images evoke something that feels more than cultural (in the sense of being universal, infinite, divine...) yet can only be apprehended through cultural forms (ibid., p. 342).

Colman, in this essay, unites theories of the archetypes that view them as fundamentally emergent, constitutive, formative and transformative processes. The symbolic forms they take may be seen to engage with our emotional responses to life experiences shifting our ‘ground of being’ from the collective unconscious, to the unconscious in the symbolic images in cultural forms.

Conclusion

Saunders and Skar see the archetypes as emergent and self-organizing processes that need to be examined in relation to other processes, such as the instincts and complexes rather than in isolation. If the archetypes are understood ‘as separate entities, for example genetic structures, they would only be able to form complexes centred on pre-existing archetypes’ (Saunders and Skar, 2001, p. 319). This appears to be the case also in the scientific model of the archetypes proposed by Knox (2003/2012), which defines them as ‘biological entities in the form of information which is hard-wired in the genes, providing a set of instructions to the mind as well

as the body' (Knox, 2003/2012, p. 24). As genetic structures, the function of the archetypes appears to be narrowly circumscribed.

More recent developments in studies of the archetypes tend towards releasing them from earlier reliance on science and classical scholasticism for acceptance and introducing them as significant components of cultural experience. Saunders and Skar state that the archetypes are a form of energy, that 'came into existence as the brain and consciousness evolved and as societies developed' (ibid., p. 312). The theme of a simultaneous development of archetypes and society is repeated in their later assertion that: 'if we do not assume that these predispositions to typical life experiences (the archetypes) are fixed forms somewhere within us, but rather, that they *emerge* from the self-organizing systems (complexes) that are formed as we move through life, then we must remain open to the possibility that new archetypes can be born into our constantly evolving experience of life' (ibid., p. 320). Their discussion supports Jung's notion that 'There are no isolated psychic processes, just as there are no isolated life-processes' (Jung, 1934/1969, CW8, p. 93:197).

Their close relation to the complexes means the archetypes have an emotional function. Colman states that he bases his own interpretation of the archetypes as 'emergent' entities, on 'the relation between symbol and affect' (Colman, 1918, p. 342). This relationship is a constitutive emotional experience that is 'mediated by symbolic systems of culture' and 'apprehended through cultural forms' (ibid.). Colman's thought, with regard to the relationship between the effect of the archetypes and symbol in apprehending and mediating cultural forms, shows similarities with Raymond Williams' cultural materialist concept of the structure of feeling. For Williams, however, feeling tends to refer principally to Jung's meaning of it as

evaluation, rather than as emotion or affect. This will be discussed further in the next part of the thesis. The final section of this chapter will now endeavour to continue to establish a connection between the archetypes and cultural studies in an examination of Pietikäinen's essay 'Archetypes as symbolic forms' (1998).

Section Two: Petteri Pietikäinen, 'Archetypes as symbolic forms' (1998)

Introduction.

The last section of this chapter examines an article written by Petteri Pietikäinen (1998), published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, in which he argues that Jung's notion of the archetypes, as one of his most important ideas, could be expanded upon so as to become more accessible to cultural studies. To open the discussion, Pietikäinen positions his argument in the context of a comparison between the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (1872-1945) and Jung. Pietikäinen's views were controversial when published and provoked written critical responses from some leading Jungian scholars. I will discuss the responses from Anthony Stevens (1998), George B. Hogenson (1998) and Hester McFarland Solomon (1998) as well as Pietikäinen's reply to all three of his critics (1998). I will also refer to Greg Mogenson (1999), who in the same context and later edition of the same journal, added a further perspective to the discussion.

Ernst Cassirer (1872-1945)

Pietikäinen describes Cassirer's three volume, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1923-1929) as a study of 'different ways of "having a world", or modalities of mental activity, like language, myth and phenomenology of knowledge' (Pietikäinen, 1998, p. 325). Cassirer was 'suspicious of psychoanalysis,' particularly in his view that Freud reduced 'all great cultural

achievements to sublimation of basic instincts,' which he saw as 'undermining his Enlightenment ideals of 'human freedom, autonomy of reason and cultural progress' (ibid., pp. 325-326). He did not study the unconscious and is described as a 'philosopher of *consciousness*,' in favour of 'consciousness and "mind"/ "spirit" (*Geist*) and mainly interested in the 'higher cognitive functions – epistemology, science, mathematics' (ibid.).

Cassirer's philosophy 'views different cultural products as varied forms of symbolic activity; that is, as active ways of understanding the world (*Weltverstehen*)' (Pietikäinen, 1999, p. 14).

Cassirer and Jung

Jung's principal interests are contrasted with Cassirer's and Pietikäinen describes Jung as a 'psychologist of the *unconscious* [...] pre-occupied with the 'lower' or 'deeper' dimensions of man – dreams, fantasies, emotions' (Pietikäinen, 1998 p. 326). He argues that Jung's psychology is a 'psychology of symbolic forms' in that it illustrates a 'pre-occupation with man and his cultural symbols' (Pietikäinen, 1999, p. 14). Jung's 'obsession' with the unconscious psyche revealed a lack of understanding of modern philosophies and, Pietikäinen continues, 'if the traditional basic dichotomy between reason (*logos*) and imagination or 'non-reason' (*mythos*) is accepted then Jung can be seen to represent a psychology of *mythos* and Cassirer, on his part, a philosophy of *logos*' (ibid., p. 327).

In *C.G. Jung and the Psychology of Symbolic Forms* (1999), Pietikäinen writes, 'The great difference between Cassirer and Jung lies in their theoretical approach to the symbolic universe: notwithstanding his studies of myth and religion, Cassirer's philosophical focus is on the more developed symbolic forms, whereas Jung operates with the concept of the "unconscious,"

which by definition expresses itself in archaic, mythical, and more “opaque” forms’ (Pietikäinen, 1999, p. 14).

Points of contact between Cassirer and Jung

Pietikäinen identifies four ‘points of contact’ between Cassirer and Jung. The first is that, in the context of philosophy, Pietikäinen considers Cassirer and Jung to be ‘idealists’ in that they both consider external reality to be ‘essentially mental’, or as defined and cited ‘created by the mind’ (Flew, 1985), (ibid., p. 328). Second, he notes similarities in their attitudes towards the concept of ‘symbol’ and also between Jung’s notion of the ‘archetypes’, and Cassirer’s ‘philosophy of symbolic forms.’ He writes: ‘They both emphasize form (symbolic/archetypal) and function (e.g., representation/communication) instead of substance or causality, and characterize man as *animal symbolicum* – more than anything else man’s ability to create and use symbols distinguishes him from (other) animals’ (ibid., p. 328).

The third ‘point of contact’ is that although Cassirer was ‘suspicious of psychoanalysis’ and favoured ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’/‘spirit’ over the unconscious’, when they write about myth their ideas are similar (ibid., p. 326). Pietikäinen states that a key concept in Cassirer’s work is the ‘mythical consciousness’ which shares an affinity with Jung’s ‘unconscious myth-forming function.’ Both were influenced by ‘Lévy-Bruhl’s theory of primitive mentality’ (ibid., p. 328). According to Pietikäinen, both Cassirer and Jung ‘look for the meaning of myth in the human mind’ and yet they ‘neglect the impact of the external forces on the formation and validation of myths’ (ibid.) They have an ‘evolutionary’ view of myths as “‘elementary’ or ‘archaic’ forms of culture”, but do consider them to be maintaining a function in ‘modern societies’ (ibid., pp. 327-328).

Pietikäinen asserts that forms of ‘mythical thought’ or ‘unconscious myth-formation’ is not a subject of historical study only, but manifests itself today in phenomena like political myths (Cassirer) or dreams and fantasies (Jung) (ibid., p. 328). In the fourth ‘point of contact’ it is noted that both writers share an historical perspective in their writings and Pietikäinen describes this as being depicted as a ‘dialogue with the past’ in Jung’s work, in contrast with the ‘substantial historical studies’ produced by Cassirer and is a characteristic that endures throughout their works. It is also observed that both writers are avid scholars (ibid., pp. 328-329).

From symbolic to cultural forms

Cassirer, in his work on ‘symbolic form’ and ‘culture’, examines the question of whether ‘structure’ or ‘function’ is the most important when considering how the two key concepts relate and connect to each other in the process of thought. Pietikäinen cites Cassirer, who writes, in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 1: Language* (1955):

the concept of culture cannot be detached from the fundamental forms and directions of human activity: here ‘being’ can be apprehended only in ‘action’...Thus, with all their inner diversity, the various products of culture - language, scientific knowledge, myth, art, religion...become multiple efforts, all directed toward the one goal of transforming the passive world of mere *impressions*, in which the human spirit seems at first imprisoned, into a world that is pure *expression* of the human spirit. (ibid., pp. 328-329).

The answer to Cassirer’s question seems to be ‘function,’ and the function is purposive and transformative, similar to the function of the archetype in relation to culture, except that Cassirer is referring to a conscious function rather than an unconscious one. Cassirer’s

suggestion, in this citation, that ‘*mere* impressions’ become ‘*pure* expression’ of spirit, alludes to the value placed on ‘culture’ from an idealist point of view. ‘Spirit’ according to Jung, as noted earlier in this chapter, can also refer to ‘mind’ and in that case mere impressions are transformed into expression of thought in symbolic forms. Cassirer also suggests that, on a material level, the direction of ‘human activity’ is cultural production where abstract ‘impressions’ form concrete ‘expressions’ i.e. symbolic or cultural forms (ibid.). Man, Pietikäinen writes, ‘has the capacity of liberating himself through developing cultural forms’ (ibid., p. 330)

‘Symbolic form’, Pietikäinen writes, ‘denotes a symbolic expression in its most extensive meaning: the expression of ‘mental’ contents through perceptual ‘signs’ and ‘images’ (ibid., p. 331). He describes how Cassirer suggested that there are ‘three dimensions or functions of symbolic formation’, which are, ‘expression... representation... and meaning or significance’ (ibid., p. 332). ‘Expression’ is the most basic ‘concrete’ function and ‘significance’ is the most ‘conceptual and abstract’ (ibid.). Myth and religion are examples of ‘expressive’ functions while mathematics is an example of the ‘conceptual and abstract’. The description is not meant to place any order of value on the functions as they are to be recognised as ‘qualitatively different modes of signification’ (ibid).

The reason why Cassirer chose the concept of ‘symbolic form’, Pietikäinen writes, is:

the latter word denotes the logical structure and continuity of certain cultural products, and the former signifies the fact that these forms are man-made and dependent upon the capabilities of *animal symbolicum* to actively advance their development. *Weltverstehen* implies free activity of the mind, and it requires that the focus of

attention should not be directed exclusively to the purely scientific and exact comprehension of the world [...] but “to all the forms assumed by man’s understanding of the world” (ibid., pp. 332-333).

This definition of Cassirer’s use of the term ‘symbolic form’ resonates with the earlier attitude towards the human sciences, knowledge and interpretation realised in the work of Dilthey.

‘Cultural interpretation of the archetypes’

‘Archetypes’ may be understood as ‘symbolic forms’ because, Pietikäinen writes, they are ‘culturally determined’ not ‘quasi-biological entities.’ He insists that the medium that transmits symbolic forms is culture, not biology’ (ibid.). They ‘operate functionally in the same way that the other symbolic forms do: they give an organized and coherent structure to different manifestations of man’s cultural activity, and at the same time they express the ‘spirituality’ of man’ (ibid). In the context of the functions outlined above, as organized, coherent, structuring and expressive, culturally determined symbolic forms may be seen to be better understood as the ‘archetypal image’, that is, that aspect of an archetypal imperative which is perceived by consciousness because of its expression in culture and society.

Pietikäinen maintains that the idea that the archetypes are ‘quasi-biological entities’, or that they are the product of ‘genetic inheritance’ is ‘untenable’ (ibid., p. 333-334). By dismissing the biological aspect of the archetype, he denies that as a dynamic psychological process it involves the mind and, therefore, the brain. He states that humanity ‘is not born with the collective unconscious’ in the same way as we are not born with ‘cultural determinants’ in the psyche. Human beings are, however, born with the potential to assimilate articulated and ‘unarticulated’ collective ideas and activities that confirm their position in relation to the distant

past (ibid., pp. 333-334). He describes this as being when ‘undercurrents’ are simply passed from one generation to another, and as a result of this *cultural* transmission, our culture is not a single monolithic entity but a dynamic process, in which the cultural diversity is comparable to the evolutionary biodiversity in nature’ (ibid p. 334).

Pietikäinen in this instance, like Cassirer before, implies that there may be the potential for the ‘transmission’ and transformation of the cultural consciousness but without explaining how this developmental process may arise in the individual. His rejection of Jung’s concept of the ‘collective unconscious’, but acceptance that ‘*unarticulated* collective ideas’ may *simply* be passed on in ‘*undercurrents*’ that confirm the individual’s position in relation to the past, is suggestive of traditional Jungian notions of the idea of the collective unconscious. Pietikäinen’s apparent ambivalence towards the unconscious processes of the psyche are mediated by his proposal that there is a pre-conscious level on which the articulation of cultural histories takes place. This position is similar to that of Raymond Williams’ in his description of the transmission from one generation to another, ‘often not consciously’, but through the ‘structure of feeling’ of a culture in a given historical moment, and will be explored in greater detail in the following chapters (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69).

Jung and hermeneutics

Pietikäinen’s principle ‘point of contact’ with Jung appears to be in response to ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947/1954), where Jung revised his ideas on the archetypes and differentiated between the archetype-*as-such*, and ‘archetypal representations’, the manifestations of which can be ‘culturally determined’ in consciousness. Pietikäinen concedes that although he does

not consider the archetypes to be credible from a scientific viewpoint, it is not at the moment possible to prove or disprove the theory. He writes:

When the desperate search for ‘scientific’ proofs of archetypes is abandoned, the whole matter can be seen as a *hermeneutical* enterprise, in which archetypes are related to and seen in context with other cultural constituents, like religion, myth or art. These phenomena are imbued with ‘numinous’ or other affective and expressive characteristics, but they still manifest themselves *in concreto*, and this fact renders it possible to discuss them rationally. (ibid., pp. 336-337).

Pietikäinen’s approach to the Jungian archetypes, is to regard them as ‘symbolic’ or ‘cultural forms’ but within a rational methodological framework. Hermeneutics allows for the objective interpretation of the ‘numinous’, emotive, and ‘affective,’ expressions outside as well as inside the parameters of science or the discourse of analytical psychology and in relation to cultural forms. Pietikäinen defines hermeneutics as both ‘the art of interpretation (usually of texts)’ and ‘a philosophy that analyses the interpretative method itself.’ He states that Schleiermacher and Dilthey-as well as Jung- represent the former, methodological hermeneutics, which is historically older than “ontological” or philosophical hermeneutics’ advanced in the twentieth century (ibid., p. 327). He states that Jung had a tendency to interpret ‘the unconscious as if it were a hermeneutical inquiry of a text.’ For Pietikäinen, ‘the hermeneutical method of cultural studies’ is fertile ground for the analysis of the archetypes if they are regarded to be ‘symbolic’ or ‘cultural forms’ (ibid., p. 338).

Although Pietikäinen does not engage with the concept of the ‘collective unconscious’ he does appear to concede to the notion of the personal unconscious (ibid., p. 342). He emphasises the need for greater consideration of that which he articulates as the ‘non-cognitive’, in cultural

studies, the term ‘non-cognitive,’ for Pietikäinen, means the representation of the ‘emotional, numinous and pathological’ in cultural forms (ibid., p. 338). Pietikäinen writes that Jung’s ‘theory of the archetypes expands on Cassirer’s notion of symbolic forms to cover the non-cognitive functions operating in the relations between man and his culture.’ The archetypes, ‘give form’ to the unconscious in, ‘dreams, fantasies, and strongly felt experiences’ (ibid). The ‘non-cognitive aspects of human activity’ have been ‘neglected’ in the ‘history,’ the ‘social sciences’ and ‘philosophy’, according to Pietikäinen, but, he argues, Jungian psychology has the potential to provide a positive contribution to the changing the ‘paradigm of cultural studies’ in light of ‘its emphasis on the ‘non-cognitive’ and ‘abnormal’ yet common aspects of human life’ (ibid).

Concluding thoughts

Pietikäinen proposes that Jung’s theory of the archetypes adds significance to interpretations of Cassirer’s ‘philosophy of symbolic forms’ by introducing notions of the ‘unconscious’. On the other hand, he writes, the archetypes are enriched when viewed in the broader context of Cassirer’s study of ‘cultural/symbolic forms’, as ‘...unarticulated but active constituents of human experiences’ (ibid., p. 340). The latter, it may be argued, is an insight with which Jung was already familiar. This is apparent in his essays on art and literature. By highlighting the significance of the archetypes and/or archetypal meanings that contribute an active and *affective* shaping of the unarticulated, formative meanings expressed in cultural forms and activities, Pietikäinen does propose a valuable contribution to cultural studies. The following chapters aim to illustrate this aspect of the archetypes in the study of Williams’ structure of feeling’.

'Responses to Pietikäinen' (1998/1999)

Introduction

Pietikäinen's article proved to be controversial but although he is resolute in his rejection of the scientific biological/genetic framework for explaining archetypes as inherited, he also makes clear that he does not wish his writing to be viewed as 'a negative exercise in debunking' (Pietikäinen, 1998, p. 341). The final section of this chapter gives a brief summary of the critical responses provoked by Pietikäinen's article that were expressed by contemporary post-Jungian scholars, published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* and his published reply (Pietikäinen, 1998b). The summary of responses from Stevens (1998), Hogenson (1998), McFarland Solomon (1998) and Mogenson (1999), are included here because their interpretations contribute to the perpetual broadening of perspective of Jungian psychology.

Anthony Stevens (1998)

In his response to Pietikäinen, although Stevens recognises that this is not his motive, he argues that Pietikäinen's lack of understanding and his 'misguided' proposal does 'analytical psychology no service', (Stevens, 1998, p. 345). Stevens equates Pietikäinen with twentieth century anthropologists, philosophers and behavioural scientists, who have, in his opinion, rejected Jung's idea that we possess an 'innate symbol forming propensity' (ibid.)' He charges Pietikäinen with adopting the position that the mind is a *tabula rasa* which only contains 'that which 'culture' puts into it' (ibid., p. 346). In doing so he overlooks the possibility for innate knowledge. Stevens cites a number of evolutionary psychologists, psychiatrists and archaeologists who propose that, 'the human mind evolved the capacity to think, use symbols, develop explanations, and create myths as the result of selection pressures encountered by our species in the course of its evolutionary history' (ibid).

Stevens writes:

This view, which has now entered the mainstream of behavioural science, is compatible with Jung's later formulation of his archetypal theory, namely, that it is the 'archetype-as-such' which is inherited as an innate predisposition rather than the archetypal images, symbols, and patterns of behaviour that the archetype-as-such gives rise to. What becomes fixed in the genetic structure is the predisposition to develop certain kinds of perception, ideation, or action, and not the actual...ideas, and actions themselves. (ibid).

The potential for the archetype-as-such is located in the unconscious and is not influenced by culture and/or symbolic forms, but Stevens considers it to *genetically* predispose the personal unconscious and consciousness to subsequently create meaning. Hogenson (1998), McFarland Solomon (1998) and Saunders and Skar (2001), also dispute Stevens' hypothesis based on genetics. Hogenson writes, of Stevens' 'biological/evolutionary' approach to Jung, that although he feels that this point of view has been neglected, he is concerned that Stevens represents a position of 'biological reductionism' (Hogenson, 1998, p. 364). McFarland Solomon states concisely, 'the claim that archetypal images can be carried through the genes is, for most Jungians, clearly untenable' (McFarland Solomon, 1998, p. 375).

It is, Stevens writes, 'Through evolution that we have acquired the capacity to use symbols to connote concepts [...] symbol formation has an adaptive function, it promotes our grasp on reality [...] not just to adapt passively but to master it, to adjust reality to our needs' (ibid., p. 346). Although Stevens' words are phrased in terms of evolutionary processes, he does however appear to concur with the point of view proposed by Pietikäinen that the ability to 'connote' and therefore, interpret symbols, has evolved in conjunction with the development of human *consciousness*, particularly in relation to language. Although he does not refer to

language directly as a ‘symbolic form’ Stevens is critical of Pietikäinen for neglecting to add Chomsky’s later developments in ‘psycholinguistics’ to his recognition of Cassirer’s study of language as this omission neglects the ‘neurological’ aspects of language development. Stevens asserts that language ‘is a hybrid of culture and genes’ (ibid., p. 348). This, however, does not appear to be in dispute in Pietikäinen’s essay, he only questions the notion that archetypes and the collective unconscious are genetically inherited.

Stevens supports Jung’s proposal that the interpretation of symbols is an innate characteristic, and that the ‘symbolizing ability proceeds on an archetypal basis which gives rise to characteristic symbolic manifestations’ (ibid., p. 345). Stevens writes:

a living symbol [...] comes into existence spontaneously as the best possible formulation of a relatively unknown thing [...] something more and other than itself which eludes our present knowledge is what endows it with fascination and power. As its conscious (known) and unconscious (unknown) elements are bridged, it is as if creative energy flows between them, releasing a sudden perception of meaning or a flash of insight. (ibid., pp. 346-347).

Stevens describes the emergence of the symbol, and its emotional influence, as dependent on the archetypal process for its manifestation. This, as has been already noted in this thesis, is a dynamic psychic process where meaning is then created between the ‘unknown’ and the ‘known’ of the unconscious and consciousness, respectively. Stevens appears to suggest that the bridging of the two elements enables the ‘flow’ of ‘creative energy’ between the conscious (known) which would include culture and society, and the unconscious (unknown) including symbols. The bridge illustrates that a mutual engagement between consciousness and

unconsciousness is involved in the apperception and interpretation of archetypal and/or symbolic meanings.

This implies that Stevens accepts that culture could play a part in the formation and interpretation of symbolic and archetypal meanings, but he finds the ideas of Pietikäinen and other ‘academic fashions’ to be transient and reductive because they ‘attribute everything to culture and nothing to genes’ (ibid., p. 353). He considers this viewpoint to compromise the advances in the evolutionary and biological bases of archetypal theory, when, in his opinion, the ‘collective unconscious forms the epistemological bedrock on which Jungian Psychology is founded’ (ibid., p. 352).

George Hogenson (1998)

Hogenson’s response is to Pietikäinen and Stevens. He engages further with the epistemological question concerning the relationship between biology and culture in Jung’s writings. Hogenson takes issue with Pietikäinen because despite his dismissive attitude towards the biological foundation of Jung’s ideas, Cassirer was, according to Hogenson, very ‘respectful of evolutionary theory and ethology.’ He presents his own view of Cassirer’s position, stating that Cassirer ‘did have reservations about the range of claims made by ethologists; this was to do with his view of the mediating capacity of symbolic forms [...] he believed the symbolizing capacity of humans effectively removed the majority of human endeavours from the influence of biology.’ He suggests that Cassirer’s writing shows the limitations of such scientific frameworks for investigation but ‘not their intrinsic scientific integrity’ (Hogenson, 1998, p. 357).

His intention in his response to Pietikäinen and Stevens is to ‘reframe’ the ‘epistemological problem’ as an answer to ‘the status of arguments for innate structures in psychology and the status of the symbol in relation to innate structure’ (ibid., p. 358). Hogenson begins his discussion in the context of Kant’s philosophy, which was influential to both Jung and Cassirer, with a brief explanation of ‘the categories’ as ‘innate structures of mind’ that ‘exist *a priori*’ (ibid.). The central argument in Cassirer’s investigation into ‘symbolic forms’, according to Hogenson is that: ‘Regardless of the differences that may exist among systems of representation such as myth, science or language, or the changes that may occur in such systems over time, there exist universal...*a priori* principles of form that determine the shape of these systems’ (ibid., p. 359). This Kantian point of view, supports notions of innate processes that function to give ‘structure to representation and symbolization.’ Hogenson asserts that the argument for innateness cannot be separated from the scientific, ‘biological’, neurophysiological, or ‘genetic’ position, ‘except to the degree that they remain purely hermeneutical in nature, that is, remain arguments about the nature and processes of interpretation internal to a particular symbolic system’ (ibid., pp. 359-360).

Hogenson, like Stevens, believes that in dismissing the suggestion that there may be biological, genetic, and innate aspects to the formation of symbols and the Jungian archetypes, Pietikäinen’s argument becomes one where he ‘favours cultural relativism’ and if this is due to his ambivalence regarding any potentially biological explanation for innateness then he is also rejecting an important aspect of Cassirer’s work. Hogenson does, however, give credit to Pietikäinen for recognising that Cassirer determined that a symbolic form is the ‘energy of mind that seeks to shape experience’ (ibid., p. 361). Hogenson finds the principal contribution made by Pietikäinen is raising the debate about ‘reductionism’ in the study of Jung, as has already

been mentioned in his reference to Stevens' point of view as representing 'biological reductionism' (ibid., p. 364).

Hogenson states, 'it seems to me that if there is a single *epistemological* point of view that is consistent throughout Jung's life and work, it is a rejection of any reductionist move in psychological theory' (ibid.). His overall position is to reject reductionist notions of 'final foundations' in the study of Jungian concepts. In Hogenson's opinion, this 'involves seeing the products of the psyche in richer more pluralistic terms' and it is 'the combination of [...] the biological and the hermeneutical that provides the real strength of his system' (ibid., p. 370). Clinical practice, Hogenson writes, is based on 'interpretative ability' and, for Jung, 'meaning [...] resides in the symbol' and humans have 'evolved the ability to create [...] and the need to interpret them in ways that are many and varied' (ibid.). One could argue that the same 'interpretative ability' is of value to cultural analysis.

In this critical essay Hogenson does not disclose details of his own position in relation to Jung's notion of the 'archetypes' but he has argued elsewhere, that Jung did not have a '*theory of the archetypes*,' but a number of 'pre-theoretical [...] hypotheses.' Each of these ideas appeals to different types of scholars, such as Stevens', development of evolutionary ideas and Hillman's imaginal viewpoint, to give just two examples (Hogenson, 2004, p. 32). Hogenson's developing position is influenced by more recent writings on 'the origin of phenomena' namely 'emergence.' This suggests that in some systems phenomena may 'come into being without any precursor state' predicting their appearance (ibid., p. 45). Hogenson writes that Saunders and Skar, in 'Archetypes, complexes and self-organisation' (2001), who proposed that the archetypes '*emerge* from the complexes' (Saunders and Skar, 2001, p.320), support his

position, but Knox (2003) and Stevens (2003) oppose its inherent dismissal of notions of the archetype-as-such.

Hester McFarland Solomon (1998)

Solomon's response is that neither Pietikäinen, nor Cassirer, are clinicians but philosophers and she values the former position in this discussion over the latter. She compares Cassirer with Jung and Freud, all of whom, she states, shared a similar cultural background but as a philosopher Cassirer was not under the same 'pressure' to gain 'professional acceptance and status' by locating his theories in scientific discourse. Solomon asserts that the methods used to validate Jung's Word Association Test included '*physiological* measures' and 'quantification of subjective data', the findings of which, she writes, 'constituted the basis of the later theory of archetypes...locating it clearly in the biological realm'. (Solomon, 1998, p. 373). Solomon's position as an adherent to a biological approach to the archetypes is clear but she accepts that it is not enough to locate depth psychology in scientific discourse without evidence. She maintains, in reference to Stevens' position, that 'the assertion of a *genetic* determination of Jung's archetypal images would require substantial empirical testing to avoid being classed as a metaphysical construct' (ibid., p. 374).

Solomon goes on to assert that the 'genius of the thrust of Jung's discoveries' is characterised by its '*biological*' basis. For her, Jung's theory of the archetypes 'spans science and hermeneutics' as it corresponds to the 'major life events of the individual', which are both physiological and psychological. She considers Pietikäinen's proposal to consider the archetypes in relation to symbolic forms to be an attempt to 'extract science' from the 'humanities', two fields that she believes to be 'bridged' by Jung's theory of the archetypes and offer a 'holistic' approach to humanity. Solomon, like Stevens, seems to conflate Pietikäinen's

attitude to genetics with biology as a whole. Pietikäinen, like Solomon, rejects the notion that archetypes are genetically inherited but he does not reject *all* scientific knowledge, because, he writes, ‘any area of culture is potentially a symbolic form’ (Pietikäinen, 1998, p. 331). This thesis aims to consider Pietikäinen’s inquiry into symbolic forms and archetypes as active constituents of a wide range of non-cognitive, cognitive, and cultural, human experiences, as a holistic and conciliatory position, rather than one which consistently pitches ‘science’ against the ‘humanities.’

Solomon asserts her own position that ‘biological development’ through life ‘has mental representation and emotional meanings’ corresponding to ‘major life events’, represented in ‘archetypal images’ and she challenges Pietikäinen to agree with her own interpretation of ‘the powerful image of Madonna and child.’ She writes: ‘Would he not agree that much of the power of the image rests on the conjunction of the physical and biological, skin-to-skin relationship and the emotional and spiritual, mind-to-mind relationship of the first couple, mother and child, calling forth a vast history and a multitude of artistic vision of this universal theme?’ (Solomon, 1998, p. 375).

Pietikäinen’s defence (1998b)

Pietikäinen (1998b) replies to the criticism of his respondents, and clarifies his position as a historian rather than a philosopher, specifically, a historian of ideas. To Solomon’s question, he states that he would ‘investigate the historical evolution and diffusion of Christian imagery’ (Pietikäinen, 1998b, p. 380]. He writes:

Symbols of madonna and child in the places where there are (or have been) practising Christians is quite natural. It seems as if

Christianity's lack of a protective mother goddess was repaired by the wide-spread cult of Virgin Mary, whose features resemble those of the pagan fertility goddesses. Madonna and child can indeed be a 'universal motif', but the point is that we do not need archetypes to explain its possible universality. (ibid.).

The exchange between Solomon and Pietikäinen is important because it illustrates their commitment to the critical divide that may be seen to exist between clinical and academic interpretations of archetypal images. In this essay, Pietikäinen disputes Solomon's assertion that Jung's theory bridges science and the humanities (ibid., p. 379). For example, it might also be argued that the physical/biological and emotional/spiritual would not be needed to explain the universality of the image when history or religion can, but what is being proposed is not a bridge across a divide but rather a synthesis of aspects of Jung's analytical psychology with aspects of critical discourses that lessen the divide and *add* valuable interpretations to one another's work and so enrich cultural and psychological studies.

Pietikäinen states that as a historian he has, after close reading of Jung and post-Jungian texts, become more 'sceptical' towards Jungian ontology and he refers to the theory of archetypes as, 'ahistorical structural categories of the collective unconscious, which remain quite 'immune' to the influences of contingent historical events' (ibid., p. 379). He states that, in his concept of the archetypes, Jung was concerned with the unchanging nature of the 'mental structure, not with the historical changes and their *historical* explanations' (ibid.). The 'essence' of Jungian psychology is described by Pietikäinen as, 'the mythification of man and the ensuing escape from history to myth' (ibid., p. 381). Unfortunately, a progressive proposal for the enrichment of cultural studies, has taken a sceptical turn and Pietikäinen has arrived at analytical psychology as the re-mythification of humanity.

Although Pietikäinen offers a great deal of detailed counter-criticism to his respondents in his reply, he reveals that he finds ‘quarrelling’, ‘crises’ and conflicting theories to be a ‘healthy sign.’ He re-asserts that, ‘Rather than scientific, Jungian methodology can perhaps be characterised as ‘hermeneutic’, although it has, he writes, ‘more to do with the Romantic idealist tradition than with twentieth century hermeneutics.’ He writes:

Just like the Romantics, he undervalued rational argumentation and preferred giving full rein to his...imaginative and interpretative capacities. Like a modern day Romantic, he saw everything as being constantly on the move, assuming new forms, seeking restlessly new channels for expression, manifesting not only the known and the predictable but especially the unknown and the unpredictable. (ibid., p. 388).

Pietikäinen, by positioning Jung back into his own historical context now takes a cultural materialist position and turns an earlier assertion that Jung’s work represents a ‘metaphysical fantasy, grounded on unverifiable (or unfalsifiable) doctrines’ into a cultural product of his time (ibid., p. 384). He concludes: ‘Jung’s psychology successfully defies interpretations which try to define it neatly with the help of a certain theoretical apparatus or historical viewpoint, but this ‘opaque’ quality of his work makes it all the more challenging for a historian like me to examine an influential thinker like Jung’ (ibid., p. 388). This point of view encapsulates the pluralistic appeal of Jungian psychology.

Greg Mogenson (1999)

Greg Mogenson (1999), also in an article published in the *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, added his response to the discussion but not in the context of archetypal theory, cultural studies, symbolic forms, history, or science but solely in the context of Jung’s analytical psychology. He states that in the whole debate ‘within contemporary critical discourse’ analytical

psychology is represented in ‘grotesque caricature.’ He is ‘struck’ by the ‘absence of reference to the psyche’, as it is fundamental to Jung’s psychology. He writes, ‘unlike archetypes, the existence of which is disputed, the psyche or unconscious, as unknown and insubstantial as it may be in its unfathomable depth, has the status of being the object of its own science’ (Mogenson, 1999, p. 127).

He is not, Mogenson writes, ‘threatened’ by Pietikäinen’s attempts to rescue the archetypes from biology by ‘identifying them with symbolic forms,’ but his sense of unease appears to arise out of the turn to the ‘outside of the psyche’ to ‘authenticate’ the archetypes and so ‘undermine the ontological ground and epistemological scope’ of Jung’s psychology (ibid., p. 132). Mogenson concludes that the loss of this essential aspect of analytical psychology is the result of critical discourse imposing false dichotomies, such as ‘evolutionary psychology’ versus ‘cultural symbolism’ when it may be seen to be in a ‘field of its own’ (ibid). He seems to echo Jung’s concern, expressed in ‘The Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology’ (1931), about the necessity to counter the sense of an ‘ontological’ threat posed by a ‘psychology without the soul’ (Jung, 1931/1969, CW8 p. 338:649) with the possibility of a ‘psychology *with* the psyche’ (ibid., p. 344:661). With regards to the ‘epistemological scope,’ of Jung’s work, it seems that the range of perspectives introduced only briefly in this thesis, in addition to Pietikäinen’s proposed integration with cultural studies, only aims to broaden the scope and maintain the living sense of analytical psychology.

The significance of Mogenson’s comments outlined above, for the development of this thesis, is that it is important to consider that the essence of a writer or artist and their work may be seen, or ‘felt into,’ in their original expression, as well as in their cultural and historical context.

The author's intention, in their own cultural and historical environment, should be a fundamental consideration when attempting to re-present their ideas in contemporary forms of cultural and critical theory, before forging new connections.

Conclusion: Are the archetypes symbolic and/or cultural forms?

Pietikäinen recognises that the archetypes are of particular importance to the study of symbolic forms because they can appear as 'non-cognitive functions operating in the relations' between humanity and culture in, for example, dreams, fantasies and strong emotions. 'These emotional dimensions' he writes, have been neglected in the study of culture and cultural forms (Pietikäinen, 1998, p. 338). Stevens, although eager to defend his position as an evolutionist and critical of that which he perceives as Pietikäinen's cultural reductionism, also expresses the 'power' and 'fascination', or non-cognitive affects, of the symbol (Stevens, 1998, p. 347). Solomon's biological perspective also emphasises the 'powerful biological, emotional and socio-cultural dynamics' of the archetypal image associated with 'major life events' (Solomon, 1998, p. 375). Saunders and Skar (2001) and Colman (2018) also acknowledge the intensity of feeling that the archetypes can evoke.

The examination of the archetypes in Part Two of this study has revealed that they are as important in their capacity as mediators of intuitive, instinctive apprehension, as they are to the symbolic expression or manifestation of the archetypal image. Their close relation to the expression of feeling and their ability to irrupt spontaneously in consciousness renders the archetypes a fundamental source from which to begin this investigation into a possible relationship between the archetypal process and the structure of feeling. Jung writes:

The archetypes [...] have their own initiative and their own

specific energy. These powers enable them both to produce a meaningful interpretation (in their own symbolic style) and to interfere in a given situation with their own impulses and their own thought formations. In this respect, they function like complexes; they come and go very much as they please, and often they obstruct or modify our conscious intentions in an embarrassing way [...] One can perceive the specific energy of archetypes when we experience the peculiar fascination that accompanies them. (Jung, von Franz, ed., 1964, pp. 67-68).

This citation, from Jung's later work, describes his sense of the overall autonomy of the archetypes. They are dynamic unconscious psychological processes and for this reason, *do not seem to present in analytical psychology as being the same as symbolic forms*. Whether they are viewed from, for example, the perspective of psychology, philosophy, neurophysiology, biological science, emergence theory, or as an intrinsic aspect of cultural forms, they are significant psychic forces that have the potential to energise symbolic forms with intense emotions, 'peculiar fascination' and 'in their own symbolic style' (Ibid.). It seems that the archetypes can 'appear,' unconsciously, within symbolic forms, and be manifest in cultural forms in acts of 'unconscious creation' (Dilthey, in Rickman, ed., 1976, pp. 259-260).

Jung had expressed a version of these insights over one hundred years ago. He writes of the constitutive aspect of the archetype in 'On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry' (1922/2003).

The creative process [...] consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping this image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the language of the present, and so makes it possible for us to find our way back to the deepest springs of life. Therein lies the social

significance of art: it is constantly at work educating the spirit of the age, conjuring up the forms in which the age is most lacking. The unsatisfied yearning of the artist reaches back to the primordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to compensate the inadequacy and one-sidedness of the present. The artist seizes on this image, and in raising it from deepest unconsciousness he brings it into relation with conscious values, thereby transforming it until it can be accepted by the minds of his contemporaries according to their powers. (Jung, 1922/2003, CW15, p. 82:130).

Creative production, according to Jung, is energised and constituted by the ‘activation of the archetypes’ and unconsciously ‘shaped into finished work’, or cultural form. The finished work is evaluated, through feeling, and interpreted according to the readiness of the contemporary consciousness to realise the symbolic and archetypal meanings manifest in the form as transformative.

This process suggests a possible psychological relationship with Raymond Williams’ concept of the structure of feeling, where the structure of feeling in the art form could be an unconscious manifestation of the collective unconscious/archetype and when adapted to the language of the present, be interpreted as the creative activity of the archetypes shaping the ‘finished work’ (ibid.). Because content remains unconscious until the audience is able to assimilate it, re-readings and interpretations can change and develop over time, contributing to the sense, expressed by Dilthey, that there is potential for the author to become understood better than they understood themselves.

Now that the thesis has introduced a basic conceptual framework of notions of the archetypes, part three, Chapter Six ‘Cultural Studies, Cultural Materialism and the ‘Structure of Feeling’,

will examine Williams's work from the position of the emergence of mid-twentieth century British cultural studies. The chapter begins with an outline of the development of British cultural studies, then considers some early influences on the development of Williams's ideas such as F. R. Leavis and Karl Marx, and the fruition of his own particular approach to cultural studies i.e., cultural materialism. A chronological review of the development of the concept of the structure of feeling concludes the chapter.

PART THREE

CHAPTER SIX

**CULTURAL STUDIES, CULTURAL MATERIALISM
AND
THE 'STRUCTURE OF FEELING'**

Introduction

This chapter is divided into two sections. It begins, in section one, with a brief introduction to the influence of historicism on Raymond Williams and the 'structure of feeling' as an historicist concept. It is followed by a summary of the origin of twentieth century British cultural studies which represents a significant cultural and political shift that heralded both a clear departure from and a new approach to traditional literary theory and criticism and, as such, forms the context in which the work of Raymond Williams developed. Next, the chapter will examine the development of Williams' work, it follows the early influence of F. R. Leavis (1895-1978) during his time at Cambridge and the further influence of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) and historical materialism, that influenced him in describing his own cultural studies perspective as cultural materialism. Section two of this chapter concentrates on detailing the concept of the 'structure of feeling' as it evolves in Williams' writings.

Williams, historicism and the 'structure of feeling'

Williams' work has its basis in literary studies, interpreted from a historicist viewpoint. His approach to literature, the arts and other cultural forms, is to examine them in the context of the socio-cultural situation in the past in which they were created or produced, for example, according to the dominant attitudes and ideas of the time and in relation to the accepted artistic conventions of the period. This approach encourages greater understanding of the outside influences on the creativity and content of the completed work and enables the recognition of the transmission and/or transformation of key ideas from the past to the present. With reference to his core concept, the 'structure of feeling,' Williams states, it 'was initially developed' from his reading of 'the accessible evidence of actual articulations in texts and works,' produced in the past (Williams, in Williams and *New Left Review*, 1979/1981, p. 158). This relates his

concept to the fundamental method of *feeling into the past* attributed to Herder and the historicism of the Romantic period, already noted in chapters two and three of the thesis.

Although Williams' writing is prolific, in volume and range, he objected to the tendency to be portrayed as a '*literary critic*,' and the unspecific term 'cultural studies' did not do justice to the 'area Williams inhabits' (Eagleton, 1984/2005, pp. 108-109). But, Eagleton, a well-known academic writer and former student of Williams, maintains that in spite of Williams' inclination to defy categorisation, he conveyed a sense of 'historicist humanism' that he 'sustained' despite the rapid changes taking place in academic trends in the late twentieth century (ibid.). Williams' difficulty in accepting categorisation of his work could be explained by Weedon's reference to the 'deconstruction of disciplinary boundaries' that appears in the development of cultural studies.

Weedon writes:

Challenging existing disciplinary boundaries, cultural studies drew on questions, theories and methods taken from literary studies, history, sociology, film and media studies. In the process literature was no longer privileged as the bearer of universal values. Literary texts were read alongside other modes of writing as one cultural process among others. Moreover attention was focused not only on texts but on the process of writing, publishing, distribution and readership. This marked a shift from theories of 'literariness' as a fixed, recognizable aesthetic quality to 'literariness' as a social category produced via the institutional practices of publishing, education and literary criticism

(Weedon, in Knellwolf, et, al., eds., 2001, pp. 162-163).

Written, pictorial and other textual representations, are all expressions of the living sense of humanity in their own space and time. Cultural studies offer a broad perspective in which to observe and evaluate them. The extension of the area of study to include the activities of writing, publishing, distribution, readership and education, are a reminder that artistic practices are social as well as creative and are dependent on human agency, rather than inspiration or universal laws.

Text and intertextuality, in place of literariness, alters the focus on the text to include its social, historical, political economic, cultural, psychological/psychoanalytical and aesthetic contexts, displacing the highbrow idealist tradition of Literature and associated ideas of the individual creative talent of the author, and encompassing the value of popular cultural forms and other collective interests, such as readership, education, publishing and distribution. Notions of the 'text' became popular in the mid-twentieth century in a revised sense of 'textuality as literary style' used in the early nineteenth century. 'Text developed into a pan-disciplinary concept,' that included 'a full range of media (visual, aural, and corporeal)' as well as 'ritual spectacles, social activities, commodities and spaces' (Threadgold, in Bennet, Grossberg, Morris, eds., 2005, pp. 345 -346). Intertextuality, in brief, has been described as 'a theory of meaning and meaning production,' in which: 'all texts [...] are composed of other (pre-existing) texts [...] held together in a state of constant interaction [...] all texts exist in a state of [...] interdependency with other texts (Buchanan, 2010/2018, p. 263).

This connects with Jung's thoughts on the relationship between the function of the 'finished work' and the 'social significance of art' (Jung, 1922/2014, CW15, pp. 82-83:130). To recap, Jung writes of the 'finished work:'

By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the language of the present [...] Therein lies the social significance of art: it is constantly at work educating the spirit the age, conjuring up the forms in which the age is most lacking [...] he brings it into relation with conscious values thereby transforming it until it can be accepted by the minds of his contemporaries according to their powers. (ibid.).

Jung, in this essay, establishes that creativity performs a compensatory function where the unconscious symbolic content of the archetypal image, engages in a process of bridging the collective unconscious (infinite) with 'conscious values' (present). If the transformative aspect of compensation, as manifest in the image, is not 'compatible with the general attitude,' however, the symbolic meaning will not yet be accessible to the consciousness of the audience (ibid., p. 83:131). It may also, from Williams's position, be possible for later generations to understand the symbolic significance of earlier cultural forms at a later time as 'the accessible evidence of an actual articulation' of its time that is represented in the 'structure of feeling' (Williams, *New Left Review*, 1979/1981, pp. 158). The unconscious, 'constantly at work,' 'conjuring up forms,' until they 'can be accepted,' expresses another parallel between Jung and cultural studies, in that the archetypal and symbolic 'meaning and meaning production' of the psyche expresses a similarity with the notion of intertextuality.

Origins of cultural studies in Britain

The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies was established in Britain in 1964 under the Directorship of Richard Hoggart (1918-2014), then Professor of Modern English Literature, until he left in 1968. Stuart Hall (1932-2014), a sociologist and cultural critic, was the Director of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies from 1968–1979. Hall describes the emergence and evolution of contemporary cultural studies as an area of study that arose out of ‘a break’ in traditionally held academic points of view (Hall, in Hall, et al., eds., 1980, p. 7). He states:

In intellectual matters absolute beginnings are exceedingly rare. We find, instead, continuities and breaks. New interventions reflect events outside a discipline but have effects within it. They most often work to reorganize a set of problems or field of inquiry. They reconstitute existing knowledge under the sign of new questions. They dispose existing elements into new configurations, establish new points of departure. Cultural Studies, in its institutional manifestation, was the result of such a break in the 1960s. But the field in which this intervention was made had been initially charted in the 1950s. (ibid., p. 16).

Hall confirms that among the ‘new interventions’, which were to become, ‘originating texts’, in cultural studies are two seminal texts. These were written by the literary and cultural critic Raymond Williams (1921-1988) and are *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (1958) and *The Long Revolution* (1961), in which he takes a historical view of culture as a social and political, rather than a purely artistic, process. A ‘long retrospective, historical glance’, Hall writes, was taken by Williams as well as Richard Hoggart in *The Uses of Literacy* (1957), and the British cultural historian, E.P. Thompson (1924-1993) in *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963). This post-war historical viewpoint raised questions, according to Hall, as to whether there had

been ‘a decisive rupture with the determining historical forces’ or whether history was being represented in a ‘recomposition into new continuities’ (ibid., p. 17). If, he writes, evidence suggests that there are ‘new emergent cultural forms and tendencies’, how would these, as ‘historical processes’, be ‘qualitatively understood and assessed’? (ibid.).

Williams examined this question throughout his writings where, in *Marxism and Literature* (1977), he describes the significance of ‘emergent’ cultural formations. He writes,

By ‘emergent’ I mean, new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship are continually being created. But it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between those which are really elements of some new phase of the dominant culture [...] and those which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it: emergent in the strict sense, rather than merely novel. (Williams, 1977, p. 123).

Hall and Williams both take a view that while the ‘new’ is always evolving and will be represented in culture, it will not always be manifest as a ‘break’ with the past but in a continuous and sometimes transformative relationship to it. Williams’s concept of the ‘structure of feeling’ resembles a ‘qualitative’ way in which to articulate emergent aspects of culture and will be examined in detail in the second part of this chapter.

In a later paper, Hall revisits the question of ‘breaks’ in historical processes represented in thought. He states that ‘significant *breaks*’ occur, ‘where old lines of thought are disrupted, older constellations displaced, and elements, old and new, are regrouped around a different set of premises and themes’ (Hall, in Bennett, et al., eds., 1981, p. 19). Hall’s notion of ‘breaks’ does not represent a sense of unbridgeable historical gaps in thought but, rather, a sense of

breakthroughs creating access for new ways of thinking. The ‘shifts in perspective’ that arise, ‘reflect not only the results of an internal intellectual labour, but the manner in which real historical developments and transformations are appropriated in thought, and provide Thought’ (ibid.). He suggests that historical processes are conveyed in the relationship between individual internal thought and its emergence as ‘Thought’ externally, in cultures.

Williams viewed the arts as illustrative of the interaction between all social and cultural practices and ‘human energy.’ Hall cites Williams, writing in *The Long Revolution* (1961):

If the art is part of society, there is no solid whole, outside it, to which, [...] we concede priority. The art is there, as an activity, with the production, the trading, the politics, the raising of families. To study the relations adequately we must study them actively, seeing all activities as particular and contemporary forms of human energy (ibid., p.22).

Williams’s culturalism, in which the emphasis is on the ways in which culture is made, relies also on the conscious awareness of the part ‘human agency’ plays in the interaction between social and cultural practices (Bennett, Martin, Mercer, Woollacott., eds., 1981, p. 10). For Williams, the result of that interaction, through which people, ‘actively respond to the conditions of their social existence’, by ‘creatively fashioning’ lived experience and ‘social relationships into diverse and structured patterns of living, thinking and feeling’, is a creative response that becomes represented in cultural forms (ibid.).

Williams’s ideas emerged as a creative and alternative response to other more dominant positions in ‘Thought’ in the mid-twentieth century and is similar in this sense to the position

from which Jung was writing throughout the first half of the twentieth century and beyond. Jung's work was developing in the historical tradition of dynamic psychiatry and Freudian psychoanalysis, before it emerged as alternative, oppositional thought, in analytical psychology. The tendency of both writers to have opposed traditional epistemological boundaries in their writings in order to advance their ideas is a significant point of convergence. Williams' early influence was the literary criticism of F. R. Leavis, outlined under the next sub-heading.

Williams and F. R. Leavis

Williams' earliest work, *Culture and Society 1780-1950*, (1958) was a point of departure from the contemporary literary criticism of F. R. Leavis (1895-1978), whose work was a major influence on the development of twentieth century English literary criticism. Leavis taught, and developed and edited the *Scrutiny* journal, at Cambridge University from the 1930s until the 1960s, during the time that Williams was a student there. Williams entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in October 1939 to read English. In 1941 he was called up to join the army where he remained in service until 1945 when he returned to complete his studies. He discovered on his return to Cambridge, '...a specific literary culture around Leavis...poles removed from what we had known in '41. There was really no longer a conscious left presence' (Williams, *New Left Review*, 1979/1981, p. 61). Williams later stated that Leavis had become involved in the formation of a 'cultural conservatism' (ibid., p. 112).

A broader context of the academic milieu within which Williams was beginning to form his ideas is found in recent texts that describe the evolution and development of literary theory and criticism and which take the view that the contribution made by F. R. Leavis is more complex.

In *Literary Theory and Criticism* (2006), Baldick, in 'Literature and the academy', asserts that from the 1930s an 'historic shift' took place in the nature of literary criticism. It had previously been practised by poets and writers as 'amateur' critics but a new professionalism was emerging in universities, 'the critic had formerly been a poet speaking to other poets, or to the readers of public magazines, but was now a professor' (Baldick, in Waugh, ed., 2006, pp. 85-86).

Leavis was involved in the development of 'practical criticism' and 'close reading' (Eagleton, 1983, pp. 43-44). These evolving methodologies applied to the critical analysis of literature were influenced by New Criticism; the dominant contemporary American approach in the 1930s and 1940s, and I.A. Richard's experiment in the psychology of reading at Cambridge, *Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgement* (1929). These approaches studied the text, 'as an object in itself', focusing on the value of the 'words on the page', without reference to external biographical, social, cultural or historical contexts that may have influenced its origin (ibid., p. 43-44). By the 1950s and 1960s, Baldick writes, the vast majority of critics, which would include Raymond Williams, were academics (Baldick, in Waugh, ed., 2006, p.86). The work of his generation of critics would, therefore, have been informed by the new critical methods of their predecessors.

The designated cultural conservatism of F.R. Leavis, has, on the other hand, been defined as 'liberal humanist', based on the 'moralism' of Samuel Johnson and the 'social vision' of Matthew Arnold and as maintaining a rejection of efforts to directly politicise the text (Barry, 1995, pp. 28-29). Gary Day, in 'F.R. Leavis: criticism and culture' (Day, in Waugh, ed., 2006, pp. 130-139), writes that Leavis tended to feel 'misrepresented' and has been misunderstood, in part because there are evident contradictions in his work. He writes:

The result is that Leavis is often portrayed as a conservative critic. His concentration on the individual work, how it explores and enacts experience, has led many to assume that he had no interest in a text's relationship to its context. In fact, Leavis consistently maintained that a tradition of literature held out possibilities of growth and development that were denied by the wider society (ibid., p. 130).

Leavis's emphasis on 'tradition', in his, *The Great Tradition* (1948), in which he singles out only five significant writers, contributed to the view of his exclusive attitude to Literature and of being a critic concerned only with culture as 'high' art. He writes; 'What I think and judge I have stated as responsibly and clearly as I can. Jane Austen, George Eliot, Henry James, Conrad and D.H. Lawrence: the great tradition of the English novel is *there*' (F. R. Leavis, 1948/1983, p. 39). However, Leavis also states, that the 'few really great' novelists in *The Great Tradition* (1948), are 'distinguished' by their ability to 'not only change the possibilities of the art for practitioners and readers, but that they are significant in terms of the human awareness they promote; awareness of the possibilities of life' (ibid., p. 10). According to Day, Leavis, like Williams in his late work, considered 'culture' to have more than one meaning. Day asserts, 'By using it to refer to an art of living as well as literary achievement, Leavis anticipates how the term will be deployed by later thinkers like Raymond Williams' (Day, in Waugh, ed., 2006, p. 131).

For example, the following summary of Leavis's thought pre-dates an aspect of Williams's theory of the 'structure of feeling':

All great art [...] does communicate what he called a "felt significance", something which confirms our sense that life is not mere duration or simply a succession of days, that there is

indeed pattern and purpose to existence. This did not derive from any supernatural agency, but from human creativity giving shape and meaning to the contingency of the world in the form of cultural continuity and change. Significant art, Leavis remarks, “challenges us in the most disturbing and inescapable way to a radical pondering, a new profound realization, of the grounds of our most important determinations and choices”. Are these truly the words of a conservative critic? (ibid., p. 137).

The notion of ‘felt significance’ in ‘human creativity giving shape and meaning [...] in the form of cultural continuity and change’, shares similarities with the ‘structure of feeling’. Leavis, and Day, however, appear to conflate notions of ‘art’, high art’, Literature’ and ‘Tradition’ with ‘culture’, while Williams sees culture as an inclusive notion, encompassing all human productivity; creative, material, economic and institutional. Williams suggests that contemporary meanings of ‘culture’ had emerged during the industrial revolution and was ‘a very key moment in the interpretation of that experience’ and ‘in all the social thought that had accompanied it’ (Williams, *New Left Review*, 1979/1981, p. 97). He did not agree that culture depended entirely on art or artistic achievement but rather the fact of ‘living’ in itself creates culture.

When asked of his motivation for writing his first book, *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (1958), Williams stated:

It was oppositional – to counter the appropriation of a long line of thinking about culture [...] it allowed me to refute the increasing contemporary use of the concept of culture against democracy, socialism, the working class or popular education, in terms of the tradition itself [...] Secondly, the possibility had

occurred to me [...] that this might also be a way of centring a different kind of discussion both in socio-political and in literary analysis (ibid., pp. 97-98).

In *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (1958) Williams does not appear to be entirely in 'opposition' to notions of 'tradition', he writes, 'What we receive from the tradition is a set of meanings', but he continues, 'not all of these will hold their significance' (Williams, 1958/2017, p. 390). In his next major work, *The Long Revolution* (1961), he becomes more critical of that which he describes as the 'selective tradition'. Although the 'selective tradition' forms continuity between 'lived culture and period cultures' it would also, by definition, exclude and neglect many elements of the culture as lived. He asserts, 'The selective tradition thus creates, at one level, a general human culture; at another level, the historical record of a particular society; at a third level, most difficult to accept and assess, a rejection of considerable areas of what was once a living culture' (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 72). 'Living culture,' for Williams, means all material aspects of all cultures not just selective forms of high art at the expense of all other forms of creativity.

Williams' emphasis on continuity between 'lived' and 'living' cultures is similar to Leavis' notion of the 'living principle'. Day writes that Leavis used this term also to mean 'tradition.' He writes, 'The critic maintains the 'living principle' [...] by making the works of the past live in the present, and by identifying the significant new life in contemporary literature' (Day, in Waugh, ed., 2006 p. 133). Day cites Leavis's work, in which, he writes, the critic must 'establish where, in the age, is the real centre of significance, the centre of vital continuity [...] where we have the growth towards the future of the finest life and consciousness of the past' (ibid., p.137). This aspect of Leavis's work, seems to have influenced Williams's later attempts to articulate the 'structure of feeling.' In *The Long Revolution* (1961) he suggests that

the ‘structure of feeling’ emerges in the ways in which the culture of a particular historical period or moment may be *felt*, or evoked, in its cultural material, but, significantly, this occurs when engaging with it at a *later* time in history. This results in re-articulations of the past in the present, where ‘the new generation’ will take up ‘continuities,’ and shape ‘its creative response into a new structure of feeling’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69-70). Leavis identifies the importance of a ‘centre of vital continuity’ for ‘the growth towards the future’, with which Williams would appear to agree. He may have been less concerned, however, with the continuity of the *finest* of life and consciousness, and more sympathetic to enabling the continuous expression of the vitality of all living cultures.

The brief diversion into the criticism of F.R. Leavis, has been to provide insight into the dominant academic position in early twentieth century English studies, from which Williams’s work emerges as different, *a breakthrough*. The works of Leavis and Williams illustrate development within a continuous process of ‘continuities and breaks’ that would formulate further questions and result in ‘new points of departure’ (Hall, in Hall et al., eds., 1980, p. 16). Williams’s early work continues in the vein of literary criticism and analysis but he views ‘culture’ as a much broader, far-reaching concept. Like Leavis, he appears to appreciate culture as inherently critical to human development and he values its potential as a transformative influence, but for Williams the point of departure is the motivation to explore the questions of social and political, over moral, transformation.

In Hall’s description of the early influence of Williams’s work, he turns to *The Long Revolution* (1961), which he describes as a ‘text of the break’ (ibid., p. 19). *The Long Revolution* (1961), Hall writes:

was a seminal event in English post-war intellectual life. It marked the opening of a strikingly different kind of reflection on past and present. It linked with the ‘culture-and-society’ debate in its literary-moral points of reference. But in its theoretical mode and ambition it clearly also broke with that tradition [...] It shifted the whole ground of debate from a literary-moral to an anthropological definition of culture. But it defined the latter now as the ‘whole process’ by means of which meanings and definitions are socially constructed and historically transformed, with literature and art as only one, specially privileged, kind of social communication. (ibid.).

The Long Revolution (1961) as a difficult, if ground-breaking text, arise because Williams is attempting a Marxist position that appears in a ‘highly displaced fashion’ (Ibid.). In *Politics and Letters* (1979), attention is drawn to the ‘hostile’ criticism of the ‘established press’; the rapid change in national politics since the publication of *Culture and Society* (1958) which had resulted in ‘a sudden fear of the left’, and, paradoxically, the criticism from the left that came from E.P. Thompson, historian, and acquaintance of Williams. (Williams/*New Left Review*, 1979/1981 p.134), (Smith, 2008, p. 410). Hall, states, however, ‘Bearing in mind the cultural and intellectual climate of the ‘Cold War’ in which it was conceived and written one can only register [...] the intellectual boldness of the whole venture (ibid.) The importance here, of *The Long Revolution* (1961), is that it contains the first detailed description of one of his ‘most notable theoretical innovations’, the ‘structure of feeling’, which is a key concept in this thesis (Williams, ‘*New Left Review*’, 1979/1981, p. 156). To follow, a summary of the influence on Williams of one of the core concepts of the writings of Marx and Engels.

Historical Materialism

The emergence of a Marxist materialist position from one of literary-moral idealism in Williams' work, is reflected in the following summary of how language as a material development relates to historical materialism, and the significance, for Williams, of language as a fundamental material and practical attribute of cultural life. An example from the works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, read in the context of Williams and cultural studies, informs Williams' position. In *The German Ideology* (Marx, Engels, 1888/1966), the editor describes in a note the intention behind Marx's 'Theses on Feuerbach' (1888).

"Theses on Feuerbach" were written by Marx in Brussels in the spring of 1845, when he had already completed, in the main, the development of his materialistic theory of history, and had extended, materialism to the understanding of human society.

According to Engels, this was "the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of a new world outlook [...]"

In his "Theses on Feuerbach" Marx reveals the basic shortcomings of the materialism of Feuerbach and of all his forerunners - its passive, contemplative approach and its failure to understand the importance of man's revolutionary, "practical-critical" activity. He emphasises the decisive role of revolutionary practice in the cognition and remaking of the world.

(Marx, Engels, 1888/1966, Notes, p. 534].

In, 'Feuerbach. Opposition of the Materialistic and Idealistic Outlook,' (1888) Marx and Engels write under the sub-heading 'The Essence of the Materialistic Conception of History. Social Being and Social Consciousness,' of the importance of language:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the

material intercourse of men, the language of real life [...] In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven [...] Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness [...] have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as *their* consciousness (Marx, Engels, 1845-6/1966, pp. 24-25).

The ‘language of real life’, grounds humanity in its own development through its role in the ‘production of ideas’, communication, thought, and ‘material activity. This bears some similarity to the emphasis on language and self-development articulated in Vico and Herder, noted earlier, and is, for Williams, the fundamental basis of cultural as well as material reproduction. In *Marxism and Literature* (1977), Williams also includes a citation from the same work to illustrate how Marx and Engels approached the subject of language ‘as part of their argument against pure, directive consciousness’ (Williams, 1977, p. 28). They write:

we find that man also possesses ‘consciousness;’ but, even so, not inherent, not ‘pure’ consciousness. From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness, as it exists for other men [...] for language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. (ibid., p. 29).

Language, for Williams, as noted earlier is an important aspect of an historical materialist approach to culture because it is a ‘practical constitutive activity’ central to the development of society, communication, thought and ideas (ibid). His allusions to idealist negations of the practical activity of language are raised in reference to Vico and Herder, whom, although he agrees with them to some extent, also present a difficulty. Williams writes:

Thus there is an obvious danger, in the thinking of Vico and Herder, of making language “primary” and “original”, not in the acceptable sense that it is a necessary part of the very act of human self-creation, but in the related and available sense of language as the founding element in humanity: “in the beginning was the Word”. It is precisely the sense of language as an *indissoluble* element of human self-creation that gives any acceptable meaning to its description as “constitutive”.

[...] The idea of language as constitutive is always in danger of this kind of reduction. Not only, however, in the direction of the isolated creative word, which becomes idealism, but also, as actually happened, in objectivist materialism and positivism, where the “world” or “reality” or “social reality” is categorically projected as the pre-existent formation to which language is a response. (ibid.).

Williams’ approach to language is that it is not seen as given, but as an ever-changing process ‘of the activities of real people in social relationships.’ Central to its role in historical materialism is that it includes ‘individuals not simply as products of the society but in a precise dialectical relation both producing and being produced by it’ (Williams, *New Left Review*, 1979/1981, p.330). This would mean that the ‘material production’ of institutional buildings, such as ‘palaces, churches, prisons and schools’ are not then more material than the people that rule or govern them and define their function’ (ibid., p. 351). The idealist conceptions of culture

that perpetuate ‘intangible notions and values’ deny the human agency evident in ‘real physical processes of communication’ (ibid.).

Williams’ materialism illustrates a key difference between his position and that of Jung. Jung writes in, ‘Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology’ (1931/2001), ‘Just as formerly the assumption was unquestionable that everything that exists originates from the creative will of a God who is a spirit, so the nineteenth century discovered the equally unquestionable truth that everything arises from material causes’ (Jung, 1931/1969, CW8, p. 340:653). Marx was writing in the nineteenth century and this citation from Jung’s writing expresses his impatience with a period that he considered to have developed a ‘psychology without the soul’ (ibid., p. 338:649), and believed that only ‘material things alone have substance’ (ibid., p. 339:649).

Cultural Materialism

The height of Williams’s engagement with Marxism is the publication of *Marxism and Literature* (1977). Williams introduces the text declaring that he has written it at a time of ‘radical change’ in which ‘Marxism’ and ‘Literature’ are involved; not as two completed areas of study but in ‘active development’, a ‘body of thinking still in movement’ (Williams, 1977, p. 1). He acknowledges the influence and contribution of European Marxists of the Frankfurt School, such as, Walter Benjamin (1892-1940). The work of European Marxists, including the works of Marx, i.e., *Grundrisse*, (ibid., p. 4), was becoming available in English translation more widely in the 1960s and 1970s. Georg Lukacs (1885-1971), Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) and Lucien Goldmann (1913-1970) are also named, among others, as direct influences on his own ideas as well as on the ‘selective and alternative’ interpretations involved in the tradition of Marxism. His positioning of Marxism as a process

that is continuously evolving gives Williams the confidence required to formulate ‘new questions’ and ‘points of departure’ within the framework of the traditions of Marxism and Literature, when he had previously felt marginalised by his beliefs and ideas.

Marxism and Literature (1977), provides a critical analysis of Marxism. It is a complex text where Williams analyses and discusses key Marxist concepts using difficult, abstract language. It is an important text, however, because it is here that Williams attempts to set out his current position based on the changes in his ‘thinking over the last fifteen years or so’ (Williams, *New Left Review*, 1979/1981, p. 324). It also records a detailed development of his theory of ‘structures of feeling’ which is central to the theory of cultural materialism and will be explored in detail in the next section of this chapter.

Williams describes his current position in the ‘Introduction’ to this text. He concedes that they differ from ‘traditional Marxism’ and that ‘while presenting analysis and discussion of key elements and variants of Marxist thinking’ he is now developing his own theory as ‘cultural materialism.’ (Williams, 1977, p. 5). He writes:

I am concerned...to develop a position which, as a matter of theory, I have arrived at over the years. This differs at several key points, from what is most widely known as Marxist theory [...] It is a position which can be briefly described as cultural materialism: a theory of the specificities of material cultural and literary production within historical materialism (ibid.).

Cultural materialism then, Williams confirms, is concerned with all material cultural production, but the emphasis on ‘literary production’ is a direct result of the influence of the

structural/Marxist current in literary studies at the time, making language central to his new position (Williams, *New Left Review*, 1979/1981, p. 324).

‘Cultural materialism, or cultural materialism’

John Higgins in, *Raymond Williams: Literature, Marxism and Cultural Materialism* (1999), adopts Williams’ emphasis on culture as a ‘constitutive force’ in the reproduction of the ‘existing social order’ (Higgins, 1999, p. 125). He states that there are two ways to interpret cultural materialism, ‘*cultural materialism*’ is suggestive of the Marxist influence on the development of his theory and so emphasises the social and ‘constitutive’ aspects; ‘*cultural materialism*’, however, may be seen to refer to ‘his response to the theory and practice of literary analysis’ and, therefore, *materialism* may be seen to challenge the idealism inherent in traditional literary criticism (ibid.).

Although Williams’s work arose out of his study of literature, he was particularly interested in all forms of language, reading and writing, in all their uses as methods of communication.

Higgins writes:

At the centre of cultural materialism is the call for a critical attitude towards all forms and practices of representation, and not only those associated with literature. A key characteristic of cultural materialism is its bringing together of three dimensions of intellectual analysis and enquiry which are far too often kept apart, to the detriment of each: the textual, the theoretical or conceptual, and the historical (ibid., p.134).

Williams went on to extend the scope of his criticism to include television and film as equally relevant ‘forms and practices of representation.’ As already discussed above, literary criticism had been dominated by ‘practical criticism’ and ‘close reading’, which valued ‘textual’ analysis over other methods and, according to Higgins, Williams considered structuralist criticism to place a higher value on ‘theory.’ Cultural materialism, then, is where ‘textual, theoretical, conceptual and historical’ analysis may be seen to come together in ‘the analysis of the constitutive grounds and force of all forms of signification at work in human society.’ (ibid., pp. 134-135). Cultural materialism in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries has ‘come together,’ like historicism, with more recent Marxist-influenced critical theories, such as, post-structuralism, feminism and post-colonialism.

In an essay ‘Notes on Marxism in Britain Since 1945’, published in *New Left Review* and included in a collection published in *Culture and Materialism* (Williams, 1980/2005), Williams describes how it had taken him ‘thirty years’ to develop cultural materialism, through his engagement with Marxism and other ‘transitional forms of theory and enquiry’ which he does not specify but may be inferred from the influences above, i.e. the Frankfurt School, structuralism and also, psychoanalytic theories. Williams states:

The emphases of the transition – on the production (rather than only the reproduction) of meanings and values by specific social formations, on the centrality of language and communication as formative social forces, and on the complex interaction both of institutions and forms and of social relationships and formal conventions – may be defined... as ‘culturalism’ [...] What I would now claim to have reached, but necessarily by this route, is a theory of culture as a (social and material) productive process and of specific practices, as arts, as social uses of material means

of production (from language as material ‘practical consciousness’ to the specific technologies of writing and forms of writing, through to mechanical and electronic communications systems) (Williams, 1980/2005, p. 243).

In this citation, Williams describes how he broadened his theory far beyond ‘the arts’, i.e. the literary analysis of his earlier work, to include the analysis of all forms of communication and their influence on society. He considers all forms of communication, creative, critical or institutional, as equally influential; whether spoken, written or in images. The material ways in which they are produced and reproduced and the ways in which language is the central medium for making and interpreting meanings, are all critical aspects of his version of ‘culturalism.’ Williams insists that his theory does not offer a ‘shop-counter of theoretical options’ but is specifically, ‘a theory of the historical variations of cultural process,’ that should be seen as connecting with ‘general social, historical and political theory’ (Williams, 1980/2005, p. 244).

Terry Eagleton, a student of Williams’ and also a prolific writer of Marxist cultural theory and literary theory, writes in keeping with Higgins’s viewpoint, that culture for Williams is ‘at once central and secondary.’ He continues, ‘On the one hand, culture is no more than a sector of the wider field of materialism in general; on the other hand, by being thus ‘materialized’, it comes to assume a force and reality of which aesthetic idealism had deprived it’ (Eagleton, in Regan ed., 1998, p. 258). It is in the latter sense that culture is seen as stimulating the energy required to influence social formation.

Notions of culture and culturalism materialism, Eagleton asserts, do, however, remain something of a paradox in that cultural materialism:

examines the relations between material media and meaning, and thus learns from the formal concerns of ideological criticism; and by carrying materialism directly, so to speak, into enemy territory - into a 'culture' which was constructed as idealist in the first place, and which figures for its apologists as the last bastion of 'spirit' in a degraded world – it lends Marxist criticism a keener political edge [...] but a materialist theory of culture – a theory of culture as production before it is expression – sounds, in the spontaneously idealist milieu of middle-class society, something of a category mistake or a contradiction in terms (ibid.).

Eagleton asserts that in a potential materialist/idealist dichotomy, idealism may be disappointed by the apparent loss of 'spirit' in the materialist viewpoint, but this research aims to illustrate that the central theory within cultural materialism, of 'structures of feeling', provides a restorative and connecting position between 'production' and 'expression.' Furthermore, in what may be seen to be an example of the transition to a more generalised, if diluted, reception of Williams's theory, its assimilation into school subjects, i.e. in Communications, Media, Film and English teaching, suggests that 'materialization' of culture may be seen to be becoming 'normalized' in all social classes. This is an example of the transformative nature of 'breaks' for culturalism, where, 'old lines of thought are disrupted, older constellations displaced, and elements, old and new, are re-grouped around a different set of premises and themes' (Hall, in Bennet, et. al, eds., 1981, p. 19).

Section Two. The 'Structure of Feeling'

Introduction

Section two of this chapter explores the development of the concept of the 'structure of feeling' in Williams's work. It begins with reference to two early works, *Reading and Criticism* (1950) and *Preface to Film* (1954), where the ideas for the concept are first articulated, and continues with Williams' two breakthrough texts, in the context of the new cultural studies, *Culture and Society* (1958) and *The Long Revolution* (1961), the latter extends the early ideas to describe a process of socio-cultural development. In the later works the 'structure of feeling' is an established concept still developing in the light of Williams' cultural materialism. These writings are *Marxism and Literature* (1977), *Keywords* (1976) and *Politics and Letters* (1979). This part of the thesis endeavours to clarify what Williams means by the 'structure of feeling,' in so doing it has been necessary to often cite his words directly, sometimes in quite lengthy citations, because to summarise or make changes to his individual style presented the risk of misrepresenting the inherent meaning.

This lengthy citation, from Williams' *The Long Revolution* (1961), is his attempt to explain how, whether 'in the position of the visitor, the learner, the guest from a different generation,' for example, we experience textual representations of a past period.

The term I would suggest to describe it is *structure of feeling*: it is as firm and definite as 'structure' suggests, yet it operates in the most delicate and least tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this structure of feeling is the culture of a period... it is in this respect that the arts of a period, taking these to include characteristic approaches and tones in argument, are of

major importance. For here, if anywhere, this characteristic is likely to be expressed; often not consciously, but by the fact that here, in the only examples we have of recorded communication that outlives its bearers, the actual living sense, the deep community that makes the communication possible is naturally drawn upon. (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69)

Reading and Criticism (1950) and *Preface to Film* (1954)

Raymond Williams suggests, in the above citation, that a past culture is neither represented by an elevated intellectual or spiritual process attributed to the ‘artistic genius,’ nor a process entirely driven by social and material production, but it articulates a response that is ‘felt, ‘often not consciously’ to a particular way of life, of a particular period in time. It implies another process, a psychological process of apprehension and evaluation that occurs when an archetypal image is manifest and disrupts direct thought.

The idea of the ‘structure of feeling’ emerges in Williams’ work from as early as *Reading and Criticism* (1950). Dai Smith, Raymond Williams’s biographer, refers to this early text where, he states, Williams suggests that the only value of writing of a ‘popular kind’ is to demonstrate ‘the structure of personal feelings of many writers and readers.’ The ‘structure of personal feelings’, according to Smith, is compared, by Williams, with the ‘impersonal structure’ of industrial society which ‘might cause “dissociation of feeling”.’ This is a very early expression of the emergence of one of Williams’ core concepts (Smith, 2008, p. 259).

As noted in chapter one of this thesis, in ‘Film and the Dramatic Tradition’, included in *Preface to Film* (1954) written by Raymond Williams with Michael Orrom, the authors describe how ‘tacit consent’ of ‘conventions’ between artist and audience in film, drama, literature and other forms of artistic expression, relate to the notion of a ‘structure of feeling’. The authors write, ‘we have [...] tradition - convention as tacit consent - and at times the equal necessity of experiment, from the development of new modes of feeling, and from the perception of new or rediscovered technical means’ (Williams, Orrom, 1954, in Higgins, ed., 2001, p. 32). In the description of ‘conventions’ as ‘tacit agreement,’ Williams describes a place where writer, or performers, and audience, ‘agree to meet.’ Crucially, like the ‘structure of feeling’ itself, this cannot be described as either a ‘formal’ or ‘definite process’, Williams declares that it is ‘often indeed...virtually unconscious’ (ibid., pp. 29-30). In contrast to his materialist position Williams illustrates his recognition of the existence of levels of creativity and interpretation that are other than conscious. The opposing poles of tradition and experimentation are mediated by a new living sense, then represented in new or rediscovered artistic conventions that become assimilated in both poles into a new ‘structure of feeling’.

Williams and Orrom write:

In principle, it seems clear that the dramatic conventions of any given period are fundamentally related to the structure of feeling in that period. I use the phrase *structure of feeling* because it seems to me more accurate, in this context, than *ideas* or *general life* [...] But while we may, in the study of a past period, separate out particular aspects of life, and treat them as if they were self-contained, it is obvious that this is only how they were studied, not how they were experienced. We examine each element as a precipitate, but in the living experience of the time every element

was in solution, an inseparable part of a complex whole. And it seems to be true, from the nature of art, that it is from such a totality that the artist draws; it is in art, primarily that the effect of the totality, the dominant structure of feeling, is expressed and embodied (ibid., p. 33).

Williams believed that the expression and embodiment of the 'dominant structure of feeling' is represented in the nature of the art of a period and it may only be realised 'through experience of the work itself, as a whole,' but this means, according to Williams, that it is often discovered that, 'when one has measured the work against the separable parts, there yet remains some element for which there is no external counterpart' (ibid.). This element is the 'structure of feeling' perceptible not as a number of separable parts and not as a solely 'external' manifestation of the moment but one marked by the interiority of its own generation.

The authors continue, 'Conventions', they write, are the 'means of expression which find tacit consent' and are a 'vital part of the 'structure of feeling,' changes in that 'structure' result in new conventions becoming 'perceived and realised' as older ones 'appear empty and artificial.' (Ibid.). For example, Williams was in opposition to the notion of an apparently static 'selective tradition' that had evolved from the 'tacit consent' of previous generations of academics, like F.R. Leavis, as noted in the previous chapter. New conventions, which also appear in literary criticism, for example, Marxist ideas, structural linguistics, intertextuality, in Williams' case, must, however, attain an 'accepted standard' in order to become significant to a new 'structure of feeling.' The changes will then 'demand expression' (ibid. p. 34). Although changes will meet with objections and even rejection, Williams is certain that providing they meet the 'accepted standard', new conventions and works will 'gain assent' (ibid., p. 35).

When the works emerge as new forms, Williams and Orrom explain:

The new work will not only make explicit the changes in feeling, but will in itself promote and affect them. Resistance will continue, but in the normal course of events will slowly diminish. The new work will itself become the type. But while at first it was engaged in attacking “conventions” – that is to say, the methods which were supported by the former structure of feeling – it will, as it becomes established, be creating new “conventions”, methods which come to be seen as valid and fruitful. It was attacking conventions as accepted standards, and, sometimes without consciously realising that it was doing so, creating new conventions by tacit consent. (ibid.).

Conventions as communicable ideas, then, are integral to the formation and ‘structuring’ of continuity and change in the arts. They also, as new ‘methods’, require the support of the ‘structure of feeling’ in order to gain cultural value and acceptance. Williams’ notion of ‘structure of feeling’ in this context relates to notions of tradition. Tradition is, according to Williams, selective, it requires accepted standards and it provides continuity between past and present cultural forms and the dominant structure of feeling. The new type may also maintain some continuity with past tradition but Williams suggests that new conventions provide the potential for a newly emergent structure and represent a process that may be seen to actively contribute to the generation of new meanings, new values and new ‘structures of feeling’.

Williams appears to employ ‘feeling’ rather than ‘meaning’ in his concept of a ‘structure of feeling’ as it relates to notions of *expression*. Expression is suggestive of processes of communication that may or may not depend on verbal language for the articulation of meaning, artistic expression can be represented in the visual arts, music, dance, for example. This again

implies that interpretation may take place on multiple levels of perception. His notion of ‘conventions as tacit agreement’, where audience and artist may ‘agree’ to meet, suggests that artist and audience may create and interpret meanings implicitly and/or intuitively.

Williams concludes this essay, stating:

The structure of feeling... lies deeply embedded in our lives; it cannot be merely extracted and summarized; it is perhaps only in art – and this is the importance of art – that it can be realized, and communicated, as a whole experience. (Higgins, 2001, *ibid.*, p. 40)

The ‘structure of feeling’ then, appears to embody both an interior reality, an ‘element for which there is no external counterpart’ and a material, ‘structural’ function, in cultural progress.

Culture and Society (1958)

In the ‘Introduction’ to *Culture and Society* (1958/2017) Williams states that:

In the last decades of the eighteenth century, and in the first half of the nineteenth century a number of words, which are of capital importance, came for the first time into common English use, or where, they had already been generally used in the language, acquired new and important meanings. There is in fact a general pattern of change in these words, and this can be used as a special kind of map by which it is possible to look again at those wider changes in life and thought to which changes in language evidently refer.
(Williams, 1958/2017, p. 1).

The five words ‘from which this map can be drawn’, are, according to Williams, ‘*industry, democracy, class, art and culture*’. These words are important, he adds, to ‘our modern structure of meanings’. (Ibid). The shift in meaning of these and many other words is indicative of a ‘general pattern of change’ which is ‘distinctively modern in situation and feeling’ (ibid., p. 6). The relationship between these words is particularly important to Williams as he combines each of them and their historical variations to describe the changes in the whole of English society since the Industrial Revolution.

For the purpose of this research, however, the emphasis will be on the notion of ‘*culture*’, as the locus of ‘structures of feeling’. He writes:

The field which these changes cover is again a field of general change, introducing many elements which we now point to as distinctively modern in situation and feeling. It is the relations within this general pattern of change which it will be my particular task to describe. The word which more than any other, comprises these relations is *culture*, with all its complexity of idea and reference [...] what I see in the history of this word, in its structure of meanings, is a wide and general movement in thought and feeling (ibid., p. 7).

Williams remained acutely aware of the perpetually evolving nature of words and language as a significant aspect of the cultural revolution and he illustrates this in detail in the later text, *Keywords* (1976). He suggests, in *Culture and Society* (1958), that a new and fundamentally different society has evolved with the industrial revolution and with it a newly inclusive sense of the meaning of ‘culture’. As a result also of new notions of ‘democracy’, Williams states that ‘culture’ has become ‘a complex and radical response to the new problems of social class’,

(ibid., pp. 7-8). Where it once was defined as ‘a state or habit of the mind, or the body of intellectual and moral activities’, it now means ‘a whole way of life’ (ibid., p. 8).

Williams is concerned with discerning both the meaning of contemporary culture and the ways in which it has changed, but also the relationships between meanings inherent in the process of culture, ‘their sources and effects’ (ibid.). He writes, of his method of investigation, that the aim is to examine:

not a series of abstracted problems, but a series of statements by individuals [...] I find more meaning in this kind of personally verified statement than in a system of significant abstractions [...] I feel myself committed to the study of actual language [...] to the words and sequences of words which particular men and women have used in trying to give meaning to their experience [...] The framework of enquiry is general, but the method, in detail, is the study of actual individual statements and contributions (ibid., pp. 8-9).

Williams appears to be rejecting the ‘abstractions’ of former notions of the study of ‘culture’, referring to language as a material attribute, as in the previous chapter of this research, and laying the foundations for what would become his theory of ‘cultural materialism.’ Although he values the primary sources of the works of writers and artists, their ‘actual language’, ‘words and sequences of words’, by which, Williams implies, he values the creative practice of writing, it is, however, in the personal expression of lived ‘experience’ that Williams finds the ‘general movement in thought and feeling.’ Paradoxically, language is revealed to be inadequate, sometimes, as the sole means of expression.

In *Culture and Society* Williams discusses the 'Interregnum', a period which began in the 1880s, when 'the adjective Victorian' was no longer an adequate description of the contemporary mood, and the 'new men who appear in that decade, and who have left their mark, are recognizably different in tone.' In the '1920s', he writes, the break signified, 'To the young Englishman' the 'emergence of the modern spirit' (ibid., p.215), but Williams goes on to suggest that from the viewpoint of the present, however, i.e., his present, the 1950s, this appears to have changed. He writes, 'for us, our contemporaries, our moods appear in effect after the war of 1914–1918,' this means, for Williams, that D.H. Lawrence (1885-1930) is a contemporary in mood, but not of the same generation (ibid., pp. 215-216). Williams considers new 'structures of feeling' will appear from generation to generation, yet suggests that the 'interregnum' which, began in the 1880s has endured until his present day. Williams implies a sense of inactivity or apathy and states that there is nothing 'very new: a working-out rather of unfinished lines; a tentative redirection' (ibid., p. 216). His work expresses the 'structure of feeling' within which he is writing. It is a period in which generations have been interrupted by the war of 1914-1918 and another of 1939-1945.

The 'interregnum' could, therefore, signal a time, when 'unfinished lines' and 'tentative redirections' were taking longer to process and pre-emergent 'structures of feeling' were forging new conventions that were not quite ready for expression or interpretation. Williams continues his discussion, referring to the earlier fiction of George Gissing (1857-1903), *Demos* (1886) and *Nether World* (1889), which as successors to the 'industrial novels' of the 1840s, had, however, altered the terms of the earlier 'structure of feeling.' Like the earlier novelists, Gissing writes of the conditions of poverty, but, Williams writes, 'he is also the spokesman of another kind of despair: the despair born of social and political disillusionment' (ibid., p. 233). This, according to Williams, is expressed in 'feeling' rather than 'reality'.

D. H. Lawrence, Williams writes, provides a critique of the realities of industrialisation and its depersonalising effect on the importance of community, human relationships and also the destruction of nature. Lawrence assimilated some of the views of the nineteenth century Romantic tradition that condemned the acquisitive nature of industrialism and he uses this as the impetus towards the bitter recognition of the new ‘ugliness’ of England, which is the result of changes wrought by the industrial landscape (ibid., p. 266). Williams’s sense that he finds D. H. Lawrence more representative of his own contemporary ‘structure of feeling’ may be because depersonalisation, destruction and ugliness arise out of the reality of the more recent historical period that he had lived, and been actively involved in.

In this discussion of the ‘interregnum’ Williams describes the sense of continuity between expressions of industrialisation, poverty, disillusionment and destruction, in ‘structures of feeling’, dating from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, and ends on the note that ‘tentative redirections’ in tone towards contemporary moods and events, were beginning to be articulated in the literary/cultural criticism of T. E. Hulme (1883-1917). It is possible that Williams recognized D.H. Lawrence as the expression of the contemporary mood of his own time because Lawrence’s life, which he wrote about, represented similarities with Williams’s own life experience. Williams’s childhood in Wales implied in his first novel *Border Country* (1960/2006), has close similarities with his description of Lawrence’s up-bringing. Williams writes:

It is no accident that the early chapters of *Sons and Lovers* are at once a marvellous recreation of this close, active, contained family life, and also in general terms an indictment of the pressures of industrialism. Almost all that he learned in this way was by way of contrasts, and this element of contrast

was reinforced by the accident that he lived on a kind of frontier,
within sight both of industrial and of agricultural England
(*ibid.*, p. 273).

Williams' discussion in *Culture and Society*, then, reveals a subjective dimension to the interpretation of 'structures of feeling.'

The Long Revolution (1961)

'The long revolution' to which Williams refers, in the title of his second seminal text published in 1961, is comprised of three concurrent revolutions. These are the democratic, industrial and cultural revolutions, which taken together, over a long period of time, are forging a 'great process of change' (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 14). To view the three revolutions as separate processes is to risk taking a reductive approach to Williams' work but this thesis will continue to concentrate on the cultural revolution, as the most significant to this study.

Williams describes the cultural revolution, as, 'deeper'. It is, he writes, where 'a large part of our most significant living experience', the most difficult human questions, are 'fought' and 'interpreted' in 'art and ideas', but they should be viewed as part of the whole process of, 'the struggle for democracy, the development of industry, the extension of communications, and the deep social and personal changes' (*ibid.*, p. 12). His use of notions of *depth* to describe the changes occurring in 'culture' illustrates Williams' perception of 'art and ideas', and their interdependence with the social, political and personal, as structured, and/or layered, in nature.

The depth of 'social and personal changes' (*ibid.*), appears, in Williams's work, to relate to the structure of meanings: historical; socio-political and personal, that exists in the production and interpretation of language and the languages of art and ideas, in particular. He suggests that

there are exterior factors influencing language, such as the historical, political and class differences expressed in dominant discourses. Moreover, despite his materialist viewpoint, he also gives great emphasis to internal factors, as has already been noted, when he writes of tacit meanings. He suggests that forms of expression and interpretation may appeal to structures of language that may be meaningful on deeper, even unconscious, levels of consciousness and his references to marginal and hidden meanings rely on intuitive, instinctive, or 'felt', levels of perception.

The notion of a 'structure of feeling' is developed in greater detail in *The Long Revolution* (1961). He writes; 'When we have grasped the fundamental relation between meanings arrived at by creative interpretation and description, and meanings embodied by conventions and institutions, we are in a position to reconcile the meaning of culture as "creative activity" and a "whole way of life"' (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 60). He goes on to say that, 'this reconciliation is then a real extension of our powers to understand ourselves and our societies' (ibid). Williams explores emerging and evolving notions of British culture and is concerned with the importance of the individual and collective experience of art and its relation to cultural life. He reiterates that the very experience of living in a certain time and/or place is reflected in its culture, the arts in particular, and it is experienced, but not necessarily consciously as a 'structure of feeling.' Because the arts operate in the less tangible parts of our activity, such as feeling, certain elements of character and tone of the living past are able to transcend history and consciousness and be 'drawn upon', or felt into, in another, later, time and place. Williams implies, despite his overall concern with the material, social and cultural, the importance of the living sense of inner, as well as outer, reality.

Williams goes on to state that while it does not appear to be formally learned, future generations will however project their own unique ‘structure of feeling.’ He states:

the new generation responds in its own ways to the unique world it is inheriting, taking up many continuities [...] yet feeling its whole life in certain ways differently, and shaping its creative response into a new structure of feeling. (ibid.).

Notions of a ‘structure of feeling’ appear to refer to a natural, instinctive transition of meaning, or meaning-making, and allude to a ‘*structure of meaning*’ as well as feeling. Feeling one’s whole life differently implies that on a level of apprehension, a process of evaluation is taking place that enables a re-shaping and re-direction to occur. Although a ‘structure’ is suggestive of something fixed or static the ‘structure of feeling’ and ‘structure of meaning’ are fluid and dynamic.

Marxism and Literature (1977)

The Dominant, Residual and Emergent

The next phase in Williams’s development of the concept of the ‘structure of feeling’ is found in *Marxism and Literature* (1977). He analyses the ‘complexity’ of culture and expands on the process of its development through the idea that it is comprised of three inter-relating, ‘historically varied,’ elements, the ‘dominant’, the ‘residual’ and the ‘emergent.’ A brief summary of each will follow because they represent the way in which Williams arrives at the concept of the ‘structure of feeling’ as appearing to be connected with the past, present, and future of cultural experience on different levels of meaning.

The emphasis on the ‘dominant’ and its definitive features is important, he writes, but it should also be considered to have ‘a sense of movement’ so that it can ‘connect with the future’ and ‘the past.’ Williams writes, ‘In authentic historical analysis it is necessary at every point to recognize the complex interrelations between movements and tendencies both within and beyond a specific and effective dominance’ (Williams, 1977, p. 121). As an example, Williams states, ‘bourgeois culture is a significant generalizing description and hypothesis, expressed within epochal analysis by fundamental comparisons with feudal culture or socialist culture’ but it requires ‘comparative differentiation’ over ‘four or five centuries’ if it is not to become ‘static’. Williams re-iterates here that all ‘whole cultural processes’ should be seen in living relation to the dominant system of society (ibid.).

The ‘residual’, Williams writes, is ‘different to the archaic [...] I would call the “archaic” that which is wholly recognized as an element of the past, to be observed, to be examined or even on occasion to be consciously “revived,” in a deliberately specializing way’ (ibid., p. 122). The residual, however, is ‘very different [...] The residual, by definition, has been effectively formed in the past, but it is still active in the cultural process, not only, and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present’ (ibid.). Williams gives three cases, characteristic of English culture; ‘organized religion,’ ‘rural community’ and ‘monarchy.’ The ‘rural community,’ for example, may from certain ‘limited’ positions, i.e., ‘industrial capitalism,’ be considered oppositional, but it is generally accepted as an area for pleasure, the ‘leisure [...] of the dominant order.’ Monarchy, Williams writes, has ‘virtually nothing that is actively residual (alternative or oppositional), but, with a heavy and deliberate additional use of the archaic, a residual function has been wholly incorporated’ (ibid., p. 122-123). Williams defines the ‘selective tradition’ in literature and the arts as residual. He writes, ‘It is the incorporation of the actively residual – by re-interpretation, dilution, projection,

discriminating inclusion and exclusion – that the work of the selective tradition is especially evident’ (ibid., p. 123).

‘Emergent means,’ Williams writes,

That new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship are continually being created. But it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between those which are really elements of some new phase of the dominant culture [...] and those which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it: emergent in the strict sense, rather than merely novel. Since we are always considering relations with a cultural process, definitions of the emergent, as of the residual, can be made only in relation to a full sense of the dominant (ibid.).

Williams describes the emergent in relation to Marxism and the emergence and formation of a the new ‘working class,’ which was ‘immediately evident in nineteenth century England.’ A new class, emerging as ‘oppositional rather than alternative’ needs to strive for incorporation (ibid., p. 124). This is evident in the example of ‘the emergence and incorporation of working-class writing, where the fundamental problem of emergence is clearly revealed, since the basis of incorporation [...] is the effective predominance of received literary forms – an incorporation, [...] which already conditions and limits the emergence’ (ibid.).

Pre-emergence

In terms of ‘cultural emergence,’ Williams asserts that it is countered by the dominant tendency to select and exclude (ibid., p.1 25). He writes:

What matters, finally, in understanding emergent culture, as distinct from both the dominant and the residual, is that it is never only a matter of immediate practice...it depends crucially on finding new forms or adaptations of form...what we have to observe is in effect a *pre-emergence*, active and pressing but not yet fully articulated, rather than the evident emergence [...]. It is to understand more closely this condition of pre-emergence, as well as the more evident forms of the emergent, the residual, and the dominant, that we need to explore the concept of structures of feeling (ibid., pp. 126-127).

Structures of Feeling

For Williams, notions of the past are potentially problematic, particularly the way in which its representation may be manipulated to suggest distance and dissociation from the present, and the political implications of this. He suggests that customary 'description and analysis' of both culture and society places them in the past tense. Therefore, he asserts, 'human cultural activity' and experience are converted into 'finished products' in cultural analysis, even when they are sometimes continuing to evolve. There is, Williams writes, a tendency for the 'projection' of actions '...not only into the always moving substance of the past, but into contemporary life, in which relationships, institutions and formations, in which we are still actively involved are converted...into formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes' (Williams, 1977, p. 128).

Williams confirms that the past is characterised by an energised, continuous fluidity of its own, and because 'culture' is also an active process, the production of a specific and static past is inconceivable. By denying the formative nature of cultural processes, Williams states that

cultural analysis would centre on a 'produced past' where 'only the fixed explicit forms exist, and living presence is always, by definition, receding' (ibid.). Williams goes on to assert that the importance of being able to distinguish between fixed representations of a produced past and defining aspects of present experience. He writes:

If the social is always past, in the sense that it is always formed, we have indeed to find other terms for the undeniable experience of the present: not only the temporal present [...] but the specificity of present being [...] within which we may indeed discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, positions, but not always as fixed products, defining products. And then if the social is the fixed and explicit [...] all that is present and moving, all that escapes or seems to escape from the fixed and explicit and the known, is grasped and defined as the personal [...] (ibid).

Williams's concern that the social is represented in culture as always 'past' or 'receding' and drawing 'living presence' with it, can be countered by the notion that the personal, especially as it is represented in art, 'escapes' the 'fixed', 'explicit' and 'known' of the social and emerges in that which he has described as the 'tacit.' In this context, notions of apparently 'fixed' and 'defining social products' or 'institutions', such as fixed notions of gender, when *re*-presented in more fluid notions of sexuality and relationship in contemporary manifestations of the personal that escape, may appear in the work of writers, Virginia Woolf and D. H. Lawrence, for example, be emergent in Edwardian society, and eventually become incorporated into twentieth century critical discourse. The writers shape future historical conceptions of the period. While simultaneously questioning the Victorian values in and of their own time, they begin forging 'tentative redirections' into new conventions.

Literary modernism and its focus on inner life, in this context, represents the relationship that exists between the personal and the social and its emergence in culture. The escape of the personal, in the present, influences the social, institutional values, but not simply as ‘fixed’ and ‘defining’ or ‘receding’ products, as Williams suggests, but as continuities. It is in the *interpretation* of artistic forms, either contemporary interpretations of contemporary articulations, or present interpretations of past interpretations and creative expressions, that the mobility and plurality of meanings counter the rigidity implied when the past is viewed as ‘fixed and defining.’ According to Williams, it is up to the spectator/reader to *make* art ‘present’, by engaging actively in readings and re-readings, therefore giving it ‘formative process with a specific present’ (ibid., p. 129). For Williams, it is also important that the social, as well as the personal, should be given relevance as an ‘immediate and actual significance’ (ibid., p. 130).

In *Marxism and Literature*, Williams is critical of psychological terms for analysing culture and society. He considers notions of ‘imagination’, the ‘psyche’ and the ‘unconscious’ to function in art, myth and dreams, as ways of ‘displacing’ and ‘overriding’ ‘specific social conditions’ (ibid). He writes of ‘practical consciousness,’ which is different from, ‘official consciousness, not just as a matter of relative freedom or control’ but practical because it is ‘what is actually being lived and not only what it is thought is being lived’ (ibid., pp. 131-132). Practical consciousness is social and living in the present moment. But to articulate practical consciousness as ‘alternative’ to official consciousness, it should not be an absence, silence or the unconscious, the latter, Williams writes, is that ‘which bourgeois culture has mythicised’ (ibid.).

Williams suggests that the language of the unconscious is not an appropriate means for articulating the practical consciousness of 'what is actually being lived.'. Yet, paradoxically, he describes this sense of 'presence' as: 'a kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material, but each in an embryonic phase before it can become fully articulate and defined exchange' (ibid., p. 131). He implies that meaning, articulation and expression, are at work beneath or before practical consciousness. Although Williams, in his earlier essay 'Preface to Film' (1954), refers to 'tacit agreement' between artist and audience as 'virtually unconscious' (Williams, Orrom, 1954, in, Higgins ed., 2001, p. 30), in the later *Marxism and Literature* (1977), he displays ambivalence towards employing the language of psychology and/or psychoanalysis to describe his ideas. His allusion to an 'embryonic phase' of thought and feeling, however, is suggestive of a liminal or intuitive aspect of language and apprehension and he raises this tension in discussion of the unconscious in the final section of this chapter.

Williams states that 'all that escapes...the fixed and explicit' is generally held to be 'personal'. Yet there is a place in which the personal meets with the social, and this is what he calls the 'structure of feeling'. It is where the 'embryonic', or 'pre-emergent' meet the 'already articulate and defined' but where the social is not necessarily reduced to fixed forms. Williams declares that this is clearly observable, for example, in language, in the differences between the spoken language of generations (Williams, 1977, p.131). To return to literary modernism as an example, it represents interiority and the escape of the 'personal', notably, in the characteristic use of internal monologues, or the stream of consciousness, as a narrative style. where language as personal consciousness escapes into the narrative. This was informed by currents in psychological and psychoanalytic thought at the time and provides an example of the intertextuality of formative processes at play in cultural continuity and the emerging structure of feeling of the moment.

Keywords (1976), Politics and Letters (1979)

The final section of this chapter examines *Politics and Letters* (1979) which is a collection of interviews between Raymond Williams and the editorial board of 'The New Left Review.' The interviews cover a wide area of Williams' life and works from childhood to the late 1970s. Williams maintained a deep interest, even an 'intellectual passion,' in language throughout his work (Eagleton, in Eagleton, ed., 1989, p. 8) and so *Keywords* (1976), is also discussed, in brief.

Keywords (1976)

Keywords (1976) is Williams' study of the changes in meaning that take place in the use of language over time, and the keywords he examines are those that he considers crucial to his studies of culture and society. He describes his intention as follows:

This is not a neutral review of meanings. It is an exploration of the vocabulary of a crucial area of social and cultural discussion, which has been inherited within precise historical and social conditions and which has to be made at once conscious and critical – subject to change as well as to continuity – if the millions of people in whom it is active are to see it as active: not a *tradition* to be learned, nor a *consensus* to be accepted, nor a set of meanings [...] but as a shaping and reshaping... (Williams, 1976, p. 24).

In his 'Introduction' to the text, Williams describes the importance of language as 'subject to change' and also an agent of change. For example, in *Keywords* (1976), Williams gives a definition of the word *unconscious* beginning from early seventeenth century meanings of the word, *conscious* and tracing it through history. In the summary of its development until the

mid - late twentieth century, Williams asserts that the most ‘difficult’ and ‘extended’ use of *unconscious* has emerged in the work of Freud (Williams, 1976, p. 322). As noted earlier in the thesis, Williams also considered the shock of the emergence of Freud’s work to have contributed to a new ‘structure of feeling’ and this suggests that it became an agent of change.

Politics and Letters (1979)

In *Politics and Letters* (1979) the interviewer asks Williams to discuss his entry for the *unconscious* in *Keywords* (1976) as, ‘it seems to be the first time that you hint at your attitude towards the central category of psychoanalysis.’ The question is:

you say that it is often not clear whether the hypothesis of the unconscious indicates, within a range of experiences which are ordinarily in transition from unconscious to conscious, cases of a failed transition, or whether it denotes two fixed states, conscious and unconscious, as reified abstractions. You then refer to Freudian theory, without naming it, as a school which ‘resists the implication of a “normal” transition [from unconscious to conscious] and by contrast insists on a fully unconscious area from which transition is not possible except by special methods [...] Should we take it, therefore, that you believe that there is a normal and continuous process of transition from unconscious to conscious, with certain exceptions in which there is a failure of transit – is that what you regard as the most plausible and acceptable scientific hypothesis at present?

(Williams, *New Left Review*, 1979, pp. 180-181).

Williams’s answer to the question is:

I would certainly not look, until I had been finally convinced that all

other directions were fruitless, towards a prior categorization of an unconscious accessible only by certain specialized techniques. To say that the transition from unconscious to conscious is normal, however, is to claim too much. I think that two very important considerations come into play here, where much of the importance of Freud can be properly granted, and yet research proceed in a useful way. First, in the very interesting area of the relation between manifest speech and what Vološinov called inner speech, there are processes of which we must all be aware that are prior to articulation, and in that quite strict and literal sense not fully conscious [...]

Examples would include the way in which writers typically discover what they want to say in the act of writing itself. This means that it is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis to talk of unconscious processes which can be articulated and become conscious. But I don't think this can necessarily be called normal – it is often specialised. What is, on the other hand, a quite normal process is the socio-cultural development of language, as the historical or even further evolutionary possibility of that transition (ibid., p. 181).

Williams's reply offers further insight into his ideas on the importance of the structure of language to the process of culture, in the context of Freudian psychoanalysis. He accepts the notion of the unconscious and that 'unconscious processes [...] can [...] become conscious'. However, he then says, this cannot be considered 'normal', and when applied to writers, 'it is often specialized.' 'Specialized', in this context may, on the one hand, mean the special or divine gift attributed to the writer or artist, and his comment may then appear to be suggestive of the idealist notion of the special creativity of the artist that Williams has previously sought to oppose (Williams, 1961/2011, pp. 25-25). It also contradicts Williams' prior work on the 'structure of feeling' where in *The Long Revolution* (ibid., p. 69), he states that it develops and functions 'not consciously', and in Williams and Orrom *Preface to Film* (1954), where the

notion of ‘tacit consent’ as ‘virtually unconscious’ in the development of new conventions relates to notions of ‘inner’ speech in artists and audiences alike, not special but emergent in manifest speech as the socio-cultural communication of the evolving transition of meanings.

Following this reply, it is suggested by the interviewer that Williams had now ‘built in a bias towards the idea of normality’, and that as ‘manifest speech’ is spoken all the time and ‘inner speech’ is behind it, ‘there must be a constant ongoing process of transition?’ Williams replies:

there are certain periods of language which impose silent areas, so what is theoretically a normal process of transition cannot occur [...] historically there are certain language situations which are repressive. People talk of language as a means of expression, but it is also evidently a means of selection. In certain socio-historical circumstances, there are things which could not be said, and therefore, in any connecting way, not thought. This may help to explain the very common cultural phenomenon of an extraordinarily shocking innovation of discourse –Freud himself is an example of this – which produces elements of *recognition*. The possibility of a pre-emergent as well as an emergent structure of feeling corresponds, in my terms, to this phenomenon. (ibid., p. 182).

In the fuller version of Williams’s reply, he refers to the importance of this position for Marxists because ‘there are certain forms of quite literal repression’ and silences. Williams takes the position of his recently defined ‘cultural materialism’ in this reply (Williams, 1977, p. 5). It arises out of his intention that we recognise the potential for manifestation of ‘silent areas’, whether they are shocking because of their content or their emergence. In his unveiling of language as repressed and silenced by dominant processes he counters the manipulative

influences by giving attention to both, the traditionally accepted and the marginalised forms of cultural production. In his replies, Williams unites his core concepts cultural materialism and the 'structure of feeling' to explain the importance of language in the formation and transformation of cultures.

Conclusion

Williams defines the importance of notions of the 'emergent' in *Marxism and Literature* (1977). He writes, 'By 'emergent' I mean [...] that new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship are continually being created.' To be truly 'emergent' meanings must be 'substantially alternative or oppositional' to the dominant culture and not just new innovations within it (Williams, 1977, p. 123). The ideas of Marx and Freudian psychoanalysis entered this flow, then Jung's analytical psychology joined and continued to shock the dominant positivist/scientific materialist culture of the early twentieth century. In the mid twentieth century Raymond Williams disturbed idealist humanist notions of culture and tradition with his developing notion of cultural materialism. The 'alternative' and 'oppositional' voices of Marx, Freud, Jung and Williams have all connected with the deeper, emotional levels of human nature that require new forms of expression to recognise and articulate new realities. All four writers, although in different ways, remain influential to interpretations and re-interpretations of twentieth century 'structures of feeling'.

The description of the 'structure of feeling' as part of a process of continuity, cultural transformation and progress, suggests some parallels with the transformative processes described in analytical psychology. Williams and Orrom (1954), describe a dialectical situation that occurs in artists and audiences where tradition and experimentation are mediated by the

attitudes of the present and assimilated into new conventions that will eventually form a new 'structure of feeling' but as pre-emergent forms, which are 'active and pressing but not fully articulated' (Williams, 1977, p. 126), they resound with the activity of symbols and archetypes which are performing an evaluative function and will, in time, 'demand expression.' For Williams, this takes place in the new but barely tangible, 'structure of feeling' (Williams and Orrom, 1954, in Higgins, ed., 2001, p. 34) and in Jung, the archetypal image. Both processes depict a generative energy that propels the appearance of new symbolic forms towards the formation of new 'structures of feeling.'

The next chapter, Chapter Seven 'Critical Points of Convergence between C. G. Jung and Raymond Williams', begins with a summary of Williams's account in *The Long Revolution* (1961) of the development of past notions of the creative mind. It is in this account that Williams refers directly to the 'new psychologies' by which he means the depth psychologies of Freud and Jung. The chapter also examines Jung's notion of psychic reality and explores Williams's cultural or social reality. The last section of the chapter examines Virginia Woolf's modernist novel *Mrs Dalloway* (1925) from the perspective of Jungian analytical psychology and the 'structure of feeling'.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CRITICAL POINTS OF CONVERGENCE

BETWEEN

C. G. JUNG AND RAYMOND WILLIAMS

Introduction

Jung, in 'The Structure of the Psyche' (1927/1969), describes his perception of the relationship between the unconscious, history and creativity.

He writes:

[...] the unconscious, as the totality of all archetypes, is the deposit of all human experience right back to its remotest beginnings. Not, indeed, a dead deposit, a sort of abandoned rubbish-heap, but a living system of reactions and aptitudes that determine the individual's life in invisible ways – all the more effective because invisible. It is not just a gigantic historical prejudice, so to speak, an *a priori* historical condition; it is also the source of the instincts, for the archetypes are simply the forms which the instincts assume. From the living fountain of instinct flows everything that is creative; hence the unconscious is not merely conditioned by history, but is the very source of the creative impulse. It is like Nature herself [...] transcending her own historical conditions in her acts of creation.'

(Jung, 1927/1969, CW8, p. 157:339)

Jung describes the unconscious as an active living and instinctive source of the past from which the creative impulse originates, and communicates 'invisibly' the whole of past 'human experience,' 'reactions and aptitudes' to the individual. This description of the instinctive, invisible aspect of the collective unconscious and the archetypes, as conveyors of past experience and an important source of creative expression, does provide the potential for the interpretation of Raymond Williams's concept of the 'structure of feeling', from the perspective of analytical psychology. This chapter begins with a close reading of the first chapter of Williams's *The Long Revolution* (1961), titled 'The Creative Mind.'

The title of *The Long Revolution* (1961/2011) is described by Anthony Barnett, in the foreword (2011) as representing ‘a concept not a description’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. vii). It refers, he writes, to ‘a historical process that is hard to comprehend because we are all within it’ (ibid., p. viii). Williams, Barnett writes, thought of the long revolution as a ‘far-reaching transformation’ but it is a difficult concept because ‘We have to build into any understanding of our society that we are undertaking the work within an inherited framework of what it means to understand it, a framework that we must also question’ (ibid.).

The long revolution then, according to Williams implies a consciousness of our position, including our own role in processes of historical and cultural transformation, within an evolving historical continuity that is ‘inherited’ in that it is internalized and subjective. This requires objective analysis and interpretation to understand how its development relates to the assimilation of historical processes as external influences on the present and future. Positing the archetypes as the foundation for the formation of an intuitive connection with our consciousness and unconsciousness of the past elicits a method for recognizing the value of a subjective, psychological approach to our understanding of the transformative nature of histories.

This analysis of Williams’s writing indicates the importance for him of the inter-relationship between the interior subjective process of understanding and how this may influence and be influenced by exterior social experience. The consciousness of an ‘inherited framework’ for understanding external historical processes, implies some accord with the post-Jungian notion of the sense of ‘historical continuity’, that describes it as a natural process by which ‘the unconscious operates in history’, to provide the potential to convey knowledge that has not

consciously been learned but is able to provide a ‘grounding mechanism’ for the present (Lu, 2011, p. 15).

It has already been noted that Jung, in his introduction to *Symbols of Transformation* (Jung, 1912/2014, CW5 p.5:3), was aiming to, ‘broaden the basis of analysis’, from its focus on the individual, to direct his attention ‘more’ towards ‘historical material’ in order to gain deeper insight into psychological problems (ibid.). Williams, on the other hand, acknowledged that ‘the personal’ or ‘psychological’ are ‘powerful’ aspects to be considered in the analysis of social and historical processes (Williams, 1977, p. 129). Both writers express the point made by Lu that, ‘An awareness of one’s personal and impersonal link to the past’ contributes to feeling grounded in what Jung in ‘Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology’ (1931) called a ‘living sense of history’ (Jung, 1931/1969, CW8, p., 341:655). This is expressed in Jung’s writing as history working on ‘two distinct levels’, one is the objective/conscious level and the other, the natural/archetypal level (Lu, 2011, p. 15). For Williams, histories are enriched by the objective, conscious interpretation of subjective expressions of past lived experience which are most ‘likely to be expressed’ in ‘the arts of a period [...] often not consciously’ but as enduring illustrations of cultural forms that communicate that which Williams describes as ‘the ‘actual living sense’ of the shared experience that has made the communication possible’ (Williams, 1977, p., 69).

For Jung, the creative forces of the archetypes are considered to be inherited as potential functions of the brain, ‘From the scientific, causal standpoint the primordial image can be conceived as a mnemonic deposit, an imprint’ and as ‘a mythological motif, it is a continually effective and recurrent expression that reawakens certain psychic experiences or else

formulates them in an appropriate way,’ from this point of view, Jung adds, ‘it is an expression of the physiological and anatomical disposition’ (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 444:748). They represent an infinite, timeless, and universal aspect of the unconscious psyche and as such are *ahistorical* concepts. This is not the same as Williams’s feeling into *history*. But, at the same time, Jung’s emphasis on the potential for the universal and archaic past to maintain a continuous unconscious presence in the individual psyche, and to relate to the unconscious archetype and feeling in order to forge conscious change, provides a psychological perspective and an effective language for the discussion of the structure of feeling. Williams’s analysis of the representation of the past in cultural or symbolic forms could, as noted in previous chapters, be read as the product of unconscious creative processes.

In the first chapter of *The Long Revolution*, ‘The Creative Mind’, Williams touches on aspects of psychology in his brief historical summary of the developing consciousness of the poet as artist. It reveals something of his own tentative allusions to having read Jung as well as Freud and Read, and gives a summary of contemporary mid-twentieth century developments in the science of perception. Williams’s summary of the historical development of the creative mind of the poet illustrates how conceptual frameworks are gradually altered over time when accepted ideas are challenged and new structures of feeling are formed. The historical and cultural developments in notions of the creative mind summarised here are echoed in Jung’s writings and inform the interpretation of Jung’s psychological writings as poetic.

The second part of this chapter of the thesis will then explore Virginia Woolf’s novel *Mrs Dalloway* (1925) as an example of how the creative writing of the literature of the modern period expressed a newly emerging conceptual framework that Williams, as noted in the

previous chapter, characterises in terms of a ‘structure of feeling’ of the unconscious. Williams suggests that a new structure of feeling emerged in the arts of the twentieth century to provide for the expression of the unconscious and compensate for the ‘shock’ of the new scientific discourse. Virginia Woolf’s novel illustrates the use of literary devices that explore this structure of feeling and is read from a Jungian perspective on the unconscious.

‘The Creative Mind’

Williams begins *The Long Revolution* (1961) with an account of the historical development of notions of the creative mind because he considers it to be significant to the discussion of culture which, he writes, is centred ‘on the relations between art and learning’ and all ‘activities’ that create ‘society’. His aim is to examine evolving notions of creativity in the context of ‘important recent scientific work on perception and communication’ (Williams, 1961, p. 19).

Williams reminds the reader that when considering historical texts:

In any past writing, only part of the original meaning is recoverable, for the meaning as a whole has come to us through many minds, and even when we have distinguished their influence we find that the original significance is, with its context, still partly withheld. (ibid).

He suggests that original meanings may be ‘partly withheld’ not necessarily by conscious action but because through many re-readings over time, ‘through many minds’, texts will take on new significance. This implies that degrees of influence will vary according to the organisation of society. As noted in an earlier chapter of this thesis introducing Williams’s concept of the ‘structure of feeling’, he is critical of the notion that cultural forms tend to be considered to be finished products even when their meanings are still evolving. In Williams’ words, they are then seen as ‘formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes’ (Williams, 1977, p.

128). In a broader context this analysis implies that all histories are ‘formative processes’ that connect the present with the fluid, abstract aspects of the past as a range of lived experience in addition to concrete historical facts.

Williams, for instance, introduces his brief history of the creative mind stating that the ‘creative idea’ seemed to have originated in the Renaissance period, a period ‘spanning the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ (Leitch, et al, ed., 2010, p., 10), but on close reading it became apparent that it had been greatly influenced by Classical thought, the significant development of which initially spanned ‘from the fifth century B.C.E until the fifth century C.E.’ (ibid, p. 7). He begins his discussion with a comparison between Plato and Aristotle, he cites Plato (427-347BC) writing in *The Republic* where he considered art including poetry to be imitations of reality and not valued for its creativity. For Plato, Williams writes, only God created things, ‘workmen’ were ‘the artificers of things’, and ‘artists the imitators of things’ (Williams, 1961/2011, pp., 19-20). Plato’s view of art and artists is an aspect of his theory of ‘Forms’, or ‘Ideas’, which are original and created by God. All further representations are, therefore, unreal, merely imitations of the original (Russell, 1946/2004, p. 123).

The reference to Plato’s notion of art as ‘imitation’ is a key one in his philosophy but it does not now represent a ‘formed whole.’ If considered from Williams’ viewpoint, it is a part of a formative process that occurs in Plato’s writing but develops with Aristotle’s interpretation, and continues to evolve in academic criticism for hundreds of years. It represents the beginning of a multifaceted formative process that develops in, for example; philosophy, literary criticism, and also in analytical psychology, in Jung’s development of notions of the archetypes (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 304:512).

Aristotle (384-322 BC) was Plato's student and, according to Williams, in contrast to Plato he accepted the arts as imitation but developed his own emphasis on the value and significance of the part they play in a 'normal learning process', based on 'universals' (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 21). Williams cites Aristotle's *Poetics*, where he states:

The poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e., what is possible as being probable or necessary [...] Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. (ibid.).

Aristotle, appears to be endorsing poetry and 'the nature' of 'universals' as the type of knowledge described as 'mythos' by Rowland, noted in an earlier chapter, as they are, 'expressions of psychic potential' (Rowland, 2010, p. 21). He values the interpretation of 'universals' as a higher form of acquiring cultural meaning than the interpretation of 'singular' accounts of historical events.

Following on from Plato and Aristotle and from Renaissance thought, Williams suggests that 'four doctrines of art emerged.' He describes the first as one that 'defined art as an imitation of the hidden reality, thus making it a form of revelation,' this continued in the vein of Plato's thought and complemented Christianity by suggesting that art is 'an allegory of the mind of God' (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 22). The second 'doctrine' is similar but less influenced by Christian thought, it viewed art as 'a perpetual imitation and embodiment of the Idea of Beauty', in which sense it still echoes Platonism. This 'doctrine' entered artistic tradition as 'Classicism' (ibid.).

The third, according to Williams, developed the emphasis of Aristotle, seeing art as the ‘idealisation of nature,’ a perception of art that represented things ‘not as they are but as they ought to be’. This ‘doctrine’ departed from Classicism, Williams writes, towards ‘an important tradition’ of ‘moralising and didactic works’ (ibid.). Williams states that the “creative” emphasis’, emerges in the ‘fourth doctrine where nature is perceived ‘as God’s art’ (ibid., p. 23). This emerging idea is attributed to the Italian poet Torquato Tasso (1544-1595) and considers art to be ‘a form of energy which vies with nature’. Tasso, Williams writes, took the position that ‘there are two creators’, God is the creator of nature and ‘man’ creates art. The evolution of the ‘four doctrines’, although often interrelated, indicate a formative process of significant change, over hundreds of years, from a religious to a humanist theory of creativity (ibid).

The point Williams is making is an illustration in his writing of the structure of feeling in which he maintains that multiple ‘strands’ of earlier traditions in thought and literature are carried forward, sometimes in revised conventions, and will create new meanings. This happens ‘within a larger movement of thought’ (ibid., p. 25). In the example of the history of the representation of the ‘creative mind’ poets began to assert ‘a purely human creativity’ emphasising the ‘powers of the emergent mind’. Williams states that when ‘imitation’ becomes ‘the learning of reality’ and then ‘becomes creation’ or the making of new realities, then a ‘a critical stage in art and thought has been reached’ (ibid.).

The Creative Imagination

Williams continues his historical overview of later traditions of English poetry with references to the Metaphysical poets of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Romantic poets of

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The turn to the Romantic Period had by the end of the eighteenth century seen creativity becoming aligned with the ‘creative imagination’ and viewed as a ‘general human faculty’ although this was still considered to be ‘at its highest in the poet’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 26). This point of view, Williams writes, is the basis of the work of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) in his *Defence of Poetry* (1840), where it is still maintained that art is ‘imitation’ but that an ‘organising principle’ or ‘synthesis’ occurs in the mind of the poet which, Williams suggests, is a new emphasis on ‘the creative human act’ (ibid., p. 26).

Of particular importance to Williams in the transformation from ‘imitative’ to ‘creative’ theories of artistic production is the argument that art has been regarded as, on the one hand, ‘fiction’ and so ‘inferior to reality’, and on the other hand, as being endowed with having ‘superior reality’ that is not accessible to ‘other human faculties’ (ibid., p. 29). He explains:

The belief in artistic creation as the medium of a superior reality seems most likely to be held in a period of transition from a primarily religious to a primarily humanist culture, for it embodies elements of both ways of thinking: that there is a reality beyond ordinary human vision, and yet that man has supreme creative powers. But, in such a transition, the latter claim will be made on general grounds, thus tending to challenge the artist’s singularity. (ibid).

Williams describes how the transition of meaning between two major cultural and historical movements has taken place through the embodiment of ‘both ways of thinking’, in the manner of a compromise, in which the individual superiority of the artist is gradually dismantled by the notion that rather than being a special gift from God, all humanity possesses the ‘creative powers’ of imagination. This development is influenced by the growing influence in psychological thought, including psychoanalytic and analytical psychology, that in the

nineteenth century is beginning to engage with notions of creativity from an increasingly materialist and scientific perspective.

According to Williams, there are two increasing emphases at this time. The first on a materialism that denies ‘any kind of supernatural reality, any reality beyond man’s reach’ (ibid., p. 31). This has meant that art may now be seen as a ‘reflection of reality’ but in a more subtle way than Plato’s ‘imitation’, as it is now informed by Shelley’s notion that the artist ‘selects’ and ‘organises’ reality, ‘thus giving meaning and value’ (ibid.). The emphasis on materialism, therefore, allows for the artist to be in possession of greater autonomy over their art. The second emphasis, Williams writes, comes from the ‘new psychology’ and ‘particularly in Freud and Jung’ where their claim that there *is* a ‘reality beyond man’s ordinary reach’, but ‘in a different form’, is represented in notions of ‘the unconscious’. Williams see this as the possibility for ‘either a new science or for a new definition of art’ (ibid.). As we now inhabit a later phase of this formative process it may be construed that notions of the creative imagination and the unconscious continue to be explored at the interface between both science and art.

The ‘New’ Psychologies

Williams’s attention to the new psychologies and especially the notion of the unconscious is brief but it further denotes a change in direction away from the special talent of the individual artist towards the value of artistic expression for the reading audience or spectator. He selects a citation from Freud’s writings, where Freud suggests that the artist’s ability to, ‘turn away from reality,’ towards fantasy and then to shape fantasy so that the creative work provides pleasure for the audience, enables ‘repressions’ to be ‘outbalanced and dispelled by it.’ This means that the artist, ‘opens out to others the way back to the comfort and consolation of their

own unconscious pleasure, and so reaps their gratitude and admiration' (ibid., p. 32). Freud's work is not fully referenced in Williams' text but appears to be from an edition of 'The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms' (1916-1917) (Freud, 1986, p. 555). The relief experienced on returning to conscious reality from the usually inaccessible, perhaps repressed, personal unconscious, suggested by Freud, builds on Aristotle's earlier notion of catharsis. According to Williams, Freud's attention to the difference between fantasy and reality suggests that fantasy, as the 'material of art', is 'inferior' to reality and is typical of an 'ordinary realist position' (Williams, 1961/2011, p.33).

Williams continues his references to the new psychology noting a 'development of this position' that 'is found in Herbert Read, who starts from Freud's account of the mind' (ibid., p. 32). Williams cites Read's work found in the second edition of *Art and Society* (1945) where Read writes:

If we picture the regions of the mind as three superimposed strata (we have already noted how inadequate such a picture must be), then continuing our metaphor we can imagine in certain rare cases a phenomenon comparable to a 'fault' in geology, as a result of which in one part of the mind the layers become discontinuous, and exposed to each other at unusual levels [...] Some such hypothesis is necessary to explain that access, that lyrical intuition, which is known as inspiration and which in all ages has been the rare possession of those few individuals we recognize as artists of genius. (ibid.)

This is an interesting citation because the ellipsis excludes a sentence that ends, 'and from that 'seething cauldron' snatches some archetypal form, some instinctive association of words, images or sounds, which constitute the basis of the work of art' (Read, 1945, p. 94). This is

highly suggestive of the influence of Jung on Read's ideas. Read's next comment in *Art and Society* (1945) immediately following Williams's chosen citation is:

With such a theory we could then go on to explain the social function of the artist. His primary function, and the only function which gives him his unique faculties, is this capacity to materialize the instinctual life of the deepest levels of the mind. At that level we suppose the mind to be collective in its representations, and it is because the artist can give visible shape to these invisible fantasies that he has power to move us deeply. (ibid., p.95).

It again seems possible that Read's reference to the artist giving shape to the collective representations of the mind is illustrative of Jung's influence and that Williams would have been familiar with Jung's ideas through Read's work. Williams's next summary of the new psychology, however, introduces Jung's thoughts on the unconscious collective process of creativity directly.

Williams refers to Jung's essay, 'Psychology and Literature' (1933), as it appears in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* (1933/2001). He cites Jung, who makes a distinction between 'two kinds of artistic creation', the 'psychological', drawn from the materials of consciousness raised to intensity, the other 'visionary', drawn from 'timeless depths...the hinterland of man's mind' (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 32). The essay is divided into two parts, the first is 'The Work of Art' where Jung discusses the two kinds of artistic creation. Williams's interpretation is referring to the second part of the essay where Jung writes about 'The Poet' and Williams notes in his interpretation of Jung's writing that Jung draws a distinction between the 'private personality of the artist' and 'the nature' of their 'activity as an artist' (ibid.). Jung sees the latter, Williams writes, as an 'impersonal creative process' that is also 'a general human

process' (ibid). Williams implies that the significance of this process is that it takes 'us back' to a level of creativity which Jung describes as, 'that level of experience at which it is man who lives, and not the individual' (ibid), suggesting that a further distinction arises between creativity as an expression of repressed contents of the personal unconscious, and reveals an expression of a level of experience where the collective history of humanity is revealed. The latter could be read as Williams associating positively with Jung's psychology because it is an aspect of analytical psychology that engages with creativity as a common collective human process rather than with creativity as a special gift, the former being a value that is integral to Williams's articulation of the concept of the 'structure of feeling'.

In his concluding thoughts on the new psychologies, Williams does not, at this stage, engage further with the psychology of a collective historical influence on creativity, but returns to his assertion that 'art is a special kind of exploration and organisation of reality, the artist being primarily an emotional explorer, whereas the scientist, by contrast, is a rational explorer' (ibid., p. 33). He acknowledges that realities previously considered to be inaccessible are, however, manifest in the creative arts. Williams's cultural studies develop on the borders between the creative arts, social science and psychology where he examines the symbolic forms of sometimes inaccessible realities, and the human relationship between those artistic representations and society. Jung also expressed his concern with the relationship between art and society.

The collective voice of the creative mind

Jung writes, in the second part of the 'Psychology and Literature' (1933) essay, 'What is 'essential for the work of art is that it should rise far above the realm of personal life and speak

from the spirit and heart of the poet as man to the spirit and heart of mankind' (Jung, 1933/2001, p. 172). He is criticising that which he sees as a tendency in psychoanalysis to evaluate art in terms of the individual poet, and the personal psychology of the artist. For Jung, this is a reductive approach to the art form because the artist 'is objective and impersonal', they are a 'duality or a synthesis of contradictory aptitudes', both 'a human being with a personal life' and 'an impersonal, creative process' (ibid.). Art makes the artist 'its instrument' and the artist, according to Jung, has 'a higher sense' (ibid., p. 173). He refers to the artist's creativity as 'a special ability' (ibid., p. 174) but for Jung, this does not mean a special gift or talent, but is meant in the sense that 'he is collective man', somebody who conveys and 'shapes the unconscious, psychic life of mankind' (ibid., p. 173). The special role of the poet, or artist, is to balance and 'restore' the psychic and spiritual needs of his society (ibid., p. 175).

To clarify Jung's endeavour to extend the importance of artistic expression from the individual to the whole of society, the last paragraph of the essay on which Williams based his reference to Jung's thought, is cited here. Jung states:

The secret of artistic creation and of the effectiveness of art is to be found in [...] that level of experience at which it is man who lives, and not the individual, and at which the weal and woe of the single human being does not count, but only human existence. This is why every great work of art is objective and impersonal, but none the less profoundly moves us each and all. And this is also why the personal life of the poet cannot be held essential to his art – but at most a help or hindrance to his creative task[...] His personal career may be inevitable and interesting, but it does not explain the poet (ibid., p. 176).

He suggests that the significance of art is in the art form and in its ability to touch a chord in collective humanity, irrespective of the individual artist who created it. This appears to concur, in part, with Williams' earlier summary that there had been a transition from the individual creative power of the poet to the 'general ground' that challenges 'the artist's singularity' (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 29). The 'general ground', according to Williams, suggests a collective artistic consciousness, but one that has the potential to 'take us back' to 'timeless depths' (ibid., p. 32), in a Jungian sense, to a collective psychic reality 'beyond ordinary reach' (ibid., p. 31).

Perception and Realities

Williams continues to examine notions of creativity and reality from a viewpoint that combines psychology, science and the arts. He considers the influence of contemporary science and addresses, 'recent work on perception', emerging in the 1950s, notably in the work of Professor J. Z. Young, *Doubt and Certainty in Science – A Biologist's Reflections on the Brain* (1951), a study which formed a series of Reith Lectures broadcast by the BBC in 1950. Williams cites Young, who asserts that, 'The brain of each one of us does literally create his or her own world' (ibid., p. 33). This, according to Williams at that time, is a 'startling sentence' (ibid.). Science introduces a further aspect to the materialist conceptions of creativity confirming that conscious selection plays its part in the organisation of reality in the creative arts but amid recent competing notions of the role of the unconscious in influencing the forms they take.

Young's assertion is also significant for Williams because he sees it as a further 'challenge' to the 'deeply' held attitudes towards creativity as an exceptional attribute of the artist (ibid., p. 34). Williams writes that the process of perception ordinarily produces, "“reality” – the things

in themselves as they really are' but the artist's perception 'is seen as in any of a number of ways an *alteration* [organisation, idealisation, transcendence], of a reality that is shared by all others' (ibid., *Emphasis added*). This way of thinking, he writes, is deeply entrenched in 'our thinking and intellectual tradition' but requires a 'necessary revaluation' following the developments in the science of perception' (ibid.). Notions of the artist as a superior talent are examined in relation to Young's position that perception is ordinary brain activity and, therefore, suggests everybody shares the potential to be creative. The use of the word 'create' to describe the activity of every human mind is, Williams suggests, the source of the challenge (ibid.).

This is an important development in Williams' evolving discussion that creativity is, on the one hand, a critical aspect of the human brain's physiological ability to perceive and interpret its own reality and, on the other hand, as an ordinary, if complex, activity involved in the process of representation, interpretation and communication of conscious and unconscious psychic content in a range of cultural and symbolic forms. His engagement with Young's scientific perspective grounds notions of creativity in material reality. A key concept in Young's work, according to Williams, is that human beings undergo a slow process of learning how to see and it is through 'the rules of seeing' that we learn to interpret the world and form our own reality. This is the result of the creative ability of the brain but, for Young, the significance of this does not lie in the assumption that 'our sense organs provide us with an accurate record, independent of ourselves', because that is 'an illusion' that denies the relationship between perception and interpretation (Young, J.Z. 1951, cited in Williams, 1961/2011, p. 35).

Young writes:

The visual receiving system in its untrained state has only very limited powers. We are perhaps deceived by the fact that the eye is a sort of camera. Contrary to what we might suppose, the eyes and brain do not simply record in a sort of photographic manner the pictures that pass in front of us. The brain is not by any means a simple recording system like a film (ibid., p. 35).

Williams cites the scientific viewpoint of Young to support that seeing what is in front of us in the external environment is only one aspect of reality. In taking this point of view Williams and Young are enabling the envisioning of another role of an internal psychic life, in creating our realities. Williams cites Young again, who claims that our part in creating the world around us is crucial because, ‘we cannot speak simply as if there is a world around us of which our senses give true information.’ We should, he maintains, ‘remember all the time that what we see and what we say depends on what we have learned; we ourselves come into the process’ (ibid.). The process of perception will still require imagination, creativity and interpretation.

Williams acknowledges the significance and vitality of the creative process. In his analysis of creativity as a productive and interpretative process, it is dependent on a relationship between exterior and interior determinants and so shares similarities with a Jungian viewpoint. Williams’s focus, here however, is on cultural forms in relation to social reality and his discussion is centred on the conscious mind despite the implications and later articulations, in *Keywords* (1976) and *Politics & Letters* (1979) noted in the previous chapter of this thesis, that a deeper level, i.e., the unconscious, exists. Jung, on the other hand, explicitly maintains the primacy of the unconscious mind and psychic reality in relation to human history and creativity.

Psychic Reality

Jung believed that all immediate experience is psychic. ‘Sense impressions’, he writes, ‘are psychic images, and these alone constitute my immediate experience, for they alone are the immediate objects of my consciousness’ (Jung, 1931/1969, CW8, p. 352-353:680). For Jung, because ‘all our knowledge’ consists in the psyche, its immediacy renders it ‘superlatively real’ and he refers to this as ‘psychic reality’ (ibid). He explains:

If we try to penetrate more deeply into the meaning of this concept, it seems to us that certain psychic contents or images are derived from a “material” environment to which our bodies belong, while others, which are in no way less real, seem to come from a “spiritual” source which appears to be very different from the physical environment [...] whether it is an external fact or a thought that concerns me – both happenings are psychic reality. The only difference is that one psychic happening refers to the physical world, and the other to the spiritual world. If I shift my concept of reality on to the plane of the psyche- where alone it is valid – this puts an end to the conflict between mind and matter, spirit and nature, as contradictory explanatory principles. Each becomes a mere designation for the particular source of the psychic contents that crowd into my field of consciousness. (ibid., p.353:681).

Jung is expressing his view that contrary to the dominant worldview the ‘material’ is not of greater value than the ‘spiritual’ source of knowledge but that current attitudes form a false dichotomy as they are interdependent, if different, ways of interpreting reality. His position, which unreservedly places greater value on the ‘spiritual’ or ‘psychic’, is made clear in his writings despite being unfashionable. But for Williams, unlike Jung, reality is grounded in the material and social.

Jung finds material reality restrictive because it denies the whole experience of reality by rejecting the significance of psychic reality and the unconscious. The ‘particular way of thinking’ that is confined to the ‘material or concrete reality of objects perceived by the senses’ is the ‘thinking that underlies “sound common sense” and our ordinary use of language.’ But there are, Jung states, ‘very many things in the mind which did not derive from the data of the senses (Jung, 1933/1969, CW8, p. 382:742). The ‘particular way of thinking’ Jung refers to echoes Jung’s notion of directed thinking considered earlier in this thesis in the discussion of the essay ‘Two Kinds of Thinking’ (1912/2014), while the significance of psychic reality and the unconscious echoes his notion of undirected thinking.

Culture and Reality

Williams writes, ‘henceforth we must start from the position that reality *as we experience it* is in this sense a human creation; that all our experience is a human version of the world we inhabit.’ He adds that this ‘version has ‘two main sources: the human brain as it has evolved; and the interpretations carried out by our cultures’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 36). Williams is concerned with creativity as it relates to cultural development. The brain, according to Williams, is the, ‘central biological function’ which enables interaction with the environment, including control over it, in order to maintain survival (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 36).

Williams writes, ‘We ‘see’ in certain ways – that is, we interpret sensory information according to certain rules – as a way of living.’ He suggests that the ways in which we ‘see’ are influenced by culturally determined ‘rules’, but, he writes, ‘these rules and interpretations are, as a whole neither fixed nor constant’ (ibid.). He continues:

We can learn new rules and interpretations, as a result of which we shall

literally see in new ways. There are thus two senses in which we can speak of this activity as 'creative'. The evolution of the human brain, and then the particular interpretations carried by particular cultures, give us certain 'rules' or 'models', without which no human being can 'see' in the ordinary sense at all. In each individual, the learning of these rules, through inheritance and culture, is a kind of creation, in that the distinctively human world, the ordinary 'reality' that his culture defines, forms only as the rules are learned (*ibid.*).

Williams suggests that the process of 'seeing ordinary reality' is complex. The creation of rules and models, and the interpretations they require indicate a social function learned through cultures and personal histories. They tend to be 'neither fixed nor constant' and because Williams conceives of the present as always receding into the past, creativity is required to learn new 'rules and models' as they change over time and become assimilated into the present before further developments take place. He appears to be referring to the culture-making function of ordinary social realities.

The effect of 'the new knowledge' of the depth psychologies and the process of perception he has been describing is important because 'the knowledge [...] is in itself an effort towards a new interpretation, a new rule' (*ibid.* p. 37). Williams asserts that 'cultural rules' can be altered, extended and otherwise modified and new rules can be added meaning a 'different reality can be experienced.' The result being that 'new areas of reality can be revealed or created, and these need not be limited to any one individual, but can [...] be communicated, thus adding to the set of rules carried by the particular culture' (*ibid.*, pp.36-37)

To recap on this chapter so far, Williams states that; ‘Two strong emphases, nearer our own time, have been widely made.’ On the one hand, ‘The ‘growing belief in a simple kind of materialism, usually accompanied by an explicit denial of any kind of supernatural reality, any reality beyond man’s reach, has made room for art in terms of its organisation of reality’ - the artist selects, organises [...] and thus gives meaning and value.’ On the other hand, ‘The new psychology [...] in Freud and Jung,’ has however, ‘repeated, in a different form, the claim that there is a reality beyond man’s reach, it is not claiming to be supernatural but it is an ‘unconscious’ reality (ibid., p.31). Williams illustrates that socio-cultural rules and models may at one time have appeared ‘fixed and constant’, but will evolve and assimilate a ‘new science, or a new definition for art’ (ibid.). He concludes that new knowledge is, ‘an effort towards new interpretation’ (ibid., p. 37).

The new definition of art that Williams suggests is emerging out of the new sciences of perception and the new psychologies at the time of his writing, is articulated as a kind of democratisation of creativity where the creative process is also a general human cultural process. As new knowledge and discourse enter ordinary language, artists select and organise their creative mediums and art forms, and audiences select, evaluate and organise their interpretations and this forges new realities. New ‘structures of feeling’ are then seen to emerge in the arts as creative expressions of new knowledge and these will continue to evolve and develop further changes to artistic conventions and influence the rules of socio-cultural realities.

For Jung, all perceptions and all knowledge exist in the psyche and they all form psychic reality. He does not differentiate between experience gained from either the outer material environment

or from inner spiritual sources, he states that these contradictory spaces are just a name for all the contents of the psyche that ‘crowd’ the ‘field of consciousness’ (Jung, 1931/1969, CW8, p. 353:681). But in the earlier essay ‘Two Kinds of Thinking’ (1912/2014) Jung is less concerned with the sources of psychic content and focuses on the distinction between the creative functions of psychic content. He writes that when psychic content creates conscious thought it becomes directed towards the relation of the psyche with the outer social environment and this is ‘reality-thinking, a thinking that is adapted to reality’ and linear thinking the, ‘successiveness of objectively real things, so that the images inside our mind follow one another in the same strictly causal sequence as the events taking place outside it’ (Jung, 1912/2014, CW5, p. 11:11).

On the other hand, the flow of inner unconscious content in undirected thinking, is ‘subjective and actuated by inner motives’ (ibid., p.28:37) but ‘leads away from reality’ as the language of thought fades and ‘image piles on image’ and ‘feeling on feeling’ (p17:19). ‘We no longer compel our thoughts along a definite track, but let them float, sink or rise according to their specific gravity’ (p. 17:18), ‘[...] the stuff of this thinking which shies away from reality can only be the past with its thousand and one memory images’ and it is imaginative tending towards the inner life of fantasy and dream. William James considered this kind of thinking, ‘associative thinking’ to be ‘the ordinary kind’ (p.17-18:18-19). Considered in the context of ‘structures of feeling’, Jung’s notions of psychic reality and two kinds of thinking suggest a creative process that supports a general cultural process if a ‘structure of feeling’ could be portrayed as the organisation of the ordinary, creative flow of imagery, feeling and associative thinking into the socially adapted language of the evaluative interpretation of the arts.

The next part of this chapter looks at ways in which the emerging ‘structure of feeling’ of the unconscious was represented in the modern period in the writing of Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) in *Mrs Dalloway* (1925). It is well-known that Woolf had some knowledge of Freud’s work but I have not established whether she was familiar with Jungian ideas. The Jungian reading of *Mrs Dalloway* in the next part of this chapter does, however, reveal some similarities with themes expressed in his work. This appears to accord with the notion that, as they were contemporaries, elements of the newly emergent ‘structures of feeling’ of modernity, and of the unconscious, were simultaneously being assimilated into Jung’s and Woolf’s writings respectively.

Virginia Woolf, Mrs Dalloway (1925), and The Structure of Feeling of the Unconscious

Introduction

Politics of Modernism (1989), is a collection of Williams's essays, unpublished notes and planned papers that were edited and published posthumously. In his Introduction Pinkney, the editor, states that Williams continued to focus on language in his comments on Modernism and modernity, where its 'social position tends to come through as a proposition about language: ordinary language is clichéd, one-dimensional, abstract; and poetic language will accordingly embrace difficult, experimental forms in an effort to revitalize perception' (Williams, and Pinkney, ed., 1989, p.5). The description contains echoes of Jung's position in the essay 'Psychology and Literature' (1933), cited by Williams in *The Long Revolution* (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 32) and noted earlier in this chapter. In this essay Jung distinguishes between the 'ordinary' in the language of the 'conscious life' in the 'psychological mode' of writing, and the 'poetic' qualities of the 'visionary' ways of writing 'from the hinterland' and 'timeless depths' of the mind (Jung, 1933, pp155-176). The social position of language tends to be perpetuated in attitudes toward the literature of the modern period as poetic and visionary writing is sometimes thought to convey a style of intellectual abstraction characteristic of highbrow Modernism while ordinary language is characteristic of the expression of popular culture.

The 'experimental forms' of the 'stream of consciousness' or 'interior monologue' have become associated with the writing of the modernist period, where 'the enactment in the "stream of consciousness" of Joyce and Woolf' is seen to represent the 'simultaneous fragmented and multiplied perceptual identities of contemporary urban living' (Williams, Pinkney, ed., 1989, p. 4). Rowland (2005, 2010, 2017, 2019, 2021) has written extensive post-Jungian literary analyses of Jung's response to James Joyce and *Ulysses* (1915). This chapter

explores Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* (1925) as an example of how the main character of the text, Clarissa Dalloway, enacts the emergent structure of feeling of the unconscious in the modern period in the varying levels of consciousness conveyed through her internal monologue

'Stream of consciousness' and 'interior monologue'

The stream of consciousness is a term introduced by the American psychologist and philosopher William James (1842-1910), in *Principles of Psychology* (1890), to describe 'the continuous flow of memories, thoughts, feelings and perceptions through the waking mind' (Wilson, 2007, p. 165). He observed that 'the mind proceeds like a river or stream, rather than in blocks or units like speech [...] thought is fluid, fast-flowing, associative, rather than structured [...] not wholly grammatical' (Childs, 2000, p. 170). There are differences in the perception of the two terms under discussion. Childs considers Woolf's writing in *Mrs Dalloway* to align more closely with the term 'interior monologue' because 'the flow of thoughts' often connect characters, using 'tags, such as "he thought" or "she thought" to help make connections between characters and the narrator, 'in this way, Woolf conveys what she calls "life" [...] the narrative can slide between different consciousnesses' comparing and connecting their experiences and 'evoking the idea of many minds' (ibid.). In *Mrs Dalloway* she evokes fragments of multiple minds that are flowing individually but simultaneously.

Wilson writes that there are critics who will insist that prose fiction is only an interior monologue 'if fragmented and unpunctuated, eschewing nearly all of the rules of the ordering of written language.' It is rarely seen but is 'most famously in the last book of *Ulysses*, Molly Bloom's soliloquy' (Wilson, 2007, p. 167). Jung, in his critical essay of *Ulysses*, celebrated reaching the end of his reading of the text in spite of the disordered prose:

And just as Faust was dissolved in the Eternal Feminine, so it is Molly Bloom [...] who has the last word in her unpunctuated monologue, putting a blessed close to the hellish, shrieking dissonances with a harmonious final chord.
(Jung, CW15, 1932, p. 127:191).

The two narrative methods and the prevailing discussion that defines them indicates the degree to which the representation of the ‘interior life’ of the individual was and still is ‘a central concern’ for the artist. In *Mrs Dalloway*, Clarissa Dalloway’s ‘interior monologue’ is in accord with Child’s description given above and can at times seem to be a narrative of ordinary conscious life in contrast to Molly Bloom’s soliloquy, but there are times also when the order of Clarissa’s conscious thoughts are disrupted by an internal ‘stream of consciousness’ illustrated in ‘moments’ that emerge as revelations conveying a numinous quality as if interrupted by a flow of *unconscious* processes. The ‘Woolfian moment’ is characterised, for example, by ‘the sense of time pausing, of a number of human and or non-human factors coming together in a unity’ this may be ‘unique’ and yet have ‘the power to “speak” an inner truth or set of inner truths, both of the participants and components and to the observer’ (Hawthorn, 1998, p. 144). A ‘moment’ in Woolf’s writing, then, implies similarities with an unconscious archetypal experience. In *Mrs Dalloway* Clarissa’s interior monologue and those of other key characters orders the narrative enabling connections to be made between them in time, place and memory. Glimpses of different levels of consciousness remind the reader that a deep unconscious inner life is a continuous living presence that is autonomous and flows independently of the transience of external perceptions.

The literary conventions of stream of consciousness and interior monologue illustrate the development of a new ‘‘structure of feeling’ of the unconscious in the arts. In addition to the

works of William James and Freud they are also comparable with Jung's essay 'Two Kinds of Thinking' (1912). The stream of consciousness and interior monologue are both characterized by 'directed' and 'undirected thinking.' To recap, the former is 'adapted to reality' in that it communicates the sequence of events and is directed outwards, while the latter 'leads away from reality into fantasies of the past or future' and words 'cease' and 'image piles on image' and 'feeling on feeling.' Jung writes, 'Naturally enough the stuff of this thinking can only be the past with its thousand and one memory images' (Jung, 1912/1952/2014, CW5, pp. 17-18). The latter mode of thinking is expressed in Clarissa Dalloway's reminiscences and Woolf utilises these thoughts to introduce other key characters, as Clarissa's undirected thinking intrudes upon the reality thinking that directs her in preparations for her party that evening.

The 'stream of consciousness' expressed in modernist novels is seen in relation to the new depth psychologies, for example, notions of the complexities of language revealed in Freud's therapeutic method of 'free association', which is based 'on the belief that an evasion of the conventional ordering techniques of both thought and language would eventually allow repressed memories and thoughts to emerge' (Wilson, 2007, pp. 166-167). May Sinclair (1863-1946) was a novelist writing in the same early twentieth century period as Woolf and is known for becoming the first to apply William James's term 'stream of consciousness' to 'prose fiction' in her review of Dorothy Richardson's (1873- 1957) novels in *The Egoist* in 1918 (Wilson, *ibid.*) (ffytche, 2010, p. 416).

Sinclair was also 'involved in the founding of the Medico-Psychological Clinic in Brunswick Square, the first British institution formally committed to the exploration of psychoanalytic techniques in psychotherapy', in 1916 she wrote a review of Jung's *Psychology of the*

Unconscious (1912) (ffytche, 2010, p. 417). Virginia and Leonard Woolf began to publish Freud's works in 1921 at their Hogarth Press (Showalter, ed., Woolf 1925/1992, p. xviii).

Reflexivity

Williams considers the works of twentieth century modernist writers and artists to be 'aligned with Freud's discoveries' (Williams, 1989, p. 33). He writes that this tends to attribute:

[...] a view of the primacy of the subconscious or unconscious as well as, in both writing and painting, a radical questioning of the processes of representation. The writers are applauded for their denaturalizing of language, their break with the allegedly prior view that language is either a clear, transparent glass or a mirror, and for making abruptly apparent in the very texture of their narratives the problematic status of the author and his authority. As the author appears in the text, so does the painter in the painting. The self-reflexive text assumes the centre of the public and aesthetic stage, and in doing so declaratively repudiates the fixed forms, the settled cultural authority of the academies [...] and the very necessity of market popularity (such as Dickens's or Manet's). (ibid.).

This citation summarises Williams's perception of the influence that psychoanalytic thought impressed on the production and interpretation of modernist artists and their art forms but also gives a sense of his ambivalence towards the primacy of depth psychologies as a key method of interpreting modernism. His reference to the 'denaturalizing of language' implies the social position that favours obfuscation of the language of everyday life. Williams describes language as being both 'a means of expression' and 'a means of selection' (Williams, 1979/1981, p. 182). He encourages the recognition of the dominance of those selective processes that marginalise and silence emerging ideas. Placing greater value on the method of self-reflexivity over others

by offering it the centre-stage position is, therefore, selective and reductive because other methods that maintain continuity as opposed to breaks in cultural development and the view that necessitates the arts as objects of cultural production and consumerism, are repudiated.

By the time of Williams's interpretation in the citation above, the significance of the unconscious creative impulse of the artist and the potential for the manifestation of unconscious content in the representation of the resulting form, is well established in the discourses of modernism and postmodernism. In addition to questioning 'processes of representation' and also the forms and representations in which they appear in works of art, psychoanalytic thought is key to the notion of 'reflexivity' and its development as a significant influence on modern and postmodern critical discourse (ibid.). Hauke (2000) refers to depth psychology as a new science of the end of the nineteenth century that prompted 'the initial stirrings of the postmodern' (Hauke, 2000, p.27). He writes 'Here for the first time was modern rational science turning in on itself, the human observer, in a reflexivity never previously attempted in the same way' (ibid.).

As well as depth psychology's emergence as a self-reflexive text in itself, this position has had an enduring effect that continues to pervade the study of culture and the arts. Reflexivity has been referred to as 'the abiding practice of self-consciously reflecting on social and cultural conditions' (Rapport, 2014, p. 365). A more detailed summary states that reflexivity is concerned with:

[...] the way in which as human beings we are able to bring to consciousness, to reflect on and come to know, all the seeming grounds of our own being [...] calling into question the very

conventions by which we might endeavour to ‘call’ something into ‘question [...] Our progress as a species or as individuals or social groups concerns our capacity to be reflexive. (ibid., p. 364).

The ‘self-reflexivity’ of the modernist artist appears, therefore to rely on *conscious* reflection of their selected style of expression, for example the stream of consciousness style of writing or an abstract style of painting, where the artist purposefully defies convention in their chosen method of representation in an attempt to challenge ‘fixed forms’ in the arts (Williams, 1989, op. cit.) and forge progress, ‘as individuals or groups’ through new developments (Rapport, 2014, op. cit.). But the increasing influence of the depth psychologies on critical/cultural theories encouraged still deeper engagement with their ideas especially the unknown aspect of unconscious motivation and the appearance of unconscious content in the arts.

Hauke states, ‘Out of this reflexivity a new ‘object’ emerged – one that paradoxically belonged to the Subject and was Other at the same time. This was the Unconscious [...]’ (ibid., p. 28). Hauke’s portrayal of the ‘Unconscious’ brings to mind Jung’s differentiation between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious, in particular. Jung describes the collective unconscious, as ‘the impersonal, objective psyche’ which lies beneath the personal unconscious or ‘the (subjective) human psyche’ (Yeoman, A. and Lu, K., 2024, p. 97). The collective unconscious is an aspect belonging to the individual psyche but it is always ‘Other’ because it is entirely inaccessible and irrepresentable. Williams, in his reference to the ‘structure of feeling’ as something expressed and passed on through generations ‘often not consciously’ illustrates that the value of unconscious processes as ways of explaining cultural processes are, despite being inaccessible and irrepresentable, paradoxically being integrated into his cultural materialist perspective (Williams, 1961/2011, op. cit. p. 69).

Mrs Dalloway (1925)

Individuation

Clarissa Dalloway is reflexive, she calls into question her own being, and her self-reflexivity from a Jungian point of view, can be seen to represent a stage in the process of individuation. For Jung, individuation ‘plays a large role in our psychology,’ he writes, ‘it is the process by which individual beings are formed and differentiated; in particular, it is the development of the psychological *individual* as a being distinct from the general collective psychology’ (Jung, 1921/2014, CW6, p. 448:758). Although it is a process of differentiation, Jung adds, ‘As the individual is not just a single, separate being, but by his very existence presupposes a collective relationship, it follows that the process of individuation must lead to more intense and broader collective relationships and not to isolation’ (ibid.)

Samuels (1985), writes that there is a ‘fundamental connection of the self to questions of meaning.’ The self, Jung would say, is ‘in pursuit of [...] the discovery of meaning and purpose in life’ (Samuels, 1985, p. 89). Samuels explains:

Individuation can be seen as a movement towards wholeness by means of an integration of conscious and unconscious parts of the personality. This involves personal and emotional conflict resulting in differentiation from general conscious attitudes *and* from the collective unconscious [...] This suggests becoming oneself, the person one was intended to be, achieving one’s potential. That implies a recognition and acceptance of parts of oneself that are initially repugnant or seem negative [...] Jung refers to the ‘achievement of a greater personality [...] by such integration, though he acknowledged that the integration of the shadow, implying acceptance of rejected, repressed and as yet

unlived aspects of oneself is painful, particularly when what is involved is the withdrawal of projections on to other people. The self becomes an image not only of a more complete person but also of the goal of life and in this context we can rightly speak of attaining or realising one's self. (ibid., p. 102).

Clarissa Dalloway's internal monologue, although she delights in her walk through the city before returning home to prepare for her party, reveals the inner 'personal and emotional conflict' she feels as a result of her pre-occupation with the 'rejected, repressed and as yet unlived aspects of herself' (ibid.).

Time

Mrs Dalloway, begins abruptly with an urgent sense of Clarissa Dalloway's busy city day immediately interrupted by the glimpse of a summer's day in the country house over thirty years before and a memory of her romantic relationship with Peter Walsh, before swiftly returning to the present again as Clarissa walks out to stand at the kerb and wait for traffic to pass before joining the fragmented but crowded events of contemporary city life to buy flowers in preparation for her party later in the evening. Time, past and present is a key motif in *Mrs Dalloway*. Woolf writes:

For having lived in Westminster – how many years now? over twenty, - one feels even in the midst of the traffic, or waking at night, Clarissa was positive, a particular hush, or solemnity; an indescribable pause; a suspense (but that might be her heart, affected, they said, by influenza) before Big Ben strikes. There! Out it boomed. First a warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. (Woolf, 1925/1992, p. 4).

Clarissa's reverence for time is repeated throughout the text in the chiming of clocks that order the narrative and represent simultaneous connections between the characters. She has been very ill and time has taken on a new perspective, the 'leaden circles' dissolve in the air like solemn echoes reminding her of the irrevocable passing of time. She ponders her own mortality in contrast with infinite time, 'Did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely, all this must go on without her', or was there consolation in the idea that 'death ended absolutely?' On the other hand her thoughts embrace continuity between past and present, thinking that 'somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home', as she perceives the living sense of the rural past in the streets of the modern city (ibid., 9).

Self

As she walks Clarissa's thoughts turn to how she sees herself in relation to other people and how other people may see her. She greets an old friend, Hugh Whitbread, and after what appears to have been a comfortable encounter, Hugh takes his leave after assuring her he'll be at her party tonight but Clarissa is left feeling uneasy, self-conscious, 'very sisterly and oddly conscious at the same time of her hat. Not the right hat for the early morning, was that it? (ibid.). Clarissa's thoughts flow in and out in this vein of self-doubt:

How much she wanted it – that people should look pleased as she came in, Clarissa thought and turned and walked back towards Bond Street, annoyed because it was silly to have other reasons for doing things. Much rather would she have been one of those people like Richard who did things for themselves whereas, she thought, waiting to cross, half the time she did things not simply, not for themselves; but to make people think this or that; perfect idiocy she knew (and now the policeman held

up his hand) for no one was ever for a second taken in. Oh if she could have her life over again! she thought, stepping on to the pavement, could have looked even differently!

(ibid., pp. 10-11)

Clarissa's self-reflexive mood continues to reveal her self-doubt which intensifies as she feels invisible in the city crowd and in contrast to Richard, her husband. In the early pages of the text, this adds to the expression of her lost sense of self:

But often now this body she wore, (she stopped to look at a Dutch picture), this body, with all its capacities, seemed nothing -nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible; unseen; unknown; there being no more marrying, no more having of children now, but only this astonishing and rather solemn progress with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this being Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa any more; this being Mrs. Richard Dalloway. (ibid.).

This aspect of Clarissa is revealed in contrast to her eager intent to present herself as an accomplished society hostess.

Shadow

Clarissa's thoughts turn to her dislike of her daughter Elizabeth's friendship/relationship with Miss Kilman. 'But it might be only a phase' Richard had said to reassure her. Clarissa, however, is horrified by the force of her own response:

It rasped her, though, to have stirring about in her this brutal monster! to hear twigs cracking and feel hooves planted down in the depths of that leaf-encumbered forest, the soul; never to be content quite, or quite secure, for at any moment the brute

would be stirring, this hatred, which, especially since her illness, had power to make her feel scraped, hurt in her spine; gave her physical pain, and made all pleasure in beauty, in friendship, in being well, in being loved and making her home delightful rock, quiver, and bend as if indeed there were a monster grubbing at the roots, as if the whole panoply of content were nothing but self love! This hatred!

(ibid., p. 13)

Clarissa, through her internal monologue is enacting her personal and emotional conflict by dismantling her Self in expressions of her perceived flaws and weaknesses but she is able to acknowledge the strength of her shadow – the brutal hooved monster, ‘this hatred!’ (ibid.).

Moment of invisibility

When she returns home to ‘her life’ where she at once feels ‘blessed and purified’ Clarissa is unhappy to find Richard is ‘lunching out’ and she has not been invited. Her disappointment causes her to recall two lines that she read earlier in the day from the pages of an open book on display in a shop window:

Fear no more the heat o’ the sun
Nor the furious winter’s rages

(ibid., p. 10)

The phrase is haunting, and Clarissa’s thoughts at the time she first read it had turned to the sadness of recent world events, ‘This late age of the world’s experience had bred in them all, all men and women, a well of tears’ (ibid., p. 10). The frequent repetition of the phrase throughout the novel adds to its haunting sorrowful quality and now in her profound dismay Clarissa repeats it to herself, ‘Fear no more the heat o’ the sun; for the shock of Lady Bruton

asking Richard to lunch without her made the moment in which she had stood shiver, as a plant on the river-bed feels the shock of a passing oar and shivers; so she rocked; so she shivered' (ibid., p. 32).

The moment is characteristic of Woolf's writing, 'the sense of time pausing, human and non-human factors coming together in unity' (Hawthorn, 1998, p. 144), is also a metaphor for how deeply disturbed Clarissa feels by her exclusion and invisibility and how it intensifies the magnitude of how she sees time and life passing over her. She makes her way 'slowly upstairs' but is 'feeling herself suddenly shrivelled, aged, breastless [...] out of her body and brain which now failed, since Lady Bruton whose lunch parties were said to be extraordinarily amusing, had not asked her' (Woolf, 1925, p. 33).

Moments of unlived potential

Clarissa, since her illness, now sleeps alone in an attic room as 'Richard insisted, after her illness' (ibid., p. 34). Woolf writes:

The sheets were clean, tight stretched in a broad white band
from side to side. Narrower and narrower would her bed be
[...] So the room was an attic; the bed narrow; and lying there
reading, for she slept badly, she could not dispel a virginity
preserved through childbirth which clung to her like a sheet.
(ibid., p. 34).

Clarissa falls into a reverie about the past and more thoughts of rejection, repression, and unlived potential, she recalls the warmth of lost summer days at Bourton in contrast to her relatively detached marriage to Richard which has recently deteriorated into the cold isolation

of his banishment of her to the attic bedroom (Woolf, 1925, p., 34). He may have insisted that it is because of her illness but for Clarissa ‘there was an emptiness about the heart of life; an attic room’ (ibid., p. 33). As her thoughts turn again to her body, her invisibility, and isolation, they prompt her to reflect on the passion and turbulence of relationships with Peter Walsh and Sally Seton in the past and ponder questions of missed opportunities.

In an often-interpreted passage Clarissa’s thoughts reflect on her belief that she is lacking ‘something central which permeated’, a warmth that ‘broke up surfaces and rippled the cold contact of man and woman, or of women together’. Clarissa resents this and blames herself for having ‘a scruple picked up heaven knows where’ but acknowledges that she ‘could not resist sometimes yielding to the charm of a woman’ (ibid., p. 34). She recalls the sense of a ‘sudden revelation’, a symbolic impression that re-ignited a time in her past.

Then, for that moment, she had seen an illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner meaning almost expressed [...] It was over - the moment. Against such moments (with women too) there contrasted [...] the bed (ibid., p. 35).

The memory, symbolising the contrast between the warmth of the past and the cold reality of the present prompts Clarissa to retrace the events of that summer at Bourton, not to thoughts of Peter but to her relationship with Sally Seton. ‘Was it love? She asks herself, remembering Sally’s ‘overpowering’ charm. Clarissa tells herself she does not harbour these feelings now, ‘She could not even get an echo of her old emotion,’ but some of ‘the old feeling’ is recalled when taking out her hair pins she is reminded of the ‘excitement’ and ‘ecstasy’ doing her hair had roused back then (ibid., p. 37). Sally had ‘kissed her’ in the ‘most exquisite moment of her whole life [...] she felt that she had been given a present, wrapped up, and told just to keep it, not to look at it – a diamond, something infinitely precious, wrapped up [...] which, as they

walked [...] she uncovered, or the radiance burned through, the revelation, the religious feeling! – when old Joseph and Peter faced them’ and a quarrel with Peter ensued (ibid. p., 39). She felt his hostility; his jealousy’ and the fragility of her joyful memory wanes as in the present she recalls, ‘Always, when she thought of him she thought of their quarrels for some reason – because she wanted his good opinion so much, perhaps’ (ibid.).

Moment of fragmentation

As the fragile memory fades Clarissa’s thoughts to the fact of her aging self, ‘she had a sudden spasm, as if, while she mused, the icy claws had had the chance to fix in her’ (ibid., p. 40). She protests against death reminding herself that ‘months and months of her fifty-second year ‘remained untouched’ and ‘as if to catch the falling drop’ of time and life:

Clarissa (crossing to the dressing-table) plunged into the very heart of the moment, transfixed it, there – the moment of this June morning [...] seeing the glass, the dressing-table, and all the bottles afresh, collecting the whole of her at one point (as she looked into the glass), seeing the delicate pink face of the woman who was that very night to give a party; of Clarissa Dalloway; of herself. (ibid.).

Clarissa reflects on the conscious effort involved in assembling all the parts she must assume to perform her social duties, to present a persona, her social self:

How many million times she had seen her face, and always with the same imperceptible contraction! She pursed her lips when she looked in the glass. It was to give her face point. That was her self - pointed; dartlike; definite. That was her self when some effort, some call on her to be her self, drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for

the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and made a meeting-point, a radiancy no doubt in some dull lives, a refuge for the lonely, to come to, perhaps; she had helped young people, who were grateful to her; had tried to be the same always, never showing a sign of all the other sides of her - faults, jealousies, vanities, suspicions, like this of Lady Bruton not asking her to lunch; which, she thought (combing her hair finally), is utterly base! Now where was her dress?
(ibid., p. 40).

Virginia Woolf draws a subtle distinction between Clarissa as herself and her self. In the mirror, Clarissa Dalloway, 'herself', is giving a party that night, but Clarissa who must make an effort to draw all the 'parts together' is 'her self' and is 'definite', constant, never showing 'all the other sides of her' (ibid.). This version of Clarissa describes her consciousness of the masks she wears, her different personas, that meet her need to express her social conscience and connect with a broader range of society. Woolf suggests, however, that as Clarissa herself, 'She alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman', because she is aware of other compositions of herself that are coexistent but multifaceted, multidimensional and inclusive of negative sides (ibid.). When Clarissa prepares to leave her room and go downstairs to join the rest of the house she stops and, 'Strange, she thought, pausing on the landing, and assembling that diamond shape, that single person,' because she needs to 'assemble' a point, 'one centre', the 'mistress' of the house. So, she masks the multi-faceted individual she knows herself to be before adopting one of the many social masks required of her (ibid., p. 41).

Synchronistic moments

To recap briefly on chapter four of the thesis, the summary of Jung's main points to describe synchronistic phenomena are described as follows:

1. The coincidence of a psychic state in the observer with a simultaneous, objective, external event that corresponds to the psychic state or content (e.g. the scarab), where there is no evidence of a causal connection between the psychic state and the external event, and where, considering the psychic relativity of space and time, such a connection is not even conceivable.
 2. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding (more or less simultaneous) external event taking place outside the observer's field of perception, i.e. at a distance, and only verifiable afterward (e.g., the Stockholm fire).
 3. The coincidence of a psychic state with a corresponding not yet existent future event that is distant in time and can likewise only be verified afterward.
- (Jung, 1957/1969, p. 526:984).

Jung calls the second and third examples 'synchronistic' because the 'coinciding events are not yet present in the observer's field of perception' they are 'anticipated in time in so far as they can be verified afterward' (ibid., p. 526:985).

The narrative of the novel is ordered by references to time, especially in the chimes of clocks that reveal the simultaneous thoughts and activities of the different characters and Virginia Woolf also creates synchronous events as expressions of deeper meaning through the coinciding narratives of her main characters. Clarissa's morning is spent reflecting on her past passionate relationships with Peter Walsh and Sally Seton. She recalls the past in contrast to her marriage to Richard which has recently deteriorated into the cold isolation created by his insistence that she move to the attic bedroom alone, leaving Clarissa to reflect that 'there was an emptiness about the heart of life: an attic room' (ibid., 33). At the moment Clarissa's

thoughts turn away from the past and back to the reality of the present and preparations for her party she hears a voice downstairs, ‘Mrs Dalloway will see me [...] Oh yes she will see *me* [...] After five years in India, Clarissa will see me’ (ibid., p.43, author’s emphasis). Clarissa is surprised, ‘taken aback’ (ibid., pp. 43-44), by his unexpected visit. Peter’s visit is synchronistic from Clarissa’s point of view because he arrives completely unexpectedly, as she thinks he is in India, and he is anticipating his visit at a more or less simultaneous time when she is thinking of him in the minutes before he arrives.

The same evening Sally Seton, although not invited to Clarissa’s party hears about the event and takes Clarissa by surprise. Sally coincidentally appears at her party:

What name? Lady Rosseter? But who on earth was Lady Rosseter?
It was Sally Seton! Sally Seton! After all these years! She loomed
through a mist. For she hadn’t looked like that, Sally Seton, when
Clarissa grasped the hot water can. To think of her under this roof,
under this roof! Not like that! [...] One might put down the hot water
can quite composedly. The lustre had left her. Yet it was extraordinary
to see her again, older, happier [...] (ibid., p.188).

Clarissa’s meeting with Sally confirms the loss of the ‘echo of her old emotion’ when she would stand ‘in her bedroom at the top of the house holding the hot-water can in her hands and saying aloud, “She is beneath this roof...She is beneath this roof!”’ (ibid., p.37). She is eager to reconnect with Peter and Sally and leaves them at the party together reminiscing until she is free to join them.

The events of their unexpected visits express connections similar to those which are described by Jung as ‘synchronistic’. Peter and Sally’s thoughts of Clarissa are simultaneous with

Clarissa's thoughts of them but they separately, yet also simultaneously, are planning to meet with her that day. Clarissa, however, is unaware that her friends are thinking of her, or that they will imminently become present to each other but their presence becomes verifiable later and so the events would appear to be synchronistic for Clarissa. It forms a meaningful coincidence because it brings conflicting aspects of Clarissa's past and present life together in a way that creates a more harmonious acceptance of her relationship with Richard.

The most vivid and meaningful coincidence in the novel concerns the character Septimus Warren Smith a young soldier, now a clerk, who is suffering from an acute psychotic episode associated with 'shell-shock' and whom, with his wife Rezia, spends the morning in London waiting to attend an appointment. Their lives interweave momentarily with Peter Walsh in Regent's Park where Peter observes Rezia's attempts to communicate with Septimus in his psychotic state. Septimus and Rezia also appeared earlier in the morning in Bond Street at the same time and place as Clarissa. Her proximity to them is made apparent to the reader although they do not meet each other at all in the novel. Yet, when Clarissa hears that the event of Septimus's death happened just before her party it has a profound effect on her.

Dr Holmes

Septimus embodies the war trauma, pain and fragmentation of post-war modern society. The Warren Smiths are disillusioned by their familiar doctor, the condescending Dr Holmes whom Septimus considers to be a 'damned fool' (ibid., p.100). He perceives the doctor as devilish, 'the repulsive brute, with blood red nostrils', seeing in him the embodiment of human nature (ibid., p.102). Septimus no longer wants to see Holmes, who only recommends outside interests, advising that he should 'play cricket' (ibid., p. 27), as treatment for what the doctor

terms ‘a funk’ to describe the escalating expressions of suicidal thoughts, hallucinations and delusions, that illustrate his deteriorating fragmented state of mind (ibid., p. 100). Holmes scolds Septimus for talking of ‘killing himself to his wife’ because he ought to ‘owe her a duty’, as ‘there was nothing whatever the matter with him’ (ibid., p. 100-101).

Sir William Bradshaw

Septimus and Rezia Warren Smith leave Regent’s Park to go to their appointment where they are seeking a second professional opinion on Septimus’s mental health from the eminent psychiatrist Sir William Bradshaw. ‘Twelve o’clock struck as Clarissa Dalloway laid her green dress on her bed and the Warren Smiths walked down Harley Street’ (ibid., p. 103). The bells toll as all the clocks in London chime along with Big Ben, symbolizing the solemnity of the moment as again ‘The leaden circles dissolve in the air’ (ibid.). Sir William Bradshaw ‘the priest of science’ (ibid.) with complete confidence in his professional opinion recognises the severity of Septimus’s condition, ‘ascertained in two or three minutes’ and duly noted ‘on a pink card’ (ibid.). He takes Rezia to the next room, leaving Septimus disempowered and alone, to remark on the gravity of her husband’s condition and recommends a rest cure, away from her, in one of his homes in the country. When Rezia protests she is told ‘He has threatened to kill himself. There was no alternative. It was a question of law’ (ibid., p. 106) at which Rezia, in ‘agony’, feels ‘deserted’ and ‘failed’ again (ibid., 108).

The perfunctory way in which Sir William treats the Warren Smiths is a representation of his extreme rationality in contrast to the suffering of his patients and their families, ‘To his patients he gave three-quarters of an hour; and if in this exacting science which has to do with what, after all, we know nothing about – the nervous system, the human brain – a doctor loses his

sense of proportion, as a doctor he fails' (ibid.). Showalter writes that 'Woolf's indignant representation of the kind of therapeutic advice Septimus receives from Doctors Holmes and Bradshaw also incorporates her own unhappy experience with doctors' and she 'reserves her harshest satire' for them (ibid., p.xli -xlii). Woolf writes, ironically, of Bradshaw's devotion to two goddesses; 'Proportion, divine proportion, Sir William's goddess', and her 'sister' namely 'Conversion' (ibid. p.109). The latter is an implicit criticism of colonialism and is at work overseas engaging in the act of imposing 'the true belief that is her own' in other countries (ibid.). Sir William Bradshaw's perspective, and the psychic fragmentation portrayed in the suffering of Septimus illustrates a socio- historical viewpoint of the modern period in Woolf's expression of the continuing trauma of war, and the tension that persists in conflicting attitudes towards 'science and religion' (Main, 2004, p., 138), in the caricature of Sir William Bradshaw, 'the priest of science' (Woolf, V., 1925/1992, p. 103).

Clarissa's Party

Clarissa hears of Septimus's death from Sir William, 'whom she disliked' (ibid., p. 200), and Lady Bradshaw 'one didn't dislike her' (ibid., p.201) at her party. They arrive late and Lady Bradshaw explains that this is because of Sir Williams's involvement in a telephone call related to his patient's suicide. Sir William, in the aftermath, is talking quietly to Richard about a Bill they wish to pass in parliament, 'It had its bearing upon what he was saying about the deferred effects of shell shock. There must be some provision in the Bill' (ibid., pp. 200-201). When Clarissa hears from Lady Bradshaw that a young man who had been in the army had killed himself, 'Oh! thought Clarissa, in the middle of my party, here's death' (ibid., p. 201). She is taken aback by the revelation of Septimus's suicide. Clarissa's initial shock and dismay is at the fact that they bring the notion of death to her party, 'What business', had they, 'to talk of

death at her party? But Clarissa leaves the party to find an empty room where she can be alone and reflect on the meaning of what she has heard.

The fact that a young man had killed himself" (ibid.) and she hears of it at her party is meaningful to Clarissa because the more or less simultaneous event of the tragedy of his death coincides and contrasts with her party as a symbol of the celebration of life and society. Earlier in the day she has been upset by the attitudes of Richard and Peter regarding her parties.

But – but – why did she suddenly feel, for no reason that she could discover, desperately unhappy? [...] she went through one thing and another [...] It was a feeling, some unpleasant feeling, earlier in the day perhaps; something that Peter had said, combined with some depression of her own, in her bedroom, taking off her hat; and what Richard had said had added to it, but what had he said? [...] Her parties! That was it! Her parties! Both of them criticised her very unfairly, laughed at her very unjustly, for her parties. That was it! That was it! (ibid., p132).

Peter thought she liked 'to impose herself', have 'famous people about' is 'simply a snob', Richard thought her 'foolish to like excitement when she knew it was bad for her heart' (ibid., p. 133). Richard also thought it 'a very odd thing how much Clarissa minded about her parties' and 'If she worried about these parties he would not let her give them' (ibid., p. 131). But, Clarissa, knew both men to be 'quite wrong' because 'what she liked was simply life' (ibid., p. 133).

But because of her recent brush with death as a result of a serious illness which has left Clarissa with a weakened heart, the experience of physical frailty and impending death has been on

Clarissa's mind all day. Shakespeare's words 'Fear no more the heat o' th' sun', are repeated in her thoughts throughout the text and have added to the solemnity of the leaden circles that dissolve in the air like a presentiment of her own gradual invisibility and imminent absence from the world. The citation is from *Cymbeline* and is published in a collection of literary sources in a recent Norton critical edition of *Mrs Dalloway*. It is 'a late romance', and forms part of a 'funeral song, which offers some small comfort in the idea that a dead youth has now passed beyond fear, and will never again be either too cold or too hot' (Woolf, 1925/ 2021, p. 232). Septimus repeats throughout the day and as he waits to plunge from the window sill that 'the sun is hot', and on the afternoon of his death he watches the sunbeams move around the room as he thinks 'Fear no more, says the heart in the body, fear no more' (ibid., p.153).

It has been suggested by Showalter (1992) that Septimus Smith is 'Clarissa's double' because, in the planning of the novel, 'Woolf had intended the book to end with Clarissa's death: Mrs Dalloway was to kill herself, or perhaps merely to die at the end of the party' (Showalter, ed., Woolf, V., 1925/1992, p. xxxvi). Jenson (2007) writes, 'Woolf used the term 'double' to describe the relation between the characters of Clarissa and Septimus and noted that the novel would study the sane and insane side by side' (Jenson, Shiach ed., 2007, p.116). But, in a Jungian reading of the novel the suggestion of a psychic connection between Clarissa and Septimus, though they do not meet, suggests a synchronistic phenomenon. Main (1997), gives the example of Jung's experience of a patient, summarised previously in chapter four of this thesis, who is described as an excessively rational woman who dreams about a scarab brooch. Interpreted in terms of Jung's theory of synchronicity, her 'conscious attitude' was challenged by the powerful irrational event of the synchronicity' of a similar insect appearing and tapping at the window during the consultation. Her rationalism had been compensated from the unconscious by the irrational event and was seen as 'an expression of the process of

individuation furthered through compensation'. Only after the 'excessive rationalism' was compensated could her 'transformation' or 'individuation' progress' (Main, 1997, p. 9).

Now at her party alone in the quiet empty room Clarissa allows her thoughts to flow effortlessly, she distances herself momentarily from the party and the anxious persona of the society hostess, the composed conscious image she has practiced for so long, as she re-imagines Septimus's brutal death in detail and contemplates how 'he had flung it away' in an act of 'defiance' while 'they went on living' and 'would grow old' (ibid., p. 202). She recognises and admires in the young man his act of defiance and self-sacrifice although she does not know that he was thinking, 'He did not want to die. Life was good' as he sat on the window sill preparing to fall (ibid., p. 164). Her quiet reflection seems to forge a moment of clarity for Clarissa as she interprets the act as heroic and defiant even though she could not have known his mood when Septimus sat on the window sill. He had, however, waited 'until the very last moment' thinking 'Life was good. The sun hot', but on hearing the approach of Holmes he flung himself out of the window and cried 'I'll give it to you!' as he fell (ibid., p. 164).

His death represents a sense of freedom and autonomy, the image of Septimus falling 'vigorously, violently' onto the railings (ibid.) symbolises his falling on his sword in defiance of becoming an eternal scapegoat. He gave his life on his own terms so that his autonomy would neither be taken from him by Sir William Bradshaw, nor leave him, as he had feared, 'suffering forever, the scapegoat, the eternal sufferer [...] putting from him with a wave of his hand that eternal suffering, that eternal loneliness' (ibid. p.27). Holmes, misunderstanding Septimus until the end calls him, 'Coward!' Septimus's death appears to have the effect of unconscious compensation as it coincides with Clarissa's celebration of life and the psychic

tension she has been experiencing as the opposing archetypes of life and death find balance in a change in her conscious attitude to one of renewal.

Clarissa tells herself that, 'She had escaped. But that young man had killed himself' (Woolf, V., 1925/1992, p. 203) She finds in the death of the unknown young man, affirmation of her own chosen life:

Odd, incredible; she had never been so happy. Nothing could equal, she thought, straightening the chairs, pushing in one book on the shelf, this having done with the triumphs of youth, lost herself in the process of living, to find it, with a shock of delight, as the sun rose, as the day sank [...] to look at the sky [...] seen it in London when she could not sleep. (ibid.).

Clarissa is, for now, free of the heavy presentiment that has weighed on her as she enacted her preparations for her party under the solemn heaviness of leaden circles and the toll of the bells because the symbols of death were not foretelling hers, 'She had escaped' (ibid., p.203). 'She felt glad that he had done it; thrown it away while they went on living' (ibid., p. 204) But her guests are waiting, 'she must go back. She must assemble' (ibid., 204). Clarissa has found renewed and simple pleasure in living the life she has left to live. Her renewal has also included integrating conscious and unconscious parts of her past and present relationships with Peter, Richard, Sally and Miss Kilman, and an image of the goal of life, 'the process of living' (ibid., p.203) in her movement towards the realisation of 'wholeness' (Samuels, 1985, p.102).

Structures of feeling of the modern period

The expression of the unconscious

Virginia Woolf represents the structure of feeling of the unconscious in *Mrs Dalloway* in her chosen style of writing because the interior monologue of Clarissa Dalloway also reveals a level of dialogue between the unconscious and the flow of consciousness where symbolic and archetypal moments emerge spontaneously to compensate Clarissa's one-sided thinking. The moments appear to disrupt, and at the same time, advance narrative progression in the novel and represent forward movement in Clarissa's process of individuation. The expression of the structure of feeling of the unconscious represented in the novel illustrates that one structure of feeling can evolve and form new structures of feeling in the process of cultural development.

The role of the unconscious in harbouring the hidden potential of desire is expressed, for example, in the numinosity of Clarissa's 'sudden revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check', when 'for that moment, she had seen a revelation [...] an inner meaning almost expressed' (ibid., pp 34-35) that had ignited her attraction, 'to women too' (ibid., p35). In this way the articulation of the new language of interior life emerges in consciousness as a pre-emergent or newly emergent structure of feeling. As an example, attitudes to sexual freedom that were marginalised by the dominant ideologies and discourses of the early twentieth century entered the breaks and gaps in the official organisation of society via the arts, and the recognition and evaluation of a newly emergent discourse found tacit agreement in the audience and they began to shape new formations and new socio-cultural realities. The emerging structure of feeling of sexual freedom in *Mrs Dalloway* emerged two generations later as an

influential structure of feeling in Britain when, in the 1960s, changes to legislation supported the recognition of this cultural development in the official organisation of society.

The 'split'

Another structure of feeling to gain expression in the modern period is represented in the tension arising out of a perceived 'split between science and religion or their respective domains of matter and spirit' (Main, 2004, p.138). The 'split' is seen in *Mrs Dalloway* where Woolf alludes to it ironically. Rather than side with either science or religion, as already noted in this chapter, she describes the over-rationality of science and the dogmatic conversion to western religion and morality in her articulation of the 'goddesses' of 'Proportion, divine proportion' and 'Conversion' (Woolf, 1925/1992, p. 109), as the symbols of the success of leading psychiatrist Sir William Bradshaw; the 'priest of science' (ibid., p. 103). Through Woolf's main characters she rejects the dominant discourses of science and religion which she portrays as being imposed upon others and her writing, apparently unintentionally, expresses notions of matter and spirit as, the 'living body, or life' and 'psychic factors' in a dichotomy that relates more securely to the expression of the structure of feeling of the unconscious in scenes that resonate with analytical psychology (Jung, 1926/1928, CW8, p. 320:604). Jung's theory of synchronicity, in particular, illustrates his unease with the principal division which he sees as an over-valuation of the dominant outlook of scientific materialism.

Raymond Williams has written widely on the effects of the growth and development of the city, or metropolis, on the modern period and its cultural forms, and his thoughts evolve from the poetry of William Wordsworth (1770-1850) to encompass the city of the 20th century novels of James Joyce and Virginia Woolf. He recalls that in the writings of the earlier Romantic period,

‘perceptions of the new qualities of the modern city had been associated from the beginning, with a man walking, as if alone, in its streets’ but it often signified isolation, represented in images of the modern city as a crowd of strangers (Williams, 1989, p.39). In Britain where ‘industrial and metropolitan development was early’ writers identified the ‘modern city as a crowd of strangers, in a way that was to last’ (Williams, 1989, p. 39) and is expressed by Wordsworth in *The Prelude, Book Seventh* (1850) and cited by Williams:

How often in the overflowing Streets
Have I gone forward with the Crowd, and said
Unto myself, the face of everyone
That passes by me is a mystery...
...Until the shapes before my eyes became
A second sight-procession, such as glides
Over still mountains, or appears in dreams.
(Williams, 1973/2011, p. 233).

When Wordsworth was planning and writing the first version of *The Prelude* at the time of the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Greenblatt, S., et al., eds., 2006, pp.322-324) to be among a crowd of unfamiliar faces would have been unusual ‘to people used to customary small settlements’ (Williams, 1989/2007, p., 40). By the modern period, however, ‘Ordinary modes of perceiving others are seen as overborne by the collapse of normal relationships [...] Other people are then seen as if in ‘second sight’ or, crucially, as in dreams: a major point of reference for many subsequent modern artistic techniques’ (ibid.).

In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, representations of unconscious ways of seeing paved the way for alternative symbolic expressions of the city and its relation to the principal concerns of modern culture and society. The city became represented in two ‘literary modes’, in the work of George Gissing (1857-1903) which represented social observation,

where the city epitomised crowds, ugliness and despair, and in the other mode the city became a symbol. Williams writes, 'The city had long had a symbolic dimension, most powerfully in the religious image of the Holy City, the City of God'. In 'distinguishable ways', Williams asserts, the structure of feeling of the city then becomes a 'symbolic vision of the city as the condition of human life'.

He summarises a poem written by James Thomson, *The City of Dreadful Night* (1870-1873) that describes the rich and the poor as 'The saddest and the weariest men on earth' who when in 'a long procession' they come 'to the cathedral' it cannot alleviate their sadness 'despite every kind of human activity' (Williams, 1973/2011, p.238). Williams writes, 'they are given a sense of life which is a perception of delusion' and a 'loss of belief in the false dreams of God or immortality, or of any convincing living purpose, is now the condition of the city and the condition of man' (ibid.). Williams writes that Thomson's poem is 'a powerful vision' that connects:

[...]the fact of the city and of the new anguished consciousness.
Struggle, indifference, loss of purpose, loss of meaning – features
of nineteenth-century social experience and of a common
interpretation of the new scientific world-view – have found, in
the City, a habitation and a name. For the city is not only, in this
vision, a form of modern life; it is the physical embodiment of a
decisive modern consciousness. (ibid., 239).

This image of the city is symbolic of the anguished consciousness at the diminishing religious world-view and is represented in the loss of belief and a sense of meaning. The new scientific world-view portrays a city made by humanity without God (ibid., p. 240). The structure of feeling of the city as the condition of human life is represented in the expression of the loss of

belief and deep uncertainty that continues to echo fifty years later in the London of *Mrs Dalloway*. Woolf includes in her novel a fragment of narrative that introduces ‘a seedy-looking (nondescript man’ who ‘carrying a leather bag stood on the steps of St Paul’s Cathedral, and hesitated, for within was what balm, how great a welcome [...] the cathedral offers company, he thought, invites you to membership of a society [...] why not enter in he thought [...] why not enter in?’ (Woolf, 1925/1992, p. 31). The man is left standing, hesitating, as attention is drawn away from him to an aeroplane passing overhead in an illustration of the new velocity, simultaneity and multiplicity of a later secular modernity.

Fragmentation and multiplicity

The structure of feeling of fragmentation and simultaneous multiplicity is given expression in Williams’s description of the writings of Woolf and Joyce. He cites a passage from Woolf’s work, possibly *Orlando* (1928), (Williams’s citations are rarely fully referenced), where he associates the view from the windows of a fast car to the fragmentary experience of the city. His interpretation considers this movement to relate to film in particular where there is ‘a direct relation between the motion picture, especially in its development in cutting and montage, and the characteristic movement of an observer in the close and miscellaneous environment of the streets’ (Williams, 1973/2011, p. 242). Williams considers this to be ‘most clear’ in Joyce’s *Ulysses* (1922) but it can also be seen to be characteristic of *Mrs Dalloway* (1925). The multiple people and events that are seen through Clarissa’s eyes and her memories as she is walking through the streets of London in the first twenty-eight pages of the novel; the traffic, the groups, the individuals, the parks, the shops, the motor car, the sky-writing aeroplane, all represent, and can be imagined as simultaneity in a montage of multiple images.

Showalter writes ‘Planes, cars and movies are among the most conspicuous signs of modernity, and such references [...] encouraged many critics to read *Mrs Dalloway* as a textbook of modernism [...] a consciously “modern novel” (Showalter, ed., Woolf, 1925/1992, p. xxiv). Virginia Woolf observes the montage from a literary point of view as that which constitutes Life. She writes in the essay ‘Modern Fiction’ ((1919):

Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day.
The mind receives a myriad impressions – trivial, fantastic,
evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From
all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms;
and as they fall they shape themselves into the life of Monday
or Tuesday [...]’ (Woolf, Bowlby, ed., 1993, p. 8).

Woolf attributes Joyce with being the ‘most notable’ for attempting to come closer to life than his predecessors. She writes, of Joyce:

Let us record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order
in which they fall, let us trace the pattern, however disconnected
and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident
scores upon the consciousness [...] In contrast with those
whom we have called materialists, Mr Joyce is spiritual; he
is concerned at all costs to reveal the flickerings of that innermost
flame which flashes its messages through the brain [...] (ibid., p. 9).

Virginia Woolf and her character, Clarissa Dalloway, celebrate the expression of Life in the simultaneity and multiplicity of the modern period, and in the representation of life as the spiritual re-kindling of the psyche the notion of fragmentation represents an alternative optimistic structure of feeling of modernity. As Woolf asserts ‘If we want life itself, here surely we have it’ (ibid.).

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to illustrate the critical points of convergence between the ideas of Jung and Williams and this has been found in the potential for ‘structures of feeling’ to be interpreted as the communication of the creativity and expression of the unconscious. The text chosen for close-reading is *Mrs Dalloway* because the synchronous events, represented in analytical psychology as oppositional frames of reference, such as life/death, past/present, city/country, self/other, etc., also represent dichotomies present in discourses of the post-war socio-cultural organisation of the British modern period. They provide multiple levels for active interpretation and illustrate the compensatory and formative role of the archetype in the process of individuation. The novel represents the ‘structure of feeling’ of unconscious expression, especially the expression of the creativity of the archetype in the manifestation of synchronistic moments.

CONCLUSION

Introduction

This conclusion begins by providing a brief recap of the aim of the thesis and the key concepts that have been discussed. The next section describes the notion of feeling as a problematic description of a concept that usually implies individual emotion or affect but aims to illustrate a response that is collective and the way in which it has been resolved. Two further sections return to historicism as a principal methodology that encompasses aspects of both Williams's and Jung's notions of the presence of the past and then recaps on Jung's notions of 'historical continuity' and the collective unconscious. A short conclusion of the aim of the thesis follows, and the last section outlines a final conclusion on the benefit of analytical psychology to cultural studies and culture-making and suggestions for further research.

Aim

The aim of the thesis has been to examine Raymond Williams's concept of the 'structure of feeling' from the perspective of Jungian and post-Jungian analytical psychology. Williams's key concept seeks to illustrate that the current collective, social, cultural and political organisation of society in which an artist lives can have a formative influence on their creativity and may be reflected consciously or unconsciously, in the style and content of the works of art created. This was viewed in relation to Jungian descriptions of the structure of the psyche because analytical psychology places particular emphasis on the creative potential of the collective unconscious and the archetypes, and also stresses that although the archetypes emanate from the matrix of the collective unconscious, they convey universal patterns of meaning that will become culturally determined and shaped by the living sense of the present socio-cultural attitudes current at the time when they emerge in individual consciousness.

Feeling

Williams's concept of the 'structure of feeling' has been problematic because the word 'feeling' is so closely related to notions of emotion and affect. He was aware of the complexities and he admits to it being 'a deliberately contradictory phrase, with which I have never been happy' (Williams, 1979/1981, p., 159). To recap on earlier definitions, Williams states, 'It was a structure in the sense that you could perceive it operating in one work after another which weren't otherwise connected' and it was also 'one of feeling much more than of thought – a pattern of impulses, restraints, tones, for which the best evidence was often the actual conventions of literary or dramatic writing'. For Williams, 'literary analysis' is the experience through which he maintained the application of the phrase, rather than because of any 'theoretical satisfaction with the concept' (ibid.). The concept has, however, become characteristic of Williams's approach to literary and cultural analysis. Its complexity on close reading and analysis has not only been in relation to the word feeling, however, but also to the inherently implicit yet collective process by which the 'structure of feeling' is communicated. Reading Williams in the context of Jungian thought has offered a different way of engaging with the phrase.

Feeling, from a Jungian point of view, is neither emotion nor affect, it is the word used to describe evaluation. The Jungian definition of feeling adds clarity to the term 'structure of feeling' because as a process of evaluation it informs us how progress could be made from the point of interpretation and selection of conventions, to the tacit consent of the readers/audiences/spectators, to the development of a consensus regarding the elements that are rejected or those that are approved for the ensuing 'structure of feeling'. The selection of patterns of impulses, restraints and tones, in artistic conventions implies that evaluation takes

place prior to consent. The ‘structure of feeling’ does not remain static, it is a developmental process.

Williams’s concept of a ‘structure of feeling’ has been described earlier in the thesis as being agreed and developed implicitly in tacit agreement with the audience and able to proceed to a transition that occurs implicitly from one generation to another. This adds another dimension to the concept which is that it also infers the articulation of an unconscious intersubjective aspect of psychic life that is expressed collectively. The thesis suggests, therefore, that the ‘structure of feeling’ could be described as an inter-subjective transition of the living sense of the past from earlier generations to later ones that is communicated through archetypal processes which enable the progression of cultural development.

Williams, Jung and Historicism

Williams and Jung both stress the significance of the past in their works in echoes of the historicist attitude introduced by Herder (1744-1803) towards ‘feeling into the past’ (Herder, Foster ed., 2002, p. xvii). To recap, this encourages an empathetic approach to the continuous presence of the ‘living sense’ of the past, which Jung sees as an important aspect of the collective unconscious and Williams suggests is represented in the ‘structure of feeling’ inherent in the cultural/art forms of a period. Williams states, ‘this characteristic is likely to be expressed; often not consciously’ because it is in the arts that we find that ‘in the only examples we have of recorded communication that outlives its bearers, the actual living sense, the deep community that makes the communication possible, is naturally drawn upon’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69). Dilthey (1833-1911) and Schleiermacher (1768-1834) on hermeneutics, refer to ‘unconscious creation’ as that which the authors or artists ‘could not have said because

they lacked the historical distance from themselves to see' (Hamilton, 1996/2003, p. 61). This supports Williams's view that there are characteristics of past cultures that are communicated in the arts, but not necessarily consciously.

Jung supports the notion of unconscious creation and expresses it in his essay 'Picasso' (1934):

Non-objective art draws its contents essentially from "inside."

This "inside" cannot correspond to consciousness, since consciousness contains images of objects as they are generally seen, and whose appearance must therefore necessarily conform to general expectations. Picasso's object, however, appears different from what is generally expected – so different that it no longer seems to refer to any object of outer experience at all [...] but come from an "inside" situated behind consciousness [...]

Behind consciousness there lies not the absolute void but the unconscious psyche, which affects consciousness from behind and from inside, just as much as the outer world affects it from in front and from outside. Hence those pictorial elements which do not correspond to any "outside" must originate from "inside".

(Jung, 1934/2014, p. 136:206).

This summary illustrates the autonomy of the inner unconscious processes that affect representation. Inner images originating in the unconscious are inaccessible to the individual or artist because they are 'invisible and cannot be imagined' (ibid., p. 136:207) and 'in contrast to objective or "conscious" representations all pictorial representations of processes and effects in the psychic background are *symbolic*' the meanings of which are potential and for the moment 'unknown' (ibid. Author's emphasis).

Picasso's art is characteristic of the modern period and from Williams's historicist perspective the particular characteristics of the period represented in his paintings are those which Jung

described in a letter to Herbert Read in 1960 as, ‘the fragmentation of aesthetic contents’ and the ‘strength which brought about the dissolution of a work. He saw and understood what the surge of depth meant. Almost consciously he accepted the challenge of the all-powerful spirit of the time’ (Jung, Adler Jaffé, 1953/1984, p. 193). Jung is writing from a position of historical distance and is able to view ‘the spirit of the time’ with more clarity so that he refers to Picasso’s non-representational art forms are considered as unconscious but also self-reflective.

Historical Continuity and the Collective Unconscious

Jung’s notion of ‘historical continuity’, or the ‘continuity of history’ is more recently described as ‘recognizing the unconscious operating in history’ (Lu, 2011, p.15). Lu differentiates between ‘conscious history’ as a rational dialogue with the past and ‘natural history’ or ‘archetypal history’ as timeless, rooted ‘in mythology’ and arising from the collective unconscious (ibid., p. 16). Jung describes the unconscious as an internal sense of the past lives of humanity in which the ‘unconscious [...] contains all the patterns of life and behaviour inherited’ from their ‘ancestors’, and also ‘in the conscious life of the adult [...] this unconscious, instinctive functioning is continually present and active (Jung, 1931/1969, CW8, p. 349:673) and he describes the collective unconscious as ‘something like an unceasing stream or perhaps ocean of images and figures which drift into consciousness in our dreams’ (ibid., p. 350:674). Williams’s defines Jung’s ‘hypothesis of the collective unconscious’ as the ‘assumption of a primary and autonomous unconscious mind or being’. Williams’s definition of the collective unconscious as comprising the potential to be an autonomous *being* acknowledges Jung’s assertion that the unconscious is a continually active psychic presence. It is, Williams writes, ‘a common human property’ which ‘precedes (both in time and in importance) the ordinary development of consciousness’ (Williams, 1976/1983, p. 322).

Conclusion

The 'structure of feeling' is a historicist notion. Through active interpretations 'structures of feeling' are perceived to represent the living sense of the past that survives in the present in the arts. Textual analysis defines continuities and discontinuities between the arts of past generations and examines continuities and discontinuities between the art forms of the past with those of the present. It explores the gaps that form between discourses and the position of marginalised and silenced voices. 'Structures of feeling' form the basis for transformation and cultural development and are a formative influence on ensuing structures of feeling.

The thesis has examined the concept of the 'structure of feeling' from the perspective of analytical psychology. It finds that from this point of view 'structures of feeling' represent the potential for interpretations from the position of Jungian and/or cultural studies because 'structures of feeling' communicate the unconscious creativity of the archetypes and the collective unconscious as they negotiate the perpetual living sense of the past. Together Jungian and cultural studies illustrate the ways in which 'structures of feeling' are creative, imaginative, evaluative and formative processes of cultural development.

Final conclusion: Culture-Making and Future Research

The relevance of the study of the relation between psychoanalysis, the depth psychologies and cultural studies is expressed by Homans in *Jung in Context* (1979/1995). He writes:

The depth psychologies not only interpret or analyze culture, but that they also create it. I call this the tension between culture-analyzing and culture-making. The *first* characterizes the earliest or classical view of depth psychology (Freud's view),

the second the view just now emerging. (Homans, 1979/1995, p. xiii).

The ‘second view’ emergent at the time of the publication of the first edition of Homans’s text in the 1970s and beginning to illustrate his contribution to culture-making was that of Jung who was seen as ‘innovative’ but ‘outsider-ish’ from the viewpoint of a subject area dominated by Freudian psychoanalysis. The aim of the thesis has been to contribute to this area of study by researching both Jungian studies and cultural studies together, in an endeavour to analyse the ‘structure of feeling’ a key concept of eminent cultural theorist Raymond Williams, from the perspective of Jungian and post-Jungian analytical psychology.

Homans writes that the tension between analysing and making culture is apparent in the three main concerns that tend to be raised in discussions about depth psychology; its ‘origins’, the ‘principal ideas or structure’, and its ‘consequences as a social force – its influence upon those who inhabit the social world that surrounds it’ (ibid.). All three concerns are closely inter-related and would be illuminated by further study of the political, philosophical and historical implications of depth psychology in Samuels, *The Political Psyche* (1993 *Politics on the Couch* (2018) and ffytche, *The Foundation of the Unconscious* (2012), *Psychoanalysis in the Age of Totalitarianism* (2016) and Bishop, *Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics, Volume 1* (2008) and *Volume 2* (2009) *The Archaic The Past in the Present* (2012).

Homans states that *Jung in Context* was ‘the only full-length scholarly study of a major depth psychologist that took an openly contextual approach’ (ibid., p. xii). By the time of the second edition, 1995, there had been a decisive ‘shift [...] in a number of new directions’ which allowed for the emergence of a broad interdisciplinarity to be incorporated into investigations of the ‘historical and contemporary significance of depth psychology’ (ibid., p. xi). He adds:

[...] culture-making is identical with what I also refer to as “deep sociality.” Scholarship on psychoanalysis today sees more than before how connected are people and ideas. The origins of psychoanalysis lie more in social forces than in Freud’s introspective or scientific genius [...] While culture-making connotes the construction of ideas, deep sociality suggests that all such construction is collaborative. (ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.).

Homans’s description of culture-making as being identical with his phrase ‘deep sociality’ and both being closely aligned with the collaborative construction of ideas resonates with the notion of the ‘structure of feeling’ which as an aspect of cultural development is also a collective expression of the ‘deep community that makes communication possible’ (Williams, 1961/2011, p. 69). In Williams’s work the deep community that augments the communication of the collective expressions refers to cultural transformation and transition of cultural forms. Homans, in a slightly later development of his ideas, refers to ‘deep sociality or intersubjectivity’ (Homans, 1979/1995, p. xxxiv) and both phrases but ‘intersubjectivity’, in particular, invites further study in the context of this thesis as a way of exploring implicit collective communication.

The aim of the thesis has been to examine the ways in which the collective unconscious and the archetypes, through their deep access to the past in the individual psyche can influence the present and help explain the tacit collaboration that takes place which can result in new ‘structures of feeling’ which permeate society as collective evaluations of cultural and artistic forms. As I reach the end of the thesis the feeling I have is that my contribution at the moment raises more questions than answers.

Further research

The main questions relate to three areas that if time and word count had not been exhausted would have provided further substance to the thesis. The first is the importance of thought and language and the psychological and cultural levels of expression on which they function. Reading the historicists such as Vico, Herder, Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Williams mentioned in this thesis, has illustrated that there are a broad range of contributions to the field but the aim is to explore the area with particular reference to Jung in Gardner *Rhetorical Investigations* (2013) and a re-reading of Jung's own work on word association, Jung *Studies in Word Association*, (1904-7) *CW2, Experimental Researches*, and Kugler's *The Alchemy of Discourse* (2002) in which the author proposes an archetypal approach to language.

Jung's word association experiments relate closely to the complexes and this is the second area of further research in the context of Jung and cultural studies. It would include the work of Singer, *The Vision Thing* (2000), Kimbles and Singer, *The Cultural Complex* (2004) and the writings of Henderson, *Shadow and Self* (1990), Adams, *The Multi-Cultural Imagination* (1996), *The Mythological Unconscious* (2001). Morgan's essay in Kimbles and Singer, (2004) 'Exploring Racism: a clinical example of a cultural complex' (2004) discusses the notion of a social unconscious in addition to the collective and cultural unconscious. The texts mentioned here also explore aspects of the cultural unconscious.

Further work on analytical psychology would include a deeper examination of the archetypes and, in particular, their 'psychic and physical yet neither because beyond both' psychoid nature, in the context of Jung's theory of synchronicity (Main, 1997, p.36) in Main, *Jung on*

Synchronicity and the Paranormal (1997), *The Rupture of Time* (2004) and Jung's essays on his theory of Synchronicity.

For literary and cultural studies, Rowland in *Jungian Literary Criticism* (2019), provides valuable suggestions for further reading which include; exploring reader-response theory and Greenblatt's new historicism, in particular, his work on 'resonance' and 'wonder', also Rowland's *Jung as a Writer* (2005), *Jung and the Humanities* (2010) and Rowland and Weishaus *Jungian Arts-Based Research and "The Nuclear Enchantment of New Mexico"* (2021). For cultural studies, Hauke *Jung and the Postmodern* (2000) on postmodernity, and for continuing to keep up-to date with contemporary writings on modernity and modernisms Brooker, et al, *The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms* (2010).

The area of research for past, present and future research is very broad but rewarding. I have referred in this section to many texts that I have already read but that now require a deeper and closer re-reading. The most challenging aspect of researching the thesis has been the endeavour to read, understand and convey the knowledge I have managed to acquire from four academic fields; analytical psychology, cultural studies, historicism and literary theory and criticism, in a way that I hope holds at the very least some cohesion, and at best some interest for the reader.

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