

Primordial narrative: A new approach to C. G. Jung's archetype concept

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## Abstract

Classical Jungian approaches to the relationship between archetype and narrative have privileged a conception of the former as timeless, symbolic and static. This view positions archetype as an abstract formal principle. Yet, existing scholarship does not adequately explain how archetype so conceived can dynamically drive human experience, which is the claim Jungians also make of the concept. The thesis proposes that when the traditional conception of the relation between archetype and narrative is subverted and the former is understood as itself narratively constituted, one comprehends how a formal principle can drive human experience. Further, the thesis contends that a narrative conception of archetype allows the synthesis of its various conceptualisations, which had been thought incompatible. To support these hypotheses, the thesis proposes a fundamental redescription of narrative to secure the ontological ground for a narrative conception of archetype. This redescription is founded in Aristotle, drawing also on Martin Heidegger's onto-phenomenology and Alfred North Whitehead's notion of *creativity*. It unveils archetype's various conceptualisations as situated in a mutually supportive structure, founded on a primordial creativity, which brings into relation basic ontological elements. Such creativity is revealed as not only the source of archetype's universality but also as a primordial cultural phenomenon, which identifies archetype's relation to human being as one of mutuality. Thus, a narrative conception of archetype clarifies that the latter is properly conceived as formal principle only where such principle is understood as a necessary element in the dynamic of archetype's unfolding as human experience. The implication is that narrative is never simply a tool of clinical analysis but is the stuff of psyche itself.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

The traditionally dominant view amongst Jungian scholars of the relationship between archetype and narrative has focussed on how the former manifests itself in the plots of the latter. In this view, myths, fairy tales and religious stories become images of an underlying psychic reality. This approach positions archetype as a kind of Platonic Idea, that is, as a timeless, independent transcendent entity of which a thing in the world is a mere copy.

To so identify archetype is to view it primarily as abstract formal principle. This aligns with Jung's description of it as "the introspectively recognizable form of *a priori* psychic orderedness" (CW8, para. 965). However, this conception of archetype poses a significant problem, which is that formal principles are static. Consequently, it is unclear how archetype so conceived could also dynamically drive human experience. Yet, this is Jung's claim given he describes archetype further as "the principle of spontaneous movement and activity" (CW9i, para. 393).

Therefore, the thesis asks the following question: How can archetype be simultaneously a static and dynamic principle? It is contended that an answer is found in the reappraisal of the relationship of archetype to narrative. Specifically, when the traditional relation is subverted and archetypes are understood as narratively constituted rather than as constituting narratives, it becomes possible to understand how a formal principle can drive human experience.

The proposed shift towards a view of archetype as narratively determined foregrounds the question of its ontology. This is a significantly underexplored area in Jungian scholarship, which has tended to frame its investigations of archetype in (quasi) scientific or cultural terms. One of the few to have seriously considered the ontological question is the clinical psychologist Roger Brooke. In his seminal work,

*Jung and Phenomenology*, Brooke (1991/2015) applies to archetype the philosopher Martin Heidegger's onto-phenomenology, which seeks to elucidate Being through the description of human experience. The thesis builds upon Brooke's work, with the aim of deepening our understanding of the ontology of archetype.

The contention is that this approach allows one to achieve clarity as to what Jung (CW8, para. 277) meant by archetype's primordially given he conceived the concept in numerous, sometimes contradictory ways. Jungian analyst Jean Knox (2003) contends these various conceptualisations can be consolidated as follows: (a) biological entities, (b) organising mental frameworks of an abstract nature, (c) core meanings containing representational content, and (d) eternal metaphysical entities.

This indeterminacy in archetype's conception has harmed the reception of Jung's analytical psychology (see Hogenson, 2019; Roesler, 2024). Therefore, the thesis poses a second question: How could Jung conceive in such divergent ways what he considered to be a unified concept? It is argued that the answer to this second question flows from the answer to the first. Thus, in reconciling archetype as both static and dynamic principle, the thesis contends that a deeper rationality is uncovered, which unveils the unity of Jung's various understandings of the concept.

To support the research objectives, a fundamental redescription of narrative is proposed, which is grounded in Aristotelian ethics and metaphysics. The thesis contends that this new model of narrative illuminates its ontology, which will be primarily related to Heidegger's onto-phenomenology. However, the thesis will also draw upon the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, specifically the latter's conception of *creativity*, which he considers the ultimate ontological fact.

The thesis proposes a complementarity between Heidegger and Whitehead as well as between both men and Jung, which it contends secures the ontology of

the narrative conception of archetype. It posits further that such a conception brings to view a primordial narrative event, which in its patterning of the relation between basic ontological elements, enables archetype as formal principle to dynamically drive human experience.

### **History of Jung's Archetype Concept**

The concept of archetype is foundational to analytical psychology. The term itself derives from the Greek words "*archē*" and "*typos*," which mean "origin" and "imprint," respectively. The supposition in Western thought of a blueprint underlying observable phenomena can be traced at least as far back as Plato. Jungian scholar Roderick Main (2015) argues that all the earliest uses of the term "archetype" are from authors influenced by Plato's Theory of Ideas, such as the first century C.E. Jewish theologian Philo, the early Christian Church father Irenaeus and the Neoplatonist philosopher Plotinus.

The Platonic conception remained influential through medieval times up to the early modern period. Christian theologian Augustine (ca. 396/1982) understood the Ideas as "certain original and principal forms of things" (p. 80). By the end of the period, the Platonic baton had reached the philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1674–1675/1997), who argued all human knowledge is rooted in divine ideas and thus exists independently of creation.

Main (2015) argues the 17th-century philosopher John Locke spearheaded a shift to more immanent conceptions of archetype in his use of the term to denote "things in the world which are the originals of our ideas" (p. 118). For Jung, this movement culminated in what he criticised as the reductionist speculations of the

18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant's categories of understanding (CW8, para. 276).<sup>1</sup>

However, Jung's criticism of Kant reflects a deficiency in his reception of the philosopher (see Bishop, 1996; Brooke 1991/2015, pp. 78–79). Where Kant explicitly discusses archetype, he adopts a *transcendent* rather than reductionist approach to the concept. According to Kant (1781/2007, p. 299), the transcendent is that which cannot be experienced by human beings; he distinguishes it from the *transcendental*, which he argues describes those a priori conditions that make any human experience possible. For Kant (1788/2015), archetype is an ideal of moral perfection. The closest Kant (1788/2015) comes to a reductive reading of it is his notion of *ectype*, which according to the philosophers Victoria S. Wike and Ryan L. Showler (2010) "is generated by the archetypal idea being forced to fit into the limitations of the sensible world and human nature" (pp. 526–527).

It was not until the 19th century that according to Jungian analyst George B. Hogenson (2004), the conceptualisation of archetype shifted from a focus on its ontological status towards what he calls its "analytic and descriptive utility" (p. 34). For Hogenson, this development was encapsulated in theories advanced in biology by the anatomist Richard Owen (1848) and the polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1807–1817/2016). Owen used the concept of archetype as a taxonomic system for vertebrates. This allowed him to postulate a basic common pattern for that species. Owen's static approach identifies his conception as a descendent of the Platonic Idea. In contrast, Goethe took a dynamic view of underlying anatomical

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<sup>1</sup> Kant (1781/2007) defines the categories of understanding as fundamental concepts that enable the organisation of *appearances*, that is, empirical intuitions of objects, into meaningful objects of human experience.

patterns, which had more in common with the Aristotelian notion of genesis or coming-into-Being.

Owen (1848) and Goethe's (1807–1817/2016) divergent stances on archetype accord with Heidegger's (1958/1976) observation that for the ancient Greeks, *archē* had a double meaning. It was not only that from which something takes its origin and beginning but also “what, as this origin and beginning, likewise keeps rein *over*, i.e., restrains and therefore dominates, the other thing that emerges from it” (1958/1976, p. 228). Owen's approach emphasises this second meaning of *archē*, whilst Goethe's emphasises the first.

The philosopher Reiner Schürmann (1982/1987) argues that it is in the second sense of *archē* that one understands it as formal principle. For him, this is its narrower conception, whose complementary notion is then “the sequent, the consequence, the derivative, the ‘issue’” (1982/1987, p. 107). Thus in Owen's (1848) approach, entities are mere instantiations of their overriding basic pattern. In contrast, Goethe's (1807–1817/2016) understanding of archetype as dynamic stresses the *archē*'s creative aspect and with that the idea of *telos*. According to Schürmann, the latter is the complementary notion to *archē* conceived in what he considers its broader sense of “primordial element” (1982/1987, p. 106). Here, *archē* does not dominate entities but is instead the pattern for their unfolding.

Jung draws on both senses of *archē* in his conception of archetype (CW9i, para. 68). For him, what unites these contrasting approaches is an understanding of archetype as an unconscious, universal, affectively charged psychic or psyche-like structure, whose meaning “can be grasped only approximately” (CW8, para. 417). But his efforts to specify this broad conception are undercut by his characteristic eclecticism. Thus, archetype becomes variously “pattern of behaviour” (CW3, para.

565); “instinctive impulses and forms that can be observed in all living creatures” (CW3, para. 565); “underlying idea” (Jung, 1989/2012, p. 132); “symbolic formula” (CW6, para. 625); “luminosity and numinosity” (CW8, para. 392); “metaphors” (CW9i, para. 267); “the probability of psychic events” (Meier, 2001, p. 69); “both psychological and physical” (Meier, 2001, p. 167); and “deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity” (CW7, para. 109).

The above descriptions, which are in some cases seemingly incompatible, traverse respectively the disparate fields of ethology, biology, philosophy, mathematics, theology, literature, statistics, psychology and physics, and anthropology. Hogenson (2004) attributes this conceptual confusion to the fact Jung did not have a theory of archetype. This is a claim the latter’s own writings support (see Jung, 1976/2015b, xli).

The view of archetypes as specifically age-old deposits of human experience informs the traditionally dominant approach to the relation of archetype to narrative. This is because Jung asserts that such deposits of experience often take the form of myths (CW7, para 109). In his later work, Jung makes the crucial distinction between what he calls *archetype-as-such*, which cannot be directly apprehended, and *archetypal image*, which is the manifestation of archetype-as-such (CW8, para. 417). This distinction allows one to understand myths and other such narratives as archetypal images.

But consistent with the present research’s objectives, some post-Jungian scholars have taken tentative steps towards extending such narrative conceptions towards archetype-as-such. For example, Christian Roesler (2016/2022) argues archetypal process patterns emerge in therapeutic work, which “describe the development [of psyche] from a starting point to a solution and . . . can, therefore, be

conceived of in narrative form” (p. 60). Indeed, Susan Rowland (2017) takes an explicitly narrative approach to the problem in her conception of archetypes as “gods seeking to live out their particular genre of stories” (p.6).

For Roesler (2012, 2016/2022), narrative is the link between the complex symbolic conceptions of the classical Jungian notion of archetype and more recent biologically grounded understandings of it as a preverbal representation of relational experience. According to Roesler (2012, 2016/2022), such a representation creates a pre-disposition to assimilate an archetypal story pattern that echoes the relational structure of that representation. This leads Roesler (2016/2022) to propose archetype as not biologically innate but instead culturally transmitted “in the course of socialisation as part of the cultural canon” (p. 112). Thus, Roesler (2024) novelly defines archetype as “a condensed form of psychological wisdom,” which manifests as cultural narratives, such as “religions, mythological stories, social practices, [and] rituals” (pp. 229–230).

### **Focus of Research**

The view of archetype as narratively constituted is authorised by a further description Jung gives of the concept. According to him, archetype is also “always a sort of abbreviated drama” in that “it begins in such and such a way, it extends to such and such a complication, and it finds its solution in such and such a way” (McGuire & Hull, 1977/1993, p. 289). In the same passage, Jung would even seem to reinterpret the biological thesis of archetype narratively, describing specifically the nest-building instinct of birds as follows: “In the way they build the nest there is the beginning, the middle, and the end” (McGuire & Hull, 1977/1993, p. 289).

Whilst it would be too much to argue that with the latter claim, Jung subsumes the biological thesis into a narrative conception, it does suggest that a view of

narrative as synthesising the various conceptualisations of archetype is a credible proposition. However, Jung's failure to elaborate on his intuition sedimented a relation between narrative and archetype that emphasised the latter as stasis. The work of Jungian scholars such as Edward Edinger (1994) and Erich Neumann (1954) illustrates this tendency, to which Roesler's (2024) intervention appears as a rebuttal. In the terms discussed earlier, this conflict is grasped as respectively that between archetype conceived as formal principle or primordial element.

Roesler (2024) argues it is a feature of all conceptualisations of archetype that can be empirically analysed that they do not adequately ground its supposed innateness. Roesler (2016/2022, p. 118) speculates it is the metaphysical conception alone that may validate archetype's claims to universality; however, he does not explore this intuition in any depth. And ultimately, existing scholarship fails to convincingly explain Jung's variegated approach to archetype. The literature attributes the apparent aporia to either conceptual confusion (Heisig, 1979; Mills, 2023b; Pietikainen, 1998; Roesler, 2012, 2016/2022, 2024); an unsystematic method (Hogenson, 2004); or an ill-conceived attempt to introduce scientific rigour to a subject that may resist such categorisation (Roesler, 2024).

The thesis contends these explanations fall short of the mark. The stakes are clearer when the problem is stated from the opposite standpoint: Is there a conception of archetype that *does* encompass the various approaches to it Jung employs? Roesler (2024) argues Jung sees the biological thesis as key to the consolidation of the various conceptualisations. However, according to Roesler, the incompatibility of some of these conceptions means any such unifying endeavour is "fundamentally impossible" (2024, p. 68). Roesler argues, as does Hogenson (2004), that consequently the tendency in scholarship has been to conceive archetype in a

particular way and seek evidence from Jung or other sources to corroborate that view.

### **Research Hypotheses**

Yet, scepticism of a unified position and/or retreat into epistemological silos are not the only possible responses to the confused intellectual picture. The thesis contends a more fruitful approach lies in a deeper exploration of archetype's apriority. According to Hogenson (2004), such apriority is "an infinitely regressing, transcendental archetype-as-such that leaves in its wake the phenomenal experience of the archetypal image" (p. 48).

This approach to archetype directly addresses Roesler's (2016/2022) speculations on the universality of the metaphysical conception. Roesler (2024) himself does not pursue the matter because for him, it is problematic since it locates Jungian psychology either in the field of religious practices or at least outside the sphere of so-called "normal science" (p. 67). For Roesler (2024), this limits the extent to which the metaphysical conception can be investigated.

Apart from the Platonic Idea, the way the metaphysical thesis is generally approached in scholarship is through Jung's concept of *psychoid archetype*. This is envisaged to structure spatiotemporal events in a manner meaningful to people—a phenomenon Jung calls *synchronicity* (CW8, para. 840). As either psychoid or Platonic Idea, archetype is supposed by Jung to be located in or as the primordial layer of psyche he calls the *collective unconscious* (CW8, para. 229). Roesler (2012) argues the latter is best understood "not in the sense of an inherited knowledge [as Jung conceives it] but in the sense of an inter-individual psychological system of information transmission" (p. 242). But such a view accords less with an

understanding of archetype as metaphysical entity and more with the historian of ideas Petteri Pietikainen's (1998) conception of it as non-cognitive cultural product.

The thesis's proposed recasting of archetype as a narratively constituted metaphysical structure aligns with contemporary efforts to foreground its dynamism. In addition to Roesler's (2016/2022) observation of archetypal process patterns in therapy, the Jungian scholar Paul Bishop (2009, p. 74) relates archetype to ways of seeing. Further, Knox (2001) conceives it as an emergent property of brain activity, which "pattern[s] our [unconscious] expectations and perception" of interpersonal relations (p. 631).

As noted, Jung at times describes archetype in similarly dynamic terms. He speaks of it specifically as guiding the psychological centering process he calls *individuation* (CW8, para. 411). In this guise, Jung conceives the phenomenon as the "archetype of transformation" (CW9i, para. 258). Roesler (2024) speaks of individuation as "the core of archetype theory" (p. 231). Here, what is privileged is a conception of archetypes "as universal patterns producing meaning and guiding development" (Roesler, 2024, p. 2).

Roesler's (2024) conception supports an understanding of archetype as narrative structure. The literary theorist Tzvetan Todorov (1978/1990, p. 30), who coined the term *narratology*, conceives narrative as a pattern of relations. According to Todorov, such relations are ones of succession and transformation, existing between and amongst events. He identifies the paradigmatic form of transformational relation as the passage from one event to its contrary.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> This is a phenomenon Jung (CW5, para 581) calls *enantiodromia*. The idea will be revisited in detail in Chapter 3 in the context of the commonalities the thesis posits between the projects of Jung and Heidegger.

In his existential phenomenological interpretation of Jung, Brooke (1991/2015) explicitly recasts archetype as relational. But to understand what Brooke meant by this, one must first familiarise oneself with his philosophical method. The American Psychological Association (n.d.) defines existential phenomenology as a philosophy that “seeks to get at the meaning of lived experience through the careful and systematic analysis of lived experience itself.” Heidegger established the foundations of the discipline in his magnum opus, *Being and Time*.

Heidegger’s project was the illumination of the meaning of Being. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 39)<sup>3</sup> argues it is through the interpretation of human being—which he calls *Dasein*—that access to Being-as-such is secured.<sup>4</sup> For Heidegger, human being is not an encapsulated entity in the manner of the philosopher René Descartes’s *res cogitans* (thinking thing). Instead, he conceives it as always already embedded in a world with which it is involved. Heidegger calls this ontological condition *In-der-Welt-Sein* (Being-in-the-world).

Heidegger (1927/2010) understands Being-in-the-world as a context of relations involving *Dasein* and its environing world, oriented towards a particular purpose or meaning (H. 86–87). Brooke’s (1991/2015) move is to reinterpret archetype as Being-in-the-world, arguing that when approached from this relational perspective, one dispenses with the need to view archetypes as “hypothetical entities” (p. 154).

In conceiving narrative as a pattern of relations, Todorov (1978/1990) implies such relations too are oriented towards meaning. The hermeneutic phenomenologist

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<sup>3</sup> The H-number refers to the pagination used in the German text of *Being and Time* since its seventh edition. The thesis employs this pagination throughout.

<sup>4</sup> In the thesis, where “being” refers to the conditions of intelligibility for specific, concrete beings, it will be written as “Being.” This is intended both to aid comprehension and to reflect Heidegger’s (1975/1982, p. 17) distinction between Being and beings, which he calls the “*ontological difference*.”

Paul Ricœur (1991) identifies narrative meaning with what he calls *phronetic* or *narrative understanding*, conceived as “the practical wisdom of moral judgment” (p. 23). He takes on the phrase from the ancient Greek word “*phronesis*,” which is translated as “practical wisdom” or “prudence.” One recalls that for Roesler (2024) too, narratives convey meaning, which he understands as a condensed psychological wisdom and identifies with archetype. According to Ricœur, narrative meaning ultimately concerns the “universal aspects of the human condition” (1991, p. 22); whilst for Roesler (2024), it “creates resonance in humans because it obviously has to do with being human” (p. 230). So despite their diverging focus, for both men, the nature of the meaning inherent to narrative is identical.

It is unsurprising that Roesler’s (2024) cultural conception of archetype aligns with the findings of hermeneutics. Yet if as he argues, narrative is the privileged manifestation of archetype, the former’s characteristic relationality must find its source in the latter. Jung does not speak of archetype as relationality per se, but his well-known analogy with the axial system of a crystal moves in that direction.<sup>5</sup> He describes the operation of this system as follows: “[It] preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own,” continuing that the system determines for the liquid “the specific way in which the ions and molecules aggregate” (CW9i, para. 155). Here, what is emphasised is archetype as pattern. The thesis builds on Jung’s insight, arguing that archetype brings elements into meaningful relation because it is itself relation.

## Theoretical Framework

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<sup>5</sup> Jung’s concepts of the persona and anima/animus archetypes also move in the direction of relationality given they determine the ego’s respective interactions with its social setting and the unconscious (CW7, paras. 243–265, paras. 296–340). However, Jung never explicitly identifies these archetypes as constituted as relation, focusing instead on their effects on the ego.

The reconceptualisation of archetype as narratively constituted requires a fundamental redescription of narrative. To achieve this, the thesis proposes a new model of narrative, grounded in Aristotelian ethics and metaphysics. It contends these two strands of Aristotle's thought are linked by his concept of the Prime Mover. In his *Metaphysics*, the latter is the origin of all motion in the universe. The research contends the Prime Mover is also the ultimate good that orients Aristotle's moral investigations in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Aristotle's ethics offers a more appropriate framework for the analysis of narrative than the excavations of plot and character that are the concern of his *Poetics*. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) explores the teleology of human experience, that is, its orientation towards purpose. This is also the focus of the thesis's investigations into narrative. Whilst Aristotle's (ca. 335 B.C.E./1907) analysis of narrative in the *Poetics* too is deeply concerned with purpose, its focus on artistic arrangement means it primarily addresses narrative teleology in its aesthetic dimension.

Nonetheless, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) does not explicitly treat on the narrative structure of experience in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, his teleological framework has been highly influential in the development of theories of the narrative conception of human life, such as those of Ricœur and the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. Even a trenchant critic of this position like the philosopher Crispin Sartwell (2000) acknowledges Aristotle as the father of the idea of lived narrativity.

The thesis aims to demonstrate a homology between its proposed narrative model and existential phenomenology. This is necessary because it is only through establishing narrative as an ontology that the narratively constituted archetype can

be considered innate to the Being of human being. In the thesis, human being is primarily understood as *psyche* or *soul*, which is conceived, following Brooke (1991/2015), not as an encapsulated entity but as a world-constituting phenomenon identifiable with Dasein. The thesis uses existential phenomenology as its main theoretical framework because it allows the equation, crucial to its hypothesis, of the notions of “innateness” and “apriority” as they concern human being.

Heidegger (1975/1982) interprets innateness not as physiology-biology but as philosophy-ontology. For him, the sense of the word lies in its indication “that [B]eing and existence are understood *prior* to beings” (1975/1982, p. 74). Heidegger (1927/2010) argues the work of existential phenomenology is to elucidate what he calls this *fundamental ontology*, which he asserts not only underpins the ontologies of the various intellectual disciplines but also conditions their very possibility (H. 13).

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1927/2010) declares such fundamental ontology “must be sought in the *existential analysis of Dasein*” (H. 13). But in his later work, the term “fundamental ontology” is dropped in recognition of the fact that the existential analysis of the Being of human being—which concerns the published two divisions of *Being and Time*—was only ever a preparatory study to serve his ultimate enquiry into the nature of Being-as-such (Heidegger, 1969/1972a, pp. 31–32).

Heidegger (1927/2010) had intended to bring to view Being-as-such in *Being and Time*’s unpublished third division. His failure to do so was due to what Heidegger (1947/1998) considered his inability at the time to think through “this turning [*Kehre*]” from Dasein to Being-as-such (p. 250).<sup>6</sup> Yet, the extent of the turn was such that

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<sup>6</sup> Heidegger (1947/1998, p. 239, Footnote a) argues the *Kehre* began in 1936. This would date it to the time of the composition of his posthumously published work *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, which was written from 1936 to 1938. However, the psychoanalyst and philosopher William J. Richardson (1963/2003), who introduced the Heidegger I/II heuristic to denote the shift from the early

philosophers like Frederick A. Olafson (1975) have questioned the continuity of his project. But it is contended this view fails to penetrate sufficiently into Heidegger's purpose, which effort, the thesis argues, authorises the treatment of his phenomenology as a unified endeavour. Indeed, Heidegger (1947/1998) himself considered the Kehre a continuation of his investigations.

The thesis uses Heidegger's interpretations of Being-as-such as a scaffold for its explorations into the ontology of narrative. The later Heidegger (1989/2012, 1998/2015) calls Being-as-such "*Seyn*" (Beyng), conceiving it as the ontological background that discloses beings and the Being of beings. As the philosopher Mark A. Wrathall (2021b) puts it, "Being-with-an-i is the terminal product of a particular [B]eyng having allowed a particular world to coalesce and stabilize and rigidify" (p. 122).

Heidegger (1997/2006) also understands Beyng as that which occurs "in-between' beings" (p. 43). According to Wrathall (2021b), as "in-between," "Beyng gives or 'allocates' to a world a texture on the basis of which a particular set of defining, constitutive relations becomes salient" (p. 121). In such understanding, one observes an analogy with the proposed relational concept of archetype. Further, since the thesis posits the latter as narratively constituted, this implies that when conceived primordially, narrative is as relational as the manifestations of it that inform Todorov's (1978/1990) enquiries.

Beyng is itself disclosed in a primordial event Heidegger (1969/1972a) calls *Ereignis* (or Appropriation). For Heidegger (1969/1972a), this event is not understood in the sense of a thing occurring but rather as "that which makes any occurrence

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to later work, argues the turn was a more gradual process, beginning after *Being and Time's* publication in 1927.

possible” (p. 19). According to Heidegger (1989/2012), Beyng and Ereignis, though deeply intertwined, are distinct concepts. Heidegger (1989/2012) speaks of their relation as follows: “Beyng essentially occurs as the event [Ereignis]” (p. 25). This identifies Ereignis as the *means* through which Beyng discloses beings and the Being of beings.

Nonetheless, Heidegger’s aversion to traditional metaphysics, which is concerned with the ontology of substances, ensures he never specifies Beyng’s ontology. In addition to his interpretation of it as in-between, Heidegger (1997/2006, p. 198, p. 321) refers to Beyng as “rift that lights up” and “abyss.” In these somewhat mysterious metaphors, Heidegger conveys his reluctance to define the phenomenon.

Heidegger (1969/1972a) approaches the concept of Ereignis similarly. He identifies it as the primordial “It” that gives the gifts of Being and time to beings but is puzzled by “its” ontology. He concludes that Ereignis is understood in the phrase “Appropriation appropriates” (1969/1972a, p. 24). According to Heidegger, that which “it” appropriates is Being, time and Dasein. Yet whilst such phrasing is consistent with his subversion of metaphysics, the thesis contends that a further ontological push is possible. This drives its use of Whitehead’s process philosophy as a supplementary theoretical framework.

Whitehead’s (1929/1985, pp. 208–210) central idea is that flux is a better descriptor of reality than stasis. For him, reality is constituted at its most basic level by innumerable occurrences, which he calls *actual entities* or *actual occasions* (1929/1985, p.18).<sup>7</sup> Whitehead understands actual entities/occasions as singular

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<sup>7</sup> Whilst Whitehead (1929/1985, p. 77) generally uses the terms synonymously, the choice of whether to refer to the occurrence as an actual entity or actual occasion depends respectively on whether the focus is on its “atomic” quality—i.e., the irreducibility of its occurrence to more basic components—or its spatiotemporal extensiveness.

experiencing subjects, which constitute themselves out of a plethora of objects in an act of becoming he calls *concrecence* (1929/1985, pp. 211–212).

For Whitehead (1929/1985), a *subject* is any unit of experience. Thus, it is not to be identified with a human being. Indeed, according to Whitehead, the human being is precisely *not* a subject; rather it is composed of subjects. This is because for him, human being—understood as an animal body incorporating a mind—is a nexus of actual entities/occasions, running the gamut from sub-atomic particles to thoughts. Whitehead (1933/1967) contends this nexus is dominated by the nexus of enduring human experience; it is only as the latter that human being is understood by him as *person*.

For Whitehead (1929/1985), an *object* is an entity “which is a potentiality for being a component” in the becoming of an actual entity/occasion (p. 88). These objects are either (a) actual entities that are no longer concrecing, (b) nexuses of such objectified actual entities, (c) abstract forms or potentials called *eternal objects*, or (d) *propositions*, which are conceptual hybrids of objectified actual entities and eternal objects (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 52).

According to Whitehead (1929/1985), concrecence culminates in the formation of a concrete entity he calls a *superject* (p. 45). At this point, the no-longer-concrecing actual entity/occasion is said to have perished (Whitehead, 1929/1985, p. 29). In perishing, it makes the transition from a subject of experience to an object available to be experienced by a novel actual entity/occasion. For Whitehead, the perished actual entity/occasion exercises a creative influence over a novel actual entity/occasion; he calls this influence *objective immortality* (1929/1985, p. 29).

The philosopher Steven Shaviro (2009) catalogues the many differences in detail between Whitehead and Heidegger. However, he admits to a striking similarity

in their gestalt due to their shared dynamic conception of Being (2009, ix). The thesis contends the basis for this similarity is the two men's mutual concern for a *relational ontology*, the superlative importance of which arguably deemphasises the differences Shaviro highlights between them.

The importance of relation to Heidegger in his concepts of Being-in-the-world and Beyng has already been highlighted. Whitehead (1933/1967) approaches such ontology specifically from the perspective of the subject-object relation, which he considers "the fundamental structure of experience" (p. 176). However, as has been noted, he does not understand subject and object in the Cartesian sense of knower and known. Heidegger (1975/1982) shares Whitehead's rejection of Cartesian orthodoxy but goes further by dispensing entirely with the terms "subject" and "object" in his search for a new philosophical language (p. 64).

Further, both men posit a generative primordial occurrence at the heart of Being. For Heidegger (1969/1972a), this has been understood as Ereignis, whilst for Whitehead (1929/1985), one understands it as the becoming of a special kind of actual entity, which he calls the *primordial nature of God*. The latter, in contrast to the finite actual entities so far discussed, concerns pure potential. It is the principle of order that patterns a universe.

Whitehead (1929/1985) asserts that God's primordial nature occurs alongside another special kind of actual entity, which he calls the *consequent nature of God*. This concerns the divine's manifestation as concrete reality. God's consequent nature perceives all finite actual entities/occasions, which it is both affected by and

seeks to influence. The aim of God's consequent nature is to realise the perfection of its primordial nature.<sup>8</sup>

It is important to stress that Whitehead (1929/1985) does not conceive God in a conventionally religious or moral sense; instead, he continually points to its status as an actual entity, albeit one distinct from others due to its foundational significance for a universe. The philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers (2002/2014) argues for an interpretation of God's two natures as two poles of a single divine actual entity "that can only be distinguished abstractly" (p. 456). For her, this interpretation clarifies Whitehead's insistence that God is an actual entity.

Stengers (2002/2014) takes this view because according to Whitehead (1929/1985), actual entities are dipolar—specifically, they have a physical and a mental pole. The former is oriented towards concrete reality, while the latter is focused on that reality's conceptual valuation (Whitehead, 1925/1985, p. 248). Thus from Stenger's perspective, God's primordial and consequent natures are respectively its mental and physical poles. She contends that when Whitehead speaks of God's two natures, he does so only in a "manner of speaking" (2002/2014, p. 455). Yet, Whitehead (1929/1985, p. 345) explicitly conceives God as two distinct experiences, which poses a significant problem for Stenger's reinterpretation.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of the present research, it does not matter whether the Whiteheadian God is conceived as one or two actual entities; what is important is that it operate primordially, which is a conception Stengers (2002/2014) does not dispute. But the philosopher George Allan (2020) argues much more

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<sup>8</sup> It is only in God's case that Whitehead (1929/1985) distinguishes between an actual entity and an actual occasion (p. 88). For Whitehead, God is an actual entity *not* an actual occasion. This is because in its primordial nature, it exists outside of space and chronological time, meaning that unlike the finite entities, it lacks extensiveness. God also differs from other actual entities in that in its consequent nature, it is everlasting rather than evanescent.

radically for God's removal from the Whiteheadian scheme. This is because for him, such an entity undermines Whitehead's commitment to temporal process.

It is contended that Allan's (2020) claim suffers from a reductive interpretation of Whitehead's concept of time. For example, Whitehead (1920, pp. 107–113) conceives the temporal phenomenon of duration as an extended present, in which past and future reality are brought into relation within a unified event. Such understanding has much in common with the primordial conception of time Heidegger (1927/2010) calls *Temporality*, which he posits as the original, unified time of the dimensions of past, present and future.

Temporality therefore mediates the tension Allan (2020) identifies between the apparent timelessness of primordiality and the in-time-ness of finite entities.

Heidegger (1927/2010) conceives Temporality as the condition of possibility for the time of such entities. Temporality is crucial to the theoretical framework of the thesis not only because it supports an understanding of time as primordial but also because it clarifies that there can be no temporal process, such as is narrative, without such primordiality.

According to Whitehead (1929/1985), the activity of God's primordial nature is the ordering of the relations of eternal objects to one another from out of an original disorder (p. 40). For Whitehead, this activity is the primordial expression of what he considers the deepest principle of the universe: creativity. He posits creativity as the phenomenon in which "the many enter into complex unity" (1929/1985, p. 21). The implication for Whitehead is that actual entities are simply creativity's "accidental embodiments" (1929/1985, p. 7).

The thesis contends that Whiteheadian creativity is the specification of primordiality that is absent from Heidegger's non-metaphysical conception. It

contends further that the concept secures the ontological status of narrative. When the latter is considered from the perspective of what Ricœur (1991) calls *emplotment*—which he identifies with the ancient Greek idea of *mûthos*—the intuition behind the move becomes apparent. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle (ca. 335 B.C.E./1907) defines *mûthos* as “the arrangement of the incidents” (1450a6). For Ricœur (1991), therefore, emplotment is crucially not a stasis but a dynamism, which achieves the following: (a) mediation between multiple narrative events and unified story, (b) assertion of the primacy of concordance over discordance, and (c) the drawing of a configuration out of a succession.

The thesis will use Heidegger and Whitehead to elucidate what it considers emplotment’s primordial counterpart, which is posited as a patterning of basic ontological elements. These basic elements are called eternal objects in the Whiteheadian scheme, but the thesis will refer to them as *narrative Ideas*, conceived as equivalent to Platonic Ideas. This primordial patterned relation is then envisaged as that which enables archetype understood as formal principle to drive human experience.

Whitehead (1929/1985) explicitly identifies eternal objects with Platonic Ideas. However, unlike the Ideas, he does not envisage eternal objects as independent of the phenomenal world of change (1929/1985, p. 20). In Whitehead’s identification of eternal objects with Platonic Ideas, a clear point of contact between process philosophy and analytical psychology is located. This has led the process philosopher Stanley R. Hopper (1989) to speculate that “‘eternal objects’ (as primordial potentials) are to Whitehead’s ‘process’ [philosophy] as Jung’s ‘archetypes’ are to his [Jung’s] ‘consciousness’” (p. 116). But the process philosopher John B. Cobb (1989) counters that a description of archetype in terms of

eternal objects more properly views the latter not as untethered abstractions but as necessarily embodied in frequently repeated past experiences.

The above disagreement re-enacts Jung's divergent understanding of archetype as "underlying idea" (1989/2012, p. 132) and "deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity" (CW7, para. 109). Hopper (1989) and Cobb (1989) adopt the former and latter positions, respectively, bolstering the claim of an inherent intimacy between Whitehead and Jung. Yet, the extent to which Whiteheadian concepts can be credibly employed in determining archetype's ontology is potentially constrained by Jung and Whitehead's many intellectual differences.

Process theologian David Ray Griffin (1989) identifies a number of such differences: (a) Whitehead's openly philosophical approach in contrast to Jung's self-professed empiricism; (b) Whitehead's attempt to return to pre-Kantian modes of thought as opposed to Jung's enthusiasm for both Kant and post-Kantian philosophers, such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche;<sup>9</sup> (c) Whitehead's focus on concepts compared to Jung's focus on images; (d) Whitehead's emphasis on cosmology over Jung's emphasis on the human soul; and (e) Whitehead's application of impersonal criteria to his subject matter compared to Jung's confessed grounding of his psychology in his personal experiences.<sup>10</sup>

But just as the thesis argues for an underlying affinity between Whitehead and Heidegger despite their differences, so it argues for Whitehead and Jung. As Griffin (1989) puts it with regards the latter pairing: "Although the historic differences

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<sup>9</sup> That said, Stengers (2002/2014, p. 9) argues it is wrong to locate Whitehead in pre-Kantian thought, citing Whitehead's (1929/1985, p. 11) own view that "philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher."

<sup>10</sup> Jung developed his psychological theory as a way of understanding a period of transformative personal experience he called his "confrontation with the unconscious" (see Jung, 1963/1989, p. 188).

between the two movements are indeed profound, they are not finally insuperable” (p. 14). For Griffin, a complementarity exists between Whitehead and Jung, which points to a deeper intellectual kinship. Brooke (1991/2015) argues the same for Heidegger and Jung.

The affinity the thesis posits between Jung, Heidegger and Whitehead aims to secure the ontology of a narrative conception of archetype. The significance of such a move would be to shift analytical psychology’s engagement with narrative from a focus on the latter as a methodological tool to an appreciation of it as constitutive of psyche.

### **Thesis Outline**

The research is organised into three main sections. The first, which covers Chapters 2 and 3, centres on Jung. In Chapter 2, a critical review is undertaken of existing scholarly literature on his archetype concept. In Chapter 3, the posited affinity between Jung and Heidegger is explored and their respective views on death proposed as the key to illuminating the identity of their projects.

The second section, which comprises Chapters 4 and 5, focuses on depth psychological approaches to narrative and time. In Chapter 4, existing psychoanalytic views on narrative are discussed and the idea of a link between narrative and morality introduced. In Chapter 5, a critical account of psychoanalytic perspectives on time is presented. It is argued that such perspectives have developed towards a conception of time as Temporality. The contention is that this development reaches its fullest extent in Jung.

In the third section, which covers Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the ontology of the narrative conception of archetype is developed. In Chapter 6, the concept of narrative and its relation to morality is more fully explored. An Aristotelian reading of

Kant is employed to assess whether morality itself is narratively constituted. A preliminary model of narrative grounded in the idea of the good is then constructed to support the proposed reconceptualisation of archetype as narrative structure.

In Chapter 7, existing work on the continuity between narrative and ontology is explored. Heideggerian concepts are employed to produce a final version of the narrative model, which is proposed to unveil narrative as an ontological language. In Chapter 8, Jung's archetype concept is reinterpreted in terms of this model, which clarified by Whitehead's concept of creativity, is proposed to support a synthesis of archetype's various conceptualisations.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of its implications and potential future work, before presenting an epilogue.

## Chapter 2: Current State of Thought on Jung's Archetype Concept

This chapter critically examines classical and contemporary Jungian approaches to archetype. It argues that the proliferation in conceptualisations can be traced back to the “original sin” of Jung’s mis-reception of Kant. The aim is to prepare the ground for an understanding of the metaphysical conception as the basis for the synthesis of archetype’s various conceptualisations.

### Formation of a Concept

Jung’s first recognisable use of the archetype concept was in his 1912 book *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* (Transformations and Symbols of the Libido).<sup>11</sup> In that text, Jung (1912, p. 35) used the phrase “*typische Mythen*” (typical myths) to describe archetype, tying it to the work of the 19th-century historian Jacob Burckhardt. It was from the latter that Jung adopted the term “primordial image” to denote such typical myths (CW6, para. 624).<sup>12</sup> Jung (1917/1922) defines primordial images as “the most ancient, universal, and deep thoughts of mankind,” adding “they are feeling just as much as thought, and might therefore be termed *original thought-feelings*” (p. 411).

This formulation of the concept recalls the 19th-century anthropologist Adolf Bastian’s idea of *Elementargedanke* (elemental thought). He used the idea to explain the similarity in mythological and folkloric motifs amongst ethnic groups who would seem not to have had prior contact. Jung was highly influenced by Bastian, even

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<sup>11</sup> The first English translation of the book was titled *Psychology of the Unconscious* and published in 1916. Jung made extensive revisions to the text, retitling it *Symbols of Transformation*. The latter was published in German in 1952 and English in 1956.

<sup>12</sup> The historian of psychology Sonu Shamdasani (2003) notes that the 19th-century polymath Carl Gustav Carus, who too was an influence on Jung, also spoke of primordial images. Schopenhauer (1851, p. 336) used the word “*Urtypen*” to describe the same concept, although he employed it specifically in reference to Greek mythology.

stating that regarding what the former would later term “archetypes,” Bastian had “long ago called them ‘elementary’ or ‘primordial thoughts’” (CW9i, para. 89).

Jung also tied the archetype concept to the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s idea of collective representations and to the sociologists Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss’s categories of the imagination (CW9i, para. 89). Further, Jung (CW6, paras. 751–753) equated the concept with Schopenhauer’s notion of the Idea, which the philosopher Hilde S. Hein (1966) argues is a Kantian reworking of Plato.<sup>13</sup>

By 1917, Jung was also using the word “dominants” to refer to the archetype concept, describing such dominants as “the ruling powers, the gods; that is, the representations resulting from dominating laws and principles” (Jung, 1917/1922, p. 432).<sup>14</sup> Sonu Shamdasani (2003) speculates Jung took on the term from the 19th-century cultural historian Karl Lamprecht and his theory of dominants. This was a psychological theory of history, which argued that transitions between epochs are driven by the rise and fall of dominants or collective feelings. Such feelings, working through each individual, “governed and regulated all other feelings, sensations, and aspirations” (Shamdasani, 2003, p. 283).<sup>15</sup>

Jung explicitly states that he took on the concept of archetype from Augustine (CW8, para. 275). But as noted in Chapter 1, Jung was influenced not only by conceptions of archetype as formal principle—of which Augustine’s principle forms are an example—but also by an understanding of archetype as primordial element.

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<sup>13</sup> Hein (1966) argues that Schopenhauer’s version of the Platonic Idea is equivalent to Kant’s concept of the noumena or thing-in-itself “with the additional property of being knowable,” adding “like Kant and unlike Plato, Schopenhauer conceives this Idea to be ontologically one with the phenomena through which it is expressed” (p. 135).

<sup>14</sup> See the discussion in Chapter 1 of the dominance aspect of archē.

<sup>15</sup> In his *Collected Works*, Jung refers to Lamprecht on only two occasions (CW3, para. 421; CW11, para. 576). And he does so not in relation to the latter’s theory of dominants but to Lamprecht’s consideration of the possibility of incest in biblical times. The latter was a project about which Jung was dismissive, lowering the likelihood that Lamprecht influenced his thinking on the archetype concept.

In Chapter 1, Goethe's anatomical investigations were identified with this latter approach. And the mathematician Peter Saunders and Jungian analyst Patricia Skar (2001) speculate Jung's development of his archetype concept may indeed have been directly influenced by Goethe.

Saunders and Skar's (2001) view finds support in a response Jung gave to a question posed in a 1955 interview: When asked if Goethe's work was the source of Jung's view that "true reality can only be approached and surmised spiritually," he replied, "You are quite right. And I try to confirm Goethe's intuitions on the basis of experience" (McGuire & Hull, 1977/1993, p. 270).

The case for Goethe's influence on Jung's concept of archetype is further bolstered by the historian of science Robert J. Richards's (2002) claim for the former that archetype was not only a utilitarian tool of biology but also "a dynamic force actually resident in nature, under whose power creatures would come to exist and develop" (p. 440). Thus, one may understand Jung's eventual shift in his manner of referring to the concept—from "primordial image" to "archetype"—as not only a change in terminology, but also a coming to presence of the deeper significance of his project.

### **Birth of the Jungian Archetype**

Jung publicly used the term "archetype" for the first time in 1919 in a lecture titled "Instinct and the Unconscious." Speaking with reference to the collective unconscious, Jung asserts:

In this "deeper" stratum we also find [in addition to the instincts] the *a priori*, inborn forms of "intuition," namely the *archetypes* of perception and apprehension, which are the necessary *a priori* determinants of all psychic processes. Just as his instincts compel man to a specifically human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his ways of perception and apprehension into specifically human patterns. (CW8, para. 270)

In the same lecture, Jung makes the following claim: “*Wherever we meet with uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension we are dealing with an archetype, no matter whether its mythological character is recognized or not*” (CW8, para. 280). It is contended that this reference to archetype as both mythology and mode of apprehension succinctly demonstrates the ambiguity that was to characterise Jung’s engagement with the concept.

Jung’s use of the terms “intuition,” “perception,” “apprehension” and “a priori” immediately recalls Kant’s philosophy of mind; indeed elsewhere, Jung describes archetypes as “somewhat similar to the Kantian categories” (CW10, para. 14). Yet, one immediately becomes aware of an imprecision in his implicit and explicit use of Kant. This is because archetypes cannot be simultaneously categories, perceptions and intuitions as these are distinct concepts in Kant’s thought, albeit ones which combine in the latter’s notion of subjective experience. Furthermore, Kant (1781/2007) understands by “a priori” a knowledge acquired independently of experience; however, Jung uses the term synonymously with “primordial,” which is to understand apriority ontologically rather than epistemologically.

But the key problem with Jung’s 1919 conception of archetype is the discontinuity alluded to between its pseudo-Kantian language and its simultaneous appeal to archetype’s so-called mythological character. Here, Jung combines the intellectual registers of philosophy of mind and hermeneutics without securing the ground for such a move. The contention is that this was the original sin, whose consequence was the proliferation of conceptions of archetype in analytical psychology.

As noted in Chapter 1, Knox (2003) has consolidated Jung’s various descriptions of archetype into four main conceptualisations. Her taxonomy would

seem a useful framework with which to discuss Jung's investigations into archetype as well as the scholarship they spawned.<sup>16</sup>

### Biological Entities

Knox (2003) contends that archetype understood as biological entity takes the form of information “which is hardwired in the genes, providing a set of instructions to the mind as well as to the body” (p. 23).<sup>17</sup> Jung argues in much of his writings for the biological basis of archetype, often drawing explicit analogies between archetype and the instinctive behaviour of non-human creatures—from the propagative instinct of the yucca moth (CW 8, para. 268) to the a priori image that may drive the activities of the leaf-cutting ant (CW8, para. 398).<sup>18</sup> He sought support for these analogies in

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<sup>16</sup> Roesler (2012) and the Jungian analyst John R. Haule (1984) also present taxonomies of Jung's various descriptions of archetype: The former identifies four categories (biological, empirical/statistical, transcendent, and cultural), while the latter presents six categories (form-giving principles, typical images, teleological component in instinct, dynamic/structural component of the psyche, quality of experience, and typical complexes). Roesler's categorisation is closest to Knox (2003), with two of the former's categories—biological and transcendent—the same as the latter's. Roesler's statistical/empirical and cultural categories are arguably also restatements of Knox's conceptualisations—respectively of abstract organising mental frameworks and core meanings containing representational content. However, Roesler's way of presenting these categories arguably does not convey their nature in its most essential form. For example, his view of archetype as statistical/empirical phenomenon is based on an understanding of the former as the common core of inter-individually similar psychological complexes. Therefore, his statistical category is merely an *implication* of the existence of abstract organising mental frameworks, manifesting with a certain regularity. Similarly, Roesler's cultural category is an implication of archetype understood as representational content since the core meanings contained in the latter form the basis of the hermeneutic investigations that Roesler argues constitute the cultural approach. Haule's categorisation is unsatisfactory mainly because its taxonomy is insufficiently delineated. For example, archetype understood as the teleological component in instinct overlaps somewhat with a view of it as form-giving principle given that the former can be understood as the ethological instance of the latter. Similarly, Haule's way of presenting his “typical images” and “typical complexes” categories does not sufficiently differentiate between them. This is more successfully achieved using the respective Knoxian categories of core meanings containing representational content and abstract organising mental frameworks. Haule's taxonomy, unlike those of Knox and Roesler, also fails to explicitly identify a transcendent/transcendental notion of archetype. While it could be argued that this conceptualisation is implicitly captured by Haule's “dynamic/structural component of the psyche” and “quality of experience” categories, it is considered more efficient to adopt a consolidated approach in this area, such as Knox offers.

<sup>17</sup> Psychologist and philosopher of science Susan Oyama (2000) suggests provocatively that genetics is a modern iteration of Plato's Ideas. This line of argument is similar to Hein's (1966) view of how Schopenhauer adapts Plato. In both cases, the Idea is transported from a transcendent realm and relocated into the same ontological “space” as its representational object. However, as Hein argues of Schopenhauer, such a move is fundamentally at odds with Plato, who conceives of the Idea and its representation as existing in “two distinct and dissimilar realms” (1966, p. 136).

<sup>18</sup> It should be noted that Jung is here using the word “image” in the sense of “schema” rather than as something with a particular representational content.

the work of ethologists such as W. H. R. Rivers, who proposed the all-or-none stimulus reaction, and C. Lloyd Morgan, who distinguished inherited and learned behaviour in animals (CW8, para. 264, para. 398 Footnote 112). In ethological terms, Jung describes archetype as follows:

In any situation of panic, whether external or internal, the archetypes intervene and allow a man to react in an instinctively adapted way, just as if he had always known the situation: he reacts in the way mankind has always reacted. (CW18, para. 368)

Jungian analyst Anthony Stevens (1995)—one of the main modern proponents of the biology thesis—argues that this way of approaching the concept is corroborated by the ethologists Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen's theory of the innate-releasing mechanism. This theory states that the regularity of patterns of behaviour in animals cannot be explained solely by learning but must also be attributed to innate systems, which are triggered by appropriate environmental stimuli.

Shamdasani (2003) notes that while Lorenz was formulating his theory, he considered its relation to Jung's archetype concept. However, according to Shamdasani, Lorenz dismissed any link on the grounds that the innate behaviour patterns could only be triggered by external stimuli and not by inherited species-specific internal images. Knox (2003) argues Lorenz's dismissal of Jung was rooted in what she sees as the former's erroneous view that the latter was a Lamarckian. This label refers to the pre-Darwinian evolutionary biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, who argued that characteristics acquired by an organism during its lifetime can be passed to its offspring. Lorenz later recanted his objection to Jung, stating, "I think

archetypes are innate-releasing mechanisms invested in visualisation, in fantasy, of the individual” (Evans, 1975, p. 59).<sup>19</sup>

The charge of Lamarckism is often levied against Jung (see Hogenson, 2001; Roesler, 2016/2022; Shamdasani, 2003). It stems from a number of references he makes to the accretionary nature of archetype: for example, his definition of the concept as “deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity” (CW7, para. 109) and his doubly expressed view of archetype as having been “engraved” on the human mind (CW8, para. 275; CW9i, para. 99).

Lamarckism had long been discredited in evolutionary biology. Hence as Hogenson (2001) observes, any association “would jeopardise Jung’s repeated claim to have grounded his theory in sound scientific method and doctrine” (p. 592). Roesler (2016/2022) argues that it is criticism of Jung’s supposed Lamarckism that forced him in 1947’s “On the Nature of the Psyche”<sup>20</sup> to make his seminal distinction, discussed in Chapter 1, between archetype-as-such and archetypal image.

Yet, it is unclear Roesler is correct in this causal attribution. Firstly, the clarification Jung makes does not exclude Lamarckism per se, as the inherited characteristic could simply shift from archetypal image (understood in the sense of concrete behaviour) to underlying predisposition, equatable with archetype-as-such. Secondly, as early as his 1918 paper “The Role of the Unconscious,” Jung had already differentiated archetype along these lines, speaking of “innate possibilities of ideas,” which “do not produce any contents of themselves . . . [but] give definite form to contents that have already been acquired” (CW10, para. 14).

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<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, Jung’s collaborator Marie-Louise von Franz (1972/1975, p. 127) wrote that Lorenz informed her that he accepted the validity of Jung’s archetype concept in principle.

<sup>20</sup> A revised and enlarged version of this paper was published in 1954.

In this 1918 paper, Jung seems to deny the charge of Lamarckism, at least in its classical form, with his insistence that there are no such things as “*inherited ideas*” (CW10, para 14). Nonetheless, he ostensibly leaves the door open to a modified form of Lamarckism with his claim that archetype is “an inherited mode of psychic functioning” (CW18, para. 1228). However, a more charitable reading would be that Jung viewed archetype as biologically inherited because of the common genetic constitution of human beings.

The fact Jung continued to argue for the biological basis of archetype is remarkable given the lack of corroborating evidence in his lifetime. Shamdasani (2003) notes that even researchers sympathetic to Jung’s project—namely the zoologist Adolf Portmann and the psychoanalyst Michael Fordham—failed to secure the biological foundations of the concept. Shamdasani cites a letter from Fordham to Jung in which the former asks whether the latter’s views on archetype are philosophically based rather than biological. Jung (1976/2015b) replied, “My reasons are not philosophical ones, they are statistical,” adding that because animals’ instinctual patterns are inherited “I see no reason to assume that man should be an exception” (p. 451).

As Shamdasani (2003, p. 267) notes, the implication of Jung’s response is that the biological inheritance of archetype is established by analogy rather than proof. From a scientific perspective, this is sub-optimal. All of which begs the question: Why did Jung persist in framing archetype as a scientific problem? Roesler (2024) argues the root of the matter lies in Jung’s training as a medical doctor. According to him, this channelled Jung’s academic energies from the outset onto a natural science path, forcing him to construct a complementary scaffold for

archetype “to defend his theory against suspicions of not being scientific” (2024, p. 57).

However, the philosopher Peter Kingsley (2018) argues Jung’s engagement with science was disingenuous, and that he used its language merely as a vehicle to communicate what Kingsley considers to be the mystical nature of Jung’s work. He asserts that Jung’s way of using science was an implicit attempt to return it from its modern, positivistic framework to the primordial reality Kingsley considers its source. This view aligns with the Goethean understanding of science as the study of the aesthetic-teleological processes of nature (Harrington, 1996, p. 5).

Yet in recent decades, positivistic science has produced findings and theories that could support the notion of archetype, albeit in a limited sense. These include attachment theory, in which behavioural systems mediate the relationship between mother and young child (Bowlby, 1969); the language acquisition mechanism (Chomsky, 1966); innate facial attention structures in newborns (Johnson & Morton, 1991); and inherited basic emotion systems in which life-threatening external stimuli activate certain emotions, which, in turn, trigger fixed behaviour patterns (Panksepp, 2011).

But as Roesler (2024) observes, much of this work provides evidence for only a basic conception of archetype, in contrast to the higher-order psychological processes Jung claims for the concept. Thus, Roesler argues the term “archetype” should not be used to describe the innate mechanisms identified by science “as this creates confusion instead of clarification” (2024, p. 114). Further, the mechanisms so identified would all seem to rely on inter-personal relationships to arrive at structures that could allow for the higher-order functions Jung conceives for archetype.

However, this would seem to contradict Jung's view of archetype as existing *before* experience.

To illustrate, let us consider the newborn's innate capacity to pay attention to faces. Knox (2003) describes how such unconscious mechanisms—which are a simple stimulus response and do not contain any signification in themselves—lead the caregiver to interpret the infant's attention as a form of communication and to respond accordingly. Thus, an interpersonal relationship is established, which leads to the formation in the infant of similarly unconscious image schemata or primitive spatial and conceptual representations. Knox equates such schemata with archetypes and argues they form the basis for more elaborate, and again unconscious, internal working models “which guide expectations and perceptions, so serving as a template for future relationships” (2003, p. 77).

Knox (2003) argues image schemata fulfil archetype's posited universality because the basic conditions of the newborn's environment are virtually identical across cultures. For her, the implication is clear: “If we adopt this model for archetypes, we have to discard the view that they are genetically inherited and consider them to be reliably repeated early developmental achievements” (2003, p. 60).

But even this retooled version of the biology thesis has been criticised. Roesler (2016/2022) argues Knox's claims for the universality of image schemata are tenuous since the described system is contingent upon the caregiver responding in the normally expected fashion to the newborn's gaze, which he contends is not a given. According to Roesler, this means that image schemata cannot be considered archetypes as their universality is not secured.

Furthermore, relationship-oriented conceptions of the biology thesis depart significantly from more traditional views. For example, Stevens, writing with Price (1996/2016), understands archetypes as “neuropsychic units which evolved through natural selection and which are responsible for determining the behavioural characteristics as well as the affective and cognitive experiences typical of human beings” (p. 6).

But this view is subject to its own contingency criticism due to our increased knowledge of epigenetics, that is, how environment impacts the way genes work. Epigenetics posits that genes do not reliably express themselves in the same way in every human being. This means the universality of a biologically based archetype is again called into question.<sup>21</sup> However, the psychiatrist Erik Goodwyn (2023) attempts to salvage this conception with his notion of self-generated learning. Here, archetypes are biologically-based symbolic associations, which children teach themselves in interaction with their environment.

While such views as Goodwyn (2023) and particularly Knox (2003) would seem to stretch the definition of what Jung considered an archetype, the following extended quote from him may give pause for thought:

Among the psychological factors determining human behaviour, the instincts are the chief motivating forces of psychic events . . . . But if we look upon the appearance of the psyche as a relatively recent event in evolutionary history, and assume that the psychic function is a phenomenon accompanying a nervous system which in some way or other has become centralized, then it would be difficult to believe that the instincts were originally psychic in nature. And since the connection of the psyche with the brain is a more probable conjecture than the psychic nature of life in general, I regard the characteristic *compulsiveness* of the instinct as an ectopsychic factor. None the less, it is psychologically important because it leads to the formation of structures or patterns which may be regarded as determinants of human behaviour. Under these circumstances the immediate determining factor is not the ectopsychic

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<sup>21</sup> One might argue culture plays the same role in modifying the expression of archetypes as environment does for genes. However, this would be unwarranted, as there is no sense in Jung that cultural facticity irrevocably severs an individual from their non-expressed potentiality in the manner of epigenetics.

instinct but *the structure resulting from the interaction of instinct and the psychic situation of the moment* [emphasis added]. The determining factor would thus be a *modified* instinct. (CW8, paras. 233–234)

If by “determinants of human behaviour” one understands “archetype,” then Jung would seem here to anticipate contemporary conceptions of the latter as a fusion of biology and environment. Yet, such a reading also assumes that the phrase “psychic situation of the moment” can be understood in relational terms, which is itself an arguable point. Finally, the whole project of locating a corporeal ground for archetype is problematised by phenomenological approaches to the concept, which are discussed in depth in Chapter 3.

### **Abstract Organising Mental Frameworks**

The second of Knox’s (2003) four conceptualisations of Jung’s archetype concept considers them abstract mental principles, which operate as “a set of rules or instructions but with no symbolic or representational content, so that they are never directly experienced” (p. 23). It is in this guise that Jung compares archetype to the axial system of a crystalline solution, seeing it as “factors and motifs that arrange the psychic elements into certain images, characterized as archetypal, but in such a way that they can be recognized only from the effects they produce” (CW11, para. 222, Footnote 2).

This conception of archetype aligns it squarely with archetype-as-such. Understood as the latter, Jung considers archetype “empty and purely formal” (CW9i, para 155). However, Knox (2003) and Roesler (2012, 2016/2022) question this characterisation. This is because for them, it suggests Jung proposes archetype-as-such as having no content whatsoever. And as Roesler (2012) remarks, “It is difficult to imagine even a single mental concept which carries no content” (p. 228).

But here, Knox (2003) and Roesler (2012, 2016/2022) are guilty of over-interpreting Jung. It would seem more in keeping with the latter's approach to conclude that rather than positing that archetype-as-such is without content, Jung is actually stating that its content is *not represented*. It is thus only in this latter sense that archetype is empty. Indeed, Roesler (2024) concedes that organising principles "must be regarded as containing information"; otherwise, "all archetypes would be the same, which is not the case" (p. 38). As Jung himself puts it, archetype "has an invariable nucleus of meaning," with such meaning "always only in principle, never as regards its concrete manifestation" (CW9i, para. 155).

The view of archetype as abstract organising mental framework—or as Roesler (2016/2022, p. 9) puts it, "a general attractor"—can be traced back to Jung's time at the Burghölzli psychiatric hospital in Switzerland. He worked as a psychiatrist at the institution from 1900 to 1909, during which time he formulated his theory of complexes. Jung understands the *complex* as an autonomous, unconscious content, being "the *image* of a certain psychic situation which is strongly accentuated emotionally" (CW8, para. 201). Here, he uses the word "image" in the sense of organising principle, although he is clear such a guiding pattern must have its associated theme. According to Hogenson (2004), "this characteristic of the complex—that it exhibited a kind of typical core element—became the initial insight leading to the theory of archetypes" (p. 40).

Saunders and Skar (2001) use Jung's notion of the complex to arrive at a statistical definition of archetype as "an equivalence class of complexes" (p. 312). But they take the idea of archetype as abstract organising mental framework further. They reconceive it as an emergent property of the brain or mind resulting from self-organisation, "in which order and pattern arise spontaneously and apparently out of

nothing” (2001, p. 314). According to them, this phenomenon has as its content “instincts and experiences which are in some way associated, because they occur or first occur at the same time, because they relate to similar things, or in some other way” (2001, p. 318).

The key implication of Saunders and Skar’s (2001) argument is that when archetype is viewed as emergent phenomenon, the concept of archetype-as-such becomes redundant. This is because there is no longer a need to search for an a priori to archetypal image (which latter is understood here as “complex”) as the latter is effectively its own ground. For Hogenson (2004), the relative importance attached to archetype-as-such and archetypal image is the main point of difference among contemporary writers “trying to work out the meaning of the notion of archetypes” (p. 45).

Hogenson (2001) sees archetypes as “emergent properties of the dynamic developmental system of brain, [physical] environment, and [the typically human environment of symbolic] narrative” (p. 607). This means Hogenson (2001) subscribes to the Saunders and Skar (2001) view. Hogenson (2004) contrasts the emergence position with that of Stevens (1982/2003) and Knox (2003), who seek to retain a role for archetype-as-such in the understanding of the concept.<sup>22</sup> However, the emergentist recasting of archetype-as-such as superfluous is arguably incorrect since the latter may still be said to subsist in the order and pattern of the self-organisation that manifests as archetypal image. Thus, the contention is that archetype-as-such remains a feature of both schools.

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<sup>22</sup> Hogenson (2004) recognises that Knox’s (2003) position could also be considered emergentist given her image schemata develop from the interaction between the innate mechanism in the newborn and its relational environment. Nevertheless, he views this as only a weak form of emergence since the properties of the image schema are predictable given its component elements. In contrast, in the strong form of emergence, Hogenson notes that “phenomena can come into being without any precursor state predicting the appearance of those phenomena” (2004, p. 45).

Further, Hogenson (2004) himself weakens his claim of a strong opposition between the emergentist view and that of Stevens (1982/2003) and Knox (2003) by arguing that the concept of archetypal image persists even in biological and neo-biological conceptions of archetype. He claims that those who locate archetype-as-such in genes (Stevens) or image schemata (Knox) are performing an unwarranted reduction of the concept. Jung states that archetype-as-such “is characterized by certain formal elements and by certain fundamental meanings . . . [that] can be grasped *only approximately* [emphasis added]” (CW8, para. 417). Thus for Hogenson, archetype’s inherent elusiveness means attempts at empirical determination are futile. This leads him to posit that genetic blueprints or image schemata are best viewed as archetypal images “rather than instances of the archetype-in-itself” (2004, p. 48).

### **Core Meanings Containing Representational Content**

In archetype’s third guise, it is a concrete phenomenon, which according to Knox (2003), “provide[s] a central symbolic significance to our experience” (p. 23). Here, one enters the privileged arena of archetypal image and an understanding of archetype as symbol. Jung defines *symbol* as a phenomenon that “always presupposes that the chosen expression is the best possible description or formulation of a relatively unknown fact, which is none the less known to exist or is postulated as existing” (CW6, para. 814).

Symbols are to be distinguished from signs, which hold only fixed meanings, in contrast to the polysemous nature of symbol. It is clear from Jung’s definition of the latter that he understands it as standing in a relation of expression to archetype-as-such (Samuels et al., 1986/2013). However, the post-Jungian scholar James Hillman (1981/1985) adopts a contrary position, arguing archetype should be

understood solely as image. This brings him into unexpected alliance with the emergentist school since Hillman's emphasis on the mythological dimension of archetype would appear diametrically opposed to the Saunders and Skar (2001) conception.

Knox (2003) considers the mandala—Sanskrit for “magic circle”—as the exemplar of archetypal image. Jungian scholars Andrew Samuels, Bani Shorter and Fred Plaut (1986/2013) describe the mandala as “a geometric figure in which the circle is squared or the square encircled . . . [which] radiates from or moves into a centre, depending upon one's perspective” (p. 90). For Jung, it represents the archetype of psychological wholeness, which he calls *Self*, with the mandala's roots as a cosmogonic symbol lying in religious tradition (CW9i, paras. 627–712).

In highlighting the link between symbol and tradition, one enters necessarily into the cultural sphere and an understanding of archetype as cultural product. But archetype conceived as core meanings containing representational content embraces not only religion but also art, architecture, epic, drama, ritual and mythology. Hillman (1981/1985) claims that what he calls the “metaphorical discourse” of myth is “the primary, and irreducible, language of . . . archetypal patterns,” with culture viewed by him as the site “where these patterns are portrayed” (p. 3). Thus for Hillman, the whole of human cultural endeavour is the constructive activity of archetype. In contrast, Pietikainen (1998) limits its cultural reach to non-cognitive or unconscious products, “such as dreams, fantasies, and certain strongly felt experiences” (1998, p. 338). Nonetheless, both he and Hillman agree that the meaning of archetype is best explored through hermeneutic investigation.

Mythology played a foundational role in the development of Jung's archetype concept (see CW5, paras. 1–3). As early as 1912's *Wandlungen und Symbole der*

*Libido*, he argued that myths served to work out the complexes of a culture (p. 35). It is in that book that Jung first presented the much-discussed case of the Solar Phallus Man, which he used as evidence for the archetypal status of mythology. Here, a schizophrenic patient claimed to see a phallic object hanging from the sun, which he then said was the source of the wind. Jung noted a strong similarity between the man's fantasy and myths told in the ancient Roman Mithraic cult. He considered this evidence for the workings of archetype because the man's social and intellectual circumstances excluded "any possibility of direct transmission" of the myth (CW5, para. 223).<sup>23</sup> This led Jung to the following conclusion: "That we must be dealing with 'autochthonous' revivals independent of all tradition, and, consequently, that 'myth-forming' structural elements must be present in the unconscious psyche" (CW9i, para. 259).

It will be recalled that Jung claims archetype is the inherited possibility of a concrete idea not the concrete idea itself. Yet, the Solar Phallus Man case problematises this view. This is because the patient's vision reproduces the specific detail of the Mithraic myth rather than adhering to Jung's maxim that archetypal imagery should "*dream the myth onwards* and give it a modern dress" (CW9i, para. 271). The latter is what one would expect if it were indeed only the possibilities of concrete ideas that are inherited. But the fact that the myth is reproduced in its near original form would seem to mark the case as an example of an inherited idea as opposed to an inherited possibility of an idea. Thus despite Jung's protestations, one returns to the charge of Lamarckism (see CW8, para. 320).

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<sup>23</sup> Several scholars have questioned the credibility of the Solar Phallus Man case, suggesting the fantasy may be explained by cryptoamnesia (Bair, 2003; Hogenson, 2004; Roesler, 2012).

According to Hogenson (2004), the apparent problems with the Solar Phallus Man case led eventually to Jung resiling from its use as an illustration of the workings of archetype. But this is not correct, as Jung continued to stress the importance of the case as late as 1959—two years before his death (McGuire & Hull, 1977/1993, p. 434). Hence, the charge of Lamarckism may not be unfounded. Indeed, Jung (1976/2015b) wrote that while he did not believe in the inheritance of individual acquisitions under experimental conditions, he also did not believe such statements could be generalised “since changes in individual cases must have been inherited, otherwise no change would have come about in phylogenesis” (p. 450).

In the above quote, Jung seems to erroneously conflate the transmission of random genetic mutations with that of acquired characteristics. But the fact that he does so at all is instructive; it suggests that at some level he does not rule out the biological transmission of archetypal imagery. This is why while on the one hand, Jung (1976/2015b) asserts, “We have practically no evidence for inherited representations,” on the other, he counters that “even this statement is not quite safe” (p. 451).

Roesler (2016/2022) refutes the idea that archetypal representations can be genetically transmitted. This is due to what he considers the impossibility of information as complex as myths being encoded in genes. Instead, as discussed in Chapter 1, he argues for a view of archetype as culturally propagated. This sits in tension with Jung’s (1976/2015b) own assertion that the biology thesis of archetype is “far more probable than that they are handed down by tradition” (p. 451). Nonetheless, Jung’s characteristic ambiguity resurfaces when in a letter to the Nobel prize-winning physicist Wolfgang Pauli, he states that with regards to whether archetype is acquired or innate “both are true” (Meier, 2001, p.131).

Roesler (2024) observes that the contemporary anthropological consensus is that cross-cultural similarities in myths are the result of migration rather than autochthonous revival. Further, a key additional anthropological finding Roesler cites is that not all myths are universal—for example, those concerning the Great Mother Goddess and rebirth only exist in civilisations connected to the Fertile Crescent region of the Middle East.<sup>24</sup>

This is problematic for Jung since he considers both the Great Mother Goddess and rebirth as archetypes (CW9i, paras. 148–258). But if they lack universality, this calls into question his whole concept or would at least necessitate a rethinking of an idea of universality in which archetype is “found in the same form in the behaviour as well as the beliefs and the inner psychological experiences of all people, regardless of location and at all times throughout history” (Roesler, 2016/2022, pp. 7–8).

### **Eternal Metaphysical Entities**

In the final conceptualisation of archetype, which considers it an eternal metaphysical entity, Knox (2003) argues one is returned to the foundation of the concept in Plato’s Ideas. Jung understands the Ideas as “primordial images stored up . . . (in a supracelestial place) as eternal, transcendent forms” (CW9i, para. 68). This is the conceptualisation of archetype that is closest to a religious-spiritual view. Indeed, Jung describes archetype as exhibiting “a distinctly numinous character which can only be described as ‘spiritual’” (CW8, para. 405).

The archetypes that comprise the classical stages of the Jungian individuation process—i.e., Shadow, Anima/Animus, Wise Old Man/Great Mother and Self—are

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<sup>24</sup> According to Roesler (2024), this is because agriculture was invented in the Fertile Crescent; thus, in that region, “religious ideas developed into first conceptions of a realm of the dead and a female figure which was responsible for birth and death, for growing and decaying and for the renewal of life itself” (p. 163).

examples of the concept understood as eternal metaphysical entity. According to the intellectual historian David Macey (2000/2001, p. 20, p. 212), it is such conceptualisations that have left Jung and his psychology open to the charge of mysticism. Jung was sensitive to such criticism—even as he spoke of archetype's numinosity—often preferring to emphasise the empirical nature of his enquiry (CW9i, para. 149).

Nevertheless, Hogenson (2001) and the philosopher and psychoanalyst Jon Mills (2023b) argue the charge of mysticism is unfair. The latter attributes it to Jung's failure to secure the metaphysical ground for his concept. To address this supposed deficit, Mills (2023a) uses an onto-phenomenological method to arrive at a transcendental conceptualisation of archetype. Here, it is understood as an agentic, unconscious schema, which emerges from its own, undifferentiated, a priori ground to manifest as a unified world of multiplicity, which Mills (2023a) calls *psyworld*.

Mills (2023a) describes *psyworld* in terms strongly reminiscent of Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world:

The *psyworld* is that which we are, at once given or thrown, in the sense that we must encounter and grasp the situation or facticity in which we find ourselves, *before* any moment of self-reflection or analysis, that is, before an observing conscious ego develops simply because we are *inside* the situation—materially, environmentally, culturally. (p. 69)

Mills (2023b) argues his onto-phenomenological approach to archetype makes superfluous the need for a collective unconscious, with the latter's connotations of transcendence. But whilst Jung holds firm to the idea of the collective unconscious, he sometimes speaks of its constituent archetypes in ways that would characterise them, as Mills does, as transcendental as opposed to transcendent phenomena.

The prime example of this is Jung's notion of psychoid archetype, which was touched upon in Chapter 1. He claims archetype's transcendence accounts for its psychoid nature (CW8, para. 417). As noted previously, it is psychoid archetype that accounts for Jung's concept of synchronicity, which he defines formally as "the simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state with one or more external events which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state—and, in certain cases, vice versa" (CW8, para. 850). But given it is the psychoid that accounts for synchronistic experiences, this implies the former is operating as a condition for such experiences, that is, as a transcendental phenomenon.

In his explorations of psychoid, Jung brings to view a universe where at the deepest level there is no division between psyche and matter. He refers to this "unitary aspect of being" as "*unus mundus*" (CW14, para. 662), identifying it with the collective unconscious (CW14, para. 660). Like the latter, Jung conceives of the former as constituted by archetypes, which in their guise as eternal metaphysical entities are able to manifest in the ordinary world as psychic or physical phenomena.

Physicist Harald Atmanspacher and philosopher of physics Dean Rickles (2022) consider *unus mundus* an example of dual-aspect monism, a theory that posits "a deeper, undivided reality from which both [mind and matter] arise as epistemic aspects" (p. 4). Jung (CW8, para. 937) claims this notion of a primordial wholeness that not only underlies psyche and matter but also founds acausal relations between them was pre-figured by the 17th-century philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's concept of psychophysical parallelism. The theory postulates God as the guarantee of a pre-established harmony between mind and matter. However, for Atmanspacher and Rickles, the *unus mundus* differs from Leibniz's concept in

that the former only distinguishes between mind and matter in an epistemic sense, whilst the latter, in asserting their harmony, posits them as ontologically distinct.

According to Atmanspacher and Rickles (2022), psychoid archetype is an intangible structuring principle of *unus mundus*. For Roesler (2016/2022), the fact that all human beings are envisaged to have access to this psychophysically neutral sphere of potential is the reason he proposes the metaphysical thesis as at least theoretically the most coherent of Jung's various conceptualisations in relation to archetype's supposed universality.

The contention is that when archetype is understood in terms of *unus mundus*, one moves closer to the true nature of its apriority. As noted in Chapter 1, Hogenson (2004) views this apriority as "an infinitely regressing, transcendental archetype-as-such that leaves in its wake the phenomenal experience of the archetypal image" (p. 48). This aligns with Jung's claim for archetype that its real nature "is not capable of being made conscious" (CW8, para. 417).

Jung developed his ideas on psychoid archetype in discussions with Pauli (Meier, 2001). This demonstrates that even in this seemingly most nebulous conceptualisation, he still sought a scientific grounding for the concept. Atmanspacher and Rickles (2022) take on this mantle in their discussion of the parallels between the mind-matter acausal correlations of *unus mundus*, and quantum entanglement, which concerns the acausal correlations between two particles.

Atmanspacher and Rickles (2022) argue further that the true significance of Jung's conjecture of acausal relations between psyche and matter is "the radical and brilliant idea that the currency of these correlations is not (quantitative) statistics, as

in quantum physics, but (qualitative) meaning” (p. 49). This idea of archetype as pattern of meaning is the crux of the concept for Jung. As he puts it:

There is a mystical aura about its [archetype's] numinosity, and it has a corresponding effect upon the emotions. It mobilizes philosophical and religious convictions in the very people who deemed themselves miles above any such fits of weakness. Often it drives with unexampled passion and remorseless logic towards its goal and draws the subject under its spell, from which despite the most desperate resistance he is unable, and finally no longer even willing, to break free, because the experience brings with it a depth and fulness of meaning that was unthinkable before. (CW8, para. 405)

Thus, to understand archetype as pattern of meaning is to grasp such meaning as human, which implies the archetype concept is properly approached through the examination of human experience. This is an inherently phenomenological endeavour, holding out the possibility that archetype can be understood in such terms. It is the task of the next chapter to bring this possibility to light.

### **Chapter 3: Critical Discussion of Relations Between Analytical Psychology and Existential Phenomenology**

In *Jung and Phenomenology*, Brooke (1991/2015) argues Jung's way of seeing the problem of psychology identifies him as at heart a phenomenologist. Specifically, Brooke proposes an intellectual kinship between Jung and Heidegger. This chapter posits how such an understanding of Jung unveils an even deeper affinity with Heidegger than Brooke claims. The contention is that this affinity discloses itself in the psychological and existential analyses of death and the latter's soteriological significance.

#### **Jung the Phenomenologist**

Jung often referred to his method as phenomenological. One may understand this in the sense that it involved a bracketing of prior theoretical assumptions and the adoption of a descriptive approach to psychological experience, which addressed the latter on its own terms. Jung's approach to psychology would thus appear consistent with the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl's (1900–1901/2001) exhortation that “we must go back to the ‘things themselves’” (p. 168).

Jung first referenced phenomenology in his 1913 paper “The Theory of Psychoanalysis” (CW4, para. 253). Brooke (2000) argues that it was Jung's critique of what the former calls “the violence on experience caused by Freudian metaphysics,” which led Jung to label his own approach phenomenological (p. 12). Brooke (1991/2015, 2000) claims that it is Jung's focus on the elucidation of direct experience that authorises him to so describe his method.

Yet, Brooke (1991/2015) contends that while Jung grasped the aims of phenomenology and made use of some of its guidelines, “he lacked the conceptual tools to express his insights in a phenomenologically rigorous way” (p. 2). Instead,

according to him, Jung “generally continued to think theoretically as a natural scientist” (1991/2015, p. 10). To illustrate this tendency, Brooke (1991/2015, p. 48) cites the Cartesian subject-object distinctions that permeate Jung’s work, which if unmodified, would be incompatible with a truly phenomenological approach.

Nonetheless, Brooke (1991/2015) notes 12 points of correspondence between Jung’s conception of psyche and Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, which he contends supports his view of Jung as a phenomenologist. Each will now be briefly discussed to assess the merits or otherwise of this claim.

### **1. *Spatiality***

Brooke (1991/2015) argues that both psyche and Dasein are primordially constituted by a lived spatiality of which geometric space is an abstraction. According to him, the spatiality inherent in psyche is illustrated most particularly in Jung’s exploration of synchronistic phenomena. However, Jung also discusses lived spatiality in other contexts—for example, his conviction that individuation “does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself” (CW8, para. 432) and more generally his claim that “‘at bottom’ the psyche is simply ‘world’” (CW9i, para. 291).

Brooke (1991/2015, p. 82) identifies Jung’s understanding of psyche as world with the phenomenological lifeworld, that is, the world as pre-thematically experienced in the everyday life of human subjectivity. Lifeworld is a concept formulated by Husserl (1954/1970) to distinguish the subjective experience of the world from the objective world posited by the natural sciences. In lifeworld, the strict Cartesian subject-object split is modified so as to reveal the boundary between subject and object as porous.

Yet crucially, Husserl (1954/1970) retains subject and object as concepts. This betrays the ontological gap between a conception of psyche's lived spatiality as lifeworld and an understanding of it as Dasein. It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that for Heidegger (1975/1982, p. 64), Dasein transcends notions of subject and object. This is because it exists not as some correlation of experiencing subject and experienced world (as is the case for lifeworld), but as Being-in-the-world, that is, primordial embeddedness in its world. Thus, the inherent spatiality of Dasein is of a different order to that of lifeworld.

Consequently, it is not possible to equate the spatiality of psyche and Dasein if the former is understood as lifeworld. This is a problem to which Brooke (1991/2015) freely admits, acknowledging that "to situate psyche as lifeworld does not involve a hermeneutic leap" into the ontology of Dasein (p. 82). The latter's constitutive spatiality is apparent even in its name, which literally means "there-Being." For Heidegger (1927/2010), Dasein's *there* is its "essential disclosedness," that is, its inherent openness to both its world and itself (H. 132). The sense of Dasein's inherent spatiality is also conveyed in Heidegger's identification of its there with a "clearing" (1927/2010, H. 133).

Heidegger (1927/2010) asserts that Dasein's spatiality is determined by what he calls its *de-distancing* and *directionality*. De-distancing is Dasein's way of Being that "lets beings be encountered in nearness" (Heidegger, 1927/2010, H. 105). Here, Heidegger does not imply a sense of measurable distance, but rather the ontological proximity to beings that Dasein experiences in its meaningful involvements.

Dasein's directionality is its way of Being in which it is always already oriented towards what Heidegger (1927/2010) calls a *region*, which he understands as the "whereto of the possible belonging somewhere of useful things" (H. 103). By

“region,” he does not mean a geometric space, but what one might call a “space of activity.” This space is oriented towards a possibility of Being of Dasein, with useful things finding their place in respect to the realisation of that possibility.

Thus, the correspondence Brooke (1991/2015) claims between the spatiality of psyche and Dasein glosses over significant differences—even where the former is understood as lifeworld. Nonetheless, Brooke argues that reinterpreting psyche as lifeworld at least allows Jung’s conception of psyche to achieve what the former views as “terminological clarity, so that the existential significance of his thought can more appropriately be grasped” (1991/2015, p. 82). This emphasises that a Heideggerian revisioning of psyche must push past lifeworld to attain the structure of Dasein.

## **2. *Forgotten Presence***

Brooke (1991/2015) argues psyche and Dasein are both characterised by a peculiar mix of immanence and ineffability. By this, he means they are simultaneously the most proximate of phenomena and the least understood. Brooke calls this paradox “forgotten presence” (1991/2015, p. 89). To illustrate, Jung refers to psyche in highly intimate terms as “the only immediate experience we can have” (CW5, para. 344). But he also claims that “no one knows what ‘psyche’ is” (CW8, para. 806). Heidegger (1927/2010) posits a similar conundrum for Dasein when he asserts it is “ontically ‘nearest’ to itself, ontologically farthest away” (H. 16).

As forgotten presence, one might expect psyche and Dasein to contain the possibility of recollection. This is not a point Brooke (1991/2015) explicitly pursues; however, if by “recollection” one posits true self-understanding, then both Jung and Heidegger articulate such a possibility in their respective notions of Self and authenticity.

For Jung, Self is “the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. . . . [which] expresses the unity of the personality as a whole” (CW6, para. 789). As Brooke (1991/2015) observes, the editors of Jung’s *Collected Works* note that this definition is almost identical to Jung’s attempted definition of psyche as “the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious” (CW6, para. 797). According to the editors, “The inference would seem to be that every individual, by virtue of having, or being, a psyche, is potentially the [S]elf. It is only a question of ‘realizing’ it” (CW6, para. 789, Footnote 72). This would appear to support an interpretation of Self as a recollection of psyche. Yet, such recollection is never complete because as Jung cautions, Self cannot be fully realised “on account of its unconscious component” (CW6, para. 789).

Self’s posited Heideggerian counterpart—authenticity—is recollected or “retrieved” from possibilities of Being that had been dormant in Dasein’s inauthentic state. Heidegger (1927/2010) uses the word “*Wiederholung*” to describe this retrieval, which is also translated as “repetition.” As recollection (or re-collection), repetition and retrieval can be conceived as the articulation of forgotten presence. Here, recollection becomes a mode of Dasein’s authentic Being, distinguished from mere *remembering*, which Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 339) identifies as a modality of Being that closes off Dasein from its authenticity.

### **3. Hermeneutic Circle of Self-understanding**

Brooke (1991/2015) argues that for both psyche and Dasein “there is no Archimedean point outside of either, from which it can be inspected” (p. 90). This is why Jung is forced to admit that “only the psyche can observe the psyche” (CW9i, para. 384), while Heidegger is required to presuppose Dasein’s pre-conceptual

understanding of Being in order to begin his explorations into the meaning of Being in general.

Yet, Heidegger (1927/2010), at least, denies a circularity, arguing “beings can be determined in their [B]eing without the explicit concept of the meaning of [B]eing having to be already available” (H. 8). He contends that were it otherwise, human beings would have achieved no ontological knowledge. But Heidegger would appear to overstate his case with this denial as there is clearly a form of circular reasoning in presupposing the nature of a specific mode of Being (i.e., that of Dasein) at the outset of an investigation into the nature of Being in general.

Nonetheless, Heidegger (1927/2010) escapes a *vicious* circle (and is thus justified in his method) if the circle is hermeneutic, that is, if initial conceptions are refined as the investigation proceeds. In fact, *Being and Time* follows just such a procedure, with its second division revisiting division one’s existential analytic of Dasein but at the deeper level of Temporality.

Further, according to Heidegger (1927/2010), Dasein is constituted as a self-referential loop. This view is founded on his observation that “beings which, as [B]eing-in-the-world, are concerned about their [B]eing itself have an ontological structure of the circle” (1927/2010, H. 153). This is also the structure apparent in Jung’s definition of psyche as “the totality of all psychic processes” (CW6, para. 797). Indeed, viewed in the context of Dasein’s self-reference, Brooke (1991/2015) contends that Jung’s circular definition of psyche “might reveal its nature more clearly than do attempts to step outside it” (p. 68).

#### **4. Pre-reflective Understanding of the World**

Brooke (1991/2015) notes that psyche and Dasein are for the most part lived as an unreflective understanding of their relationships with other beings. For psyche,

this state is unconscious, while for Dasein, it is unthematic (Brooke, 1991/2015, p. 90). The different terms reflect the divergent approaches Jung and Heidegger take not only to the concept of the unconscious but also consciousness.

Jung defines consciousness as “the relation of psychic contents to the *ego*, in so far as this relation is perceived as such by the ego”; on the other hand for him, “those relations to the ego that are not perceived as such are *unconscious*” (CW6, para. 700). However, Jung cautions that the demarcation between the two is indistinct since the unconscious is or has an intelligibility that mimics consciousness, albeit in an unreflective manner (CW8, para. 387).

Further, Jung notes it is possible to speak of “intensities of consciousness” to describe situations where some degree of unconsciousness attaches to consciousness (CW8, paras. 385). The philosopher Martin Weichold (2021) suggests it is this latter phenomenon that Heidegger understands by “unthematic,” arguing that “something is *unthematic* in the experience of an agent if and only if she is not focussed on it, but still conscious of it” (p. 729).

Yet, Heidegger (1987/2001) is adamant that the conscious-unconscious dichotomy is a “fatal distinction” (p. 254). This is not because he recognises any elision between the two, as Jung does, but because he views the very concept of the unconscious as illegitimate, labelling it “pure hypothesis” (1987/2001, p. 169). For him, the unconscious is an expediency invented by Freud because the latter could find no uninterrupted psychic causality in just the confines of consciousness (1987/2001, pp. 207–208).

But Heidegger (1927/2010) is also sceptical of the notion of consciousness and the related idea of ego—even where the latter is understood in the Husserlian transcendental sense of a foundational subjectivity. This is because Heidegger views

both as derivations, which “are so far from including the *a priori* character of ‘real’ subjectivity that they pass over the ontological character of facticity of Dasein and its constitution of [B]eing” (1927/2010, H. 229). The ontological character to which Heidegger refers is Dasein’s existence as Being-in-the-world.

Nevertheless, William J. Richardson (1965) argues that Dasein’s mode of Being can still be described as unconscious. This interpretation finds support in Heidegger’s (1927/2010) concept of “*Umsicht*” (circumspection). Here, “circumspection” does not hold the common-place meaning of “caution” or “wariness”; instead, it is an unthematic kind of sight “which guides our [Dasein’s] operations and gives them their specific certainty” (1927/2010, H. 69).

The fact that circumspection has a configuring role in Dasein’s practical involvements means it is a form of intelligibility. But crucially, this is an unreflective intelligibility—which is how Jung describes the unconscious. Therefore, Richardson’s (1965) claim for Dasein finds support in that entity’s behaviour. For Jung (CW8, paras. 194–219), human behaviour is guided by the unconscious complexes, which play the same configuring role in psyche’s involvements as circumspection does for Dasein.

### **5. Pre-personal Structure**

For Brooke (1991/2015), the implication of the foregoing is that psyche and Dasein are unconscious/unthematic relational matrices, which precede personal identity. Consequently, according to him, neither “should be confused with the ego boundaries of the individual person who is seen situated bodily at a particular place”; instead, ego is embedded in psyche and Dasein (1991/2015, pp. 90–91).

Jung defines ego as “a complex of ideas which constitutes the centre of [a person’s] field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity

and identity” (CW6, para. 706). The equivalent concept for Heidegger (1927/2010) is the ontic “who” of Dasein, which he considers “maintains itself as an identity throughout changes in behavior and experiences, and in this way relates itself to this multiplicity” (H. 114).

Brooke (1991/2015) argues that for Jung and Heidegger, the formation of personal identity “is a process of appropriating as one’s own what is found to be already lived [in the relational matrix]” (p. 91). Brooke considers this “I” of personal identity as not only constituted by appropriation but also by reflection and apperception, the latter defined as “a process by which things, images, and events are perceived psychologically and not merely literally” (1991/2015, p. 125).

Brooke (1991/2015) observes that Jung identifies an intimate link between appropriation, apperception and reflection, illustrated in the following quote:

“Reflection” should be understood not simply as an act of thought, but rather as an attitude. It is a privilege born of human freedom in contradistinction to the compulsion of natural law. As the word testifies (“reflection” means literally “bending back”), reflection is a spiritual act that runs counter to the natural process; an act whereby we stop, call something to mind, form a picture, and take up relation to and come to terms with what we have seen. It should, therefore, be understood as an act of *becoming conscious*. (Jung, CW11, para. 235, Footnote 9)

Jung’s identification of reflection with consciousness is instructive and provides a point of correspondence between psyche and Dasein that Brooke does not explore—one founded in the everyday mode of Being of Dasein. Heidegger (1927/2010) argues that in Dasein’s circumspect dealings with things, the latter’s objective presence is initially inaccessible to it; instead, Dasein encounters things by way of their function in the context of the overall project within which it is engaged.

Nevertheless, the objective presence of useful things can become foregrounded to Dasein where the functional context is disrupted by something discovered as missing, unusable or not belonging to Dasein’s project. Objective

presence also becomes apparent to Dasein in its deliberations over the suitability of a useful thing for a particular task.

Therefore, in Dasein's thematic discovery of beings, one understands the type of spiritual act Jung (CW11, para. 235) calls reflection. In other words, the shift in Dasein's mode of engagement with its world—from circumspect absorption to circumspect deliberation—can be considered an act of becoming conscious. In this act, ego, the who and ultimately insight are constituted. For Jung, the goal of this process of personal differentiation is Self, whilst for Heidegger, it is authenticity.

### **6. “Ownmost” yet not Personal**

Jung's Self and Heidegger's authenticity are the individual's ownmost forms of psyche and Dasein, respectively. But Brooke (1991/2015) notes that in both cases, such differentiation is grounded in and emerges from the collective, which latter Jung (CW10, para. 719) calls “mass-mindedness” and Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 114) calls “*das Man*” (the they).<sup>25</sup>

Jung only begins to use expressions such as “mass-mindedness” and its derivatives in his mature phase. However, the scholar of psychology and religion Peter Homans (1979/1995) argues the same concerns are implicit as early as Jung's 1912 essay “New Paths in Psychology.” In that text, Jung argues human being initially takes on a collective identity, which he calls *persona* and describes as “a *mask* . . . [which] meets the requirements and fits the opinions of society” (CW6, para. 799). For Jung, therefore, *persona* is an “arbitrary segment of collective psyche” (CW7, para. 245). Homans identifies *persona* with the concept of mass-

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<sup>25</sup> Jung and Heidegger both draw on the imagery of dictatorship to describe the phenomenon of the dissolution of individual subjectivity into the group (see CW10, para. 718; Heidegger, 1927/2010, H. 126).

mindedness, arguing both are “characterized by a rationalistic commitment to collectivity” (1979/1995, p.181).<sup>26</sup>

For Heidegger (1927/2010), the equivalent to Jung’s persona is what he calls the *they-self*, which he distinguishes from the authentic self. According to Heidegger, Dasein as the they-self is dispersed in the they, meaning the latter “prescribes the nearest interpretation of the world and of [B]eing-in-the-world” (1927/2010, H. 129). Furthermore, in a clear echo of Jung’s concept of persona-as-mask, Heidegger describes the they-self as “*disguises* [emphasis added] with which Dasein cuts itself off from itself” (1927/2010, H. 129).

Heidegger (1927/2010) describes this inauthentic mode of Dasein’s Being as “*Verfallen*” (fallenness). The philosopher Stephan Käufer (2021) interprets the concept as “the essential human tendency to understand and experience existence in terms of everyday dealings” (p. 313). Yet, Heidegger sees no negative connotation in falling prey to everydayness, arguing that Dasein understands itself initially and for the most part in this mode of Being.

Brooke (1991/2015) argues that the fundamentally collective nature of psyche and Dasein means the individual as individual is necessarily constituted within a “range of [shared] possible relations that are appropriated, or affirmed, as one’s own” (p. 91). Thus paradoxically, psyche and Dasein are both deeply personal and impersonal. This is why Jung can conceive of individuation as “the better and more complete fulfilment of the *collective* [emphasis added] qualities of the human being” (CW7, para. 267), and Heidegger (1927/2010) can regard the authentic self as a “*modification of the they*” (H. 130).

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<sup>26</sup> It should be noted that as Jung’s references to mass-mindedness become explicit in his later work, his use of the word “persona” diminishes, suggesting Homans (1979/1995) is correct in the identity he posits between the concepts.

## 7. *Bodiliness*

According to Brooke (1991/2015), neither Jung nor Heidegger understand the body as “the meaningless body of anatomy”; rather, for them, it is an embodiment of presence, which “gives itself through and through to those meaningful phenomena with which it is engaged” (p. 91). The term phenomenology uses to describe such embodiment is *lived body*. However, this concept is associated more with Husserl and fellow phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty than with Heidegger. Somewhat notoriously, the latter does not explicitly discuss the body in *Being and Time*, with the issue covered only implicitly in his analysis of Dasein’s spatiality. This led the philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfuss (1991) to argue that Heidegger “seems to suggest that having a body does not belong to Dasein's essential structure” (p. 41).

Whilst Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 108) acknowledges that Dasein’s corporeality “contains a problematic of its own,” frustratingly, he does not pursue the matter. Thus if one’s interpretive horizon were limited to Heidegger’s early work, Brooke’s (1991/2015, p. 91) contention that for Heidegger, “the body is the bodying forth of human existence” would seem overstated. However, the later Heidegger (1987/2001) does discuss the body in these terms; specifically, he observes that while the corporeal body’s limit “stops with the skin,” the lived body’s limit extends much further, encompassing what he poetically calls “the horizon of [B]eing within which I sojourn” (pp. 86–87).

Dasein’s sojourn is of an ecstatic character, taking place, as Heidegger (1987/2001) puts it, “amidst the beings in the clearing” (p. 87). Thus for him, “the bodying forth of the body . . . is a way of Da-sein’s [B]eing” (1987/2001, pp. 86–87). The philosopher Kevin Aho (2013) argues that with this description, Heidegger “successfully fills out the account of embodiment that is missing in *Being and Time*”

(p. 271). Hence for Heidegger, the body becomes a kind of “subtle body,”<sup>27</sup> which is how, according to Brooke (1991/2015), the body understood in terms of psyche should also be viewed (p. 91).

Nonetheless, Brooke (1991/2015) concedes that Jung’s way of conceptualising psyche and body does not always align with phenomenology. On the one hand, Jung (CW18, para. 70) sees psyche and body as “two aspects of the living being”—an intuition that for Brooke, grasps towards the phenomenological lived body. But on the other hand, when Jung (CW8, para. 850) formally deploys his notion of synchronicity to describe this being-together of psyche and body, he conceives them—at the level of human experience at least—as distinct, albeit parallel, entities.<sup>28</sup> Thus while it might be possible to interpret psyche phenomenologically as embodied presence, the extent to which Jung actually thought this way is debatable.

## **8. Imagination**

Brooke (1991/2015, p. 48) argues that imagination—understood in the Jungian sense of *fantasy*—is the definitive structure of psyche. Jung (CW6, para. 722) defines fantasy as “the direct expression of psychic life.” For him, it is an imaginative activity in which “inner and outer worlds are joined together in living union” (CW6, para. 78). Accordingly, fantasy is not for Jung a mere intellectual

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<sup>27</sup> The term “subtle body” denotes a form of embodiment distinct from the purely physical, which while not normally accessible to the senses is still considered a material reality. The historian G. R. S. Mead (1919/1967) describes it as “man’s psychical embodiment” (p. 33).

<sup>28</sup> Jung had proposed synchronicity as an explanation for the being-together of psyche and body in his 1935 Tavistock Lecture series (CW18, paras. 136–143). Yet in 1952’s “Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle”—which was his mature statement on the matter—he adopts a more cautious stance. In this later work, Jung (CW8, para. 938, Footnote 70) states that while he entertains the possibility that psyche and body are related synchronistically, synchronistic phenomena themselves did not seem to occur frequently enough to speak of them as conforming to a law. Nonetheless, Jung adds that if the necessary regularity were ever proven, his “present view that synchronicity is a relatively rare phenomenon would have to be corrected” (CW8, para. 938, Footnote 70).

faculty; rather, it is an “autonomous activity of the psyche,” which unites the individual and their world (CW6, para. 78).<sup>29</sup>

Brooke (1991/2015) argues that fantasy or imagination is “that ‘between’ out of which the world and one’s sense of oneself (ego) emerge and are derived” (p. 48). Thus for him, it exhibits the same transcendent openness as Dasein. He cites as support the psychologist Edward L. Murray’s (1986) observation that Heidegger views the imagination as essentially identical with Temporality. Heidegger lays out the identification of imagination and Temporality in his 1929 book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. For Murray (1986), like Temporality, imagination sets “the stage for the creation of actuality, for the birth of [B]eing, for the realization of possibilities, for the construction of life and transformation of one’s existence” (p. 62).

Heidegger (1929/1997) considers imagination the “ontological synthesis” of the Kantian mental faculties of intuition and concept (p. 141).<sup>30</sup> Thus for him, it is the root of all knowledge. For Jung, imagination plays a similarly constitutive role, as it makes possible the synthesis of the four psychological functions of thinking, feeling, intuition and sensation (CW6, para. 78).

Therefore, for psyche and Dasein, imagination is both the transcendental condition of experience and the pre-eminent creative act. However, the psyche as conceived by Jung seems to lack the temporal condition crucial to Heidegger’s concept of imagination. Whilst Brooke is silent on this point, the superlative importance of imagination to both Jung and Heidegger suggests one is justified in

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<sup>29</sup> “World” is understood here in the Cartesian sense of *res extensa* (extended thing).

<sup>30</sup> Kant (1781/2007) understands intuition as an immediate representation of an object, occurring in space and time; whilst concept is a mediate representation of an object, where that object is judged as something. Thus, intuition and concept concern singular and general objective representations, respectively.

asking if time may be as foundational to psyche as it is to Dasein—a point which will be returned to later in the chapter.

### **9. “No-thingness” Given Through Images/Things**

Brooke (1991/2015) asserts that psyche and Dasein manifest themselves respectively through images and things rather than as substantive entities that relate to an external world. For Jung, “psyche is indistinguishable from its manifestations” (CW11, para. 87). Brooke observes that such manifestations are essentially images. Therefore, Jung’s understanding of the relationship between image and psyche would seem most cogently expressed in his claim that “image *is* psyche” (CW13, para. 75).

For Heidegger (1975/1982), the fact that Dasein is primordially involved with things in its mode of Being means “its own self is reflected to it from things” (p. 159). Brooke (1991/2015) argues the difference in terminology (image for Jung, thing for Heidegger) should not blind one to the fact that the two phenomena “are ontologically identical” (p. 93). With reference to the previous discussion of imagination, it becomes clear why this might be so: Imagination is the disclosive activity that constitutes the very things/images with which human being is concerned. That is why for Heidegger, “each one of us is what he pursues and cares for” (1975/1982, p. 159).

Brooke (1991/2015) argues that Jung’s specific use of the word “image” does not mean he intends images “to be separated from the reality of ‘things’” (p. 93). This view is supported by Jung’s claim that “everything of which we are conscious is an image” (CW13, para. 75). Thus for Brooke, the “lingering subjectivism” that he considers to adhere to the word “image” becomes unnecessary when the latter is considered from a Heideggerian perspective (1991/2015, p. 93). In Brooke’s view,

“Whether actual or fantasised, one is directly present to the thing/image itself, only the mode of presence is different” (1991/2015, p. 93).

### **10. Truth**

Brooke (1991/2015) notes that for psyche and Dasein, truth is constituted within themselves. In both cases, therefore, truth is something other than the Aristotelian notion of the agreement of a statement with its object. Brooke contends that for Jung, “there was never any ‘truth’ worth discussing that was not *psychologically true*, i.e. true for the psyche” (1991/2015, p. 93). Jung subordinates even scientific truth to this condition, arguing that it “will always be a product of the subjective psychological constellation of the investigator” (CW6, para. 9).

For Heidegger (1975/1982), “Dasein exists *in truth*, that is, *in the unveiledness of itself and of the beings to which it comports itself*” (p. 216). This idea of unveiling is central to his analysis of truth. Heidegger takes on this conception from the ancient Greek notion of *aletheia*, which means “disclosure.” Further, because for him truth is unveiledness, it *is* “only when and as long as Dasein exists” (1975/1982, p. 219). As Brooke (1991/2015) observes, this means that truth for Heidegger is “thoroughly historical and situated” (p. 93). This is a position he claims Heidegger shares with Jung, since according to Brooke, “there is no truth that is not given within the *temporal* [emphasis added] unfolding of psyche, or *Dasein*” (1991/2015, p. 93).

Brooke’s (1991/2015) claim implicitly asserts that psyche, like Dasein, is finite—i.e., it has a beginning and an end. However, this position sits in tension with Jung’s assertion that psyche has an eternal quality (CW18, para. 1572). Given Jung’s privileging of psychological truth, this would seem to identify such truth as also in some way timeless. Yet for Heidegger (1975/1982, p. 220), truth is never

timeless, which problematizes any simple equation of the Jungian and Heideggerian approaches to the concept.

For Jung (CW18, para. 1572), the psyche's eternal quality relates specifically to archetype. In his conception, since archetypes are psychological contents, they have the potential to constitute truth. Therefore, Brooke's (1991/2015) claim of the necessary historicity of psychic truth would appear incorrect. However, Jung stresses the difficulty of separating human finitude from the supposedly infinite archetypal realm. This is expressed in his statement that "every individual life is at the same time the eternal life of the species" (CW11, para. 146). This statement might rescue Brooke's claim of the historical situatedness of psychic truth since it foregrounds the impossibility of a collective unconscious operating outside of a time-bound personal psyche.

Yet, Jung also concedes the possibility of an extra-psychic *metaphysical* truth, which psychology can assert nothing about since in his view, it is a science whose privileged matter is "the psyche and its contents" (CW5, para. 344). Jung's claim that psychology is agnostic to metaphysical truth again challenges Brooke's (1991/2015) contention of a homology between psyche and Dasein. This is because such a claim allows for the possibility, inimical to Heidegger (1975/1982), of a truth that "subsists in itself" (p. 220).

### **11. The Authentic Attitude**

Brooke (1991/2015) contends that a receptive stance is important to the development of an authentic personality for both psyche and Dasein. According to him, a non-egoic attitude privileges "a more hospitable and humble relationship to the [S]elf" (1991/2015, p. 93). As Jung (CW14, para. 778) puts it, "*the experience of the [S]elf is always a defeat for the ego*"—the implication being that ego, to a

significant extent, must relinquish its agency for psyche to attain its ownmost individuality.<sup>31</sup>

But the analogy with Dasein is not as unambiguous as Brooke (1991/2015) suggests. This is because the place of agency is completely different in *Being and Time* compared with the later Heidegger. Olafson (1975) observes that the Dasein of *Being and Time* is very much an agent pursuing its own projects—which includes that of authenticity. For Olafson, it is only in Heidegger’s later work that Dasein takes on a receptive attitude, with its prior agency assumed by Being-as-such. As Olafson puts it, “What remains of the active function of *Dasein*, after this reallocation of functions, is for the most part a kind of watchful waiting within an [existential] openness that *Dasein* itself does not effect” (1975, p. 101). The change in Dasein’s status is an integral part of the later Heidegger’s turn to Being-as-such. This turn is succinctly expressed in Heidegger’s (1947/1998) assertion that “the human being is not the lord of beings. The human being is the shepherd of [B]eing” (p. 260).

## **12. Finitude**

For Brooke (1991/2015), the human being’s thematisation and appropriation of their own mortality is essential to the development of authentic personality for both psyche and Dasein. The problem of finitude was briefly touched upon in the discussion of Jung and Heidegger’s approach to truth. And it will not be pursued in any depth here; instead, discussion of the matter will be held over to later in the chapter.

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<sup>31</sup> But the ego’s defeat cannot be total as this would amount to a possession of it by Self, and as Jung asserts:

It must be reckoned a psychic catastrophe when the *ego is assimilated by the [S]elf*. . . . [because] its [the ego’s] adaptation [to the world of consciousness] is disturbed and the way opened for all sorts of possible accidents” (CW9ii, para. 45)

This approach is taken because of all the correspondences Brooke (1991/2015) identifies between psyche and Dasein, it is contended that the human being's disposition towards the certainty of their own death is of the greatest significance for any attempt to illuminate the identity of Jung and Heidegger's projects. However, one must be aware that in positing such identity, the work of both men is subjected to what Heidegger (1929/1997) would understand as an act of interpretive violence. One must therefore be mindful of his accompanying note of caution around such creative endeavour:

Such violence, however, cannot be roving arbitrariness. The power of an idea which shines forth must drive and guide the laying-out. Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able, through this, to place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech. That is one way, however, by which the guiding idea, in its power to illuminate, comes to light. (Heidegger, 1929/1997, p. 141)

### **Jung, Heidegger and the Enantiodromia of Death**

The correspondences Brooke (1991/2015) identifies between psyche and Dasein—and with which the thesis is broadly aligned—sit uneasily with Jung's (1973/2015a) professed contempt for Heidegger, whose ideas he described as “unutterably trashy and banal” (p. 331). Yet in a letter to Medard Boss, the creator of *Daseinanalysis*—a form of psychoanalysis based on existential phenomenology<sup>32</sup>—Jung (1976/2015b) also claimed that Boss's Heidegger-inspired notions were merely restatements of his own theories:

You believe that you have discovered something entirely new and unknown to psychology in your "pre-given world pattern" and are not aware that by this somewhat fulsome phrase you are describing exactly what I mean by the archetype. It has also escaped you that in the description of the [S]elf presented more than once at curatorium meetings—quite apart from my published work—I made a connection between the subject and the world and

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<sup>32</sup> Boss first applied existential phenomenology to psychology in his 1947 book *Meaning and Content of Sexual Perversions* (published in English in 1949). In that work, he acknowledged his debt to the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, who was the first to use Heidegger's ideas in a psychological context.

said that here lies the special significance of the [S]elf as opposed to the purely subjectivistic ego. (p. xli)

The translator of the above extract writes that Boss takes on the term "pre-given world pattern" (*vorgegebener Weltentwurf*) from Heidegger's *Being and Time* (Jung, 1976/2015b, xli, Footnote 7). Whilst this precise expression is not used in that text, its meaning lies in the pattern of relations that constitutes Being-in-the-world. Thus, Jung's apparent identification of Being-in-the-world with archetype would seem to authorise Brooke's (1991/2015) phenomenological approach to the latter. It also appears to validate Brooke's contention that Jung's *Weltanschauung* (worldview) is ultimately phenomenological despite his natural science leanings, which are again evident in the letter's presentation of subject and world as separate concepts.

Nonetheless, the idea of a latent intellectual kinship between Jung and Heidegger is contested by scholars such as the post-Jungian analyst Ladson Hinton. According to Hinton (2021), Jung sits far from a fully existential-phenomenological position because his tendency is to distance himself from the "blood, sweat and tears side of a clinical encounter" (p. 729). He argues this is due to Jung's emphasis on the archetypal realm, which for Hinton, operates as "a convenient, comforting escape hatch, a self-deluding defensive effort to avoid facing the groundlessness of existential reality" (2021, p. 728).

Yet, Hinton (2021) does not reference Brooke's *Jung and Phenomenology* in his analysis, which brings into question the depth of his engagement with the problem of the relationship between Jung and Heidegger. Brooke (1991/2015) seeks to synthesise their worldviews by presenting Jung as the phenomenologist he claimed to be. This synthetic approach also informs the interdisciplinary scholar Alan Cardew's (2004) hermeneutic comparison of the two men. He identifies the key link as their mutual appreciation of the German romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin.

Cardew points specifically to the following lines from Hölderlin's (1808/1984) poem, "Patmos": "Nah ist/Und schwer zu fassen der Gott/Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst/Das Rettende auch [Near and/Hard to grasp, the god/Yet where danger lies/Grows that which saves]" (pp. 88–89).

Jung quotes the above lines in several places in his writings (CW5, para. 630; CW6, para. 446; CW10, para. 195; CW14, para. 294; Jung, 1963/1989, p. 245). He uses them to illustrate his idea that the renewal of psychic life requires a descent into the unconscious, which carries with it the threat of extinction. This dialectic between life and death is an example of what Jung (CW5, para 581) calls *enantiodromia*, which is the tendency for a thing to become its opposite.

Heidegger, writing with Fink (1970/1979), was also gripped by this idea, which was originally formulated by the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus.<sup>33</sup> For Heidegger (1977), the crucial dialectic of opposites takes place in the context of man's relationship to technology. He argues that technology has led to a tendency towards what he terms *Gestell* (enframing), where the world is disclosed as merely the site of material resources rather than a place of authentic existence. According to Heidegger (1977), "Where Enframing reigns, there is *danger* in the highest sense" (p. 28). But in keeping with the enantiodromic concept, Heidegger (1977) argues with reference to the extract from "Patmos," that it is from this danger that salvation must come—if it were to come at all—observing that "the closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine" (p. 35).

But what does it mean to save? Heidegger (1977) argues it is not merely "to seize hold of a thing threatened by ruin, in order to secure it in its former

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<sup>33</sup> Heraclitus writes: "As the same thing in us are living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old. For these things having changed around are those, and those in turn having changed around are these" (Graham, 2010, p. 163, F54).

continuance” (p. 28). To him, salvation is “to fetch something home into its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its genuine appearing” (1977, p. 28).<sup>34</sup> Thus, salvation is inherently phenomenological, where the latter is understood in its formal sense, which according to Heidegger (1927/1962) is “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (H. 34).

Heidegger’s (1977) concept of salvation has Jungian overtones in its evocation of a hero’s journey: A push into a place of dissemblance or confusion to retrieve truth (“fetch something home in its essence”) and bring it to the light of consciousness (“genuine appearing”). Thus for both Jung and Heidegger, a confrontation with what the former calls “the region of danger” (CW12, para. 438) is the enantiodromic condition for salvation.

One might also conceive such danger as oblivion. According to Heidegger (1977), the latter blocks the self-manifestation of essence; yet it also holds the possibility of a turning towards essence. Further, as Heidegger’s translator notes, one understands oblivion as not a mere forgetting but as “that concealedness which is the source and foundation of all unconcealedness” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 36, Footnote 2). Here, one encounters again *aletheia*, the ancient Greek concept of truth; further, one observes the outline of a link between truth and salvation. Heidegger’s way of understanding oblivion accords with what Jung calls “the original state of *identity*,” that is, the concealedness from which emerges unconcealedness or what Jung calls consciousness (CW6, para. 762).

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<sup>34</sup> The meaning of essence in Heidegger’s work, particularly as it relates to Dasein, is a matter of much controversy. This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

But oblivion is also death. And for both Jung and Heidegger, it is death—or at least one’s relation to it—that plays the pivotal role in the retrieval of essence. Thus, the space now opens for a detailed examination of Brooke’s (1991/2015) claim of the shared importance of finitude to the development of psyche and Dasein—a claim to which the thesis attributes the highest significance.

According to Heidegger (1927/2010), for Dasein to achieve its authentic potentiality-of-Being, it must first take over its Being-toward-death. This means it must adopt an attitude of anticipation towards the existential possibility of its own death. He defines death as “*the end of Dasein . . . [its] ownmost, nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and insuperable possibility*” (1927/2010, H. 258–259). Heidegger distinguishes death both from *perishing*, which he equates with the end of biological life, and *demise*, which is the end of Dasein’s experience of an intelligible world.<sup>35</sup>

The philosopher Iain Thomson (2013) argues Heidegger views death as the ontological condition of the ontic possibility of demise. Thus for Thomson, Dasein can experience death at any point in its life. This is experienced as the collapse of its life-projects, that is, those possibilities of Being in which inauthentic Dasein holds itself. As Thomson puts it:

In the desolate experience he [Heidegger] calls “death,” the self—temporarily cut off from the world in terms of which it usually understands itself—finds itself radically alone with itself, and so can lucidly comprehend itself in its entirety for the first time, since there is no worldly, futural component of itself to elude its self-transparent grasp. (2013, p. 266)<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Whilst demise and perishing would normally go together in human beings, this may not always be the case. For example, a person in a coma may be subject to a demise, but not a perishing.

<sup>36</sup> Thomson (2013) notes the controversy amongst Heideggerian scholars as to what Heidegger means by death. He observes that most scholars straightforwardly equate death with “*demise . . . decease . . . or mortality*” (2013, p. 263). However, Thomson not only does not subscribe to this view, but his elaboration of death seems closer to the phenomenon Heidegger (1927/2010) actually describes in *Being and Time*—one characterized by a breakdown in signification. This suggests Heidegger intends by death something Dasein can experience, which is not the case for demise since

In such comprehension, what becomes available to Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-of-Being, which is there to be taken over. Heidegger (1927/2010) labels as *anticipatory resoluteness* the phenomenon in which “Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-of-[B]eing in a way that confronts death” (H. 382). Thus, one encounters again that interplay, evoked by Hölderlin, of the greatest danger and the saving power.

Jung discusses in both metaphorical and literal terms the importance of death to the retrieval of essence (see also Welman, 2000). In the metaphorical sense, he identifies death with the *Mothers*—those dread goddesses conceived by Goethe in his play, *Faust* (CW5, para. 553). In the play, Mephistopheles gives Faust the key to the place of the Mothers—an underworld realm that Jung identifies with the collective unconscious and which he conceives as holding “a possibility of life being renewed, and also of its being destroyed” (CW5, para. 631). He contends the treasure held by the Mothers is the hero’s life in its truest sense: “It is himself, new-born from the dark maternal cave of the unconscious” (CW5, para. 580). Jung interprets Faust’s desire to visit the Mothers as that of every hero, namely “a yearning for the mystery of rebirth” (CW5, para. 417).

Jung also takes a metaphorical approach to death in his analysis of the sixth woodcut from the 1550 alchemical tract “Rosarium Philosophorum.” The tract is an anthology of sayings by various writers organised around a series of twenty woodcuts on the theme of the *hieros gamos* (sacred marriage)—a central idea in alchemy.<sup>37</sup> The sixth woodcut, known as “Death,” is reproduced in Figure 1. It shows


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as Thomson observes, “once demise arrives our Dasein is no longer ‘here’ to experience anything” (2013, p. 265).

<sup>37</sup> Jung’s mature model of the psyche is described by alchemy. For him, the practice is not primarily about gold-making, but a “religious-philosophical or ‘mystical’ movement,” whose goal is the individual’s psychospiritual transformation (CW12, para. 554). However, Jung was not the first to

a crowned hermaphrodite lying in a sarcophagus, its body partially immersed in a stagnant pool of water. The accompanying motto reads: “Here King and Queen are lying dead/In great distress the soul is sped” (CW16, para. 466).

**Figure 1:** *Conception or Putrefaction*



*Note.* From *Sixteenth Century Floor: Rosarium Philosophorum Room*, by The Alchemy Website ([https://www.alchemywebsite.com/virtual\\_museum/rosarium\\_philosophorum\\_room.html](https://www.alchemywebsite.com/virtual_museum/rosarium_philosophorum_room.html)). In the public domain.

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express this view, with similar arguments proposed in the 19th century by writers such as the hermeticist Mary Atwood.

The royal couple have just engaged in an act of intercourse, the incestuous nature of which has been punished with their death. As Jung observes, “the picture represents the *putrefactio*, the corruption, the decay of a once living creature” (CW16, para. 467). Thus, it would seem all hope is lost, and death has triumphed. But by the enantiodromic condition, the greatest danger becomes the saving power. To wit, the image is also entitled “Conceptio” and contains the following further text: “Corruptio unius generatio est alterius”—the corruption of one is the generation of the other” (CW16, para. 467). This marks the scenario as a transition, where death gives way to life.

The coming salvation is illustrated by the joining of the previously separate king and queen into the single form of the hermaphrodite. The latter symbolises the alexipharmic philosopher’s stone—the goal of alchemy—which Jung identifies with Self. But the hermaphrodite is inert at this point, meaning the saving power remains embryonic.

Yet, the importance of death to Jung in the renewal of life does not lie solely in metaphor. In the literal sense of death as a perishing, he tells us “it is hygienic . . . to discover in death a goal towards which one can strive, and that shrinking away from it is something unhealthy and abnormal which robs the second half of life of its purpose” (CW8, para. 792). To clarify, such striving is not a longing for death; it is paradoxically a longing for life. As Jung puts it, “Only he remains vitally alive who is ready to *die with life*” (CW8, para. 800).

Jung considers that the work of life’s second half is “to devote serious attention to [oneself]” after the extravert exertions of its first half, which are characterised by “money-making, social achievement, family and posterity” (CW8, para. 785, para. 787). He describes as “plain nature” the work of the first half of life,

while in contrast, he views life's second half as a work of culture, which "lies outside the purpose of nature" (CW8, para. 787).

For Jung, culture is "the development of that wider consciousness" (CW8, para. 769). As already noted, such a description can also be grasped in terms of Heideggerian unconcealedness. Further, the contrast in the activity Jung sees as proper to the two halves of life is also Heideggerian in that it reflects the latter's distinction between the "pull of the crowd, [which is] the anonymous voice of the 'they' (*das Man*), and the voice of conscience, which is a call from the [S]elf to live authentically" (Brooke, 1991/2015, p. 107).

Yet, Dasein can only answer this call if it takes over its own Being-toward-death. Thus for both Jung and Heidegger, the horizon against which the authentic personality can emerge lies exclusively in the human being's appropriation of their most immutable possibility.<sup>38</sup>

### **Time and Redemption**

Heidegger's (1927/2010) analysis of Being-toward-death introduces the second division of *Being and Time*. This section explores time's role in the constitution of the Being of Dasein. Brooke's (1991/2015) Heideggerian reinterpretation of Jung does not extend to an explicit analysis of time. Given the

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<sup>38</sup> While Jung (CW8, para. 812) is open to the religious view of death as entry into an afterlife, Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 248) claims to make no judgement on the issue, arguing merely that "the this-worldly, ontological interpretation of death comes before any ontic, other-worldly speculation." However, the theologian George Pattison (2013) is sceptical of Heidegger's agnosticism in this regard given that according to the former, "the main thrust of Heidegger's presentation [in *Being and Time*] makes any discourse about life 'after' death not only otiose but existentially pernicious" (p. 14, Footnote 3). Yet, Heidegger would appear justified in his view that the existential analytic proceeds without prejudice to the existence or otherwise of an afterlife. This is because what is most important for him is not death's relation to some "after" but the initiatory significance it has for the truly individualised life in the here-and-now. This existential work of death is effaced when one's attention shifts towards what may follow human perishing, as this effectively becomes a denial of death. The work of death is arguably also the thrust of Jung's engagement with the concept despite his ruminations on the nature of the hereafter (see CW8, paras. 790–794, para. 804; 1963/1989, pp. 299–326).

latter's foundational importance to Heidegger, this is a significant omission.

Nevertheless, some existing scholarship has sought to bring Heidegger's understanding of time into relation with Jung.

The philosopher Matthew Gildersleeve (2015, 2016) draws parallels between the temporal analysis of Dasein and both Jung's analysis of the Rosarium woodcuts and his concept of the *transcendent function*. Jung defines the latter as the "union of conscious and unconscious contents" (CW8, para. 131) and also as the process by which this union is achieved (CW8, para. 147). The transcendent function has three stages. The first stage is the retrieval of the unconscious material that requires integration into consciousness. According to Jung, the analysand locates the energy needed to resolve their psychic conflict "*in the intensity of the emotional disturbance itself*"; therefore, the analysand's first step is to "make himself as conscious as possible of the mood he is in" (CW8, paras. 166–167). So, the process begins with the elaboration of a mood.

Gildersleeve (2015) equates this initial stage of the transcendent function with the disclosure of an anxious mood in Dasein. According to Heidegger (1927/2010), anxiety is the disclosive feeling proper to Being-toward-death. In anxiety, Dasein is brought before its "ownmost thrownness" (1927/2010, H. 342). Heidegger defines *thrownness* (or in the German, "*Geworfenheit*") as the "*facticity of [Dasein's] being delivered over*" to its there (H. 135). It was noted earlier in the chapter that the literal translation of Dasein as "there-Being" references its inherent spatiality. Therefore, thrownness is grasped in simpler terms as the condition of Dasein in which it finds itself existing in a world through no choice of its own.

For Heidegger (1927/2010), what is revealed to Dasein in its ownmost thrownness is "the uncanniness of everyday, familiar [B]eing-in-the-world" (H. 342).

The German word Heidegger uses, of which “uncanniness” is the translation, is “*Unheimlich*,” which means “the sense of not-being-at-home” or “being scared.” Here, Dasein’s world “has sunk into insignificance . . . our heedful awaiting finds nothing in terms of which it could understand itself” (Heidegger, 1927/2010, H. 343).

The implication for Heidegger (1927/2010) is that in its Being-toward-death, “Dasein is concerned about its [B]eing-in-the-world absolutely” (H. 250). This frees it for what he terms the “call of conscience,” which “has the character of *summoning* Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-of-[B]eing-a-self by *summoning* it to its ownmost [B]eing-guilty” (1927/2010, H. 269). *Being-guilty* is an existential term in which “the agent in question is responsible without adequate justification . . . for a form of existence that negates or extinguishes other possible forms of existence” (Wrathall, 2021d, p. 365). In its Being-guilty, Dasein is called upon to be resolute, that is, to accept its ownmost facticity and its ownmost possibility for existence, which is revealed to it in this facticity.

According to Heidegger (1927/2010), when Dasein accepts its ownmost facticity and possibility of Being, it enters into anticipatory resoluteness, in which it “project[s] upon itself this [B]eing-guilty that Dasein is *as long as it is*” (H. 305). What Heidegger emphasises here is that for Dasein to be authentic, it must understand itself in a resolute fashion “up to its end,” that is, up until its demise (1927/2010, H. 305).

Heidegger (1927/2010) additionally defines resoluteness as “letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in the they”; yet, he also maintains that resoluteness “does not escape from ‘reality’” (H. 299). By “reality,” he means the concrete facticity of life as it is rooted in the they. The seeming paradox is resolved if resoluteness is understood as a process of reconciliation between Dasein’s ownmost

potentiality of Being and its facticity. For Heidegger, it is in this process that Dasein “first discovers what is factually possible in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible as one’s ownmost potentiality-of-[B]eing in the they” (1927/2010, H. 299).

This rootedness of the authentic personality in facticity is a point which was touched upon earlier. As Jung puts it in relation to individuation, “If a plant is to unfold its specific nature to the full, it must first be able to grow in the soil in which it is planted” (CW6, para. 760). Gildersleeve (2015) equates resoluteness with the second stage of the transcendent function, which is the ego’s reconciliation with the unconscious. He describes this in syncretic Jungian-Heideggerian terms as “resolving the opposites between inauthentic falling prey and Dasein’s authentic ownmost potentiality of [B]eing” (2015, p. 305).<sup>39</sup>

Jung observes that in the transcendent function’s second stage, it is as if “a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with equal rights” (CW8, para. 186). If in this quote, one substitutes “Dasein” for “human beings,” the statement’s latent existentialism becomes apparent: Anticipatory resoluteness is unveiled as a dialogue between the inauthentic Dasein of the they and the authentic Dasein of the ownmost potentiality for Being.

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<sup>39</sup> While Gildersleeve (2015) identifies the second stage of Jung’s transcendent function with the process of accommodation between Dasein’s ownmost possibility-of-Being and its inauthentic facticity, an alternative approach would be to fold this reconciliation process into the first stage of the transcendent function, which is the evocation of the unconscious material. This is because for the unconscious material to be apparent to consciousness, it must adjust to ego expectations so as to manifest in a manner of which the ego could at all be aware. The reconciliation between ego and the unconscious at this first stage is driven by the latter. But Jung notes that in the second stage of the transcendent function, “it is no longer the unconscious that takes the lead, but the ego” (CW8, para. 181); so, ego is required to make the necessary adjustment. Therefore, Jung posits two reconciliation processes not one, with the first providing the material for the second. However, Gildersleeve transfers the unconscious-led reconciliation process from its proper place in the first stage of the transcendent function into the second. He then either amalgamates it with the ego-driven reconciliation process or dispenses with the latter entirely. Nonetheless, the relevance of his work to the present enquiry is unaffected as his analysis still highlights significant parallels between the existential analytic of Dasein and Jung’s transcendent function.

Dasein's authenticity is grounded in its facticity. As such, according to Heidegger (1927/2010), it is taken up by inauthentic Dasein as a kind of heritage from itself. This "taking-up" is what occurs in the *Wiederholung* (retrieval, repetition), which defined in temporal terms, is a "going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there" (Heidegger, 1927/2010, H. 385). This process amounts to what the philosopher Daniel Watts (2021) calls a "forward-looking stance on one's history . . . [in which] Dasein relates to its past not as a sequence of finished occurrences but as a site of latent possibilities" (p. 635).

The third and final stage of the transcendent function is the union of ego and the unconscious. Gildersleeve (2015, 2016) equates this stage with what Heidegger calls the *Augenblick* (moment). Here, what is disclosed to Dasein is its fate, that is, its authentic occurrence as a self-constant being as opposed to the inconstancy of self that is posited to characterise inauthentic Dasein.

Heidegger (1927/2010) understands the *Augenblick* as the experience of the authentic present as it is constituted in Temporality. Heidegger (1927/2010) formally defines Temporality as the "unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been" (H. 326). Heidegger (1975/1982) distinguishes Temporality—with its unity of the dimensions of past, present and future—from what he considers the vulgar concept of time, characterised as "a sequence of nows . . . whose intrinsic direction is from the future to the past" (p. 260).

The paradoxical quality of Temporality—that it encompasses past, present and future as well as existing outside these temporal dimensions—is shared by archetype. This is despite Jung not presenting the latter as a temporal structure as such—a state of affairs in tension with the Jungian analyst Angeliki Yiassemides's

(2014/2016) view that archetype is the aspect of Jung's theory "most blatantly" linked to time (p. 18).

Jung speaks of archetype as past ("existed since the remotest times" (CW9i, para. 5)), present ("something that exists *now*" (CW9i, para. 276)), future ("potential future" (CW9i, para. 278)), and as previously touched upon, timeless or existing outside time ("eternal' presence" (CW12, para. 329)). However, just as Jung had no theory of archetype, he had no theory of time. Nonetheless, Yiassemides proposes Jung viewed time as "a unified temporal field" (2014/2016, p. xx)—an assertion that not only echoes Temporality, but also suggests, as speculated earlier, a constitutive role for time in psyche.

In the Augenblick, Dasein is aware of what Heidegger calls its *situation*, that is, it is aware of its authentic Being-in-the-world disclosed in the light of anticipatory resoluteness (Heidegger, 1927/2010, H. 299). The philosopher Simon Critchley (2009) associates the Augenblick with the ancient Greek concept of *kairos* (right or opportune time). He notes Christian theologians interpreted the latter as "the fulfilment or redemption of time that occurred with the appearance of Christ" (2009, para. 9). This sentiment could be recast in Heideggerian terms as follows: *The Augenblick is the fulfilment or redemption of chronological time that occurred with the appearance of authentic Dasein.* On this reading, Temporality takes on a soteriological aspect. Indeed, Critchley queries whether Heidegger's ideas can inhabit such forms "without accepting or at least aping their content" (2009, para. 9).

Thus, one is again met with that seeming intimacy between truth and salvation. Gildersleeve (2016) identifies the Augenblick with the 10th woodcut of the Rosarium, known as "The New Birth," which is reproduced in Figure 2. Here, one is confronted once more with the crowned hermaphrodite; but instead of lying in the

slumber of death, it is animated. In the image, the hermaphrodite is winged and balanced on a floating crescent moon. Its female half (the queen) clutches a snake by its neck, while its male half (the king) holds a golden chalice containing three snakes (or a three-headed snake). To the figure's left is a single bird; to the right, a tree ripe with moon fruit.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Lunar imagery is the key theme of this woodcut due to the potentiality-of-Being inherent in the scenario; indeed, Jung writes often of the connection between the moon, the feminine and pregnancy (e.g., CW14, para. 217). The lunar imagery in the woodcut is to be contrasted with its solar imagery, of which the king is the representative, and which can relate to concrete reality (CW14, para. 116). Jung refers to the tree in the 10th woodcut as the "sun and moon tree" (CW16, para. 533); but this is arguably an example of the distortion in the meaning of the woodcut series of which the alchemical scholar Johannes Fabricius (1971) accuses Jung. The latter interprets woodcuts 11–20 of the twenty-image series as "less complete, but otherwise analogous" to the series shown in woodcuts 1–10 (CW16, para. 520). But Fabricius argues that the 20 woodcuts are best understood as a single series, illustrating the unfolding of the alchemical opus. As Fabricius notes, in the *Rosarium*, there is a moon tree and there is a sun tree, and they are depicted separately—the former in the 10th woodcut, the latter in the 17th. The 17th woodcut, which also depicts a new birth but of a different kind, is titled "The Demonstration of Perfection." The hermaphrodite in woodcut 17 has a more masculine aspect than that in woodcut 10. This leads Jung to refer to the two figures respectively as emperor and empress and to suggest that the first 10 woodcuts describe the contra-sexual transformation of the unconscious in a man, while the second 10 depict the same process in a woman (CW16, para. 520). However, there is the sense that Jung is not completely satisfied with this formulation, as he speculates that the second series may refer to the transformation of consciousness in a man (CW16, para. 520). This alternative explanation is an implicit recognition that the two cycles, as Fabricius contends, are linked. Fabricius's approach arguably allows one to broadly identify woodcuts 1–10 with the first stage of the transcendent function, woodcuts 11–17 with the second and woodcuts 18–20 with the third. This contrasts with Jung's apparent identification of the transcendent function solely with woodcuts 1–10. However, Jung's distortion of the series would appear not to compromise the validity of the parallels Gildersleeve (2016) identifies between the *Rosarium* woodcuts and Heidegger's existential analytic of *Dasein* since the present analysis corroborates Gildersleeve's conclusions.

**Figure 2:** *The New Birth*



Note. From *Sixteenth Century Floor: Rosarium Philosophorum Room*, by The Alchemy Website ([https://www.alchemywebsite.com/virtual\\_museum/rosarium\\_philosophorum\\_room.html](https://www.alchemywebsite.com/virtual_museum/rosarium_philosophorum_room.html)). In the public domain.

Jung interprets the hermaphrodite as a pre-figuration of Self.<sup>41</sup> He argues such symbols “bring with them something of the timelessness of the unconscious which expresses itself in a feeling of eternity or immortality” (CW16, para. 531). Whilst Heidegger does not subscribe to ideas like eternity or immortality due to his emphasis on Dasein’s finitude, Temporality is still a concept of time that stands outside the in-time existence of beings. It is therefore similar in effect to the timelessness to which Jung (1976/2015b) refers, which is “outside time . . . outside change” (p. 561).

Heidegger (1975/1982) understands time’s standing-outside of itself as the “ecstatic character” of Temporality (p. 267). Heidegger (1927/2010) calls the dimensions of past, present and future the three “*ecstasies* of [T]emporality” (H.

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<sup>41</sup> Jung claims both that the hermaphrodite is the *lapis*—the goal of the alchemical opus (CW16, para. 468)—and that he has “never come across the hermaphrodite as a personification of the goal, but more as a symbol of the initial state” (CW16, para. 535). This seeming paradox is explained by the consubstantiality of the *prima materia*, the initial state of alchemy’s fundamental substance, and the lapis, its final state (CW13, para. 282).

329). Yet because the vulgar conception of time considers these three temporal dimensions mutually exclusive, one could understand Temporality—as their original unity—to constitute a paradox. This is also the hermaphrodite’s condition in the Rosarium.

Jung conceives the hermaphrodite as an unconscious content striving for consciousness. He speaks of its paradox in temporal terms, arguing such contents “belong to the remote past” but are also “something altogether strange, new and belonging to the future,” expressing themselves in the present as an “invasion” (CW16, para. 529). His temporal interpretation of woodcut 10 would therefore seem to align in substance with Temporality and specifically authentic Temporality.

For Heidegger (1927/2010), Dasein is constituted in the temporalisation of this original temporal unity (H. 331). In authentic Temporality, Dasein first projects itself towards its ownmost future possibility, what Heidegger calls its *coming-toward-itself*; in that projection, it is confronted with its ownmost past, that is, its *having-been* (1927/2010, H. 325–326). This produces in the present an insight into its authentic way of Being, the Augenblick, which unveils to Dasein its ownmost possibilities for action. These are those possibilities that belong to it individually and essentially but had been concealed from it by its fallenness.

Jung interprets the phenomenon of the type illustrated in woodcut 10 similarly as a moment of insight: “This is always an intuitive experience that is felt as a concrete reality. It is the prefiguration and anticipation of a future condition, a glimmering of an unspoken, half-conscious union of ego [king] and non-ego [queen]” (CW14, para. 208). In Heideggerian terms, ego/king is Dasein’s having-been, the non-ego/queen its coming-toward-itself and the uniting vision of the hermaphrodite the Augenblick.

Gildersleeve (2016) understands woodcut 10 as the retrieval of Dasein's "missing possibilities" of Being (p. 104). According to Gildersleeve (2015), such possibilities are experienced by Dasein as insight into the meaning of the guilty mood in which it had found itself. Heidegger (1975/1982) asserts that for Dasein, such insight "is not a free-floating knowledge about itself"; rather, it possesses a "genuine truth-character, adequately unveiling the existence of the Dasein which is supposed to be unveiled by it" (p. 277). Thus, what finally discloses itself is that glimpsed alliance between truth and salvation.

This unveiled existence of which Heidegger (1927/2010) speaks is thoroughly individual. Indeed, he uses the word "individuation" to describe its achievement (see 1927/2010, H. 336; 1975/1982, p. 288). Heidegger's use of the word recalls Jung, who knows it as "a process of *differentiation*, having for its goal the development of the individual personality" (CW6, para. 757). Hence, in the crowned and animated hermaphrodite of the New Birth, one grasps the singularity of the saving power wrested from the greatest danger. It is in such appreciation that one recognises the manifestation of essence as the common project of Jung and Heidegger. From this perspective, it is thus far from wrong to view the former, as Brooke (1991/2015) does, in an existential phenomenological light.

But to so understand Jung is to view his work as a hermeneutics. This follows from the importance Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 148–153) places on interpretive activity in the unveiling of the truth of human experience. Jung's (CW7, para. 491–493) explicit hermeneutics centred on the interpretation of symbols, which mainly took the form of narrative artefacts. Yet, it is contended in the next chapter that alongside such endeavours, Jung and other depth psychologists engaged in a

hermeneutics of human experience, whose ultimate effect was to illuminate the narrativity of psyche.

## Chapter 4: Narrative and the Unconscious

In their analytic work, both Jung and Sigmund Freud made extensive use of narrative artefacts, such as myths, dream accounts and case histories. Yet, as the personality psychologist Dan McAdams (2006) observes, neither man “explicitly imagined human beings as storytellers and human lives as stories to be told” (p. 13). Such an understanding of the relationship between human being and narrative has been embraced by narrative psychologists. This follows the work of the communications scholar Walter R. Fisher (1987/1989), who popularised the term “*homo narrans*” (storytelling human) to convey the sense of narrative as most essentially understood not as text or discourse but as “the shape of knowledge as we first apprehend it” (p. 193).

Whilst McAdams (2006) is right that depth psychology has not explicitly adopted a narrative approach to human experience, this chapter argues it has done so implicitly. Thus, an *anima narratrix* (storytelling psyche) is posited as the unconscious’s equivalent to *homo narrans*, with the contention being that the outlines of the concept can be delineated in the development of depth psychology. It is proposed that an understanding of the unconscious as *anima narratrix* supports not only our comprehension of the way it tells its stories but also our understanding of its contents as story itself.

### Meaning of Narrative

The question of what defines narrative is not simple, being in large part determined by the intellectual context within which it is posed. For example, in the literary field, narrative can be defined as “the representation of a real or fictitious event or series of events by language, and more specifically by written language” (Genette, 1969/1976, p. 1). Yet this definition, whilst aligning with the ordinary

understanding of the term, does not exhaust even literary conceptions. As noted in Chapter 1, Todorov (1978/1990) views narrative not only as a recounted sequence of events but also as relations of transformation between and amongst events.

But narrative is far from just the preoccupation of literary theorists. In addition to psychology, it is also of concern to numerous other disciplines, such as linguistics, the social sciences and hermeneutical phenomenology—each offering its own understandings of a concept now extended beyond literature. Ricœur (1991), in particular, sought to break down conceptual barriers between life and story by explicitly challenging the conventional view that “stories are recounted and not lived; [while] life is lived and not recounted” (p. 20).<sup>42</sup>

Despite depth psychology’s lack of explicit engagement with the idea of narratively constituted human experience, it is important to stress that its engagement with narrative as such has been substantial. Indeed, James Hillman (1983/2019) suggests Jung and Freud can be distinguished in their respective approaches to psychoanalysis by the way each implicitly conceives the intelligibility of narrative.

Using the Aristotelian framework of the Four Causes, Hillman (1983/2019) posits that Freud, through his Oedipal theory of infantile sexuality, is concerned with the *material* and *efficient* causes of narrative—i.e., the constituent events and the plot that explains them, respectively. In contrast, Hillman argues that Jung—with his concepts of archetype and the collective unconscious—focuses on narrative’s *formal* and *final* causes, respectively its characteristic type and the goal it serves.

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<sup>42</sup> The philosopher Louis O. Mink’s (1974, p. 123) contention that “stories are not lived but told” illustrates this conventional view of narrative.

For Hillman (1983/2019), Jung's emphasis on formal and final causes ensures he "gives far more weight to individual character than either to narrative [as a temporal sequence of events] or plot" (p. 13). Hillman contends that it is individual character that is constituted in the "multiplistic and variegated" plots that inform Jung's archetype concept (1983/2019, p. 14). As noted in Chapter 2, Jung claims archetype expresses itself in narratives such as myths. And when narrative is understood in terms of formal and final causes, it is this archetypal dimension that is described. Nevertheless, Hillman explicitly links archetype only to narrative's formal cause, observing that the latter concerns the "archetypal idea, myth, or person . . . at work in the story" (1983/2019, p. 13).

On the other hand, Hillman (1983/2019) argues that Freud explored psychic reality through a single narrative, the presiding formal cause of which is the Oedipus complex. Jung asserts the latter is also an archetype (McGuire & Hull, 1977/1993, p. 288); but this is a characterisation Freud might reject due to the concept's sometime mystical connotations.<sup>43</sup> Instead, Freud roots the Oedipus complex in a biological imperative, resulting in what Hillman calls his "double style of writing . . . [in which] what was plot and myth on one level was theory and science on another" (1983/2019, p. 14).<sup>44</sup>

According to Hillman (1983/2019), this double movement can be understood as a type of Freudian compromise formation between "an unconscious literary

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<sup>43</sup> The commonly held view is that Freud dismissed outright Jung's archetype concept. But comments he makes in his "Wolf Man" case study concerning the origin of *primal phantasy* leave scope for debate. Here, Freud (1918/1955b) asserts such fantasies "are unquestionably an inherited endowment, a phylogenetic heritage," which leads him to make the following remarkable admission: "I fully agree with Jung in recognizing the existence of this phylogenetic heritage" (p. 97). Nevertheless, Freud still seeks to distance himself from his by this time estranged colleague by characterising Jung as guilty of a "methodological error" in applying "a phylogenetic explanation before the ontogenetic possibilities have been exhausted" (1918/1955b, p. 97).

<sup>44</sup> Ricœur (1977) frames this situation as the dichotomy between Freud the hermeneuticist and Freud the scientist.

presentation . . . and the *conscious* analogy with physical medicine” (p. 11). This leads him to claim that Freud is most essentially understood as a writer of therapeutic fictions, which aligns with Ricœur’s (1977) understanding of the truth-claim of psychoanalysis as a narrative one.

As noted in Chapter 1, Ricœur (1991) emphasises narrative’s moral dimension. Elsewhere, Ricœur (1990/1994) expresses the same view more forcefully, claiming “there is no ethically neutral narrative” (p. 115). Cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner (1990)—a key proponent of the *homo narrans* thesis—makes a similar argument, contending that to expound a narrative “is inescapably to take a moral stance, even if it is a moral stance against moral stances” (p. 51).

Furthermore, the historian Hayden White (1980) considers that “where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too” (p. 26). White and Bruner (1990) intertwine narrative and morality because both view the former as operationalising a desire to moralise reality. For them, narrative achieves this by identifying reality with a social system, which latter according to White, “is the source of any morality that we can imagine” (1980, p. 18).

White (1980) argues that a social system of values is both that “in which [one] is enjoined to achieve full humanity,” and also the ground for “any closure of a story one might wish to tell about a past, whether it be a public or a private past” (p. 18). Bruner (1990) terms such a system *folk psychology* and conceives the type of closure it gives narrative as specifically the restoration of violated cultural norms.

The foregoing thus identifies narrative as a moral problem. Therefore, if one understands the Oedipus Complex as a therapeutic fiction, its ethical function is emphasised despite Freud’s (1914/1957a, p. 62) antipathy to such considerations.

Further, if one follows Bruner (1990) and White (1980), an appreciation of the Oedipus complex as narrative allows this ethical function to be understood precisely as the sustaining of a particular moral framework.<sup>45</sup> In this way, Freud, like Jung, becomes an enquirer into final cause, which one can equate with narrative meaning.

### **Two Authors of Psyche**

Jungian scholar Raya Jones (2019) suggests the depth and narrative psychologies are most fundamentally distinguished by their respective approaches to meaning. She argues that whereas the former focuses on “how meaning *happens* to people”—i.e., how subjectivity is shaped—the latter is concerned with a pre-existing subject “who *makes* meaning” (2019, p. 10).

Roesler (2019) attempts to reinterpret depth psychology in narrative psychological terms by recasting consciousness and the unconscious as the two authors of psyche. He conceives of the conscious author as operating from above, explicitly telling and retelling life stories in ways that convey personal meaning, while the unconscious author operates from below, telling its own stories through fantasies, such as dreams, neurotic symptoms and the transference.

According to Roesler (2019), the stories told by the unconscious author confront its conscious counterpart “with a different perspective on its own [consciousness’s] [B]eing, often puzzling, sometimes disturbing or even frightening” (p. 218). Yet whilst according to Roesler, it is psychotherapy’s aim to bring these “two independent story lines . . . into a new synthesis” (p. 218),<sup>46</sup> one observes that it is precisely in the analytic encounter that such neat division of authorship is tested.


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<sup>45</sup> In a previous work, I recovered the moral sense of the Oedipus myth itself as the recognition of the generative quality of human suffering (Ajuonuma, 2023).

<sup>46</sup> Hillman (1972) refers to this process as a “*rapprochement*” between the “day ego” and the “night ego” (pp. 186–187)

This is because the analyst and analysand are communicating on both conscious and unconscious levels simultaneously, suggesting the presence of not two but four authors.<sup>47</sup> Jung (CW16, para. 422) describes the situation in a diagram, an adapted form of which is presented in Figure 3.<sup>48</sup>

**Figure 3: The Analytic Relationship**



*Note.* (a) Conscious Relationship Between Analyst and Analysand  
 (b) Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Within Analyst and Analysand  
 (c) Unconscious Relationship Between Analyst and Analysand  
 (d) Transference Relations Between Analyst and Analysand  
 Adapted from "The Psychology of the Transference." In *CW16*, para. 422.

<sup>47</sup> Indeed, one would be justified in including the modifier "at least" in front of "four" to reflect the influence on the analyst and analysand of relationships outside the analytic dyad.

<sup>48</sup> Both Jung's original diagram and the adaptation suggest the analyst and analysand have a symmetrical relationship. However, Fordham (1978/2018) modifies Jung's diagram to reflect the clinical reality that the analyst has both a stronger ego than the analysand and a more stable relationship to their own unconscious.

The relationship depicted in Figure 3 is a psychoanalytic equivalent of Ricœur's (1991) concept of narrative co-construction. According to him, the act of story configuration is the common work of text and reader. This means emplotment is completed not in the former but in the latter. Thus for Ricœur (1991), the merger of the lifeworlds of these two entities is an inherent feature of narrative. In the analytic encounter, the analyst and analysand function as both text and reader for and within each another. It is for this reason that Ricœur (1970) locates psychoanalysis within the hermeneutic field, which he defines as "the area of symbols or double meanings and the area in which the various manners of interpretation confront one another" (p. 8).

Jung notes that sometimes the relations illustrated in Figure 3 can themselves become merged, leading "to the greatest possible confusion" (CW16, para. 423). Nonetheless, the analytic encounter may still be characterised as a confrontation between a conscious and unconscious author—albeit with both conceptualised as composite analyst/analysand entities. Initially, the dyadic partners' relative contributions are difficult to discern. But this becomes clearer as the analysis proceeds, until what relational psychoanalysts call the *real relationship* is established in which, according to Lyons-Ruth et al. (1998), the analyst and analysand achieve "reasonably accurate sensings of each person's current 'ways of being with' [the other]" (p. 285).

### **Case Histories and Dreams**

The importance analysts like Roesler (2019) attach to the convergence of the storylines of the two (composite) authors aligns with Freud's (1905/1953b) contention that the purpose of analysis is the construction of an "intelligible,

consistent, and unbroken” personal narrative (p. 18).<sup>49</sup> Freud makes this claim in his famous “Dora” case history, which is the narrative form with which he is most closely associated. In addition to “Dora,” he wrote four other long case histories: 1909’s “The Rat Man” and “Little Hans,” 1911’s “The Schreber Case,” and 1918’s “The Wolf Man.” Their enduring influence informs Ricœur’s (1977) view that case histories “constitute the primary texts of psychoanalysis” (p. 843).<sup>50</sup>

From the perspective of the two-author model, the case history is the product of the conscious author. Hillman (1964/1978) defines case history as “a biography of historical events in which one took part,” contrasting it with what he calls *soul history*, which he defines as a biography of *experience* “reported best by emotions, dreams and fantasies” (p. 77). At first sight, his taxonomy would seem to mirror Roesler’s (2019) two-author model; however, on closer inspection, this is found not to be the case. This is because Hillman defines his two histories in ways that explicitly set events apart from the experience of events, whereas “experience” and “event” constitute the narrative products of both the conscious and unconscious authors.

Hillman (1983/2019) acknowledges his error when he later posits the case history “as *one* [emphasis added] of the ways the soul speaks about itself”; thus, it becomes “a fiction cast in literalisms which necessarily does not recognize itself as such” (p. 30). The matrix of relations in Figure 3 further supports this view of the case history as a *poiesis*, that is, an act of creation.

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<sup>49</sup> Chapter 6 discusses arguments against the validity of such a project.

<sup>50</sup> Historian of psychoanalysis Anne Sealey (2011) argues that Freud’s purpose in writing his case histories was to describe the application of his sexual theory rather than to analyse the peculiarities of the individuals involved per se. She claims Freud stopped using this narrative form once the reception of his theory was sufficiently established. Jungian analyst Betsy Cohen (2015) argues that Jung also used case histories primarily to illustrate theory. However, his manner of presenting these cases was mostly anecdotal, particularly after his break with Freud.

In contrast, the unconscious author's work is more readily recognised as fiction, steeped as it is in the realm of fantasy. In the case where this second authorship emerges from the collective (as opposed to personal) unconscious, Jung (CW15, para. 141) argues its products can be identified with mythic works of art. For depth psychologists, the second author is also the creator of neurotic symptoms and dreams. But like its conscious counterpart, the web of relations between and within analyst and analysand creates potential for distortion of the "intention" of this author.

This point is illustrated using the example of dreams. Jung (CW8, paras. 561–564) asserts that dream narratives display the following four-stage dramatic structure: (a) *Exposition* (statement of place, protagonists, and the initial situation), (b) *Development of Plot*, (c) *Peripeteia* (culmination), and (d) *Lysis* (solution). Whilst Jung (CW8, para. 565) argues this structure "can be applied without much difficulty to the majority of dreams met with in practice," Hillman (1983/2019, p. 42) counters that dreams are not only rarely so well structured—being "mainly abrupt and fragmentary or hysterically swollen and meanderingly long"—but also, and more fundamentally, primarily image. Thus for Hillman, "when we see a drama in it, we are always, in part, seeing our own hypothesis" (1983/2019, p. 42).<sup>51</sup>

Jungian analyst Patricia Berry (1982), who subscribes to Hillman's view, argues that such dream hypotheses tend to take the form of heroic narratives in which the protagonist "corrupts the dream into a mirror in which the ego sees only its concerns" (p. 67). Yet at heart, the Hillmanian and Jungian approaches to dream are ultimately distinguished by their answer to the following question: Is the dream

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<sup>51</sup> Jung's (CW8, paras. 561–564) understanding of dream structure implies a linearly causal relationship between the constituent stages of any one dream. However, Jung (1987/2008) argues that a *series* of dreams do not relate to each other causally but are instead "arranged around a *center of meaning*" (p. 10). This view brings Jung closer to the Hillmanian approach given that as the philosopher Robert Avens (1980) observes, for Hillman, as for Jung, images operate as centres of meaning.

necessarily engaged in a communication with consciousness? Jung answers “Yes,” viewing it as “a sort of finely attuned compensation of the one-sidedness, errors, deviations, or shortcomings of the conscious attitude” (CW8, para. 566). But Hillman (1972) says “No,” claiming that “when we take the dream as a corrective to the leftovers of yesterday or as instruction for tomorrow, we are using it for the old ego” (p. 187).

By comparing Jung and Hillman’s respective approaches to dream, one gains insight into how the analyst’s conscious attitude can shape the meaning of the unconscious content that emerges in analysis. This is because the analyst’s conception of what dream is will determine the way a specific dream’s meaning is co-constructed by themselves and the analysand in the analytic space.

Further, according to Freud (1900/1953a), the analysand’s own consciousness may be at such odds with their unconscious that the dream itself is distorted to hide its import.<sup>52</sup> Here, the dream is split into two layers—its manifest and latent contents. For Freud, the same mechanism applies in the neurotic symptom. This understanding is the direct consequence of his theory of repression, which describes how unacknowledged wishes are symbolically fulfilled as what he calls *phantasy*.

The latent content of phantasy is unveiled through interpretation. Ricœur (1977) argues that interpretation is aimed at the analysand’s concomitant recognition (as opposed to misrecognition) of themselves, the other and their own phantasy. According to Ricœur, in a fully elaborated case history, these elements are synthesised. Therefore for him, the problem of psychoanalytic insight is finally one of

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<sup>52</sup> Jung (CW8, para. 471), however, disagrees with this view, arguing that the dream is never a distortion and should be addressed on its own terms.

“recovering the ability to recount one’s own history, to endlessly continue to give the form of a story to reflections on oneself” (1977, p. 862).<sup>53</sup>

### **Affect and Narrative**

Roesler (2019) notes the strongly affective quality of the unconscious author. This is consistent with Jung’s (CW9i, para. 496) claim that unconscious agency reveals itself most clearly in emotion. Roesler identifies the second author with the unconscious complex, which Jung (CW8, para. 210) describes similarly as “the *architect* [emphasis added] of dreams and of symptoms.” Such understanding aligns with the view—introduced in Chapter 2—of the unconscious complex as an organising principle.

Jung refers to complexes as *splinter psyches*, observing “their origin is frequently a so-called trauma, an emotional shock or some such thing, that splits off a bit of the psyche” (CW8, para. 204). The extent of the complex’s emotional pull can lead to what he describes as “a momentary and unconscious alteration of personality known as identification with the complex,” which he equates with possession (CW8, para. 204). Indeed, intensity of affect can be so strong as to temporarily disarm the conscious author of its storytelling capacities, leading to either narrative paralysis (Frosh, 1999) or narratives characterised by random associations, gaps, and idiosyncratic language (Holloway & Jefferson, 2000).<sup>54</sup>

Jungian analyst Coline Covington (1995) further locates absences of articulated story in situations where consciousness is estranged from affectivity. She

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<sup>53</sup> The psychoanalyst Donald Spence (1984) argues there is a limit to this process of narrative reconstruction, as the source of the patient’s difficulty is ultimately inaccessible. Further, the psychoanalyst Roy Schafer (1981) observes that the narrative reconstruction’s *form* is just as important as its content in the elucidation of the psychic situation.

<sup>54</sup> Yet, one must note that non-linear stories do not necessarily imply narrative incapacity. Narratives may be only *seemingly* incoherent, since as the narrative scholar Corinne Squire (2013) argues, the social, cultural and historical specificity of this kind of meaning-making ensures that any one narrative can never be fully accessible across all social, cultural and historical contexts.

attributes such instances to “the repeated attack and destruction of relationship, or of ongoing internal objects” (1995, pp. 409–410). In this scenario, the narrative work, understood as a patterning of relations, has broken down. And this has occurred not only at the level of the first author but also the second. The latter, in its identification with the complex, is the mode through which according to Jung, our lives are mostly lived (CW1, para. 220). For Covington, the result is that the patient is unable “to establish a presence as an active figure within a live drama, or, in other words, to function as subject” (1995, p. 410).

Thus if one is to understand the aim of psychotherapy as the synthesis of the narratives of the first and second authors, it is not enough that the former be able to intellectually comprehend the story of the latter—it must also integrate its affective state. Ricoeur (1977) argues that interpretations that are only consciously grasped may even harm the analysand where a new pattern of energies has yet to emerge from the system of resistance, repression and compromise constellated by a pathogenic affect.

Yet for Jung, not all unconscious affect is pathogenic and repressed (CW8, para. 366). This is because for him, the archetypes of the collective unconscious not only have a “*feeling-value*” (CW8, para. 411) but also “have never been in consciousness” (CW9i, para. 88). Further, as noted in Chapter 3, archetype is defined not just by its reference to the present and to the past but by the promise it holds for the future (CW9i, para. 278). When one views interpretation narratively, this potential for transformation becomes more apparent.

But as Covington (1995) asserts, a narrative reconstruction of a life has no transformative power so long as it does not acknowledge what she calls the “‘secret’ internal world” (p. 412). Such interiority can be grasped as the

unconscious author. Covington argues further that if unacknowledged, the internal world narrates itself through symptoms. This unveils the unconscious as not only author but also text.

### **The Unconscious as Language**

The idea of the unconscious as a form of language or discourse is most cogently argued by the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. The symptom, according to Lacan (1956/2001b), is the subject's attempt to articulate a desire that cannot be expressed through the chain of signifiers that constitute the language of its community. Thus, the symptom itself becomes "the signifier of a signified [content] repressed from the consciousness of the subject" (1956/2001b, p. 76).

For Lacan (1956/2001b), symptom and desire constitute a language because their signification (or meaning) is found not in specific instantiations or signifiers but in each signifier's relation to other signifiers in the system. He takes on this conception of language from the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1916/2011), who proposed two axes of linguistic meaning: paradigmatic and syntagmatic. On the paradigmatic axis, a signifier's meaning depends on its relation to other signifiers that could be used in the same context; on the syntagmatic axis, its meaning depends on its place in the chain of signification.

De Saussure's work was adapted by the linguist and literary theorist Ramon Jakobson (1956/1971), who reinterpreted the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of meaning as the rhetorical figures of metaphor and metonymy, respectively. Jakobson made this move on the basis that metaphor, like the paradigmatic axis, substitutes one term for another within a specific context, while metonymy's use of one term to refer associatively to another displays the same relation of contiguity as the syntagmatic axis.

Lacan (1957/2001a) used Jakobson's insight to propose that symptom and desire constitute language because they *are* metaphor and metonymy. For Lacan, this is because symptom, like metaphor, is a substitution, where "flesh or function is taken as a signifying element," while desire is "eternally stretching forth towards . . . *something else*" in the manner of metonymy (1957/2001a, p. 184). According to Lacan, the Freudian dreamwork similarly constitutes a language, with *condensation* (the superimposition of dream images) and *displacement* (the transfer of significance from one image to another) identified with metaphor and metonymy, respectively.

Lacan (1957/2001a) conceives the unconscious as fundamentally "the discourse of the Other" (p. 190). This means that for him, it is determined by the particular signifying chain that constitutes the language of a culture. Narrative understood as a type of discourse is an example of a signifying chain. In his recognition of the unconscious as a quasi-text, albeit fragmented and incomplete, Lacan, like Jung, can be viewed as adopting a narrative approach to psyche. But while the latter privileges story coherence, the former de-centres such concerns.

So far, the discussion of narrative's relation to the unconscious has been limited to the psychic constitution of the individual. How does the story change—if at all—were we to shift our focus to the group?

### **Culture Narratives**

Cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1997) defines culture as "the production and the exchange of meanings," asserting that people belong to the same culture if "they interpret the world in roughly the same ways and can express themselves . . . in ways which will be understood by each other" (p. 2). In the present century, post-Jungian scholars have extended the idea of the unconscious complex to human

beings' cultural context. This reworking of the concept, pioneered by Thomas Singer and Samuel Kimbles, is known as *cultural complex theory*.

Singer and Kimbles (2004b) define the cultural complex as “an emotionally charged aggregate of ideas and images that cluster around an archetypal core” (p. 176). They posit such complexes work in the psyche of both groups and their individual members. For Singer and Kimbles (2004a), cultural and personal complexes have similar features in that they both “tend to be repetitive, autonomous, resist consciousness, and collect experience that confirms their historical point of view” (p. 6).

According to Singer and Kimbles (2004a), cultural complexes exhibit the same bipolarity that the Jungian analyst John Weir Perry (1970) identifies for personal complexes. This means that when constellated, the group or individual member identifies with one part of the complex, while the other is projected upon the “suitable hook” of another group or one of its individual members (Singer & Kimbles, 2004a, p. 6). Thus for those caught in their grip, cultural complexes, like their personal counterparts, convey “a simplistic certainty” upon the world (Singer & Kimbles, 2004a, p. 7).

Cultural complex theory is founded on another pre-existing Jungian idea: the cultural unconscious. This was first formulated by Joseph Henderson (1990), who locates it between the personal and collective layers of the unconscious.<sup>55</sup> Jung did not explicitly theorise a cultural layer to the unconscious despite his numerous

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<sup>55</sup> Jungian scholar Kevin Lu (2013b) deviates from the standard Jungian view in that he argues Henderson may not have originated the idea of the cultural unconscious and instead it might be attributed to the historian Arnold Toynbee. Lu's (2013a) key critique, however, is that cultural complex theory suffers from Singer and Kimbles's failure to secure the ground for an extrapolation of the notion of the individual complex to the collective, beyond mere analogy. Lu (2013a) argues this ground could be strengthened by drawing on the collectivity inherent in Jungian concepts such as individuation, archetype and the collective unconscious.

forays into the analysis of group culture (particularly in volume 10 of the *Collected Works*). However, in a previous work, I argued that Singer and Kimbles (2004a) are justified in their view that Jung's various discussions of national character are an attempt to address this issue (Ajuonuma, 2022). As I noted, Jung's specific contention that archetypal patterns drive national and/or racial character is most famously articulated in his 1936 essay "Wotan," where he attributes Nazism's rise in Germany to the "ancient god of storm and frenzy" (CW10, para. 373).

I observed further in that earlier work that Jung's writings in the 1930s on German character, particularly with regards to the perception of Jewish people, have been widely disparaged (Ajuonuma, 2022).<sup>56</sup> Singer (2013) suggests the controversy triggered a reluctance on the part of most Jungians during the second half of the 20th century to comment on cultural matters—a hiatus ended by Henderson's intervention. But analytical psychology is not alone among the depth psychologies in seeking to apply its insights to society. Freudian psychoanalysis has a broadly similar concept to the cultural unconscious that it calls the *social unconscious*, which the group psychoanalyst Haim Weinberg (2007) defines as "the co-constructed shared unconscious of members of a certain social system such as community, society, nation or culture" (p. 312).

Yet, one will recall that when understood narratively, the unconscious is both narrator and narration. This means it can be conceived as Jones (2019) proposes, that is, as both the subject-that-makes-meaning and the meaning-making process that constitutes the subject. This makes the situation more ambiguous than just a

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<sup>56</sup> However, it should be noted that Jung always denied the charge of anti-Semitism (e.g., CW10, para. 1030). Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels has written extensively on the topic, particularly in his 1993 book, *The Political Psyche*.

view of its constituent complexes—individual or cultural—as one or the other phenomenon.

Jones (2019) observes that despite its focus on the subject-that-makes-meaning, narrative psychology grapples with the same ambiguity. This leads her to conclude that in both depth psychology and narrative psychology, “the problem-space [of subjectivity and meaning-making] shifts in ways that one problem appears as a kind of answer to the other problem” (2019, p. 13).

The implication is that when one speaks of either personal or cultural narratives, one speaks also of identity (see Carr, 1986/1991; MacInytre, 1981/2014). Further, as Henderson (1990) contends, when Jung addressed the personal, much of what he considered “was actually always culturally conditioned” (p. 104). This leads Henderson to suggest that personal identity is grounded in the collective, arguing that “in [a child’s] *participation* with her [mother] and other members of the family, the child also receives its first real orientation to the whole culture *in which they all have been molded* [emphasis added]” (1990, p. 105). Thus broadly speaking, the primacy of cultural discourse in the constitution of personal identity is as much a Jungian concern as it is Lacanian.

Jungian analyst Renos Papadopoulos (1997, 2011) contends it is sometimes necessary for people to submerge—consciously or unconsciously—their personal identity into a collective identity to cope with trauma. But for him, this must be only a temporary response because otherwise, “one remains fixed as a collective person without one’s own uniqueness, individuality, contradictions and irregularities but also without the possibility of further growth and development” (2011, p. 229).

Yet, as I noted in my earlier paper, cultural complex theory is not an explicit theory of collective or cultural identity (Ajuonuma, 2022). This is the consequence

of Singer and Kimbles's (2004a) insistence that cultural complexes are different from cultural identity; however, they concede that in practice "there are times when [they] can seem impossibly intertwined" (p. 5). Thus, they acknowledge that for some people "their complexes—cultural and personal—are [emphasis added] their identity" (2004a, p. 5).

In that earlier paper, I highlighted an important characteristic of complexes, which is most apparent at the cultural level, and which I identified as "their ability to convey a sense of unity upon a subject at the expense of the 'other'" (Ajuonuma, 2022, p. 11). For this reason, Singer and Kimbles (2004b) contend that while cultural complexes "are positively involved in the individual's sense of belonging to and identification with his or her reference group," their negative side causes the group and its members to "generate stereotypes, prejudices and a whole psychology of otherness threat" (p. 189). Singer (2009) grasps the complex's bipolarity as an us-vs-them dynamic. I argued that from this perspective, "the *explicit* theory of cultural complexes becomes an *implicit* theory of cultural identity" (2022, p. 11).

I contended further in that paper that Singer and Kimbles's (2004a) tangential treatment of cultural identity necessitates a shift from analytical psychology towards other disciplines to clarify the nature of such identity's belonging-together with the cultural complex (Ajuonuma, 2022). I argued firstly that the us-vs-them dynamic "positions the cultural complex as a form of power relation, characterised by inclusion and exclusion" (2022, p. 11). According to Hall (1996), identities can only operate as points of identification and attachment "*because* of their capacity to exclude" (p. 5). For him, this implies that the unities identities posit are not natural but "constructed within the play of power and exclusion" (p. 5).

Thus, Hall agrees with the political theorist Ernesto Laclau (1990) that “the constitution of a social identity is an act of power” (p. 31). I noted that the group psychoanalyst Farhad Dalal (2001) holds a similar view. For Dalal, “the individual is constituted at the deepest of levels by pre-existing power relations in the world” (2001, p. 547).

But I also argued that one’s ability to make use of the above insights to delineate the relationship between cultural complex and cultural identity is complicated by the fact that the former is a psychological concept rather than social, political, economic or historical (Ajuonuma, 2022). Thus, I posited that the power relations constituted in the cultural complex may have no material ground. However, I contended that this does not negate a reading of the cultural complex as determining cultural identity. I argued such a view finds support in the analysis of a cultural complex Singer (2004) calls an *archetypal defence of the group spirit*.

The idea is based on the Jungian analyst Donald Kalsched’s (1996) theory of archetypal defences of the personal spirit. When a trauma is such that it threatens an individual’s psychic survival, Kalsched proposes that an archetypal self-care system is catalysed to defend and preserve what he calls the “inviolable personal spirit” (1996, p. 12). This system can be understood narratively in that it exhibits a relational structure, the content of which is an archaic daimonic figure guarding an inner wounded child against trauma. However, in so guarding, the daimon forecloses the possibility of the individual’s psychic development. It is therefore not only the persecutor of those external others who might perpetuate a further trauma on the inner child, but also the persecutor of the child itself, whom Kalsched understands as the individual’s true self.

For Singer (2004), a structurally identical self-defence mechanism operates at the cultural level. Thus, in response to a severe collective trauma, according to him, it is the group's psyche that catalyses the daimonic figure "to protect the group or collective spirit" (2004, p. 19). The system's implied narrative structure can be understood as creating identities for those captured in its configuration of the world.

I observed in my previous work that psychoanalytic writers such as Kevin Lu (2013a) and Earl Hopper (2007) have noted correspondences between Singer's archetypal defence theory and the psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan's idea of *chosen trauma* (Ajuonuma, 2022). Volkan (2001) defines the latter as "the shared mental representation of a massive trauma that the group's ancestors suffered at the hand of an enemy" (p. 79).<sup>57</sup> According to Volkan, where a stressful situation causes the psychological regression of a large group, "its chosen trauma is reactivated in order to support the group's threatened identity" (2001, p. 79). This has the following potentially destructive consequence: "A *time collapse* typically occurs. . . . An ancient enemy will be perceived in a new enemy, and the sense of entitlement to regain what was lost, or to seek revenge against the contemporary enemy, [will] become exaggerated" (2001, p. 89).

I noted in my earlier paper that this description of the time collapse "recalls the ruthless persecution of the 'other' by the daimonic figure of the archetypal defence of the group spirit" (Ajuonuma, 2022, p. 13). But as I further observed, it is in Volkan's (2001) delineation of the shifting role of the chosen trauma that one gains insight into how cultural complexes become enmeshed with identity. According to Volkan, the trauma is initially transmitted through the generations as if

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<sup>57</sup> Weinberg (2007) argues that the social unconscious is comprised of both chosen traumas and chosen glories.

a future cohort could mend the group's "injured self-images associated with the mental representations of the shared traumatic event" (2001, p. 87). But he suggests that with time, the chosen trauma's historical truth loses salience; instead, the shared trauma becomes that by which the group's members are "linked together" (2001, p. 88). Thus, it now takes on a *narrative* truth.

Ricœur (1977) contends that the narrative truths of psyche are concerned more with the truth of experience—what he calls "saying-true" and "doing-true"—than the *being-true* of historicity (p. 861). Thus, as I noted in the earlier work, the us-vs-them dynamics that underpin cultural identity do not depend on the material existence of the power relations they imply (Ajuonuma, 2022). Rather, as Freud (1917/1963) observes of the neurosis, it is "*psychical reality which is the decisive kind*" (p. 368).<sup>58</sup>

Thus, to the extent that psychic reality is unconscious, the foregoing analysis implies that one is authorised to speak of anima narratrix even in the case of groups. Furthermore, given the views advanced by Lacan (1957/2001a), Henderson (1990) and Dalal (2001), which identify culture as the matrix of the individual, one may understand anima narratrix as constituted most fundamentally as collective narratives, that is, as collective structures of meaning. But then the question must be asked: Can we transcend those identities such narratives create for us?

### **Individuation Narratives**

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<sup>58</sup> As I suggested in an earlier work, this problematizes Lu's (2013a) call for cultural complex theory to be grounded in the practice of history (Ajuonuma, 2022). The consequence is that Singer (2013) is able to dismiss Lu's call as follows: "In the psyche of groups, meaning is created not out of facts but out of the 'spin' on facts and the 'spin' is often the fruit of a cultural complex at work" (p. 413).

Personality development is foundational to analytical psychology given Jung's privileging of constructive methods of analysis; indeed, he explicitly identifies such development with individuation (CW17, para. 307). However, Jung's grasp of the possible relation of individuation to narrative is restricted to analyses of dream/picture sequences, alchemical parables and mythological stories (e.g., CW5, paras. 176–685; CW9i, paras. 525–626; CW12, paras. 44–331; CW14, paras 1–789). Thus for Jung, there is no conception of individuation (at least as classically presented) that one could view through an anima narratrix frame.

So, to delineate such an approach, one may turn to narrative psychology itself for instruction. Mark Freeman (2002) posits a concept he calls the *narrative unconscious*, which resembles both analytical psychology's cultural unconscious and psychoanalysis's social unconscious. He defines it as "those culturally-rooted aspects of one's history that remain uncharted and that, consequently, have yet to be incorporated into one's story" (2002, p. 193).

Freeman (2016) later reformulates his theory to incorporate what he terms the *ethical unconscious*. He deploys the concept to advance his view that not only do we belong to history and culture in ways that escape our conception but "our way of belonging often seems to bear within it strong valuations regarding what is right and good—and wrong and evil" (2016, p. 520).

Freeman (2019) posits two frameworks for conceiving the relationship between personality development and narrative: (a) narrative gain and (b) non-normative personality development. Freeman (2014) claims people experience narrative gain when they can articulate "a view of [their] existence that is demonstrably more adequate, capacious, truthful, and/or ethically sound than the one it has superseded" (p. 19). In the case of non-normative personality

development, Freeman, writing with Robinson (1990), conceptualises it as the following four-stage sequential process: (a) recognition, (b) distancing, (c) articulation, and (d) appropriation.

In *recognition*, the individual experiences a state of unease, which drives the developmental process. As Freeman and Robinson (1990) put it:

There is some semblance of a disjunction or contradiction between what exists and what is posited as representing a more ideal state of knowing or [B]eing, even if it is the case that this ideal state is not yet fully known. (p. 64)

In *distancing*, the individual adopts a hermeneutical stance to their life to determine the source of this unease and how they might extricate themselves from what Freeman (2019, p. 39) calls “the provoking situation.” In *articulation*, the individual gains a sense of what they might understand to be a better way of Being, “such that the contours of the self-to-[B]e come into view” (Freeman, 2019, p. 40). In *appropriation*, the individual now lives this new self-understanding, which is experienced as a life narrative “more consonant with one’s innermost [B]eing” than that which was superseded (Freeman, 2019, p. 40).

The above outline of Freeman and Robinson’s (1990) model of non-normative personality development reveals it as at bottom identical with Freeman’s (2014) concept of narrative gain. In both cases, Freeman takes on the Ricoeur (1991) and MacIntyre (1981/2014) view of narrative as that which can be lived. Furthermore, he sees narrative’s movement as continual, with the moment of appropriation best viewed as a beginning, which looks towards “those future ends, however ill-defined, that will eventually serve to pull us into yet another cycle of development” (Freeman & Robinson, 1990, p. 66). This recalls Jung, who understands individuation as similarly “a never-ending process” (CW9ii, para. 44).

Freeman (2019) draws a parallel between his concept of narrative gain and the philosopher Charles Taylor's idea of *comparative propositions*. Taylor (1989) argues that the development of personality is concerned either "covertly or openly, implicitly or explicitly" with such propositions, the aim being to establish "not that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some position is superior to some other" (p. 72). Taylor contends this process of development proceeds by what he terms "reasoning in transitions" (1989, p. 72). However, Freeman (2019) is sceptical of the idea that personality always develops through such processes of subjective reasoning. Instead, he argues that the catalyst for one's development may be found not in oneself but in the Other. For Freeman (2010), this Other need not be a human other; it could just as well be art, nature, or God. The important thing for Freeman (2010) is that one should have a "*relatedness* to some Other . . . that can serve as a point of orientation and direction for the process of discerning the direction of one's life" (p. 216).

Freeman (2019) accepts that for Jung, this constellating Other is the unconscious. However, while he acknowledges the unconscious can play such a role, Freeman argues it is more likely to do so not as "some sort of already-articulated disturbing 'object' [archetype] locked away in the [collective] unconscious" but as "some unarticulated strand of the past" (2019, pp. 44–45). Here, he is explicitly linking the Other to his notion of the narrative unconscious. But Freeman is also implicitly connecting the narrative unconscious to his concept of the ethical unconscious, which he claims contains the valuations that condition "our way of belonging to this deep history into which we are born" (2019, p. 49).

Thus, Freeman (2019) does not understand the ideal state as a free-floating individualised entity; rather, it is always grounded in a specific cultural context. This

aligns with Jung's understanding of individuation as "the better and more complete fulfilment of the *collective* [emphasis added] qualities of the human being" (CW7, para. 267). Further, Freeman (2010) understands the Other as the "*transcendent horizon*" for the individual's life story, a horizon that is concerned "finally, about the state and destiny of one's very soul" (p. 94). With such a conception, Freeman (2019) acknowledges he is introducing into the developmental process an idea of the good more expansive than that contained within just narrative gain.

Freeman (2019) makes the explicit connection—to which the thesis has already alluded—between his narrative view of personality development and Jungian individuation. For him, individuation is itself "a *storying—or re-storying—process*" (2019, p. 38). The implication is that Self and the ideal state—the respective goals of personality development for Jung and Freeman—are similarly connected.<sup>59</sup> Hence, what is now thematic is that sense of individuation as anima narratrix that had previously escaped conception.

### **Ethical Relativity**

The foregoing reinforces the idea—proposed by Bruner (1990), Ricœur (1990/1994) and White (1980)—that narrative and ethics are intertwined. Yet, Freeman (2019) cautions that narratives catalysed by the good may express beliefs and behaviors at odds with traditional understandings of the ethical. For him, while one might suppose that hypergoods like kindness and compassion "will ultimately gain the upper hand," such an outcome is not assured (2019, p. 39).

Jung speaks similarly of Self, which he claims, "Cannot be equated either with collective morality or with natural instinct, but must be conceived as a

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<sup>59</sup> This is less of a controversial position when Jungian individuation is understood not so much in its classical archetypal sense but as a psychological centering process (see Roesler, 2024, p. 232).

determining factor whose nature is individual and unique” (CW11, para. 394). And with regards this developing personality, he expresses his hope that everything “may turn to ‘good’,” by which he means “an unfolding which does no damage . . . but conserves the possibilities of life” (CW9i, para. 595, Footnote 141).

Yet, this absence of moral absolutism does not diminish the felt force of the ethical obligation for either Jung or Freeman. Hillman (1983/2019) addresses the implications of this type of scenario in his discussion of the moral claim of archetypal images:

The question of ethical relativity that raises its head whenever one speaks of a "pandemonium of images" and a plurality of gods is answered by the dedication that the images demand. It is they—not we—who demand meticulous crafting into jewelled idols; they, who call for ritualized devotions, who insist they be consulted before we act. Images are the compelling source of morality and religion as well as the conscientiousness of art. (p. 68)

Hillman’s (1983/2019) thesis relativises the impulse to personality development.<sup>60</sup> This is a sharp departure from Jung, who privileges the Self archetype in this regard (CW18, para. 1419). Freeman (2019) does not believe in archetypes. Nevertheless, he would appear to harbor some sympathy in this direction when he speaks of the “‘hypergoods’—or gods—that orient and direct the course of life” (p. 48). Therefore, the ideal state, like Self can be conceived as that which manifests asymptotically from dedication to some idea of the good.

That-which-manifests is also anima narratrix; albeit now in an individuated guise, telling the “truer” story of one’s soul. This interpretation of the unconscious aligns with Jung’s claim for archetype that it “determines the nature of the

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<sup>60</sup> Hillman (1974, as cited in Avens, 1980, p. 95) makes this point explicitly in his claim that “each archetypal possibility of the psyche . . . could follow its principle of individuation within its particular divine model.”

configurational process and the course it will follow, with seeming foreknowledge, or as though it were already in possession of the goal” (CW8, para. 411).

Therefore, when one conceives anima narratrix as constituted in collective narratives, one understands such narratives most primordially as archetypal. Yet as Ricœur (1983/1990a) observes, “*narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence*” (p. 52). Thus, an investigation into the relation of the unconscious to narrative is incomplete whilst the relation of the unconscious to time is unexplored.

## Chapter 5: Time and the Unconscious

Augustine (397–401/2001) succinctly captured the elusiveness of time in his famous remark: “I know what it is if no one asks me what it is; but if I want to explain it to someone who has asked me, I find that I do not know” (p. 262). For Jung and Freud, such elusiveness manifests in the context of what both considered the timelessness of unconscious processes. Yet, as noted in Chapter 3, Jung did not produce an explicit theory of time, and as the psychoanalyst André Green (2009/2018) observes, neither did Freud.

Freud (1933/1964) at least acknowledged the lacuna, asserting that he and psychoanalysis had made “too little theoretical use” of the unconscious’s supposed timelessness, which latter he argued “seems to offer an approach to the most profound discoveries” (p. 74). Jung (1984), for his part, appeared to posit what such discoveries might be when he assigned time a constitutive role for human being in his claim that it “coincides with our psychological condition” (p. 415).

This chapter argues that psychoanalytic views on time have implicitly developed towards an understanding of the concept that aligns with Temporality. It examines the origins in Freud of such conceptions and the way his successors took forward his ideas. The contention is that this movement in psychoanalytic thinking reaches its fullest extent in Jung’s investigations into the temporal condition of archetype. The implication is that psyche is not only constituted as *homo narrans* and *anima narratrix* but also, as Hinton (2015/2017) proposes, *homo temporalis* (temporal man).

### Freudian Views on Time

Freud (1892/1966) was the first to grapple with the problem of time as it relates to the unconscious, proposing in a draft paper that the latter exhibits a

“neglect of the characteristic of time” (p. 253). But it was not until *The Interpretation of Dreams* that Freud (1900/1953a) made his first definitive statement on the issue, positing that “in the unconscious nothing can be brought to an end, nothing is past or forgotten” (p. 577).

Yet according to James Strachey, the editor and translator of the *Standard Edition* of Freud’s complete works, it was only in 1907 that Freud first explicitly referred to the unconscious’s timelessness (Freud, 1901/1960, p. 274, Footnote 2). In a revised version of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Freud (1901/1960) remarks: “In the case of *repressed* memory-traces it can be demonstrated that they undergo no alteration even in the course of the longest period of time. The unconscious is quite timeless” (p. 274, Footnote 2).

Freud (1915/1957b) elaborates that by “timeless,” he means that unconscious processes are not only unaltered by the passage of time but also “have no reference to time at all” (p. 187). This notion of a type of process that does not refer to time seems paradoxical. And this point will be revisited later in the chapter. Freud’s idea of the atemporality of the unconscious survived even the fundamental change he made to his conception of psyche in 1920’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Here, an unconscious comprised of repressed memory-traces and representations made way for one underpinned by the libidinal impulses of the *id*. Later, Freud (1933/1964) wrote:

There is nothing in the *id* that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the passage of time, and—a thing that is most remarkable and awaits consideration in philosophical thought—no alteration in its mental processes is produced by the passage of time. Wishful impulses which have never passed beyond the *id*, but impressions, too, which have been sunk into the *id* by repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they had just occurred. (p. 74)

The psychoanalyst Charles Hanly (2009/2018) argues provocatively that Freud's understanding of the unconscious as timeless was a defensive move on his part, resulting from a "biologically driven narcissistic anxiety about death" (p. 32). Hanly bases this claim on his contention that "in using the words 'timeless' and 'immortal,' Freud is drawing on an ancient identification of the timeless with the unchanging" (2009/2018, p. 30). However, it is not obvious that this is what Freud meant. Indeed, Hinton (2014) argues that in his use of such terminology, Freud was simply conveying the idea of something that is not partaking in the flow of time "which is different than something 'eternal'" (p. 441)—a point which will also be revisited later in the chapter.

According to Hanly (2009/2018), Freud's deployment of the word "timelessness" is warranted only if its meaning is restricted to its purely psychoanalytic sense, which the former boils down to four essential factors: (a) the durability of the unconscious organisations, (b) the inability of repression to divest the latter of motivational efficacy, (c) the indifference to time of such structures, and (d) the inability of time to heal the psychic conflicts they constitute. But even a cursory glance at Freud's writings clarifies his understanding of timelessness as consistent with what Hanly considers its psychoanalytic meaning—which Freud was of course instrumental in establishing.

Hanly's (2009/2018) claim is that the unconscious cannot ultimately be timeless because its contents "are not at all immune to change" (p. 31). Nonetheless, his manner of conceiving such change—"[unconscious contents] have a beginning; they will have a variable history according to their influence in the life of the individual and of the individual's relational life on them; and they will end with death" (2009/2018, p. 30)—aligns not so much with a changing unconscious, but a

changing *relationship* of the individual to their unconscious. The possibility of the latter through the achievement of insight is for Freud (1933/1964) the very pre-condition of psychoanalytic work:

[Repressed contents] can only be recognized as belonging to the past, can only lose their importance and be deprived of their cathexis of energy, when they have been made conscious by the work of analysis, and it is on this that the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests to no small extent. (p. 74)

For Freud (1915/1957b), when unconscious contents become conscious, they pass from timelessness into time, such that “reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs [consciousness]” (p. 187). Yet according to the psychoanalyst Jean-Claude Rolland (2009/2018), this strict division in the temporal condition of consciousness and the unconscious is unwarranted. This is because for him, it does not account for the fact, for example, that memory sequences recounted in analysis are often “less subservient to temporal [linear time] than to drive-related considerations” (2009/2018, p. 53).

The implication is that loci of consciousness exist that follow the logic of what Green (2009/2018) calls the *outside-time* of the unconscious rather than chronological time. He goes further than Rolland (2009/2018) in challenging Freud’s temporal dichotomy by identifying five orders of time, which confront one another in psychoanalytic work: (a) the time of remembering, (b) psychobiological time, (c) the time of the projection, (d) the “murdered time” of repetition-compulsion, and (e) *Nachträglichkeit* or the re-transcription of memory.

Let us consider how these orders interact. In the *time of remembering*, the analysand attempts to bring into consciousness memory-traces attached to pathogenic libidinal impulses to deprive the latter of their force by marking the former as belonging to the past. Yet, Freud (1914/1958) observes that the analysand is compelled to repeat such impulses, thus blocking their ability to remember. Green

(2009/2018) equates repetition-compulsion with a *murdered time* because in his view, it suggests “a form of abolition [of temporal movement] close to foreclosure” (p. 7).

But repetition-compulsion is a murder of time for another reason: It denies repressed contents the possibility of assuming their place in the chronological order as *past*. Further, in foreclosing temporal movement, repetition-compulsion opposes genuine future. Hence, the *time of projection*—which according to Green (2009/2018, p. 10), “play[s] an organizing role in relation to future experiences of a psychic nature”—becomes a recapitulation of infantile phantasy. The latter is itself determined by the development of libido, which occurs in *psychobiological time*. Further, in *Nachträglichkeit*, one observes a destabilisation of the time of remembering through a conscious dialectic between present and past, resulting in a re-transcription of the meaning of memories.

Freud never defined *Nachträglichkeit*. And in Strachey’s English translation of it as “*deferred action*” (Freud, 1918/1955b, p. 45, Footnote 2) and Lacan’s (1956/1966, p. 256) French translation as “*après-coup*” (at a later date), one has two contrasting ways of conceiving the concept. These differ in the significance attached to the original memory of the event. In deferred action, the memory has an intrinsic meaning, which is dormant until such time as it is revisited by the analysand and its meaning activated in conscious awareness; here, the movement of signification is forward in time. In *après-coup*, the memory’s meaning is constituted retrospectively by the analysand; here, the movement of signification is backwards in time.

*Après-coup* has similarities to Jung’s (CW4, paras. 394–395) concept of *retrospective fantasising*, where an analysand’s present psychic situation drives them to reinterpret the contents of memory to support a fantasy. In *après-coup*, the

analysand consciously shapes a fantasy from a specific memory, while in retrospective fantasising, the analysand unconsciously shapes a fantasy from any available and suitable memories.<sup>61</sup> It is contended that it is après-coup's connection to a specific memory rather than memory in general that is the key difference to retrospective fantasy—present and particular past being linked in après-coup by what the psychoanalyst Haydée Faimberg (2005, p. 2) calls “a relationship of meaning.”

In his discussion of Nachträglichkeit, Green (2009/2018) uses the translations “deferred action” and “après-coup” interchangeably, although it is clear from the manner of his presentation that he is discussing the concept from the former perspective. Yet, it may not be incorrect to think together deferred action and après-coup. As the psychoanalyst Ignês Sodr  (2005) argues, “a convincing new version of the past has to carry the belief that, ‘in reality’, this is how it has always been . . . [which] can only be effected through a movement in both directions of time” (p. 8).

The psychoanalyst Dana Birksted-Breen (2003) advances a similar view, which in its recasting of the progressive movement of deferred action as *developmental time*, allows the incorporation into Nachträglichkeit of the future as *future* (rather than as the present's relative position to the past). This allows a more expansive conception of the dialectic between Nachträglichkeit's backward- and forwarding-looking movements:

One movement cannot be separated from the other because retroactive resignification *is* developmental progression. For there to be progression there also has to be this kind of retrospective resignification. The forward movement necessitates a backward movement at the same time and, equally, the

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<sup>61</sup> Nonetheless, the psychoanalysts Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1967/1973) argue against any link between Nachträglichkeit and fantasy except in the case of primal phantasies. However, this view is conditioned by their understanding of Nachträglichkeit exclusively as deferred action. Further, it should be noted that Jung (CW4, paras. 394–395) does not use the word “fantasy” in the sense of illusion—which is how Laplanche and Pontalis interpret retrospective fantasising—but as resignification, or what Freud (1919/1955c, p. 185) calls “a construction of analysis.”

continual incorporation and restructuring of the past in the backward movement necessitates the ability to move forward. (Birksted-Breen, 2003, p. 1509)

This creative encounter between past and future, occurring in the present, is a psychoanalytic version of Temporality. In Chapter 3, it was observed that Heidegger (1927/2010) defines the latter as the “unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been” (H. 326). There, it was noted that Temporality demands what Watts (2021, p. 635) calls “a forward-looking stance on one’s history.” In psychoanalytic terms, this is the realm of the resignification of memory, which according to Birksted-Breen’s (2003) conception of *Nachträglichkeit*, is necessarily accompanied by developmental progression. One understands the latter in existential phenomenological terms as Dasein’s “letting-itself-come-toward-itself,” which Heidegger identifies as “the primordial phenomenon of the *future*” (1927/2010, H. 325).

Freud (1908/1959) himself flirted with the idea of a temporalised unity of past, present and future in his discussion of the temporal condition of the unconscious wish:

Mental work is linked to some current impression, some provoking occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one of the subject's major wishes. From there it harks back to a memory of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in which this wish was fulfilled; and it now creates a situation relating to the future which represents a fulfilment of the wish. What it thus creates is a day-dream or phantasy, which carries about it traces of its origin from the occasion which provoked it and from the memory. Thus past, present and future are strung together, as it were, on the thread of the wish that runs through them. (pp. 147–148)

Freud’s (1908/1959) elaborations on the working of the wish illustrate why his claim that unconscious processes do not refer to time is not straightforward. This is because for Freud, unconscious processes formulated as wishes inherently enter into a temporal order. However, this order must be distinguished from the temporal

order of conscious contents. It is only in relation to the latter that unconscious contents can be considered timeless. Freud's failure to clarify this point is the source of the seeming paradox noted earlier in the chapter. But in the absence of a theory of time, it was a clarification he was ill-equipped to make.

Temporality provides a way of conceptualising the temporal condition of the wish; however, there are important differences. Firstly, the temporalisation of the wish differs from Temporality in that its directionality is present-past-future rather than future-past-present. Secondly, the temporal unity of the wish exhibits a sequential movement, which is not the case for Temporality, where the unity of past, present and future consists in a simultaneous "interplay of each toward each" (Heidegger, 1969/1972a, p. 15).

Nonetheless, the psychoanalyst Elliott Jaques (1982) attempts to fuse Temporality with Freud's (1908/1959) temporal interpretation of the wish in his positing of a goal-driven libidinal process constituted in a simultaneously existing past, present and future. Jaques calls his formulation *time of intention* and contrasts it with what he terms *time of succession*, that is, clock time. But despite this effort at synthesis, the time of intention for Jaques is ultimately not co-extensive with Temporality. This is because he considers the former the mode of time of the unconscious, and for him, "Heidegger lacked a conception of unconscious mental processes" (1982, p. 90). Yet as discussed in Chapter 3, it does not follow that Heidegger's denial of the unconscious forecloses its incorporation into his philosophy.

Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1967/1973) too note similarities between the existential phenomenological and Freudian conceptions of time.<sup>62</sup> However, their focus is specifically on the resignification of memory, for which they argue Freud provides the more precise description of the phenomenon. But this claim is based on their view of *Nachträglichkeit* as deferred action. Thus, Laplanche and Pontalis, like Green (2009/2018), emphasise the past and hence subscribe to the *there-and-then* approach to psychoanalysis rather than its *here-and-now* counterpart, which Birksted-Breen (2003) associates with *après-coup*.

At its extreme, the here-and-now approach has developed in the direction of a complete devaluation of the past. For example, the psychoanalyst Janine Puget (2009/2018) argues for a focus both on what she calls the *evental present*—the lived experience of an event that disrupts linear temporality—and the *relational present*, a time of potential that emerges in the encounter of two or more individuals. Ostensibly, Puget's insistence on the transformative power of such moments suggests an affinity with the *Augenblick*. However, a deeper examination reveals the gap to a truly Heideggerian conception since Puget views the past as an inherent obstacle to transformation rather than a necessary resource.

Nonetheless, it remains possible to observe from this brief survey of the development of psychoanalytic ideas on time a grasping—albeit in fits and starts—towards an understanding of the concept that may indeed align with existential phenomenology. It is contended this implicit movement reaches its fullest extent in Jung.

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<sup>62</sup> Laplanche and Pontalis (1967/1973) understand Temporality as a phenomenon in which “consciousness constitutes its own past, constantly subjecting its meaning to revision in conformity with its ‘project’” (p. 112). But this reference to consciousness is jarring since Heidegger (1927/2010) de-emphasises its role in existential phenomenology as against what he terms the “formal phenomenology of consciousness” of his mentor Edmund Husserl (H. 115).

## Jungian Views on Time

Jung's first ruminations on the relation of time to the unconscious came in a lecture given as a student in which he discussed the nature of soul. Here, Jung (1983, para. 96) equated the latter with a "vital principle extend[ing] far beyond our consciousness"—a phenomenon the Jungian analyst Marie-Louise von Franz (1983) observes he would later come to understand as the unconscious. Jung argued that since the soul "eludes all sense perception," it "*must be independent of space and time,*" which led him to postulate its immortality (1983, paras. 98–99).

It will be recalled that immortality is a word Freud also used in reference to the unconscious, which formed the basis of Hanly's (2008/2019) critique. But while the latter's criticism of Freud would seem unwarranted, the premise of this critique is on much firmer ground with Jung. This is because whilst Jung in some instances conceptualises the temporal condition of the unconscious as Freud does (e.g. CW8, para. 383), his view of the soul's relation to time exemplifies his general approach—which is to view the time of the unconscious as some form of eternity.

Yet, Jung lacks consistency as to whether his concept of eternity refers to outside-timeness or an infinite timespan, be the latter linear or cyclical. In *Symbols of Transformation*, Jung (CW5, para. 425) explores the problem of time through a discussion of its identification with the Mithraic god Aion. The ancient Greek word "*aion*" means "epoch" or "everlasting," which suggests a linear conception of eternity. Jung notes the god is "conventionally represented as a lion-headed human figure . . . [who is] wrapped in the coils of a serpent" (CW5, para. 425). According to him, the lion and serpent are ancient libido symbols. Jung (CW6, para. 778) understands by libido "*psychic energy,*" as opposed to Freud's exclusively sexual interpretation. He

thus adopts a psychological conception of Aion as “a time symbol . . . composed entirely of libido-images” (CW5, para. 425).

However, for Jung, the lion and snake are antagonistic dispositions of libido (CW5, para. 425). This allows him to view time not as an “empty and purely formal concept,” but instead as “defined by the rising and setting sun, by the death and renewal of libido, the dawning and extinction of consciousness” (CW5, para. 425). From the perspective of Aion’s libido-symbols, Jung therefore takes on a view of eternity as cyclical.

Yiassemides (2014/2016) argues that Jung ties libido to time because the former—as “the quintessentially oppositional force” (p. 3)—is most appropriate for symbolising a concept she argues is itself characterised by an inherent opposition. She understands this conflict in two ways: firstly, as a struggle between time as the medium of life and its inevitable function as the bringer of death; and secondly, as the conflict between time as chronology (which contains the whole of the first opposition) and time as eternity, understood as outside-timeness.

This second approach to time’s supposed internal conflict reflects the dichotomy the 2nd century Christian heretical movement Gnosticism posited between the temporal condition of what it called *Pleroma*—the timeless, unchanging heavenly state—and *Creatura*, the timebound plane of existence defined by change. Jung was strongly influenced by the Gnostics, considering them “the first thinkers to concern themselves (after a fashion) with the contents of the collective unconscious” (CW18, para. 1501). In 1916, he composed under a pseudonym a poem in the Gnostic style entitled *Septem Sermones ad Mortuos* (Seven Sermons to the Dead).

In its elaboration of Pleroma and Creatura, Yiassemides (2014/2016) considers the poem pivotal in shaping Jung's approach to time.<sup>63</sup>

Pleroma exhibits a temporal condition Charles Taylor (2007) calls *higher time*. According to Taylor, this is a time that "gathered, assembled, reordered, [and] punctuated profane, ordinary time" (2007, p. 54). He posits three kinds of higher time: (a) Platonic eternity, (b) the Augustinian eternity of gathered time, and (c) the Eliadean time of origins.<sup>64</sup> Pleromatic time most closely approximates Platonic eternity, which is the timeless condition of Plato's Ideas.

Augustinian eternity differs from the Platonic in that it enters into relation with temporal order. It is a gathered time because it brings together past, present and future into an eternal extended "now," in contrast to the temporal dispersion Augustine (397-401/2001) argues characterises the human soul. This gathering of temporal dimensions into a unity prompts Taylor (2007) to suggest Augustinian eternity as a precursor to Temporality.

For Taylor (2007), the Eliadean time of origins is the time when the order of things in a secular reality is established. Its name refers to the historian of religion Mircea Eliade, who proposed it in the context of his notion of eternal return.<sup>65</sup> According to Eliade (1954/2005), archaic societies possessed a "nostalgia for a periodical return to the mythical time of the beginning of things, to the 'Great Time'" (p. xxiii). This Great Time was conceived to have existed sometime in the remote past, when the relevant agents were "perhaps gods, but at least heroes" (Taylor, 2007, p. 57). Taylor observes that in the modern age, the time of origins holds a new

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<sup>63</sup> While the poem is not part of Jung's *Collected Works*, it is one of the visionary experiences recounted in *The Red Book: Liber Novus*.

<sup>64</sup> Taylor (2007) does not consider infinity a type of higher time, although he observes that in the form of the repeated cycle, its meaning is traditionally anchored in the concept.

<sup>65</sup> This is not to be confused with the Nietzschean understanding of the concept as a philosophical tool for self-reflection.

reference: It now concerns a time of recognisably *human* agency—for example, the declaration of US independence, which is a Great Time revisited in the annual rite of the 4th of July celebrations (Taylor, 2007, p. 197, p. 716).

### ***Archetype and Higher Time***

Yet as already observed, whilst Jung associates the unconscious with higher time, he does not explicitly treat on time in the *Collected Works*. This may explain why the concept has been only sporadically explored in analytical psychology.<sup>66</sup> In Chapter 3, it was noted that Yiasssemides (2014/2016) contends time is most closely approached by Jung in his explorations of archetype. In Chapter 2, it was observed that one of Jung's ways of conceiving archetype is as Platonic Idea; this would identify its temporal condition with Platonic eternity.

But the above conclusion is problematised by Jung's insistence (also noted in Chapter 3) that archetype operates with reference to time. Thus if its temporal condition is described by eternity, it must be of the Augustinian rather than Platonic variety. This supposition is supported by Jung's claim for archetype that "it is a timeless condition where beginning, middle, and end are just the same, they are all given in one" (McGuire & Hull, 1977/1993, p. 289).

The implication is that archetype concerns the lived experience of time and not the impersonal temporal condition of Platonic eternity. Further, even as archetypal time straddles the lived temporal dimensions, it is for Jung—as it is for Heidegger (1927/2010)—the future that has priority. This is because Jung understands psychic processes as teleological, using the Aristotelian term "entelechy" to describe archetype's futurity (CW9i, para. 278).

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<sup>66</sup> For example, Main (2004) addresses the issue of simultaneity in Jung's concept of synchronicity, whilst von Franz (1970/1974) explores time's qualitative aspect.

Jung's reference to entelechy can be further grasped in Aristotelian terms as a privileging of final over efficient cause. Chapter 4 discussed how this conceptualisation supports a distinction between the approaches to narrative taken by Jung and Freud. Yet for Yiassemides (2014/2016), it is also the basis for distinguishing their temporal orientations: Jung's emphasis on final cause betrays a focus on telos and the future, whilst Freud's concern with efficient cause necessitates an emphasis on origins and the past.

Freud's treatment of origins is not confined to individual human histories but extends to the species. Specifically, Freud (1913/1955a) speculates that in pre-history a tyrannical father with exclusive sexual access to the females in a primal horde was murdered and eaten by his oppressed sons, who in their later guilt erected a totem to him and instituted a taboo against incest within the horde.<sup>67</sup> The archetypal nature<sup>68</sup> of this theory suggests it is appropriate to attribute to it a temporal condition of a higher order than explicitly envisaged by Freud for unconscious contents. Yet, it would still not be accurate to accept Hanly's (2009/2018) contention that Freud understands by timelessness something akin to the temporal condition of the Kantian noumena. This is because such a claim identifies the temporality of the Freudian unconscious with eternity.

It is contended that the higher time relevant to Freud is the Eliadean time of origins. Eliade (1954/2005) understands the latter in terms of archetypes, arguing that for the human being in archaic and traditional societies, archetypes are "the models for his institutions and the norms for his various categories of behavior [which] are believed to have been 'revealed' at the beginning of time" (p. xxviii). This

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<sup>67</sup> According to Freud (1913/1955a), this primal drama is not only reenacted psychologically in the Oedipus complex but also in religious myths and rituals, such as the Catholic Eucharist.

<sup>68</sup> See Footnote 43 in Chapter 4.

supports an understanding of the archetypal drama of the primal horde as a Great Time, which we grasp as both “behind us, but . . . also in a sense above us” (Taylor, 2007, p. 57).

Further, as that which occurred in the beginning, the Great Time may be reapproached only in ritual. In clinical terms, it is the time of origin of the neurosis, which the patient “reapproaches” in the ritual of repetition-compulsion. It is contended that in this elision of the temporal condition of the neurosis with Eliadean higher time, the true import of Freud’s description of the unconscious as timeless is finally understood: It is so not because it is outside of chronological time nor indeed because it is unaltered by such time but because it *exceeds* it, that is, its initiatory significance lifts it above the flow of chronological experience of which it is part.

However, one is not bound by this excess. The time of origin, despite being what Taylor (2007) calls “the great Exemplar,” is still that “which we can be closer to or farther away from as we move through history” (p. 57). Taylor understands such histories as collective. Yet, a psychoanalytic interpretation identifies them also as individual, the goal of therapy being the depotentiation of the time of origin in the history of the analysand.<sup>69</sup>

### ***Synchronicity and Time***

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<sup>69</sup> This intertwining of the Eliadean time of origins with Freud is novel also because the traditional approach has been to associate Eliade with Jung. This is despite Eliade (1954/2005) himself observing that his use of the term “archetype” has “an entirely different meaning” (p. xxviii). According to Eliade, this difference is accounted for by the distinction between archaic ritual and depth psychology. Yet, as the scholar of the psychology of religion Mary Jo Meadow (1992) correctly observes, Eliadean archetypes can also be grasped psychologically. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that outside of a neurotic context, the time of origins is not a source of pathology; indeed, both Eliade (1954/2005) and Taylor (2007) view rituals geared towards the Great Time as vessels for collective renewal. However, one might still conceive of circumstances, particularly in modern times, where a people’s attachment to an initiatory event could take on a pathological character—e.g., where national foundational myths foreclose realistic engagement with present realities. (See also the discussion of cultural narratives in Chapter 4.)

It has been posited that the time of origins and Augustinian gathered time constitute the temporal conditions of the Freudian and Jungian unconscious, respectively. These two types of higher time differ in their relation to secular time: The former concerns chronological order, while the latter addresses temporal dimensions. This is a distinction Yiassemides (2014/2016) also recognises in her assertion that “for Jung past and future are perceived as dimensions, rather than temporal demarcations on a timeline” (p. 29). Such demarcations are a feature of Freud even where the chronological order is subverted, as is the case in *Nachträglichkeit*, where the sense of a fixed timeline remains, albeit one traversed non-linearly.

In the Jungian conception, all temporal demarcations exist simultaneously in what Yiassemides (2014/2016) calls a “constant interaction between past, present and future” (p. 31). Hence, Jung speaks of time’s *psychic relativity*—a situation in which temporal order does not exist in itself but depends on psychic conditions (CW8, para. 836). This suggests a certain elasticity to time, which for Jung, means it “can apparently be reduced almost to vanishing point” (CW8, para. 840).

It was Jung’s (CW8, para. 840) reflections on the relativity of time in the unconscious that led him to propose archetype as psychoid.<sup>70</sup> For him, the psychoid has latent meaning, which the human being apprehends—to a delimited extent—in synchronistic phenomena. The classic example Jung (CW8, para. 843) gives is the case of a young female analysand, who at a critical moment in her analysis dreamt she was given a golden scarab, a type of beetle sacred to the ancient Egyptians. As she recounted the dream, Jung was disturbed by a knocking sound behind him. He turned to see a flying insect tapping against the outside windowpane. Jung opened

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<sup>70</sup> See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of psychoid archetype.

the window and caught what flew into the room: It was a scarabaeid beetle—a member of the scarab family.

Jung (CW8, para. 845) interprets this event as pointing the way forward for the woman's treatment since the scarab was considered a symbol of rebirth by the ancient Egyptians. While this was clearly a subjective determination on his part, for Jung, it did not undermine the validity of the synchronistic experience. This is because he contends that it is the “anthropomorphic interpretation . . . [that] forms the indispensable criterion of synchronicity,” arguing that this remains the case even though “what that factor which appears to us as ‘meaning’ may be in itself we have no possibility of knowing” (CW8, para. 916).

It was noted in Chapter 2 that Jung defines synchronicity as “the simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state with one or more external events which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state—and, in certain cases, vice versa” (CW8, para. 850). The operative words in this definition—which he gave in his seminal 1952 paper “Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle”—are “simultaneous” and “meaningful.” Existing scholarship's engagement with synchronicity has tended to focus on the latter, which Yiassemides (2014/2016) attributes to “Jung's own insufficient elaboration of the temporal implications” of the concept (p. 48).

Nevertheless, the lack of scholarly interest in the temporal aspect of synchronicity is puzzling given that “time”—in the form of *chronos*—enters into its very name. Taken alongside the prefix “syn-” —which means “together, similarly, alike” (Oxford University Press [OUP], n.d.-f)—this gives synchronicity a literal meaning of “together-in-time,” which is of course what is meant by simultaneity. Yet, Jung destabilises this reading when he describes the “falling together in time,” which

characterises synchronicity, as only “a *kind* [emphasis added] of simultaneity” (CW8, para. 840).

The suggestion is that when Jung uses the word “simultaneous” in his definition of synchronicity, he does so only loosely. Indeed, this is the conclusion Wolfgang Pauli reached when he told Jung that the way the latter used terms like “time,” which have precise meanings in physics, was in the manner of “dreamlike images of the imagination” (Jung & Pauli, 1992/2014, p. 57). Such imprecision is reflected in the fact that in some of the examples of synchronicity Jung gives, the meaningfully aligned psychic and/or physical events can be far apart in chronological time. This has led Main (2004) and fellow Jungian scholar Robert Aziz (1990) to describe time’s role in synchronicity as problematic, with the latter going so far as to dismiss its relevance in favour of meaning.

Yiassemides (2014/2016) argues that Jung addresses such difficulties in his claim that synchronicity concerns two kinds of simultaneity: one that is immediately obvious—what Aziz (1990, p. 71) calls “clock-time simultaneity”—and one that is not. According to Jung (CW8, para. 850), in the latter case, it is an unconscious psychic state that is simultaneous with the external event rather than a conscious one (as would be the case in clock-time simultaneity). However, there is a strong element of sophistry to this argument as the concrete examples Jung gives of non-obvious simultaneity involve meaningful coincidences of unconscious psychic states with *future* external events.

For instance, Jung (CW8, para. 844) discusses the case of the wife of one of his analysands who became agitated after witnessing a flock of birds land on her house, which she held to be a portent of death. He states that the incident occurred soon after her husband left the house to visit his doctor over suspicions of heart

disease. Despite the doctor finding no cause for concern, the husband collapsed in the street on his way home and was brought back to his house, dying.

Here, the unconscious psychic state (the wife's agitation) is not simultaneous with the husband's death. Jung tries to surmount this difficulty by arguing that the relevant simultaneity is not between the psychic state and the external event, but between the ordinary psychic state of an individual and an unexpected one "which is directly or indirectly connected with some objective external event" (CW8, para. 855). Jung then states that it is this second scenario that describes synchronicity despite its clear deviation from the earlier definition.

It is contended that with this move, Jung weakens rather than strengthens the case for the temporal interpretation of synchronicity given the definitional inconsistencies it creates. However, the temporal view is salvageable if instead of relying on either two types of simultaneity or the co-incidence of psychic states, the nature of the *chronos* in the term "synchronicity" is redefined. The usual approach is to understand *chronos* as linear time. But if one were instead to understand it in terms of time's psychic relativity, certain inflections in Jung's manner of characterising synchronicity become more intelligible.

For instance, as Aziz (1990) observes, Jung's understanding of synchronicity as only a kind of simultaneity makes more sense when the key implication of psychically relative time is grasped: that all temporal demarcations coexist "en bloc" (p. 71). Thus, it becomes irrelevant whether the parallel events of synchronistic phenomena happen at the same clock time; what is important is that they happen in the same relative time. But what is meant by this?<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> In the remainder of this chapter, the term "relative time" will continue to denote the idea of temporal elasticity. However, this is to be distinguished from what physics means by the term—i.e., that an object's experience of time is relative to that object's speed. Jung (1976/2015b, p. 109) states that it was Albert Einstein—the originator of the idea of time's relativity in physics—who first got him thinking

One finds an answer in the type of time the ancient Greeks contrasted with *chronos*: *kairos*. As noted in Chapter 3, this is translated as the right or opportune time. Thus, when one speaks of time's qualitative as opposed to quantitative aspect, one is concerned with *kairos*. Von Franz (1988/1992) ties *kairos* directly to synchronicity in her definition of the former as "a magical moment in which synchronistic events happen" (p. 146). However, it is Aristotle's (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1096a25–30) conception of *kairos* as the temporal manifestation of the good that gives a fuller sense of its import.

Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) conceives the good as "an activity of soul in accord with virtue" (1098a15–17). According to him, there are two kinds of virtue: moral and intellectual. One type of intellectual virtue is *phronesis*, which was briefly discussed in Chapter 1. For Aristotle, *phronesis* is the intellectual virtue that accompanies moral virtue. He understands it as that which guides activity towards its *telos* (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1145a1–10). This describes *phronesis* in quasi-spatial terms. But as the philosopher Sean Kirkland (2007) argues, from a *kairotic* perspective, *phronesis* is also understood temporally. This is because for Aristotle, the *phronimos*, that is, the person who possesses *phronesis*, must always "examine what pertains to the opportune moment" (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1104a8–9). Yet, this way of conceiving *kairos* leaves one with the sense of it as only a special kind of *chronos*. But as Kirkland (2007) demonstrates in his analysis of the Aristotelian concept of *good deliberation*—the consequent activity of *phronesis*—*kairos* can be grasped as relative time.

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about the possibility of a psychically relative time. The implication of physics's conception of relativity is that time exists as a block rather than a flow, which aligns with Aziz's (1990) conception of psychically relative time.

Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) defines good deliberation as “a certain correctness of deliberation . . . that accords with what is beneficial and aims at what one ought, in the right manner, and at the right time” (1142b15–30). However, this definition assumes the chronological understanding of *kairos* that the present enquiry attempts to escape. In contrast, Kirkland (2007) interprets good deliberation as not only that which occurs at the right time but as also itself temporally constituted. Specifically, he conceives it as oriented towards a desired but indeterminate *future* outcome, which is grounded in ethical standards arising out of an often inaccessible and habituated *past* and results in right action in the *present*. In Kirkland’s conception, what is thus discerned is a unified temporal field, where good deliberation is unveiled as constituted in a *kairos* understood as the interplay of the three dimensions of time. This interplay is precisely what Jung means by relative time.

But if psychically relative time is grasped as *kairos*, how is Aristotle’s (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) conception of the latter as the temporal manifestation of the good captured in Jung’s framework? The answer lies in the latent meaning of psychoid archetype. Like the good, such meaning is proposed to manifest in spatiotemporal reality, which as noted in Chapter 3 is for Jung always a psychic reality (CW11, para. 87). He identifies latent meaning with the Chinese *Tao*, which Jung notes “does not appear in the world of the senses, but is only its organizer” (CW8, para. 920).

Jung’s initial explorations of synchronicity occurred in the context of his meditations on Chinese philosophy (Jung, 1984, p. 44, Footnote 1). His specific focus was the supposed universal life energy flowing from the interplay of the opposites of yin and yang—the passive and active principles of nature, respectively—which find their common source in the *Tao*. Jung (1984) referred to

synchronicity as “the prejudice of the East” (pp. 44–45).<sup>72</sup> For him, the phenomenon is the necessary implication of Chinese philosophy’s contention that all nature is subject to “one and the same energy that moves everything” (1984, p. 417).

Further, in his discussion of yin-yang’s relationship to synchronicity, Jung (1984) claims that “when we observe energy we really observe time,” which allows him to speak of the “identity of energy and time” (p. 410, p. 417). To illustrate, he gives the example of a stone falling downhill. Jung calls the time observed in this energetic activity “the time of the falling stone” (1984, p. 412). He posits this time exists only so long as the process is in motion,<sup>73</sup> arguing that so long as it is, such time is “simply different moments expressed through different forms” (1984, p. 411).

The above view informed Jung’s (1984) earliest definition of synchronicity, given in 1929, as “things happening at the same moment as an expression of the same time content” (p. 417). Yiassemides (2014/2016) identifies the phrase “time content” with the “momentary subjective state” in Jung’s 1952 definition, interpreting this state as “a certain phase in one’s life” (p. 53). But it is contended that with this move, Yiassemides makes the mistake of assuming that the 1929 and 1952 definitions are describing the same phenomenon—they are not, despite Jung labelling both synchronicity.

The phenomenon Jung terms synchronicity in 1929 is what he calls *acasual orderedness* in his 1952 paper, which is the operation of psychoid archetype in the sensible world.<sup>74</sup> Jung described his 1952 conception of synchronicity—which

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<sup>72</sup> Jung made this statement in a lecture on dreams given in November 1928. However, his first published use of the term “synchronicity” was not until 1930, in a memorial address for the sinologist Richard Wilhelm (see CW15, para. 81).

<sup>73</sup> While this recalls Aristotle’s (4th century B.C.E./1984b) contention that time is something to do with motion, it does not align completely given Aristotle maintains that time is not identical with motion. This point is revisited in more detail in Chapter 7.

<sup>74</sup> Aziz (1990) proposes to solve this definitional problem by reserving the term “synchronicity” for the operation of psychoid archetype and using “synchronistic experience or event” to refer to the conscious awareness of this operation. Whilst Aziz is justified in this proposition, the thesis does not

concerns the delimited conscious awareness of psychoid's operations—as “only a particular instance of general acausal orderedness” (CW8, para. 965).<sup>75</sup> According to Yiassemides (2014/2016), a temporal interpretation of synchronicity clarifies this statement because it allows one to grasp synchronicity as the impingement of the relative time of psychoid archetype upon the linear time of consciousness. This is why Jung could also understand synchronicity as a “rupture of time” (McGuire & Hull, 1977/1993, p. 230).

But this begs the question: What specifically is the time proper to synchronicity and its more general modality of acausal orderedness? The contention is that it is the melding of relative time and chronological time into a synthesis, which shall be referred to as *chrono-kairos*. In this posited phenomenon, it is kairos that plays the bigger part. This is clear only once one recognises that the term “time content” in Jung's 1929 definition is functionally equivalent to “meaning” in its 1952 counterpart. In both cases, what is captured is the phenomenon of *purpose*, which responds to the qualitative conception of time, that is, to kairos.

In the 1952 definition, meaning refers to the delimited understanding of purpose that is available to human being. Such knowledge is derived from the latent meaning of psychoid archetype, which acausally orders events to accord with its purpose (CW8, para. 920–922). Further, one may grasp such events as belonging to the same time content since they are also, as Jung (1984, p. 412) puts it, “part of a great process and marked by a particular condition.”

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follow him so as to stay as close as possible to Jung's own way of referring to these concepts in his mature work.

<sup>75</sup> Jung arrived at this distinction between synchronicity and acausal orderedness at the prompting of Pauli, who commented on early drafts of the 1952 text (see Jung & Pauli, 1992/2014, pp. 53–70). Pauli raised the possibility of such a distinction in a discussion of the discontinuities of physics (such as radioactive decay), which he and Jung both considered instances of acausality in nature.

Therefore, “time content” in the 1929 definition and “meaning” in the 1952 definition can be understood as describing the same phenomenon of purpose from the respective viewpoints of acausal orderedness and synchronicity. One might argue that Jung’s shift in terminology between the definitions reflects a de-privileging of time’s role. Such a view would align with Aziz’s (1990) claim “that time is not the unifying factor of the psychophysical archetypal field; the unifying factor is simply meaning” (p. 149). But when time is conceived relatively instead of chronologically, the shift in terminology is unveiled as a clarification of Jung’s intent as opposed to a revision.

This becomes clear once one recalls that what is described in the 1929 definition is the operation of psychoid archetype. For Jung, in the psychoid realm “knowledge [or meaning] finds itself in a space-time continuum in which space is no longer space, nor time time” (CW8, para. 912). Thus rather than posit a break between time and meaning, the shift in Jung’s terminology alerts us to a complicity, which is captured in the idea of *kairos*.

Further, when synchronicity is conceived in *kairotic* terms, it becomes apparent why Jung explicitly binds time and content in his 1929 definition. *Kairos* is the time of “content-full” experience, as opposed to the aridity of *chronos*. This sense of it is captured in both Puget’s (2009/2018, p. 93) definition of *kairos* as “the time that bears a precise meaning for each of us,”<sup>76</sup> and Jaques’s (1982, p. 14) conception of it as “the human and living time of intentions and goals.”

The latter quote in particular recalls Jung’s (1984) identification of time with energetic process. While he illustrates this concept with the movement of an inanimate

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<sup>76</sup> Puget (2009/2018) links *kairos* to her notions of the evental and relational presents and appears to adopt the language of synchronicity when she claims that “the mind strives to grant materiality to this evanescent state [*kairos*], and somehow situates it in time and space” (p. 89).

object, Jung's discussion occurs squarely in the context of an exposition on how purposeful activity constitutes human experience. For him, "life is teleology *par excellence*; it is the intrinsic striving towards a goal, and the living organism is a system of directed aims which seek to fulfil themselves" (CW8, para. 798).

One can therefore understand the time of human energetic process as a flow or flux composed of successive moments of clock time, which are imbued with and integrated by the purpose of *kairos*. The philosopher Henri Bergson (1889/1910) conceives of a subjective form of time, which he calls *durée*, that is similar. It is distinguished from the "atomised fragments" of clock time by its qualitative nature, experienced by consciousness as "a continuity, a flow" (Gunter, 1982, p. 636). Thus when its temporal extension is emphasised, the chrono-*kairos* is understood alternatively as *duration*, which then becomes another way of describing the temporal condition of synchronicity and its more general modality of acausal orderedness.

Further, it is only human awareness that distinguishes the temporal conditions of synchronicity and acausal orderedness. In the former, such awareness introduces a potential division between *chronos* and *kairos*, which are never divided in the latter. As Jaques (1982, pp. 158–159) observes, the quality of human awareness is different between *chronos* and *kairos*: In *chronos*, one has knowledge of discrete events, while one's awareness is more diffuse in *kairos*. Thus for him, in the apprehension of *chronos*, time is objectified and one is conscious of its passage as discrete units; whilst in *kairos*, the experience of time as continuity endows it with subjectivity.

Jaques (1982) argues that human time naturally oscillates between the temporal poles of *chronos* and *kairos*, with that which is de-emphasised at any one

moment remaining active in the background.<sup>77</sup> According to the Jungian analyst Angela Connolly (2017), where human experience denies either of these poles, pathology results. For her, in the absence of chronotic awareness, human time is frozen, producing “a present that is completely subsumed by the past and where the possibilities of the future are forever denied” (2017, p. 10). Conversely for Connolly, in the absence of kairotic awareness, human time is dead, “becoming reduced to a purely concrete chronological experience” (2017, p. 11).

In such pathological cases, synchronicity cannot exist. This is because the latter’s temporal condition is described by the *interplay* of *chronos* and *kairos*. This dialectic is the basis for the following two novel reformulations of the concept:

- (a) *Synchronicity is consciousness of those psychic and/or physical events in chronological time that happen in the same kairotic time.*<sup>78</sup>
- (b) *Synchronicity is the intermittent coalescing in consciousness of the particulars of a chronological processual unity, which are usually only vaguely so apprehended due to their immersion in flux.*

The reformulated definitions proceed from the two conceptions of the temporal condition of synchronicity proposed in this chapter: The first assumes the *chrono-kairos*, while the second assumes duration. In both cases, one grasps synchronistic awareness as that “absolute knowledge . . . not mediated by the sense organs,” which Jung considers characteristic of the phenomenon (CW8, para. 948).<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Von Franz (1970/1974) also adopts a two-dimensional approach to time, stressing that one must recognise “both irreversible linear time and a time ‘field’ in which creative single acts occur, in order to grasp the full significance of time” (p. 248).

<sup>78</sup> The Jung-influenced poet Richard Berengarten (2021) has proposed the neologism “synkairicity” to highlight this qualitative rather than quantitative understanding of time in acausal phenomena.

<sup>79</sup> Synchronicity can also be understood as akin to the *Augenblick* in that in the moment of epiphany, relative time is apprehended by the human being. However, for Heidegger (1927/2010), such apprehension does not attain the clarity of consciousness of particulars, which is in sharp contrast to Jung, for whom particulars are always revealed in the epiphany. Further, the extent of the epiphany is inherently greater in the *Augenblick* since it directly concerns the possibility of the individual’s authentic Being. While that is not to say that synchronicity does not also convey such profound insight

In sum, the controversy Yiassenides (2014/2016) identifies between time- and meaning-related interpretations of synchronicity is resolved when time is understood kairotically.<sup>80</sup> Jung describes synchronicity in its wider sense of acausal orderedness as “acts of creation,” and synchronicity proper as “*acts of creation in time*” (CW8, para. 965). However, given synchronicity and acausal orderedness are posited as sharing the same temporal condition, one may grasp the latter’s creativity as also occurring in time.

Nonetheless, the creativity that characterises synchronicity and acausal orderedness is conceived by Jung “not only as a series of successive acts of creation, but also as the eternal presence of the *one* creative act” (CW8, para. 967, Footnote 17). In the language of this chapter, this means that psychoid archetype expresses itself not only as chronos, but also always already as kairos. But this is not the kairos with which the chapter has been so far concerned; rather, it is that which exhibits as Jung states of psychoid, “a pattern that exists from all eternity, repeats itself sporadically, and is not derivable from any known antecedents” (CW8, para. 967). Such a kairos would be the condition of possibility of the chrono-kairos and duration.

The implication of Jung’s position is that the relative time of psychoid operates on two levels. Thus if, as argued, it is the Jungian perspective that aligns the psychoanalytic conception of time most closely with Temporality, one would expect to find in the latter a similar temporal hierarchy.

### **The Two Kairoi**

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(particularly in its relation to the realisation of Self), as conceived by Jung, such profundity is not required.

<sup>80</sup> The fact Aziz (1990) does not reach this conclusion may be due to his strict acceptance of Jung’s description of the temporal character of the synchronistic moment as purely chronological.

Heidegger (1975/1982) considers Temporality “the basic constitution of the being we call the Dasein” (p. 318). As discussed in Chapter 3, he differentiates Temporality from the sequence of nows of vulgar time. Yet, any identification of Temporality with the Jungian conception of time—which has been characterised in terms of *kairos*—requires the former, like the latter, be constituted not only by temporal relativity but also meaning.

For Heidegger (1927/2010), “meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself” (H. 151). Like Temporality, Heidegger (1927/2010), considers meaning to be constitutive of Dasein, which in its Being, he contends understands both its own Being and the Being of beings unlike itself (H. 12–13). According to Heidegger (1975/1982), to *understand* is “to project oneself upon a possibility” (p. 277). For Heidegger (1975/1982), such a possibility is “in every instance a possibility of [B]eing-in-the-world” (p. 278). This analysis of understanding informs Heidegger’s (1927/2010) alternative definition of meaning as “*the upon which of the project*” (H. 151).

Heidegger’s (1975/1982, 1927/2010) conceptions of meaning and understanding imply an identification of the former with potentiality-of-Being. But since *kairos* has been understood as the unity of relative time and meaning, an identification of the latter with potentiality-of-Being suggests a Heideggerian conception of *kairos* is achieved by exploring the idea of a unity between Temporality and potentiality-of-Being.

Heidegger (1975/1982) himself identifies *kairos* with the *Augenblick* (pp. 287–288). It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that in this experience of the authentic present, what is revealed to Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-of-Being. This would seem to be the unity of meaning and time that characterises *kairos*. However, the

precise nature of this unity is only clarified when it is recalled also that the Augenblick is not an isolated present but is constituted in Temporality. Thus, it is the unity of meaning and *relative time* that is crucial to Heidegger's concept of kairos. Like Jung, he conceives such time as operating on two levels. For Heidegger, this is captured in the distinction he makes between two linked notions of Temporality: *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*.

*Zeitlichkeit* is the way the Being of Dasein is conditioned by time (Blattner, 2021). It is this notion of Temporality that allows Dasein to have meaningful involvements with innerworldly beings, other Dasein and itself (in the form of its having-been-ness and its coming-toward-itself). Heidegger (1927/1962) uses the word "*Verhalten*" (comportment) to refer to such involvements. *Zeitlichkeit* supports the latter by enabling Dasein to understand the Being of the beings to which it comports itself.

*Temporalität* is the way Being-as-such is conditioned by time (Blattner, 2021). Thus, it is the condition of the possibility for *any* understanding of Being whatsoever. Heidegger (1975/1982) identifies it with the Platonic Idea of the good, which he understands as an "illuminating light" that is "the condition of possibility for all knowledge" (pp. 284–285). The Idea of the good is the apotheosis of the Platonic Ideas. In the *Republic*, Plato (ca. 375 B.C.E./1981) speaks of it as follows:

In the world of knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential Form of Goodness. Once it is perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom, either in his own life or in matters of state. (Book 7, 517)<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Aristotle (340 B.C.E./2011), however, considers it unnecessary and indeed misleading to speak of the good in this way. For him, comprehension of the good as a universal principle is in effect no different to comprehension of it as manifested in particulars. He argues further that assigning the quality of eternity to the good does nothing to clarify why a universalist conception should be

Nonetheless, Heidegger's (1975/1982) use of Plato's Idea of the good to illustrate Temporalität seems incongruous. The temporal condition of the former is a timeless eternity; in contrast, for Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 329–331), Temporalität is finite because Dasein is finite.<sup>82</sup> Whilst the fact Temporalität stands outside the in-time existence of beings provides some basis for a Platonic conception, if one were to understand it as a form of higher time, it would be as Taylor (2007) suggests, Augustinian eternity. Yet, given Temporalität's finitude, all analogies between it and eternity—Platonic or Augustinian—are beside the point. Therefore, it is necessary to delve deeper into Plato's light metaphor to grasp the basis for Heidegger's identification of Temporalität with the Idea of the good.

The lord of light to which Plato (ca. 375 B.C.E./1981) refers is the sun. According to him, it “stand[s] there in the same relation to vision and visible things as that which the Good itself bears in the intelligible world to intelligence and to intelligible objects” (ca. 375 B.C.E./1981, Book 6, 508). Plato observes further that the sun not only makes vision possible and objects visible “but also brings [those objects] into existence and gives them growth and nourishment”; for him, this is so even though the sun “is not the same thing as existence” (ca. 375 B.C.E./1981, Book 6, 508). He claims an identical situation exists for intelligible objects: “These derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very [B]eing and reality” (ca. 375 B.C.E./1981, Book 6, 508). Thus for Plato, the Idea of the good is “even beyond [B]eing, surpassing it in dignity and power” (ca. 375 B.C.E./1981, Book 6, 508).

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privileged as “the good will not be good to a greater degree by being eternal either” (340 B.C.E./2011, 1096b1–5). It is for these reasons that Aristotle instead speaks of the good in terms of the particularities of human life.

<sup>82</sup> See the discussions of Dasein's finitude in Chapter 3.

Therefore, one properly understands Plato's illuminating light in Heideggerian terms as that which is responsible for the coming to presence of beings and the Being of beings. Heidegger (1975/1982) can equate this light with Temporalität because he understands the latter as the source of what he calls *presencing*. Heidegger (1969/1972a) conceives presencing as a dynamic state of manifestation. Heidegger (1969/1972a) contrasts it with the traditional metaphysical notion of presence, which he views as a static concept that abstracts from its source in the temporal unity of original time.

Specifically, Heidegger (1975/1982) understands presencing as the unity of three schemata: the presencing of the present, the presencing of the past and the presencing of the future.<sup>83</sup> Heidegger (1969/1972a) understands the latter two schemata as *absence*. Heidegger (1975/1982, pp. 310–311) argues that it is in absence that the meaning of presencing is most clearly grasped. He illustrates this by presenting a scenario in which the functional context of Dasein's dealings with innerworldly beings is disrupted by something being discovered as missing, which then becomes obtrusive to Dasein by its absence.

For Heidegger (1969/1972a), a thing that is missing is either no longer present or not yet present. According to him, what is no longer present “presences immediately in its absence—in the manner of what has been, and still concerns us”; further, for him, in that which is not yet present “absence also concerns us . . . in the manner of presencing in the sense of coming toward us” (1969/1972a, p. 13).

According to Heidegger (1975/1982), each of the three schemata is both ontologically prior to and inseparable from its relevant ecstasy of time. He refers to

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<sup>83</sup> Heidegger (1975/1982, p. 305) uses the Latin word “*praesens*” to denote the schemata, which he conceives as both presence and absence; however, his manner of discussing *praesens* clearly identifies it as dynamic presence (presencing) rather than the static conception of traditional metaphysics.

the schemata as *horizons*. This is because each schema functions as the upon-which that the relevant ecstasy projects all that confronts Dasein in and for a particular time dimension. It is only through these schemata that Dasein can disclose specific modes of Being-in-the-world in the past, present and future. The schemata's role as the upon-which is in addition to their role as the unified source of presencing. The combination of horizontal schema and ecstasy completes the structure of the relevant dimension of time. Further, the unity of the horizontal schemata operates as the condition of possibility for the unity of the ecstasies.

Heidegger (1969/1972a) equates presencing with Being. He contends that the history of metaphysics has been a preoccupation with the presencing of what-is-present—by which he means the Being of beings. Heidegger's aim is to shift our focus to the source of such presencing, which for him, can only be approached from the perspective of Being-as-such. For this reason, he prefers to describe the presencing of what-is-present as “letting-presence” (1969/1972a, p. 5). Heidegger conceives the latter as a process of unconcealment, in which what is being revealed remains concealed in both itself and in its giving of presence to beings and the Being of beings.

Heidegger (1969/1972a) further locates the source of presencing in the original “belonging together” of Being and time (p. 19). This is the phenomenon of Ereignis, which was briefly discussed in Chapter 1. The thesis has translated it as “Appropriation.”<sup>84</sup> According to Heidegger, as Appropriation, Ereignis appropriates

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<sup>84</sup> Yet as Wrathall (2021a) notes, there are various ways of translating Ereignis. In addition to Appropriation, he lists the following: Event, Coming-into-View and Adaptation. Whilst recognising the merits of each, Wrathall considers Adaptation—that which “ordains that something's essence is disclosed in terms of that to which it is adapted or well-suited” (2021a, p. 19)—to be the best translation since for him, it includes the other meanings:

“Adaptation is the conceptual heart of *Ereignis* because it is being apt or fit for the context within which things *occur* [emphasis added] that allows them to *come into view* [emphasis added]. . . . [It] also sustains *ownership and self-ownership* [emphasis added] . . . [since]

Being and time to itself. Further, as the source of presencing, Ereignis is thus also the illuminating light. Hence, Ereignis may be conceived as the later Heidegger's reworking of his earlier concept of Temporalität.<sup>85</sup>

Heidegger (1969/1972a) contends that Being and time cannot be thought as beings. Further, for him, neither can Ereignis. Instead, as noted in Chapter 1, he views the latter as primordial event, which as such “makes any [factual] occurrence possible” (1969/1972a, p. 19).<sup>86</sup> This recalls Jung's (CW8, para. 967, Footnote 17) contrast between psychoid's “successive acts of creation” and “the eternal presence of the *one* creative act.” Unlike the former, the latter knows no prior and is understood—like Ereignis—as self-causing.

The above analogy with Jung would seem to suggest an intimacy between Ereignis and kairos. Such an understanding would not contradict Heidegger's (1975/1982) explicit identification of kairos with the Augenblick because the contention is that these two approaches to kairos are complementary. When Heidegger (1975/1982, p. 288) states that the Augenblick “belongs to the Dasein's original and authentic [T]emporality,” he is referring to Zeitlichkeit. Therefore, his claim is that kairos belongs to the temporal condition of the Being of Dasein. However, a conception of kairos in terms of Ereignis shifts one's focus from Dasein to Being-as-such and the way the latter is conditioned by time, that is, Temporalität. Thus, when the kairos is understood in terms of the Augenblick and Ereignis, it is again viewed as operating at two levels.

### **Structures of Occurrence**

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something is the property of another when it is adapted or suited to the possession of the other” (Wrathall, 2021a, pp. 27–28).

Joan Stambaugh uses Appropriation to translate Ereignis in *On Time and Being*. The thesis employs her translation because in that text it is the sense of Ereignis as ownership that is most apparent.

<sup>85</sup> The basis for this proposition will be laid out in Chapter 7.

<sup>86</sup> See Footnote 84 on translations of Ereignis.

So far, the temporal aspect of kairos has been understood as constituted most originally by relative time. It was observed that in *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*, Heidegger (1975/1982) delineates two notions of such time. It was seen also that both notions of Temporality speak to Being as well as time. Further, it was demonstrated that Being can be identified with meaning in Heidegger's conception. In this way, it was shown that both *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität* can be conceived as meaningful relative time, that is, as *kairos*.

It was contended that *Temporalität* was reworked by the later Heidegger (1969/1972a) as *Ereignis* and that both can be conceived in terms of the higher *kairos*. This suggests the lower *kairos* corresponds to *Zeitlichkeit*. The implication would be to clarify that when Heidegger (1975/1982) conceived the *Augenblick* as *kairos*, he is more precisely understood as identifying the former with the present of the lower *kairos*, which is grasped in its specifically temporal totality as the unity of the dimensions of past, present and future.

This revised understanding of Heidegger's (1975/1982) conception of *kairos* emphasises it as a structure of occurrence. Heidegger's translator, Joan Stambaugh (1972), contends that every theory of time must furnish such a structure. The thesis adopts a similar position. According to Stambaugh, for the later Heidegger, occurrence centres on "the temporal character of Being itself," while for the early Heidegger, it "concerns the temporality of *Dasein*" (1972, p. x).

Heidegger (1927/2010) defines *Dasein*'s occurrence formally as "the specific movement of the *stretched out stretching itself along*" (H. 375). This means that *Dasein* never exists as a mere succession of momentary realities, but is integrated as a history, stretched out between its thrownness and its possibilities of Being. For Heidegger, *Dasein* occurs because it is inherently historical. He calls this inherent

historicality “*historicity*,” which is an ontological structure that enables Dasein to understand its occurrence as a history (1927/2010, H. 375).

According to Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 377), historicity is itself structured by *Zeitlichkeit*. The philosopher Thomas Sheehan (2024) reinterprets *Zeitlichkeit* as an “ex-sistential κίνησις [becoming] . . . [that] *unfolds* into and as *Zeit*” (p. 51). But he does not understand *Zeit* as “time”; rather, he conceives it as “the ‘field of force’” within which human beings understand the Being of beings (2024, p. 52). It is contended this field of force is identifiable with historicity given the latter too directly unfolds from *Zeitlichkeit*.<sup>87</sup>

Yet, the proposed identification of *Zeitlichkeit* with the lower *kairos* faces what might be an insurmountable problem. The latter has been conceived as the higher *kairos* immersed in *chronos*. However, such a conception would appear to posit two ontologically distinct “times”: *chronos* and higher *kairos*. These temporal modes are understood in Heideggerian terms as vulgar time and *Temporalität*, respectively; yet, to consider these ontologically distinct is an untenable position in existential phenomenology. This is because for Heidegger (1927/2010), there is primordially only one time—*Temporalität*—which is leveled down to vulgar time (H. 405).


In addition to the sequence of counted nows that characterise vulgar time, Heidegger (1927/2010) posits a second mode of chronological time, which he calls *within-time-ness*. According to him, the latter is the time “‘in which’ beings are encountered” (1927/2010, H. 404). For Heidegger, *within-time-ness* and historicity are thought together, since as he observes, “every occurrence runs its course ‘in time’” (1927/2010, H. 404). He also identifies *within-time-ness* as the ontical basis for

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<sup>87</sup> However, Sheehan (2024) does not make this connection, perhaps due to his exclusive focus on section 65 of *Being and Time*, whose temporal analysis is restricted to original time and vulgar time.

the development of vulgar time (1927/2010, H. 333). The Heideggerian temporal hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Hierarchy of Heidegger's Temporal Concepts**



Whilst Temporalität and vulgar time cannot be separated ontologically, one might still speak of their admixture if by this, one means something like “middle term.” Temporalität and vulgar time are at opposite ends of a temporal continuum, which, from Figure 4, would appear to have historicity as its midpoint.<sup>88</sup> But historicity cannot on its own be identified with the lower kairos because historicity and within-time-ness are thought together. With reference again to Figure 4, this leaves the following alternative compound middle term: “Zeitlichkeit–historicity–within-time-ness.” Yet according to Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 377), within-time-ness and historicity arise equiprimordially from Zeitlichkeit. This justifies the consolidation of the compound middle term to simply the latter. Therefore, as hypothesised, Zeitlichkeit is disclosed as the Heideggerian translation of the lower kairos. The intuition is simple: Only as Zeitlichkeit is the original time of Temporalität brought into relation with the levelled-down time of the vulgar concept.

So, just as the higher kairos is identified with Temporalität, which relates to the occurrence of Being-as-such, the lower kairos is identified with Zeitlichkeit and Dasein’s occurrence. The latter is the factual togetherness of Dasein’s historicity and within-time-ness, that is, the stretching along of Dasein as a specific history. This double identification of the lower kairos as Zeitlichkeit and Dasein’s occurrence is the Heideggerian translation respectively of the chrono-kairos and duration.

The foregoing demonstrates that it is in the Jungian conception that psychoanalytic approaches to time most closely resemble Temporality. Hence, Jung’s (1984, p. 415) intuition that time “coincides with our psychological condition” is now properly understood as a psychic transcription of Temporality. It has already

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<sup>88</sup> Strictly speaking, there is a break in the continuum between within-time-ness and vulgar time since the latter—as individual nows shorn of their connection to past and future—is an abstraction. In contrast, within-time-ness is, for Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 333), “a genuine phenomenon of time” since it arises necessarily from the temporalisation of original time.

been noted from Ricœur (1983/1990a) that temporal existence is what gives narrative its full meaning. But conversely it is also the case for him, that time is only humanly meaningful "*to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode*" (1983/1990a, p. 52). Therefore, narrative itself must now be taken up as a problem.

## Chapter 6: Revisiting Narrative

The current lack of a unified concept of narrative is a significant issue for any attempt to secure the narrativity of human experience. In this chapter, through a deeper examination of the various approaches to narrative, its moral and ethical dimension is clarified. It is posited that the morality of narrative is the consequence of what is found to be the narrativity of morality. This is demonstrated through an Aristotelian reading of Kant—whose ethical frameworks are often opposed—building on Ricœur’s (1990/1994) reconciliatory project. It is contended that through the narrative conception, the two philosophers’ respective goal-oriented and rules-based approaches to morality are brought into alignment. It is posited further that this move supports the preliminary specification of a novel approach to narrative, grounded in Aristotelian thought. This new model is hypothesised as universally applicable, thus providing a sound basis for the reconceptualisation of archetype as narrative structure.

### Theories of Narrative

The literary theorist Gérard Genette’s (1969/1976) concept of narrative, which was presented in Chapter 4, is echoed, albeit in more restrictive terms, by the linguist William Labov. For Labov (1972), narrative is a way of “recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred” (pp. 359–360). However, social scientists hold a more capacious view, understanding narrative simply as a sequence of events occurring in time (Andrews et al., 2000). Here, it describes not only the past but also the future and present and extends beyond the linguistic into visual media, such as paintings, films, sculptures, architecture, etc. This broader conception also encompasses the lived narratives familiar from Chapter 4.

Narrative as a sequence of events is referred to as *fabula*, a term coined by the narratologists Vladimir Propp and Viktor Shklovsky. Yet, narrative is also understood as a *perspective* on events. In this latter sense, it is known, again following Propp and Shklovsky, as *sjuzhet*. The distinction between *fabula* and *sjuzhet* echoes that which structuralist theory makes between “story” and “discourse,” respectively: The former consists of a sequence of events, a set of characters, and a temporal and spatial setting; while the latter is the way the former is articulated. As the narratologist Seymour Chatman (1978) puts it, “The story is the *what* in a narrative that is depicted, discourse the *how*” (p. 19).

But such neat division between event and perspective is criticised by the literary theorist Jonathan Culler. According to Culler (1980), whilst one might conceive of a substratum of events, which occur in a particular sequence prior to and independent of any perspective on those events, the reality is that the choice of events articulated in a narrative is itself the product of perspective. Further, he contends that supposedly causal events can be fabricated to support a given perspective. It is such insight that led Freud (1917/1963) to move from his early unquestioning belief in the material reality of the neurosis-inducing infantile sexual trauma to his later understanding that such reminiscences “are not always true” (p. 367). Indeed, MacIntyre (1981/2014, pp. 242–249) denies events as such are even recoverable, arguing one can only aspire to a *characterisation* of events, which always already involves an interpretation (see also Carr, 1986/1991, pp. 68–69).

The view of narrative as interpretation is the approach taken by cognitive psychology. For Bruner (1990), narrative is “the typical form of framing experience”

(p. 56).<sup>89</sup> However, the philosopher Galen Strawson (2004) denies narrative this privilege, arguing that its emphasis on coherence is a tyranny. Strawson claims further that for its proponents, narrativity is only constituted where an individual cognises their life as one lived as narrative. Yet while this might be true for Ricœur, MacIntyre and Freeman, it is not so for Bruner. This is because the latter's understanding of narrativity as the restoration of violated cultural norms restricts it to what is in effect a problem-solving exercise. As Bruner puts it, "When things 'are as they should be,' the narratives of folk psychology are unnecessary" (1990, p. 40).

Strawson (2004) and Crispin Sartwell (2000) argue that human experience not only exceeds our ability to comprehend it narratively but also that narrative's teleological structure shuts off human beings from a genuine experience of the present. This is because neither consider the present to be constituted in relation to a telos.<sup>90</sup> Their position is founded on a view of narrative as instrumental; thus,

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<sup>89</sup> Bruner (1990) takes this view because in his *homo narrans* approach, human beings have "a readiness or predisposition to organize experience into a narrative form" (p. 45). He uses the words "readiness" and "pre-disposition" to stave off any suggestion that human beings, as he puts it, "'store' specific archetypal stories or myths, as C. G. Jung has proposed" (p. 45). However, as noted in Chapter 2, Jung denies myths are stored in this manner and instead claims human beings have only a predisposition to create such narratives. This suggests Bruner's attempt to distance himself from Jung is at least in this respect misguided.

<sup>90</sup> It is argued later in this chapter that there are two kinds of narrative: instrumental and individuated. When narrative is viewed as the latter, the force of Sartwell (2000) and Strawson's (2004) critique is significantly weakened. It will be seen in Chapter 7 that Heidegger's analysis in *Being and Time* of Dasein's coming-toward its authentic self can be understood as individuated narrativity. Yet, Strawson, absent the necessary differentiation between narrative's two modes, dismisses the narrative interpretation of Dasein in the following polemical terms:

[It is] false as a universal claim about human life, false as a claim about what it is for human beings to be what or who they are, false as a normative claim about what good or authentic human life must be like, false about what any self-understanding must involve, and false about what self-understanding is at its best. (2004, p. 449)

Given Strawson freely admits to not fully understanding Heidegger's ideas, these comments are remarkable. However, it should be noted that a narrative interpretation of the later Heidegger's (1977) concept of *Gestell*—where the world is disclosed as merely the site of material resources rather than a place of authentic existence—is vulnerable to Strawson's instrumentalist critique, which ironically in this regard, he would share with Heidegger himself.

Sartwell speaks of its “technologies of technology” (2000, p. 60), whilst for Strawson, it risks “a strange commodification of life and time” (2004, p. 450).

In contrast, Sartwell (2000) posits what he calls the “chaotic moment” as the true condition of human experience (p. 27). Yet, he accepts that human lives may be impractical without narrative, labelling its lack “a kind of madness,” albeit insisting that “too much narrative is also a kind of madness” (2000, p. 67). In this latter regard, Sartwell explicitly criticises the Ricœurian conception of narrative, arguing that it fails to distinguish between the worlds of action and fiction. But this misunderstands Ricœur’s purpose, which one grasps as the elucidation of narrative’s capacity to elide life and story.

Ricœur’s (1991) identification of narrative with emplotment implies an interpretive view of the former. For Ricœur, such interpretation is informed by the “universal aspects of the human condition” (1991, p. 22). Yet, this way of understanding narrative interpretation is not uncontested. Bruner (1990) takes a narrower approach in his claim that narrative is an interpretation “*that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical cultural pattern*” (pp. 49–50). And as discussed in Chapter 4, Freeman’s (2019) stance on narrative interpretation dispenses with all notions of normativity.

The contrast between Freeman (2019) and Bruner (1990) is particularly instructive in distinguishing the different approaches taken within even just the interpretive view of narrative. A consideration of their respective approaches to narrative equilibrium illustrates this point. According to Todorov (1971/1977), narrative aims for the restoration of equilibrium after an initial disruption (p. 111). Bruner calls the disruption of the initial equilibrium *violation*, whilst Freeman (2019) calls it *provocation*; however, they diverge sharply as to the nature of the restored

equilibrium. For Bruner, what is sought is the restoration of the initial state. In contrast, Freeman, writing with Robinson (1990, p. 64), understands the restoration of narrative equilibrium more radically as a “move beyond.”<sup>91</sup>

The difference between these two modes of narrative resolution is clarified when the problem is viewed through the prism of the phenomenology of reading. Ricœur (1985/1990b) grasps the act of reading as a confrontation between the worldviews of text and reader, having three possible outcomes: (a) confusion, (b) alienation, and (c) fusion of horizons. In the first, the reader’s worldview is subjugated to that of the text; in the second, the reader applies their own worldview to the text; and in the third, the reader establishes an analogising relation to the text, in which they incorporate the latter’s worldview into their own through a dialectic between the stances of confusion and alienation.<sup>92</sup>

Brunerian narratives may be located in this taxonomy if one understands their constituent violations and cultural norms as conflicting worldviews. Bruner’s (1990) description of narrative allows it to be understood specifically as involving acts of alienated reading since “the objective of such narrative is not to reconcile, not to legitimize, not even to excuse, but rather to explicate” (p. 95). Here, the narrator, as defender of the cultural norm, takes the role of reader, while the transgressive protagonist of the narrative is the text. The narrator then “reads” this “text” in a manner that seeks to impose the former’s worldview on the latter, which in Brunerian terms is an attempt to restore a violated norm. That is why for Bruner, “the explications offered in the ordinary telling of such narratives are not always

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<sup>91</sup> For Todorov (1971/1977), in the restoration of narrative equilibrium, the old and new equilibria whilst similar are never identical. This locates him somewhere between the Freemanite and Brunerian conceptions. However, Todorov was a structuralist, meaning he saw narrative not as interpretation but as a sequence of events, albeit with an inherent pattern.

<sup>92</sup> The hermeneutic phenomenologist Hans-Georg Gadamer in his 1960 text *Truth and Method* was the first to explore the phenomenon of the fusion of horizons.

forgiving of the protagonist depicted. Rather, it is the narrator who usually comes off best” (1990, pp. 95–96). Thus, such narratives involve notions of praise and blame.

In contrast, Freemanite narratives can be understood as responding to a fusion of horizons. Here, there is a reconciliation of the mutually violating worldviews of the initial and ideal states, which one may understand as reader and text, respectively. Whilst this reconciliation involves a resolution in favour of the latter, crucially it does not amount to a dissolution of the initial worldview into that of the ideal state. Such dissolution is what would be expected from a stance of confused reading. Instead, the resolution is a deliberative process, in which the initial state gradually appropriates the worldview of the ideal state *as its own*. This happens even though as Freeman and Robinson (1990) assert, the ideal state is initially “not yet fully known” (p. 64).

Hence, Freeman (2019), like MacIntyre (1981/2014), understands the unity of a human life as the unity of a narrative quest. According to MacIntyre, “a quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge” (1981/2014, p. 254). For him, that which is sought is “the good life for man,” which he defines as “the life spent in seeking for the good life for man,” adding that “the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is” (1981/2014, p. 254). Thus for MacIntyre, the human good is both the aim and activity of a virtuous life.

MacIntyre’s (1981/2014) idea of the human good is a reworking of the Aristotelian conception. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) conceives of this good as “an end of our actions” (1097b20–21) and as “an activity of soul in accord with virtue” (1098a15–20). For him, it is moral virtue accompanied

by phronesis that allows human being to bring to completion the aim of a rational life (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1145a1–10). Aristotle conceives the link between moral virtue and phronesis (prudence) as follows: “There will be no correct choice [of action] in the absence of prudence, nor in the absence of [moral] virtue; for the latter makes one carry out the end, the former the things conducive to the end” (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1145a1–10). In Aristotle’s teleological framework, this end is *eudaimonia* (human flourishing), which is realised through a whole life lived in accord with the practical application of correct reason.

Yet, Aristotle’s concept of rationality has been criticised. W. R. Fisher (1987/1989) identifies it with only narrow conceptions of reason, contrasting it with the ancient understanding of the latter as a union of logos and mythos. According to him, this union was simply termed “logos,” which meant “story, reason, rationale, conception, discourse, thought” (1987/1989, p. 5). W. R. Fisher (1987/1989) argues that from the time of the pre-Socratics, this unified logos underwent a separation, resulting in its eventual transformation into the modern concepts of logic and value.<sup>93</sup> Thus, the crux of his quarrel with Aristotle is that the latter’s notion of rationality retains logos but discards mythos.

W. R. Fisher (1987/1989) views the ancient understanding of logos as the concept of reason proper to narrative. Further, the centrality of mythos to this conception means one may speak of *species of reason*, each sufficient and complete onto itself and encompassing a mythopoesis that conveys a particular worldview or moral principle. It is contended that the plurality of values inherent in

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<sup>93</sup> Heidegger (1953/2000b) also discusses this original, unitary sense of logos, arguing its reduction to mere logic contributed to Being’s occlusion in philosophy. When combined with W. R. Fisher’s (1987/1989) claim that mythos was separated out from the original logical unity, the implication is that Being is conceivable as a primordial narrative, which is precisely the argument of the thesis.

the concept of mythos authorises the relativisation of the good, which condition is the ethical status of Freemanite narratives.

Thus, the true import of Freeman's (2019) approach to the restoration of narrative equilibrium is now apparent: His conception refers to restoration in its higher sense of *apocatastasis*, that is, the reestablishment of a lost perfection. This becomes clear once one grasps such perfection as a moral telos set by a species of reason. As perfection, it can be strived for but never achieved. Therefore, through a consideration of narrative firstly as sequence of events and then as perspective and interpretation, one is returned to an understanding of it as moral.

### **Narrative and Moral Law**

In speaking of a morality set by reason, the present exploration of narrative joins with Kantian ethics, specifically the latter's concept of *moral law*. According to Kant (1788/2015), moral law is a universal practical principle constituted by a priori reason for itself. Kant (1785/1998) understands it as a moral command or what he calls categorical imperative, which he denotes as follows: "*Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law*" (4:421).<sup>94</sup> By "maxim," Kant (1785/1998) means "a subjective principle of acting," which he distinguishes from the objective principles laid down by moral law (4:421, Footnote 1)

While Kant (1788/2015) does not specify the exact content of moral law, he understands it as something obvious, "long since decided in common human reason . . . by habitual use, like the difference between the right and the left hand" (5:155). His deployment of the phrase "by habitual use" to describe the acquisition

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<sup>94</sup> For Kant (1785/1998), this results in the following practical application of the categorical imperative: "*So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*" (4:429).

of moral knowledge is the first link to Aristotle's (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) ethics, which also privileges the idea of moral habituation.

For Kant (1788/2015), moral law determines the pure form of the human will, with the latter's impure or empirical form determined by desire. The pure will is the enabling faculty for what Kant (1785/1998) calls *good will*, which is the desire to act in accordance with moral law. Kant (1785/1998) equates the will with practical reason "since *reason* is required for the derivation of actions from laws" (4: 412). Thus for Kant (1788/2015), practical reason too is both pure and empirical.

Kant (1788/2015) also speaks of practical *wisdom*, which he understands as "*the fitness of the [human] will for the highest good*" (5:131). This identifies the concept with pure practical reason. Yet, the idea of practical wisdom applies also to narrative. As noted in Chapter 1, Ricœur (1991) understands narrative as exhibiting "the practical wisdom of moral judgment" (p. 23). Thus, the contours of a possible elision between narrative and moral law come into view. However, Kant and Ricœur's divergent understandings of practical wisdom pose significant obstacles to such a conception.

Ricœur (1991) conceives practical wisdom in the Aristotelian sense as the ability to take right action in a particular situation. This contrasts sharply with Kant's (1788/2015) concept of practical wisdom, where right action is determined solely by universal principles. Yet despite Aristotle's (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) focus on particularities, he is careful to stress that practical wisdom does not exclusively focus on particulars but concerns universals also—although the weight is firmly with the former (1141b20–25).

But in the absence of an Aristotelian attention to particularities, Kant's universalism would seem to beg the question of how his ethics solves the problem

of conflicting moral obligations. Yet, Kant (1797/1996, 6:224) responds that obligations conforming to moral law cannot genuinely conflict even if they appear to do so in a particular situation. In such a scenario, he advocates comparing the moral grounds of the apparently conflicting obligations and using judgment guided by moral law to determine right action. But Kant provides no systematic method for doing so, suggesting what is ultimately required is as Ricœur (1990/1994, p. 269) proposes, the deliberative judgment of *phronesis*. Thus for Ricœur, the latter does not contradict Kantian practical wisdom; rather, it completes it.

According to Ricœur (1990/1994), for *phronesis* to solve a moral conflict, it must appeal to ethics. He distinguishes ethics from morality despite noting the following: “Nothing in their etymology or in the history of the use of the terms requires such a distinction. One comes from Greek [ethics], the other from Latin [morality]; both refer to the intuitive idea of *mores*” (1990/1994, p. 170). In line with what Ricœur identifies as the traditional approach, the thesis has so far employed the terms interchangeably.<sup>95</sup> However, Ricœur’s distinction between ethics and morality is helpful for illuminating the posited intimacy between narrative and moral law.

Ricœur (1990/1994) understands ethics as “the *aim* of an accomplished life” (p. 170). This definition identifies it with Aristotelian human flourishing. Ricœur views morality as complementing ethics. He understands morality as “the articulation of this [ethical] aim in *norms* characterized at once by the claim to universality and by an effect of constraint” (1990/1994, p. 170). This definition identifies morality with the Kantian conception.

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<sup>95</sup> The typical conflation of the concepts is illustrated in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) definition of ethics as “moral principles, or a system of these” (OUP, n.d.-c).

From Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011), one understands the aim of an accomplished life as set by universal rational principles as discerned in particulars. Thus, given Ricœur's identification of ethics with the Aristotelian ethical telos and the former's conception of morality as the application of ethics, one can grasp morality as an expression of both a priori reason and human circumstance. The implication is that while moral law is constituted by a priori reason for itself, its manifestations—i.e., moral propositions, objective maxims and obligations<sup>96</sup>—are contingent. This aligns with MacIntyre's (1981/2014) contention that the objective maxims Kant presents as conforming with moral law (e.g., "I must always tell the truth") are actually based on his "Lutheran childhood in Königsberg" (p. 52).

What is apparent from the above is that abstracted from particulars, ethics becomes identical with moral law. This allows a conception of the latter too as the aim of an accomplished life. The effect is to immediately shift one's understanding of Kantian ethics from deontology, that is, duties and rules, to teleology. This latter approach to Kant is traditionally deemphasised despite the fact Kant (1788/2015) himself speaks not only of moral obligation but also *happiness*, which latter is of the kind felt on achieving the *final end* of moral law. He understands this idealised state as "the highest good in a person" (1788/2015, 5:110). Thus, for both Kant and Aristotle, some notion of the good is both the aim and activity of the rational being. The difference is one of emphasis: For Kant, activity is primary, whilst for Aristotle, it is aim.

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<sup>96</sup> Moral propositions are specific applications of moral law, objective maxims are those subjective practical rules that align with moral propositions derived from moral law, whilst obligations are the specific duties such practical rules entail. "It is always wrong to lie" is an example of a moral proposition. "I must always tell the truth" is an example of an objective maxim. "I will tell my friend the truth about the situation" is an example of an obligation.

According to Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011), the achievement of this aim is supported by moral virtue, which he conceives as a habituated disposition having the correct rational relation to emotion and action (1106b25–1107a2). He proposes 11 such virtues: courage, moderation, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, ambition, gentleness, friendliness, truthfulness, wittiness and justice. For Aristotle, the *phronimos* (prudent person) exhibits all these virtues because the moral virtues and *phronesis* constitute a unity (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1145a1–3).

Aristotle's (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) unity of virtues finds its Kantian equivalent in Kant's (1785/1998) view that the various moral obligations are unified by their common grounding in moral law. This gives rise to Kant's (1797/1996) conception of moral virtue as "the strength of a human being's maxims in fulfilling his duty" to moral law (6:394). By "duty," Kant (1788/2015, 5:80) means a subjective disposition that conforms with moral law, coming from a feeling of respect for this law, and with no basis in either the empirical experience of oneself or in theoretical knowledge. Thus for Kant (1788/2015), virtue lies in resisting natural inclinations and acting instead in accord with those duties imposed by moral law. Therefore, virtue lies in acting from good will.

Kant's (1797/1996) understanding of moral virtue contrasts with that of Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) in that it privileges virtue's relation to rules as opposed to character. Yet, this need not imply a contradiction if one understands the virtues along with the philosopher John B. Rawls (1971) as "sentiments, that is, related families of dispositions and propensities regulated by a higher-order desire, in this case a desire to act from the corresponding moral principles" (p. 192). The contention is that Rawls's concept of virtue unites Aristotle and Kant. The higher-order desire to which he refers is the good will, which according to Kant

(1788/2015, 5:19), is determined by moral law as expressed in moral propositions. Thus, a Rawlsian perspective identifies moral law as not only the source of moral propositions but also correct dispositions towards action and emotion.

This relation of Aristotelian and Kantian virtue allows one to understand the complementarity of phronesis and Kant's (1788/2015) conception of practical wisdom further as follows: *Virtue of character is that which enables right action in the case where virtue of law leads to impasse*. Thus, Kantian right action is conceived as not only guided by maxims conforming to moral law but also by the dispositions such maxims require to give effect to that law.

The above analysis again demonstrates the validity of an Aristotelian—and thus teleological—approach to Kant. Teleology has already been understood as a key characteristic of narrative. Therefore, the proposition presented earlier in the chapter that Kantian right action and narrativity might be conceivable in terms of each other has become more plausible by viewing moral law through an Aristotelian lens. Yet, to secure the ground of narrative in Aristotle, it remains to overcome W. R. Fisher's (1987/1989) contention that Aristotle's concept of reason is too focussed on logos at the expense of mythos to concern narrative.

It is contended that contrary to W. R. Fisher's (1987/1989) view, Aristotelian reason does speak to mythos and that the latter is captured in his ethics in the following moral principle: *Human flourishing is realised through moral virtue*. This is the mythos MacIntyre (1981/2014) identifies in his narrative interpretation of Aristotelian ethics. Further, an Aristotelian approach to Kant allows the identification of the following mythos in the latter's ethics: *Humans strive towards the virtuous happiness of the highest good*. The Aristotelian and Kantian mythoi are therefore both accounts of heroic progress. In the case of Kant, this is explicitly recognised

by Heidegger (1975/1982, p. 135) in his conception of the Kantian moral personality as the “hero in [the ego’s] soul.” With this insight, Heidegger would seem to understand moral law as catalysing some type of narrativity.

### **Two Modes of Narrative**

The contention of the thesis is that the phenomenon Kant (1788/2015) calls moral law can be understood as primordial narrative. Kant considers moral law to determine pure will. Thus, if one conceives the former narratively, the latter must also be narratively constituted. This implies the empirical will too is determined narratively. According to Kant, empirical will is constituted in an inclination towards objects. Here, the desire for an object not only precedes the practical rule driving an individual’s action but is also the very condition for the individual to adopt that rule as a maxim. To illustrate: One might desire the object “success in business,” which is associated with the practical rule “be innovative.” One might then adopt this rule as a maxim. However, it is not adopted for its own sake—as would be the case where the will is determined by moral law—but for its ability to realise the desired object.

From the above, one observes that the teleological structure of action proceeding from empirical will is more readily apparent than that proceeding from pure will. In the former case, the distinction between means and end is clear; whereas in the latter, the means and end are conflated—but not to the extent that it makes no sense to distinguish them. Thus, the Kantian analysis of will supports the proposition of two modes of narrativity: (a) that determined by moral/ethical principles and (b) that determined by inclination.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> This taxonomy is similar to the means-ends/constituent-ends dichotomy the philosopher Charles B. Guignon (1993, see also Blattner, 2000) posits as the “two different ways of understanding the relation of actions to the whole of life” (p. 230). According to Guignon, in a means-ends way of living, actions are undertaken “*in order to* get something,” while in a constituent-ends approach, action “is

Let us begin with the second. This shall be termed *instrumental narrativity*. It is a posited characteristic of this mode of narrative that its objects are nonidentical with its ends. Here, one speaks separately of objects and ends because the former are merely the means of obtaining the latter. To illustrate, one may consider a person engaged in painting a portrait. In this example, the activity is undertaken for the purpose of acquiring some other good. It may be assumed that this other good is money (but it could just as well be a conceptual good, such as honour or fame). Therefore, the completed portrait is the object of the narrativity, whilst the financial reward is its end.

MacIntyre's (1981/2014) distinction between goods internal and external to practices is instructive at this point. He defines *practice* as follows:

Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (1981/2014, p. 218)

MacIntyre (1981/2014) explicitly identifies as practices the arts, sciences, games and the creation and sustaining of human communities; but he does not consider this list exhaustive. For him, goods are internal to practices if they cannot be realised in any other way than through those activities associated with that practice. Conversely, MacIntyre considers goods to be external to practices where they are attached to such practices "by the accidents of social circumstance" (1981/2014, p. 219). In the latter case, according to MacIntyre, "There are always alternative ways for achieving such goods, and their achievement is never to be

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undertaken *for the sake of being* such and such" (1993, p. 230). Despite being a narrativist, Guignon does not specifically present these two approaches as modes of narrativity. However, this can be explained by his privileged association of narrative with life purpose, which meant narrativity could only apply to the constituent-ends relation. The effect of this was to restrict Guignon's ability to present the two ways of living as contrasting narrative constructions.

had *only* by engaging in some particular kind of practice” (1981/2014, p. 219). In our example, money is such an external good because it can be obtained by means other than portraiture, whilst the finished portrait is an internal good because it can be achieved only through the practice of portrait painting.

The logic of internal and external goods is a way of distinguishing between instrumental narrativity and that catalysed by moral/ethical principles. The latter kind is characterised as much by its manner of performance as it is by its object. Further, this object is sought for its own sake. Therefore, there are no external goods, only internal ones. In the portraiture example, this means that the end of the activity of painting is not financial reward but the finished portrait itself—thus, object and end coincide. Yet crucially, it is not the object/end per se that drives the activity; instead, it is undertaken as an expression of an ethical disposition.

A key implication is that in narratives catalysed by moral/ethical principles, the specification of the internal good is not initially given. Rather, as MacIntyre’s (1981/2014) definition of practice argues, the drive towards excellence inherent in a practice widens conceptions of what the object/end of such practices should be. Here, one is reminded of his description of a narrative quest as “an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge” (1981/2014, p. 254). MacIntyre explicitly ties narrative only to the whole human life. But one could reasonably conceive practices—which are slices of such lives—as minor narratives embedded within the major narrative of the life quest. Indeed, MacIntyre himself understands the latter as the superordinate good, which enables the ordering of the goods of the various practices in which human being is engaged (1981/2014, p. 254).

The profound difference in the protagonist's conception of the internal good between the two narrative modes can now be grasped. In instrumental narrativity, the character of the internal good is pre-specified to ensure its relation to the external good—its true object—remains within the limits prescribed by what MacIntyre (1981/2014, p. 219) has termed “the accidents of social circumstance.” However, in narratives catalysed by moral/ethical principles, the protagonist not only has the highest regard for the internal good but is constantly striving to transform and enrich its nature. This ensures the telos of such narrativity is never pre-specified. Such an idea was already introduced in Chapter 4's discussion of the individuation narratives of the unconscious. For this reason, the mode of narrative catalysed by moral/ethical principle shall be termed *individuated narrativity*.

This delineation of narrative's two modes allows a deeper insight into why Freeman (2019) and Bruner's (1990) approaches to interpretation are so opposed: It is because narrativity for the former is individuated, while for the latter, it is instrumental. One can so characterise Freemanite narratives because their internal object—the ideal state—is not initially known. Brunerian narratives exhibit instrumental narrativity because they are determined by a pre-specified internal object, which one may understand as the defended cultural norm. This object, which takes the form of narrative artefact, is the culturally appropriate told story.

Brunerian narratives' characteristic concern with praise and blame allows a further identification with instrumental narrativity. This is because the ultimate objective of such narratives is the attribution of moral honour to the narrator at the expense of the protagonist, which reveals the narrative as oriented towards an external good. Such intertwining of morality and inclination finds philosophical ground in the Kantian concept of material principles of morality. Here, according to

Kant (1788/2015), it is “a certain special moral sense which, instead of reason, determines the moral law,” (5:38) which latter, he argues, is then distorted into a maxim of self-love that “*advises*” as opposed to a law of morality that “*commands*” (5:36).<sup>98</sup>

Thus, the moral propositions underpinning Brunerian narratives are conceived in Kantian terms as masquerades of morality. However, even when so understood, the implication is that instrumental narratives are still founded on a concept of law—in this case, the principle of self-love. This conclusion supports White’s (1980) claim that narrative has to do fundamentally with authority and the conflict between that which sustains it and that by which it is threatened.<sup>99</sup>

### **Ethical Pillars of Narrative**

It has been demonstrated that an appreciation of narrative as a moral problem is achieved through the acknowledgment of the narrativity of Kantian morality. This is grasped in an understanding of the latter’s complementarity with Aristotelian ethics. But to secure the moral conception of narrative, Ricœur’s (1990/1994) distinction between morals and ethics must be resumed, where the latter is primary. Thus to finally illuminate narrative’s moral impulse, its ultimate ground in ethics must be demonstrated, which so far has been approached only indirectly.

Narrative’s foundation in ethics is contended to rest on three connected pillars: (a) the good, (b) relation of phronesis to the good, and (c) the conflict of moral virtue and vice. This will be demonstrated through a discussion of Aristotelian ethics in the context of Brunerian narratives. The approach is used because if such

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<sup>98</sup> Hillman (1983/2019) proposes a similar distinction in his contention that “it is when we lose the images [the true source of morality] that we become moralistic” (p. 68).

<sup>99</sup> While White (1980) makes this claim specifically in reference to socio-political legal orders, there is nothing in his argument to prevent its generalisation to any operative system of values.

instrumental narratives can be understood in Aristotelian terms, then support is lent to the generality of the thesis given that the heroic nature of the Aristotelian mythos identifies it as an individuation narrative.

### **1. *The Good***

As already noted, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) understands moral virtue as character, that is, as habituated disposition displaying a prudent relation to emotion and action. The ancient Greek word for character is “*ēthikē*,” which Aristotle observes is derived from “*ethos*,” the ancient Greek word for habit (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1103a15–20). The OED defines character most relevantly for the present purposes both as “the aggregate of the distinctive features of something,” (OUP, n.d.-a, Definition II.8.a) and as “the sum of the moral and mental qualities which distinguish an individual or a people, viewed as a homogeneous whole” (OUP, n.d.-a, Definition II.9.a). The OED defines habit, again most relevantly, as “a settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain way” (OUP, n.d.-d, Definition III.9.a)

Sean Kirkland (2007) observes that the words “*ēthikē*” and “*ethos*” are linked by the ancient Greek word “*êthos*,” whose primary meaning, according to him, is a “familiar location, a haunt, or a dwelling place where one has become accustomed to living” (p. 131). Thus, Kirkland identifies a connection between habit, character and dwelling place, leading him to speculate on the manner in which the first two ideas are related to the third. He contends the link lies simply in the realisation that “human beings live together according to certain codes of conduct or structures that order our communal life . . . wherein we first and foremost find ourselves related to the ultimate good” (2007, p. 133). He adds that such codes of conduct

“are generally those that govern the actions that are affirmed and encouraged by our community” (2007, p. 133).

Kirkland (2007) grounds his view not only in Aristotle’s ethics but also in the latter’s politics. In the *Politics*, Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1984c) claims human being is naturally political and, as such, properly lives in a type of community he calls a *polis* (state) (1253a1–6). According to Aristotle, “every community is established with a view to some good,” and the polis, which he considers the highest of all communities, “aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good” (ca. 350 B.C.E./1984c, 1252a1–6).

Kirkland (2007) argues of Aristotle that in identifying human being as political animal, he “seems to say that we are defined in our essential function, and thus in our *aretê* [moral virtue], by the good that acts as the ordering end of our communal life” (2007, p. 132). Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) argues that this collective human good, whilst the same thing as the human good for the individual, is “something greater and more complete” (1094b9).

However, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) understands the very highest form of the human good as not at all concerned with practical matters but instead characterised by what he calls *theoria* (contemplation). For Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011), contemplation is the highest form of human flourishing because it engages with the abstractions, which he considers “noble and divine” (1177a16). Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) claims that in contemplation, human being most closely participates in the wise activity of divine reason, which he conceives as reason’s eternal thinking of itself (1178b21–24).

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1928, 1072a19–1073a13) identifies this divine activity as the *First or Prime Mover*. According to him, it is the

source of all motion in the universe but is itself unmoved. For Aristotle, the Prime Mover is this source because it is the ultimate object of desire (ca. 350 B.C.E./1928, 1072a24–28). The implication is that it is precisely the object contemplated in contemplation. This intertwining of Aristotle’s ethics and metaphysics is crucial to the present research (see Broadie, 1993/1994; Ross, 1924, p. 397).

But whilst there is a hierarchy to Aristotle’s (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) conception of the human good, it is contended that practical human flourishing need not necessarily be conceived as a “lower” form. Thus, the thesis adopts the philosopher and classicist J. A. Stewart’s (1892) view that human flourishing “even when realised in the performance of moral actions, is θεωρία [theoria], or contemplation of the eternal” (p. 5). The implication is that practical human flourishing and contemplative human flourishing are the same good.

In sum, for Aristotle, the good determines not only what is virtuous for the individual but also what is virtuous for their community. Bruner’s (1990) folk psychology directly concerns the latter. But whilst the social norms of which Bruner speaks are empirically as opposed to rationally determined, they remain manifestations of some notion of the good, albeit distorted as Kantian self-love. Thus, the good, broadly understood, is the first pillar of narrative’s posited foundation in ethics.

## **2. *Phronesis and the Good***

Phronesis has already been discussed in some depth and its relation to the human good described. However, to fully grasp the phenomenon, it is important to set it in context. Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1139b15–18) identifies phronesis as one of five intellectual virtues, the others being *techne* (art or productive reason),

*episteme* (science or demonstrative reason), *nous* (intellect or intuitive reason) and *sophia* (wisdom or theoretical reason). He considers *sophia* the highest intellectual virtue as it is the complete understanding of abstract matters, encompassing both knowledge that proceeds from first principles (*episteme*) and knowledge *about* first principles (*nous*) (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1141a16–21).

Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) understands the relation of *phronesis* to *sophia* as akin to that of steward to master. He employs the following analogy: “[The art of medicine] does not make use of health but rather sees how it comes into [B]eing; it is for the sake of health, then, that medicine issues commands, but it does not issue them to health” (1145a5–10). Health and the art of medicine represent *sophia* and *phronesis*, respectively. The analogy therefore allows an understanding of the activity of *phronesis*—i.e., good deliberation—as aimed at a human flourishing that is ultimately determined by the wise activity of *sophia*, which human being grasps in contemplation.

By way of contrast, in the *Magna Moralia* (a text whose authorship by Aristotle is debated), *phronesis*’s stewardship to *sophia* is grounded in the idea of leisure. Here, the contention is that it is precisely the virtuous life that gives human beings sufficient time to contemplate (Ross, 1915, MM 1.34, 1198b17–19). The philosopher C. D. C. Reeve (2006) relies on this conception when he interprets Aristotle’s health-medicine analogy as “medicine prescribes for the sake of health, as practical wisdom for the sake of leisure and leisured activities [contemplation]” (p. 212). However, the philosopher and classicist Peter P. L. Simpson (2014) observes that the majority scholarly opinion is now that Aristotle did not write

*Magna Moralia*,<sup>100</sup> which problematises Reeve's interpretation of the relationship between sophia and phronesis.

It is contended that an understanding of the master-steward analogy that grounds the relation of sophia to phronesis in the higher and lower octaves of human flourishing rather than leisure clarifies the inherent intimacy between the universal and particular forms of the Aristotelian good. From such perspective, when Kirkland (2007, p. 138) argues of phronesis that it takes its power from "the light provided by the communal dwelling place," this light can be understood as the refraction in the contingent world of the light of sophia.

As previously discussed, Kirkland (2007) conceives the communal dwelling place as constituted by collective codes of conduct. The latter were also identified as the concern of Bruner's (1990) folk psychology. Such psychology determines the aim of Brunerian narratives by specifying the cultural norms they seek to defend. These narratives organise the events of the story to accord with this aim, which is ultimately set by the "good" of self-love.

The relation of Brunerian narrative to folk psychology is homologous with that which Kirkland (2007) posits between phronesis and the communal dwelling place. The latter is the arena within which phronesis organises human activity to accord with its virtuous aim. And whilst this aim receives its particular determination from the prudent person's cultural context, it is ultimately set by that which is contemplated in the activity of sophia, that is, the highest good. Thus, one locates the second pillar of narrative's foundation in ethics in the relation of phronesis to the good.

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<sup>100</sup> However, Simpson (2014) himself argues against this view, claiming that differences in the style and sophistication of *Magna Moralia* compared with the *Nicomachean Ethics* are due to the former being intended for an audience outside the Aristotelian school.

### 3. *Conflict of Virtue and Vice*

The identification of the third and final pillar proceeds from Bruner's (1990) assertion that narratives are only constituted in the case of transgressions from cultural norms. Sartwell (2000)—who has already been noted as a critic of narrative—holds an identical view, remarking that “*the ethical that is not threatened with collapse cannot be narrated*” (p. 26). Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) conceives virtue as that which supports the realisation of the ethical aim and vice as that which threatens it.

In Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) discusses in detail the connection of virtue to vice. He understands the latter as an excess or deficiency in relation to emotion and action, and the former as the middle ground in such relations. To realise the human good, one must voluntarily and consciously align oneself with it by developing virtue. For this reason, Aristotle equates the virtue of character with disposition (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1105b20–1106a15).

Kirkland (2007) understands disposition as a moral stance, which is held “in relation to one’s communal dwelling place, and thus toward the good that orders it” (p. 133). This connection of subjective disposition to objective ethics establishes notions of moral success and failure. MacIntyre (1981/2014) claims that to determine what constitutes a virtue and a vice is “to adopt a stance on the narrative character of human life” (p. 167). He continues: “Virtues will find their place as those qualities the possession and exercise of which generally tend to success in this [narrative] enterprise and the vices likewise as qualities which likewise [sic] tend to failure” (1981/2014, pp. 167–168).

Nonetheless, it is not the case that vice “interferes” in the narrative such that the absence of the former ensures the latter is properly constituted; rather, vice is an intrinsic part of narrativity. As Sartwell (2000) puts it, ethics depends on violation to gain its narrative content just as “the police depend on criminals for employment” (p. 48). In Aristotelian terms, this could be translated as follows: Virtue depends on vice for its morally purposive *praxis* (action).

For Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011), the development of virtue occurs in the context of our natural tendency to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. But he does not tie this tendency to vice, as for him, virtue also concerns pleasure and pain. Instead, Aristotle posits virtue “as being such as to produce the best [actions] in relation to pleasures and pains, and vice as being the contrary” (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1104b26–29). Further, for Aristotle, virtuous and vicious activity are voluntary, which is why the former can be praiseworthy in its relation to pleasure and pain and the latter blameworthy (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1109b30–1110a35).

Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) therefore sees human being as engaged in a struggle over whether to hold a virtuous or vicious relation to pleasure and pain. According to him, “he who deals with these [pleasure and pain] well will be good, but he who does badly will be bad” (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1105a12–14). Indeed, Aristotle considers this struggle to ennoble virtuous activity since in his view, “the doing of something well is better when it is more difficult” (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1105a10–11).


Thus, the conflict of virtue and vice is grasped as central to Aristotle’s ethics. Yet, one understands from Bruner (1990) and Sartwell (2000) that ethical conflict is also key to narrative. It will be recalled that Bruner specifically conceives narrative as only constituted in the case of transgressions from cultural norms. The foregoing

discussion of the conflict between virtue and vice allows Bruner's idea of narrativity to be understood in Aristotelian terms. This conflict is thus the final pillar of narrative's foundation in ethics.

### **Preliminary Model of Narrative**

In conformity with the three ethical pillars, the thesis proposes the following preliminary model of narrative, which is illustrated in Figure 5:

**Figure 5:** *Preliminary Deep Structure Model of Narrative*



The model comprises six main elements: narrative good, intelligibility of narrative good, disposition, dwelling place, free articulation and factual articulation. *Narrative good* rests on the first ethical pillar. It is the Aristotelian highest good, that is, the Prime Mover. Like the latter, it is simultaneously the faculty of the highest reason, the activity of the highest reason, and the object the highest reason gives itself to understand. In the preliminary model, such rationality is specified in the ancient sense of the conjoined logos and mythos.

This three-fold rational structure is specifically the *intelligibility of narrative good*, that is, narrative reason. As is the case for the Prime Mover, this also is a self-given reason. Such intelligibility is constituted as *disposition* and *dwelling place*. Disposition is the faculty of the highest reason. It operates as both a twofold non-sensory perception (*affective* and *intellectual*) and as *configuration*; together, these constitute the activity of the highest reason. Dwelling place is the object the highest reason gives itself to understand. Such reason grasps its self-given object in its *free articulation* of it. *Factual articulation* is the translation of free articulation to the particulars of a world.

### ***Disposition and Dwelling Place***

In the elucidation of the first ethical pillar, *êthos* (dwelling place) was understood as the common ground of *ethos* (habit) and *êthikê* (character). It will be recalled that the OED defines habit as “a settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain way” (OUP, n.d.-d, Definition III.9.a). Further, the OED defines disposition as “the state or quality of being disposed, inclined, or ‘in the mind’ (*to* something, or *to do* something)” (OUP, n.d.-b, Definition II.7a).

For Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011), however, habit is not settled disposition; rather, it is settled activity, which latter then *gives rise* to settled disposition

(1103b20–23).<sup>101</sup> It will be recalled also that Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) observes that *ēthikē* (character) is etymologically derived from *ethos* (habit). Given his claim that settled disposition also derives from habit, this implies the possible identification of settled disposition and character.

However, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) explicitly understands *ēthikē* as *moral* character. This implies that any possible identification is specifically with settled *moral* disposition. It has already been noted that Aristotle equates the latter with moral virtue. But since for him, moral virtue is simply a way of speaking about moral character that emphasises the specific forms it assumes, this implies moral character is indeed identifiable with settled moral disposition.

In Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) stresses the reciprocal relation of moral disposition and virtuous activity: The more habituated is virtuous activity, the more habituated is moral disposition; the more habituated is moral disposition, the more habituated is virtuous activity. Yet, he reminds that disposition is a tendency not only to act in a particular way, but also to *feel* in a particular way (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1105b25–30, 1106b25). In the latter scenario, disposition is understood as *temperament*, which the OED defines as both “constitution or habit of mind” and “natural disposition” (OUP, n.d.-g, Definition II.7).

As already noted, Kirkland (2007) conceives disposition as a moral stance held “in relation to one’s communal dwelling place, and thus toward the good that orders it” (p. 133). In such understanding, what is foregrounded is a sense of disposition as “perspective on . . .” or “perception of . . .” This aligns with an

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<sup>101</sup> The thesis uses the 2011 Bartlett and Collins translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In that text, the ancient Greek word “*hexis*”—which following Kirkland (2007), the thesis understands as “disposition”—is rendered as “characteristic.” The latter term is distinguished from “character” in the Bartlett and Collins translation, which is their rendering of the ancient Greek “*ēthos*.”

alternative OED definition of the word as “bent of the mind, *esp.* in relation to moral or social qualities” (OUP, n.d.-b, Definition II.6). The Aristotelian polis and the good have already been understood as moral/ethical structures. Therefore, disposition becomes the capacity to and activity of perceiving such structures. When disposition is moral, it aligns consistently with these structures. Thus, a settled moral disposition is also a settled moral perception.

In the preliminary model, narrative good provides the ethical sense that constitutes the whole structure by granting it its reason. Disposition, as the faculty of such reason, enables narrative good’s relation to feeling and activity as well as its perception of itself, that is, its dwelling place. In perception of dwelling place, one does not speak of the mutual constitution of perception and percept but instead of their mutual *fittingness*. The latter is guaranteed by narrative good, which not only constitutes disposition’s perception but also dwelling place as this perception’s percept. Thus, *disposition and dwelling place are mutually fitting because each is the flipside of the other.*

Narrative good constitutes dwelling place as a relational matrix of basic elements or complexes of such elements, whose relations accord with the intelligibility of narrative good. These basic elements are recalled from Chapter 1 as narrative Ideas. They are the abstract forms of narrative particulars such as setting, story and characteristics. By the latter, one understands “objective” qualities, for example, “colour” as opposed to the “subjectivity” of character. Disposition is then the fitting stance towards these narrative Ideas in terms of feeling and activity.

The preliminary model’s framework is analogous in many respects to the philosopher Ronald de Sousa’s concept of *paradigm scenarios*. De Sousa (1987) understands such scenarios as emotion-imbued narrative templates. According to

him, individuals internalise these templates, which then disclose their world in ways consistent with the relevant emotion. For de Sousa, the templates “are drawn first from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to which we are exposed” (1987, p. 182).

De Sousa (1987) posits that paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: (a) the situation-type and (b) the set of characteristic responses to that situation. In the first aspect, the paradigm scenario discloses a factual world in terms of the situation-type. This situation-type provides the characteristic objects for the core emotion and related emotions associated with that scenario (e.g. in a “fear” scenario, the characteristic objects would include a perceived threat and a vulnerable subject). In the second aspect, the individual responds to the situation in a way that is first biologically and then culturally determined. These responses take the form of emotions, actions, and deliberations on emotions and actions.<sup>102</sup>

De Sousa (1987) proposed his theory to support the idea of the rationality of emotion. This idea is also inherent to the preliminary model given its deployment of the ancient conception of reason, which incorporates evaluative feeling. In the model, the intelligibility of narrative good is analogous to the paradigm scenario, while dwelling place and disposition are respectively the situation-type and characteristic response.

In privileging emotion, De Sousa (1987) emphasises what the preliminary model calls affective perception. Yet in the model, perception is oriented as much to activity as it is to feeling. This means that in its perception of dwelling place, narrative good perceives not only how it feels to itself but also how it functions as

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<sup>102</sup> According to de Sousa (1987), one deliberates on the appropriate emotional response to a situation if one is unsure which paradigm scenario constituted it.

itself. That is why the preliminary model names intellectual perception as narrative reason's other perceptual activity.

The idea of intellectual perception is similar in thrust to the Aristotelian philosopher Eve Rabinoff's (2018) own conception of the term. Rabinoff argues that for Aristotle, the faculty of perception is not only sensory but also intellectual. She contends that the latter form of perception is determined by ethical concerns. According to her, in virtuous activity, the particulars of a human world are constituted and ethically evaluated through such intellectual perception.<sup>103</sup>

Rabinoff's (2018) claim is based on Aristotle's (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) discussions of phronesis. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he asserts that phronesis concerns a perception of particulars "of a form different from that [of one of the senses]" (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1142a30). Rabinoff argues that with this statement, Aristotle equates phronesis with intellectual perception. This leads her to understand the former as "perceiving well" (2018, p. 127) and to define it as "the capacity for intellectual perception" (2018, p. 114).

But this appears to exceed Aristotle's (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) purpose since he expressly states that the phenomenon Rabinoff refers to as intellectual perception is "perception rather more than prudence" (1142a30). Here, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) would seem to limit the understanding of phronesis to precisely the capacity for good deliberation. However, Rabinoff (2018, p. 127) conceives phronesis as also the faculty of intellectual perception, a move she considers justified not only by Aristotle's association of practical reason with a non-sensory

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<sup>103</sup> Rabinoff (2018, pp. 132–133) argues that intellectual perception's reality-constituting role is unthematic for Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For her, such perception constitutes particulars by selecting only those relevant to ethical action, whilst excluding from sensory perception all those that are not. Whilst the fact of such exclusion is accepted, the thesis disagrees on how it arises. It contends that what is unthematic for Rabinoff is the good's direct role in both the selection of the particulars and the manner of their perception.

perception but also by his discussion of moral virtue as residing in the mean between extremes in relation to action and emotion.

In this latter context, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) conceives moral virtue as a chosen disposition marked by the mean relation to action and emotion “as the prudent person would define it” (1106b36–1107a2). He asserts later in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the determination of blameworthiness in the case of a deviation from this mean disposition “is subject to perception [of the particulars]” (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1109b21–23). For Aristotle, as already noted, such perception is non-sensory.

Rabinoff (2018) argues that the implication of Aristotle’s claim that a deviation from the mean is discerned by perception is that “the discernment of the mean is also achieved by perception” (p. 127). Further, since it is the prudent person who discerns this mean, Rabinoff concludes that phronesis must be the capacity for intellectual perception. This argument is persuasive and establishes a two-fold understanding of phronesis, which Rabinoff presents as follows: “To be receptive of the particulars *with respect to which* one deliberates, and to thereby deliberate well about *how to act* with respect to those particulars (2018, p. 128).

For Rabinoff (2018), ethical agency belongs to the prudent person. Yet in the preliminary model, the ethical agent is not a human being but the good itself. To so identify the latter is to view it as superordinate entity. This is also the implication of the identification of narrative reason with the Prime Mover, since such a move equates the former with Aristotle’s (ca. 350 B.C.E./1928, 1072a19–1073a13) notion of God. However, the “God” of narrative is understood as a species of divinity rather than divinity simpliciter, which is Aristotle’s conception.

But the philosopher Sarah Broadie (1991/1993) contends that the Aristotelian God cannot be an ethical agent since God can do no otherwise than what God does. Therefore for her, “such a being is beyond being influenced by ethical judgment” (1991/1993, p. 155). Yet, it is contended that it is still possible to understand Aristotle’s God—and thus narrative good—as ethical agent if God is conceived as that whose activity is inherently ethical. Nonetheless, the thesis again departs from Aristotle’s understanding of God in that it views the latter not as divine *being* but divine *activity*. Thus, its application of the word “agent” to narrative good should be understood in those terms.

Yet, Rabinoff (2018) stresses that the ethical agent must be “an embodied, situated individual, rather than primarily a disembodied, abstract rational will” (p. 3). If narrative good’s agency is accepted, it would be natural to view it as the latter; but an analogy with radio—a modern medium of narrative—clarifies the difficulty. Let us consider a hypothetical situation in which knowledge of broadcasting is lost but broadcast content persists in an automated fashion. A person who comes across a working radio might in flicking through its channels think it the originator of its content. Further, that person may posit any number of theories to explain why this might be so. But if in some way, they were to grasp the idea of broadcasting, they would understand their theories to be false. Indeed, they would comprehend broadcasting as the very condition for the constitution of the embodied and situated radio.

To persist with the analogy, a radio’s defining work is to receive broadcasts and relay them to listeners; a “good” radio performs this work well. According to Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011), human being also has a defining work. For him, the work of human being is “an activity of soul in accord with reason”; and this activity is

done well when “virtue is added to the work” (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1098a7–12). Therefore, a “good” human being is engaged in activity that accords with correct reason.

Stewart’s (1892) claim of the derivation of the Aristotelian practical human good from the universal good should be recalled at this point. From this interpretation of Aristotle, the ethical agent is construable not only as an embodied, situated individual, but also a disembodied, abstract rationality. In terms of the radio analogy, this agent is thus both the radio set *and* broadcasting—but ultimately the latter. Therefore, to understand the ethical agency of narrative good is to grasp the latter as disembodied, abstract and rational and also embodied, situated and individual. When one speaks of factual articulation (to which the thesis turns later in the chapter), one speaks of narrative good in the latter sense.

### **Configuration**

Narrative good’s twofold perception of its dwelling place has so far been described. This perception has been understood as enabled by narrative reason’s faculty of disposition. Given narrative good and its reason are the preliminary model’s translation of the Prime Mover, one grasps its self-perception as occurring outside chronological time. The implication is that narrative good’s affective and intellectual perception of itself is not a sequential phenomenon but occurs all at once.

Yet whilst perception is an activity of a kind, it is not the *proper* activity of narrative reason. In the preliminary model, such activity is identified as configuration. This is a “reckoning with . . .” oriented towards those narrative Ideas that manifest as dwelling place so as to affect an arrangement of these elements that accords with the intelligibility of narrative good. For the same reasons as perception, configuration is conceived to stand outside chronology. But in its constant taking up and guiding of

narrative Ideas into a totality, it differs from perception in that it generates motion. Further, such motion does not end with the achievement of the correct arrangement of narrative Ideas; rather, configuration is the eternal constitution of dwelling place such that the resulting motion effectively resembles a circle.

As a component of narrative reason, configuration, like perception, rests on the first ethical pillar. However, unlike perception, it also finds support in the second as the translation at the level of the highest good of the proper activity of phronesis, that is, good deliberation. This implies good deliberation is determined by a higher form of correct deliberative activity. However, Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) reminds that good deliberation is “bound up with action” (1140b5–6). Thus, to speak of good deliberation as responding to an abstract deliberative activity would seem to contradict his purpose. It also begs the following question: If the Prime Mover is perfect, on what does it have occasion to deliberate? The difficulty is compounded when one recalls that in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle identifies only contemplation as the activity of the highest good (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1177a12–19).

Nonetheless, the idea that the Prime Mover generates its own motion and is thus not solely contemplative finds support in Aristotelian scholarship. According to Broadie (1993/1994), the Prime Mover is a dynamic activity of reason that is oriented towards its self-constitution. She identifies this activity with Aristotle’s concept of the motion of the first sphere. For Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1928, 1072a19–1074b14), the first sphere is a celestial, that is, divine substance at the outermost limit of the cosmos, whose motion, caused by the sphere’s love for the Prime Mover, is an eternal circle.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> In his text, *On the Heavens*, Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1984a, 269a29–31) identifies celestial substance as divine.

The traditional understanding of the relation of first sphere to Prime Mover is that the latter is the final cause of the former's motion. The Prime Mover, as object of desire of the first sphere, is envisioned to engage in a pure self-contemplation, which Broadie understands in the traditional sense of an activity that "does not produce or cause changes in its object" (1993/1994, p. 2). However, she argues that if the Prime Mover engages only in contemplation, the connection between the first sphere's motion and its final cause cannot be satisfactorily explained.

According to Broadie (1993/1994), this dilemma is solved if one instead considers the first sphere's desire for its object, which is the efficient cause of its motion, as co-originary with its final cause. Thus for her, the motion of the first sphere is precisely the Prime Mover's dynamism, a claim she elaborates as follows:

The desired end would not *be* a cause were it not for the desire which brings it about. That is: without the desire, no end would be aimed at, nor would there be any outcome requiring to be explained in terms of the end. From this point of view the first cause includes desire. It is not just the end, but desire-for-the-end (or, alternatively, the end-as-desired). (1993/1994, p. 7)

Broadie (1993/1994) dismisses the objection that the Prime Mover's perfection means it is neither desirous nor kinetically active. For her, the desire of the Prime Mover is not to be confused with ordinary desire because the Prime Mover is always already its desired object. Therefore, its desire does not connote incompleteness. Similarly for Broadie, the Prime Mover's kinetic activity is not the sort of self-terminating motion that characterises the movement of sublunary objects; instead, it is an eternal activity, which generates "the endless rotation of the heavens" (1993/1994, p. 7).

Thus for Broadie (1993/1994) the Prime Mover's self-contemplative activity is not separate from the first sphere and its motion but is rather the first sphere's very "substance" (p. 15). This implies the Prime Mover is an always already unified

tripartite structure, consisting of contemplation, desire and first sphere. This structure replicates that which is proposed for narrative good: perception is contemplation, configuration is desire, and dwelling place is first sphere. It is contended further that Aristotle's (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) definition of wisdom as the fusion of science and intellect also supports Broadie's position. This is because it allows an understanding of the activity of the highest reason, that is, wisdom, as not only a self-contemplation (intellect) but also a self-demonstration (science).

The foregoing has described how configuration is understood as a higher form of good deliberation. This implies that just as Rabinoff (2018) conceives the latter as intimately linked to her conception of intellectual perception, so the thesis's concept of intellectual perception is bound up with configuration. Yet since narrative intellectual perception occurs eternally with its affective counterpart, this suggests the latter is also bound up with configuration. This conclusion is supported by de Sousa's (1987) observation that feeling is essential to the efficient activity of reason since it "limits the range of information that the organism will take into account, the inferences actually drawn from a potential infinity, and the set of live options among which it will choose" (p. 195).

Therefore, narrative fittingness refers not only to the mutuality of perception and dwelling place but also to both concepts' fittingness to configuration. It is in this way that the three components of narrative reason form their unified structure. One may apply the following Aristotelian insight from Rabinoff (2018) to describe the relation: "The perception [disposition] of the particulars [elements of dwelling place] *just is* the supposition of the aim as realized or specified in some circumstance [configuration]" (p. 131).

### ***Free and Factual Articulation***

From the above, the object that narrative reason gives itself to understand can be conceived as narrative reason's own unified tripartite structure. But for it to grasp this object, the latter must be articulated as such. For Aristotle (c. 350 B.C.E./1928), divine thinking "will be one with the object of its thought" (1075a4). Therefore, from the perspective of the present chapter, the articulation of narrative reason's self-given object is precisely such reason's contemplative and kinetic thinking of that object. This is what the preliminary model calls free articulation. As the primordial object of narrative reason, that which is freely articulated in free articulation rests on the first ethical pillar.

By way of contrast, the object of the practical good is articulated as correct human action and emotion. Following Stewart (1892), this object is understood as derived from the object of the highest good. It is constituted in what the preliminary model calls factual articulation. Contrary to its free counterpart, factual articulation of the good occurs in the context of vice. This will be recalled as the substance of narrative's third ethical pillar, which concerns the conflict between virtuous and vicious relations to pleasure and pain.

For Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011), pleasure and pain "accompany every passion [emotion] and every action" (1104b14–15). Thus, action and emotion articulate the practical human good in accord with this scenario. As he puts it:

The pleasure or pain that accompanies someone's deeds ought to be taken as a sign of his characteristics [disposition]: he who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys this very abstention is moderate, but he who is vexed in doing so is licentious; he who endures terrifying things and enjoys doing so, or at any rate is not pained by it, is courageous, but he who is pained thereby is a coward." (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011, 1104b4–10)

Therefore, that which is factually articulated in factual articulation is the virtuous arrangement of pleasure and pain.<sup>105</sup> This object thus rests on the third ethical pillar.

Factual articulation encompasses the idea of narrative as not only narration but also artefact, that is, a sensory/mental/emotional record of narration. It is the commonly held conception of narrative. But while the insight that such articulation takes the form of action and emotion is shared by scholars such as Labov (1972) and the narrative psychoanalyst Tilmann Habermas (2018),<sup>106</sup> the fact that what action and emotion are articulating is a particular configuration of pleasure and pain has been unthematic in scholarship.

In the preliminary model, factual articulation sits at a remove to narrative good and its self-given reason. Chapter 7 will explain why this is so. But what must be noted here is that to shift from the event-centred view of narrative with which this chapter began to one that privileges ethics is to recognise narrative as human. This confirms it as ultimately a cultural phenomenon, which was the conclusion of Chapter 4. Indeed, Bruner (1990, pp. 59–65) identifies narrative meaning with cultural meaning. For him, the latter is expressed as acts of human communication, requiring a shared cultural context. This aligns with W. R. Fisher's (1987/1989) conception of narrative as a rhetorical activity, constituted in the interplay of reason, value and action—a schema similar to that of the preliminary model.

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<sup>105</sup> Given factual articulation is also the articulation of narrative good, then the latter too is that which is factually articulated in factual articulation. This identifies narrative good as pleasure and pain, with narrative reason now understood as that which enables its virtuous arrangement. The implication is that in the absence of such reason, narrative good is a confusion or even non-differentiation of pleasure and pain. Such a phenomenon could be conceived as the ontological basis for Lacan's (1986/1992) idea of *jouissance*, which is a painful enjoyment. However, an investigation of this contention is beyond the scope of this thesis given its focus on archetype, which is the principle of order.

<sup>106</sup> Labov (1972) and Habermas (2018) argue the point in the specific context of oral personal experience narratives. However, there is nothing in either their treatment or indeed commonsense to suggest the claim does not apply to narrative in general.

Yet where a shared cultural context is absent, and consequently narratives fail as conveyors of meaning, there remains the possibility of their reconfiguration, such that interlocutors may draw coherence from incoherence. Thus, a *breakdown* in Ricœur's (1991, p. 27) "common work" of emplotment can be the condition for a *breakthrough* in understanding. As the narrative psychologist Jill Bradbury (2021) puts it, "The sense of being out of place creates new vantage points for reading the world . . . and releases new possibilities for meaning" (p. 154).

The structural unity posited for narrative is a strong foundation for the narrative interpretation of archetype. But to secure such a conception, narrative's ontology must be established. This is the task of the next chapter.

## **Chapter 7: Establishing the Ontology of Narrative**

The work of the thesis so far has been to erect its conceptual scaffolding. It began by presenting an overview of its research objectives. It then critically reviewed the literature on Jung's archetype concept and posited that conceptual ambiguities have obscured how such structures can be understood to impact lived lives. It explored numerous points of connection between Jung and Heidegger, identifying mutualities in their understanding of death as key to the existential phenomenological interpretation of analytical psychology. It discussed existing depth psychological approaches to narrative and time and demonstrated how psychodynamic conceptions of the latter have developed in the direction of Temporality. It detailed how a critical examination of narrative unearths its foundation in morality and ethics, leading the thesis to posit a preliminary new model of narrative to support its core intervention: the reconceptualisation of archetype as narrative structure.

This chapter explores the aspect of narrative that has so far been unthematic in most scholarship: its ontology. It begins by examining existing work on the continuity of narrative and Being before investigating how Being-as-such can be conceived narratively. It then restates the preliminary deep structure model in existential phenomenological terms and uses the insights of the latter to produce a temporal version of the former. The hypothesis is that this procedure secures the ontology of a narrative conception of Being.

### **Homo Narrans as a Mode of Being**

W. R. Fisher's (1987/1989) contention, presented in Chapter 4, that human being is most essentially understood as homo narrans leads him to propose narrative as a paradigm that "expresses and implies a philosophical view of human

communication” (p. 90). The communications scholar John M. Allison (1994) contends that here W. R. Fisher is arguing for “the narrative structure of human existence” (p. 124). The implication is stark: Human being is not *homo narrans* because of a storytelling function it possesses but because narrative *in a certain form* constitutes its Being. Allison labels this form *narratization* and conceives it as “the human predisposition to exist in terms of beginnings, middles, and ends that are configured in the midst of experience rather than retroactively” (1994, p. 109).

Allison (1994) contrasts *narratization* with *narration*, that is, verbal storytelling. But to view human beings as constituted by narrative is also to say more, even, than that they “tell” stories through the medium of life as Freeman (2019) and MacIntyre (1981/2014) argue. Indeed, the latter explicitly denies the idea human being is ontologically constituted as narrative when he states that the human being is “not essentially” a storyteller but only becomes so “through his history” (1981/2014, p. 250).

Literary scholar Barbara Hardy (1968) was one of the first to propose narrativity as belonging originally to human being before being taken over as discourse. According to Hardy, “narrative, like lyric or dance, is not to be regarded as an aesthetic invention used by artists to control, manipulate, and order experience, but as a primary act of mind transferred to art from life” (p. 5).

This view would seem to contrast with that of Ricœur (1991), who speaks of human beings as “applying to ourselves the plots that we have received from our culture” (p. 33). As a result, the phenomenologist David Carr (1986/1991) argues Ricœur considers narrative solely a means of introducing an order to events that “they do not otherwise have” (p. 15). The implication is that narrative is always a fiction—even when lived.

But Carr's (1986/1991) position is a reductive interpretation of Ricœur, since for the latter, narrative is as much narratization as it is verbal or lived narration. This follows from Ricœur's (1991) claim that one must "grant to experience as such a virtual narrativity which stems, not from the projection of literature onto life, but which constitutes a genuine demand for narrative" (p. 29).<sup>107</sup> Thus for Ricœur, life becomes "a story in its nascent state" (1991, p. 29) or an "(as yet) untold story" (1983/1990a, p. 74).<sup>108</sup>

Ricœur (1990/1994) locates in ethics his concept of human being as narratively constituted, claiming that "the subject of ethics is none other than the one to whom the narrative assigns a narrative identity" (p. 178). For Ricœur, narrative identities give to ethical selves "the recognizable features of characters" (p. 166). He presents an onto-phenomenology for this ethical self, describing its structure of Being as "*being enjoined*" (1990/1994, p. 354).<sup>109</sup> Ricœur understands being-enjoined as the ontology of a self that is constituted in the attestation and injunction of an Other. For him, this Other cannot be reduced to other people and is more akin to the early Heidegger's notion of *conscience* (1990/1994, p. 355).<sup>110</sup> This is despite Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 273) himself making no explicit ethical claims regarding the concept.

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<sup>107</sup> Ricœur's (1991) concept of virtual narrativity is one of three ways in which he considers narration anchored in life, the others being (a) the conceptual network of action and (b) action's symbolic mediations. In the former, just as emplotment creates meaning from events, human action creates meaning from the heterogeneous conditions that are the pre-cursors to action (e.g., project, aim, means, circumstances, etc.). In the latter, human action operates as quasi-text, which can be interpreted in relation to symbolic conventions.

<sup>108</sup> Here, Ricœur (1983/1990a) makes a further connection between narrative and psychoanalysis. He argues that in the form of the nascent story, the analysand presents to the analyst "bits and pieces of lived stories, of dreams, of 'primitive scenes', conflicting episodes," the goal being for the analysand "to draw from these bits and pieces a narrative [of themselves] that will be both more supportable and more intelligible" (p. 74).

<sup>109</sup> It is contended that the concept of being enjoined bridges the perceived gap between the early and later Heidegger's ontological projects. The rationale for this claim will become clear as the chapter proceeds.

<sup>110</sup> See Chapter 3 for a discussion of Heideggerian conscience.

Carr (1986/1991) too posits a continuity between narrative and the lived life but grounds it instead in Edmund Husserl's theory of internal time consciousness. This theory describes the subjective experience of temporal objects, which Husserl (1928/1964) contends is constituted in three moments: (a) *primal impression* or the immediate givenness in the present of the temporal object, (b) *retention* or the grasp of the just-past impression of the object, and (c) *protention* or openness to the immediate future impression of the object.

Husserl (1928/1964) considers the unity of these three temporal moments—what he calls the “living present” (p. 77)—to be the basis for the conscious experience of temporal succession. Carr (1986/1991) extends Husserl's analysis to cover not only what the former considers relatively passive experiences, such as listening to a melody,<sup>111</sup> but also *mutatis mutandis* basic actions (p. 31). Carr gives as an example of the latter a tennis serve.<sup>112</sup> Here, one is not concerned with a temporal *object*—as in the case of a melody—but a temporal *objective*, which is realised by the action of an experiencing subject.

Carr (1986/1991) contends human life is constituted by narrativity in three ways. Firstly, relatively passive experiences and basic actions are temporal closures,

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<sup>111</sup> Carr (1986/1991) uses the modifier “relatively” because he considers that it is not right to conceive of, for example, listening to a melody as a wholly passive experience. The thesis adopts the same view because actions such as listening, which one might consider passive, are always constructive acts. This is why Ricœur (1991) says that a narrative's plot—another type of supposedly pre-existing temporal object—is only complete in the mind of the reader or listener (see the discussion in Chapter 4 of narrative co-construction). Thus when one speaks of a pre-given temporal object, one does so only in a superficial sense because at a deeper level such objects are originally constituted by the experiencing subject. Indeed, Carr criticises Husserl “for putting too much emphasis on the passive,” arguing instead that “human existence is properly characterized as an active and practical existence, and that even its supposedly passive aspects, like perception, are ultimately determined by activity” (1986/1991, p. 30).

<sup>112</sup> With this example, Carr (1986/1991) would seem to conceive basic action in a looser sense than the philosopher Arthur C. Danto's (1965) classic formulation of it as that which requires no other action in order to be performed. This is because as Carr indeed notes, a tennis serve is comprised of several apparently distinct actions such as tossing the ball, drawing back the arm, etc. However, Carr argues that the interconnections between these actions mean they are more precisely understood as *phases* of the basic action of the tennis serve.

which according to Carr, “can only be expressed by speaking of a beginning, a middle, and an end” (1986/1991, p. 47). Secondly, the complex sequences of experiences and actions that constitute a human life are also temporal closures and thus exhibit narrative structure. For Carr, such sequences are constituted by temporally discrete, often interrupted phases of relatively passive experience and action, necessitating more than just a retentional-protentional grasp.

Carr (1986/1991) argues the time of extended events is only understood phenomenologically by combining retention and protention—what Husserl (1928/1964) also calls primary memory and primary expectation, respectively—with the complementary Husserlian notions of *recollection* and *anticipation*. Husserl understands recollection as secondary memory and anticipation as secondary expectation. These refer respectively to the ordinary understanding of memory and anticipation. Carr continues that the combination of the primary and secondary temporal faculties endows human being with “a prospective-retrospective grasp” (1986/1991, p. 84). According to him, it is this temporal grasp that “lends to the various phases of action and experience their status of beginning, middle, or end, and thus constitutes a whole from which the parts receive their significance” (1986/1991, p. 84).

Thirdly for Carr (1986/1991), human life is continuous with narrative because it too not only concerns the unfolding of events but also embraces the same three distinctive perspectives on events: those of the storyteller, audience and characters. Carr (1986/1991, pp. 61–62) claims that to be a subject of human experience “is to make the constant attempt to surmount time in exactly the way the story-teller does,” which he contends is achieved with the aid of the prospective-retrospective temporal grasp. For him, the result is that in the complex sequence of events that make up

human lives, “we are subjects or agents, narrators, and even spectators to the events we live through and the actions we undertake” (1986/1991, p. 64). This is a restatement of Husserl’s (1931/1960) claim that “the ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a ‘history’” (p. 75).

Nonetheless, Carr’s (1986/1991) narrative interpretation of Husserl’s theory of internal time consciousness is not explicitly supported by the theory itself. As the philosopher William Blattner (2020) contends, while retention and protention enable human being to experience ongoing processes, they do not in themselves provide any sense of relevance or direction with regards such processes. The implication is that when Carr speaks of Husserl’s theory in terms of beginnings, middles and ends, he is, as it were, jumping the gun.

According to Blattner (2020), the missing link between Husserl and narrative is Temporality. He argues that in the latter’s identification of the past with having-been and the future with a coming-toward a possibility of Being, Heidegger (1927/2010) introduced a form of time that was unseen by Husserl and constitutive of narrativity. Blattner (see also the philosopher Micheal J. Sigrist, 2015) reinterprets Temporality in terms of the linguistic concept of *aspect*. Like *tense*, aspect is a way in which language reckons with time. The linguist Bernard Comrie (1976) defines it as “different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation” (p. 3).<sup>113</sup> Blattner argues two forms of aspect are relevant to an analysis of Temporality: Telic and Perfect. The former describes situations “which move towards a logical conclusion,” while the latter denotes “the continuing relevance of a previous situation” (Comrie, 1976, p. 14, p. 56).

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<sup>113</sup> Comrie (1976) bases this definition on that provided in 1943 by the linguist Jens Holt.

The sentences “John had been ill” and “John will drive to the hospital” are examples of Perfect and Telic aspect, respectively. From these examples, it would seem that the Perfect maps straightforwardly onto the past tense, whilst the Telic maps onto the future tense; however, this is not the case. Comrie defines tense as that which “relates the time of the situation referred to to some other time, usually to the moment of speaking (1976, pp. 1–2). This definition makes no reference to the situation’s internal temporal constituency, which is the concern of aspect. The implication is that the sentence “John had been ill” can be rewritten in the present tense as “John has been ill” and the future tense as “John will have been ill” and remain in the Perfect aspect. Similarly, “John will drive to the hospital” can be rewritten in the past tense as “John drove to the hospital” and the present tense as “John is driving to the hospital” and remain in the Telic.

Blattner (2020) translates the Perfect and Telic aspects respectively as Temporality’s having-been and coming-toward. According to him, the independence of aspect from tense is the linguistic analogy of Heidegger’s claim of a non-successive relationship between the three ecstasies of original time. As Heidegger (1927/2010) puts it, “The future is *not later* than the having-been, and the having-been is *not earlier* than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present, in the process of having-been” (H. 350).

This temporal unity of having-been and coming-toward occurring in the present constitutes a type of *movement*. It was noted in Chapter 5 that Sheehan (2024, p. 51) calls this “ex-sistential κίνησις [becoming].” One observes the same sense of movement when one thinks together the Perfect and Telic aspects. From the perspective of the present, Blattner (2020) understands the Perfect as expressing “the relevance of the past to current matters,” and the Telic as denoting

“the directionality or teleology of current matters into the future” (p. 15). According to him, it is precisely relevance and direction that Heidegger adds to Husserl’s theory of time consciousness, which is now understood to privilege tense.

But one finally secures a conception of Temporality as the missing link between Husserl and narrative when one recognises that human being’s ability to conceive of the latter as beginning, middle and end depends on its grasp of temporal aspect. As Blattner (2020) puts it, “As one follows a narrative, one retains what has already happened in so far as it is relevant to the development of the story, and one projects possible developments of the story, aiming toward some denouement” (p. 21). This movement from having-been to coming-toward, which is encountered in narrative, leads Blattner to claim that it is specifically in the narrative mode that the aspectual Perfect and Telic most closely resemble what Heidegger means by the original past and future.

Nonetheless, Blattner (2020) does not identify Temporality with what he calls the “‘narrative Perfect’ and ‘narrative Telic’” (p. 21). This is because he does not subscribe to the view advanced by Charles Guignon (1993, 2000) and Taylor (1989) that human existence is necessarily understood narratively. The most Blattner will concede is that the coherence of human life or human *process* is “constituted by an appropriate pairing of what is relevant about the past [Perfect aspect] with where the life or process is heading [Telic aspect]” (2020, p. 25).

Blattner’s (2020) way of conceiving the relation of narrative to human being is similar to the philosopher Ben Roth’s notion of *fundamental narrativity*. According to Roth (2018), human being achieves self-understanding “by casting larger hypothetical arcs of plot in the same way that readers, when in the middle of a story, project where that story is going in order to understand the identity and situation of

its characters” (p. 747). But whereas Blattner grounds in Temporality the relation of Heidegger to narrative, Roth locates this relation in the structure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.

Yet, it will be recalled that for Heidegger (1927/2010), Being-in-the-world and Temporality are both primordial phenomena of Dasein (H. 41, H. 234). Thus, it should be irrelevant whether the question of narrative’s relation to existential phenomenology is addressed from the perspective of Being or time. Nonetheless, Roth (2018) understands his theory as a genuinely narrativist account of Heidegger, whilst Blattner (2020) does not so conceive his own. Why the conflict?

The philosopher Tony Fisher’s (2010) exploration of the narrativist and anti-narrativist readings of *Being and Time* provides a framework for answering the question. T. Fisher labels these two positions respectively as the *final configuration* and *unattainability* theses of Dasein. He considers Guignon the prime exponent of the former, with T. Fisher taking his label for this position from Guignon’s own description:

In taking a stand on its own life, Dasein takes over some range of possibilities as definitive of its identity—some set of personality traits, life-styles, roles, or attitudes—and exists as “being-toward” the realization of a final configuration of possibilities for its life overall. (Guignon, 1993, p. 225)

Whilst Heidegger refers only tangentially and minimally to narrative in his work,<sup>114</sup> T. Fisher observes the narrativists still claim a grounding for their position in Heidegger’s own concepts, specifically (a) authentic historicity, that is, Dasein’s mode of Being that enables it to understand its occurrence as its *fate*<sup>115</sup> and (b) the

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<sup>114</sup> For example, Heidegger’s (1927/2010) injunction against “telling a story” to explain the origin of beings from some other being (H. 6), and his observation that biography and historiography are ways in which Dasein has sought to interpret itself (H. 16).

<sup>115</sup> See Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 385).

related and crucial issue of Dasein's self-constancy.<sup>116</sup> Heidegger (1927/2010) understands self-constancy both as “the who of Dasein” and “a mode of [its] [B]eing” (H. 375). Guignon (1992) considers Dasein's resolute stance towards its own death to be the guarantor of this self-constancy.<sup>117</sup>

In contrast, T. Fisher (2010) observes that for the anti-narrativists, the issue of Dasein's “who” is fundamentally undecidable. This position claims there can be no final configuration of Dasein since its Being always remains an issue for it. In this view, Dasein is factually unattainable. This leads Blattner (2000)—himself a key proponent of the unattainability thesis—to claim that “one of Heidegger's principal aims is to argue that there is a form of purposive unity to the longer stretches of our activity that is not narrative” (p. 193). For Blattner, such unity is non-narrative because it is not oriented towards a defined goal.

According to T. Fisher (2010), the anti-narrativists too claim support for their position in Heidegger's writings. He points specifically to Heidegger's (1927/2010) assertion that “as long as Dasein is, a not-yet belongs to it, which it will be—what is constantly outstanding” (H. 242). This means Dasein can never achieve a final configuration of itself because in its Being it is always already “still determined by ‘[B]eing ahead of itself’” (Heidegger, 1927/2010, H. 236). Nonetheless, T. Fisher notes that even if it is accepted that Dasein is factually unattainable, “there is nothing to stop it from attaining a sense of completion through the realisation of a

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<sup>116</sup> The concept of self-constancy is also taken up by Ricœur (1990/1994) to express specifically the ethical self's manner of permanence in time, which he understands as “keeping one's word” (p. 123). Ricœur (1990/1994, p. 123) argues that this view of self-constancy is more capacious than that offered by Heidegger, whose own conception relates primarily to Dasein's anticipatory resoluteness in the face of death. Ricœur contrasts the self-constancy of the ethical self—which he also calls the *ipse* personal identity (or selfhood)—with the kind of permanence in time of the *idem* personal identity, which he understands as that which can be reidentified as the same in the manner of an object. For Ricœur, the difference between selfhood and sameness is respectively of the order of that between a “who” and a “what.”

<sup>117</sup> See Chapter 3 for a discussion of resoluteness and existential death.

project upon which it has authentically resolved, and with which it now identifies itself” (2010, p. 251). He adds that the validity of such a position is independent of whether the project is completed or not.

However, Sigrist (2015) contends that if Dasein is understood as process—the implication of an aspectual view of Temporality—then its death, that is, the end of Dasein, takes on the function of temporal closure that its not-yet is thought to preclude. Thus for Sigrist, a conception of human being as having a sense of itself as a whole *mortal* life “is sufficient to establish that narrative fits human lives and human selves . . . . [because] it is only in terms of the whole that any given moment of my life is intelligible and meaningful to me” (2015, pp. 184–185).

T. Fisher (2010) attempts to trace a middle ground between the narrativist and anti-narrativist positions with his concept of *narratability*. This refers to Dasein’s ability to interpret itself by means of its pragmatic involvements in the world. For T. Fisher, narratability works as the condition “on the possibility of any narrative-type activity as such” (2010, p. 255). He uses the activity of cobbling to illustrate his concept, arguing that a person understands themselves as a cobbler by existing in the “space” between (a) their thrownness in the equipmental contexture of their craft and (b) their project, that is, their ability to be a cobbler. For him, it is in such “existing between,” that Dasein exhibits historicity.

T. Fisher (2010) contrasts the above with the narrativist view of historicity, which he claims argues that authentic Dasein has a coherent and constant self-conception, which is fully explicit to it. In his concept of narratability, T. Fisher posits a non-narrative interpretation of historicity, which flows from the fact that from the perspective of Dasein’s pragmatic involvements, historicity is necessarily episodic and generally unthematic. Yet, this approach is problematic, as it seems to reduce

historicity to inauthentic historicity. Heidegger (1927/2010) conceives the latter as a phenomenon in which “the primordial stretching along of fate is concealed” (H. 391). Thus in inauthentic historicity, Dasein is unveiled as inconstant, understanding itself in terms of its various everyday possibilities of Being.


Nonetheless, for Heidegger (1927/2010), the interpretation of Dasein’s historicity—inauthentic or otherwise—is “just a more concrete elaboration of [T]emporality” (H. 382). Furthermore, in its historicity, Heidegger insists Dasein occurs as Being-in-the-world (1927/2010, H. 383). One can therefore observe a commensurability between Blattner’s aspectual model, Roth’s fundamental narrativity, Sigrist’s mortal process and T. Fisher’s narratability. The equivalence lies in the models’ convergence on the supposed phenomenon of Dasein’s narrative structure from four mutually supportive directions: Temporality (Blattner), Being-in-the-world (Roth), authentic historicity (Sigrist) and inauthentic historicity (T. Fisher).<sup>118</sup>

These narrative approaches to Dasein owe less to the literary analogue and more to an understanding of narrative as a structure of storied experience, that is, as narratization. Taken together, it is contended they provide a narrative description of the existentialia Heidegger (1927/2010) presents in *Being and Time*, which is illustrated in Figure 6.

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<sup>118</sup> Whilst Sigrist (2015) does not explicitly use the language of authenticity in his narrative model—perhaps due to its association with the traditional narrativist reading of Heidegger—his contention that a human life constitutes a unity only against the horizon of death is the language of authenticity in all but name.

**Figure 6: Narratization Models of Dasein From the Perspective of its Existentialia**



From the above, it is now possible to understand why Roth (2018) views his theory as a genuinely narrativist account of Heidegger, while Blattner (2020) does not so conceive his own. It is because Roth implicitly accepts narratization—beginning, middle and end constituted in experience—as a form of narrative, while Blattner is unable to extend his conception beyond narrative’s traditional guise of discourse or textual artefact.

One finds support for this conclusion in Blattner’s (2000) following strident dismissal of the narrativist thesis: “Our histories are not narratives. Our lives are not literature. We are not texts” (p. 201). Nevertheless, Blattner (2020) concedes that human experience and narrative are “closely related” (p. 21). But he contends that to say any more would be to endorse Carr’s (1986/1991) thesis of the narrative structure of human being—a view he sets himself firmly against.

Nonetheless, Blattner’s (2020) aspectual model of human experience would seem an existential phenomenological equivalent to Carr’s (1986/1991) Husserlian approach to identifying the continuity between narrative and the lived life. Husserl (1928/1964) attributes the subjective experience of the temporal unity of retention, primal impression and protention to what he calls *absolute consciousness*. For him, it

is this that enables human being to “grasp the entire consciousness [of a temporal object] as an all-together, as an all-at-once” (1928/1964, p. 151). Thus, absolute consciousness is the ground for Carr’s understanding of human life as narratively structured.

But as Sigrist (2015) observes, “if we interpret the nullity that Dasein *is* in terms of verbal aspect [as Blattner does] . . . it is apparent that Heidegger is substituting this nullity as the basis of original time for Husserl’s absolute consciousness” (p. 180). The implication is that whether one understands the human experience of temporal unity in terms of aspect or absolute consciousness, one attends with greater or lesser precision respectively to the same phenomenon—narratization.

### **Narration and Experience**

In Chapter 6, it was noted that structuralist theory conceives narrative as composed of story and discourse. Traditional narrativist accounts of Dasein share with Blattner (2000) a discourse understanding of narrative, that is, a view of narrative as narration. This claim is supported by the way scholars such as Guignon (1993) speak of authentic human existence as a “self-composing” (p. 231). Here, Dasein in effect takes over an authorial position outside itself from which it narrates itself. In Guignon’s terms, one understands this position as Dasein’s final configuration.

The word “final” alludes to the temporal constitution of narration. As Allison (1994) observes, the narrator of discourse is envisaged to stand at a temporal vantage point distinct from the events they narrate. Usually, it is an ex-post position to events. This position shall be termed *interpretive-perspective*. Carr (1986/1991) observes that to speak of an ex-post position is to locate the narrator quasi-spatially

as well as temporally. Thus, interpretive-perspective can be conceived not only as a retrospective view but also “as a standpoint *outside* or *above* the events which takes them all in at a glance and sees their interrelation” (1986/1991, p. 58). Dasein exhibits just such an ecstatic relation to events in the Augenblick.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, the final configuration view understands Dasein as a narrator in both senses of ex-post.

According to Guignon (1993), from such a standpoint, Dasein imparts a narrative structure to life by “emplotting events along the guidelines of a moral map of aspiration and evaluation” (p. 236). Thus when Guignon (1993, p. 229) speaks of an authentic life as one “lived as a unified flow characterized by cumulateness and direction,” he is describing the imposition of meaning upon what structuralists would consider otherwise meaningless events. But while Guignon does not himself go as far as to describe pre-narrated events as meaningless, he does downplay their value, terming them “episodic sequence[s] of calculative strategies lacking any cumulative significance or overriding purpose” (1993, p. 230).

This chapter has so far identified four narrative components: (a) interpretive-perspective, (b) narratization, (c) narration, and (d) artefact. The structuralist conception allows narrative to be grasped as follows: a discourse or storied articulation (*narration*), constituted by a narrator’s *interpretive-perspective*, which takes the brute form of an *artefact*, identified with the structuralist notion of story. Thus, structuralism acknowledges only three of the posited four narrative components. What remains unthematic for it is that interpretive-perspective and narration are linked by narratization.

Roth (2018) implicitly recognises this link in his analysis of the shared hermeneutic structures involved in interpreting human experience and reading a

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<sup>119</sup> See the discussions of the Augenblick in Chapters 3 and 5.

story. According to him, “as readers, we are thrown into the story’s plot. Initial details are given to us and structure our expectations of what is to come” (2018, p. 754). Roth’s use of the word “thrown” immediately evokes Heidegger. It will be recalled that Heidegger (1927/2010) defines it as the “*facticity of [Dasein’s] being delivered over*” to its there or its *world* (H. 135).

For Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 136), Dasein’s thrownness is revealed to it in what he calls its *Befindlichkeit* (variously translated as “attunement,” “disposedness,” “situatedness” and “findingness” [Wrathall, 2021c, pp. 242–244]). This important concept will be revisited later in the chapter. But here, *Befindlichkeit* can be grasped as the Heideggerian description of the initial state of Roth’s (2018) reader. In their taking up of the story, this reader *qua* reader finds themselves delivered over to their there, which is the world of the story. This world then becomes the reader’s world. With this interpretation, the first outlines of a novel ontological conception of narrative come into view.

What Roth (2018) calls the story’s plot, the thesis understands as artefact, that is, the material components of the narrative, its facticity. Further, the thesis understands reading as narration.<sup>120</sup> For Roth, in reading, our projected expectations feed back upon us to “structure our understanding of the progressing story” (2018, p. 754). But as he observes, such expectations may be frustrated as one proceeds, prompting a revision of one’s understanding of the story’s hermeneutic frame, which ultimately structures the experience of reading.

Roth’s (2018) insight is that this relation of hermeneutic frame (interpretive-perspective) to storied articulation (narration) occurs also in life. This allows the

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<sup>120</sup> Reading is grasped as narration when one recalls Ricœur’s (1991) theory of narrative co-construction, which is discussed briefly in Footnote 111 and more fully in Chapter 4.

human experience of acting and suffering to be understood as a form of discourse. But because life and verbal language are different narrative media, it would be reasonable to expect the former's discourse to follow its own rules, distinct from those of narratology. For example, Roth argues that in reading, the meaning of the text eventually presents itself but that no such meaning is revealed in human lives. This view is echoed by the philosopher Bernard Williams (2009), who locates the key difference between literary and lived lives in the fact that it is essential for the former "that their wholeness is always already there, and essential [for the latter] that it is not" (p. 311). Williams understands the unity of literary lives as resting in the fact that "the end of them is present at their beginning" (2009, p. 311). Thus, unlike lived lives, literary lives are locked into their fate.

But what of the counterclaim posed by traditional narrativists that it is precisely fate that gives the shape of a literary narration to a lived life? This is an objection to which Sigrist (2015) provides the following succinct response: "Even if one were to become convinced that one's actions were not free but pre-determined, one would be unable to make any practical use of that conviction" (p. 176). This is because as Williams (2009) argues and Sigrist accepts, living a life can only involve having a conception of what it means to be at a certain point and how to move on from there. This implies that life discourse is never given or as Sigrist puts it, "Our lives are not written for us and we are not compelled to act as if they were" (2015, p. 176).

The contention is that the traditional narrativist account of Heidegger suffers from a conflation of authentic historicity with the narrative interpretation of a life. This can be framed as a confusion between self and person, respectively. When one speaks of the latter, one posits a human entity who endures through change, one

who is identifiable and reidentifiable in the manner of an object. Here, as Blattner (2020) puts it, the question of human experience is framed “in terms of continuity and discontinuity” (p. 23). However, he argues that for Heidegger, this is precisely the wrong question. Blattner contends such language conceives human being in exclusively tensal terms, whereas Heidegger is concerned with aspectual experience. This way of framing the situation is the temporal equivalent of Heidegger’s (1927/2010) definition of self as “a *way of existing*, that is, *not* [emphasis added] as a being objectively present” (H. 267).

Thus according to Blattner (2020), when Heidegger speaks of the self-constancy of authentic Dasein, he is not “focusing on personal identity through time, continuity through change . . . [but] on the coherence of the Perfect-aspect relevance of the past with the Telic-aspect direction of the future” (2020, p. 24).<sup>121</sup> T. Fisher (2010) makes a similar point from the perspective of Dasein’s everyday involvements when he argues that human being is not fundamentally “a ‘someone’ with an ‘identity’ as the narrativists would have it. . . . [but] rather, a mode of [B]eing” which presents a self (p. 260). Therefore, for Blattner and T. Fisher, existential phenomenology unveils human being as process *not* person. Further, from Roth (2018), one may understand such process as discourse.

W. R. Fisher (1987/1989) speaks of an underlying intimacy between the discursive genres. The thesis posits narratization as the specific form of this intimacy. The effect is to validate Sigrist’s (2015) claim that “lives fit so well into [written]

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<sup>121</sup> Blattner’s (2020) opposition of self-constancy to personhood reflects Ricœur’s (1990/1994) distinction between the ipse and idem identities (see Footnote 116). Further, Blattner’s identification of self-constancy with the narrative Perfect-Telic is the equivalent *in the field of action* of Ricœur’s equation of the self-constant ethical subject with the subject to whom a narrative assigns a narrative identity. In fact, Blattner’s conception of self-constancy as a unity of action suggests the permanence in time of the ethical subject—which manner of enduring Ricœur (1990/1994, p. 118) understands as “keeping one’s word”—takes the form of *deed*. Ricœur would seem to agree with such a reading when he states that, “To say ‘I am’ is to say ‘I want, I move, I do’” (1990/1994, p. 321).

narratives because lives and [written] narratives share in the same temporal form” (p. 177). From Blattner (2020), one understands this form as aspectual. Thus, to conceive of human life as narrative is to view the latter not as literature but as experience.

### **Narrative and Care for Beyng**

This narrative investigation of phenomenology (or indeed phenomenological investigation of narrative) is complicated by the fact that as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1956) observes, phenomenology itself lacks a definitive self-concept. It is (a) “the study of essences” but he stresses that (b) it equally seeks to understand human being and the world “on the basis of their state of fact” (1956, p. 59). It is also (c) “an attempt to describe our experience as it is and to describe it directly, without considering its psychological genesis or the causal explanations which the scientist, historian or sociologist may give” (Merleau-Ponty, 1956, p. 59). Yet, he reminds that (d) the Husserlian notion of genetic phenomenology conceives consciousness as developing in the context of historical communities. Further, Merleau-Ponty (1956) observes that (e) phenomenology aspires to be an “exact science”; but he notes that simultaneously it is (f) “an account of space, time, and the world ‘as lived’” (p. 59). In addition, the discipline is both (g) a transcendental philosophy and (h) a philosophy in which “the world is always ‘already there’ as an inalienable presence which precedes reflection” (Merleau-Ponty, 1956, p. 59).

It is contended that the oppositions that characterise the above descriptions reflect whether the phenomenological emphasis is on the individual human being or its broader experiential context.<sup>122</sup> At the limit, this second object of enquiry is Being-

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<sup>122</sup> Of Merleau-Ponty’s (1956) descriptions of phenomenology, those that place the emphasis on the individual human being are: (b), (c), (f) and (g). The remaining descriptions emphasise human being’s broader experiential context. Heidegger’s (1927/2010, H. 37) description of phenomenology as “the science of the [B]eing of beings” is of the latter kind, which reflects his understanding of

as-such or what the later Heidegger (1989/2012) calls *Seyn* (Beyng). So far in the thesis, the phenomenological emphasis has been on the individual human being; now, in a repeat of Heidegger's *Kehre*, the emphasis shifts to Beyng.

The interpretation of Beyng is at the core of Heidegger's later work (e.g., 1947/1998, 1969/1972a, 1989/2012). In Chapter 1, Beyng was understood as that which discloses beings and the Being of beings. Thus, it is the ontological background "against which entities can be uncovered and attain a stable, enduring presence" (Wrathall, 2021b, p. 121). Heidegger (1969/1972a) stresses the equiprimordiality of Beyng and Dasein. This implies that a narrative conception of existential phenomenology can be approached not only from the perspective of the latter but also the former. It has been argued that narratization achieves the narrative description of human being; it is argued further that the deep structure model, which was preliminarily presented in Chapter 6, achieves the same for Beyng. Further, the thesis makes the ambitious claim that the model clarifies how the two published divisions of *Being and Time* relate to the missing third.

But to progress, one must first appreciate that as descriptions of the Being of Dasein, the four narratization models already treated are narrative restatements of

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phenomenology as ontology. This type of wider enquiry also informs Merleau-Ponty's view that "the world is that which we represent to ourselves, not as men or as empirical subjects, but insofar as we are all one single light, and we participate in the One without dividing it" (1956, p. 63). But the thesis does not argue for the division of phenomenology into two distinct projects: one addressing individual human being and another exploring its broader experiential context. These two poles are necessarily intertwined. For example, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 7) argues that an enquiry into Being-as-such takes as its starting point the being that we ourselves are, which is the individual Dasein. Further, his analysis of *das Man* (the they) posits that the Being of the individual Dasein is initially and for the most part constituted by the collective Being of its everyday world, leading him to conclude that "the self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self*" (1927/2010, H. 129). Heidegger distinguishes this they-self from the authentic self, which for him is "the self which has explicitly grasped itself" (1927/2010, H. 129). When Heidegger's existential analytic turns to Temporality, the phenomenological emphasis shifts towards this authentic self, which he understands crucially as the "most radical *individuation*" of Dasein (1927/2010, H. 38). It is this characteristic double movement in the phenomenological work that drives the seemingly opposed perspectives Merleau-Ponty identifies.

the Heideggerian concept of *Sorge* (care).<sup>123</sup> In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1927/2010) understands care as the Being of Being-in-the-world (H. 198). He attributes to it the following formal structure: “Being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)” (H. 192). This means that Dasein, as a being concerned with its possibilities of Being (Being-ahead-of-oneself), is always already in a world in which it is practically involved with beings (Being-together-with).

According to Heidegger (1927/2010), care’s unified structure manifests in two fundamental ways: (a) Dasein becomes its ownmost possibility of Being or (b) its Being is delivered over to the world with which it is involved. Heidegger calls such involvement *Besorgen* (taking care). The dichotomy reflects the distinction respectively between Dasein’s authenticity and inauthenticity. Heidegger calls this phenomenon the ambiguity of care, which nonetheless, he claims, “refers to a *single* basic constitution in its essentially twofold structure” (1927/2010, H. 199).

A bifurcated yet unified structure of human experience was also unveiled in the analysis of the two modes of narrativity presented in Chapter 6. From the analyses made in the current chapter, individuated and instrumental narrativity can now be understood as narrations, structured by narratization. Yet, it follows that in so structuring, narratization must itself exhibit individuated and instrumental forms. These forms are equivalent respectively to the first and second manifestations of the structure of care. This correspondence allows one to understand care’s first manifestation as determined by ethical principles and its second by desires and inclinations.

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<sup>123</sup> This is explicitly only recognised by Roth (2018), which is unsurprising given his anchorage in Being-in-the-world of the narratization phenomenon.

Whilst as already noted the Heidegger of *Being and Time* downplays ethical concerns, the later Heidegger is less circumspect. For him, Beyng is now positioned as holding “a message for us that carries directive significance for our lives” (Olafson, 1975, p. 102). Yet if one conceives the Kehre with Heidegger (1947/1998) as a continuation of his project, such ethical concerns are understood as already in play in *Being and Time*, albeit deemphasised. This would unveil care’s first manifestation as an ethical achievement, supporting its identification with individuated narratization. Further, Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 199) speaks of the first manifestation of care as oriented towards “the *perfectio* of human being,” which is precisely also the aim of individuated narratization.<sup>124</sup>

The later Heidegger (1947/1998) shifts from an identification of care with the Being of Dasein to an understanding of care as Dasein’s care for Beyng. Beyng is now the home of human being, its essence. That is why Heidegger insists it is “not some etymological play” when in *Being and Time* he refers to the “Being-in” of Being-in-the-world as “dwelling” (1947/1998, p. 272).<sup>125</sup> With this statement, Heidegger points again to the post-Kehre continuity of his work. From this perspective, the following quote from him may be considered a restatement of the formal structure of care from the standpoint of Beyng:

The human being is . . . “thrown” by [Beyng] itself into the truth of [Beyng], so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of [Beyng], in order that beings might appear in the light of [Beyng] as the beings they are. (1947/1998, p. 252)<sup>126</sup>

Heidegger (1954/1971a) ties dwelling to the notion of *building*. For him, “building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling—to build is in itself

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<sup>124</sup> However, one recalls from the discussion of individuated narratives in Chapter 4 that such perfection is only asymptotically possible.

<sup>125</sup> See *Being and Time*, H. 54.

<sup>126</sup> Heidegger (1947/1998) uses the word “ek-sistence” rather than “existence” to convey more clearly the sense of Dasein’s ecstatic nature, that is, the way it stands outside of itself in its relation to Beyng.

already to dwell” (1954/1971a, p. 146). The political scientist Mads Qvortrup and the rhetorician Esben Bjerggaard Nielsen (2019) interpret Heidegger’s notion of building as “an activity, where one is preoccupied with the world and the projects or engagements that present themselves as important and meaningful” (p. 150).

Qvortrup and Nielsen (2019) conceive this notion of building in the context of a narrative project. Specifically, they equate it with the phenomenon the thesis has identified with narratization. According to them, the goal of building is the sustaining of dwelling place, which they conceive as “a world we have not chosen [which] grants us an ongoing story” (p. 151). Thus for them, dwelling places are constituted as narratives that precede us and which we are committed to sustaining in our acts of building, that is, in our narratizations.

The foregoing allows narratization to be understood as not only identical with the existential becoming of Dasein but also the latter’s heeding of the claim of Beyng. Thus, one is returned to Ricœur’s (1990/1994) concept of the structure of selfhood as being-enjoined to an Other. Heidegger (1947/1998) contends human being “essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by [Beyng],” adding that “only from that claim ‘has’ he found that wherein his essence dwells” (p. 247). Therefore, the sustaining of dwelling place is identifiable with “the care for [Beyng]” (Heidegger, 1947/1998, p. 261).

The contention is that Qvortrup and Nielsen’s (2019) analysis of dwelling opens the path to a narrative conception of Beyng. It is posited that the preliminary model’s notion of narrative good captures this conception. But to pursue this thought, it is first necessary to investigate Heidegger’s (1969/1972a) notion of the *destiny of Beyng*.

### **Destiny of Beyng**

The later Heidegger (e.g., 1947/1998, 1957/1991, 1969/1972a) often speaks of the *Geschick* (destiny) of Beyng. By *destiny*, one may understand “an underlying tendency in the order of things, a force that provides a sense of direction even though it does not coerce in any way” (Guignon, 2021, p. 221). Destiny is a recurrent theme for Heidegger, and its manner of treatment reflects the changing emphases of his work.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1927/2010) explores destiny in its relation to Dasein. Here, he identifies destiny with the authentic “occurrence of the community of a people” (1927/2010, H. 384).<sup>127</sup> Thus even in these early explorations of destiny, it is the wider experiential context of the individual human being that is foregrounded. So when the later Heidegger explores the destiny of Beyng, he simply takes this approach to its limit.

For Heidegger (1947/1998), it is specifically the destiny of Beyng that shapes the way beings and the Being of beings manifest. Hence, one may understand by destiny a configuring pattern. This understanding supports an identification of destiny with intelligibility. Thus when one speaks of the destiny of Beyng, one speaks also of Beyng’s intelligibility. Whilst Heidegger does not explicitly treat on the latter, the contention is that its meaning is recovered from his analysis of the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world.

It will be recalled from Chapter 3 both that Being-in the-world is Dasein’s primordial embeddedness in its world and that Dasein’s literal translation is “there-Being.” It will also be recalled from that chapter that Heidegger (1927/2010) conceives Dasein’s there as its inherent openness to its world and itself. According

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<sup>127</sup> Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 384) distinguishes destiny from fate, which he understands as a phenomenon of individual Dasein.

to Heidegger, the “Being-in” component of Being-in-the-world is “the [B]eing of the there” (1927/2010, H. 133). For him, Being-in is equiprimordially constituted by two existential structures: One of them, *Befindlichkeit*, was encountered earlier in the chapter; the other is *Verstehen* (understanding).

In *Verstehen*, Dasein projects itself upon a possibility of its Being. Without such understanding, it would be unable to comport itself to either innerworldly beings, other Dasein or itself. Further for Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 148–160), understanding is the ontological condition for both pre-linguistic interpretation (*Auslegung*)—i.e., where something is understood as something in Dasein’s practical engagement with it—and consequent explicit statement (*Aussage*).

Heidegger (1927/2010) asserts that understanding operates in a pre-given ontological framework, which he calls the *fore-structure of understanding* (H. 151). This structure is composed of three elements: fore-having (*Vorhabe*), fore-sight (*Vorsicht*), and fore-conception (*Vorgriff*). *Fore-having* is the background to understanding, in which the practical relevance of an innerworldly being (e.g., a hammer in a workshop) is disclosed to Dasein. *Fore-sight* is the perspective from which Dasein views the innerworldly being apprehended in the fore-having (i.e., the hammer is seen as for driving in nails). *Fore-conception* is Dasein’s unthematic grasp of the function of the innerworldly being disclosed in the fore-having and the fore-sight (e.g., the hammer is implicitly conceived as a hammer). For Heidegger, this fore-structure of understanding is inseparable from understanding.

*Befindlichkeit* (which will be translated as attunement) is also a form of understanding. For Heidegger (1927/2010) therefore, “a certain possibility of interpretation also belongs to it” (H. 160). Such interpretation manifests in how things “feel” to Dasein. As intimated earlier in the chapter, attunement allows Dasein to

situate itself in a specific world. Further for Heidegger, it is precisely attunement that enables Dasein to discover innerworldly beings, making it the ontological condition for Dasein's comportments, that is, its meaningful involvements with such beings (1927/2010, H. 137–138)

According to Heidegger (1927/2010), understanding and attunement together constitute “the attuned intelligibility of [B]eing-in-the-world” (H. 161). It is contended that on the basis of Heidegger's (1947/1998) identification of Being-in with dwelling, the destiny of Beyng can be comprehended in terms of the attuned intelligibility of Being-in-the-world. This claim will now be demonstrated.

### ***Demonstration of Attuned Intelligibility as Destiny of Beyng***

If in the phrase “Being-in-the-world,” one substitutes “dwelling” for “Being-in,” the following formulation is obtained: Dwelling (in)-the-world. Heidegger (1927/2010) conceives “world” phenomenologically as “*that for which one lets beings be encountered in the kind of [B]eing of relevance*” (H. 86). For Heidegger, *relevance* is what establishes the practical function of those innerworldly beings understood to have the kind of Being of equipment, which Being he calls *Zuhandenheit* (ready-to-hand).

For Heidegger (1927/2010), relevance operates as a contexture of practical relations, which are oriented either implicitly or explicitly towards a possibility of Dasein's Being (H. 86). This contexture makes sense to Dasein because of an underlying structure of meaning Heidegger calls *Bedeutsamkeit* (significance). The latter allows Dasein to understand its possibility of Being in terms of the specific circumstances of its Being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger (1927/2010, H. 86), the ontological ground for such understanding is *Weltlichkeit* (worldliness). This is the way in which Dasein's environing world, that is, the world of its practical

involvements, is disclosed to it. Environing world is therefore distinguished from phenomenological world, with the latter understood as the ontological structure to which worldliness refers. Phenomenological world will be referred to simply as “world” for the remainder of this demonstration.

As already noted, Heidegger (1927/2010) understands the Being-in of Being-in-the-world as the Being of the there. Further, he identifies the there with world (1927/2010, H. 143). But it is recalled from Chapter 3 that Heidegger also refers to the there as *clearing*, which as the philosopher Tobias Keiling (2021) observes, “articulat[es] the idea of a region of meaningfulness” (p. 734). Thus, one now has the following equation of terms: “world,” “the there” and “clearing.” But these are not to be understood as synonyms; instead, their equivalence lies in their reference to the same phenomenon of the disclosure of beings and the Being of beings. Thus, to use the philosopher Gottlob Frege’s (1892/1998) distinction, they have the same reference but not the same sense, describing the one phenomenon of disclosure from three different perspectives: (a) totality of meaningful practical relations (world), (b) Being of Dasein (the there), and (c) Beyng (clearing). The relevance of Beyng’s perspective is apparent once it is recalled that the later Heidegger (1947/1998) conceives Beyng as that which discloses beings and the Being of beings.

If “clearing” is substituted for “world” in Dwelling (in)-the-world, one is left with another reformulation of Being-in-the-world: Dwelling (in)-the-clearing. This is precisely the signification the later Heidegger (1947/1998) gives Being-in-the-world when he redefines it as “the essence of [Dasein’s] ek-sistence with regard to the cleared dimension” (p. 266).<sup>128</sup> For him, this dimension is “the clearing of [Beyng]”

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<sup>128</sup> By *ek-sistence*, Heidegger (1947/1998) understands Dasein’s “ecstatic inherence in the truth of [Beyng]” (p. 248). The implication is that the truth of Beyng is also the clearing of Beyng.

(1947/1998, p. 266). Thus, the later Heidegger elevates the clearing from an existential of Dasein to an ontology of Beyng. Further, he expressly identifies the phenomenon of the clearing with world (1947/1998, p. 266). Therefore, in Heidegger's later work, the original concept of Being-in-the-world is finally transformed as follows: Dwelling (in)-the-clearing-of-Beyng.

This revision in Heidegger's (1947/1998) concept resulted from his finally being able to think through what he called "the turning . . . to 'Time and Being'," which had failed in *Being and Time* (p. 250). According to him, one's experience of that early text is through the "the oblivion of [Beyng]," that is, its total occlusion (1947/1998, p. 250). Consequently, what is proper to Dasein and what is proper to Beyng cannot be distinguished. The later Heidegger clarifies that what is proper to the former is that it be "the shepherd of [Beyng]" (1947/1998, p. 252). That is why for him, Dasein's essence is to ecstatically dwell (1947/1998, p. 257). One now conceives such dwelling as the reformulation of Being-in-the-world.

The early Heidegger (1927/2010) foregrounds the inherent dynamism of Being-in-the-world as a thrown-projection, that is, as a comportment toward a possibility of Being in a world in which Dasein already finds itself. While the later Heidegger (1947/1998, p. 257) retains the idea of thrown-projection as constitutive of Being-in-the-world, he dispenses with the technical terms "attunement" and "understanding" as descriptions of the Being-in of Being-in-the-world. This is despite the early Heidegger's (1927/2010, H. 336, H. 340) conception of these existential structures as the intelligibility proper to thrownness and projection, respectively.

Heidegger (1947/1998) can make this move because he reinterprets Being-in as dwelling. The latter concept takes the place of attunement and understanding in the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world. For the early Heidegger (1927/2010), world—

as that which is disclosed through attuned intelligibility—is also intelligibility. However, for the later Heidegger (1947/1998), the phenomenon called world is defined in relation to Beyng not Dasein.

Yet, the early Heidegger (1927/2010) considers Being-in-the-world “a structure that is primordially and constantly *whole*” (H. 180). It follows therefore that existential structures cannot simply disappear. Thus, one may expect the seeming absence of attunement and understanding in the later Heidegger to reflect, like world, their reassignment to Beyng. Indeed, this is found to be the case in Heidegger’s (1989/2012) concept of *Grundstimmung* (basic disposition) and his (1954/1972b, 1981/2000a) concept of *Andenken* (remembrance), which are respectively an attunement and understanding that disclose Beyng.

This implies that the early Heidegger’s (1927/2010) concepts of attunement, understanding and world are transformed in the later Heidegger as follows: *The intelligibility of Beyng, which Dasein takes over in ecstatic dwelling*. This statement, combined with the thesis’s identification of intelligibility and destiny, allows the attuned intelligibility of Being-in-the-world to be finally grasped as follows: *The destiny of Beyng, which Dasein takes over in ecstatic dwelling*. Here, what is at last perceived is the rationale for Heidegger’s (1947/1998) replacement of his early concept of Being-in-the-world with the later idea of dwelling-in-the-clearing-of-Beyng. In this way, the specification of destiny of Beyng in terms of attuned intelligibility is demonstrated.

### ***Articulation of Destiny of Beyng***

The early Heidegger (1927/2010) identifies an additional existential structure, which he claims occurs essentially with attunement and understanding. He calls this structure *Rede* (discourse), describing it as “the articulation of intelligibility”

(1927/2010, H. 161). Heidegger defines discourse formally as “the structuring of the attuned intelligibility of [B]eing-in-the-world” (1927/2010, H. 162). According to him, discourse operates equiprimordially with attunement and understanding in the disclosure of world (1927/2010, H. 161). Further for Heidegger, in such operation, discourse articulates Being-in-the-world as a unified structure (1927/2010, H. 351).

This equiprimordiality of discourse with attunement and understanding suggests it too is conceivable as belonging originally to Beyng. The early Heidegger (1927/2010) considered discourse “*the existential-ontological foundation of language*” (H. 161). However, his focus on Dasein meant language was conceived solely in terms of human being. But as was the case for attunement and understanding, Heidegger’s concept of articulation eventually turns towards Beyng. Heidegger (1947/1998, p. 239) now speaks of language as the “house of [Beyng],” which thematises the idea of Beyng’s *self*-articulation. Heidegger (1959/1971b) expressly grasps this notion with his concept of *Sagen* (saying). Thus, from the standpoint of the later Heidegger, discourse is reinterpreted as Beyng’s saying of itself, that is, its articulation of its own destiny.

### ***Destiny of Beyng and Understanding***

The superlative importance of the future to both existential phenomenology and narrative means one must be especially clear on how understanding is conceived as a constitutive component of the destiny of Beyng. In his discussion of the general reception of understanding as it was conceived in *Being and Time*—i.e., as projection upon possibility—Heidegger (1947/1998) foreshadows the potential difficulty. For him, the concept of understanding in *Being and Time* was turned into a mere “representational positing,” which was then taken “to be an achievement of

subjectivity” (1947/1998, p. 249). This was particularly galling for Heidegger since it was precisely such Cartesian terminology that he meant to overturn with that text.

The later Heidegger (1947/1998) conceives the projection inherent to understanding more primordially as “ecstatic relation to the clearing of [Beyng]” (p. 249). By “relation,” Heidegger (1947/1998) means “the relation of [Beyng] to the essence of the human being” (p. 239). But this is not a Heideggerian underpinning of the relation of the Cartesian subject to its object; rather, it is a statement on the primordially of relation itself. That is why Heidegger (1998/2015) also calls Beyng “the *in-between*” (p. 116).<sup>129</sup>

To clarify the above, one must first explore the controversies around what Heidegger means by human being’s essence. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1927/2010) argues that the essence of human being “*lies in its existence*” (H. 42). For the early Heidegger, Dasein *exists* because it is “a being which is related understandingly in its [B]eing towards that [B]eing” (1927/2010, H. 53). This existence enables Dasein to comport itself toward its possibilities of Being. For Heidegger, the question of Dasein’s existence, that is, the question of its essence, is decided specifically in terms of its factual possibilities of Being. These provide it with an *existentiell* understanding of itself, which is an understanding of a possible way to Be as a particular human being. Thus for Heidegger, the question of essence “is an ontic ‘affair’ of Dasein” (1927/2010, H. 12).

Nevertheless, the philosopher Nate Zuckerman (2015) argues that what Heidegger (1927/2010) means by *existentiell* possibilities is ambiguous. Zuckerman presents four interpretations: (a) particular identities we live out, (b) basic understandings of Being that convey sense upon our worldly comportments, (c)

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<sup>129</sup> See the discussion of Beyng in Chapter 1.

authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, and (d) the possibility of existing at all rather than not. He argues most Heideggerians subscribe to one of the first two interpretations. But for him, these result in unsatisfactory accounts of Dasein's essence, which he labels respectively *existentialist* and *transcendentalist*.

Zuckerman claims the former conceives Dasein's essence as "contingent and changing," while the latter considers it "universal, necessary and common to every such entity" (2015, p. 499).

According to Zuckerman (2015), the problem with both the existentialist and transcendentalist approaches to Dasein's essence is that they necessitate a reading of *Being and Time* that is self-undermining. For him, the existentialist view of Dasein's essence as contingent suggests Heidegger's (1927/2010) protracted account of Temporality is irrelevant, whereas he sees the problem for the transcendentalists as Heidegger's discussion of concepts such as facticity and historicity. However, Zuckerman argues these conflicting views of human essence are resolved in the fourth interpretation of existentiell possibilities, that is, the possibility of existing at all rather than not. He considers this the genus of human essence, of which the other three interpretations are species.

The question of *whether* Dasein is or is not is captured in an alternative definition Heidegger (1927/2010) gives of existence in *Being and Time*: Dasein's "possibility to be itself or not to be itself" (H. 12). For him, this concerns human being's manner of "seizing upon or neglecting" existentiell possibilities (1927/2010, H. 12). Zuckerman (2015) gives an ontological interpretation of this ontic dilemma by conceiving it in terms of existential death, that is, Dasein's ownmost non-relational possibility of Being. For him, the different ways of thinking Dasein's essence are "always in response to the most general threat of *Dasein's* impossibility" (2015, p.

496). This impossibility—which Chapter 3 notes Thomson (2013) proposes as the ontological basis for the ontic possibility of Dasein’s demise—is what is disclosed to Dasein in its Being-toward-death. Here, one must note the similarity between Zuckerman’s analysis of the relation of death to essence and the investigations in Chapter 3 into the dialectic between these two concepts.

For Zuckerman (2015), the answer to the Hamletian question—to be or not to be—depends on whether we, as Dasein, can be “what we understand [project] ourselves to be” (p. 502). This is the language of authenticity—which concerns the third of his four interpretations of human essence. Zuckerman considers authenticity to be the essential species of the genus to-be-or-not-to-be. This is because for him, authenticity is “the fullest or most perfect manifestation of *Dasein*’s essence as a capacity to take up a responsible stance on what it is to be an understander of [B]eing at all” (2015, p. 495, Footnote 4).

But while Zuckerman’s (2015) argument is persuasive, the later Heidegger (1947/1998) would seem to undercut it when he argues that nihilation—i.e., the “not” of existence— “unfolds essentially in [Beyng] itself, and not at all in the existence of the human being” (p. 273). Thus for Heidegger, Dasein can only posit “Yes” or “No” to its existence because “the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’ are already intrinsically in thrall to [Beyng]” (1947/1998, p. 273).

The implication is that Zuckerman’s (2015) conception of the essence of human being operates under the same oblivion of Beyng that the later Heidegger (1947/1998) contends is the entire experience of *Being and Time*. Heidegger claims that when he said in that text that the essence of Dasein lies in its existence, he meant that “human being occurs essentially in such a way that he is the ‘there’, that is, the clearing of [Beyng]” (1947/1998, p. 248). Thus, when the later Heidegger


(1947/1998, p. 249) conceives projection as Dasein's "ecstatic relation to the clearing of [Beyng]," he is identifying projection with the relation of Beyng to itself as *Dasein* or to put it another way, *relation as such*.

In this working-through of projection, the thesis has secured a more primordial concept of understanding as that which belongs originally to Beyng. But this is not to identify Being as a being; rather, it is to grasp it as activity itself. Stambaugh (1972, pp. x–xi) calls this the "sheer occurrence" of Beyng. It is Beyng's primordial understanding that human being "remembers" in the *Andenken*. Heidegger (1954/1972b) claims that in such recollection, Dasein thoughtfully attends to Beyng's unfolding as a history intelligible to us. This manner of unfolding requires the kind of Being of human being. Thus, Beyng and Dasein's relation is one of mutuality.

### **Heidegger and the Preliminary Model of Narrative**

The existential phenomenological structures so far discussed have their counterpart in the narrative ontology proposed. In Figure 7, a Heideggerian interpretation of the preliminary deep structure model is presented.

**Figure 7:** *Existential Phenomenological Interpretation of Preliminary Model of Narrative*



Beyng is the existential phenomenological interpretation of narrative good, whilst the destiny of Beyng is equivalent to the intelligibility of narrative good. Being-in finds its narrative counterpart in disposition. Attunement and the fore-structure of understanding are respectively affective and intellectual perception. Understanding proper is equivalent to configuration. World accords with dwelling place, whilst discourse is the translation of free articulation. Finally, Dasein's occurrence corresponds to factual articulation.

The Being of Dasein has been understood as that which enables the factual manifestation of Beyng. But as Guignon (2021) observes of the later Heidegger, in Beyng's unfolding, one properly conceives Dasein not as an individual but as a community. This is because the Being of Dasein enables the articulation of the destiny of Beyng, which for Heidegger (1969/1972a, p. 9) concerns the epochs of

world history. These epochs do not refer to discrete chronological periods but to particular manifestations of Beyng. This allows Heidegger to speak of the sequence of epochs as the history of Beyng (1969/1972a, p. 9).

Earlier in the chapter, the Being of Dasein was identified with narratization. As proposed by Allison (1994), narratization concerns specifically the individual human being; however, his grounding of the concept in Carr's (1986/1991) narrative interpretation of Husserl supports narratization's extension to the group. This is because Carr's analysis is oriented towards the illumination of the phenomenology of collective histories—an approach itself authorised by Husserlian genetic phenomenology.


Ricœur (1983/1990a) locates the origin of the ontological link between the individual and their society in the idea of participatory belonging—a concept derived from genetic phenomenology. According to him, participatory belonging allows cultures or societies to engage with the realm of activity reserved for individuals. Ricœur argues this phenomenon “defines the bearers of action as *members of. . .*,” adding that participatory belonging is “a real, ontological connection insofar as it has precedence with respect to the consciousness the members have of it” (1983/1990a, p. 198).

When narratization is conceived collectively, the claim that the Being of Dasein enables the factual manifestation of Beyng can be reformulated narratively as follows: *Narratization enables the factual articulation of narrative good*. This reformulation allows the examination of that element of the preliminary model that was previously held back: the relation of narrative good to factual articulation. One now conceives this relation as constituted in narratization. Further, Sigrist's (2015) treatment of aspect, which the thesis has tied to narratization, grounds the latter too

in Aristotle, specifically his ideas on potentiality, movement, actuality and coming-into-Being. These ideas will be explored in Chapter 8.

The foregoing implies that narratization is grasped most comprehensively as not only an activity of becoming and a heeding of the claim of an Other; it is also the structure that enables the factual articulation of that Other, conceived narratively as narrative good. This allows the following refinement of the preliminary model:


**Figure 8:** *Preliminary Deep Structure Model of Narrative Incorporating Narratization*



In Figure 8, narratization's borders with free and factual articulation are porous. This illustrates its role as mediator between the spheres of narrative good and factual articulation. In the first version of the preliminary model (Figure 5), these spheres were separated by a solid line. This previous depiction is now understood as illustrating the fact that without narratization, narrative good and facticity cannot be related.

For the sake of completeness, Figure 9 illustrates the relation of existential phenomenology to the revised preliminary model.

**Figure 9:** *Existential Phenomenological Interpretation of Revised Preliminary Model*



## Narrative and Temporality

Blattner's (2020) aspectual model allows the identification of narratization with *Zeitlichkeit*, the temporal condition of the Being of Dasein. As noted in Chapter 5, Heidegger (1927/2010) asserts that *Zeitlichkeit* enables Dasein's occurrence, that is, its "succession of experiences 'in time'" (H. 373). The thesis has demonstrated that this is precisely also the function of narratization. This confirms that the latter is grasped most fundamentally as Temporality despite the alternative Heideggerian approaches to the narratization phenomenon discussed earlier in the chapter.

From a solely narrative perspective, narratization has also been understood as that which mediates between narrative good and factual articulation. However, the preliminary model is a unified structure, which means one should not conceive narrative good and factual articulation as two separate phenomena linked by a third; instead, one should view all three as a mutuality, which can be conceived as follows: *Narrative good is a structured self-narration as factual articulation*. In existential phenomenological terms, this translates as "Beyng is a structured self-unfolding as Dasein's occurrence." In the two statements, "self-narration" and "self-unfolding" are functionally equivalent. This supports the following initial syncretism: (1) *Beyng is a structured self-narration as Dasein's occurrence*.

To reiterate, Beyng conceived as self-narration is not posited as a being but is affirmed as activity; indeed, it is the most primordial activity. When such activity is conceived narratively, Beyng, as that which grants the meaningful manifestation of beings, can be grasped as a primordial interpretive-perspective. Further, the equivalence of Beyng and narrative good means the latter too can be so grasped. Interpretive-perspective has been understood as guiding the emplotment of narrative events. Thus, to conceive Beyng as interpretive-perspective is to grasp it as

exhibiting an ex-post relationship to factual events, which themselves acquire meaning only from the intelligibility conveyed upon them by interpretive-perspective.

The identification of interpretive-perspective also with narrative good allows one to conceive “interpretation” and “perspective” as respectively narrative good’s self-configuration and self-perception. This positions interpretive-perspective as a reflexive phenomenon, which one also understands as appropriating factual events. Such events are conceived narratively as factual articulation and phenomenologically as Dasein’s occurrence. The foregoing supports the following revision to the initial syncretic description of Beyng: (2) *Beyng is a structured narration of a reflexive interpretive-perspective as the appropriation of Dasein’s occurrence.*

The implication of the above is that the traditional narrativist reading of Heidegger is not so much wrong as misplaced: It looks for its final configuration—the ultimate meaning of a human life—in Dasein when it is to be found in Beyng. Further, a narrative conception of Beyng clarifies why Heidegger (1969/1972a, p. 23) insists Appropriation (which was discussed in Chapter 5) not only appropriates Being and time to itself but also Dasein. As noted in Chapter 1, for Heidegger, “Appropriation appropriates” (1969/1972a, p. 24). Thus, in appropriating human being’s occurrence, interpretive-perspective *is* Appropriation, which Heidegger also calls the *event of Appropriation* to emphasise its dynamic nature. To grasp interpretive-perspective as Appropriation is also to understand it from Chapter 5 as Ereignis and the source of presencing.

Further, in conceiving interpretive-perspective as narrative good’s self-configuration and self-perception, it is identified as the unified reflexive activity of disposition. This unified activity is precisely narrative good’s perception and

configuration of its own dwelling place. Therefore, if interpretive-perspective is Appropriation, so is the reflexive activity of narrative disposition. This implies the latter too is both Ereignis and the source of presencing.

However, an understanding of narrative disposition as Ereignis reveals the deep structure model as still incomplete. According to Heidegger (1969/1972a), Ereignis gives the gifts of Being and time. Indeed, Ereignis precisely *is* the giving of those gifts, which Heidegger also equates with the sending of the destiny of Being. For him, *sending* is a special sort of giving, which “gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws” (1969/1972a, p. 8).<sup>130</sup>

But the preliminary model explicitly only describes the giving of the gift of Being. In Chapter 5, it was shown that Heidegger (1969/1972a) understands Being as presencing. The model captures the latter idea through the concept of dwelling place, which as the object grasped in narrative good’s free articulation of itself, is the condition of possibility for any narrative manifestation or presencing whatsoever. Yet for Heidegger, there is no gift of Being without the gift of time—the two are inseparable. This suggests that to locate the gift of time in the preliminary model, one must find a concept inseparable from dwelling place. The only candidate is disposition.

But nowhere in the preliminary model is disposition presented explicitly as or in terms of time. However, it *is* thought in terms of motion, specifically that which accompanies the configuration of narrative Ideas. From Aristotle (4th century B.C.E./1984b), one understands motion as intimately linked to time but not identical. (219a8–9). He defines time as “number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after',”

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<sup>130</sup> Heidegger (1969/1972a) asserts that in such sendings “both the sending and the It [Ereignis] which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation” (p. 9).

which means for him, time is only motion “in so far as [motion] admits of enumeration” (4th century B.C.E./1984b, 219b1–2). Aristotle contends such enumeration is achieved by counting the nows, which identifies the latter also as motion (4th century B.C.E./1984b, 219b10–18).

Aristotle’s (4th century B.C.E./1984b) definition of time restricts it to its vulgar concept. Heidegger (1975/1982) reworks Aristotle by translating the ancient Greek words “*to proteron*” and “*husteron*” as not only “before” and “after,” respectively, but also “earlier” and “later,” respectively. This allows him to translate Aristotle’s definition of time as follows: “Time is something counted in connection with encountered motion with a view to the before and after, in the horizon of the earlier and later” (1975/1982, p. 240).

For Heidegger (1975/1982), the implication is that time “is not only what is counted about the motion, but it is counted there *so far* as that motion stands in the prospect of the before and after when we *follow* it as *motion*” (p. 240). Thus, what becomes thematic for Heidegger is motion understood as “*away from something toward something*” (1975/1982, p. 242). This allows him to reinterpret the nows counted in the motion as transitions. Here, the now retains its connection to past and future. From this perspective, the sequence of counted nows can be conceived as a single unfragmented now, encompassing the whole motion. For Heidegger, this aligns the Aristotelian concept of time with original time.

The above supports a conception of original time, in narrative terms, as not only the specifically temporal moment of narratization—i.e., aspect—but also the time accompanying the motion of narrative Ideas. This latter time shall be referred to as the *original time of narrative*. Whether such time is identical with the unified reflexive activity of disposition or constitutes the latter or is constituted by it is yet to

be determined. All that can be said at this point is that the deep structure model is necessarily incomplete until it explicitly captures disposition's activity as a temporal phenomenon, specifically as event.

Sigrist (2015) argues philosophers of action conceive event as an occurrence that happens “all at once and with no internal stopping or end point” (p. 178). Thus, an example of an event would be thinking as such—the moment it occurs it is complete. This understanding of event contrasts with narratology's use of the term, which describes a “transition from one state to another state” caused or experienced by an agent (Bal, 1997, p. 5). The philosopher Alain Badiou's (1988/2007) concept of event is an even greater departure from Sigrist's position in that it denotes a fundamental break in affairs.<sup>131</sup>

What narratologists understand by event, philosophers of action call *process*. The latter is a type of occurrence that both never happens all at once and does involve a natural end point. Thinking in order to understand something is an example of a process. Sigrist (2015) claims reasonably that the distinction philosophers of action make between the phenomena they call “event” and “process” reflects that which Aristotle (ca. 350 B.C.E./1928, 1048b18–35) posits between *energeia* (an action complete in itself) and *kinesis* (an action not complete in itself), respectively.

Disposition's reflexive activity is an event because it happens all at once. But through its identification with Appropriation, its status as event is properly understood as of a completely different order to the events of which philosophers of action speak. This is because as Heidegger (1969/1972a) states, Appropriation is the condition of possibility for any within-time occurrence whatsoever.

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<sup>131</sup> See also the discussion in Chapter 5 of Puget's (2009/2018) evental present.

One further understands disposition's activity as event when one recalls its identification with interpretive-perspective. As Carr (1986/1991) observes, from the latter standpoint, all story elements are apprehended "at a glance" (p. 58). This description allows interpretive-perspective—and thus the event of Appropriation—to be conceived as a type of *seeing*; indeed, its most primordial form. Aristotle (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) explicitly understands seeing as an *energeia* (event) because for him, it "seems to be complete at any given moment . . . [and] is not deficient in anything that could subsequently come into [B]eing so as to complete its form" (1174a15–17).

But for there to be sight, there must be presence. This implies the two phenomena—like disposition and dwelling place—are flipsides of one another. Following Heidegger (1975/1982), presence has already been understood more originally as *presencing*. It is recalled from Chapter 5 that the latter is the unity of the *presencing* of the present, the *presencing* of the past and the *presencing* of the future. Given the posited relation between *seeing* and *presencing*, the temporal constitution of the latter unveils the at-a-glance perspective of interpretive-perspective as a unified *tensal* perspective. Thus, time enters into interpretive-perspective as *tense*. In this way, one identifies through alternative means the "site" of original time in the preliminary model as the unified reflexive activity of disposition.

In conceiving interpretive-perspective and the event of Appropriation as vision, one is returned to the Platonic metaphor of light, which Heidegger (1975/1982) identifies with *Temporalität*. In Chapter 5, the latter was posited as the early Heidegger's attempt at his later notion of Appropriation. Further, *Temporalität* was understood as the temporal condition of Being-as-such. As noted earlier in the chapter, the later Heidegger (1989/2012) refers to Being-as-such as *Beyng*, which is conceived in the preliminary model as narrative good. Therefore, one grasps

Temporalität narratively as the temporal condition of narrative good. This temporal condition is related in some way to the unified reflexive activity of disposition. Thus, time is made thematic in the preliminary model by bringing disposition's activity into relation with the phenomenon Heidegger (1975/1982) knows as Temporalität. But what is this relation?

To answer the question, one must briefly unpack the evolution of the concept of Temporalität. As Blattner (2021) observes, Heidegger uses that specific term only sporadically after the mid-1920s. By *On Time and Being*, Heidegger (1969/1972a) understands the unity of original time in purely temporal terms, making no reference to the specification of Being that Heidegger (1975/1982) had previously also assigned to original time; instead, the role of such specification in determining the manner of presencing is taken over by the destiny of Being.

This change in approach had the advantage of distinguishing the phenomenon of original time from that of the specification of Being. The effect is to clarify what is at stake in time and Being's belonging together as Appropriation. According to Heidegger (1969/1972a), the latter gives its gifts "through the interjoined modes of giving: sending and extending" (p. 20). The gift that Appropriation *sends* is the specification of Being, whilst that which it *extends* is original time. Yet, it is precisely original time and the specification of Being that constitute the early Heidegger's (1975/1982) concept of Temporalität. Thus, the later Heidegger reworks Temporalität by recasting it as the gift of Appropriation.

Appropriation has been understood narratively as the unified reflexive activity of disposition. Thus if the relation of Appropriation to Temporalität is as giving is to gift, so is the relation of disposition's activity to the same phenomenon. Further, one recalls that such activity is narrative good's perception and configuration of its own

dwelling place. Therefore, when disposition's activity is understood as the giving of the gift of the phenomenon of Temporalität, its constituent self-perception and self-configuration are grasped as a unified *temporal* phenomenon. Chapter 5 identified Temporalität with the higher kairos and that term shall be used as the narrative translation of the phenomenon.

From the foregoing, therefore, the original time of narrative cannot be identified with the unified reflexive activity of disposition; instead, one more correctly grasps the latter as the overarching phenomenon of which narrative's original time is a gift. Thus, narrative time is constituted by disposition's reflexive activity, which will now be referred to simply as interpretive-perspective.

### **Interpretive-Perspective and Free Articulation**

Interpretive-perspective manifests most originally as narrative good's free articulation of itself. In Chapter 6, free articulation was understood in Aristotelian terms as the articulation of the object constituted in divine reason's self-thought. Following Broadie (1993/1994), the deep structure model conceives the reflexive activity of such thinking as kinetic as well as contemplative. Thus, not only does divine self-thought constitute its own object as that which is contemplated, but also it constitutes it as a self-unfolding.

In the deep structure model, what is freely articulated in free articulation is narrative good's desired configuration of the Ideas of its dwelling place. This object is constituted in narrative self-perception and self-configuration, that is, interpretive-perspective. Again in Aristotelian terms, one grasps interpretive-perspective as narrative reason's self-thinking and free articulation as the articulation of the object of this thought. The implication is that interpretive-perspective and free articulation are a rational unity.

This unity finds its existential phenomenological counterpart in Heidegger's (1959/1971b) identification of Appropriation with Beyng's articulation of itself (pp. 127–128). In such articulation, Appropriation is precisely Beyng's belonging together with Being, original time and Dasein (see Heidegger, 1969/1972a). Yet, Being has already itself been understood as temporal. As Heidegger (1969/1972a) puts it, Being is "the gift granted by the giving of time" (p. 22). Therefore for Heidegger (1969/1972a, p. 22), "Being vanishes in Appropriation" as far as it is more primordially understood temporally. However, even as so temporally constituted, Being retains its own salience in Appropriation's articulation.

The above suggests that what is freely articulated in free articulation can be conceived analogously as the belonging together of primordial *narrative* phenomena. So far, what is freely articulated has been described as follows: *narrative good's desired configuration of the Ideas of its dwelling place*. This description will now be parsed to determine whether a conception of free articulation as a belonging together of primordial narrative phenomena is supported.

### ***Free Articulation as a Belonging-together***

To say that what is freely articulated in free articulation is narrative good's desired configuration of the Ideas of its dwelling place is simply to say that what is freely articulated in such articulation is narrative reason. But this is no more than is already known. Further, the unity of interpretive-perspective and free articulation allows what is freely articulated in the latter to be understood also as interpretive-perspective. But this is again no more than is already known.

Nonetheless, one's thinking is progressed when these two tautologies are combined. This allows what is freely articulated in free articulation to be specified as (a) narrative reason and (b) interpretive-perspective. The two terms would therefore

seem to be identified. The thesis has understood narrative reason as narrative good's self-given rationality and interpretive-perspective as that which grants the narrative its time and Being. The latter two concepts, as the gifts of rational activity, do not also belong to narrative good because in the absence of the rationality it gives itself, narrative good is not rational. Yet if narrative reason belongs to narrative good but time and Being do not so belong, then that to which time and Being do belong—i.e., interpretive-perspective—cannot be equated with narrative reason. Thus, the identity of interpretive-perspective and narrative reason is only seeming.

Interpretive-perspective and narrative reason are therefore not two different ways of referring to the same phenomenon, but two different phenomena. However, they are functionally equivalent—both being what is freely articulated in free articulation. So, as distinct phenomena, what is their relation? The thesis has already provided the answer: *Interpretive-perspective is narrative reason's self-thinking*. What is clear from this statement is that narrative reason is the more primordial phenomenon.

In Chapter 6, narrative good was conceived as providing the ethical sense that constitutes the whole narrative structure by granting it its reason. It will be recalled that the thesis identifies narrative reason with the destiny of Beyng. For Heidegger (1969/1972a), the latter is sent by Beyng. However, this is not meant in the sense that such destiny is an object that a subject called "Beyng" then sends; rather, Beyng sends itself as its own destiny. The event of the sending of this destiny is what Heidegger also understands by Appropriation.

Thus, when one speaks of narrative good as providing the narrative structure with its reason, this is analogous to Beyng's sending of its own destiny. The event of the sending of this destiny is understood narratively as interpretive-perspective.

Therefore, the conception of the latter as narrative reason's self-thinking allows Appropriation to be conceived as the self-thinking of the destiny of Beyng.

Further, interpretive-perspective has been understood as appropriating human being's occurrence. Yet, it has also been conceived as the primordial unfolding of narrative good. As the latter, there is no human being to appropriate. Thus, these two understandings of interpretive-perspective would seem contradictory until one recalls that interpretive-perspective is a rational unity with free articulation. The thesis identifies free articulation with the existential phenomenological conception of discourse, which the later Heidegger (1959/1971b) understood as Beyng's saying of itself. According to him, Beyng cannot articulate itself as a history intelligible to Dasein without this self-saying. This allows one to infer that if interpretive-perspective is to appropriate human being, it can do so only as free articulation. The implication is that free articulation is the essential link between narrative good and human being. Thus, what is freely articulated in such articulation *is* this essential link.

The thesis has now identified three ways in which what is freely articulated in free articulation is most fundamentally described: (a) narrative reason, (b) interpretive-perspective, and (c) essential link between narrative good and human being. Since interpretive-perspective has been understood as narrative's reason self-thought, one properly grasps (b) as a function of (a). Therefore, interpretive-perspective is only a distinct mode of what is freely articulated in free articulation if what uniquely describes it can be identified. This requires an answer to the following question: What is the fundamental nature of narrative reason's self-thinking?

Following Broadie (1993/1994), one conceives such thought as contemplative and kinetic. But can we not penetrate deeper? To contemplate is to engage with presence, which has been understood as a phenomenon of original time. Further,

from Heidegger's (1975/1982) reading of Aristotle, original time is conceived as the horizon to which motion refers. Interpretive-perspective itself has been grasped as a temporal phenomenon. This implies that reason's contemplative and kinetic thinking is ultimately a temporal thinking, thought in terms of presence and motion. Therefore, what is freely articulated in free articulation is properly described as follows: (a) narrative reason, (b) original time, and (c) essential link between narrative good and human being.

In the above, one observes the narrative equivalents of all four elements of Appropriation's belonging together: Narrative good and human being are straightforwardly *Beyng* and *Dasein*, respectively, whilst original time is again both itself and the Being it constitutes. The only difference between the narrative and Heideggerian conceptions of belonging-together is the former's incorporation of narrative reason. However, closer inspection reveals this difference as only seeming. This is because the destiny of *Beyng* (narrative reason's Heideggerian equivalent) is precisely what is sent in Appropriation and indeed is what defines the belonging together of *Beyng*'s self-saying. Therefore, the deep structure model makes explicit what is only implicit in the later Heidegger's (1959/1971b) thought.

### ***Free Articulation and Kairos***

In free articulation, original time inhabits both its kairotic forms. As narrative reason's contemplative-kinetic thought, it is the specifically temporal moment of the higher *kairos*. One also observes it indirectly as the equivalent constitutive moment of the lower *kairos* since what is freely articulated in free articulation is also the essential link between narrative good and human being, whose temporal condition was identified in Chapter 5 with the lower *kairos*. In the deep structure model, as in Heidegger (1927/2010), human being is fundamentally temporal. As stated in

Chapter 1, the thesis primarily understands human being as psyche or soul, which means the latter too is properly understood as a temporal phenomenon. This was demonstrated in Chapter 5, with the relevant phenomenon again the lower kairos.


The contention is that a conception of the lower kairos as human psyche supports an understanding of the higher kairos as divine psyche. This would equate the higher kairos with the Platonic world soul. According to Plato (ca. 360 B.C.E./1959), the world soul is a living intelligence, which drives the universe's life and motion by mediating between divine intelligence and the physical world (30b–c, 34b, 35a, 37a–b). The thesis grasps such divine intelligence as narrative reason's self-thought, that is, interpretive-perspective. Interpretive-perspective's relation to facticity—which latter is the deep structure model's conception of physical world—is mediated by free articulation since facticity belongs to human being. Therefore, one may understand that which is freely articulated in free articulation as precisely the higher kairos. Thus, the latter is finally grasped as follows: *the unity of that which is freely articulated in free articulation, that is, the unity of the structural moments of narrative reason, original time, and essential link between narrative good and human being.*

As that which is so articulated, the higher kairos remains the gift of interpretive-perspective. The original time constituted in this gift is the tensal unity of past, present and future. The lower kairos is the way the higher kairos manifests as human experience. The original time of the lower kairos is the aspectual unity of past, present and future. The thesis has understood this latter unity as the temporal moment of narratization, which is the deep structure model's conception of human being. Thus, one may conceive the relation of higher kairos to lower kairos alternatively as the “descent” of the gift of narrative reason's self-thought into


facticity. This emphasises the higher kairos's structural moment of essential link between narrative good and human being. One may understand the scenario as the narrative equivalent of Heidegger's (1947/1998, p. 252) conception of human being as "thrown" by Beyng. What the narrative interpretation clarifies is that that which is thrown by Beyng is Beyng's articulation of itself.

The complete deep structure model of narrative can now be specified. It is illustrated in Figure 10, incorporating the most relevant temporal concepts from Figure 4. Its existential phenomenological translation is presented in Figure 11.

Figure 10: Deep Structure Model of Narrative



**Figure 11: Relation of Existential Phenomenology to Deep Structure Model of Narrative**



Heidegger (1927/2010) claims of Temporality that it “holds within itself the possible structural unity of understanding, attunement, entanglement [in world], and discourse” (H. 335). This allows him to specify these existential structures in the following temporal terms: Understanding “is grounded primarily in the future,” attunement “temporalizes itself primarily in having-been [past],” entanglement in world “is temporally rooted primarily in the present,” whilst discourse “is grounded in the ecstatic unity of [T]emporality” (1927/2010, H. 349–350). One now grasps the relation of discourse to Temporality more primordially as the articulation of the latter in the former when discourse is understood as Beyng’s self-saying.

This chapter has unveiled narrative as a way of speaking about Being.<sup>132</sup> In demonstrating narrative as an ontological language, the relation of Beyng to Dasein has also been clarified. This was achieved through the elucidation of a deeper continuity between existential phenomenology and narrative than envisaged in existing scholarship. With narrative’s ontological conception secured, the thesis now turns to how archetype—the ultimate focus of its enquiry—is understood in narrative terms.

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<sup>132</sup> But the narrative ontology so delineated must be distinguished from that proposed by the philosopher Axel Hutter (2022), whose conclusions were derived from an analysis of a literary text, specifically, Thomas Mann’s *Joseph and His Brothers*. From the present investigation, one understands that such an approach risks obscuring the very phenomenon of human experience one would wish to illuminate.

## Chapter 8: Archetype as Narrative Structure

The implication of an understanding of narrative as ontology is that to conceive archetype as narrative is to acknowledge it as ontological structure. It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that while Jung describes archetype in seemingly contradictory ways, through Knox (2003), the following four main conceptualisations are discerned: (a) biological entities, (b) organising mental frameworks of an abstract nature, (c) core meanings containing representational content, and (d) eternal metaphysical entities.

Roesler (2016/2022) identifies several characteristics of archetype, which may be understood to manifest in each conceptualisation:

- inherent patterns of experience and behaviour
- a priori forms of perception
- strongly affectively charged
- numinous
- expressed in the form of symbols, human actions and behaviours, social phenomena
- universal
- autonomous
- unconscious

To the above, and echoing Jung (CW8, para. 920; CW9i, para. 155), one must add the following to this list:

- latently meaningful
- purely formal

In this chapter, it is contended both that the above characteristics can be conceived narratively and that a narrative interpretation of archetype enables a

synthesis of its four main conceptualisations. The chapter posits such synthesis is achieved when the true nature of the archetypal a priori is illuminated, bringing to view what Hogenson (2004) intuited as the “infinitely regressing, transcendental archetype-as-such” (p. 48).

It will also be recalled from Chapter 2 that Jung uses the term “a priori” ontologically rather than epistemologically. In this way, he follows Heidegger (1975/1982), who understands by apriority a term denoting the character “by which [B]eing precedes beings” (p. 20). Therefore, Heidegger, like Jung, recasts apriority as primordially. This chapter takes the same approach, the goal being to secure the specification of archetype as narrative structure.

### **Mapping of Deep Structure Model Onto Archetypal Characteristics**

The proposition is that the deep structure model of narrative maps onto archetype’s characteristics as follows:

- *Affective/Intellectual Perception*—a priori forms of perception; strongly affectively charged
- *Dwelling Place*—purely formal
- *Configuration*—inherent patterns of experience and behaviour
- *Narrative Good*—universal, autonomous, unconscious
- *Intelligibility of Narrative Good*—latently meaningful
- *Factual Articulation*—symbols, human actions and behaviours, social phenomena
- *Free Articulation and Narratization*—numinous

#### ***Affective/Intellectual Perception***

As noted in Chapter 2, Jung (1917/1922) contends that archetypes “are feeling just as much as thought and might therefore be termed *original thought-*

*feelings*” (p. 411). One now grasps this phenomenon as that described by affective/intellectual perception in the deep structure model. Jung’s identification of such thought-feelings as original reminds that one is here concerned with a perception and judgment that operates *before* human experience. His description of archetype as original thought-feeling highlights what he considers to be the intimate connection between a priori forms of intellect and emotion. This aligns with the relationship the deep structure model posits between affective and intellectual perceptions, which it presents as a unified phenomenon.

Jung further describes archetype both as a “*feeling-value*” (CW8, para. 411) and “a collective emotion . . . which is not primarily a personal experience but becomes one only secondarily” (CW8, para. 555). In these descriptions, what is emphasised is archetype’s affective charge. Thus, Jung’s overarching approach to archetypal feeling and emotion allows it to be conceived as *affect-that-perceives*, demonstrating its identity with affective perception.

### ***Dwelling Place***

In its a priori perception, what archetype perceives is its own structural pattern, which Jung understands as its “possibility of representation” (CW9i, para. 155). Here, what is emphasised is archetype’s purely formal aspect. One understands this narratively as its desired configuration of dwelling place. It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that dwelling place is constituted as meaningfully related narrative Ideas or complexes of such Ideas. These Ideas are abstract and thus neutral regarding their specific mode of representation. But it is important to note that narrative Ideas *in themselves* are prior to dwelling place, with the latter being the phenomenon that manifests only those Ideas that accord with the intelligibility of narrative good.

The priority of narrative Ideas to dwelling place implies that for archetype to be considered narrative structure, there must be a corresponding ground of neutrality from which it constructs its possibility of representation. And indeed, such a concept was encountered in Chapter 2 in the notion of *unus mundus*, which Jung describes as the “unitary aspect of [B]eing,” where there is no division between psyche and matter (CW14, para. 662).

### **Configuration**

As inherent pattern of experience and behaviour, archetype guides activity in the manner of configuration. Experience is understood as activity when one recalls Carr’s (1986/1991) observation that even supposedly passive aspects of human existence “are ultimately determined by activity” (p. 30). Crucial to the equivalence of this archetypal characteristic to narrative configuration is that in both cases, the guidance of activity is always already oriented towards the realisation of some notion of the good.

### **Narrative Good**

Whilst affective/intellectual perception, dwelling place and configuration are all primordial narrative structures, they are surpassed in primordiality by narrative good. The deep structure model understands the latter as animating all human existence through its self-given reason. Thus as a universal phenomenon, it is the ontological ground for archetype’s universality.

Further, in animating human existence, narrative good, like archetype, exhibits autonomy. Jung claims that the autonomy of archetype, which latter he also calls *spirit*, “appears as an intention of the unconscious superior to, or at least on a par with, the intentions of the ego” (CW8, para. 643). For him, such autonomy is

expressed through human being because “[archetype’s] truth is nothing if it cannot live.” (CW8, para. 648).

Jung (CW8, para. 643, para. 645) observes that the potentially superior position of archetype vis à vis ego-consciousness might merit it being called a “higher” or “wider” consciousness rather than the unconscious; nevertheless, he still characterises it as the latter. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, Jung argues that archetype is such that its true nature “is *not capable* [emphasis added] of being made conscious” (CW8, para. 417). Here, one approaches the condition of narrative good, which in its unconsciousness, autonomy and universality, exceeds that of even the reason it gives itself.

### ***Intelligibility of Narrative Good***

Narrative good’s self-given reason has been understood as its intelligibility. This is the component of the deep structure model that imbues the narrative with meaning by structuring its articulation. Such meaning is to be distinguished from that which may be apparent to human being in the narrative’s specifically factual articulation as emotion and action. Therefore, narrative reason as such is always latent. This is the ground for what Jung (CW8, para. 922) calls the “latent ‘rationality’” of archetype, which as noted in Chapter 5, orders events and experiences to accord with its purpose or meaning.

### ***Factual Articulation***

Narrative reason and factual articulation are understood as bearing the same relation to one another as latent meaning and archetypal image. When one speaks of archetypes as symbols, human actions and social phenomena, one understands them as archetypal images. Therefore, such images are grasped in terms of the deep structure model as factual articulations.

### ***Free Articulation and Narratization***

In Chapter 7, it was demonstrated that one of the three structural moments of what is freely articulated in free articulation is the essential link between narrative good and human being. The Being of the latter has been understood as narratization. It will be recalled that narratization is viewed in three senses: (a) activity of becoming, (b) heeding of the claim of narrative good, and (c) structure enabling the factual articulation of narrative good. The essentiality of the link between narrative good and human being centres on the second sense. It is on this basis that archetype's numinosity—i.e., the human experience of it as divinity—is identified with the nexus of free articulation and narratization.

The remaining two structural moments of what is freely articulated in free articulation were found to be narrative reason and original time. It will be recalled that one grasps these two phenomena together as interpretive-perspective, which as the unified reflexive activity of disposition is also precisely dwelling place. Consequently, dwelling place can be conceived as a composite structural moment of what is freely articulated in free articulation, constituted specifically by narrative reason and original time. Thus, it is precisely in human being's relation to the freely articulated dwelling place that the essential link between human being and narrative good is itself constituted. Therefore, the freely articulated dwelling place is the immediate numinous object of narratization. It is also the precise narrative description of archetype's "possibility of representation." As numinous, it plays the same inciting role as the unconscious in Jungian individuation.

It was noted in Chapter 2 that for Jung, numinosity is an emotional quality; indeed, it was the most frequent focus of his discussions on the affectivity of archetype. It will be recalled further that Jung considers numinosity a quality "which

can only be described as ‘spiritual’” (CW8, para. 405). According to him, it is in this guise of spirit that archetype bestows meaning upon human lives (CW8, para. 648). Qvortrup and Nielsen (2019) attribute the same significance to our narrative dwelling places. They describe the deep sense of purpose such narratives provide as the “spark that originally ignited our beliefs and caused us to dwell” (2019, p. 158). In much the same vein, Jung speaks of archetype’s *luminosity*, which he understands as accompanying its numinosity (CW8, para. 392).

For Qvortrup and Nielsen (2019), the emotional pull of dwelling place is such that those caught in its grip react fiercely to anyone who would seek to undermine its narrative—a scenario they call “dwelling deeper” (p. 158). According to them, such fascination leads an individual or group to defend its story “even if one faces allegations of cognitive dissonance” (2019, p. 158).<sup>133</sup> These sentiments are reflected in Jung’s observation of archetype that it is “healing or destructive, but never indifferent, provided . . . that it has attained a certain degree of clarity” (CW8, para. 405). The deep structure model allows one to understand such clarity as achieved in free articulation. However, Jung’s claim highlights the potential for what is articulated in free articulation to influence narratization in problematic ways.

### **Archetype as Narrative Occurrence**

Alongside Roesler’s (2024) specification of archetype’s various characteristics, one will recall his contention that a universal process of psychological transformation is at the core of Jung’s concept. Not only does Roesler identify this universal process as Jungian individuation, but he also considers it the manifestation of a “dynamic inherent in the human psyche” (2024, p. 231). As noted in Chapter 1, Jung calls this dynamism “archetype of transformation” (CW9i, para.

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<sup>133</sup> See the discussion in Chapter 4 on cultural narratives.

258). In this conception, he approaches archetype from what Roesler considers its core.

The fundamental occurrence at the heart of Jung's archetype concept is described in the deep structure model by interpretive-perspective. The latter structures the psychophysically neutral realm of narrative Ideas as psychoid archetype structures *unus mundus*. This means that to identify archetype of transformation with interpretive-perspective is also to identify the former with psychoid archetype.<sup>134</sup>

Further, to conceive archetype as interpretive-perspective is to conceive it as event, which the thesis has taken to mean a phenomenon that occurs all at once.<sup>135</sup> The contention is that this is Jung's thrust when he speaks of psychoid as "the eternal presence of the *one* creative act" (CW8, para. 967, Footnote 17). Indeed, when one parses this quote, what becomes thematic is its intimate relation to the structural moments of interpretive-perspective: Interpretation is the singular creative act of eternal configuration, whilst perspective is the eternal perception of presence.

Yet, Jung claims archetype is not only the eternally present single creative act but also "a series of *successive* [emphasis added] acts of creation" (CW8, para. 967, Footnote 17). The word "successive" is highlighted because it reminds that archetype also operates in chronological time. In such operation, one understands its meaning as unfolding through human being. This process has been grasped

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<sup>134</sup> Jung used the term "archetype of transformation" only once in the *Collected Works*. This was in his paper titled "Concerning Rebirth," (originally published in 1940, with a revised and expanded version published in 1950). The psychoid concept first appeared in Jung's published work in 1947's "The Spirit of Psychology" (republished in a revised and augmented form as 1954's "On the Nature of the Psyche"). But it was not until 1952's "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle" that he delved into its implications. Yet, the Jungian analyst Ann Addison (2019, p. 15) notes that Jung was privately using the term "psychoid" as early as 1907. Jung's work on psychoid archetype can be considered his attempt to think through the implications of archetype of transformation since individuation, which is guided by the latter, is envisaged by him to operate both psychically and materially (CW8, para. 432).

<sup>135</sup> See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the nature of event.

narratively as narratization, of which the individuation process has been recognised as a mode.

In Chapter 2, it was noted that Jung (CW7, paras. 266–406) describes individuation in terms of the following archetypal staging posts: Shadow, Anima/Animus, Wise Old Man/Great Mother and Self. These archetypes can be understood as phases in the overarching dynamic of archetype of transformation. But it will be recalled that Jung (CW6, para. 789) considers Self archetype to encompass all other psychic phenomena. This implies Self is not only the goal of archetype's dynamism but also the dynamism itself. This phenomenon finds its narrative correspondence in the unity of interpretive-perspective and free articulation—the former being the dynamism as such, the latter its operative goal. This further implies that the staging posts of archetype of transformation are conceived narratively as the constituent phases of interpretive-perspective.<sup>136</sup>

Yet, to speak of archetype of transformation and interpretive-perspective as constituted in phases would seem to identify them as not so much event but process or motion. Further, to ascribe motion to such transcendental phenomena would appear to contradict Aristotle's (4th century B.C.E./1984b) insistence that "there is no such thing as motion over and above the *things* [emphasis added]" (200b33). For him, "things" are sublunary and celestial bodies. Neither archetype of transformation nor interpretive-perspective are things in either sense. Therefore, to speak of them in terms of motion is to conceive the latter as operating "over and above the things" (Aristotle, 200b33)

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<sup>136</sup> Due to space constraints, a demonstration of this claim will not be possible in the thesis, although the concluding chapter presents an outline for further work in this direction.

Nonetheless, the thesis agrees with the philosophers Sarah Waterlow (1984) and Ursula Coope (2005/2008) that Aristotle's conception of what it means for a thing to be in motion supports a broader view of motion than he would ostensibly allow. Aristotle (4th century B.C.E./1984b) defines motion as "the fulfilment of what is potentially, as such" (201a10–11). He uses the example of a bronze that is potentially a statue to illustrate the concept. Aristotle observes that it is not the fulfilment of bronze as potentially bronze that one calls motion but the fulfilment of the potential of bronze to be a statue. But the way he presents his argument suggests that rather than bronze (the thing) being the locus of the motion, it is instead a new entity: bronze-that-is-becoming-a-statue. It is contended that in implicitly positing such an entity, Aristotle is already exploring movement on a higher register than just the things.

This entity, which can be characterised generally as "X-that-is-becoming-Y," is a phenomenon that was encountered in Chapter 7's discussion of the existential becoming of Dasein, which was identified with narratization. Dasein was understood as a movement of having-been to coming-toward. The motions of archetype of transformation and interpretive-perspective can also be described by this inferred Aristotelian entity. This is because the emphasis now is on the motion as such and not the particular thing in motion.<sup>137</sup>

Further, from the use of Broadie (1993/1994) in the thesis, the motion of interpretive-perspective is grasped as not a normal kinesis since it has always already achieved its desired object. Also, despite their status as events, interpretive-perspective and archetype of transformation are not normal *energeia* either. This is

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<sup>137</sup> Interpretive-perspective can thus be understood as the ontological ground for Todorov's (1978/1990) concept of narrative as relations of transformation.

because to so view them would be to accept them as actualities of potential, which is inconsistent with an understanding of them as always already fulfilled.

### ***The Narrative A Priori***

Yet, the most primordial condition of dynamic archetype remains unthought in the present enquiry. To approach it, one must recall Jung's alternative description of archetype as "the principle of spontaneous movement and activity" (CW9i, para. 393). In this formulation, he conceptualises archetype as spirit, claiming one is concerned here with that which permeates life, endowing it with "'enthusiasm' and 'inspiration'" (CW9i, para. 393). With this approach, he moves beyond even the idea of latent meaning towards a concept of archetype that according to Jung, speaks instead to creativity (CW9i, para. 393).

The thesis contends such a conception is the true core of archetype, that is, the a priori of the a priori. It is captured ontologically in the concepts of narrative good and Beyng. But neither is precisely described in their respective theoretical frameworks; instead, the focus rests on Beyng's occurrence as Ereignis or narrative good's occurrence as interpretive-perspective.

Nonetheless, Beyng and narrative good are ontologically prior to Ereignis and interpretive-perspective. However, to recognise such priority is not to understand Beyng and narrative good as separate phenomena to Ereignis and interpretive-perspective. Indeed, there is neither ground in Heidegger nor the deep structure model to authorise such a move; rather, what is required is a way of conceptualising a situation in which A is prior to B without the two being separate phenomena. The contention is that one finds the solution in Whitehead's (1929/1985) concept of creativity.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Whitehead (1929/1985) considers creativity the deepest principle of the universe. According to him, in this phenomenon, “the many enter into complex unity” (1929/1985, p. 21). It will be recalled that such activity also describes the work of actual entities/occasions, which work for Whitehead, is the constitution of novel unity from a plethora of objects (1929/1985, pp. 211–212). Further, he contends that actual entities/occasions are creative precisely because they are instantiations of creativity (1929/1985, p. 7). According to Whitehead, creativity cannot operate apart from its instantiations. The implication is that while creativity is ontologically prior to actual entities/occasions, it is never separate from them.

It will also be recalled from Chapter 1 that the thesis claims an equivalence between the becoming of the Whiteheadian God’s primordial nature and Ereignis. This is based on the fact that both are conceived as generative primordial occurrences. For Whitehead (1929/1985), God is an actual entity, which makes it an instantiation of creativity (p. 7). Therefore, the posited equivalence between the becoming of God’s primordial nature and Ereignis opens the way to a more precise specification of the nature of Beyng and narrative good. From a Whiteheadian perspective, one may view both as creativity, with Ereignis and interpretive-perspective their inseparable primordial instantiations. This contention is further supported by the fact that Beyng and narrative good are, like creativity, the most fundamental phenomenon in their respective ontological frameworks.

The primordial activity of Beyng and narrative was proposed in Chapter 1 as relation. However, an understanding of such activity as creativity allows it to be named more precisely as *synthesis*. For narrative, this insight surprises only by its self-evidence because since Aristotle (ca. 335 B.C.E./1907), the narrative work has

been understood as the arrangement of the many into unity. The contention is that it is this quintessentially narrative operation that describes archetype's spontaneous movement and activity. Thus, when Jung speaks of such an activity as creativity, one understands this notion most fundamentally not as the creation of any concrete or abstract entity but as creativity as such.

### **Synthesis of the Conceptualisations of Archetype**

The thesis has identified creativity's work of synthesis as the core of Jung's archetype concept. This positions the phenomenon as the origin of Knox's (2003) four conceptualisations. Yet, the manner in which the latter emerge from their source can only be clarified once the narrative character of these conceptualisations is determined. This approach unveils the various conceptions of archetype as not, as Roesler (2024) argues, ultimately incompatible but rather as mutually supportive emanations of narrative good. This claim will now be demonstrated.

### ***Biological Entities***

Knox (2003) argues archetype conceived as biological entity takes the form of information "which is hardwired in the genes, providing a set of instructions to the mind as well as to the body" (p. 23). It was noted in Chapter 2 that the biological thesis is the one to which Jung himself resorted as an explanation for archetype's supposed universality. But as the discussion of the controversies surrounding this way of conceiving the concept showed, it is far from clear how the biological thesis both secures archetype's universality and speaks to its more complex semantic associations.

In terms of the deep structure model, one might provisionally locate the biological thesis at the level of factual articulation. This is because it is at this level that beings are encountered *as* beings. Narrative has been grasped as factually

articulated as emotion and action. Further, it has been understood that to conceive articulation in such terms is to understand it as embodied. Embodied emotion and action are articulations of ontic experience. But archetype is a primordial phenomenon and is thus described ontologically not ontically. Therefore, the biological thesis cannot be grounded in factual articulation; rather, it is located in the *relation* between embodied emotion and action, that is, in the way they address one another. This is an ontological phenomenon because it concerns how factual experience is structured. That which structures factual experience has already been grasped as narratization. Thus, the latter is identified as the narrative ground of the biological thesis.

The contention that the biological thesis concerns the relation between embodied emotion and action is supported by existing scholarship. Goodwyn (2024) argues archetypes are innate embodied metaphors, mapping emotions onto physiology in universally recognisable ways. The innate nature of these mappings—which are instances of what Goodwyn more generally calls *primary metaphors*—is why he considers archetype biologically transmitted.

Goodwyn (2024) gives the following example of an innate embodied metaphor: “anger is heat.” He observes that this metaphor is the basis for a number of common sayings, such as “‘*hot* under the collar, ‘a real *hothead*’, ‘*boiling* over with anger” (2024, p. 425). Goodwyn argues the mapping of anger to heat is innate “because when we feel anger [an emotion], our temperature increases along with rising blood pressure [actions]” (2024, p. 425). For him, “anger is heat” is specifically an archetype because “we are biologically predisposed not only to make this association, but to understand it on a visceral level” (2024, p. 425). Goodwyn claims further that the case for innate mappings is supported by studies of blind people,

which he contends “seem to suggest we *do* pre-form categories like up/down, light/dark, etc., which self-organize *anyway* [as visuospatial innate embodied metaphors such as “sadness is down” and “happiness is light”], regardless of whether such preformation seems ‘necessary’” (2024, pp. 425–426).

But according to Goodwyn (2024), some primary metaphors, such as the Chinese “happiness is flowers in the heart” or the Zulu “anger is grinding corn” should be understood as culturally determined rather than innate. This is because for him, “flowers” and “corn” “do not derive *from the human body or its species-specific responses to generic environmental features,*” which he considers the criteria for innateness (2024, p. 426). The implication for Goodwyn is that cultural mappings cannot be archetypal despite “carry[ing] a great deal of individual meaning” (2024, p. 427).

Yet if Goodwyn’s (2024) logic is pursued, even cultural mappings can be considered embodied metaphors. This is because while, for example, flowers are not innate to human beings, the expression “flowers in the heart” can be understood as denoting sensations felt in the chest, which one can grasp as universally accompanying the emotion of happiness. Similarly, grinding in “grinding corn” is an activity human beings commonly associate with aggression or extreme discomfort, which would make its mapping onto anger universally recognisable.

Goodwyn (2024) relates his concept of innate embodied metaphors to archetypal images that specifically take the form of symbols or verbal articulations. Thus for example, for him, the saying “hot under the collar” is an archetypal image, which articulates the archetype “anger is heat.” But a key implication of the deep structure model is that every and any factual articulation is an archetypal image. This includes articulations in the medium of life. There is nothing in Goodwyn’s

theory that would seem to restrict its extension in this regard. Indeed, he speculates on just such a move when he suggests complex metaphors of action, such as rituals, may “evince some level of innate guidance” (2024, p. 427).

In Chapter 1, it was seen that innateness and apriority—the latter understood as primordially— can be identified when one conceives the former not as physiology-biology but as philosophy-ontology. Therefore, to speak of an innate embodied metaphor is to speak of primordially as it most immediately touches human experience. Thus through Goodwyn (2024), one arrives again at an understanding of the biological thesis as narratization.

Further, since narratization is aimed at the factual articulation of what is freely articulated in free articulation, to understand the biological thesis as narratization is to adopt a teleological approach to human biology. Here, one is returned to Aristotle’s (ca. 340 B.C.E./2011) contention, discussed in Chapter 6, that human being is most essentially described by the work proper to it, which is to act in accordance with a rational telos, understood narratively as the now factually articulated dwelling place.

### ***Core Meanings Containing Representational Content***

Knox (2003) states that to understand archetypes as core meanings containing representational content is to view them as concrete phenomena, which “provide a central symbolic significance to our experience” (p. 23). To so conceive archetype is therefore to understand it as image, which has been grasped narratively as factual articulation. Further, it will be recalled from Chapter 6 that factual articulation is not only the dynamism of narration; it is also the stasis of narrative artefact.

When the biological thesis was provisionally located at the narrative register of factual articulation, the latter was viewed solely as narration. When one grasps factual articulation as also artefact, the same register might be thought to ground a conception of archetype as core meanings containing representational content. Yet, it remains the case that the apriority of archetype means it is never located at the level of factual articulation. Indeed, this prohibition is even starker in the case of narrative artefact since the relevant factual articulation is past. Thus, if one were to understand artefact as archetype, one would be casting the latter as an *a posteriori* phenomenon.

For the biological thesis, it was demonstrated that primordially is described in the relation between embodied emotion and action. It was observed that the deep structure model captures this relation in narratization. For core meanings containing representational content, it is again the relation of emotion to action that is described; however, as artefact, the relevant relation is past. Therefore, the primordially of this conceptualisation is described narratively by the narratization *that had been there*. The fact that narratization can be past identifies it as a finite temporal phenomenon, supporting its identification with *Zeitlichkeit* (see Heidegger, 1927/2010, H. 330–331).

Furthermore, just as the biological thesis can be understood in terms of metaphor, so can core meanings containing representational content. However, the way metaphor is conceived in each case is different. The OED defines metaphor in the following two ways: (a) “A figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable”; and (b) “Something regarded as representative or suggestive of something else, esp. as a material emblem of an abstract quality, condition, notion, etc” (OUP, n.d.-e).

Goodwyn's (2024) innate embodied metaphors are captured by the first definition. But in the narrative description of archetype as core meanings containing representational content, one is concerned with metaphor as described by the second definition, that is, as symbol. It is in this latter sense that Jung speaks when he claims archetype "expresses itself, first and foremost, in metaphors" (CW9i, para. 267).

One grasps how a past narratization involves metaphor when one recalls that the immediate object of narratization is the freely articulated dwelling place. The latter has been understood as the primordial object of narrative good's self-given rationality. However, dwelling place is not identified with its factual articulation; instead, the latter is properly understood as a symbol or metaphor of dwelling place.

This is illustrated by the following example. In a room, one may find a set of chairs, desks, a whiteboard and some marker pens. One may look at these items and the space they inhabit as the exemplar of "classroom." However, if one considered the items and the room they occupy as instantiations of a dwelling place constituted by the rational principle "education," there is no reason "classroom" should have been so articulated. It could instead have been a clearing in a forest, with the "chairs," demarcated spaces on grass; the "desks", boulders; the "whiteboard," the bark of the nearest tree; and "marker pens," pieces of flint.

Thus from the standpoint of the freely articulated dwelling place, the particulars of a past narratization are always symbols. When so conceived, what is foregrounded is the polysemous nature of brute artefact. However, the human tendency is to reduce such particulars to single meanings, which are then culturally transmitted as a tradition. This process robs artefact of its relation to possibility. Further, where artefact's source in primordially is still felt, a conflation of artefact with

archetype results since the process has made them co-extensive. Hence, one loses sight of archetype, becoming separated from what Jung calls its “living reality” (CW12, para. 74). This reality is only saved when artefact is grasped as symbol. That is why for Jung, an artefact is only symbolic if its metaphorical nature is affirmed (CW9i, para. 267).

### ***Eternal Metaphysical Entities***

The thesis has claimed representational contents as metaphors because in their relation to core meanings, they refer outside themselves. It has argued that past narratization underpins this conceptualisation of archetype. Further, it has stressed the constitutive importance of dwelling place to such a conception. The latter, as the pattern of relations of narrative Ideas, operates not only outside of common spatiotemporal notions, but is also their origin.<sup>138</sup> Thus, dwelling place is the narrative ground for the conceptualisation of archetype as eternal metaphysical entity.

Dwelling place responds to onto-phenomenological approaches to archetype, such as those of Brooke (1991/2015) and Mills (2023a), which were discussed in Chapter 2. Mills’s (2023a) conception of archetype—as an agentic, unconscious schema, which emerges from its own undifferentiated, a priori ground to manifest as a unified world of multiplicity—is a particularly good formulation for an understanding of archetype as grounded in dwelling place. This is because it references both the latter’s di-polar nature (schema and ground of unified multiplicity) as well as its source in narrative good (undifferentiated, a priori ground).

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<sup>138</sup> As such, dwelling place is identifiable with the later Heidegger’s (1989/2012) concept of *Zeit-Raum* (time-space).

But as also discussed in Chapter 2, there are two ways of conceiving archetype as eternal metaphysical entity: (a) pattern of relations and (b) hypothetical entity. Brooke (1991/2015) and Mills (2023a) are concerned with the former, while in the latter, one is referred to the foundation of the concept in Plato's Theory of Ideas. As noted in Chapter 1, the Platonic view positions archetype as an abstract formal principle. In dwelling place, the two modes of the metaphysical thesis are unified as the pattern of relations of narrative Ideas. Thus, the deep structure model allows archetype conceived as abstract formal principle to be understood as also a relational phenomenon.

### ***Organising Mental Frameworks***

Knox (2003) contends that to understand archetypes as organising mental frameworks is to see them as abstract mental principles, which operate as “a set of rules or instructions but with no symbolic or representational content, so that they are never directly experienced” (p. 23). This conceptualisation finds its narrative support straightforwardly in configuration, which has been understood as the proper reflexive activity of disposition.

Thus, a narrative analysis of the four conceptualisations of archetype reveals them as bound in a mutually supportive structure, founded on the unceasing creativity of narrative good.


### **Archetypal Time**

Nonetheless, there is one conceptualisation of archetype that is missing: time. It was argued in Chapter 5 that the intimate connection Yiassenides (2014/2016) highlights between archetype and time may explain why Jung did not explicitly theorise on the latter. However, when he did discuss time, it will be recalled that he did so from an archetypal standpoint. But even if Jung's explicit statements on the

matter were absent, a narrative understanding of archetype authorises its temporal conception. Thus, archetypal time becomes as much an emanation of archetype's spontaneous movement and activity as any of the four conceptualisations previously discussed.

The narrative ontology of Jung's archetype concept is now completely described. It is presented graphically in Figure 12.

**Figure 12:** Narrative Conception and Synthesis of Jung's Archetype Concept



Finally, it is instructive to note that Hillman (1975/1992) refers to archetype, which he calls *soul*, as “a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself” (p. xvi). Archetype grasped as interpretive-

perspective formalises this thought. Further, the continuity between narrative and existential phenomenology that has been demonstrated means that to conceive archetype as the former is to understand it ultimately as an ontological phenomenon.

## Chapter 9: Conclusion

The thesis has demonstrated that Jung's archetype concept can be understood as a narrative phenomenon. This approach enabled a synthesis of the divergent ways scholarship has addressed the concept. A deep structure model of narrative was constructed, which more precisely illuminated its continuity with existential phenomenology. This allowed archetype to be rooted in a narrative ontology. Through this method, its relation to human being was clarified. The relation was found to be one of mutuality, albeit ultimately determined by archetype's most primordial conception, which was identified as spontaneous movement. The thesis claimed the latter as the source of archetype's various conceptualisations, including the temporal. It employed Whitehead's (1929/1985) notion of creativity to secure the ontological ground of spontaneous movement and identified what such creativity describes as a narrative phenomenon.

Further, the thesis demonstrated that a view of archetype as timeless and static is only partial since such conceptions abstract from its inherent dynamism, which is narratively determined. This is a stronger claim for archetype's narrativity than even Roesler's (2016/2022) contention that its process patterns can "be conceived of in narrative form" (p. 60). Firstly, he constrains his argument to the therapeutic setting, which is an unnecessary limitation. Secondly, the linkage he makes between narrative and archetype is only of an "as if" variety. The deep structure model moves beyond such heuristic conceptions, thus securing the universality of archetype that Roesler questions.

Roesler's (2016/2022) criticism of Jung's archetype concept led him to posit archetype instead as a cultural achievement. For Roesler (2024), this positioned it as a contingent phenomenon, developed in "social practice" (p. 229). But while the

thesis also argued for the cultural foundation of archetype, it contended that when one locates this at the level of factual articulation as Roesler (2024) does, one loses sight of archetype's true nature.

The thesis argued instead that the relation of archetype to culture is more properly viewed from the opposite perspective, that is, from the standpoint of latent meaning. It conceived the latter as the intelligibility of narrative good, which rationality it understood as the conjoined logos and mythos. It argued that narrative's cultural dimension refers specifically to the latter. This established mythos as the basis for the conception of archetype as cultural. Therefore, when Rowland (2017) contends that archetypes are "gods seeking to live out their particular genre of stories" (p. 6), narrative ontology allows an understanding of such gods as narrative goods and their genres of story as mythoi.

In extending narrativity to the biological conception of archetype, the research achieved a reconciliation between the cultural and biological theses, which are often opposed. It posited the two instead as flipsides of one coin, describing past and present narratization, respectively. Further, the thesis conceived narratization, and thus human being, as most originally a collective phenomenon, which enables narrative good's unfolding of itself.

This self-revelatory event was called interpretive-perspective and identified with Whitehead's (1929/1985) concept of the becoming of God's primordial nature. For him, the latter strives constantly for "depth of satisfaction" in concrete reality (1929/1985, p. 105). But this satisfaction depends on the extent to which God's primordial order is expressed in its consequent nature. It was observed further that the Whiteheadian God does not impose its order on actual entities but instead seeks only to influence their becoming through what Whitehead describes as "the patient

operation of the overpowering rationality of [its] conceptual harmonization” (1929/1985, p. 346).

Thus, to a greater or lesser extent, actual entities retain autonomy. It was shown that for Whitehead (1929/1985), the individual human being is a nexus of actual entities. The implication is that it is in human being's power to pursue God's purpose or its own. However, the collective character of the narratization posited by the deep structure model meant this choice was not explicitly described; rather, the model conceived narratization as that of an idealised humanity. In Whiteheadian terms, narratization was thus understood as God's consequent nature.

However, the thesis addressed the matter of human will in its demonstration of the dichotomy between instrumental and individuated narratizations. It identified as individuated any individual narratization that aligns with narrative reason. Further, it equated this phenomenon with Jungian individuation. Thus, one now understands by the latter an individual human being's implication in the activity of a species of divine reason, which seeks expression in all entities. Therefore, the collective narratization of the deep structure model is conceived alternatively as the totality of all possible individuated narratizations catalysed by a particular species of reason. But this totality is not a mere sum of such narratizations; rather, it is a unity.

The thesis conceived narratization as the “subject” of human experience. Thus, it understood self not as person but process. This emphasised that the same phenomenon is viewed when one speaks either of narratization or Dasein. The thesis explored Ricœur's (1990/1994) notion of the ethical self, which for him, is a basic correlate of Dasein (p. 313). This implies Ricœur's ethical self is also understood as narratization. Indeed, the latter concept clarifies his assertion that narrative assigns a narrative identity to the ethical self. What one can now

understand by this claim is that factual human experience specifies that which structures it. This foregrounds a conception of narrative identity as an ontic description of the ontological fact of narratization.

The thesis understood narratization as a temporal phenomenon, suggesting narrative identity is also temporally constituted. This view aligns with Ricoeur's (1985/1990b) contention that the latter "rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text" (p. 246). This posits narrative identity as determined by verbal discourse, which is the approach to the concept generally taken by narrative psychology. Further, it positions such identity as a cognitive achievement. Ricoeur (1991) contends individuals create narrative identities by applying plots to their lives, which are functions of stories existent in the wider culture. He posits what he calls *narrative understanding* to describe how one might transcend one's egoistic self in favour of "a self instructed by cultural symbols" (1991, p. 33).

But the thesis has provided the rationale for an alternative view of narrative identity. It allows such identity to be comprehended as constituted not only by factual articulation, such as verbal discourse, but also by narrative good. This unveils narrative identity as also a phenomenon of the unconscious. Thus, such identity is both what human being ontically assumes for itself and that which it ontologically *is* in itself. In the latter case, narrative identity is precisely narratization rather than an ontic description of it.

The thesis equated narratization with the biological and cultural theses of archetype. This implies narrative ontology distinguishes two types of unconscious narrative identity: (a) that which structures present human experience and (b) that which structured past human experience. In contrast to a consciously assumed

narrative identity, in neither case is there possibility for error as to the nature of that which is determined. This is important to grasp because while Ricœur (1985/1990b) may enjoin us to apply story plots both to our lives and those of lives past, if these find no ground in that which human experience articulates—i.e., narrative good—then one is opened to all manner of psychic conflict and historical inaccuracy.<sup>139</sup>

### **Future Work**

The thesis argued that a conception of interpretive-perspective as the narrative ground of Jung's archetype of transformation implies the former must be capable of phasal description. Whilst the deep structure model allows a static decomposition of interpretive-perspective, the latter's mode of occurrence is less well described. In the model's favour, the fact that interpretive-perspective is a rational unity with free articulation mitigates the consequences of this lacuna because what is freely articulated in free articulation is identical to the event that constituted it. However, to attain a complete narrative ontology, any future work would need to precisely specify the way in which interpretive-perspective constitutes what is freely articulated in free articulation.

It is envisaged such an extension to the model would provide the ontology for all existing dynamic narrative models. Examples of such include Todorov's (1978/1990) *five-stage theory*, which understands narrative progression in terms of equilibria; Claude Bremond's (1980) *logic of narrative*, which conceives it as composed in the sequential phases of virtuality, realisation and conclusion; and

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<sup>139</sup> These are problems of which Ricœur was aware. For example, Ricœur (1977) warns against psychoanalytic interpretations that are at odds with an analysand's libidinal structure. Further, in the case of narrative constructions of historical entities, Ricœur (1985/1990b) stresses the former must align with historical facts as far as they can be discerned.

Algirdas Julien Greimas's (1977) *narrative grammar model*, which understands narrative progression in terms of the functional roles that constitute the narrative.

These models all attempt to discern underlying patterns in narrative particulars; however, their structuralism differs markedly from that developed in the thesis. This is because the latter's foregrounding of narrative good locates the patterning of narrative particulars at a level of abstraction unthought by the structuralists. When approached from this perspective, the patterns in narrative particulars are properly conceived as the consequence of the highest interpretive activity.<sup>140</sup>

Refining the deep structure model to explicitly describe the pattern of progression of interpretive-perspective would shift the model's focus towards the way narrative good narrates its human story rather than the fact of this storytelling. A further significance of identifying such a pattern is that it may illuminate a similar shape to the progress of specifically human experience.

### **Epilogue: Ontological Languages**

The thesis validated Roesler's (2016/2022) intuition that the metaphysical conception alone authorises Jung's claim of the universality of archetype. But in positing archetype as at bottom also a cultural phenomenon, the thesis argued for a metaphysical conception of culture, which located archetype as outside the orthodox understanding of the cultural that Roesler proposes for it.

It may be objected that Roesler's (2024, p. 229) definition of archetype as "a condensed form of psychological wisdom" means his approach is in spirit similar to

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<sup>140</sup> Existing narrative models also differ from the deep structure model in that they treat narrative as an object. More specifically, such models conceive narrative as *utterance*, whose supposed intrinsic structure becomes the object of enquiry for a knower, sharing the same world. In contrast, the hermeneutic approach to structuralism taken in the thesis views narrative as a phenomenon that itself constitutes world.

that developed in the thesis. This is because the deep structure model also proposes a conception of archetype as condensed form of psychological wisdom, specifically, the conjoined logos and mythos. However, in his grounding of archetype in social practice, Roesler anthropomorphises it; the effect is to equate psychological wisdom with human wisdom. Thus, his definition itself falls victim to the “psychic inflation” that Jung warns is the result of human identification with archetype (CW7, para. 227).

Narrative ontology confirms archetype as ultimately not human. Yet, it posits that archetype needs humanity in order to occur historically.<sup>141</sup> The thesis addressed this mutuality and indeed the broader question of archetype’s nature from a narrative perspective. Nevertheless, the continuity it demonstrated between narrative and existential phenomenology means archetype could just as well be described by the latter. This is of course Brooke’s (1991/2015) contention. Further, the similarities the thesis identifies between not only Jung and Heidegger but also both men and Whitehead suggest the ontology of archetype could also be described by process philosophy.

Whitehead’s (1920, 1929/1985, 1933/1967) philosophy developed into a cosmology. But the importance to it of subjectivity suggests this cosmology can be conceived, like existential phenomenology, as a hermeneutical ontology. Further, the thesis emphasises the hermeneutic foundation of narrative in its conception of the latter’s rationality as the conjoined logos and mythos. In the deep structure model, this hermeneutic approach to reason is brought to full ontological clarity.

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<sup>141</sup> Whether archetype needs human being simpliciter is a separate issue and not one addressed in the thesis as it is not relevant to the elucidation of human experience. However, in theory, archetype could articulate itself as the Being of some other rational being, although in such a situation, it could not be said to occur *historically* as one would ordinarily understand that concept.

The foregoing signifies that the phenomenon called “archetype” is describable in different ontological languages. Like their linguistic counterparts, some are more developed than others in their possibilities of description. For example, the thesis argued that what existential phenomenology calls *Beyng* is more precisely described by process philosophy’s notion of creativity.<sup>142</sup> On the other hand, existential phenomenology describes the ontology of human being more precisely than process philosophy, for whom the human is not a primordial phenomenon.

Narrative ontology combines the possibilities of description offered by existential phenomenology and process philosophy. In the form of the deep structure model, it speaks as much to metaphysics as it does to ethics, reflecting its conception in Aristotle. As ethics, its foundation in the good is described; as metaphysics, what is emphasised is its temporal ground.

The thesis has understood time as the self-thought of reason and reason as the intelligibility of the good. This identifies reason as the link between time and the good, between metaphysics and ethics. Thus, when archetype is conceived as narrative structure, one understands it, contrary to misconception, as the most rational of phenomena.

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<sup>142</sup> Nonetheless, Heidegger (1981/2000a) arguably attempts to elucidate the direct experience of the phenomenon of creativity in his investigations into poetic thinking.

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