



University of Essex

Digital
Verification
Unit

Report

Dignity in Conflict

Investigating the role of open-source content in exposing vulnerable persons to public curiosity during armed conflict

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Executive Summary

Armed conflicts are increasingly well-documented on publicly accessible online platforms. This can facilitate accountability for international crimes and other violations of international law. Simultaneously, public online spaces have been instrumentalised by belligerents to humiliate and demoralise individuals belonging to the enemy, often reaching large audiences.

The University of Essex Digital Verification Unit (DVU) has conducted a structured analysis of 77 pieces of open-source content exposing vulnerable individuals to public curiosity during armed conflict. This report provides a detailed analysis of patterns identified both in the conduct depicted in the content as well as in how it is disseminated and reacted to online.

Key findings

- Content depicting degrading or humiliating conduct or exposing vulnerable individuals to public curiosity is frequently and widely shared online. In our dataset, it was especially prevalent on Telegram and X. At times, this content attracts a considerable audience.
- Across different conflicts, victims were frequently filmed in humiliating or degrading circumstances, such as while being partially naked and handcuffed, stomped on or otherwise physically abused, forced to repeat submissive chants or to admit defeat, or mocked through derisive comments. In almost 80% of the analysed content, the victims are clearly or possibly identifiable.
- The alignment of those distributing content varies across different armed conflicts. For Sudan and Palestine, the content we identified was often shared in solidarity with the victim. Conversely, in others, especially Myanmar and Russia/Ukraine, accounts supportive of the perpetrator disseminated the majority of the relevant content.
- Regardless of the position of those disseminating content online, the content analysed in this report tends to attract hostile comments – frequently against both the group to which the perpetrator belongs and the victim.

These findings raise intricate questions deserving further attention from various stakeholders.

- *Courts, legal scholars and practitioners*: There is a need to clarify under which circumstances uploading or further disseminating footage of degrading or humiliating treatment online could in itself amount to an outrage upon personal dignity. Another question meriting further debate is whether the protection from public curiosity vulnerable individuals enjoy in international armed conflict has or should have an equivalent in non-international armed conflict.
- *Platforms*: Content depicting violations of international law is not always graphic or violent. Whether non-violent content depicts an international crime, and whether deleting such content is in the interest of the affected individuals will frequently be a highly contextual question. Given this complexity, a nuanced approach to content moderation is indispensable; and those affected by humiliating and degrading content must be a part of the conversation on how to moderate it.
- *Advocates, journalists and individual users*: When using content depicting humiliating or degrading treatment to raise awareness and work towards accountability, this can harm the victim. Further discussions on the potential negative repercussions of sharing certain content for victims can help to raise awareness of such risks. When using content exposing vulnerable individuals, taking measures to protect the victim's privacy and dignity, for instance by blurring the faces of victims, should be considered.

About the Essex Digital Verification Unit

The Essex DVU was launched in 2016. It works with Amnesty International Evidence Lab to document and verify the evidence of alleged human rights violations all around the world. At the DVU, students are trained in open-source investigative techniques; they search through and verify user-generated content posted on social media.

The DVU's work is used by Amnesty and other external actors, such as United Nations commissions of inquiry, regional human rights bodies, and Forensic Architecture.

For further information, please consult our [project website](#) or contact Dr Matthew Gillett (matthew.gillett@essex.ac.uk) or Tatjana Grote (t.grote@essex.ac.uk).

Disclaimer

The views expressed in the following report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of Essex, Amnesty International or any other organisation that collaborates with the DVU.

Generative artificial intelligence was used to generate the image on the cover page. No generative artificial intelligence was used for the drafting of this report.

To avoid further exposing those affected by the content analysed for the purposes of this project, we will not make our dataset publicly available. Access to the dataset may be granted to interested researchers and practitioners on a case-by-case basis. If you would like to gain access to our dataset, please contact Tatjana Grote (t.grote@essex.ac.uk).

For the sake of simplicity, the following will refer to the 'victim' as the person who is filmed, photographed or subjected to humiliating or degrading treatment by another person, who will be referred to as 'perpetrator'. These labels are merely functional and do not express a definite conclusion regarding the criminal liability or legal victim status of any of the involved individuals. We decided to blur the faces of all identifiable victims in the images shown in this report to avoid further harm and exposure.

Reader discretion is advised given the nature of the content.

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In memory of Ann Goldsmith.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the age of social media ubiquity, a new frontier has opened up paralleling the kinetic clashes during armed conflicts. Online platforms increasingly host content from opposing parties and their supporters. Increasingly, belligerent parties or their agents deliberately use social media to document and publicise their interactions with detainees or otherwise vulnerable persons belonging to opposing parties.

Uploading or disseminating online content exposing vulnerable individuals to the public eye, and potentially documenting humiliating or degrading treatment, can produce contradicting effects. On one hand, it can provide evidence of crimes that have sometimes evaded justice precisely because they are hidden from public view. It may further allow the family of the exposed individuals to learn about their fate, potentially ending years of uncertainty.¹ On the other hand, being exposed and potentially humiliated not only in front of the immediate perpetrators, but also before a potentially global audience can add to the harm suffered by the victims as well as their loved ones. Moreover, social media can offer a platform for third parties to insult the victim and, if the victim is identifiable, expose them to the risk of further violence.²

This tension is perfectly captured by the following excerpt from an article discussing an incident where an Israeli soldier filmed a Palestinian man being immobilised on the ground while forcing him to repeat humiliating phrases and then uploaded the video to the man's own Facebook account:

'Humiliated by the video and afraid that he will be attacked again, Azem [the victim] no longer leaves his house. When friends call and invite him out, he declines. "I am extremely embarrassed," Azem says. "The video mocks us, the people of Palestine." Though he took the video down quickly, others saw it, including Sebastia's Mayor Mohammed Azem (no relation), who saved a copy as evidence of the soldiers' mistreatment.'

During armed conflict, this conceptual tension between accountability and protection may translate into a legal one. One on hand, international humanitarian law (IHL) obliges belligerent parties to work towards identifying dead and missing persons and to investigate certain violations. Open-source content depicting vulnerable persons can facilitate these efforts. On the other hand, IHL shields protected individuals from unjustified public curiosity. It further obliges parties to refrain and, to the extent possible, prevent third parties from seriously humiliating or degrading others, which can amount to the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.³ If the act of uploading or disseminating content depicting vulnerable persons available online can constitute a violation of IHL, or even a war crime, IHL may end up protecting the dignity of vulnerable individuals at the cost of accountability and the right to truth.

¹ 'Family Identifies Missing Palestinian in Photo Posted by Israeli Soldier after 21 Months' *TRT World* (1 August 2026) <<https://www.trtworld.com/article/9efb96543f4d>>. All online sources were last accessed on 27 August 2026.

² Such violence can be perpetrated by the party who also created the initial content (e.g., filmed and uploaded a video) or by others. It may even be perpetrated by the victim's own side. For instance, prisoners of war who are being interviewed by their captors may face serious repercussions once they return to the party they belong to.

³ Both will be explored further below.

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The positive effects of open-source content related to armed conflict on accountability efforts and its role within international criminal law frameworks have been well-documented.⁴ The purpose of this report is to offer a systematic analysis of the potential harm it may cause and how such harm is regulated by IHL, identifying legal gaps and tensions. This understanding is necessary to engage in a productive and balanced discussion on how the positive effects of open-source content can be harnessed without harming those such content exposes, and whether the current legal framework governing armed conflict is fit to do so.

The following analysis, conducted by the [University of Essex Digital Verification Unit](#), examines examples of open-source content exposing vulnerable persons from several armed conflicts posted to a range of platforms. Leveraging both legal and empirical analysis, it seeks to explore the following questions: How visible is online content exposing vulnerable persons to public curiosity online? What are the dominant motives for disseminating it? How do users react to it? How could the answers to the previous questions impact the harm caused by the content in question, and how its dissemination online is regulated by IHL?

The answers to these questions are relevant to several stakeholders. Identifying content evidencing gross military misconduct can be of interest to states and military leaders who will frequently be under an obligation to prevent their agents from engaging in the conduct shown in the identified content, as well as its distribution. How the relevant content is distributed and reacted to online is relevant to those who may further disseminate it for non-hostile purposes (e.g., journalists, human rights advocates, researchers). To effectively abide by the principle of 'do no harm', said actors need to understand how directing further attention to certain content may cause additional harm, sometimes to the very people they seek to protect. Lastly, the discussions put forward in this report can enrich policy debates about how platforms should moderate conflict-related content and how states should regulate such moderation practices.

The following will first introduce the legal framework governing the conduct addressed in this report (Section 2). It will then describe the methodology used to identify, categorise and analyse relevant content (Section 3) and provide an overview of the resulting dataset (Section 4). Sections 5 to 8 will present four case studies, addressing patterns identified in the in-person conduct shown in the content related to said case studies and in how this content has been distributed and reacted to online. Section 9 will conclude.

2. LEGAL BACKGROUND

As noted above, open-source content can provide evidence of international crimes and violations of international law, while potentially in itself constituting part of such a violation. As this report is concerned with content that exposes or humiliates the individuals shown in it, those provisions on outrages upon personal dignity and those protecting certain individuals

⁴ See, e.g., Lindsay Freeman, 'Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prosecutions: The Impact of Digital Technologies on International Criminal Investigations and Trials' (2017) 41 *Fordham International Law Journal* 283; Sam Dubberley, Alexa Koenig and Daragh Murray, *Digital Witness: Using Open Source Information for Human Rights Investigation, Documentation, and Accountability* (Oxford University Press 2020); Alexa Koenig and others, 'New Technologies and the Investigation of International Crimes: An Introduction' (2021) 19 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 1; Daragh Murray, Yvonne McDermott and K Alexa Koenig, 'Mapping the Use of Open Source Research in UN Human Rights Investigations' (2022) 14 *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 554.

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against insults and public curiosity are especially pertinent.⁵ Both will be outlined below, with a special focus on the dissemination of open-source content online.

2.1 Open-source content and the obligation to shield protected individuals from public curiosity and insults

In times of armed conflict, persons under the control of an enemy belligerent have on occasion been instrumentalised by the controlling belligerent party to demonstrate its military success or alleged superiority. Even without such deliberate instrumentalization, being exposed to public scrutiny while being in a vulnerable situation is inherently humiliating and carries a significant risk of being attacked or abused by observing third parties,⁶ potentially including after their release or repatriation.⁷ As armed conflict tends to create or reinforce hostilities between the opposing groups, individuals who find themselves in the hands of the enemy are further at a heightened risk of being insulted or disrespected simply because of their allegiance to the enemy belligerent party. IHL therefore obliges belligerent parties to protect prisoners of war (PoWs) and protected persons from insults and public curiosity.⁸

Traditionally, PoWs and protected persons may have been exposed to public curiosity by parading them in public spaces.⁹ In contemporary armed conflicts, the internet, and social media in particular, provide a novel way of exposing individuals to public curiosity or insulting them. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) therefore suggested that to ensure the continued effectiveness of Article 27 GCIV, it should be interpreted to also cover 'the disclosure of photographic and video images, recordings of interrogations or private conversations, personal correspondence or any other private data, irrespective of which public communication channel is used, including the internet.'¹⁰

What does this mean for open-source content showing prisoners of war or civilians under the control of the enemy belligerent party? Following the ICRC's view, any open-source content which may allow protected individuals to be identified should be considered as exposing them

⁵ As this report is concerned primarily with direct dignitary harm, it will focus on the humiliation and violations to dignity shown in or caused by open-source content. However, this does by no means imply that outrages upon personal dignity and exposure to public curiosity never coincide with other crimes or violations of IHL. While these crimes and violations are no less important, it would be impossible and inconsistent with the purpose of this report to provide a complete list and analysis of such potentially concurrent crimes or violations here. In principle, the right to privacy and the international human rights law (IHRL) prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment could also be relevant. However, given the near universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions and the uncertainty regarding how IHRL applies during armed conflict, the natural focus of this report is IHL. This is not to say, however, that IHRL could not be relevant.

⁶ Note, however, that belligerent parties must protect PoWs and protected persons against any unjustifiable exposure to public curiosity, not only when accompanied by insults or violence; International Committee of the Red Cross, *Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention: Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* (Cambridge University Press 2025) para 2268.

⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2269.

⁸ Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Geneva Convention III) [hereinafter GCIII]) and Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Geneva Convention IV) [hereinafter GCIV]).

⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2269.

¹⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2273. Note that taking pictures of or filming detainees without disseminating such content beyond the circle of persons involved in their handling is not outlawed by Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

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to public curiosity. Accordingly, belligerent parties would have to refrain from uploading or further disseminating such material, in the absence of a lawful and reasonable justification consistent with international law. They would also have to exercise due diligence to prevent others from exposing protected individuals online or from subjecting them to disrespectful or abusive online comments.¹¹ This may require instructing their armed forces on how to protect individuals from public curiosity and insults and informing their population (especially media professionals and social media platforms) about what IHL requires in this respect.¹²

As all state parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions, they must not aid or assist others in exposing protected individuals, e.g., by sharing content exposing protected individuals to public curiosity. They may even be obliged to take all reasonable measures to stop ongoing violations and prevent foreseeable ones.¹³ In the context of open-source content, this could translate into an obligation to consider regulating the social media platforms within their jurisdiction in a manner that would limit the availability or reach of content which is exposing protected individuals to public curiosity or insults.¹⁴

A strict interpretation of these obligations risks eliminating the positive impact of open-source content on accountability and identification efforts. With respect to the latter, the ICRC Commentary notes that there are 'other more suitable and effective mechanisms' than uploading content online to allow missing or deceased persons to be identified, such as the transmission of internment cards, ICRC visits and correspondence with the family.¹⁵ While IHL, indeed, includes a great number of provisions aimed at facilitating the identification of missing or deceased persons, such as the obligation to forward information about protected persons and respond to enquiries about them,¹⁶ this assumes that the belligerent parties in question comply with them. Where this assumption does not hold, open-source content may constitute a more effective mechanism.

With respect to the potential of online content to contribute to awareness raising, war crime prosecutions and other accountability mechanisms, the ICRC considers that such content can contribute to greater respect for IHL.¹⁷ It was therefore necessary 'to strike a reasonable balance in the implementation of this provision between the benefit derived from making

¹¹ This obligation to protect can be derived directly from the language of Article 27 GCIV which states that protected persons 'shall be protected' against, inter alia, insults and public curiosity. Yet, this obligation remains one of conduct. Belligerent parties are therefore not automatically violating IHL whenever protected persons are subjected to public curiosity or insults, but they are obliged to take adequate protective measures. As stated in the ICRC Commentary, this 'may also require measures to protect protected persons from rhetoric (both offline and online) that calls for or threatens violence against them'; International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2263.

¹² See International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) paras 217 and 222.

¹³ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 229.

¹⁴ Note that the content of the positive obligation to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is highly context-dependent, taking into account factors such as 'the foreseeability of the violations and the State's knowledge of it, the gravity of the breach, the means reasonably available to the State and its ability to take effective measures to ensure respect'; International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 229.

¹⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2270.

¹⁶ Article 137 GCIV. For a more complete overview on obligations relating to missing and deceased individuals, see Romanowsky XL and Chau MS, 'The Protection of the Missing and the Dead under International Law' Forensic Science and Humanitarian Action (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 2020).

¹⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2271.

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information regarding protected persons public ... and the possible humiliation and even physical harm they may cause to those who appear in them.¹⁸

More specifically, the ICRC Commentary suggests that content exposing protected individuals to public curiosity could exceptionally be disseminated based on the demands of public interest (e.g., when they show well-known or wanted persons) or the vital interests of individuals (e.g., to prevent a person from going missing and or when information is sought to reconnect them with their family).¹⁹ Yet, when disclosing material under such exceptional circumstances, the dignity of the affected persons must still be protected, especially when the content in question shows degrading or humiliating treatment.²⁰ When making such material available online, appropriate measures to protect the identities of the protected individuals exposed by the content (e.g., if suitable, altering voices, blurring faces or other identifying information) should be taken.

It should be noted that Article 13 GCIII and Article 27 GCIV are both only applicable in international armed conflicts (IAC). No equivalent protections are set out in Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II. The ICRC Customary Law Study also did not identify an equivalent rule of customary law which would apply in non-international armed conflicts.²¹ Consequently, civilians and fighters (both those fighting on behalf of the government and those fighting against it) in NIAC would only be protected against exposure which also amounts to humiliating or degrading treatment, discussed in the subsequent section, or have to turn to other bodies of domestic or international law for protection.²²

2.2 Open-source content exposing vulnerable individuals as an outrage upon personal dignity

IHL is not limited to prohibiting the exposure of certain protected individuals. It also seeks to protect everyone affected by armed conflict, not only PoWs and protected persons, from being severely humiliated or degraded by prohibiting outrages upon personal dignity in both IAC and NIAC. In NIAC, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions prohibits 'outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment'. Although less widely ratified, this prohibition is reproduced in Article 4(2)(e) Additional Protocol II.²³ In IAC, Additional Protocol I²⁴ provides in Article 75(2)(b) that the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or military

¹⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2272.

¹⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2272.

²⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross (n 6) para 2272. Content which involves children requires special care.

²¹ A Dutch Court noted that 'while many states do indeed have an injunction regarding protection against public curiosity, they often explicitly refer to 'prisoners of war', a term that refers to captured opponents in international armed conflicts. The more general term 'prisoner' is used in the military manuals of only nine states. This is insufficient for the Court to conclude that there is a case of *opinio juris* and state practice that the injunction to protection against public curiosity also falls under the injunction to humane treatment in non-international armed conflicts.'; *Cases 09/748011-19(dayv.I) and 09/748004-21(dayv.II)* The Hague District Court (21 April 2021) ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:3998.

²² Distributing a person's image without their consent could amount to a violation of the right to privacy. However, it should be noted that IHRL traditionally binds states. Whether non-state actors are bound by it in a given situation requires a case-by-case assessment.

²³ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol II) 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 [hereinafter AP2].

²⁴ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I) 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter AP1].

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agents: ... 'outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault'.²⁵ These provisions are further considered to form part of customary international humanitarian law in both IAC and NIAC. This means the prohibition is applicable to state agents and non-state armed groups alike.

Outrages upon personal dignity further constitute war crimes under international criminal law. Articles 8(2)(b)(xxi) and (c)(ii) of the Rome Statute²⁶ set out the war crimes of 'committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment' in international and non-international armed conflicts, respectively. The terms of this crime reproduce the prohibition set out in Article 3(1)(c) common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.²⁷ The ICC Elements of Crimes specify that this crime comprises the following elements: (1) The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons; (2) The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other violation was of such degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity; (3) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict (or non-international for that version of the crime); and (4) The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Importantly, a footnote to Element (1) of this offence provides that "For this crime, 'persons' can include dead persons". The same footnote to Element (1) adds further significant clarifications, namely '[i]t is understood that the victim need not personally be aware of the existence of the humiliation or degradation or other violation'. This is crucial with respect to online content: even if the victim is not aware that a video depicting them is circulating online, this may still amount to or contribute to an outrage upon personal dignity committed against them.

The ICTY has held that the assessment of the severity of the humiliation should not be based only on subjective criteria related to the sensitivity of the victim, but also on objective criteria related to the gravity of the act.²⁸ The ICTY's *Aleksovski* Trial Chamber noted that outrages upon personal dignity are particularly intolerable forms of inhumane treatment that cause 'more serious suffering than most prohibited acts falling within the genus'.²⁹ It also concluded

²⁵ The International Court of Justice has further stated that Common Article 3 applies in both international and non-international armed conflicts; *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua* (Merits) [1968] ICJ Rep 14 [218].

²⁶ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3 [hereinafter 'Rome Statute'].

²⁷ Article 3 is identical in all four Geneva Conventions; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I) [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II) [hereinafter GC II]; GC III and GC IV.

²⁸ See International Committee of the Red Cross, *Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field* (Cambridge University Press 2016) para 664. The Commentary cites *Prosecutor v Aleksovski* (Trial Judgment) IT-95-14/1 (25 June 1999) [56]; *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al* (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-96-23-T&IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 2001) [504]; *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al* (Appeals Judgment) IT-96-23-T&IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002) [162]-[163].

²⁹ *Prosecutor v Aleksovski* (n 28) [54].

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that 'the humiliation must be so intense that the reasonable person would be outraged'³⁰ – which reflects Element 2 of the ICC Elements of Crimes.

While a case-by-case assessment of the severity of the conduct in question is indispensable, the following has been considered as outrages upon personal dignity: forced public nudity;³¹ rape and sexual violence;³² inappropriate conditions of confinement; being forced to perform subservient acts; being forced to relieve bodily functions in one's clothing; or enduring the constant fear of being subjected to physical, mental or sexual violence³³ hanging naked from handcuffs or being forced to maintain a certain position for a prolonged period of time;³⁴ treating corpses in a disrespectful manner or mutilating them.³⁵ Other examples of degrading treatment can be found in decisions of human rights bodies: treatment or punishment of an individual if it 'grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience';³⁶ not allowing a prisoner to change his or her soiled clothes;³⁷ cutting off a person's hair or beard as punishment.

When assessing the severity of the humiliation, 'relevant aspects of the cultural background of the victim' are to be taken into account.³⁸ On this basis, the Council of Europe's Genocide Network argues that 'the Elements of Crime preserved the subjective aspect to the offence and permitted a cultural- or religious-specific humiliation, degradation or violation of dignity to be considered as an outrage upon personal dignity even though the same act may not be considered as an outrage upon dignity when inflicted upon another person. In such situations, the objective element would be satisfied by demonstrating that the particular act would be 'generally recognised' as an outrage upon personal dignity when inflicted upon a person belonging to a particular cultural or religious group'.³⁹

³⁰ *Prosecutor v Aleksovski* (n 28) [56].

³¹ *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al* (n 28) [766-774]; *Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo* (Confirmation Decision) ICC-01/04-01/07-717 (14 October 2008) [375]-[376]. See also, *Prosecutor v Akayesu* (Trial Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) [688].

³² *Prosecutor v Furundžija* (Trial Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) [270]-[275]; *Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al.* (Trial Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-00-56-T (17 May 2011) [2158].

³³ *Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.* (Trial Judgment) IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) [173].

³⁴ *Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo* (n 31). Note that the ICC Trial Chamber noted that this constitutes a form of humiliating treatment specific to female prisoners.

³⁵ *Prosecutor v Brđanin* (Trial Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) [1019].

³⁶ *The Greek Case* (1969) 12 YB 186.

³⁷ *Hurtado v Switzerland* (1994) Series A No 280-A, para 12.

³⁸ International Criminal Court, *Elements of Crimes* (International Criminal Court 2011), footnotes 49 and 57 [hereinafter 'ICC Elements of Crimes'].

³⁹ European Network of contact points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 'Prosecuting War Crimes of Outrage upon Personal Dignity Based on Evidence from Open Sources – Legal Framework and Recent Developments in the Member States of the European Union' (Eurojust 2018) 5 <<https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/assets/2018-02-prosecuting-war-crimes-based-on-evidence-from-open-sources-en.pdf>>, citing Christine Byron, *War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* (Manchester University Press 2009) 142. Post-World War Two cases demonstrate the application of this culturally-specific factor. For example, the trial of Chuichi and Others concerned Indian Sikh PoWs who had their hair and beards shorn, and one was forced to smoke a cigarette despite this being forbidden to Sikhs. It was held that these factors aggravated their physical ill-treatment; *ibid.*, citing Tanaka, Chuichi and Others, Australian Military Court, Rabaul, 12 July 1946, 11 LRTWC 62, 140.

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ICTY jurisprudence also clarifies that, if the severity threshold is met, it is not required that the humiliation or degradation inflicted upon the victim be long-lasting.⁴⁰ *A fortiori*, if the humiliation is long-lasting, for instance because content documenting it is available to a large audience potentially for forever, this may reinforce the conclusion that the humiliation suffered is sufficiently severe.

Whether certain humiliating or degrading acts were documented by the perpetrator as well as whether such content was made available online are important factors to be taken into account when determining whether treatment amounts to an outrage upon personal dignity. In assessing the severity of humiliating and degrading treatment, national courts have considered the use of the victim as a trophy,⁴¹ the documentation of humiliating or degrading treatments by taking pictures,⁴² and making video footage showing the treatment available to a large public online⁴³ as increasing the humiliation and degradation suffered by the victim.

Regarding the mental element (*mens rea*), the Elements of Crimes for this offence do not explicitly define it. In consequence, the general mental element under Article 30 of the Rome Statute applies. This means that the perpetrator must have intended to commit the act concerned and was aware that this act would humiliate, degrade or violate the dignity of the victim.⁴⁴ In *Hilal*, a Finnish District Court considered that making images documenting humiliating or degrading treatment publicly available on social media constitutes strong evidence that the perpetrator knew their conduct would humiliate, degrade or violate the victim.⁴⁵

In sum, the availability online content depicting humiliating or degrading content interacts with the prohibition and criminalisation of outrages upon personal dignity in various ways. First, when seen in connection with the in-person conduct the content shows, it can provide evidence of an act or omission which can constitute the *actus reus* of an outrage upon personal dignity simply by documenting that the alleged conduct, indeed, took place. When assessing whether this conduct was sufficiently grave to amount to an outrage upon personal dignity, the fact that the perpetrator decided to film the humiliating treatment and disseminate the resulting footage online has been considered as intensifying the severity of the humiliation suffered by the victim. Moreover, the uploading of such content online has been considered as evidence that the perpetrator met the *mens rea* requirement of knowing about the humiliating effects of their conduct on the victim.

Far less clarity exists with respect to virtual conduct which lacks any direct connection with the in-person conduct itself. If the uploader did not participate, actively or passively, in the in-

⁴⁰ *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al* (n 28) [501].

⁴¹ 5-3 StE 2/16 - 4 - 1/16, OLG Frankfurt am Main (12 July 2016) C. Rechte Würdigung, VI. Subjektiver Tatbestand.

⁴² *Cases 09-748003-18 and 09-748003-19* (The Hague Court of Appeal) ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2021:103 (26 January 2021).

⁴³ *Cases 09/748011-19 and 09/748004-21* (The Hague District Court) ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:3998 (21 April 2021).

⁴⁴ Note that the ICTY considered the requisite degree of *mens rea* a practically only marginally relevant question since for all acts that meet the objective threshold set out above, it would be rare that a perpetrator would not also know about their effects; *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al* (n 28) [513].

⁴⁵ *District Prosecutor v. Hilal* (DC Kanta-Häme) R 16/214 (22 March 2016), noting the following: 'H. knew that by publishing the photograph in question publicly on his Facebook profile, it would be freely viewable by a very large number of Facebook users. H. must, at the latest at that point, have realised that his conduct would outrage the dignity of the dead person referred to in the charge.'

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person humiliation of the victim, but then decides to make footage thereof available online, would this in itself constitute an outrage upon personal dignity? If content depicting an outrage upon personal dignity is already available online and then shared by a user, thus amplifying its reach, does this amount to a separate outrage upon personal dignity? If a user shares content with the awareness that it is likely to add to the humiliation of the victim, but does so in order to raise awareness of international crimes and facilitate accountability for them, would they potentially be committing a war crime? How is the gravity assessment impacted by the existence of humiliating comments by third parties?

The answers to these questions matter. If uploading or sharing a video depicting an outrage upon personal dignity in itself were to constitute a violation of IHL and potentially a war crime, states would be under an obligation to suppress such conduct, including when such conduct provides evidence of violations attributable to said state. While it is beyond the scope of this report to provide conclusive answers to these questions, the following will discuss how the legal categorisation of some of the content analysed below may differ depending on how they are answered.

3. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE

This report primarily draws on open-source research conducted by the University of Essex DVU across a range of active and recent conflicts globally, covering the period from 2020 onwards. It does not aim to be exhaustive, but rather to construct a dataset of incidents that illustrate broader patterns of harm to dignity in contemporary armed conflict. Importantly, the over-representation of particular conflicts or parties to a given conflict in this dataset should not be read as implying that other parties committed fewer, or no, offences. It may reflect the limits of publicly available sources and documentation or our team's selectivity given the DVU's limited personnel and resources. Moreover, as with any OSINT-based research, the distribution of content across conflicts in our dataset is impacted by the unequal access to the internet across different countries, whether due to censorship or lacking infrastructure. Additionally, global platforms were much easier to reach for our UK-based team than more locally used platforms or websites. While we relied on online translation tools to overcome language biases, some conflicts were covered by members of our team who are not native speakers of the languages relevant to the conflict in question, hence creating potential language-based biases. Due to time constraints, we further had to exclude the Americas from our project scope.

Research was conducted through searches across eight online platforms, as well as through conflict-monitoring accounts and human rights documentation platforms, tracking IHL violations. Search queries combined conflict-specific terminology (e.g. names of parties, geographic locations, and descriptive language relating to the treatment of detainees, prisoners of war, and civilians).

For content to be included in the dataset, it had to meet the following criteria:

1. the conduct depicted had to have a nexus to an armed conflict (international or non-international);
2. the content had to depict conduct which could reasonably be suspected of falling within the scope of the IHL prohibitions outlined above, specifically
 - a. Exposure of protected persons to public curiosity;
 - b. Humiliating or degrading treatment;
 - c. Mistreatment of deceased persons

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3. the content had to have been uploaded on or after 1 January 2020
4. the content was not AI-generated.⁴⁶

Geo-location and chrono-location were attempted to verify content in line with established standards for OSINT investigations. However, the nature of the content this report is concerned with complicates verification significantly. It often depicts only the victim(s), instead of offering a wider view of the surrounding areas which can be used to verify the time and place of the incident. Frequently, it was filmed in remote or deliberately obscured settings (e.g. open fields, detention facilities, generic interiors). The type of conduct shown in the relevant conduct further leaves no physical impact which could be identified via satellite imagery.

Since this report does not seek to establish individual criminal responsibility or state responsibility for violations of international law, these geo- and chrono-location challenges, while important to note, do not undermine its core objective. Much of our analysis concerns how open-source content exposing vulnerable individuals can create harm when it is distributed and reacted to online. This harm does not depend on the precise location of the original incident.⁴⁷

Where precise geo-location was not possible, the team therefore instead assessed whether the broader context, the surrounding environment, language spoken, dress, and conduct visible in the footage, were broadly consistent with the alleged location. In particular, we focused on whether the perpetrators and/or victims could be reliably identified as belonging to a party to the conflict. Content was also verified by tracing whether it had been reposted across multiple platforms, checking for consistency in how the location and incident were described across those postings, and further cross-referencing with available news reporting where available.

This contextual approach to verification leads to a lower level of confidence that the conduct in question happened as and when it pretends to. This limitation must be taken into account with respect to our analysis of the in-person conduct patterns the content revealed. Yet, for the reasons explained above, this lower level of confidence does not impinge on those findings of this report relating to how content is distributed and reacted to online.

Each piece of relevant content was registered in a collaborative dataset. Apart from the content itself, we added supplementary information and categorised the conduct shown as well as how it was distributed and reacted to online.

To gauge the visibility of and level of engagement with the content in our data dataset, we collected additional data, depending on its availability. For all platforms, we were able to record the number of reactions (i.e., likes or emoji reactions of different kinds). Except for most of the content posted on Telegram, we further registered the number of comments. For content

⁴⁶ It should be noted that AI-generated content can cause significant harm. For instance, there have been reports of heavily sexualised deepfake images of women have been used to silence anti-military activists in Myanmar; Amara Thiha, 'Revenge Porn Has Become a Political Weapon in Myanmar' (*The Diplomat*, 9 August 2021) <<https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/revenge-porn-has-become-a-political-weapon-in-myanmar/>>. However, harm to a specific person only arises when the AI-generated content in question uses images of a real person. This will frequently be impossible to ascertain with certainty without local knowledge of the situation in question, which is why we decided to exclude all AI-generated content from our scope.

⁴⁷ Nonetheless, awareness of these challenges is still necessary as it might lead to a certain bias in which types of violations are investigated using OSINT methodology.

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uploaded on YouTube, X, or Telegram as well as for certain content on Instagram and Facebook (58 out of 77 entries) view counts were available.⁴⁸

For each piece of content, we conducted a reverse image search using Google Lens to identify other instances of the content being uploaded on social media. Where content was uploaded by several uploaders, we saved links to such uploads in a separate column and categorised their frequency (0, 1-5, 6-10, 10 or more).⁴⁹

We used the caption of the content and the account name of the uploader to gauge whether the uploader is supportive of the victim, of the perpetrator, or neutral. In cases where the allegiance of the uploader was unclear, it was coded as 'unknown'. Where we identified hate speech or otherwise abusive comments in the piece of content included in the dataset or reposts of the same content elsewhere, we recorded the existence of such comments and their target (i.e., whether they were hostile towards the victim, the perpetrator, or both).

We further categorised the conduct shown in the conduct, the situation the conduct seems to take place in and the victim. This coding was based only on the information immediately available from the content and its description. It is not to be understood as a conclusive legal categorisation.

- Conduct: When the perpetrator engaged in active or passive conduct creating a situation that is liable to humiliate the victim (e.g., through forced nudity, making the victim repeat humiliating sounds or phrases, insulting or verbally ridiculing the victim, stepping or spitting on the victim, posing next to the victim), the content was coded as 'humiliating or degrading'. When the victim was visible and potentially identifiable, but not obviously humiliated, this was categorised as 'exposure'. When the perpetrator used violence, an additional label ('violence') was added. If the victim was deceased and being mistreated (e.g., by being stepped on, driven over, kicked, etc.), this was coded as 'mistreatment of the dead'. Conduct fitting none of these categories was labelled as 'other'.
- Situation: Content which appeared to show a detention facility was categorised as 'formal detention'. When the victim was under the physical control of the perpetrator (e.g., being guarded by armed individuals, hands tied, being forced to sit on the ground), this was coded as 'ad Hoc detention'. When the perpetrator interacted with the victim without being within their physical control, this was labelled as 'invasion phase'. Situations fitting none of these categories were labelled as 'other'. Where the situation was unclear, it was coded as 'unknown'.
- Victim: Content showing unarmed victims not wearing uniform without any allegations of being a member of armed forces or armed group were categorised as civilians. Where the context, description or comments accompanying the content raised sufficient doubt to reverse the assumption of civilian status, we used the label 'unknown'. Victims wearing uniform without allegation of civilian status within an IAC

⁴⁸ This data can serve as a proxy for the visibility of and engagement with a piece of content. Potential biases and other shortcomings of using the number of views, comments, reactions and shares/re-tweets as a such proxies will be discussed further in section 4 below.

⁴⁹ Note that we were not able to collect information on the uploaders, number of views, likes, shares and reactions for all posts including content documenting the same incident. As to be discussed below, we have no reason to believe that this introduced a significant bias. However, the only way of testing this assumption would be to extend the collection of the above-mentioned information to all posts reproducing the same video or image.

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
context were labelled as prisoners of war. Captured individuals alleged to be members of the state armed forces or an armed group in a NIAC were classified as ‘fighter hors de combat’.

For each piece of content which was *prima facie* within scope, we followed a three-step procedure: 1) inclusion in the dataset and collection of supplementary information, 2) verification (and exclusion if verification suggests that content is not within scope), 3) review of relevance and categorisation of content.

4. OVERVIEW OF THE DATASET

Our final dataset comprised 105 entries in total, of which 77 were considered as reliably within the scope of this report,⁵⁰ which is what the below analysis is based on. The in-scope entries span seven conflicts across four regions. Israel/Palestine is the largest single group (21 entries, 27%), followed by Sudan (17 entries, 22%) and Russia/Ukraine (15 entries, 19%). Myanmar accounts for 10 entries (13%), while Syria and Mali are each represented by 5 entries (6%) and Ethiopia by 4 entries (5%).

The dataset spans a period of approximately five years, with the earliest upload date recorded in July 2021 and the most recent in June 2026. The majority of content was uploaded in 2024 or later, with 2026 being the most represented year (22 entries), closely followed by 2025 (20 entries) and 2024 (19 entries).⁵¹ Breaking down the timeline by conflict shows that for most conflict’s entries cluster around a small number of discrete episodes.



1 - Temporal distribution of the dataset.

⁵⁰ The remaining entries were either assessed as out of scope or lacking a sufficiently clear nexus to an armed conflict (19 entries), inaccessible at the time of review (5 entries), or duplicates of existing entries (4 entries).

⁵¹ The 11 entries from 2023 are concentrated in the final months of the year, closely tracking the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza in October 2023 and the intensification of RSF operations in Sudan. The four earliest entries, from 2021, all relate to the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia. Content from 2026 reflects ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Israel/Palestine, Myanmar, and Mali, with several entries relating to escalations in Mali and a surge in RSF activity in Sudan in the first half of the year.

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Eleven of the 21 entries (52%) relating to the conflict in Israel/Palestine were uploaded between 7 October and 17 December 2023, beginning on the day of the Hamas-led attack on Israel and continuing through the early weeks of the subsequent Israeli ground operation in Gaza. A second, smaller cluster appears around September–October 2024. For content related to Sudan, two distinct clusters can be identified which align precisely with documented RSF offensives.⁵² The remaining entries are more dispersed through 2024 and 2025. The conflict showing the most evenly distributed timeline in our dataset is Russia/Ukraine, with entries appearing in nearly every month from September 2024 to May 2026 at a rate of roughly one per month, rather than clustering around a single triggering event. Content relating to the armed conflict in Myanmar is concentrated almost entirely within a single seven-week window between 20 April and 10 June 2026. This window coincides with a documented resurgence of Tatmadaw counter-offensive operations following Myanmar's December 2025/January 2026 junta-organised elections.⁵³ In sum, the data in our dataset suggests that military offensives or massacres tend to produce an often instantaneous stream of online content exposing vulnerable individuals.

A large majority of in-scope entries (73%) involve victims who are under the physical control of the perpetrator, whether in ad hoc detention (44 entries) or formal detention (12 entries). This distribution reflects the specific vulnerability created by detention, and ad hoc detention in particular. While formal detention centres may be visited by organisations such as the ICRC,⁵⁴ ad hoc detention does not allow for the same supervision, hence providing a fertile breeding ground for mistreatment.

In 61% of the entries, the victims are clearly identifiable, either because their faces are shown or their names are mentioned.⁵⁵ For 18% of our entries, we considered that enough of the victim's face or other identifying features were visible (e.g., tattoos) or audible (e.g., voice) for the victim to be potentially identifiable. The fact that victims are identifiable in a substantial proportion of the content has direct implications for the dignitary and psychological harm that online distribution causes, including to family members who may encounter footage of their relatives. It further creates a risk of the victims or their family being targeted at a later point.

⁵² The first and largest group, 9 entries between 23 and 26 October 2024, corresponds to the RSF's retaliatory campaign across Gezira State that began on 20 October 2024 following the defection of an RSF commander to the Sudanese Armed Forces. The second cluster, 3 entries between 27 and 31 October 2025, corresponds to the fall of El Fasher to the RSF on 26 October 2025 after an 18-month siege, an assault that the UN Human Rights Office subsequently found to have killed more than 4,000 people within the city in its first three days alone; Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, 'Sudan: RSF Violations in Capture of El Fasher Amount to War Crimes' (*OHCHR*, 13 February 2026) <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/sudan-rsf-violations-capture-el-fasher-amount-war-crimes>>.


⁵³ There are too few pieces of content relating to Ethiopia, Mali and Syria to identify a clear single-event cluster. Mali's entries lean heavily toward April–May 2026 (4 of 5 entries) while Syria's entries are spread from December 2024 (immediately following the fall of the Assad government) through January 2026, tracking the protracted and uneven process of consolidating control that followed the change of government. Content relating to the armed conflict in Ethiopia in our dataset has been uploaded between July and November 2021, corresponding to the period in which footage of captured Ethiopian National Defence Force soldiers being paraded through the streets of Mekele.

⁵⁴ See Article 126 GCIII, Article 143 GCIV.

⁵⁵ In 21% of our entries, the victims' faces or other identifying body features were not visible. While we classified these entries as 'non-identifiable', it should be noted that specific pieces of clothing, unique mannerisms or simply the context of the depicted incident may at times still allow those who personally know the victim to identify them.

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The content was collected from eight distinct platforms. X is by far the most represented, accounting for 26 of the 77 in-scope entries (34%). Telegram is the second most common platform with 17 entries (22%). Reddit and Facebook each account for 9 entries (12%), Instagram for 8 (10%), YouTube for 4 (5%), and TikTok and VK Video for 2 entries each (3%).⁵⁶ It shows that certain platforms are particularly prominent for content from specific armed conflicts. Telegram and VK Video together account for all 15 Russia/Ukraine entries, while X and Facebook account for all 10 Myanmar entries.




2 - Number of entries per conflict by platform.

The view counts we recorded reflect the substantial reach the content this report is concerned with online, with most the viewed item in the dataset accumulating over 7.2 million views on X alone. However, there are notable differences in reach both within and across conflicts. The graph below shows boxplots for each conflict – a statistical tool to visualise the spread of the data within one variable. The red dots indicate statistical outliers and the lines within each box represent the median logged views.⁵⁷ The large number of outliers and long boxes for several conflict illustrates how reach within a given conflict can be highly uneven, with a handful of viral items driving the mean far above the typical case. These differences likely reflect a combination of a time bias (the older content is, the more users could have seen it), algorithmic amplification, network effects on different platforms, and the degree to which content is actively promoted. It further shows that content exposing vulnerable individuals tends to attract a lower level of viewership for some armed conflicts (e.g., Mali, Myanmar) than others (e.g., Russia/Ukraine, Ethiopia).

⁵⁶ It must be remembered that most pieces of content in our dataset have been posted across several platforms. The statistics presented in this report are based on the platform on which we first found the content. While we have no reason to believe that the distribution presented above would significantly change if all posts of the same piece of content across different platforms had been taken into account, this is nonetheless important to note when drawing any general conclusions.

⁵⁷ Note that the number of views is logarithmically transformed to reduce the distance between the highest and the lowest value. This makes it easier to visualise the general distribution of view counts, which range from numbers in the lower thousands to several millions.

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
3 - Boxplots for each conflict based on number of logged views by conflict. The length of the vertical lines indicates the overall spread of the data for each conflict. The box shows the spread of the middle 50% of the data, i.e., excluding the highest and lowest quartiles.

Across the in-scope entries, content uploaded to express outrage or solidarity and raise awareness accounts for the largest share (47%). For 35% of the entries, the caption and context allowed to infer that the uploader was supportive of the perpetrator's conduct.⁵⁸ This demonstrates the complexity of content depicting dignity violations. While it may often serve as a means of documenting violations of international law, in a significant number of cases, it still is intended to amplify the humiliation of victims or to celebrate the conduct of perpetrators.

We identified stark differences across different conflicts in the apparent positionality of the uploaders of the relevant content. Russia/Ukraine entries were drawn entirely from Telegram and VK Video channels affiliated with, or sympathetic to, Russian military and paramilitary actors, who post footage of captured or killed Ukrainian soldiers as a form of battlefield reporting and morale-building for their own audience. Similarly, the footage relating to Myanmar was sourced from resistance-aligned accounts who upload footage of captured junta soldiers. In both cases, the uploader is aligned with the party in physical control of the victim. Israel/Palestine, Sudan, and Syria show the opposite pattern: content is overwhelmingly sourced from accounts supportive of the victim, such as human rights activists, journalists, or sympathetic members of the public condemning the conduct shown.

⁵⁸ The allegiance of the remaining 14 uploaders (18%) could not be determined with sufficient confidence.

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4 - Number of entries by conflict, sorted by allegiance of the uploader.

The dataset also captures reactions, likes, comments, and shares for most entries, which allow an analysis of audience engagement.⁵⁹ Views and reactions are correlated: content that is seen by more people generally attracts proportionally more reactions. However, the rate of engagement relative to views (reactions per 1 000 views) varies considerably by conflict and is not simply a function of total reach. Russia/Ukraine content has the highest engagement rate in the dataset (approximately 19 reactions per 1 000 views), more than double the rate for Sudan (approximately 5) and Mali (approximately 7). This suggests that Telegram audiences, although smaller in absolute reach than the viral reach achieved by some X content, are unusually engaged.


Our dataset reflects that controversy is a driver of sustained audience interaction in the comments section. Entries where hostile comments were identified attracted higher median comment counts overall than entries with no hostile comments (20.5), with the highest median comment count (218) found among the 10 entries where hostile comments target both the victim and the perpetrator simultaneously.

Hostile comments were identified beneath 40 of the 77 in-scope entries (52%), underscoring that the harm caused by this content is rarely confined to the original post. In most cases, secondary abuse by other users compounds the original harm. Of the 40 entries with hostile comments, 16 (40%) saw hostility directed at the victim (for example, comments mocking, blaming, or celebrating the victim's mistreatment) while 12 (30%) saw hostility directed at the perpetrator. A further 10 (25%) saw both occur simultaneously. Unsurprisingly, hostility targeting the victim is markedly more common on content uploaded by accounts supportive of the perpetrator than on victim-supportive content, confirming that the surrounding audience

⁵⁹ As noted in the previous section, not all types of visibility and engagement data was available for all platforms. Consequently, platform bias needs to be accounted for when interpreting data on the visibility of and engagement with the content in our dataset.

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tends to mirror, and amplify, the framing established by the original uploader rather than independently assess the conduct shown.



5 - Share of posts attracting hostile comments by allegiance of the uploader.

Victim identifiability does not protect against this dynamic, on the contrary: of the 47 entries where the victim is identifiable, 27 (57%) carry hostile comments, a higher proportion than among entries where the victim cannot be identified. This suggests that showing an identifiable person does not deter hostile commentary and may in some cases facilitate it by giving commenters a named or visible individual to target. Further statistical analysis of a larger, statistically representative dataset would be required to confirm that the correlations identified above are statistically significant.

This general overview of the dataset reveals three crucial insights. First, the dataset is not geographically or temporally balanced. This may be partially due to the above-mentioned potential selection biases and limited sample size. However, it could equally indicate that content exposing protected individuals or showing their mistreatment is more prevalent for some conflicts than for others and frequently follows significant conflict events such as offensives or captures of enemy positions. Second, it shows that the content this report is concerned with is uploaded to further humiliate the victim and celebrate the perpetrator's conduct by some, while simultaneously being uploaded as a means to raise awareness and ensure accountability by others. Third, it shows that when such content is uploaded, it frequently triggers hostile reactions — regardless of the purpose of the uploader and especially when the victims are identifiable. In other words, even if content is uploaded or shared in support of the victim, it may nonetheless cause harm to them.

Importantly, these results describe the dataset we created and worked with. As noted above, this dataset does not claim to be exhaustive and has not been constructed under conditions which ensure its representativeness. Further analysis would therefore be required to confirm that the trends identified in our dataset are representative of larger, generally valid patterns.

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As noted above, four conflicts stood out during our analysis: Sudan, Israel/Palestine, Myanmar, Russia/Ukraine. They will be analysed in more detail in the following, discussing representative pieces of content and the patterns they reveal.

5. CASE STUDY 1: SUDAN

Sudan has experienced conflict and recurring civil war for decades, characterised by prolonged periods of internal armed conflict, particularly in the Darfur region. Sudan's current internal armed conflict began following the overthrow of Sudan's then President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. The two main actors in the coup were the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The alliance between the SAF and RSF broke in April 2023, leading to civil war and a prolonged internal armed conflict from this time. The conflict constitutes a non-international armed conflict, with the ICRC assessing that within days of the outbreak of conflict in April 2023 the thresholds of organisation and intensity were met. Therefore, Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions are applicable, as is customary international humanitarian law governing NIAC.

Two particular periods within conflict are relevant to the content identified in this report. The first relates to a period of attacks perpetrated by the RSF in Al-Jazirah State in October 2024, following the defection of a senior RSF commander, Abu Aqla Kaikal, to the SAF. The second period relates to the RSF attack and takeover of El Fasher in late October 2025, which came after a prolonged siege of the area.

5.1 Patterns identified in the in-person conduct

Several patterns appear evident from the content identified in relation to the non-international armed conflict in Sudan. In several videos, armed actors filmed civilians and themselves while mocking them, forcing them to perform degrading acts (e.g., making animal noises), forcibly moving, physically assaulting or killing them. In many cases, the footage shows the perpetrators talking to the camera as they show both themselves and detainees, recording detainee responses. The perpetrators can regularly be seen laughing and smiling as they record the verbal and physical abuse of detainees. A second common feature is the filming of physical harm and violence perpetrated against detainees, including the kicking, slapping or even killing of detainees.

Several videos were uploaded from 24 October 2024 to 26 October 2024, in and around the village of Al Seriha. These videos seem to have been taken in the context of an attack on the village by the RSF following the defection of Abu Aqla Kaikal from the RSF to the SAF.

One video uploaded on X on 24 October shows a group of men in civilian clothing sitting in a building as someone talks to them off camera.⁶⁰ We were not able to independently verify what is being said to the detainees, but several of them are identifiable. One detainee can be seen in later videos. According to news reports on the event, the video was broadcast by RSF members online, who later killed the individuals shown in the video.⁶¹

⁶⁰ According to the uploader, this building is the mosque of Al-Seriha. We were not able to independently verify this claim.

⁶¹ 'مليشيا الدعم السريع تقتل أكثر من 100 مواطن وسط السودان في قرية واحدة منصة قلب إفريقيا الإخبارية' (*Heart of Africa*, October 2024) <<https://heartofafrica.info/?p=5705>>. Note that the cited news report provides a list of names of those killed in the massacre in Al-Seriha.

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In a second video uploaded on X on 25 October 2024, a man who appears to be an RSF soldier⁶² records detainees who are sitting and crouching outside with their backs against a wall. The man is dressed in khaki combat trousers and a jacket, with other perpetrators also in uniform appearing in the video. The man speaks mockingly to the men, recording both the detainees and himself, at times pointing to individual detainees and asking them questions. The man repeatedly mentions the name 'Kaikal', with captions indicating that he is telling the men the attack is happening because of Kaikal, and that the situation is his fault. The video also shows a detainee in a striped polo shirt who was recorded in the first-mentioned video as he is led along in a line of detainees, many of whom have their hands raised above their heads. The perpetrator filming continues to walk and record detainees being marched to unknown locations, and when passing he appears to mock them, including by forcing them to repeatedly make animal noises.



6 - Screenshots from post uploaded on X on 24 October (picture on the left) and from post uploaded on 25 October 2024 (three pictures on the right); Red highlights added by editorial team.

A third video, taken by the same man who recorded the second video shows the man recording, talking to, and mocking detainees who are being forced to walk along the border of Al-Seriha. Many of the men appear elderly and have their hands tied behind their backs. Several have torn or bloody clothes. According to captions provided by the uploader, the soldier filming himself is asking the detainees about their daughters, whether they were kidnapped and where they are buried. In several moments the soldier deliberately moves closer to the detainees to show their face from as close as possible. His style of filming is highly intrusive and suggests that he seeks to ensure that the public can identify the men.

⁶² Showing the same man interacting with RSF soldiers in a collegiate manner, strongly suggesting he forms part of the RSF, see Peter Mwai, Kumar Malhotra and Matt Murphy, 'How an RSF Commander's Defection Led to a Massacre in Sudan' *BBC Verify* (23 December 2024) <<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7864519eqvo>>.

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7 - Satellite images of Al-Seriha accessed through Google Earth and screenshot from video uploaded on X on 26 October 2024. Red highlights, RSF uniform picture from official RSF website and explanatory text added by editorial team.

A fourth video, uploaded to X on 25 October 2024, appears to show detainees being forced to march away from the village. We observed this conduct in several other videos. The footage is recorded by a man in a vehicle transporting several men in combat uniform with machine guns. It appears evident from the uniform and RSF insignia of one of the men on the truck that they are RSF forces. The video shows the men forcing detainees to walk and run along a road, with the person filming shouting repeatedly at the detainees, at times telling them to make animal noises. Many of the detainees are running, and many are holding their hands above their heads. The detainee in the striped polo shirt, recorded both when detained inside a building and when being led outside, is visible again, as he is one of the many men seemingly forced to walk along the road.



8 - Screenshots from video uploaded on X on 25 October 2024. Red highlights and RSF logo on the right added by editorial team.

Taken together, these videos perfectly capture the tension this report seeks to explore. The way in which the perpetrators interact with and use the camera strongly suggests that they decided to film themselves to deepen the humiliation of the individuals they were verbally

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abusing. However, the fact that some of the detainees occur throughout the footage may help their families to gain clarity about their fate.

Several other videos after October 2024 and in other locations also show incidents of RSF forces recording humiliation and violence perpetrated against individuals who appear to be unarmed civilians. In one video, uploaded to X on 7 November 2024, several men surround a detainee who is initially sitting on the ground, with a man in a khaki t-shirt⁶³ grabbing the detainee by the beard and pulling him to his feet. A man on the left of the video is dressed in combat uniform which contains the RSF insignia, whilst several others who surround the detainee are in plain clothes but carrying weapons. The man holding the detainee by his beard looks into the camera whilst shaking the man from his beard, with the detainee's voice shaking. The men surrounding the detainee look into the camera and are laughing and smiling. Once again, the way in which the perpetrators interact with the camera indicates that the act of filming is a deliberate attempt to further degrade the victim. By laughing and smiling into the camera, the perpetrators make light of the situation, which in itself can be seen as deepening the humiliating aspect of their conduct.



9 - Screenshots from video uploaded on X on 7 November 2024. Red highlights and explanatory text added by editorial team.

⁶³ This man has been identified as an RSF soldier; Tayed Saeed, 'مسن سوداني' (الترند اليوم: إذلال) شيخ السريحة), مسن سوداني', (Dabanga Radio TV Online, 28 October 2024) <<https://shorturl.at/W2oAm>>. We were not able to independently verify his identity.

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Another video, uploaded to Instagram on 31 October 2025, shows a man surrounded by 6 people who are dressed in what appears to be the RSF combat uniform. The detainee is held in front of the camera whilst the soldiers mock him. One of the soldiers holds what appears to be a 1000 Sudanese note up to the camera, before giving the detainee other notes to eat. Another soldier then slaps the face of the detainee, with other officers holding his face to the camera.



10 - Screenshot from video uploaded on Instagram on 31 October 2025. Red highlights added by editorial team.

A common feature across all of the footage reviewed is the purposeful humiliation of detainees, through perpetrators mocking them, forcing them to answer repetitive, humiliating questions and compelling them to make animal noises. Another common pattern is the perpetration of physical violence against detainees including slapping, kicking, and hitting with weapons, in addition to forcing detainees to walk and run. Throughout and following these acts, the perpetrators frequently turn the cameras on themselves while smiling or laughing and record themselves with detainees in the background of the footage. These acts appear intentionally committed to humiliate detainees and would most likely be considered to cause a real and serious sense of humiliation, making them possible outrages upon personal dignity.

5.2 Identity of the distributors, online reach and reactions

The content related to the armed conflict in Sudan identified in this dataset was uploaded across a variety of platforms, with the majority coming from X and Facebook. The visibility of the content from Sudan in our dataset is somewhat varied. Overall, the content from Sudan content has a relatively low median view count (21 300), with less viral content than, e.g., in the context of Israel/Palestine. This may be the result of the 'attention deficit' the armed conflict

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in Sudan has suffered from, especially compared to the armed conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Russia/Ukraine.⁶⁴

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the average number of views across all of the pieces of content for Sudan is 152 278. This means that the individuals exposed and sometimes humiliated are on average seen by thousands of people – without even counting re-posts of the video in question on other platforms or by other users. In fact, one of the videos showing detainees being paraded in Al-Seriha discussed above attracted 1.4 million views on X, which is the highest number of views for the content from Sudan in our dataset. X, Instagram and YouTube Shorts to have the highest engagement rates in terms of reshares. The average number of reshares/retweets stands at 335. The highest number of reshares can be found on the same X video aforementioned (1 600).

As noted above, a number of the videos appear to be taken by the perpetrator themselves as they are in 'selfie' mode. Yet, the uploaders of the content identified in the dataset are predominantly supportive of the victims, condemning the conduct seen in the video and expressing solidarity and sympathy with the victims, rather than praise or support for those who appear to be taking the videos. One example is a video that has been taken from the perspective of the perpetrators showing individuals wearing RSF uniforms riding in a vehicle while following a group of people running ahead of them and pointing guns at them. While the original video can be assumed to have been taken by the perpetrators themselves, it has not been possible to find the original uploader. However, access to the video is available through those who have posted it in support of the victims. This support is clear from the caption on the videos stating, '*Watch how the RSF tortures and dehumanizes Sudanese people*'. Amongst the distributors of the content are several official news outlets, for example, Rassd News Network, Sudan Tribune, Sudan News (Sudan Nabaa), and Middle East 24. Their primary motivation for sharing the footage analysed above seems to be to raise awareness of the atrocities.

The general tone of the comments on the content relating to Sudan is sympathetic to the victims. There is largely an expression of outrage and sadness at the fact that the RSF (mostly from the content contained in the dataset) are committing acts of such violence, humiliation and degradation against their own countrymen who largely seem to be civilians. Many the comments express sympathy for the victims of humiliation or degrading treatment. Some examples are:

- 'May God curse the oppressors and the unjust'
- 'This is atrocious, the fact that no one talks about this is infuriating and insane'
- 'This is truly disturbing...'
- 'So sad what the f is happening why would they do this to their own people [sad crying emoji faces]'

A lot of the comments call for wider awareness and broader acknowledgement by the international community of what is happening in Sudan, especially the pieces of content focused on El Fasher.

⁶⁴ For a more detailed discussion of why Sudan does not receive the same media attention as other conflicts, see, e.g., Henry Roberts, 'Why Sudan Needs to Be in the Media Spotlight' (*International Broadcasting Trust*, 9 February 2026) <<https://ibt.org.uk/opinion/why-sudan-needs-to-be-in-the-media-spotlight/>>.

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- 'What is happening in El Fasher is an indescribable humanitarian tragedy. Innocent lives are being lost, hospitals are being attacked, and children are being left to face hunger and fear. We call upon the entire world to pay attention to what is happening, to work towards an immediate ceasefire, to open humanitarian corridors for aid to reach those affected, and to ensure justice for all those who have been harmed...'
- 'We are not asking for hatred, we're asking for awareness.'

Some comments adopt an angrier tone and express sentiments of revenge against the perpetrators:

- 'You're fighting the citizens, you dogs. These citizens, you sons of bitches, are carrying weapons just to protect themselves from your looting militias. You kill them in cold blood, you dogs. You tell me to enter the battle? May God take revenge on you, you honorless scum. The blood of the sons of Al-Sariha and Azraq is on your necks until the Day of Judgment.'
- 'May God take revenge on you and turn your schemes against your own throats.'

There are few overtly offensive comments relative to the number of comments overall, however, a few racist comments can be seen on a video depicting individuals being shouted abuse at while their hands are tied and they are blindfolded: 'Descendants of Arabs this is the result of miscegenation. Infiltrate the enemy into your territory. The children of these will burn the nation to favor the people of their father or mother from the east... Africa does not learn.' This comment appears to be blaming the atrocities on the descendants of those who have mixed heritage. Similarly, a video showing a man of Indian heritage attracted several comments stereotyping the man and mocking him based on this.

Another point of interest is the trend of sympathy being seen in the comments for the SAF. The majority of the content from Sudan depicts videos where it is the RSF committing acts of humiliation or degradation. However, in a couple of the pieces of content, it is the RSF who appear as the victims. The comments on these videos are vastly different to those on videos where the RSF are the perpetrators. In one video, there are what are alleged to be a number of RSF soldiers laying on the ground having surrendered and been made prisoners of war. In the video, an alleged SAF soldier then executes them by shooting them while in a surrendered position. Still, the comments are largely unsympathetic:

- '& yet no one will parade for them or their lost lives.'
- '...the rsf is the one with genocide allegations not the saf.'

In another video depicting RSF soldiers appearing to surrender, the comments also do not express support or sympathy:

- 'Their best words.'
- 'Do not trust them'
- 'We'll settle the score, but patience is key'
- 'The army is not like you, traitors'
- 'Our army doesn't operate like you, you conscienceless lot'

In sum, the majority of comments and interactions from the public to the videos shown appear to show support, sympathy and allyship with the civilians seen in the videos as victims of degrading treatment. Nonetheless, we identified comments under several pieces of content which call for or condone violence or express racially charged hatred. Even within an overwhelmingly supportive and non-inflammatory comments sections, such comments can

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deepen the humiliation of the victim or, if directed at the perpetrator, encourage vigilante justice and further divide societies along racial or religious lines.

Generally speaking, the online dissemination of and reaction to the content from Sudan raises intricate legal questions. There can be no doubt that the fact that the videos analysed above are publicly available online exposes the victims to a much larger group of people, some of which may be hostile towards them. However, it is equally clear that in the vast majority of cases recorded in our dataset, this dissemination is not motivated by malicious intentions. In fact, it has also created a space where people express their sympathy and solidarity with the victims and may allow family members to learn about the fate of their loved ones. Cynically speaking, one may argue that those sharing the content analysed above to express their support of the victim end up realising the perpetrators' probable aim of creating a wider audience for the humiliating and degrading treatment of the victim. A more hopeful interpretation may be that those who share content to support the victim can help to give back some power to the victim by leveraging their humiliation to facilitate accountability for the perpetrators and avoid that the victims and the crimes against them are forgotten.

This raises the following questions: Does the online dissemination of content exposing vulnerable individuals and/or showing their humiliation only, or more significantly, add to the humiliation of the victim if it is aimed at humiliating the victim and met with hostile comments targeting the victim? In other words: when such content is shared by those sympathetic to the victim, does this decrease the additional humiliating effect of the online dissemination? If so, who distributes the content would need to be taken into account when assessing how the availability of footage of in-person outrages upon personal dignity affects their severity.⁶⁵ In addition, to comply with their obligation to suppress violations of IHL, would states not only have to work towards preventing the above-analysed content from being uploaded by the perpetrator, or would they also need to limit its potential negative effects by restricting its distribution by journalists, human rights advocates and sympathetic members of the public? It lies beyond the scope of this report to conclusively answer these questions, but the above analysis of the case of Sudan underlines its relevance.

6. CASE STUDY 2: ISRAEL/PALESTINE

The armed conflict between Israel and Palestine has a long and convoluted history. For the purposes of this report, the main period of interest started with the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, during which Hamas fighters entered Israel, killed and abducted both civilians and Israeli soldiers. Israel responded with far-reaching, extensive airstrikes and several ground offensives.⁶⁶ Israeli and Hamas leaders have been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to events from 7 October onwards, though the Hamas accused have since been killed.

⁶⁵ This report is not concerned with establishing individual criminal responsibility. However, it should be noted that additional questions arise in a criminal justice context. When it can no longer be proven that the perpetrator uploaded the video themselves, can the fact that it is online still be taken into consideration? Does the mere fact that the perpetrator recorded the footage suffice, or would judicial factfinders need to establish that the footage was also uploaded by the perpetrator to consider the additional humiliation this entails in their assessment of the severity of the in-person conduct?

⁶⁶ While this report is not concerned with the crime of genocide, it should be noted that parts of the Israeli response to the Hamas October 7 attacks have been considered by the International Court of Justice to constitute a potential genocide; *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel)* (Provisional Measures Order) [2024] ICJ Rep 19 [30].

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Many of the resulting interactions between individuals belonging to the opposing parties of the conflict have been documented online. In fact, some of the videos showing the abduction of Israeli civilians created a significant media response in the wake of October 7.⁶⁷ Moreover, Hamas regularly published videos showing the hostages it captured and livestreamed several prisoner exchanges on YouTube, exposing the returning hostages to the public eye.⁶⁸ On the other side, the IDF felt compelled to advise its soldiers to refrain from posting footage from Gaza, responding to the large number of videos shared by IDF soldiers online.⁶⁹ As a result, many of the original videos uploaded by IDF soldiers themselves are no longer available. However, as to be seen below, they remain accessible on other accounts.

6.1 Patterns identified in the in-person conduct

In the content relating to Israel/Palestine we analysed, four main patterns have been identified: large groups of detainees being forced to sit or lie on the ground while being handcuffed and often partially or fully naked, violence, forced submissive behaviour and the mistreatment of deceased persons.

In several cases, victims are gathered into groups and forced to sit on the ground, sometimes in presumably very uncomfortable positions. Some have their hands cuffed and/or are blindfolded. For instance, a picture published on 7 December 2023 on X shows a group of men sitting in a row directly on the ground; they all appear to have been forced to undress. Soldiers are visible in the background. Their uniforms are consistent with those of the IDF. A second image uploaded also on X on the same day provides another view of the same event. In this second photo, the detainees can be seen with their hands behind their backs which might indicate that they are handcuffed. They are forced to kneel on the concrete floor. A video uploaded on X on 7 December 2023 shows the same scene. Both photos and the video were taken in front of the Ulayyan pharmacy in Jabalia.⁷⁰


⁶⁷ Notably, some of these videos were shared by the family of the hostages; Corky Siemaszko, 'Hostage Families Share Disturbing Video of Israeli Soldiers Being Abducted by Hamas on Oct. 7' *NBC News* (23 May 2024) <<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hostage-families-share-disturbing-video-israeli-soldiers-abducted-hama-rcna153558>>; Rob Picheta, 'Families of Female Israeli Hostages Release Graphic Abduction Footage to Pile Pressure on Netanyahu' *CNN* (22 May 2024) <<https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/22/middleeast/israel-idf-hostage-video-hamas-intl>>.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., 'Hamas' Gaza Hostage Video Sows Fear in Israel' *France 24* (6 September 2025) <<https://www.france24.com/en/video/20250906-hamas-hostage-video-sows-fear-in-israel>>; 'New Footage Shows Six Israeli Captives Held in Gaza Tunnel Prior to Deaths' *Al Jazeera* (12 December 2025) <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/12/new-footage-shows-six-israeli-captives-held-in-gaza-tunnel-prior-to-deaths>>; Dana Karni, Tal Shalev and Oren Liebermann, 'Videos Show 6 Israeli Hostages Celebrating Hanukkah in Gaza Tunnel Months before They Were Killed' *CNN* (12 December 2025) <<https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/11/middleeast/hanukkah-israeli-hostages-gaza-tunnel-latam-intl>>.

⁶⁹ 'IDF Restricts Media Coverage of Soldiers to Protect Them from Risk of Legal Action' *The Guardian* (8 January 2025) <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/08/idf-restricts-media-coverage-of-soldiers-to-protect-them-from-risk-of-legal-action>>.

⁷⁰ Both pictures as well as the video showing the same scene were geo-located by an X user, pinning them down to a precise location (coordinates: 31.544221, 34.498364); see Anno Nemo [@NemoAnno], 'More Palestinian Prisoners and Israeli Soldiers. What Seems to Be an Israeli Humvee Is Also Visible. End: 31.544067, 34.498210 2/ <https://t.co/PuDAH3M3RC> <https://t.co/m3S2hec9TN>' <<https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1732866843772158203>>. We were able to confirm this geo-location.

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11 - Pictures and screenshot of video uploaded on X on 7 December 2023. Highlights and satellite imagery added by editorial team

This incident is representative of two wider patterns we identified in the content related to Israel/Palestine. First, the detainees are seated directly on the ground, lined up. In some of the images, they appear to be handcuffed. They are clearly in a vulnerable position, which is potentially exacerbated by being identifiable to a large audience.⁷¹ Many hold their hands over their heads or lower their faces, visually highlighting their increased vulnerability and potential distress.

Second, most detainees are at least partially naked. Such imposed nudity can be humiliating for the victim, certainly when exposed to a large online audience. The humiliating nature of this forced nudity is compounded when the victims' religious beliefs are taken into account. In this specific instance, at least some of the victims are likely to be of Muslim faith. According to the Islamic rule of *awrah*, men should cover themselves from the navel to the knee in public settings. This cultural context makes sharing pictures or videos of individuals dressed in only their underwear even more serious as it is not only humiliating them but also forcing them to act against their religious beliefs.

71 In fact, one user claims to recognise one of the detainees; بلقيس الحريزي [@x_blg_h_], '@K_AminThaabet Do Not Lie. Those Who Were Arrested Were Civilians and Displaced People Who Were in a School for the Displaced in Northern Gaza. Among Those Detained Was a Journalist Working for the Al-Arabiya Al-Jadeed Newspaper. What I Published Was a Lie. <https://T.Co/UOGNUo1kY>' <https://x.com/x_blg_h_/status/1732792737194185171>.

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13 - Picture uploaded on X on 7 December 2023 (middle). Red highlights and images of IDF soldiers on the left and right added by editorial team.

Another pattern is the use of violence against immobilised individuals. One video uploaded on Reddit on 14 December 2023⁷² shows soldiers kicking men who are already lying on the ground, blindfolded and handcuffed. Their vulnerability vis-à-vis their perpetrators compounds the humiliation they endure. Some of the victims lie motionless on the ground. Soldiers handle the victims' bodies as if they were mere objects.



12 - Screenshot from video uploaded on Reddit on 14 December 2023. Red highlights and image of IDF berets, boots and M4 rifle in the middle column added by editorial team.

⁷² The video had been distributed on a Telegram channel, but the channel was no longer available at the time of writing because it violated Telegram's terms and conditions.

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According to news reporting, the incident took place around 31 October 2023 in the South Hebron Hills in the occupied West Bank.⁷³ We were not able to independently verify that the video was taken in this location. However, the uniforms and berets of the perpetrators indicate that they are members of the IDF. Reportedly, an IDF spokesperson condemned the soldiers' conduct and initiated an investigation. The victims are said to be Palestinian workers who tried to cross the border without a permit.⁷⁴ As in the incident analysed above, nudity forms part of the humiliation suffered by the victims. In the video, most victims are at least partially undressed. Some victims are completely naked, thereby exposing their private parts. Despite being blindfolded, those who personally know the victims may be able to identify them.

Another pattern occurring in the content related to Israel/Palestine is humiliation through forced submissive behaviour. As noted in the introduction, Al-Jazeera reported that IDF soldiers had forced a young man to lie on the ground and repeat phrases like 'I love Israel', uploading the scene to the man's own Facebook account.⁷⁵ Similar content in which the perpetrators compel the victim to listen to or repeat politically charged language was identified in the context of our analysis.

One video posted on X on 3 September 2024 shows a soldier filming himself and another man alternately while speaking. The detainee is blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back and is facing a wall. The generated translation of the soldier's remarks refers to the construction of the Jewish Temple, as does the video's caption. It is also claimed that the individual is an IDF soldier mistreating the detainee.

As the video is filmed inside and no news reporting providing further information could be identified, we were unable to verify the location and time of the incident. However, the badge worn on the soldier's chest appears to be the Mashiach badge, worn by some IDF soldiers.⁷⁶ The Mashiach badge serves as a religious symbol relating to the Jewish aspiration for redemption.⁷⁷ According to a report, an Israeli soldier was arrested for displaying this badge.⁷⁸ The badge together with the soldier's helmet allow to infer that the person who filmed the video is most likely an IDF soldier.

⁷³ Gianluca Pacchiani, 'IDF Soldiers Film Themselves Abusing, Humiliating West Bank Palestinians' *The Times of Israel* (1 November 2023) <<https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-soldiers-film-themselves-abusing-humiliating-west-bank-palestinians/>>.

⁷⁴ Pacchiani (n 74).

⁷⁵ The incident is reported to have taken place on 2 July 2025 in the town of Sebastia, West Bank. See Delaney Nolan, 'Assaults by Israeli Soldiers Become a Daily Reality in West Bank's Sebastia' *Al Jazeera* (12 August 2025) <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/12/assaults-by-israeli-soldiers-become-a-daily-reality-in-west-banks-sebastia>>.


⁷⁶ Rony Shapira, "'Messiah' Patches on Israeli Soldiers' Sleeves Are a Short March to Mission Failure' *Haaretz* (29 May 2026) <<https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2026-05-29/ty-article-opinion/.premium/messiah-patches-on-israeli-troops-sleeves-are-a-short-path-to-mission-failure/0000019e-7463-de7e-abfe-f66773dd0000>>.

⁷⁷ 'הפאצ' שזכר את צה"ל: שתיים, שלש... משיח' (הגאולה, 29 July 2024) <<https://hageula.com/news/moshiach/25888.htm>>.

⁷⁸ Tzavi Jasper, 'IDF Soldier Sentenced to Month in Prison for Wearing "Messiah" Patch' *The Jerusalem Post* (14 May 2026) <<https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-896110>>.

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The video shows that the soldier forces the detainee to repeat words after him, reportedly referencing the Jewish Temple. This particular choice of words allows to infer that it was the soldier's intention to humiliate the detainee, both through forcing him into a submissive physical posture and by compelling him to show disrespect toward his assumed religious beliefs and political views. The online dissemination of the video further compounds this humiliation. The detainee's family might identify him and witness him being forced to submit to the religious and political aspirations of the enemy, which could also humiliate him in the eyes of his loved ones. Even worse, it could put the detainee and this family at risk of retribution from the group he belongs to if his behaviour is considered as unjustifiably submissive and shameful.



14 - Screenshot from video uploaded on X on 3 September 2024. Red highlights and images of Mashiach badge and helmet added by editorial team.

Another piece of content uploaded on Reddit on 23 October 2024 shows a group of detainees standing on the loading area of a truck. The detainees have their hands tied and are in their underwear. In the beginning of the video, the detainees are repeating a chant critical of Hamas, condoning 'revenge' against them. According to media coverage of the incident, the video was taken by an IDF soldier.⁷⁹ A vehicle can be seen in the back which is consistent with a type of Humvee used by the IDF. The video was taken in Al Saftawy, Jabalia, Gaza.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ 'Gazan Detained by IDF: We Waited for You to Free Us from Hamas Tyranny, Our Children Are Dying of Hunger' *The Times of Israel* (8 January 2024) <https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/gazan-detained-by-idf-we-waited-for-you-to-free-us-from-hamas-tyranny-our-children-are-dying-of-hunger/>. Another newspaper notes that the video was shared by a military source; Ronny Reyes, 'Palestinians Blame Hamas for Gaza War after Israeli Soldiers Strip Them down to Underwear' *New York Post* (8 January 2024) <<https://nypost.com/2024/01/08/news/palestinians-blame-hamas-for-war-in-gaza-while-stripped-by-idf/>>.

⁸⁰ fdov [@fdov21], 'Israeli Soldiers with Prisoners, Al Saftawy, Jabalia, Gaza. 31.538239, 34.480659 @GeoConfirmed <https://t.co/1diupwaFm3>' <<https://x.com/fdov21/status/1744394181819105655>> accessed 31 July 2026.

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The caption of the video depicting the incident suggests that the detainees were forced to condemn Hamas. We were unable to confirm with certainty whether this is an accurate description of the incident. However, even if the chanting was not forced, the fact that several detainees can be identified exposes them to the risk of repercussion if their conduct shown in the video is considered as willing cooperation with the enemy. Moreover, it should be noted that some of the detainees look into the camera at one point. Realising that they are filmed while being in a vulnerable position and half-naked may be considered to cause a real and serious sense of humiliation, especially in light of the cultural context noted above.



15 - Screenshot from video uploaded on Reddit on 23 October 2024. Highlights, satellite imagery and image of IDF vehicle on the right added by editorial team.

The final recurring pattern is the mistreatment of deceased bodies. Several instances of Israeli soldiers desecrating the bodies of Palestinians by throwing them off rooftops, picking them up with excavators or pulling them behind cars have been covered extensively by several news outlets and human rights groups.⁸¹ Apart from said videos, we identified several videos from the October 7 attack by Hamas in which the bodies of abducted individuals are kicked and trampled on, while their death is being celebrated.

⁸¹ See, e.g., Catalina Marchant de Abreu, 'Truth or Fake - Video of Palestinian Body Dragged by Israeli Army Vehicle Was Filmed in Israel, Not Gaza' *France 24* (1 November 2023) <<https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/truth-or-fake/20231101-video-of-palestinian-body-dragged-by-israeli-army-vehicle-filmed-in-israel-not-gaza>>; Yolande Knell and James Gregory, 'Israel Investigates after Its Soldiers Filmed Throwing Bodies off Roof' *BBC News* (20 September 2024) <<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn8jg0x5xg8o>>; Lorenzo Tondo, 'Israeli Soldiers Filmed Pushing Bodies of Palestinians off West Bank Roof' *The Guardian* (20 September 2024) <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/20/israeli-soldiers-filmed-pushing-bodies-of-palestinians-off-west-bank-roof>>.

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One video uploaded on a predominately Hebrew Telegram channel on 7 October shows a group of men stepping on the head and body of a seemingly deceased soldier. The soldier, wearing the distinctive IDF red combat boots,⁸² is covered in blood.



16 - Screenshots from video uploaded on Telegram on 7 October 2023. Red highlights and images of IDF boots on the right added by editorial team.

Some of those mistreating the body seem to be unarmed and wear civilian clothing. However, one of the perpetrators is armed. Several other men standing closeby can be seen wearing green headbands, strongly resembling those typically worn by Hamas. One individual can furthermore be seen with a uniform patch showing a Palestinian flag, which is also consistent with the military dress of Hamas. Even if these Hamas fighters are not actively participating in the mistreatment, neither do they intervene to stop their fellow fighters or bystanders.



17 - Screenshots from video uploaded on Telegram on 7 October 2023. Red highlights and images of Hamas uniform on the right added by editorial team.

⁸² Israeli Defence Forces, 'The History of the Red Combat Boots' (IDF, 29 December 2022) <<https://www.idf.il/en/articles/2022/the-history-of-the-red-combat-boots/>>.

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While we were not able to identify news reports on this specific incident, the surrounding area roughly matches that of the Kibbutz Nahal Oz, which was attacked on October 7th. The fence, trees and sports pitch which can be seen in the back indicate that the video was taken at the Western end of the village, only a few kilometres from the border with Gaza and an Israeli military base which was equally attacked on the same day.⁸³



18 - Screenshots from video uploaded on Telegram on 7 October 2023. Red highlights, satellite imagery and image of Nahal Oz added by editorial team.

These videos can be seen as having two contrasting effects. On one hand, documenting scenes like the one shown in the video analyzed above is particularly crucial if the victim is deceased since they will not be able to tell the world about what happened to them. Moreover, they will not return to their loved ones, who therefore depend on external information to ascertain the fate of the victim. On the other hand, seeing a loved one's body being trampled on and abused may cause significant emotional harm to family members, partners and friends of the victim – in addition to the dignitary harm suffered by the victim themselves which is amplified by the dissemination of videos like the one analyzed above.

Overall, the content we identified in relation to Israel/Palestine shows several overlapping patterns. Multiple pieces of content showed handcuffed, half-naked detainees who are often in uncomfortable and vulnerable positions. Several videos show detainees being physically mistreated. Another group of content showed detainees being forced into submissive behaviour, usually involving the repetition of phrases or chants which are politically or

⁸³ Alice Cuddy, 'Questions for IDF over Fall of Israel Border Post Nahal Oz by Hamas on 7 October' *BBC News* (4 October 2024) <<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg7825rk8j9o>>.

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religiously sensitive. Lastly, we identified several videos showing deceased persons being mistreated, e.g., by being stepped on or thrown off rooftops. From a legal perspective, much of the behaviour depicted in the relevant content could potentially qualify as ill-treatment as well as violations of the IHL rules on the treatment of deceased persons.

6.2 Identity of the distributors, online reach and reactions

Content related to the armed conflict in Israel/Palestine has been posted and shared across various social media platforms. While platforms such as Instagram and YouTube provided some relevant content, the majority of the material gathered during our research comes from X and Reddit. Overall, Israel/Palestine entries have the lowest median view count of any conflict (12 900) despite containing the single highest-viewed item in the entire dataset (7.2 million views), indicating a highly polarised distribution in which some of the content circulates relatively silently while a small number of items go viral. For instance, while the video of an IDF soldier forcing a detainee to repeat phrases relating to the Jewish Temple was viewed 38 300 times, the picture showing a group of half-naked detainees sitting on the ground in Jabalia attracted 4.5 million views on X alone. The video showing the abuse of a deceased person on October 7th attracted 'only' 3 590 views, whereas a video of IDF soldiers pushing a body down a building was viewed by 7.2 million users on X. Arguably, even just an audience of a few hundred online viewers suffices to deepen the sense of humiliation experienced by an individual who is exposed in this way without their consent. Consequently, an audience of several million people, potentially all over the world, is certainly a fact to be taken into account when assessing the severity of a given conduct.

The users who uploaded this content have diverse profiles. The majority appear to support the victims and aim to expose violations of international law and crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict. Many users who uploaded relevant content identify as members of anti-Zionist online communities. Captions are often brief, reflecting the perspective of the uploader (e.g., 'IDF torturing Palestinian civilians' or 'Men from Gaza arrested, bound, nearly naked, and forced to sing a condemnation of Hamas'). They frequently provide detailed information about incidents, including the location, a description of the events in the video, and the names of the perpetrators and victims. This shows that several users uploading content exposing vulnerable individuals deliberately provide identifying information, potentially to honour the victim or to underline the veracity of their claims, or to expose the perpetrator. In one instance, a researcher posted an image showing an Israeli soldier standing opposite a handcuffed, half-naked Palestinian and included the soldier's name and Instagram account.

However, we equally identified content uploaded by users who appear to treat the situation with mockery or show support for the actions of the perpetrators. For instance, an Israeli news host posted a photo showing half-naked men sitting on the ground in Jabalia. He captioned it: 'why aren't there women in the picture?'. Another caption of a video showing half-naked detainees in Gaza states 'Till a total victory. Hamas must Surrender! Return the hostages!'.

The user comments accompanying the content relating to the conflict in Israel/Palestine are particularly divisive with supporters of both sides commenting on the same content. The general tone of the comments accompanying content related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects shock and disgust at such treatment. In most cases, users express bewilderment as well as anger towards the perpetrators. Many comments express either support for Palestine, often accompanied by the Palestinian flag or emojis signalling shock. Others label Israeli soldiers as 'devils', 'terrorists', 'cowards', 'monsters', 'rats', or 'sadistic pigs' in response to the

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mistreatment or acts of torture alleged in the content captions. Furthermore, some comments compare Israel and its soldiers to the Nazi regime and Hitler. For instance, users describe Israeli soldiers as 'new Nazis' or claim: 'They act exactly like the Nazis. Hitler would be proud of his Jews.' Several comments call for extreme violence. Such remarks come from both supporters and opponents of IDF soldiers. On one hand, some users 'hope the IDF captures or kills all the terrorists as well as those who help them' - a phrasing that, presumably, targets Palestinians. On the other hand, IDF soldiers face such a wave of hatred that some comments no longer regard them as human beings: 'It's horrible! I hope all the IOF soldiers die a humiliating death! Amen!', 'human animals', or, more broadly, 'Israelis are not human beings.' Comments along those lines respectively target all Palestinians and Israelis, or even all Jewish people, as a whole and dehumanise them.

Another category of comment seeks to downplay the suffering of the victims. For instance, beneath several videos alleging to show IDF soldiers mistreating Palestinians, some users claim that even worse treatment exists and that they should, therefore, consider themselves lucky with their fate.

- 'That's abuse? Better than a bullet in the head as was done to the hostages'.
- 'I think you don't understand the meaning of the word torture'.
- 'Better than raping or burning them alive?'.
- 'Is it a crime to read a book to someone? He does not shoot them in the head from point blank range as the Palestinians did to the Israeli hostages.'
- 'You think this is bad?? Are you insane??The prisoners are still alive!'

This demonstrates that, even if the person who uploaded the content intended to expose the perpetrator, the material can reach a wider audience; among this audience, some may attempt to downplay the incident or outright insult the victim or the group they belong to. For victims, this may compound the humiliation they suffered at the hands of the direct perpetrator and make it more permanent. In addition, such comments, in combination with the content itself, can be traumatic for their families. A family member browsing social media might unexpectedly come across images showing their loved one being mistreated by attackers, accompanied by comments making light of the victim's suffering. This compounds not only the humiliation suffered by the victim but also the humiliation and pain their family may feel. Moreover, in particular where victims are forced into submissive behaviour, they may face repercussions if such conduct is perceived as an unjustified act of surrender. Preventing such content from being uploaded online could therefore contribute to protecting not only the dignity of the victim, but also the physical safety of the victim and their family.

Yet, the case of Israel/Palestine equally underlines the potential of open-source content with respect to ensuring that serious potential violations of international law and international crimes do not go unnoticed, especially in a situation where countless journalists have allegedly been killed by a belligerent party. Moreover, there have been incidents where content which was produced by the perpetrators to humiliate the victim have allowed families to know that their loved ones are still alive and in detention.⁸⁴ The content from Israel/Palestine thus reveals similar contradicting effects as that discussed in the previous sections, while further highlighting the difficulty of harnessing the positive potential of such content without exposing the victim to insults and potentially even physical violence.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., 'Family Identifies Missing Palestinian in Photo Posted by Israeli Soldier after 21 Months' *TRT World* (1 August 2026) <<https://www.trtworld.com/article/9efb96543f4d>>.

7. CASE STUDY 3: MYANMAR

Armed conflict has been a formative element of Myanmar's history. The most recent iteration of conflict can be traced back to 1 February 2021, when the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) ousted the elected government and detained civilian political leaders after a decade of civilian rule. Protests against the military taking control were suppressed violently,⁸⁵ driving protesters towards armed resistance movements.⁸⁶ In April 2021, pro-democratic leaders formed a shadow government and later announced the formation of an armed wing, the People's Defence Force (PDF). Moreover, several ethnic armed groups started launching military operations against the Tatmadaw. In addition, local and regional fighting forces have emerged. While all of these actors are fighting the Tatmadaw, they are not equally aligned with the PDF. The situation in Myanmar is therefore highly complex, with a wide array of actors fighting against the Tatmadaw in several, parallel non-international armed conflicts.

7.1 Patterns identified in the in-person conduct

The content we identified in relation to the non-international armed conflicts in Myanmar follows a clear pattern: non-state armed groups capturing Tatmadaw soldiers and individuals allegedly associated with the military junta take pictures and videos of those they captured. The detainees are frequently handcuffed. Their faces are not blurred and tend to be clearly visible, allowing for the identification of the captured soldiers. In the content we identified, the captured individuals are not being physically mistreated. Neither are they forced to engage in clearly humiliating behaviour or ridiculed in an obvious manner. In some videos, they are given food or cigarettes. There are several videos in which soldiers pose in front of captured detainees, or make the detainees pose in front of military equipment.

One image uploaded on X on 20 April 2026 shows a member of the Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF) posing with another soldier in front of seven detainees.⁸⁷ Four of the detainees are wearing a Tatmadaw uniform. The faces of the depicted Tatmadaw soldiers are not blurred, making them clearly identifiable. At least some of them were possibly aware that they were being photographed.

⁸⁵ UN General Assembly, 'Report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar' (2021) A/HRC/48/18 paras 34–35.

⁸⁶ Lorcan Lovett, 'Who Is Fighting in Myanmar's Multi-Front Civil War?' *Al Jazeera* (27 March 2026) <<https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/3/27/who-is-fighting-in-myanmars-multi-front-civil-war>>.

⁸⁷ According to the uploader, the picture was taken near Naypyidaw. We were unable to identify the precise location of the conduct.

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19 - Image uploaded on X on 20 April 2026. Red highlights, explanatory text and additional images added by editorial team.

Another picture uploaded on Facebook on 10 June 2026 shows 14 shirtless men in civilian clothing with their hands tied behind their back in front of several rifles, a pile of bullets and several military helmets. The patch and flag of the PDF can be seen on the top left and top right corner. The bottom of the picture displays a caption which reads 'Prisoners of war surrendering at the Myitkyina Police Station'.



20 - Image uploaded on Facebook on 10 June 2026.

Another picture shows a group of PDF soldiers in front of what seems to be an entry gate. Our analysis confirmed that this picture was taken in front of the Myitkyina Police Station, Pakokku Township (coordinates: 21.241257291838245, 94.85141152257636). We identified two news reports which state that the police station had been taken over by the PDF on the morning of 10 June 2026.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ 'မြစ်ခြေရဲစခန်းကို တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်တွေသိမ်းပိုက်ပြီးနောက် စစ်တပ်စစ်ကြောင်းပြန်ရောက်လာ' (People's Spring, 12 June 2026) <<https://www.ludunwayoo.com/news-mm/2026/06/12/159770/>>; Khaing Lu Hla, 'ပခုက္ကူမြို့နယ်မြစ်ခြေရဲစခန်းအား တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့တွေက တိုက်ခိုက်သိမ်းပိုက်' NarinJara News (10 June 2026)

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21 - Image uploaded on Facebook on 10 June 2026. Satellite images accessed through Google Earth and highlights added by editorial team.

According to one of the news reports describing the event, the PDF released a statement which affirmed that 'prisoners of war will be held in accordance with international military laws, and those who commit war crimes will be identified and prosecuted in accordance with military laws before a military court'.⁸⁹

Two other videos uploaded on X and YouTube, respectively, show groups of alleged captured government soldiers guarded by uniformed men with rifles.⁹⁰ In both videos, surrounding soldiers can be seen smiling and making generally non-offensive gestures towards the camera. In one of the videos, the detained individuals are lying on the ground with their hands above their heads.

2026) <<https://burmese.narinjara.com/local-news/detail/6a290bd0a38d850330aec985>> accessed 22 July 2026.

⁸⁹ Translated from Burmese; Hla (n 89).

⁹⁰ In one video, these soldiers can clearly be identified as PDF soldiers. Another video is more ambiguous, albeit equally showing yellow markers frequently worn by PDF soldiers.

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22 - Screenshot from video uploaded on Facebook on 9 June 2026 (left) and screenshot from video uploaded on X on 26 April 2026.

While some of the identified content clearly shows members of the Myanmar armed forces, others depict individuals in civilian clothing. For several pieces of content, accompanying captions and news reporting claim that some of the individuals captured and photographed or filmed are members of the police or local administrators. In sum, the practice of photographing and filming detained individuals does not seem to be limited only to members of the Tatmadaw.

In one instance, the administrator of the village Aye Aye Tharyar was detained on the Kawthaung-Namma Thon (locally known as Pakla) road in Kawthaung Township on 13 May 2026. He was accused of supplying the Tatmadaw with uniforms, shoes and bulletproof vests and of having led an operation which killed nine PDF members. Not only his picture but also pictures of his driver's licence and ID were uploaded on Facebook on 17 May 2026. On the latter, the administrator's address is clearly visible. While the administrator was ultimately killed when trying to flee, uploading personal information is highly intrusive and can significantly increase the risk of later identification and harm to both the victim and their loved ones.

Logo of the Tanintharyi
Region Public Defense Corps

Logo of the People's Defense
Organization Kawthaung Township



23 - Images uploaded on Facebook on 17 May 2026. Red highlights and explanatory text added by editorial team.

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The content from Myanmar we identified raises several critical legal questions. The first question is whether taking photographs or videos of detainees and uploading them constitutes an outrage upon personal dignity. It could be argued that being filmed or photographed while being captured inevitably humiliates the detainee since they are in a vulnerable situation. Especially when the capturing soldiers make the captured individuals pose in front of seized military equipment, this might violate the dignity of said individuals as they are being instrumentalised as a ‘trophy’. While a case-by-case assessment will be required, the mere act of filming or photographing detainees may be considered by some as not being sufficiently grave to qualify as an outrage upon personal dignity. Arguably, mere exposure is less outrageous than other types of conduct which have been classified as outrages upon personal dignity (e.g., rape, being forced to walk down a public street naked). If exposure was by definition seriously humiliating, the obligation to shield certain individuals from public curiosity would almost be redundant as it would constitute an outrage upon personal dignity either way.

This raises a second question: in a NIAC, are soldiers and/or civilians protected from mere exposure to public curiosity? In an international armed conflict, photographing or filming prisoners of war or protected persons and making such footage available to the public violates Article 13 GCIII and Article 27 GCIV, respectively. As noted above, a Dutch District Court held that no customary equivalent of at least Article 13 GCIII exists in NIAC. Moreover, no rules replicating Article 13 GCIII or Article 27 GCIV have been included in the ICRC Customary Law study. Whether this is a correct assessment of customary law as it stands lies beyond the remit of this report. Still, the content we identified related to the armed conflict in Myanmar highlights that the absence of legal protection against being exposed to public curiosity is not only a concern for members or non-state armed groups and civilians, but also for the government armed forces. Just as in IACs, exposing captured fighters or civilians to public curiosity arguably humiliates them and, to the extent they are identifiable, further exposes them and their loved ones to secondary harm by third parties who might seek to punish or take revenge on individuals they perceive as their enemies.

In sum, the content related to the conflict in Myanmar that we identified invites further discussions on the gravity threshold of the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity and whether there is or should be customary protection against public curiosity for fighters and civilians in NIAC.

7.2 Identity of the distributors, online reach and reactions

The content related to the armed conflict in Myanmar that we identified was uploaded across different platforms. However, most of the content our initial searches produced was uploaded on X and Facebook. The users uploading the content are overwhelmingly supportive of the NSAGs taking pictures and videos of detainees. For instance, the captions added by one of the most active accounts consistently praise the conduct of the anti-Tatmadaw NSAGs, noting the alleged good and lawful treatment of detainees, while criticising the military junta. Others are known to be pro-democratic,⁹¹ or refer to pro-democratic movements in their usernames (e.g., ‘Spring Revolution of Myanmar’). Some individual users uploading relevant content

⁹¹ For instance, Mizzima TV is known for its Tatmadaw-critical coverage; Mong Palatino, ‘Mizzima News: Surviving the Junta and Reporting Myanmar’s “Spring Revolution”’ (*Global Voices*, 3 May 2025) <<https://globalvoices.org/2025/05/03/mizzima-news-surviving-the-junta-and-reporting-myanmars-spring-revolution/>>. The same holds true for the Independent Mon News Agency; ‘Independent Mon News Agency (IMNA)’ (*Online Burma/Myanmar Library*, 2026) <<https://www.burmalibrary.org/en/category/independent-mon-news-agency-imna>>.

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seem to be members of said NSAGs, based on other content they uploaded. A few users, especially on Reddit, present as dispassionate observers, focusing mostly on technical aspects related to the weaponry or combat tactics. We were not able to identify any of the content related to Myanmar as being uploaded by pro-Tatmadaw accounts.

For several pieces of content, the description added by the uploader indicated that the uploader seeks to provide evidence of the respect and fairness with which enemy detainees and civilians are treated. For instance, one caption reads: 'Karenni Armed Group have arrested the junta soldiers alive from the battlefield and have given them good treatment unlike what the junta regime forces did to the PDF and other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar.' Another piece of content, which shows civilians who were evacuated from a Tatmadaw outpost, states that video demonstrates '[the PDF's] commitment to safeguarding innocent lives, rescuing all junta soldiers' family members without inflicting harm on them.'

For the content uploaded on X and videos on Facebook that form part of our dataset, the average number of views is 29 014. The median view count is 24 600, which is higher than that of Sudan and Israel/Palestine. However, content from Myanmar has not gone viral in the same way that content from other conflicts has. The most viewed video shows a Tatmadaw soldier speaking with his captors while they give him a cigarette. It received 81 400 views.

Overall, engagement with the content is relatively low, with 6.9 comments on average, a maximum of 48 and a minimum of zero. The general tone of the comments on the content relating to Myanmar is celebratory. Frequently, users encourage the non-state armed groups to fight on and express hope that the revolution will succeed and the military rule will end. Overall, humiliating, degrading or incendiary comments represented a minority - yet we were able to find a few of such comments for almost every piece of content.

Some comments ridicule or otherwise denigrate the Tatmadaw and its soldiers. Notably, some of the comments we identified are sexualised or focus on the detainees' appearance, mocking their body shape or clothing.

- 'The lower classes are getting their heads full of sperm...'
- 'Handsome soldier. I wish I could buy him'
- 'While most people across the country are thin, these thieves are fat,'

Several comments further call for violence and explicitly demand for the detainees to be mistreated, frequently invoking the Tatmadaw's alleged crimes against civilians.

- 'Do the same to those junta criminals. Crush them for what they did to the civilians.'
- 'Don't forget that you gave the lives of nine young people... Don't let this guy die easily... Death means a quick escape... Although this guy can't get back what he did, he needs to get back what he got for the lives of nine young people. Let him be tortured for two or three months and then die the worst possible death!!!'
- 'Don't take war dogs prisoner. If you don't want to do this, please check what they have done to the people in the past and save money. Especially if they are commanding level war dogs, don't take all the food.';
- 'Death penalty!'
- 'There is no need for a prison, let the people suffer.'
- 'When the video ends their life ends 🤖', with another user replying: 'that's even better'

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As noted above, the content from Myanmar has attracted a relatively small number of comments. This shows that even when a piece of content does not go 'viral', triggering a large number of comments, hostile and hate speech may still be present.

Moreover, it shows that even if the main objective of the uploader may be to demonstrate that detainees are treated well, this does not exclude that the availability of the resulting content entails verbal abuse online. In fact, when the uploader is supportive of the detaining power, it is likely that the audience will be hostile towards the detainees and hence may insult them, encourage violence or other violations of international law against them.

Comments ridiculing, sexualising or attacking the victim can deepen the humiliation caused by the in-person treatment of the victim, and add harm by creating an increased sense of insecurity in the loved ones of the victim who may see such comments. As mentioned above, the in-person treatment of the detainees shown in the content from Myanmar may not clearly cause a real and serious sense of humiliation. However, when content depicting such conduct is published online, the gravity of the in-person conduct needs to be considered in conjunction with the humiliation added by the existence of a larger audience and abusive comments online. The content from Myanmar we analysed highlights the importance of such a holistic analysis.

8. CASE STUDY 4: RUSSIA/UKRAINE


The tension between Russia and Ukraine has dramatically increased after the Euromaidan movement and the ousting of Ukrainian President Yanukovich in 2014. This tension quickly manifested in the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and Russian proxies in the Donbas region, which both took place the same year. The low-intensity conflict dragged on until 22 February 2022, when Russia formally recognised the statehood of the breakaway republics. Two days later, the Russian military began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The war continues to this day, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides, displacement of millions of Ukrainians and destruction of multiple population centres in the south and east of Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an international armed conflict, fought by the regular militaries and auxiliary units of Ukraine and Russian Federation, the only other state directly taking part in the hostilities being the DPRK.

8.1 Patterns identified in the in-person conduct

Having assessed a number of sources, mainly on Telegram, two kinds of video content were found to be the most common.

One kind of video depicts Ukrainian prisoners of war being questioned about their experience in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) and their capture. Some of these videos are filmed directly after capture, with the Ukrainians still in the field while others are filmed in a studio, presumably in the Russian rear. It is difficult to verify such videos, as the background gives no clues for geolocation. However, most of them originate from the official pages of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the military TV channel Zvezda, or Odnoklassniki, a Russian social media site. In all videos the Ukrainians are wearing the AFU uniform with no additional distinguishing features. No individuals being clearly identifiable as Russian agents appear in frame, but some of the studio-filmed recordings feature a watermark of the emblem of the Russian Armed Forces. The AFU prisoners are not humiliated or mistreated in such footage, but their faces are shown, they are identified by full name and date of birth, and all of their answers lead to a call for their fellow Ukrainian soldiers to surrender.

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20 - Video uploaded on Telegram on 3 April 2026. Red highlights and images on the right added by editorial team.

A second type of video depicts killed Ukrainian soldiers, often captioned with calls to other Ukrainians to surrender and avoid the fate of those seen in the footage. Sometimes the captions simply assert the power of the Russian military and mock its deceased enemies. For instance, in a video uploaded on Telegram on 10 January 2025, the Russian soldier filming comments on the Soviet helmet worn by the killed Ukrainian, with the caption stating that Ukraine, despite receiving plentiful help from NATO, still treats its men as cannon fodder and gives them WW2-era equipment.



19 - Screenshot uploaded on Telegram on 10 January 2026. Red highlights, additional images of combat markings and explanatory text added by editorial team.

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In most of the images and videos showing deceased combatants we found in the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the deceased soldiers cannot be identified from the footage. However, at least one video aired on Russian state television, as suggested by the watermark of the footage, has provided the name and shown the documents of a killed Ukrainian. The video is claimed to be related to the Battle of Mariupol, which lasted from March to May 2022, and the RT journalist says that the Ukrainian soldier whose identity he shares was killed by his own as he tried to surrender to Russians. Although the filming and distribution of said video cannot clearly be attributed to Russia, it nonetheless shows how insufficient regulation of third parties distributing the relevant context can allow for significant dignitary and privacy harm.



21 - Screenshot from video uploaded on VK Video on 2 April 2025.

The identified footage from the war in Ukraine presents two main legal issues. The first relates to the exposure of PoWs to public curiosity. The war being an unambiguously international armed conflict, the captured soldiers clearly fall under the definition of PoWs. Filming them and making such footage publicly available therefore most likely constitutes a violation of Article 13 GCIII. This holds true for both living and deceased combatants.

While they are not seen mistreated in the videos, the PoW interviews often use the captured Ukrainian soldiers' experience (which might be real or fabricated) for propaganda; while some other videos showcase prisoners in high numbers as trophies to demonstrate Russian army's success. Especially when deceased persons are shown, the graphic nature of the content appears to be aimed at shocking the viewer and thus demoralise the enemy. Such actions dehumanise the prisoners and seek to use them to further the goals of the side that has captured them, while their own agency is taken away. Some of the PoW interviews feature wounded soldiers or those still in shock from being captured very recently. They are clearly in a vulnerable state where they cannot provide valid consent to being filmed. In addition, these circumstances could inflict additional distress onto the relatives.

At the same time, such videos could equally serve as a relief for the family of the prisoners, proving to them that their loved one is alive and reasonably well, or providing certainty that they have passed away. As to be discussed further below, several identified content pieces were reposted to Ukrainian Facebook groups dedicated to looking for missing military members, with the response to such reposts not expressing any negative sentiment towards the soldiers for surrendering. While the legal categorisation of the conduct will therefore frequently be relatively unambiguous, its effect on the family of the victim may not always be as clear.

8.2 Identity of the distributors, online reach and reactions

The absolute majority of the relevant content identified has been uploaded to Telegram by several channels covering the Russo-Ukrainian war from a pro-Russian angle. Aside from the tone and captions, the pro-Russian position of the channels can be identified via the use of the capital Z in the titles (a reference to white marks applied to Russian military equipment at the onset of the invasion), Russian symbols and colours in profile images, and reposts of official Russian MOD material. The entries are in Russian, mostly targeting the Russian audience of the channels and sometimes making calls to Ukrainians to surrender. The recordings found on Yandex and V Kontakte are presented as documentation of war rather than as personal posts like the entries from Telegram, but contextual clues can lead us to reasonably assume that these were uploaded by pro-Russian users as well - not in the least because both websites are primarily used in Russia and the videos refer to the war as a 'Special Military Operation' - the Russian official name for the conflict.

Notably, some of the videos, specifically the ones featuring prisoners of war, have been reposted by Ukrainian Facebook groups for those trying to find missing people. It is unclear whether the uploaded videos did lead to the prisoners being identified by their families. These reposts normally attract less views and interactions than the original uploads. A few videos have also been uploaded to Reddit communities dedicated to discussing the war. Those spaces are generally more neutral and focused on technical discussions surrounding weapons and other military material.

Most of the captions to the videos give a short description of what the video shows and serve to frame the videos as proof of Russia supremacy on the battlefield - be it allegations of criminal practices or heavy losses within the Ukrainian military, or the number of killed or captured Ukrainian soldiers. Some other captions implicitly address Ukrainians, encouraging them to surrender or turn against their government. Thus, in general the aim of uploading these videos seems to be to raise the morale of one's own side and demoralise the enemy.

The average number of views among entries considered the most relevant for this report is 304 938. However, it is distorted significantly by one outlier, which has a significantly higher number of views than any other entry. However, even when taking into account such outliers, content from Russia/Ukraine in our dataset still has the second-highest median view count (116 000) and by far the highest engagement rate per view, making it the most consistently visible conflict in the dataset, notwithstanding its lower absolute entry count (15 entries).

Most of the Telegram channels that have uploaded the gathered content do not allow the readers to leave comments, and Telegram does not provide the number of reposts for the messages on the platform. The number of impressions under the posts generally correlates with the number of views, reaching from a little over a hundred on posts with a low number of views to over 5 000 on more widely viewed posts. The majority of the impressions are the ones that can be understood as positive: 'thumbs up', 'like', 'fire' or 'laugh'.

One Telegram channel that does enable comments is "Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны". The comments left by its users allow us to gauge the possible reaction to the content discussed. One video is an interview with a Ukrainian prisoner of war. He says that he did not want to fight but was forcibly conscripted. The majority of reactions to this video are 'laugh' emojis, with the comments mostly not believing his story.

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Some commenters express hatred towards the PoW by likening him to a pig. Some of the more extreme (but representative of the general spirit of the comments) are the following:

- 'A pig's plea for mercy.'
- 'Put this ukrofascist bastard on a bottle!'
- 'Bull...t, they would run away if they didn't want this'
- 'Break their f...ing heads with a sledgehammer'
- 'The pig is lying'
- 'Oh, poor thing 🥺 Shoot him, please, but not in a painful way, so that he can't even oink'

Another piece of content depicts several killed Ukrainian soldiers at the site of a captured position. The comments here are a lot less openly hostile. Some of the commenters engage in a technical discussion about which weapon's effects were seen in the footage. Some of them express compassion for the killed soldiers, shock at the horrors of war or dissatisfaction with the commenters who mock the deceased:

- 'Such horror... How can I unsee this now 🙄'
- 'Even though they are mad bastards, their mothers still wait for them and hope they are alive'
- 'A killed warrior does not have a nationality'
- 'Don't leave comments like this, you people are like children' (in response to others making light of the situation)

However, other commenters expressed joy at seeing the enemy soldiers dead or mocked them:

- 'Top photos 🔥'
- 'They look well tanned'
- 'A good khokhol is a dead khokhol' (khokhol is a slur for Ukrainians)
- 'Don't give a damn for this AFU dead meat'
- 'Zeke has no mercy for khokhols, just like a true Aryan, or rather a true Jew. Khokhols are sent as cannon fodder and Indians will move in to replace them' (Zeke means Ukrainian president Zelenskyy)

Just as observed in the case of Myanmar, even if no humiliating conduct or mistreatment is depicted in the content, on occasions where comments are enabled, a large amount of them abuse the depicted persons. Such exposure creates additional risks and may serve as a source of distress for the loved ones of the prisoners or killed soldiers. In other words: in the age of social media, failing to protect PoWs from online exposure will frequently coincide with a failure to protect them from insults, and potentially put them and their family at risk of physical violence.

9. CONCLUSION

This report has explored how the existence of and engagement with online content exposing vulnerable individuals during armed conflict can cause harm, and how such harm is regulated by international humanitarian law. We identified 77 pieces of content across different social media platforms which expose vulnerable individuals to public curiosity, frequently also humiliating or degrading them. The majority of the content we identified relates to the armed conflicts in Ukraine, Sudan, Israel/Palestine and Myanmar. However, our investigation

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suggests that many more videos of the same kind are available online, also relating to other armed conflicts.

We identified several general patterns in both the in-person conduct shown in the videos and the way in which they were distributed and reacted to online. A significant share of the content in our data set shows victims being filmed or forced to pose for videos in vulnerable positions, for instance while being handcuffed, sometimes blindfolded and half-naked. Another clear pattern was victims being verbally abused, forced to repeat humiliating phrases or make animal noises. Frequently, such attacks on the dignity of the victim were accompanied by physical attacks and happened in situations of ad hoc detention, i.e., between the battlefield and more formal detention centres. Both in IAC and NIAC, we found several pieces of content which show captured fighters being interviewed or simply detained, without any obvious signs of more severe humiliation.

Overall, the dataset shows that the content this report focuses on is highly prevalent online and often attracts a significant audience. In much of the content we analysed, the victims are identifiable. The fact that such content is viewed by an at times sizable audience online may therefore deepen their sense of humiliation and could put them or their family at risk. Our analysis of how and by whom such content is being uploaded and distributed online showed that there are a variety of different motivations, with some being more prevalent in certain conflicts. The content we identified in connection with the armed conflicts in Myanmar and Ukraine was uploaded by those capturing the soldiers exposed by it, seemingly to celebrate their victories, demonstrate dominance over the victim and demoralise the enemy. However, the content relating to the conflicts in Sudan and Israel/Palestine was largely uploaded and distributed further by individuals appearing to be supportive of the victim with the purpose of drawing attention to their suffering, exposing the perpetrator and expressing sympathy with the victim.

Regardless of whether content is distributed in support of the victim or the perpetrator, many of the videos and images we found attracted abusive comments. Sometimes the same post attracted comments targeting the victim and comments attacking the perpetrator. Comments targeting the victims were often downplaying their suffering, approving of their treatment and sometimes sexualising the victim. Those comments relating to the perpetrator often generalised and demonised the perpetrator group as a whole. Frequently, such comments involved references to the religion, race or political affiliation of the perpetrator.

Our analysis reveals the need to further clarify both law and policy surrounding conflict-related online content.

With respect to the legal framework governing the conduct this report focuses on, two key questions have surfaced. The first question relates to how the fact that content exposing vulnerable individuals fits into the legal framework governing ill-treatment. There is an incipient discussion of this question in the legal literature on armed conflict and online spaces.⁹² Our report reaffirms the importance of such discussions. In much of the content we analysed, the victim was clearly identifiable to loved ones or acquaintances, hence exposing the victim to the risk of secondary harm and their loved ones to the emotional suffering caused by

⁹² See, e.g., Sarah Zarmsky, 'Is International Criminal Law Ready to Accommodate Online Harm?: Challenges and Opportunities' (2024) 22 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 169; Mischa Gureghian Hall, 'The War Crime of Outrages against the Personal Dignity of the Dead: Legal Basis, Evolution, and Elements' (2025) 107 *International Review of the Red Cross* 529.

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recognising the victim. However, it is sometimes exactly those in support of the victims who upload and distribute content exposing them and showing the humiliation they were subjected to by the perpetrator. This raises a number of complex questions. Assuming that the fact that such content is available online can be considered to deepen the humiliation of the victim, is this also the case if the content was not uploaded or re-shared by the perpetrator filming the content, or when the victim is not identifiable? If content is uploaded to raise awareness and express outrage and solidarity with the victim, could this still amount to an international crime or violation of international law, or does its online presence empower the victim instead of further humiliating them in this context? If even the well-meaning distribution of such content is considered to humiliate or degrade the victim, or simply exposes protected individuals to public curiosity or insults, would parties to the Geneva Conventions be obliged to work towards taking it down? These questions require further attention by courts, scholars and practitioners.

The second, and far less prominent, legal question raised by this report is whether there is an equivalent to the protection of PoWs and protected persons against exposure to public curiosity in non-international armed conflict. We identified a significant number of videos or images relating to non-international armed conflicts in which fighters or civilians were merely exposed to public curiosity, without any obvious humiliation or degradation.⁹³ Such content would constitute a violation of IHL if the individuals in question are PoWs or protected persons.⁹⁴ Does the same hold true in NIAC? As noted above, a Dutch Court could not identify a customary equivalent of the protection of PoWs against exposure to public curiosity in NIAC.⁹⁵ Neither is such a rule included in the ICRC Customary Law study. Yet, it seems that the dynamics and risks associated with (virtually) parading captured fighters or civilians are very similar in NIAC as in IAC. The content showing captured fighters we identified instrumentalises their person and image by using them to demonstrate strength and demoralise the enemy. This holds true for both IAC and NIAC. In both types of conflicts, a captured fighter may face serious repercussions once released, especially when seeming to cooperate with their captors. A clear image of a civilian could be used by enemy civilians or militaries, e.g., to create revenge porn or to target them physically,⁹⁶ regardless of whether the conflict in question crosses any national borders. Certainly, IHL does not grant the same assumption of potential legitimacy to fighters in IAC as in NIAC. Yet, the fact that both fighters and civilians are frequently and systematically exposed to online public curiosity in NIACs makes a debate on whether and to what extent this asymmetry between IAC and NIAC is necessary and justified.

From a policy perspective, this report highlights the tension between accountability and protection which platforms and regulators are facing with respect to content relating to armed conflict.

The debate on how to regulate violent and humiliating content is not entirely new and different approaches have emerged. For instance, Meta's Community Standards as well as YouTube's Violent or Graphic Content Policy and TikTok's Community Guidelines prohibit content which

⁹³ Certainly, it is possible to argue that having one's picture being posted online after being captured, often while being handcuffed or half-naked, in itself constitutes humiliating and degrading treatment. However, as discussed above, some of the content from non-international armed conflict we found shows non-handcuffed individuals who are seemingly given food or simply being guarded.

⁹⁴ See discussion of Article 13 GCIII and Article 27 GCIV in Section **Error! Reference source not found.**2.1. of this report.

⁹⁵ See footnote 21 above.

⁹⁶ Thiha (n 46).

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shows or glorifies violence against others or promotes hateful conduct based on protected characteristics. Nonetheless, several policies recognise exceptions for content with educational, documentary or public-interest value.⁹⁷ This may include posts aimed at documenting or condemning human rights abuses and armed conflicts. X prioritises visibility with contextual warnings rather than removal, with its Violent Content Policy and Sensitive Media Policy allowing certain graphic content if it is appropriately labelled and does not glorify violence.⁹⁸ Telegram merely commits to removing illegal content.⁹⁹ These differences in how strictly content is mirrored in our dataset, with X and Telegram being the most prominent platforms.

Our analysis suggests that a singular focus on violent or graphic content may be too narrow. While some of the content we analysed included graphic scenes of violence or nudity, some of the most humiliating videos in our dataset involved no nudity or physical contact between the victim and the perpetrator at all. Platforms need to be aware that especially in a setting like armed conflict, humiliation and degradation does not always take the form of violent conduct. Merely filming individuals being captured or verbally abused can cause serious dignitary harm – especially since it seems that such content can attract a significant audience and spark a great number of reactions. It should be noted that it is precisely this engagement which leads to benefits for both platforms, whose users will spend more time on them, and those uploading such content, who might grow their following and potentially even monetise it. While there are therefore incentives to upload and retain such content online for platforms and users, these interests must give way to the protection of the dignity of those affected.

However, simply deleting such content cannot be the answer to preventing dignitary harm. In our dataset, the relevant content was frequently circulated by those supporting the victim. Our analysis of how users reacted to it showed that said content online can create a space to express sympathy and solidarity with the victims, to call for or facilitate accountability, and sometimes even to find out about the fate of loved ones. Footage of ill-treatment being available online can further constitute crucial evidence of such crimes and create public awareness. The challenge faced by regulators, platforms and individual users alike is therefore to reap the benefits of content depicting individuals in vulnerable positions in times of armed conflict being available online while limiting the harm caused by this. This will often require a complex, contextual balancing exercise.¹⁰⁰

This report cannot and does not claim to provide any novel or definite answers on how to conduct this exercise. Instead, it aims to spark a conversation within the OSINT, international law, human rights and platform regulation communities. Such a cross-cutting conversation is necessary to raise awareness and find solutions which are cognisant of a multitude of relevant

⁹⁷ Meta, 'Community Standards' (*Transparency Centre*, 2026) <<https://transparency.meta.com/policies/community-standards/>>; TikTok, 'Community Principles' (2026) <<https://www.tiktok.com/safety/en/policies-and-engagement/community-principles>>; YouTube, 'How YouTube Evaluates Educational, Documentary, Scientific & Artistic (EDSA) Content' (*YouTube Help*, 2026) <<https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6345162?sjid=17980981057587392370-EU>>.

⁹⁸ X, 'Violent Content Policy' (2026) <<https://help.x.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-content>>.

⁹⁹ Telegram, 'Telegram FAQ' (2026) <<https://telegram.org/faq?setln=en#q-there-39s-illegal-content-on-telegram-how-do-i-take-it-down>>.

¹⁰⁰ See also, e.g., Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns and Christian Katzenbach, 'Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance' (2020) 7 *Big Data & Society* 1, at 10.

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perspectives. International lawyers may have a different understanding on where the right balance between accountability and victim protection lies or how to find it than platforms and domestic regulators. Victims from different regions of the world may have different preferences as to whether they would like to prioritise the protection of their image or accountability for and public awareness of the outrageous conduct they or their community were subjected to. Some of those who use open-source content for advocacy or accountability purposes, especially in a non-professional setting, may simply not be fully aware of the potential negative side-effects of the content they are posting.

While such conversations are being had, immediate measures on the individual level may help to mitigate the potential harm caused by the content this report focuses on. For instance, when posting content to raise awareness blurring the faces of victims can help to limit their personal exposure and secondary humiliation.¹⁰¹ Unedited versions can be submitted to accountability or family reunification mechanisms via private channels.¹⁰² It might further be advisable to monitor comment sections on content showing vulnerable individuals or their mistreatment, and to disable comments if they lead to further abuse of the victim or hate speech. While imperfect, these measures can be useful starting points for individual users as well as more professional or institutional actors who seek to expose attacks on dignity in armed conflict.

This report has shown that content depicting vulnerable individuals and their mistreatment presents both too significant an opportunity for ensuring accountability for international crimes, and too serious a protection concern, to be overlooked. The report seeks to contribute to the redress of these harmful practices, though the provision of data analysis in light of the relevant normative framework. The authors stand ready to cooperate with regulators, international entities, and civil society actors seeking to take action in response to these practices.

¹⁰¹ Note that many journalistic outlets which used content identified in this dataset applied precisely this measure and blurred the faces of the victims. At times, the faces of the perpetrators were equally blurred, although this was a less consistent pattern.

¹⁰² See, e.g., ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'OTPLink' (2026) <<https://otplink.icc-cpi.int/>>; eyeWitness, 'Practical Guide - When to Use the eyeWitness to Atrocities App?' (June 2023) <<https://www.eyewitness.global/documents/2023-eyeWitness-new-resource-launch.pdf>>.

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