The political and institutional roots of Afghanistan’s regime collapse (2001–2021)

This thesis examines the paradox of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s 2021 collapse: how a state that received massive international support for more than twenty years could so quickly fall to the Taliban insurgency. Existing literature collectively emphasises incapacity as a key driver of conflict and subsequent collapse. Building on this, I argue that the leading explanation for this long war is “political reluctance,” underpinned by Pashtun ethnonationalism, enabled by constitutional centralisation, and nurtured by international support. This pattern stemmed from the Muhammadzai Model of Governance (MMG), with Afghan nationalism as its guiding principle. Unlike other ethnic groups, such as Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and marginalised Pashtun tribes, who largely remained aligned with the Republic, Pashtun tribes provided both sides of the conflict - the President and the insurgents. Nonetheless, Pashtun Presidents’ co-ethnic solidarities shaped selective engagements with the Pashtun Taliban, which softened meaningful suppression. This research employed a single-case and process-tracing approach to analyse historical archives, constitutional documents, SIGAR reports (2001-2023), and academic and media sources. It examines three corresponding mechanisms: first, the fraternal discourse that depicted the Taliban as “brothers”, fellow Afghans and armed opponents; second, the 2004 Constitution’s centralisation, which enabled selective confrontation with minimal accountability; and third, U.S. aid flows that incentivised both sides of the conflict to endure rather than resolve it. These mechanisms were mutually reinforcing, creating symbiotic economic ties in which the President’s political calculations aimed not to jeopardise the Taliban’s survival, while making foreign aid flows under their control by tolerating a certain level of conflict to continue. The Taliban also accessed the same aid resources through their shadow regime. The Republic assumed that the existing state of affairs would continue as it was, ignored the U.S. policy shift, and took this risky political gamble, bypassing the U.S.-led coalition’s counterinsurgency expectations. Ultimately, neither President was able to secure a base among their co-ethnic insurgents, but both lost international backing, leading to their abrupt withdrawal and the fall of the Afghan state. This research concludes that the collapse was due to political factors rather than military ones, so that both Afghan presidents committed “political suicide” through their double counterinsurgency strategies at the expense of state stability.