Chapter

Perspective Chapter: Security Governance and Authoritarian Continuity in Post-Authoritarian Democracies – Indonesia's National Security Strategy (1988–2024) in Comparative Perspective

Zayu Rizki Safitri

Abstract

This perspective chapter examines the evolution of Indonesia's national security governance from the final decade of the New Order (1988–1998), through democratic transition and institutional re-configuration during *Reformasi* (1998–2014), to executive security governance under President Joko Widodo (2014–2024). It asks how strategic coherence can be produced in the absence of a single codified National Security Strategy (NSS) and a permanent National Security Council (NSC), and how selected executive-centred governing practices may be adapted after authoritarian regime change. Drawing on historical institutionalism, securitisation theory, and civil–military relations (CMR), this chapter develops the concept of Adaptive Authoritarian Continuity (AAC) and applies the Priority–Institutional Structure–Threat Interpretation–Civil Role (PIT-C) framework. The analysis combines documentary research with 45 semi-structured elite interviews conducted between 2022 and 2024. It finds substantial democratic and institutional transformation after 1998, including the abolition of Dwifungsi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI), the separation of Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Indonesian National Police (POLRI), and the expansion of civilian participation. At the same time, differentiated security institutions generated continuing co-ordination demands, while presidential co-ordination and arbitration remained important within the post-2014 architecture. The AAC therefore identifies governing-logic continuity rather than regime or institutional continuity, showing how selected practices associated with executive-centred security governance may be transformed and re-deployed within a substantially changed democratic order.

Keywords: adaptive authoritarian continuity, indonesia, national security governance, securitisation, civil–military relations, historical institutionalism, PIT-C

1. Introduction

Indonesia occupies a significant position in the Indo-Pacific security environment. As the world's largest archipelagic state, the fourth most populous country, largest Muslim-majority nation, and Southeast Asia's largest economy, it combines strategic geography, substantial natural resources, demographic diversity, and regional influence. Its position between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and its central role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) make it an important case for examining contemporary security governance. Yet, Indonesia has never adopted a single codified National Security Strategy (NSS) or established a permanent National Security Council (NSC) with comprehensive strategic-co-ordinating authority. Instead, national security governance has developed through constitutional provisions, sectoral legislation, presidential regulations, defence white papers [1, 2], development plans, specialised institutions, inter-ministerial co-ordination, and executive arbitration. This raises a broader question: how can strategic coherence be produced when security authority is dispersed across multiple institutions without an integrated national security architecture?

The question is particularly significant because Indonesian security governance is developed across a major regime transformation. The collapse of President Suharto's New Order (Orde Baru [ORBA]) in 1998 initiated constitutional, political, and security-sector reform (SSR), including constitutional amendments, competitive elections, decentralisation, strengthened legislative and judicial institutions, expanded civil liberties, and changes to political authority. The abolition of the armed forces' (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [ABRI]) Dwifungsi (dual function), separation of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Indonesian National Police (POLRI), strengthening of civilian political authority, and introduction of presidential term limits represented substantial departures from the New Order. *Reformasi* therefore constitutes a genuine transformation of regime type and institutional arrangements rather than merely an incomplete democratisation. Yet, institutional transformation did not produce complete rupture in security governance. Post-*Reformasi* Indonesia retained dispersed mandates, specialised institutions, executive co-ordination, and had no permanent body integrating the full range of national security concerns. As the security agenda expanded to terrorism, maritime affairs, cyber governance, public health, infrastructure, economic resilience, technological competition, energy, food security, and environmental risks, co-ordination across institutional boundaries became increasingly important.

This chapter, therefore, does not treat Indonesia's entire 1988–2024 trajectory as a case of democratic backsliding. It distinguishes three analytically distinct configurations: the final decade of the authoritarian New Order (1988–1998), democratic transition and institutional re-configuration during *Reformasi* (1998–2014), and executive security governance within an established electoral-democratic order under President Joko Widodo (2014–2024). This periodisation matters because democratic backsliding concerns erosion within an existing democratic order, whereas the earlier period encompasses authoritarian rule and subsequent regime transformation. *Reformasi* is consequently treated as a substantive democratic and institutional transformation, while the post-2014 period permits democratic erosion – including possible executive

aggrandisement, weakened accountability, or constraints on political contestation – to be examined as a specific and conditional question.

This chapter develops Adaptive Authoritarian Continuity (AAC) to explain how substantial institutional transformation can co-exist with the persistence and adaptation of selected governing logics associated with authoritarian rule. The AAC does not imply the survival of the New Order regime or institutional architecture, nor the failure of democratic reform. Rather, it identifies continuity at the level of governing practices, including executive discretion in strategic security decisions, executive-centred co-ordination across institutional boundaries, political and bureaucratic negotiation, institutional ambiguity where mandates overlap, and presidential arbitration where no integrated co-ordinating mechanism exists. These practices changed in their institutional setting, actors, legal basis, and substantive purposes after 1998. Adaptive Authoritarian Continuity therefore captures governing-logic continuity rather than regime or institutional continuity.

Historical institutionalism explains how this combination of change and continuity can occur. Institutional transformation does not involve complete replacement although it may proceed through path dependence, layering, conversion, and drift [3, 4]. *Reformasi* introduced democratic institutions, legal constraints, civilian oversight arrangements, and specialised security organisations while interacting with inherited organisational capacities, administrative practices, and institutional relationships. Earlier arrangements did not determine subsequent outcomes, but instead shaped the institutional repertoire available to later governments. Layering increased institutional differentiation; conversion enabled existing capacities and relationships to acquire new functions; and changing security conditions altered the consequences of arrangements whose formal structures remained relatively stable.

Securitisation provides a complementary mechanism. The securitisation theory examines how issues acquire security significance and become subject to heightened urgency or exceptional attention [5, 6]. This chapter treats securitisation not as inherently authoritarian, but rather as a potential mechanism through which changing threat interpretations generate co-ordination demands and facilitate executive intervention. When threats cross bureaucratic boundaries, security framing may increase demand for rapid or cross-sectoral co-ordination. In a fragmented architecture without a permanent comprehensive co-ordinating institution, governments may respond through institutional layering, specialised mandates, temporary arrangements, or executive co-ordination. Repeated presidential arbitration may, under particular institutional and political conditions, reproduce executive-centred practices. Its consequences, nevertheless, depend on constitutional constraints, legal authority, institutional oversight, bureaucratic interests, political bargaining, crisis conditions, executive preferences, and societal contestation.

The Indonesian case also challenges the assumption that effective national security governance requires a codified NSS or a permanent NSC. Security-governance scholarship emphasises co-ordination across increasingly differentiated public and private actors [7], while strategic studies commonly conceptualise NSS as connecting political objectives, strategic priorities, and instruments of national power [8–10]. Indonesia demonstrates that strategic coherence can instead emerge through dispersed legal authority, specialised institutions, inter-ministerial co-ordination, political negotiation, and presidential arbitration. The absence of an NSS

or NSC is therefore treated primarily as a co-ordination problem, rather than simply as evidence of institutional failure.

To analyse this evolution, this chapter develops the Priority–Institutional Structure–Threat Interpretation–Civil Role (PIT-C) Framework. *Priority (P)* examines the objectives and interests elevated as strategically important; *Institutional Structure (I)* examines how responsibilities are organised, differentiated, co-ordinated, and arbitrated; *Threat Interpretation (T)* examines how threats and risks are constructed and prioritised; and *Civil Role (C)* examines civilian authority, participation, oversight, expertise, and contestation. The PIT-C is an analytical framework rather than a separate causal theory. Its dimensions are mutually constitutive: changing threat interpretations can re-shape priorities; priorities can encourage institutional layering; institutional differentiation can generate co-ordination demands; and civilian participation can constrain, legitimise, engage in, or contest executive security authority.

This chapter advances four principal arguments. First, national security priorities changed substantially across the three periods: regime stability, developmentalism, and political order under the New Order; democratisation, institutional reform, and civilian supremacy during *Reformasi*; and broader concerns including national resilience, economic security, infrastructure, technology, and maritime affairs after 2014. Continuity lies not in the substantive priorities themselves, but in the continuing importance of executive authority in arbitrating among them. Second, institutional transformation was substantial without producing complete strategic integration. The New Order's military–executive hierarchy was displaced by *Reformasi*-era pluralisation, TNI–POLRI separation, civilianisation, parliamentary involvement, and specialised institutional development. The post-2014 system operated through this pluralised architecture, while the absence of a comprehensive co-ordinating mechanism kept presidential co-ordination and arbitration important where responsibilities overlapped. Third, threat interpretation expanded from ideological subversion, internal instability, and regime security under the New Order, through terrorism and communal conflict during *Reformasi*, towards multi-dimensional concerns including cyber security, public health, maritime security, economic resilience, technological competition, infrastructure, and environmental risks after 2014. Fourth, the Civil Role, initially limited to largely pseudo-democratic participation under the New Order, expanded substantially after *Reformasi*. Civilian political leadership, parliamentary actors, civil society, academia, media, professional groups, and other non-military actors became increasingly significant. This expansion did not eliminate executive-centred co-ordination or oligarchic influence; broader civilian participation could therefore co-exist with executive-centred co-ordination and persistent elite influence.

The central puzzle is consequently how substantial democratic institutional transformation could co-exist with the persistence and adaptation of selected executive-centred governing practices in national security governance. This chapter argues that these practices did not survive because authoritarian institutions remained intact. Rather, selected governing logics were transformed and re-deployed within new constitutional, institutional, civil–military, and security conditions. The Indonesian case therefore contributes to comparative research on post-authoritarian governance by distinguishing regime continuity, institutional continuity, and governing-logic continuity; demonstrating how strategic co-ordination can develop without a codified NSS or permanent NSC; and connecting securitisation to historical institutional change. Security governance thus becomes an arena in which

authoritarian legacies are neither simply preserved nor eliminated, but rather somewhat selectively transformed and re-deployed.

The remainder of the chapter is organised into five substantive sections. Section 2, 'Explaining National Security Governance: Theory and Analytical Framework', establishes the theoretical foundations in post-authoritarian governance, hybrid regimes, authoritarian persistence, historical institutionalism, civil–military relations (CMR), and securitisation; defines AAC; and introduces PIT-C and the longitudinal research design. Section 3, 'Authoritarian Security Governance under the New Order (1988–1998)', establishes the authoritarian baseline through the four PIT-C dimensions. Section 4, 'Democratic Reform and the Reconfiguration of Security Governance (1998–2014)', assesses *Reformasi* as a substantive political and institutional transformation while analysing the fragmentation and co-ordination problems emerging within the democratic architecture. Section 5, 'Executive Security Governance and Adaptive Authoritarian Continuity (2014–2024)', examines the Jokowi period through changing security priorities and threat interpretations, institutional layering and fragmentation, presidential co-ordination, civilian participation, and democratic accountability. Section 6, 'Discussion and Conclusion: Adaptive Authoritarian Continuity', synthesises the longitudinal findings, evaluates AAC and PIT-C, specifies the roles of historical institutionalism and securitisation, and considers the comparative implications.

In sum, Indonesia moved between 1988 and 2024 from military–executive centralisation, through democratic institutionalisation and pluralisation, towards executive-co-ordinated security governance within an electoral-democratic order. The transformation was substantial, although selected executive-centred governing logics were adapted to new conditions. The AAC consequently shifts attention from whether authoritarian institutions survive to how governing practices associated with authoritarian rule are transformed and re-deployed after regime change. Combined with PIT-C and securitisation as a conditional mechanism interacting with historical institutional change, AAC provides a framework for analysing post-authoritarian security governance in which democratisation, expanding civilian participation, institutional fragmentation, and executive-centred co-ordination can co-exist.

2. Explaining national security governance: Theory and analytical framework

The relationship between political regime changes and national security governance is central to comparative politics, CMR, and security studies. Classical democratic theory associates democratisation with civilian supremacy, constitutional accountability, legal oversight, parliamentary scrutiny, professional armed forces, judicial review, and civilian participation [11–13]. Security-sector reform similarly seeks to transfer security authority towards constitutionally accountable civilian institutions [14, 15]. Yet regime transformation does not necessarily eliminate the governing practices through which authority was previously organised. Hybrid-regime and authoritarian-persistence scholarship show that democratic institutions may co-exist with inherited practices, elite networks, and executive dominance [16–20]. The analytical question is therefore not

whether authoritarian institutions simply survive but rather how selected governing practices are displaced, retained, or re-configured after institutional transformation.

Indonesia's 1988–2024 trajectory encompasses three qualitatively distinct political configurations rather than a single episode of democratic backsliding: the authoritarian New Order (1988–1998), democratic transition and institutionalisation during *Reformasi* (1998–2014), and an established electoral-democratic order after 2014 in which executive co-ordination became increasingly important alongside questions of accountability and democratic resilience. *Reformasi* fundamentally transformed constitutional arrangements, decentralisation, elections, judicial institutions, parliamentary oversight, *Dwifungsi* ABRI, and the separation of TNI and POLRI [21, 22]. These were substantive institutional changes, not superficial continuity. Democratic backsliding is therefore treated as a specific, principally post-2014 possibility rather than the framework for the entire period.

2.1 Theoretical framework

Historical institutionalism explains how institutional transformation can co-exist with continuity through path dependence, layering, conversion, drift, and gradual adaptation [3, 4]. Security institutions possess organisational memory, routines, expertise, legal authority, and elite relationships, meaning democratic reform may change formal authority while leaving expectations concerning co-ordination and executive leadership intact. Continuity should not, however, automatically be equated with authoritarian legacy, since practices may persist as administrative responses to recurring governance problems. This chapter therefore distinguishes regime continuity, institutional continuity, and governing-logic continuity. Indonesia experienced a clear regime transformation and substantial re-structuring of New Order security institutions; the focus here is instead on whether practices such as executive discretion, elite-mediated co-ordination, institutional ambiguity, and presidential arbitration persisted in adapted forms.

Securitisation provides a second theoretical lens. Security studies expanded from war, military force, and inter-state conflict towards political, economic, societal, environmental, cyber, and human-security concerns [5, 23, 24]. Security governance consequently involves legislatures, intelligence and police institutions, civil society, private actors, and international organisations [7, 25]. Securitisation concerns how particular issues become understood and prioritised as security problems, with subsequent approaches emphasising the importance of audiences, context, and power [6, 26].

The Indonesian case further demonstrates why securitisation should not be treated as synonymous with authoritarian governance. Kurniawan [27], examining the politics of securitisation in democratic Indonesia, shows how security claims and practices operate within changing democratic institutions and political contexts. This perspective is particularly relevant to the present study because security framing may expand executive authority or generate intensified forms of co-ordination without necessarily displacing democratic institutions. Securitisation is therefore treated here as a conditional mechanism through which particular issues acquire heightened security significance and generate demands for intensified co-ordination. Its institutional consequences depend on the constitutional framework, political contestation, organisational interests, and forms of executive authority through which security responses are organised.

As contemporary security concerns cross bureaucratic boundaries, governments may respond through specialised agencies, interministerial co-ordination, and institutional layering, whereby new arrangements are added to rather than replacing existing ones [3, 4]. In Indonesia, the absence of a permanent, comprehensive NSC means that security authority remains distributed across constitutional provisions, sectoral laws, presidential regulations, defence white papers, development plans, ministerial policies, specialised institutions, and executive co-ordination.

Interview evidence illustrates the resulting co-ordination problem. A former senior official of the National Resilience Institute (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* – Lemhannas) stated that Indonesia had lacked a NSS because 'all threats are responded to partially, not a complete system' (S-12, 16 August 2022). Similarly, a retired senior Ministry of Defence official and former Deputy Chancellor of the Republic of Indonesia Defence University (RIDU) described differing understandings of security across ministries, despite institutional cooperation (S-45, 8 December 2022). These accounts are not treated as proof of institutional absence, but rather as evidence of fragmented strategic co-ordination. Where no permanent institution possesses a comprehensive cross-sectoral co-ordinating mandate, presidential intervention may serve to arbitrate competing mandates and generate strategic coherence. Where such intervention becomes recurrent, it may also reproduce or adapt executive-centred governing practices.

The mechanism is therefore neither linear nor deterministic. Security framing may increase demands for executive intervention, rapid action, and cross-institutional co-ordination, particularly when conventional institutional procedures appear insufficient. These demands may produce institutional layering, overlapping mandates, task-specific co-ordination, or other organisational responses; where fragmentation persists, presidential co-ordination and arbitration may become more prominent. Repeated reliance on such practices may, under particular institutional and political conditions, reproduce or adapt selected executive-centred governing logics over time. Neither securitisation nor executive co-ordination is inherently authoritarian; their implications depend on the institutional context, the constraints on executive authority, and how security authority is exercised.

Civil–military relations provides the third lens. Classical and contemporary scholarship examines the subordination of security institutions to civilian political authority [11–13, 28, 29]. In Indonesia, the abolition of Dwifungsi and the separation of TNI and POLRI fundamentally altered the location of security authority. Yet reduced military influence does not necessarily produce fully dispersed civilian security governance. This chapter therefore distinguishes military dominance, civilian supremacy, and executive-centred security governance: military dominance entails direct political predominance by the armed forces; civilian supremacy entails constitutional subordination to civilian authority; executive-centred governance concerns concentration of strategic co-ordination and arbitration within the civilian executive. Civilian supremacy can therefore co-exist with strong executive-centred co-ordination.

2.2 AAC, PIT-C, and methodological approach

The above-mentioned theoretical perspectives provide the foundation for AAC, the chapter's central analytical concept. The AAC does not refer to the survival of the New Order regime or the unchanged persistence of its institutions. Instead, it captures the

persistence and adaptation of selected governing logics associated with authoritarian security governance after Indonesia's institutional transformation. Continuity concerns practices such as executive discretion, elite-mediated co-ordination, institutional ambiguity, and presidential arbitration, while adaptation concerns their operation through democratised constitutional arrangements, civilianised security institutions, the separation of TNI and POLRI, new legal and regulatory instruments, specialised agencies, interministerial co-ordination, and expanded civilian participation.

Under the New Order, executive-centred security governance operated within a presidential–military hierarchy; after *Reformasi*, comparable co-ordinating and arbitrating functions could be exercised through civilian executive institutions and specialised agencies. The AAC therefore identifies functional rather than institutional continuity. Historical institutionalism explains how such practices may be retained, converted, or layered within a changing institutional environment; securitisation identifies a conditional mechanism through which changing threat interpretations can generate new priorities and co-ordination demands; and CMR clarifies the transformation in the location and form of security authority. The AAC thus represents a historically contingent pattern of adaptation rather than an assumption that authoritarianism inevitably reproduces itself.

The PIT-C framework, developed from the author's doctoral research, operationalises AAC by providing four mutually constitutive dimensions for tracing changes in national security governance: Priority, examining strategic security objectives and their evolution; Institutional Structure, assessing the organisation, differentiation, co-ordination, and arbitration of security authority; Threat Interpretation, scrutinising how threats are constructed, prioritised, and translated into policy responses; and Civil Role, analysing the participation, oversight, and contestation of parliament, political parties, civil society, universities, media, private actors, and policy experts alongside the broader principle of civilian supremacy [30]. These dimensions are analytically inter-connected: changing threat interpretations can re-shape strategic priorities and institutional arrangements; institutional structures influence how threats are recognised and addressed; strategic priorities can drive institutional re-organisation; and institutional arrangements shape opportunities for civilian participation, oversight, and contestation. The PIT-C framework therefore provides a structured means of examining both institutional transformation and governing-logic continuity without reducing either to the other.

The empirical evidence illustrates the interaction among these dimensions. A senior police researcher described individual security institutions as developing their own 'roadmap[s]' while maintaining collaboration with other security stakeholders (S-10, 31 August 2022), highlighting the co-existence of institutional differentiation and co-ordination. A RIDU professor similarly described a NSC as providing policy options while leaving ultimate authority with the president (S-35, 22 September 2022), illustrating the distinction between co-ordination, advice, and executive decision-making. The breadth of the security concept is reflected in a senior police official's definition encompassing external defence, internal security, public order, and natural-disaster management, alongside the protection of the state, public safety, and individuals (S-13, 19 August 2022). An academic likewise situated *Ketahanan Nasional* within the balanced development of welfare and security across society (S-23, 23 August 2022), while another emphasised the need to balance 'civil control, managerial efficiency, and security' in civilian participation (S-22, 25 August 2022). Taken together, these accounts illustrate how institutional co-ordination, strategic

priorities, threat interpretation, and civilian roles intersect within Indonesia's multi-dimensional conception of national security.

The framework is applied longitudinally across the three political periods examined in this chapter. Section 3 analyses the New Order (1988–1998); Section 4 examines *Reformasi* (1998–2014); Section 5 considers the post-2014 period under Joko Widodo; and Section 6 synthesises the findings across the three periods. This longitudinal application addresses the central question of how substantial democratic institutional transformation co-existed with the persistence and adaptation of selected executive-centred governing practices. The analysis neither characterises Indonesia as remaining authoritarian after *Reformasi* nor does it assume that democratic institutions completely displaced the previous security order. Instead, national security governance is examined as an arena in which democratic transformation, institutional fragmentation, changing threat interpretations, expanded civilian participation, and executive co-ordination interact over time. Within this framework, AAC identifies patterns of governing-logic continuity; historical institutionalism explains processes of institutional adaptation; securitisation identifies a conditional mechanism linking threat interpretation to co-ordination and executive intervention; CMR clarifies changes in the location and form of security authority; and PIT-C provides the empirical structure for tracing these dynamics across 1988–2024.

The analysis draws on qualitative research conducted between 2022 and 2024 as part of the author's doctoral research at the University of Essex. Ethical approval was obtained (ETH2122-0470), and the study followed requirements concerning informed consent, confidentiality, voluntary participation, and secure data management. The evidence comprises 45 semi-structured elite interviews, conducted primarily in Indonesia and lasting approximately 60–120 minutes, supplemented by documentary analysis of constitutional provisions, legislation, presidential and other regulatory instruments, defence documents, national development plans, parliamentary materials, ministerial and institutional reports, and relevant historical records. With participants' consent, interviews were recorded and transcribed; where recording was impractical, detailed contemporaneous notes were taken, with transcripts and notes checked against the original recordings or notes to preserve context and meaning.

2.3 Interview section, protocol, analysis, and limitations

The 45 participants were selected purposively rather than through statistical sampling. Selection was guided by the research questions, PIT-C framework, and the need for direct knowledge of Indonesia's national security institutions, policy processes, CMR, and SSR. Participants included serving and former military, police, intelligence, and government officials, parliamentarians, diplomats, academics, legal practitioners, defence specialists, and civil-society actors. Institutional diversity was sought to facilitate comparison between perspectives rather than reliance on a single organisational account. Participants are anonymised as S-01–S-45, with relevant characteristics provided in Appendix A.

The semi-structured interview protocol was developed from the research questions, historical periodisation, and four PIT-C dimensions. Questions addressed national security priorities; institutional structures and co-ordination; threat interpretation; and civilian participation, oversight, and accountability, while also examining changes across the three historical periods. The format provided consistency while allowing

follow-up questions to clarify unexpected issues, explore participants' institutional experiences, or examine divergent accounts.

Interviews were conducted primarily in Indonesia between 2022 and 2024 and lasted approximately 60–120 minutes. With participants' consent, interviews were recorded and transcribed; where recording was impractical, detailed contemporaneous notes were taken. Transcripts and notes were checked against the original recordings or notes to preserve context and meaning. Interview data were analysed through iterative thematic and interpretive coding. Initial coding organised evidence around the four PIT-C dimensions, followed by analysis of recurring themes, institutional differences, historical change, and relationships between formal arrangements and reported practices. The analysis was inductive and abductive: themes emerged from participants' accounts while recurring or unexpected patterns were interpreted through historical institutionalism, securitisation, and CMR. Documentary evidence was used to contextualise, corroborate, or qualify interview accounts, while differences between sources were retained analytically rather than resolved by privileging one account.

The interview evidence has several limitations. Retrospective accounts, particularly concerning the New Order and early *Reformasi*, may reflect recall, positional, and interpretive biases. Documentary and historical sources therefore provide the primary basis for re-constructing earlier institutional arrangements, while interviews illuminate institutional memory, retrospective interpretations, and perceived longer-term consequences of institutional change. The elite composition of the sample may also introduce institutional or positional bias; individual accounts are not assumed to represent entire organisations and are assessed against documentary evidence and, where possible, contrasting participant perspectives.

Finally, the 45 interviews are not statistically representative of Indonesian society. Their purpose is analytical: to identify institutional perceptions, mechanisms, patterns of co-ordination, and competing interpretations relevant to the longitudinal development of national security governance. The credibility of the interview evidence was strengthened through systematic participant selection, consistency in the interview protocol, verification of transcripts and notes, comparison across institutional perspectives, and triangulation with documentary sources. The findings should therefore be understood as analytically transferable rather than statistically generalisable claims about Indonesian officials, institutions, or citizens.

3. Authoritarian security governance under the New Order (1988–1998)

The final decade of Indonesia's New Order provides the authoritarian baseline against which subsequent transformations in national security governance can be assessed. Between 1988 and 1998, President Suharto presided over a consolidated authoritarian order in which executive authority, military influence, bureaucratic control, and developmental objectives were closely intertwined. Through *Dwifungsi*, its territorial command structure, and the deployment of military personnel throughout civilian institutions, ABRI exercised defence and socio-political functions, extending its role into political and administrative governance [22, 31–33]. The legal framework of the New Order also included Law No. 20 of 1982 concerning the Basic Provisions for State Defence and Security [34]. Strategic coherence did not

depend on a formally codified NSS or a permanent NSC; rather, it was embedded in an interconnected presidential, military, and bureaucratic order in which hierarchical authority could substitute for formal cross-government co-ordination [Crouch, 1978, 31, 33]. *Dwifungsi ABRI* was therefore not merely an organisational arrangement but rather a normative conception of military responsibility encompassing both defence and national development. As one former senior military respondent explained:

> *The ABRI dual function concept is the soul, determination and spirit of ABRI's service, to carry out the Indonesian nation's battle in state defence and national welfare to achieve national goals based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. (S-38, 10 November 2022, Jakarta)*

The statement captures the broader conception of national responsibility through which defence, welfare, and development were integrated, consistent with scholarship on the military's political and socio-economic role under the New Order [Crouch, 1978, 32]. The New Order should therefore be understood as a distinct authoritarian configuration rather than an incomplete stage of democratic security governance. Through the PIT-C framework, this configuration was characterised by priorities centred on development, political stability, and regime preservation; an institutional structure organised around executive–military centralisation; threat interpretations focused heavily on internal political and social challenges; and a civil role constrained by ABRI's political position. These dimensions were mutually reinforcing, producing strategic coherence through hierarchical authority rather than horizontal co-ordination among autonomous security institutions.

3.1 Priority: Developmentalism, national resilience, and stability

New Order national security similarly integrated development, welfare, national resilience, and political stability. This reflected the logic of *developmental authoritarianism*, in which economic development and political order were treated as mutually reinforcing dimensions of national strength [Crouch, 1978, 33]. *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience) provided an especially important conceptual framework, presenting national capability as requiring equilibrium between welfare and security across social and political life, as reflected in the 1945 Constitution and the *Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara* (GBHN) [35]. One academic respondent described it as follows:

> *The concept of developing national capabilities and strengths through the regulation and implementation of balanced, harmonious welfare and security in all aspects of life in a comprehensive and integrated manner based on Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and Archipelago Insights. (S-23, 23 August 2022, Jakarta).*

This formulation demonstrates that security was constructed not narrowly as military defence but rather as a comprehensive condition of national resilience. Such constructions are consistent with securitisation scholarship, which examines how political actors define conditions as security concerns and thereby expand the scope of legitimate state intervention [5, 6, 26]. Under the New Order, however, this expansive conception operated within an authoritarian institutional structure, enabling the executive to connect development and welfare with political stability

and regime preservation. The significance for the later AAC argument lies in identifying a governing logic that could potentially be re-configured after democratisation without implying institutional survival.

3.2 Institutional structure: Executive–military centralisation

The presidency occupied the centre of political decision-making, while ABRI's territorial structure and extensive presence throughout the state provided channels through which executive authority could be translated into political and administrative practice [Crouch, 1978, 31, 32]. Strategic arbitration was consequently concentrated within the executive hierarchy rather than delegated to autonomous co-ordinating institutions, making co-ordination primarily hierarchical rather than negotiated among institutions with equivalent authority. The absence of a codified NSS or permanent NSC, therefore, did not necessarily produce strategic incoherence; under the New Order, concentrated executive–military authority itself provided the principal mechanism through which security priorities could be aligned across the state.

This configuration is significant from a historical institutionalist perspective because institutional coherence may derive from concentrated authority as well as from formal co-ordination arrangements. Institutional structures also generate organisational routines, interests, and expectations that can influence subsequent trajectories, even when the structures themselves are later transformed [3, 4]. The New Order consequently establishes the first configuration of the chapter's central institutional puzzle: strategic coherence could be achieved without a formalised cross-government strategic-co-ordination architecture because executive authority effectively performed co-ordinating and arbitrating functions.

The institutional condition that later complicated this model is reflected in retrospective interview evidence. A senior police researcher described a system in which individual security institutions developed their own strategic orientations while remaining dependent upon wider co-ordination:

> *For this reason, each security stakeholder institution has a roadmap on realizing national security. Of course, security stakeholders cannot determine their own policies, but there is collaboration with other security stakeholders, both at home and abroad. (S-10, August 31, 2022, Jakarta)*

Similarly, a professor from RIDU distinguished strategic co-ordination from operational command and identified the potential role of an NSC as follows:

> *The National Security Council should be the body that proposes policy recommendations to the president. . . The National Security Council does not command them—it's the president who does. . . Our role is simply to provide policy options, and that's enough. (S-35, September 22, 2022, Jakarta)*

These accounts are retrospective rather than direct descriptions of the New Order and are therefore not treated as evidence of its institutional structure. Their analytical value lies in identifying a co-ordination problem that becomes more consequential once authority is dispersed across specialised institutions: security actors may retain distinct organisational orientations while requiring mechanisms to integrate their activities into a broader national strategy. A parliamentary researcher

similarly identified institutional interests as a continuing obstacle to policy co-ordination:

> *Institutional interests in Indonesia are one of the things that influence law enforcement practices and policy making. This is commonly known as the ego centricity of each government institution. (S-32, September 09, 2022, Jakarta)*

The evidence suggests that Indonesia's institutional challenge is not simply the absence of an NSS, but rather the difficulty of co-ordinating differentiated mandates and organisational interests. This distinction is central to the longitudinal analysis. Under the New Order, concentrated executive–military authority facilitated strategic coherence through hierarchy; following *Reformasi*, the differentiation and pluralisation of security institutions altered the conditions under which co-ordination could be achieved. The subsequent question is therefore not whether the New Order's institutional structure survived, but rather whether practices of executive co-ordination and arbitration could acquire new functions within the transformed institutional environment [3, 4].

3.3 Threat interpretation: Internal stability and regime security

Threat interpretation constituted a further element of this configuration. National security during the New Order was heavily oriented towards internal stability, ideological cohesion, political order, and national unity. Securitisation theory is useful because it treats threats not simply as objectively given, but rather as conditions whose security significance is politically constructed [5, 6, 26]. Research on Indonesia similarly demonstrates that securitising practices under the New Order extended military-security concerns into wider political and social domains [27, 36].

The broader co-ordination problem identified in the interviews also illustrates why the relationship between threat interpretation and institutional structure matters. A retired senior MOD official and Deputy Chancellor of RIDU observed:

> *The understanding of MOD (Kementerian Pertahanan-Kemhan) and the Ministry of Transportation is different. The understanding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights is different. We work together but not everyone understands the main issue. (S-45, 8 December 2022, Sentul)*

Although this respondent was speaking retrospectively about national security co-ordination, the account highlights the distinction between shared security objectives and differentiated institutional interpretations. Under a highly centralised system, such divergence could be arbitrated through executive authority; under a pluralised system, it becomes a problem of co-ordination among differentiated institutions. Securitisation therefore, did not mechanically produce authoritarianism; its consequences depended on the institutional context through which security claims were interpreted and acted upon [6, 27].

3.4 Civil role: Controlled participation and constrained contestation

The New Order did not exclude civilian actors from security governance. Technocrats, bureaucrats, political elites, academics, and other civilian actors

participated in policy formation, administration, and development. The critical distinction is between civilian participation and civilian supremacy. CMR scholarship defines civilian control in terms of the location and accountability of ultimate political authority, not simply the presence of civilians within state institutions [11–13]. Civilian participation under the New Order, therefore, occurred within an authoritarian structure in which autonomous contestation was substantially constrained. A senior police researcher nevertheless emphasised institutional collaboration:

> *For this reason, each security stakeholder institution has a roadmap on realizing national security. Of course, security stakeholders cannot determine their own policies, but there is collaboration with other security stakeholders, both at home and abroad. (S-10, 31 August 2022, Jakarta)*

The analytical significance is that collaboration does not necessarily indicate distributed authority. The central question remains: who determines the boundaries within which security institutions formulate and implement policy. This distinction between cooperation and civilian control becomes important when comparing the New Order with *Reformasi*. A senior academic researcher articulated the post-authoritarian principle more explicitly:

> *Best practices in democratic countries require a distinction between the duties and powers of civil and operational authorities. Operational authorities cannot assign themselves, so all their duties must be based on the decisions of the civil authorities.*

The respondent added:

> *Another aspect of civilian participation in the defence aspect is the coordination and harmonization of defence needs with other national priorities. This requires efforts to strike a balance between civil control, managerial efficiency and security. (S-22, 25 August 2022, Jakarta)*

These observations provide a bridge to the institutional transformation examined in the next section. They reflect the principle that operational security authority should derive from constitutionally accountable civilian decision-making while recognising that civilian control must co-exist with organisational efficiency and security requirements [14, 28]. The crucial change after 1998 was therefore not the emergence of civilian participation from nothing; instead, the transformation of the institutional basis through which civilian authority was exercised.

3.5 PIT-C configuration and governing legacies

The four PIT-C dimensions constituted a mutually reinforcing configuration of New Order security governance. Priority centred on development, national resilience, political stability, and regime preservation; Institutional Structure concentrated authority within the presidency and its relationship with ABRI; Threat Interpretation privileged internal political and social stability; and Civil Role permitted participation while restricting autonomous democratic control. Strategic coherence consequently emerged through hierarchical authority. This did not mean that the New Order possessed a functional equivalent of a formal NSS. Rather,

strategic co-ordination was embedded in the political architecture of the regime itself, where concentrated executive and military authority reduced the need for horizontal co-ordination among autonomous security institutions.

Historical institutionalism helps explain why such arrangements may remain analytically relevant beyond their original institutional settings. Organisational routines, expectations, interests, and patterns of authority can become established reference points even when political institutions subsequently change [3, 4]. The potential legacies identified here are therefore governing practices and logics rather than surviving institutions: executive-centred co-ordination, presidential arbitration, comprehensive conceptions of national resilience, the linkage between security and development, and an expansive conception of state responsibility for national stability. These may subsequently be transformed through processes of layering, conversion, drift, or displacement rather than simply reproduced unchanged [3, 4].

This distinction is essential because *Reformasi* fundamentally transformed Indonesia's political and constitutional order. The dismantling of ABRI's formal political role, separation of TNI and POLRI, expansion of legislative and judicial oversight, competitive elections, decentralisation, and strengthening of formal civilian political authority represented substantive institutional change rather than institutional continuity [21, 22]. The New Order, therefore, established an authoritarian baseline, not an institutional template that simply persisted after 1998. The subsequent analytical question is narrower: whether selected governing practices associated with executive-centred security governance could be converted, layered, or adapted within a fundamentally different democratic institutional environment.

This distinction provides the basis for examining AAC. The AAC does not imply the survival of the New Order regime or its institutions; instead, it refers to the possible persistence and adaptation of selected governing logics after the institutional conditions that originally sustained them have been transformed. The longitudinal analysis therefore moves from the New Order's strategic coherence through hierarchy, to *Reformasi's* democratic re-configuration of security authority, and ultimately to the question of how executive-centred co-ordination may have been re-constructed within Indonesia's post-authoritarian institutional order.

4. Democratic reform and the re-configuration of security governance (1998–2014)

The collapse of Suharto's New Order in May 1998 fundamentally transformed Indonesia's political and constitutional order. *Reformasi* introduced constitutional amendments, competitive elections, decentralisation, judicial reform, stronger parliamentary institutions, and extensive SSR, substantially altering relations among the state, military, police, and civilian society [21, 22]. The abolition of the military's formal political role and the separation of TNI and POLRI marked a decisive departure from New Order executive–military centralisation. *Reformasi* should therefore be understood as a genuine democratic and institutional transformation, not failed democratisation or simple authoritarian continuity. The question for this study is instead how security governance was re-configured after this transformation

and what institutional conditions subsequently emerged for the possible adaptation of selected governing practices.

Through PIT-C, *Reformasi* involved substantial changes in all four dimensions. Priority (P) shifted towards democratic governance, civilian authority, constitutional accountability, and emerging non-traditional security concerns; Institutional Structure (I) became more pluralistic and differentiated; Threat Interpretation (T) broadened beyond regime and political stability towards terrorism, communal conflict, organised crime, maritime insecurity, and disasters; and Civil Role (C) expanded through parliament, civil society, academia, media, and civilian ministries. These changes altered both the location of security authority and the processes through which security priorities were defined and co-ordinated.

4.1 *Reformasi* and the transformation of strategic priorities

Under the New Order, national security was closely connected to regime stability, political order, and developmental authority. *Reformasi* altered this orientation by placing greater emphasis on constitutional government, human rights, civilian supremacy, and institutional accountability. The SSR sought to move security authority towards constitutionally accountable civilian institutions and strengthen democratic oversight [14, 15]. The separation of the police from the military was central to this transformation. A senior police respondent described the separation as a foundational element of Indonesian SSR:

> *Security Sector Reform in Indonesia.. was marked by the political decision to separate the Police from the TNI institutions and lines of command on April 1, 1999. (S-1, 13 June 2022, Jakarta)*

Another respondent connected this institutional separation to subsequent constitutional and legislative changes:

> *The results of the amendments to the 1945 Constitution Article 30. . . separated the role of defence by the TNI and security by the Police. . . followed by Law No. 2 of 2002, Law No. 3 of 2002 and Law No. 34 of 2004. (S-10, 31 August 2022, Jakarta)*

These accounts are retrospective and therefore do not constitute independent evidence of the precise sequence or implementation of the reforms. Their significance here is as respondents' accounts of the institutional transformation through which defence and internal security became more clearly differentiated. These institutional changes were subsequently reflected in Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning the POLRI, Law No. 3 of 2002 concerning State Defence, and Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI [37a; 37b; 38]. The reforms did not simply modify the New Order's security institutions; they re-distributed security authority and established a more explicit distinction between military defence and police security functions. The abolition of *Dwifungsi* similarly removed the military's formal political role. As S-1 recalled, President Abdurrahman Wahid and senior military officials agreed that:

> *ABRI should not be an instrument of power. . . removing the military faction in the DPR. (S-1, 13 June 2022, Jakarta)*

The abolition of military representation in parliament and the withdrawal of the military from its formal socio-political role represented substantial institutional displacement rather than incremental modification of the New Order settlement [22]. *Reformasi* therefore altered the location of political authority within security governance, establishing civilian political institutions as the legitimate source of ultimate authority.

4.2 Institutional structure: Pluralisation and fragmentation

Democratisation nevertheless created a new co-ordination problem. The dismantling of the New Order's executive–military hierarchy dispersed security authority across civilian ministries, TNI, POLRI, intelligence agencies, parliament, and specialised bodies. Rather than replacing centralisation with a comprehensive national-security architecture, *Reformasi* produced a more differentiated system in which co-ordination increasingly depended on interaction among institutions with distinct mandates. This reflects broader security-governance scholarship, which emphasises co-ordination among multiple actors rather than hierarchical command [7, 39]. A former senior Lemhannas official assessed the resulting strategic-co-ordination problem in particularly direct terms:

> *For twenty-four years, Indonesia has not had a national security strategy. Because there is no legal basis. All threats are responded to partially, not a complete system. (S-12, 16 August 2022, Jakarta)*

This statement is a retrospective assessment made in 2022 rather than direct historical evidence of the institutional structure between 1998 and 2014. Its analytical value, therefore, lies not in establishing that Indonesia objectively lacked co-ordination during every stage of *Reformasi*, but rather in identifying a perceived gap between differentiated institutional responsibilities and comprehensive strategic integration. The absence of a codified NSS and a permanent comprehensive co-ordinating institution meant that institutional differentiation did not automatically produce an integrated strategic framework. The emergence of specialised security institutions illustrates this process. One respondent observed:

> *Other security institutions have also been formed specifically for certain crimes, such as the National Counter Agency* (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme-BNPT) *and National Narcotics Agency* (Badan Narkotika Nasional-BNN). *(S-13, 19 August 2022, Jakarta)*

The development of specialised agencies enhanced the capacity to address particular security problems; however, it also increased the number of institutional actors involved in security governance. Specialisation can improve expertise and organisational accountability while simultaneously generating co-ordination requirements across organisational boundaries [7, 39]. In the Indonesian case, the resulting architecture was therefore more differentiated without necessarily becoming more integrated. Attempts to create a more comprehensive national-security framework also remained politically sensitive. S-12 recalled that during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the proposed National Security System Bill generated concerns that it might become:

> *A new vehicle. . . to return to the old New Order model. (S-12, 16 August 2022, Jakarta)*

This concern is analytically important because it illustrates how the historical experience of centralised security governance shaped perceptions of subsequent institutional reform. The difficulty of creating an overarching security framework was not necessarily attributable to a single institutional obstacle. It was also connected to concerns about the potential concentration of authority and the possibility that a new co-ordinating mechanism could reproduce aspects of the earlier security order. Institutional rivalry constituted another reported obstacle. A retired senior Ministry of Defence official and former Deputy Chancellor of the Republic of Indonesia Defence University stated:

> *The National Security Law has been prepared for a long time. . . but the Police don't want it because it creates institutional jealousy. (S-45, 8 December 2022, Sentul)*

Again, this is a respondent's attribution rather than independent evidence establishing the police's institutional motivation. It nevertheless illustrates the organisational interests that may complicate attempts to consolidate security authority. The contrast between S-12 and S-45 is revealing: one account emphasises the political memory of authoritarian centralisation, while the other highlights competition among security institutions. Together, they indicate that the absence of comprehensive co-ordination cannot be explained simply by administrative deficiency.

Historical institutionalism helps situate this pattern within a broader process of institutional change. Institutional transformation often occurs through layering, re-configuration, and gradual adaptation rather than wholesale replacement, as new arrangements are added to existing organisational environments and interact with established interests and routines [3, 4]. *Reformasi*, therefore, produced substantial institutional pluralisation while leaving the problem of how differentiated security authorities could be co-ordinated across sectors unresolved.

4.3 Threat interpretation: The expansion of security concerns

Threat interpretation also changed substantially after 1998. Security governance increasingly addressed terrorism, communal conflict, organised crime, maritime insecurity, disasters, and other non-traditional concerns. These developments represented a significant expansion beyond the New Order's emphasis on political stability, ideological threats, and internal regime security. A senior police respondent recalled several of the security challenges that emerged during this period:

> *There were cases of Bali bombings, bombs in several hotels in Jakarta. . . as well as conflicts between the Dayak and Madura communities. (S-13, 19 August 2022, Jakarta)*

The Bali bombings of 2002 and other terrorist attacks placed counter-terrorism prominently on the national security agenda, while communal conflicts demonstrated the continuing importance of internal security and social stability. These challenges required different institutional capabilities and contributed to the

development of specialised counter-terrorism, intelligence, policing, and conflict-management arrangements. The legal and institutional articulation of security also developed during the SBY presidency. An international-relations expert observed:

> *There was an Intelligence Law issued in 2011. . . the Defence Law and the Police Law. . . security thinking became more systematic during Pak SBY's era. (S-14, 19 August 2022, Jakarta)*

The Intelligence Law was enacted as Law No. 17 of 2011 [40]. The counter-terrorism framework was subsequently amended through Law No. 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism [41]. This should not be interpreted as evidence that Indonesia had developed a comprehensive NSS. Rather, it indicates increasing legal and institutional articulation across distinct areas of security governance. The broadening of security concerns therefore generated additional institutional capacity without necessarily resolving the problem of strategic integration identified in the previous sub-section.

Securitisation provides a useful lens for understanding this development. Security issues acquire heightened political significance through processes of interpretation, framing, and contestation rather than simply because of their objective characteristics [5, 6]. The Indonesian experience further demonstrates that securitisation is not synonymous with authoritarian governance: security claims and practices can operate within democratic institutions and changing political contexts [27]. During *Reformasi*, expanded security agendas consequently contributed to institutional differentiation and new co-ordination demands, although they did not mechanically produce executive domination.

4.4 Civil role: Democratic expansion and uneven institutionalisation

The Civil Role (C) changed substantially after 1998. Civilian authority expanded through parliament, civilian ministries, civil society, universities, media, and professional organisations. The removal of the military's formal political role created greater space for civilian actors to participate in debates over defence and security policy, while constitutional and legislative reforms strengthened the formal basis of civilian oversight [30]. Civil-society participation was particularly visible in debates over military reform. One academic respondent observed:

> *The involvement of civil society in the discussion of the TNI Bill since 2003 has been quite prominent. (S-22, 25 August 2022, Jakarta)*

This illustrates that civilian participation extended beyond formal political institutions into substantive debates over security-sector design. It also demonstrates the broader transformation of the Civil Role dimension: security governance was no longer confined to executive–military structures; however, it became subject to participation and contestation by societal actors. Civilian leadership also became more firmly embedded within executive institutions. S-30 observed:

> *Abdurrahman Wahid also managed to regulate the institutional functions of the Department of Defence.. including appointing a civilian Minister of Defence. (S-30, 24 August 2022, Jakarta)*

The appointment of civilian political leadership to the defence portfolio was significant in the context of post-authoritarian civil–military reform because it reflected the re-location of ultimate political authority away from the military. In CMR terms, this development is consistent with the broader shift towards civilian supremacy following the abolition of *Dwifungsi* and the separation of TNI and POLRI. Nevertheless, formal institutional transformation did not necessarily eliminate all organisational legacies or behavioural tensions. A parliamentary researcher stated:

> *The changes in the structure have not been fully manifested in the behaviour of officials. . . TNI and POLRI often feel superior to civilians. (S-32, 25 September 2022, Jakarta)*

This is treated as a respondent's assessment rather than a generalisation about all military or police personnel. Its analytical significance lies in the distinction between formal institutional change and behavioural adaptation. Institutional rules can change relatively rapidly, while organisational expectations, professional identities, and established relationships may adapt more gradually. Similarly, S-14 asserted:

> *The civilian is not ready. . . Indonesian civilians are apathetic. (S-14, 19 August 2022, Jakarta)*

This statement is likewise interpreted as a respondent's perception concerning civilian capacity and participation, rather than as an empirical judgement about Indonesian society as a whole. Taken together, these accounts suggest that the expansion of formal civilian authority did not automatically eliminate institutional tensions or ensure uniform civilian participation.

This distinction is important for CMR. Civilian supremacy concerns where ultimate political authority resides and whether security institutions remain accountable to civilian decision-makers; it does not require the disappearance of military expertise, organisational interests, or institutional influence [11, 13]. *Reformasi* therefore substantially strengthened civilian authority while leaving the institutionalisation of civilian oversight and the relationship between civilian and security institutions uneven.

4.5 *Reformasi* as institutional transformation and conditions for later adaptation

Across the PIT-C dimensions, *Reformasi* produced a fundamentally different security-governance configuration. Priorities shifted towards democratic and constitutional governance; security authority became more pluralistic and differentiated; threat interpretation broadened; and civilian participation expanded. The abolition of *Dwifungsi*, separation of TNI and POLRI, removal of military representation in parliament, and strengthening of civilian authority demonstrate substantial institutional transformation rather than a continuation of the New Order [21, 22].

Yet democratisation did not establish a comprehensive mechanism for co-ordinating an increasingly multi-dimensional security environment. New laws, specialised agencies, civilian institutions, and participatory mechanisms were layered onto a system in which responsibilities remained distributed [3, 4]. Reformasi therefore generated a central tension between democratic dispersion of

security authority and the continuing need for strategic co-ordination. This tension should not itself be interpreted as AAC, since the institutions and political arrangements of the New Order were substantially displaced. The AAC concerns the possible later adaptation of selected governing practices, not institutional survival.

The evidence from 1998–2014 consequently establishes the institutional conditions rather than the outcome. Democratisation dispersed security authority and expanded civilian participation, while broader and more complex security concerns generated new co-ordination demands. In the absence of a permanent comprehensive national-security co-ordinating institution, presidential and inter-institutional co-ordination remained potential mechanisms for addressing these demands. The post-2014 period therefore raises a narrower empirical question: whether selected practices of executive-centred co-ordination and presidential arbitration were subsequently reproduced or adapted within the transformed democratic institutional order. Section 5 examines this possibility.

5. Executive security governance and AAC (2014–2024)

The election of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in 2014 marked a further stage in Indonesia's post-authoritarian democratic development. Without a military background and emerging from civilian electoral politics, his election was associated with continued democratic institutionalisation and the consolidation of civilian politics [32, 42]. By 2014, the military's formal political role had been dismantled, TNI and POLRI had been separated, civilian authority had been constitutionally established, competitive elections had been routinised, and parliamentary and societal participation had been expanded. The analytical question was therefore no longer whether Indonesia was completing its transition from authoritarianism, but instead how national security governance operated within an established electoral-democratic order.

The Jokowi administration did not reverse the principal institutional reforms of *Reformasi*. Instead, it increasingly relied on presidential co-ordination, executive discretion, and cross-sectoral integration to manage a broader and more inter-connected security environment. This provides the principal empirical setting for evaluating AAC, defined not as the continuity of an authoritarian regime type or institutions, but as the persistence and adaptation of selected executive-centred governing logics within transformed institutions, particularly presidential arbitration, where authority remains fragmented.

Across PIT-C, Priority (P) expanded towards economic resilience, infrastructure, maritime strategy, technology, food and energy security, and competitiveness; Institutional Structure (I) became increasingly specialised although it remained fragmented; Threat Interpretation (T) broadened into economic, digital, health, environmental, technological, and geopolitical domains; and Civil Role (C) remained substantially broader than under the New Order while co-existing with stronger executive co-ordination.

5.1 Strategic priorities and institutional co-ordination

Under Jokowi, *Ketahanan Nasional* increasingly encompassed economic development, infrastructure, maritime connectivity, food and energy security,

industrialisation, digital transformation, and technological resilience. The development agenda also included the statutory framework for the national capital through Law No. 3 of 2022 concerning the National Capital (IKN) [43]. This reflected contemporary understandings of national security as extending beyond conventional defence to economic, technological, societal, and infrastructural capacities [44]. A parliamentary researcher described this broader conception:

> *The understanding of security threats adopted by President Joko Widodo adds an element of welfare. . . massive development effort. . . an attempt to eradicate Javanese centricism. (S-32, 25 September 2022, Jakarta)*

The continuity with the New Order, therefore, lies partly in the linkage between security and national development, while the institutional context has changed: under Jokowi, this linkage operated within an electoral-democratic order rather than through authoritarian regime preservation. Respondents nevertheless questioned the extent to which strategic priorities were institutionally integrated. A former senior MOD official stated:

> *The priority is no longer a national priority, what is Legacy's priority. To leave the good name that the capital can be moved in the new capital. (S-45, 8 December 2022, Sentul)*

Similarly, a former Lemhannas official remarked:

> *He wants to be Sea Power of Asia but the program doesn't go there. . . He just threw political jargon. (S-12, 16 August 2022, Jakarta)*

These are individual assessments rather than independent evidence of presidential motivation. Their analytical significance is that, without a single codified NSS integrating strategic priorities, the presidency remained an important site of strategic agenda-setting. The possible continuity therefore concerns executive arbitration, not institutional continuity [3, 4].

This became particularly significant because Indonesia continued without a comprehensive codified NSS or permanent NSC. Security governance operated through Kemenko Polhukam, the Ministry of Defence, TNI, POLRI, BIN, *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT), BSSN, BNPB, sectoral ministries, and temporary co-ordinating arrangements. New institutions and mandates were layered onto the differentiated architecture established during *Reformasi*, increasing specialised capacity while also multiplying co-ordination requirements [3, 4, 7, 39]. Several interviews illustrate this co-ordination problem. S-14 recalled Jokowi stating during a level-two emergency:

> *There is no Ministry's vision and mission, everyone follows my vision and mission. (S-14, 19 August 2022, Jakarta)*

S-12 similarly criticised the perceived discretion involved in presidential regulations and *Perppu* during COVID-19:

> *Now it seems that the President Regulations (*Perpres*)/Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (*Perpu*) decisions are only subjective from the leadership/president. . .*

> *when the president faced COVID-19, then it happened but the related ministers were made by themselves. (S-12, 16 August 2022, Jakarta)*

These statements are respondents' assessments, not independent findings that presidential decisions were subjective. Their analytical value lies in illustrating how presidential direction could function as a practical mechanism for integrating fragmented institutional mandates during periods of heightened co-ordination demands. The absence of an NSC remained relevant. A RIDU professor argued:

> *Take the example of COVID-19. That should have been the task of the National Security Council. . . The National Security Council should simply provide policy recommendations, and that's enough. (S-35, 22 September 2022, Jakarta)*

This formulation distinguishes strategic co-ordination from operational command: an NSC could integrate information and provide policy options without commanding operational agencies. Similarly, a former Chief of BAKAMLA RI observed:

> *The collaboration tends to be more about ego sectoral interests. . . Otherwise, what happens is there's a gap. (S-17, 15 August 2022, Sukabumi)*

Together, these accounts indicate the co-existence of specialisation and fragmentation. Presidential co-ordination could consequently operate as a functional substitute for institutional integration, without re-creating the hierarchical security architecture of the New Order.

5.2 Threat interpretation, securitisation, and executive governance

Threat interpretation expanded further during the Jokowi period to include cybersecurity, digital infrastructure, economic resilience, food and energy security, environmental risks, pandemics, technological competition, maritime disputes, and the Indo-Pacific. This multi-dimensional security environment increased demands for co-ordination across previously differentiated policy domains [5, 6].

Securitisation provides a mechanism for understanding how particular issues acquire heightened political significance; it should not be equated with authoritarian governance. In democratic Indonesia, securitising claims remained subject to institutional and political contestation [27]. COVID-19 illustrates the distinction: emergency conditions legitimately required extensive executive and cross-sectoral co-ordination, although the involvement of security institutions does not itself demonstrate authoritarianism.

The relevant mechanism is therefore conditional. Security framing can generate demands for rapid and cross-sectoral intervention; governments may respond through new agencies, legal instruments, temporary task forces, expanded mandates, or executive co-ordination [5, 6, 26]. Where institutional fragmentation persists, presidential arbitration may become more prominent. Repeated reliance on such arbitration may reproduce executive-centred governing practices without re-storing authoritarian institutions. Historical institutionalism explains how such practices can become embedded through adaptation and layering [3, 4].

The process is not deterministic. Executive co-ordination may also reflect bureaucratic interests, political bargaining, presidential preferences, or crisis

conditions, while parliament, courts, civil society, and other institutions may constrain securitising claims. Securitisation is therefore treated as one mechanism through which executive-centred governance may be reproduced or adapted, not as a complete causal explanation.

5.3 Civilian participation and democratic accountability

Civilian participation remained substantially broader than under the New Order through Parliament, civil society, universities, media, professional organisations, and other actors [30]. However, this expanded participation coexisted with concerns regarding the growing role of security institutions and executive authority. A Member of Parliament stated:

> *Everything nowadays seems to fall under the police. . . because the police report directly to the President. . . They're handling everything: cybercrime, Human Resources Staff of the Indonesian National Police (SSDM), narcotics, Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) cases, terrorism. . . (S-34, 23 September 2022, Jakarta)*

This is a respondent's perception rather than an objective measure of POLRI's institutional scope. Its analytical significance is that civilian control and expanded security-sector responsibilities can co-exist. Civilian supremacy concerns who authorise and oversee security authority, rather than whether security institutions retain narrow mandates [11, 13]. S-45 similarly argued:

> *The same is now being perfected by the police, who are also now like the government's tools. . . if previously the military was repressive in nature, now it uses repressive laws. (S-45, 8 December 2022, Sentul)*

The comparison is an evaluative respondent's interpretation, not evidence of institutional equivalence with the New Order. Likewise, S-32 described an amendment involving Perppu No. 2 of 2017 as having:

> *returned to the unilateral decision mechanism by the executive under the pretext of an emergency. (S-32, 25 September 2022, Jakarta)*

These accounts identify tensions among emergency governance, coercive authority, and institutional checks. A former permanent representative to the United Nations went further:

> *Those who are free to speak are those who are pro to government programs. Those who are not pro can't talk. . . There is no difference from the New Order era. (S-41, 2 December 2022, Jakarta)*

This is the strongest respondent comparison and should not be adopted as the chapter's conclusion. It instead identifies a perceived narrowing of political contestation that must be assessed alongside the continued operation of elections, parliament, civil society, courts, and other democratic institutions. Thus, civilian participation and executive co-ordination can co-exist, while the scope and effectiveness of accountability may vary across institutions and policy domains.

The evidence therefore points to a more differentiated relationship between civilian participation and executive authority than a simple opposition between democratic governance and authoritarianism. Civilian actors retained substantially greater formal and substantive opportunities to participate than under the New Order, while executive institutions acquired significant co-ordinating and operational roles. The relevant question is consequently not whether civilian supremacy disappeared, but rather how civilian supremacy operated alongside increasingly executive-centred security governance.

5.4 Executive security governance and AAC

The Jokowi period represents a distinct configuration from both the New Order and *Reformasi*. Strategic priorities became multi-dimensional; security institutions became more specialised although they remained fragmented; threat interpretation expanded across conventional and non-conventional domains; and civilian participation remained substantially broader than under authoritarian rule. Together, these conditions increased demands for strategic co-ordination while leaving presidential arbitration as an important mechanism for integrating differentiated institutions.

The longitudinal distinction is therefore critical. Under the New Order, strategic coherence was generated primarily through military–executive hierarchy. *Reformasi* dismantled that hierarchy and produced democratic institutional pluralisation and fragmentation. Under Jokowi, strategic coherence increasingly depended on presidential arbitration across specialised institutions. The continuity consequently lies not in regime type, military-political dominance, or institutional structure, but rather in the recurring importance of central executive co-ordination for producing strategic coherence.

This is the specific meaning of AAC. Selected governing practices associated with executive-centred security governance were potentially adapted to institutions that had become civilianised, democratised, legally differentiated, and subject to broader participation. The relationship between these processes is better understood as conditional and mutually reinforcing rather than sequential. Where an issue acquires heightened security significance, demands for cross-sectoral co-ordination may increase, particularly when existing institutional mandates are fragmented or overlapping. Governments may respond through institutional layering, expanded mandates, temporary co-ordinating arrangements, or greater reliance on executive direction. Where fragmentation persists and no permanent institution possesses comprehensive co-ordinating authority, presidential arbitration may become more prominent. Repeated reliance on such practices may, under particular institutional and political conditions, reproduce or adapt selected executive-centred governing practices within the transformed democratic institutional order. Securitisation therefore constitutes one possible mechanism through which executive-centred co-ordination may be reinforced, rather than a deterministic pathway to authoritarian governance.

Securitisation is one mechanism within this sequence, not its sole cause. The outcome remains mediated by constitutional rules, legal constraints, institutional oversight, bureaucratic interests, political bargaining, crisis conditions, presidential preferences, and societal contestation. Democratic backsliding should consequently be treated as a potential consequence or dimension rather than the organising

explanation for 2014–2024. Elections remained institutionalised, civilian government persisted, and the military did not regain its former formal political role. At the same time, executive-centred security governance could create tensions concerning emergency powers, institutional oversight, and political contestation [45, 46]. The AAC, therefore, does not establish authoritarian re-storation or uninterrupted democratic consolidation. It identifies, instead, the selective adaptation of executive-centred governing practices within a substantially transformed democratic institutional environment.

The trajectory can thus be summarised as military–executive hierarchy under the New Order; democratic pluralisation and institutional differentiation during *Reformasi*; and presidential co-ordination and arbitration across fragmented security institutions after 2014. The continuity is functional and relational rather than institutional. Section 6 brings these findings together to assess what persisted, what changed, and how historical institutionalism, securitisation, CMR, and PIT-C collectively explain the evolution of Indonesian national security governance.

6. Discussion and conclusion: AAC

6.1 Longitudinal synthesis: What continues, what changes, and what adapts

The longitudinal analysis demonstrates that Indonesia's national security governance between 1988 and 2024 cannot be adequately explained either as institutional continuity or as a linear transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democratic governance. The three periods examined in this chapter represent qualitatively different political and institutional configurations. The New Order (1988–1998) was characterised by authoritarian military–executive centralisation, in which regime preservation, political stability, and developmental objectives were closely integrated. *Reformasi* (1998–2014) produced substantial democratic and institutional transformation through constitutional reform, competitive elections, decentralisation, the abolition of Dwifungsi ABRI, the separation of TNI and POLRI, and the expansion of civilian and parliamentary participation [21, 22]. After 2014, Indonesia operated within an established electoral-democratic order in which security governance became increasingly multi-dimensional and specialised, while presidential co-ordination and arbitration assumed renewed importance.

These changes are important because they establish a distinction between regime continuity, institutional continuity, and governing-logic continuity. Regime continuity would imply the persistence of the authoritarian political order; institutional continuity would suggest that New Order institutions or formal arrangements survived substantially intact; governing-logic continuity instead concerns the possible persistence or adaptation of particular ways of organising authority after the political and institutional structures that originally sustained them have changed. This chapter uses the third meaning. The AAC therefore refers to the persistence and adaptation of selected governing logics associated with authoritarian rule after regime transformation. It does not imply that the New Order regime survived, that *Reformasi* was superficial, or that post-2014 Indonesia reproduced New Order institutions. Rather, it identifies the possibility that practices such as executive-centred co-ordination, presidential arbitration, elite-mediated

PIT-C dimension	New Order (1988–1998)	Reformasi (1998–2014)	Post-Reform (2014–2024)
Priority	Regime preservation, political stability, and developmentalism	Democratic institutional reform, civilian authority, terrorism, communal conflict, maritime and internal security, and disaster management	Resilience, economic security, infrastructure, maritime affairs, technological capability, and competitiveness
Institutional structure	Military–executive hierarchy	Pluralisation, separation, civilianisation, differentiated, and incomplete integration	Specialised fragmentation and presidential co-ordination
Threat interpretation	Ideological subversion, political instability, internal disorder, and regime threats	Terrorism, communal conflict, organised crime, maritime insecurity, disasters, and internal security	Multi-domain: cyber, health, maritime, economic, technological, environmental, energy, and food security
Civil role	Restricted: military dominance and Dwifungsi ABRI	Expanded civilian authority and parliamentary/societal participation	Broader participation alongside executive-centred co-ordination
Governing logic	Military–executive centralisation	Democratic institutionalisation and pluralisation	Presidential co-ordination and arbitration

Source: Author's construction based on the longitudinal analysis and the PIT-C framework.

Table 1.
The PIT-C transformations across the three periods: New Order, Reformasi, and Post-Reform.

co-ordination, and reliance on institutional arrangements where mandates overlap may remain available within a substantially transformed political order. This interpretation is consistent with scholarship showing that democratic institutions can co-exist with inherited practices, elite relationships, and forms of executive concentration without constituting a simple continuation of authoritarian rule [16, 17, 19, 20].

The table above (**Table 1**), demonstrates both substantial change and selective continuity. The most important institutional discontinuity occurred during *Reformasi*. The abolition of the military's formal political role, separation of TNI and POLRI, strengthening of civilian political authority, and expansion of parliamentary and societal participation fundamentally altered where security authority was located [21, 22]. Civilian supremacy consequently became more firmly established, even though the institutionalisation of civilian oversight remained uneven. Civilian supremacy and executive-centred co-ordination should therefore not be treated as opposites. Civilian control concerns where ultimate political authority and accountability reside, whereas executive-centred co-ordination concerns how authority is organised and exercised within that civilian political order [11, 13, 14].

The central puzzle is consequently not whether authoritarian institutions survived *Reformasi*. They did not survive in their New Order form. Rather, the question is whether certain governing practices associated with executive-centred security co-ordination could be adapted to the new institutional environment. *Reformasi* therefore establishes the institutional discontinuity against which later evidence of adaptive continuity must be assessed. The possibility of AAC becomes analytically meaningful precisely because the institutions changed while some

organisational problems – particularly the need to co-ordinate differentiated security actors – remained.

6.2 Institutional mechanisms: Historical institutionalism, securitisation, and PIT-C

Historical institutionalism provides the principal explanation for how continuity and change can co-exist. Institutions shape subsequent trajectories not simply through formal rules, but rather through organisational routines, accumulated expertise, interests, expectations, and established relationships [3, 4]. This does not imply deterministic path dependence. Rather, earlier institutional choices influence the repertoire of practices available to later actors. The Indonesian case illustrates this through processes of layering, conversion, and gradual adaptation. Democratic institutions and specialised security organisations were added to a political environment previously structured by executive–military centralisation. Existing capacities and expectations could subsequently acquire different functions under changed political conditions.

This helps explain why the post-*Reformasi* security architecture became increasingly differentiated without producing a single comprehensive co-ordinating institution. Security responsibilities came to be distributed across civilian ministries, TNI, POLRI, intelligence agencies, specialised bodies, parliament, and other institutions. The result was not institutional absence, rather institutional differentiation. Security governance literature similarly emphasises that contemporary security problems frequently cross organisational boundaries and require co-ordination among multiple public and non-state actors [7, 25]. Whole-of-government scholarship identifies the resulting co-ordination problem as a persistent feature of complex public administration, particularly where responsibilities are dispersed across specialised organisations [39].

The relationship between these processes can be represented as a conditional institutional mechanism. The figure does not suggest that securitisation inevitably produces executive concentration, nor that institutional fragmentation necessarily generates authoritarian continuity. Rather, it identifies the conditions under which changing security priorities and differentiated institutional arrangements may increase demands for co-ordination, creating opportunities for presidential arbitration and the adaptation of previously established executive-centred governing practices.

Figure 1 therefore conceptualises AAC as a contingent outcome rather than a pre-determined consequence of security governance. Security framing can increase the perceived urgency of particular problems and generate demands for rapid or cross-sectoral co-ordination, while institutional differentiation can make such co-ordination more difficult. Presidential intervention may consequently become an important means of arbitrating among competing mandates. Whether this produces greater strategic coherence, greater concentration of practical executive authority, or some combination of the two depends on the institutional and political conditions within which co-ordination occurs. Repeated reliance on executive-centred co-ordination may, over time, reproduce selected governing practices associated with earlier authoritarian arrangements, although their meaning and effects are altered by the democratic institutions within which they operate.

Figure 1.
The mechanism linking securitisation to executive-centred governance. From changing threat interpretation to the potential reproduction of executive-centred governing practice. Source: Author's conceptualisation based on the longitudinal analysis, historical institutionalism, securitisation theory, civil–military relations, and the PIT-C framework. Conceptual framework showing how changing security pressures generate new functions, legal layering and institutional conversion, leading to differentiated mandates and increased coordination requirements. Negotiation and executive arbitration support operational coordination, although do not necessarily produce strategic integration.

Securitisation provides a complementary mechanism for understanding why such co-ordination can become more demanding. Securitisation scholarship conceptualises security not simply in terms of objectively existing threats; instead, through processes by which particular issues are politically constructed and prioritised as matters of security [5, 6, 26]. The expansion of Indonesia's security agenda – from political stability and internal order towards terrorism, maritime security, cyber threats, public health, economic resilience, energy, food, and technological competition – therefore reflects changing interpretations of what requires security governance.

Importantly, securitisation is not synonymous with authoritarianism. Kurniawan's [27] analysis of securitisation in democratic Indonesia demonstrates that security practices operate within changing democratic institutions and political contexts. Security framing may generate demands for rapid intervention and cross-sectoral co-ordination without necessarily displacing constitutional institutions. Its consequences depend on the legal framework, political contestation, organisational interests, oversight arrangements, and the manner in which executive authority is exercised.

The relationship identified in this chapter is consequently conditional rather than deterministic. Where security issues cross institutional boundaries, specialised agencies and layered arrangements may be created or expanded. Where mandates remain fragmented, presidential co-ordination can become more prominent as a means of arbitrating competing priorities. Repeated reliance on such co-ordination may reproduce an executive-centred governing practice even though the institutions performing it are civilian and democratically constituted. This is the specific sense in which continuity becomes adaptive.

The PIT-C provides the analytical structure through which these processes can be observed. It is not presented as a linear causal sequence, but rather as mutually related dimensions of security governance. Changes in threat interpretation can alter priorities; changing priorities can encourage institutional re-organisation; institutional differentiation can increase co-ordination demands; and expanded civilian participation can alter the legitimacy, accountability, and contestability of security decisions. The framework therefore connects institutional change to the substantive organisation of national security without reducing the analysis to a single causal variable.

6.3 Adaptive continuity, civilian authority, and democratic governance

The concept of AAC also contributes to debates concerning democratic consolidation and democratic backsliding by drawing a boundary between institutional transformation and subsequent executive-centred governance. Scholarship on democratic backsliding generally focuses on processes through which democratic institutions, accountability, and political contestation are weakened, including executive aggrandisement and the erosion of institutional constraints [45, 46]. These concepts are relevant to the post-2014 period, particularly when examining emergency governance, executive discretion, restrictions on contestation, or changes in the relationship between executive authority and oversight institutions. They should not, however, be projected retrospectively across the entire 1988–2024 period.

The evidence instead indicates that civilian participation and executive co-ordination can co-exist. Post-*Reformasi* Indonesia expanded the role of civilian ministries, parliament, civil society, academia, media, and professional organisations in security governance. Civil society participation in defence reform, for example, became increasingly visible, including in debates surrounding the TNI Bill [30]. At the same time, presidential co-ordination remained significant because differentiated institutions continued to possess their own mandates, interests, and organisational priorities.

This distinction is particularly important for interpreting the interview evidence. Respondents identified concerns about institutional fragmentation, executive discretion, the expanding role of the police, emergency decision-making, and restrictions on dissent. These observations provide valuable evidence of how actors within and around the security sector perceived changes in governance; nevertheless, they should not automatically be treated as proof of authoritarian restoration. For example, S-41's assertion that those opposing government programmes could not speak freely and that there was 'no difference from the New Order era' represents a respondent's interpretation and must be considered alongside the continued existence of elections, parliament, courts, civil society organisations, media, and other mechanisms of democratic contestation. Similarly, concerns about executive decision-making during emergencies may indicate potential tensions between rapid governance and accountability without establishing that the underlying democratic institutional order had been displaced.

AAC therefore provides a more precise analytical category than either simple continuity or a broad claim of democratic backsliding. It identifies how selected governing practices may persist under changed institutional conditions while leaving open the question of their democratic consequences. Executive co-ordination can enhance coherence and facilitate rapid responses to complex or urgent problems; it can also increase the practical concentration of authority where institutional constraints, transparency, or avenues of contestation are insufficient. The analytical task is consequently to examine the institutional conditions under which executive co-ordination operates rather than treating co-ordination itself as evidence of authoritarianism (**Table A1**).

6.4 Comparative implications and conclusion

The Indonesian case generates three broader theoretical implications. First, regime transformation does not necessarily produce an immediate transformation of every governing practice. Historical institutionalism demonstrates how organisational routines, relationships, and expectations can outlast the institutional arrangements in which they developed, while later actors may convert or adapt them to new purposes [3, 4]. The Indonesian trajectory therefore illustrates the importance of distinguishing changes in political regime from changes in governing logic.

Second, national security coherence does not necessarily require a codified NSS or permanent NSC. Indonesia demonstrates that strategic coherence can instead emerge through executive co-ordination, sectoral strategies, specialised institutions, presidential direction, and inter-ministerial arrangements. The absence of a single comprehensive co-ordinating institution creates fragmentation, although it does not

prevent strategic prioritisation. It changes the institutional location through which such prioritisation is produced.

Third, the case demonstrates the value of bringing securitisation, CMR, and historical institutionalism into a common analytical framework for the debate on democratic government. Securitisation explains why particular issues acquire heightened political significance [5, 6, 26]; CMR clarifies the changing location of ultimate authority and civilian control [11, 13]; historical institutionalism explains how institutions and governing practices change gradually through layering, conversion, and path-dependent processes [3, 4]; and PIT-C provides an empirical framework for tracing these developments across time.

Therefore, this chapter's central conclusion is that democratic institutional transformation and selective continuity in governing practices can co-exist. Indonesia's post-1998 order cannot be understood as a continuation of the New Order: *Reformasi* fundamentally altered the constitutional, political, and security-sector architecture of the state. Yet institutional transformation did not eliminate the practical need for strategic co-ordination, and the presidency remained an important site for arbitrating among differentiated institutions and competing security priorities. After 2014, these practices operated within a civilian electoral-democratic framework and in response to a substantially broader security agenda.

The AAC captures this more limited, even though theoretically significant, form of continuity. It refers neither to the survival of authoritarian institutions nor to the failure of democratisation. It describes how selected executive-centred governing logics may persist, acquire new functions, and be reproduced through different institutional arrangements after authoritarian rule has ended. The Indonesian case consequently suggests that the relationship between democratisation and national security governance is best understood not as a binary movement from authoritarianism to democracy, but rather as an evolving interaction between institutional transformation, inherited governing repertoires, changing threat interpretations, organisational interests, and mechanisms of executive co-ordination.

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the University of Essex, where the doctoral research on which this chapter is based was undertaken. The author is particularly grateful to the academic colleagues and research community who provided intellectual guidance and constructive feedback throughout the research and writing process.

The author also wishes to express sincere appreciation to the 45 interview participants who generously contributed their time, expertise, and perspectives to the research. Their insights, particularly those of policymakers, military and police officers, intelligence practitioners, parliamentarians, diplomats, academics, legal experts, defence practitioners, and civil society representatives, were invaluable to the development of the arguments presented in this chapter. All interview participants are anonymised in accordance with the ethical commitments governing the research.

The author further acknowledges the University of Essex Ethics Committee for granting ethical approval prior to data collection. The research was conducted in

accordance with the University's research ethics procedures, including informed consent, voluntary participation, confidentiality, and secure management of research data.

The author acknowledges the use of QuillBot for language polishing of the manuscript and Google NotebookLM to assist with qualitative coding and thematic organisation of the research material. The analysis, interpretation, and conclusions remain the author's own.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Funding

This chapter was supported by the University of Essex's open access fund.

Appendix A

S-No.	Rank/positions/alliance	Group cluster	Dates	Gender/age	Place
S-01	A Police Commissioner served as the Head of the Firearms and Explosives Licensing Sub-Directorate at the Metro Jaya Regional Police.	Military and Law Enforcement Official	31/5 and 13/6 – '22	Female – early 50s	Polda Metro Jakarta (Capital City Central Police Station)
S-02	First Admiral, Director General of Defence Potential	Government policymaker (also classified under military officials)	31/5 and 20/6 – '22	Male – late 50s	MOD Office, Jakarta
S-03	Retired Army major general with a doctorate in defence administration, formerly serving as a regional commander and head of the military's training command	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Military Officials)	4/6 and 21/6 – '22	Male – mid-60s	University of Defence, Sentul
S-04	Vice Admiral (Ret.), Navy, served as Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia	Government policymaker (also classified under Military Officials)	5/6 and 8/6 – '22	Male – mid-60s	MOD Office, Jakarta
S-05	Retired Rear Admiral serving as a Senior Analyst in the Archipelagic Insight Division at the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas)	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Military Officials)	23/6 and 20/7 – '22	Male – mid-60s	Lemhannas, Jakarta
S-06	First Marshal of the Air Forces	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Military Officials)	29/5 & 17/6 – '22	Male – late 50s	University of Defense, Sentul.

S-No.	Rank/positions/alliance	Group cluster	Dates	Gender/ age	Place
S-07	Public notary	Private Sector and Civil Society Representatives	03/6 and 11/6 – '22	Male – early 40s	Private Office, Jakarta
S-08	Senior officer of the Indonesian Air Force who served as Commander of the Para Commando Division of the Air Force Special Operations Corps (Korps Pasukan Gerakan Cepat - Korpasgat)	Military and Law-Enforcement Official	23/5 and 07/7 – '22	Male – early 50s	Halim, Jakarta
S-09	Head of Operations, El Tari Air Base, First Marshal (Special Task Forces), Indonesian Air Force	Military and Law Enforcement Official	07/6 and 25/7 – '22	Male – early 50s	Halim, Jakarta
S-10	Police Grand Commissioner Adjunct with a doctoral degree from the Research & Development (R&D) Department of the National Police	Military and Law Enforcement Official	01/8 and 31/8 – '22	Male – mid-50s	R&D Police, Jakarta
S-11	Former Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement Party)-affiliated regional legislator from Kepulauan Meranti—now an active university lecturer in Batam	Government Policymakers and Legislators	13/8 and 15/8 – '22	Male – mid-50s	Meranti, Sumatra
S-12	A retired Air Marshal serving as a legal and human rights professional at the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas RI).	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Military Officials)	12/8 and 16/8 – '22	Male – early 70s	Lemhannas, Jakarta
S-13	The Brigadier General serves as Deputy Head of the Academic Division at the Police Science College (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian - STIK).	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Police Officials)	16/8 and 19/8 – '22	Male – mid-50s	STIK, Jakarta
S-14	Associate Professor in International Relations at Padjadjaran University and President University	Academics and Strategic Analysts	18/8 and 19/8 – '22	Male – mid-50s	Private Office, Jakarta
S-15	Former President Director of the state-owned ammunition factory	Private Sector and Civil Society Representatives	01/8 and 21/8 – '22	Male – late 60s	Private Office, Jakarta
S-16	Retired Brigadier General of Police served as the Director of Research and Development of the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia – BAKAMLA RI)	Military and Law Enforcement Official	02/8 & 08/8 – '22	Male – late 60s	Coast Guard (BAKAMLA), Jakarta

S-No.	Rank/positions/alliance	Group cluster	Dates	Gender/age	Place
S-17	Retired Vice Admiral, formerly head of the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA RI), and former Vice Chief of Naval Staff	Military and Law Enforcement Official	15/8/'22	Male – late 60s.	Coast Guard (BAKAMLA), Sukabumi
S-18	Security Expert, as a Dean at the University of Pattimura	Academics and Strategic Analysts	13/8 and 23/8 – '22	Male – late 60s	Maluku, Ambon, Sulawesi
S-19	Scholar, University of Jaya Baya	Academics and Strategic Analysts	10/8 and 22/8 – '22	Male – late 60s	Jakarta
S-20	Rear Admiral, Head of Research and Community Engagement at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Military Officials)	21/8 and 05/9 – '22	Male – late 50s	RIDU, Sentul
S-21	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	22/8/'22	Male – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-22	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	25/8/'22	Female – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-23	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	23/8/'22	Male – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-24	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	23/8/'22	Male – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-25	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	23/8/'22	Male – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-26	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	24/8/'22	Male – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-27	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	24/8/'22	Male – mid-20s	Jakarta

S-No.	Rank/positions/alliance	Group cluster	Dates	Gender/age	Place
S-28	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	25/8/'22	Female – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-29	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	24/8/'22	Female – mid20s	Jakarta
S-30	Postgraduate at RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Civil Society Representative)	24/8/'22	Female – mid-20s	Jakarta
S-31	A senior Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) politician, serving as Speaker of the House since 2019 and formerly Co-ordinating Minister for Human Development and Cultural Affairs (2014–2019).	Government Policymakers and Legislators	08/9 & 22/9 – '22	Female – early 50s.	Jakarta
S-32	Legal researcher specializing in criminal law at the Research Centre of the Parliamentary Expertise Agency of the Indonesian House of Representatives.	Government Policymakers and Legislators	08/9 & 25/9 – '22	Female – early 40s	Jakarta
S-33	An Air Vice Marshal served as the Chief of the National Search and Rescue Agency (Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan – BASARNAS).	Military and Law Enforcement Official	22/9/22	Male – mid-60s	SAR office, Jakarta.
S-34	A veteran Indonesian politician with over three decades of service in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR RI), consistently representing the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera – PKS).	Government Policymakers and Legislators	23/9/'22	Male – late 60s	Jakarta
S-35	Professor at RIDU.	Academics and Strategic Analysts	22/9/'22	Male – mid-50s	Unhan, Jakarta
S-36	Rear Admiral served as Inspector of the Indonesian Fleet Command	Military and Law Enforcement Official	28/9/'22	Male – late 50s	Navy HQ, Jakarta

S-No.	Rank/positions/alliance	Group cluster	Dates	Gender/age	Place
S-37	Retired Rear Admiral, Navy, served as the Assistant for Electronic Communication to the Chief of Staff of Indonesia's Navy (Assistant Komunikasi dan Elektronika Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut – ASKOMLEK KSAL). Rector at a prominent maritime university in Indonesia	Military and Law Enforcement Official	12/10 and 31/10 – '22	Male – early 60s	Navy HQ, Surabaya
S-38	Retired Major General; territorial commander of Kalbar; Territorial Assistant to the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI)	Military and Law Enforcement Official	2/11 and 10/11 – '22	Male – late 60s	Jakarta
S-39	An Air Force Colonel in Kopasgat (the Air Force Task Forces), currently serving as an instructor at the Indonesian Air Force Academy Cadet Corps.	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Military Officials)	07/11/'22	Male – mid-50s	Jakarta
S-40	Major General (Ret.) last served as Commander of the Jayakarta Regional Military Command (Pangdam Jaya)	Military and Law Enforcement Official	02/11 & 25/11 – '22	Male – early 70s	Jakarta
S-41	Retired Consular/Diplomat; last served at Indonesia's embassies in Italy and Singapore	Government Policymakers and Legislators	21/11 & 2/12 – '22	Male – early 60s	Jakarta
S-42	Police Grand Commissioner Adjunct (Inter Pol & United Nations forces), posted in Kalimantan Barat	Military and Law Enforcement Official	11/2/23	Male – early 50s	Jakarta
S-43	Retired Police Inspector General and former Lampung Regional Police Chief; also a tutor at Lemhannas	Military and Law Enforcement Official	7/8/22 - 6/9/22	Male – late 60s	Jakarta
S-44	A senior Indonesian diplomat who formerly served as Indonesia's Permanent Representative to the UN and Special Rapporteur on human rights	Government Policymakers and Legislators	4/1/'23	Male – early 70s	Jakarta
S-45	Retired Major General, Deputy Chancellor, RIDU	Academics and Strategic Analysts (also classified under Military Officials)	08/12/22	Male – mid-60s	Sentul

Table A1.
Anonymised elite interview sources-s (own construction).

Author details

Zayu Rizki Safitri
Department of Sociology and Criminology, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom

*Address all correspondence to: zayu.safitri@essex.ac.uk

IntechOpen

© 2026 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. CC BY

References

[1] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia. Defence White Paper Indonesia 2008. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia; 2008

[2] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia Defence White Paper 2015. Jakarta: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia; 2015

[3] Thelen K. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2004. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511790997

[4] Mahoney J, Thelen K, editors. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge, the UK: Cambridge University Press; 2010

[5] Buzan B, Wæver O, de Wilde J. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers; 1998

[6] Balzacq T, editor. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. Abingdon, Oxfordshire, the UK: Routledge; 2011

[7] Krahmann E. Conceptualizing security governance. Cooperation and Conflict. 2003;**38**(1):5–26. DOI: 10.1177/0010836703038001001

[8] Drew DM, Snow DM. Making Twenty-first Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA: Air University Press; 2006

[9] Gray CS. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford, the UK: Oxford University Press; 2010

[10] Yarger HR. Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, USA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; 2006. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/723

[11] Huntington SP. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1957

[12] Janowitz M. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press; 1960

[13] Feaver PD. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-military Relations. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University Press; 2003

[14] Bruneau TC, Matei FC. Towards a new conceptualization of democratization and civil-military relations. Democratization. 2008;**15**(5):909–929

[15] OECD DAC. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. Paris, France: OECD Publishing; 2007

[16] Diamond L. Elections without democracy: Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of Democracy. 2002;**13**(2):21–35. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0025

[17] Bogaards M. How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism.

Democratization. 2009;**16**(2):399–423. DOI: 10.1080/13510340902777800

[18] Levitsky S, Way LA. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2010

[19] Svolik MW. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge, the UK: Cambridge University Press; 2012. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139176040

[20] Maerz SF, Lührmann A, Hellmeier S, Grahn S, Lindberg SI. State of the world 2019: Autocratization surges – Resistance grows. Democratization. 2020;**27**(6):909–927. DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2020.1758670

[21] Aspinall E. Indonesia: The irony of success. Journal of Democracy. 2010;**21**(2):20–34

[22] Mietzner M. Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; 2009

[23] Walt SM. The renaissance of security studies. International Studies Quarterly. 1991;**35**(2):211–239. DOI: 10.2307/2600471

[24] Baldwin DA. The concept of security. Review of International Studies. 1997;**23**(1):5–26

[25] Abrahamsen R, Williams MC. Security beyond the state: Global security assemblages in international politics. International Political Sociology. 2009;**3**(1):1–17. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00060.x

[26] Balzacq T. The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context. European Journal of International Relations. 2005;**11**(2):171–201. DOI: 10.1177/1354066105052960

[27] Kurniawan Y. The Politics of Securitization in Democratic Indonesia. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan; 2018. DOI: 319-62482-2",1,0,0>10.1007/978-3-319-62482-2

[28] Croissant A, Kuehn D, Chambers PW, Wolf SO. Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia. London, the UK: Palgrave Macmillan; 2013

[29] Croissant A, Kuehn D. Patterns of civilian control of the military in East Asia's new democracies. Journal of East Asian Studies. 2009;**9**(2):187–217. DOI: 10.1017/S1598240800002988

[30] Caparini M. Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants. Abingdon, Oxfordshire, the UK: Routledge; 2016

[31] Crouch HA. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing; 2007

[32] Mietzner M. Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi's Rise, Democracy, and Political Contestation in Indonesia. Policy Studies (East-West Center). https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06525 [Accessed: 2026-August-06]

[33] Sebastian LC. Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; 2006. DOI: 10.1355/9789812305466

[34] Republic of Indonesia. Law No. 20 of 1982 concerning the Basic Provisions for State Defence and Security. 1982

[35] Republic of Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (As Amended). 1945

[36] Fijałkowski Ł, Jarząbek J. Between emergency and routine – Securitisation of military security in Iran and Indonesia. Third World Quarterly. 2019;**40**(9):1670–1688. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2019.1578645

[37] Republic of Indonesia. Law No. 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police. 2002

[38] Republic of Indonesia. Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces. 2004

[39] Christensen T, Lægreid P. The whole-of-government approach to public sector reform. Public Administration Review. 2007;**67**(6):1059–1066

[40] Republic of Indonesia. Law No. 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence. 2011

[41] Republic of Indonesia. Law No. 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. 2018

[42] Aspinall E. Oligarchic populism: Prabowo Subianto's challenge to Indonesian democracy. Indonesia. 2015;**99**:1–28

[43] Republic of Indonesia. Law No. 3 of 2022 concerning the National Capital (IKN). 2022

[44] Baylis J, Wirtz JJ, Johnson JL, editors. Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Oxford, the UK: 7th ed. Oxford University Press; 2022

[45] Bermeo N. On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy. 2016;**27**(1):5–19. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2016.0012

[46] Waldner D, Lust E. Unwelcome change: Coming to terms with democratic backsliding. Annual Review of Political Science. 2018;**21**:93–113