Research Repository

Technological Change and Institutional Inertia: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1993) 'Technological Change and Institutional Inertia: A Game-Theoretic Approach.' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 3 (3). pp. 199-224. ISSN 0936-9937

Full text not available from this repository.


In this paper, we study a co-evolutionary model of economic change at two hierarchical levels. At the lower level, 'institutions' are given and the focus is on how resources are allocated and innovation produced in response to the pay off structure induced by prevailing institutions. At the higher level, it is the institutions themselves that change as the outcome of a process of social bargaining. The main objective of the paper is to study the interaction between these two levels of change, attempting to provide some insight on issues like technological/institutional divergence, technological dead-end, institutional inertia, etc.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Technological change; Institutions; Evolution; Games
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2013 22:11
Last Modified: 05 Jan 2013 22:11

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item