Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1993) Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example. Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (4). pp. 618-631. DOI https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1034
Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1993) Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example. Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (4). pp. 618-631. DOI https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1034
Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1993) Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example. Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (4). pp. 618-631. DOI https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1034
Abstract
Competition tends to promote efficient (equilibrium) behavior through the higher survival of the organizations (say firms) that adopt it. On the other hand, culture (understood as the "inherited" social pattern of behavior) may induce certain short-run inertias. This paper analyzes a dynamic model of the struggle between these two forces in the evolution of alternative stable configurations of social behavior.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Jan 2013 22:42 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2024 11:35 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4944 |