Carlier, G and Renou, L (2006) Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example. Economic Theory, 28 (2). pp. 461-473. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0632-7
Carlier, G and Renou, L (2006) Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example. Economic Theory, 28 (2). pp. 461-473. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0632-7
Carlier, G and Renou, L (2006) Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example. Economic Theory, 28 (2). pp. 461-473. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0632-7
Abstract
We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less discriminating the optimal menu of contracts is.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Debt contracts; Diversity of opinions; Screening; Costly monitoring; Pooling. |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Jan 2013 11:34 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2022 14:37 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5013 |