RENOU, LUDOVIC (2011) <scp>Group Formation and Governance</scp>. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13 (4). pp. 595-630. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01513.x
RENOU, LUDOVIC (2011) <scp>Group Formation and Governance</scp>. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13 (4). pp. 595-630. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01513.x
RENOU, LUDOVIC (2011) <scp>Group Formation and Governance</scp>. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13 (4). pp. 595-630. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01513.x
Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority, or qualified majority, on its (endogenously derived) size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation of larger groups than majority, but also a change of status quo.</jats:p>
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2013 22:36 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Oct 2024 10:34 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5029 |