Mengel, Friederike (2012) Learning across games. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (2). pp. 601-619. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.020
Mengel, Friederike (2012) Learning across games. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (2). pp. 601-619. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.020
Mengel, Friederike (2012) Learning across games. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (2). pp. 601-619. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.020
Abstract
This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into categories. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A process of simultaneous learning of actions and partitions is presented and equilibrium partitions and action choices characterized. Learning across games can destabilize strict Nash equilibria even for arbitrarily small reasoning costs and even if players distinguish all the games at the stable point. The model is also able to explain experimental findings from the traveler's dilemma and deviations from subgame perfection in bargaining games. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Learning; Bounded rationality; Categorization |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 07 Mar 2013 11:42 |
Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2024 16:41 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5767 |