Kovářík, Jaromír and Mengel, Friederike and Romero, José Gabriel (2018) Learning in Network Games. Quantitative Economics, 9 (1). pp. 85-139. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/QE688
Kovářík, Jaromír and Mengel, Friederike and Romero, José Gabriel (2018) Learning in Network Games. Quantitative Economics, 9 (1). pp. 85-139. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/QE688
Kovářík, Jaromír and Mengel, Friederike and Romero, José Gabriel (2018) Learning in Network Games. Quantitative Economics, 9 (1). pp. 85-139. DOI https://doi.org/10.3982/QE688
Abstract
We report the findings of experiments designed to study how people learn in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use these data to estimate learning types using finite mixture models. Monitoring information requests turns out to be crucial, as estimates based on choices alone show substantial biases. We also find that learning depends on network position. Participants in more complex environments (with more network neighbours) tend to resort to simpler rules compared to those with only one network neighbour.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Experiments; Game Theory; Heterogeneity; Learning; Finite Mixture Models,; Networks |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 27 Mar 2013 12:57 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 16:44 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5809 |
Available files
Filename: QE688%4010.3982%2F%28ISSN%291468-0262.EEA-ESEM.pdf
Licence: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0