Fosco, Constanza and Mengel, Friederike (2011) Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (5). pp. 641-658. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.002
Fosco, Constanza and Mengel, Friederike (2011) Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (5). pp. 641-658. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.002
Fosco, Constanza and Mengel, Friederike (2011) Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (5). pp. 641-658. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.12.002
Abstract
We study the coevolution of networks and action choices in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents in our model learn about both action choices and choices of interaction partners (links) by imitating successful behavior of others. The resulting dynamics yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors coexist under a wide range of parameters. Two scenarios can arise. Either there is "full separation" of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is "marginalization" of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Game theory; Cooperation; Imitation learning; Network formation |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 13 May 2013 19:29 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 16:39 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5814 |