Satyanath, Shanker (2007) Capital Controls, Political Institutions, and Economic Growth: A Panel and Cross Country Analysis. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2 (4). pp. 307-324. DOI https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00006044
Satyanath, Shanker (2007) Capital Controls, Political Institutions, and Economic Growth: A Panel and Cross Country Analysis. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2 (4). pp. 307-324. DOI https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00006044
Satyanath, Shanker (2007) Capital Controls, Political Institutions, and Economic Growth: A Panel and Cross Country Analysis. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2 (4). pp. 307-324. DOI https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00006044
Abstract
Statistical studies on the effects of capital controls on growth have generally yielded insignificant results. In this paper, we show that capital controls negatively affect growth in authoritarian countries, while growth in democratic countries is insignificantly affected. We also show that the adverse effects of capital controls likely pass through the efficiency of investment. Our findings suggest that policy makers should take careful account of the political context when considering the decision to impose capital controls.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 26 Apr 2013 13:17 |
Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2022 14:37 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/6038 |
Available files
Filename: QJPS.pdf